

PALLADIUM THEOLOGICUM

The course of scholastic theology after the mind of St. Bonaventure
in seven tomes • Tome V: On the Virtues

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TREATISE V — ON THE VIRTUE OF FORTITUDE

Latin and English in parallel

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PROLOGUE

¹ IN this virtue, as in the third Cardo, the Gate of a rightly instituted life is turned, and therefore it is also Cardinal; if to this the anointing of the Spirit so accede that it is mobile to each of God's nods, and easily versatile, it will be counted among the seven Gifts: Hence Fortitude is Twofold; one a Virtue, the other a Gift. The first is moral, and is obtained sometimes by use, sometimes by infusion. The second always comes entirely from above, from the Father of lights, from whom is every perfect Gift. Of the first species of Fortitude I shall treat ex professo; of the other, however, I shall touch somewhat on this occasion: Further, this is the only virtue which, remaining unshaken amid the various and shifting vicissitudes of this age, emulates the stable lot of the Blessed; so that however much a strong man may be elevated in prosperity or depressed in adversity, he always clings to his origin with the utmost need, like the light which stands equally distant from the Sun, whether shining in shady valleys or resplendent on the highest mountains. It never allows itself to be puffed up by popular favor, being not unaware of itself, deeming itself to receive testimony from conscience alone: The incentive of this virtue, and at the same time its reward, is Love, at whose sense nothing looks insuperable, but all things it omens as favorable, and to be trodden with an easy foot; hence Fortitude is especially ascribed to love in the canticles: *Strong as death is love*; for death, insensible to so many and such great things by which we strive in vain to avert it, at last takes sense from all, and although livid with pale countenance, yet dominates the most powerful. Not otherwise does the strong man overcome whatever is aimed at him, and although with much humility of soul he grows cheap to the world, he never ceases to exercise that most absolute dominion; wherefore by St. Doctor tit.6. cap.7. he is compared to iron unconquerable, which so subdues the other metals that they obey its blow. Other splendid comparisons of Fortitude see with the Seraphic Doctor there.

In hac virtute, tanquam in tertio Cardine, vitae recte institutae Ianua circumvertitur, ideo et Cardinalis est; Huic si unctio Spiritus ita accedat, ut ad singulos Dei nutus mobilis, et facile versatilis sit, inter septem Dona computabitur: Hinc Duplex est Fortitudo; una Virtus, altera Donum. Prima moralis est, et aliquando usu, aliquando infusione obtinetur. Secunda tota semper desuper venit a Patre luminum, a quo est omne Donum perfectum. Hic de prima Fortitudinis specie agam ex professo; de altera vero tangam nonnihil, huius occasione: Porro haec est sola virtus, quae inter varias, et nutantes huius saeculi vicissitudines inconcussa manens, stabilem Beatorum sortem aemulatur; ut quantumvis vir fortis, sive in prosperis eleveatur, sive in adversis deprimatur, suae semper origini summa haereat necessitudine, sicut lux, quae aequae a Sole distat, sive opacis fulgens vallibus, seu summis resplendens montibus. Popolari se aura sufflari nunquam patitur, quippe sui ipsius non nescius, a sola conscientia testimonium accipere meretur: Huius virtutis incentivum pariter et praemium est Amor, ad cuius sensum nihil suspicit insuperabile, sed omnia ominatur fausta, et facili calcanda pede; ideo dilectioni praecipue Fortitudo adscribitur in canticis: Fortis est ut mors dilectio; Mors enim insensibilis ad tot, et tanta, quibus eam avertere, frustra nitimur; tandem omnibus sensum aufert, et pallido licet livida vultu, potentissimis tamen dominatur. Haud secus vir fortis, quaecumque in ipsum intentantur, superat, et quamvis multa animi demissione saeculo vilescat, in illud tamen absolutissimum dominatum exercere non desinit; quamobrem a Sancto Doctore tit.6. cap.7. comparatur ferro indomabili, quod caetera metalla ita domat, ut ipsi ad ictum obtemperant. Alias praeclaras Fortitudinis comparationes vide apud Seraphicum ibi.

DISPUTATION I: ON FORTITUDE

¹ ABOUT to treat of Fortitude, I shall institute the chief question concerning Martyrdom, which is the most excellent act of this virtue; for he is strongest who does not doubt to spend his life for Christ, and takes upon himself the whole forces of the Tyrant, and triumphs though conquered. I shall then treat of certain companions and auxiliary troops of this virtue, with which it defends itself against the vices adverse to it: for against Presumption, Ambition, and empty Glory fights that great-souled virtue, hence called MAGNANIMITY; but at its back stands Pusillanimity, against which it also aims some blows: there follow Magnificence, Patience, and Perseverance. All these attend Fortitude at its side, and enter hostile engagements with the vices opposed to them, as I shall say here as briefly as possible: this is the whole matter and series of this twofold disputation which I shall bring forth on FORTITUDE; but first I shall examine whether it is a Virtue, and of what kind.

DE Fortitudine acturus, praecipuam quaestionem instituo de Martyrio, quod huius virtutis praestantissimus est actus; fortissimus enim ille est, qui pro Christo vitam prodigere non dubitat, totasque Tyranni in se suscipit vires, victusque triumphat. Agam deinde de nonnullis huius virtutis comitibus, et auxiliariis copiis, quibus se contra vitia sibi adversa propugnat: Contra enim Praesumptionem, Ambitionem, et inanem Gloriam pugnat magnanima illa virtus, quae hinc MAGNANIMITAS appellatur; sed huic a tergo instat Pusillanimitas, contra quam nonnullos etiam ictus intentat: sequitur Magnificentia, Patientia, et Perseverantia. Hae omnes astant fortitudini a latere, et hostiles ineunt congressus cum vitiis sibi oppositis, ut quam brevissime hic dicam: haec est tota materia et series duplicis huius disputationis, quam de FORTITUDINE proferam; in primis autem, num Virtus sit, et qualis, examinabo.

Question I: Whether fortitude is a virtue, and what virtue

¹ I ASSERT first, that Fortitude is a virtue. It is the teaching of St. Augustine *lib. de moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 15.* and of Aristotle 3. *Eth.*

An FORTITUDO sit Virtus, et quae.

ASSERO primo, Fortitudinem esse virtutem. Est D. Augustini *lib. de moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 15.* Aristotelis 3. *Eth.*

² IT IS PROVED by St. Bonavent. first *ad 8. Sap.* where under the name of *Virtue* it is counted among the other moral Virtues.

PROBATUR a D. Bonavent. primo *ad 8. Sap. ubi sub nomine Virtutis, caeteris Virtutibus moralibus adnumeratur.*

³ IT IS PROVED secondly by the Holy Doctor in *Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 7.* That which makes a man morally good is a virtue: Such is fortitude: Therefore. The major is Aristotle's 2. *Eth. cap. 6.* the minor is proved, because it removes the impediments that repel one from rectitude, which are the difficulties opposed. So it is had in *Proverb. 31. Who shall find a valiant woman? etc. She hath sent her hand to strong things 2 fortitude, and her garment is comeliness.* The Holy Doctor proves this by the examples of the Apostles, who, having received through the Holy Spirit the virtue and gift of fortitude, confronted Tyrants *Act. 1.* and he shows the same of the holy Martyrs, especially the Virgins, Catherine, Cecilia, Agnes, and others, who went rejoicing to prisons and to tortures. Because, namely, they were strengthened by God. For fortitude is from heaven, as is said in *1 Machab. 3.* See the Holy Doctor.

PROBATUR secundo a S. Doctore in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 7. Quod facit hominem moraliter bonum, est virtus: Talis est fortitudo: Ergo. Maior est Aristotelis 2. Eth. cap. 6. minor probatur, quia tollit impedimenta repellentia e rectitudine, quae difficultates opponunt. Sic habetur Proverb. 31. Mulierem fortem quis inveniet? etc. manum suam misit ad fortia 2 fortitudo, et decor indumentum eius. Id probat S. Doctor exemplis Apostolorum, qui accepta per Spiritum Sanctum fortitudinis virtute, et dono occurrebant Tyrannis Act. 1. et idem ostendit de sanctis Martyribus, praecipue Virginibus, Catharina, Caecilia; Agnete, et aliis, quae laetabundae ad carceres, et ad supplicia ibant. Quia scilicet erant a Deo confortatae. De caelo enim fortitudo est, ut dicitur primo machab. 3. Vide S. Doctorem.

⁴ HENCE again this assertion is proved in the *opusc. de septem itiner. aeternitatis*, dist. 5. because it gives strength for overcoming the perils opposed to rectitude, and the very punishments and deaths, and for hastening intrepidly toward the virtues. It proves the assumption in the *opusc. de septem Donis, de Dono fortitudinis*, cap. 1. from Aristotle 3. Eth. cap. 8. and 9. where he says: *He is brave who does not fear terrible things, and endures, as he ought, for the sake of good*, and from Paulinus to Jerome, where he says: *He who is truly brave neither dares rashly nor fears imprudently*, and from St. Augustine lib. 5. de civit. cap. 17. where he relates that many underwent death bravely for the good of the Republic, and from Tully de offic. where he says there were two precepts of Plato, for those wishing to benefit the Republic. The first, that they so uphold the citizens' welfare that whatever they do they refer to it, forgetful of their own advantages. The second precept is that they care for the whole body of the Republic principally, not merely uphold some part while deserting the rest; and therefore this fortitude is ordered to an end that is within the limits of nature.

HINC rursus hoc assertum probat opusc. de septem itiner. aeternitatis, dist. 5. quia dat robur ad superanda pericula opposita rectitudini, ipsasque poenas, atque mortes, et ad virtutes intrepide festinare. Assumptum probat opusc. de septem Donis, de Dono fortitudinis, cap. 1. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 8. et 9. ubi ait: Fortis est, qui non timet terribilia, et sustinet, ut oportet, boni gratia, et ex Paulino ad Hieronymum, ubi ait: Qui vere fortis est, nec temere audet, nec inconsulte timet, et ex D. Augustino lib. 5. de civit. cap. 17. ubi narrat, quod multi mortem subibant fortiter ob bonum Reipublicae et ex Tullio de offic. ubi ait, duo fuisse praecepta Platonis, volentibus Reipublic. prodesse. Primum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut quaecunque agunt, ad eam referant obliti commodorum suorum. Secundum praeceptum est, ut totum corpus Reipublicae curent principaliter, nedum aliquam partem tueantur, alias deserant, et ideo haec fortitudo ordinat ad finem, qui est intra limites naturae.

⁵ IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor thirdly in *Compend. Theol. lib. 5. cap. 36.* from Macrobius lib. 1. in somn. Scipionis, cap. 8. for fortitude raises the mind above perils, teaches one to fear nothing but what is base, not to dread the onset of death, and to summon the tamed passions intrepidly to virtue.

PROBATUR a S. Doctore tertio in *Compend. Theol. lib. 5. cap. 36.* ex Macrobius lib. 1. in somn. Scipionis, cap. 8. *nam fortitudo elevat animum super pericula, docet nil timere nisi turpia, non pavere mortis occursum, passiones edomitas ad virtutem intrepide cedere.*

⁶ NEXT, because it has marvelous effects; for it makes men victorious against the enemies of God, as is said in 1 Machab. 6. Secondly it preserves a man's own goods: *When the strong man is armed, etc.* Thirdly, because it enriches with goods, Proverb. 10. *The hand of the strong hath prepared riches.* Fourthly it storms the kingdom of heaven, Matth. 11. *The violent take it by force.* Fifthly it adorns, Proverb. 31. *Fortitude, and her garment is comeliness.* Sixthly it secures one in extremities, Proverb. 30. *The lion, mightiest of beasts, will fear no one's approach.* Seventhly it awaits a recompense, Proverb. 31. *Who shall find a valiant woman? Afar, and from the uttermost coasts, is the price of her, etc.*

DEINDE quia effectus habet mirabiles; reddit enim victores contra hostes Dei, ut dicitur primo Machab. 6. Secundo homini sua bona conservat: Cum fortis armatus, etc. Tertio, quia ditat bonis, Proverb. 10. Manus fortium divitias parat. Quarto regnum caelorum expugnat, Matth. 11. Violenti rapiunt illud. Quinto ornat, Proverb. 31. Fortitudo, et decor indumentum eius. Sexto in extremis assecurat, Proverb. 30. Leo fortissimus bestiarum, ad nullius pavebit occursum. Septimo remunerationem expectat, Proverb. 31. Mulierem fortem quis inveniet? Procul et de ultimis finibus pretium eius, etc.

⁷ *IT IS PROVED fourthly by St. Bonavent. in Pharetra, lib. 2. cap. 31. for it moderates and reduces to the norm of honesty the passions of Fear and Daring, and that in regard to the most difficult objects, namely, the perils of death. It proves the assumption from the Fathers.*

PROBATUR quarto a D. Bonavent. in Pharetra, lib. 2. cap. 31. nam moderatur, et ad honestatis normam reducit passiones Timoris, et Audaciae, idque circa obiecta difficillima, nempe, circa mortis pericula. Assumptum probat ex Patribus.

⁸ *St. GREGORY 7. Moral. cap. 8. says: The fortitude of the implanted is to conquer the flesh, to withstand one's own pleasures, to extinguish the delight of the present life, to love the hardships of this world for the sake of earthly things, to despise the allurements of prosperity, to overcome in heart the fear of adversity. The same is had in lib. 4. cap. 30. and lib. 5. cap. 13.*

D. GREGORIUS 7. Moral. cap. 8. ait: Insitorum fortitudo est carnem vincere, propriis voluptatibus contraire, delectationem vitae praesentis extinguere, huius mundi aspera pro terrenis amare, prosperitatis blandimenta contemnere, adversitatis metum corde superare. Idem habet lib. 4. cap. 30. et lib. 5. cap. 13.

⁹ *St. JEROME, lib. 16. in Isa. cap. 57. Fortitude, and constancy is the royal road; from which he declines to the right who is rash and pertinacious: to the left, he who is fearful and timorous.*

D. HIERONYMUS, lib. 16. in Isa. cap. 57. Fortitudo, atque constantia via regia est; a qua declinat ad dexteram, qui temerarius est, et pertinax: ad sinistram, qui formidolosus est, et pavidus.

¹⁰ *St. AUGUSTINE epist. 19. ad Hieronymum: He who is truly strong in virtue neither dares rashly nor fears imprudently.*

D. AUGUSTINUS epist. 19. ad Hieronymum: Qui vere virtute fortis est, nec temere audet, nec inconsulte timet.

¹¹ *St. AMBROSE lib. 1. de offic. cap. 30. he is brave who consoles himself in some sorrow: And truly it is rightly called fortitude, when each one conquers himself, restrains his anger, is softened and swayed by no enticements, is not disturbed by adversity, is not exalted by prosperity, and is not carried about, as it were by a wind, by the change of varied affairs. The same is had in cap. 39. and lib. 5. in Lucam, cap. 6.*

D. AMBROSIUS lib. 1. de offic. cap. 30. fortis, qui se in dolore aliquo consolatur: Et revera iure ea fortitudo vocatur, cum unusquisque se ipsum vincit, iram continet, nullis illecebris emollitur, atque inflectitur, non adversis perturbatur, non extollitur secundis, et quasi vento quodam variarum rerum circumfertur mutatione. Idem habet cap. 39. et lib. 5. in Lucam, cap. 6.

¹² *SENECA, epist. 59. The wise man and the brave man is fortified and intent against every onrush; if poverty, if grief, if ignominy, if pain makes its assault, he will not give ground, undaunted, but will go against those things, and stand amid them.*

SENECA, epist. 59. Sapiens, et fortis ad omnem incursum munitus, et intentus; non si paupertas, non si luctus, non si ignominia, non si dolor impetum faciat, pedem referet intrepidus, et contra illa ibit, et inter illa stabit.

¹³ *IT IS OBSERVED*, however, by the Holy Doctor in the places alleged, with St. Thom. *ad 1. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 8.* that others exercise acts of the virtue of fortitude that are not true, but like it.

OBSERVAT autem S. Doctor *allegatis locis, cum D. Thom. ad 1. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 8. alios exercere actus virtutis fortitudinis, non veros, sed similes.*

¹⁴ *I ASSERT* secondly: Fortitude is a special virtue. *IT IS PROVED* from what has been said, because it has a special honesty in taming the passions, especially daring and fear. Although by the Fathers cited it is extended to the taming of nearly all vehement passions, as St. Thom. also teaches *art. 2. ad 2.*

ASSERO secundo: *Fortitudo est virtus specialis. PROBATUR ex dictis, quia habet specialem honestatem ad edomandas passiones, audaciae praesertim, et timoris. Quamvis a Patribus allatis extendatur ad omnes fere passiones vehementes edomandas, ut docet etiam S. Thom. art. 2. ad 2.*

¹⁵ *I ASSERT* thirdly, that Fortitude is a Cardinal virtue. So St. Bonav. *in the places cited*, St. Thom. *quaest. 127. art. 11. IT IS PROVED* by the Holy Doctor *ex S. Sap.* where it is numbered with the Cardinal Virtues in those words: *She teacheth Sobriety, and Prudence, and Justice, and Virtue.* The Holy Doctor proves the same *in the places cited*, from the Fathers alleged.

ASSERO tertio, *Fortitudinem esse virtutem Cardinalem. Ita S. Bonav. locis adductis, D. Thom. quaest. 127. art. 11. PROBATUR a S. Doctore ex S. Sap. ubi cum virtutibus Cardinalibus numeratur illis verbis: Sobrietatem, et Prudentiam docet, et Iustitiam, et Virtutem. Idem probat S. Doctor allatis locis, ex Patribus allegatis.*

¹⁶ *IT IS CONFIRMED* because the Cardinal virtues are so called either because through them we enter into the other virtues; or because the order of human life is directed and regulated in the four Cardinals of the lesser world, in likeness of the greater, as the Holy Doctor says *serm. 6. Hexaëmer.* Such is fortitude: Therefore.

CONFIRMATUR *quia virtutes Cardinales dicuntur, vel quia per eas ingrediamur ad alias virtutes; vel quia vitae humanae ratio dirigitur, et regulatur in quatuor Cardinibus mundi minoris, ad similitudinem maioris, ut ait S. Doctor serm. 6. Hexaëmer. Talis autem est fortitudo: Ergo.*

¹⁷ *IT IS PROVED* also by the reasoning of St. Bonaventure *in 3. dist 33. passim, especially quaest. 4.* because it belongs to the Cardinal virtues, or, as he says *at the end*, principal virtues, that which is chiefly attended to in virtue; but among the others one is placed to work firmly, as is clear from Aristotle *2. Eth. cap. 4.* and Fortitude claims to itself the praise of working firmly.

PROBATUR *etiam ratione S. Bonavent. in 3. dist 33. passim, praecipue quaest. 4. quia virtutum Cardinalium, seu, ut ait ad ultimum, principalium, est id, quod praecipue in virtute attenditur, inter alias autem una ponitur firmiter operari, ut patet ex Aristotele 2. Eth. cap. 4. laudem autem firmiter operandi sibi vindicat Fortitudo.*

¹⁸ From what has been said you have that the object of fortitude is the passions of Daring and Fear, moderating by the mean. So St. Thom. *quaest. 123. art. 3.* and St. Bonaventure *in the places cited, and serm. 5. Hexaëmer.* from Aristotle *lib. 2. Eth. cap. 7. and lib. 3. cap. 6.* but it is mediately concerned with perils, especially of death, as the objects of those passions. Aristotle indeed says *3. Eth. cap. 3. and 9.* that fortitude is chiefly about the perils of death, which is in war.

Ex dictis habes, obiectum fortitudinis esse passiones Audaciae, et Timoris, moderans media. Ita D. Thom. quaest. 123. art. 3. et S. Bonavent. locis adductis, et serm. 5. Hexaemer. ex Aristotele lib. 2. Eth. cap. 7. et lib. 3. cap. 6. mediate vero versatur circa pericula, maxime mortis, veluti obiecta istarum passionum. Ait vero Aristoteles 3. Eth. cap. 3. et 9. fortitudinem esse maxime circa pericula mortis, quae est in bello.

¹⁹ St. Thom. art. 6. ADDS, with Aristotle 3. Eth. cap. 9. that fortitude is more concerned with repressing fears than with moderating daring; therefore the principal act of fortitude is to endure, that is, to stand immovable in perils, rather than to attack. The reason is, because it is more difficult to repress fears in perils than to moderate daring. First, because he who endures suffers from another, as from a stronger; but the daring man attacks, as against a weaker; and it is more difficult to fight with a stronger than with a weaker. Second, he who endures already feels the perils imminent; but he who attacks has them as future. Third, to endure is lasting; but to attack can be sudden: and it is more difficult to remain immovable for a long time than to move suddenly.

ADDIT S. Thom. art. 6. cum Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 9. fortitudinem magis versari circa timores reprimendos, quam circa audacias moderandas, ideo principalis actus fortitudinis est sustinere, hoc est immobiliter sistere in periculis, quam aggredi. Ratio est, quia timores in periculis reprimere difficilius est, quam audacias moderari. Primo, quia sustinens ab alio, ut fortiori, sufferit; at audax invadit, ut debiliorem; difficilius est autem pugnare cum fortiori, quam cum debiliori. Secundo, qui sustinet, iam sentit pericula imminencia; qui autem aggreditur, habet ea, ut futura. Tertio, sustinere est diuturnum; aggredi autem potest esse subito: difficilius est autem diu manere immobilem, quam subito moveri.

²⁰ OBSERVE, that the end, as it were proximate, of fortitude is to express the likeness of its habit in act; but its remote and ultimate end is beatitude, that is, God. So St. Thomas art. 7.

OBSERVA, finem, velut proximum, fortitudinis esse, ut similitudinem sui habitus exprimat in actu; finis autem eius remotus, et ultimus est beatitudo, sive Deus. Ita S. Thomas art. 7.

²¹ OBSERVE secondly, that the brave man, from the consideration of the honesty of his act, does indeed take delight, yet from the suffering of hardships, in which he is engaged, he grieves. So St. Thom. art. 8. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 9. The Holy Doctor adds above, that from the abundance of God's grace the pain and sadness are often swallowed up, as happened to the tender holy Virgins.

OBSERVA secundo, fortem ex consideratione honestatis sui actus delectari quidem, tamen ex perpessione tristium, in quibus versatur, tritari. Ita S. Thom. art. 8. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 9. Addit vero S. Doctor supra, ex abundanti gratia Dei saepe absorberi dolorem, et tristitiam, sicuti tenellis Virginibus sanctis eveniebat.

²² OBSERVE thirdly, that fortitude is seen chiefly in sudden events. So St. Thom. art. 9. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 8.

OBSERVA tertio, fortitudinem maxime in eventibus repentinis cerni. Ita S. Thom. art. 9. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 8.

²³ OBSERVE fourthly, that the brave man employs anger, but moderated by reason, for the act of fortitude. So St. Thom. quaest. 127. art. 10. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 8. and St. Bonavent. in 3. loco citato.

OBSERVA quarto, fortem ad actum fortitudinis iram adhibere, sed moderatam ratione. Ita D. Thom. quaest. 127. art. 10. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 8. et D. Bonavent. in 3. loco citato.

²⁴ I ASSERT fourthly, that fortitude is inferior to Prudence and Justice, but superior to Temperance.

ASSERO quarto, fortitudinem esse inferiorem Prudentia, et Iustitia, sed superiorem Temperantia.

²⁵ *IT IS PROVED* by the Holy Doctor 3. dist. 33. quaest. 4. for the Cardinal Virtues order man in those things that are toward the end, which are all something created; but since man is compared both to himself and to another, the Cardinal Virtues are the moderators of these: if in respect of himself, it can be about the rational, and behold Prudence; or about the Concupiscible, and behold Temperance; or about the Irascible, and behold Fortitude. But if it order toward another, thus it is Justice, because there is one ratio by which he is compared to another, which is the ratio of the due; and because this ratio can be attended to according to the act of each power, hence Cardinal Justice is said to go round about all the powers, and yet is one, on account of the one ratio of ordering toward another. From this you have that Justice is the most noble, then Prudence, which moderates reason, inferior to the will. Thirdly Fortitude, which moderates the concupiscible, even the sensible, inferior to reason and will: lastly Temperance, which is concerned with the concupiscible, which is the lowest.

PROBATUR a S. Doctore 3. dist. 33. quaest. 4. nam Virtutes Cardinales ordinant hominem in his, quae sunt ad finem, quae omnia sunt aliquid creatum; cum autem homo comparetur, et ad se, et ad alterum, Virtutes Cardinales sunt horum moderatrices, si respectu sui, vel potest esse circa rationalem, et ecce Prudentia; vel circa Concupiscibilem, et ecce Temperantia; vel circa Irascibilem, et ecce Fortitudo; Si vero ordinet ad alterum, sic est Iustitia, quia una est ratio, qua comparatur ad alterum, quod est ratio debiti, et quia haec ratio potest attendi secundum actum cuiusque potentiae, hinc Iustitia Cardinalis dicitur circuire omnes vires, et tamen una est, propter unicam rationem ordinandi ad alterum. Ex quo habes, Iustitiam esse nobilissimam, deinde Prudentiam, quae rationem, voluntate inferiorem, moderatur. Tertio Fortitudinem, quae moderatur concupiscibilem, etiam sensibilem, inferiorem ratione, et voluntate: Ultimo Temperantiam, quae versatur circa concupiscibilem, quae est infima.

²⁶ *NOTE*, that St. Ambrose, cited by St. Bonaventure in *Pharetra*, prefers Fortitude to the others, but understand it secundum quid, namely, either in respect of a certain general utility, since it is useful both in warlike and in civil affairs, as St. Thom. answers art. 12. ad 1. Or because fortitude is concerned chiefly with difficulties.

NOTA, D. Ambrosium apud D. Bonaventuram in *Pharetra*, praeferre Fortitudinem caeteris, sed intellige secundum quid, nempe, vel secundum quandam generalem utilitatem, pro ut, et in rebus bellicis, et in rebus civilibus utilis est, ut respondet S. Thom. art. 12. ad 1. Vel quia fortitudo maxime circa difficilia versatur.

Question II: On the gift of fortitude

¹ *THE GIFT* of fortitude is a habit existing, as in a subject, in the will, insofar as it is engaged about arduous things, and it easily makes it mobile for repelling fears and repressing daring, with the hope of escaping any perils whatsoever, which the virtue does not furnish. Hence the soul is better disposed by the gift of fortitude toward every arduous thing than by any moral virtue. Therefore through this fortitude the Saints wrought marvelous works of fortitude, enduring with exultation, Act. 5. *They went rejoicing from the sight of the Council, because they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus.* Thus Blessed Andrew hastened joyfully to the Cross, Agatha to prison. This gift, in the apex of perfection, which the Holy Doctor calls *of the purified soul*, renders the soul, as it were, insensible amid perils and other evils, and feasting and exulting amid delights. See the Holy Doctor *de septem Donis, de Dono fortitudinis, cap. 2. et 3.* bringing forth splendid things.

DONUM fortitudinis est habitus existens, sicut in subiecto, in voluntate, inquantum negotiatur circa ardua, et mobilem eam facile reddit ad repellendos timores, et reprimendas audacias, cum spe evadendi quaevis pericula, quod a virtute non praestatur. Hinc melius se habet anima dono fortitudinis ad quaevis ardua, quam per aliquam moralem virtutem. Ideo

per hanc fortitudinem Sancti fecerunt mirabilia fortitudinis opera, sustinendo cum exultatione, Act. 5. Ibant gaudentes a conspectu Concilii, quoniam digni habiti sunt pro nomine Iesu contumeliam pati. Sic B. Andreas ad Crucem, Agatha ad carcerem laetanter properabant. Hoc donum in apice perfectionis, quod vocat S. Doctor purgati animi, reddit animam veluti inter pericula, et mala caetera insensibilem, et inter epulas coniuuantem, et exultabundam. Vide S. Doctorem de septem Donis, de Dono fortitudinis, cap. 2. et 3. praeclara promentem.

Question III: On martyrdom

¹ CHIEF among the acts of Fortitude is to undergo death for God, which is to endure Martyrdom. Moreover, a Martyr is so called, as it were a confessor.

PRAECIPUUS inter actus Fortitudinis est subire mortem propter Deum, quod est Martyrium sustinere. Dicitur autem Martyr, quasi confitens.

² BASILIDES the heretic, cited by Tertullian in *de praescript.* toward the end, said that it is not licit to undergo Martyrdom. Gyraldus, however, counseled flight from Martyrdom, as though it were the work only of outstanding saints. St. Bonavent. refutes him in the *Apologia pauperum*.

BASILIDES haereticus apud Tertullianum de praescript. ad finem dicebat, non licere Martyrium, subire. Gyraldus vero fugam a Martyrio, tanquam opere eximiorum tantum sanctorum, suadebat. Eum refellit D. Bonavent. in Apologia pauperum.

³ I ASSERT that Martyrdom is in every case an act of virtue.

ASSERO, Martyrium esse in omnibus actum virtutis.

⁴ IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor from the *epist. ad Heb.* where, after narrating the deeds of the Martyrs, who for faith and religion experienced mockeries and scourges, chains and prisons, etc., he straightway exhorts in *cap. 12. Let us run by patience to the fight proposed to us, looking on the Author of faith, and the finisher JESUS, who, having joy set before him, endured the cross, despising the shame.* Where the Gloss: *Girded and equipped, let us run without hesitation to the combat of Martyrdom.*

PROBATUR a S. Doctore ex epist. ad Heb. ubi enarratis Martyrum gestis, qui pro fide, et religione ludibria, et verbera experti, vincula, et carceres, secti sunt, etc. hortatur statim cap. 12. Curramus per patientiam ad propositum nobis certamen, aspicientes in Authorem fidei, et consummatorem IESUM, qui proposito sibi gaudio sustinuit crucem, confusione contempta. Ubi Glossa: Succincti, et expediti curramus sine dubitatione ad certamen Martyrii.

⁵ NEXT he brings forward *2. Corinth. 12. Most gladly will I spend, and be spent myself, for your souls.* Where the Gloss: *Perfect Charity is that one be ready even to die for his brethren,* and straightway *Philippines 1. I desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ:* where the Gloss has: *Certain imperfect men, who die with patience.*

DEINDE affert id 2. Corinth. 12. Ego libentissime impendam, et superimpendar ipse pro animabus vestris. Ubi Glossa: perfecta Charitas est, ut quis paratus sit etiam pro fratribus mori, mox id Philip. 1. Cupio dissolvi, et esse cum Christo: Ubi Glossa habet: Quidam homines imperfecti, qui cum patientia moriuntur.

⁶ He also urges that passage *2. Timoth. 4.* where Paul, exulting, is near Martyrdom: *For I am even now ready to be sacrificed, and the time of my dissolution is at hand. I have fought the good fight, etc.* and he cites the Gloss confirming the same.

ILLUD etiam urget 2. Timoth. 4. ubi exsultabundus Paulus Martyrio vicinus: Ego enim iam deliberor, et tempus resolutionis meae instat. Bonum certamen certavi, etc. et adducit Glossam, id ipsum confirmantem.

⁷ He urges the same also from Act. 5. where the disciples went rejoicing from the sight of the Council, because they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus, as I also related above.

ID etiam urget Act. 5. ubi discipuli Ibant gaudentes a conspectu Concilii, quoniam digni habiti sunt pro nomine Iesu contumeliam pati, ut supra etiam retuli.

⁸ He ADDS that of 1 Peter, cap. 2. Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you should follow his steps.

ADDIT id Petri prima, cap. 2. Christus pro nobis passus est, vobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequamini vestigia eius.

⁹ That it is a HEROIC act to lay down one's life for Christ, is had in Ioan. 5. But to decline death for a time, either to reserve oneself for a more glorious triumph, or for the solace and help of the flock, is not less praiseworthy; for thus the holy Pontiffs often hid themselves. Thus Christ also fled at one time.

HEROICUM vero actum esse animam ponere pro Christo, habetur Ioan. 5. Declinare autem mortem ad tempus, vel ut se reservet ad gloriosorem triumphum, vel ad solatium, et auxilium ovium, non est minus laudabile; sic enim saepe Sancti Pontifices se abscondebant. Sic et Christus aliquando fugit.

¹⁰ He PROVES next by the examples of the Saints, Peter and Paul, Andrew, Laurence, Sebastian, Tiburtius, Vincentius, and the like, who offered themselves spontaneously to Martyrdom; for if that were not licit, they would already have gravely sinned and been damned, dying in a forbidden act, which is an insane thing to say; surely Christ exhorted, Matth. 10. *Fear not them who kill the body, and cannot kill the soul.*

PROBAT deinde exemplis Sanctorum, Petri, et Pauli, Andreae, Laurentii, Sebastiani, Tiburtii, Vincentii, et consimilium, qui se Martyrio sponte obtulerunt; quod si id non liceret, iam graviter peccassent, et essent damnati, morientes in actu vetito, quod insanum est dicere; sane Christus hortabatur, Matth. 10. Nolite timere eos, qui occidunt corpus, animam autem non possunt occidere.

¹¹ THE REASONING of St. Bonaventure from the said Scriptures appears firm, for Martyrdom is a firm standing in faith and justice against the persecutors of the Church, and the offering of one's life to God, which is the greatest sign of Charity, as is said Ioan. 15.

RATIO D. Bonavent. e dictis Scripturis firma apparet, nam Martyrium est firma statio in fide, et iustitia contra persecutores Ecclesiae, et exhibitio vitae Deo, quod est maximae Charitatis indicium, ut dicitur Ioan. 15.

¹² I ASSERT secondly, that Martyrdom is an act of Fortitude. So St. Thom. art. 2. and in common with St. Bonavent. *de septem donis, de Dono fortitudinis.*

ASSERO secundo, Martyrium esse actum Fortitudinis. Ita D. Thom. art. 2. et communiter cum D. Bonavent. de septem donis, de Dono fortitudinis.

¹³ IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor first from that passage Heb. 11. *The Saints by faith conquered kingdoms, were made strong in battle, turned armies to flight, etc.* which the Church reads of the holy Martyrs, and St. Gregory homil. 27. in Evang. He expounds it thus: *The saints were made strong, they tame the tormentors, they strengthen the spirit, they shine with virtues, they despise earthly things, they desire heavenly*

things, they can be killed, they cannot be bent, and homil. 30. in Evang. The Apostles would not have presumed to withstand the powers of this world, unless the fortitude of the Holy Spirit had made them firm. Thus Peter answered the Princes threatening him: We ought to obey God rather than men.

PROBATUR a S. Doctore primo ex illo Heb. 11. Sancti per fidem vicerunt regna, fortes facti sunt in bello, castra verterunt, etc. quod de sanctis Martyribus legit Ecclesia, et D. Gregorius homil. 27. in Evang. Sic exponit: Fortes facti sunt sancti, tortores domant, spiritum roborant, virtutibus coruscant, terrena despiciunt, caelestia appetunt, occidi possunt, flecti nequeunt, et homil. 30. in Evang. Apostoli mundi huius potestatibus contraire non praesumerent, nisi eos Sancti Spiritus fortitudo solidasset. Sic Petrus Principibus minitantibus respondit: Obedire Deo oportet magis, quam hominibus.

¹⁴ IT IS PROVED secondly by St. Bonaventure, by the reasoning drawn thence: The work of fortitude is to make firm in rectitude against perils, especially of death. But in such a way the Martyrs are made firm, as St. Cyprian has it lib. 2. epist. 6. ad Martyres.

PROBATUR secundo a S. Bonavent. ratione hinc deducta: Opus fortitudinis est solidare in rectitudine contra pericula, maxime mortis. Tali autem modo solidantur Martyres, ut habet D. Cyprianus lib. 2. epist. 6. ad Martyres.

¹⁵ I ASSERT thirdly, that Martyrdom is commanded also by Charity.

ASSERO tertio, Martyrium imperari etiam a Charitate.

¹⁶ IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor, from the Scriptures cited.

PROBATUR a S. Doctore, ex allatis Scripturis.

¹⁷ I ADD therefore, that it is an act of the highest perfection, insofar as it is commanded by Charity. It is proved by the Holy Doctor from that passage Ioan. 15. Greater Charity than this no one hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends: but Charity is the greatest virtue, and hence its acts are most perfect, as is said 1 Corinth. 13. Coloss. 3.

ADDO proinde, esse actum maximae perfectionis, pro ut a Charitate imperatur. Probatur a S. Doctore illo Ioan. 15. Maiorem Charitatem nemo habet, quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis: est autem Charitas maxima virtus, atque adeo actus eius sunt perfectissimi, ut dicitur prima Corinth. 13. Coloss. 3.

¹⁸ I ASSERT fourthly, that a Christian is not bound to go to Tyrants for Martyrdom in every event, nor indeed ought he to offer an occasion for killing without cause; nevertheless in certain causes he not only can but even ought, as if the ignominy of the faith of Christ is at stake, if any are wavering in the faith. Thus the bravest Captain of the Church, St. Sebastian, protested this of himself. So St. Thom. art. 1. ad .¹ and St. Bonaventure pursues this more fully in the place cited, Apolog. Christ counsels, Matth. 10. When they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another, yet this is not to be done absolutely, but the Gloss, with Rabanus, warns it is to be done in some case: indeed even perfect men fled at times on account of causes, either to provide for the flock; or to reserve themselves for a greater occasion, as Athanasius; but other perfect men ran to Martyrdom, whom I recalled above.

¹ N. Editor's note: the 1655 print itself reads 'art. 1. ad .' with the numeral after 'ad' missing; rendered as printed (likely 'ad 1.').

ASSERO quarto, non teneri Christianum adire in omni eventu Tyrannos ad Martyrium, imo neque debere sine causa praebere occasionem occidendi; attamen in causis non modo potest, sed etiam debet, ut si fidei Christi ignominia paretur, si aliqui nutent in fide. Sic a se protestatus est fortissimus Dux Ecclesiae S. Sebastianus. Ita D. Thom. art. 1. ad . et

hoc latius prosequitur S. Bonavent. loco cit. Apolog. *Suadet Christus Matth. 10. Cum vos persecuti fuerint in civitate ista, fugite in aliam, hoc tamen non absolute, sed in aliquo casu faciendum monet cum Rabano etiam Glossa: fugerunt quidem et viri perfecti aliquando ob causas, vel gregi ut providerent; vel ut ad maiorem occasionem se reservarent, ut Athanasius; sed alii perfecti ad Martyrium cucurrerunt, quos supra recensui.*

¹⁹ WHENCE the Holy Doctor infers that the adversary argues badly. Perfect men sometimes fled Martyrdom: Therefore it is not a work of perfection. For it is answered by denying the consequence. First, because not all perfect men fled, as I said: Next, because not everything perfect men do is of greater perfection; Jacob, David, Urias, Mathathias fled, yet they were not perfect in all things, for they cultivated neither virginity nor the Evangelical poverty; Athanasius also fled, who nevertheless encountered perils when there was need, but he fled at times from licit causes, not always.

UNDE infert S. Doctor male arguere adversarium. Viri perfecti aliquando fugerunt Martyrium: Ergo est opus perfectionis. Respondetur enim negando consequentiam. Primo, quia non omnes viri perfecti fugerunt, ut dixi: Deinde, quia non omne, quod agunt viri perfecti, est maioris perfectionis; fugerunt Iacob, David, Urias, Matharias, non tamen fuere in omnibus perfecti, nam nec virginitatem, nec paupertatem Evangelicam coluere, fugit et Athanasius, qui tamen etiam periculis occurrebat, cum opus esset, fugit autem aliquando ex causis licitis, non semper.

²⁰ NOR is it an objection, that passage Ioan. 21. *Another shall gird thee, and lead thee whither thou wouldst not;* for this signifies only that death is not to be inflicted on himself by the Martyr, as St. Bonaventure notes with St. Augustine; but by another, when it is shunned by the senses, although the will commands, for the honor of God, not to shun it, because the perfection of Charity commands also to overcome the fear of death, as the Holy Doctor notes from St. Augustine tract. 123. in Ioan. See the Holy Doctor distinguishing most splendidly.

NEQUE obstat id Ioan. 21. Alius te cinget, et ducet quo tu non vis; hoc enim tantum significat, mortem non esse a Martyre sibi conferendam, ut notat S. Bonavent. cum D. Augustino; sed ab alio, cum a sensu refugiatur, tametsi voluntas ob Dei honorem imperet non refugere, quia perfectio Charitatis imperat etiam superare mortis timorem, ut notat S. Doctor ex D. Augustino tract. 123. in Ioan. Vide S. Doctorem praeclare differentem.

²¹ I ASSERT fifthly, that for the perfect notion of Martyrdom it is required that one endure death for Christ, that is, for God. So St. Thom. quaest. 124. art. 4. St. Bonav. in the places cited, and in 4. dist. 4 part. 2. q. 2. et 3.

ASSERO quinto, ad Martyrii perfectam rationem requiritur, ut mortem quis sustineat propter Christum, sive Deum. Ita D. Thom. quaest. 124. art. 4. D. Bonav. locis adductis, et in 4. dist. 4 part. 2. q. 2. et 3.

²² IT IS PROVED, because a Martyr is called, as it were, a witness of the Christian faith, by which the visible things are proposed to us as to be despised for the invisible, according to the Apostle Heb. 11. Therefore it belongs to Martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith, professing that he despises all present things so as to attain the future, which does not happen except by the outpouring of his very life for God. Hence St. Augustine Sermon. 4. de Innoc. and Sermon. 1. de Sanctis, cited by St. Bonavent. Sermon. 2. de B. Bartholomaeo and in 4. d. 4. part. 2. dubio 1. *It is not the punishment that makes the Martyr, but the cause.* The same he has in the Pharetra, lib. 4. cap. 49. citing St. Gregory in registr. lib. 2. ind. 11. cap. 36. with St. Cyprian.

PROBATUR, quia Martyr dicitur quasi testis fidei Christianae, per quam nobis visibilia pro invisibilibus proponuntur contemnenda, iuxta Apostolum Heb. 11. Ad Martyrium ergo pertinet, ut homo testificetur fidem, protestans, se omnia contemnere praesentia, ut ad futura perveniat, quod non fit, nisi profusione ipsius vitae propter Deum. Hinc D.

Augustinus Serm. 4. de Innoc. et Serm. 1. de Sanctis *apud D. Bonavent.* Serm. 2. de B. Bartholomaeo et in 4. d. 4. part. 2. dubio 1. Martyrem non facit poena, sed causa. *Idem habet in Pharetra*, lib. 4. cap. 49. *referens D. Gregorium* in registr. lib. 2. ind. 11. cap. 36. *cum D. Cypriano.*

²³ YET it is not necessary that a Martyr die for the confession of the faith, but it suffices if he suffer for the defense of some virtue, and endure persecutions for justice, as St. Thom. says *art. 5.* we have an example in John the Baptist, who was killed not for the confession of the faith, but for preaching continence against the adulteress, as Valentia notes *quaest. 2. puncto 1.* Tanner. *d. 4. quaest. 2. dub. 2. num. 34.*

NON tamen necesse est, ut Martyr propter confessionem fidei moriatur, sed satis est, si ob defensionem alicuius virtutis, et patiatur propter iustitiam persecutiones, ut ait D. Thom. art. 5. exemplum habemus in Ioanne Baptista, qui non ob fidei confessionem, sed ob praedicandam continentiam contra adulteram, occisus est, ut advertunt Valentia quaest. 2. puncto 1. Tanner. d. 4. quaest. 2. dub. 2. num. 34.

²⁴ The Holy Doctor OBSERVES, however, in 4. d. 4. part. 2. dub. 1. that since for Martyrdom there is required a just will and a just cause, and the first failed in the Innocents, the second in the Thief, neither was a Martyrdom; nevertheless they obtained the laurel of Martyrdom by privilege from the grace of God, so that the effusion of blood for Christ was for them as though voluntarily endured, as Tanner. also warns *num. 22.* with St. Augustine *Serm. 66. inter additos a Lovaniensibus*, and others.

OBSERVAT autem S. Doctor in 4. d. 4. part. 2. dub. 1. quod ad Martyrium cum requiratur iusta voluntas, et iusta causa; et primum defecerit in Innocentibus: Secundum vero in Latrone, neutrum fuisse Martyrium; attamen Martyrii laureolam privilegio obtinuisse ex Dei gratia, ita ut effusio sanguinis propter Christum, fuerit eis ut voluntarie tolerata, ut monent etiam Tanner. num. 22. cum D. Augustino Serm. 66. inter additos a Lovaniensibus, et alii.

²⁵ IN WHAT WAY Martyrdom is the Baptism of blood, we shall see in 3. part. *Tract. de Baptismo, disp. 2. quaest. 1.* with St. Bonavent. in 4. d. 4. part. 2. But whether a Martyr with a defect, as Blessed Martin, receives the laurel, I said elsewhere *prima 2.*

QUO PACTO autem Martyrium Baptismus sanguinis sit, videbimus 3. part. Tract. de Baptismo, disp. 2. quaest. 1. cum D. Bonavent. in 4. d. 4. part. 2. An vero Martyr defectio, ut B. Martinus, recipiat laureolam, alibi dixi prima 2.

²⁶ It is ANSWERED with St. Bonaventure in 2. dist. 40. art. 2. *quaest. 1.* that he has not the golden crown [Aureola], but only the golden one of charity.

RESPONDETUR cum D. Bonavent. in 2. dist. 40. art. 2. quaest. 1. non habere Aureolam, sed solam Auream charitatis.

²⁷ I shall say only this with St. Bonaventure there *quaest. 3. ad 4.* that Martyrdom is called the Baptism of blood because in Martyrdom life is laid down, which is in the blood, as is said *Levit. cit.* Or because there, in the effusion of blood, every Martyrdom is ordinarily completed. He there observes that the holy Martyrs rescued by others from torments, except the sword. He assigns the reason, because the other torments act almost as it were, creatures working naturally, and because the creatures obey God, it was fitting that they show reverence even to the holy servants of God. Thus Lions and other beasts licked the feet of the Saints. The fire gave way, etc. But in the punishment of the sword free malice operates more, and it does not befit God to allow his work to act freely, although at times it was impeded in some respects, as the sword became torpid, as in St. Pantaleon.

ILLUD solum dicam cum D. Bonavent. ibi quaest. 3. ad 4. Martyrium dici Baptismum sanguinis, quia in Martyrio ponitur vita, quae in sanguine est ut dicitur Levit. cit. Vel quia ibi in effusione sanguinis completur omne Martyrium ordinarie. Ibi observat SS. Martyres ab aliis erutos tormentis, excepto gladio. Rationem assignat, quia caetera tormenta fere agunt, creaturis operantibus naturaliter, et quia creaturae Deo obtemperant, congruum fuit, ut ostenderent reverentes etiam sanctis fidelibus Dei servis. Ita Leones, aliaeque ferae pedes Sanctorum lambebant. Ignis cedebat, etc. At in poena gladii operatur libera magis malitia, quam Deum sinere opus suum libere agere decet, etsi aliquando impedita in nonnullis fuerit, ut gladius torperet, sicut in D. Pantaleone.

²⁸ YET the sword is not necessary for Martyrdom; nor fire, but hardships suffice, as St. Bonaventure notes *Serm. 3. de S. Andrea*. For thus SS. Sylverius, John, and others died, for whom nevertheless therefore the last responsory is changed in the office, and it says: *Corona aurea, etc.* But not: *Hic est vere Martyr*, not because they are not Martyrs, but because they did not shed blood. Truly, those who in prisons were consumed by hunger, and who by wasting disease in caverns for Christ, are Martyrs.

NON tamen necessarius est gladius; vel ignis ad Martyrium, sed sufficiunt aerumnae, ut notat D. Bonavent. Serm. 3. de S. Andrea. Sic enim SS. Sylverius, Ioannes, et alii occubuere, quibus tamen ideo immutatur ultimum responsorium in officio, et dicitur: Corona aurea, etc. Non autem: Hic est vere Martyr, non quia non sint Martyres, sed quia sanguinem non fudere. Profecto et qui in carceribus fame sunt consumpti, et qui tabe in cavernis pro Christo, Martyres sunt.

²⁹ The Holy Doctor also TEACHES in 4. dist. 32. quaest. 1. ad secundum, that a wife cannot deny her husband that he proceed to Martyrdom, if it is necessary.

DOCET etiam S. Doctor in 4. dist. 32. quaest. 1. ad secundum, uxorem non posse negare marito, ut ad Martyrium, si oportet, pergat.

³⁰ St. Bonaventure relates from the Fathers MANY analogical Martyrdoms in bearing adversities, in the mortification of the flesh, and in the pursuit of virtues, in *Pharetra, lib. 4. cap. 49.* for sermons. The same he indicates in *Psal. 118.* in those words *Narraverunt mihi iniqui fabulationes.*

MULTA analogice Martyria in ferendis adversis, in carnis mortificatione, et virtutum studio, refert ex Patribus S. Bonavent. in Pharetra, lib. 4. cap. 49. ad conciones. Eadem indicat in Psal. 118. in ea verba Narraverunt mihi iniqui fabulationes.

³¹ The Holy Doctor OBSERVES also ad 15. Ioan. ad those words: *Quae ego mando, etc.* That Martyrdom cannot be nobly sustained without the supreme help of God; for to pour out life, which we love naturally, is not of nature.

OBSERVAT etiam S. Doctor ad 15. Ioan. ad ea verba: Quae ego mando, etc. Non posse absque Dei supremo auxilio praeclaro Martyrium sustineri; nam profundere vitam, quam naturaliter diligimus, non est naturae.

³² IF you say, that the heretical Donatists underwent death for the faith, by forcing tyrants to arms.

SI dicas, haereticos Donatistas mortem subiisse propter fidem, cogendo tyrannos ad arma.

³³ The Holy Doctor ANSWERS, that this is to die from despair, and headlong error; but a Martyr dies for the supreme end.

RESPONDET S. Doctor, hoc esse mori ex desperatione, et errore praecipite; at Martyr moritur ob finem supremum.

³⁴ FINALLY he observes in 4. dist. cit. and in *serm. primo de S. Matthia*, that a Martyr is so purified by Martyrdom that he straightway flies to heaven, and therefore he does him an injury who prays for

him, as St. Augustine teaches *de verbis Apostoli, Serm. 17.* and it is related *extra. de celebr. Missarum, cap. Cum Matthae, §. ultimo.*

TANDEM observat in 4. dist. cit. et in serm. primo de S. Matthia, *Martyrem ita Martyrio purificari, ut illico ad caelum evolet, atque ideo iniuriam ei inferat, qui pro eo orat, ut docet D. Augustinus de verbis Apostoli, Serm. 17. et refertur extra. de celebr. Missarum, cap. Cum Matthae, §. ultimo.*

³⁵ The HOLY DOCTOR *ad cap. 3. sap.* in those words: *Iustorum animae in manu Dei sunt*, which the Church sings of the Martyrs, asks why the Martyrs, among the other Saints, are especially called just.

S. DOCTOR *ad cap. 3. sap. in ea verba: Iustorum animae in manu Dei sunt, quod de Martyribus canit Ecclesia, quaerit, cur Martyres, inter alios Sanctos, praecipue vocentur iusti.*

³⁶ He ANSWERS, because he is just who disregards loss for the sake of a friend, as is said *Prov. 12.* But the Martyrs disregard and despise the loss of all things and of life for the love of God, as the Apostle describes, *Heb. 11.*

RESPONDET, *quia iustus est, qui negligit damnum propter amicum, ut dicitur Prov. 12. Martyres autem negligunt, ac contemnunt amissionem rerum omnium, et vitae ob Dei amorem, ut describit Apostolus, Heb. 11.*

³⁷ IN *Psal. 115.* he expounds the etymology of the name Martyr in Greek Μάρτυρ TESTIS, and says; that a Martyr bears witness to Christ, while he does not hesitate to undergo death for him, and to pour out his life: Secondly to bear witness to the resurrection of the flesh; for he would not give his flesh to death unless he had hoped to receive it again: Thirdly to bear witness to the truth of eternal beatitude; for he would not so despise worldly things unless he expected eternal things.

IN *Psal. 115. exponit ethymologiam nominis Martyr Graece Μάρτυρ TESTIS, et ait; Martyrem testificari Christum, dum pro eo mortem subire, et vitam profundere non dubitat: Secundo testificari carnis resurrectionem; non enim carnem morti daret, nisi eam recipere sperasset: Tertio testificari veritatem aeternae beatitudinis; non enim mundana adeo sperneret, nisi aeterna expectaret.*

³⁸ IN *Psal. 118.* in those words: *Many, who persecute me, etc.* he notes that on the feasts of the most holy Nativity honor is shown to Martyrs of threefold kind. For first there is Stephen, who was a Martyr in will and in deed. Next John, who in will alone; thirdly the Innocents, who had only the deed.

IN *Psal. 118. in ea verba: Multi, qui persequuntur me, etc. notat in festis Sanctissimae Nativitatis honorem exhiberi Martyribus triplicis generis. Primo enim est Stephanus, qui voluntate, et opere fuit Martyr. Deinde Ioannes, qui sola voluntate, tertio Innocentes, qui solum opus habuere.*

³⁹ FINALLY on *Psal. 33.* he concludes that Martyrdom ought to have three things, namely, the Final Cause, that it be suffered for God: The Formal Cause, that it be sustained willingly, nor be as the wheel of a cart, which carries straw, and yet creaks and murmurs: Thirdly perseverance.

TANDEM *ad Psal. 33. concludit, Martyrium debere tria habere, scilicet Causam finalem, ut propter Deum patiatur: Causam formalem, ut voluntate sustineatur, nec sit, ut rota carri, quae foenum portat, et tamen stridet, et obmurmurat: Tertio perseverantiam.*

Doubt I: Whether martyrdom confers first grace

¹ THE FIRST opinion is that Martyrdom, by privilege and the special promise of Christ, has the power of conferring first grace, and consequently, like a Sacrament, justifies *ex opere operato*. So Sotus in 4. dist. 4 quaest. 6. et dist. 14. quaest. 13. litt. V. §. *sed nec debet requiri*, whom the disciples follow,

Faber disp. 11. de poenit. cap. 1. Mastrius 4. disp. 2. quaest. 7. art. 2., adducing Vega, Bellarmine, Suarez, Henriquez, Valentia, Tolerus, Coninck, Lessius, Amicus, Aversa, Bonacina, Becanus, Baldus, Turrianus, etc.

An conferat MARTYRIUM primam gratiam.

PRIMA opinio est, Martyrium ex privilegio, et speciali promissione Christi habere vim conferendi primam gratiam, atque adeo ad instar Sacramenti iustificare ex opere operato. Ita Sotus in 4. dist. 4 quaest. 6. et dist. 14. quaest. 13. litt. V. §. sed nec debet requiri, quem sequuntur discipuli, Faber disp. 11. de poenit. cap. 1. Mastrius 4. disp. 2. quaest. 7. art. 2. adducens Vegam, Bellarminum, Suarez, Henriquez, Valentiam, Tolerum, Coninchium, Lessium, Amicum, Aversam, Bonacinam, Becanum, Baldinum, Turrianum, etc.

² Of these, some do not speak so absolutely, as Tannerus disp. 4. quaest. 3. dubio 3. numero 114.

Ex his aliqui non adeo absolute loquuntur, ut Tannerus disp. 4. quaest. 3. dubio 3. numero 114.

³ THE SECOND opinion holds that Martyrdom does not confer first grace ex opere operato, and does not help without it. Wherefore it judges contrition necessary for one existing in mortal sin. So D. Bonaventure 4. d. 4. part. 2. quaest. 2. Alexander of Hales 4 part. quaest. 8. m. 9. art. 4. D. Thomas 3. part. quaest. 66. art. 12. ad 2. Paludanus d. 4. quaest. 3. art. 1. and others of old. Vasquez defends this opinion as common among the ancients, and even among the Fathers, d. 153. cap. 3, and Cano relec. de poenit. part. 3, and Bassaeus V. Martyr. num. 7, adducing also Ban. 2. 2. quaest. 124. art. 5. d. 1. Less. lib. 3. cap. 1. d. 4. num. 43. Sylvius 3. part. quaest. 66. art. 11. quaestio 3.

SECUNDA sententia asserit, Martyrium ex opere operato non conferre primam gratiam, atque sine ea non iuvare. Quare esistenti in peccato mortali censet necessariam esse contritionem. Ita D. Bonavent. 4. d. 4. part. 2. quaest. 2. Alens. 4 part. quaest. 8. m. 9. art. 4. D. Thom. 3. part. quaest. 66. art. 12. ad 2. Palud. d. 4. quaest. 3. art. 1. et alii antiquitus. Quam sententiam tanquam inter veteres communem, ac etiam inter Patres defendit Vasquez d. 153. cap. 3. et Cano relec. de poenit. part. 3. ac Bassaeus. V. Martyr. num. 7. adducens etiam Ban. 2. 2. quaest. 124. art. 5. d. 1. Less. lib. 3. cap. 1. d. 4. num. 43. Sylvium 3. part. quaest. 66. art. 11. quaestio 3.

⁴ I ASSERT with this opinion that Martyrdom has not the power of conferring first grace ex opere operato.

ASSERO cum hac sententia, Martyrium non habere vim conferendi primam gratiam ex opere operato.

⁵ It is PROVED first by the argument of D. Bonaventure, quaest. cit.: For the removal of a mortal fault ex opere operato, Sacraments are necessary in reality or in vow, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 7. can. 4. and sess. 6. cap. 4, and this because justification of this kind depends on the institution of Christ. Now Christ instituted Baptism as simply necessary in reality or in vow. But baptism of blood precisely is not Baptism either in reality or in vow, and the notion of vow extends, at most, to baptism of the Spirit (flame).

PROBATUR primo argumento D. Bonavent. quaest. cit. Ad delendam culpam mortiferam ex opere operato, necessaria sunt Sacramenta in re, vel in voto, ut docet Concilium Trid. sess. 7. can. 4. et sess. 6. cap. 4. et hoc, quia iustificatio huiusmodi pendet e Christi institutione. Iam vero Baptismus instituit, ut simpliciter necessarium in re, vel in voto: At baptismus sanguinis praecise, non est Baptismus nec re, nec voto, et ratio voti solum extenditur, ad summum, ad baptismum Flaminis.

⁶ The adversaries RESPOND that there is a promise even about Martyrdom, Matth. 10. *Whoever shall confess me before men, I will also confess him before my Father.* Ioan. 12. *Whoever loses his soul for my sake, shall*

find it. Mark 8. *Whoever shall lose his soul for my sake and for the Gospel, shall save it.* These words, according to Augustine 13. de civit. cap. 7, contain a special promise made to those who expose their life for Christ. But if Baptism, because it is a figurative representation of the death of Christ, as in Rom. 6, has that power; much more Martyrdom, since it is a real conformation to Christ dying. This argument was used by Clement lib. 5. Constit. Apost. cap. 7. Cyprian Ep. 37. Tertullian in Apolog. near the end, and other Fathers.

RESPONDENT adversi, etiam de Martyrio haberi promissum, Matth. 10. Qui me confessus fuerit coram hominibus, confitebor et ego eum coram patre meo. Ioan. 12. Qui perdet animam suam propter me, inveniet eam. Marci 8. Qui perdiderit animam suam propter me, et propter Evangelium, salvam faciet eam. Quae verba ex Augustino 13. de civit. cap. 7. specialem continent promissionem, factam iis, qui vitam pro Christo exponunt. Quod si Baptismus, eo quod sit figuralis repraesentatio mortis Christi, ut habetur Rom. 6. habet eam virtutem; multo magis Martyrium, cum sit realis conformatio cum Christo moriente. Quo argumento usi sunt. Clem. lib. 5. Constit. Apost. cap. 7. Cyprianus Ep. 37. Tertullianus in Apolog. circa finem, et alii Patres.

⁷ But truly all these things collapse by the reasoning of D. Bonaventure, loc. cit. For Christ promises remission precisely to Baptism of water alone, at least in vow with an act of penance, as the Seraphic Doctor shows, dist. 4. part. 2. quaest. 1. ad 1, and the Council of Trent cited above. And although Scripture, with the Fathers, shows in Martyrdom a certain accidental excellence toward a little crown of laurel, still no one will find therein any excellence without charity, as I shall say in the response to the arguments.

ENIM vero haec omnia ex D. Bonaventurae loc. cit. discursu corruunt. Nam exacte Christus soli Baptismo aquae, saltem in voto, cum actu poenitentiae, promittit remissionem, ut ostendit S. Doctor dist. 4. part. 2. quaest. 1. ad 1. et Concil. Trid. supra citatum. Quamquam vero praecellentiam quandam accidentalem ad laureolam ostendat Scriptura cum Patribus in Martyrio, non tamen ad hoc ullus inveniet sine charitate excellentiam, ut dicam in responsione ad argumenta.

⁸ And if you say it is extended to little children, I say they are not formally averse to the acts proper to it by God. And behold the great difference, which neither Mastrius num. 182. nor Amicus disp. 12. sect. 3. acknowledged. Nor indeed does Christ promise glory through Martyrdom to those existing in mortal sin, but simply to those laying down their soul, as S. Bonaventure notes on Ioan. 12.

QUOD si dicas extendi ad parvulos, dico, eos non esse formaliter actibus propriis a Deo aversos. Et ecce diversitas grandis, quam neque Mastrius num. 182. neque Amicus disp. 12. sect. 3. agnoverunt. Neque vero Christus existentibus in mortali promittit per Martyrium gloriam, sed simpliciter ponentibus animam, ut notat S. Bonavent. ad 12. Ioan.

⁹ It is PROVED secondly by D. Bonaventure in 1. sent. dist. 17. part. 1. dub. 7. from 1 Cor. 13, where the Apostle, enumerating heroic works, all without charity, finally recounts Martyrdom: *And if I deliver my body, so that I burn, but have not charity, it profits me nothing.* And immediately he takes against himself that dying for another is an act of heroic charity, according to Ioan. 13. *Greater charity no one has, than that a man lay down his soul for his friends.*

PROBATUR secundo a D. Bonavent. in 1. sent. dist. 17. part. 1. dub. 7. ex prima Cor. 13. Ubi Apostolus enumerans opera heroica, quaecunque sine charitate, tandem Martyrium recenset: Et si tradidero corpus meum, ita ut ardeam; charitatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest. Statim vero sibi opponit, esse actum heroicæ charitatis mori pro alio, iuxta id Ioan. 13. Maiorem charitatem nemo habet, quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis.

¹⁰ Mastrius RESPONDS first that charity is required consequently, just as it is required for faith.

| *RESPONDET Mastrius primo, requiri charitatem consequenter, sicuti exigitur ad fidem.*

¹¹ AGAINST this: because he requires it so that the work may be meritorious; therefore it ought already to be clothed in charity.

| *CONTRA, quia exigit hic, ut opus sit meritorium: Ergo debet esse iam vestitum charitate.*

¹² He RESPONDS secondly that this can be understood even of other works outside Martyrdom, as if someone torment himself for empty glory, or do other works.

| *RESPONDET secundo, id posse intelligi etiam de aliis operibus extra Martyrium, ut si quis se excruciet ob gloriam inanem, vel alia opera faciat.*

¹³ AGAINST this: because the Apostle in the literal sense ascends by gradation to the heroic work of Martyrdom. So D. Bernard expounds it, serm. 27. in Cant., cited in D. Bonaventure lib. 2. Pharetra, cap. 25. The same D. Bernard, epist. 77, signifies that Martyrdom does not supply the place of Baptism except by the merit of the one receiving it.

| *CONTRA, quia Apostolus sensu litterali per gradationem ascendit ad opus heroicum Martyrii. Sic exponit D. Bernardus serm. 27. in Cant. apud D. Bonavent. lib. 2. Pharetra, cap. 25. Idem D. Bernardus epist. 77. significat, Martyrium non supplere vicem Baptismi, nisi ex merito suscipientis.*

¹⁴ But the Seraphic Doctor OBSERVES in the cited dub. 7 that through Martyrdom sins are remitted, that is, one is disposed to grace. Therefore he concludes: I believe nevertheless, that if someone who has no great obstacle should endure death for Christ, he would dispose himself to the reception of grace, so that charity would be given him.

| *OBSERVAT autem S. Doctor dubio 7. citato, per Martyrium remitti peccata, id est, ad gratiam disponi. Ideo concludit: Credo tamen, quod si aliquis pro Christo sustineret mortem, qui non magnum haberet obicem, quod disponderet se ad gratiae susceptionem, ita quod daretur sibi charitas.*

¹⁵ In this sense, lib. 4. Pharetrae, cap. 49, he cites D. Augustine lib. 20. de civit. cap. 13. and Prosper in l. sent. 149. sententia: *Those who, without receiving the laver of regeneration, die for the confession of Christ, it avails them as much for washing away sins as if they were washed in the sacred font of Baptism.*

| *In hunc sensum lib. 4. Pharetrae, cap. 49. affert D. Augustinum lib. 20. de civit. cap. 13. et Prosperum in l. sent. 149. sententia: Qui non percepto regenerationis lavacro, pro Christi confessione moriuntur, tantum eis valet ad abluenda peccata, quantum si abluerentur fonte sacro Baptismatis.*

¹⁶ He OBSERVES also in the cited dub. with D. Augustine 13. de Civitate, cap. 7, that Martyrdom is an act of heroic love, according to Ioan. 13. *Greater charity no one has*, and therefore no one undertakes the work of Martyrdom who has not been anticipated by a great aid of charity, and consequently is not disposed to charity if he undertakes it sincerely; for S. Augustine says: *When, without abundance of grace and Spirit, man could love Christ so much that he could not deny him in so great a peril of life with so great a hope of pardon.*

| *OBSERVAT etiam dub. citato cum D. Augustino 13. de Civitate, cap. 7. Martyrium esse actum amoris heroici, iuxta id Ioan. 13. Maiorem charitatem nemo habet, atque ideo non aggredi quenquam opus Martyrii, qui auxilio grandi charitatis non sit praeventus, atque adeo non disponatur ad charitatem, si sincere aggreditur; ait enim S. Augustinus:*

Quando sine abundantia gratiae, et Spiritus, tantum Christum amare possit homo, ut eum in tanto vitae discrimine sub tanta spe veniae negare non possit.

¹⁷ Again, in the cited quaest. the Seraphic Doctor brings forward a congruence, on account of which the Martyr suffering from the abundance of actual grace is disposed more to perfect habitual charity than one receiving Baptism, namely, because the latter is figuratively made like to Christ dead for us; the former truly, that is, really.

RURSUS quaest. citata affert S. Doctor congruentiam, ob quam Martyrium patiens ex actualis gratiae abundantia, disponitur magis ad perfectam habitualement charitatem, quam suscipiens Baptismum, nempe, quia hic figuraliter Christo assimilatur mortuo pro nobis; ille vero realiter.

¹⁸ D. Thomas brings this reasoning forward, quaest. 66. art. 11. and quaest. 87. art. 1. ad 2, and other Scholastics with D. Bonaventure, and it is taken from D. Clement P. lib. 1. Constit. Apostolic. cap. 7, where he says: *He who has merited to obtain Martyrdom, let him rejoice in the Lord, that he has attained so great a crown, and although he may have been a Catechumen, let him depart glad; for the passion he sustains for Christ shall stand to him for a truer baptism, because he himself in very fact dies with Christ; the others in figure.*

HANC rationem afferent D. Thom. quaest. 66. art. 11. et quaest. 87. art. 1. ad 2. et alii Scholastici cum D. Bonavent. et sumitur e D. Clemente P. lib. 1. Constit. Apostolic. cap. 7. ubi ait: Qui Martyrium consequi meruit, gaudeat in Domino, quod tantam coronam est adeptus, et quamvis fuerit Cathecumenus, laetus discedat; passio enim, quam pro Christo sustinet, cedet ei in veriore baptismum, quoniam ipse re ipsa commoritur Christo; alii in figura.

¹⁹ The Seraphic Doctor has ANOTHER proposition in the cited quaest., taken from D. Augustine, or Gennadius, de Eccl. dogmatib. cap. 74, where he says: *All sins are forgiven in Baptism; but in Martyrdom they are extinguished.* Ambrose also speaks in this way, lib. 1. de poenis. cap. 2, where he wishes to say that in Martyrdom sins are extinguished because they are washed away by justification, and by death the power of sinning is taken away. But this does not weaken our assertion.

ALIAM propositionem habet S. Doctor quaest. cit. quae sumitur ex D. Augustino, seu Gennadio de Eccl. dogmatib. cap. 74. ubi ait: Omnia peccata in Baptismo dimitti; in Martyrio autem extingui. Quo modo loquitur etiam Ambrosius lib. 1. de poenis. cap. 2. ubi vult dicere, in Martyrio peccata extingui, quia iustificatione diluuntur, et morte aufertur potentia peccandi. Hoc vero nostram assertionem non infirmat.

²⁰ SIMILARLY he says that Martyrdom is a Baptism and a crown, because he immediately transfers to it what is the utterance of S. Cyprian de singularitate cleric. cap. 20, which the Seraphic Doctor does not deny, but confirms in the body of the text.

SIMILITER ait, Martyrium esse Baptismum, et coronam, quia ad eam cito transfert, quod est effatum S. Cypriani de singularitate cleric. cap. 20. quod non negat S. Doctor, sed in corpore confirmat.

²¹ OTHER things like these the Holy Fathers have who enumerate Martyrdom among the baptisms, as Nazianzen orat. 39. Ambrose Sermon. 3. in Psal. 118. Tertullian lib. de laps. cap. 16.

ALIA his similia habent SS. PP. qui inter baptismata Martyrium enumerant, ut Nazianzenus orat. 39. Ambrosius Sermon. 3. in Psal. 118. Tertullianus lib. de laps. cap. 16.

²² They seem MORE to conflict, because, treating of Baptism of water, they except Martyrdom: Cyril of Jerusalem Cathec. 3. *If anyone is not baptized, he has not salvation, except only the Martyrs:* and

Fulgentius, de fide ad Petrum, cap. 3. *Without the Sacrament of Baptism, except those who in the Catholic Church pour out their blood for Christ without Baptism, no one can receive the kingdom of heaven, nor eternal life.* Bernard makes the same exception, epist. 77. Yet these do not mean this of one who is in actual mortal sin, but of one existing in original sin and having a vow of it; for if he is in mortal sin, they require an act of contrition.

MAGIS videntur pugnare, quia tractantes de Baptismo aquae, excipiunt Martyrium, Cyrillus Hierosol. Cathec. 3. Si quis non baptizatur, salutem non habet, praeter solos Martyres: et Fulgentius, de fide ad Petrum, cap. 3. Absque Sacramento Baptismatis, praeter eos, qui in Ecclesia Catholica sine Baptismate pro Christo sanguinem fundunt, nec regnum caelorum potest quisquam accipere, nec vitam aeternam. Eandem exceptionem facit Bernardus epist. 77. Hi tamen id non intelligunt intelligant de eo, qui est in peccato mortali actuali, sed de existente in originali, et habente votum eius, si enim est in mortali, actum contritionis exigunt.

²³ The adversaries bring forward MANY other passages from Innocent III in cap. Cum Martha, Augustine Serm. 5. de Martyribus, and Serm. 27. de verbis Apostoli, Tract. 84. in Ioan., Tertullian in Apol. at the end, and in Scorpiaco, cap. 6, Cyprian lib. de laudibus Mart., Clem. Alex. lib. IV. strom., Cypr. epist. 52, saying that all sins are remitted to the Martyr, and that he flies to heaven at once. All these are understood of venial sins, as the Seraphic Doctor notes in the body of the text.

MULTA alia loca afferunt adversarii ex Innocentio III. in cap. Cum Martha, Augustino Serm. 5. de Martyribus, et Serm. 27. de verbis Apostoli, Tract. 84. in Ioan. Tertulliano in Apol. in fine, et in Scorpiaco, cap. 6. Cypriano lib. de laudibus Mart. Clem. Alex. lib. IV. strom. Cypr. epist. 52. dicentibus, Martyri remitti peccata omnia, et in caelum statim evolare. Haec omnia de venialibus intelliguntur, ut notat S. Doctor in corpore.

²⁴ They will also OPPOSE that word of John: *Greater love than this no one has, than that a man lay down his soul for his friends.*

OPPONENT etiam illud Ioannis: Maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis.

²⁵ The Seraphic Doctor RESPONDS *dubio cit.* that the sense of this text is there expounded, when it is said: *for enemies.*

RESPONDET S. Doctor dubio cit. ibi exponi huius textus sensum, dum dicitur: pro inimicis.

²⁶ Wherefore, as Vasquez urges excellently, this efficacy of Martyrdom depends on the Divine will; but neither from Scripture, nor from the definition of the Church, nor from any other revelation is this power had, but when a Martyr is spoken of, it is supposed that he was justified from supernatural love by contrition, if he were stained lethally; and by a vow of Baptism, if he is not yet baptized. For these are the necessary means from the clear definitions of the Church: for an adult is bound to have a vow of Baptism if he cannot be rebaptized, as the Council of Trent defines in the place cited above; and if he does not have it, he is not a Martyr, since he is not disposed; for he lacks the will of assuming the necessary means of salvation. Similarly perfect penance with a vow of the Sacrament of Penance for mortal sins is a necessary means, as the same Council of Trent defines sess. 14. cap. 4. Therefore one not contrite, voluntarily undergoing death in that way, will perish, as many even of the adversaries concede; for he is not by Martyrdom exempted from the observance of the law, as Scotus infers d. 4. quaest. 1. litt. V., inferring that, if he does not remember, Martyrdom does not supply it, which doctrine Mastrius follows disp. 2. quaest. 7. num. 188.

Quare, ut optime Vasquez urget, haec Martyrii efficacia dependet ex Divina voluntate: at neque ex scriptura, neque ex definitione Ecclesiae, neque ex alia revelatione haec virtus habetur, sed dum Martyr dicitur, supponitur ex dilectione superna iustificatus contritione, si lethaliter sit maculatus; et voto Baptismi, si adhuc non est baptizatus: Haec enim sunt ex claris Ecclesiae definitionibus media necessaria: Adultus enim tenetur habere votum Baptismi, si non potest rebaptizari, ut definit Concilium Trid. supra citato loco; et si illud non habet, non est Martyr, cum non sit dispositus; caret enim voluntate assumendi media salutis necessaria. Similiter poenitentia perfecta cum voto Sacramenti Poenitentiae ob peccata mortalia est necessarium medium, ut definit idem Concilium Trid. sess. 14. cap. 4. Itaque non contritus, mortem ita voluntarie subiens, peribit, ut concedunt multi etiam ex adversis; neque enim per Martyrium ab observantia legis eximitur, ut infert Scotus d. 4. quaest. 1. litt. V. infert, si non recordetur, supplere Martyrium, quam doctrinam sequitur Mastrius disp. 2. quaest. 7. num. 188.

²⁷ For I ARGUE ad hominem from the same Mastrius *disp. 1. quaest. 10. num. 560. et in 3. disp. 6. quaest. 15.*: What is necessary by a necessity of means for salvation is so necessary that without it salvation cannot be obtained, nor does ignorance or forgetfulness excuse; but Baptism for all, and Penance for adult sinners, is necessary by a necessity of means, as he himself asserts immediately after *num. 365.*, with Scotus in several places; therefore.

ARGUO enim ad hominem ex eodem Mastrio disp. 1. quaest. 10. num. 560. et in 3. disp. 6. quaest. 15. Necessarium necessitate medii ad salutem, ita necessarium est, ut sine eo salus obtineri non possit, nec excusat ignorantia, vel oblivio: Sed Baptismus omnibus, et Poenitentia adultis peccatoribus est necessaria necessitate medii, ut ipse mox asserit num. 365. cum Scoto pluribus in locis: Ergo.

²⁸ The adversaries RESPOND that Martyrdom has a privilege, so that it suffices for original sin, and for mortal sins with attrition alone.

RESPONDENT adversarii, Martyrium habere privilegium, ut sufficiat pro originali, et cum sola attritione pro mortalibus.

²⁹ Yet this privilege is found nowhere, John 3 bearing against it: *Unless one be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, etc.* Nor that word: *Unless you do penance, etc.* Which the Council of Trent expounds of the pain of contrition *sess. 14. cap. 4.*, where it defines that with sorrow outside the Sacrament it is necessary, which has always been necessary for salvation; but this is contrition, as the Council declares, and Mastrius cites it *num. 198.*

Hoc tamen privilegium nullibi invenitur, detrahens illi Ioan. 3. Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua, et Spiritu sancto, etc. Neque illi: Nisi poenitentiam egeritis, etc. Quod de dolore contritionis explicat Concilium Trid. sess. 14. cap. 4. ubi definit, cum dolorem extra Sacramentum esse necessarium, qui semper fuit necessarius ad salutem; haec autem est contritio, ut declarat Concilium, et illud allegat Mastrius num. 198.

³⁰ HENCE now the question is solved, what disposition is required in a Martyr existing in actual mortal sin.

HINC iam soluta est quaestio, quae dispositio exigatur in Martyre, existente in actuali peccato mortali.

³¹ For SOME have said attrition suffices; for this is necessary even in Baptism of water; however some add that, from inadvertence, when death has overtaken, the will of dying for Christ suffices. So Scotus *4. dist. 14. quaest. 1.* Faber *disp. 11. de Poenit. cap. 2.* Aretinus *4. dist. 14. quaest. 3. art. 4.* Hiquaeus in the same place, and other Scotists, to whom Mastrius subscribes *disp. 2. quaest. 7. num. 195.*, adducing also Suarez, Coninck, Amicus, Aversa, Bonacina, Becanus, Turrianus, and others among these. Caspensis thinks the same *Tract. 17. disp. 4. sect. 3. num. 30.* with Sanchez *Tom. 1. Decal. lib. 2.*

cap. 35., because, he says, the love of God above all things is implicitly enclosed in this. So Suar. *disp.* 29. *sect.* 3. Henriquez cap. 34. Coninch. *quaest.* 6. *dub.* 2. Bonac. *de Sacram. disp.* 2. *quaest.* 1. *puncto* 1.

ALIQUI enim dixere sufficere attritionem; haec enim etiam in Baptismo aquae est necessaria; attamen addunt aliqui, ex inadvertentia morte invaso, sufficere voluntatem moriendi pro Christo. Ita Scotus 4. dist. 14. quaest. 1. Faber disp. 11. de Poenit. cap. 2. Aretinus 4. dist. 14. quaest. 3. art. 4. Hiquaeus ibidem, et alii Scotistae, quibus subscribit Mastrius disp. 2. quaest. 7. num. 195. adducens etiam Suarez, Coninchium, Amicum, Aversam, Bonacinam, Becanum, Turrianum, et alios apud hos. Idem sentit Caspensis Tract. 17. disp. 4. sect. 3. num. 30. cum Sanchez Tom. 1. Decal. lib. 2. cap. 35. quia in hoc, ait, clauditur amor Dei super omnia implicite. Sic Suar. disp. 29. sect. 3. Henriquez cap. 34. Coninch. quaest. 6. dub. 2. Bonac. de Sacram. disp. 2. quaest. 1. puncto 1.

³² THE SECOND opinion requires contrition: So the Authors cited at the beginning of the question for the first opinion. And it is D. Thom. *quaest.* 66. *art.* 12. *ad* 2., where for this he expounds the passage of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 13: If I deliver my body, so that I burn, but have not charity, it profits me nothing. Whence he infers that Baptism of blood includes Baptism of the Spirit.

SECUNDA sententia exigit contritionem: Ita Authores initio quaestionis pro prima sententia allati. Estque D. Thom. quaest. 66. art. 12. ad 2. ubi ad hoc exponit locum Apostoli, prima Cor. 13. Si tradidero corpus meum, ita ut ardeam, charitatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest. Unde infert, Baptismum sanguinis includere Baptismum flaminis.

³³ I assert therefore, secondly, that contrition is necessary.

Assero igitur secundo, necessariam esse contritionem.

³⁴ It is *PROVED* most efficaciously by the reason brought forward above, because Penance from contrition with the Sacrament in vow, when it cannot be had, is necessary by a necessity of means; and just as, if the Martyr were to survive, he would be bound to Baptism of water, if he is not baptized, and to confession, if he has actually died in sin, so it is required that he now be contrite. And this, speaking per se, Suarez asserts to be necessary, because contrition with a vow of the Sacrament (he says) is by the Decree of the Council of Trent *sess.* 14. *cap.* 4. necessary where the Sacrament cannot be had.

PROBATUR efficacissime ratione, supra allata, quia Poenitentia ex contritione cum Sacramento in voto, quando illud nequit haberi, est necessaria necessitate medii; et sicuti, si Martyr superviveret, teneretur Baptismo aquae, si non est baptizatus, et confessioni, si actualiter est mortuus peccato, ita exigitur, ut nunc conteratur: Et hoc, per se loquendo, necessarium asserit Suarez, quia contritio cum voto Sacramenti (ait) est ex Decreto Concilii Trident. sess. 14. cap. 4. necessaria, ubi non potest haberi Sacramentum.

³⁵ NEITHER does he rightly infer in the second *dicto* that attrition could suffice from ignorance.

NEQUE recte infert in secundo dicto, sufficere posse ex ignorantia attritionem.

³⁶ But I *ARGUE* against him ad hominem: A necessity of means differs from a necessity of precept, because the latter does not admit ignorance, as all confess; but according to you, perfect Penance here is necessary by a necessity of means; therefore. Wherefore Mastrius does not rightly say that we seek a principle by this argument; for we argue from the universal foundation of the Church. Wherefore at least in death we ought to embrace the safer opinion, and not to fight in uncertainty, as Bassaeus says solidly with D. Bonaventure.

ARGUO autem contra eum ad Hominem: Necessitas medii a necessitate praecepti differt, quia ea non admittit ignorantiam, ut omnes fatentur; sed per te hic, Poenitentia perfecta est necessitate medii necessaria: Ergo. Quare non recte Mastrius ait, nos hoc argumento petere principium; Arguimus enim ex universali Ecclesiae fundamento: Quare in morte saltem, cettioorem debemus amplecti sententiam, et non pugnare in incertum, ut solide cum D. Bonavent. ait Bassaeus.

Doubt II: Whether the baptism of infants can be supplied by martyrdom

¹ The NEGATIVE opinion is attributed to Alexander of Hales 4. part. quaest. 22. memb. 5. art. 1. Adrian in 4. quaest. ult. de Baptismo, Armachanus lib. 8. de qq. Armen. cap. 37. D. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 4. part. 2. art. 1. quaest. 2. — where however he did not teach it, nor can this opinion be found in his writings, as Suarez disp. 29. sect. 1. Vasquez disp. 153. cap. 7. Mastrius disp. 2. quaest. 7. art. 4. and other recent authors cited by him testify.

SENTENTIA negativa adscribitur Alensi 4. part. quaest. 22. memb. 5. art. 1. Adriano in 4. quaest. ult. de Baptismo, Armacano lib. 8. de qq. Armen. cap. 37. D. Bonaventurae in 4. dist. 4. part. 2. art. 1. quaest. 2. ubi tamen id non docuit, nec in eius scriptis haec sententia reperiri potest, ut testantur Suarez disp. 29. sect. 1. Vasquez disp. 153. cap. 7. Mastrius disp. 2. quaest. 7. art. 4. et alii recentes apud illum.

² The SECOND opinion, the assertive one, is that of D. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 114. art. 1. ad 1. et quodl. 6. art. 4. Richard in 4. dist. 4. art. 2. quaest. 3. Scotus dist. 4. quaest. 3., whom the others commonly imitate, as in Mastrius loc. cit. Soto disp. 3. art. 11. Suarez, and Vasquez above. This is the opinion of D. Bonaventure dist. 4. part. 2. art. 1. quaest. 2., where he limits the opinion of Alexander of Hales, who said that Baptism of water profits more persons than that of blood. Whence he makes no distinction here between infants and adults, as Suarez notes.

SECUNDA sententia assertiva est D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 114. art. 1. ad 1. et quodl. 6. art. 4. Rich. in 4. dist. 4. art. 2. quaest. 3. Scotus dist. 4. quaest. 3. quem communiter imitantur alii apud Mastrium loc. cit. Soto disp. 3. art. 11. Suarez, et Vasquez supra. Haec est sententia D. Bonavent. dist. 4. part. 2. art. 1. quaest. 2. ubi limitat sententiam Alensis, dicentis, Baptismum aquae pluribus prodesse, quam sanguinis. Unde nihil in hoc distinguit inter parvulos, et adultos, ut notat Suarez.

³ MORE CLEARLY, in the fourth part of that distinction, dub. 4. cit., where he confesses that the Holy Innocents are Martyrs by privilege. And in dubio 4. he asserts that an infant who, while being carried to Baptism, is killed so as not to be baptized, and dies for Baptism, is rightly and piously believed baptized in his blood: what could be clearer?

CLARIUS ea quarta distinctionis parte, dub. 4. cit. ubi SS. Innocentes esse ex privilegio Martyres fatetur. Et dubio 4. asserit, infantem, qui, dum portatur ad Baptismum, occiditur, ne baptizetur, et moritur pro Baptismo, recte in sanguine suo pie credi baptizatum: quid clarius?

⁴ THE Innocents indeed the Church venerates as Martyrs, and the Holy Fathers confess it: Augustine lib. 3. de lib. arb. cap. 23. et lib. 2. de Symbolo ad Catech. cap. 5. et lib. 3. cap. 4. Cyprian serm. de Stella, et Magis. Leo Pope serm. de Epiph. primo, et secundo. Origen homil. 3. in varia Evang. loca. And the Church prays for them in its prayer as Martyrs.

Innocentes sane, ut Martyres, veneratur Ecclesia, et Sancti Patres fatentur, Augustinus lib. 3. de lib. arb. cap. 23. et lib. 2. de Symbolo ad Catech. cap. 5. et lib. 3. cap. 4. Cyprianus serm. de Stella, et Magis. Leo Pap. serm. de Epiph. primo, et secundo. Origenes homil. 3. in varia Evang. loca. Ecclesia vero eos in oratione, ut Martyres, exorat.

⁵ S. Bonaventure adds, *dub. 1.*, that the liberty of will was wanting to them, and therefore their Martyrdom was not so perfect as in holy adults; for to perfection charity is required, moving the will, as is said *Ioan. 15*. Wherefore, when Mastrius infers: If contrition were necessary, it would follow that in infants the Martyrdom is imperfect, according to the Fathers — which is readily granted to him: Nay, I retort: If the reason is equal, therefore no disposition of will is required in adults.

Addit S. Bonav. dub. 1. defecisse eis voluntatis libertatem, ideo non ita perfectum Martyrium fuisse, sicuti in sanctis adultis; ad perfectionem enim requiritur charitas movens voluntatem, ut dicitur Ioan. 15. Quare dum Mastrius infert: Si esset necessaria contritio, sequeretur in parvulis imperfectum esse, iuxta Patres, Martyrium, quod ipsi libenter conceditur: Imo retorqueo: Si est aequalis ratio: Ergo nulla voluntatis dispositio exigitur in adultis.

Question IV: On the precepts of fortitude

¹ We do not have affirmative precepts of fortitude in particular; although we do have precepts of Patience and Perseverance, annexed to fortitude, as D. Thomas says *quaest. 140. art. 2. ad 3. Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 2. dub. 3.*

De praeceptis Fortitudinis.

Affirmativa quidem praecepta fortitudinis in particulari non habemus; Tametsi praecepta Patientiae, et Perseverantiae adnexarum fortitudini habeamus, ut ait D. Thom. quaest. 140. art. 2. ad 3. Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 2. dub. 3.

² Some have precepts in a certain genus, for instance in wars, of not yielding *Deuter. 20. et Iosue 1. et prima Ioan. 3.*, of laying down one's life for the brethren. Nor is there any doubt that the acts of fortitude themselves fall under a precept, as I said in my *Tract. de Charitate*, when treating of the order of that virtue.

Habere aliqui in aliquo genere, puta in bellis, praecepta non cedendi Deuter. 20. et Iosue 1. et prima Ioan. 3. ponendi animam pro fratribus. Nec dubium, quin ipsi actus fortitudinis sub praecepto cadant, ut dixi Tract. de Charitate, agendo de ordine ipsius.

³ As to the negative precepts, inordinate fear, opposed to fortitude, is forbidden: *Deut. 20. et Matth. 10. Fear not them who kill the body.*

Quoad praecepta negativa, prohibetur inordinatus timor, fortitudini oppositus, Deut. 20. et Matth. 10. Nolite timere eos, qui occidunt corpus.

Question V: On the vices opposed to fortitude

¹ Three vices opposed to fortitude are enumerated: Timidity, Fearlessness (intimiditas), and Audacity.

De Vitiis Fortitudini oppositis.

Tria vitia fortitudini opposita numerantur, Timiditas, Intimiditas, et Audacia.

² As to Fear, it is then inordinate when the appetite absolutely flees those things which reason dictates are to be endured. So S. Thomas.

Quoad Timorem, tunc est inordinatus, quando appetitus absolute refugit ea, quae ratio dictat esse sustinenda. Ita S. Thomas.

³ Here is condemned that fear which is inordinate concerning the dangers of death, when on this account one abandons the faith, or those things which fortitude commands to be pursued. Of these it

is said *Apocal. 21. But the fearful, etc. their part shall be in the pool, etc.*

Hic damnatur timor, qui est inordinatus circa pericula mortis, dum ex hoc relinquit fidem, vel ea, quae fortitudo praecipit proseguenda. De his dicitur Apocal. 21. Timidis autem, etc. pars illorum erit in stagno, etc.

⁴ Fearlessness (intimiditas) is the vice by which things to be feared are not feared. Thus of the Celts Aristotle says *3. Eth. cap. 7. They fear nothing on account of foolishness*, and there he opposes this to Fortitude.

Intimiditas est vitium, quo non timentur timenda. Sic de Celtis ait Aristoteles 3. Eth. cap. 7. Nil eos timere propter stultitiam, Ibi hanc Fortitudini opponit.

⁵ But it exceeds and inclines to the extreme. Of these *Prov. 14. The wise man feareth, and declineth from evil: the fool leapeth over, and confideth.*

Excedit autem, et ad extremum declinat. De his Prov. 14. Sapiens timet, et declinat a malo: Stultus transilit, et confidit.

⁶ Audacity is an excess in undergoing and invading dangers, as D. Thomas says *quaest. 127. art. 1.*, according to Aristotle *2. Ethic. capite 7. et lib. 3. cap. 7.*

Audacia est excessus in periculis subeundis, et invadendis, ut ait D. Thom. quaest. 127. art. 1. iuxta Aristotelem 2. Ethic. capite 7. et lib. 3. cap. 7.

⁷ It differs from fearlessness; for this does not estimate the dangers, as if in respect of the one acting there were none, or they were not evils; but Audacity, or rashness, attacks dangers rashly on account of excessive overconfidence.

Differt ab intimiditate, haec enim non aestimat pericula, quasi vero respectu operantis nulla sint, aut mala non sint: Audacia vero, seu temeritas, ob nimiam praesidentiam, temere aggreditur pericula.

⁸ It is said to have the vice in the opposite extreme, namely, Cowardice (ignavia), as is gathered from Aristotle *loc. cit.*, namely, when one does not dare what he ought, and when he ought.

Habere dicitur vitium in alio extremo oppositum, nempe, Ignaviam, ut colligitur ex Aristotele loc. cit. cum scilicet non audet, quod debet, et cum debet.

⁹ Commonly, however, these sins are not judged distinct from the sins which follow from them, or to which they are ordered.

Communiter tamen haec peccata non censentur distincta a peccatis, quae ex eisdem consequuntur, sive ad quae ordinantur.

DISPUTATION II: ON THE VIRTUES JOINED TO FORTITUDE

¹ Fortitude indeed has no subjective parts, of which it might be predicated as a genus; for it is not divided into many virtues specifically distinct; it is one special virtue about a specific object; it has, however, integral parts according to those things which must concur for the act of fortitude; it has also potential parts, inasmuch as those things which fortitude observes about the most difficult matters, namely, the dangers of death, certain other virtues observe about certain other less arduous things, and these are joined to fortitude.

De Virtutibus, Fortitudini Adiunctis.

Non habet quidem Fortitudo partes subiectivas, de quibus veluti genus praedicetur; non enim dividitur in multas virtutes, specie distinctas; est enim una virtus specialis circa obiectum specificum; habet tamen partes integrales secundum ea, quae necesse est ad actum fortitudinis concurrere; habet etiam potentiales, quatenus ea, quae fortitudo observat circa difficillima, nempe, circa pericula mortis; aliquae aliae virtutes observant circa alia quaedam minus ardua, et hae fortitudini adiunguntur.

² The integral parts of Fortitude, moreover, are four: Magnanimity, or confidence, and a certain hope implanted by virtue of surely overcoming the dangers of death. Magnificence, insofar as it signifies the constant execution of those things which one has destined in his mind by prior confidence. Patience, by which the mind is not broken by sorrow under the difficulty of imminent dangers of death. Perseverance, signifying a mind unmoved amid the dangers of death, and enduring in good even to the end. So S. Thomas *loc. cit. ex Tullio lib. 2. de Invent.*

Partes autem integrales Fortitudinis sunt quatuor, Magnanimitas, seu fiducia, ac spes certa indita virtute superandi pericula mortis. Magnificentia, quatenus significat constantem executionem eorum, quae praevia fiducia animo destinavit. Patientia, qua animus difficultate imminentium mortis periculorum per tristitiam non frangatur. Perseverantia, significans animum inter pericula mortis immobilem, ac in bono usque ad finem durabilem. Ita S. Thom. loc. cit. ex Tullio lib. 2. de Invent.

Question I: On magnanimity

¹ Magnanimity, as it is a virtue annexed to Fortitude, has for its matter honors and dishonors. So D. Thomas *art. 1. ex Aristotele 4. Eth. cap. 3.* For he is Magnanimous who has a mind for something great, or who has a mind rightly affected concerning those things which among exterior goods are absolutely and simply the greatest, as is honor: both because honor is nearest to virtue, as its testimony; and because it is rendered to God and to the best of men; and because, in pursuing honor and forbidding vituperation, men postpone all other things: therefore he who is rightly affected concerning honors is called Magnanimous.

De Magnanimitate.

Magnanimitas, ut est virtus Fortitudini adiuncta, pro materia habet honores, et inhonorationes. Ita D. Thom. art. 1. ex Aristotele 4. Eth. cap. 3. Est enim Magnanimus, qui habet animum ad aliquid magnum, seu qui habet animum recte affectum circa ea, quae inter res exteriores absolute, et simpliciter sunt maxima, uti est honor, tum quia honor est propinquissimus virtuti, tanquam testimonium eius; tum quia Deo, et optimis quibusque exhibetur, tum quia honori

consequendo, et vituperio vetando homines omnia alia postponunt: ergo qui circa honores recte affectus est, dicitur Magnanimus.

² This the Seraphic Doctor intended in his *Opusc. declarator. terminorum Theol.*, when he defines Magnanimity: *It is a spontaneous and rational undertaking of difficult things.*

ID voluit S. Doctor in Opusc. declarator. terminorum Theol. dum Magnanimitatem definit : Est difficultium spontanea, et rationabilis aggressio.

³ And in *serm. 5. Hexaëmer.*, where he says that Magnanimity is that which appreciates great things and despises vile ones. But he corrects what Aristotle says, lib 4. moral. Nicom. cap. 3, *The magnanimous man is in the appetite of honor*, and explains it to be about the true honors of eternal things, not about worldly praises. Therefore the magnanimous man tends toward those things which are truly worthy of honor, as D. Thomas says *loco cit.* and Tannerus *disp. 3. quaest. 2. num. 56.*, nor is true magnanimity opposed to humility, since under different aspects the former wills honors, the latter refuses them, as D. Bonaventure teaches *loco cit.* and D. Thomas *ad 4.*; for magnanimity esteems one worthy of great things with consideration of the gifts of God: but humility, so that one may lie open to contempt, with consideration of his own vileness.

ET serm. 5. Hexaëmer. ubi ait, Magnanimitatem esse, quae appreciat magna, et despicit vilia. Corrigit autem id, quod ait Aristoteles lib 4. moral. Nicom. cap. 3. Magnanimus est in appetitu honoris, et explicat, esse in veris honoribus aeternorum, non in laudibus mundanis. Itaque magnanimus ad ea, quae honore sunt vere digna, tendit, ut ait D. Thom. loco cit. et Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 2. num. 56. neque magnanimitas vera opponitur humilitati, cum sub diversis rationibus illa honores velit, haec recuset, ut docet D. Bonavent. loco cit. et D. Thom. ad 4. nam magnanimitas aestimat dignum magnis consideratis Dei donis: Humilitas vero, ut se patui pendat; considerata sua vilitate.

⁴ I ASSERT first, that Magnanimity is a virtue.

ASSERO primo, Magnanimitatem esse virtutem.

⁵ It is PROVED because it pertains to virtue that the good of reason be preserved in human affairs; but among other exterior human goods, honors hold the principal place: therefore magnanimity, which sets the mode of reason about great honors, is a virtue.

PROBATUR quia ad virtutem pertinet, ut in rebus humanis bonum rationis servetur; inter caeteras autem res humanas exteriores praecipuum locum tenent honores: Ergo magnanimitas, quae modum rationis ponit circa magnos honores, est virtus.

⁶ THIS also the affections, or dispositions, of the body confirm, which Aristotle attributes to the Magnanimous man, 4. *Eth. cap. 3.*, highly consonant with the disposition of an honest mind, when he says: *The movement of the magnanimous man seems slow, and his voice grave, and his speech steady.* For velocity of movement (says S. Thomas *ad 3.*) proceeds from this, that a man attends to many things, which he hastens to accomplish; but the magnanimous man attends only to great things, which are few, and which also require great attention, and therefore he has a slow movement.

HOC etiam confirmant affectiones, seu dispositiones corporis, quas Aristoteles 4. Eth. cap. 3. Magnanimo tribuit, valde consentaneas honestae mentis dispositioni, eum ait: Motus lentus magnanimi videtur, et vox gravis, et locutio stabilis. Velocitas enim motus (ait S. Thom. ad 3.) provenit ex eo, quod homo ad multa intendit, quae explere festinat; sed magnanimus solum ad magna intendit, quae pauca sunt? quae etiam egent magna attentione, et ideo habet motum tardum.

⁷ SIMILARLY also sharpness of voice, and velocity, belong especially to those who wish to contend about anything whatsoever, which does not pertain to the magnanimous, who meddle only with great things. Tannerus notes these things *num. 58.* from D. Bonaventure in *Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 2. cap. 58.*, where he also brings forward other signs of the magnanimous man, as a square forehead of moderate size, long strides, etc.

SIMILITER etiam acuitas vocis, et velocitas praecipue competit his, qui de quibuslibet contendere volunt, quod non pertinet ad magnanimos, qui non intromittunt se, nisi de magnis. Haec notat Tannerus num. 58. ex D. Bonavent. in Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 2. cap. 58. ubi etiam alia magnanimi indicia affert, ut frontem quadratam, et modetatae magnitudinis, longos passus, etc.

⁸ I ASSERT secondly, that Magnanimity is a special virtue. So D. Thomas *quaest. 129. art. 4.* from Aristotle 2. *Eth. cap. 7.* The reason is, because it constitutes a mode about a determinate matter, namely about honors, as I said. But because honor is the reward of every virtue, therefore magnanimity consequently, by reason of its matter, regards all the virtues.

ASSERO secundo, Magnanimitatem esse specialem virtutem. Ita D. Thom. quaest. 129. art. 4. ex Aristotele 2. Eth. cap. 7. Ratio est, quia modum constituit circa determinatam materiam, scilicet circa honores, ut dixi. Quia tamen honor est cuiuslibet virtutis praemium, ideo magnanimitas consequenter, ratione suae materiae, respicit omnes virtutes.

⁹ I ASSERT thirdly, that Magnanimity is a certain potential part of Fortitude. So D. Thomas *art. 5.* and D. Bonaventure above. It agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind in arduous things; but it falls short of it, because it confirms in that about which it is easier to preserve firmness.

ASSERO tertio, Magnanimitas est pars quaedam potentialis Fortitudinis. Ita D. Thom. art. 5. et D. Bonavent. supra. Convenit cum fortitudine, confirmando animum in arduis; sed deficit ab ea, quia firmat in eo, circa quod facilius est firmitatem servare.

¹⁰ To Magnanimity, Confidence contributes, and Security to Fortitude; but consequently Security belongs to magnanimity, and Confidence to fortitude. So S. Thomas in the same place *art. 6. et 7.*

AD Magnanimitatem confert Fiducia, et securitas ad Fortitudinem, ex consequenti vero securitas ad magnanimitatem, et fiducia ad fortitudinem pertinet. Ita S. Thom. ibidem art. 6. et 7.

¹¹ Now confidence is a certain hope of the mind of bringing to the end the thing begun. Security is the habit by which imminent evils are not dreaded, as S. Bonaventure teaches in *opusc. declarat. terminorum Theologiae.*

Est autem fiducia certa spes animi perducendi ad finem rem inchoatam. Securitas est habitus quo imminetia incommoda non formidantur, ut docet S. Bonavent. in opusc. declarat. terminorum Theologiae.

¹² The goods of fortune also contribute to magnanimity. So S. Thomas *art. 8.*

Etiam bona fortunae ad magnanimitatem conferunt. Ita S. Thom. art. 8.

Question II: On the vices opposed to magnanimity

¹ FOUR are these, of which three are opposed by excess, Presumption, Ambition, and Vain glory: the fourth by defect, namely Pusillanimity.

QUATUOR sunt haec, e quibus tria opponuntur per excessum, Praesumptio, Ambitio, et Inanis gloria: Quartum per defectum, scilicet Pusillanimitas.

² PRESUMPTION is the vice by which one attempts things that exceed his powers and capacity. Thus St. Thomas, *art. 1. and 2.*, following Aristotle, *2. Eth. cap. 7. and lib. 4. cap. 3.* For the magnanimous man does not strive for things greater than befit him, nor does he transgress the proportion of his capacity, just as naturally every action is commensurated with the power of the agent. The same St. Bonaventure teaches, *in speculo animae, cap. 1.*

PRAESUMPTIO est vitium, quo quis attentat ea, quae vires, et facultatem suam excedunt. Ita S. Thom. art. 1. et 2. iuxta Aristotelem 2. Eth. cap. 7. et lib. 4. cap. 3. Magnanimus enim non tendit in maiora, quam sibi conveniunt, nec transcendit proportionem suae facultatis, sicut etiam naturaliter quaelibet actio commensuratur virtuti agentis. Id ipsum docet S. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 1.

³ BUT SINCE what we can do through others we can in a manner do through ourselves, according to Aristotle, *3. Eth. cap. 3.*, therefore it is not presumption to attempt a work of virtue with Divine help, which is denied to no one. It will, however, be presumption if one attempts it from himself, or for his own merits, or falsely, or more than others, as Bl. Bonaventure teaches, *loco citato.*

QUIA tamen, quae per alios possumus, quodammodo per nos possumus ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 3. ideo non est praesumptio attentare opus virtutis cum Divino auxilio, quod nemini denegatur. Erit vero praesumptio si a se, vel pro suis meritis, vel falso, vel plus aliis attentet, ut docet D. Bonavent. loco citato.

⁴ AMBITION is the vice by which one inordinately desires honor. Thus Bl. Thomas, *quaest. 130. art. 1. and 2.*; Bl. Bonaventure, *in speculo animae, cap. 4.* This, moreover, happens in three ways: either the ambitious man seeks an honor he does not merit, or an honor which he does not refer to God, or to the utility of others, but to his own advantage. Thus St. Thomas, *quaest. 131. art. 1. and 2.*; Bl. Bonaventure, *in Pharetra 3. part. cap. 24.*, proving this with many authorities of the Fathers.

AMBITIO est vitium, quo quis inordinate honorem desiderat. Ita D. Thom. quaest. 130. art. 1. et 2. D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 4. Hoc autem tripliciter evenit, vel ambiens honorem, quem non meretur, vel quem non in Deum, vel in aliorum utilitatem, sed in proprium refert commodum. Ita S. Thom. quaest. 131. art. 1. et 2. D. Bonavent. in Pharetra 3. part. cap. 24. multis Patrum autoritatibus id probans.

⁵ Wherein the Seraphic Doctor notes, *serm. 5. Hexaëmer.*, that honor is not a good desirable per se.

UBI notat S. Doctor serm. 5. Hexaëmer. honorem non esse bonum per se appetibile.

⁶ VAIN glory is the vice by which glory is sought vainly, either about what is not, or about what is not worthy of glory; or about what is praised only by the judgment of men, either by seeking glory, or by referring glory itself to an undue end. Thus Bl. Thomas, *quaest. 132. art. 1. and 2.*; Bl. Bonaventure, *in speculo animae, cap. 1. and 4.* Thus it is opposed to magnanimity, seeking a glory which is a certain effect of honor unduly. See also Bl. Bonaventure, *p. p. Centil. sect. 18. and in explicatione terminorum Theol.*

INANIS gloria est vitium, quo vana quaeritur gloria, vel de eo, quod non est, vel de eo, quod non est gloria dignum; vel de eo, quod iudicio hominum tantum laudatur, gloriam expetendo, vel ipsam gloriam ad finem indebitum referendo. Ita D. Thom. quaest. 132. art. 1. et 2. D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 1. et 4. Sic opponitur magnanimitati appetens gloriam, quae est effectus quidam honoris indebite. Vide etiam D. Bonavent. p. p. Centil. sect. 18. et in explicatione terminorum Theol.

⁷ It can, moreover, be mortal, if one glories in illicit things, or refers glory to himself as his last end.

POTEST autem esse mortale, si de illicitis gloriatur, vel ad se, ut finem ultimum, gloriam referat.

⁸ VAIN glory is a capital vice, whose daughters are Disobedience, Boastfulness, Hypocrisy, Incontinence, or Contentiousness, Obstinacy, Discord, and Presumption of novelty. Thus St. Bonaventure, *in speculo, loco cit. and p. p. Centil. sect. 18.*; Bl. Thomas, *quaest. 132. art. 4. and 5.*, from Bl. Gregory, *31. moral. cap. 31.*

| *INANIS gloria est vitium capitale, cuius filiae sunt Inobedientia, Iactantia, Hypocrisis, Incontinentia, seu Contentio, Pertinacia, Discordia, et Praesumptio novitatum. Ita S. Bonavent. in speculo, loco cit. et p. p. Centil. sect. 18. D. Thom. quaest. 132. art. 4. et 5. ex D. Gregorio 31. moral. cap. 31.*

⁹ DISOBEDIENCE is the will fleeing subjection, unwilling to be subject to superiors.

| *INOBEDIENTIA est voluntas fugiens minoritatem, nolens subiici superioribus.*

¹⁰ BOASTFULNESS is the will, on account of an apparent power of its own, showing itself off.

| *IACTANTIA est voluntas, propter apparentem potestatem propriam se ostentans.*

¹¹ HYPOCRISY is the will simulating itself deceitfully under the appearance of sanctity, acting openly in a base manner and vilely in secret, with no intention, no work.

| *HYPPOCRISIS est voluntas per speciem sanctitatis se simulans fallaciter in aperto, et viliter agens in occulto, sine intentione, sine opere.*

¹² INCONTINENCE is the will, by conforming itself, seeking to be praised by those who are evil.

| *INCONTINENTIA est voluntas per conformationem sui, ab his, qui mali sunt, laudari appetens.*

¹³ OBSTINACY is the will fleeing the warning of probity, irrevocably defending its words or deeds.

| *PERTINACIA est voluntas fugiens minorationem probitatis, dicta, vel facta sua irrevocabiliter defendens.*

¹⁴ Discord is the will fleeing the lessening of its wisdom, dissenting from what is said by others.

| *Discordia est voluntas fugiens minorationem sapientiae ab his, quae ab aliis dicuntur, dissentiens.*

¹⁵ Presumption of novelty is the will exceeding the quality of its state, desiring to be conspicuous on account of an apparent novelty of knowledge or wisdom.

| *Novitatum praesumptio est voluntas excedens qualitatem sui ordinis, propter apparentem novitatem scientiae, vel sapientiae ostentari cupiens.*

¹⁶ But Bl. Isidore, *lib. in Deuter. cap. 16.*, distinguishing between pride and vainglory, says that from pride arise Contempt, Envy, Disobedience, Blasphemy, Murmuring, Detraction, and others. But from Vain glory, he says, arise Contentions, Heresies, Boastfulness, and Presumption of novelty. So the holy Doctor, *p. p. Centil. sect. 18.*

| *At D. Isidorus lib. in Deuter. cap. 16. distinguens inter superbiam, et inanem gloriam, ait, de superbia oriri Contemptum, Invidiam, Inobedientiam, Blasphemiam, Murmurationem, Detractionem, et alia. Ex Inani vero gloria, ait oriri Contentiones, Haereses, Iactantiam, et Praesumptionem novitatum. Haec S. Doctor p. p. Centil. sect. 18.*

¹⁷ Nothing, however, is to be wondered at, that these are born of Vain glory, as of a bad shrub, for the appetite for glory is vehement, and on the part of the universal matter, as Tanner also notes, *d. 3. quaest. 2. dub. 5. num. 73.*

Nil autem mirum, haec ex Inani gloria, ut mala arbusta, nasci, nam appetitus gloriae est vehemens, et ex parte materiae universalis, ut notat etiam Tanner. d. 3. quaest. 2. dub. 5. num. 73.

¹⁸ Pusillanimity is the vice opposed to Magnanimity by defect, whereby one shuns great things, even those proportioned to his powers; thus that servant who on that account hid his talent was punished, *Matth. 25. Lucae 19*. Thus Bl. Thomas, *quaest. 133. art. 1. and 2*. It is placed among the vices by Aristotle, *4. Eth. cap. 3.*, and by Bl. Gregory, *p. p. Pastor. cap. 5*. It is, moreover, at the other extreme from presumption, as Bl. Bonaventure teaches, in *speculo animae, cap. 3*. He names this vice a child of Sloth.

Pusillanimitas est vitium Magnanimitati oppositum per defectum, quo magna refugit, etiam quae suis viribus sunt proportionata; sic ille servus, qui ob id talentum abscondit, punitus est Matth. 25. Lucae 19. Ita D. Thom. quaest. 133. art. 1. et 2. Sic inter vitia ponitur ab Aristotele 4. Eth. cap. 3. et D. Gregorio p. p. Pastor. cap. 5. est autem in altero extremo praesumptionis, ut docet D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 3. Hoc autem vitium Acediae filium nominat.

¹⁹ The holy Doctor adds that it has the nature of mortal sin, when by pusillanimity the things necessary for salvation are omitted; if anyone out of pusillanimity should neglect the defense, preaching, or correction, to the detriment of faith, or the spiritual, or even temporal loss of his neighbor, as St. Gregory says in *Past. part. 1. cap 5*.

Addit S. Doctor habere rationem mortalis, cum pusillanimitate omittuntur necessaria ad salutem; si quis detrimentum fidei, vel damnum proximi spirituale, vel etiam temporale ex pusillanimitate defensionis, praedicationis, vel correctionis dissimularet, ut ait S. Gregorius in Past. part. 1. cap 5.

²⁰ From this branch arise servile, human, and worldly fear. Servile fear is when one abandons evil out of fear of punishment.¹ Human fear is when one, sparing the flesh, shuns spiritual goods that are adverse to the flesh. Worldly fear is when out of fear of the world, that is, of some person, one omits a good.

¹ Editor's note: the print reads 'ob metum poenae timorem' — a typesetter's doublet ('metum... timorem'); rendered as 'out of fear of punishment'.

Ex hoc ramo oriuntur Timor servilis, humanus, et mundanus. Timor servilis est, cum quis dimittit malum ob metum poenae timorem. Timor humanus est, cum parcens carni, spiritualia bona refugit, quae carni adversantur. Timor mundanus, cum timore mundi, scilicet personae alicuius, omittit bonum.

²¹ The first fear is always mortal; but the second and third are only mortal when on their account things necessary for salvation are omitted. See all this in *speculo animae, loc. cit.*

Primus timor semper est mortalis; at secundus, et tertius, tantum mortales sunt, cum propter ea omittuntur salutis necessaria. Haec omnia vide in speculo animae, loc. cit.

Question III: On magnificence

¹ Magnificence is defined by Bl. Bonaventure, in *explicat. terminorum Theol.*: "It is the thought and administration of great and lofty things with a large and most splendid undertaking of soul." The same is found *de septem donis. De Dono fortitudinis, cap. 3. and lib. 5. Comp. Theol. cap. 36*. Which definition is Tully's, *lib. 2. de Inventione*.

Magnificentia definitur a D. Bonavent. in explicat. terminorum Theol. Est magnarum rerum, et excelsarum cum animi ampla quadam, et splendidissima propositione, cogitatio, atque administratio. Idem habet de septem donis. De Dono fortitudinis, cap. 3. et lib. 5. Comp. Theol. cap. 36. Quae definitio est Tullii lib. 2. de Inventione.

² I assert first, that this is a virtue. It is proved because it works great things in its proper matter, keeping due proportion to him who works, or makes the outlay. Therefore there is required in these right thought, or intention; and administration in the outward execution, as Tully used to say. It differs from magnanimity, for this is concerned with great honors, that with great expenses; and because no end of human works is so great as the goods of God, therefore magnificence is concerned chiefly in great expenses for the honor of God, as Aristotle in 4. *Eth. cap. 2.* said: "Honorable expenses are the greatest, those that pertain to divine sacrifices."

Assero primo, hanc esse virtutem. Probatur quia operatur magna in materia propria, servata debita proportione ad eum, qui operatur, vel facit sumptus. Itaque requiritur in his recta cogitatio, seu intentio; et administratio in exteriori executione, ut dicebat Tullius. Differt a magnanimitate, nam haec in magnis honoribus; illa in magnis sumptibus versatur, et quia nullus finis humanorum operum est adeo magnus, ut bona Dei, ideo magnificentia praecipue magnis in sumptibus ad Dei honorem versatur, ut Aristotele 4. Eth. cap. 2. dixerit: Honorabiles sumptus sunt maximi, qui pertinent ad divina sacrificia.

³ I assert second, that it is a potential part of Fortitude. So St. Bonaventure, *locis adductis*, and Bl. Thomas, *quaest. 134. art. 4.*

Assero secundo, eam esse partem potentialem Fortitudinis. Ita S. Bonav. locis adductis, et D. Thom. quaest. 134. art. 4.

⁴ It is proved, because two things are required that something be a potential part of some virtue. The first is, that it have agreement and affinity with that virtue as with a principal; the second, that it be surpassed by it. Now Magnificence agrees with Fortitude in that each tends to something arduous, and each is in the Irascible, doubtless because magnificence moderates hope in order to a magnificent work; but it falls short of fortitude, because that arduous thing to which fortitude tends has difficulty from danger impending over the person; but the arduous thing to which magnificence tends has difficulty from the outlay of goods, which is much less than danger to the person.

Probatur, quia duo exiguntur, ut aliqua sit pars potentialis alicuius virtutis. Primum est, ut illa cum hac, tanquam principali, convenientiam habeat, et affinitatem: secundum est, ut ab ea excedatur: Magnificentia autem convenit cum Fortitudine, quod utraque tendit in aliquid arduum, et utraque est in Irascibili, nimirum quia magnificentia moderatur spem in ordine ad opus magnificum; sed deficit a fortitudine, quia illud arduum, in quod tendit fortitudo, habet difficultatem ob periculum, personae imminens; arduum autem, in quod tendit magnificentia, habet difficultatem ob dispendium rerum, quod est multo minus, quam periculum personae.

Question IV: On the vices opposed to magnificence

¹ One vice St. Bonaventure names, *locis adductis*, which is called *Parvificentia*, inclining to defect; but the other, rising to excess, is still unnamed among the Latins, as Bl. Thomas also teaches, *quaest. 135. art. 1. and 2.*, from Aristotle, 2. *Eth. cap. 7. and lib. 4. cap. 2.*

Unvm vitium nominat S. Bonavent. locis adductis, quod dicitur Parvificentia declinans ad defectum; alter vero ad excessum exurgens, adhuc apud Latinos innominatum, ut docet etiam D. Thom. quaest. 135. art. 1. et 2. ex

| Aristotele 2. Eth. cap. 7. et lib. 4. cap. 2.

² For since magnificence is concerned with great works and expenses, it ought to hold the mean, respecting the means of the spender and the dignity of the work. But if it blazes less than the dignity of the work requires, it is called *Parvificentia*; if, however, it exceeds, it is called *Banausia*, from the furnace, which consumes all, and it can be called *Consumptio*, as Bl. Thomas says, *art. 2*.

| *Cum enim magnificentia magnis in operibus, et sumptibus versetur, debet medium tenere, respiciens facultatem expendentis, et dignitatem operis. Quod si minus infumat, quam dignitas operis requirat, dicitur Parvificentia: Si vero excedat, dicitur Banausia a furno, qui omnia consumit, et potest dici Consumptio, ut ait D. Thom. art. 2.*

³ Note that the discourse here is about Magnificence as it is a virtue concerning the passions; it is not, in another and different way, also a virtue toward another, concerning actions.

| *Adverte, sermonem hic esse de Magnificentia, pro ut est virtus circa passiones; non alia diversa ratione etiam est virtus ad alterum circa operationes.*

Question V: On patience

¹ Patience is defined by Bl. Bonaventure, 3. *part. Centil. sect. 43.*: "It is the virtue bearing with equanimity the evils of insults and of every adversity." Or: "Patience is the equanimous endurance of evils inflicted," or from Bl. Gregory, *homil. 35. in Euang.*: "True patience is to endure the evils of others with equanimity, and to be moved by no grief of soul against him who inflicts evils." Or: "Patience is the victorious endurance of all annoyances inflicted from elsewhere."

| *Definitur Patientia a D. Bonavent. 3. part. Centil. sect. 43. Est virtus contumeliarum, et omnis adversitatis aequanimiter mala portans. Vel: Patientia est aequanimis malorum illatorum tolerantia, vel ex D. Gregorio homil. 35. in Euang. Vera patientia est aliena mala aequanimiter perpeti, et contra eum, qui mala irrogat, nullo animi dolore moveri. Vel: Patientia est omnium molestiarum, aliunde illatarum, victoriosa perpassio.*

² In the explicatorio terminorum Theol. he thus defines it: "Patience is the equanimous endurance of evils."

| *In explicatorio terminorum Theol. sic eam definit: Patientia est aequanimis malorum tolerantia.*

³ In the opusculo de septem donis, de dono fortitudinis, cap. 3., it is stated: "Patience is the cause of honesty and utility, the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous things." So also in compend. Theologicae veritatis, c. 36., and opusc. de profectu religiosi lib. 2. c. 34., from Bl. August. *de patientia, cap. 2.*: "Patience is that by which we bear evils with an equal mind, that is, without perturbation of justice."

| *Opusculo de septem donis, de dono fortitudinis, cap. 3. habetur: Patientia est causa honestatis, et utilitatis, arduarum rerum voluntaria, et diuturna perpassio. sic et in compend. Theologicae veritatis, c. 36. et opusc. de profectu religiosi lib. 2. c. 34. ex D. August. de patientia, cap. 2. Patientia est, qua mala aequo animo toleramus, hoc est, sine perturbatione iustitiae.*

⁴ Hence it is clear that it is a special virtue.

| *Hinc constat, eam esse virtutem specialem.*

⁵ *It is proved*, because the reason of moral virtue is to preserve the rectitude and good of reason against the impulse of the passions: but Patience thus moderates the passions of the Irascible and Concupiscible against sadness, lest reason succumb in adversities.

Probatur, quia virtutis moralis ratio est conservare rectitudinem, et bonum rationis contra impetum passionum: at Patientia sic moderatur passiones Irascibilis, et Concupiscibilis contra tristitiam, ne ratio succumbat in adversis.

⁶ It is *proved* by Bl. Bonaventure, *ad 21. Lucae*, in those words: "In your patience you will possess your souls," and *Proverb. 16*. "The patient man is better than the strong: and he who rules his spirit, than he who takes cities," and *cap. 15*. "He that is patient is governed with much wisdom," and *cap. 19*. "The doctrine of a man is known by patience"; *Iacob 1*. "Patience has a perfect work"; *Heb. 10*. "Patience is necessary for you, that, doing the will of God, you may receive the promise." He has similar things *de septem donis, de dono fortitudinis, cap. 3*.

Probatur vero a D. Bonavent. *ad 21. Lucae illis verbis*: In patientia vestra possidebitis animas vestras, et *Proverb. 16*. Melior est patiens viro forti: et qui dominatur animo suo, expugnatore urbium, et *cap. 15*. Qui patiens est, multa gubernatur sapientia, et *cap. 19*. Doctrina viri per patientiam dignoscitur, *Iacob 1*. Patientia perfectum opus habet, *Heb. 10*. Patientia vobis necessaria est, ut voluntatem Dei facientes, reportetis promissionem. *Similia habet de septem donis, de dono fortitudinis, cap. 3*.

⁷ *The same* he proves there from Bl. Gregory, *homil. 36. in Evang. and homil. 20. in Ezech.*

Idem probat ibi ex D. Gregorio *homil. 36. in Evang. et homil. 20. in Ezech.*

⁸ *In cap. 8. Lucae*, he proves it in those words: "Hearing the word, they retain it, and bring forth fruit in patience," and from the place of James cited above, *Heb. 10*.

In *cap. 8. Lucae, id probat illis verbis*: Audientes verbum retinent, et fructum afferunt in patientia, et ex loco citato *Iacobi Heb. 10*.

⁹ *He observes*, moreover, in *sermone 2. de pluribus Martyribus*, that for the formal object of patience there is required adversity tolerated out of the motive of honesty, and a right will; yet it can happen out of necessity as a virtue, as on account of it Manasses in captivity attained salvation.

Observat autem *sermone 2. de pluribus Martyribus, ad obiectum patientiae formale requiri, ut sit adversitas tolerata ex motivo honestatis, et voluntas recta; posse tamen ex necessitate fieri virtutem, sicut propter eam Manasses in captivitate salutem assecutus est.*

¹⁰ *And in serm. 3. de sanctis Apostolis* he observes, from Bl. Bernard, *serm. 2. de Convers. S. Pauli*, a threefold kind of patience, or three degrees of this virtue. The first is to tolerate without murmuring. The second is to tolerate willingly. The third is to go joyfully to punishments, as *Act. 5*. "The Apostles went rejoicing, etc."

Et *serm. 3. de sanctis Apostolis observat ex D. Bernardo serm. 2. de Convers. S. Pauli, triplex genus patientiae, seu tres gradus huius virtutis. Primus est tolerare absque murmure. Secundus tolerare libenter. Tertius gaudenter ire ad poenas, ut Act. 5. Ibant Apostoli gaudentes, etc.*

¹¹ *I assert* second, that Patience is a quasi-potential part of Fortitude. So Bl. Bonaventure, *locis adductis*, and Bl. Thomas, *quaest. 136. art. 4*.

Assero secundo, *Patientiam esse partem quasi potentialem Fortitudinis. Ita D. Bonavent. locis adductis et D. Thom. quaest. 136. art. 4.*

¹² *It is proved*, because it is concerned with difficult things together with fortitude; but it falls short of it, because it is concerned also with difficult things of less moment than death.

Probatur, quia circa difficilia versatur cum fortitudine; sed deficit ab hac, quia versatur etiam circa difficilia minoris momenti, quam sit mors.

¹³ *Note*, that it is similar to longanimity, because each endures evil for the sake of some good; it differs, however, because longanimity is concerned in tending to something distant in remoteness, and thus it regards hope more than sadness; and because the longanimous man is not broken by the long hope of expectation, as the holy Doctor says, *de profect. Relig. lib. 2. cap. 35.*, he imitates patience.

Nota, similem eam esse longanimitati, quia utraque sustinet malum ob aliquod bonum; differt tamen, quia longanimitas versatur in tendentia ad aliquid in longinquum distans, atque adeo magis respicit spem, quam tristitiam, quia vero longanimis non frangitur longa spe expectationis, ut ait S. Doctor de profect. Relig. lib. 2. cap. 35. patientiam imitatur.

¹⁴ *I assert* third: that Patience is inferior not only to the Theological virtues, but also to the four Cardinal virtues; And as to the Theological virtues, it is clear; because they have a nobler object, God. As to the Cardinal virtues, it is plain from what was said at the beginning of *disput. 1.* But it can be surpassed by Fortitude, for that bears more vehement dangers of death, and thus it ought to be stronger in regulating reason; so also Temperance is recognized as better, which moderates the vehemence of the concupiscibles by touch.

Assero tertio: Patientia esse non solum Theologicis, sed etiam quatuor Cardinalibus inferiorem; Et quo ad Theologicas, constat; quia habent obiectum nobilius, Deum. Quoad Cardinales, patet ex dictis initio disput. 1. Ea vero a Fortitudine superari potest, nam illa ferrut in pericula mortis vehementiora, atque adeo debet esse validior ad rationem regulandam, sic et melior Temperantia dignoscitur, quae vehementiam concupiscibilium tactu moderatur.

¹⁵ *It is said*, however, to work a perfect work in its genus. It is also called the root of all virtues by Bl. Gregory, *homil. 35. in Evang.*, in Bl. Bonaventure above, inasmuch as it removes the one thing that prohibits, which is sadness, as Tannerus notes, *disp. 5. num. 86.*, and Bl. Bonaventure, *in 4. dist. 22. art. 3. quaest. 1.* Whence the Apostle, *Heb. 12.* "Let us run by patience, etc.," as St. Bonaventure has it, *in Diaeta, loco citando.*

Dicitur tamen perfectum opus operari in suo genere. Dicitur etiam radix omnium virtutum a D. Gregorio homil. 35. in Evang. apud D. Bonavent. supra, quatenus removet prohibens unum, quod est tristitia, ut notat Tannerus disp. 5. num. 86. et D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 22. art. 3. quaest. 1. Unde Apostolus Heb. 12. Per Patientiam curramus, etc. ut habet S. Bonavent. in Diaeta, loco citando.

¹⁶ *I assert* fourth: that perfect Patience is a gift of God. So Bl. Bonaventure in almost all the places cited, especially *de septem donis*, and *in Diaeta, tit. 7. cap. ult.*

Assero quarto. Patientia perfecta est donum Dei. Ita D. Bonavent. locis fere omnibus adductis, maxime de septem donis, et in Diaeta, tit. 7. cap. ult.

¹⁷ *It is proved* by St. Bonaventure, because, as the Apostle says, *Heb. 12.*, that which leads to eternal life is above nature, and a gift of God: such is patience, as I have said: Therefore. The major is proved; for means ought to be proportioned to the end, as the holy Doctor often says; but glory is supernatural.

Probatur a S. Bonavent. quia ut ait Apostolus Heb. 12. Illud, quod ducit ad vitam aeternam, est super naturam, et donum Dei: Talis est patientia, ut retuli: Ergo. Maior probatur; nam media debent esse ad finem proportionata, ut saepe ait S. Doctor; at gloria est supernaturalis.

¹⁸ Read the proof, or touchstone of Lydian stone, for proving true patience in Bl. Bonaventure, *de profectu Religiosi*, lib. 2. cap. 35. The merit and reward of Patience you have in cap. 36. The degrees and progress of Patience in cap. 37.

Probationem, seu lapidem Lydium ad probandam veram patientiam legito in D. Bonavent. de profectu Religiosi, lib. 2. cap. 35. meritum, et praemium Patientiae habes cap. 36. Gradus, et profectum Patientiae cap. 37.

¹⁹ Most illustrious Panegyrics of Patience from the Fathers you have in Bl. Bonaventure, lib. 2. *Pharetrae*, cap. 33.

Praeclaros Patientiae Panegyricos habes e Patribus in D. Bonavent. lib. 2. *Pharetrae*, cap. 33.

Question VI: On the vices opposed to patience

¹ { Bl. Thom. quaest. 137 and 138.

De Vitiis, PATIENTIAE oppositis.

{ D. Thom. quaest. 137 et 138.

² To Patience by defect is opposed Impatience, whereby one struggles in vain against adversities, or grieves immoderately over them. But the magnitude of the sin of impatience is to be estimated from its effects, which arise from it, from which the very sin of impatience does not seem to be distinguished. The holy Doctor calls this vice *Ira* (Wrath).

Patientiae per defectum opponitur Impatientia, qua quis frustra adversis reluctatur, vel immoderate de eisdem tristatur. Magnitudo vero peccati impatientiae aestimanda est ex effectibus, qui ex ea oriuntur, a quibus ipsum impatientiae peccatum non videtur distingui. Vocat autem S. Doctor hoc vitium Iram.

³ Yet no vice opposed to patience by defect is commonly assigned, because the more lightly adversities are borne, the more it is held worthy of praise.

Vitium tamen per defectum oppositum patientiae, communiter nullum assignatur, quia quo leuius adversa feruntur, eo maioris id laudis habetur.

Question VII: On perseverance

¹ Perseverance is defined by Bl. Bonaventure, 3 part. Centil. sect. 43., from Tully, lib. 2. *de Invent.*: "it is a stable and weighed continuance by well-considered reason." But he says it is defined masterfully thus: "Perseverance is a lasting, or final, permanence in good." Thus it is defined also in the opusculum *Declaratorio terminorum Theologiae*. He repeats the same definitions in the *Opusc. de septem donis; de Dono fortitudinis*, cap. 3.

De PERSEVERANTIA.

Perseverantia definitur a D. Bonavent. 3 part. Centil. sect. 43. ex Tullio, lib. 2. de Invent. est ratione bene considerata, stabilis, et perpensa permansio. Magistraliter vero sic eam definiri ait: Perseverantia est permanentia in bono diuturna, seu finalis. Sic eam definit etiam opusculo Declaratorio terminorum Theologiae. Eisdem definitiones refricat Opusc. de septem donis; de Dono fortitudinis, cap. 3.

² ¶ In compend. Theol. verit. lib. 5. cap. 36. he thus defines it: "It is the virtue of a stable and perpetual continuance in well-considered reason." It is thus defined almost by Bl. Thomas, *quaest. 137. art. 1.*, and by Tanner, *disp. 3. quaest. 2. dub. 5.*

¶ In compend. Theol. verit. lib. 5. cap. 36. sic eam definit: Est virtus in ratione bene considerata stabilis, et perpetua permansio. Sic fere definitur a D. Thom. *quaest. 137. art. 1. et Tanneto disp. 3. quaest. 2. dub. 5.*

³ I assert, that this is a special virtue.

Assero, hanc esse specialem virtutem.

⁴ It is proved from that, by the reason of Bl. Bonaventure, *de perfectione vitae ad sorores, cap. 8. and de septem donis, lo.. cit.*

Probatur ab illo, ratione D. Bonavent. *de perfectione vitae ad sorores, cap. 8. et de septem donis, loco cit.*

⁵ That is a virtue which promotes the good necessary by removing some special difficulty: Perseverance removes the difficulty resulting from the lasting continuance in the good necessary for salvation: Therefore. The major is Aristotle's, *2. Eth. cap. 3.* The minor is Christ's, *Matth. 10.* "But he that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved." Weigh the particle (*hic*): for it implies that anyone else, not persevering, will lack salvation. It is confirmed from Bl. Bernard, *epist. 129.*: "Without perseverance, neither does he who fights obtain victory, nor the victor the palm: for it is itself the nurse to merit, the mediatrix to reward, the sister of patience, the daughter of constancy, the friend of peace, the knot of friendships, the bond of unity, the bulwark of sanctity. Take away perseverance, and obedience has no reward, nor beneficence grace, nor fortitude praise. For it alone is that to which eternity is rendered, or rather which renders itself to eternity," the Lord saying, *Matth. 10.* "He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved."

Illa est virtus, quae ad bonum necessarium promovet, aliquam specialem difficultatem removendo: Perseverantia removet difficultatem resultantem ex diuturnitate permanendi in bono necessario ad salutem: Ergo. Maior est Aristotelis 2. Eth. cap. 3. Minor est Christi, Matth. 10. Qui autem perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit. Pondera particulam, (hic) innuit enim alium quempiam, non perseverantem, cariturum salute. Confirmatur ex D. Bernardo, epist. 129. Absque perseverantia, nec qui pugnat, victoriam, nec palmam victor consequitur: Ipsa enim est nutrix ad meritum, mediatrix ad praemium, soror patientiae, constantiae filia, amica pacis, amicitiarum nodus, unitatis vinculum, sanctitatis propugnaculum. Tolle perseverantiam, nec obsequium mercedem habet, nec beneficium gratiam, nec laudem fortitudo. Sola est enim cui aeternitas redditur, vel potius quae aeternitati reddit, dicente Domino, Matth. 10. Qui perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit.

⁶ This perseverance, which we treat of, is that whereby one, out of purpose, and therefore out of the special intention of actual perseverance itself, as it were a special end in the proposed good begun, persists immovably.

Haec perseverantia, quam tractamus, est, qua quis ex proposito, adeoque ex speciali intentione ipsius actualis perseverantiae, velut specialis, finis in proposito inchoato bono immobiliter persistit.

⁷ For Perseverance can be taken in three other ways, so that it is not some special virtue, as Bl. Thomas noted, *quaest. 137. art. 1. ad 2.* First, as it is the general condition of grace and of the virtues with which a man departs from this life. Of which I treated in *prima secunda, Trac. de Gratia.*

Potest enim Perseverantia tribus aliis modis sumi, ut non sit specialis aliqua virtus, ut notavit D. Thom. quaest. 137. art. 1. ad 2. Primo ut est generalis conditio gratiae, atque virtutum, quibuscum homo ex hac vita decedit. De qua egi prima secunda, Trac. de Gratia.

⁸ Second, as it signifies the immobility of persisting, arising from the habit of virtue, which follows upon every habit of virtue, as it is a quality difficult to move, as St. Thomas says, *loc. cit. ad 3.*

Secundo ut significat immobilitatem persistendi, ortam ex habitu virtutis, quod quemlibet habitum virtutis consequitur, ut est qualitas difficile mobilis, ut ait S. Thom. loc. cit. ad 3.

⁹ Third, it is taken by Bl. Thomas, *ad 1., from Aristotle 7. Eth. cap. 7. and 4. Eth. toward the end*, whereby one persists in good with vehement struggle, enduring the perils of life and the difficulties of resisting pleasures, especially those of the flesh.

Tertio accipitur a D. Thom. ad 1. ex Aristotele 7. Eth. cap. 7. et 4. Eth. ad finem, qua quis vehementi repugnantia in bono persistit, tolerando vitae discrimina, et difficultates resistendi delectationibus, maxime carnis.

¹⁰ I assert second, that Perseverance is a potential part of fortitude. For it agrees with fortitude in sustaining difficulties in good. But it declines, because fortitude is concerned with overcoming the difficulties of death: but Perseverance with other lesser ones, namely, with lastingness in good works, which is not so grave, infused.¹

¹ N. Editor's note: the print reads 'quod non est adeò grave, infusus.' — 'infusus' dangles with no noun to modify; kept as printed in the Latin, since no certain correction exists (possibly 'infusus' depended on a word lost in the print).

Assero secundo, Perseverantiam esse partem fortitudinis potentialem. Convenit enim cum fortitudine in sustinendis difficultatibus in bono. Declinat vero, quia fortitudo versatur ad vincendas difficultates mortis: Perseverantia vero circa alias minores, nempe, circa diuturnitatem in bonis operibus, quod non est adeo grave, infusus.

¹¹ The necessity, fruits, and praises of Perseverance, see in Bl. Bonaventure, *locis adductis, and lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 34.*, where he brings forth many things from the Fathers.

Perseverantiae necessitatem, fructus, et laudes vide in D. Bonavent. locis adductis, et lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 34. ubi multa e Patribus profert.

¹² I assert third; Perseverance needs a special help of God. So Bl. Thomas, *art. 4.* For Perseverance is taken in two ways with respect to purpose. First, for the habit of virtue; and in this way it needs the habit of grace, like the other infused moral virtues. Second, it is taken for the act of persevering in grace unto death; and in this way it needs not only habitual grace, but the special help of God preserving man in good, as Bl. Augustine teaches, *lib. de bono perseverantiae*, and it was defined in the holy Council of Trent.

Assero tertio; Perseverantia indiget speciali Dei auxilio. Ita D. Thom. art. 4. Perseverantia enim ad propositum dupliciter capitur. Primo pro habitu virtutis; et hoc modo eget habitu gratiae, sicut et caeterae virtutes infusae morales. Secundo sumitur pro actu perseverantiae in gratia usque ad mortem; et hoc modo non solum gratia habituali eget, sed speciali Dei auxilio conservantis hominem in bono, ut docet D. Augustinus lib. de bono perseverantiae, et definitum est in S. Concilio Tridentino.

¹³ With regard to the virtue of Constancy, it agrees with Perseverance, in that it persists in some good. It differs, for Perseverance makes one persist in good against the difficulty that arises from the length of the undertaking: but Constancy makes one persist against difficulty from any other

impediment. And therefore Perseverance is a more principal part of fortitude than Constancy, because the difficulty that arises from the lastingness of the act is more essential to the act of virtue than that which is from exterior impediments. So Bl. Thomas, *art. 3*. Therefore this also needs a special help of God.

Circa virtutem Constantiae convenit cum Perseverantia, ut persistat in aliquo bono. Differt, nam Perseverantia facit persistere in bono contra difficultatem, quae oritur ex diversitate exitus: Constantia autem facit persistere contra difficultatem ex quovis alio impedimento. Et ideo principalior pars fortitudinis est Perseverantia, quam Constantia, quia difficultas, quae ex diuturnitate actus oritur, est essentialior actui virtutis, quam illa, quae est ab exterioribus impedimentis. Ita D. Thom. art. 3. Ideo et hoc eget Dei auxilio speciali.

Question VIII: On the vices opposed to perseverance

¹ The chief vice opposed to Perseverance, as Bl. Bonaventure teaches, in *speculo animae, cap. 1. and p. p. Centil. sect. 18.*, is Obstinacy, at whose extreme stands softness. So Bl. Thomas, *quaest. 138. art. 1*. Obstinacy has excess, softness defect. For the praise of Perseverance is that one not withdraw from good on account of difficulties; from which both the soft man withdraws, who lightly yields to difficulties; and the obstinate, who persists in his purpose beyond reason; for the obstinate man is an impudent holder-fast, as Isidore says, *lib. 10. Etymol.*

De Vitiis, PERSEVERANTIAE oppositis.

Praecipuum vitium oppositum Perseverantiae, ut docet D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 1. et p. p. Centil. sect. 18. est Pertinacia, e cuius extremo stat mollities. Ita D. Thom. quaest. 138. art. 1. Pertinacia excessum, mollities vero defectum habet. Laus enim Perseverantiae est, ut non recedatur a bono ob difficultates; a quo recedit et mollis, qui leviter cedit difficultatibus; et pertinax, qui ultra rationem in suo proposito persistat; est enim pertinax, impudenter tenax, ut ait Isidorus lib. 10. Etymol.

² These Aristotle calls in *7. Eth. cap. 9. Ischyrognomones*, that is, of strong opinion, or *Idiognomones*, that is, of their own opinion, more than is fitting. As it were nails fixed in a wall, which are the gnomons on clocks.

Hos vocat Aristoteles 7. Eth. cap. 9. Ischyrognomones, idest, fortis sententiae, vel Idiognomones, idest, propriae sententiae, plusquam oportet. Quasi clavi muro confixi, qui in horologiis sunt Gnomones.

³ But the magnitude of the vices opposed to Perseverance is to be estimated from the reason of the matter in which one falls short, or in which one persists beyond what is due, and from the consequent losses.

Magnitudo autem vitiorum, quae Perseverantiae opponuntur, a ratione materiae, in qua quis deficit, seu in qua quis ultra debitum persistit, damnisque consecutis, aestimanda est.