

COMMENTARIES ON HUMAN ACTS (COMMENTARII DE ACTIBUS HUMANIS)

Gennaro Buccheroni, S.J.

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Title Page and Approbation

OF IANUARIUS BUCCERONI
OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS

COMMENTARIES

ON HUMAN ACTS

ON THE VOLUNTARY, ON THE FREE,
ON ELICITED AND COMMANDED ACTS,
ON THE OTHER DIVISIONS OF THE VOLUNTARY,
ON IGNORANCE, ON CONCUPISCENCE,
ON FEAR, ON FORCE OR VIOLENCE,
ON MORALITY, ON GOODNESS AND MORAL EVIL,
ON THE VARIOUS SOURCES OF MORALITY,
ON MERIT

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APPROBATION

Since the work, whose title is *Commentarii de actibus humanis*, written by Father Ianuarius Bucceroni of the Society of Jesus, has been reviewed by certain theologians of the same Society, and they have approved that it can be published, we grant the faculty that it be printed, if it shall so seem to those whom it concerns.

Rome, on the 3rd day of March, 1890.

ROGER FREDDI

Superior of the Roman Province of the Society of Jesus

LET IT BE PRINTED

Fr. ALBERT LEPIDI, O.P., Master of the Sacred Apostolic Palace

LET IT BE PRINTED

JOSEPH CAPPETELLI, Archbishop of Myra, Vicegerent

Preliminary Notes

COMMENTARIES ON HUMAN ACTS

1. Human acts are, generally, acts of man, by which the same man orders himself to an end consonant with himself. For every agent acts on account of an end. But this is the distinction between rational nature and irrational nature: that the former, by its own acts, orders itself unto an end, while the latter is ordered unto an end by another. Aptly St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2: “It must be considered that something tends to an end by its action or motion in two ways. In one way, as moving itself to the end, as man does; in another way, as moved to the end by another, as an arrow tends to a determinate end from the fact that it is moved by the archer, who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things which have reason move themselves to the end, because they have dominion over their acts through free choice, which is the faculty of will and reason. But those things which lack reason tend to the end through natural inclination, as moved by another, and not by themselves, since they do not know the notion of the end. And therefore they cannot order anything unto an end, but are only ordered unto an end by another. For the whole irrational nature is compared to God as an instrument to the principal agent... And therefore it is proper to rational nature that it tend to the end as acting itself, or leading itself to the end; but it is proper to irrational nature as acted upon and led by another, whether to an apprehended end, as brute animals are, or to an end not apprehended, as those things are which entirely lack cognition.”
2. Wherefore human acts, concerning which these Commentaries treat, and concerning which St. Thomas treats in 1. 2., are acts of man as wayfarer, by which man tends toward Beatitude, so that, with divine grace assisting, he may merit it for himself and at last obtain it. Hence the Angelic Doctor first treats in 1. 2. of the ultimate end of man and of Beatitude, then of human acts. Hence human acts can be considered either relatively to the man who by them is ordered to the end, or relatively to the end to which man is ordered by their aid. We shall speak in an orderly way of human acts according to each consideration, in distinct Commentaries.

Commentary I: On the Voluntary

1. Human acts considered relatively to man can be looked at in two ways: first, according as they proceed from human faculties, which is to consider them in their intrinsic nature; for an act, generally in created things, is nothing other than the determination of some faculty from potency to act. secondly, according as they fall short from this nature proper to them, on account of accidental impediments which do not allow the human faculties to act rightly. Therefore first we set out to speak of the intrinsic nature of a human act; but afterward we shall speak of those accidental impediments.
2. Moreover usage has prevailed, and not without reason, that a distinction should be made between an act of man and a human act. Since man is a substantive name, and directly signifies a supposit or person, an act of man is taken merely materially for any act whatever proceeding from a man, or from a human supposit and person: for actions belong to supposits. But since human is an adjective name, and directly denotes a form, a human act is an act proceeding from man not in just any way, but according to the form or nature proper to him, namely with advertence of the intellect and deliberate will. "Of actions," says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1., "which are done by man, those alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man (namely adequately, and as to the substance of the work, and as to the mode of operating). But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts. Hence those actions alone are called properly human of which man is master. But man is master of his acts through reason and will: hence free choice also is said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are called properly human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions belong to man, they can indeed be called actions of man, but not properly human actions, since they are not of man insofar as he is man." And in the same place, a. 3: "Acts are called human insofar as they proceed from a deliberating will." Therefore, since a human act is an act proceeding from deliberate will, in order that we may know its intrinsic nature more deeply, it is necessary to explain briefly: 1. the nature of the voluntary; 2. the nature of the free; 3. finally, in how many ways any act whatever can proceed from deliberate will. Hence in this first Commentary on human acts we have proposed first to explain the nature of the voluntary.
3. Moreover, before we proceed further, it must be noted that human acts are called acts rather than actions, because this name action is accustomed to designate more the exterior operation, although it is also used for an interior act; while, on the contrary, the name act is used rather for an interior act, or for an act considered in its intrinsic principle, than for an exterior operation, namely for an act considered with respect to its exterior object or extrinsic effect; although it is also taken for an exterior action, as when one says: an act of religious profession, an act of matrimony, an act of contract, etc. But a human act, as is clear from the very determination of the adjective added to it, properly designates an act according as it proceeds from its intrinsic principles and is considered according to them; which from what has been said is now sufficiently drawn out.

Moreover, since a human act proceeds from the will and from the free will, and in it alone, as in its proper subject, morality is found, concerning which there will be discussion hereafter, human acts are also called voluntary acts, free acts, moral acts, and one name is used for another indiscriminately, as may be seen in the Angelic Doctor in 1. 2. And thus q. 18. a. 5: “some acts are called human or moral, according as they are from reason.” And q. 1. a. 3: “moral acts and human acts are the same.” And q. 20. a. 6. ad 2: “it must be said that action and passion pertain to the genus of morals, insofar as they have the nature of the voluntary. And therefore according as by a diverse will they are called voluntary, according to this they are two morally, and there can be good on one side, and evil on the other.”

4. If a human act is an act proceeding from deliberate will, it is essentially a voluntary act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 71. a. 6. For the voluntary, cognition is essentially prerequired: nothing is willed unless foreknown. This prior cognition is, in a human act, the prerequired condition; but voluntariness is properly the form constitutive of it. - From defect of the aforesaid condition, the acts of infants, of the insane, of those sleeping, of the intoxicated, are not human acts, but acts of man. Hence, if someone in a state of insanity, sleep, or intoxication baptizes, consecrates, contracts, or is present at Mass, recites the canonical hours, these acts are of no moral value and have no moral effect, because they are not human acts. And this holds even if someone, while still master of himself before he falls into that state, foresees it, indeed wills and intends it. For when, being master of himself, he wills and intends to do it, nevertheless he does not do it; but when, no longer master of himself, he does it, he does not will to do it by a human act; and since those things are of the moral order and of moral value, they can be done only by a human act. In sleep the imagination prevails, or at least “the intellect does not prevail; whence man follows the imaginative apprehension as if true.” St. Thomas, *On Dreams*, sect. 6. Namely, “the use of reason is indeed more or less impeded in sleeping; nevertheless it is always impeded as to something, so that one cannot have an altogether free judgment.” St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 2. ad 2. - Cf. Lugo, *On the Sacraments*, D. 8. n. 106; Suarez, *On Religion*, tr. 6, *On Vow*, l. 1. c. 10; Sanchez, *On Matrimony*, l. 1. D. 8. n. 20; Laymann, l. 4. tr. 4, *On Vow*, c. 1. n. 4.
5. But if the prior cognition of the intellect is not indeed lacking, but is not perfect, the act, so far under this head, is human insofar as it is directed and ordered by that prior cognition. Therefore, one who is ignorant of what he does materially, or as to the fact, or is ignorant of what he does formally, that is, as to the morality of his action, because namely he is ignorant of the law, sins in no way; for example, if someone on a day of abstinence is ignorant that he is eating meat, or, eating it, is ignorant of the law of abstinence. - But it is not required that someone have perfect cognition of the thing, that namely, that the thing be known in itself and in the individual, or with every certainty; for it is sufficient that it be apprehended at least confusedly, and with doubt. For, with prior cognition of the thing standing, although confused, now the will is borne into it, whatever it may be; with doubt of thing and thing standing, the will is borne into each. And thus an adult is validly baptized, although he has not yet fully explored all the obligations of a Christian, and afterward he is bound by them. One receiving the subdiaconate, at least confusedly, apprehends and consequently wills all the obligations annexed to that state; wherefore, although he is ignorant of the chastity to be preserved which

is annexed to it, nevertheless he is bound to it. A hunter striking a beast, concerning which he doubts whether it is a man, in truth wills both: to kill the beast and the man.

6. From defect of voluntariness or of deliberate will, the first intuition of evident truth and the first love of good in common, or of happiness, are not human acts. Beatitude itself, since it is not an act of deliberate will, but a necessary act, although it is a perfect act of the intellect and of the will, nevertheless is not a human act; and by the Angelic Doctor himself in 1. 2. it is not considered as a human act, but as the end of human acts. And thus in the prologue to q. 6 St. Thomas says: "Therefore, because it is necessary to arrive at beatitude through certain acts, it is consequently necessary to consider human acts, that we may know by which acts one may arrive at beatitude, or the way of beatitude may be impeded." Therefore to the question which is commonly discussed, whether beatitude is a human act, one must answer that it is not a human act, but the term and end of all human acts. Cf. Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 1. D. 2. S. 2.
7. From defect of both elements, intellectual cognition and deliberate will, those sudden passions of desire, fear, and anger, which are stirred up in the sensitive appetite, are not human acts, but acts of man. The same must be said of those actions which man does from a certain natural instinct, thinking nothing about them, as when someone moves a foot or hand while intent on other things, or strokes his beard, etc. "It must be said," says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3, "that actions of this sort are not properly human, because they do not proceed from deliberation of reason, which is the proper principle of human acts; and therefore they have, as it were, an imagined end, but not an end pre-established by reason."
8. These things having been established, the question is at once resolved concerning that cognition prerequisite for a human act: namely, whether merely sensitive cognition suffices for a human act, the apprehension of a thing through sensitive imagination. - Since a human act, as has already been said, is an essentially voluntary act, the proposed question falls back into another more general question.

Since the will is borne toward an apprehended good, it is asked: whether it can be borne toward an object apprehended by sensitive cognition alone, or through phantasy and imagination alone, and not at the same time through the intellect.

It must be denied altogether; and the reason is that, as the natural appetite follows the natural form, and the sensitive appetite follows sensitive cognition, so the spiritual appetite follows spiritual cognition. Therefore spiritual cognition alone is its foundation, and is consonant with it, so that it may be moved into act. Moreover, the cognoscitive power moving the will, which is an intrinsically inorganic and spiritual faculty, illuminates and directs it. But this cannot belong to a sensitive power of an inferior order, which is an intrinsically organic faculty. Aptly Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Libertas*, 20 June 1888: "The will is in no way moved unless cognition of the mind has shone before it like a certain torch: namely, the good desired by the will is necessarily a good insofar as it is known by reason."

And St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 3: "It must be said that... the goodness of the will properly depends upon the object. But the object of the will is proposed to it through reason. For the understood good is the object of the will proportioned to it. But the sensible or imaginary good is not proportioned to

the will, but to the sensitive appetite; because the will can tend toward universal good, which reason apprehends. But the sensitive appetite tends only toward a particular good, which the sensitive power apprehends. And therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason in the way in which it depends on the object... The appetite of the will cannot be concerning the good unless it is first apprehended by reason.” And Cajetan, on q. 10. a. 3: “If sense alone could move the will, then man could will without the use of reason, and consequently could sin and do well, which is not intelligible; for it implies the existence of an act of free choice without the use of reason.” For liberty is founded in reason. Wherefore a human act, both insofar as it is an act proceeding from the will and insofar as it is proceeding from deliberate will, altogether requires prior cognition of reason. Cf. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. ad 3; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2; D. 6. S. 4. 5; Lessius on q. 9. a. 1. D. 4. a. 2.

9. And thus much concerning the first element of the human act. The remaining matters which must be treated concerning it will more conveniently be explained presently when the discussion is about the other element, or about voluntariness. This element includes two things: the voluntary and the free. We pause now in explaining the voluntary. The voluntary, so called from the will, is that which proceeds or is caused by the will. “Voluntary,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2. ad 1, “is said denominatively from the will... which names the rational appetite.” And in the same place, a. 3: “The voluntary is said to be that which is from the will,” namely, as the same Holy Doctor explains in the same article, that which proceeds from the will. Wherefore the voluntary is nothing except either an act of the will or the effect of that act. And thus, q. 20. a. 2. ad 3, the Angelic Doctor says, “it must be said that voluntary is said not only of an act of the will, but also of exterior acts, according as they proceed from will and reason, and therefore there can be a difference of good and evil concerning both.” Just as some motion is from the sole instinct and impulse of nature, so some act is elicited from the vital appetite and arises from prior cognition. Just as the former motion has its proper name and is called natural, so also this act has its proper name and is called voluntary. And therefore this name is never attributed to those things which happen without cognition, and it is not used except to signify those things which are done by one's own will alone, without any exterior impeller. Thus 1 Peter 5:2: Not for the sake of base gain, but voluntarily; and sometimes those things which are done without obligation are also called voluntary, and those things which are done with a ready mind are especially called voluntary. Wherefore by this name voluntary is signified that motion which arises from one's own intrinsic appetite eliciting the act, with prior cognition. For since in every motion there is both to act and to act on account of an end, and since the end, the first cause of all things, does not exercise its causality except by means of cognition of it, the voluntary consequently will be that whose principle is simply intrinsic with cognition of the end. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 1. n. 10.

10. The voluntary differs from the willed. For the willed neither proceeds from the will, nor consequently is it an act of the will or the effect of that act; but it designates only the object of the act of the will. Suaresius gives the example, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 1. n. 2, “of a death effected by another,” while I indeed desire it, consent to it, and rejoice in it, but “do not cooperate.” That depraved desire, consent, and joy are voluntary, because they proceed from the will; but that death of the enemy, effected by another, with me in no way cooperating, is not voluntary for me, but only willed; for it does not proceed from my will, or depend upon it

in any way, but is only the object of the act of my will. If, on the contrary, either I myself were to inflict that death, or at least were to cooperate so that it would be inflicted by another, then it would proceed from my will, and for me it would be at once voluntary and willed. Yet the willed object is not altogether excluded from the voluntary, insofar as the voluntary, that is, the very act of the will, is terminated at that object, and the will embraces that object by its act, and the act itself, according as it exists in the concrete, concerning such an object, proceeds from the will. But although not everything willed is also voluntary, nevertheless the voluntary is always in some way willed. For nothing can proceed from the will unless in some way it is the object of the will. Suarezius, l. c. S. 1.

11. Since the voluntary proceeds from the will, which is a principle intrinsic to the agent, the voluntary agrees with any natural motion whatever, but differs from the violent. For the former proceeds from an intrinsic principle, the latter from an extrinsic principle. "But this," says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. c. and ad 3, "the name voluntary imports, that the motion and act be from one's own inclination..... Yet it is commonly of the nature of natural and voluntary motion that they are from an intrinsic principle." And in the same place, a. 4:

"The act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior cognoscitive principle, just as the natural appetite is a certain inclination from an interior principle and without cognition. But what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle." And thus in 1 Peter, loc. cit., it is said: "Feed the flock which is among you: overseeing not by constraint, but spontaneously according to God, neither for the sake of base gain, but voluntarily."

12. The voluntary can be taken in three ways: first, in an improper sense, for the spontaneous; secondly, in a proper and strict sense, for the free; thirdly, in a proper and enlarged sense, for any act whatever of the will. The spontaneous, according as it is distinguished from the voluntary properly so called, is said to be that which proceeds from the sensitive appetite from a prior sensitive cognition of the object into which the appetite tends. For as the appetite of nature follows from the natural form, so the vital appetite, elicited, follows from the apprehended form, actually representing the object. The form apprehended intellectually is followed by the rational appetite or will; the form apprehended sensibly is followed by the animal, or sensitive, appetite, common to brute and man. That which proceeds from the sensitive appetite indeed proceeds necessarily, but flows forth of its own accord, and therefore it is called necessary and spontaneous. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2., q. 8. a. 1., q. 30. a. 1.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 6. S. 4. The voluntary, taken in a proper and strict sense, for the free, is that which proceeds from the will determining itself to act, with the active power of the same will of eliciting or not eliciting the act, of eliciting this act or another act. Wherefore the free essentially includes the notion of the simply voluntary. Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 3. 6.; Lessius on q. 6. St. Thomas a. 1., on q. 9. a. 1. D. 4. The voluntary, taken in a proper and enlarged sense, for any act whatever of the will, is generally that which proceeds from the spiritual or rational appetite, namely from the will, with prior intellectual cognition of the object.
13. St. Thomas in 1. 2. seems to acknowledge no other voluntary than in the first and second sense, which voluntary he calls according to an imperfect and perfect notion. Hence the

Angelic Doctor requires three things for the perfectly and properly voluntary. The first is that it be from an intrinsic principle, from an intrinsic inclination; for the will, whence voluntary, like every appetite, is nothing but a certain inclination intrinsic to the agent. "Appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination of the one appetizing toward something." 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. The second is that not only the motion itself of the will be from within, but also the motion of the will unto the end, since "it is necessary that all agents act on account of an end"; 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2.; and therefore prior cognition of the end is required. The third, finally, is that the very application of the faculty to act be from within, namely that the faculty itself move itself to the end and not be moved by another. Therefore, according to the Angelic Doctor, the voluntary is then had perfectly or properly, when from within the will there is motion, motion unto the end, determination of motion unto the end. And this last thing, according to the Angelic Doctor, is to move oneself, which in no way is to be confused, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, with motion simply from an intrinsic principle.

14. It is worth the effort to bring forward the very words of the Holy Doctor, so that it may be clear whether the interpretation set forth of his doctrine is genuine. "Of those things which are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, but some do not. For since every agent, or moved thing, whether it acts or is moved, acts or is moved on account of an end, those are moved perfectly by an intrinsic principle in which there is some intrinsic principle, not only so that they are moved, but so that they are moved unto an end. But for something to be done on account of an end, some cognition of the end is required. Therefore whatever thus acts, or is moved by an intrinsic principle, which has some knowledge of the end, has in itself the principle of its act, not only so that it acts, but also so that it acts on account of an end. But that which has no knowledge of the end, although there is in it a principle of action or motion, nevertheless the principle of that which is to act or to be moved on account of an end is not in it, but in another, by whom the principle of its motion unto the end is impressed upon it. Hence things of this kind are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have knowledge of the end are said to move themselves, because in them there is a principle not only so that they act, but also so that they act on account of an end. And therefore, since each is from an intrinsic principle, namely that they act, and that they act on account of an end, the motions and acts of these are called voluntary. But this the name voluntary imports, that the motion and act be from one's own inclination. And from this it is that the voluntary is said to be, according to the definition of Aristotle and Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene, not only that whose principle is within, but with the addition of knowledge. Hence, since man most of all knows the end of his work and moves himself, in his acts the voluntary is found most of all." 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. And then a. 2: "As has been said, for the notion of the voluntary it is required that the principle of the act be within, with some cognition of the end. But cognition of the end is twofold, namely perfect and imperfect. Perfect cognition of the end indeed is when not only the thing which is the end is apprehended, but also the notion of the end is known, and the proportion of that which is ordered to the end itself. And such cognition of the end belongs to rational nature alone. But imperfect cognition of the end is that which consists in the apprehension of the end alone, without this, that the notion of the end and the proportion of the act to the end be known. And such cognition of the end is found in brute animals through sense and natural estimation. Therefore perfect cognition of the end is

followed by the voluntary according to the perfect notion, according as, once the end has been apprehended, someone can, deliberating concerning the end and concerning those things which are to the end, be moved unto the end, or not be moved. But imperfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the imperfect notion; according as, namely, one apprehending the end does not deliberate, but suddenly is moved into it. Hence to rational nature belongs the voluntary according to the perfect notion, but according to the imperfect notion it belongs also to brutes... Will names the rational appetite; and therefore it cannot be in those things which lack reason. But voluntary is said denominatively from will, and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will according to some agreement with will. And in this way voluntary is attributed to brute animals, insofar namely as through some cognition they are moved unto an end... It must be said that from this it happens that man is master of his act: that he has deliberation concerning his acts. For from the fact that deliberating reason is related to opposites, the will is able toward either. But according to this, the voluntary is not in brute animals, as has been said." And a. 3. §. Sed contra: "That of which we are masters is said to be voluntary." And likewise q. 21. a. 2, the Holy Doctor affirms that in all voluntary acts there is present in the will dominion over its act.

15. But when it is said by the Angelic Doctor that the voluntary according to the perfect notion requires that the notion of the end be foreknown, the sense is not that it is necessary to know what an end is; but the sense is that the thing which is the end is known as an end, that is, as a term to be obtained through other things, so that the proportion of these as means to that thing is foreknown. Thus, for example, a woman about to prepare a banquet foreknows the banquet as the term of her preparation. This preparation must be directed to that. Wherefore, by reasoning from the banquet, she is moved to the preparation of these meats, of this wine, at this hour, in this place, as things corresponding to the obtaining of that banquet, and therefore she foreknows the proportion of these things, and therefore chooses and prepares these foods before others, these drinks before others.
16. But properly and strictly such a voluntary is so not only materially, because the voluntary is narrowed to the free, but also formally, since then the act, as has also been said, is from an intrinsic principle simply, not only insofar as the will simply acts and acts on account of an end, but also insofar as from itself it is determined to acting on account of an end, since it can be toward either, as St. Thomas says; or, as the same Angelic Doctor says, it itself is what moves itself unto the end. Since, on the contrary, toward an act of which it itself is not mistress, the will is as it were applied, determined, moved unto the end from elsewhere, namely by the very instinct of nature, by God himself conferring nature, by whom the principle of its motion unto the end is impressed, as the Holy Doctor says. Hence the former act, strictly and properly speaking, is voluntary; the latter should rather be called of the will. The former is from the power of the will, namely from the will which can be toward either; the latter is only from the natural inclination of the will. Since that former free act is in reality not concerning the end, namely concerning the necessary end which we necessarily will, by the natural instinct itself, but concerning the means to be chosen for the end; hence St. Thomas constantly narrows the voluntary to the free choice of means.

17. "Since each is from an intrinsic principle, namely that they act, and that they act on account of an end, the motions and acts of these are called voluntary." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. To act on account of an end, as is clear of itself, is not the act itself by which we desire the end, but is the act by which we choose and assume the means, or something as a means to the end. And then, 1. c.: "Hence since he most of all knows the end and moves himself (namely unto the end), in his acts the voluntary is found most of all." The tendency and motion unto the end is contained in the choice of means. And 1. c. a. 2: "Perfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the perfect notion, according as, namely, with the end apprehended, someone can, deliberating concerning the end and concerning those things which are to the end, be moved unto the end or not be moved." And q. 10. a. 1, the Holy Doctor sets the voluntary against the natural in the very acts of the will, so that some are voluntary or free, others natural from the very intrinsic necessity of nature. And as the will is founded, as in its principle, in nature itself, that is, in the very substantial nature of man, so the voluntary act is founded in the natural act of the will, as in its principle, namely in the act by which man wills good in common or the ultimate end. For the free act of the will, or voluntary act, is concerning a determinate good, and that which is an end; but the natural act is concerning good in common and the ultimate end. But in every volition the volition of good in common and the volition of the ultimate end is included, as the principle is included in the conclusion. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 6., Cajetan on this place; St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1., Cajetan on this place.
18. Hence, if by the name voluntary is understood that which is from the will, acting of itself, or moving itself and applying itself to act, that which is from the rational appetite as author and master, which comes under the name voluntary strictly and properly, without doubt the free is altogether of the notion of the voluntary. But if by the name voluntary is understood merely an act of the will, namely an act elicited by the will, or an act elicited by the will according to its own propensity and inclination, the free is not of the notion of the voluntary. For first, the imperfect voluntary from imperfection of cognition is not rarely necessary, as may be seen in sudden motions. Secondly, beatific love is a perfect voluntary, for it is from perfect cognition of the object, and from the will loving God perfectly known by the whole inclination of its proper nature, and it is necessary. Thirdly, "Naturally man wills not only the object of the will, but also other things which belong to other powers, as cognition of the true, which belongs to the intellect; and being and living, and other things of this kind, which regard natural consistency, all of which are comprehended under the object of the will, as certain particular goods." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. "It must be said that the ultimate end moves the will of necessity, because it is the perfect good, and similarly those things which are ordered to this end, without which the end cannot be had, such as being, and living, and things of this kind." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. ad 3. And these things man wills even by a perfect act of the will. - Therefore man naturally wills three things: first, good in common; secondly, beatitude, or happiness; thirdly, everything fitting to the one willing according to his nature. Suarez, in 1.2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 3.
19. Now then, as in exterior things the natural is found in two ways, namely always or frequently, so also in natural motions of the will the natural is found in both ways. For toward certain

objects, namely toward the first and the second, the will is so naturally determined that it cannot in any way will the opposite. But toward certain things it is so naturally inclined that it can by accident will the opposite, and such is that third object. For that which naturally befits man, such as being and living and other things of this kind, can be considered in two ways. First, these things can be looked at as certain particular goods according to themselves, and thus they can, although rarely, be rejected by the will because they have annexed the defect of some good which is desired, as may be seen in those who kill themselves. Secondly, they can be considered as they are necessarily connected with beatitude or happiness, and thus, so far as is on their part, they cannot be rejected by the will. Wherefore, if they are known sufficiently and in due manner by the intellect and proposed to the will, the will necessarily wills them and cannot not-will them. Cajetan on q. 10. a. 1. 2.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. § 3.

20. From what has been said, the distinction between the voluntary and the permitted is clear. The voluntary is that which is from an intrinsic principle, namely from the will, which by its affection, its propensity, its inclination, is borne into it, and therefore truly wills it, and by its volition contributes, as much as it can, that it be. "This the name voluntary imports, that the motion and act be from one's own inclination." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. "The act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior cognoscitive principle, just as the natural appetite is a certain inclination from an interior principle and without cognition." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. And thus the good which is in the world is voluntary to God, for God truly wills it and by his will contributes that it be. The routing of enemies in the siege of a fortress is voluntary to the leader of the army, for he truly wills it and by his will contributes that the defeated yield to the victors. The permitted is that which someone, although he does not will it, since it is contrary to his proper propensity and inclination, and consequently he positively contributes nothing by his will that it be, nevertheless does not will to impede, although absolutely he can, since from elsewhere he is not bound to do this. Wherefore sin is not voluntary to God, but only permitted by God, since certainly it is against the natural propensity of God and his proper inclination; nor does God positively contribute anything by his will that it be, but he only does not impede it, although he can do this, on account of most wise causes. Likewise, "it must be said that human law is said to permit some things, not as approving them, but because it is not able to direct them." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 93. a. 3. ad 3. The death of innocents, in the assault upon a city, is not voluntary to the leader of the army, since it is outside his intention and affection, and consequently he himself can positively contribute nothing by his will toward it; but it is permitted by him, since, on account of sufficient and rational causes, he does not impede it, although absolutely he could, for he could desist from that assault upon the city. But sin is voluntary to man, and not only permitted by him. "It must be said that that into which the will tends by sinning, although it is evil and contrary to rational nature according to the truth of the thing, nevertheless is apprehended as a good and as fitting to nature, insofar as it is fitting to man according to some delight of sense, or according to some corrupted habit." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. ad 3. And in this way the will is inclined and borne into it by its affection, and wills it: "when the will is moved by the appetible according to its own inclination, the motion is voluntary." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. ad 2.

21. Further, from what has been said, what the involuntary is is clear. The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Therefore the involuntary can be taken in three ways. First and properly for the involuntary, according as it is distinguished from the non-voluntary, or for the involuntary contrarily. Such an involuntary “is said through this, that the will is contrary to that which is done, whence sadness follows upon the involuntary.” St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 3. a. 8. Wherefore the involuntary contrarily is that which in a voluntary act is against the positive affection of the will. Secondly, the involuntary is taken for the non-voluntary. “The non-voluntary is said through the mere removal of the act of the will.” St. Thomas, l. c. Moreover, the removal of the act of the will can be understood in two ways: first negatively, for a mere negation of the voluntary. Of this kind are all acts which are neither elicited nor commanded by the will. Secondly privatively, insofar as an otherwise voluntary act lacks under some respect some condition required for a voluntary act, and thus that voluntary act is at the same time called an involuntary or non-voluntary act. Therefore the involuntary privatively is that which, in a voluntary act, is not from voluntary consent, insofar as some condition of the voluntary is lacking, namely due cognition on the part of the intellect and deliberation on the part of the will, and yet there is not in the will a contrary affection. Hence, says St. Thomas, l. c., sadness follows upon the involuntary, which nevertheless does not always follow upon the non-voluntary. For sometimes it happens that someone approaching one not his own, whom he believes to be his own, although he does not actually will to approach one not his own, because he does not know her to be not his own, nevertheless wills habitually and would will actually if he knew; whence when he afterward perceives that she was not his own, he is not saddened but rejoices, unless he has changed his will.” But if he neither wills habitually, nor would will actually if he knew, it would not be held merely non-voluntary, but involuntary. And from this example it appears how the involuntary and the non-voluntary privatively are verified only in a voluntary act, while for the non-voluntary merely negatively no act of the will is prerequired.
22. If in the involuntary that contrary affection of the will is of itself efficacious for impeding the contrary motion, so far as is on the part of the one operating, and the thing is so displeasing to the will that it wills it in no way, the involuntary simply is had. But if that affection is a simple affection, of itself not efficacious for impeding the contrary act, or if the thing is not so altogether displeasing to the will, and the will wills it at least in some way, then the involuntary in a certain respect is had. Hence an indication can be taken concerning consent or dissent of the will with respect to temptations to be repelled; concerning perfect or imperfect resistance of the will to the same; so that although perhaps mortal sin is excluded, nevertheless some defect, negligence, and venial sin are not excluded. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 3., a. 7. ad 2.
23. Since the voluntary is had by an act of the will, various questions are raised here concerning the object of this act, concerning the will itself passing from potency to act, concerning the very act of the will required for the voluntary. And first, with respect to the object, it is asked: whether the will is concerned only with good. - The answer must be affirmative. The reason: the will is the rational appetite. But every appetite is only of the good, because appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination of the one appetizing into something. “But nothing is

inclined except into something similar and fitting. Since therefore every thing, insofar as it is a being and a substance, is a certain good, it is necessary that every inclination be into good." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. But since each power extends itself to those things in which the notion of its object can be found in any way whatsoever, and since the notion of good is found not only in the end, but also in those things which are to the end, the will extends itself to all these things, St. Thomas, ib. a. 2. But since the will tends into apprehended good, "for the will to tend into something, it is not required that it be good in the truth of the thing, but that it be apprehended under the notion of good." St. Thomas, ib. a. 1. Therefore the will can indeed be concerned with evil as material object, but by no means as formal object. But since the same power is of opposites, yet not bearing itself in the same way to each, the will is related both to good and to evil: to good by desiring it, but to evil by fleeing it. Hence, since whatever the will wills or does, it wills or does because it is good or on account of good, good and end are convertible, and the object of the will is said to be good and end. St. Thomas, ib. ad 1., q. 1. a. 2. ad 3. - Cf. Becanus, *On Beatitude and Human Acts*, C. 2. q. 7.; Lessius in l. c. St. Thomas.

24. Moreover, the good into which the will tends must not only be apprehended, but also determinate and possible. - First, the voluntary cannot be except concerning a determinate thing. For the will is moved only into good; but good has the notion of an end. "Since good is what all things desire, and this has the notion of an end, it is manifest that good imports the notion of an end." St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 5. a. 4. But an end is only something certain and determinate. And therefore he who wills to contract betrothal with either of two does not contract, and the priest who wills to consecrate any one host out of several hosts does not consecrate. Sanchez, *On Matrimony*, l. 1. D. 26. S. 1., Rubr. Miss. *De Defectibus*, § VII. n. 1. - Furthermore, the voluntary cannot be concerning an impossible thing. For "the will is a certain rational appetite; but every appetite is only of the good. The reason for this is that appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination into something. But nothing is inclined except into something similar and fitting." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. - Although, however, the object of the will must be a possible good, it is not nevertheless necessary that this good also be existing, because, since it moves the will only metaphorically through cognition, it is enough that it be apprehended by the mind and represented in the imagination. For it does not move the will except insofar as it is judged by the intellect to be fitting or good.
25. Having been established that the voluntary must be concerning a possible good, can the voluntary at least be concerning a thing impossible not in fact, but in law? - Concerning a thing impossible as to the fact itself, the voluntary cannot be, as is clear from what has been said, cf. n. 24, if someone uses reason rightly. Hence no one can seriously will to touch with his hand a vacuum space outside the world. The question is concerning a thing impossible only as to law, for example, to contract marriage with one having a diriment impediment, to consecrate water, to baptize with wine, etc. But it seems that the answer must be affirmative, since the will is borne into the fact itself, and need not necessarily be borne at the same time into the law, or into the fact only dependently upon the law. And thus one who contracts marriage with a diriment impediment unknown, and one who even attempts marriage before a civil magistrate, truly wills, so far as in him lies, to contract marriage. Hence it is that the Church afterward sometimes dispenses in the root, namely without consent being renewed, and validates the

marriage, Sanchez, *On Matrimony*, l. 2. D. 33. And indeed in C. *Ex sponsalibus*, un., *de Spons.* in 6., it is said: “from pure and certain betrothals, even if they are null by reason of consanguinity, affinity, frigidity, religion, or any other reason, provided they are not null from defect of consent, there arises ... the impediment of justice of public honesty.” Therefore true consent with a diriment impediment is openly supposed.

26. From the object of the will we proceed to the very faculty of the will, as passing from potency to act.

Hence the first question arises: whether the will is moved by the intellect? - The will is by no means moved by the intellect with respect to the exercise of the act. The reason is that the will is an inclination into the good of the whole supposit, while the other faculties are inclinations into some particular good of the supposit. But the inclination into the good of the whole ought to move and incite the particular inclinations, because particular goods ought to be referred to the good of the whole, and not conversely; just as a cause which regards the universal end moves causes which regard particular ends. Therefore “it belongs to the will to move the other powers by reason of the end, which is the object of the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3. Since the first final principle pertains to the will, it itself is the first mover in man. St. Thomas, 1.2. q. 9. a. 1., q. 11. a. 1. ad 2. Cf. Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 6. S. 7. But the intellect moves the will with respect to the specification of the act. For the intellect is what proposes the object to the will. “But the object moves by determining the act after the manner of a formal principle, from which action is specified in natural things.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1. After the manner of a formal principle, because it is not an intrinsic formal principle but an extrinsic one, nevertheless not separated, as an idea or exemplar, but conjoined.

27. Another question follows: whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite? - The answer must be negative with respect to the exercise of the act, on account of the same reason brought forward in the preceding number. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1. But sense moves the will not directly and immediately, but indirectly and mediately, by inducing a disposition in the willing subject with respect to the specification of the act. For “that which is apprehended under the notion of good and fitting moves the will by mode of object. But that something appears good and fitting happens from two things, namely from the condition of that which is proposed, and of him to whom it is proposed. For fitting is said according to relation, whence it depends on each of the extremes. And thence it is that taste disposed in diverse ways does not receive something in the same way as fitting and as not fitting. Whence the Philosopher says in 3 *Ethics*, cap. 5. a med. to 5., As each one is, such does the end seem to him. But it is manifest that according to passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to some disposition, whence according as man is in some passion something seems fitting to him which does not seem so to him existing outside the passion: as to the angry man something seems good which does not seem so to the quiet man; and in this way, on the part of the object, the sensitive appetite moves the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 2. Nor indeed does it stand in the way that the mover is not moved by that which it moves, so that there would be reciprocal motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, insofar as it obeys reason. For St. Thomas answers, l. c. ad 3: “It must be said that reason, in which the will is, moves by its command the irascible and

concupiscible, not indeed by despotic principality, as a slave is moved by his master, but by royal or political principality, as free men are ruled by a governor, who nevertheless can move contrariwise. Whence both the irascible and the concupiscible can move the will in the contrary direction. And thus nothing prevents the will from sometimes being moved by them.” Cf. St. Thomas, l. c. a. 5.; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 6. S. 6. 7.; Cajetan on q. 9. a. 2.

28. Aptly St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1: “It must be said that something needs to be moved by another insofar as it is in potency to several things. For that which is in potency must be reduced into act through something which is in act, and this is to move. But some power of the soul is found to be in potency to diverse things in two ways: in one way as to acting or not acting; in another way as to acting this or that; as sight sometimes sees actually and sometimes does not see, and sometimes sees white and sometimes sees black. Therefore it needs a mover as to two things, namely as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act; of which the first is on the part of the subject, which sometimes is found acting, sometimes not acting; but the other is on the part of the object, according as the act is specified. But the motion of the subject itself is from some agent. And since every agent acts on account of an end, as was shown above q. 1. a. 2., the principle of this motion is from the end. And thence it is that the art to which the end belongs moves by its command the art to which that which is to the end belongs, as the art of steering commands the art of shipbuilding.... But good in common, which has the notion of an end, is the object of the will. And therefore on this part the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts. For we use other powers when we will. For the ends and perfections of all the other powers are comprehended under the object of the will, as certain particular goods. But always the art or power to which the universal end belongs moves to acting the art or power to which the particular end belongs, comprehended under that universal: as the leader of an army, who intends the common good, namely the order of the whole army, moves by his command some one of the tribunes, who intends the order of one battle-line.” Therefore according to the Angelic Doctor the will is not moved with respect to the exercise of the act either by the intellect or by sense. But on the contrary, it itself is what moves the other faculties with respect to the exercise of the act. Hence the same Holy Doctor, l. c. ad 3, says still more clearly: “It must be said that the will moves the intellect as to the exercise of the act, because even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is contained under universal good, as a certain particular good.”
29. Since the will, as has been said, is moved in some way by the inferior appetite, another question thence arises: whether the will is moved of necessity by the inferior appetite. - It must be said that either reason is totally bound by the passion of the sensitive appetite, or reason is not totally absorbed by passion, but there remains, as to something, the free judgment of reason. If the first is verified, then there is not any motion of reason, and consequently neither of the will. If the second has place, according as the free judgment of reason remains as to something, consequently something of the motion of the will remains. “Therefore insofar as reason remains free and not subject to passion, so far the motion of the will which remains does not tend of necessity to that to which passion inclines. And thus either the motion of the will is not in man, but passion alone dominates; or if there is a motion

of the will, it does not follow passion of necessity.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 3. Wherefore, although the will cannot make it that motions of concupiscence do not arise, nevertheless it can not will to desire, or not consent to concupiscence. For although reason is clouded over by passion, nevertheless something of reason remains free. And according to this someone can either repel the passion totally, or at least contain himself lest he follow the passion. Sometimes indeed the sensitive part is totally subjected to reason, as happens in the virtuous and in the saints. Sometimes, conversely, reason is totally absorbed by passion, as happens in those who through vehement anger or concupiscence become furious or insane; concerning such persons the same account holds as concerning brute animals, which of necessity follow the impulse of passion. But we will and operate many things apart from passion of the sensitive appetite, through the choice alone of the rational appetite, as is clear in those things in which reason resists passion. St. Thomas, l. c. ad 1. 2. 3.

30. Since the will is moved neither by the intellect nor by sense to the exercise or use of the act, it is now asked: whether the will moves itself to act. - With respect to the specification of the act, the will is moved by the object, as is already clear from what has been said in n. 26. With respect to the exercise of the act, the will moves itself in the volition of means. For to move oneself is to reduce oneself, to apply oneself, to determine oneself from potency to act, by ordering oneself to the end. But the will, with respect to the volition of means unto the end, because it is free and has dominion over the act, is itself that which determines itself to act and orders itself to the end. Therefore. On the contrary, by an exterior principle, which is the cause of the will itself, it is moved with respect to the exercise of the act in the first volition of the end. For in this volition the will is not itself that which determines itself to act and orders itself to the end, but it is determined by the natural instinct itself of the will, received from an exterior principle, namely from God. Hence the principle of voluntary motions is something naturally willed, which is good in common, the ultimate end itself, and universally all those things which befit the one willing according to his nature. But the will does not always will these various objects actually, although it always has the aforesaid natural instinct, “but only when it is in some determinate disposition,” by which the aforesaid natural power is then stirred up to act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. c. ad 1. 2.
31. That according to St. Thomas the will moves itself with respect to the exercise of the act in the volition of means is affirmed most clearly in 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3, where the Angelic Doctor treats this question expressly: whether the will moves itself. In the paragraph *Sed contra*, he says: “because the will is mistress of its act, and in it there is to will and not to will; which would not be if it did not have in its power to move itself to willing. Therefore it moves itself.” And then he responds: “It must be said that.... it belongs to the will to move the other powers by reason of the end, which is the object of the will. But... in this way the end is related in appetible things as a principle in intelligible things. But it is manifest that the intellect, through the fact that it knows a principle, reduces itself from potency into act as to the knowledge of conclusions. And in this way it moves itself. And similarly the will, through the fact that it wills the end, moves itself to willing those things which are to the end,” passing from act to act. And ad 1: “It must be said that the will does not move and is not moved according to the same thing. Whence neither according to the same thing is it in act and in

potency; but insofar as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potency into act with respect to those things which are to the end, namely so that it actually wills them.” The same is clear from 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2: “It must be said that it is necessary that all agents act on account of an end. For among causes ordered to one another, if the first is removed, it is necessary that the others be removed. But the first among all causes is the final cause. The reason for this is that matter does not obtain form except according as it is moved by an agent. For nothing reduces itself from potency into act. But the agent does not move except from intention of the end. For if an agent were not determined to some effect, it would not act this more than that. Therefore, in order that it produce a determinate effect, it is necessary that it be determined to something certain, which has the notion of an end. But this determination, as in rational nature it comes about through the rational appetite, which is called will, so in other things it comes about through natural inclination, which is called natural appetite.” St. Thomas then adds the things which have already been reported in n. 1, and in c. ad 1. 2 he says that man is moving himself to the end; that those things which have reason move themselves to the end, because they have dominion over their acts; that it is proper to rational nature that it tend to the end as acting itself, or leading itself to the end; that man through himself acts on account of an end; that man orders into the end and acts himself into the end. This discussion indeed is about the volition of means. St. Thomas treats the question: whether to act on account of an end is proper to rational nature. Now to act on account of an end is to will and assume something as a means proportioned to attaining the end. And it is the same thing to move oneself to the end, to tend into the end, to act or lead oneself to the end, to order into the end; and, as the same Holy Doctor has it, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3. ad 3, to be moved by itself according to the notion of the end; for he says that the will is moved by itself as to the exercise of the act, according to the notion of the end. And in the same place, when the second difficulty has been proposed: “A movable thing is moved at the presence of the mover. But the will is always present to itself. If therefore it moved itself, it would always be moved, which is clearly false,” he responds: “To the second it must be said that the power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will by which it wills the end sometimes is not always in the will itself. But in this way it moves itself. Whence it does not follow that it always moves itself;” since one actually willing the end moves himself to the means to be willed.

32. As regards the volition of the end, in 1. 2. q. 9. a. 4 the Holy Doctor asks whether the will is moved by some exterior principle; and he responds by distinguishing motion as to specification and as to exercise, saying: “It must be said that according as the will is moved by the object, it is manifest that it can be moved by something exterior. But in that way in which it is moved, as to the exercise of the act, it is necessary to posit that the will is moved by some exterior principle. For everything which is sometimes an agent in act and sometimes in potency needs to be moved by some mover. But it is manifest that the will begins to will something when previously it did not will this. Therefore it is necessary that it be moved by something to willing. And indeed, as was said in the preceding article, it moves itself insofar as through the fact that it wills the end it reduces itself to willing those things which are to the end. But it cannot do this except by means of counsel. For when someone wills to be healed, he begins to think how he might attain this; and through such thought he arrives at this, that he can be healed through a physician, and this he wills; but because he did not always actually will

health, it is necessary that he began to will to be healed from some mover; (that is, some principle was the cause for him why he began to will). And if indeed it moved itself to willing, it would have been necessary that it do this by means of counsel from some presupposed will, but one must not proceed to infinity. Whence it is necessary to posit that, into the first motion of the will, the will comes forth from the instinct of some exterior mover.” But this exterior mover, as is held from article 6, is God.

33. In order that these things may be made clear, it must be noted that for the will to move itself can be taken in two ways: first, according as it merely signifies that it passes from potency of volition to the act of willing, the active power of the will being sufficient for this in its own order, namely in the order of a second cause, without another mover being required as though supplying a defect of the active faculty of the will in that order of a second cause. And in this sense, whether the discussion is about the volition of means or about the volition of the end, “it is certain,” says Cajetan in l. c., “that for willing the will with the object suffices.” Whether the will wills the end or wills the means, it always wills, and the active power of the will is always the same; nor is a greater active power required for willing one thing than for willing another. Whence it is also clear that if in this sense, according to the Angelic Doctor, the will moves itself in the volition of means, the will also moves itself in the volition of the end. Therefore, besides this ordinary and evident sense, there is another peculiar and more intimate sense. For the will to move itself can signify not only that the will wills, but that the will acts, and reduces and applies itself to acting; and to will is not the same as to act, to move; nor does that which suffices for willing suffice for acting, for moving. For willing, as has been said, the will and the object suffice; but for acting something else is required, for the end also is required; for to act is to act on account of an end. “It is necessary that all agents act on account of an end.” Indeed the appetite of the end is preredquired, either in time or by nature. “The first among all causes is the final cause... An agent does not move except from intention of the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. For moving oneself, that is, for determining oneself to act, the end is likewise preredquired, namely the appetite of the end. And the reason is clear, because an agent, by moving itself, that is, by reducing itself from the potency of acting to the act of acting, reduces itself from that potency to a certain act, to a determinate act, and this can be only from intention of the end. St. Thomas, ib. Whence it is also that in this sense the will moves itself only when it proceeds from one act into another, from intention of the end to the choice of means. And in this sense St. Thomas takes that expression, the will moves itself, and upon this, that the agent acts on account of an end, and upon motion, which is the act of the movable by the mover, he builds his whole doctrine. Cajetan on q. 9. a. 4.
34. And this truly signifies that the will moves itself, for, as is clear, it does not signify that the will simply wills, but signifies the will acting from itself, namely the causative force or causality of the will applying itself to acting; and for this the will with the object does not suffice, but the will is required as pre-willing the end by nature or in time, as has already been said. Wherefore that moving itself or acting from itself does not import in this sense, as in the former, the exclusion of another mover, as though furnishing powers for acting, but it excludes only the application to acting from intention of the end made by an exterior mover: the will itself, mistress of its act, from the prior intention of the end applies itself to acting, or to willing the

means. The will, through the fact that it wills the end, moves itself to willing those things which are to the end... Insofar as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potency into act with respect to those things which are to the end, so that, namely, it actually wills them... The will is moved by itself according to the notion of the end. St. Thomas, l. c. Whence it is more than sufficiently clear that St. Thomas derives from the prior volition of the end the fact that the will acts from itself, or moves itself. This indeed is not verified in the first volition of the end; and the reason brought forward by the Holy Doctor is now well understood, why, although the will moves itself in the volition of means, nevertheless it does not move itself also in the very volition of the end, namely in the first volition of the end, because if indeed it moved itself to willing the end, it would have been necessary that it do this by means of counsel, namely from a prevolition or intention of the end, for this is to act from counsel, just as to know by means of syllogism and from principles is the same; and consequently from some presupposed will of the end, which would be to proceed to infinity. Wherefore it is necessary that, into the first motion of the will concerning the end, the will comes forth from the instinct of some exterior mover, namely God, that is, from the very instinct of the will's proper nature tending to good, given indeed by an exterior principle, not received from the object, but from God, the cause effecting and creating the will with its proper nature. Wherefore in the first volition of the end, it is not the will itself which moves itself, acts from itself, as mistress of the act ordering, acting, leading, directing itself into the end; but the will in this volition is moved and acted, ordered and directed by an exterior mover, namely by God. Aptly Cajetan in l. c.: "And this act (of volition of the end) is said to be from an exterior agent... because to this act the will does not concur as acting on account of an end, but as tending to the end from the direction of the superior agent ordering it in this. And for this reason this act, although it is willing, and of the will, and from the will as eliciting the act, nevertheless is not voluntary, because it is not from the will as applying itself to willing, but natural; because the giver of nature applies it by means of an inclination given for willing. For it is necessary, as is said in the text, that there be an infinite process in voluntary things unless one arrives at one non-voluntary but natural act of the will, in which there is a stopping point." Cf. *Contra Gentiles*, l. 2. c. 48., l. 3. c. 88. 89.; Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 9. a. 4.

35. Besides, no doubt truly can remain for anyone concerning the mind of the Holy Doctor, if one remembers the texts which have already been reported in the preceding numbers, in which the Holy Doctor explains what he himself understands by moving oneself and being moved, when he explains the distinction between a rational and irrational agent; where he says that to move oneself is to order oneself into the end, which rational nature does, but to be moved is to be ordered by another into the end, namely by God, which is verified in irrational nature. Wherefore according to the Holy Doctor, to move oneself is to move oneself into the end; to be moved is likewise to be moved into the end, which the Holy Doctor sometimes says explicitly, sometimes more briefly, only implicitly; the term of that motion is not precisely act, but act toward the end; for it is one thing, speaking precisely, to move oneself to act, another to move oneself to a certain act, and consequently to an end, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2; for in reality it is not act and motion as such, but act and motion toward an end. And thus St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2, explicitly says: "Those things which have reason move themselves to the end..., those which lack reason tend to the end through natural inclination, as moved by another." And 1. 2.

q. 6. a. 1: "That which has no knowledge of the end, although in it there is a principle of action or motion, nevertheless the principle of that which is to act or to be moved on account of an end is not in it, but in another, by whom the principle of its motion unto the end is impressed upon it. Hence things of this kind are not said to move themselves, but by others to be moved. But those things which have knowledge of the end are said to move themselves, because in them there is a principle not only so that they act, but also so that they act on account of an end."

36. Now powers are of a twofold order. Some are those which are exercised by their own act alone, as are all natural and animal powers which are not subject to the superior command of our will. But some are those in which the use of the proper act is distinguished from the act itself; such are all natural and animal powers insofar as they are subject to a superior command and use, which, namely, we use when we will. For command is an act of the will as moving to act; use is likewise an act of the will as applying the executive powers, and of those same powers as executing. Powers of the first order have simply to operate, and to operate this, from the same mover: the exercise and the species of the act. Use or ordination into the end is had only from the first and universal mover, or from God, giving or causing nature. But powers of the second order, as is clear, have the exercise and use of the act and its ordination to the end from one mover, and from another they have the specific or specified act, because the use and exercise of the act is something other than the specified act. Moreover, by exercise of the act the Angelic Doctor understands use properly so called, which is an act of the will as of a principle moving and applying the executive powers, and of these same powers as executing. Wherefore by being in potency to act and not to act, he does not understand potency to its own acting and not acting itself, according to themselves, but potency to acting and not acting according as they are subject to use and to active ordination to the end. For the visual power, for example, if it is referred to seeing and not seeing as such, and seeing this, say white or black, is reduced by the same mover, say white, both into the act of seeing and into the act of seeing white. And this is to compare the power to only its own act and object according to itself. But if it is referred to seeing and seeing white as it is subject to use, then, since use is the act of the visual power not according to itself, but as executing the will commanding the use, thus it needs one mover for this, that it be reduced into the act of use and of ordination into the end, and another for this, that it be reduced into the act of its own proper species. Therefore sight according to itself does not need a twofold mover, one for this, that it see, and another for this, that it see white. And it is similar in other natural things. From the same mover each is had, both that they operate and that they operate this. And it is clear that reason supports this from the fact that in the concrete there is not indeed a twofold real potency to a twofold real act, one potency to acting and another potency to acting this; but there is one potency to one adequate act, requiring one adequate mover, namely that, as that act cannot be an act in reality without at the same time being this act, so the mover cannot move to act without at the same time moving to this act; and conversely, it cannot move to this act without at the same time moving to act. Therefore one power does not need two movers diverse over against one another, such as are on the part of the object and on the part of the subject. And this is confirmed: for when an active power, of itself sufficient for the act, and the object are posited, if all other things preredquired for acting are not lacking, that power, because it is active and sufficient, puts forth

its powers and acts, and it does not need another extrinsic or intrinsic mover. Thus in the present question, for the will to will, for example, is for the will to elicit an act of volition. Once the will is posited, a faculty active of itself, and once the object is sufficiently proposed to it on the part of the intellect, the will is reduced into act by its own proper force, without any other motive force, either extrinsic or intrinsic, impelling it to act. Besides, the difficulty would return concerning that other motive force, which would itself need another motive force, and so on to infinity. Hence, as is clear, the necessary concurrence of God for acting is not thereby excluded, which is required for another reason, namely because as a creature depends on God in its being, so also it depends on God in its operating.

37. Wherefore, besides the mover on the part of the object, there is no need of an extrinsic mover on the part of the subject in order that a power operate simply, or that it be determined to operating. Otherwise the will, in necessary natural acts, would not be a sufficient active power for willing, and in free acts it would no longer be able toward either, nor would it be mistress of the act, nor would it itself determine itself to act, as St. Thomas himself hands down in very many places. Therefore a mover on the part of the subject is needed only so that the power acts, that is, acts on account of an end and is ordered to the end. It stands, therefore, that one power, according to itself, needs one mover; and, as it is subject to another, it needs another, as is clear. And St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1., cf. n. 28, when he establishes the necessity of a mover on the part of the subject, does not speak generally of any power whatever which simply passes from potency to act, as otherwise his doctrine would have to be understood in the most general sense, but he speaks of a power of the soul. But he speaks of the powers of the soul not absolutely according to themselves, but he speaks of these powers which we use when we will, and therefore according as they are subject to a superior power. Nor does he speak simply of the exercise of the act, but of the exercise or use of the act, and its ordination into the end, as is clear from the reason brought forward from the end, and from the more general end which moves to the means and to particular ends, since that motion belongs altogether to another superior faculty, namely insofar as the art or faculty to which the end or more universal end belongs moves another subordinated to itself, to which the means or particular end belongs. Hence the motion of this is not simply according to itself, but according as it is subject to the prior faculty and to ordination into the end. Hence in the cited q. 9. a. 1, St. Thomas explains this motion only by command: the superior faculty, he says, moves the inferior by its command. Wherefore there, ad 3, St. Thomas says, "It must be said that the will moves the intellect as to the exercise of the act, because even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is contained under universal good (the object of the will) as a certain particular good." Therefore the matter is not about the simple exercise of the act of the intellect, or according to itself, but about that exercise of the act according as it is subject to the command and use of the will. And, in truth, if it were otherwise, it would then follow that the intellect could not be moved to act without a prior motion of the will, which is clearly false.
38. And since the will, by its innate liberty, also commands itself, and also uses its own free act in order to attain the end, it is clear that in elicited and free acts of the will of this kind, there is need of a twofold motion, one on the part of the object, with respect to the specification of the act, the other on the part of the subject with respect to the exercise or use of the act and of its

ordination into the end. For when the object has been proposed to the will by the intellect, the will still remains in potency to willing or not willing; it needs another motion, distinct from the motion of the object, by which it is moved in reality to act and is ordered to the end, and this is on the part of the subject, that is, of the will itself willing the end, or of the act of the will by which it wills the end. For in this way the will moves itself, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3. ad 2. Therefore the will moves itself insofar as through the fact that it wills the end, it reduces itself to willing those things which are to the end. St. Thomas, 1. c. a. 4. c. Whence the aforesaid motion is not required for this, that the will simply will, but that it act itself into the end. But into the first motion of the will the will proceeds from the instinct of an exterior mover, ib. a. 4. c. From this it is clear that the will does not move itself in every act of its own, but only in some, namely in those which are appetitions of means. And thus St. Thomas expressly says, 1. c. a. 4. in c. and ad 3, that the will cannot move itself with respect to all things. Wherefore the will, with respect to the same exercise of the act, in its free acts, itself moves itself to act, by choosing means to the end and by ordering itself to the end; which nevertheless does not exclude that it is also moved by God, the first cause.

39. But in necessary acts it is itself what wills by its innate power, since the will is a vital and active power, but it does not move itself to act by ordering itself to the end: it proceeds into the aforesaid act and is ordered into the aforesaid end by the force of the natural instinct implanted in it by God. For that natural instinct has been implanted in the will by God, the cause of the will, so that the will can rightly be said to be moved by God. "The will," says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 4. ad 3, "with respect to something sufficiently moves itself (in free acts) and in its own order (because the will is the proximate principle, which does not exclude the first principle which is from without, *ibid.* ad 1); but it cannot move itself with respect to all things (namely also in necessary and natural acts); whence it needs to be moved by another, as by the first mover," insofar as the natural instinct has been implanted by him. Cfr. also 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. ad 1. ad 3. "Whence the Holy Doctor says in the body of the article, it is necessary to posit that into the first motion of the will (necessary and natural) the will proceeds from the instinct of some exterior mover," who is God. For it is God who implants this instinct in the will toward good in common, by which afterward the will is inclined toward particular good, either likewise naturally, by the force of the natural instinct itself, or freely by determining itself to that. "God," says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 6. ad 3, "moves the will of man, as universal mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good, and without this universal motion man cannot will anything."
40. But from the fact that the will does not move itself except by willing those things which are to the end, and not by willing the end itself, it does not follow that in reality the will does not move itself by willing any end whatever. The reason brought forward by the Holy Doctor, that otherwise there would be a process to infinity, altogether excludes this. For that reason proves the intended point only with respect to the first volition of the end. And this is confirmed by the fact itself; for it is evident that the will does not will every end naturally and necessarily, but can also well will ends freely, and by willing these ends sin. Moreover, from the fact that the will does not move itself except by willing those things which are to the end, it does not follow that the will ought always to order all things explicitly to some extrinsic end, and ought

explicitly to will all things under the notion of means or under the notion of end. For acts commanded by a free will are on account of an end, because actions of this kind proceed from intention of the end by choice of means, and are usually the principal means for attaining the end. Acts elicited by the will which are concerned with means, as choice is, are most of all on account of an end, because likewise they proceed from intention of the end and are ordered to obtaining the end. But even an act of intention of the end is on account of an end. For intention proceeds from love of the end. Therefore it is on account of the end, since to act on account of an end or for the sake of the end is the same; and that which is done from love of the end is done for the sake of the end. But an act of this kind tends to a definite aim, not rashly, but from the direction of the agent himself; and therefore man in that act truly operates on account of an end, as moving himself by that act into the formal end, with prior cognition of it. Simple love or simple will is also on account of an end. For in loving a good, it is loved on account of its intrinsic goodness. And thus God is rightly said to be loved, as ultimate end, on account of himself, on account of his intrinsic infinite goodness. And St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. c., teaches universally that every human act is on account of an end, and simple love of God, as ultimate end, freely elicited, is a human act. Therefore simple love is on account of an end, not because it is on account of some extrinsic reason for willing such an end, but because it is on account of the intrinsic goodness of it. Nor indeed does that particle *on account of* signify an extrinsic reason for willing, but it simply denotes the reason for willing, the causality and motion of willing. Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 1. D. 2. S. 1.

41. Moreover, the will, as will, is concerned rather with the end, which it properly wills; as free, it is concerned rather with the means, to which choice properly pertains. An act of the will is sometimes efficacious, sometimes inefficacious by way of simple complacency. That thing which is the end contains in itself the notion of honorable and delectable good, the notion of the appetible on account of itself, the notion of an end; which last notion does not consist in this, that good appetible on account of itself moves the will to love or desire of itself, for this is had from the notion of good appetible on account of itself; but rather it is in this, that by love and desire of itself it moves the will to the choice of means by which that good can be obtained if absent, or conserved if present. The same must be said of a means; for in it there is the notion of useful good, the notion of the appetible on account of another, the notion or causality of means. Moreover, there cannot be given an act of the will, whether efficacious or inefficacious, which is not concerned either with the end or with the means, at least materially. For every good is desired either on account of itself or on account of another. Nevertheless there can be given an inefficacious act of the will, or one by way of simple complacency, which explicitly is not concerned with means insofar as they have the notion of means, nor with the end insofar as it has the notion of end. For someone can, by way of simple complacency, love honorable or delectable good under the notion of good appetible on account of itself, abstracting from the notion of end. And similarly he can love useful good under the notion of good appetible on account of another, abstracting from the notion of means. A married man can indeed love the good of chastity on account of itself, under the notion of the honorable, stopping in it itself, namely in such a way that from love of it he is not moved to choosing means; for he can will not to attain it, and therefore he does not love it under the notion of an end. Similarly he can love it on account of another, under the notion of useful good, stopping

in it, namely in such a way that he neither chooses nor assumes it as a means to attaining some end. Becanus, tr. 1, *On Beatitude*, c. 2. q. 8.

42. Therefore to the question, whether God moves the will, “it must be said, with the Holy Doctor, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 6. ad 3, that God moves the will of man, as universal mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion man cannot will anything.” For whatever man wills, he always wills good, and he is moved to willing good by God, who gives this natural inclination to the will, by universal motion, as the Angelic Doctor says. Therefore God moves the will insofar as he gives it a natural instinct toward good, and thus he moves it as universal mover and by universal motion. For “in all ordered movers it is necessary that the power of the second mover be derived from the power of the first mover, because the second mover does not move except insofar as it is moved by the first.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 33. a. 3. Therefore the second mover is moved by the first mover, insofar as it has power derived from the first mover; for otherwise, from the fact that the second mover does not move except as moved by the first mover, it would not follow that it receives power derived from that one. Therefore the human will is moved by God, the power of natural instinct toward good having been implanted in it. And in 1. 2. q. 13. a. 2. 3, “it must be said,” says St. Thomas, “that, as is said in *Physics* 1. 3. text. 16 and following, motion is ‘the act of the movable by the mover’; and therefore the power of the mover appears in the motion of the movable; and on account of this, in all things which are moved by reason there appears the order of the moving reason, although the things themselves which are moved by reason do not have reason. For thus an arrow tends directly to the mark from the motion of the archer, as if it itself had reason directing it; and the same appears in the motions of clocks and of all human contrivances which are made by art. But as artificial things are compared to human art, so all natural things are compared to divine art. And therefore order appears in those things which are moved according to nature, just as in those things which are moved according to art, as is said in *Physics* 1. 2. text. 49. And from this it happens that in the works of brute animals certain sagacities appear insofar as they have a natural inclination to certain most ordered processes, as ordered by the highest art. And on account of this also certain animals are called prudent or sagacious, not because there is in them any reason or choice; which appears from this, that all things which are of one nature operate similarly.” Therefore the human will, insofar as it has from God a natural instinct toward good, is moved by God and is moved to the end, as by a universal mover and universal motion, in the way that a clock is moved by the artificer and by art, to indicating the hours, by the workmanship fashioned in it. By universal motion: for “man through reason determines himself to willing this or that, which is truly good or apparently good.” Therefore God so moves the human will that in free acts he does not determine it to the act, since it is itself what determines itself to the act, where the matter concerns the volition of good in particular. Wherefore in such a volition of particular good God so moves the will that this will can be toward either: “But nevertheless sometimes God especially moves certain persons to willing something determinately, which is good, as in those whom he moves through grace, as will be said below, q. 109 and 112.” q. 9. a. 6. ad 3. For God moves the will in the supernatural order both as to exercise and as to specification, by infusing various supernatural habits and acts, concerning which there is treatment in the *Treatise on Grace*. - Besides this reason why God moves the will, namely that God has given to the will a natural

inclination to the good of reason, there is another reason which the Holy Doctor assigns in the body of the cited article, namely that God is the author of the will itself, and that this consequently depends in its being and operating upon God as upon the first cause. And this reason is the root and foundation of the former, and is common to the will and to all other created things. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. ad 3. Whence it follows that the human will is moved by God alone, as by an exterior principle, since the human will depends on God alone in its being and operating; from God alone, the cause of its nature, it has the universal inclination to good; and therefore it is moved by God alone as by an exterior principle, insofar as he is for it the cause of willing. Thus, therefore, the human will is moved by God in its acts in such a way that it is not excluded that it simply moves itself: for something can be moved by another which nevertheless moves itself, “and thus it is with the human mind.” St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 24. a. 1. ad 5.

43. Finally, the question is raised concerning the very act of the will required for the voluntary: whether the voluntary can exist without every act? - The Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3, treats expressly the question whether the voluntary can exist without every act; and he says, § *Sed contra*: “That of which we are masters is called voluntary. But we are masters of that which is to act and not to act, to will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will is voluntary, so also not to act and not to will.” Then he responds: “It must be said that voluntary is said of that which is from the will. But something is said to be from another in two ways. In one way directly, namely what proceeds from another insofar as it is acting, as heating from heat. In another way, indirectly, from this very fact that it does not act, as the sinking of a ship is said to be from the pilot insofar as he ceases from piloting. But it must be known that not always is that which follows upon defect of action reduced as into its cause into an agent from the fact that it does not act, but only then when it can and ought to act. For if the pilot could not direct the ship, or the piloting of the ship had not been entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship which happened through the absence of the pilot would not be imputed to him. Since, therefore, the will by willing and acting can impede this which is not to will and not to act, it is imputed to it as if existing from it. And thus the voluntary can be without an exterior act with an interior act, as when one wills not to act; but sometimes also without an interior act, as when one does not will.” Nor indeed is it valid to object that cognition is of the notion of the voluntary. But cognition is through some act. Therefore the voluntary cannot exist without some act. For the Angelic Doctor himself, l. c. ad 3, responds: “It must be said that an act of cognition is required for the voluntary in the same way as an act of the will, namely that it be in someone's power to consider, to will, and to act. And then, just as not to will and not to act, when the time has come, is voluntary, so also not to consider.”
44. The same Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 71. a. 5, treats the question whether in any sin whatever there is some act, and responds: “It must be said that this question is raised principally on account of the sin of omission... if in a sin of omission there is understood only that which pertains per se to the notion of sin, thus sometimes the sin of omission is with an interior act, as when someone wills not to go to church; but sometimes it is without every act, either interior or exterior, as when someone, at the hour in which he is bound to go to church, thinks nothing about going or not going to church. But if in the sin of omission there are also

understood the causes or occasions of omitting, thus it is necessary that in the sin of omission there be some act. For there is no sin of omission except when someone passes over what he can do and not do. But that someone decline to not doing that which he can do and not do is only from some cause or occasion, conjoined or preceding. And if indeed that cause is not in the power of man, the omission does not have the notion of sin, as when someone because of illness passes over going to church. But if the cause or occasion of omitting is subject to the will, the omission has the notion of sin; and then it is always necessary that that cause, insofar as it is voluntary, have some act, at least interior, of the will. This act indeed is sometimes borne directly into the omission itself, for example when someone wills not to go to church, avoiding labor. And then such an act pertains per se to the omission. For the will of any sin whatever pertains per se to that sin, because the voluntary is of the notion of sin. But sometimes the act of the will is borne directly into something else, through which man is impeded from the due act; whether that into which the will is borne is conjoined with the omission, for example when someone wills to play when he ought to go to church; or whether it is preceding, for example when someone wills to keep watch late in the evening, from which it follows that he does not go to church at the morning hour. And then this interior or exterior act is related per accidens to the omission, because the omission follows outside the intention; but we say that to be per accidens which is outside intention. Whence it is manifest that then the sin of omission indeed has some conjoined or preceding act, which nevertheless is related per accidens to the sin of omission. But judgment about things must be given according to that which is per se, and not according to that which is per accidens. Whence it can more truly be said that some sin can exist without every act; otherwise, acts and surrounding occasions would also pertain to the essence of other actual sins.” In response to the second objection he adds: “Something is called voluntary, not only because an act of the will falls upon it, but because it is in our power that it happen or not happen... Whence even not willing itself can be called voluntary, insofar as it is in man's power to will and not to will.”

45. Indeed there seems to be no doubt concerning the doctrine of St. Thomas, that namely, absolutely speaking, there can be a voluntary without every act, when the voluntary is not from the will acting, but from the will not acting, namely suspending an act either of volition or of nolition. “And it is proved, because liberty of the will includes the power of acting and not acting. Therefore, once the object is known, which does not bring necessity upon it, it can not operate by the force of its liberty. Therefore that lack of act is in the will from its liberty. Therefore it will be voluntary, both because it is free, and the free supposes the voluntary, and because in the mode in which it is, it arises from the intrinsic potency of the will from cognition. But for a suspension of act of this kind, an act is not required, but lack of influx is enough. Therefore an act is not necessary for every voluntary”: thus Suarez, tr. 2. D. 1. S. 5. n. 2. Lessius also affirms this on q. 6. a. 3. D. 1, saying that it is gathered from the cited place of St. Thomas: “Nevertheless omission of an exterior or interior act can be voluntary without any internal or external act which is the cause of that omission. It is proved, because you can omit Mass without this, that you are unwilling to hear Mass, or that you will something from which the omission of Mass necessarily follows as an effect, or which is for you the cause why you omit Mass; in like manner you can omit internal acts, such as an act of love of God, of hatred of sin, without another internal act which for you is the cause of omitting.”

46. But Billuart, with others, denies it. The reason is that there can be no voluntary where the exercise or act of the will is not had; for voluntary is said of that which proceeds from the will. Therefore, if that omission is voluntary, there is given an act of the will which is the cause or occasion of that omission, which for that reason is called and is voluntary. "It is confirmed: when the object has been proposed by the intellect, either the will determines itself to willing or not willing, and then there is some act of volition or nolition; or it determines itself to suspending every act of volition and nolition, and thus there is also some act, because that determination to suspension happens through some act; for the will is of itself a power indifferent to suspending or not suspending, just as to acting or not acting. Or finally it in no way determines itself but remains, as before, in pure indifference to willing or not willing, to suspending or not suspending, and thus there is no exercise of liberty, but the power remains as if dead, nor from it can there be the voluntary except in first act." D. 1. a. 3.
47. Now, whether no act is required for the indirect voluntary, or whether some act is necessarily demanded, this above all must be noted with respect to practice: that for the notion of the indirectly voluntary there does not suffice power in the will and negation of foresight, but three things must concur, namely, to be able, to be bound, and not to will. Wherefore, as the direct voluntary belongs to the agent, so the indirect voluntary belongs to the one not prohibiting, in him who could and ought to prohibit.
48. From this doctrine it follows that the evils which subjects, children, servants, etc., commit when bishops, pastors, rulers, public magistrates, parents, masters, etc., command, counsel, or in any other way impel them, are directly voluntary to those latter; but the evils which the former commit when the latter neglect and omit to withstand the wickedness of their respective subjects are indirectly voluntary to them, if nevertheless they can and ought to oppose this resistance in particular cases, and omit it by not warning, not correcting, not punishing, and not applying other means which they can and ought to use.

Commentary II: On the Free

1. We have spoken of the voluntary of human acts in the first Commentary; now, in this second Commentary, we must speak of the free. That the free is found in human acts is a truth of faith, which is established with all evidence and certitude from Sacred Scripture and Tradition. Cf. Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 2. The reason is that “if some good is proposed to the will which has the complete notion of good, and the ultimate end, on account of which all things are desired, it cannot not will to be happy, or will to be miserable. But in those things which are ordered to the ultimate end, nothing is found so evil that it does not have some good mixed in, nor anything so good that it suffices in all things; whence, however much it is shown to be good or evil, it can always adhere and flee into the contrary by reason of the other which is in it, from which it is taken, if it is evil simply, as an apparent good, and, if it is good simply, as an apparent evil; and thence it is that in all things which fall under choice, the will remains free, having determination in this alone, that it desires natural happiness, and not determinately in this or that.” St. Thomas, 2. Dist. 25. q. 1. a. 2., 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 6. S. 3., D. 8. S. 4.; Lessius on q. 10. St. Thomas; Würzburg Theology, n. 144 ff.
2. The free adds, above the act of the will, only a relation to the power eliciting the act of the will and having the power to suspend that act, or to elicit another act diverse only in species or even opposed. In the first case it is called liberty of exercise or of contradiction; in the other case, liberty of specification; in the third case, liberty of contrariety. Cf. Becanus, tr. 1. c. 2. q. 1., c. 3. q. 3. The exercise of the act is from the application of the will to willing; specification is from the various nature of the object. Therefore the free certainly requires in the will an active power of act and non-act, of this or that act; but it by no means requires immunity also from infirmity, namely from concupiscence and other passions and miseries of human life; since these are extrinsic, they cannot change the intrinsic manner of acting of the human will. Hence St. Thomas says: “it must be said that that infirmity which is in voluntary evils is subject to the power of man; and therefore it neither removes nor diminishes the notion of fault.” 1. 2. q. 21. a. 2. ad 3. This liberty, concerning which we are treating, is physical liberty. But moral liberty involves in its concept only the lack of obligation in conscience, or under fault, by force of a law commanding or prohibiting; which obligation presupposes physical liberty. Wherefore moral liberty connotes physical liberty. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. 3., q. 15. a. 2., q. 24. a. 3.
3. The aforesaid active power of the will essentially requires immunity from intrinsic necessity. The reason is that otherwise there would now be no further distinction between natural or necessary acts, and voluntary or free acts; now all acts of the will would be necessary, as being from intrinsic necessity, or all would be free if intrinsic necessity does not take away the liberty of the act. And thus the very acts of the will concerning the ultimate end or happiness, or concerning good in common, would be free. “Will,” says St. Thomas, “is divided against nature, as one cause against another, for some things happen naturally, and some things happen voluntarily.” 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. ad 1. Namely, acts are divided into necessary acts and free acts. The former happen naturally, but the latter voluntarily. For an act to happen naturally is

for it to happen from the instinct of nature, from intrinsic necessity. But for an act to happen voluntarily is for it to happen neither from the instinct of nature nor from intrinsic necessity. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. 4.; Würzburg Theology, n. 94 ff.

4. Besides immunity from intrinsic necessity, that active power of the will which is contained in the liberty of the same will further requires intrinsic active indifference to acting, namely a power intrinsically indifferent to acting or not acting, to acting this or that, once all conditions prerequired for acting have been posited. - Proof of the first part: the free excludes intrinsic necessity of acting. Therefore it necessarily implies intrinsic power of acting or not acting, of acting this or that. But this power is a power intrinsically and actively indifferent. Therefore. Proof of the second part: if that active indifference were to be understood only antecedently to the necessary prerequisites for acting, a free cause would differ in nothing from a necessary cause. Würzburg Theology, n. 100 ff. - The voluntary, according to the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1, imports the motion or act of those things which, from their own inclination and not inclined by another, perfectly move themselves. How therefore, if the aforesaid active intrinsic indifference of the will were lacking, would the voluntary still be had from one's own inclination and from perfect motion by oneself to act?
5. The doctrine concerning the free, proposed in the preceding number, both as to the matter and even as to the words themselves, is truly the doctrine of St. Thomas. For the Angelic Doctor explains the free through dominion of the act. "Those actions alone are called properly human of which man is master. But he is master of his acts through reason and will; whence also free choice is said to be the faculty of will and reason." 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. - He explains it through moving oneself to the end. "Therefore those things which have reason move themselves to the end, because they have dominion of their acts through free choice." 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. "Perfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the perfect notion, insofar, namely, as, the end having been apprehended, someone can, deliberating about the end and about those things which are to the end, be moved into the end or not be moved." 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2. - He explains it through power for opposite acts. "From this, that deliberating reason is disposed toward opposites, the will is able toward either." Ibid. ad 2. - He explains it through the determination of the faculty itself to act. "Man through reason determines himself to willing this or that, which is truly good or apparently good," 1. 2. q. 9. a. 6. ad 3; and he excludes God's determination to one from without; for he opposes this determination to particular good, proceeding from the will itself, to the motion of God toward good in common. Likewise he excludes intrinsic determination to one, saying: "But there is another mode of causing proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the mode which belongs to nature, which is determined to one." 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. ad 1. ad 3. "But the will is indeed, according to the order of nature, determined to one common thing, which is good, but it is indeterminately disposed with respect to particular goods." 1. 2. q. 13. a. 2. And here it must be noted that St. Thomas so truly excludes from a freely acting cause determination to one, that he explains a necessary cause in acting through this determination to one, taking necessity in acting and determination to one in acting for one and the same thing. And thus in 1. 2. q. 13. a. 2 he says: "But there is a difference between the sensitive appetite and the will, because, as is clear from what has been said above q. 1. a. 2. ad 3, the sensitive appetite is determined to

one particular thing according to the order of nature; but the will is indeed, according to the order of nature, determined to one common thing, which is good, but it is indeterminately disposed with respect to particular goods.” And ad 2. um: “The brute animal takes one thing before another, because its appetite is naturally determined to it; whence immediately, when through sense or through imagination something is represented to it, to which its appetite is naturally inclined, it is moved to it without choice, just as also without choice fire is moved upward and not downward.” These things specifically concerning the distinction between the will and the sensitive appetite. But speaking altogether generally about causes, St. Thomas divides them into natural and voluntary, or into necessary and free, q. 10. a. 1. ad 1, q. 21. a. 1. 2, etc.; and he explains the mode of causing of a natural, or necessary, cause by determination to one, without power toward either. Wherefore, according to the Angelic Doctor, a necessary cause is a cause determined to one; a free cause is a cause actively indifferent toward either. The Angelic Doctor furthermore explains the free expressly through the active indifference of the will. “Therefore because the will is an active principle not determined to one, but holding itself indifferently toward many things, God so moves it that he does not determine it of necessity to one, but its motion remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.” 1. 2. q. 10. a. 4.

6. And in this last place the Angelic Doctor explicitly, in the very words, excludes determination by God to one; wherefore he also excludes predetermination to one. But if by the name of premotion is understood that motion of God concerning which the Angelic Doctor says, God moves the will, divine premotion can very well be admitted, indeed must be admitted, since God's motion is prior by nature to the motion itself of the will. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas in the cited place, namely q. 9. a. 6. ad 3, “that God moves the will of man as universal mover to the universal object of the will, which is good; and without this universal motion man cannot will anything. But man through reason determines himself to willing this or that... good.” Moreover it is evident that that universal motion is prior by nature to this determination; whence, without that preceding universal motion of God, the particular determination of the human will cannot be had.
7. But if by the name of premotion is understood premotion to one certain act, to one determined act, just as St. Thomas excludes determination, or predetermination, by God to one, so also he excludes motion or premotion by God to one. Whence the Angelic Doctor immediately adds that God so moves the will that its motion remains contingent and not necessary: it certainly remains contingent and not necessary, as flowing from the human will, in the composite sense of the divine motion itself. He so moves that it remains contingent. Wherefore the explanation of the Angelic Doctor differs in nothing from the explanation of liberty given above in the preceding number.
8. Moreover, the Angelic Doctor explains liberty through choice, 1. 2. q. 13. a. 2. 6, which altogether excludes determination to one, and is indeterminately disposed toward many things, or is actively indifferent toward choosing them. Nor indeed can choice be understood without this intrinsic active indifference. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas in the cited place, “that since choice is the pre-acceptance of one thing with respect to another, it is necessary

that choice be with respect to many things which can be chosen; therefore in those things which are determined to one, choice has no place. But there is a difference between appetite and the will, because, as is clear from what has been said above, q. 1. a. 2. ad 3, the sensitive appetite is determined to one particular thing according to the order of nature; but the will is indeed, according to the order of nature, determined to one common thing; but it is indeterminately disposed with respect to particular goods. And therefore properly it belongs to the will to choose, but not to the sensitive appetite, which alone is in brute animals; and on account of this it does not belong to brute animals.” Cf. *Contra Gentiles*, l. 2. c. 48, l. 3. c. 88. 89.

9. Finally, the Angelic Doctor explains the free through the active application of appetitive motion to something, which also excludes any intrinsic and extrinsic determination to one. “Consent,” he says, “properly speaking, is not in brute animals. The reason for this is that consent imports application of appetitive motion to the doing of something. But it belongs to him in whose power the appetitive motion is to apply appetitive motion to the doing of something: just as touching a stone indeed belongs to a staff, but applying the staff to the touch of the stone belongs to him who has it in his power to move the staff. But brute animals do not have appetitive motion in their own power; rather such a motion in them is from the instinct of nature, whence a brute animal indeed desires, but does not apply appetitive motion to something. And on account of this it is not properly said to consent, but only a rational nature is, which has appetitive motion in its own power, and can apply it or not apply it to this or to that.” 1. 2. q. 15. a. 2.
10. Wherefore it must be concluded that, as the free excludes any intrinsic necessity, and consequently any extrinsic coercion, so also it excludes any intrinsic and extrinsic determination to acting. Nor indeed does it avail to object those things which the Angelic Doctor has in the same cited place, q. 10. a. 4. ad 3, where he says: “it must be said that, if God moves the will to something, it is impossible with this position that the will not be moved to that thing; nevertheless it is not impossible simply. Whence it does not follow that the will is moved by God of necessity.” From these words indeed the Holy Doctor can seem to teach that the will is not determined to one before the divine motion, but, once the divine motion has been posited, is now determined to one. And this would be to teach, in almost the same number of words, the noted distinction of the composite and divided sense. Namely, in the composite sense of the divine motion it is impossible or impossible that the act not be posited; but that this is possible simply, possible namely in the divided sense of the divine motion. - But the Holy Doctor in that response ad 3 certainly says this, which is quite different: once the divine motion has been posited, it is impossible that the act not be posited. But since the divine motion is of such efficacy that through it not only is something done, “but also that it be done in that mode which agrees with the nature of the thing itself; and therefore it would be more repugnant to the divine motion if the will were moved from necessity, which does not belong to its nature, than if it were moved freely, as belongs to its nature,” *ibid.* ad 1; consequently it cannot be said to be impossible simply that the act not follow; for what is impossible simply cannot be that which is, but contingently is toward either, for the acting will can act or not act. What is impossible simply is not contingent, but is altogether determined.

And it must be noted that the act remains contingent and free in the composite sense of the divine motion itself, and in the same composite sense that act consequently proceeds from a will actively indifferent and able toward either. For the Holy Doctor says, both in the said response ad 1. um and in the body, that that motion accommodates itself to the nature of things and of the will, and consequently does not move this will by necessity and with determination to one. If that motion agrees with the nature of the will, if it does not move by necessity by determining to one, it certainly moves in such a way that, with the divine motion itself standing, the will remains what it is, and, as the Holy Doctor says in the body of the article, this is the will, namely an active principle not determined to one, but holding itself indifferently toward many things. Therefore the will remains, in the composite sense of the motion, wholly what it is, and therefore actively indifferent and able toward either, not determined to one; and likewise, with that motion standing, the motion of the will remains contingent and free, and therefore proceeded from the will, under that motion, as not determined to one. God so moves it that he does not determine it of necessity to one, but its motion remains contingent, in the evidently composite sense of the divine motion itself. Nevertheless, once this divine motion to something has been posited, it is impossible with this position that the will not be moved to that thing, since that divine motion already implies with itself the concomitant motion of the will itself, though contingent and free, because most certainly the motion of the will remains contingent and free. Cf. 1. p. q. 19. a. 8.

11. According to the Angelic Doctor, the free is founded in the objective indifference of the preceding judgment of reason, proposing the thing not as absolutely to be chosen, but only as choosable on account of the various reasons of fittingness and unfittingness which can be present in it. For he says that the free is had “insofar as, the end having been apprehended, someone can, deliberating about the end and about those things which are to the end, be moved into the end or not be moved.” 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3. “From this it happens that man is master of his act, that he has deliberation concerning his acts. For from this, that deliberating reason is disposed toward opposites, the will is able toward either.” Now deliberation cannot be had unless reason proposes to the will the various fittingnesses and unfittingnesses which are in the object. Moreover in 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2 the Angelic Doctor has these words: “In the motion of any power by its object, the account must be considered through which the object moves the power.... Whence, if some object is proposed to the will which is universally good, and according to every consideration, of necessity the will tends into it, if it wills anything; for it will not be able to will the opposite. But if some object is proposed to it which is not good according to every consideration, the will is not borne into it of necessity.” Therefore the free is founded in this proposing of the object on the part of reason under diverse considerations, according to which the same object can be rejected or approved by the will. And in 1. 2. q. 13. a. 6: “In all particular goods, (reason) can consider the notion of some good and the defect of some good, which has the notion of evil. And according to this it can apprehend each of goods of this kind as choosable or fleeable. But perfect good alone, which is beatitude, reason cannot apprehend under the notion of evil, or of some defect. And therefore man wills beatitude of necessity, nor can he will not to be blessed, or to be miserable. But choice, since it is not about the end, but about those things which are to the end, is not of perfect good, which is beatitude, but of other particular goods. And therefore man chooses not of necessity, but freely.” And 1.

2. q. 17. a. 1. ad 2: "It must be said that the root of liberty is the will, as subject; but reason is so as cause. For from this the will can freely be borne to diverse things, because reason can have diverse conceptions of good. And therefore the Philosophers define free choice as a free judgment concerning reason, as though reason were the cause of liberty."
12. "It is inferred that, when a grave temptation has arisen, and after the sensitive appetite, whether concupiscible, venereal, or irascible, is vehemently excited by phantasy or from elsewhere, that then, I say, acts of a threefold kind can be given in the will. First, those which precede the use of reason and are elicited by the tempted person in that instant or time in which the intellect has not yet proposed to the will motives deterring it, but only those enticing it toward that object into which the appetite is borne. And these acts of the will are called first-first motions. Secondly, those which follow upon some use of reason, and are elicited by the tempted person in that instant in which the intellect proposes deterring motives only obscurely, but motives enticing toward illicit love or toward hatred so vividly that the will is moved by the deterring motives only weakly and imperfectly. And these acts of the will are called second-first motions. Thirdly, finally, those which follow upon the perfect use of reason and are elicited by the will in that instant in which the intellect has proposed to the will, sufficiently clearly and intensely, deterring motives or the unfittingness and moral malice, by which the will could be freely deterred, if it seriously willed. And these acts of the will are called deliberate acts. Acts of the 1.i kind are not free, and consequently neither are they formally sinful. Acts of the 2.i kind are imperfectly free, and only venially sinful. But acts of the 3.ii kind are perfectly free, and consequently, if there is gravity of matter, they are mortally sinful." Struggl, *Moral Theology*, tr. 1. q. 1. a. 1. n. 10. Cf. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 3.
13. A question arises from the established doctrine of the preceding number 11: whether for the exercise of liberty there is preredquired a practical judgment, or command of reason, by which it is defined that the object here and now, all things considered, is to be chosen or rejected? - R. Bellarmine (*On Grace and Free Choice*, l. 3. c. 8. 9.) indeed concedes that a judgment of this kind is required, and he further concedes that the will is determined to one from this judgment, but he denies that liberty is weakened thereby. For he says that that very practical judgment by which the will is determined is in the power of the will, insofar as, various objects or reasons of fittingness or utility having been proposed to the will, the will permits itself to be moved rather by one than by another object, rather by one than by another reason of fittingness or utility, from which permission of the will one practical judgment rather than another flows. Wherefore, although the will is determined by practical judgment, nevertheless this practical judgment follows upon the exercise of liberty. And thus liberty remains whole. But although the authority of Cardinal Bellarmine is great, still we cannot follow his opinion in this matter. For that practical judgment by which the will is determined to one: is it absolutely necessary, or is it absolutely free? If the 1.um, therefore all liberty is ended. If the 2.um, either it is free intrinsically, or extrinsically from the command of the will. The first cannot be said, because the formally free faculty is not the intellect but the will. But if the second is said, then either that command of the will is determined from another judgment of the intellect, and thus one must proceed to infinity, or it is not determined from a previous practical judgment, and then it is false that the will in all its free acts is determined by the last practical judgment of the

intellect. Wherefore, with Suarez in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 2, D. 6. S. 5. 6, D. 8. S. 4, Lessius in q. 6 of St. Thomas, and others, it is rather to be said that, for having the free determination of the will, such a practical judgment altogether determining it is not necessary. For to have the exercise of the will it is enough that the intellect propose the object to it as choosable; for by thus proposing the object, it proposes that object under some notion of good. Cfr. Becanus, tr. 1. c. 2. q. 5. 6. 7.

14. As has already been said, "the will is moved in two ways. In one way as to the exercise of the act; in another way as to the specification of the act, which is from the object. - Therefore in the first way the will is moved by no object of necessity. For someone can fail to think about any object whatever, and consequently neither actually will it." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. And *De Malo* q. 6. a. un.: "The appetite for beatitude itself also is from necessity as to the determination of the act, because one cannot will the opposite; but not as to the exercise of the act, because someone can then not will to think about beatitude, because even the acts themselves of intellect and will are particular." "But as to the second mode of motion, the will is moved by some object of necessity, but by some not." 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. The reason is that there are some objects, namely good in common, the ultimate end in common, and the means necessary to it, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. 2, which are not proposed to the will by reason except under the consideration of good. "But any other particular goods, insofar as they fall short of some good, can be taken as not good. And according to this consideration they can be rejected or approved by the will," 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2, rejected as not good, approved as good; for thus indeed there is had, on the part of the object, a moving reason of the faculty toward act, but a sufficient moving reason is not had. "The sufficient motive of any power is only an object which totally has the notion of motive. But if it is deficient in something, it will not move of necessity." 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. ad 1.

Commentary III: On Elicited and Commanded Acts of the Will

1. If the mode by which the voluntary proceeds from the will is considered, the voluntary is manifold. Moreover this mode of proceeding from the will can be considered 1.^o in order to the very power and faculty of the will from which it proceeds; 2.^o in order to the act itself which proceeds from the will; 3.^o finally in order to the object about which that act is concerned. Hence various divisions of the voluntary arise, about which we shall speak in order in distinct Commentaries. In the present Commentary we shall set forth the divisions which are had from that first head.
2. If human acts are considered in order to the power and faculty of the will from which they proceed, some human acts are internal, others external, according as they are completed by the interior will alone, or by another interior faculty; or they obtain their complement by the exercise of an exterior faculty. Others, moreover, are natural, others supernatural, according as they are effected by the powers of nature alone, or also by the powers of grace. Finally, some are called elicited and others commanded in relation to the faculty by which they are immediately exercised, or by whose act they are determined. Thus an act of faith is an elicited act of the intellect, commanded by the will. An act of contrition from the motive of charity is an elicited act of the will, commanded by the same will. Similarly, love of God and love of enemies are elicited acts of the will, but the latter is commanded by the former.
3. Therefore, if it is attended to whether the voluntary proceeds from the will immediately or mediately, one voluntary is such elicitedly, another commandingly. The first is had when the whole act is completed by the will alone and in the will, without the aid of another faculty, whether interior and spiritual, or exterior and corporeal; as are volitions and nolitions. The other is had when the act indeed depends on the command itself of the will, but is nevertheless completed by another faculty of the agent; whether interior, as are intellect, phantasy, memory; or exterior, as are the members of the body and the organs of the senses, such as to walk or to speak. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. ad 2, q. 6. a. 4; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 1. S. 1, D. 10. But an act can be at once elicited and commanded, for the will can command itself in its own acts. Then the act proceeds not from the will alone, but also from another act of the will itself; and for this reason theologians say that one virtue, e.g. charity, commands the acts of other virtues, when the will from the motive of one virtue elicits an act of another virtue, for example, from love of God it has mercy on the poor. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 5; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 10. S. 1.
4. There is a twofold division of elicited acts of the will, according as these acts consist in the pursuit of good or in flight from evil; according as they are concerned with the end or with the means. As to what pertains to the first division, some elicited acts of the will in reality consist in the pursuit of good, others in flight from evil, as is to be seen in love, desire, joy; hatred, fear, sadness. Desire is concerned with absent good, joy with present good; love abstracts from both. Fear likewise is concerned with absent evil, sadness with present evil, hatred with both. "Just as for delight two things are required, namely the conjunction of good and the perception

of this kind of conjunction, so also for sorrow two things are required, namely the conjunction of some evil, which for this reason is evil, because it deprives some good, and the perception of this kind of conjunction.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 35. a. 1.

5. Love is the first and simplest act of all. For from it desire is born, and the hope of obtaining the good, and, with daring, of approaching those things which are serviceable to this, and finally joy concerning the good obtained. To love is nothing other than to will good to someone. Hence it has a twofold respect: one to the good which we will; the other to the person to whom we will good. From the prior respect, i.e. from the good which we desire, there is had love of concupiscence; from the latter, i.e. from the person to whom we will well, love of benevolence. But the good which we desire can be not only a good distinct from the person, but also the person himself. And thus we can love God by love of benevolence, by way of the person to whom we will good, and by love of concupiscence, by way of the good which we will for ourselves. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 26. a. 4.
6. Hatred is opposite to love. Yet hatred is said to arise from love, insofar as someone therefore hates another thing because it is contrary to the loved thing. But hatred is twofold, of abomination and of enmity. Hatred of abomination is that by which we detest evil, or by which we do not will to someone evil for the person. Hatred of enmity, by which on the contrary we will evil to some person. Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 29. a. 1.
7. Between love and hatred there is present a twofold difference. “First, because the same act can at once be love of concupiscence and of benevolence. For, with respect to the good which we will, it is called of concupiscence; with respect to the person to whom we will it, it is called of benevolence. But the same act in number cannot at once be hatred of abomination and of enmity. For one act is that by which I abominate or detest the evil of some person; but another by which I will and desire evil to some person. The prior arises from love of the person. The latter from displeasure with the person. Secondly, although in hatred there is also a twofold respect, as in love, nevertheless not in the same mode. For in an act of love each respect is by way of pursuit or complacency: one to the good which we will, the other to the person to whom we will it. But in hatred one is by way of displeasure, the other by way of complacency. And indeed in hatred of abomination the respect to the person is by way of complacency, the respect to the evil by way of displeasure. The contrary happens in hatred of enmity, where the respect to the person is by way of displeasure, the respect to the evil by way of complacency.” Becanus, tr. 1. c. 3. q. 1. n. 4.
8. Moreover, love and hatred can be considered in two ways. “First, by way of simple complacency and displeasure; and thus they are acts really distinct from desire, joy, fear, and sadness. For the one is concerned with good absolutely, the other with evil absolutely, abstracting from presence and absence. Secondly, by way of efficacious complacency and displeasure. And thus love is essentially included in desire and joy; hatred in fear and sadness. For desire is the act by which we efficaciously will the good which is absent. Joy is the act by which we efficaciously will the good which is present. Similarly fear is the act by which we efficaciously abominate absent evil, sadness that by which we abominate present evil. Hence it follows that, just as love and hatred of abomination include a twofold respect, one to the good or evil which we will or

do not will, the other to the person to whom we will or do not will it, so also the same must be said of desire and joy, and likewise of sorrow and sadness. For just as through love I absolutely will good to someone, so through desire I efficaciously will absent good to him, and through joy I efficaciously love his present good. The same holds concerning the opposite acts.” Becanus, cited place, n. 5.

9. Now then, if the pursuit of good and flight from evil are attended to, and good and evil are considered both as taken simply and according as they have the notion of the arduous or difficult, or insofar as there is something attainable or fleeable with some difficulty, then this series of acts is had: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; and anger, which has no opposite. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 23. a. 1. Love, desire, and joy tend toward good simply; hatred, flight or abomination, and sadness recede from evil simply. Hope tends toward arduous or difficult good, but insofar as it is good; despair recedes from good, but insofar as it is arduous and difficult. Similarly, arduous evil indeed has the notion that it should be avoided, insofar as it is evil, and fear pertains to this. It also has the notion that one should tend into it, as into something arduous, through which, namely, someone escapes subjection to evil, and thus daring tends into it. Wherefore daring and fear refer themselves to the same thing, namely to evil; but daring attacks that evil in order to overcome it, with danger neglected, while on the contrary fear flees it. Finally, anger is caused by difficult evil now lying upon one, at whose presence it is necessary that either the appetite succumb, and thus not go beyond the bounds of sadness, or that it have a motion to invading the harmful evil, or to avenging it, which pertains to anger. For anger is the appetite of vengeance, or the appetite of harming another, under the notion of vindictive justice. It cannot have a motion to fleeing, that is, to escaping or avoiding that evil, because the evil is now posited as present or past. If present, it cannot be impeded from affecting; if past, it cannot be avoided from having happened. And thus there is no contrary motion to anger by reason of approach and withdrawal from the same object, good and evil. Similarly neither is there a motion contrary to it according to the contrariety of good and evil, because to evil now lying upon one there is opposed good already attained, which now cannot have the notion of the arduous or difficult; nor after the attainment of good does any other motion remain except the resting of the appetite in the attained good, which pertains to joy. Whence it remains that only cessation from motion is opposed to it, and thus to become mild is opposed to this which is to be angry, which is not contrarily opposed, but negatively or privatively. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 23. a. 2. 3. 4. “One who hates desires the evil of the enemy insofar as it is evil. But one who is angry desires the evil of him against whom he is angry, not insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it has a certain notion of good; namely, insofar as he judges it to be just, insofar as it is vindictive.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 46. a. 7. “Vengeance is made through the infliction of punishment. But it belongs to the notion of punishment that it be contrary to the will, that it be afflictive, and that it be inflicted for some fault. And therefore the angry man desires this, that he to whom he brings harm perceive and grieve, and that he know this to come about because of the injury inflicted on him. But one who hates cares nothing about this, because he desires the evil of another insofar as such.” St. Thomas, cited place, ad 2. Under acts of this kind all other acts are contained; e.g. envy is sadness concerning the good of another; shame is

fear of what is shameful, etc. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 23. a. 4, q. 24. a. 4. Thus, however, the preceding acts are ordered according to the way of generation. First occur love and hatred; secondly desire and flight; thirdly hope and despair; fourthly fear and daring; fifthly anger; sixthly and finally joy and sadness. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 25. a. 3.

10. As to what pertains to the other division, “every action of the will is concerned either with the end or with a means, which happens to be done in two ways, either by desiring or by executing; from which there arises a twofold order of acts of the will and of the practical intellect, which governs the will in morals. The prior contains all those acts which are necessary up to the last choice of the means, which are will, intention, counsel, consent, choice. The two prior are concerned with the end; the later, in the order in which they have been numbered, are concerned with the means. But when choice has been established, the will proceeds to free execution, and thus there is the second order, in which only two acts are numbered: command and use; to which acts fruition is added, which is not an operation ordered to either desiring or attaining the end; but rather, the end having been obtained, it follows upon it.” Suarez, tr. 2. D. 6, at the beginning. Cf. Cajetan on 1. 2. introd. q. 8. - This twofold order of acts of the will is founded in the twofold relation of the will to the willed thing, namely both to the end and to that which is to the end, or the means. The first relation is according as the willed thing is in the will; the second relation is according as the will really tends to the willed thing itself in itself. Once a comparison has been established between the first and second relation, it appears that the first is compared to the second as the imperfect to the perfect; and consequently the will proceeds from the first to the other. The perfection of the will according to the first relation is only according to willing; namely, the will will be perfect when it completely wills the end and that which is to the end. But the perfection of the will according to the other relation is according to the very possession of the good had, when the will has completely attained it; namely, when it really has that which is to the end, and really obtains the end itself. St. Thomas explains this twofold relation of the will thus, 1. 2. q. 16. a. 4: “It must be said that the will has a twofold relation to the willed thing. One, indeed, according as it is in some way in the one willing through a certain proportion or order to the willed thing. Whence also things which are naturally proportioned to some end are said to desire it naturally; but thus to have the end is to have it imperfectly. But every imperfect thing tends into perfection; and therefore both the natural appetite and the voluntary appetite tend so that it may have the end itself really, which is to have it perfectly, and this is the second relation of the will to the willed thing. But the willed thing is not only the end, but that which is to the end.”
11. Will, or simple volition, is the first act of the will, so called from the power itself; just as the first act of the intellect concerning principles is also called from the very power, intellect or understanding. Will, according as it is used not for the power but for the act, signifies a certain simple act of the will, which is, as it were, the first inclination of the will into the object, proposed as lovable in itself, without any order to another. From this it is clear that this act is properly concerned with the end, for the end alone is a good lovable in itself. For the simple act of a power is toward that which is, according to itself, the object of the power. But since the principle of every motion of the will is the end, this act is the first motion of the will. St.

Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. 2; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 6. S. 1; Lessius in the cited place of St. Thomas; Cajetan in the cited place.

12. But this is not to be understood in such a way that will, taken for the act, is so exclusively of the end alone that an act which is concerned with means can in no way be called will. This appears false from the very common manner of speaking: for there is said to be a will of the end, and there is also said to be a will of the means. Therefore what has been said must be taken thus: that will, used for the act, is of the end alone and not of the means principally and properly, as the same Angelic Doctor has in *De Veritate* q. 22. a. 13. ad 9, a. 15. c. But although there is said to be a will of the end and a will of the means, the former principally and properly, the latter secondarily and less properly, nevertheless the distinction is not in mere speech, but in the thing itself. For the end and the means, or honorable good and useful good, are not related equally, but as that which is according to itself, or absolute, and as that which is according to another, or toward something, or relative. The former is reduced to the category of quality, the latter to the category of relation. Wherefore, although the same will, as power, in thing and nature, is concerned with each good, nevertheless will as act is not the same in thing and nature. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 2. ad 2. And here it must be noted that will, whether it is of the end or of the means, insofar as it resolves to do something, is usually called a purpose, for example, the will not to sin hereafter, to hear Mass, to abstain from servile works, etc. But then the will already approaches intention, and is true intention.
13. Intention by force of the name signifies to tend into another. “But both the action of the mover and the motion of the movable tend into something. But the fact that the motion of the movable tends into something proceeds from the action of the mover. Whence intention first and principally pertains to that which moves to the end. Whence we say that the architect and everyone commanding moves others by his command to that to which he himself tends. But the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end. Whence it is manifest that intention is properly an act of the will,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 12. a. 1, and not of the intellect; and it is an act of the will with respect to the end. “The will indeed does not order; but nevertheless it tends into something according to the order of reason. Whence this name, intention, names an act of the will, presupposing the ordering of reason, ordering something into the end.” St. Thomas, *ibid.* ad 3, q. 12. a. 5.
14. Therefore in the end two notions can be considered. The first, that it is a certain good lovable in itself, without any order to another, and thus is the object of the will. The other, that a good of this kind is to be obtained through due means. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3, q. 12. a. 4. “Whence it is gathered that intention of the end is found only in the absence of the end itself; wherefore God does not properly intend his happiness; nevertheless he wills and loves it, whence will can remain even after the end has been obtained, which also manifests the distinction of these acts.” Suarez, cited place. Indeed, as the same Angelic Doctor observes, 1. 2. q. 12. a. 1. ad 4, “the will regards the end in three ways. In one way absolutely, and thus it is called will, according as we absolutely will either health, or anything else of this kind. In another way the end is considered according as one rests in it, and in this way fruition regards the end. In a third way the end is considered according as it is the term of something which is

ordered into it, and thus intention regards the end. For we are not said to intend health from this alone, that we will it, but because we will to arrive at it through something else.” “But the reason for this is that three things are required for integrating the notion of an end: the goodness itself lovable on account of itself; and the negation of further order; and the termination of other things to it. For the end, as such, must be loved on account of itself and not on account of another end, and other things must be loved on account of it. And the end indeed, insofar as it is lovable on account of itself, pertains to the act of volition; but insofar as it does not lead further, it pertains to fruition, which signifies rest in the term; but insofar as other things are to be ordered to it, it terminates intention. And from this you also have that when that which is to the end is loved absolutely, it puts on the notion of an end, and similarly when one stops in it, and in the same way when it is desired as to be attained through preceding things.” Cajetan in the cited place.

15. Moreover the end which intention regards is not necessarily the ultimate end, as in fruition, as will be said in its own place. “Intention,” says St. Thomas in the cited place, a. 2, “regards the end according as it is the term of the motion of the will. But in motion the term can be taken in two ways. In one way, the ultimate term itself, in which one rests, which is the term of the whole motion. In another way, some means which is the principle of one part of the motion, and the end or term of another. As in a motion by which one goes from A into C through B, C is the ultimate term, but B is a term, though not the ultimate. And there can be intention of each. Whence, although it is always of an end, nevertheless it is not necessary that it always be of the ultimate end.... Fruition indeed imports rest, which is in the end, which pertains only to the ultimate end; but intention imports motion into the end, not into rest.”
16. From these things which have been said about will and intention “it is inferred, first, that will is not distinct from love; for the notion of love is to tend into good absolutely, whether it is present or absent.... Only this seems to be added: that the name of love can be used more universally and sometimes signify an affection of the will whether concerning the means or concerning the end.... Secondly, many gather that the act of intention is not distinguished from the act of desire... for desire in a general signification signifies any appetite whatever for obtaining a good which someone lacks; and it extends itself not only to the appetite of an efficacious will, but also to imperfect volitions or velleities, and indeed even of impossibilities; but intention seems to signify only the absolute and efficacious will of obtaining the loved end through fitting means. Wherefore, if we speak of desire not in that general signification, but insofar as it is efficacious desire of the end, in this way it does not seem to have a formal notion distinct from intention, because it has the same formal object, namely, to obtain an absent good.” Suarez, cited place. Thirdly, “concerning an end not yet acquired, the will can have only two perfect acts which are necessary for the attainment of it, namely will and intention, or love and desire; but it can have other imperfect acts, which nevertheless are reduced to these.... There would be difficulty concerning the act of hope, which also is concerning an end not had.... But it must be said that the act of hope is not of itself necessary in this quasi-line of human acts, but accidentally concerning some object which is arduous and excellent, so that the appetite may be confirmed; and it is common to acts concerning the end and concerning the means: and finally, when it is necessary, it is concerned with the end and is

reduced to intention, for it is, as it were, a certain volition of obtaining the end, however arduous and excellent it may appear.” Suarez, cited place. Fourthly, will is concerned only with the end and not with the means. The reason is that it supposes no prior act, which is repugnant to the volition of means as such. But an act of intention, either virtually or expressly, is an appetite of means in common. The reason is that intention is an efficacious will of obtaining the end. But to will the end absolutely as thus to be attained is virtually to will to execute all the means necessary to the end. Moreover someone can explicitly elicit this act: I will to employ all the means necessary to the end; which act is intention, because it precedes every consultation about means and choice, and is the principle of counsel and choice. Therefore. But it is said in common, not in particular, for by this reason it is distinguished from choice. And thus there can be intention of the end, even when those things which are to the intended end have not yet been determined, of which there is choice, as daily experience itself makes clear. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. 2. 3, q. 12. a. 4, *De Veritate* q. 23. a. 13. 15; Suarez, cited place, S. 2; Lessius in q. 8. a. 3 and in q. 12.

17. But for declaring the preceding acts still more, it is worth the effort to add those things which Laymann has, 1. 2. tr. 2. c. 1. n. 6, explaining which acts are contained in hope as elements. “It remains,” he says, “that we explain the definition of theological hope, according to its stricter acceptance, handed down by the Scholastics with the Master in 3. D. 26: A certain expectation of beatitude from the grace of God and our merits. When expectation is said, note that these acts of the will are subordinated, namely love, desire, intention, expectation. For love extends more broadly than desire, for we love both with absence and with presence; we desire only absent things. Desire extends more broadly than intention and expectation, because desire of absent good is one thing when simple, by which we desire even those things which we judge to be very difficult or impossible to acquire, and therefore we despair of them and do not intend to attain them; in which way one condemned to be affected with punishment desires a longer life, which nevertheless he despairs of and sometimes does not intend to obtain. But another is efficacious desire of an absent good, or of one not yet possessed, which, insofar as it is judged possible to acquire through means, is called intention; but insofar as it is judged arduous, yet really to be acquired on account of the efficacy of the means, or on account of one's own faculty or that of another helper, is called expectation. From this it appears that the act of expectation or hope adds a certain mode of firmness above the act of intention on account of the faculty of obtaining having been seen through.” Cf. St. Thomas, 3. D. 22. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3, a. 3. ad 1. ad 2.
18. And from these things which precede, n. 16, it is clear that the motion of the will into the end and into that which is to the end can be considered in two ways. In the first way, according as the will is borne into each absolutely and according to itself. And thus there are simply two motions of the will into each. The first motion, by which it is borne into the end absolutely, and sometimes precedes in time, is will. As when someone first wills health, and afterward, deliberating in what way he can be healed, wills to hire a physician so that he may be healed. In the other way the motion of the will can be considered according as the will is borne into the end according as it is the reason for willing those things which are to the end, and into the very things which are to the end; and it is one and the same motion of the will, and it is intention. And conversely, according as the will is borne into that which is to the end, on

account of the end, it likewise is one and the same motion of the will tending to the end and into that which is to the end. For when I say, I will medicine on account of health, I designate only one motion of the will. The reason for this is that the end is the reason for willing those things which are to the end. But the same act falls upon the object and upon the reason of the object. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3, q. 12. a. 4, *De Veritate* q. 22. a. 14. Fittingly Cajetan on q. 8. a. 3: "The end and that which is to the end, as willed things, are disposed in two ways. First formally and separately according to themselves; and thus they are loved by diverse volitions, and one is the cause of the other. Secondly, as one is virtually enclosed in the other; and thus by one volition, as to subject, they are loved.... For this willed thing is on account of that one, virtually participated in this one.... For thus they occur at least..., so that (the end is) the reason for loving that which is to the end. But I say at least because nothing prevents one also actually, by one act, tending into alms on account of God, into the former as matter, into the latter as form; just as one bodily vision tends into color and light. For those things which are to the end are compared to the end as matter to form, as is clear from what was said above in q. 5. And know that in things of this kind, which by one act are terminated to each, the word *propter* does not state the cause of the volition, but of the willed thing; for it states the cause why that material thing terminates the act of willing, and it does not state another volition causing this one, except virtually."

19. Whether someone can intend several things at once; and, if several impossible things are intended, which intention prevails? - Resp. To the 1. um, affirmatively. For either those things are ordered to one another or not. "If indeed they have been ordered to one another, it is manifest that man can intend many things at once. For intention is not only of the ultimate end, but also of an intermediate end; but someone at once intends both the proximate and the ultimate end, as the making of medicine and health. But if two things not ordered to one another are taken, thus also man can intend several things at once, which is clear from this, that man chooses one thing before another because it is better than the other. But among the other conditions by which something is better than another, one is that it is of use for several things. Whence something can be chosen before another from this, that it is of use for several things, and thus manifestly man intends several things at once." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 12. a. 3. - Resp. To the 2. um: 1.º If those impossible wills are simultaneous, the predominant one prevails, namely the one which would be chosen once the impossibility was known. 2.º If among contrary wills one succeeds another, the later prevails over the prior, for it is predominant in the order of time. Except: unless the prior has revoked, at least virtually, every subsequent will; for then the prior will, provided it is not expressly revoked, is certainly predominant. Cf. Lugo, *On the Sacraments*, D. 8. n. 121. 123; St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 24.
20. Wherefore, if one person has asked from you today's Mass for thanksgiving, another for one gravely ill, and you have elicited the intention of each, it must be held that it was applied for the latter, whether that one asked for it earlier or later. If you determine with yourself: Whatever vow I shall hereafter make without the permission of the confessor, I do not will it to have force; and afterward you vow something without consulting the confessor, it has no force, provided that will is not retracted expressly or virtually, namely if, mindful of the first vow, you were to make the second. If someone were to contract matrimony intending it to be soluble,

with such a mind that if he knew it to be indissoluble he would not contract it, the matrimony is null; for indissolubility is an essential property of Christian matrimony. But he would contract validly if merely through error alone he thought matrimony to be dissoluble, because then the certainly predominant will is that of contracting the matrimony itself, and consequently that error does not take away the intention of contracting in the mode in which he ought. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 210. 700, l. 6. n. 24; Elbel n. 130.

21. Fruition is named from fruit. "But sensible fruit is that which is expected last from a tree and is perceived with a certain sweetness. Whence fruition seems to pertain to love or delight, which someone has concerning the last thing expected, which is the end." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 11. a. 1. Wherefore fruition is an act of the will including three things: love, possession, joy. It includes love, but is not love, because love of itself abstracts from the attainment of the object. This is also clear from the force of the name itself; for to enjoy is to take fruit from a thing, but love only states a weight toward the loved thing. "To love," says Suarez, tr. 2. D. 7. S. 3, "is to be borne by a certain vital weight into a known good, and to be united to it; from which there follows the appetite of obtaining that good (desire), and, once presence is posited, joy follows, which does not unite the lover with the loved, but rather is a certain sweetness which arises from that union and possession of the good." Hence fruition also includes possession. Whence Augustine, l. 1. *On Christian Doctrine*, cap. 4, says: "To enjoy is to adhere by love to some thing on account of itself." But it is not possession, unless perhaps as informed, as it were, by joy and delight. This joy and delight of the will is that which properly comes under the name of fruition.
22. Therefore the object of fruition is good under the notion of good; but that good must be delectable, for it is the cause of delight. But delight is complacency in that which is fitting, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 11. a. 1. ad 3; it is the rest of the appetitive power in some loved good and consequent upon some operation, St. Thomas, *ibid.* q. 34. a. 1. But both the end and the means can in some way be the object of joy, although the reason for rejoicing, or the formal object, is always the end. The 1st reason is that joy arises from the attainment of delectable good. But the means itself can be a delectable good. And thus we experience ourselves to be delighted when we obtain fitting means. Therefore. The 2nd reason is that every loved good either is an end, or is by reason of an end. Therefore every good which delights is an end, or by reason of an end. Cf. Suarez, tr. 2. D. 7; Cajetan on q. 11. a. 1.
23. Wherefore fruition properly such is not of means, but of the end; indeed fruition properly is of the ultimate end. For fruition, as has already been noted, is named from fruit; and two things pertain to the notion of fruit, namely that it be last, and that it quiet the appetite with a certain sweetness or delight. "But the last is either simply or in a qualified respect. Simply, indeed, that which is not referred to another. But in a qualified respect, that which is the last of some things. Therefore that which is simply last, in which someone is delighted as in the last end, this is properly called fruit, and someone is properly said to enjoy it. But that which is not delectable in itself, but is desired only in order to another, as a bitter drink for health, can in no way be called fruit. But that which has in itself a certain delight to which certain preceding things are referred can indeed in some way be called fruit, but not properly; and according to

the complete notion of fruit we are said to enjoy it. Whence Augustine says..... that we enjoy known things in which the delighted will rests. But it does not rest simply except in the last, because as long as something is expected, the motion of the will remains in suspense, although it has already arrived at something.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 11. a. 3.

24. Fruition can indeed be given as pertaining to love of friendship. For it is certain that we can rejoice concerning the goods of a friend, because they are his, on account of his good.
“Nevertheless it is true that the name of fruition is more properly attributed to joy which pertains to love of concupiscence, since to enjoy is to take fruit; whence it seems to import a respect to the advantage of the one enjoying.” Suarez, tr. 2. D. 7. S. 2.
25. But a twofold joy or fruition is distinguished, perfect and imperfect. “For since it is concerning the end attained, if the end has been perfectly attained, the fruition is perfect; if it has been attained in a certain hope, some fruition can arise from this, but imperfect, because that is already some kind of attainment; and this seems to be that fruition concerning which Paul says, rejoicing in hope.” Suarez, cited place. From hope of obtaining a good, delight also arises, for the good becomes in some way present to the mind. Hence also the memory of a good in which someone has already rejoiced furnishes delights to the one thinking. But a present thing floods the mind with far greater joy. To the point, the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 11. a. 4: “To enjoy imports a certain comparison to the last, according as the will has something for the last end. But the last end is had in two ways. In one way perfectly, and in another way imperfectly. Perfectly, indeed, when it is had not only in intention, but also in itself. Imperfectly, however, when it is had in intention alone. Therefore perfect fruition is of an end already really had; but imperfect fruition is also of an end not really had, but in intention alone.” Wherefore the same Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 12. a. 5. ad 2, says: “Fruition does not import the ordering of something into something, as intention does, but absolute rest in the end.”
26. This perfect and imperfect fruition is not the same as proper and improper fruition, about which it was said in n. 22-23. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 11. a. 4. ad 2, “that the rest of the will is impeded in two ways. In one way on the part of the object, namely because it is not the last end, but is ordered to another. In another way on the part of the one desiring the end, who has not yet obtained the end. But the object is what gives species to the act; but the mode of acting depends on the agent, so that it is perfect or imperfect according to the condition of the agent. And therefore fruition of that which is not the last end is improper, as deficient from the species of fruition. But fruition of the last end not had is indeed proper, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect mode of having the last end.” Therefore delight is of itself harmless, indeed good, when it agrees with reason and adds courage to man for the exercise of virtues; but worst is the delight of those “who rejoice when they have done evil, and exult in the worst things.” Prov. 2:14; St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 34.
27. A more vehement delight is indeed sometimes drawn from the senses, but a more perfect and greater one is drawn of itself by the intellect. “For much more is man delighted concerning this, that he knows something by understanding, than concerning this, that he knows something by sensing, because intellectual cognition is both more perfect and is also more known, because the intellect reflects more upon its own act than sense does; and intellective

cognition is also more loved. For there is no one who would not rather lack bodily sight than intellectual sight in the mode in which beasts or fools lack it, as Augustine says in book XIV of *The City of God*. But if intelligible spiritual delights are compared with sensible bodily delights, then, according to themselves and speaking simply, spiritual delights are greater. And this appears according to the three things which are required for delight, namely the joined good, and that which is joined, and the conjunction itself. For the spiritual good itself is greater than bodily good, and is more loved. A sign of this is that men abstain even from the greatest bodily pleasures so that they may not lose honor, which is an intelligible good. Similarly also the intellective part itself is much nobler and more cognitive than the sensitive part. The conjunction of each is also more intimate, more perfect, and firmer.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 31. a. 5. 6.

28. Choice is the pre-acceptance of one thing with respect to another; wherefore it imports a certain preceding comparison and discretion from the other. Therefore choice follows upon a sentence or judgment, which is like the conclusion of an operative syllogism. Whence that falls under choice which is disposed as a conclusion in the syllogism of things to be done. But the end in things to be done is disposed as a principle, and not as a conclusion. Wherefore the end, insofar as it is of this kind, does not fall under choice. It is said, insofar as it is of this kind, for that which is in one operation as an end can be ordered to something else as to an end; and in this way it falls under choice. And thus the ultimate end in no way falls under choice; but other ends can fall under choice: as, in the operation of a physician, health is disposed as the end, whence this does not fall under the choice of the physician, but he supposes it as a principle. But bodily health is ordered to the good of the soul; whence, for him who has care concerning the salvation of the soul, to be healthy or to be infirm can fall under choice. Therefore choice is an act of the will by which the will is borne into a particular means as means, or as useful good. Although choice is formally concerned with the means, nevertheless it virtually includes the volition of the end. For it is impossible to love one thing on account of another without at least implicitly loving this latter, since it itself is what moves to the love of the former. Indeed it can well happen that the will explicitly, by one and the same act, can will the end and the means by way of one object. For this reason intention and choice can be really and physically distinguished, and they can also really and physically not be distinguished. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 12. a. 4.
29. Therefore, although in the name of choice something is imported which pertains to reason, or to the intellect, and something which pertains to the will, nevertheless choice substantially or essentially is not an act of reason but of will; for choice is completed in a certain motion of the soul toward the good which is chosen. “For that it is directly an act of the will is clear from two things. First from the notion of the object: because the proper object of choice is that which is to the end, which pertains to the notion of good, which is the object of the will; for both the end is called good, as honorable or delectable, and that which is to the end, as useful. Secondly, from the notion of the act itself. For choice is the last acceptance by which something is accepted for pursuit, and this indeed is not of reason, but of the will. For however much reason prefers one thing to another, one thing has not yet been pre-accepted before another for

operation until the will is inclined into one more than into another, for the will does not follow reason of necessity.” St. Thomas, *De Veritate* q. 22. a. 15.

30. Choice consequently proceeds from the efficacious intention of the end, and its object is useful good as such, and possible to us. For the reason for choosing something is that through it we can attain the end. But through that which is impossible one cannot attain the end. Nor indeed can it be that the end is possible unless that which is to the end has been possible. But no one is moved to that which is impossible. Wherefore no one can tend into the end except through this, that it appears that what is to the end is possible; and therefore choice can be had only of that which is possible. But choice retains its intrinsic nature, although it does not happen to be made among many things, when that means is only one. For an act is specified by its proper object, and the same object of choice remains, namely the means to the end, whether it is a single means, or is compared with others. Choice is by way of desire, because it is concerning the means as to be executed, and precedes execution; and therefore it is concerning an absent thing. Moreover, choice is the purpose of the will, since purpose is an act of the will by which someone determines that he is going to do something.
31. Finally, choice is always of human acts. For just as intention is of the end, so choice is of those things which are to the end. But the end is either an action, namely a human action, or some thing. But when some thing has been the end, it is necessary that some human action intervene; either insofar as man makes that thing which is the end, as the physician makes health, which is his end, whence also to heal or to make health is the end of the physician; or insofar as man uses or enjoys that thing which is the end, as for the miser money, or the possession of money, is the end. The same must be said of that which is to the end: for it is either an action, namely a human action, or some thing, with some human action intervening through which he makes that which is to the end, or uses it. And thus choice is always of human acts.
32. If a comparison is established between the simple act of the will, or volition or will, and choice, there is furthermore a difference between each; for the simple act of the will, namely volition or will, is not universally free as to the specification of the act, since it is necessarily terminated to some object, in such a way that it cannot be terminated to the opposite. But choice is always free both as to the exercise of the act and as to specification. For will is of the end, and therefore concerning perfect good, which is beatitude, it is not free. But choice, since it is not of the end, but of those things which are to the end, is not of perfect good, which is beatitude, but of other particular goods, and therefore it is free.
33. We have spoken of choice before counsel was treated, according to the order of the Angelic Doctor himself. For although counsel is prior to choice, as the cause of it, and therefore it would seem that one must speak first of counsel, nevertheless the order of doctrine requires that one speak first of choice according to itself and its intrinsic nature, and then indeed of its extrinsic cause. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 13; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 8. S. 1. 2; Cajetan, cited place; Lessius in this place. - Now counsel properly is an act of the intellect including two things: inquiry and discovery of means, and judgment concerning those things which are done by us and which

come into doubt. It is an act of the intellect; for it belongs to counsel to inquire into and discover means to the end, which belongs to reason and intellect.

34. It includes inquiry. For choice follows upon a judgment of reason about things to be done. But in things to be done much uncertainty is found, because actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which on account of their variability are uncertain. But in doubtful and uncertain matters, reason does not pronounce judgment without preceding inquiry. And therefore inquiry of reason before judgment about things to be chosen is necessary. And this inquiry is called counsel, because counsel begins from it. In this inquiry the principle is the end. For counsel is about operations; but the reason of things to be done is taken from the end. Whence what we first seek to know in this inquiry is, concerning that which is to be done on account of the end, whether it is fitting for leading into the end. And thus this inquiry of counsel is resolute, namely beginning from that which is intended in the future until one arrives at that which must be done immediately. Discovery is furthermore added, for inquiry is ordered to discovery.
35. This inquiry and discovery is of means. For the end in things to be done has the notion of a principle, because the reasons of those things which are to the end are taken from the end. But a principle does not fall under question; rather principles must be supposed in every inquiry. Whence, since counsel is a question, there is not counsel concerning the end, but only concerning those things which are to the end, or concerning means to be chosen.
36. Besides the aforesaid inquiry into means and discovery of means, counsel includes a discretive judgment about the means more apt for attaining the end; this is to be done, for that inquiry and discovery is terminated at a judgment concerning things to be done for the end. For the term of inquiry is that which is immediately in our power for us to do. For just as the end has the notion of a principle, so that which is done on account of the end has the notion of a conclusion. Whence that which first occurs as to be done has the notion of the last conclusion at which inquiry is terminated. "Counsel," says Cajetan on q. 14. a. 1, "signifies completed inquiry, i.e. up to judgment inclusively. For inquiry itself, without judgment, is not counsel except inchoatively."
37. Moreover, counsel is about those things which are done by us. Counsel properly imports a comparison had among several. For it is called *consilium* as if *consilium*, because many sit together for conferring at the same time. For it must be considered that, in particular contingents, in order that something certain be known, several conditions, or circumstances, must be considered, which are not easily considered by one person, but are more certainly perceived by several, while what one considers does not occur to another. But in necessary and universal matters there is a more absolute and simpler consideration, so that one person by himself can more sufficiently suffice for this kind of consideration. And therefore the inquiry of counsel does not pertain to universal and necessary things, but properly pertains to contingent singulars. But cognition of truth in such contingent singulars does not have anything great so that it would be appetible of itself, as cognition of universals and necessary things is; rather it is desired according as it is useful for operation, because actions are concerned with contingent

singulars. And therefore it must be said that counsel properly is about those things which are done by us, or are to be done by us, namely to be done or avoided.

38. But counsel is not about all things which are done by us, but only about those things to be done by us which come into doubt. For those things which are already determined as to how they ought to be done do not need counsel, as happens in the arts, which have certain ways of operating and proceed by determined ways to determined ends. And thus a scribe does not deliberate how he ought to draw letters; for this is determined by art. Nor likewise do those things need counsel which are known of themselves, or are minimal, about which it does not much matter whether they are done thus or otherwise, because they help little and hinder little with respect to attaining the end. But reason takes what is little as almost nothing.
39. Therefore counsel involves not one but several acts of the intellect. For that inquiry does not happen without discourse and consideration of several things. But counsel sometimes signifies inquiry alone, sometimes judgment alone, although it does not proceed from discourse, but properly embraces each. Counsel in this last sense indeed frequently precedes choice, but not always. For when choice is made among many things, which happens more often, all those things must have been discovered, proposed, discussed, and judged by the intellect. But where the matter concerns things known of themselves, or determined by art, or minimal things, as has already been said, then there is not formal counsel.
40. In children not yet using perfect use of reason, and in the insane, there is some mode of choice, because they can compare means with the end and among themselves. Whence, when questioned, they give a reason on account of which they choose this rather than that. But this choice is not properly human or moral, because it is not made from perfect counsel and power of the one operating: then reason does not judge of itself, but follows the apprehension of sense, and the will accompanies the intellect. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 14; Cajetan in this place; Lessius in the same place; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 8. S. 5.
41. Consent. To consent is to sense together, and thus it imports a certain conjunction to that to which assent is given. To consent, according to the force of the word, properly imports the application of sense to something. But it is proper to sense that it is cognitive of present things. And because an act of the appetitive power is a certain inclination to the thing itself, according to a certain likeness, the very application of the appetitive power to the thing, according as it adheres to it, receives the name of sense, as though taking a certain experience of the thing to which it adheres, insofar as it is pleased in it. But it belongs to him in whose power appetitive motion is to apply appetitive motion to the doing of something, just as touching a stone indeed belongs to a staff, but applying the staff to the touch of the stone belongs to him who has in his power to move the staff. On account of this, properly, as to the thing itself, only the rational will is said to consent, which has its appetitive motion in its own power and can apply it or not apply it to this or to that.
42. Consent can be attributed to any free act of the will conforming itself, or consenting, to the judgment of the intellect, i.e. accepting the good proposed to the intellect, in which way sin is said to be perfected by consent; and thus it is not a special act, and is concerned not only with

means but also with the end. But insofar as it is a special act, it is concerned with the means, and is not an act distinct in species from choice, but only by reason from diverse respects. For insofar as the will wills and accepts what the intellect judges to be useful, and thus conforms itself to it, it is called consent; but insofar as it prefers that either to other useful means, or certainly to other useless things not conducing to the end, it is called choice. But also in reality consent can be distinguished from choice, namely when consent is inefficacious.

43. For indeed, as has already been said, “consent names the application of appetitive motion to something pre-existing in the power of the one applying; but in the order of things to be done one must first take the apprehension of the end, then the appetite of the end, then counsel concerning those things which are to the end, then the appetite of those things which are to the end. But appetite tends naturally into the ultimate end. Whence also the application of appetitive motion into the apprehended end does not have the notion of consent, but of simple will. But those things which are after the ultimate end, insofar as they are to the end, fall under counsel. And thus there can be consent concerning them, insofar as appetitive motion is applied to that which has been judged from counsel. But appetitive motion into the end is not applied to counsel, but rather counsel to it; because counsel presupposes the appetite of the end, but the appetite of those things which are to the end presupposes the determination of counsel. And therefore the application of appetitive motion to the determination of counsel is properly consent. Whence, since counsel is only concerning those things which are to the end, consent, properly speaking, is only concerning those things which are to the end.... Choice adds above consent a certain relation with respect to that before which something is chosen. And therefore after consent, choice still remains. For it can happen that through counsel several things leading to the end are found, and while each of them is pleasing, consent is given to each of them; but from the many which are pleasing we pre-accept one by choosing. But if only one thing which pleases is found, consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only by reason; so that consent is said according as it pleases for acting, but choice according as it is preferred to those things which do not please.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 15. a. 3. With respect to those many things left aside, there is consent, but inefficacious; for consent is the adherence of the will to those things which are judged by the intellect to be useful for attaining the end. With respect to the one thing actually pre-accepted, choice is had, which is the pre-acceptance of one thing with respect to another, or an efficacious volition of some particular thing for attaining the end. - Suarez, tr. 2. D. 8. S. 2; Lessius in the cited place of St. Thomas.
44. The Holy Doctor raises the question in a. 4, “Whether consent to an act pertains only to the higher part of the soul?” and responds: “It must be said that the final sentence always pertains to him who is superior, to whom it belongs to judge concerning others. For as long as what is proposed remains to be judged, a final sentence is not yet given. But it is manifest that higher reason is what has to judge concerning all things, because concerning sensibles we judge through human reasons; but concerning those things which pertain to human reasons we judge according to divine reasons, which pertain to higher reason. And therefore as long as it is uncertain whether resistance is to be made according to divine reasons or not, no judgment of reason has the notion of a final sentence. But the final sentence concerning things to be done is consent to the act; and therefore consent to the act pertains to higher reason, according as the

will is included in reason.” The Holy Doctor distinguishes higher and lower reason: according to the various notions of things of a higher and lower order with respect to the nature of the rational soul; and thus higher reason judges according to divine reasons, e.g. that an oath, matrimony, etc. is licit and honorable according to divine law, which heretics deny; lower reason judges according to human reasons, e.g. that an oath, matrimony, etc. is licit and honorable according to human laws. Therefore it is not one reason and another reason, but it is the same reason judging according to higher and loftier reasons, or according to reasons of a lower order. Moreover, the difficulty arises from this, that if higher reason intends the inspecting and consulting of eternal things, therefore to consent to an act does not pertain to higher reason alone; for many times man consents to an act, e.g. of sin, certainly not on account of eternal reasons, but on account of some temporal reasons, or even on account of some passions of the soul. To this it must be said that, if lower reason is considered according to itself, it does not have to consent to an act, because consent to an act is the final sentence concerning things to be done. And the final sentence always pertains to him who is superior, as to him whose role it is to judge concerning others; such in the proposal is higher reason. But if lower reason is considered according as it participates in higher reason, to which it is conjoined both suppositally and identically, then higher reason is what always has the final sentence and consent, since although, in the proposed case of sin, it does not move to acting according to eternal reasons, nevertheless it does not withdraw from acting according to those same reasons, however much it may see according to those reasons that one must abstain from so acting. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas in the cited place ad 3, “that higher reason is said to consent not only because according to eternal reasons it often moves to acting, but also because according to eternal reasons it does not dissent.” Cf. *De Veritate* q. 15.

45. Use is one thing active, another passive. The first is an act elicited by the will, by which the will moves the other powers to operating. For to use some thing is to apply it to its function; as riding is the use of a horse, and striking is the use of a staff. But it belongs to the will to apply the powers of the soul, the members of the body, and exterior things which are in our power, to their functions, or quasi-functions. The other is the act of the executing power, proceeding from active use, which power is compared to the will, by which it is applied to acting, as an instrument to the principal agent. But action is properly attributed not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as building to the builder, not however to the instruments. Whence it follows that to use is properly an act of the will.
46. “But to operation we apply both the interior principles of acting, namely the powers themselves of the soul, or the members of the body, as the intellect to understanding and the eye to seeing; and exterior things, as a staff to striking. But it is manifest that exterior things we do not apply to some operation except through intrinsic principles, which are the powers of the soul, as the habits of the powers, or organs which are members of the body.... Whence it is manifest that to use is first and principally of the will as of the first mover, but of reason as directing, and of the other powers as executing.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 16. a. 1. Now, as to consent is to apply appetitive motion to something to be desired, so to use is to apply some principle of action to action. But to apply something to another belongs only to that which has dominion and choice over it; and this belongs only to him who knows how to refer something

into another, which pertains to reason. And therefore to consent and to use pertain only to reason and not to sense. St. Thomas, cited place, a. 2.

47. Use properly is of means, for use signifies a certain motion of the will to something in order to another, i.e. to really obtaining the willed thing, or end. "To use," says St. Thomas, q. 10. a. 3, "imports the application of something to something. But what is applied to another is disposed in the notion of that which is to the end. On account of this, both those things which are accommodated to the end are called useful, and utility itself is sometimes named use. But it must be considered that the last end is said in two ways. In one way simply, and in another way with respect to someone. For since the end is sometimes called the thing, but sometimes the attainment of the thing, or possession of it, as for the miser the end is either money or the possession of money, it is manifest that, speaking simply, the last end is the thing itself; for the possession of money is not good except on account of the good of money; but with respect to this man, the attainment of money is the last end, for the miser would not seek money unless so that he might have it. Therefore, speaking simply and properly, some man enjoys money, because he constitutes his last end in it; but insofar as he refers it to possession, he is said to use it."
48. Use follows choice, if nevertheless use is taken according as the will uses the executive power by moving it. But because the will also in a certain way moves reason and uses it, use of that which is to the end can be understood according as it is in the consideration of reason referring it into the end. And in this way use precedes choice. But since the motion by which the will moves to executing precedes the execution itself of the work, and this motion follows choice, use, which pertains to the aforesaid motion, is between choice and execution. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 16. a. 4.
49. Use is distinguished in reality from choice when counsel is first made, and choice concerning the means according to itself, before there is treatment of execution; but it is least of all distinguished in reality from choice when the intellect suddenly determines the means and all the circumstances, and the will, in the same instant in which it chooses the means, also chooses the circumstance of actual execution, for from the force of such a choice there follows the action of the executing power. Wherefore use is the will executing the chosen means for attaining the end. Use and choice are not acts specifically distinct between themselves, because they tend into the object under the same notion of good, namely as it is useful for attaining the end. But choice is concerned with the means in the order of intention, as future and as the effect of the end. Active use is concerned with the same means in the order of execution, as present and as the efficient cause of the end had in reality. And thus these two acts are concerned with objects materially distinct. Finally, because acts of the will are reflected upon themselves, in any act of the will consent and choice and use can be taken: as if it is said that the will consents that it choose, and consents that it consent, and uses itself for choosing and for consenting. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 16; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 9. S. 1. 2; Lessius in the cited place of St. Thomas.
50. The command about which there is treatment here is the command by which someone commands himself, not that by which he commands others. Man can command himself in two

ways: 1.° as it were in the exercised act, while he moves himself to doing something. 2.° in the signate act, by expressly eliciting the act of command: do this. A command of this kind is partly an act of the will, partly an act of the intellect, because to command is to move to acting: “but the first mover among the powers of the soul to the exercise of an act is the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. But to command is not to move in any manner whatsoever, but to move as though by imposing a law; but it is the intellect that imposes law on the will, since it judges concerning things to be done. Wherefore command is a motion of the will, by the ordering and intimation of reason, toward doing something. Hence if command is directed to another, it needs an external manifestation.

51. Now then it is asked here, what is this act of intellect and will which adequately constitutes command. As to what pertains to the act of the intellect, note: 1.° Before will and intention there precedes a practical judgment of the intellect, by which someone judges not only that a thing is good in itself, but also fitting for himself, and that it is expedient to love it. This judgment contains some notion of command. “For one commanding orders him whom he commands to doing something, by intimating or announcing.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. 2.° Before choice and consent likewise a practical judgment precedes, whether it is by way of formal counsel or not, proposing a means apt for the end as choosable; and a judgment of this kind contains the notion of command more, since it moves more by announcing and intimating. 3.° After that choice which precedes active use in time, another more practical judgment precedes, distinct in this from the judgment which precedes choice, that it more immediately reaches the work and all determined circumstances necessary for the execution of the work. The reason is that before every act of the will there must precede a judgment of the intellect consonant with it, by which it may be directed and illuminated; and active use is an act of the will which adds something to the choice already made. This judgment participates still more in the notion of command, for it moves the will more vehemently, by announcing and intimating, not so much by its own power as by the power of the choice already made. For it is altogether ordered to the execution of the work, and inclines more to overcoming the difficulty of the work, which always appears greater at the time of execution than in consultation and abstract choice. 4.° Besides these practical judgments there is found in us another judgment, which we experience when we speak thus internally with ourselves: do this; and it explicitly expresses the efficacious act of the will to be elicited for executing the work. This judgment properly constitutes command. “To command is indeed essentially an act of reason; for one commanding orders him whom he commands to doing something, by intimating or announcing: but thus to order by way of a certain intimation belongs to reason. But reason can intimate or announce something in two ways: in one way absolutely; and this intimation is expressed by a verb of the indicative mood, as if someone were to say: this is to be done by you. But sometimes reason intimates something to someone by moving him to this; and such intimation is expressed by a verb of the imperative mood: do this.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. This judgment is not of itself necessary for the work; nevertheless it is a useful act, so that the will itself, and the whole man, may be moved more, or so that he may approach execution more quickly, or may persevere in it more constantly, because while man thus commands himself, he is, as it were, reflected upon himself and becomes superior to himself;

and because, as external speech with respect to others, so internal speech with respect to oneself has the power of moving and arousing the soul.

52. As to what pertains to the act of the will, it must be noted that this command, if it is efficacious and true, supposes an absolute will; for if it is made without any will, it is fictitious and only words; but if the will which precedes is inefficacious, it too will be inefficacious. And the reason is that the whole efficacy of moving is from the will. Therefore a will of this kind completes the notion of that command. "To command is an act of reason, nevertheless with an act of the will presupposed, in the power of which reason moves through command to the exercise of the act." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. The act of the will preceding the act of reason which is command is choice, by whose power reason moves. Wherefore command is the practical judgment itself, whether direct or reflexive, which, from choice already made, by announcing and intimating what is to be done, moves to execution. "It must be said that not every act of the will precedes this act of reason which is command; but some act precedes, namely choice, and some act follows, namely use: because after the determination of counsel, which is the judgment of reason, the will chooses; and after choice reason commands that through which what is chosen is to be done; and then at last the will of someone begins to use by executing the command of reason; sometimes indeed the will of another, when someone commands another; but sometimes the will of the one commanding himself, when someone commands himself." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 3. ad 1.
53. From these things it is deduced that command properly is not in use. For command is naturally prior to the use of command. "It must be said," says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 3, "that use of that which is to the end, according as it is in reason referring it to the end (that is, insofar as use is taken for the act of the will moving reason to consulting and deliberating about the means, thus use evidently), precedes command. But use of that which is to the end, according as it is subjected to the executive power, follows command, because the use of the one using is joined with the act of that by which someone uses. For someone does not use a staff before he in some way operates by the staff. But command is not simultaneous with the act of him to whom command is given, but command is naturally prior to the obeying of command, and sometimes is also prior in time. Whence it is manifest that command is prior to use." Nevertheless active use itself also has some notion of command, and is often called command. For the will commands the other powers, even the intellect. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 4. a. 2. ad 2. Indeed the will even commands itself. For the will commands all voluntary acts, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 71. a. 6. ad 2, and one act of the will is commanded by another act of the same will. For to command belongs to one having dominion, and the will has dominion of all human actions.
54. Therefore there are three elements which constitute command. The first is the ordering of something to something. For when it is prescribed, Love God, someone is ordered to loving God. The other element is intimation or announcement; for unless the precept is intimated, or announced and manifested, someone cannot be moved by the precept, and consequently neither ordered to anything. The third element is motion: for by a precept someone is moved by the one commanding to that to which he is ordered through the same precept, which therefore is intimated and announced to him so that he may execute it and complete it in

work. Ordering and intimation pertain to reason; but motion pertains to the will. For to order includes to compare or bring one thing together with another, which belongs to reason. To intimate or announce is to manifest and to speak, which also pertains to the intellect. But although to move of itself first belongs to the will, because it is the first mover among the powers of the soul to exercise, nevertheless it belongs secondarily and participatively to the intellect from the preceding act of the will, because the power of the prior act remains in the following act. Whence, just as in choice something remains of the power of the preceding act of counsel, namely the order of means, so in command something remains of the power of choice, namely the efficacy of moving. Therefore command is an act of reason, with an act of the will presupposed, in whose power reason moves through command to the exercise of the act. - Wherefore command is not a simple act, but composed of acts of intellect and will. - Moreover, whenever two things concur to constitute some one thing, one of them is as the formal with respect to the other. But it must be considered in acts of the soul that an act which is essentially and elicitively of one power or habit is materially disposed, and receives form and species from a superior power or habit, according as the lower is ordered by the higher. For if someone exercises an act of fortitude on account of love of God, that act indeed, e.g. to die for Christ, is essentially and elicitively an act of fortitude; but it is materially disposed with respect to love of God, and thus materially indeed it is an act of fortitude, but formally of charity. Similarly in command, since the will concurs as the supreme power, for it concurs as the first mover to exercise, and what is from a superior power is disposed as formal in a composite act, but what is from an inferior power is disposed as material; it follows that ordering and intimation in command are disposed as material, and motion as formal. Wherefore command is essentially and elicitively an act of reason, as to its material element, and of the will as to the formal element; or it is an act of reason participating in the will as first mover. - St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. 2. 3. 5; Quodl. 9. a. 12; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 9. S. 3; Cajetan in the cited place; Lessius in the same place.

55. Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or several? - Resp. Although command and the commanded act are several acts in the genus of being, nevertheless in the genus of morals they are one act, because from them one perfect action is made, "whence they are judged to be united as if by way of matter and form; from which it is gathered that not only command and the commanded act, but also counsel, choice, and use, insofar as they tend to the execution of the same action, if they are done together and without moral interruption, are all judged to complete one perfect human act." Suarez, cited place, S. 3. "It must be noted that all acts which are after intention draw goodness or malice from intention, because they follow from the force of intention. For consultation is morally good or evil because it proceeds from a good or evil intention. The same must be said of judgment, choice, command, use, attainment. And so this whole series of acts is judged one sin in number in order to confession. Whence he who has committed homicide is not bound to say that he intended, consulted about means, judged, chose, etc.; but it is enough that he say that he committed homicide, unless perhaps some means otherwise illicit of itself had intervened, as if he had used magic art or the work of another." Lessius on q. 17. a. 9. D. n. 31. Cf. also on q. 17. a. 4. And St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 4: "But just as in the genus of natural things some whole is composed of matter and form, as man from soul and body, who is one natural being, although he has a multitude of parts, so

also in human acts the act of the inferior power is materially disposed to the act of the superior, insofar as the inferior power acts in the power of the superior moving it. For thus also the act of the first mover is disposed formally to the act of the instrument. Whence it is clear that command and the commanded act are one human act, just as a certain whole is one, but according to parts is many.”

54. Whether acts of the will, of reason, of the sensitive appetite, of the vegetative soul, and of the exterior members are commanded? - Resp. 1.º “It must be said that, as has been said, command is nothing other than an act of reason ordering, with a certain motion, to the doing of something. But it is manifest that reason can order concerning an act of the will. For just as it can judge that it is good to will something, so it can order by commanding that man will. From this it is clear that an act of the will can be commanded.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 5.

2.º “It must be said that, because reason is reflected upon itself, just as it orders concerning the acts of other powers, so also it can order concerning its own act. Whence also its own act can be commanded.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 6.

3.º It must be said that according to this some act is subject to our command insofar as it is in our power. The sensitive appetite is a power using a bodily organ. But every act of a power using a bodily organ depends not only on the power of the soul, but also on the disposition of the bodily organ. “But that which is on the part of the power of the soul follows apprehension. But the apprehension of imagination, since it is particular, is ruled by the apprehension of reason, which is universal, as a particular active power by a universal active power. And therefore on this side the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. But the quality and disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason. And therefore from this side it is impeded that the motion of the sensitive appetite be totally subjected to the command of reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 7.

4.º “Reason commands by way of an apprehensive power. And therefore those acts which proceed from the intellective or animal appetite can be commanded by reason; but not those acts which proceed from natural appetite. For acts of this kind are of the vegetative soul.... And on account of this acts of the vegetative soul are not subjected to the command of reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 8.

5.º “It must be said that the members of the body are certain organs of the powers of the soul. Whence in the mode in which the powers of the soul are disposed to this, that they obey reason, in this mode also the members of the body are disposed. Therefore, because the sensitive powers are subjected to the command of reason, but not the natural powers, all motions of members which are moved by the sensitive powers are subjected to the command of reason. But motions of members which follow the natural powers are not subjected to the command of reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 9.

55. Whether all acts of will, reason, and sense are commanded? - Resp. Negatively. For, 1.º as to the will, the first love or first will of the end is not an act properly commanded, because it proceeds from a less practical judgment and presupposes no other act of the will. It is said to be from a less practical judgment insofar as, as the Angelic Doctor says, that act of the will is not from the ordering of reason or from deliberating reason. Likewise, not all those

indeliberate affections which are naturally excited are commanded acts. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 5. ad 3, 1. p. q. 82. a. 3. Let the same be said of all those acts of the intellect which, once the object has been apprehended through imagination, are elicited by the intellect by natural instinct.

2.º As to the intellect, the first act of the intellect likewise is in no way commanded, since it presupposes no other act of the intellect and will. - The will can indeed command other acts of the intellect as to exercise. "Nevertheless it sometimes happens that because of some impediments the intellect does not obey the will, as if the motion of sense or phantasy is so vehement that it almost snatches the intellect; for then either the will cannot use its choice, or certainly, while it itself wills, it obtains what it wills, yet immediately interrupts the act of the intellect. Therefore it can return to the same thought, if it is moved from elsewhere." Suarez, tr. 2. D. 10. S. 1. - But as to the species of the act, the intellect does not depend on the will in simple apprehension and judgment, where there is evidence. The reason is that the intellect is a necessarily acting power when the object is perfectly proposed to it as necessarily true. But where there is not evidence, it can be moved by the will as to the species of the act, i.e. to assenting or dissenting. The reason is that then the intellect is not necessitated to the act by its object. Therefore it is determined to the act only by the will. And thus the act of supernatural faith is free not only as to exercise, but also as to the species of the act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 6, 2. 2. a. 9; Suarez, cited place.

3.º As to the sensitive appetite, when there is present in phantasy a sufficient representation of a fitting object, the will cannot command the sensitive appetite not to desire. The reason is that the will and intellect cannot immediately move the sensitive appetite unless there is present a representation of phantasy; but the sensible appetite of itself is a natural power acting necessarily, if the object is duly proposed. Moreover, sometimes the will cannot by its command remove the apprehension of imagination, and then also it cannot impede every act of the sensitive appetite. This is clear in those acts which altogether precede the use and advertence of reason, and in those which are necessarily caused by the real presence of the object, or by some material alteration of the body itself. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 7. c. and ad 1, a. 9. ad 3. "Moreover, even when an act of phantasy does not proceed from a change of an exterior object, it can happen that the will cannot remove it, because the interior motion itself of the imagination, which often is made through the natural alteration of the humors and of the vital spirits, or on account of the operation of some intrinsic agent, an angel or a demon, can be so vehement and troublesome, that the will cannot at its own choice drive it away, because even then it depends upon the actual motion of the object, although made interiorly, which motion the will cannot impede. But it must be known that the will and reason, although by commanding they cannot restrain those motions, nevertheless can moderate them, if they attend to other things." Suarez, l. c., S. 2. "When the apprehension of the imagination and the motion of the appetite do not proceed from the actual motion of the object, the will can both recall the imagination to something else, and impede the motion of the appetite... The reason is that the will is the general principle of human acts... Yet it is necessary to note that the efficacy of this command, of necessity, has force only so long as the will itself actually moves and the intellect attends; for as soon as the will ceases, the phantasy and the appetite can return to their acts." Suarez, l. c. Whenever the will efficaciously commands the sensitive appetite, and by an absolute appetition seeks or flees some object, it always and necessarily obeys, not insofar as the will removes every

repugnance, but insofar as the will is not drawn away by that repugnance. This is clear from the fact that we often attack things repugnant to the appetite itself.

4.° Hence the reason is understood on account of which the motive power obeys the will at a nod and without resistance, and the sensible appetite, which is more perfect and more similar to the will, often resists it. For the cause is that the exterior members are not moved, cf. Lessius on q. 17, a. 5 and following, by a proper object, as is the vital sensible cognitive and appetitive faculty, but are moved only by a superior power, as a certain instrument and organ, which is wholly subjected to the principal mover. Nevertheless they intrinsically require the due disposition for effecting motion; whence it can happen that from a defect of this the command of the will can be impeded. And because they have a certain natural weight, although they do not have a vital appetite, they also can in some manner resist the command of the will. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17. a. 9.; Suarez, l. c.; Cajetan on q. 17.

56. Therefore twelve motions of the intellect and of the will can be numbered, which can be coordinated thus. 1.° The end is apprehended, for example, divine glory. 2.° There is the willing of that end. 3.° The intention of the same end. 4.° The imperfect fruition of the aforesaid end. And thus the first relation of the will to the end is completed. For since the aforesaid acts are in the will, the will perfectly has the end in itself, that is, it perfectly wills the end. Hence there begins also the first relation of the will to that which is toward the end. For the perfect and efficacious intention of the end gives the will a descent to that. Counsel then follows concerning those things which are toward the end. But because this counsel is voluntary, and reason is moved by the will to counsel, and this motion is truly use; hence in the 5.° place must be put the use of reason for counsel, but in the 6.° place counsel concerning those things which are toward the end, for example, concerning the study of Theology, concerning goodness of morals, etc. 7.° There is consent adhering to the conclusion, namely that these things are pleasing. 8.° There is election preferring one of the things concluded, namely perfect holiness of morals and the religious state to other states of life, Theology to other sciences, etc. And this election is “the last thing which pertains to the first relation of the will in respect of that which is toward the end...; for there is completed the proportion of the will, so that it should completely will that which is toward the end,” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 16. a. 4., and consequently that which is toward the end is had perfectly in the will. 9.° There is precept or command, which commands the things elected to be committed to execution. And hence begins the second relation of the will to that which is toward the end; since now it begins to descend to this, that it should have the end really. 10.° There is use, by which the will moves the executive powers, applying them to execution, namely the feet to going to school, and the intellect to studying, etc. 11.° There is execution itself, attaining, through that which is toward the end, namely through a journey, through study, etc., the end itself, e.g. to promote and contemplate the glorification of God. And thus 12.° the whole process is consummated by perfect fruition supervening, which is concerning the end really had and possessed. Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 16. a. 4. Cf. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 16. a. 4., Cajetan on q. 9. a. 4, par. Ad evidentiam — Scito secundo.

Commentary IV: On the Other Divisions of the Voluntary

1. If the voluntary is considered in order to the act itself, which proceeds from the will, and in order to the object, about which that act is occupied, other divisions of the voluntary are had.
2. Two things concur in the voluntary, namely an intrinsic principle and cognition of the end. By reason of this cognition, one voluntary is perfect, another imperfect. But this division can be taken in two ways. For if only an imperfect cognition of the end is had, as to its intrinsic nature, as is sensitive cognition, which consists in the apprehension alone of the thing which is the end, without the fact that the account of the end and the proportion of the means to the end are known, then the imperfect voluntary is had, which also belongs to brute animals. But if perfect cognition of the end is had, as to its intrinsic nature, as is the intellective cognition of the thing which is the end, of the thing which is the means, and at the same time of the account of the end and of the proportion of the means, then the perfect voluntary is had, which belongs only to rational nature. Therefore the imperfect voluntary is the act of the sensitive appetite; the perfect voluntary, from the act, is the rational appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2.
3. The perfect and imperfect voluntary can besides be had in the very act of the will, according to its accidental perfection. The perfect voluntary is had in those acts of the will which proceed with full cognition and advertence. The imperfect voluntary is had in those acts of the same will which proceed with half-full cognition and advertence, as are sometimes the acts of children, and the acts of the half-fatuous, the half-asleep, the half-drunk, acts of sudden anger. The aforesaid deliberation is situated in the consideration of various objects, which are proposed as to be chosen to the liberty of the will, and it can be completed in a very brief time and in a single moment. Whence it happens that in this imperfect voluntary there can be great latitude, such as there can be in imperfect advertence. Yet in this division the imperfect voluntary is taken insofar as the perfect voluntary is excluded, and consequently insofar as there is excluded the perfect use of reason which may suffice for the exercise of liberty, according to the capacity of the object. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 3. 4.
4. By reason of the voluntary itself, or of the inclination of the will, one voluntary is such simply or perfect, another is such secundum quid or imperfect. The first is that which proceeds from the will, by the full inclination of the same will, without any repugnance, as, for example, the leader of an army going on to triumph after victory has been obtained. The second is that which indeed proceeds from the will consenting, but not without some repugnance of the same rational will, so that there is indeed an actual volition, but one mingled with a conditional nolition of the object. Thus a sailor, when the danger of shipwreck presses, actually wills and deliberately wills to throw out the merchandise, which nevertheless, by a deliberate will also, he would wish to preserve, if shipwreck were not threatening; whence not without a deliberate repugnance of the will, but an inefficacious one, he absolutely consents to throw it out. Whence “those things which are done through fear are not voluntary simply, but mixed.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 142. a. 3. Cf. n. 6 and S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 3., a. 7. ad 2., 3. q. 47. a. 1. — This division of the voluntary into the voluntary such simply and into the voluntary secundum quid,

into the perfect and imperfect voluntary, can be taken in various senses, as is already clear from what has been said and will further be clear from what is soon to be said. For that denomination can be taken from various respects of the voluntary.

5. By reason of the free, or by reason of deliberation, one voluntary is absolute and simply, another *secundum quid*, which is also called *velleity*. And thus, while a temptation of sin stands in the will, which nevertheless someone deliberately resists, the will, as nature, or *secundum quid*, wills the sin; but nevertheless the same will, as the will of reason, absolutely and simply detests the sin. Appositely St. Thomas, 3. p. q. 21. a. 4., where at the same time he gives the reason for this division: "The will of man simply is the will of reason. For this we will absolutely, which we will according to deliberate reason. But that which we will according to the motion of sensuality, or even according to the motion of the simple will, which is considered as nature, we do not will simply, but *secundum quid*, namely if something else does not stand in the way, which is discovered through the deliberation of reason. Whence such a will is rather to be called *velleity* than absolute will; because, namely, man would will this, if something else did not stand in the way."
6. By reason of the object toward which the will tends, one voluntary is absolute and simply, another is that which is *velleity* and *secundum quid*, namely insofar as it is considered absolutely, as it in fact is, according to all its circumstances, or only insofar as it is in itself, abstraction having been made from the circumstances. To the point, the Angelic Doctor, 1. p. q. 19. a. 6. ad 1: "Everything, according as it is good, is thus willed by God. But something can be, in the first consideration of itself, according as it is considered absolutely, good or evil, which nevertheless, insofar as it is considered with some adjunct, which is the consequent consideration of it, has itself in the opposite way. Thus for a man to live is good and for a man to be killed is evil, according to absolute consideration; but if there is added concerning some man that he is a murderer, or one living to the danger of the multitude, thus it is good for him to be killed and evil for him to live; whence it can be said that a just judge antecedently wills the man to live, but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. Similarly God antecedently wills every man to be saved, but consequently wills certain men to be damned according to the demand of his justice. Nor however do we will simply that which we will antecedently, but *secundum quid*: because the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves, and in themselves they are in particular. Whence we will something simply, according as we will it with all the particular circumstances considered, which is to will consequently. Whence it can be said that a just judge simply wills the murderer to be hanged, but *secundum quid* would will him to live, namely insofar as he is a man. Whence it can rather be called *velleity* than absolute will. And thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills, comes to be, although that which he antecedently wills does not come to be." And hence it is clear that the throwing of merchandise into the sea, which was spoken of above in n. 4, by one account is voluntary *secundum quid*, but by this account must be called voluntary absolutely and simply, namely by looking at the thing as it is done here and now.
7. The voluntary, also by reason of the object and by reason of its perfection, is one kind of voluntary that is absolute, efficacious, perfect, or complete, as it is called by St. Thomas, and

another is voluntary which again is called velleity, of simple complacency, or imperfect and incomplete, as it is called by the same Holy Doctor. The first is that which extends itself even to the attainment of the thing, by willing the thing and the means to it. The other is that which does not proceed as far as the attainment of the thing, but rests in simple complacency toward it. Thus the Angelic Doctor assigns the reason of this division, 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5. ad 1: "It must be said that the will is middle between the intellect and exterior operation. For the intellect proposes its object to the will, and the will itself causes exterior operation. Thus therefore the principle of the motion of the will is considered on the part of the intellect, which apprehends something as good in the universal. But the termination or perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to order to operation, through which someone tends to the attainment of the thing: for the motion of the will is from the soul to the thing; and therefore the perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to this, that something is a good for someone to do. But this is possible. And therefore the complete will is only concerning the possible, which is good for the one willing. But the incomplete will is concerning the impossible, which according to some is called velleity: because, namely, someone would will that, if it were possible." And thus a sick man hoping for health wills health with a complete will: for he has an absolute and efficacious will for health, at the same time willing the means inducing health. A sick man despairing of health, whence he neglects to apply the means necessary for recovering it, wills health with an incomplete will; for he has only simple complacency, or velleity, for health, since at the same time he does not will the means inducing health.

8. Complete and incomplete will, therefore, is not to be taken thus, as if incomplete will were a non-deliberate willing, or not capable of merit and demerit, or as if incomplete will were a half-deliberate willing. For someone can deliberately and with full deliberation will to expel God from his kingdom if he could, and similar things; where it is certain that sin and grave sin are found. But the completion and incompleteness of the will must be taken according to the order of the will to operation, namely according to the manner of the motion of the will to the thing. Hence, from the fact that the motion of the will is to the thing, to be attained, disposed, etc., by the mediation of exterior operation, it is not perfect with the perfection apt by nature to be found in the genus of the motion of the will unless it is terminated at an achievable good, although it is perfect as to consent, deliberation, and other things of this kind. And thus a sinner, even a great sinner, who wills to be converted to God and therefore wills to do penance, has a complete will. Cajetan in l. c. And in q. 20. a. 4 the same Angelic Doctor says: "If we speak of the goodness of the exterior act, which it has (the exterior act) according to the matter and the due circumstances, thus it is compared to the will as term and end, and in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will, because every inclination or motion is perfected in this, that it obtains the end or reaches the term: whence there is no perfect will, unless it is such that, given the opportunity, it operates. But if possibility is lacking, the will existing perfect, so that it would operate if it could, the defect of perfection, which is from the exterior act, is simply involuntary." Therefore the will can be called and be complete in two ways. In one way according to that relation by which the thing willed is in the will. In another way according to that relation by which the will tends into the real attainment of the thing willed. According to the first mode, the perfection of the will is signified by this, that there is

willing perfectly; but according to the second, by this, that there is having perfectly, or attaining and possessing the thing willed. Whence a will prepared to operate if it could is a perfect will, because it perfectly wills, and this pertains to the perfection of the first relation; and it is imperfect simply, because it does not arrive at this, that it really have, attain, and possess that which it wills and which it is naturally ordered to have. For every motion falling short of the term is imperfect through privation consisting in the attainment of the term. And since the first perfection is of another account than the second, and the whole latitude of the first is compared to the second as imperfect to perfect, the consequence is that however much the interior act of the will may grow, and however intense it may be, by itself it will never arrive at this, that it be perfect simply, without exterior attainment. On account of this the Savior said, John 15:13: Greater charity no one has, than that someone lay down his soul for his friends; he said “lay down,” not “wish to lay down.” Cajetan in l. c.

9. The voluntary, by reason of the very act of the will by which it proceeds from the will, is one kind direct, another indirect. The direct is from the will acting. The indirect is from the will not acting, not prohibiting. And here one must distinguish between omission and the effect of omission. An omission is voluntary, although there is no obligation of positing the act. For if the intellect adverts to that which is omitted, now that omission depends upon the will, so that it be posited or not posited, and thus it is always voluntary. Nor is it required for this, that it be voluntary, that there be a precept of positing the act. He who, intent on study, omits Mass on a weekday, omits it no less freely than on a feast day. Whence an omission is not always culpable; for this other thing depends upon a precept, which certainly can be present, of positing the act, but such a precept is not always had. Indeed there are many voluntary omissions which nevertheless at the same time are not culpable. He who gives himself to prayer or study omits lawful recreation, not through a direct volition of that omission, but from the voluntary choice of prayer or study at that time, and certainly he does not sin, indeed he merits. But the effect accompanying or following an omission is not voluntary apart from an obligation of impeding it, unless perhaps the omission is ordered to this effect. For the aforesaid effect does not proceed physically from the will; for the will, not acting, can exercise no physical influence into it. Nor indeed does it proceed morally from the will; for, since it does not proceed physically from the will, the will in no way influences it, and therefore neither can it be attributed to it morally, except insofar as the will can and ought to impede it. For then that effect is imputed to the will, insofar as the care of impeding the effect is incumbent upon the will. Wherefore, setting aside this obligation of impeding the effect following from the omission, an effect of this kind is not voluntary. Appositely the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3: “Not always is that which follows upon a defect of action traced back, as to a cause, to the agent from the fact that he does not act, but only then when he can and ought to act. For if the helmsman could not direct the ship, or if the governance of the ship had not been committed to him, the sinking of the ship, which would happen through the absence of the helmsman, would not be imputed to him. Therefore, because the will by willing and acting can impede this which is not willing and not acting, and sometimes ought to do so, this which is not willing and not acting is imputed to it, as existing from it.”

10. "It is confirmed 1.^o from the distinction which exists between the omission itself and that effect following or accompanying it, respectively to the will. An omission of itself immediately, no other cause intervening, depends upon the will; for the will can no less immediately not will than will. Whence, in order that non-volition or the omission of willing be voluntary indirectly, it does not need another cause, but only advertence and the suspension of influence in a vital mode, which it provides by eliciting another act impossible with the act which is omitted; for then the omission proceeds indirectly from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end. But the effect following or accompanying an omission is not of itself immediately from the will, but by the mediation of another intervening cause; if, for example, while I omit to separate two men fighting, the killing thereafter following is caused neither by my will nor by my omission, but by the sword of the killer; likewise when a sailor omits to govern the ship, neither his will nor his omission sinks the ship, but the storm. Therefore, in order that such an effect be referred back to the will as to a cause, and be called interpretatively voluntary, something must be assigned by which it happens that it pertains in some manner to the will and has some connection with it; and nothing else can be assigned except the precept of impeding that effect. 2.^o There are effects following or accompanying a voluntary omission which in no way are voluntary, because of a defect of obligation to impede them: thus God voluntarily omits to impede the sins of men, and nevertheless the sins are not voluntary to him, because he is not bound to impede them." Billuart, *De Act. hum.*, Diss. 1, a. 1.
11. But it has been said, unless perhaps the omission is ordered by way of means to this effect; for if the aforesaid omission is ordered by the agent himself as a means to this effect, "then it is manifest that such an effect would be directly intended and willed, and consequently positively and directly voluntary: as, if someone, to this end that he suffer cold, for the sake of mortification, omits to approach the fire; the cold is positively voluntary to him, because intended and willed of itself." Billuart, l. c. But if the aforesaid omission of itself is ordered as a means to this effect, as, for example, if someone omits to eat and drink and then dies from hunger and thirst, then, because of that intimate conjunction between the omission and the effect, the effect with it is judged to constitute one object, and pertains to the same species with its cause. He who wills the antecedent also wills the consequent intimately connected with it, sufficient cognition being supposed. Whence in a voluntary of this kind, a precept can contribute only to this, that that voluntary be base or honorable, but not to this, that it be voluntary, since the voluntary is from the intrinsic, and the precept is extrinsic. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.
12. The voluntary, likewise by reason of the very act of the will and by reason of the object which immediately terminates the act of the will, is one thing as voluntary in itself, another as voluntary in the cause. The first is had when someone immediately wills something in itself; but the second when someone wills the cause from which he foresees that some effect will follow; for then he does not will this in itself, but in another, namely in its cause. He is said to foresee, that is, merely to foresee; for if besides he wills it, now that effect will be directly and in itself willed and voluntary, and not only in the cause. Hence, moreover, it follows that that effect will no longer be willed and voluntary as an effect; nor likewise will its cause be willed and voluntary as a cause; but then the effect in respect of the will will have the character of an

end, and the cause the character of a means. For that which someone wills for its own sake has the character of an end; that which someone wills for the sake of another has the character of a means. Nor indeed is it valid to object that, if the effect is merely foreseen, and the will is not borne into it by its own act, now that effect is outside the intention, and can in no way be voluntary even in the cause. For because the will, by not willing the cause, can impede the effect, and sometimes ought to do so, the effect is imputed to it; and consequently, since it is not willed in itself, it will be willed in the cause. S. Th. q. 6. a. 3., q. 71. a. 5. And thus the evil things of the deed, committed against the neighbor in drunkenness, are voluntary in the cause for him who has been voluntarily made drunk, foreseeing those evils from previous experience, although he neither willed nor intended those same evils. Cf. the following number and Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4, etc.

13. Many Theologians wholly distinguish the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause from the direct and indirect voluntary. And thus Suarez says: “the voluntary in itself is clear enough; for then something is called voluntary in itself, when it is willed in itself, so that the will is immediately occupied about it, either through a proper act, if it is direct voluntary, or through the lack of an act, if it is indirect voluntary.” D. 1. S. 4. Likewise St. Thomas, q. 77. a. 7: “Two things,” he says, “seem to have to be considered. First indeed, that something can be voluntary, either according to itself, as when the will is borne directly into it; or according to its cause, when the will is borne into the cause, and not into the effect; as is clear in him who is voluntarily made drunk. For from this, that which he commits through drunkenness is imputed to him as quasi-voluntary. Secondly it must be considered that something is called voluntary directly or indirectly. Directly indeed, that into which the will is borne; indirectly, however, that which the will was able to prohibit, but does not prohibit.” — But others call the voluntary in itself and in the cause direct and indirect voluntary, and they express this by another division, namely of the positive and negative voluntary. For the positive voluntary is that which proceeds from a positive voluntary action. The negative voluntary, on the contrary, is that which depends upon the voluntary omission of some action. And thus the positive voluntary is in him who by his command or counsel provokes another to committing theft; the negative voluntary is in him who does not impede a theft when he can and ought to impede it. Cf. Gury-Ballerini n. 5., Suarez, l. c.
14. Further, a comparison having been established between both divisions, of the voluntary in itself and in the cause, and of the direct and indirect voluntary, and insisting on the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, it must be said that the direct voluntary comprehends under itself both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause: for the direct voluntary is said by the Angelic Doctor to be “that which proceeds from the will as from an agent,” q. 6. a. 3. ad 1. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause proceed from the will insofar as it is acting and willing. — But the indirect voluntary can be reduced both to the voluntary in itself and to the voluntary in the cause. The indirect voluntary is said by the same Holy Doctor to be “that which is from the will, as from one not acting,” l. c. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause include the will acting and willing. Therefore the indirect voluntary is neither properly voluntary in itself, nor likewise properly voluntary in the cause. Yet it can be reduced to each. For the indirect voluntary is said either only of the interior act of the will, or

also of the exterior act. If the first, since not willing is immediately from the will, it can be called voluntary in itself. If the second, since exteriorly not acting is as it were the object exteriorly completing that not willing, as the latter is in some manner voluntary in itself, so also the former; since, as it were, one complete non-act is constituted, for example, not willing to hear Mass and not hearing Mass in fact, from both the lack of the interior and of the exterior act, as one complete act is constituted from the internal and external act, of willing to hear Mass and of hearing Mass. Now, as from the positing of an act, as from a cause, some effect can follow, so upon the omission of an act another act can follow; and although this is not properly the effect of that omission, as that omission is not properly the cause of the following act, since not acting cannot properly be a cause, nevertheless it can be considered as an effect; whence it can be called voluntary in the cause, and thus, for example, the death of those sailing is indirectly voluntary, and, in the sense stated, is voluntary in the cause for the helmsman of the ship ceasing from governing.

15. Concerning a bad effect in particular, the question is raised: what is required so that a bad effect following, voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, be imputable to the will unto fault? — The matter concerns only a bad effect; for if the discussion is about a good effect, if this is outside the intention, it can attribute no morality to the act of the will by reason of itself. The will does not touch it by its act; therefore the goodness of the will cannot arise from it. “For this,” says S. Th. q. 18. a. 7. ad 3, “that the will be good, it is required that it be of the good under the aspect of the good, i.e. that it will the good on account of the good.” On the contrary, if the effect is bad, although the will does not intend it, it can receive its imputation, namely if it is bound to impede it, and consequently to abstain from positing its cause. It is said by reason of itself; for by reason of the cause itself we have already seen how the exterior act adds something of goodness or malice. Cf. n. 7.
16. Further, for the aforesaid imputation three conditions are required. The first is that he who posits or omits the cause advert at least confusedly that such an effect is going to follow from that cause; because nothing is willed unless it is in some manner foreknown. Wherefore, with ignorance of the future effect standing, no one can be held by any obligation of not positing the cause, namely the cause either by doing something or by omitting to act. Therefore the effect will be able in no way to be imputed to him. Hence death is not imputed to him who offered to another a liquid which he did not know to be poisonous. Nor is drunkenness imputed to him who, ignorant of the strength of the wine, drank to satiety. Precognition of the effect can be had in two ways: first, if it is directly foreseen; secondly, if it is in the power of the one acting to forethink and notice it, and from negligence he omits to do this.
17. The second condition is that the agent be able to impede such a cause, i.e. physically, which is clear of itself; there is no obligation to impossible things; and likewise morally, or without a graver inconvenience, according to the nature of the thing. For, with attention to the matter in question, not only physical but also moral impossibility can excuse. Consequently the sins of subjects are often not imputed to a Superior, because it is impossible for the Superior himself to impede them, at least without a graver inconvenience.

18. Finally, the third condition is that the agent ought to omit or remove that cause, by reason of the aforesaid bad effect that is going to follow; because an effect following outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his own right. For then the agent in fact does not will the effect, but wills the permission of the effect. Appositely S. Th. q. 6. a. 3: "But it must be known that not always is that which follows upon a defect of action traced back as to a cause into the agent, from the fact that he does not act, but only then when he can and ought to act. For if the helmsman (of the ship) could not direct the ship, or if the governance of the ship had not been committed to him, the sinking of the ship, which would happen through the absence of the helmsman, would not be imputed to him." And thus also if someone has not kept the ecclesiastical fast, and at night experiences pollution, this pollution perhaps following from the aforesaid intemperance is not imputed to him; for he was not bound to observe the law of fasting by reason of impeding this effect, but from elsewhere, by reason of the precept of the Church. On the contrary, he sins who gives alms to a poor man whom he knows will abuse it to make himself drunk; for although that alms is a cause wholly per accidens of the aforesaid drunkenness, nevertheless one is bound from charity to abstain from giving the alms precisely by reason of the aforesaid bad effect. The reason is that when there is an obligation of not positing the cause by reason of such an effect, although cause and effect are not connected physically and one is not the cause of the other, nevertheless they are connected morally, insofar as, with the obligation standing of impeding the effect as far as possible, its cause, although only per accidens, constitutes with it one moral object, according to the account of inconvenience, and therefore the will of one is judged to be the virtual will of the other. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.
19. These things having been set down, another question is easily resolved: when is someone bound to remove or not posit a cause, by reason of the bad effect that is going to follow, which he foresees? It is said, by reason of the bad effect that is going to follow; for the question is not about the obligation of a cause not to be posited or to be removed by reason of itself. For if it is good in itself, it is not to be removed by reason of itself; but if it is evil, whether a bad effect follows or does not follow, it cannot be posited, because it is evil in itself. Thus, for example, someone eating meat then suffers shameful motions; abstracting from this effect, he indeed can eat meat on Sunday, but cannot eat it on Friday, not on account of that effect which happens on Friday, for otherwise he could not eat it even on Sunday, but because on Sunday it is permitted by the Church to eat meat, and on Friday it is prohibited. Wherefore the question in this case is such: whether, namely, on account of that foreseen bad effect, he ought to abstain from meat, both on Friday and on Sunday and on any other day.
20. Now someone is bound to remove a cause, by reason of the bad effect that is going to follow, 1.º when from it per se, or from its intrinsic nature, directly and primarily, and uniquely, a bad effect follows. The reason is that then a cause of this kind must be evil in itself. For a cause according to moral estimation is judged from the effect into which of itself, or from its nature, it directly and primarily tends; since this is nothing but bad, consequently the cause is bad. And then the case is verified that, abstracting from the effect, someone cannot posit the cause by reason of itself; and thus neither can he tend in any manner into the effect, since, the cause

being removed, the effect is removed. And thus it is not licit to offer poison to someone, from which nothing but death would follow.

21. Someone is bound 2.^o to remove a cause, if, although a good effect follows from it, nevertheless the bad effect follows from it per se, directly and primarily; and only through this as medium, another good effect follows from it per se, namely secondarily and indirectly. The reason is that, notwithstanding that secondary and indirect good effect, the cause remains evil; and evils are not to be done that goods may come. The same must be said if the good effect follows only per accidens, in whatever way it happens. For a cause is specified not by an effect per accidens, but by an effect per se. "The power of a cause is estimated according to effects per se, but not according to effects per accidens." S. Th. q. 20. a. 5. "For judgment concerning some thing is not given according to that which is per accidens, but only according to that which is per se." S. Th. ib. c. And thus a girl cannot procure abortion in herself in order to avoid infamy; for the good effect follows from another preceding bad effect, from the killing of the innocent through the procured abortion, which is assumed as a means to that end.
22. Someone is bound 3.^o to remove a cause, by reason of the bad effect that is going to follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless one is bound to impede the effect from justice, or from charity, or from a precept which urges as to be fulfilled. Hence a physician and a surgeon, suffering bad motions in the exercise of their own art, do not sin, because they are not bound, by reason of impeding such an effect, to omit the exercise of their own art. But he would sin if someone wished to play for the sake of recreation while the last Mass on Sunday will soon be celebrated, so that consequently he omits it from distraction. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 152. "For he who is obligated to a law must necessarily be obligated to procure the ordinary means, and those proximately necessary from the very nature of the thing for observing the law..... Ordinary, I say; for human laws do not compel to extraordinary and excessively difficult things." Ithurriaga, Cas. 32. n. 4. But the reason, as has already been said, is taken from this: that by reason of the precept, that cause and the effect following from it, although physically they are connected only per accidens, and neither is the cause of the other, nevertheless morally they are judged to have the account of one inconvenient object, or of one to be avoided by the will; and therefore the will of one is judged the virtual will of the other. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4. 5. Therefore homicide would deservedly be imputed to him who, against a law prohibiting it, left heavy vessels upon a window without securing them, or impeding them by some barrier from falling into the public way, if they then were carried away by the wind and killed a man.
23. From this it is understood that for this voluntary, not just any precept of avoiding the cause is sufficient, one which is wholly extrinsic to such an effect, as appears in the example brought forward in him who in the time of Lent is bound to fasting and to abstinence by reason of the precept of the Church, but not lest pollution follow. Rather, there is necessary a precept which induces an intrinsic obligation of avoiding that cause, precisely by reason of such an effect, and consequently which induces a moral mutation in that object, by reason of that moral connection with the effect, that precept standing. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.

24. Finally, someone is bound 4.^o to remove the aforesaid cause, by reason of the bad effect, when, although that cause is honorable in itself or indifferent, nevertheless from the part of the agent there is no proportionate necessity, utility, or fittingness. The reason 1.^o is that natural equity requires this, that we avoid evil as far as can reasonably be done. Wherefore a reasonable cause for permitting a bad effect is necessary, and this can be nothing other than either necessity, or utility, or at least the fittingness of the action, or the good which is in that action, or which comes from that same action. 2.^o Because then an honorable end of the one acting is lacking from the part of the agent. 3.^o Because then to will a cause of this kind without any proportionate reason shows of itself a bad affection directly toward that evil future effect, or at least there is often the proximate danger of such a bad affection directly toward the aforesaid evil effect. Wherefore a priest does not sin when administering Communion to a hidden sinner publicly asking, because he does this to avoid the public harm which would follow from that public denial of the Eucharist. On the contrary, he would sin administering Communion to a public sinner publicly asking, because now that honorable end is lacking for impeding that immense sacrilege, which would not be without public scandal.
25. On the contrary, someone is not bound to omit or remove a cause by reason of the aforesaid bad effect when, setting aside that special obligation from charity, from justice, from an urgent precept, of impeding the effect, the bad effect follows merely per accidens, or from extrinsic circumstances, or follows only from another preceding good effect. For since the cause must be judged from the effect per se, and from the effect into which it tends directly and primarily, that cause is either good, or at least indifferent, in itself. Wherefore, if an honorable end of the one acting is not lacking from elsewhere, the agent can posit or preserve it. "And although also the goodness of the action is not caused from the goodness of the effect, nevertheless from this the action is called good, that it can induce a good effect; and thus the very proportion of the action to the effect is the reason of its goodness." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2. ad 3. And thus the leader of an army in war directing fiery balls against a fortress in which there are enemies attacking is not bound to desist from the assault of the fortress from the fact that those enemies therefore blaspheme God. For that assault is a cause wholly per accidens, from extrinsic circumstances, of those blasphemies.
26. Likewise someone is not bound to omit or remove a cause, precisely by reason of the bad effect, if from it there follows at the same time a good effect which the agent intends; at the same time, because namely that cause tends equally directly and primarily, by an almost parallel influence, into a good and bad effect. For then the cause in itself according to moral estimation is indifferent, but honorable insofar as it is subject to the intention of the agent; for the bad effect is not intended, but only permitted. Wherefore the agent can posit that cause, if again one is not bound to impede that effect in the particular case on account of charity, justice, or another special precept to be fulfilled, nor from the part of the one acting is an honorable end lacking. "Nothing prevents," says the Angelic Doctor, "one act from having two effects, of which one only is in the intention, but the other is outside the intention. But morally acts receive their species according to that which is intended, not from that which is outside the intention, since it is per accidens." 2. 2. q. 44. a. 7. Therefore it is licit to repel

force by force; for equally from this repulsion of force by force inflicted there follows the defense of one's own life and the destruction of another's. Cf. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

27. Nor indeed is it required that the good intended in the positing of the cause equal the evil which also follows from it. For first, morally speaking, that equalization is impossible, since good and evil are in a diverse genus. Besides, the liceity of such an action does not depend on this equalization, but on the fact that that action is honorable in itself, since, objectively speaking, it is indifferent, but, subjectively speaking, only an honorable end is intended in it. It is confirmed from the fact that, where the matter concerns avoiding the evil of others, we are often not bound to that except from charity, and charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience: the gravity of this inconvenience, from the doctrine of all, is considered per se, namely independently of equalization with the evil to be permitted. Moreover, if that equalization were always required, already it would be a most grave inconvenience if someone always had to abstain from acting in order to avoid the evil which also follows from it; and such an inconvenience would be still graver if it had to be undergone by all. Wherefore, although that equalization between good and evil is not had, if the inconvenience to be undergone is considered in the particular case, nevertheless it is had if it is considered generally with respect to all, and with respect to all cases. Finally, confirmation is added from what Theologians commonly teach. For from the common doctrine, one is not bound, on account of bad effects against chastity, to abstain from horseback riding, from a more comfortable manner of lying in bed, from the moderate taking of drink or hot foods, from leading honorable dances. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 483. A woman can go to church to hear Mass, although scandal of someone follows from his own malice. Nor indeed is someone bound to give a driver a wage greater than is just, lest he blaspheme. The bad effect in these cases certainly exceeds, and far exceeds, the good effect.
28. Now, since that cause of permitting the bad effect is situated in the good itself which is had or follows from the action whence that bad effect arises, although compensation and equalization are not required between the good and bad effect, nevertheless a proportionate reason is required for positing the cause of the bad effect, as was said in n. 24. Wherefore a reason for acting is required to be greater in proportion as the cause touches the bad effect more proximately and immediately, in proportion as the influence of the aforesaid cause into the bad effect is more necessary, in proportion as its influence into this effect is greater, in proportion as the bad effect is more certain and graver, in proportion as less right to the action considered in itself is had. And this consideration has place especially where the matter concerns avoiding harm to others, whether temporal or spiritual. And if the discussion is about spiritual harm or sin, that must be weighed in particular: whether, namely, the sin arises rather from another's malice than from our action. — If therefore a cause influences the bad effect remotely and lightly, and from it some good effect also follows, for this reason there is not an obligation of taking away the cause, because a lesser reason is required for positing a cause influencing evil only lightly and remotely than if it influenced gravely and proximately. Hence you are not bound to abstain from honorable and useful conversation with a woman on account of bad motions arising thence. Billuart, De Act. hum., Diss. 1, art. 1.

29. Another question concerning this matter remains to be resolved: whether an effect that has followed, gravely culpable, voluntary in the cause or indirectly, is always imputable unto grave fault, so that someone contracts the grave malice proper to that effect, if someone illicitly posits the cause, without any sufficient reason. — The aforesaid malice cannot be contracted in the case except insofar as someone wills the cause; for the matter concerns the voluntary in the cause, or the indirectly voluntary; the effect, as going to follow, is foreseen only from the cause. But the cause cannot contain in itself the malice proper to the effect except insofar as it influences the effect. If therefore the cause influences the effect merely per accidens, and there is no special obligation of not positing the cause by reason of the bad effect, cf. nn. 18, 19, 22, 23, no malice from the effect can redound into the cause. Therefore although someone posits the cause without sufficient reason, not for that reason does he contract any malice of the effect, although he sins from elsewhere. With respect to such an effect the will has itself merely permissively. The reason is that, since the effect follows only per accidens, there is no connection, so far as is from the nature of the thing, between the cause and the effect. And for this reason he who wills the cause does not also will the effect, but wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. But since the malice of the effect in no way redounds into the cause, for the effect does not follow from that cause per se, but merely per accidens, someone willing the cause, every intention of the bad effect being excluded, contracts no malice of this, neither grave nor light, although perhaps from elsewhere he even sins gravely. And thus if someone foresees pollution from excess of drink or food, without willing and intending it, he will sin lightly or perhaps even gravely by reason of that excess, but by no means will he sin by reason of the pollution, since this effect is not willed, but happens outside and against the intention, and the cause is outside the genus of luxury. Nor indeed is someone bound to remove all causes influencing some bad effect only per accidens, by reason only of the bad effect itself; and in no way also is he bound to abstain from positing that cause if, supposing that it is honorable or at least indifferent in itself, there is present a reasonable motive for positing a cause of this kind. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.
30. But if the cause per se, that is from its own nature, influences the effect, and influences gravely, grave malice redounds from the effect into the cause. Wherefore someone contracts the grave malice proper to the effect by willing its cause without any sufficient reason. Moreover, at least practically speaking, he who wills a cause per se gravely influencing a bad effect, gravely evil, without any sufficient reason, in fact directly wills the bad effect itself; since on the one hand the cause and effect are inseparably connected with each other, so far as is from the very nature of the thing, and on the other hand, since there is no other honorable reason present for positing the cause on account of another honorable effect, as is supposed, this is certainly a sufficient sign that someone wills the effect itself. He who, for example, knowingly and prudently sets fire to another's house, whence the whole house is burned, certainly wills the burning of the house, and this is deservedly imputed to him. Yet except the case in which, although the cause per se gravely influences the bad effect, nevertheless in the particular case, on account of peculiar dispositions of the agent or of the patient, that cause is deprived of such an effect, although per accidens.

31. If finally the cause indeed influences the effect per se, but only lightly, only light malice can rebound from the effect into the cause. Wherefore he who wills the cause of that bad effect gravely evil, without sufficient reason, can sin only lightly, always excluding the proximate danger of further consent. Moreover, practically speaking, in such a case a sufficient indication of bad affection directly toward the effect itself is not had. For since the cause per se has only a light influence into that effect, gravely bad, a cause of this kind is not of itself sufficient for the positing of the effect, and thus, so far as is from the nature of the thing, they are not inseparably connected with each other. Wherefore, at least practically speaking, it is not because someone wills the cause that he also wills the effect; but he can have himself only permissively with regard to this effect. And indeed there are many who utterly shudder at mortal sin, but do not hate venial sin in such a way that they would not admit it even by a deliberate purpose. These easily consent to a lightly bad cause; but they are in no way borne into a gravely bad effect. — Hence the proper reason must be sought why, although smallness of matter is not given in the venereal matter, nevertheless it is given in those acts of mere sensuality, such as lookings, from a cause of mere curiosity, at things less honorable, with the intention of the venereal thing itself being again excluded, as the most common opinion of theologians holds. For since here the cause influences the effect only lightly, only light malice can rebound from the effect into the cause, nor must someone willing the cause necessarily will also the effect.
32. In the last place it must be noted “that the same act can be voluntary in another causally, and nevertheless be involuntary in itself objectively, as if someone by a direct act wholly does not will to kill a man, and nevertheless wills to shoot an arrow, sufficient diligence not being used, lest he kill a man; for then homicide, if it should happen to occur, is in itself involuntary formally by reason of the prior act, and nevertheless it is voluntary in another and virtually by reason of the posterior act. And the reason is that those two acts in themselves are not formally contrary; and otherwise, since the will is free, although it does not will homicide, it can fail to be applied actually to showing the necessary diligence lest homicide follow; and therefore I said that it is involuntary objectively rather than causally.” Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, s. 4.
33. You will resolve from all that has been said about the voluntary in the cause: 1.º “If the cause of pollution is gravely influencing it, and the man does not abstain from positing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed unto sin, even if it was not intended, provided it was foreseen at least confusedly. But causes of this kind are without doubt all those which per se are grave faults in the genus of luxury, namely touches or looks upon the shameful parts of another’s or one’s own body with base and deliberate pleasure; the sight of human intercourse and lingering thoughts about venereal matters. Therefore all pollutions coming from these causes certainly are mortal sins. Thus S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5, and others commonly. And then that base act, which is the cause of pollution, has special malice against nature, as Sanchez says, De Matr. l. 9. D. 45. n. 23, and all consent.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 482. Special malice, namely of the effect or pollution, which is a sin against nature, besides the proper malice which consists in the pleasure excited from a base object. Cf. Salmant., Theol. Schol., Tr. 13, D. 10, n. 274.

Gravely influencing: wherefore if the cause, whether by reason of itself or by reason of the disposition of the subject, does not gravely influence, grave fault is absent by reason of the pollution perhaps going to follow; since then it follows outside the intention and per accidens. Salmant., Theol. Mor., Tr. 26, C. 7, n. 41.

Per se they are grave faults: “the common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal (namely in the cause), unless it comes from a cause per se mortal in the genus of luxury... The reason is that, since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484. — In the genus of luxury: whence “it is inferred that pollution is not mortal which happens outside the intention from causes illicit still mortally in another genus than luxury, for example from drunkenness, or from eating, excessively immoderate or on a forbidden day.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484.

34. 2.º “If someone, about to do some necessary or licit and honorable thing, foresees that pollution will naturally follow, and this applies much more to distillation, which nevertheless he in no way wills or intends; then, provided the danger of consent to pleasure is absent, he is not bound to abstain from such an action, because an effect per accidens and outside the intention following upon one pursuing his own right is not imputed. Hence, notwithstanding pollution, it is licit to hear the confessions of women, to study cases of conscience, to touch oneself from necessity, cautiously and from necessity to kiss women, to embrace them according to the custom of the country, if otherwise he would have to be regarded as uncivil.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 481. “It is licit for someone who suffers great itching in the private parts to drive it away by touch, even if pollution follows.” l. 3. n. 483. The reason is that these acts either per se influence only lightly, or, although per se they gravely influence, nevertheless since they are not done from a base cause of concupiscence and pleasure, but from an honorable cause, necessary, useful, fitting, they no longer have the same force and influence into the effect, which is gravely increased from that bad propensity of the will, and on the contrary is greatly diminished from the will being turned to another thing and, so far as is in itself, resisting. Whence the bad effect, if it follows, is attributed rather to the infirmity of nature than to the aforesaid acts as to a cause. Moreover, the aforesaid honorable end standing, someone is not bound to abstain from the cause in order to impede the bad effect. For when a cause has two effects, one good, the other evil, it can be posited from the intention of the good effect alone, having itself permissively toward the evil. Therefore that bad effect in the case truly follows per accidens and outside the intention. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 483.; S. Th. 3. p. q. 80. a. 7.

35. 3.º “It is inferred that the pollution which arises from a not long conversation with a girl, or from a light look, or from curious reading venially base, is only venial; because, as was said, since those causes influence lightly, the subsequent pollution proceeds rather from a natural cause than from them.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484.; Billuart, Dissert. 1, art. 1. But if someone has a just cause, he sins in nothing, St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 29. A just cause is “any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484., l. 5. n. 29. And “if in some body by reason of infirmity... or of another cause, there is a positive indisposition to venery, although causes are applied to him which otherwise of themselves gravely influence into pollution or carnal pleasure with respect to others..., nevertheless with respect to him...

they will not be gravely influencing, but only lightly, or even in no way, or they will be causes only materially of the genus of luxury; wherefore commonly... by reason of their influence into pollution he will not sin mortally.” Salmant., Tr. 16, c. 7, v. 41.

36. 4.º A fortiori, grave fault is absent in those actions which influence remotely and per accidens, since they are outside the genus of luxury. Therefore, although pollution or bad commotion is foreseen as going to follow, it is licit to ride horseback not only for the sake of necessity and utility, but also for the sake of recreation; to lie down in some position for resting more comfortably; moderately to take hot foods or drinks; to lead honorable dances, etc. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 483. Grave fault is absent: for whether light fault is present in the positing of such causes without a just reason, on account of the future effect, is disputed. Holzmann and others deny it, “because, as they say, then pollution arises rather from the infirmity of nature than from that cause, which concurs in pollution only per accidens and remotely. But more probably Sanchez, Lessius, and others affirm it... because to permit pollution without a rational cause always seems something indecent and disordered.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484. — Sanchez, De Matr. l. 9. D. 45.; Sporer, De Matr. n. 644 and following; S. Th. 3. p. q. 80. a. 7.; St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484.; Salm., Tr. 26, C. 7, n. 41.; Lessius, De Iust. et Iure, L. 4, C. 3, Dub. 14, nn. 97-102.
37. Since the cause as such participates in the specific malice of the effect, but not in a diverse malice, it suffices to accuse only the malice of the effect in confession; or, if the cause in itself has another special malice, it suffices to state each separately. And thus, if on account of play you omitted Mass, it suffices to accuse this omission; if on account of theft you likewise omitted Mass, then you can accuse separately the theft and the omission of Mass. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 9.; Lugo, De Poenit., D. 15, n. 479.
38. The last question concerning the same matter remains to be resolved, namely: when is an effect willed in the cause imputed? — If the discussion is about internal sin, this certainly is first committed then, when the will consents to the culpable cause to be posited. But if the matter concerns the external act itself of sin, an effect voluntary in the cause and imputable is imputed, speaking per se, first then, when someone has posited the cause, or from the time when he could and ought to have impeded it, if he noticed it after the cause had been posited. “The reason is that the free volition, or the non-impeding of an evil effect, is formally evil, but not the physical existence of the effect; and thus formal sin is committed when a perverse volition or nolation of this kind is had... Thus therefore he who, for example, offered poison to another... does not sin when the death of the other follows... but when he freely posited the cause of this effect”; Struggl, q. 1, art. 3, n. 32.; and sin is always committed then, whether the effect follows or does not follow, because, for example, the other did not take the poison, the poison did not harm, etc. It is said, speaking per se, for if someone can impede an effect of this kind up to its very execution, and does not impede it, or takes complacency for himself in its futuration or existence, in his mind he continues the sin whose cause he earlier freely and culpably posited. Struggl, l. c. But whether, when the effect from the posited cause in reality follows necessarily, it is imputed, or at least imputability is so increased that someone ought to explain it in confession, some affirm, others deny. St. Alphonsus affirms it, l. 5. n. 10. “An

omission,” says the Holy Doctor, “voluntary in the cause is also imputed unto sin, even if afterwards the will cannot operate; for instance if someone makes himself drunk, foreseeing that by reason of drunkenness he will omit Mass, then he is bound to confess the cause and its effect, namely drunkenness and the omission of Mass, as Salm. etc. better say, with others commonly against Vasq. etc., provided the will is not retracted before the effect has followed, as Sanch. etc. probably teach; for then it is probable that he is not bound to confess the effect that followed. From this also it is deduced that if the effect happens after retraction, a censure imposed against sinners is not incurred, because that requires contumacy in the act of sin.” Cf. also l. 4. n. 149 and l. 7. n. 40. But Lugo denies it, who has these things: “It must be supposed in the sin, for example, by which you killed another with poison, that there intervenes first an internal act of the will, by which you willed to give him poison; then an external action, by which you prepared and gave the poison; then the effect that followed, namely his death.... The first and sufficiently common opinion affirms that the external effect must be explained... Father Vasquez, etc., broadly defends the contrary opinion. That opinion has always seemed truer to me... The more common reason... is that the external act, which is denominated free from the actual liberty of the internal act, is truly and properly sin; but the effect afterward following, in sleep for example, is not properly sin... but the effect of sin; but in confession all and only sins must be explained; therefore the external act must be explained when it is actually free, but not the effect afterward following... because there cannot be actual sin in him who actually does not sin, nor can he actually sin who actually does not act: but he who sleeps, while his enemy dies by poison, then does nothing; therefore then he does not sin.” De Poenit., D. 16, nn. 437, 439, 440, 449. But this opinion must be limited, unless the penitent has incurred a censure or a reserved case on account of the effect that followed. Lugo himself has this limitation, indeed he adds: “It can also happen that a censure is incurred by him who already through contrition, or through attrition with the sacrament, has been justified from the past sin”; n. 453. Cf. also n. 460 and Laymann, l. 1, Tr. 2, c. 2, n. 5. But, as Ithurriaga observes very well, Cas. 40, n. 31 and following, Cas. 50, n. 26 and following, there is no reservation where there is no subject of reservation, or sin, since it has already been absolved. For of no being there are no properties. What is not, is not such. But where only a retraction of the will has preceded, the cause retracted by the will is no longer in itself a culpable effect. But reservation or censure cannot be incurred when there is no sin through the act.

39. Finally, one voluntary is actual, another virtual, another habitual, another interpretative. — The actual voluntary is given when someone actually wills something, whether he wills explicitly, that is, clearly and in particular, or implicitly, that is, confusedly, namely by a universal or quasi-universal will which is extended also to this object; for example, he who wills to receive the subdiaconate also wills to elicit the vow of chastity connected with it; he who wills to marry also wills to sustain his wife, etc. — The implicit voluntary is often also voluntary virtually, insofar as it contains in itself, according to force and virtue, another act into which the will then consequently breaks forth. And thus he who conceives true sorrow for sins committed implicitly and virtually conceives the purpose of not sinning thereafter, whence he then explicitly elicits it.

40. The virtual voluntary is clear in three ways. — The virtual voluntary, first, is that which perseveres in some virtue of itself, and is given when the explicit and clear will itself, or intention of the end, no longer exists, but only the volitions of the means exist explicitly and clearly, which volitions of the end itself accompany in a remiss degree. Cf. Lugo, *De Fid.*, D. 1, n. 98. Thus, for example, when a priest wills to celebrate Mass and then vests himself, approaches the altar, and performs the other customary things, without still having that clear actual will of consecrating, the consecration will be virtually voluntary in this first mode, if, while he performs all things voluntarily, the will of consecrating is always present confusedly and remissly. — Or at least the acts of the cogitative or estimative then remain, which first are generated when the mind proposes its object to the will, which acts then go on to influence all subsequent actions. For when the mind apprehends that object, the apprehension of it is at the same time generated in the cogitative or estimative, which pertains to sensible cognition, and moves the sensible appetite and the exterior members to motion. Lugo, *De Sacr. in genere*, D. 8, s. 5, n. 87. — Next, the virtual voluntary is that which perseveres in the exterior work itself commanded by the prior act of the will, or in the voluntary execution of the means, which someone voluntarily applies by the force or virtue and impulse of the prior intention of the end, although not even a remiss volition concerning the end any longer exists. Thus a pilgrimage undertaken to the sanctuary of the Blessed Virgin will be virtually voluntary for one journeying, although on the journey he no longer attends to it, indeed thinks about wholly diverse things. Cf. Laymann, l. 1, Tr. 2, C. 3, n. 4; S. Th. 3. p. q. 64. a. 8. ad 3. “It must be said that it is not necessary that someone always think about the last end whenever he seeks or operates something. But the virtue of the first intention, which is with respect to the last end, remains in any appetite whatever of any thing, even if the last end is not actually thought about. Just as it is not necessary that he who goes along a road think in every step about the end.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 6. ad 3. — The virtual voluntary, third, is that which perseveres in some moral effect of its own; thus, for example, a contract entered into by a procurator will be virtually voluntary to the principal agent, who gave him the faculty of acting in his name. It is said, perseveres in some moral effect of its own, so that a merely physical effect may be excluded, into which perhaps that prior act of the will influences, as it is a physical act; for instance, if, after a will of consecrating has been had, then while sleeping you consecrate in a dream, the consecration is null. For that prior act of the will does not influence this effect as it is a human or moral act, but merely as it is a certain physical action. Cf. Laymann, l. c.; Lugo, *De Poenit.*, D. 24, S. 4.; Suarez, Tr. 3, D. 6, S. 5.; Tr. 2, D. 8, S. 3, n. IV.; *De Relig.*, V. 2, Tr. 6, *De Voto*, l. 1, C. 10.
41. The habitual voluntary, which St. Thomas often uses in place of the virtual, is properly that which was, but neither is in itself, not even remissly, nor in the exterior commanded work, or in the execution of the means, nor in any positive moral effect, but is, morally speaking, in a merely negative effect, insofar namely as the prior will has not been retracted. Hence a will of this kind suffices for certain moral effects. Thus if an adult, invalidly baptized, is rebaptized while he sleeps, the baptism is valid. Thus also, “for contracting,” says St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 769, “an interpretative or conditional will does not suffice, as we said n. 773, but an actual or virtual will is required, or at least one sometime had and not retracted according to the things to be said, l. 6. n. 324.” Cf. Laymann, l. c.

42. The interpretative voluntary is an act of the will which neither is nor was, because cognition of the object is not present and was not present, but would be, if cognition of this kind were had. Therefore that act of the will indeed is not in itself, but is only in its cause, i.e. in the actual disposition and propensity of the will. "But if someone rightly considers, this is not properly voluntary; for if someone wholly ignorant by chance had killed an enemy, yet was so disposed that if he knew him to be an enemy he would more easily kill him, for that reason the action would not be judged voluntary to him; rather Aristotle called it non-voluntary, and it can also be called not involuntary. Whence this interpretation rather serves so that the action be judged not to be against the will of another, for example of a Superior, than so that it be judged to be from his will; and therefore it must be said to be in fact neither voluntary nor involuntary to him." Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4. — The voluntary interpretatively is also called the implicit voluntary, or voluntary by virtue on the part of the work. And thus one intending an honorable good which of itself is referred to the glory of God, although he does not explicitly think about the glory of God, nevertheless operates interpretatively on account of the glory of God.
43. The Angelic Doctor, De Veritate q. 15. a. 4. ad 10, takes interpretative consent for consent which is not contained in the formal act of the will consenting, but in the absence of an act of resisting, when namely the will can and ought to resist. For by the very fact that the will then does not resist or dissent, it is judged to consent. For St. Thomas raises the objection: "The same judgment seems to be concerning interpretative and expressed consent. But interpretative consent does not seem to be a mortal sin, because sin is not transferred into some power except through an act of that power; but in interpretative consent there is not found any act of reason by which it is said to consent, but only negligence of repressing illicit motions. Therefore interpretative consent into pleasure is not a mortal sin. Therefore neither, similarly, is expressed consent." To this objection he responds thus: "It must be said that before reason weighs pleasure, or the harm of it, it does not have interpretative consent, even if it does not resist; but when reason has already weighed the pleasure arising and the harm following, as when a man perceives himself to be inclined totally through pleasure of this kind into sin and to rush headlong, unless he expressly resists, he seems to consent. And then sin is transferred to reason through its act, because to act and not to act, when someone ought to act, are reduced to the same genus of act, according as a sin of omission is reduced to a sin of act."
44. Of the interpretative will, as of a true will, there is also some moral effect, namely by its force to interpret a law, and also to moderate its rigor, which is commonly done generally by theologians and canonists, and by all in particular cases where there is place for legitimate *epikeia*. Hence the question is raised: when the permission of a Superior is required for the liceity of an act, does his interpretative will suffice? R. 1.^o Negatively, if a positive act of the will of the Superior is required for the validity and substance of the act, as in dispensing impediments diriment of marriage, in the conferral of jurisdiction of a confessor, etc. The reason: because then the act, without the bond of law dissolved by the authority of the Superior, without jurisdiction imparted by the Superior, will be always against the law and null. — R. 2.^o Affirmatively, if permission is required only so that it be clear that the Superior is not unwilling. The reason: because, if his will is in fact reasonably presumed, now it is clear

that he would not be unwilling if he knew; and thus now the matter is done with due dependence upon his will, and no right of his is injured, as if someone, while the superior is absent, celebrates or ministers the sacrament of penance in his Church. Sanchez, *De Matr.* l. 3. D. 35. n. 17. 24.; Struggl, T. 1. q. 1. a. 2. n. 21.; Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.

45. From what has been said it is easily drawn out what it is for a man to operate on account of an end either actually, or habitually, or virtually, or interpretatively, which Suarez explains thus in 1. 2. Tr. 1. D. 2. S. 4: "The will is said actually to operate on account of an end when it is actually moved by the end; whence for this mode of operating there is required in the first place actual cognition and thought about the end itself, because unless it is actually apprehended, it cannot actually move. Then there is required an actual motion of the will either into the end itself or into another thing on account of it, because this is what actual operation on account of an end signifies... Habitually, when this habitual relation is judged to have been left from some preceding act, by which that work either in particular or at least under generality has been referred to such an end, although when that work is done the preceding act or relation is in no way either actually, or in some virtue which it has left so that through it it might influence the work, but merely habitually; because that intention, once had, was not retracted. As, for example, someone referred very early in the morning all the works of the day to God; afterwards, however, in the course of the day he operates something referable of itself to God, yet without that memory of the prior intention, and without any actual or virtual influence; then that man is said habitually to operate on account of God, on account of the relation left by habit from the prior intention had and not retracted... Concerning the third mode, virtually on account of the end, it must be noted that it is as it were a middle between the preceding ones, because it neither requires actually an influence on account of the end, as the first; nor absolutely none, as the second; but requires some influence through some virtue left from the prior intention... For this mode it is necessary that actual cognition and intention of such an end have preceded, because otherwise there would be nothing whence that virtue would have been left. Then it is necessary that such an intention not have been retracted by a contrary intention, because otherwise this contrary intention would have destroyed the virtue left by the prior intention. Third, it is necessary that some effect left from the prior intention endure, so that from it in some manner the work may proceed, which afterwards is said to be done virtually on account of such an end. But what this effect is seems to have to be explained in one way with respect to external acts, in another way with respect to the internal act of the will itself. For an exterior act can be done on account of an end without actual thought and intention of the end. The common example is when someone makes a journey which he begins on account of some end, but in the actual progress itself he does not always remember the end itself; indeed sometimes he does not even remember the very walking or motion. And the same happens in the celebration of Mass from a prior intention. Then therefore the virtue left from the prior intention seems to be nothing other than the application of the executive power itself to the actual external operation, which endures and is continued in the effect itself, so long as he does not wholly cease from the action, nor the act is suspended through a contrary will. And although it happens that external actions are varied, nevertheless because one succeeds another in the mind, one also excites to another, and in this way the interior virtue is judged to endure in the effect itself. But when the external action has been wholly interrupted,

for example by sleep or something of this kind, then it is necessary that the act of the will be begun as it were anew; and since an act of the will cannot be without cognition of the intellect, therefore from the part of that it seems conveniently that this virtue left from the prior intention be expounded, because namely from the preceding intention, apprehension, consultation, and other similar acts, it has been brought about that, when such an object is proposed to the power, for example that a journey is to be made, it is at once represented as to be executed, without another motion or special consideration of it or of the end to which it is ordered; and in this way the will at once executes that which is proposed, and begins to use that means which is proximate, or which then first occurs as to be executed, and thus it is rightly said virtually to operate on account of the end. Concerning the fourth mode, which we have called operating interpretatively on account of an end, it must be noted that sometimes the will intends some object in which it rests by force of consideration and of this actual motion; nevertheless that thing intended by its own nature is borne and ordered to another end. Then therefore the will is said properly, and as it were explicitly, to intend the end proposed to it; but interpretatively it is said to intend the further end to which the end intended in the prior mode is borne by its own nature. And in this way he who operates honorably on account of the goodness of mercy or justice, thinking nothing about God or about another end, is said to operate on account of God, or on account of beatitude, and to fulfill that saying of Paul, 1 Cor. 10: Do all things unto the glory of God; because, namely, the honorable good itself which is intended is borne by its own nature to God, and is the means by which one tends to beatitude. And therefore, although man by his own act does not intend that further end, he is said to operate on account of it interpretatively, which others call operating on account of an end from the nature of the work itself rather than from the intention of the one acting.”

46. And these things are concerning the voluntary considered in itself. For if the voluntary is considered according as it is brought forth exteriorly by some sign, then expressed, tacit, presumed, and interpretative will are distinguished. Expressed will is that which is expressed by words, letters, nods, or some exterior deed. This is one thing explicitly expressed, when namely someone by an exterior sign manifests some act of the will clearly and explicitly, or in particular; it is another thing implicitly expressed, when someone by an exterior sign manifests that he wills something with which another thing is connected. Tacit will is that which is manifested by silence itself, as when a Superior, having been questioned, is silent. He who is silent is seen to consent, Rule 43 of Law in the Sixth; namely 1.º in favorable things, for to accepting these the will is borne by natural inclination itself; 2.º when someone is bound and is able to speak, for then the reason is consent, and the reason for dissent is lacking; 3.º when no manifest reason for being silent is present. For there can be no place for conjecture against a manifest reason. — Presumed will is that which, although it is not known to us a posteriori by some exterior sign or by silence itself, nevertheless is gathered a priori to be present. For some sufficient cause is present for judging so. — Interpretative will is that which, since in fact it neither was present nor is present, nor is it gathered to be present or to have been present by some exterior sign a posteriori, nor by some sufficient cause a priori, nevertheless there is present some sufficient reason for gathering that it would be present, if cognition of the object were had. — The aforesaid cause or reason present is the disposition of the soul by which,

supposing that someone had thought about the matter, or if he were thinking about it, he in fact wills, or would will, the thing. Cf. Struggl, Tr. 1, q. 1, a. 2.

47. Presumed will is often confused with interpretative will. Often also the former is distinguished from the latter by distinguishing presumed will concerning the present, which is properly called by us presumed, and presumed will concerning the future, which is properly called by us interpretative. In order that the difference of each may become better known, the matter can be declared by this practical example. A religious on a journey, the Superior being absent, wishes to buy a thing of some importance, of great utility for the whole community. He writes about the matter to the Superior. While the Superior, having received the letter, writes back, the occasion urges buying the thing and he buys it, the response not yet having been received because of lack of time, presuming an affirmative response from the otherwise well-known will of the Superior. Here you have will simply presumed, or presumed concerning the present. But whether the will of the Superior is in fact present or is falsely presumed to be present, the truth itself must be inspected, which the response of the Superior afterward received will declare. But if the same occasion urges buying a thing as useful as possible to the community, say a huge supply of excellent books at the least price, and there is no time to consult the absent Superior, nevertheless from the same will of the Superior, otherwise well known, that religious presumes that he would agree if asked, and buys the books with money received for the journey, preferring the utility of the monastery to a more comfortable journey: you have will presumed concerning the future, or interpretative. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. 4. n. 18.; Laymann, l. c. n. 3.; Struggl, l. c. n. 20.

Commentary V: On Ignorance

1. In the preceding Commentaries we have spoken about the nature of the human act; now we must speak about the impediments of the same human act. For having a human act there is required the exercise of an advertent intellect, the exercise of the free choice of the will, and the exercise of the other faculties proceeding from the free will. If we consider the fact itself, often we act without knowing what we are truly doing, thinking that we are doing something else. Often also we act, impelled by some vehement passion of concupiscence, or oppressed by some vehement passion of fear. Not rarely also we are forced to suffer, wholly unwilling, by an extrinsic force inflicted on the members of our body. Hence it is asked whether acts of this kind are truly human acts and imputable to the agent, since ignorance, concupiscence, fear, force, or violence seem to take away or diminish the aforesaid conditions and endowments of the human act. For ignorance takes away the prerequired cognition; concupiscence clouds and diminishes it; likewise concupiscence, fear, and violence hinder the inclination of the will. In the present Commentary there will be discussion only of ignorance. Concerning concupiscence, concerning fear, concerning force, there will be discourse in the following Commentaries.
2. Ignorance is distinguished into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent. Ignorance can be compared either to the will of the one ignorant, or to the action done ignorantly. With respect to the will, every ignorance is either antecedent, because it precedes the consent of the will, or consequent, because it follows the consent of the will. The former is involuntary, the latter voluntary. With respect to the action, it is either antecedent, because it is the cause of the act, or concomitant, because it is not the cause of the act. Hence the same ignorance can be antecedent and consequent in a diverse respect: antecedent, because it is the cause of the act; consequent, because it follows the consent of the will. Becanus, Tr. 1, C. 2, q. 10, n. 36.
3. The first question which is raised concerning ignorance, and which the Angelic Doctor in fact raises, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8, is: “whether ignorance causes the involuntary.” The question is not whether ignorance causes the non-voluntary, or the involuntary merely privatively. For it is evident and not disputable that an act from ignorance, or done with ignorance, destitute of the condition essentially required for the voluntary, is a non-voluntary act. Therefore the question is only whether an act of this kind is, besides, involuntary, namely involuntary contrarily. Understand involuntary with respect to the condition ignored, not with respect to the object known and willed. For he who, for example, eats meat on a forbidden day can be understood to will and operate two things. The first is to eat meat, which is not unknown by him; the other, that he transgresses the precept, is unknown by him.
4. Therefore ignorance with which someone acts either has itself causally in relation to that which is done, or has itself merely concomitantly with respect to that which is done. It has itself concomitantly “when ignorance is about that which is done; nevertheless even if it were known, it would nonetheless be done. For then ignorance does not induce one to will that this be done, but it happens at the same time that something is both done and ignored; as in the

example posited, namely when someone indeed wished to kill an enemy, but, being ignorant, kills him, thinking that he is killing a deer. And such ignorance does not make the involuntary (namely contrarily), because it does not cause something which is repugnant to the will; but it makes the non-voluntary (or the involuntary merely privatively), because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8. And this holds whether that concomitant ignorance is voluntary or is involuntary. Hence it is that the Angelic Doctor speaks generally and does not distinguish. Nevertheless a difference is present between involuntary and voluntary ignorance in the case, because, although neither causes the involuntary, concerning which the Holy Doctor properly treats, l. c., nevertheless involuntary concomitant ignorance, since it simply takes away the voluntary, makes the simply non-voluntary; but voluntary concomitant ignorance, since it does not simply take away the voluntary, for it is voluntary, indeed makes the non-voluntary in itself, but voluntary in the cause. “Therefore because that which is caused from the will is regarded as voluntary in morals, insofar as ignorance itself is voluntary, to that extent it falls short from this, that it causes the non-voluntary.” S. Th., De Malo q. 3. a. 8.

5. If ignorance is not merely concomitant, or does not have itself merely concomitantly in relation to that which is done, but is a cause, or has itself causally, namely is the cause of doing that which is done, then that ignorance is either voluntary, or consequent upon a free act of the will, or it is not voluntary, or is antecedent to a free act of the will. A free act of the will, namely concerning the ignorance itself, not concerning that which is then done from the ignorance itself. “Consequently,” says St. Thomas in the same place, “ignorance has itself to the will insofar as it is voluntary.” Therefore when ignorance of this kind is the cause of doing that which is done, “since it itself is voluntary..... it cannot cause the simply involuntary (namely contrarily, since that which is done is voluntary in the cause whence it proceeds, namely in that willed ignorance); nevertheless it causes the involuntary secundum quid, insofar as it precedes the motion of the will toward doing something, which would not exist if knowledge were present”; ib.; namely, although that motion of the will is voluntary in the cause, nevertheless in itself it is wholly involuntary; for it would not be if knowledge were present. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 4.
6. But if the ignorance causing, or which is the cause of doing that which is done, is not voluntary, or is antecedent, then ignorance causes the involuntary simply, since that which is done, by the very fact that it is caused by ignorance, would not exist if knowledge were present, and thus is against the will. Nor indeed is it, in itself, willed; nor in any way willed in the cause. Therefore it remains totally or simply involuntary. “Antecedently,” says the Holy Doctor in the same place, “ignorance has itself to the will when it is not voluntary, and nevertheless is the cause of willing what otherwise one would not will; as when some man is ignorant of some circumstance of the act, which he was not bound to know, and from this does something which he would not do if he knew: for instance when someone, diligence having been applied, not knowing that someone is passing along the road, shoots an arrow with which he kills the passer-by. And such ignorance causes the involuntary simply.”

7. Whether ignorance renders an act objectively null? — Resp. Negatively. The reason is that our false estimation cannot alter the objective truth of the thing. And thus an unbeliever who, in baptizing, thinks that a man is not in reality justified by baptism, if nevertheless he has the intention of doing what the Church does, validly baptizes. A priest baptizing in a case of necessity with water which he falsely does not think to be natural, if the true water is natural, validly baptizes. A parish priest who assists at matrimony, falsely thinking that he still needs a certain special delegation of the bishop which he does not have, validly assists at it. Cf. Bonac., *De Sacram.*, D. 1, Q. 2, P. 1, n. 28.; Sporer, *De Matr.*, n. 48.

8. Whether ignorance is always a sin? — Ignorance differs from nescience and from error. Nescience is the simple negation of knowledge; whence anyone who lacks knowledge of certain things can be said not to know them. Nescience, as is clear, is not a sin. But ignorance is the privation of knowledge, namely when someone lacks knowledge of those things which he is apt by nature to know. Error is to approve false things as true. “Whence it adds a certain act over and above ignorance: for there can be ignorance without the fact that someone makes a judgment concerning things unknown, and then the one ignorant is not erring; but when he now makes a false judgment about the things which he does not know, then he is properly said to err. And because sin consists in act, error manifestly has the account of sin (namely of itself or objectively); for it is not without presumption that someone make a judgment concerning things ignored, and especially in those things in which danger exists.” S. Th., *De Malo* q. 3. a. 7. It is not without presumption, namely again of itself or objectively; for subjectively and as to formal sin, or fault, presumption yields to truth, if in good faith, if invincibly, someone has erred, as must presently also be said concerning ignorance.

9. Although ignorance is joined with error, nevertheless it is distinguished from error. Likewise, although ignorance is joined with sin, nevertheless it is not always sin itself. “Since the will is of the good or of the apparent good, the will is never moved into evil unless that which is not good appears in some way to reason as good; and on account of this the will would never tend into evil except with some ignorance or error of reason.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77. a. 2. Ignorance indeed takes away cognition of the thing ignored, but it does not take away the use of reason. If the use of reason itself is lacking, as in infants, the insane, those sleeping, the drunk, the voluntary and the human act cannot be had from defect of the use of reason, unless perhaps in the cause. Yet practically it is not always easy to determine whether sometimes in these there is had a use of reason sufficient for grave sin.

10. Further, as concerns ignorance, a twofold ignorance must be distinguished by reason of the voluntary: one invincible, the other vincible. Invincible ignorance has place when someone suspects absolutely nothing concerning the thing itself and concerning the obligation of inquiring; or, although he has fallen into a suspicion of the thing and of the obligation of inquiring, nevertheless after moral diligence has been applied, he could not know the thing. It is said, after moral diligence; for it is not necessary that the diligence to be applied be the greatest, but it suffices that it be common and ordinary, proportioned to the person and to the matter in question. Cf.

St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 3. Vincible ignorance is had when someone not only comes into doubt of the thing and of the obligation of inquiring, but besides has the occasion of coming to knowledge of the thing, and nevertheless voluntarily passes it by.

11. Invincible ignorance is involuntary; but vincible ignorance is voluntary. Vincible ignorance is one thing directly voluntary, another indirectly voluntary, another voluntary per accidens. Directly voluntary ignorance is called affected ignorance. This is had when someone deliberately wills to be ignorant, whether on account of weariness of learning, or so that he may sin more freely, or so that he may have an excuse for sin, or so that he may simply not be drawn back from sin, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 9., q. 76. a. 3., De Malo q. 3. a. 8. Indirectly voluntary ignorance is had when someone omits to apply study for knowing, or neglects to learn on account of mere laziness or sloth, on account of the labor of learning, on account of other occupations. Ignorance of this kind is distinguished in two ways, namely into crass or supine and into purely vincible. Crass or supine is in him who, although he does not studiously seek ignorance, nevertheless applies no or almost no diligence to acquire for himself that knowledge which according to his condition he can have. Purely vincible is when someone applies some diligence for knowing the truth, but slight and by no means sufficient, with consideration of the quality of the person and the gravity of the matter. Finally, ignorance voluntary per accidens is that which is not intended and is outside the intention, and which is had “when someone directly or indirectly wills something upon which ignorance follows. Directly indeed, as is clear in the drunk man who wills to drink wine superfluously, through which he is deprived of the use of reason; indirectly, however, when someone neglects to repel the rising motions of passion, which, increasing, bind the use of reason in a particular eligible thing.” S. Th., De Malo q. 3. a. 8.; 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.
12. Moreover forgetfulness, inconsideration, and inadvertence are equated with ignorance. Wherefore the same moral judgment must be passed concerning these as concerning simple ignorance. Cf. Suarez, D. 4, S. 3.; St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 169.
13. Further, invincible ignorance is not sin; but vincible ignorance is sin, if it is of those things which someone is bound to know, but not if it is of those things which someone is not bound to know. The reason of the first part is that ignorance is called invincible because it cannot be overcome by study. But it is not imputed to a man as negligence if he does not know those things which he cannot know. Therefore such ignorance, since it is not voluntary, because it is not in our power to repel it, is not sin. The reason of the second part is that whoever neglects to have or to do that which he is bound to have or do, sins by a sin of omission. Whence, on account of negligence, ignorance of those things which someone is bound to know is sin. But the sin is graver in proportion as the ignorance is more voluntary. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 2., q. 19. a. 6., Quodl. 8. a. 15.
14. Therefore it will be a sin to be ignorant of those things without knowledge of which someone cannot rightly exercise a due act. Whence all are commonly bound to know those things which are of faith and the universal precepts of law; but individuals are bound to know those things which pertain to their state or office. But there are certain things which, although someone is

born apt to know them, nevertheless he is not bound to know, such as the theorems of geometry and particular contingencies, unless perhaps in a particular case occurring. S. Th. I. c.

15. Having posited that ignorance can be sin, it is asked further: whether ignorance can also be a cause of sin? — Sin can be taken in two ways: formally, for subjective fault itself; materially, for the objective act itself of sin. — If the discussion is about the objective act itself of sin, how ignorance can be a cause of sin is shown thus. Toward that which is unknown as to all things, the will cannot be borne. But if something is known according to something and unknown according to something, the will can will it. And in this way ignorance is a cause of sin, as when someone knows that this one whom he kills is a man, but does not know that he is his father; or when someone knows that some act is pleasurable, yet does not know that it is sin. Further, the moving cause is twofold, one per se and another per accidens. Per se indeed is that which moves by its proper power; but per accidens, as removing what prohibits, or as the very removal of what prohibits. And in this way ignorance can be the cause of an act of sin. For it is the privation of knowledge perfecting reason, which prohibits the act of sin insofar as it directs human acts. Whence it is clear that not every ignorance of one sinning is a cause of sin, but only that which takes away the knowledge prohibiting the act of sin, not that which simply takes away the knowledge of the act of sin. If the will of someone, for example, is so disposed that, recognizing his father, he certainly would not kill him, and this man kills a man not knowing that he is his father, ignorance is the cause of the act of parricide; if on the contrary the will of someone is so disposed that he would not be prohibited from the act of parricide even if he recognized his father, ignorance of the father is not the cause of sin for this man, but has itself concomitantly to the sin; and therefore such a one does not sin because of ignorance, but sins while ignorant. S. Th. I. 2. q. 76. a. 1. — If the discussion is about the subjective fault itself of sin, vincible ignorance can be a cause of sin or fault. The reason is that “ignorance is said to cause the act which the opposite knowledge was prohibiting.” But someone can deliberately will not to know certain things, lest he be drawn back from sin; someone can, on account of other occupations, neglect to learn those things by which he would be drawn back from sin. But invincible ignorance cannot be the formal cause of sin. For invincible ignorance can be the cause of effecting an act which would be sin if it were done voluntarily; yet simply it is never a cause of sin, because when it is present, not only is the act not sin, but it can even be virtue. Cf. n. 6. — S. Th. I. c. a. 3.; Suarez, Tr. 5, D. 4, S. 1, n. 5.
16. “But it must be considered that reason is directive of human acts according to a twofold knowledge, namely according to universal and particular knowledge. For one conferring about things to be done uses a certain syllogism, whose conclusion is judgment, or election or operation. But actions are in singulars. Whence the conclusion of the operative syllogism is singular; but a singular proposition is not concluded from a universal except by means of some singular proposition. Thus a man is prohibited from the act of parricide by this, that he knows that a father is not to be killed, and by this, that he knows this one to be his father. Therefore ignorance of either can cause the act of parricide, namely both of the universal principle, which is a certain rule of reason, and of the singular circumstance.” S. Th. I. 2. q. 76. a. 1. The former, by reason of the object, is ignorance of law; the latter is ignorance of fact. The first is had when either the general law itself is ignored, or the comprehension of some particular case

under the aforesaid law. But the other is had when either the thing itself morally taken, concerning which the matter is, is ignored, as, for example, if you believe you are killing a wolf and you kill a man; or when some circumstance of the thing, likewise morally inspected, is ignored, as, for example, if you believe you are killing an enemy and you kill your brother. Ignorance of law happens both in the uneducated and in learned men themselves, who often go off into contrary opinions; ignorance of fact likewise can happen in all, from inconsideration, from forgetfulness, from inadvertence. Ignorance of law is one thing simply of law, commanding or prohibiting something; another is of the penalty constituted by law against transgressors of the law. This ignorance can happen more easily when the penalty is extraordinary.

17. Since ignorance can be a cause of sin, another question arises: whether ignorance can excuse entirely from sin? — Ignorance which is the cause of an act has of itself that it excuses from sin. The reason is that the voluntary belongs to the account of sin. But that ignorance causes the involuntary; since, as has already been said, ignorance is said to cause the act which the opposite knowledge was prohibiting; and thus such an act, if knowledge were present, would be contrary to the will, which the name involuntary imports.
18. But sometimes it does not excuse totally from sin, sometimes it excuses totally from sin. And this the Angelic Doctor declares thus, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 3: “That it sometimes does not excuse totally from sin can happen from two things. In one way from the part of the thing itself ignored. For ignorance excuses from sin insofar as something is ignored to be sin. But it can happen that someone indeed ignores some circumstance of sin, which if he knew, he would be drawn back from sinning, whether that circumstance makes for the account of sin or not; and nevertheless there still remains in his knowledge something through which he knows that it is an act of sin; for instance, if someone striking someone knows indeed that he is a man, which suffices for the account of sin, but nevertheless does not know him to be his father, which is a circumstance constituting a new species of sin; or perhaps he does not know that the one defending himself strikes him back, which, if he knew it, he would not strike him, which does not pertain to the account of sin. Whence although such a one sins on account of ignorance, nevertheless he is not totally excused from sin, because there still remains to him cognition of sin. In another way this can happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, namely, that ignorance itself is voluntary either directly, as when someone studiously wills not to know certain things, so that he may sin more freely; or indirectly, as when someone, on account of labor or on account of other occupations, neglects to learn that by which he would be drawn back from sin. For such negligence makes the ignorance itself to be voluntary and a sin, provided that it is of those things which someone is bound and able to know. And therefore such ignorance does not totally excuse from sin. But if the ignorance is such as to be wholly involuntary, either because it is invincible, or because it is of that which someone is not bound to know, such ignorance wholly excuses from sin,” if namely ignorance of this kind, invincible, is total by reason of the bad object unknown, and not only partial; for example, if someone in the example already adduced not only invincibly were ignorant of the circumstance of father, but also of the circumstance of man, and believed that he was striking and killing a beast.

19. Ignorance which is not the cause of sin does not excuse from sin. The reason is that ignorance of this kind does not cause the involuntary, but only makes the man not willing; but of the account of sin, as has been said, is the voluntary; and the voluntary is taken away by the involuntary, not by the non-voluntary; for the non-voluntary is simple lack and negation, just as white is taken away by black, but is not taken away by non-white, because non-white is a mere negation. — Wherefore when it is said that ignorance which is not the cause of the act does not excuse from sin, the sense is that of itself it does not excuse from sin, or does not have the force of taking sin away from the act, because it permits or leaves the act to be perfectly voluntary; but the sense is not that in the act in fact there perseveres the account of formal sin, for while ignorance stands, if it is invincible, the act lacks the condition required for sin, namely cognition of the malice of that act. But the Angelic Doctor, in the cited place, says simply that ignorance of this kind does not excuse from sin, because this ignorance in relation to the act has itself merely per accidens and not per se, as is clear from what has been said, since it influences nothing in the act, and knowledge considers those things which are per se, not those which are per accidens. — Wherefore, since that ignorance merely happens accidentally to sin, it neither accuses nor excuses the sin. It does not excuse, since it does not cause the involuntary; it does not accuse, because nevertheless it makes the act non-voluntary. But that by these things the Holy Doctor does not wish to affirm that in an act posited with such ignorance the account of sin is had, is confirmed from q. 6. a. 8., where, speaking of concomitant ignorance, which namely is not the cause of that which is done, and of what would be done still even if it were known, he says: “and such ignorance does not make the involuntary, because it does not cause anything which is repugnant to the will; but it makes the non-voluntary, because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed.” Moreover formal sin cannot exist in the non-voluntary. Cf. also q. 19. a. 2. ad 3.
20. The question now follows: whether ignorance diminishes sin? — “Ignorance which is not the cause of sin, but has itself concomitantly to sin, neither diminishes sin nor increases it,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4. The reason is that that ignorance influences nothing in the act of sin; whence, just as it does not excuse from sin, cf. n. 19, so also it neither increases nor diminishes sin, but leaves it wholly in that state in which it is. If a confessor, for example, is so disposed in soul that he absolves all penitents, whether prepared or indisposed for sacramental absolution, the fact that he is ignorant, whether voluntarily or non-voluntarily, of the principles of Moral Theology, this ignorance, as it is not the cause of the sin and does not excuse from that sin, so neither does it increase or lessen it. The same should be said of an ignorant physician of the healing art who is so disposed in soul that he wills to procure, as much as is in him, not the health, but the death of the sick.
21. But ignorance which is the cause of sin, and “which totally excuses from sin, because it totally takes away the voluntary, does not diminish sin, but wholly takes it away.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.
22. Ignorance alone which is the cause of sin, and yet does not totally excuse from sin, can diminish sin, because it diminishes the voluntary. Cf. n. 4. 5. Wherefore consequent ignorance indirectly voluntary, namely crass or supine ignorance, or purely vincible ignorance, and

ignorance voluntary per accidens, since they diminish the voluntary, consequently diminish sin.

23. "Sometimes," says the Angelic Doctor in the cited place, "ignorance which is the cause of sin is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or per accidens; as when someone does not will to labor in study, from which it follows that he is ignorant; or when someone wills to drink wine immoderately, from which it follows that he is made drunk and lacks discretion. And such ignorance diminishes the voluntary, and consequently sin. For when something is not known to be sin, it cannot be said that the will is borne directly and per se into sin, but per accidens. Whence there is less contempt there, and consequently less sin."
24. Consequent ignorance directly voluntary, that is, affected ignorance, seems on the contrary to increase the voluntary, and consequently sin. "But it happens sometimes," says St. Thomas in the cited place, "that such ignorance is directly and per se voluntary, as when someone of his own accord does not know something, so that he may sin more freely. And such ignorance seems to increase the voluntary and sin. For from the intention of the will toward sinning it comes about that someone wills to undergo the loss of ignorance on account of the freedom of sinning." Thus indeed St. Thomas and others. But others deny it, and their opinion, says St. Alphonsus, H. A. Tr. 19. n. 8., in reality cannot be called improbable. For he who transgresses the law knowingly and prudently openly contemns it; he who affects ignorance still seems to fear the law somewhat.
25. But it seems that one must distinguish, for ignorance of this kind can proceed from various affections and motives. If someone affects ignorance merely on account of weariness or labor in learning, or not precisely lest he be drawn back from sin, but lest he be drawn back from such an action, to which he strongly clings, the sin certainly is not increased: for example, if someone were unwilling to know what the Church has defined concerning some matter, because he does not wish to depart from the Church's definition, and otherwise wishes to think freely, as long as the Church's definition is not certain to him. For then, if it happens in the matter that he dissents from the definition of the Church, without doubt this is with a lesser will, and without pertinacity, and with less contempt. But if someone affects ignorance for this end, lest he be drawn back from sin, the sin is increased precisely in the account of intrinsic inclination, and of the inclined will, and, in this sense, of the voluntary, since the man so loves that thing that on account of it he wills even to undergo the loss of ignorance; but it is diminished simply in the account of a human act, for ignorance, from whatever cause it may arise, per se lessens the account of a human act and the formal contempt of law. Moreover, in such a case that man wills to be ignorant for this reason, lest he be drawn back from sin. Therefore, if he knew, perhaps in reality he would be drawn back from sin. Therefore that ignorance shows that the will is not so firmly established in such a sin. Finally, if someone affects ignorance because he absolutely wills the sin itself, whether in reality it is prohibited or not, wholly contemning the law, the sin certainly is increased, because that ignorance is a sign of great affection toward sin and of greater contempt, since he pursues sin with such affection that he wills even to suffer the loss of ignorance and thus to sin, although perhaps the thing in itself is not sin; as if someone, in the example adduced, should be unwilling to know the

definition of the Church, because he has decreed to think thus, whatever the Church may think. And in this sense indeed St. Thomas in the cited place seems to be understood. Cf. Suarez D. 4. S. 2.; Lugo, On Penance, D. 4. S. 4. n. 183.; Struggl, cited place, n. 36.

26. As regards the species of sins from ignorance, concerning sins not foreseen, which are done from voluntary ignorance totally depriving one of the use of reason, such as the sins of the drunken and of those voluntarily insane, let us neither say that these are not in the genus of morals, considering those acts in themselves, nor confess that the aforesaid are according to themselves sins, because at length they are somehow voluntary; but let us say that they are circumstances of sins, and pertain to the circumstance what, signifying the effect. And the reason is that these are voluntary only in their causes.

For from this, that they are in some way voluntary, since to be voluntary in the cause is to be voluntary in some way, they are in the genus of human and moral acts, and they are not excused from all fault. But from the fact that they are voluntary only in their causes, they are not sins according to themselves, but, drawn away from their proper species, they are circumstances of the sins of which they are effects, and they look to the species of those sins in which they are voluntary. And thus homicide and blasphemy of God from drunkenness are reduced to the species of drunkenness, insofar as those two subsequent sins pass over into the circumstance of this first sin, the sin of drunkenness. Whence Augustine, in book 22 Against Faustus, says: "Lot is to be blamed not as much as that incest, but as much as the drunkenness merited." Not foreseen; for if sins are foreseen in some way, with their proper objects, then the sins are of the same species of which they would be if they were done by one knowing. And in this way the Jews were guilty of the death of Jesus Christ, although, if they had known, they would not have crucified him. 1 Cor. 2:8. Cf. Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.

27. Concerning sins likewise not foreseen, which are done from ignorance of fact, culpable on account of negligence, as when one occupied with hunting kills a man instead of a stag, it must be said that they pertain to the species of sins directly willed, for instance of dangerous hunting, and of similar acts by which those sins are caused. The reason is that more is required for the account of a proper species than the simple account of the voluntary; for that from which the species of sin is taken must be intended per se. Whence, although those sins are voluntary in their causes, nevertheless, because they are not voluntary in themselves, they are not intended per se, and because of this they are not according to themselves sins, neither as elicited acts, nor as commanded acts; but they are events, or effects of sins, not intended nor foreseen, although foreseeable, and because of this aggravating circumstances, yet not themselves drawing into their own species, but they themselves are drawn away into the species of their causes. "For when something," says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4., "is not known to be sin, it cannot be said that the will is borne directly and per se into sin, but per accidens." The Holy Doctor is speaking of ignorance indirectly voluntary and culpable. — Concerning sins also not foreseen, which are done from ignorance of law culpable on account of negligence, the very same seems to be said on account of the same reason. And thus he who on a fasting day eats twice on account of culpable negligence in knowing the Church's laws of fasting does not contract any malice specifically other than that of that voluntary ignorance. Cf. Cajetan in the cited place of St. Thomas, La Croix, l. 1. n. 757-760.

28. And here it is asked: whether vincible ignorance of law is a special sin per se? — R. Negatively. For every law commanding the observance of itself implicitly indeed commands cognition of the same law. But it does not command this except in order to the work which is commanded to be done or omitted. Therefore that vincible ignorance of law receives its species from the transgression itself of the law, of which it supplies the cause or danger. And this has place also as regards ignorance of the articles of faith. For although knowledge of these, as the more common opinion has it, is commanded by a special precept and by itself, and therefore, if one rests in the obligation itself of knowing, such ignorance is per se culpable, nevertheless this sin is opposed to the virtue of that same faith. For the malice of sin against faith is in this, that someone offends the authority of the one speaking by not believing. But this irreverence is found not only when someone knowingly dissents from God speaking, but also when someone culpably neglects to examine whether it is the doctrine of God, and because of that negligence disbelieves the things which are said by God. Cf. Lugo, *On Penance*, D. 16. n. 182 seq.; Laymann l. 1. Tr. 2. c. 4. n. 10.; Viva, *On Human Acts*, q. 3. final article; Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.
29. Therefore, since sins which proceed from ignorance are only voluntary in the cause, and consequently have no other malice than the malice which was present in positing the cause itself, it follows that the gravity also of that malice is not to be judged from the thing itself viewed in itself, which is the effect of that ignorance, but from the quantity of malice of the same ignorance. And thus the measure of the guilt of a physician in homicide, the guilt of an advocate in the harm of his client, the guilt of a confessor in the harm of his penitent, the guilt of a parish priest in the harm of his parishioner, is not from harm of this kind viewed in itself, but from the degree of negligence in examining some particular fact, or in considering some law; which negligence indeed can be very slight, although from it even the gravest harm can follow. — But guilt for a bad effect from ignorance is incurred, although an effect of this kind does not follow; and the sin can be repeated, if, while advertence of ignorance of this kind remains, someone again determines to persevere in it. For example, a parish priest is ignorant of the impediments of matrimony, and knowingly and prudently goes on exercising his office, but meanwhile no matrimony is contracted; attending to his ignorance, he neglects again and again to acquire due knowledge. The parish priest is guilty of errors, not only those which he commits, but also those which he probably is going to commit, voluntarily neglecting to acquire knowledge altogether necessary to his office, and he multiplies sins as often as with a new will he neglects to give effort to the study of those impediments. — But if someone grieves over that ignorance, and henceforth applies study according to his powers, those things which arise from the prior negligence will not further be imputed to him.
30. Whether actions which someone does from a contracted habit are to be held as human, and therefore imputable. — R. 1.º Speculatively. They are human and imputable, if he adverts to them, in themselves; otherwise in the cause only, as long as nevertheless he has not retracted the habit, nor tries to root it out. 2.º Practically. “Sinners of this kind who are badly habituated, although they have cognition less ready than others, nevertheless always have some actual cognition of their crimes sufficient for rendering the acts deliberate and mortal.” St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 4. par. Thirdly, l. 3. n. 127., *Treatise on Human Acts* XIV.

31. But he who knowingly and prudently sins from habit, and not from some passion arising, or from ignorance, sins from malice; for he who has a habit always rejoices in this, that he operates from habit, as long as he uses the habit. "For to anyone having a habit, that which is fitting to him according to his proper habit is per se lovable, because thus it becomes in some way connatural to him, according as custom and habit is turned into nature. But that which is fitting to someone according to a vicious habit is that which excludes spiritual good; from which it follows that man chooses spiritual evil in order to obtain the good which is fitting to him according to the habit. And this is to sin from certain malice. Whence it is manifest that whoever sins from habit sins from certain malice." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 78. a. 2. Sins from malice are those which are committed with the full affection of the will. He who has been accustomed to commit a sin is indeed proved to love and foster it. But he who studies to amend a custom, if sometimes by force of custom he slips, sins rather from infirmity. Cf. following Commentary n. 27.

Commentary VI: On Concupiscence

1. In the preceding Commentary there was discussion of the first impediment of the human act, namely of ignorance, which holds itself on the part of the intellect, which is the first principle of the human act. It must now be said in the present Commentary concerning concupiscence, the other impediment of the human act. For concupiscence holds itself chiefly on the part of the will, which is the second principle of the human act. Indeed ignorance takes away cognition of the intellect; but concupiscence chiefly affects the inclination of the will, at the same time affecting the cognition itself of the intellect.
2. By the name of concupiscence in this place is not understood that depraved tinder of cupidity by which we flee honorable things and are borne into illicit pleasurable things, Rom. 7:8, 23; but generally, any passion whatever of the sensitive appetite is understood, which is borne into pursuing the good proper to itself and into avoiding evil. Let us explain the several elements of this definition in a few words.
3. It is called any passion whatever; for concupiscence here is not taken for the special passion of the sensitive appetite, but generally for any motion of the sensible appetite. For concupiscence, properly speaking, is a special passion, and St. Thomas treats of it in 1. 2. qq. 30 and 31. After he treated of the passions of the soul in general, qq. 22-25, he then begins to treat of the passions of the soul in particular, namely of the passions of the concupiscible and irascible powers, qq. 26-48. But the special passion of the concupiscible power is concupiscence, according as it is distinguished from the other passions of the concupiscible power, namely from love and delight, and from their opposites, that is, hatred and sadness. "The pleasurable good," says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 30. a. 2., "according to sense, is commonly the object of the concupiscible power; whence according to its differences the diverse passions of the concupiscible power are distinguished... But there is another account of the moving power of the end itself or good, according as it is really present and according as it is absent: for according as it is present it makes one rest in itself; according as it is absent it makes one be moved toward itself. Whence the pleasurable thing itself according to sense, insofar as it in some way adapts and conforms the appetite to itself, causes love; but insofar as being absent it draws to itself, it causes concupiscence; but insofar as being present it gives rest in itself, it causes delight. Thus therefore concupiscence is a passion differing in species both from love and from delight... The pleasurable good is not absolutely the object of concupiscence, but under the account of absent... For particular conditions of this kind diversify the species of passions, or even of the powers of the sensitive part, which regards particulars."
4. Of the sensitive appetite, generally, according as it includes the concupiscible and irascible power; the distinction of which is from the object itself, according as namely it is either absolutely a sensible good, or a difficult and arduous good. "The object of the concupiscible power," says the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 23. a. 1., "is sensible good or evil accepted simply, which is pleasurable or painful. But because it is necessary that sometimes the soul suffer difficulty or struggle in obtaining some such good, or in fleeing some such evil, insofar as this

is in some way elevated above the easy power of the animal; therefore the good or evil itself, according as it has the account of arduous or difficult, is the object of the irascible power. Therefore whatever passions regard absolutely good or evil pertain to the concupiscible power, as joy, sadness, love, hatred, and the like; but whatever passions regard good or evil under the account of arduous, according as it is something obtainable or fleeable with some difficulty, pertain to the irascible power, as daring and fear, hope and things of this sort... The good insofar as pleasurable moves the concupiscible power. But if the good has a certain difficulty for obtaining it, from this very fact it has something repugnant to the concupiscible power. And therefore it was necessary that there be another power which would tend into it; and the account is the same concerning evils. And this power is the irascible. Whence consequently the passions of the concupiscible and irascible powers differ in species... To this end the irascible power has been given to animals, that the impediments may be removed by which the concupiscible power is prohibited from tending into its object, either on account of the difficulty of obtaining the good, or on account of the difficulty of overcoming evil. And therefore all passions of the irascible power are terminated at the passions of the concupiscible power. And according to this also the passions which are in the irascible power follow joy and sadness, which are in the concupiscible power.”

5. Of the sensitive appetite. For “there is a twofold delight: one which is in intelligible good, which is the good of reason. Another, which is in good according to sense. The first delight indeed seems to be of the soul only. But the second is of soul and body, because sense is a power in a bodily organ. Whence also good according to sense is the good of the whole composite. But the appetite of such delight seems to be concupiscence, which pertains at once both to the soul and to the body, as the very name of concupiscence sounds. Whence concupiscence, properly speaking, is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible power, which is denominated from it.” Hence it is clear that concupiscence is not the same as desire. “It must be said that desire can pertain more, properly speaking, not only to the lower appetite, but also to the higher. For it does not import some association in desiring as concupiscence does, but a simple motion into the thing desired.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 30. a. 1.
6. Into the good proper to itself, namely the pleasurable, sensible good apprehended by imagination. “To seek something under the account of a good pleasurable according to sense, which is properly to desire concupiscently, pertains to the concupiscible power.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 30. a. 1. ad 3. “Concupiscence is appetite of a pleasurable good. But something is pleasurable in two ways: in one way, because it is fitting to animal nature, as food and drink and other things of this kind. And concupiscence of a pleasurable thing of this kind is called natural. In another way something is said to be pleasurable because it is fitting according to apprehension: as when someone apprehends something as good and fitting, and consequently is delighted in it. And concupiscence of a pleasurable thing of this kind is called non-natural, and is more accustomed to be called cupidity. Therefore the first natural concupiscences are common to men and other animals, because to each there is something fitting and pleasurable according to nature; and in these all men agree... But the second concupiscences are proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as good and fitting beyond that which nature requires.”

7. Into pursuing the good proper to itself, and into avoiding evil. For the object of the concupiscible power according to the Angelic Doctor is good and evil; from appetite of good flight from evil is caused. "The objects of the concupiscible power are good and evil. But naturally good is prior to evil, because evil is the privation of good; whence also all passions whose object is good are naturally prior to passions whose object is evil: for because good is sought, therefore the opposite evil is rejected." Moreover concupiscence, in the present question concerning its influence on the voluntary, as has already been said, is taken not in the stricter sense for the appetite of sensible good alone, but in the broader sense for any motion whatever of the sensible appetite, or for any passion whatever of this appetite, and insofar as generally it is "a motion of the appetitive sensitive power, which is from the imagination of good or evil." St. Thomas, 3. D. 26. q. 1. a. 1.
8. The question is moved in the first place: whether concupiscence causes the involuntary? — Concupiscence does not cause the involuntary. For concupiscence rather does this, that something is voluntary, than that it is involuntary. "For something is called voluntary from this, that the will is borne into it. But through concupiscence the will is inclined to willing that which it desires." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 7.
9. But concupiscence is one thing antecedent, another consequent. The former precedes the free act of the will, and consequently is stirred up merely naturally. The latter follows the free act of the will. The former draws and inclines reason and will. The latter overflows from the will. The former is not voluntary; the latter is voluntary either in itself, if the will deliberately wills and stirs it up, or in the cause, if it results naturally from a free act of the will. "The sensitive appetite," says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6., "can have itself to free choice both antecedently and consequently. Antecedently indeed, according as passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines reason or will. Consequently, however, according as the motions of the higher powers, if they are vehement, overflow into the lower. For the will cannot be moved intensely into something without some passion being stirred up in the sensitive appetite." Therefore concupiscence can be at once antecedent and consequent: antecedent in its beginning and consequent in its continuation, insofar as namely the consent of the will comes to it, fostering it. But since concupiscence by its own nature always inclines and impels to act, there is no consideration and distinction of concupiscence causing and concomitant.
10. Antecedent concupiscence diminishes the voluntary both in the account of the voluntary and in the account of the free. Wherefore an act proceeding from it is less voluntary under each account, the more intense that concupiscence is. The reason of the first part is that an act is voluntary insofar as it is from an intrinsic principle. But concupiscence is extrinsic to the will. Therefore an act proceeding from its impulse is less voluntary in the account of the voluntary. Hence St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6. ad 3., says: "It must be said that although the motion of the will is more intense when stirred up by passion, nevertheless it is not so proper to the will as if it were moved to sin by reason alone." And in the body of the same article: "An act is sin insofar as it is voluntary and existing in us. But something is said to exist in us through reason and will. Whence the more reason and will do something from themselves, not from the

impulse of passion, the more it is voluntary and existing in us; and according to this passion diminishes sin, insofar as it diminishes the voluntary.”

11. The reason of the second part is that an act is less voluntary in the account of the free, the less dependence it has on the part of the free will and advertence on the part of reason. But when the preceding passion is more vehement, the less is the dependence of this consequent act upon the will freely determining itself and upon reason considering. For the free will, the more it finds the soul already inclined by passion, the less it itself influences the determination of the consequent act. Then, although passion cannot directly influence judgment, nevertheless it can indirectly influence it in three ways: 1.^o through a certain distraction, for sense is less attentive to individual things when it attends to many; 2.^o through a certain contrariety, insofar as it inclines to things contrary to that which ought to be judged, and the soul becomes weak and feeble; 3.^o through bodily alteration, for it perverts the phantasy, which does not furnish itself for the right operations of the intellect, as is seen in the insane and the furious from the vehemence of passions. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 7. ad 3., q. 10. a. 3., q. 73. a. 6. ad 2., q. 77. a. 1. 2. 3. 6. 7.; Suarez D. 3. S. 3. 4.
12. But although from antecedent concupiscence an act of the will is less voluntary, because it is not so proper to the will as if the will were moved by reason alone, nevertheless it becomes more intense and easier. And according as the passion is greater, by that much it renders the effort of the will easier. And thus soldiers from hope of glory, parents and friends from love of children and friends, bear any burdensome things pleasantly. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6. ad 3.
13. Consequent concupiscence presupposes an act more voluntary in proportion as it itself is more intense. The reason is that consequent concupiscence is stirred up in us consequently to the act of the will freely determining itself. Wherefore, whether it is stirred up naturally through a certain overflowing from the higher part into the lower, or is stirred up voluntarily, either indirectly through voluntary negligence and omission of repressing rising motions, or directly, with effort applied and studiously stirring up motions in the lower part, concupiscence, as consequent and not preceding the free act of the will whence it proceeds, cannot exercise any influence of causality upon it; nor can it increase or lessen the voluntary of which it is the effect, but it presupposes that same act of the will, which rather exercises influence upon it. And if the discussion again is of concupiscence which, whether voluntarily or naturally, is stirred up from the very act of the will, since an effect ought to be proportioned to its cause and cannot surpass it, consequent concupiscence does not diminish the voluntary, but rather increases it, insofar as namely it signifies and demonstrates a greater propensity and inclination of the will to the act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 73. a. 6. ad 2., q. 77. a. 6.
14. “It must be said that the passions of the soul can have themselves to the judgment of reason in two ways: in one way antecedently; and thus, since they cloud the judgment of reason, upon which the moral goodness of the act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act. For it is more praiseworthy that someone do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the passion of mercy alone. In another way they have themselves consequently, and this in two ways: in one way by way of overflow, because namely when the higher part of the soul is moved intensely into something, the lower part also follows its motion; and thus passion

existing consequently in the sensitive appetite is a sign of a more intense will; and thus it indicates a greater moral goodness. In another way by way of election, when namely man from the judgment of reason chooses to be affected by some passion, so that he may operate more promptly, with the sensitive appetite cooperating; and thus the passion of the soul adds to the goodness of the action.... It must be said that passion tending into evil, preceding the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but consequent passion in one of the aforesaid ways increases it, or signifies its increase.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 24. a. 3. ad 1. 3. Therefore consequent concupiscence which arises from a merely natural resulting and overflowing of the higher part into the lower, renders, as is clear, that which proceeds from it voluntary, and more voluntary in the cause, the more intense it is, by this very fact that it depends upon the will. But it renders that less voluntary in itself, since it always in some way clouds reason and in some way impedes the free exercise of the will. St. Thomas, On Evil, q. 3. a. 10. But consequent concupiscence directly stirred up for acting, for example if someone deliberately stirs up hatred in himself against an enemy by turning over in his mind injuries received, so that he may desire vengeance more pertinaciously and execute it with greater boldness, renders that which proceeds from it more voluntary simply, because that passion directly and voluntarily stirred up is a sign that the motion of the will is stronger. “But this,” as St. Thomas observes, On Evil q. 3. a. 11., “is not to do good or to sin from passion, but rather to suffer passion from the election of good or evil.”

15. Whether concupiscence diminishes merit and demerit? — One must answer affirmatively concerning antecedent concupiscence; for it diminishes the voluntary in the account of the free, whence merit and demerit are taken. “Passion,” says St. Thomas, On Evil q. 3. a. 11., “preceding the motion of the will, diminishes the account of merit and demerit, because merit and demerit consist in election proceeding from reason. But passion clouds or binds the judgment of reason. But the purer the judgment of reason has been, the more perspicacious the election is for meriting or demeriting.” And 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6. ad 2: “Good passion, consequent upon the judgment of reason, increases merit. But if it precedes, so that namely man is moved to acting well more from passion than from the judgment of reason, such passion diminishes the goodness and praise of the act.” — But negatively one must answer concerning consequent concupiscence, since it is a sign of the magnitude of the affection of the will, and demonstrates its intensity. And thus St. Thomas, On Evil q. 3. a. 11., says “that he who gives alms with greater compassion merits more, and he who commits sin with greater lust sins more, because this is a sign that the motion of the will is stronger.” Cf. n. 10. 11. 13. 14.
16. It follows from what has been said that, if the discussion is of a will not obeying but resisting depraved concupiscence, the magnitude of concupiscence proceeding from a merely natural cause increases merit, and on the contrary the weakness of concupiscence from the same natural cause lessens merit; for a greater effort of the will is required against the former, a lesser against the latter. “Magnitude of concupiscence or weakness.... sometimes proceeds from a bodily cause; for certain persons from natural complexion are more prone to desiring concupiscently than others, and again certain persons have opportunities of delights inflaming concupiscence more ready than others. And such weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit,

but magnitude increases it.” St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 155. a. 4. ad 2. But if the magnitude of concupiscence proceeds from the will itself, namely from its lesser effort and labor in the exercise of self-mortification and of virtues, and on the contrary the weakness of concupiscence proceeds from the great effort and labor of the will in acquiring holiness, then the greater concupiscence diminishes merit, and the lesser concupiscence increases merit, by reason of the aforesaid cause, namely of the lesser or greater labor and effort of the will. “But sometimes,” St. Thomas adds in the cited place, “weakness or magnitude of concupiscence proceeds from a praiseworthy spiritual cause, for example from the vehemence of charity or the strength of reason, as is in a temperate man. And in this way weakness of concupiscence increases merit by reason of its cause, but magnitude diminishes it.”

17. Whether passion diminishes sin? — R. “It must be said that sin essentially consists in an act of free choice, which is the faculty of will and reason. But passion is a motion of the sensitive appetite.... If therefore passion is taken according as it precedes the act of sin, thus it is necessary that it diminish sin. For an act is sin insofar as it is voluntary and existing in us. But something is said to exist in us through reason and through will. Whence the more reason and will do something from themselves, not from the impulse of passion, the more it is voluntary and existing in us. And according to this passion diminishes sin, insofar as it diminishes the voluntary. But consequent passion does not diminish sin, but rather increases it, or rather is a sign of its magnitude, insofar namely as it demonstrates the intensity of the will toward the act of sin. And thus it is true that the greater the lust or concupiscence with which someone sins, by so much the more he sins.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6.
18. Hence it follows that sin is diminished the more, the more vehement the preceding passion is. “It must be said that it belongs to the account of sin that it be voluntary. But that is called voluntary whose principle is in the agent himself. And therefore the more the interior principle is increased, by so much also sin becomes graver; but the more the exterior principle is increased, by so much sin becomes lighter. But passion is a principle extrinsic to the will; but the motion of the will is an intrinsic principle. And therefore the stronger the motion of the will has been for sinning, by so much the sin is greater; but the stronger the passion has been impelling to sinning, by so much the sin becomes less.” St. Thomas, On Evil q. 3. a. 11. ad 3. Cf. n. 10. 11. 12.
19. But an act proceeding from consequent concupiscence is more voluntary and a greater sin, the greater that concupiscence is. “If under concupiscence there is also included the motion itself of the will, thus where there is greater concupiscence there is greater sin.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 73. a. 6. ad 2. Likewise concupiscence directly stirred up increases sin. For since it is voluntary, the greater it itself is, the greater was the voluntary from which it arose. And for the same reason greater merit is had in the voluntary restraining of concupiscence and in its lessening. Cf. n. 13. 14. 16.
20. Whether passion totally excuses from sin? — “It must be said that an act which from its genus is evil is totally excused from sin only according to this, that it is rendered totally involuntary. Whence if the passion is such as to render the following act totally involuntary, it totally excuses from sin; otherwise not totally.... Sometimes indeed passion is so great that it totally

takes away the use of reason, as is clear in those who become insane on account of love or anger. And then, if such passion was voluntary from the beginning, the act is imputed to sin, because it is voluntary in its cause.... But if the cause was not voluntary, but natural, for instance when someone from sickness or from some cause of this kind falls into such passion, which totally takes away the use of reason, the act is wholly rendered involuntary, and consequently is totally excused from sin. But sometimes passion is not so great that it totally intercepts the use of reason; and then reason can exclude passion by turning aside to other thoughts, or prevent it from following its effect, because the members are not applied to work except through the consent of reason. Whence such passion does not totally excuse from sin.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 77. a. 7., q. 6. a. 7. ad 3. Cf. also q. 10. a. 3.

21. But the reason is that the will in its mode of acting depends upon the intellect. But the intellect can propose something to the will in two ways. First, from a sudden and simple apprehension, which then happens when, by means of the phantasy and the sensitive appetite, it suddenly apprehends some pleasurable good by which the appetite is affected, and proposes this to the will under the account only of a pleasurable good, and in no way under the account of evil. For then the will is determined to seeking this, and it is not in its power to seek and reject, because the intellect determinately proposes to it a good which it may seek, and does not at the same time propose to it an evil which it may reject. Secondly, from previous deliberation or use of reason, which then happens when the intellect not only apprehends some object, but at the same time sees in it the account of good and evil, and besides judges and discourses concerning the whole matter. For then the will can indifferently either seek that object on account of the account of good, or reject it on account of the account of evil, or finally cease from every act, because neither the good mixed with evil can necessitate it to seeking, nor the evil mixed with good can necessitate it to rejecting. Becanus, Tr. 1. C. 2. q. 10. n. 34. 35.
22. Whether the first motions of depraved concupiscence are always sins, and of what kind? — There can be no doubt that the first motions of depraved concupiscence are sins, and mortal sins, for the matter is grave, if, when they arise, the will in the subsequent time consents to them, and by consenting is morosely delighted in them, whether with a long delay, or a brief and very brief delay. For the act concerns a gravely base matter, and is fully deliberate; and that first motion of concupiscence, although it may have been stirred up wholly independently of the will, with the consent of the will coming to it, now begins to be a commanded act in its delay and permanence. Wherefore that delay is a voluntary delay.
23. Likewise there is no doubt that the first motions of depraved concupiscence naturally stirred up and independently of the will, which then according to its powers dissents from and resists them, are in no way sins. For the acts are wholly involuntary, and without the voluntary there is no sin. Indeed merit then belongs to the will resisting. “The first motion,” says St. Thomas, 2. Dist. q. 1. a. 4. ad 3., “does not have the account of fault except according as in some way it is in the power of the will. Whence as long as the will does not resist, it has the account of sin. But when the will now begins to resist, then man merits.”

24. Finally, if the will, when the first motion of concupiscence arises, neither consents nor dissents, but permits it, not prohibiting it, then a motion of this kind now has the account of sin, because in some way it is in the power of the will. For that motion is now not against and beyond the will, which indeed does not intend it, but at least permits it. But the sin is not mortal, but slight. For mortal sin consists in aversion from God, which cannot be had without reason turning itself away from God through deliberation, which aversion is not had here. Therefore that sin is not mortal, but venial. It is venial sin because it is disordered, with no excusing cause, to cease from all resistance and to do nothing in so dangerous a matter; and since this is not mortal, nevertheless it cannot be exempted from venial fault. "The first motion is a motion of sensuality preceding the deliberation of reason.... But it pertains to the nature of sensuality and of reason that a motion of sensuality which is without deliberation of reason cannot be mortal sin, because mortal sin is that which consists in aversion from God, to whom man cannot be converted except through reason; and consequently aversion from God, which constitutes mortal sin, cannot be except in reason." St. Thomas, Quodl. 4. a. 22. Moreover the disorder which constitutes mortal sin is in the will, which wills evil. But here the will does not truly will, but permits; and to permit evil per se is not sin, or certainly is not mortal sin. For to will evil is from the perfect dominion of the will; to permit evil is only from its imperfect dominion, since it is only not to prohibit evil. "The will has complete dominion in some things, but incomplete in others. It has complete dominion in those acts which proceed from the command of the will, and these are acts following deliberation, which are ascribed to reason. But it has incomplete dominion in those acts which do not proceed through the command of reason, but nevertheless the will could impede them, so that thus in some way they are subject to the will, as to being impeded or not impeded; and therefore the disorder which happens in these acts causes the account of sin, yet of incomplete sin, and therefore in these acts sin is very slight and venial." St. Thomas, 2. Dist. 24. q. 3. a. 2.
25. The doctrine of St. Thomas is the same in Quodl. 4. a. 21: "It must be said that motion imports a certain inclination to a term; and this inclination pertains to appetite in human acts. But in man there is a threefold appetite. One indeed is natural, according as the appetitive power pertains to the vegetative soul, as also the digestive, expulsive, and retentive power do. The second appetite is of sensuality, which is moved according to apprehension of sense. The third appetite is of the will, which is moved according to the judgment of reason. Sin which has the account of fault, of which we are now speaking, cannot exist except in a voluntary act, which namely is in some way in the power of the one sinning. But the act of the natural appetite is not subject to the command of reason, just as neither is the act of the other powers of the vegetative soul; and therefore fault cannot consist in the act of such an appetite, just as that a man hungers or thirsts is without fault; and the same must be said in other things of this kind. But an act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason, because reason, preceding it, can command it or also impede it; and therefore such a motion can now have the account of fault; and if it follows the judgment of reason, it will also be able to be mortal sin, just as the motion of the exterior members commanded by reason. But if it precedes the judgment of reason, it is indeed sin, if it tends into something illicit, because it was in the power of man to restrain it; yet it is venial sin and very slight.... and this is called

the first motion of sin. But the motion of the higher appetite, that is, of the will, following the judgment of reason, can now be mortal sin.”

26. But, practically speaking, grave sin is also present if, positive resistance having been omitted, someone is manifestly exposed to the danger of voluntary approval and consent; which can easily happen in a matter especially alluring. And as regards those who are not of fearful conscience, and who in so dangerous a temptation do nothing against it, it is greatly to be feared lest in reality they sin gravely. But it is one thing to resist positively, another to fight directly. To positive resistance belongs the mere dissent of the will, which indeed is not to be continually repeated if the temptation remains for a long time; but it suffices to flee to God with humble prayer. Direct attack consists in eliciting contrary acts of the contrary virtue; but indirect attack is had by turning the soul away from the thought of base things, and seriously occupying it with other honorable things. This indirect attack is especially to be applied in depraved thoughts and in temptations of luxury. For by turning the soul away from the thought of base things there is had an efficacious remedy for repelling those thoughts and temptations. Directly to will to attack them detains the soul in those things, which easily, far from driving away the temptation, can increase it, “because where there is greater solicitude, the imagination is fixed more upon such an object, and through imagination” depraved motions “are especially increased.” La-Croix, l. 5. n. 111.
27. Whether custom or habit increases the voluntary or the free, or diminishes it; and consequently whether it increases fault or merit, or diminishes it? — “It must be said that from custom and the habit acquired through it, it happens that the will is borne with greater promptness, because it operates from habit with greater facility and delight than without it, other things being equal. But indeed with greater effort we operate those things which we accomplish more easily and pleasantly; therefore in this way habit increases the voluntary, because an increase of the voluntary consists in this, that the will is borne with greater impulse. But concerning the free, it must be said, as a little before we were saying concerning the affection of the will, or concerning consequent concupiscence, that habit indeed per se and formally diminishes liberty, because by inclining the will more to the other part it diminishes its indifference; nevertheless morally and in order to moral effects it is not judged to diminish it, as long as that custom is free and voluntary, on account of the same reason, because a free disposition, as such, does not diminish the free. Whence it becomes probable, if custom and habit become involuntary through a contrary act, efficacious as much as is on the part of man, who repents that he has acquired such a custom or habit, and proposes to do as much as is in him to conquer it, then, I say, it is very probable that custom diminishes liberty and consequently fault, because such custom has been turned in some way into nature, and now it is not in the power of man to conquer it so quickly, and otherwise it is now involuntary, and therefore is not reputed as a free supposition, but as necessary.” Suarez D. 3. S. 3.; St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 78. a. 2. 4. Cf. Commentary Fifth n. 30. 31.
28. Whether grace increases the voluntary or the free, or diminishes it? — “It must be said, speaking per se, that it increases the voluntary, because it moves and inclines the will to willing; and although grace is accustomed to be called an extrinsic principle, nevertheless,

speaking per se, it moves either on the part of the object, drawing the will much more sweetly than concupiscence is accustomed to draw it... or on the part of the power through a habit infused in it, or through a vital motion of it, and proceeding intimately from it. But concerning the free, it can happen that grace sometimes diminishes it by inclining the will more to the other part; nevertheless this is not always necessary, for in this there is much difference between grace and concupiscence: for concupiscence moves to one thing under some account, by hiding or diminishing cognition of the same object under other accounts; but grace, speaking per se, illuminates and shows in the object every account of good and evil which can be considered in it, and inclines to pursuing it under the most perfect and supreme account of good, which it makes one weigh and esteem as it is worthy. And thus from the force of grace it is not necessary that liberty be diminished, although, as I have said, sometimes it can be diminished.” Suarez D. 3. S. 3. Cf. also Tr. 3. D. 5. S. 3. n. 18. Therefore in no way does grace take away liberty, but it perfects it.

29. Aptly Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Libertas*, 20 June 1888: “The power of divine grace, since it enlightens the mind and impels the will, strengthened with salutary constancy, always toward moral good, makes the use of native liberty more ready and at the same time more secure. And it is far removed from the truth that, when God intervenes, voluntary motions are less free; for the force of divine grace is inward in man and congruent with natural propensity, because it flows from him who is the author of our soul and will, by whom all things are moved fittingly to their nature. Indeed divine grace, as the Angelic Doctor warns, for this reason, that it proceeds from the maker of nature, is wonderfully born and apt for guarding each nature, and for preserving the habits, force, and efficacy of each.” And already before the same Leo XIII skillfully observed: “If to be able to fall away from good according to nature were the perfection of liberty, then God, Jesus Christ, the Angels, the Blessed, in all of whom that power is not, either would not be free, or certainly would be less perfectly free than man as wayfarer and imperfect. Concerning this matter the Angelic Doctor often disputes many things, from which it can be effected and compelled that the faculty of sinning is not liberty, but servitude. Most subtly that saying upon the words of Christ the Lord, John 8:34: He who commits sin is the servant of sin. Each thing is that which befits it according to nature. Therefore when it is moved by something foreign, it does not operate according to itself, but from the impression of another, which is servile. But man according to his own nature is rational. Therefore when he is moved according to reason, he is moved by his own motion and operates according to himself, which belongs to liberty; but when he sins, he operates beyond reason, and then he is moved as if by another, held by alien limits, and therefore: ‘he who commits sin is the servant of sin.’”

Commentary VII: On Fear

1. Fear is commonly defined: a trepidation of mind on account of an imminent or future danger.
2. On account of an imminent or future danger, namely of an evil danger: for danger of a present evil is no longer present, since it is already there. But present evil does not bring in fear, but sadness. "Evil conjoined is the cause of pain or sadness by way of object." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 36. a. 4. "The object of fear is a future difficult evil, which cannot be resisted." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2. "Sadness is concerning present evil; fear is concerning future evil, which does not move in the same way as present evil." Ibid. a. 1.
3. Trepidation of mind. "It is manifest that fear, since it is concerning evil, pertains to the appetitive power, which per se regards good and evil." Ibid. a. 1.
4. Therefore fear carries before itself moral coercion, which namely is exercised upon the will itself; force or violence, on the contrary, brings in physical coercion, which is exercised upon other powers and exterior members, insofar as they are moved and impelled by some exterior force against their natural inclination.
5. Fear is divided into light and grave, by reason of the evil which is feared. The first is had either when the imminent or future evil is light, or when, although it is grave, nevertheless it is little probable and likely. But the other is had when the impending evil is grave, and is very probable or certain.
6. But evil is grave either absolutely or relatively. Hence grave fear is subdivided into absolutely grave and relatively grave. Absolutely grave harm is that which strikes fear of itself into a constant man, and is grave in itself and is commonly reputed such. Each point is explained by the Holy Doctor, 4. Dist. 29. q. 1. a. 2. And first concerning fear falling upon a constant man: "That fear falls upon someone means that someone is coerced by fear. But someone is coerced by fear when he does something which otherwise he would not will, in order to avoid something which he fears. But in this the constant man is distinguished from the inconstant man as to two things. First as to the quality of the danger which is feared, because the constant man follows right reason, through which he knows something for which one must fight or which must be done. But always the lesser evil, or the greater good, must be chosen. And therefore the constant man is coerced to sustaining a lesser evil by fear of a greater evil; but he is not coerced to a greater evil so that he may avoid a lesser evil. But the inconstant man is coerced to a greater evil on account of fear of a lesser evil, as to sin on account of fear of bodily punishment. But the pertinacious man, on the contrary, cannot be coerced even to sustaining or doing a lesser evil so that he may avoid a greater evil; whence the constant man is in the middle between the inconstant and the pertinacious. Secondly they differ as to the estimation of the imminent danger, because the constant man is coerced only from a strong and probable estimation; but the inconstant man from a slight one.... The constant man is intrepid, not because he does not fear at all, but because he does not fear the things which ought not to be feared, or where, or when, they ought not to be feared." But concerning evil grave in itself and

commonly reputed such, he adds these things: “Sins are the greatest of evils, and therefore to this in no way can a constant man be coerced; indeed man ought rather to die than to sustain such things.... But certain bodily harms are lesser than certain others, which are among the principal things which pertain to the person, such as death, blows, dishonoring through rape, and servitude; and therefore from these one is coerced to sustaining other bodily harms.... Nor does it differ whether these pertain to one’s own person, or that of wife, or children, or others of this kind.” And among other things infamy is to be reckoned with these, if it cannot easily be met, *ibid.* ad 3.; loss of all goods by theft, robbery, fire; dismissal from office; frustration of contracting matrimony; exclusion from an expected inheritance, etc. But relatively grave evil is that which according to itself, and according to the common estimation of men, is not grave, yet is grave with respect to this or that person, for instance, a boy, a girl, a woman, an old man, an infirm person.

7. Fear is further divided into intrinsic and extrinsic, by reason of the cause from which it proceeds. Intrinsic fear is that which arises from the intrinsic disposition of the subject itself, namely from each one’s own infirmity of body or soul. Fear of death stirred up from a grave illness is intrinsic fear, since it arises as from a cause from infirmity which is in the very subject of fear. Extrinsic fear is that which is stirred up by an extrinsic cause, whether this cause is natural or necessary, or whether it is a moral or free cause; as likewise fear of death from shipwreck, or from a robber encountered on the way.
8. Extrinsic fear struck by a moral or free cause is subdivided into just and unjust, according as that cause has or does not have a right of inflicting evil, as fear struck by a judge or by a brigand. And whether the fear has been struck justly or unjustly, such fear can be struck simply for obtaining something, or for inflicting some evil, as happens in robbers threatening death unless someone gives the things which he has, or in an enemy likewise threatening death in revenge; and it can be struck for extorting consent in some certain thing, for example in betrothals, in matrimony, in a contract, etc. In the first and third case, fear struck for obtaining something or for extorting consent, fear per se directly influences consent, either explicitly, as in the third case, or implicitly, as in the first case. In the second case fear per se does not directly influence consent, but per accidens it can influence the will, as, for example, if someone offers himself to an enemy threatening death to him, in order to gain peace for himself, to take that enemy’s daughter in marriage.
9. Fear by a special name is called reverential, when the fear is lest a superior be offended, or by which someone fears to resist him to whom he is subjected, namely father, mother, grandfather, father-in-law, husband, king, master, prelate, tutor, and curator, as the doctors commonly teach with Sanchez; likewise also an uncle, or cousin, or older brother, if the one suffering fear lives with them and receives sustenance from them. St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 1056. “Pontius deservedly says that reverential fear per se is grave, because it is one thing to operate from reverence owed to a superior, another from reverential fear, which necessarily puts on fear of some grave harm impending from obedience not furnished, for instance lasting indignation, etc.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 717. Certainly the indignation of a father, master, etc.,

is an evil; and, if it is lasting, it is a grave evil. Wherefore, even with other evils excluded, for example blows, threats, etc., reverential fear per se is grave.

10. "It is one thing to operate with fear, but another from fear; for the first says concomitance. Whence what is done thus, although it is absolutely voluntary, nevertheless that voluntary does not arise from fear, but rather is opposed to and conquers that fear, which is a sign of a great will; as when Christ the Lord was going forth to death, fearing it, he embraced it with the highest will, which did not arise from fear of the Father and of men, and therefore conquered natural fear. But to be done from fear signifies that fear itself induces one to willing or doing something, and then fear is the cause of such voluntary, in the way in which among the acts of the will intention is the cause of election, and election of use; and love of good is the cause of hatred of the opposite evil. For in this way in the present matter, when someone fears death he decrees and intends to flee it; and by force of this decree he chooses this means, for example to cast merchandise into the sea, and use or execution follows upon this election. Therefore from first to last fear was the cause stirring and applying the will to that efficacious act by which it commanded that exterior action." Suarez D. 3. S. 1.
11. Moreover, those things which are done from fear are more voluntary than involuntary: for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. For each thing is such simply according as it is in act. But this act, according as it is exercised here and now, is simply willed; because although such an action considered per se is not lovable simply, nevertheless here and now it is proposed as absolutely to be chosen, as a fitting means for avoiding a greater evil. Therefore under that account it is here and now simply voluntary. For judgment concerning the voluntary must be borne with the thing considered in particular with all circumstances, and not through abstraction or precision of the intellect. "But that what is done through fear is taken as existing outside this case, according as it is repugnant to the will, this is only according to reason alone, and therefore it is involuntary in a certain respect, that is, according as it is considered as existing outside this case." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. Therefore that which is done through fear without condition is voluntary, that is, according as it is actually done; but it is involuntary under a condition, that is, if such fear were not impending." St. Thomas, *ibid.* ad 3. "And because acts are in particulars, therefore it is simply voluntary, but involuntary in a certain respect." St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 47. a. 1.; Suarez D. 3. S. 1. 2.
12. From what has been said the difference is clear between those things which are done from force and those which are done from fear. "Those things which are done through fear and through force differ not only according to present and future, but also according to this, that in that which is done through force the will does not consent, but is wholly against the motion of the will. But that which is done through fear becomes voluntary for this reason, that the motion of the will is borne into it, although not on account of itself, but on account of another thing, namely for repelling the evil which is feared. For it suffices for the account of the voluntary that it be on account of another voluntary thing. For voluntary is not only what we will on account of itself, but also what we will on account of another thing, as on account of an end. Therefore it is clear that in that which is done through force the interior will does

nothing. But in that which is done through fear the will does something.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 1.

13. Likewise the difference is clear between fear and concupiscence in relation to the voluntary. “In him who does something through fear there remains a repugnance of the will toward that which is done, according as it is considered in itself. But in him who does something through concupiscence, as is the incontinent man, the prior will does not remain, which was repudiating that which is desired concupiscently; but it is changed to willing that which before it repudiated. And therefore what is done through fear is in some way involuntary, but what is done through concupiscence is in no way involuntary. For the incontinent man of concupiscence acts against that which he previously proposed, but not against that which he now wills. But the fearful man acts against that which even now he wills according to itself.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 7. ad 2.
14. From the preceding doctrine it follows that a contract per se is valid, if someone has been coerced to contracting by grave fear, but nevertheless justly. Whence he who has contracted betrothals from fear of excommunication can be compelled to matrimony, and the contract is valid. C. Ex litteris 10, On Betrothals. He who has violated a virgin is compelled to endow or marry her. He who promised something lest he be accused of a committed crime is bound to give it. The reason is that fear does not render a contract simply involuntary. For he who contracts with grave fear, all things considered absolutely, wills and consents. But since the fear was struck justly, there is no injury. Wherefore the contract cannot be invalid either on account of defect of consent or on account of inflicted injury. — Nor indeed is a contract invalid of itself, if someone has been coerced to contract by grave fear but unjustly, although it can be rescinded at the judgment of him who suffered the fear. For consent is not lacking, since consent is altogether the same, whether the fear is just or unjust. But a contract cannot be rendered invalid from injury. For the immediate cause of the contract is consent, not injury. But because he who unjustly struck fear inflicted injury upon another, he is bound to restore him to the prior state, and the other has a right of exacting this restitution, which can be done only by rescission of the contract.
15. Now those things which are done from fear are involuntary in a certain respect, when the thing is evil in itself, but good only in the present circumstances, as is clear in the example adduced of the casting of merchandise by a merchant, which in itself is evil to him, but is good to him in the present circumstance of shipwreck. But if the thing is good in itself, so that it is such even by abstracting from the present circumstances, then he who operates from fear can be borne by a perfect inclination of the will into that thing, so that the voluntary simply is had, without at the same time having the involuntary in a certain respect. And thus he who from supernatural fear of Gehenna wills to abstain from sin has the voluntary simply without an admixture of the involuntary, because observance of the divine law is simply good in itself, even by abstracting from that circumstance of fear of the divine judgments. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 442. Objection II. Moreover, “he who wills to preserve the precept from fear of hell, if he understands the force of that motive, cannot have a simple contrary affection: I would transgress the precept if there were no penalty, for through this very affection he would sin and

would incur liability to the penalty, and consequently would act against his own motive. If therefore he is truly and efficaciously moved by that motive, and understands its force and the quality of his acts, it cannot happen that such an affection is with that motive.” Suarez D. 3. S. 2.

16. Whether importunate prayers constitute grave fear? — “Pontius affirms it, etc. But more truly it must be denied, unless the prayers are added to fear of reverence toward a Superior; thus Sanchez, etc. And Sanchez well notes that not all assiduous prayers are called importunate, but only those which are most insistent and more often inculcated.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 717.
17. Whether grave fear excuses from fault? — Either the discussion is of those things which are not intrinsically and per se evil, or of those things which from their nature are intrinsically evil, as would be, for example, apostasy from the faith, blasphemy against God. If the first, ordinarily speaking, grave fear excuses from all fault, because any positive law is not accustomed to oblige with grave proportionate inconvenience, as is common. It is said ordinarily speaking, because if someone by grave fear were compelled to the violation of some positive law which would yield to common harm, or to contempt of legitimate power, or of religion, with grave public scandal, then grave fear would not excuse from the fault of transgression; for in the first case the common good must be preferred to private good; but in the second the matter would now be concerning a thing intrinsically evil from its nature. But in this second case if the one suffering, when he violates the law, should protest publicly that he does not thus act in contempt of the law, but only to avoid violence, with which existing, he declares that the law no longer obliges, then, if public scandal ceases and the aforesaid contempt ceases, which, practically speaking, seems altogether difficult, he would be excused from fault. — If the second, it is certain that fear, however grave, provided that it is not such as to take away the use of reason, never excuses from all fault: for since those things include intrinsic and essential malice, if they are done voluntarily, they can never lack fault. An example is in that Christian who, struck by fear of punishments or even of death, would deny the faith of Christ. Nevertheless it diminishes fault, since it diminishes the voluntary. Yet, ordinarily speaking, grave fear still leaves such cognition of the things which are done as suffices for mortal sin. Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 175.; Elbel 43-52.
18. Grave fear, for example of death, etc., often excuses not only from a positive precept, both divine and human, even ecclesiastical, but sometimes also from an affirmative natural precept; and thus someone is not bound with danger of life to receive baptism, to confess integrally, to receive communion, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, to aid a neighbor in extreme need of life. Lessius q. 6. a. 6.; Bus. apud St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 175. On the contrary, in order to avoid death a priest cannot violate the sacramental seal. Cf. Viva, On Human Acts.
19. Here the question is moved: whether a virgin is bound rather to permit herself to be killed than to be violated, if the invader of her chastity and life threatens death to her unless she consents to intercourse. — “There is a twofold opinion,” says St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 368. “The first, which Navarrus, Soto, Toledo, Lopez, and others hold, says that, although she can, nevertheless a woman is not bound to suffer death, but can then have herself permissively while intercourse happens, provided that by will she positively resists and the danger of

consent is absent; because, as they say, that permission is not then moral cooperation, but only material, and therefore she is sufficiently excused on account of the danger of death. The second opinion, which the Salmanticenses hold with Lugo, Azor, Bonacina, Filliucci, Palaus, etc., teaches that this is altogether illicit, because, since the woman can impede intercourse, if, induced by fear, she rests, then her cooperation becomes truly moral and voluntary. For in a woman that rest in intercourse is reputed as action. Nevertheless this reason does not convince, because that rest of the woman in reality cannot be called action, since in no way is it positive. Therefore the first opinion, speculatively speaking, does not seem to lack its probability. Nevertheless it must not be denied that the second opinion in practice is altogether to be urged, at least on account of the danger of consent, which can easily be present in that permission.”

20. Likewise the question is moved: whether a woman coerced by grave fear to matrimony, that grave fear remaining, and then coerced by her husband to intercourse by a graver fear of death, can then, by consenting to the matrimony, render it valid and consent to intercourse. — There are some who affirm, because a law constituting a diriment impediment in favor of an innocent person whom it intends to protect would yield to his gravest harm. If it were otherwise, someone would now be cast into the inevitable necessity either of sinning, if she could scarcely trust that she can have herself merely passively, or of undergoing death, and this to preserve her liberty. But one’s own liberty is not necessarily to be preferred to preserving one’s own life. But much more probably it must be denied altogether. For invalidating laws per se directly regard the common good, and do not cease on account of a particular inconvenience, even though very grave. If the impediment in the case ceased, now in reality the impediment of fear would be none. For if the impediment ceases when there is question of consummation of the marriage, then it would have to be said that the impediment had ceased from the beginning, since, speaking per se, that grave fear by which the marriage is contracted is directed and extended all the way to its consummation. Sanchez, *On Matrimony*, l. 4. D. 18. n. 13 seq.; Tamburini, *On Matrimony*, Tr. 4. C. 7. § 4.; Mazzotta, *On Matrimony*, D. 3. Q. 2. C. 3. n. 2.

Commentary VIII: On Force or Violence

1. Force or violence is called that which is from an extrinsic principle, against the inclination of the will, so that he who suffers force cannot do the contrary, and wholly resists.
2. That which is from an extrinsic principle against the inclination of the will; for the coerced and the violent are opposed to the natural and voluntary, which are said of that which is from an intrinsic principle according to proper inclination. Wherefore St. Thomas says: “what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle.” 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. “Violence makes something to be against the will,” *ibid.* a. 5. Hence the will cannot inflict force or violence upon itself. Moreover, the difference appears between force or violence and fear: for, since force or violence is that which is from an extrinsic principle, it is not from the will, while, on the contrary, since fear is in the will itself, it is from the will, as conceiving fear.
3. So that he who suffers force cannot do the contrary: for if he can act against it, force or violence is now not had; for force or violence ought to be against the inclination of the will. But that which someone admits in himself, although he can remove it, certainly is not against the inclination of the will. “When someone is coerced by some agent, so that he cannot do the contrary, this is called necessity of coercion.” Thus St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 82. a. 1. Under this head force or violence can be distinguished as twofold, absolute and total, in a certain respect and partial, according as namely someone can in no way do the contrary, or can at least attempt and do something against it, for lessening the force and violence. Yet resistance altogether absolute and continuous to the coercion inflicted is not always required for avoiding fault, when namely on one side it would be useless, but on the other the matter is less dangerous. Thus martyrs led to the temples of pagans did not sin, although they walked on their own feet. But in every case one must resist as much as is required for averting proximate danger of sin and scandal, and injury to religion. Likewise someone can be excused from resistance to be opposed on account of fear of graver harm; nevertheless it is always necessary that internally, as much as he can, he resist sin by will. Wherefore, for bearing judgment concerning fault from omission of resistance, it must be considered not only whether someone could have resisted, but also whether he ought to have resisted. Therefore he who, resisting or acting contrariwise as much as he can, suffers force; or even resisting nothing and doing nothing contrary, because he can do nothing, because he is bound to nothing, cannot be called a cooperator and accomplice.
4. And wholly resists: for although force and violence inflicted from outside are such that someone can do nothing contrary, if nevertheless that repugnance of the will is lacking, he now does not suffer force and violence unwillingly. Hence again the difference between violence and fear is clear, because he who suffers force contributes nothing to that which is done through force and violence; but “to that which is done through fear the will of the one fearing contributes something.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 1. And since interior repugnance of the will of this kind can be total, and can also be not altogether full, hence again under this head also force and violence can be distinguished as absolute and in a certain respect. “Something,”

says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5., “can be called voluntary in two ways: in one way according to action, as when someone wills to do something; in another way according to passion, namely when someone wills to suffer from another. Whence when an action is inflicted by someone exterior, the will of suffering remaining in him who suffers, it is not simply violent, because although he who suffers does not contribute by acting, nevertheless he contributes by willing to suffer. Whence it cannot be called involuntary.”

5. From what has been said it follows that violation is voluntary for a woman if, when she can repel the invader of her chastity, she does not repel him; or if, when she cannot repel him, she does not resist the force by her will, and voluntarily admits him, or at least does not resist him in every way in which she can. On the contrary, violation would be altogether involuntary for a woman if she could in no way resist the invader of her chastity and by her will wholly resisted him. Wherefore coercion can be in a certain respect in two ways, objectively and subjectively. Objectively, if the force of the one coercing truly is not so great that it cannot be repelled or at least weakened by the resistance of the one suffering. Subjectively, if, although the coercion can neither be repelled nor weakened, nevertheless someone according to his powers does not resist it, nor wholly resists it by his will. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 16.
6. Now force or violence cannot be inflicted upon the will as regards its own acts. “As regards the proper act itself (namely elicited) of the will, violence cannot be inflicted upon it. And the reason of this is that an act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior cognoscitive principle.... But what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. Indeed, if acts of the will are elicited by the will itself, as by an active intrinsic principle, since the will is their active intrinsic principle, the same acts cannot be from an extrinsic, violent principle; for violent is that which is from an extrinsic principle, with the thing suffering not contributing force. “No one can will something unwillingly, because one unwilling to will cannot will.” St. Anselm, *On Free Choice*, cap. 6. Nevertheless, in the common mode of speaking, force is said to be inflicted upon the will when force is applied so that the purpose of the will is changed, which indeed cannot happen without a proper act of the will.
7. Hence it is clear that in a twofold sense acts elicited by the will can be understood to be coerced: namely first, so that they are called violent or coerced by violence or coercion as by an active principle, which cannot be; secondly, so that they are called violent or coerced by violence or coercion as by a motive. For just as fear can move or impel someone to doing something which otherwise he would not do, so also external force and coercion. Becanus, Tr. 1. C. 2. q. 10. n. 40.
8. “As regards acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence, insofar as through violence exterior members can be impeded from executing the command of the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. But the will can suffer violence in the exterior members, although an explicit command of the will is not properly had, as, for example, if someone is seized against his own will, bound hand and foot, thrust into prison, etc. — And this is valid not only as regards exterior members, but also as regards interior faculties. For it is clear that the will not only can command the hand, for example, not to subscribe one’s own name in the promissory

note of a fictitious creditor, and that hand, seized by that man by force, must subscribe; but it can also command the intellect to think and consider some thing, and the distracted intellect is carried away to think about other things; it can command the sensible appetite to obey reason, and that appetite may be moved against reason. Likewise an extrinsic cause, for example a demon, can stir up phantasms in the imagination against the will, stir up sensible motions in the sensible appetite, with the will likewise resisting, etc. Cf. Suarez D. 2.; Lessius on q. 6. a. 4.; St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 80.

9. Commanded acts, as is drawn from the very definition of coercion and the notion of a commanded act, indeed cannot be called coerced in relation to the faculty physically eliciting them, but only morally in relation to the will commanding them. For the rest, no act which happens without the command of the will can properly be called commanded. But the will cannot be coerced to the commanded acts of other powers. For the will cannot command acts of other powers except through an act elicited by itself. But it cannot be coerced to an act elicited by itself. Therefore it cannot be coerced so that it commands acts of other powers.
10. Indeed the will itself can command an act against the natural inclination of the faculty, as when someone bends the members against their natural flexibility. That commanded act, although it is violent in a certain respect, nevertheless is not simply violent. For since the part exists on account of the whole, the part must not be viewed only according to itself, but chiefly according to its order to the whole. Hence what is violent to the part according to itself is not violent to it according to its order to the whole. "It must be said that, as the Philosopher says, Physics, book 8, text 27, the motion of an animal, by which sometimes an animal is moved against the natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, nevertheless is in some way natural to the animal, to which it is natural that it be moved according to appetite; and therefore this is not violent simply, but in a certain respect. And similarly it must be said when someone bends the members against natural disposition; for this is violent in a certain respect, namely as regards the particular member, but nevertheless not simply as regards the man himself." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5. ad 3.
11. Violence, as regards the act to which it coerces, causes the involuntary as such in a contrary way. For "Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as also to the natural. For it is common to the voluntary and the natural that each be from an intrinsic principle. And on account of this, just as in things which lack cognition, violence makes something against nature, so in cognizing things it makes something to be against the will. But what is against nature is said to be unnatural; and similarly what is against the will is said to be involuntary. Whence violence causes the involuntary," St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5.; violence simply causes the involuntary simply; violence in a certain respect causes the involuntary in a certain respect; not indeed as regards elicited acts, but as regards commanded acts. For only as regards commanded acts, and not also as regards elicited acts, can the will suffer violence. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5. ad 1.
12. Wherefore, when some passion is simply violent, because namely the force inflicted upon it is irresistible, and someone resists and repels by will in every way in which he can, it is simply and contrarily involuntary, and therefore not human, nor imputable. But when it is only violent in a certain respect, because namely it was not altogether unconquerable, and according to his

powers someone does not resist and repel it by his will, then the account of the voluntary is not taken away, and therefore neither the account of a human and imputable act, but it is only diminished according to the greater or lesser force inflicted, according to the greater or lesser resistance and repugnance. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 18.

Commentary IX: On the Morality of Human Acts

1. We have spoken of human acts in relation to man, who through them orders himself to the ultimate end of human life, or beatitude. It must now be said of the same acts in order to the aforesaid end, or of the morality of those same acts. For the order of human acts to the common end of the whole of human life constitutes the moral order, or the morality of human acts, as will soon be explained, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 21. a. 2. ad 2. But first it must be said generally of morality itself, and specifically of the moral goodness and malice of human acts. Then indeed we shall speak of the various sources of this morality in human acts. And this we shall furnish in distinct Commentaries.
2. Human acts can be considered either all generically, or these or those specifically. If they are considered generically as human acts, they are capable of conducting man to the end, namely to the ultimate end, in the possession of which happiness and beatitude and his full perfection are constituted. For through them man orders and leads himself to the end. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. 2., q. 7. a. 2. If these or those specifically, as such acts, are inspected, they are actually ordering and leading, or not, to the end, according as they are conformable to the end or not. And thus, for example, cognition of God and love of God, by their nature, order and lead man to the end; ignorance of God and hatred of God, by their nature, turn and remove man from the end.
3. If human acts, in the first way, are viewed generally, they are called moral. If, in the second way, they are considered as constituted in a particular species, they are called morally good or evil, honorable or base. "Good and evil," says St. Thomas, q. 18. a. 5., "diversify species in moral acts." Therefore morality constitutes the genus; goodness or malice the species. Let us first consider the reason of each appellation; then, for declaring the matter itself, by the way indicated from the name of the thing to the thing itself, we shall come to it.
4. The reason of the former appellation is that human acts, by which man directs himself to the end, are free acts; namely, they are in reality those acts from whose repetition habits are properly begotten, which by the Latins are called mores. For mos signifies a frequent and more often repeated mode of operating proceeding from the free determination of the will. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 58. a. 1. Certainly the free pertains especially to habits and mores. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 49. a. 4. "There the genus of morals begins, where dominion of the will is first found." St. Thomas, 2. D. 24. q. 3. a. 2. But acts from which habits or mores are begotten are most aptly called moral. Moreover, since human or free acts of this kind are those means with which man has been furnished so that he can tend to the end, namely so that he may use them not only once or another time, with attention to the nature of man, but so that he may exercise himself in them, and persevere in doing well unto the end of life, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 5. a. 7.; hence also this whole order of human actions to the end is most aptly called the moral order. "And because," says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3., "Ambrose says.... mores are properly called human, moral acts properly receive species from the end: for moral acts and human acts are the same."

5. There is no real difference between a human act and a moral act. The difference is only from the diverse account by which the human act is considered. For if it is viewed according to its physical being, insofar as it is an act proceeding from reason and free will, it is held as a human act. But if it is viewed according to the relation which it has to its norm, whence is its goodness and malice in order to the end to be attained, it is a moral act. Wherefore morality adds to the voluntary and the free a relation to the norm of honorableness.
6. We proceed to the reason of the other appellation, namely of an act morally good or evil, honorable or base. Now if human or moral acts are conformable to obtaining the ultimate end, then nothing is lacking to them, not only insofar as they are physical actions done with advertence and deliberation, but also insofar as they are a means, instituted by nature, for attaining the end. But, on the contrary, if they do not lead to the end, although nothing is lacking to them insofar as they are physical actions done with advertence and deliberation, nevertheless something is lacking to them insofar as they are a means to the end. But that to which, considered under some respect, nothing is lacking, is called good under that respect; but evil, if something is lacking, under the same respect. But this respect or order of human acts to the end, as has already been said, is called the moral order or respect. Therefore human acts, if they are viewed specifically, are rightly called morally good or evil. "Thus therefore it must be said," says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 1., "that every action, insofar as it has something of being, has so much of goodness; but insofar as something of the fullness of being which is due to human action is lacking to it, so far it falls short of goodness, and thus is called evil." And 1. 2. q. 18. a. 5: "For each thing, good is that which befits it according to its form; and evil is that which is beyond the order of its form.... Whence it is manifest that good and evil diversify species in moral acts, for differences per se diversify species."
7. Moreover to praise someone is to impute to him, or to attribute to him as author, the goodness of his act, just as to blame someone is to impute to him the malice of his act. Wherefore acts are imputable to praise or blame according as they are good or evil. But if the goodness or malice by which an act is imputed to someone for praise or blame is in the moral order, then the act which is imputed to praise is called honorable from being honored, and that which is imputed to blame is called base from being blamed. "From this," says St. Thomas, q. 21. a. 2., "an act is called culpable or laudable, because it is imputed to the agent. For to be praised or blamed is nothing other than for the malice or goodness of one's act to be imputed to someone. For then an act is imputed to the agent when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over his act. But this is in all voluntary acts, because through the will man has dominion over his act... Whence it remains that good or evil in voluntary acts alone constitutes the account of praise or fault."
8. And hence it is clear that honorable can be taken in two ways: 1.^o according as it is contradistinguished from useful and pleasurable; 2.^o according as it is contradistinguished from base. In the first way it signifies the good which is sought per se; a good ordered to an end is called useful, q. 7. a. 2., q. 8. a. 3.; it is called pleasurable insofar as by possession of itself it quiets the appetite and brings delight, St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 145. a. 3. In the other way it signifies an action which, beyond the entity of a human action, also has the account of a means

to the end, that is, an action which not only is done with advertence and deliberation, but which is done conformably to the end, which consequently is consonant with right reason, and fitting to man insofar as he is man, and bringing decorum: “Something is called honorable insofar as it has a certain decorum from the ordering of reason.” St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 145. a. 3. Hence moral good can be honorable good, useful good, and pleasurable good, when namely a human act is concerned with these goods according to the order of right reason, according as they can lead man to the end. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 145. a. 1. 2. 3. Cf. Commentary Tenth n. 7.

9. Coming to the matter itself, we note first that the Doctors commonly understand by morality the relation of human acts to their proper norm and rule, according to which they are ordered and directed. The diversity of opinions is situated rather in determining this norm and rule. And thus also commonly, genus being taken for species, acts are distinguished as moral and immoral, to designate right human acts and voluntary acts falling short of their proper rectitude. Moreover, omitting the discrepant opinions of others, and insisting upon the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, morality considered generically, according to its primary and fundamental concept, can be defined: the capacity which human actions have in themselves to be good or bad in order to the end of creation, that is, to be conformable or fitting, or not, to attaining this end. But specifically it is the account of conformity or deformity which human actions have in themselves in order to the end of creation, as means to the end, insofar as namely they are fitting or unfitting for leading man, or not, to his end. It is said according to its primary and fundamental concept; for proximately and formally that conformity or fittingness, deformity or unfittingness, is only from law, which is manifested through right reason. For by this very fact that law commands something to be done or omitted, it formally and proximately constitutes that thing in the account of a means in order to attaining the end, the use of such a means bringing forth obligation in conscience. Whence St. Alphonsus rightly says: “The moral goodness of a human act consists in a certain conformity and fittingness of the free act with right reason and law.” Treatise on Human Acts XXXIV. For then there is right reason, when it proposes an act ordered to the due end of man, which cannot be if the act is discordant from the aforesaid end, if it is contrary to law. But this law is the eternal law, from which every other law is derived and in which it is founded. Cf. St. Thomas, qq. 18. 19. 20.; Suarez, Tr. 3. D. 1. D. 2. S. 1. 2., D. 3. S. 2. 3., D. 7. S. 1-6., D. 10. D. 11.
10. And indeed, if morality is the relation of human acts to their proper norm and rule, according to which they are ordered and directed, this primary and fundamental norm of all human acts can be nothing other than the end of the whole of human life. For acts are essentially ordered and directed to an end, and all human acts, that they may be ordered and right, ought essentially to be directed to the common end of the whole of human life. According to the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2., throughout, all human actions ought to be directed and ordered to the end, 1. 2. q. 5. a. 7.; the end is the proper and chief object of the will, q. 8. a. 2.; from the end human and moral acts are principally specified, q. 87. a. 6. ad 2. Therefore the primary and fundamental account of morality must be taken from the end. Moreover by the morality of human acts this also is commonly understood, namely the account of the rectitude or non-rectitude of those same human acts; and since human acts are means to the end, the end is the rule and measure of that rectitude or non-rectitude. By morality, again, this also is understood,

that acts are according to reason or beyond reason; moreover reason manifests this and dictates that this must be followed in human acts, namely the end to be attained through acts congruent and conformable to it. But by moral goodness or malice this is commonly understood, that human acts are ordered or not ordered to that end; that they are according to right reason ordering proper acts to the end, or beyond this right reason. Hence the goodness of acts is insofar as they are useful for the end, q. 7. a. 2. ad 1. a. 4. ad 2.; and consequently from that end, and from the object ordered or not ordered to that end, a human act is constituted in the species of an act morally good or morally bad.

11. Since man is under God, the mind of man must be ordered under God, and all other things which are in man must be ordered under his reason. St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, l. 3. C. 229. Then certainly human acts, rightly ordered as the very nature of man requires, will be right, and the reason proposing them and directing one to them will be right. Moreover the rectitude of any thing is taken from its proper nature and proper end, which has been placed in all things by God himself, according to the proper determinate nature of each thing. Therefore a human act which in itself does not preserve this order of nature itself, just as it does not follow right reason, which proposes the aforesaid order and manifests that it must be preserved, so consequently it will naturally be an unfitting act, and will not be able to be ordered by man to God the founder of nature. On the contrary, an act which bears before itself the natural order, which right reason also shows, is intrinsically ordered to God the founder of nature, since it is fitting to nature itself, and consequently can be referred by man in his human act to God by right reason.
12. Therefore the rectitude or aberration of a human act is only from its fittingness or unfittingness with the ultimate end, which is not had intrinsically in it except from fittingness or unfittingness with rational nature itself. "There cannot," says St. Thomas, 2. D. 40. q. 1. a. 5., "be any act proceeding from someone deliberating without intention of the end. But that end is the good fitting to man either according to the soul, or according to the body, or according to exterior things." The body is ordered to the soul, exterior things to both. And therefore if the use of the body and of exterior things is not contrary to the good of the soul, and is in the middle between excess and defect, the use will be right; otherwise the use will be vicious.

St. Thomas, in the cited place. The former use, corresponding to the nature of the thing, is of itself referred to God, the creator of nature and the ultimate end; but the latter use, contrary to the natural order of things, cannot of itself be referred to God. Whence it is that the former is right and good, the latter morally aberrant and evil. Reason apprehending this order of things and proposing it as to be observed practically in its own acts is that right reason of which St. Alphonsus speaks, n. 9. Therefore the ultimate account of morality is in this relation of human actions to the ultimate end of man, or God, which in the actions themselves intrinsically flows forth from the very nature of the things about which those human actions are concerned.

13. The Angelic Doctor explicitly teaches concerning this matter: "Human actions, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4..... have the character of goodness from the end... as it were according to relation to the cause of goodness," namely to the primary and fundamental cause of goodness, since it is the first

cause. "The specific difference which is from the end is more general; and the difference which is from the object ordered of itself to such an end is specific with respect to it," q. 18. a. 7. Moreover all objects are of themselves ordered to the ultimate end. Therefore the specification of morality from the ultimate end is primary and fundamental. And *ibid.* ad 2: "It must be said that the end is last in execution, but is first in the intention of reason, according to which the species of moral acts are taken"; and consequently the species of good and the species of evil. And *ibid.* a. 5 ad 1, q. 18. a. 8: "Good, insofar as it is according to reason, and evil, insofar as it is beyond reason, diversify the species of morals." "Whence, if the object of the act includes something that agrees with the order of reason, the act will be good according to its species... But if it includes something that is repugnant to the order of reason, the act will be evil according to its species." But good is according to reason and evil beyond reason, as is said in q. 18. a. 5 in the body, insofar as it is fitting or not fitting to it. Moreover an object is fitting or not fitting to reason insofar as it corresponds or does not correspond to the end; and this is the same as to fit or not to fit the order of reason. "For since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to a due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the character of evil. But if it is ordered to a due end, it agrees with the order of reason; whence it has the character of good." For this reason the whole rectitude of reason must also be taken again from the end. "In those things which are for the end, rectitude of reason consists in conformity to the appetite for the due end; but nevertheless the very appetite for the end presupposes a right apprehension concerning the end, which is through reason," q. 19. a. 3 ad 2. "In moral matters reason is ordered to the common end of the whole of human life..... But since sin is through deviation from order to the end..... in moral matters, where the order of reason to the common end of human life is considered, sin and evil are always considered through deviation from the order of reason to the common end of human life," q. 21. a. 2 ad 2. If the deviation of a human act is to be taken from the ultimate end, from the same end the rectitude of a human act must be taken. And thus the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 5. a. 7, says: "The rectitude of the will..... is nothing else than the due order of the will to the ultimate end." Finally, "the goodness," says the Holy Doctor, "of the will depends on the intention of the end. But the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, which is God. Therefore it is required for the goodness of the human will that it be ordered to the highest good." 1. 2. q. 19. a. 9. Cf. also *ibid.* a. 10. Therefore it is sufficiently and more than sufficiently established that the morality generally of human acts, and their moral goodness and malice, according to the primary and fundamental concept, is to be placed in the relation of the same acts to the end of human life, in a relation of fittingness or unfittingness. "But the will of some man willing some particular good is not right unless he refers it to the common good as to an end, since even the natural appetite of any part is ordered to the common good of the whole. But from the end is taken, as it were, the formal reason for willing that which is ordered to the end; whence, in order that someone by a right will should will some particular good, it is necessary that that particular good be willed materially, but that the divine common good be willed formally." 1. 2. q. 19. a. 10.

14. Man, proceeding from God, ought ultimately to tend to God. Having in himself several higher and lower faculties, he himself ought so to act that the higher dominate the lower, and that reason and will not be subjected to the senses. Moreover, living in human society, he ought

peacefully to make use of association with men. But as those things which are from God are ordered, so God, creating all things for His glory, necessarily commands that order be observed and forbids it to be violated. The prescription of observing and not violating this order, or law, and the consequent obligation, proximately and formally constitutes the morality of human acts. But men, by observing this order prescribed by God, attain their end from God; by violating it, wandering far from their end, they are repelled by the same God lest they attain the end. Therefore men are bound to observe this prescribed order not only by the mere necessity of the end, but also by the necessity of obeying God commanding, in which morality and moral obligation properly consist proximately and formally. For morality properly imports conformity or deformity with the proper rule of morals, which indeed is the reason and will of God, or the eternal law of God; nor can it be any other. For since human reason and will depend on God in their being and operation, the norm directing human acts to God Himself, the ultimate end of man, ought to be the very reason and will of God, and no other. And from this there follows and clearly appears moral obligation, which consists in this, that man cannot transgress the law of God without offending God.

15. But that, from the same Angelic Doctor, that morality, and moral goodness and malice, must proximately and formally be taken from the eternal law, is thus clear from 1. 2. q. 19. a. 4, where he at the same time shows how that morality, goodness, and moral malice also proceeds from reason: "It must be said," he says, "that in all ordered causes, the effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause, because the second cause does not act except in the power of the first cause. But that human reason is the rule of the human will, from which its goodness is measured, it has from the eternal law, which is divine reason. Whence it is said in Ps. 4: Many say: Who shows us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, has been signed upon us; as though he were saying: the light of reason which is in us can show us good things and regulate our will only insofar as it is the light of Thy countenance, i.e. derived from Thy countenance. Whence it is manifest that the goodness of the human will depends much more on the eternal law than on human reason." The same is clear from a. 9: "That which is first in each genus is the measure and account of all things which are of that genus. But each thing is right and good insofar as it attains to its proper measure. Therefore, in order that the will of man be good, it is required that it be conformed to the divine will."
16. Therefore the first rule and measure of the good human will is the divine will. Indeed the human will, in order that it be right, is not bound to be conformed to the divine will in the material thing willed, or in the very thing itself that is willed, unless the will of God becomes known by precept or prohibition. For a thing willed by God under the aspect of the common good, to which God attends as universal provider, is good; yet under the aspect of a particular good, to which man ought to attend, and to which God wills that he attend, it can be evil. Whence Augustine, in *Enchir. C. 101. n. 26*, says: "Sometimes with a good will a man wills something which God does not will.... As if a good son should wish his father to live, whom God with a good will wills to die." But the will of God commanding or prohibiting obliges man to will and do what is commanded, and to be unwilling and not do what is prohibited. Therefore then the human will is bound to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed, or in the material thing willed. Now although the human will is not always bound to be

conformed in the material thing willed to the divine will, in order that it be right, nevertheless it is always bound to be conformed to the divine will in the formal thing willed, or in the reason for willing; and therefore it ought to will whatever it wills on account of the common and divine good as the ultimate end. For the formal thing willed by the divine will, or its motive and ultimate reason for willing, is the common and divine good, or the common good of the whole universe, insofar as it is ultimately ordered to God Himself and His glory: for the Lord has made all things for Himself. But by seeking the honorable good, virtually and implicitly the will seeks the divine good, since the ends of all things are finally ordered and directed to the ultimate end.

17. These are the words of the Angelic Doctor in the cited q. 19. a. 10: “The good of the whole universe is that which is apprehended by God, who is the maker and governor of the universe. Whence whatever He wills, He wills under the aspect of the common good, which is His goodness, which is the good of the whole universe... But the will of some man willing some particular good is not right unless he refer it to the common good as to an end, since even the natural appetite of any part is ordered to the common good of the whole. But from the end is taken, as it were, the formal reason for willing that which is ordered to the end. Whence, in order that someone by a right will should will some particular good, it is necessary that that particular good be willed materially, but that the divine common good be willed formally. Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed formally; for it is bound to will the divine and common good, but not materially.... For the apprehension of the creature according to its nature is of some particular good proportioned to its nature. But it happens that something is good according to a particular reason which is not good according to the universal reason, or conversely. And hence it happens that some will is good in willing something considered according to a particular reason, which nevertheless God does not will according to the universal reason, and conversely..... But what the divine thing willed is according to the common reason we can know; for we know that God, whatever He wills, wills under the aspect of good. And therefore whoever wills something under any aspect whatever of good has a will conformed to the divine will as to the reason of the thing willed. But in particular we do not know what God wills; and as to this we are not bound to conform our will to the divine will.” But the divine will can become known to us in three ways, namely by revelation, by precept, by operation. For by the very fact that God reveals, commands, or works something, it is manifest that He wills that very thing. And hence it is clear that morality proximately consists in the conformity or deformity of our will with the divine will and law, but remotely in the conformity or deformity of our actions with the ultimate end.
18. And this is also proved from the very account of the eternal law, from which morality certainly must be taken proximately. For “law imports order to the end actively, namely insofar as through it certain things are ordered to the end; but not passively, that is, as though the law itself were ordered to the end, except accidentally in a governor whose end is outside himself, to which it is also necessary that his law be ordered. But the end of divine government is God Himself; nor is His law something other than Himself; whence the eternal law is not ordered to another end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 91. a. 1 ad 3.

19. The established doctrine is confirmed from the necessity which the Angelic Doctor asserts for a positive divine law besides the eternal and natural law, 1. 2. q. 91. a. 4. Through this natural law man is directed only to the ultimate natural end. For through the natural law the eternal law is participated according to the proportion of the capacity of human nature. And therefore a divinely given law is superadded, through which the eternal law is participated in a higher mode, so that in a higher mode man may be directed to the ultimate supernatural end. For “through law man is directed to his proper acts in order to the ultimate end. And if indeed man were ordered only to an end which did not exceed the proportion of man’s natural faculty, it would not be necessary that man have something directive on the part of reason beyond the natural law and the humanly posited law which is derived from it. But because man is ordered to the end of eternal beatitude, which exceeds the proportion of the natural faculty of man, therefore it was necessary that beyond natural and human law he also be directed to his end by a divinely given law.” But as man through nature itself is ordered to God, so also man through law is ordered to God. St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, l. 3, c. 128, paragraph beginning Item.
19. Since the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the divine mind, but nevertheless becomes known to us through natural reason, hence reason itself also is the rule and norm of human acts, and indeed the proximate one, as proposing immediately to the will good or evil according to the eternal law. But this proximate rule is subjective, merely proposing the object; law is the proximate objective rule, constituting rectitude, whose foundation is the very nature of things, which is entirely independent of human reason. Human reason merely knows, applies, and proposes order; it does not constitute it. Suarez, in 1. 2. Tr. 3. D. 2. S. 2. n. 12. For indeed the end of things and the order of means to the end is not effected by human reason, but, constituted from nature itself, is apprehended and manifested by human reason; hence, since reason is man’s proper nature, which is ordered to truth, that which is repugnant to right reason is called by the Angelic Doctor contrary to nature, not because it is repugnant to reason as though reason itself were constitutive of the natural order, but because it is repugnant to reason manifesting rectitude, which right reason is the nature of man. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones de Malo*, q. 14. a. 2 ad 8: “And therefore that which is contrary to the order of reason is properly contrary to the nature of man insofar as he is man; but that which is according to reason is according to the nature of man insofar as he is man.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 71. a. 2. If reason did not propose that which is right in itself, but made it, then this rectitude of acting would depend on the judgment of reason, and nothing fixed and certain any longer would be in the moral goodness or malice of human actions. In those matters which by nature itself are not defined and ordered, human reason can indeed constitute order, which happens in positive laws; nevertheless nothing contrary to the nature of things and the eternal law of God can rightly be done against it. Therefore reason apprehends the rectitude of things and proposes that it is to be observed. And thus St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 5, says: “Certain acts are called human or moral according as they are from reason.” And q. 19. a. 1 ad 3: “It must be said that the good is represented by reason to the will as an object; and, insofar as it falls under the order of reason, it pertains to the genus of morals and causes moral goodness in the act of the will. For reason is the principle of human and moral acts.”

20. But it belongs to right reason to order all things to the due end. Moreover this ordering is one by which man is well disposed immediately in relation to the end itself, which the theological virtues provide; another by which he is well disposed mediately to the aforesaid end, namely is well disposed in relation to those things by which he is directed to that end, which the moral virtues provide. St. Thomas, *De Virtutibus in communi*, a. 12; 1. 2. q. 61. a. 2. But since right reason apprehends and proposes nothing except the order of things constituted and prescribed by God, hence “it belongs to the same reason that vice and sin are contrary to the order of human reason and that they are contrary to the eternal law of God.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 71. a. 2 ad 4.
21. What is said of the eternal law must be understood of any other law, since any law is an ordering of reason constituting the order and rectitude of human acts to the end; nor indeed are all human acts either commanded or prohibited by the eternal law itself. Whence many human acts are commanded or prohibited only by positive law; and thus they are constituted proximately and formally in the character of a necessary means to the end. And the eternal law itself commands that laws of this sort are to be obeyed. Moreover, all laws, “insofar as they participate in right reason, are so far derived from the eternal law.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 93. a. 3. For they are derived from it as from an exemplary cause, because all laws, in order that they be just, ought to be conformed to the eternal law; as from an efficient cause, because all legislative power is from God; as from a more universal law, approving and commanding that, on account of the common good, other determinate laws be made according to the diversity of persons, places, times, and other circumstances. St. Thomas, in the cited place, ad 2 and ad 3.
22. The remote and fundamental norm of morality, namely the ultimate end of man, embraces all human acts; otherwise it would no longer be the remote and fundamental rule of morality. The reason is clear, because all human acts are means to the end of the whole of human life. Nevertheless not all have the same relation to this end, as is already clear from what has been said: for some are ordered of themselves, namely by their intrinsic nature ordered to this end, whether immediately or mediately, as, for example, the knowledge and love of God, love of neighbor, justice to be observed toward others, etc.; and these acts are called intrinsically good, and because they are good, namely intimately and necessarily consonant with the order of reason, therefore they are then commanded by the natural law. Others, on the contrary, are of themselves repugnant, or by their intrinsic nature discordant with the common end of human life, whether again immediately or mediately, as, for example, blasphemy, perjury, sacrilege, theft, etc.; and these acts are called intrinsically evil, and because they are evil, namely intimately and necessarily discordant with the order of reason, therefore they are then prohibited by the natural law. Finally, there are other acts which of themselves, or by their intrinsic nature, are not necessarily connected with the aforesaid end and consequently with the order of reason, as, for example, conversing with a friend, going into the country, etc.; and these acts are called intrinsically indifferent. Therefore, by the necessity of attaining the end, these acts neither must necessarily be placed nor must necessarily be omitted; but if someone of his own accord wishes to place them, he certainly ought to exercise them in such a way, by the very necessity of attaining the end, that he not withdraw from the end, but always tend to the end, since for this reason nature itself has given man the faculty of acting freely, that

through free action he may lead himself to the end. Whence by the very fact that an act, namely an act in the concrete, is not repugnant to the end, it is already consonant with the end at least in some way and morally good. St. Thomas, 2 Dist. 40. q. 1. a. 5. And hence again it is clear what the order and rectitude of reason signify, namely it imports the proportion of the means to the end, which reason does not make, but knows and proposes to the will. And thus the Angelic Doctor calls moral good that which agrees with the order of reason, and likewise honorable good that which agrees with the rectitude of reason, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8, q. 39. a. 2.

23. Likewise the proximate and formal rule, namely law, also embraces all human acts: since it commands some and prohibits others; but those which it neither commands nor prohibits, but permits either positively or negatively, are to be performed, by that same commanding law, in such a way that they are not repugnant to the order and rectitude of reason; and thus acts of this sort are by that very fact morally good, since if in performing them the order of reason is observed, they are already fitting to reason and morally good and honorable.
24. If the fundamental rule is compared with the proximate objective and subjective rule, it is clear that in truth the end, by the very fact that it is the foundation of the morality or rectitude of the act ordered and directed to it, is not properly a rule, but is merely the end or term of that act, whose order to the aforesaid end or term ought to be measured according to some rule, which indeed is law and human reason; and if law is compared to human reason, the former is the remote rule, the latter the proximate rule. "It must be said," says St. Thomas, q. 21. a. 1, "that evil is broader than sin, just as good is broader than right. For any privation of good in anything whatever constitutes the character of evil; but sin properly consists in an act which is done for some end, when it does not have the due order to that end. But due order is measured according to some rule, which rule, indeed, in those things which act according to nature, is the very power of nature, which inclines to such an end. Therefore, when an act proceeds from natural power according to a natural inclination to the end, then rectitude is preserved in the act, because the mean does not depart from the extremes, namely the act from the order of the active principle to the end; but when some act recedes from such rectitude, then the account of sin enters in. But in those things which are done through the will, the proximate rule is human reason, while the supreme rule is the eternal law. Therefore whenever the act of man proceeds to the end according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, then the act is right; but when it is bent away from this rectitude, then it is called sin. But it is manifest that every voluntary act is evil by this, that it recedes from the order of reason and of the eternal law. Whence it follows that a human act, from the fact that it is good or evil, has the character either of rectitude or of sin.... It must be said that the end is twofold, namely ultimate and proximate. But in a sin of nature an act indeed falls short of the ultimate end, which is the perfection of the generated thing; but it does not fall short of every proximate end, for nature works by forming something. Similarly, in a sin of the will there is always a defect from the ultimate intended end, because no evil act of the will is orderable to beatitude, which is the ultimate end, although it does not fall short of some proximate end which the will intends and attains. Whence, even when the very intention of this end is ordered to the ultimate end, in the very intention of an end of this sort the account of rectitude and sin can be found."

25. From the nature of morality explained, it is easily deduced that it is altogether honorable to act for the sake of an end, in hope of remuneration or from fear of punishments; since every human action, in order that it be morally good, ought to tend to man's ultimate end and lead man to it. Reward and punishment, which are proposed by God Himself the Lawgiver, so that He may move men to obey His law and thus attain eternal happiness, are most apt means for attaining the end; and therefore it is not against the right order of reason, but, on the contrary, it is according to right reason to act from the motive of the aforesaid hope or from fear of the aforesaid punishments. For he who acts from the aforesaid motive wills nothing except the true good of man and flees evil, since eternal happiness is the greatest good of man, and eternal damnation is the greatest evil. — Nor indeed would there be disorder in such an operation from the fact that then man would order God to himself. For when the good for the sake of acquiring which man acts is some particular good, entirely secondary and wholly accidental to himself, then certainly the end for the sake of which, or for the sake of attaining which, the will acts is secondary; and the end for whom, or the subject and person for whom that good is loved and sought, takes on the more principal character of end, because his perfection simply is intended more. But when that good for the sake of acquiring which man acts, or which he loves for himself, is the greatest and highest good with respect to him for whom it is loved, as God is with respect to man, then that good is also principal in the account of end, because it is simply the ultimate end and cannot rightly be ordered to another as to an end. Therefore, when man loves this good for himself, he does not order it to himself as to an end, but rather loves to be joined to that good as to his good and ultimate end; and therefore he does not order God to himself, but rather himself to God as to the ultimate end, namely he orders himself to God not as a means, but as a subject which can attain an end of this sort.
26. From the declared nature of morality, and its origin or source, it further follows that not every human act takes its rectitude or perversity from positive law. For antecedently to every law certain acts are naturally right, others naturally perverse. "This," says St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, l. 3, c. 129, "the natural order requires, that lower things be subject to higher things. Therefore those things which are commanded by divine law are in themselves naturally right." And altogether from this reason it is that man by natural reason itself breaks forth into natural moral principles of his own operations. These principles indeed concern those things which are naturally fitting to man and right in themselves, and not only because they have been constituted by law. St. Thomas, in the cited place. This natural rectitude is from the very nature of man, and therefore is most truly natural. "Of whatever things," says St. Thomas in the cited place, "there is a determinate nature, there must be determinate operations which agree with that nature; for the proper operation of each thing follows its own nature. But it is clear that man's nature is determinate. Therefore there must be some operations fitting to man in themselves." Hence it is easy to determine many things which naturally fit man, both in order to himself, and in order to exterior things, and in order to other men, and in order to God, which are right in themselves. St. Thomas continues in the cited place: "According to the natural order the body of man is for the sake of the soul, and the lower powers of the soul are for the sake of reason, just as also in other things matter is for the sake of form, and instruments for the sake of the principal agent. But from that which is ordered to another, help ought to come to it, not some impediment. Therefore it is naturally right that the body and

lower powers of the soul be so cared for by man that from this the act of reason and the good of reason itself be least impeded, and rather helped. But if it should happen otherwise, it will be naturally a sin. Therefore drunkennesses and feasting, and the disordered use of venereal things, through which the act of reason is impeded and is subjected to passions, which do not permit the free judgment of reason to exist, are naturally evil.... Moreover man naturally has this, that he uses lower things for the necessity of his life. But there is some determinate measure according to which the use of the aforesaid things is fitting to human life; and if this measure is passed over, it becomes harmful to man, as appears in the disordered taking of foods. Therefore some human acts are naturally fitting, and some naturally unfitting.... But it is natural to man that he be social. This is shown from the fact that one man alone does not suffice for all things which are necessary for human life. Therefore those things without which human society cannot be preserved are naturally fitting to man. Of this sort are preserving for each one what is his own and abstaining from injuries. Therefore there are some things in human acts naturally right.... Finally, those things by which each one tends to his own natural end naturally fit him; but those which stand contrariwise are naturally unfitting. Man is naturally ordered to God as to an end. Therefore those things by which man is led into the knowledge and love of God are naturally right; but those which are contrary are naturally evil for man. Therefore it is clear that good and evil in human acts are not only according to the positing of law, but according to the natural order. Hence it is that in Ps. 18:10 it is said that the judgments of God are true and justified in themselves. But by this is excluded the position of those saying that just and right things are according to law posited”; namely, in human acts there are some things right according to nature, and not only as if posited by law, as is had in the title of the chapter.

27. Whether morality, or moral goodness or malice, is found only in the interior act of the will, or also in the exterior act? — In an exterior act, a twofold moral goodness or malice can be distinguished. For first, the objective moral goodness or malice of the exterior act can be considered, which that act has of itself, namely from its proper object and from the circumstances by which it is objectively affected, according to the right order of reason. Goodness or malice of this sort, which the exterior act has according to itself because of due or undue matter and due or undue circumstances, is derived from reason, according as that object and those circumstances exhibit the rectitude of reason or deviation from the right order of reason. This objective goodness or malice of the exterior act is prior to the goodness or malice of the act of the will. And thus the exterior act is the object of the will, insofar as it is proposed to the will by reason as a certain good apprehended and ordered by reason, or as departing from this order; and it causes moral goodness or malice in the will. Secondly, moral goodness or malice can be considered in the exterior act in order to the end, according as this exterior act is subject to the interior act of the will. For the end is the proper object of the will. And thus the character of good or evil which the exterior act has from order to the end is found prior in the act of the will, and from it is derived to the exterior act. Likewise, in so far as the exterior act consists in the execution of the work, it is an effect of the will and follows the will. The will then is compared to the exterior act as an efficient cause; whence the moral goodness or malice of the act of the will is the form of the exterior act as existing in the acting cause. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 1. Therefore “the goodness of the end from the will redounds into the

exterior act, and the goodness of the matter and circumstances redounds into the act of the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 3.

28. Therefore the moral goodness or malice of the exterior act can be considered in the order of intention, as merely willed, as an object, and in the order of execution, insofar as the aforesaid act is commanded by the will, as execution or effect. In the first way, the goodness or malice of the exterior act gives moral goodness or malice to the interior act of the will, as the object specifying it. Therefore the goodness and malice which is in that act objectively is transferred into the act formally, so that the object has nothing objectively which is not in the act formally. Therefore the exterior act as object does not have any goodness or malice distinct from the goodness or malice of the interior act, since it is the same in both, with this difference, that it is objectively in the exterior act as in the object and motive of the will, and formally in the interior act as in the subject. In the second way, the exterior act has its moral goodness or malice from the act of the will, from which it has that it is voluntary and human. The exterior act, precisely as the execution or effect of the interior act, has no intrinsic moral goodness or malice, but is good or evil extrinsically, only denominatively from the goodness or malice of the interior act. “As from the healthy which is in the animal, healthy is derived to medicine and urine....; in this way from the goodness of the will is derived the goodness of the exterior act.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 3 ad 3. The reason is manifest, because formal morality is placed in a foreknown and freely willed conformity with the end and law, or with the rule of morals; and this free volition of the will is only in the interior act of the will itself.
29. Now the exterior act and the interior act of the will, as they are considered in the genus of morals, are one human act, St. Thomas, q. 20. a. 3. If the human act is thus considered adequately, the formal moral goodness or malice of the human act is intrinsically only in the interior act of the will, but in exterior acts only by a merely extrinsic denomination. For the morality of a human act, considered formally, is not found except in a free act, and freedom formally is only in the will. Likewise formal moral goodness is from order to the end. “But since the end is the proper object of the will, it is manifest that this character of good or evil which the exterior act has from order to the end is found first in the act of the will, and from it is derived into the exterior act.” St. Thomas, q. 20. a. 1. Whence it is clear that in the exterior act moral goodness of this sort, which is according to order to the end, depends entirely on the will. St. Thomas, *ibid.* a. 2. But that “goodness of the exterior act which it has from matter and circumstances is other than the goodness which is from the end; yet it is not other than the goodness of the will which it has from the very act willed, but is compared to it as its reason and cause.” St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 4 ad 2. It is confirmed: “For however much the exterior act may seem good of itself and conformable to reason, if nevertheless it is commanded by an evil internal act, or by a depraved intention and choice, it is not good insofar as it is a human act. Therefore it is a sign that in the account of a human act it is good only by denomination from the interior act. The argument is similar because the exterior act, taken precisely and in itself, does not add formal moral goodness to man, nor does it make him more virtuous; for if we understand someone, thinking that he can perform an exterior act of virtue, to have an efficacious will of exercising such an act, he is right and virtuous, whether he can truly perform it or cannot, because virtue does not depend on a faculty, which can be lacking to

us against our will, but on the will, supposing that the will is equal... This doctrine concerning external acts proceeds in the same way in acts of the intellect and of the sensitive appetite.” Suarez, D. 10, S. 1; Becanus, Tr. 1, c. 6.

30. Hence another question arises: whether the external act in some way adds morality to the internal act. — “First it must be said that the exterior act of itself does not bring an increase of goodness or malice, other things being equal, in the interior act: thus St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 4..... because the exterior act does not have goodness distinct from the interior act, and necessarily follows from it, if it is in our power; but if it is not in our power, it does not lessen the goodness of the will.... Secondly, it must be said that external action is sometimes necessary for the goodness of the will, or for such goodness; this also is what St. Thomas intends in that a. 4. For when it is in man’s power to execute an external action, he cannot have a perfect interior will unless he execute the exterior action, because the exterior act is the term and end of the interior act, and because an absolutely perfect will is one that works when it can.... Thirdly, it must be said that accidentally the exterior act can increase goodness or malice simply. Thus St. Thomas in the place cited above, and it is easily clear. For 1. on account of the exterior act a man often lasts and perseveres more in the interior act, indeed often also multiplies interior acts; and in this way it is morally worse to kill. 2. Because the exterior action itself both kindles the affection and thus contributes to the interior act, in which way vocal prayer is accustomed to contribute to interior devotion. 3. External actions are useful for moderating the passions and habituating the body, so that it may more easily serve justice.... It must also be added that good external acts are useful for the affection of satisfaction for the temporal punishment due for sin, because satisfaction is not taken only from goodness, but chiefly from the penalty of the act; but the exterior act of itself brings its proper punishment and pain. Finally it must be added that exterior acts are necessary for certain effects of grace, which are conferred either ex opere operato or from special privilege, such as are the effects of the sacraments and the effects of martyrdom, and any others that are similar; because, since these effects do not depend on the mind alone of the one acting, they have been promised to one exercising such a work not only in affection but also in effect. And in the same way, conversely, evil external acts, or even their effects, are necessary for incurring certain punishments or censures which are not incurred through the interior act alone.” Suarez, D. 10, S. 2; Becanus, in the cited place. Hence the exterior act does not add goodness or malice to the interior act, but, as it were, extends and consummates it, or rather shows the perfection of the interior act. The matter concerns, as is clear, an interior act efficacious of itself. For if the interior act is inefficacious of itself, as, for example, to will to perform all possible good or all possible evil, one does not contract the same goodness or malice as if he were to carry out every possible good or evil. Cf. Commentary 4, nn. 7, 8.
31. The same St. Thomas says these things in the cited q. 20. a. 4: “It must be said that if we speak of the goodness of the exterior act which it has from the goodness of the end, then the exterior act adds nothing to goodness, unless it happen that the will itself according to itself becomes better in good things, or worse in evil things. And this indeed seems able to happen in three ways: in one way according to number, as when someone wills to do something with a good end or an evil one, and then indeed does not do it, but afterward wills and does it; the act of

the will is doubled, and thus there is made a double good or a double evil. In another way as to extension: as when someone wills to do something with a good end or an evil one, and desists because of some impediment; but another continues the movement of the will until he completes the work. It is manifest that a will of this sort is more lasting in good or evil, and according to this it is worse or better. Thirdly, according to intensity; for there are certain exterior acts which, insofar as they are pleasurable or painful, are apt to intensify or lessen the will. But it is clear that the more intensely the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is. But if we speak of the goodness of the exterior act which it has according to matter and due circumstances, thus it is compared to the will as term and end, and in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will, because every inclination or movement is perfected in this, that it obtains the end or attains the term. Whence the will is not perfect unless it is such that it acts when there is opportunity. But if possibility is lacking, while the will exists as perfect, so that it would act if it could, the defect of perfection which is from the exterior act is simply involuntary. But the involuntary, just as it does not merit punishment or reward in doing good or evil, so also does not take away anything from reward or from punishment if a man involuntarily simply fails in doing good or evil." Here the question concerns the goodness and malice of acts with respect to essential reward or punishment, for the exterior act adds to accidental reward, as the same Angelic Doctor says, 2 Dist. 40. a. 3. Cf. 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5 ad 1.

32. And in the same q. 20. a. 5, the Angelic Doctor, speaking of a following event, "whether an event of this sort adds something of goodness or malice to the exterior act," responds: "It must be said that the following event is either forethought (namely foreseen and intended, either directly or indirectly, q. 73. a. 8 ad 1), or it is not. If it is forethought, it is manifest that it adds to goodness or malice. For when someone, thinking that many evils can follow from his work, nevertheless does not on this account leave it off, from this his will appears more disordered. But if the following event is not forethought, then a distinction must be made, because if it follows of itself from such an act, and as in most cases, according to this the following event adds to the goodness or malice of the act. For it is manifest that an act is better from its genus from which more goods can follow; and worse, from which more evils are apt to follow. But if it follows accidentally and as in fewer cases, then the following event does not add to the goodness or malice of the act. For judgment is not given concerning a thing according to that which is accidental, but only according to that which is of itself." An effect following accidentally does not add goodness and malice to the interior act unless it is intended, or unless it is at least in some way foreseen and one can and ought to prevent it. An effect alone following of itself, even if it is not intended or foreseen, adds goodness and malice to the interior act, or rather is a sign of its perfection, because what follows an act of itself is virtually and implicitly willed.
33. The question is also raised: whether the same exterior act can be good and evil? — "It must be said that nothing prevents something from being one according as it is in one genus, and being multiple according as it is referred to another genus... And according to this nothing prevents some act from being one according as it is referred to the genus of nature, which is not one according as it is referred to the genus of morals... For continuous walking is one act according to the genus of nature, yet it can happen that there are several according to the genus of

morals, if the will of the one walking is changed, which is the principle of moral acts. Therefore if one act is taken as it is in the genus of morals, it is impossible that it be good and evil by moral goodness and malice; and nevertheless, if it is one by unity of nature and not by unity of morals, it can be good and evil.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 6.

34. But concerning the passions in particular it is asked: “Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul? — It must be said that the passions of the soul can be considered in two ways: in one way, according to themselves; in another way, according as they are subject to the command of reason and will. Therefore, if they are considered according to themselves, namely insofar as they are certain movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is not in them moral good or evil, which depends on reason, as was said above, q. 19. a. 3. But if they are considered according as they are subject to the command of reason and will, thus there is in them moral good or evil. For the sensitive appetite is nearer to reason itself and to the will than are the exterior members, whose movements and acts nevertheless are morally good or evil according as they are voluntary. Whence much more the passions themselves, according as they are voluntary, can be called morally good or evil. But they are called voluntary either from the fact that they are commanded by the will, or from the fact that they are not prohibited by the will,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 24. a. 1, namely when they can and ought to be prohibited. Therefore it is not necessary that the passions always decline from the order of natural reason. Insofar as they are beyond the order of reason, they incline to sin; insofar as they are ordered by reason, they pertain to virtue, St. Thomas, *ibid.* a. 2. Hence the same Angelic Doctor says in article 3: “If by passions we simply name all movements of the sensitive appetite (and not only disordered movements), thus it pertains to the perfection of the human good that even the passions themselves be moderated by reason. For since man’s good consists in reason as in a root, that good will be more perfect the more it can be derived to the many things which fit man. Whence no one doubts that it pertains to the perfection of moral good that the acts of the exterior members be directed by the rule of reason. Whence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as was said above, q. 17. a. 7, it pertains to the perfection of the moral or human good that even the passions themselves of the soul be regulated by reason. Therefore, just as it is better that man both will the good and do it by an exterior act, so also it pertains to the perfection of moral good that man be moved to good not only according to the will, but also according to the sensitive appetite, according to what is said in Ps. 83:8, My heart and my flesh have exulted in the living God, so that we take heart for the intellective appetite, but flesh for the sensitive appetite.” Therefore, just as exterior acts, so the passions can be considered in two ways: in one way according as they are in the genus of nature, and thus moral good or evil does not pertain to the species of the act or passion; in another way according as they are referred to the genus of morals, namely insofar as they participate something of the voluntary and of the judgment of reason, and in this way moral good and evil pertains to the species of the act or passion. Now, just as it has been said concerning exterior acts that they are good or evil according to themselves from the object, and that they are good or evil from the end, so it must be said concerning the passions. And as exterior acts are good or evil or indifferent from the object, because they bear before themselves something consonant with reason or discordant from it, or holding itself neutrally, as to pray to God and to help the poor man, theft and adultery, to walk and to speak: so in like manner some

passions are consonant with reason, and some discordant, and some neutral, as mercy and shame, which is fear of a base thing; envy, which is sadness over another's good; anger, which can be an appetite for ordered or disordered vengeance. Likewise, as exterior acts are morally good or evil from the end of the will, so also are the passions, as when someone from the judgment of reason chooses to be affected by some passion, so that, with the sensitive appetite cooperating, he may operate more promptly well or badly. And thus passion adds to the moral goodness or malice of the act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 24. a. 4; a. 3 ad 1. — Cf. the little work *De Essentia boni malique moralis* of Augustus Ferretti, who wrote excellently concerning the essence of morality against modern errors.

Commentary X: On the Moral Goodness and Malice of Human Acts

1. Human or moral acts, as has already been said in the preceding Commentary, are divided into two species; for some are morally good, others morally evil. For differences which are such of themselves diversify the species. Good and evil, as being that which is according to nature or contrary to nature, namely according to the fittingness or requirement of nature, or contrary to this fittingness and requirement, are differences of themselves, and consequently constitute diverse species. For the good for each thing is what agrees with it according to its form, and evil is what is beyond the order of its form. Whence evil is commonly defined as the privation of due form. Therefore, just as in natural things good and evil, which are according to nature and contrary to nature, diversify the species of nature, for a dead body and a living body are not of the same species, similarly in morals, good insofar as it is according to reason, and evil insofar as it is contrary to reason, diversify the moral species, since acts are called moral insofar as they are from reason: reason is the principle of moral acts. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 5; q. 19. a. 1 ad 3. — It is confirmed: “good and evil are differences of the act of the will of themselves. For good and evil pertain of themselves to the will, just as true and false pertain to reason, whose acts are distinguished of themselves as true and false, as when we say that an opinion is true or false. Whence a good will and an evil will are acts differing according to species.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 1. Indeed the difference of species in acts is according to objects. For every act has its species from its object; whence it is necessary that some difference of the object make diversity of species in acts. But this is that which through itself and not accidentally, with respect to the faculty whence the act proceeds, because nothing that is accidental constitutes a species, but only what is of itself. And thus knowledge of sound and of color, with respect to the intellect, do not differ of themselves, and consequently the acts are not diverse in species; but they differ of themselves with respect to sense, and consequently by comparison to sense the acts are diverse in species. But the differences of good and evil are differences of themselves by comparison to the will; for good, which is the proper object of the will, is what is fitting to the rational will, and evil is what is unfitting to the rational will, namely what fits the will according to reason or is unfitting to it according to reason. “The good of man is to be according to reason, but evil is what is beyond reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 5; q. 19. a. 1.
2. Here the question is raised whether there are indifferent human acts, i.e. acts which are neither morally good nor morally evil, neither honorable nor base. — If human acts are considered in the abstract, or according to their species, which they intrinsically have from their proper object, with precision made from the end and from determining circumstances, then indeed there are indifferent acts, namely those which from their species are neither evil nor good, just as man according to himself, or according to his species, is neither virtuous nor vicious. And the reason is that every object has some goodness or malice, at least natural; nevertheless it does not always import moral goodness or malice, which is considered by comparison to reason, namely to the order of reason. For not every object of a human act includes something pertaining to this order of reason: indeed not all actions are of themselves necessarily connected with the ultimate end, nor are all commanded by law or prohibited by

law, but many are merely permitted, such as to walk, to go into the field, to lift a straw from the ground, and things of this sort. Therefore such acts according to their species are indifferent. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8. — But if human acts are considered in the individual, or concretely, namely according as they are determined both by particular circumstances and by the end, the Scotists affirm that there are indifferent acts in the individual. The reason is that no certain law commands that they be directed to the ultimate end of human life, namely God, nor that one always act from a higher motive of honorableness and virtue; but, human frailty and infirmity being considered, God Himself permits man to act from this very infirmity and frailty on account of the necessity and advantage of nature itself, as, for example, sometimes to eat more abundantly, to hold banquets, to be refreshed by the sight of the sky, a field, etc. Therefore these and other similar actions can be exercised from a merely indifferent end. The Thomists, on the contrary, deny that indifferent acts are given in the individual, and more truly. And this indeed is the opinion of the Angelic Doctor. The reason is that either someone does a thing necessary, useful, fitting to rational nature, namely to soul, to body, to exterior things themselves, which are ordered to both; or he does something wholly useless and idle. If the first, this action tends to an end naturally good, and it is good. If the second, he does a thing unfitting to rational nature, as being at least superfluous; for reason dictates that beings are not to be multiplied without necessity, or utility, or some fittingness. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 9, paragraph *Sed contra*; 2 D. 40. q. 1. a. 5. Moreover, since this is proper to reason, to direct and order human acts which are done from deliberation to a due end, either a human act is in reality ordered to the due end, and has the character of good, or it is not ordered to the due end, and then by this very fact it is repugnant to right reason and has the character of evil. St. Thomas, q. 18. a. 9; Suarez, D. 9, S. 3. And from the reason adduced it is luminously clear that those indifferent acts of the Scotists are not truly such, but are morally honorable; for if they are done on account of necessity, utility, or fittingness, they are according to the order of reason and consequently morally honorable. Nor indeed is it necessary to intend another extrinsic honorable end, besides the end intrinsic to acts of this sort, in order that one act honorably. For indeed sometimes to eat more abundantly, to hold banquets, and to be refreshed in mind and body are acts according to reason, if these are contained within due limits. Therefore these acts are truly done from a motive of honorableness and virtue, although they are done from natural frailty, necessity, utility, or fittingness, since honorableness and virtue consist in this, that the rectitude of reason be observed. Moreover they are also ordered to God, at least implicitly, although not explicitly, as we shall soon explain more, since, by the very fact that they are according to reason and good, they are referred by their nature to God. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 9 ad 3; q. 39. a. 2; 2. 2. q. 23. a. 3; q. 141. a. 6 ad 2; q. 145. a. 1, 2, 3; q. 168. a. 3 ad 3; S. q. 49. a. 2 ad 6; q. 169. a. 1 ad 1; 2 D. 39. q. 3. a. 3 ad 6; D. 40. q. 1. a. 5; 4 D. 16. q. 2. a. 2 q. 1; C. G. l. 2, c. 29; de Caritate q. un. a. 7 ad 13 and ad 14; Suarez, D. 4, S. 1, n. 12.

3. Another question arises here: whether, for the moral goodness of human acts, it is necessary to direct all actions to the glory of God? — The more common and truer opinion affirms it. The reason is most clearly evident from what has been said: since every moral action, in order that it be good, must tend to the ultimate end, and be ordered to it by reason. But if a human action tends to and is ordered to the ultimate end, it is already directed to the glory of God. Therefore

it is as necessary to direct all actions to the glory of God as it is necessary that they be morally good. “The goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end; but the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, which is God. Therefore it is required for the goodness of the human will that it be ordered to the highest good.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 9. “The whole that man is, and that he can do and has, must be ordered to God,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 22. a. 4 ad 3. Hence it is enough to direct them to God virtually on the part of the work, or in the very act exercised, namely by acting on account of the end of some virtue, or an honorable end, and one consonant with rational nature; for such an act from its intrinsic nature tends to the glory of God. To the point is St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3 ad 2: “Whenever someone wills those things which are for the end, he wills the end by the same act; but not conversely.” And q. 21. a. 4: “He who does an evil act not referable to God does not preserve the honor of God, which is owed to the ultimate end.” Cajetan, on the same q. 8. a. 3, says: “one always seeking what is for the end seeks the end, not habitually, but actually, as actually extends itself also to virtually. For it is virtually, as using something within the breadth of actual use; otherwise that precept would never be fulfilled: Do all things for the glory of God; for to do imports actually to operate.” Much more, besides, is it enough to direct all actions to God virtually on the part of the one operating himself, who by an act of charity has ordered his whole life to God and remains in habitual charity. These are the words of Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3: “Between the movement of the will toward something habitually and actually, there is the movement of the will toward it virtually.... For when one having charity sins venially, he indeed habitually loves God, but not actually, as is clear, nor virtually, because sin is not directable to God. But when one having charity walks or preaches, and whatever else he does without doing evil, although he does not actually think of God, nevertheless that act is not only of such a virtue, but of charity, and the will then is borne virtually to God, and not only habitually, which belongs to one sleeping and to one sinning venially.”

4. From all things which have thus far been said, the distinction is clear between a good and evil human act, a right and sinful one, a laudable and culpable one. — A human act, from the fact that it has the form fitting to it, or on the contrary lacks the form fitting to it, namely from the fact that it is according to the order of reason or beyond this order, is good or evil. For a human act is so called according as it is from reason directing and ordering. “In (human) acts good and evil are said by comparison to reason; because, as Dionysius says, the good of man is to be according to reason, but evil is what is beyond reason. For the good for each thing is what agrees with it according to its form, and evil is what is beyond the order of its form. Therefore it is clear that the difference of good and evil considered about the object is compared of itself to reason, namely according as the object is fitting or not fitting to it. But certain acts are called human or moral according as they are from reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 5.
5. Moreover an order of reason of this sort is the order of the eternal law, and the order of human acts to the end. And thus a human act, good or evil, has the character of rectitude and of sin according to this order to the law and to the end. “Therefore whenever the act of man proceeds to the end according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, then the act is right; but when it is bent away from this rectitude, then it is called sin. But it is manifest from the premises, q. 19. a. 3 and 4, that every voluntary act is evil by this, that it recedes from the

order of reason and of the eternal law, and every good act accords with reason and the eternal law. Whence it follows that a human act, from the fact that it is good or evil, has the character of rectitude or of sin." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 21. a. 1. Therefore evil is more common than sin, good more common than right.

6. A good or evil human act, according as it proceeds freely from the will, has the character of laudable or culpable. For a laudable or culpable act is an act imputable to the agent for praise or blame; and this cannot be unless the agent is the author of that act, or the cause determining it in its being. Whence it is clear that if sin is taken for any defect whatsoever of an act, or for the deviation of an act from the end, sin is more common than fault. But if sin is not taken in a merely objective sense, but subjectively and morally, sin is the same as fault, and so it is commonly taken by theologians. Hence St. Thomas says: "It must be said that just as evil is broader than sin, so sin is broader than fault. For from this an act is called culpable or laudable, that it is imputed to the agent; for to be praised or blamed is nothing other than for the malice or goodness of one's act to be imputed to someone. But then an act is imputed to the agent when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over his act. But this is in all voluntary acts, because through the will man has dominion over his act, as is clear from what was said above, q. 1. a. 1 and 2. Whence it remains that good or evil only in voluntary acts constitutes the character of praise or blame, in which evil, sin, and fault are the same." 1. 2. q. 21. a. 2.
7. From all things said thus far it is also clear that the moral good is the same in reality as the honorable. For the moral good is what is according to the order of reason; and the honorable is said to be what fits man insofar as he is man, and what is sought for its own sake by a rational appetite. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 145. a. 3 ad 1. Nevertheless they differ in reason. For something is called honorable insofar as it has a certain comeliness from fittingness with rational nature and from the ordering of reason. St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 3. For honorableness is said as though "a state of honor." Whence from this something is called honorable, because it is worthy of honor. Honor is owed to excellence. But the excellence of man according to virtue is a certain disposition of someone holding himself fittingly according to the mode of his nature, or a disposition of the perfect toward the best. St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 1, and 1. 2. q. 71. a. 1. Moreover both clarity and due proportion concur in the account of comeliness or beauty. Whence the beauty of the body consists in this, that man has the members of the body well proportioned, with a certain due clarity of color. And similarly spiritual beauty consists in this, that the conduct of a man, or his action, is well proportioned according to the spiritual clarity of reason. And this renders man worthy of honor. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 145. a. 2. But glory is the effect of honor. For from this, that someone is honored or praised, he is rendered clear in the eyes of others. And therefore, just as the honorable and the glorious are the same, so also the honorable and the comely are the same. St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 2 ad 2.
8. As the moral good is the same in reality as the honorable, although distinguished in reason, so the moral good and the honorable are the same in reality as the pleasurable and the useful, although they are distinguished in reason. For that which is morally good and honorable, or ordered according to reason, is naturally fitting to man. But each thing is naturally delighted in

what is fitting to itself. And therefore the honorable is naturally pleasurable to man. Nevertheless not every pleasurable thing is honorable, because something can also be fitting according to sense, and not according to reason. But this pleasurable thing is beyond man's reason, which perfects his nature. Moreover even virtue itself, which according to itself is honorable, is referred to something else as to an end, namely to happiness. "And according to this the honorable and the useful and the pleasurable are the same in subject. But they differ in reason; for something is called honorable according as it has a certain excellence, worthy of honor because of spiritual beauty; pleasurable insofar as it quiets the appetite; and useful insofar as it is referred to another. Nevertheless the pleasurable is broader than the useful and the honorable, because every useful and honorable thing is in some way pleasurable, but not conversely." St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 3. But nothing "can be simply and truly useful which is repugnant to honorableness, because it must be repugnant to man's ultimate end, which is good according to reason, although perhaps it can be useful in a certain respect, with respect to some particular end." St. Thomas, in the cited place, ad 3. Whence it is clear that, as not every pleasurable thing reaches the account of the honorable, so also not every useful thing reaches the account of the honorable, but only that which is pleasurable and useful according to reason.

9. Therefore the moral good is always an honorable good. For moral good is good according to reason, and honorable good is nothing other than good fitting to rational nature, and therefore according to reason. But the moral good is not always a useful good and a pleasurable good, but only when they observe the right norm of reason.

Commentary XI: On the Object of Human Acts

1. As has already been said, the morality of human acts, and their moral goodness or malice, is from relation to the ultimate end and law of human life, from fittingness or unfittingness with the same end and law. Moreover this relation, this fittingness or unfittingness, can arise intrinsically in a human act from a threefold head, namely from the object of the same act, from the end, and from the circumstances. Hence it is commonly accustomed to be said that the object, the end, and the circumstances are the three sources of morality in a human act, and that a human act takes its moral goodness or malice from this threefold head, namely its particular, specific, and individual goodness or malice; for not all good acts are in the same species, nor likewise all evil acts in the same species. But the object, the circumstances, and the end can have order, and a diverse order, to the ultimate end and law of man. And morality consists in this order of human acts to the ultimate end and law.
2. By the object of a human act is not here understood whatever is presented to the will; for thus both the end and the circumstances would also be its object. Rather, the object is understood as that thing which someone immediately or directly and of itself wills. — The object is not considered here physically, namely as it is some existing thing. Concerning the same object physically considered, moral acts diverse in species can be concerned. Concerning the same wife, for example, there can be an honorable conjugal act and a base act of adultery. The object is considered here morally, namely as it falls under the rule of morals, or law, commanding, prohibiting, permitting. And thus the object of theft is not another's thing precisely as it is a thing, but insofar as right reason forbids that it be taken away against the owner's will. Hence the Angelic Doctor says, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8: "A human act, which is called moral, has its species from the object in relation to the principle of human acts, which is reason." And *ibid.* a. 2 ad 1, he says, "it must be said that although exterior things are good in themselves, nevertheless they do not always have due proportion to this or that action." And *ibid.* a. 5 ad 3: "The conjugal act and adultery, according as they are compared to reason, differ in species and have effects differing in species, because one of them merits praise and reward, the other blame and punishment. But according as they are compared to the generative power, they do not differ in species. And thus they have one effect according to species." And q. 19. a. 2 ad 3: "It must be said that the good is represented by reason to the will as object, and insofar as it falls under the order of reason it pertains to the genus of morals, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will." Cf. q. 18. a. 5; S. q. 41. a. 3 ad 5.
3. Human acts take their first and essential moral goodness or malice from the object. — The reason is that acts are intrinsically specified from the object. Therefore, as they have species from the object, so they also have goodness and malice. "The good and evil of an action," says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2, "just as also of other things, is considered from the fullness of being, or from its defect. But the first thing which seems to pertain to the fullness of being is that which gives species to the thing. But just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has species from its object, just as motion also from its term. And therefore, just as the first goodness of a natural thing is considered from its form, which gives species to it, so

also the first goodness of a moral act is considered from a fitting object. Whence it is also called by some good from its genus, for example to use one's own thing. And just as in natural things the first evil is if a generated thing does not obtain its specific form, for example if a man is not generated, but something in place of a man, so the first evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, as to take another's things. And it is called evil from its genus, genus being taken for species, in that manner of speaking by which we call the human genus the whole human species." And q. 18. a. 5: "Every act has species from its object." And q. 19. a. 1: "But the difference of species in acts is according to objects." Likewise *ibid.* a. 2: "The goodness of the will depends on that one thing alone which of itself makes goodness in an act, namely on the object, and not on the circumstances, which are certain accidents of the act." For the first source of morality in a human act is its object. From the object, as from a formal principle, the human act has its being, and the first thing that occurs in each thing is its being.

4. Nor indeed is it valid to object that the first and essential moral goodness is to be taken from the end, which is the first foundation of all morality, and because every willed object is willed for the sake of the end, and consequently the end is willed before the object. For the human act indeed regards first the end, but the end of the work, which is the intrinsic end and coincides with the object itself, which consequently is ordered by that intrinsic end to the ultimate end, and orders the human act first and essentially to that same ultimate end.
5. In order that an act be morally evil, it suffices that the malice be indirectly, virtually, or implicitly willed in another thing to which it is annexed. The reason is that malice cannot be intended otherwise. No one operates intending evil; but someone does not seek evil except by reason of some good which he apprehends in it. Therefore it suffices that someone seek in a thing the pleasurable to which he knows malice to be annexed.
6. But in order that an act be morally good, it is required that goodness be formally and directly willed in itself, at least in the act exercised. The reason is that honorableness is appetible in itself. Therefore right reason dictates that it is to be sought in itself. But it is not necessary that someone intend honorableness in a signate act, but it suffices that someone intend that which he sees to be honorable. And thus it is not necessary that one giving alms intend its honorableness, but it suffices that he wish to relieve the misery of his neighbor. "Evil occurs," says St. Thomas, q. 19. a. 7 ad 3, "from singular defects, but good from a whole and complete cause. Whence whether the will is of that which is evil according to itself and under the aspect of good, or is of good under the aspect of evil, it is always evil. But in order that the will be good, it is required that it be of good under the aspect of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good."
7. Whether an act is good if the object is good, but the end evil? — R. In the negative. For he who acts for an evil end, although he wills the good, nevertheless wills it under the aspect of evil, and therefore as it is willed by him it is evil. The honorableness of the means is then in no way truly sought, but only the means of attaining a depraved end is sought. "When someone wills to give alms on account of vain glory, this is one act of the will, and this whole act is evil, although it does not have malice from everything that is in it." St. Thomas, 2 D. 38. q. 1. a. 4 ad 4; 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. And St. Alphonsus says: "If the object is good, but the end of the one

operating is evil, the human act is wholly evil from the malice of the end, which destroys every goodness.” Tr. de Act. hum. n. XXXVIII; Suarez, D. 6, S. 1, 2; D. 8, S. 1, n. XIII.

8. Whether an act is good if the object is evil, but the end good? — R. In the negative. And indeed the Apostle condemns those saying: “Let us do evils that good things may come.” Rom. 3:8. But the reason is that the intention of a good end, as extrinsic to the willed object itself, if this is evil, does not prevent someone from in reality willing evil. Suarez, D. 4; D. 8, S. 1, n. XX ff.

Commentary XII: On the End of Human Acts

1. By end here is properly understood that which the agent further intends through such and such an act, as the reason on account of which he operates. This is that end which is called the end of the one operating. "It must be said," says St. Thomas, 2 Dist. 36. q. un. a. 5 ad 5, "that some act has a twofold end, namely the proximate end, which is its object, and the remote end, which the agent intends." But if the agent does not intend another end diverse from the very intrinsic end of the action which he does, then the end of the one operating coincides with the end of the work, as appears in him who wishes to steal so that he may steal, i.e. so that he may become rich from another's property. The end of the work cannot in any way be excluded by the one operating, if he himself knows the nature of the work; for that end is intrinsic to the work. Now the end of the one operating can be considered in two ways: 1.^o with respect to the intention of the will, that is, with respect to the act of the will intending it; 2.^o with respect to the act itself which is commanded, as a means to that end. Under the first consideration, the end is properly the object of the will, indeed its principal object, since the end is what moves the will to the means. Under the second consideration, the end is a mere circumstance of the commanded act, and thus is usually numbered among the circumstances. He who steals, for example, so that he may commit adultery, principally wills adultery; he intends this and efficaciously procures it. And from this adultery comes the principal malice of the will. But the act commanded for this reason by the will of adultery, namely theft, for example, has its own substantial malice from its proper object, that is, from the taking of another's thing against the will of the owner; but that it is referred extrinsically by the one operating to such and such an end is altogether accidental to it, not from its own nature, but from the judgment of the one operating. Therefore the end which is a circumstance of the act is not the end itself of the work, which gives species to the act, but some adjoined end: just as the fact that a brave man acts bravely on account of the good of fortitude is not a circumstance; but it is a circumstance if he acts bravely for the liberation of the city, or for Christ, or something of this sort. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3 ad 3; q. 18. a. 6 ad 2.
2. The end of the one operating can be one thing as primary, another as secondary. The primary end is that which someone first proposes to himself, and is the cause simply of the action. The secondary end is that which is added to the primary, and is not the cause simply of the action, but only, with the primary end, impels that it be done better, that is, more eagerly, more easily, more pleasantly, etc.
3. Human acts take moral goodness or malice from the end. For the end can be considered as a circumstance and as the object of a human act. If the end is considered as a circumstance, it can, not otherwise than the other circumstances, state an order of conformity or deformity to reason. Thus it is conformable to reason not only to give alms, but also to give them in satisfaction for sins; just as it is repugnant to reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to become drunk. Therefore, as circumstances give goodness or moral malice to a human act, so also does the end. And as circumstances of themselves give only accidental goodness and malice, so also does the end. But if the end is considered as object, then human acts take

species from the end as from an object, and therefore from it they take not only moral goodness or malice, but also from it they take essential moral goodness or malice.

4. "The same act numerically, according as it once goes forth from the agent, is not ordered except to one proximate end from which it has species, but it can be ordered to several remote ends, of which one is the end of another." It is said according as it once goes forth from the agent, for there can be several ends of his act according as this is continued and repeated; for example, to take another's property, so that one may become rich from another's property; to retain another's property, or again to take it, so that it may be preserved for the owner. It is said from which it has species, for there can be several ends, even proximate ends, of the work of one and the same act, but one is the primary end of the work from which comes the species, as it were, substantial to the act; the others are accidental and rather take on the nature of circumstances. Thus, for example, if someone undertakes a pilgrimage so that he may celebrate Mass in the Sanctuary of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, the sacrifice of the Mass is the proximate end of the work, from which the very celebration of Mass intrinsically takes its species; but to celebrate in that Sanctuary in honor of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus is also the proximate end of the work of that celebration, but as a certain extrinsic circumstance not giving species to the act. But the remote end of the one operating, to which the act is ordered, can itself also give species to the act; indeed, if it is the ultimate end in that series, it itself is what gives species to the act most of all, because it is what is prior in intention and on which all the other ends depend, since all those are subordinated. And thus he who commits adultery so that he may steal, and steals so that he may commit homicide, is rather a murderer than an adulterer and thief, because homicide is the formal and motive reason of the other acts. "When many acts differing in species are ordered to one end, there is indeed diversity of species on the part of the exterior acts, but unity of species on the part of the interior act." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6. "Nevertheless it is possible that one act according to the species of nature be ordered to diverse ends of the will. Thus this very thing which is to kill a man, which is the same according to the species of nature, can be ordered as to an end to the preservation of justice and to satisfying anger. From this there will be diverse acts according to the species of morals, because in one way it will be an act of virtue, in another way an act of vice." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 2.
5. "The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Whence as to the act of the will, the goodness which is from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, as in the acts of the other powers, except perhaps accidentally, according as an end depends on an end and a will on a will;" St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 2 ad 1; namely when several ends subordinated of themselves and willed are together, as when someone wills healing medicine on account of going into military service, on account of victory, the formal goodness of the object, for example being healthy, differs from the goodness of another end, for example military service; and when the will of one end, for example adultery, depends on the will of another end, for example theft, as when someone wishes to commit adultery so that he may steal, the malice also of the object, for example adultery, differs from the malice of the end, for example theft. But each is accidental; for it happens to an end that it is subordinated to another, and it also happens to the will that it depends on another; otherwise this would

belong to every end and every volition. Cajetan, in the cited place. Moreover a human act is human insofar as it is voluntary. But in a voluntary act a twofold act is found: the interior act of the will and the exterior act. Each of these has its proper object. "But the end is properly the object of the will. But that about which the exterior action is concerned is its object. Therefore, just as the exterior act receives species from the object about which it is concerned, so the interior act of the will receives species from the end as from its proper object. But that which is on the part of the will stands as formal to that which is on the part of the exterior act, because the will uses the members for acting as instruments, nor do exterior acts have the character of morality except insofar as they are voluntary. And therefore the species of a human act is considered formally according to the end, but materially according to the object of the exterior act. Whence the Philosopher says that he who steals in order to commit adultery is, speaking of himself, more adulterer than thief." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6.

6. Now a commanded act can be considered according to itself and taken specifically, and it can be considered formally and reduplicatively as commanded. If it is considered in the first way, it takes its essential and specific goodness or malice from the object, and accidental goodness or malice from the end. The extrinsic end of the one operating comes to the act already constituted in its species from its proper object. And it is altogether accidental to such an act, considered according to itself, that it be ordered to such an end. Thus the volition of giving alms, commanded by penance, primarily and immediately regards the honorableness of almsgiving or mercy, but only secondarily and mediately the honorableness of penance. If the commanded act is taken in the other way, i.e. formally and reduplicatively as commanded, it has its essential species from the end, because the commanding act and the commanded act are considered one act, whose principal object is then the end which each regards.
7. Therefore human acts take moral goodness or malice from the end because, insofar as they are acts, they receive species from the end as from an object. And this can also be shown otherwise. For human acts can be considered after the manner of actions and after the manner of passions, because through them man moves himself and is moved by himself. But action obtains species from the principle of acting, while passion obtains species from the term of motion. And thus heating as action is nothing other than a certain motion proceeding from heat; heating as passion is nothing other than motion toward heat; and a definition manifests the account of species. For indeed each thing obtains species according to act, and not according to potency; and therefore motion, which is distinguished through action and passion, insofar as it is action, takes species from the act which is the principle of acting; but insofar as it is passion, it takes species from the act which is the term of motion. Moreover "acts are called human insofar as they proceed from a deliberate will, but the object of the will is good and end. And therefore it is manifest that the principle of human acts, insofar as they are human, is the end." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3. For the end is not only an end, but also the object of the will, and through this is in the place of form, which is the principle of acting. But the end is the object of the will, and is the reason of acting for it, precisely insofar as it is end; for it is that which is sought of itself; and thus the end is good, and "good has the character of end." St. Thomas, *ibid.* a. 4 ad 1. "The motive and object of the will is the end... the end, although it is not of the substance of the act (namely of the commanded act), is nevertheless

the most principal cause of the act (aforesaid), insofar as it moves the agent to act. Whence also the moral act most of all has species from the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 4, body and ad 2. “The end is first in the intention of reason, according to which the species of moral acts are taken.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 7 ad 2. “The end, according as it is prior in intention, according to this pertains to the will. And in this way it gives species to the human or moral act.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 2. “And similarly (the end) is the term of the same (acts). For that at which the human act is terminated is that which the will intends as an end.”

Namely, the human act is from the end, and is to the end: from the end as action; to the end as passion; from the end as object, the intrinsic form of the act, the principle of the act by which the will acts; to the end as the term of the act, for the sake of which it acts. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3.

8. Therefore human acts, besides the absolute and intrinsic goodness or malice which they have from their proper object, have goodness or malice from the end on which they depend. “For the disposition of things in goodness and in being is the same. For there are certain things whose being does not depend on another. And in these it suffices to consider their being itself absolutely. But there are certain things whose being depends on another, whence it is necessary that they be considered by consideration toward the cause on which they depend. But just as the being of a thing depends on the agent and the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4; q. 72. a. 3.

And hence this is understood: good and end are convertible, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 2 ad 2. For whatever the will wills and does, it wills and does as good and for the sake of good.

9. Whether the intention of an extrinsic end can intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work? — R. Some affirm it; others deny it. The opinion of the latter seems to us alone true. The reason is: 1.^o because nature cannot be changed; 2.^o because the intention of the one operating adds nothing to the work, indeed it does not even touch it, since it is entirely extrinsic to it. Therefore our good intention cannot make an evil work good, nor can our evil intention make what is good evil, nor transfer what is evil intrinsically into another species of malice. But this does not prevent, as is clear, that where the question concerns an object indifferent of itself, the extrinsic end of the one operating can give moral goodness or malice. For this is not to change the intrinsic nature of the exterior work itself, but to determine its intrinsic indifference insofar as it is a human work; and this determination in morals is only from intention. And thus, although the depraved intention of a judge to harm the guilty person cannot intrinsically change the nature of a just sentence and constitute it an unjust causing of damage, nevertheless the intention of taking another’s property determines the taking itself, according as someone takes another’s thing so that he may preserve it for the owner, or so that he may take it for himself and steal it. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 584, 636. — Therefore if someone without force and fraud, but from hatred, or even so that he may harm another, impedes him from the attainment of a good to which he has no right, for example if someone impedes a testator from leaving an inheritance to someone who has no right to it, he is by no means bound to restitution. For he sins either only against charity, or even against justice, but affectively only, not effectively. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 584.

10. Whether an act is good if it has a twofold end, one good and the other evil? — R. 1.^o In the affirmative, if the evil end has itself merely antecedently or consequently, that is, merely precedes the whole act or is added to the act already preexisting, or even if it has itself merely concomitantly, that is, influences nothing in the being of the act itself but is only joined to it. The reason is that then it is wholly extrinsic to the act constituted in its whole being. For it is not the reason on account of which of the act itself, but is only the reason, for example, of a certain simple complacency which precedes, accompanies, or follows the deliberate act. But this simple complacency can exercise its influence without infecting the act, so that someone may be moved more easily to a good act, for example if alms were proposed to someone as contributing to eternal life, and to this were joined a simple complacency over the esteem to be had thence among men. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. Sometimes, in carrying out a good work, a certain sense and imperfect affection touches someone's soul, although in no way is it the end which he proposes to himself. Whatever of fault is found in this, the goodness of the work which someone does does not perish on that account. — 2.^o In the negative, if the evil end has itself truly causatively and influences the substance of the act. The reason is that then someone wills the good at least inadequately under the aspect of evil, which is to will evil. "In order that the will be good, it is required that it be of the good under the aspect of good, i.e. that it will the good and on account of the good." St. Thomas, q. 19. a. 7 ad 3. — Except unless the end is only lightly evil. The reason is that then the only lightly evil end influences not the substantial being itself of the act, but only the accidental being of the act, and therefore the whole substance of the act remains good. And thus almsgiving will be good, even if a slight ostentation has crept into that act and has truly influenced it. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4 ad 3; De Malo, q. 2. a. 4 ad 2; Suarez, D. 8, S. 1, n. XIV ff. The question concerns, as is clear, an exterior act which is one in the genus of nature and multiple in the genus of morals. "If one act is taken as it is in the genus of morals, it is impossible that it be good and evil by moral goodness and malice; yet if it is one by unity of nature and not by unity of morals, it can be good and evil." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 6.
11. Whether he sins who acts for the sake of pleasure? — R. In the affirmative, if he acts for the sake of pleasure alone, namely by positively excluding the further honorable end of the work; and this sin, speaking of itself, does not exceed venial. In the negative, if he acts simply for the sake of pleasure. The reason for the first is that pleasure is for the sake of operation, not conversely, namely so that man may be enticed to the operations necessary or useful for human life. Therefore pleasure is not the end of action, "but the means to exercising the action more constantly, more easily, and better." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 4. a. 2. It is confirmed from proposition 8, condemned by Innocent XI: "To eat and drink even to satiety for the sake of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its acts." The reason for the second is that since pleasure of itself is not evil, but good, unless someone establishes his ultimate end in it, which without doubt would be grave, there is not had a grave disorder in the human action. The reason for the third is that pleasure of itself is not evil, but good, and it is consonant with the very order of nature that man be enticed by pleasure to operating. St. Thomas, C. G. l. 3, c. 26, nn. 6, 7; 1. 2. q. 4. a. 2 ad 2. Otherwise, it would have to be said that he also sins who would be moved to acting honorably from heavenly pleasure. Moreover nature indeed more principally intends the operation itself,

to which pleasure is joined. But secondarily the same nature intends that man, from the appetite of pleasure, seek the operation. Therefore pleasure can be intended as an end, provided it is not intended as the ultimate or principal end. Therefore if someone, although he expressly thinks nothing of a further honorable end, is moved by pleasure to an action which he apprehends as consonant with nature, or in which he finds nothing contrary to the order of reason, for example to taking food, playing, etc., he does not sin at all. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 141. a. 1 ad 1.

Commentary XIII: On the Circumstances of Human Acts

1. By circumstances of a human act are understood all those accounts which are accessory to the willed object, and are as accidents of the substance of the act, and are willed only concomitantly or consequently. "The name of circumstance," says St. Thomas, q. 7. a. 1, "is derived to human acts from those things which are in place to human acts. But in local things something is said to stand around which is indeed extrinsic to the thing, yet touches it itself or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and nevertheless touch the human act in some way, are called circumstances. But what is outside the substance of a thing, while pertaining to the thing itself, is called its accident. Whence the circumstances of human acts must be called their accidents." As with the object, so circumstances are not considered here insofar as they are certain accidents physically affecting the act, but insofar as they are accidents of a human act, morally affecting it in its moral being, already constituted from the object. In its moral being, already constituted from the object, because if it gave the first and essential moral species, it would no longer be a circumstance, but would pass over into the condition of object and essential difference. Morally affecting, that is, insofar as they pertain to morals. For indeed it makes no difference to the moral being of the act that someone, for example, gave a slap to another or stole with the right hand or the left. But jurists and theologians consider circumstances differently. For the former consider them rather insofar as they disturb society; the latter, insofar as they offend God more gravely. Cf. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 5.
2. Human acts also take their moral goodness and malice from circumstances. For since they tend not to an abstract but to a concrete object, or to an object determined by its individuating circumstances, as they take specific moral goodness and malice from the object, so also they take accidental moral goodness and malice from circumstances; and from them they put on various accidental qualities: just as man has the account of his species from the soul, but something accidental belongs to an individual man according to his individual accidents. And indeed, since good is convertible with being, just as being is said according to substance and according to accident, so also good is attributed to something both according to its substantial being and according to its accidental being, both in natural things and in moral actions. Therefore, just as "in natural things there is not found the whole fullness of perfection which is due to them from substantial form, which gives species, but much is superadded from supervening accidents, as in man from figure, from color, and so concerning others, and if any of these is lacking for a decent relation, evil follows; so also it is in action. For the fullness of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but something is added from those things which come upon it as certain accidents. And things of this sort are due circumstances. Whence, if something is lacking which is required for due circumstances, the action will be evil." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 3, 9.
3. For indeed a human act takes goodness or malice from the object for this reason, that the object states a relation of fittingness or unfittingness to right reason. But circumstances also can import a relation of fittingness or unfittingness to right reason; thus, for example, it is not

only unfitting to reason to steal, but also to steal in a sacred place. Billuart, *De Act. hum.*, Diss. 4, art. 2, § 2.

4. "Thus, therefore, in a human action goodness can be considered in four ways. One indeed according to genus, namely insofar as it is an action, because as much as it has of action and entity, so much it has of goodness. Another according to species, which is taken according to a fitting object. The third according to circumstances, as according to certain accidents. But the fourth according to the end, as according to relation to the cause of goodness." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. "Nothing prevents an action having one of the aforesaid goodnesses from lacking another, and according to this it happens that an action which is good according to its species, or according to circumstances, is ordered to an evil end, or conversely. Nevertheless an action is not good simply unless all the goodnesses concur, because any singular defect causes evil; but good is caused from an integral cause." St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4, body and ad 3.
5. Therefore a human act can have a threefold moral goodness or malice, either within the same species or even of a diverse species. Thus, for example, if someone were to steal a sacred thing so that he might give it as a gift to a prostitute for obtaining fornication from her, such an act from the object would be theft, from the circumstance of the sacred thing sacrilege, from the end fornication; and therefore it would have a threefold malice diverse in species. But the intrinsic and essential moral goodness or malice of the act is taken from the object. For from the object the will is first and of itself, or directly, moved to the act. Hence although, in order that a human act be good simply, it is required that it have no evil circumstance, nevertheless it is not required that it always have proper objective circumstances from which it receives accidental goodness or an increase of goodness, as is clear in an act concerning an altogether simple object, such as the love of God. Objective circumstances are meant, or circumstances on the part of the object, for at least some circumstances on the part of the act itself are always found which confer on it some goodness or malice. And thus always, at least morally speaking, which is enough in the present matter, there is in the act some intensity, pertaining to the circumstance how, by reason of which the act has some goodness or malice which can be called accidental, insofar as the species of the act could be preserved without it. But in order that circumstances confer their moral goodness or malice on the act, they must be willed either after the manner of an object, or at least after the manner of an act, because an object does not confer moral goodness or malice on a human act except insofar as it is intended and willed. Objective circumstances, that is, those which hold themselves on the part of the object, must be willed after the manner of an object, because circumstances of this sort affect the object itself, and the act indivisibly attains the object, not as if naked, but as if clothed with its own circumstances. But circumstances which hold themselves on the part of the act must be willed either after the manner of an object, if that circumstance is extrinsic to the act itself, as, for example, is the circumstance who; for the one operating can regard himself as the object of his will and will to apply the dignity or condition of his person to the work; or after the manner of an act, if that circumstance is intrinsic to the act itself, as, for example, is the circumstance how or when. And thus, in order that the goodness or malice of the act of the will be increased from intensity or duration, it is enough that the intensity and duration be voluntary after the

manner of an act, namely insofar as the intense, lasting act itself is voluntary, etc. Cf. St. Thomas, C. G. l. 3, c. 138; 1. 2, cited places; Suarez, D. 4, D. 5, D. 6, S. 3.

6. Whether a circumstance can intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work and of the interior act? — R. In the affirmative. The reason is that a circumstance is intrinsic to the work itself or to the act itself, but by no means extrinsic, as is the end of the one operating with respect to the exterior work. Therefore it can modify the external work itself and the internal act. For not every circumstance always modifies the external work in such a way that it also intrinsically changes its nature. And thus, if a pastor recites the breviary at a time when he ought to minister the sacraments to a dying person, the intrinsic nature of the recitation of the breviary is not changed. Whence it is enough also to confess only the aforesaid omission of the administration of the sacraments. Nor indeed is that intrinsic modification to be understood in such a way that an external work, indifferent, good, or evil from its own intrinsic nature and in such a species by reason namely of the object properly, becomes from indifferent, by its nature, good or evil, from evil good, from good evil, or in another species. For since a circumstance is something accessory to the object, if the object, by reason of itself, is indifferent or good or evil and in such a species, it remains indifferent, good, evil, and in such a species under that respect, although intrinsically it can also become evil, be changed into evil, and assume another species of evil by reason of the circumstance. Thus, for example, the action of eating of itself is indifferent; but to eat on a fast day after another meal has been taken is a grave sin, and therefore the action is evil not by reason of eating, but by reason of the fast day, and by this circumstance of time it becomes evil. To use marriage is an honorable action; but to use marriage after a vow of chastity is a gravely sinful action, not by reason of the use itself of marriage, but of the vow; and by this circumstance of the vow it is changed from good into evil. To steal is an evil action against justice; but to steal a sacred thing is an action evil also against religion from that circumstance of the sacred thing, whence to the malice of theft is added the malice of sacrilege.
7. Now there are certain circumstances which change the nature of the work or act merely accidentally, namely within the same species, they increase or diminish moral goodness or malice; and therefore they are called aggravating or diminishing. Circumstances of this sort are all those which do not have goodness or malice according to themselves, but through order to another condition of the act which has that goodness or malice according to itself. Whence they increase or lessen the aforesaid goodness or malice. And thus, for example, the intensity and remission of an act, the long or short delay of an act, do not have moral goodness or malice according to themselves, but only through order to a good or evil act, of which consequently they constitute only an accidental diversity. Thus also to take something in a greater or lesser quantity does not of itself regard the order of reason in good or evil, but presupposes some other condition through which the act has malice or goodness, for example this, that it is another's, which according to itself is repugnant to reason. Whence to take another's property in a greater or lesser quantity does not diversify the species of sin. Circumstances which, by aggravating a sin, render it mortal from venial are called aggravating infinitely.

8. Of aggravating circumstances, some aggravate notably, others lightly. A circumstance is judged to aggravate notably in quantitative matter, or matter which consists in number, weight, and measure, when, taken separately and separated from the act, it would suffice for mortal sin; as one who, beyond five or six lire constituting in the case a mortal sin, should steal another five or six, namely ten or twelve. But in other matters it would be judged to aggravate notably when it notably exceeds the ordinary manner of sinning in matters of this sort, as if someone should spend the whole night in impurities with a woman, if someone should persevere for months and years in fraternal hatred, if someone should kill an enemy by cutting him limb by limb, etc. If neither of these occurs, it is judged to aggravate lightly, as that a thief steals seven or eight lire in the same case of grave matter of five or six lire, or that after a quarrel someone, being angry, remains for a little while in hatred. Billuart, *De Act. hum.*, Diss. 4, art. 2, § 2.
9. But there are other circumstances which essentially change the nature of the work and act and are called those changing the species. Circumstances of this sort are those which according to themselves regard a special order of reason. Thus, for example, to take another's property has species from the character of what is another's; for from this it is constituted in the species of theft. And if beyond this the character of place or time is considered, it will have itself in the character of a circumstance. But because reason can also order concerning place or time and other things of this sort, it happens that the condition of place concerning the object is taken as according to itself contrary to the order of reason; for example, that reason orders that injury is not to be done to a sacred place. Whence to take something belonging to another from a sacred place adds a special repugnance as regards the order of reason. And therefore the place which previously was considered as a simple circumstance is now considered as a principal condition of the object repugnant to reason.
10. Nor indeed is it repugnant that a moral act be found constituted in multiple species. For a natural being cannot be except in only one species, because its being is physically determined; nor can there be physically a process of nature into infinity, whence it is necessary to stop at some ultimate form from which the specific difference is taken, after which there cannot be another specific difference. And hence it is that in natural things that which is an accident of some thing cannot be taken as a difference constituting species, since it comes upon a thing already constituted in its species. But a moral being can be constituted in multiple species, for the species of moral acts are constituted from forms according as they are apprehended by reason. But the process of reason is not determined to one thing; rather, when anything whatever has been given, it can proceed further. And therefore what in one act is taken as a circumstance superadded to the object which determines the species of the act can again be taken by ordering reason as a principal condition of the object determining the species of the act. And thus in theft, if the mere account of place is considered, it has itself as a circumstance; but if that account of a sacred place, for example, is considered as contrary to ordering reason, because reason orders the reverence due to a sacred place and that no injury be done to it, then that account is no longer considered as a mere circumstance, but as a certain principal condition of the object; whence, as from the object, so also from it the act receives species, as though from a certain specific difference of it.

11. Hence St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 10 ad 2, says: “a circumstance, remaining in the character of circumstance, since it has the character of an accident, does not give species; but insofar as it is changed into a principal condition of the object, according to this it gives species.” For indeed since an act, as the whole that it is, tends to the object, it is indeed specified by the object. But since it tends to a concrete object, it also attains its circumstances, and from them itself puts on various accidental qualities. But when those circumstances import some consonance or dissonance with reason, and are changed into a certain principal condition of the object, then the act, which attains the object as it is, namely according to that condition which it really has, and is specified by the object, also takes species from that condition of the object. Namely that circumstance, constituting the principal condition of the object, itself also becomes the object of the act, so that there is, as it were, a twofold act, or one act virtually twofold: one concerning the object of the act, the other concerning the object of the circumstance, as appears in theft in a sacred place; namely the taking of another’s thing, the object of the act of theft, and the injury inflicted on the sacred place, the object of the circumstance of theft. And thus the principle still stands: that an act is specified by the object; for in truth there is a twofold object which is attained by the act: since the object here is not simply this or that thing, but according as it bears relation to the order of reason; moreover both the object of the act properly such, and the circumstance of that object, will be able to be consonant with or discordant from the order of reason.
12. Cajetan aptly says on q. 18. a. 10 and 11: “Notice and consider diligently that just as in natural things certain accidents are forms according to themselves, such as whiteness and sweetness, but certain others are only conditions of presupposed forms, as more, less, greater, strongly, quickly, and other things of this sort; so in morals circumstances are twofold: some are goodnesses or malices according to themselves, as are all acts of virtues and vices; some are only conditions of supposed virtues or malices, as greater and less, more and less, and the like. The difference between these circumstances is manifest, because the latter never make an act good or evil, although they increase or diminish goodness or malice. But the former make an act good or evil; and the reason is ready at hand, because the former of themselves add goodness or malice, the latter do not. Again, the difference between them is that the former according to themselves are certain species of morals having their own objects, fitting or unfitting to reason, as is clear concerning theft done in a sacred place. For to the act of theft is joined injury of a sacred place, which has its proper species from the sacred place, as an object for reason, as suffering injury: for this object is according to itself discordant from reason. But the latter are not according to themselves species of morals, nor do they have their own objects; and from this it follows that the former give species to the act which they circumstantiate, since the act is concerned with that object of the circumstance.”
13. The matter can still be explained otherwise. “It must be said that according to its substance something cannot be in two species, of which one is not ordered under the other. But according to those things which come to a thing, something can be contained under diverse species. As this apple according to color is contained under this species, namely of white, and according to odor under the species of sweet-smelling. And similarly an act which according to

its substance is in one species of nature can, according to supervening moral conditions, be referred to two species.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8 ad 1.

14. What, generally, are circumstances changing the species? — “A circumstance is sometimes taken as an essential difference of the object, according as it is compared to reason; and then it can give species to a moral act. — And this must be whenever a circumstance changes an act from goodness into malice; for a circumstance would not make an act evil except through this, that it is repugnant to reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6 ad 4. This same thing must be whenever a circumstance changes an act from indifferent into good or evil, by giving namely the first and essential species of goodness or malice. — Thus, for example, if someone after a vow of chastity should use marriage, from that circumstance of the vow the act is changed from goodness into malice; if someone for the sake of recreation wished to ride in a church, or to hold a wedding banquet in a church, or to eat a small quantity on a fast day after several other small meals; from the circumstance of place and fast the act becomes evil from indifferent, and is constituted in a determinate species of malice. — For indeed, from the fact that a circumstance according to itself is repugnant to or fits reason, it imports malice or goodness according to itself, and bears before itself an object repugnant to or fitting to reason; and through this it places in its proper species the act which it changes into evil from good, or changes into good or into evil from indifferent. For the constitution of an act in the being of evil or good is from the object. But it is clear that the changing of an act from good into evil, from indifferent into evil or good, is a constitution in the being of evil or good.
15. From what has been said it is clear, 1.^o that circumstances changing the species can be threefold: because they give to the act a new species of goodness or malice beyond the preceding species from the object; because they change the act from good into evil; because they give to the act its first moral goodness or malice. 2.^o There are two general rules concerning circumstances giving species to moral acts. The first is that whenever a circumstance makes an act evil from good, or good or evil from indifferent, it gives species to the act. The second is that whenever a circumstance regards a special, of itself proper order of reason, it again gives species to the act. But it regards a special proper order of reason when it of itself exhibits something congruent with or discordant from reason. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 72. a. 8, 9; q. 73. a. 7; q. 88. a. 5; De Malo, q. 2. a. 6 ad 2, a. 8.
16. Whether an act is good if the circumstance is evil? R. 1.^o In the affirmative, if the question concerns one and the same act in the genus of nature, and one which is multiple in the genus of morals; for example, someone chants the canonical hours in choir, or sings the conventual Mass, and at some time during the singing consents to vain glory concerning his beautiful voice, etc. The reason is that then an evil circumstance of this sort is altogether extrinsic to the good act itself, for example to the celebration of the divine offices, etc. And thus in the celebration of Mass, a priest consecrating in the state of grace places a good act; then, gravely sinning by adhering to a base thought and sacrilegiously receiving Communion, he places an evil act. — 2.^o In the negative, if the question concerns one and the same act of the will in the genus of morals. The reason is that the act of the will which embraces all these things together, namely the object and circumstances, is one most simple act, and therefore, if it is not good on

every side, it will be evil. “And therefore,” says St. Thomas, 2 D. 36. q. un. a. 5, “it happens that an act has goodness from matter and yet be done badly because of undue circumstances.” And in 1. 2. q. 18. a. 1, an act of this sort is called by the Holy Doctor good in a certain respect and evil in a certain respect; and generally, insofar as it falls short of goodness, so it is called evil: “for example, if there be lacking to it either a determinate quantity according to reason, or a due place, or something of this sort.” And q. 19. a. 2 ad 2, he says: “it must be said that, supposing that the will is of the good, no circumstance can make it evil. Therefore what is said, that someone wills some good when he ought not, can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that this circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the will is not of good, because to will to do something when it ought not be done is not to will good. In another way, so that it is referred to the act of willing. And thus it is impossible that someone will good when he ought not, because man ought always to will good, except perhaps accidentally, insofar as someone by willing this good is prevented from then willing some due good. And then evil enters not from the fact that someone wills that good, but from the fact that someone does not will another good. And similarly it must be said concerning other circumstances.” — Hence, if the circumstance is only lightly evil and extrinsic to the object, and the will embraces it concomitantly, this lightly evil circumstance does not corrupt the good act, since it is altogether accidental to the substance of the act constituted in itself. This indeed happens in natural things; the same ought much more to be in moral things. Suarez, D. 8, S. 1, n. VII ff. “And thus an affection for mortal sin in Communion corrupts it substantially and renders it sacrilegious; an affection for venial sin in Communion does not corrupt it in its substance, although it renders it less fruitful.” But if a circumstance, even lightly evil, is intrinsic to the object itself, then the whole act is evil, because that circumstance is the ultimate determination of the moral object. And thus the whole action of a Religious giving alms against the vow of poverty or against the precept of a Superior is evil, although the prohibition by reason of the vow, or by reason of the precept of the Superior, is only light.

17. How many circumstances of human acts are numbered? — R. Seven, and they are these: who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when. “The reason of this enumeration can be taken thus. For a circumstance is said as though existing outside the substance of the act, yet in such a way that it touches the act itself in some way; but this happens to be done in three ways. In one way, insofar as it touches the act itself. In another way, insofar as it touches the cause of the act. In a third way, insofar as it touches the effect. But it touches the act itself either after the manner of measure, as time and place, or after the manner of the quality of the act, as the mode of acting. On the part of the effect, as when what someone did is considered. But on the part of the cause of the act, as to the final cause, why is taken; but on the part of the material cause or object, there is taken about what (which is comprehended under what); but on the part of the principal agent, who acted is taken; but on the part of the instrumental acting cause, by what aids is taken.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3.
18. How are the aforesaid circumstances to be considered? — R. They are not to be taken insofar as the substance of the act depends on them, but insofar as they affect it accidentally. Otherwise they would no longer have the character of circumstances. Therefore: 1.^o Who does not signify the substance of the one operating, but his quality or condition, for example that he

is bound by a vow, joined in marriage, a public magistrate, etc. Lugo, de Poen. D. 16. n. 200, refers the custom of sin to this circumstance; for by it is explained how someone is disposed to sinning more easily. The circumstance of person, generally speaking, does not transfer a sin into another species, unless the sin is directly opposed to a conjunction, an office bringing a special obligation, his vow, or his state; as if a priest commits fornication, it passes into sacrilege, but if he blasphemes, he is guilty of blasphemy alone, just as another blasphemer. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 65. a. 4; q. 110. a. 4 ad 5. 2.º What and about what likewise does not express the substance of the effect or object, but its quality or quantity; for example, in theft it does not denote that the stolen thing is another's, for this pertains to the very substance of the act, but that it is sacred or profane, of great or small quantity, with resulting damage of a poor man, of wards, of marriageable girls, with scandal of many, etc. The circumstance what and about what can easily be one changing the species. But what, i.e. the effect, when it is foreseen and willed, draws into its own species; as if a woman, going to church, knows that she is to be loved there, and wills this, although she does not go on account of this but on account of hearing Mass, that act draws species from that evil effect. To this circumstance can be referred how many times, or the multiplication of acts. Yet St. Thomas did not count it among the circumstances. And the reason is that circumstances are about the same act. But the number of operations does not circumstantiate one and the same operation. For the second theft is not a circumstance of the first, or conversely, nor the third of the second, and so thereafter. From which it follows that, because someone is no less bound to confess the second sin than the first, and no less the hundredth than any other, it is not enough to say that he stole several times, but it is necessary to explain how many times he stole, if he remembers the number; and if he does not remember, he ought to express how frequently, so that a probable number may be had. 3.º Where does not signify bare place; for it is certain that any act of man is done somewhere; but the quality of the place, for example that it is public, whence scandal arises; that it is sacred, whence sacrilege is had, etc. The circumstance of sacred place, although it aggravates all sins accidentally, nevertheless draws only that sin to the species of sacrilege which is directly opposed to the sanctity of the place or to the immunity annexed to it, as outpourings of blood or of human seed, and other actions which by law impede divine worship from being offered there, for which the place is directly sanctified, and violent removals of the guilty from it. 4.º By what aids signifies accidental instruments or means which the one operating has used, for example if someone has used sacred vessels for poisoning, has employed the help of a demon, has induced other men by command or counsel to the execution of sin. Although this circumstance sometimes seems to have itself merely materially toward sin, nevertheless sometimes it also changes the species. 5.º Why denotes not the intrinsic end of the work, for this does not differ from the object and pertains to the substance of the act, but the extrinsic end and that of the one operating, as if someone steals in order to become drunk. But the extrinsic end of the one operating can coincide with the intrinsic end of the work. Why can manifestly give another species to the act. 6.º How designates the accidental mode by which the interior act of the will is done, for example intensely or remissly, from contempt, from levity, from ignorance, from fear, from passion. It also designates the mode of the exterior action, that you killed by poison, by sword, with cruelty and savagery, etc. How, although it is ordinarily aggravating or diminishing of sin, sometimes can also give

species. 7.º When signifies the quality or quantity of time, for example on a feast day, of Communion, of Holy Week; for a long time, for a short time. The circumstance of sacred time is aggravating of sin, yet not adding the species of sacrilege unless it is done in contempt of sacred time. Lessius on q. 7; Cajetan on the same q.; St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 923; St. Thomas, 4 Dist. 32. q. 1. a. 5, q. 4, solution 2.^a

Commentary XIV: On Merit

1. A human act, according as it is in the power of the will, has the character of laudable or culpable, according as it is good or evil. According to the order which it has to the end, leading to it or deviating from it, it has the character of rectitude or sin. But according as it is for the profit or harm of another, it has the character of merit or demerit. "To merit first seems to be in services by which men merit wages, in which wages first appears named. But we experience it as extended from services to attentions and benefits, when we call both those who render service and those who confer benefits well-deserving of us or of the republic." Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 114. a. 1. Consequently merit or demerit is the value of a work, by reason of which there corresponds to it reward or punishment according to the retribution of justice. For retribution according to justice is made to someone from the fact that he acts for the profit or harm of another. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 21. a. 3. Justice then intervenes, whose office is to render to each one his own. For indeed "merit and reward are referred to the same thing. For that is called reward which is recompensed to someone in return for work or labor, as a certain price of that very thing. Hence, just as to render a just price for a thing received from someone is an act of justice, so also to recompense the reward of work or labor is an act of justice." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1. "The presentation of merit and the rendering of reward are acts toward another, according to an equality of thing to thing, namely of merit to reward and conversely. Therefore for the notion of merit the notion of the just is required, although it is not sufficient," because besides this "for the notion of merit the voluntary is required." Cajetan, on I-II, q. 114, a. 1.
2. Therefore merit or demerit is had from the fact that someone acts unto the good or evil of another, namely of the Community, or of another singular person. "But when someone does that which turns to his own good or evil, retribution is also owed to him, insofar as this too turns to the common good, according as he himself is part of the college; although retribution is not owed to him insofar as it is the good or evil of a singular person, who is the same as the one acting, unless perhaps by himself, according to a certain likeness, as there is justice of a man toward himself." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3.
3. Merit in general is a property of human acts, by virtue of which some are worthy of retribution. Of itself it is indifferent to good and to evil; but by usage now received, merit, said simply, is taken for merit of reward, and merit of punishment is called demerit, or evil merit, or merit of punishment.
4. Merit, of which we are treating, namely merit of reward, is generally defined: service rendered to another, able of itself to move him to retribution. It differs from impetration and from satisfaction: for impetration moves after the manner of a submissive petition, satisfaction after the manner of compensation for an injury inflicted, but merit after the manner of service. Under the name of service comes a work yielding to the utility or honor of someone. Hence it is clear that a human act, insofar as it is good or evil, can have the notion of merit or demerit not only before men, but also before God. For although our acts, according to themselves, can bring no utility to God, no advancement or harm to him, since nothing can increase or

decrease in God, nevertheless man, insofar as he is in himself, withdraws something from God or presents something to him, when he keeps or does not keep the order which God has instituted; and by keeping the order he renders honor and glory to him. And therefore we merit something only insofar as we work for his glory, namely by manifesting his goodness by our good works. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 4, ad 1.

5. Merit before God is one thing natural, another supernatural. Natural merit is that which is found in good works of the natural order. For good works are meritorious before God of some reward. Appositely St. Thomas says appositely, I-II, q. 21, a. 4: "It must be said that the act of some man has the notion of merit or demerit according as it is ordered to another, either by reason of him or by reason of the community. But in both ways our good or evil acts have the notion of merit or demerit before God. By reason of God himself, indeed, insofar as he is man's ultimate end; and it is owed that all acts be referred to the ultimate end; hence he who does an evil act, not referable to God, does not preserve the honor of God, which is owed to the ultimate end. But on the part of the whole community of the universe, because in any community he who rules the community chiefly has care of the common good; hence it belongs to him to render retribution for those things which are done well or badly in the community. But God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, and especially of rational creatures. Hence it is manifest that human acts have the notion of merit or demerit by comparison to him; otherwise it would follow that God would not have care of human acts."
6. Supernatural merit is that which is perfected by supernatural grace, and is worthy of a supernatural reward. The supernatural merit of our human acts is divided into merit de condigno and de congruo. Merit de condigno is that which has a certain equality with the reward, and this is owed to it from some justice, at least with God's promise acceding. Merit de congruo is had when either equality is not present, or a promise is not had, so that only the fittingness, suitability, congruity of the reward is had from the liberality of the one rewarding. St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3.
7. The equality of merit with reward in a meritorious work de condigno is not an absolute equality of thing to thing; this equality is that which a thing has to a thing from its intrinsic quantity or entity, apart from all other extrinsic circumstances of persons. Hence that equality is invariable, when the utility or honorableness of the thing is unchanged. Such is the equality between price and reward in buying, and likewise between the labor of a hired worker and the reward by which that labor is compensated. For equality is had from the intrinsic quantity of the value of the thing bought or of the reward conferred, compared with the intrinsic quantity of the value of that price, of that labor; insofar as each is so much or so much; apart from every estimation of the dignity of the person selling and buying, of the one working and the one accepting that labor. This equality is also called entitative, quantitative, or arithmetical equality. To merit with someone is not to buy the reward from him. - The equality required for merit de condigno between work and reward is another equality, altogether distinct from this, namely respective equality. For it is equality according to a certain right estimation, by which a thing is not absolutely compared and set with a thing as considered in itself, but merit is respectively set with reward, with attention to the meritorious work itself and the reward, and

to the very dignity of the one working, by which that work is dignified, and to the opulence and munificence of the one rewarding, so that to confer such a reward with respect to the one rewarding is not greater or more difficult than to furnish such merit with respect to the one meriting.

8. Therefore this equality is that which merit and reward obtain from the meritorious work itself and the reward, and with respect to the condition and dignity of the person meriting and of the person rewarding. For since actions are of supposits, hence one and the same thing or operation, according as it is from a person more worthy or less worthy, increases or decreases in its value. And thus a work which, done by the leader of a whole army, would be merit *de condigno* for obtaining some principality from a king; the same thing done by a simple soldier is at most merit *de congruo*; and the reward which would be given *condignly* to the former would be bestowed on the latter only *congruously*. This respective equality, as is clear, is equality of proportion, insofar, namely, as merit is related equally to the one meriting as reward to the one rewarding; for otherwise either something greater or something less would be repaid. To the point, St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3: "According to equality of proportion we merit eternal life *de condigno*. For equality of proportion is considered when this is related equally to that, as another thing to another. But it is not a greater thing for God to bestow eternal life than for us to present an act of virtue; but as this is fitting to this one, so that is fitting to that one; and therefore a certain equality of proportion is found between God rewarding and man meriting."
9. Now, however, it must be diligently noticed that this respective equality or equality of proportion, which is also called geometrical, presupposes on the part of merit and reward a certain fittingness and connection of both with each other; for merit has a certain intrinsic value of the reward by which that merit is repaid. And thus St. Thomas, in the place cited, immediately continuing, says: "provided, however, that the reward be referred to the same genus in which the merit is; so that if the reward is what exceeds every faculty of human nature, as eternal life does, the merit also must be through such an act in which there shines forth the good of that habit which is divinely infused, consigning us to God." Therefore natural works can in no way *condignly* merit a supernatural reward. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 2.
10. Merit is related equally to the one meriting as reward to the one rewarding. For, as St. Thomas says in the place cited, "it is not greater for God to bestow eternal life than for us to present an act of virtue, but as this is fitting to this one so that to that one." And indeed, although eternal life is a good far greater than the merit of a just man, and thus between that and this there is not an arithmetical equality and equality of quantity, nevertheless with respect to God, who loves the just man as his adopted son and friend, it is not a greater thing to communicate to him eternal life, that is, his blessedness and happiness, than, with respect to the just man, the adopted son of God and friend, to render service and honor by supernatural acts. This is related equally to that, as another thing to another; for it is altogether equitable that God also recompense a just man working according to the dignity and excellence of his supernatural virtue, according to the excellence of his own virtue.

11. The Angelic Doctor again explains the aforesaid proportion, I-II, q. 114, a. 3, by equality in virtue, and he plainly derives it from a twofold head, the dignity of the work and the dignity of the one working, and explains it by a comparison of seed in relation to a tree, of a pledge in relation to a debt, of a fountain in relation to flowing water. "It must be said that the grace of the Holy Spirit, which we have in the present, although it is not equal to glory in act, is nevertheless equal in virtue, as the seed of a tree, in which there is the virtue toward the whole tree. And similarly through grace the Holy Spirit inhabits man, who is the sufficient cause of eternal life; hence he is said to be the pledge of our inheritance, 2 Cor. 1. It must be said that the meritorious work of man can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as it proceeds from free choice; in another way, according as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit. If it is considered according to the substance of the work, and according as it proceeds from free choice, thus there cannot be condignity there because of the greatest inequality; but there is congruity there because of a certain equality of proportion. (Then namely merit *de congruo* is present.) For it seems congruous that God recompense a man working according to his own virtue according to the excellence of his own virtue. But if we speak of a meritorious work according as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, thus it is meritorious of eternal life *de condigno*. For thus the value of the merit is considered according to the virtue of the Holy Spirit moving us into eternal life, according to that of John 4:14, there shall be made in him a fountain of water springing up unto eternal life. The price of the work is also considered according to the dignity of grace, through which man, having been made a sharer of the divine nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom an inheritance is owed by the very right of adoption, according to that in Romans 8:17, if sons, then heirs."
12. Now, however, although in merit *de condigno* the aforesaid equality of proportion is had, and man can merit something from God *de condigno*, nevertheless he cannot do this according to the absolute notion of justice, but only in a certain respect. For the absolute notion of justice is in equality, and it belongs to it to render to each one what is his own. "It is manifest that between God and man there is the greatest inequality, for they are infinitely distant, and everything that is man's good is from God. Hence justice of man toward God cannot exist according to absolute equality, but according to a certain proportion, namely insofar as each works according to his own mode." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1.
13. Merit *de congruo*, one kind is infallible on account of the divine promise, as the last disposition to first sanctifying grace, which the sinner infallibly merits; but another kind is that which does not have the divine promise joined to it, and to which the reward is owed from a certain fittingness alone, as are the remote dispositions to justification. Suarez, *De Gratia*, bk. 12, ch. 36, nn. 4-7. Although in infallible merit *de congruo* a divine promise is had, merit *de condigno* is not therefore had. For even with the divine promise, there still remains in that merit a defect of the condignity of the work, according to equality of proportion. Suarez, *De Grat.*, bk. 12, ch. 36, n. 4. "To merit *ex condigno*," says Cajetan on I-II, q. 114, a. 3, "is to merit in such a way that it is owed to him according to justice; so that it would be unjust for the reward not to be rendered to merit *ex condigno*. Hence also it received its name from the equal dignity of merit to reward."

14. Merit properly so called is prior in nature and causality to the reward; but it causes the reward because it is, after the manner of a moral efficient cause, and by no means does it cause it after the manner of a final cause, or that it may be. For the remunerator is moved by the merit to bestow the reward in retribution and compensation of that merit. Therefore merit is prior by nature, either as absolutely existing or as absolutely foreseen, so that it can move the remunerator to the retribution of that merit, which consequently it causes because it is, not that it may be. "Merit," says St. Thomas, "is the cause of the reward, not indeed after the manner of a final cause, for in this way the reward is rather the cause of merit; but rather, according to reduction to the efficient cause, insofar as merit makes one worthy of the reward, and through this disposes to the reward." *De Veritate*, q. 29, a. 6, ad 15.
15. If merit *de congruo* is compared with merit *de condigno*, although each is true merit, nevertheless the notion of merit is principally and perfectly in merit *de condigno*, secondarily and imperfectly in merit *de congruo*. Each is true merit; for each obtains the reward by the title of the work itself; in each, in view of the work, the remunerator renders the reward. But merit *de condigno* is perfect merit, because it brings condignity and equality of the meritorious work with the reward. But merit *de congruo* is less perfectly merit, because that title of the work does not attain to this condignity and equality; but the defect of this must be supplied by the bounty and liberality of the remunerator. Hence merit *de condigno* demands the reward from some justice; but merit *de congruo* demands the reward from the liberality of the giver. Therefore the notion of merit is analogous, not indeed by extrinsic and metaphorical analogy, but intrinsic, through a certain imperfect participation of merit in merit *de congruo*, but through perfect participation in merit *de condigno*. Therefore merit *de congruo* must be known through its relation to merit *de condigno*, of which it is a certain participation falling short of its perfection.
16. Since supernatural merit depends intrinsically upon grace, the increase and diminution of merit arise from a threefold head: from greater or lesser voluntariness, because merit is a free act; from greater service of God, because merit is service rendered to another; from the greater grace with which one acts, because merit before God is supernatural. "Since merit," says St. Thomas, "does not consist in a habit, but in an act, nor in any act whatever, but in that which is informed by the habit of grace, and since every meritorious act proceeds from the will, merit must have something from grace, and something from the will, and something also from the object of the act, whence the species of the act is drawn; and therefore from these three the efficacy of meriting can be measured: from grace, will, and object. For by as much as an act is informed by greater charity and grace, by so much is it more meritorious; similarly also, by as much as it is more voluntary, it has more of the notion of merit and of the praiseworthy; similarly also when the object is more arduous, by so much is the act more meritorious... But that some arduous thing increases the notion of merit it does not have from the difficulty of the labor, but from goodness, because by as much as something is better, by so much it is more elevated above the powers of the man working... except accidentally, namely insofar as toward that which is difficult someone rises up with greater attention and with a greater striving of the will." *II Sent.*, dist. 29, q. 1, a. 4.

17. Now, however, whether it be merit de condigno or merit de congruo, on the part of the meritorious work the following conditions are required:

- 1. For merit of reward before God there is required a proper and positive act of the will. - For merit properly so called contains an order to retribution because of service rendered to another, i.e., because of a work done for his utility or for his honor and glory. But this service is not done without some positive act. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, a. 5; II-II, q. 79, a. 1; Suarez, De Grat., bk. 12, ch. 2.
18. 2. It belongs to the notion of a meritorious act that it be free from necessity. - For indeed Sacred Scripture and the Fathers ascribe reward only to works freely done. Moreover, from the merit or demerit of human acts the freedom of the human will is deduced. Therefore merit or demerit includes freedom of acting. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3; q. 114, a. 3; Suarez, l. c., ch. 3.
19. 3. A meritorious work must be morally good. - In Sacred Scripture and among the Fathers it is never read that God will remunerate indifferent acts with reward, and much less evil acts, but only good and supernatural acts. Moreover an evil work is not worthy of reward, but of punishment. But an indifferent act either is not given in the individual, or if it is given, by its nature it does not demand reward rather than punishment. Lastly, merit is service rendered to another, of itself apt to obtain something after the manner of retribution or reward. But only a morally good work can redound to the service of God, to his honor and glory. Suarez, l. c., ch. 4.
20. 4. In order to have a meritorious work it is in no way required that it be a work of supererogation, or that the work be done spontaneously without the obligation of a precept. - Sacred Scripture and the Fathers everywhere teach that the reward of eternal life has been promised to the observation of the precepts. Moreover, man does not merit before God from the fact that he does something which is useful to God, but insofar as he works for his glory. But he works for his glory even in things commanded. Finally, a precept neither takes away nor diminishes man's freedom; it neither takes away nor diminishes the honorableness of the work; it neither takes away nor diminishes the notion of service; indeed rather it increases it, since it adds to the virtuous work the circumstance of formal or virtual obedience. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1, ad 1; Suarez, l. c., ch. 5.
21. 5. For theological merit it is required that the act be supernatural, or proceeding from the aid of grace. - For from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, all our merits are gifts of God. St. Augustine, Ep. 194, ch. 5, n. 19: "When God crowns our merits, he crowns nothing other than his own gifts." The reason is that merit and reward must be of the same order, so that if the reward exceeds the powers of nature, the merit also exceeds them; for there must be proportion between merit and reward. St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3; I-II, q. 109, a. 5; Suarez, l. c., ch. 33.

22. 6. That an act be meritorious, it is more probably required that it be from some supernatural motive. - For Sacred Scripture, when it promises eternal life to moral works, adds something which signifies that those works must be done from a supernatural motive. It promises eternal life to works done for Christ, for the name of Christ, in the name of Christ, etc. Moreover, Scripture and the Fathers teach that the just man lives by faith, that faith is the beginning, root, and foundation of justification, and consequently that man does not merit except through works done from faith. But faith proposes a supernatural end to our works. Indeed supernatural merit must have a relation to God, the supernatural end of man. Hence the Apostle at Heb. 11:6: "To those who... seek glory and incorruption and honor, he will render eternal life." Namely, to those who intend by their works glory and honor before God, and incorruptible or supernatural goods, God will repay eternal life. Furthermore those acts are meritorious of eternal life which are elicited by infused virtues. But infused virtues are distinguished in species from acquired virtues according to order to the ultimate end and according to their proper objects. "Intention makes the work good; faith directs the intention." St. Augustine, on Psalm 31, n. 4. "But, because what does not proceed from the fountain of faith does not arrive at eternal rewards, the condition of heavenly works is one thing, that of earthly works another." St. Leo the Great, Sermon 7 on Lent, ch. 3;

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 63, a. 4; Suarez, l. c., ch. 10; Maur., bk. 6, q. 92; Struggl, part 8. Cf. here n. 6 ff.

23. 7. Finally, for theological merit there is required an act absolutely existing in some difference of time. - The words of Christ, Luke 10:13, clearly prove this: "If in Tyre and Sidon the mighty works had been done which have been done in you, they would long ago have done penance, sitting in sackcloth and ashes." Here merits are had as conditionally existing, but nevertheless without reward; for in the following verse the same judgment is asserted as going to be upon these cities as upon Sodom. And indeed an efficient cause, although morally, as merit is, must be presupposed to its effect according to real existence, at least in the order of nature. But what would be future under a condition never existing, neither is, nor is future, nor was. And hence it does not have real existence.
24. On the part of the person meriting, in order that an act be meritorious, the state of a wayfarer is required. - The state of the way, positively, is the state of this mortal life, which according to the common and ordinary law is spent in this world; negatively, it is the state in which one has not yet obtained the vision and fruition of God, but tends to it through faith. - For indeed Sacred Scripture plainly teaches that the time of life alone is the time of merit, and that the time of death is the time of retribution. The Fathers also teach the same. The a priori reason is the will of God alone; the reason of fittingness is that merit has the notion of the way, reward the notion of the terminus. But the present life, in which we walk by faith, is the state of the way with respect to the future life, in which we shall see God face to face, and which has the notion of terminus with respect to the former. Hence the Blessed in heaven do not merit; likewise neither do the souls being purified merit, but they only satisfy by suffering. St. Thomas, I, q. 62, a. 9; III, q. 19, a. 3; Suarez, chs. 15, 34. - The Blessed "are not in a state of

acquiring according to anything of themselves; and therefore they merit neither for themselves nor for others, because what they now impetrate for us happens from this, that previously, while they were living, they merited that they should impetrate this." St. Thomas, III Sent., dist. 18, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; I, q. 62, a. 9.

25. On the part of God rewarding, for theological merit it is required that there be present a divine ordination of merit to reward, at least consequent, or such by which the work is accepted unto actual and efficacious merit of a determinate reward. - Such-and-such an ordination of merit to such-and-such a reward from the divine will is to be distinguished from a rigorous promise, by which God has obligated himself to giving such a reward to one so working. Theologians scarcely distinguish between the two; but it seems better that the distinction be made with Suarez, "for there could be ordination without promise, by establishing conditions sufficient for merit, and nevertheless not obligating himself to giving the reward, but reserving this to his own liberality; although, on the contrary, there cannot be a promise of reward without a previous ordination of merit." Suarez, l. c., ch. 17, n. 1. That ordination in two ways can be understood first antecedently, and it is the will antecedent the work itself, of accepting it, if it is done, for such a reward; secondly consequently, and it is the will following upon the work itself, accepting it, now actually posited, for such a reward. Merit is compared to this divine institution and ordination in such a way that from it it has that it is efficacious and actual, so to speak. For although before that divine ordination and acceptance an act can be called meritorious of itself, or in first act and aptitude, nevertheless in the being of actual merit and in its efficacy it is consummated through that ordination and acceptance. Therefore merit must be distinguished in first act and in aptitude for obtaining a reward; and thus merit is nothing other than a work condign and equal to the reward, or suitable and merely congruous for obtaining the same; and merit in second act and in efficacy of reward, and this is the exigency which merit has for reward, which is not present to it except from positive ordination and promise. Hence for merit in first act ordination and promise are not required, but these are required for merit in second act. Some ordination of God is necessary for theological merit, because God, who disposes all things sweetly and wisely, and does not add anything superfluous, has in fact disposed it so, as that well-known sentence indicates: "So great is the mercy of God, that he has willed those things to be our merits which are his gifts." Celestine Pope, Ep. to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 9. Moreover the proportion of dignity or congruity which is in the work itself, unless either law or pact or certainly some positive ordination is had, is not sufficient for having a perfect relation between merit and reward, as is evident from human affairs themselves. That dignity or congruity of the work can be only its foundation. Suarez, l. c., ch. 17.
26. As regards merit de condigno, on the part of the meritorious work itself, in order that the supernatural act of a just man be condignly meritorious of the substantial reward, it is not required that it be elicited or commanded by charity. - For the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 16, indiscriminately attributes merit of eternal life to all good works done in God. "The principal place of meriting," says St. Thomas, III Sent., dist. 30, a. 5, "is in charity; but in the others, according as they are informed by charity." Therefore the root of charity is required, since works must be done in God, but it is not required that they be elicited by charity or formally

commanded by charity. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 8; II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3; Suarez, De Grat., bk. 12, l. c., chs. 8, 9, 10, 12; Struggl, q. 2, a. 4.

27. To have merit de condigno, as has already been said, cf. n. 9, there is required in the work a foundation of condignity and of proportion with the reward. - For "merit and demerit are spoken of in order to retribution, which is made according to justice." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3. But the notion of justice imports a certain equality of things with one another. St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, a. 3; Suarez, l. c., ch. 17.
28. For merit de condigno, on the part of the person meriting, the state of grace is necessary. - This is clearly proved from Sacred Scripture, which promises eternal life only to the adopted sons of God. And the reason is clear, for then a sinful man, if it were otherwise, could before the remission of sin merit eternal life by a special help of God, while at the same time he merits eternal death, because he is a sinner. Therefore merit de condigno is founded not only in the excellence of the work, but also in the dignity of the person and friendship with God. Moreover, he who has merit de condigno has a right to eternal life. But this right belongs only to sons and friends by virtue of sanctifying grace. Therefore only those who are in the state of grace can have merit de condigno of eternal life. And the same is consequently evident concerning merit de condigno of habitual grace, which is the pledge of glory. Finally the dignity of the work is especially drawn from the dignity of the person working; for operations are of suppositis. But without the state of grace there is not had the dignity of the person working with respect to eternal life; for a person without grace remains in the natural order, most distant from supernatural beatitude. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 2; Suarez, l. c., ch. 14; Bellarmine, De Iustific., bk. 5, ch. 12.
29. Therefore acts which are elicited with supernatural help of grace have of themselves only suitability to some supernatural reward. But condignity is not had in them except from the very dignity of the person. Indeed the condignity of merit according to the Angelic Doctor is considered both according to the virtue of the Holy Spirit, who is the principal principle of the supernatural meritorious act, and according to the dignity of grace, by which man becomes a sharer of the divine nature, and consequently can work worthily of God. Then it plainly appears how the reward of eternal life, which is the proper inheritance of the sons of God, not of servants, is given as a condign reward not to servants, but to sons, namely to those who are endowed with sanctifying grace, through which they are constituted sons of God. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 3. Cf. here nn. 11, 35.
30. Even if dignity and proportion are supposed in the works, nevertheless, in order that they be actually meritorious de condigno of such a reward, on the part of God rewarding there is necessary a divine ordination, through which glory, for example, has been proposed as a reward to be obtained through such works, and by which God has decreed to accept such works unto the merit of such glory. "The mode and measure of human virtue is from God. And therefore the merit of man before God cannot exist except according to the presupposition of the divine ordination; namely, that man should obtain from God through his own operation, as a reward, that to which God has deputed for him the power of operating; just as also natural things obtain through their proper motions and operations that to which they have been

ordered by God; yet differently, because the rational creature moves itself to acting through free choice, whence its action has the notion of merit, which is not found in other creatures." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1. Now, however, besides the intrinsic ordination of grace itself, some extrinsic ordination is needed, already explained above at the beginning of this number. For merit de condigno is certainly spoken of in order to retribution, which is made according to justice. But retribution according to justice cannot be had if the other does not accept that merit. For retribution according to justice restores equality. But unless the other accepts that merit, no inequality can arise between the one meriting and the remunerator; this inequality arises only then, when the remunerator accepts the merit. Therefore for merit de condigno there is required a divine ordination by which God accepts such merit, and by which he proposes such a reward to be obtained. Suarez, l. c., ch. 17.

31. Once divine ordination alone is admitted, insofar as this is distinguished from any promise and convention, the meritorious act is ordered by the seed of grace by God to causing eternal life, just as other natural acts are ordered to their own termini. Besides this ordination Cajetan denies another pact, or promise, or, as he says against Scotus, another superadded ordination. Therefore an act through grace is meritorious from this alone, that it is from grace, that it is of such a nature, and God cannot deny reward to it, since God, who ordered it, cannot act against himself. And this, says Cajetan, is founded on the words of the Apostle, if sons, heirs. "Because to an obedient son and one working as a son, the paternal inheritance is owed by the very strict right alone, so that he cannot be deprived except unjustly. But grace alone constitutes sons of God, with any ordination whatsoever excluded. Therefore." And it is confirmed because "a human act, from the fact that it is morally good or evil, has the notion of merit or demerit even before God. For from this it follows that, from this very fact that the act is good, it is ordered by God to reward." On I-II, q. 114, a. 3. But if the discussion is of the intrinsic ordination of grace, insofar as by the force of grace alone the just man is an adopted son of God, having a right to eternal life, and his works are worthy of eternal life, without another promise, this indeed is most true, but merit and reward are not yet had properly and formally. For a distinction must be made. "For it is one thing for a work to be worthy of some wage or reward, but another for such a wage or reward to be owed to the work from justice. For it can happen that someone labors a whole day in another's vineyard, and his labor is worthy of a day's stipend, and nevertheless the other is not bound from justice to pay him that stipend, unless he has made an agreement with him. So the matter stands in the proposed case. The works of a just man existing in the state of grace are worthy in themselves and have proportion with eternal life, because they proceed from grace, which is the seed of glory; nevertheless God is not bound from justice to compensate those works, with pact and promise excluded. Hence it can rightly and briefly be said that works of this sort, with promise excluded, are worthy of eternal life, not by dignity of justice, but of proportion of means to end. But once the promise is posited, they merit eternal life from justice." Becanus, Tr. 4, De Mer. Cath., ch. 5, q. 1, n. 12. "The sixth condition (of merit)," says Billuart, De Grat., diss. 6, art. 1, "is the ordination or promise and pact of God ordering a good work to a prize or reward: not that the good work has its intrinsic value or condignity from that promise, but because beyond the dignity, which it has wholly from grace, there is necessary a promise concerning the reward to be rendered, in

order that he who has worked well from grace may have a right to the reward, and God may be obligated to render it to him. Thus commonly."

32. Merit de condigno before God is in reality preceded by the divine promise made to such a work, or, what is the same, to a man under the condition of such a work. For this is positively evident from Sacred Scripture and the tradition of the Fathers, and agrees better with reason. For merit de condigno in second act, besides condignity and equality, imports an actual right to the reward on the part of the one meriting, and a debt on the part of the one rewarding. But God cannot be obligated by another, except by himself and by his own promise. Hence the Council of Mainz, ch. 8, says: The works of the just are worthy of the remuneration of eternal life, because God has mercifully promised reward to those working well. Bellarmine, *De Iustific.*, bk. 5, ch. 14. And if St. Thomas says that God is not simply a debtor to others, but to himself, the Angelic Doctor attends to the first root of that debt, which cannot be other than God himself, interposing his own promise. Therefore because "our action does not have the notion of merit except from the presupposition of the divine ordination, it does not follow that God becomes simply debtor to us, but to himself, insofar as it is owed that his ordination be fulfilled." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1, ad 3. - Therefore the merit of a just man before God is certainly not from the rigor of justice. The rigor of justice requires such a contract that between the contracting parties no grace and liberality intervene in which the merit is founded. But this does not occur between God and man, because the whole merit of man is founded in the grace and liberality of God, especially in justifying grace, which is given to him gratuitously, and in the liberal promise of God, by which he willed to repay reward to our merits, which by many titles are owed to him. There is added also, according to the common opinion of the Scholastics, that God remunerates the works of the just above the condign. - Nevertheless, to render a reward condign to merits certainly belongs to justice, according to equality or proportion to be preserved between reward and merit. But this justice or equality to be preserved can rest only on the wise Governance of the Community, as is drawn from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 4, and therefore on legal justice; it can rest on a promise wholly gratuitous, and therefore on fidelity; and it can also rest on some convention and pact, and therefore on justice at least in some way commutative. Hence to render a reward condign to merits will be a work of justice also, if the debt and the obligation of the same are considered. There are those who in theological merit deny every debt of justice in God, even with God's promise supposed, and admit only an obligation of fidelity, namely insofar as God would be unfaithful if he did not keep what was promised, but would do injury to no one. But there are also those who admit a debt of justice from the divine promise, by which God is bound to render the promised remuneration not only by a debt of fidelity, but also by a debt of justice. - Lugo, *De Incarn.*, disp. 3, sect. 1, 2; Suarez, l. c., ch. 18; Bellarmine, *De Iustific.*, bk. 5, ch. 17.
33. This liberal promise of God being supposed, of eternal life "which God has promised to those loving him," Jas. 1:12, it follows that God owes to us, or to our merits, the reward of eternal life from some justice, and that he does not owe it to himself alone from his mere liberality and fidelity, as is the most common opinion. "The impetration of prayer," says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 6, ad 2, "rests on mercy; but merit of condignity rests on justice; and therefore by praying man impetrates many things from divine mercy which nevertheless he does not merit

according to justice." Cf. also *ibid.*, next article, ad 1. Hence the same St. Thomas in II Sent., dist. 27, a. 3, in the earlier response to 4, saying that "God is not made debtor to us," adds: "Unless perhaps from a promise, because he himself has promised reward to those working good things, and therefore it is not unfitting if someone can merit from him, from which he is in some way a debtor." And Sacred Scripture plainly says that eternal life is a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render, 2 Tim. 4:7-8; that it is rendered according to debt, Rom. 4:4; that it is a reward, Wis. 5:16; Matt. 5:12; retribution, Col. 3:23-24; remuneration, Heb. 10:35; retribution, which is owed from convention, Matt. 20. Therefore eternal life is owed by more than simple fidelity, but from some true justice. "God is not unjust, who defrauds the just of the reward of justice." St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 4, ch. 3; Bellarmine, *De Iustif.*, bk. 5, chs. 14, 18. The reason is clear. For, as Sylvius rightly argues on I-II, q. 114, a. 3, question 5, conclusion 1, "a promise under the condition of a condign work induces an obligation from justice, if it has been accepted and that work is furnished; but God promised eternal life under the condition of a good work, which, when it proceeds from grace in a just man, has condignity; and there is no doubt that the just man has accepted that promise either explicitly or implicitly. Therefore from this an obligation of justice arises. But God is he who made that promise. Therefore God is he who owes. For he is the debtor of the wage who hired the laborer and promised the wage."

34. This justice participates in commutative and distributive justice at once. For the formal notion of commutative justice is situated in the exchange of what is given and what is received, preserving equality of thing to thing, and assigning to each his own right. Now then, between merit and retribution a true exchange of what is given and what is received intervenes; for one thing is really given for another. But God, remunerating meritorious works, preserves that equality. For he who "renders to each according to his works," Matt. 16:27; Rom. 2:6; who "makes a place for each according to the merit of his works," Ecclus. 16:15; who "gives to each his reward according to his labor," 1 Cor. 3:8, plainly repays reward equal to merits. Moreover the lord of the vineyard "agreed with his workers for a denarius," Matt. 20:14, and assigns to each what is his own. "Take," he says, "what is yours and go." And the Apostle demands "his deposit" from the most just judge by the equity of justice. "I am certain, because the just judge is able to keep my deposit unto that day." 2 Tim. 1:12. Indeed the right of reward, acquired by one's own labors and equal works, and founded in the pact of the remunerator, "I will give if you do," is a proper right, which in moral estimation is equated to possession itself, or to a right in the thing. Therefore, if in the justice of God repaying reward to merits there is present a true exchange of what is given and received, if equality of reward and merit is not lacking, if a proper right of man with respect to God, even though built upon the pact of God as upon a solid and most firm foundation, is abundantly found, assuredly that justice contains the true and formal notion of commutative justice. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 16, after it had said that eternal life must be faithfully rendered to the good works and merits of the just, according as fidelity is general to every promise, immediately specifying it adds: "For this is that crown of justice which the Apostle said was laid up for him after his combat and course, to be rendered to him by the just judge, and not only to him, but also to all who love his coming." Suarez, *De Grat.*, bk. 12, ch. 30.

35. The Angelic Doctor acknowledges the equality of condign merit to reward in II Sent., dist. 27, a. 3, and I-II, q. 114, a. 3, where at the third objection he says: "It must be said that the grace of the Holy Spirit, which we have in the present, although it is not equal to glory in act, is nevertheless equal in virtue, as the seed of a tree, in which there is the virtue toward the whole tree. And similarly through grace the Holy Spirit inhabits man, who is the sufficient cause of eternal life; hence he is also said to be the pledge of our inheritance, 2 Cor. 1." St. Thomas acknowledges a right in man in the body of the same article, saying: The price of the work is also considered according to the dignity of grace, through which man, having been made a sharer of the divine nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the inheritance is owed by the very right of adoption, according to that in Rom. 8:17: if sons, then heirs." Likewise the same Angelic Doctor explicitly acknowledges an exchange of what is given and received, and therefore commutative justice: "The form of divine judgment is considered according to the notion of commutative justice, according as rewards are recompensed to merits and punishments to sins." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 61, a. 4, ad 1. "Proportional retribution belongs to commutative justice when it is considered according to a legal debt, as if it is confirmed by pact that so much be repaid for so much." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 106, a. 1, ad 2; III, q. 85, a. 3.
36. But the Angelic Doctor does not remove every commutative justice from God, but only commutative justice properly so called, which includes equality of quantity, or perfect equality; not commutative justice less properly such, which consists in respective equality and equality of proportion. "But this pertains," says St. Thomas, "to the mode of commutative justice, not indeed according to equality of quantity preserved, according as is required in commutative justice properly so called, but preserved according to equality of proportion; because namely God is related to that which he does superabundantly as the creature is to that in which it is deficient... Between master and servant there cannot be commutative justice properly so called; for no equality according to quantity can be constituted between them, since everything that belongs to the servant belongs to the master; nevertheless some mode of commutative justice is preserved, insofar as equality of proportion is found between them. Hence also the Philosopher distinguishes dominative justice from political justice, which is justice properly so called; and in this way also there can be justice of God toward creatures." IV Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, c., ad 4.
37. But the retribution of eternal life participates in distributive justice by the very fact that each one receives a reward equal to his merits. For according as the merits will be greater or lesser, the reward will be greater or lesser, preserving due proportion with them, not from insufficiency of the reward, but from the very nature of the thing, because from one equality another necessarily results, with a multitude of persons and a variety of rewards supposed. Suarez, *De Grat.*, bk. 12, ch. 32. "In the rendering of reward to merits, the form of distribution is preserved more than of commutation, since he renders to each according to his works, whereas God receives nothing from us." St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3. Indeed God receives nothing from us, and nevertheless God has been made debtor to us, as has already been said, by his promise. Hence Augustine, Sermon 16 on the Words of the Lord, says: "God has been made debtor to us, not by receiving something, but by promising what pleased him." And St. Bernard, at the end of the book *On Grace and Free Choice*: "Promised indeed from

mercy, but nevertheless to be paid from justice." And God preserves the form and proportion of justice between work and reward, as is indicated in Matt. 7:2; 10:41, and 1 Cor. 3:8. "Each shall receive his proper reward according to his labor." Therefore in the retribution of eternal life the form of commutative and distributive justice is preserved. For God not only gives to each as much reward as he has merited, which is the form of commutative justice, in which equality of thing to thing, or of what is given and what is received, is preserved; but he also preserves this proportion between merits and rewards, that the greater merits each one has, the greater rewards he receives. Becanus, Tr. 4, De Merito Cathol., ch. 5, q. 8, n. 6.

38. A meritorious work proceeding from grace and the Holy Spirit can be compared to God as retributor. And thus only the notion of dominative or paternal justice is had. For between God and any creature whatever, much less than between father and son, there can be justice simply. For man in grace is a pure creature, and an adoptive son obtains no more justice before the father than a son simply. And it is confirmed from that saying of the Apostle, 2 Tim. 4: which the Lord, the just judge, will render. But if it is referred to the reward, namely to eternal life, thus there is the notion of justice simply and equality, yet equality not in act, but in virtue, as is the seed of a tree, in which there is the virtue toward the whole tree, a fountain toward springing water, a pledge toward a debt. "Concerning the notion of justice," says Cajetan on I-II, q. 114, a. 1, "found in the merit of man before God, note that such merit, beyond the relations which it has to the man meriting and to God as preordaining, has two others: one to the reward, another to the renderer of the reward. And indeed, if the merit of man is compared to God, justice simply will never be found. But if the merit of man is compared to the reward owed according to itself, thus it is not unfitting that the merit should be equivalent to the reward to be rendered, and that an act of so great a value be ordered by God to an equivalent reward. And since the reward to be rendered by God, however much according to itself it may be equivalent to the merit, nevertheless as it is rendered by God, exceeds the merit of man, for whom there cannot be equality simply to God in anything; therefore simply there cannot be merit simply of man toward God, but according to proportion, although absolutely there can be merit simply and justice of man toward the reward itself."
39. Finally, for merit de condigno it is required that one merit for himself. - "Our work has the notion of merit from two things: first indeed from the force of divine motion, and thus someone merits ex condigno; in another way it has the notion of merit according as it proceeds from free choice, insofar as we voluntarily do something; and on this part there is merit of congruity, because it is congruous that while man uses his virtue well, God according to superexcellent virtue should operate more excellently. From this it is clear that by merit of condignity no one can merit first grace for another, except Christ alone, because each one of us is moved by God through the gift of grace, so that he himself may arrive at eternal life; and therefore merit of condignity does not extend beyond this motion. But the soul of Christ was moved by grace not only so that he himself might arrive at the glory of eternal life, but also so that he might lead others unto it, in as he is head of the Church and author of human salvation... but by merit of congruity he can merit first grace for another; for since a man constituted in grace fulfills the will of God, it is congruous, according to the proportion of friendship, that God fulfill the will of man in the salvation of another, although sometimes

there can be an impediment on the part of him whose justification some holy person desires." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 6; Suarez, l. c., ch. 16.

40. For merit de congruo it is sufficient that the conditions universally required for merit be present, and that even one of the requisites for merit de condigno be lacking. - For that the state of grace is not necessary for merit de congruo is the common opinion of theologians, among whom are St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 4, and Suarez, l. c., ch. 34, nn. 1-3. But that for merit de congruo that condition of meriting for oneself is not necessary is also the common opinion of theologians. The same St. Thomas teaches thus, I-II, q. 114, a. 6; Suarez, l. c., ch. 35. As regards the promise, a promise of reward under the condition of such a work is not repugnant to merit de congruo, nor does it immediately render the merit de condigno. For to have merit de condigno, promise alone is not sufficient, even under the condition of a work, but it must suppose the condignity of the work, according to equality of proportion. Cf. Suarez, l. c., ch. 24, n. 37; ch. 36, nn. 4-6. But a promise is not necessary for merit de congruo. But according as merit de congruo has the promise of reward joined to it or lacks it, one merit de congruo is infallible, i.e., having an infallible retribution, which at least cannot be denied without infidelity; another is fallible, i.e., whose retribution can be suspended or denied, because when it is repaid, it is given not from any precise obligation, but only from a certain fittingness or congruity. - Furthermore, for merit de congruo there are required the conditions universally necessary for merit, for merit de congruo is true merit. They suffice: for 1. equality of the work can be lacking, because reward is owed to merit de congruo not from justice but only from a certain fittingness. 2. The state of justice can be lacking, because when the state of justice is lacking, the value of the condignity of the work with the reward is everywhere lacking, not the value of congruence also of the same work with the reward. 3. The promise of God can be lacking, for in order that an act be meritorious de congruo it is sufficient that in itself it have a certain proportionate goodness, so that by reason of such a work, or in view of it, God can confer some benefit on man. But an act can be of this kind, although it does not have a promise of such a reward. For 1. that proportionate goodness of the act is in some way intrinsic to that reward, and in no way depends on the promise, which is extrinsic to it. 2. That rendering of the reward in view of the work itself can also be made without any previous promise, but through God's gratuitous acceptance following the work. 3. The condition of meriting for oneself can be lacking. For according to the law of friendship, it is congruous that a friend do the honorable will of a friend. But true friendship intervenes between man and God. Therefore it is congruous that God fulfill the will of man unto the salvation of another. St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3, *ibid.*, a. 4; I-II, q. 114, a. 6. - Merit de condigno is perfect merit; merit de congruo is imperfect merit. As all the requisite conditions are demanded for everything perfect, so for the imperfect the defect of even one required condition suffices.
41. Lastly, as regards the object of merit: 1. First actual grace in no way falls under merit. - For we would merit it only by acts of nature, which cannot be.
42. 2. We cannot merit de condigno a second actual grace, but efficacious. - For otherwise it would follow either that a just man working well is confirmed in grace by the force of his

own merit; or that one who has fallen into sin after justification did not have merit de condigno.

43. 3. We can merit de congruo other helps of grace, even efficacious ones. - For God is accustomed to accept the good works both of the just man and of the sinner, from his goodness and indulgence, by which he does not deny further grace, often joined with effect, to one doing from the powers of grace what is in himself. Therefore we can merit for ourselves richer and efficacious graces for conquering temptations, and for receiving, preserving, and increasing sanctifying grace.
44. 4. The just man can merit de condigno actual graces, insofar as they are of themselves sufficient, so that he can cooperate with them and be saved, if he wills. - For "all those things fall under merit de condigno which are necessary for a just man, after the first grace has been received, for obtaining eternal life. But such are the helps of actual grace. Therefore these helps fall under merit de condigno. And it is confirmed... from the opposite; because if the just man could not merit the helps of grace which are necessary for him for the attainment of eternal life, now he could not merit the very attainment of eternal life, which is absurd." Becanus, *De Grat.*, ch. 5, q. 6, n. 2; Valencia, q. 6, *De Grat.*, part 4, assertions 4, 5. Cf. here n. 51.
45. 5. We cannot merit de condigno first justifying grace. For merit de condigno is not had without the state of grace. Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 8; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 5. - We can merit first justifying grace de congruo. "And thus God gives grace to the unworthy, because to those who are not sufficiently worthy for this; but nevertheless they have some disposition for receiving, from which they are said in some way to merit grace ex congruo; nor from this does it follow that he is unjust, but liberal." St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4. The dispositions by which we merit the aforesaid grace de congruo are acts of faith, hope, charity, and penance.
46. 6. It is of faith that the just can merit an increase of grace and glory, from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, canon 32. - It is disputed whether they can also merit de condigno first glory, to which man is accepted by the force of sanctifying grace first infused. Some deny it, others affirm it, among whom is St. Thomas, I-II, q. 112, a. 2, ad 1. "A certain preparation of man," says the holy Doctor, "for having grace is simultaneous with the very infusion of grace, and such an operation is indeed meritorious, but not of grace, which is already had, but of glory, which is not yet had," and this evidently is first glory. Suarez, bk. 12, ch. 28. Sacred Scripture, promising glory as a wage to good works and merits, in the proper, natural, and usual sense, does not promise only a part of glory and an increase of glory, but promises glory simply, or all glory and its substance. "If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments." Matt. 19:17. Likewise the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 16, absolutely hands down that for the just "eternal life is to be proposed, both as grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Christ Jesus, and as a reward to be rendered, according to God's promise, to their good works and merits." And canon 32 numbers under merit not only the increase of glory, but also simply eternal life. For by saying first simply eternal life, it includes all glory; then by

adding increase of glory it plainly declares that by eternal life it understood the very substance of glory from its beginning, which is the same as first glory. Therefore that act of contrition, for example, by which man prepares himself and is proximately disposed for justifying grace, is simultaneous in time with sanctifying grace, for grace is infused in an instant. But that contrition in the first instant of nature, since it is the act of a person not yet sanctified by sanctifying grace, indeed merits grace *de congruo*, but cannot merit glory *de condigno*. But in the second instant of nature, that same act is now dignified by sanctifying grace, and merits first glory *de condigno*.

47. 7. The just man cannot merit *de condigno* for himself restoration after a fall. - For by the very fact that the just man sins he becomes unworthy of eternal life and worthy of eternal punishment, and consequently he can immediately be punished with this punishment, and in no way be disposed again to justification and to eternal life. Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 8; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 7.
48. 8. The just man can probably merit *de congruo* restoration after a fall. - The probability of this assertion is founded on a certain fittingness of divine justice taken more broadly, namely that God, notwithstanding a supervening sin, remember the preceding merits, and in view of them stir up the sinner to rise again from sin; especially where outstanding merits have preceded, and the subsequent sin is committed from some vehement temptation or human frailty. It is confirmed, because, experience bearing witness and the Fathers standing as sponsors, the just man more easily rises again from a fall; and because the just man can merit grace *de congruo* even for another sinner; therefore also for himself as sinner.
49. 9. We cannot merit final perseverance *de condigno*. - For from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers perseverance is uncertain; and therefore there is not present a promise of it, which is necessary for merit *de condigno*. It is confirmed from the fact that it is evident that the just, after most excellent merits, sometimes have not obtained perseverance.
50. 10. We can merit final perseverance *de congruo*. - For it seems altogether congruous that one working well and soliciting God by frequent prayer, while he does not place a voluntary obstacle, should obtain the grace of salvation; partly because the most sweet governance of God and his love toward his own require this; partly because the utility of men requires that, with the heavenly reward proposed, they be sharpened both to praying well and insistently and to working.
51. Hence it is clear that merit *de congruo* can quite well stand together with impetration. In the latter, the reason of bestowing gifts is God's mercy and the promise on account of the merits of Jesus Christ. But in the former, the reason of bestowing goods is at once God's liberality and at least some dignity of the work offered to God, which God regards with his own benignity.
52. 11. Temporal goods, insofar as they are useful for works of the virtues, by which we are led into eternal life, just as they can be called goods simply, so also fall simply and directly under merit. But insofar as they are considered according to themselves, just as they are

not goods of man simply, so they do not fall under merit simply, but in a certain respect. "It must be said," says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 10, "that what falls under merit is a prize or reward, which has the notion of some good. But the good of man is twofold, one simply, the other in a certain respect. The good of man simply is his ultimate end... and consequently all those things which are ordered as leading to this end; and such things fall under merit simply. But the good in a certain respect and not simply of man is what is good for him as now, or what is good for him in a certain respect; and things of this sort do not fall under merit simply, but in a certain respect. According to this, therefore, it must be said that if temporal goods are considered insofar as they are useful for works of the virtues by which we are led into eternal life, according to this they fall directly and simply under merit, as also the increase of grace (which is merited *de condigno*), and all those things by which man is helped to arrive at beatitude after first grace. For God gives to just men so much of temporal goods, and also of evils, as is expedient for them for arriving at eternal life; and to that extent temporal things of this sort are goods simply. Hence it is said in Ps. 33:2: Those fearing the Lord shall not be diminished of every good; and elsewhere, Ps. 36:25: I have not seen the just man forsaken, etc. But if temporal goods of this sort are considered according to themselves, thus they are not goods of man simply, but in a certain respect; and thus they do not fall under merit simply, but in a certain respect, namely insofar as men are moved by God to doing certain things temporally, in which they attain their purpose, with God favoring; so that just as eternal life is simply the reward of works of justice through relation to the divine motion... so temporal goods considered in themselves have the notion of reward, with respect had to the divine motion by which the wills of men are moved to pursuing these things; although sometimes in these things men do not have a right intention." Hence according to the mind of St. Thomas, not only the just, but also sinners, can by morally good works merit temporal goods *de congruo*. But temporal goods are not given to the just according to the proportion and quantity of merits, but according as they more or less conduce to the attainment of eternal life. Hence it happens that many just persons are left in poverty, others abound in riches, others obtain temporal goods moderately, according as it is more expedient for them unto salvation.

53. 12. Merit in favor of another is proper to Christ alone, as head of all, and from whose fullness John 1:16 testifies that we all have received. Nevertheless we can merit *de congruo* for another even first habitual grace and helps of actual grace, and the very first actual grace which we cannot merit for ourselves. The reason has already been indicated in n. 39. Yet merit of this sort is not infallible, as is plainly evident from the reasoning of St. Thomas related in the cited number and from Sacred Scripture. God said to Samuel: "How long will you mourn Saul, since I have rejected him, that he should not reign in Israel?" 1 Kings 16:1. Likewise Ezek. 14:16: "Those three men (namely Noah, Daniel, and Job) shall deliver neither sons nor daughters, but they alone shall be delivered." And Jer. 15:1: "If Moses and Samuel stood before me, my soul is not toward this people."
54. But from the fact that we offer our meritorious works to God for others, our merit is not thereby diminished, but rather increased. For since charity of neighbor impels us to procure

the salvation of others, we do better works, by which the reward of eternal life will be repaid to us more abundantly. Hence merit de congruo does not exclude merit de condigno of the good works of the just, which besides this meritorious force also have impetratory and satisfactory force.

A. M. D. G.

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