CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

Dogmatic and Moral

in Compendium

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BOOK III

On the First Commandment of the Decalogue

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Book III — On the First Commandment of the Decalogue — That is, on faith, hope, and charity, by which God is worshipped

Dissertation I — On faith, and hope

Chapter I — The propositions condemned by the Church in the matter of faith are recounted

I.

1. *An infidel who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused of infidelity.*
2. *Faith is not considered to fall under a special precept and of itself.*
3. *It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in a lifetime.*
4. *If one be interrogated by the public Power, I counsel him to confess the faith openly, as glorious to God and to the faith; to keep silence I do not condemn as of itself sinful.*
5. *The will cannot make the assent of faith in itself more firm than the weight of the reasons impelling to assent deserves.*
6. *Hence one can prudently repudiate the supernatural assent which he has.*
7. *The assent of supernatural faith, useful to salvation, stands with a merely probable knowledge of revelation; nay, with a fear whereby one fears lest God has not spoken.*
8. *Only faith in one God seems necessary with the necessity of means, but not explicit faith in God as rewarder.*
9. *Faith broadly so called, from the testimony of creatures or a similar motive, suffices for justification.*
10. *A man is capable of absolution, however much he labor under ignorance of the mysteries of the faith, and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he know not the mystery of the most Holy Trinity and of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.*
11. *It suffices to have believed those mysteries once.*
12. Two other propositions in this matter the Gallican Clergy proscribed in the year 1730. The first is this: *The Christian religion is evidently credible: for it is evident that whoever embraces it is prudent; but it is not evidently true, for either it teaches obscurely, or the things it teaches are obscure. Nay, those who say the Christian religion is evidently true must needs confess that it is evidently false. Infer hence that it is not evident: 1. That there now exists on earth any true Religion — for whence have you it that not all flesh has corrupted its way? 2. That, of all the religions on earth, the Christian is the most verisimilar — for have you traversed all lands, or do you know them to have been traversed by others? 3. That the Divinity of Christ was manifested by the Apostles and by the demons — for if you teach this, you must teach that Christ is manifestly God. 4. That the oracles of the Prophets were poured forth by the breathing of God — for what would you oppose to me, whether I deny that those were true vaticinations, or affirm them conjectures? 5. That the miracles recorded as wrought by Christ were true — although no one can prudently deny these.*

The censure which the Gallican Clergy pronounced upon the aforesaid proposition is this: *The doctrine contained in this proposition is impious, blasphemous, erroneous, and favors the enemies of the Christian religion.*

13. The other is this: *It is not evident, with moral evidence properly so called, and physical evidence, that the Christian Religion is true.*

Censure: *This proposition, containing doctrine consonant with the preceding proposition, is temerarious, and leads into error.*

14. *Purely negative infidelity, in those to whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin.* It was condemned by Pius V and Gregory XIII.
15. *Nothing is to be believed which exceeds the power of our intellect.* The Council of Rheims condemned this proposition of Peter Abelard in the year 1148.
16. *When in great sinners all love is wanting, faith also is wanting; and even if they seem to believe, it is not divine faith, but human.* Similar is proposition 51 of Paschasius Quesnel.

Chapter II — A census of propositions which seem lax, culled from the Casuists

I. "And indeed in practice I judge that absolution should never, or most rarely, be denied on account of ignorance of Christian doctrine: because ignorant rustics do not conveniently have a Teacher, and the Confessor can instruct them; nor have they any great capacity for learning. Nay (as we shall say at number 23), *this perfect instruction is not necessary for absolving them*." Thomas Sanchez, book 2 of the Summa, chapter 3, number 21.

Let the religious censors now weigh how unjustly they have carped at a typographical error, and out of place, since the doctrine is in very deed lax. For that passage is straightway retracted by Fr. Sanchez, and he substitutes: *nay, this perfect instruction is not necessary.*

II. "So long as an Infidel holds himself persuaded that his Sect is probable, although the contrary be more probable, he would indeed be bound, when placed in the article of death, to embrace the true faith, which he judges more probable — as being placed in that article in which his final salvation is at stake, and hence bound to embrace the part which he judges safer and more probable; but outside that article he is not bound, because he may still prudently think that he can persevere in his Sect, and time remains for examining the matter better. Add that the mysteries of the faith are so sublime, and Christian morals so repugnant to the laws of flesh and blood, that not any greater probability whatever is reputed sufficient to induce the obligation of believing." Thomas Sanchez, book 11 [recte 2] on the Decalogue, chapter 1, number 6; Moya, part 11, on treatise 6 of the Appendix, disputation 5, question 2. This doctrine brings Pyrrhonism into the business of Religion.

III. "That assent once had, this affirmative precept of faith of itself directly obliges no further: because on the one hand no certain and determinate time can be assigned, either by the law of Christ or by that of the Church, at which the precept of faith of itself directly obliges as to the internal act ... therefore Christ the Lord is prudently believed not to have willed to impose a precept of faith distinct of itself." Patritius Sporer, treatise 2 on the Decalogue, chapter 2, section 3, § 3.

IV. "I think that the Faithful are never of themselves and directly obliged, by the precepts of faith, to believe the mysteries either implicitly or explicitly by force of necessity." Tamburini, book 2 on the Decalogue, chapter 1, § 1, number 9.

V. "Does the precept of faith of itself oblige to an act of belief once in each year? ... I answer, certainly as more probable, that it does not oblige: because there is nothing from which such an obligation may be gathered." Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament, treatise 2 on faith, disputation 2, question 37.

VI. "I answer as more probable that this divine precept in no way obliges of itself, or by force of the precept itself, to eliciting acts of faith in the article of death: because neither reason nor any text compels one to assert the opposite." The same Leander, treatise 2 on the Decalogue, chapter 2, section 3, § 3, number 19; and others.

VII. "Nay, I think it sufficiently probable that for a great cause — for example, to avoid death, or to carry off victory from the enemy — Christians can use a garment instituted for professing a false Sect: for example, the priestly garment of the Turks, or a banner on which Mahomet is depicted." Antonio of the Holy Spirit, treatise 1, disputation 1, section 6, number 26, page 4.

VIII. "Rustics, and other simpler men in Germany, who are held for heretics, and yet are not pertinacious, can be absolved by their Parish priests. The reason is that they are not formal heretics, and have the catholic faith received in baptism, which is not lost except by erring pertinaciously." Busembaum, in La-Croix, book 2, chapter 4, doubt 3, number 5.

IX. "Even after the promulgation of the Gospel has been made, explicit knowledge of the Trinity, or of the mystery of the Incarnation, is not necessary with the necessity of means, but only of precept; and thus salvation can befall someone without his explicitly knowing that the Son of God was incarnate and suffered for us." Castropalao, Tome I, treatise 4, disputation 1, point 9, number 7.

X. "One doubting in faith with a voluntary but merely suspensive doubt is not a heretic." Torrecilla, Tome 1 of the Summa, treatise 3, disputation 1, chapter 1, section 10, number 144.

XI. "That anyone be held as a heretic in the internal forum, it is needful that he know and advert that in his opinion he proceeds against what has been defined by the Church, contemning her authority." Torrecilla, Tome 1 of the Summa, treatise 3, disputation 1, chapter 1.

Chapter III — On Faith, and its division

I. Question I. *What is faith?* Answer. Theological faith, as distinct from the other virtues, is described by the Apostle in Hebrews 11 in these words: *Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not*. The common notion among the Theologians is this: *Faith is an infused habit, by which we firmly assent to the truths revealed by God and proposed by the Church.* Theological faith, therefore, rests upon the divine authority; and this revelation is established for us through the divine Scriptures, the proposal of the Church coming in addition.

II. Question II. *Of how many kinds is faith?* Answer. Faith is divided into actual and habitual. Actual faith is a supernatural assent, firm and certain, excluding all doubt, given to the things revealed by God on account of the authority of that same divine revelation. Habitual faith is an infused virtue, which renders us permanently apt for eliciting acts of faith with the help of actual grace. Again, it is distributed into formed, or living, faith, which is nourished by habitual grace and charity, which works through love and brings forth fruits worthy of eternal life; and into unformed, or dead, faith, which lacks habitual grace and charity. The former is found in the just, the latter in sinners. Finally,

one faith is explicit, by which an article revealed by God is expressly believed; another implicit, by which an article is believed in another article that has been revealed. You believe the mystery of the resurrection, and in it you implicitly believe the resurrection of the just.

III. Question III. *What, and of how many kinds, is the object of faith?* Answer. The object of faith is what is proposed to the mind to be believed. It is twofold. One is the material object, which is also called the formal object *which* [formale quod]; and these are all the things that are believed, of which God is the primary object, and all the rest are the secondary object. The other is the formal object *by which* [formale quo], or the reason why we believe; and it is the first truth obscurely revealing. This formal reason, or divine revealing truth, which induces us to believe, demands as a necessary condition the proposal of the Church. A second condition is the firmness of the assent. The third is obscurity. A threefold act of faith is usually distinguished: namely, to believe God revealing [credere Deo], to believe God as the truth revealed [credere Deum], and to believe unto God [credere in Deum], inasmuch as we tend toward him as our last end.

IV. Question IV. *Is the confidence by which one certainly believes that his sins have been forgiven him a theological faith necessary to salvation?* Answer. The Protestants — Lutherans and Calvinists — affirm it; and their error the Council of Trent condemned, session 6, chapter 9. For theological faith is an assent given to the articles revealed by God, as has been said. But confidence in the divine mercy, by which each one applies to himself the divine promises of the remission of sins, is an act of hope, necessary for justification, but by no means effecting justification, as the Lutherans fable.

V. Question V. *Are the things which the Church proposes to be believed as revealed by God evidently credible?* Answer. It is one thing to be evidently true, another to be evidently credible. An evident truth offers itself of itself to the mind. That is called evidently credible which luminous and grave arguments propose as worthy that assent be given to it. The articles of faith are evidently credible, says the Royal Prophet, Psalm 92: *Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible*. The arguments of this evident credibility are touched upon briefly.

VI. 1. The vaticinations of the Prophets. 2. The propagation of the faith through the whole world — not by the din of arms, not by abundance of riches, not by the enticements of eloquence, not by the allurements of pleasures, but by the unskillfulness, the poverty, and the humility of twelve fishermen. 3. The sanctity of the Christian religion. 4. The immense multitude of miracles. 5. The innumerable host of Martyrs. 6. The dignity of witnesses above all exception. These and other arguments of credibility, which I have explained in Tome I on the Decalogue, book I, dissertation I, chapter 5, Parish priests ought to expound to the people, that their obedience may be reasonable. For these arguments of credibility prepare the mind for a firmer assent of faith.

VII. Question VI. *Must a pious affection of the will precede faith?* Answer. It is affirmed. That faith may be prudent, he who believes must have arguments which prove that the things to which he must give his assent are worthy of belief. But because these arguments of credibility do not remove the obscurity of the thing to be believed, the intellect cannot assent to the object of faith unless it be aided by an internal movement of the will. For an obscure object cannot bend the mind. This defect of the object the pious affection of the will must supply.

VIII. Question VII. *What men are apt for theological faith?* Answer. Men who are wayfarers. Wherefore faith is found neither in the damned nor in the demons, since they are deprived of every supernatural

gift. They believe indeed, and tremble; but with a natural faith, not a theological one. Nor is faith found in the blessed, because what they believed, they now see. But in the souls of Purgatory faith remains, because what they believe they do not yet see; just as hope also perseveres in them. Sinners who are not infidels retain the faith, though languid and, as it is called, dead. But in Heretics there is no faith: for while they deny one article, they reject the formal reason of believing — namely, the divine revelation proposed by the Church. They assert indeed that they believe on account of revelation; but this divine revelation is proposed by each of them singly, not by the Church.

Chapter IV — On the necessity of the things to be believed

I. Question I. *Is faith necessary to salvation?* Answer. Necessity is twofold: one of means, the other of precept. That is necessary with the necessity of means, without which salvation cannot be had, even though its omission were free of fault. Thus infants dying without baptism do not attain eternal glory, even though the omission of baptism be blameless in them. But that is necessary with the necessity of precept, whose blameless omission does not impede the attainment of the end, though a culpable neglect impedes it. What is necessary with the necessity of means is at the same time necessary with the necessity of precept; but not conversely. The necessity of precept binds adults only. The necessity of means is twofold: one always *in re*, in fact — such as the necessity of habitual grace, of faith, hope, and charity; the other *in voto*, in desire — such as the necessity of baptism in respect of adults, who, adorned with habitual grace, can attain salvation with the mere desire of baptism.

II. That faith is necessary with the necessity of means, both in little children and in adults, no one calls into dispute. The discourse is now of actual faith.

III. For all adults endowed with reason there is necessary, with the necessity of means, an internal, actual, explicit, and supernatural faith, both for justification and for glory. Wherefore adults having the use of reason, though baptized in infancy, cannot attain eternal salvation without actual faith.

IV. Question II. *Which articles are to be believed with the necessity of means?* Answer. At every time, explicit faith in God as supernatural author and rewarder has always been necessary to all with the necessity of means, as St. Paul teaches, Hebrews 11: *Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him.*

V. After the fall of the human race into sin, both under the law of nature and under the law of Moses, actual faith in Christ the Redeemer, at least implicit, was always necessary to all adults with the necessity of means, as the Theologians commonly teach.

VI. For all adults, after the promulgation of the Gospel, explicit faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation is necessary with the necessity of means for the attainment of eternal salvation. This truth is expressly handed down in the Gospel. St. Matthew, chapter 28: *Teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.* St. Mark, chapter 16: *Preach the Gospel to every creature: he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned.* The contrary opinion, which Fr. Sporer defends — who cites for it Laymann, Tanner, and other more recent writers — is false, and adverse to the luminous testimonies of God.

VII. The Salmanticenses, treatise 21, chapter 2, point 2, number 18, Roncaglia, treatise 6, chapter 2, question 3, and other Casuists defend the position that it can happen *per accidens* that someone be justified by a merely implicit faith in Christ. For, they say, it can come about that to a Catechumen God is proposed as supernatural author and end, no express mention being made of Christ and of the Trinity. True enough. But it can also happen that no mention be made of God as supernatural author. What then? Arbitrary and utterly fictitious is the distinction given between *per se* and *per accidens* in this cause. For the divine Scriptures are plain. The experience which the Salmanticenses adduce is too amusing, since the justification of the ungodly leaps beyond the limits of our experience. St. Thomas is ineptly alleged for this opinion.

VIII. Question III. *Is absolution to be denied to one ignorant of the mysteries of the Incarnation and of the Trinity?* Answer. The affirming opinion is common, and the contrary utterly false. Wherefore this thesis was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI: *A man is capable of absolution, however much he labor under ignorance of the mysteries of the faith, and even if through culpable negligence he know not the mystery of the most holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ*. Fr. Viva, in his commentary on this thesis, number 7, distinguishes licit absolution from invalid absolution, and wraps up in that place several things which, in my judgment, are false. Wherefore adults who, wrapped in this ignorance, have frequented the sacraments, must repeat their Confessions, as being null.

IX. Question IV. *Which are the heads of faith which adults are bound by force of precept to believe?* Answer. All adults endowed with reason are bound to know and believe explicitly all the articles contained in the Creed. For that Creed contains the sum of the Christian profession, says St. Augustine in his book On faith and the Creed, chapter 1: *Now the catholic faith is made known to the Faithful in the Creed, and committed to memory, in as brief a form of words as the matter allowed; so that for beginners and sucklings — for those who have been reborn in Christ, but are not yet strengthened by a most diligent and spiritual handling and knowledge of the divine Scriptures — there might be set forth in few words what is to be believed.* All adults, therefore, must hold in memory the aforesaid mysteries of the Creed, so that, being questioned about them, they know how to answer. They must therefore believe and know expressly that God is one, omnipotent, creator of the universe, of all things visible and invisible, savior of the human race, giver of all sanctity and of graces, who forgives sins, bestower of glory; and that this one God is threefold in three distinct persons, of which one is not another, and all three are one.

X. Concerning the articles which regard the humanity of Christ, all must know and believe that the second person, namely the Son of God, was made man, who is called Christ, and is God-man. It is not required that they expressly know that the union of the human nature with the divine was made in the person, and the other difficulties, etc. They must also know and believe that Christ was conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost, and born of the Virgin Mary; likewise that he suffered and died — nor is explicit faith in the passion under Pontius Pilate required. They are equally bound to believe that he descended into hell according to his soul; that on the third day he rose again from the dead; and finally that he ascended into heaven, to the right hand of the Father, and will come to judge the living and the dead on the last day of judgment. The communion of Saints, moreover, must be expressly believed, although it does not constitute an article distinct from the ninth, which is: *I believe the holy catholic Church*. And the express faith of this article is supremely necessary. But they can scarcely believe that the Church is one assembly, one body, gathered in unity of doctrine and of sacraments under one head — invisible, Christ, and visible, the Roman Pontiff, Vicar of that same

Christ on earth — unless at the same time they perceive that the Faithful, who are members of this mystical body, mutually aid one another, and that all spiritual goods, of which each partakes, are common.

XI. Implicitly, moreover, the Faithful must believe all the things which God has revealed in the holy Scriptures and in the word handed down, and which the catholic Church proposes to be believed.

Chapter V — What the Faithful ought to know of those things which form morals, and conform the life of Christians to the exemplar of our Master Christ Jesus

I. Both Theologians and Parish priests and Confessors are commonly solicitous and diligent in explaining the articles of faith which illuminate the mind, and which halt almost entirely in the mind. The Faithful also easily commit such articles to memory, since they inflict no grave inconvenience upon the flesh and the appetites. On the contrary, both the ministers, in explaining the doctrine of morals, and the Faithful, in learning it, at times labor under negligence. The Christian religion, as was said in Book I and must often be said again, consists of two things — namely, of what is to be believed and what is to be done — which mutually aid one another, and which, separated, are bereft of heavenly life.

II. If faith without works is dead, the instruction of faith without the instruction of morals is likewise languid and dead. Add to this that the precepts of morals, since they are hostile enemies to flesh, blood, and the appetites, are learned with difficulty, and with greater difficulty imprinted upon the soul. Therefore with greater diligence and more fervent zeal must the ministers of the evangelical flock imbue and teach the Faithful the divine and ecclesiastical precepts.

III. The first thing the person to be baptized promises is: *I renounce Satan, and all his pomps, and his works*. This renunciation precedes the profession of faith, as a necessary preamble, as it is called. When baptized infants become adults, and come to Catechism, that is, to the learning of Christian doctrine, the Catechists are bound first of all to explain most exactly the legitimate meanings of this promise and renunciation. They must teach them what those *pomps* and *works* signify, to which they have bidden farewell. Those pomps are vain and immodest garments; they are luxury, haughtiness, comedies, theatrical spectacles, which the devil devised for the seduction of men. Those works are all the things that cannot be referred to the glory of God.

IV. After the explanation of this renunciation, what the Christian life is must be set forth. Now this is the image of the life of Christ Jesus, whose principal lineaments are humility, charity, justice, chastity. A specimen of these virtues must be sketched for them; and it must be explained that, by force of the baptismal profession, the Faithful have consecrated both soul and body to God: the body itself, as Paul says, is the temple of the Holy Ghost, and must therefore be kept chaste, modest, and undefiled. Let the Catechists set forth that Christians are placed in this world solely as soldiers, who must of necessity fight continually against the World, the Flesh, and the Devil. Just as these three enemies watch day and night to destroy souls eternally, so Christians are bound to keep watch, that they may avoid seduction and attain the victory. Let them inculcate more deeply that they cannot attain the kingdom of heaven without perpetual conflict against the three enemies indicated; and that all who will live godly in Christ Jesus must suffer persecution, as Christ our Master suffered even unto death.

V. These are, as it were, the general preceptions — and many others besides, which were recounted in Book I — to be explained distinctly and perspicuously, and continually repeated: because, just as an effigy is with difficulty carved in hard marble, so with the greatest difficulty do these axioms, contrary to the appetites of men, adhere in their souls. Today they are learned, and tomorrow they vanish. And yet, unless souls be purged and formed by these preceptions, with difficulty are the very mysteries believed with a living faith. Let the ministers of Christ come to their senses, then, and understand that they most gravely betray their proper ministry unless they exactly teach young men and grown girls the doctrine by which the Christian life is to be formed after the example of Christ and the Saints. This general instruction being premised — which is as it were the basis and foundation of the Christian edifice — the rules and precepts must be explained which Christ has prescribed as the means for attaining this end.

VI. Question I. *Which are the precepts and means which God commands for the forming of morals, which Christians are bound to know?* Answer. They are the ten commandments of the Decalogue, of each of which there will be discourse. Let the ministers of God be diligent and fervent in explaining these two commandments: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God ... and thy Neighbor as thyself.* The faithful, then, must know the ten commandments of the Decalogue, and the seven Sacraments. The knowledge of Baptism, of Penance, and of the Eucharist is especially necessary, because these three Sacraments are necessary to all adults. Yet ignorance of the other four is not harmless, since that sevenfold number is a prerogative of the catholic Church. They must, moreover, know the dignity of these Sacraments, and their efficacy for purging souls and adorning them with sanctity; and besides, the dispositions which must precede in those receiving them for their worthy reception — otherwise the knowledge of them would be fruitless: for they must be known to this end, that they may profit souls.

VII. The precept of praying is grave. Now the prayer which Christ imposed upon us is the Lord's Prayer. For thus he says, Matthew 6: *Thus therefore shall you pray: Our Father,* etc.; and holy Mother Church says: *Admonished by salutary precepts, and formed by divine institution, we dare to say: Our Father,* etc. This prayer of Christ the Catechism of Trent wisely interprets; therefore Parish priests ought to explain this interpretation to the Faithful in the vernacular tongue. Necessary, moreover, is the knowledge of the precepts of holy Mother Church, and of the angelic salutation. Let Parish priests therefore diligently take care that grown children learn the Decalogue, the Lord's Prayer, the Creed, and also the angelic Salutation.

VIII. This must be added: that each one must know, besides the articles of faith and the precepts of morals common to all, those precepts and obligations also which affect his own state and office, or dignity and profession, as the divine Scriptures, the Fathers, and the Theologians teach with St. Thomas, I-II, q. 76, art. 2, saying: *All are bound to know in common the things which are of faith, and the universal precepts of the law; but each one, the things which pertain to his state or office.* Hence the married must of necessity know the things which regard their state; and it belongs to them, if they be fathers of families, to teach their children, servants, and domestics.

IX. All ecclesiastics, by force of their proper state, are bound to a greater knowledge than the laity. Of ecclesiastics, moreover, some are Clerics, some Priests, some Parish priests, Bishops, etc. The knowledge of Parish priests and Confessors ought to shine forth singularly. For by natural and divine law pastors must feed the flock with the food of heavenly doctrine. These men are bound to be so exactly versed in the doctrine of faith and morals, that they can fit it to the capacity of the rude

people. For it is theirs to break the bread for the little ones, and to imitate the nurse, who changes bread into milk, that the food may become suitable for infants. Prelates, Bishops, and supreme Pontiffs are bound to an ampler knowledge of the heavenly mysteries.

X. Question II. *Can some rude Faithful be excused, on account of dullness of wit, from the knowledge of certain articles?* Answer. There have been some who taught that certain rude persons can be saved even though they believe nothing article by article, provided they implicitly believe whatever holy Mother Church proposes to be believed. But this opinion is utterly false. Others say it is enough if those rude persons explicitly believe some one article. But this opinion too is improbable and false. Wherefore it must be said that in such persons, provided they be possessed of reason, there can be no invincible ignorance of the articles whose faith is necessary with the necessity of means. But whether, concerning the articles whose faith is necessary with the necessity of precept, invincible ignorance can occur in some rare case, I dare neither certainly deny nor affirm. Perhaps the affirming opinion is probable. The faculty of perceiving the truths of faith is to be sought not from human powers alone, but above all from the grace of God, *who enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world*.

XI. Question III. *Do those Faithful satisfy the precept of faith who learn the Creed, the ten commandments of the Decalogue, the Lord's Prayer, and the angelic Salutation in Latin, when they are altogether ignorant of the Latin tongue?* Answer. All these things, by force of an ecclesiastical precept confirmed by long custom, the Faithful must know by memory, at least as to the substance, as it is called, as has been said. If they understood nothing at all of what they have learned by memory, what would the knowledge profit them? Such persons would have a knowledge of words, not of truths; and it would be just as if they lacked knowledge.

XII. The precept of knowing the articles of faith contained in the Creed, and the precepts of the Decalogue, is divine. But that is ecclesiastical by which it is commanded that all these be consigned to memory, and recited by memory.

XIII. Question IV. *When are the Faithful bound to elicit internal acts of faith?* Answer. The Theologians distinguish a twofold obligation: one *per se*, the other *per accidens*. The first flows from the precept itself, prescinding from any other respect. The second arises from another precept, which cannot be fulfilled without an act of faith: as, if you would elicit an act of charity, faith is prerequired; for you cannot love God unless you believe him. *Per se*, then, children are obliged, once the light of reason is acquired, to elicit an act of faith; just as also, according to the graver Theologians, and especially St. Thomas, they are bound to love God with the love of charity. Concerning the other times at which adults are bound to elicit acts of faith, the Casuists dispute; and by the benefit of Probabilism they formerly, above all, exempted the Faithful from this obligation. Wherefore Innocent XI condemned this proposition: *Faith is not considered to fall under a special precept and of itself.* He condemned this other also: *It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in a lifetime.* Similar is another condemned by the same Pontiff: *It suffices to have believed those mysteries once.* Hence it appears that the precept of faith obliges of itself, and that it does not suffice to elicit an act of faith once in a lifetime, or once within a five-year period. The Casuists who wrote after the condemnation of the propositions dispute whether it is enough to elicit an act of faith once within two years, others once within a year. These disputations do not foster, but weaken, the exercise of faith; and, as it seems to me, they are also vain. Just Christians elicit acts of faith not once, but several times a day. For daily they recite the Creed, and pour out other prayers, which can scarcely — nay, not even scarcely — be performed without the

exercise of faith. Christian sinners also, unless they be utterly criminal, recite the Creed and other prayers, frequent the Churches, hear Mass, adore the sacred Body of Christ. Wherefore few of the Faithful are found who do not frequently produce acts of faith. I should scarcely count him a Christian who within a year elicited an act of faith only once. This frequency of acts I dare not define; but let each fulfill the precept in the best way he can. The life of Christians is a life of faith, of hope, and of charity. The bodily life needs daily nourishment: and shall the spiritual and divine life bring forth acts only once in a year? *The just man liveth by faith.* If he lives, he frequently performs the offices of life. When the Sacraments are received, acts of faith are necessary. At the time of death the precept urges of itself — not only because then the demon renews his assaults (*whom resist ye, strong in faith*, says St. Peter, first epistle, chapter 5), but also because at that time above all Christians are bound to bear the testimony of their profession. And, to embrace all in few words: since the life of Christians is a warfare upon earth, St. Paul exhorts all that, *taking the shield of faith*, they fight strenuously against the powers of darkness, if they truly long to obtain the prize.

Chapter VI — On the divine and ecclesiastical precept of confessing the Christian doctrine, both of faith and of morals

I. Question I. *Is there a precept of confessing the Christian faith outwardly?* Answer. All affirm it. This divine precept is twofold, affirmative and negative. The discourse is now of the first. The exterior manifestation of the faith can be made by words, signs, nods, gestures, and actions which express the faith either by peculiar institution or by common acceptation.

II. The divine precept of confessing the faith outwardly Christ frequently inculcates, saying in Matthew chapter 10: *Every one therefore that shall confess me before men, I will also confess him before my Father.* The precept presses: 1. When the honor of God, and the good of Religion, demand it. 2. When our Neighbor needs to be confirmed in the faith. 3. When we are constrained to teach others the catholic Religion. 4. When from our silence a suspicion arises, or can arise, that we have withdrawn from the faith. In these and similar cases the precept of exterior confession presses.

III. Question II. *Does he sin who, being interrogated about the catholic faith, keeps silence?* Answer. The Theologians are wont to distinguish an interrogation made by the public Power from an interrogation made by a private person. It is agreed among all that those Christians sin against the precept of confessing the faith who, interrogated about matters of faith by the public Power sitting in tribunal, keep silence and omit to profess the faith openly. Wherefore the following thesis was justly condemned: *If one be interrogated by the public Power, I counsel him to confess the faith openly, as glorious to God and to the faith; to keep silence I do not condemn as of itself sinful.* If the interrogation be made by a private person, then the circumstances of persons, of time, and of place must be regarded. For if the bystanders would incur danger from the silence, if the honor of God would suffer detriment, then the precept of confession would press, even though the interrogation were made by a private person. The Faithful are also bound to answer a catholic Superior interrogating them about the faith. And this holds true even if the Prince be a layman: for although it does not belong to such to interrogate about matters of faith, it can nevertheless happen that it is theirs to know whether their own subjects are catholics. When a Catholic sees the sacred images trampled upon, he is bound to profess his faith, that, so far as can be done, he may repel the injury inflicted upon God and upon the sacred images.

IV. Question III. *Is it sometimes licit to flee from a tyrant, that compulsion to confess the faith may be avoided?* Answer. Tertullian denied it in his book On flight in persecution; and his error the Montanists embraced. The error of Tertullian the Fathers confuted by manifest testimonies of the Gospel. St. Matthew, chapter 10, says: *And when they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another*; and again, chapter 24: *Then they that are in Judea, let them flee to the mountains.*

V. Bishops, Parish priests, and other Pastors can licitly flee, and sometimes ought, when tyrants rage against them personally, and other ministers are present who can administer spiritual assistance to the flock — as is evident from the example of the most invincible Athanasius, and as the Angelic Doctor teaches, lecture 3 on John. On the contrary, when no ministers are present, and the sheep are pressed by grave necessity and are in grave danger of losing the faith, then the Pastors cannot flee, but must expose their life for the salvation of the flock, as John says in chapter 10: *For the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep. But the hireling ... leaveth the sheep, and flieth.* Those who are not Pastors are bound, by the title of charity, not of justice, to succor their brethren when the gravest necessity presses.

VI. Question IV. *Are those who have the care of souls bound to make public profession of the faith?* Answer. All affirm it; and this the Council of Trent decreed, session 24, chapter 12. The Tridentine decree Pius IV confirmed and amplified in his motu proprio whose beginning is *Injunctum nobis*. And again St. Pius V, in his constitution which begins *In sacrosancta*, etc., commands that all Doctors, Masters, Regents, Lecturers, Preachers, etc., make the profession of faith. And these decrees oblige under grave fault, as the common opinion teaches. Beneficiaries having the care of souls are bound, within two months from the day of peaceful possession, to make the profession of faith in the hands of the Bishop or his Vicar; otherwise they do not make the fruits their own, and are bound to restitution, as the more common and more probable opinion teaches. See Tome I on the Decalogue, book 1, dissertation I, chapter 13. To the aforesaid constitutions are subject also Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops.

VII. Question V. *Would he deny the faith who denied that he is a Christian?* Answer. St. Augustine affirms it, tractate 103 on John. *For he who denies that he is a Christian, denies Christ himself.* The same must be said of him who should deny that he is a Papist, a Pontifical, a Romanist, when the interrogation were made by Heretics for the sake of religion. Similarly he would deny the faith who, interrogated whether he is a Turk or a Lutheran, should affirm it — provided the end of the interrogator was to ascertain the religion of the one answering; otherwise, if the interrogation looked to something else. He who should deny that he is a Cleric, a Priest, a Religious, would not deny the faith, yet he would be guilty of a lie — whatever certain Probabilists assert to the contrary. It is not licit, for the sake of avoiding death, to burn incense to an Idol, or to bend the knee to it, or to exhibit other signs of religion, even though interiorly the faith be kept inviolate. For when external actions of their own nature savor of religion, they can never be licitly exercised for the purpose of testifying veneration toward an Idol. The example of Naaman the Syrian, which is wont to be objected, is vain, as will be made plain in its place. The use is not licit of ceremonies which are, as it were, the tokens of a false religion, and which savor of superstition.

VIII. It is not lawful for Christians to use the garments of Infidels instituted of themselves for the protestation of a false Sect — whatever Azor, with certain others, asserts to the contrary. For although garments, absolutely speaking, have been instituted for the adornment of the body, and

under this aspect their use is licit, yet when they have been determined to the professing of a false Sect, then they can in no way be licitly employed. See Tome I on the Decalogue, book 1, dissertation I, chapter 14. Entrance into the temples of Heretics, into the synagogues of Jews and of Infidels, is licit for just causes: since such an entrance, in the common estimation of men, is not reputed an office or protestation of religion. If, however, a heretical Prince should command that the Catholics subject to his dominion enter the temples of the Heretics for the sake of religion, the Catholics ought rather to meet death than obey such a decree. Under pressing extreme necessity it is licit to go to the temples of Heretics for the receiving of baptism.

IX. It is also licit to eat idol-offerings, that is, foods consecrated to Idols, provided suspicion of superstition, scandal, and the worship of the false Sect be absent, as is gathered from St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 10: *Whatsoever is sold in the shambles, eat; asking no question for conscience' sake*. Catholics passing through the regions of Heretics cannot eat flesh on forbidden days, necessity being absent. For the precepts of the Church are to be observed everywhere. Yet to avoid death, or another grave inconvenience, the eating of flesh is licit. If, however, the eating of flesh were commanded in contempt of Religion, death would rather have to be undergone than to eat forbidden foods in contempt of one's own true Religion.

X. Question VI. *Do they sin against the precept of confessing the faith who blush at the public confession of the doctrine which rules morals?* Answer. The Christian religion, as I have said elsewhere, turns upon what is to be believed and what is to be done, as upon two inseparable hinges. Each part, then — both of the things to be believed and of the things to be done — must be publicly confessed. In the first centuries of the Church the heathen tyrants persecuted the things to be believed, but venerated the things to be done. On the contrary, in these last times of the Church, the things to be done are assailed by not a few professors of the Christian Religion itself. *For he that shall be ashamed of me* (says Christ, Luke 9) *and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed*, etc. Christ does not say: he that shall be ashamed to confess the Divinity, the Trinity, God the Creator, and the other splendid mysteries, which illuminate the mind only; but he says: *he that shall be ashamed of me* — that is, of me, a man humble, assailed with reproaches, contumelies, and derisions, crucified and dead. He adds: *he that shall be ashamed of my words*. What are the words of Christ? They are the precepts of morals, which crucify the flesh, restrain the appetites, humble the puffed-up soul, command penance, and prohibit allurements, dancings, the pomps of the world, luxury, lust, and the love of riches. *He that shall be ashamed of me before men*. It does not suffice to confess all these things in the heart; they must be manifested and defended *before men*. It is not enough to profess the things to be believed in any fashion whatever; they must be championed pure and inviolate, as Christ revealed them. By the same reason it does not suffice to profess any Moral doctrine whatsoever; but there is necessary the public confession of the Christian Moral, which leads through the strait and narrow way, which separates men from the pomps of the world, from spectacles, comedies, and the other allurements. Necessary is the profession of a Moral pure and immaculate, which is simple and ingenuous, and which detests cavillations and double-tongued distinctions.

XI. Question VII. *Is it ever lawful to simulate a false Religion by words or deeds?* Answer. From what has been said it is plain that this is never lawful. Against all simulations whatsoever Benedict XIV published a constitution, inserted in Tome 1 of his Bullarium, number 89, whose beginning is *Inter omnigenas*. From it I excerpt a few things, and subjoin them below.[1]

[1] I. "Beginning, therefore, from the business of the faith, without which it is impossible to please God, we strictly command and enjoin upon all and each of the Faithful of that Kingdom [Serbia] who desire to retain the communion of the catholic Church, that they take care not to do or admit anything against the evangelical precepts and institutes in order to conceal — when it is sometimes licit and necessary to do so — the profession of the Christian Religion; and above all, things which include a protestation of the Mahometan Sect. Therefore, if they receive circumcision, let them know that Christ, as the Apostle testifies, shall profit them nothing. Let them altogether avoid taking upon their lips Turkish names, of which they ought not even to be mindful; frequenting the abominable temples of the Infidels, which they call Mosques; profaning the days of ecclesiastical fasts by the eating of flesh — and this to the end that they may be believed Mahometans. For all these things, even if the faith of Christ be held in the heart, cannot be done without a simulation of the errors of Mahomet, contrary to Christian sincerity, which contains a lie in a most grave matter, and includes a virtual denial of the faith, with the greatest injury to God and scandal to one's Neighbor. — II. But much more, when they are interrogated by the public Power, let them know that it is illicit for them to profess themselves adherents of the Mahometan Sect; but let them know that that is the time at which it behooves them, taking the shield of faith, not only to believe with the heart unto justice, but also with the mouth to confess Christ unto salvation: otherwise, if they dare to deny him before men, he also will deny them before his Father. — III. Equally impious and illicit is the abuse of those Christians of Serbia who, being about to depart from this life, permit or command that their corpses be committed to the burial-places of the Turks, with the assistance of the latter and with Mahometan rites employed. For if they ought by no means to be ashamed of Christ in life, how much less when they are to be presented at his tremendous judgment — lest he too be ashamed of them before his eternal Father. — IV. It shall therefore be the office of Bishops, Parish priests, and Missionaries seriously to teach and admonish those Christians who nefariously presume the above-said things, with immense injury to the faith, that in vain do they flatter themselves on their custody of the Christian law and their zeal, and on the education of their children in the same: since, failing even in one of these things, they are become guilty of all. Let them therefore openly declare to them that whoever, through fear of any Power whatever, or through dread of losing temporal goods, betrays his faith, provokes the wrath of God upon himself, and, unless he repent, renders himself a stranger to all hope of salvation: since he fears man more than God, and prefers to retain momentary things rather than to acquire eternal. And if any, obstinate, will to go on in this way of the ungodly, they shall be incapable of the Sacraments in life, and, if they die impenitent, of suffrages after death — to which let no minister of the Church presume to admit them; otherwise he shall be punished by his own Bishop with canonical penalties, according also to the prescript of the above-said Council of Albania. — V. Equally to be kept from the Sacraments of the Church are those women who, admitted under the name of marriage into the cohabitation of Turks, concealing the profession of the Christian Religion, there lead a life removed from every exercise of Religion; and it must be declared to them by their Pastors that they should not place the confidence of eternal salvation in that faith which, dead without works, they persuade themselves they can profitably preserve in the heart alone."

Chapter VII — On Infidelity, and its various species opposed to the virtue of faith

I. Infidelity is threefold. The first is *negative*, which is the mere absence, so to call it, of faith in one who has in no way heard the faith. This is not a sin, but a punishment of sin. Wherefore this thesis stands condemned: *Purely negative infidelity, in those to whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin.* The second infidelity is *privative*. This positively resists the preaching of the faith, and refuses to receive the faith. The third is *positive or contrary* infidelity, in one who not only shuts his eyes to the light and preaching of the faith, but also obstinately defends errors contrary to the true faith. This contrary infidelity is threefold: Paganism, Judaism, Hereticism. Paganism is a voluntary error resisting a faith not yet received. To Paganism are reduced Atheism, Deism, and Mahometanism. Judaism is an error against the faith received in figure. Hereticism is an error resisting with pertinacity the faith received in the manifestation of the truth.

II. Question I. *Can Infidels be licitly tolerated among Catholics?* Answer. Absolutely, and prescinding from every respect, this tolerance seems illicit. The hope of a greater good, of common utility, and of

avoiding a greater evil can induce Princes to tolerate Infidels in their dominions, if they bring no prejudice upon the faith. The tolerance of Heretics demands a greater cause.

III. Question II. *Can the Church, either immediately of herself, or by the aid of Princes, compel Infidels who are not her subjects to receive the faith?* Answer. The common opinion denies it, with St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, art. 8; and it is drawn from St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 5, saying: *For what have I to do to judge them that are without?* Wherefore the Church cannot compel Infidels who are not her subjects even to hear the preaching of the Gospel: for if she cannot compel them to receive the faith, neither can she compel them to hear it. But if the discourse be of Jews who are subjects, she can compel them to hear the Gospel, because with regard to the Jews a peculiar reason holds. For they, in the figure and in the promises of the old Law which they profess, have received the Gospel. And the usage of the Roman Church, compelling the Jews dwelling at Rome to hear the Gospel, confirms our opinion. Nor does compulsion to the faith follow from this: because although the hearing of the Gospel prepares for the faith, it in no way compels. For the hearers all remain free. But all Infidels, whether subjects or not subjects, who impede the preaching of the Gospel, the Church can restrain. The Preachers, however, must announce the Gospel of Christ adorned not with arms or soldiers, but with patience, humility, meekness, penance, peace, and tranquillity. But the Church cannot deprive infidel Princes not subject to her of the dominion which they hold over their Christian subjects and slaves, as is had from the Gospel itself, Matthew 22: *Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's.* And the same St. Peter teaches, first epistle, chapter 2. But Infidels in catholic kingdoms are not capable of jurisdiction over Catholics. Wherefore it is not to be permitted that Jews have Christian menservants and maidservants, as is evident from the chapter *Cum Judaei*, 2, On the Jews.

Chapter VIII — On the communication of the Faithful with Infidels

I. Communication is twofold: one *religious*, the other *civil*. The first is forbidden: all communication in prayers, rites, sacrifices, and other exercises of Religion is a sin against the faith. The civil is absolutely licit, unless there occur a danger of subversion.

II. Hence it is not lawful for Christians to sell those things which serve their sacrifices and the rites of their vain religion. Wherefore Christians would sin who should build synagogues for the Jews, and, for the other Infidels, temples, idols, altars, priestly vestments, shrines, and other things of that kind. But other things which are indifferent, which the Infidels can use ill or well, can licitly be sold.

III. There are ten cases in which, by decree of the Church, communication with Infidels is prohibited to Christians: 1. Cohabitation. 2. Attendance at their banquets. 3. Eating their unleavened bread. 4. Entering the bath with them. 5. Receiving medicines from them. 6. Using their Physicians. 7. The nursing of the children of Jews by Christians. 8. Rendering them domestic service. 9. Subjecting oneself to them under the yoke of servitude. 10. Instituting them as legatees.

IV. As to the first case: that habitation is prohibited which carries with it true familiarity. To have Jews and Saracens as servants for laborious works is not absolutely forbidden to Christians, yet it is not expedient to retain them at home, on account of the appearance of familiarity. Access to the banquets of the Jews is forbidden, because the Jews discriminate among foods, and reject many as unclean. To eat unleavened bread by the Jewish rite is interdicted, but not when necessity impels. Entrance into the bath by agreement is forbidden, but not if it happen by fortuitous chance. In the

fifth and sixth cases it is prohibited to summon Jewish Physicians for the care of Christians, when urgent necessity is absent. What is said of the Physician must likewise be said of the Jewish Surgeon. For Christian women to suckle the children of Jews, whether in the houses of the Jews or in their own houses, is absolutely prohibited: since in both cases familiarity intervenes. Of domestic service, in the eighth and ninth cases, it has already been spoken. Yet to till the lands of Jews does not carry the character of domestic service; wherefore tenant-farmers and other workmen are not comprehended under this prohibition. The institution of Jews as heirs or legatees is forbidden, whether the legacy or inheritance be left to Universities, or to Colleges, or to Persons. Yet to those placed in grave necessity something can be bequeathed by title of alms. Catechumens are exempt from this law, because they are held as Catholics.

Chapter IX — On Heresy, and Apostasy from the faith, and the penalties enacted against Heretics

I. Heresy is *a voluntary and pertinacious error of the intellect against some truth of the catholic faith, in one who has received the faith.* It is called an *error of the intellect*, because faith resides in the intellect, and therefore the error contrary to it must be found in the intellect also. *Voluntary*, because without liberty there is no sin. *Pertinacious*, because, since heresy signifies a choosing, it requires an obstinate deliberation in the error. That anyone be called pertinacious, he must knowingly and advertently hold some error deliberately against the definition of the catholic Church. Wherefore, just as for true faith the condition of the Church proposing is required, so for true heresy the contempt of that same Church is demanded. It is not required, however, that one will to contemn the Church directly; but it suffices that he know that he holds an error against the definition of the Church. This pertinacity is taken for a deliberate election of the will, whether it arise from infirmity or from an impulse of fury; nor is delay necessary, but in a moment of time the crime of heresy, like other crimes, can be committed. *In one who has received the faith.* Error in one who has not received the catholic faith can constitute an Infidel, a Pagan, a Jew, but not a Heretic.

II. Heresy is twofold: one *formal*, the other *material*. Formal is that which I have now defined. Material is when someone believes or utters something against the faith, not knowing that it pertains to the faith. If the ignorance be invincible, the material heresy is without fault; if vincible, with fault — provided, however, the error be not affected, for the end of speaking and living more freely, or of contradicting the authority of the Church: for then it is formal heresy. There is also material heresy when someone exteriorly pronounces an error against the faith, without internal consent. Again, heresy is divided into *mental*, or merely internal, and into internal-and-external together. The former halts within the mind and soul, and is manifested by no exterior sign. But when it comes forth outwardly, then it is at once internal and external. Again, formal heresy at once internal and external is divided into that which is *manifest per se* — which is also wont to be called public — which has been uttered not only by signs and words, but also before many hearers; and into that which is *hidden per accidens* — which is also called private — which, though uttered exteriorly by words and signs, has yet happened with no one hearing or seeing. Finally, one heresy is *affirmative*, when someone openly professes before all, by word or sign, an error against the faith conceived in the mind; and another *negative*, when someone, juridically convicted of heresy, pertinaciously refuses to confess his heresy.

III. Question I. *Is one doubting in the faith to be held a Heretic?* Answer. The Theologians dispute on both sides; but the disagreement is of words rather than of the thing. It is agreed among all that a doubt arisen from infirmity does not savor of heresy, nor constitute a heretic. The question is of pertinacious doubt alone. If the doubt be regarded according to the laws of Metaphysics — according to which the intellect, remaining suspended and undecided, elicits no assent or dissent — then it is certain that one so doubting is not a heretic. But because in practice it can scarcely, nay hardly at all, happen that anyone pertinaciously doubts without passing some reflex judgment by which he judges the things of faith to be doubtful, therefore in practice they are commonly heretics who with pertinacious mind doubt about the things of faith. Hence has arisen the common axiom: *One doubting in the faith is an Infidel.* Those who doubt on account of the difficulties which arise in the articles of faith, and who, pressed by the weight of these difficulties, command a suspension of assent, sin against the faith: since, while they deliberately withhold assent, by that very fact — if not explicitly, yet in very deed — they approve the weight of the difficulties against the faith, contemn the definition of the Church, which they know to have defined such an article, and dare to measure the things of faith by their own judgment. But if they withdraw the intellect from the contemplation of the articles of faith for this reason, that they may decline weariness and labor, and remove themselves from the danger of doubting, they in no way sin. He who feels himself agitated by these straits should elicit acts of faith, and desist from the conflict. The disposition and state of the one doubting must always be regarded. If he who doubts is distressed by scruples, let him count the doubts as nothing, and turn his mind elsewhere. He who deliberately doubts on account of difficulties which occur to him, prepared to be corrected not on account of the authority of the Church, but on account of reasons which may satisfy his difficulties, is to be held as a heretic. For such a one gives faith neither to God, nor to the Church defining that such an article is from God; but trusts solely in his own brain.

IV. Question II. *What is apostasy?* Answer. Apostasy is the withdrawal of a baptized man from the whole faith, as St. Thomas says, II-II, q. 12, art. 1. The Apostate differs from the Heretic. For the latter knowingly and stubbornly denies some one evangelical truth, admits many others, and boasts that he professes Christ and his Religion; but the Apostate bids farewell to Christ and to his whole Religion, as is evident in Julian the Apostate. They also are called apostates who withdraw from some Order which they have professed. But these do not by that very fact fall away from the Christian Religion.

V. Question III. *What are the penalties enacted against Heretics?* Answer. There are two kinds of penalties. The first kind of penalties is spiritual: namely, excommunication; irregularity; the privation of spiritual power in those who are attached to sacred orders. The fourth penalty is the privation of dignities and benefices, and inability to obtain them thereafter. The fifth is the privation of burial.

VI. There are four temporal penalties. The first is the confiscation of all goods. The second is infamy, by which Heretics become unworthy of any honor and dignity whatsoever. The third is the penalty of prison. The last is capital condemnation.

VII. Question IV. *Who are subject to the penalties enacted against Heretics?* Answer. The Heretic who has conceived a merely internal heresy is not subject to the penalties recounted, because, as the common axiom has it, the Church does not judge of internal things. Similarly the merely external Heretic is immune from these penalties, because he is not a true Heretic. Now the excommunication has been

enacted against true Heretics. And this is understood of the interior forum: for if the external Heretic be brought before the tribunal, the judges judge him as guilty of heresies. Any Confessor, therefore, can absolve one who is either a merely internal or a merely external Heretic. But he who is a Heretic both internal and external, though most hidden — who in his own chamber, no one being present, pronounces the heresy conceived in his mind — is liable to the excommunication, and cannot be absolved by any Confessor whatever. Now the heresy is external when words or signs expressly and completely betray the conceived heresy, so that bystanders could truly conceive the heresy. If the external action be light, it does not suffice for manifesting heresy. Similarly, equivocal words do not suffice in the exterior forum for constituting a truly external heresy. An internal Heretic does not become external if, sleeping, he pronounce the conceived heresy in his sleep.

VIII. Question V. *Has excommunication been enacted against the believers, favorers, receivers, and defenders of Heretics?* Answer. Those are called *believers* who give faith to the errors of the Heretics; and if they betray this faith by signs and words, they are subject to the excommunication enacted against Heretics. Those are called *favorers*, *receivers*, and *defenders* of Heretics who conspire in their errors, or bring aid lest they be apprehended by the Judges, or extend help in the propagating of the heresy; and this both by omission — as if someone, interrogated by the Judges, should refuse to reveal a Heretic, or, one being consigned to his custody, should neglect to guard him — and by commission, when someone praises with words, or with aid helps the Heretic to escape. *Receivers* are named those who receive with hospitality, in their own house, dominion, or kingdom, a Heretic fleeing or hiding himself.

IX. Question VI. *Is it permitted to Catholics to dispute with Heretics?* Answer. To laymen, even learned ones, it is forbidden to enter upon a disputation with heretics about matters of faith, whether publicly or privately. Some contend that learned Laymen are not comprehended in the chapter *Quicumque*, § *Inhibemus*, On heretics, in the Sixth Book: because, they say, when the Laymen are learned, the end of the Law ceases. The contrary opinion is to me the more probable. If the law regarded the unlearned alone, it would be fruitless, because by the natural law the unlearned are interdicted from disputing. Yet cases can occur in which Laymen may — nay, ought, if they be truly learned — to undertake a disputation with Heretics. For if the Heretics, by sermons or disputations, should attempt to pervert Catholics, and apt Clerics were wanting, then they ought to descend into the arena and defend the Catholics. Under this decree are comprehended also lay Religious, since the reason of the Law is the same.

Chapter X — On prohibited Books

I. The prohibition of books is ancient, and is found in Acts chapter 19: *And many of them who had followed curious arts, brought together their books, and burnt them before all.* The Council of Nicaea commanded the books of Arius to be burned, as Socrates narrates, book 1, chapter 6.

II. For a twofold reason the books of Heretics are prohibited: both that the evil of seduction may be impeded, and that the Heretics may be confounded. Heretical books are proscribed in the Bull *Coenae*. Under this prohibition are not comprehended the books of the Jews, of the Mahometans, or of the Heathen. This prohibition has annexed to it the penalty of excommunication when four conditions concur: 1. That the books be those of Heretics. 2. That they teach Heresy, or treat of Religion. 3. That they be knowingly read, retained, or printed. 4. That this be done without the authority of the

supreme Pontiff. Those books treat of Religion which expound sacred Scripture and Theology; which interpret the affairs of Monks, of Clerics, the worship of the Saints, and rites; but not those which handle philosophical and historical matters and other inferior arts.

III. He who reads a book of a catholic author in which the errors of the Heretics were described is not subject to the penalties of the Bull, because the book is not a Heretic's, but a Catholic's. The same must be said of one reading a book of a catholic author in which certain heresies were written through ignorance. Nor does it matter whether the books of Heretics are written by pen or published in type. He who reads a sermon, an oration, an epistle, or a disputation of a Heretic containing heresy is subject to the penalties of the Bull — whatever Sanchez teaches to the contrary. Wherefore the opinion of Fr. Sporer is not to be admitted, who with Sanchez, Laymann, and others teaches that he does not incur the excommunication who should read a writing of a Heretic of fewer than ten leaves. There is, however, a parvity of matter in this reading. What is it? Azor assigns one or two little verses; Suarez, two or three lines; Sanchez, a page of a leaf; Fagundez assigns a page and a half; and each speaks according to his own pleasure. A certain rule cannot be designated. Deliberate reading is not free of venial fault. Wherefore the one safe way is to abstain altogether from this reading. Yet the circumstances of the person reading, of the thing read, and other things of this kind must be regarded, that the gravity of the fault may be defined.

IV. He who reads a book of a Heretic which in no way treats of Religion is not subject to the penalties enacted in the Bull *Coenae*. Yet the books of the Heresiarchs — of Luther, of Calvin, and of the others — are all forbidden, in whatever matter.

V. That anyone may incur the penalties contained in the Bull, he must read knowingly; that is, knowledge is required both of the law and of the fact: he must know both that the reading of a heretical book is forbidden, and that the book which he reads is heretical. To the same penalties is subject he who hands a heretical book to another to be read, that he may hear the reader. But he who by fortuitous chance hears another reading is not subject to the penalties contained in the Bull, but can sin more or less according to the diversity of circumstances. A Theologian, a Preacher, a Confessor, when grave necessity presses, can read the books of the Heretics, either to confound the Heretics or to confirm the Catholics. Yet this rarely happens.

VI. Those who have obtained a license, either from the supreme Pontiff or from the Congregation of the Holy Office, to read heretical books, if they suffer danger of seduction, and feel their mind shaken by grave temptations, sin mortally in reading such books. For no pontifical license can free from the duty of avoiding an occasion that gravely allures. But those who suffer no temptation do not sin gravely, even if they read from mere curiosity. Not only do they sin gravely who without legitimate faculty read heretical books, and incur the reserved excommunication; but also those who retain them for any cause whatsoever, whether for show and ornament, or to fill their libraries.

VII. Printers of heretical books sin mortally, and contract the excommunication — as do all those who lend helping hands to the printers, who hand over the book to be printed, who furnish inks or types: because all contribute to the printing, and favor the Heretics.

VIII. In the Tridentine and Roman Index, besides the books of the Heresiarchs, many books of Catholics are prohibited. The former are named of the first class, the latter of the second. Those books of Catholics are prohibited which contain errors hostile to the doctrine of faith or of morals, or

which instill a suspicion of error, or offend pious ears, or furnish scandal, or contain lax opinions. Books of this class are sometimes prohibited *until they be corrected*. This happens when in the book absolutely sound doctrine is contained, but some proposition, which is not capital, has fallen from the author's pen beside his intention, or from a slip of the mind, or through ignorance. Such books are prohibited under mortal sin, and an excommunication not reserved.

IX. There are several other kinds of books prohibited in the aforesaid Index. First, all books treating of Magic. Secondly, books of astrology. Thirdly, all obscene books are prohibited by the law itself; nor does any faculty or license avail for the reading of these, for they are by their nature pestilential. Finally, in the fourth rule of the Roman Index the reading of the sacred Bible in the vernacular tongue is forbidden without the license of Superiors. A book proscribed in one language is proscribed in every other, unless there be a difference, and a correction have been made.

Chapter XI — The notion, object, subject, precept of the theological virtue of hope, and the time at which its obligation presses

I. Question I. *What is theological hope?* Answer. It is *a supernatural virtue, by which the human will hopes for eternal beatitude, to be obtained by the help of God.* It is called a supernatural virtue, because it is either taken for the habit, which is infused by God, or taken for the act, which is elicited by the power of divine grace. The remaining words distinguish hope from the other theological virtues: for it is proper to hope to attain God precisely as he is our eternal beatitude, which we cannot reach by our own powers; therefore there is added: *to be obtained by the help of God*.

II. The object of hope is twofold: material and formal. The former is God to be possessed, and is called the primary material object. The latter, or formal object, is God himself as omnipotent — that is, the aiding omnipotence. The secondary object is the divine aids, the good works brought forth by the power of graces; likewise temporal goods, insofar as their use, made good through grace, paves the way to eternal beatitude. The foundations, then, of Christian hope are the omnipotence of God, his mercy, and the immense merits of Christ the Lord. Frequently, therefore, must we repeat from the depths of our heart: *But I have hoped in thy mercy*: Psalm 12. *My God is my helper, and in him will I put my trust*: Psalm 17. And this must be kept before the eyes: *I am thy protector, and thy reward exceeding great*: Genesis 15. Be of good courage, then, *in the hope of life everlasting, which God, who lieth not, hath promised*: Titus 1 [recte].

III. The subject of hope is neither the blessed, nor the damned, nor heretics. Concerning the blessed and the damned there is no disagreement. In Heretics, just as there is no theological faith, so neither is there hope. In Catholics alone, then, whether journeying on the way or dwelling in Purgatory, is theological hope found. For although those souls are secure of obtaining the reward, the reward is nevertheless absent.

IV. Question II. *Is there a precept of hope?* Answer. All affirm it, and the holy Scriptures perspicuously impose it. *Hope in the Lord.* Nay, as the Prophet adds, the life of the faithful is a life of hope: *For thou, O Lord, singularly hast settled me in hope*: Psalm 4. For what is our life — or rather our pilgrimage — but the way to our Fatherland? Thither all our desires must conspire. This truth the Council of Trent defined, session 6, chapter 6; and Alexander VII condemned the following thesis: *A man is at no time of his life whatever bound to elicit acts of faith, hope, and charity by force of the precepts pertaining to those virtues.*

This precept obliges as soon as the light of reason shines forth, and that of itself; as also when one must depart from this world. Finally, this precept presses of itself unto the frequenting of the acts of this virtue. Many teach that there is no determinate time at which such a precept presses. By what reason so great a paradox can be asserted by Christian men, I truly do not perceive. Christians can scarcely recite the Lord's Prayer sincerely without eliciting acts of hope. *Per accidens* this precept presses whenever a grave temptation against hope strikes the soul; when the Sacrament of Penance is to be performed; when the precepts of charity and of prayer press; and so forth.

V. Hope is accompanied by fear, which is the flight of an arduous evil that cannot easily be avoided. It is divided into filial, initial, servile, and worldly fear — which last is base. Servile fear is good; God urges it, Matthew 10: *Fear ye him that can destroy both soul and body in hell.* This fear is from the Holy Ghost, yet it is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. But filial and chaste fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost; as also initial fear, which is not distinguished from the first except as the imperfect from the perfect.

VI. Question III. *Is there a precept of fear?* Answer. All affirm it. It is evident from holy Scripture. In Deuteronomy chapter 10 God says: *And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?* And David, Psalm 33: *Fear the Lord, all ye his saints.* This precept is a peculiar one.

VII. Question IV. *What are the vices opposed to hope?* Answer. They are *desperation* and *presumption*. Desperation is described as an efficacious will of casting away the eternal salvation to be obtained from the divine mercy. It is a most grave sin: for it thinks ill of the divine mercy.

VIII. Presumption is a perverse, or inordinate, confidence in the divine mercy. It is a grave sin; and into it, more frequently than into desperation, fall those sinners who trust that they will attain eternal glory without fasting, without the buffeting of the flesh, and without laborious works. Wherefore those Christians who lead their life in games, in banquets, in solaces, in promiscuous conversations of men and women, do not hope in God, but tempt God; and although they do not commit the sin of presumption properly so called, which is joined with heresy, they are nevertheless in a continual sin of carelessness of their own eternal salvation. They persevere in sins from an excessive confidence in the divine mercy. This crass negligence alone, this stupid torpor and indolence in the gravest business of eternal salvation, is a grave sin. Long perseverance in sins from hope of the divine mercy is a punishment of the divine vengeance, which scatters penal blindnesses upon illicit desires.

Dissertation II — On charity towards God

The last place among the theological virtues charity occupies, because it is their end and goal. This is the bond of Christian perfection, without which all the rest profit nothing, and with which all things profit unto eternal life. But — what cannot be sufficiently lamented — not a few Casuists have attempted, by their lax opinions, as it were to extinguish this virtue above the rest, and to reduce its exercise almost to nothing, as will become plain from the following theses.

Chapter I — A census of the proscribed propositions

I. Alexander VII proscribed forty-five propositions, of which the first is of this kind: *A man is at no time of his life whatever bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues.*

II. Innocent XI, out of the sixty propositions which he proscribed, condemned three regarding this matter, and they are the following:

5. *Whether he sins mortally who should elicit an act of the love of God only once in his life, we dare not condemn.*
6. *It is probable that the precept of charity towards God does not, of itself, rigorously oblige even once in every five years.*
7. *It obliges then only, when we are bound to be justified, and have no other way by which we can be justified.*

III. Alexander VIII, in the year 1690, condemned thirty-one propositions, among which are the following in order:

9. *In truth he sins who hates sin merely on account of its baseness and its unbecomingness to nature, without any respect to God offended.*
10. *The intention by which one detests evil and pursues good merely that he may obtain heavenly glory is not right, nor pleasing to God.*
11. *Everything that is not from Christian supernatural faith, which worketh by love, is a sin.*
12. *Whoever serves God even with a view to the eternal reward, if he lack charity, is not free of vice, as often as he acts even with a view to beatitude.*
13. *Attrition which is conceived from fear of hell and of punishments, without the love of God for his own sake, is not a good supernatural movement.*

Chapter II — An inventory of propositions which seem lax

I. Fr. Thomas Tamburini, book II on the Decalogue, chapter 1, number 9, writing of faith, premises a doctrine by which he reduces to nothing the precepts of all three theological virtues. *I think* (says he) *that the Faithful are never of themselves and directly obliged to believe the aforesaid mysteries either implicitly or explicitly, by force of the necessity of a precept of faith … The reason of the first assertion is that, as we have said …*

no precept ever obliges unless it be determinate. For since it cannot pass into execution except as determinate, it is not considered to be practically complete.

At number 10 he proceeds further, to destroy the special precept of charity. *Our opinion is confirmed, first, from Azor, who teaches that the precept of charity obliges then only when we are bound to be justified, and have no other way by which we can be justified: because this precept does not seem to oblige except as a means of justification, or as a disposition to it. Thus he. From which I gather that the like can be said of the act of faith, and consequently of the act of hope, as I shall again intimate below when I treat of hope, chapter 2, § 1, and of charity, chapter 3, § 2, number 2, referring myself thither.*

II. It must now be seen what he writes of the precept of charity in the place cited by himself. He reports, at number 1, the various opinions of the Doctors in these words: *The Doctors labor in assigning the time at which the Faithful is bound by obligation to elicit a positive act of love toward God; and they assign various times, as various as are the wits of men. The first time which some assign is the beginning of the use of reason. The second, the end of life. The third, the whole of life taken indeterminately, so that at least once in it God be loved. The fourth, all feast days, on which we ought specially to be free for God. The fifth, the time at which an adult receives Baptism. The sixth, the time at which one receives the Eucharist. The seventh, when perchance martyrdom is undergone. The eighth, when you receive a great benefit from God. The ninth, when you hear someone blaspheming against God. The tenth, when you are pressed by a grave temptation, especially of hatred of God, with danger of consent, unless you turn yourself to God through love.*

2. *The doctrine of Azor pleases me, who teaches that this precept of charity was imposed for the sake of the justification of the ungodly man: therefore it obliges then only when the ungodly man, because the Sacrament of Penance is not at hand, has no other way by which to justify himself, except by eliciting an act of contrition, which always in some manner at last involves an act of love of God loved above all things. Consequently, then, and indirectly, by reason of their justification, the Faithful are obliged to an act of charity. See above, chapter 1, § 1, number 50, where the same manner of speaking pleased me regarding the precept of the act of faith and of hope: for by the things there said this doctrine of Azor will be confirmed, and the times just assigned in the preceding number can be impugned.*

3. *It is confirmed: because although the common opinion teaches that there is a special precept of loving God in those words, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and elsewhere; yet Doctors not ignoble teach that this precept is not special, to be fulfilled at a special time, but general, imbibed in all the precepts; just as the second precept, of the love of the Neighbor, is not special, but contained in the precepts of the Decalogue; for on this account it is said: On these two commandments — that is, on the love of God and of the Neighbor — dependeth the whole law and the Prophets; and: He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me; and: Love is the fulfilling of the law. For if he who keeps the commandments loves, and he who loves keeps them, then the one of these is contained in the other; and consequently the precept of charity will oblige only indirectly, and by reason of another.*

4. *Probable, therefore, and utterly safe, is the opinion of those who deny that the Faithful, at the beginning of the use of reason* (so Castropalao with Azor, Valentia, Sanchez, Suarez, Coninck, cited by the same) *or at the end of life* (so the same author there, number 9, with Azor and Sanchez, cited by the same) *are obliged to turn themselves to God by loving him: for to posit an obligation of this kind, which certainly rests on no solid foundation, is nothing else than to instill scruples — not indeed into the unlearned, for these advert less to such an obligation, but into the more learned, etc.*

III. Patritius Sporer, treatise II on the first precept of the Decalogue, chapter 5, number 31, transcribes according to his custom the opinion of his Fr. Tamburini, and of the Authors whom Tamburini alleges, and explains it at greater length, and, so far as can be done, champions it. "Probable" (he says) "has that opinion hitherto always seemed to me, that that precept never obliges of itself as to an explicit act of the love of God above all things; but that it is satisfied by the voluntary observance of the commandments, and the exclusion of all sin for God's sake, as many grave Doctors teach in Tamburini. The reason is that, on the one hand, he who wills for God's sake to observe all his commandments, and for no thing to offend him by sinning, truly loves God above all things, at least implicitly and virtually, and with his whole heart negatively ... And on the other hand, the obligation of any precept — and that a grave one, under mortal sin — is not to be asserted without a certain foundation. No certain and pressing foundation, however, can be brought forward that the precept of love ever obliges of itself to a formal and explicit act of the love of God, as will be evident on weighing the foundations commonly adduced.

"One chief foundation is the great commandment itself, the affirmative precept of charity: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart* — which surely must oblige at some time to its own proper act, lest it be in vain. We acknowledge and venerate the most divine commandment, and we desire for ourselves its exercise, and that most frequent, in all things. Yet no reason or authority proves that it is a *special* precept, to be fulfilled of itself, by obligation, at some special time; nay, with the Doctors reported, it can most probably be said to be a general precept, imbibed in all the precepts, so that it is abundantly satisfied by implicit acts of the love of God, contained in the voluntary observance of the commandments for God's sake, as has been said.

"2. By altogether the same reason, the other precept of charity also — *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself* — is not special, to be fulfilled obligatorily of itself at some special time by some internal elicited act of love toward the Neighbor (for when would this be?); but it is a general precept imbibed in all the precepts of God regarding the Neighbor; and it is abundantly satisfied when one wills to keep the precepts of God regarding the Neighbor, and, occasion given, in fact keeps them, abstaining from all hatred, offense, and injury, and, when there is need, exhibiting the external works of charity.

"3. Another new and more pressing foundation is furnished by the very first proposition among those prohibited and condemned under Alexander VII in the year 1665, running thus: *A man is at no time of his life whatever bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues.* So the condemned proposition. But no mention is here made of a formal explicit act of the love of God above all things; and it seems altogether to suffice that the precept of charity often obliges of itself, at least insofar as it is negative, as in the cases set down above, even though it never oblige as affirmative ... Therefore our opinion ought to be considered the less condemned.

"4. But behold, most recently, in the year 1679, a most pressing foundation, in my judgment, was set down by Innocent XI. Among several propositions condemned as scandalous and pernicious in practice, he also placed these three in order: *Whether he sins mortally who should elicit an act*, etc. ... Here I give my conquered hands, out of reverence and obedience to the sacred apostolic See."

IV. Fr. Castropalao, treatise 6, disputation 1, point 4, number 9: *Fifthly, others assert that, danger of death pressing, even if you be not conscious of mortal sin — nay, even if, being conscious of it, you confess it sacramentally — you are obliged to love God above all things ... I confess that this obligation is sufficiently probable, and always to be counseled in practice; but it is not altogether certain, if you are not conscious of mortal sin: for Azor and Sanchez*

reject it. Through charity, says the Angelic Doctor, we attain the last end, and are joined to God. When the moment of separation from this world, and of conjunction with God, is at hand, are we not commanded to elicit an act of love, which is the means by which we are in very deed coupled to God?

V. The same, in the place cited, number 9: *Seventhly, others say that this precept obliges, first, when martyrdom must be undergone, or some other excellent and difficult work undertaken: because it is expedient then to strengthen the soul in the service of God. But I, while I acknowledge the fittingness, disapprove the obligation.* The Christian, then, when the tyrant threatens death, and death itself is imminent, is not bound to produce an act of charity, by which he may love both God and the tyrant, and confirm and strengthen himself to undergo the agony and the monstrous torture? It will be fitting, but it will not be necessary?

VI. The same, in the place cited, number 10: *By this obligation, then, I judge that every adult is bound not every year, as pleased Peter de Ledesma — for this is too hard, and rests on no firm foundation — but a few times in his life ... And I should count a delay of three years grave.* Is it too hard to love, in the sweet embraces of friendship, once each year, God our parent, provider, preserver, redeemer, and benefactor?

Chapter III — The notion, object, prerogatives, and precept of theological charity

I. Question I. *What is charity, and what its object?* Answer. Charity taken for the habit is defined: *It is a virtue divinely infused, by which God is loved for his own sake, and the Neighbor for the sake of God.* Charity loves God as he is God, that is, on account of his goodness and perfection. In the word *Neighbor* are comprehended all rational creatures capable of eternal glory.

II. The material object, or primary object *which*, of charity is God; the secondary is the Neighbor for the sake of God. The formal object of charity is the infinite goodness of God, lovable for its own sake. By this reason charity is distinguished from the two other theological virtues.

III. The first prerogative of charity is friendship between God and men. *I will not now call you servants ... but friends*: John 15. This friendship includes reciprocal benevolence, and a mutual communion of goods, as the same Evangelist adds, chapter 14: *He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him.* The Son of God coupled human nature to himself, and raised it to the summit of Divinity, that he might shadow forth a certain semblance of equality. The second prerogative of charity is that it is the life of the soul, just as the soul is the life of the body, says Augustine. The third prerogative of charity is that it is a gift infused by God with none of our merits preceding, and with no regard for any natural capacity of ours. The fourth prerogative is the worth which charity bestows upon all other works. The other virtues have indeed from their proper object their honesty and goodness; but that they may come forth wreathed with the crown of the reward, they must needs be adorned with the nuptial garment of charity. The fifth prerogative of charity is that it is the most excellent of all the virtues, as St. Paul says, 1 Corinthians 13: *And the greatest of these is charity.*

IV. The offices and acts of actual charity are benevolence; the affection of union; complacency in the divine perfections; love of the infinite goodness; desire of his glory; to will good things to God — both intimate goods, which are all his infinite perfections, and extrinsic goods, placed in the manifestation of the divine perfections, namely, that God be worshipped, adored, praised, and loved by all creatures.

V. Question II. *Does the precept of loving God press?* Answer. This is the greatest and first of all commandments, says the Evangelist Matthew, chapter 22: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment.* Compare, I pray, these words of Christ with the opinions which I have reported above, at number 2, from Tamburini, Sanchez, and Sporer, and with the proscribed theses which certain recent Probabilists taught; and thence gather what faith is to be given to similar authors in the other obscure and entangled controversies of morals, if, in explaining the gravest and first commandment, so luminously expressed by Christ the Lord, they have fallen into opinions so lax.

VI. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 44, art. 1, proves this special precept by several weights of reasons. For by the same reason by which charity is a special virtue, the precept commanding its act is a peculiar one. *Now something is due* (says the Angelic Doctor) *in two ways: in one way, of itself; in another way, on account of another. Of itself, indeed, that is due in each business which is its end, because it has the character of a good of itself; on account of another, that is due which is ordered to the end ... Now the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, which is done through charity; and to this are ordered, as to their end, all the things that pertain to the spiritual life ... But in any genus, that which is of itself is superior to that which is on account of another; and therefore the greatest precept is that of charity.*

VII. St. Augustine, book 1 On the morals of the Church, chapter 11, explaining this commandment, says: *If, then, to them that love God all things work together unto good; and if no one doubts that the supreme good, which is also called the best, is not only to be loved, but to be loved so that we ought to love nothing more — which is signified and expressed by what was said: With thy whole soul, and with thy whole heart, and with thy whole mind — who, I ask, will doubt, all these things being established and most firmly believed, that nothing else is for us the best thing, to the gaining of which, all other things set aside, we must hasten, but God? Again, if no thing separates us from his love, what can be not only better, but also more certain, than this good? But let us briefly consider the several points. No one separates us thence by threatening death: for that very thing by which we love God cannot die, except in not loving God; for to die is nothing else than to prefer anything to him in loving and following. No one separates us thence by promising life: for no one separates us from the fountain by promising water,* etc.

VIII. Therefore that commandment is special, commanding of itself an act of love. False, then, is the opinion of certain men who asserted that that commandment is general, included in the other precepts. Wherefore Alexander VIII deservedly proscribed the following thesis in the year 1690: *Objective goodness consists in the agreement of the object with rational nature; formal goodness, in the conformity of the act with the rule of morals. For this it suffices that the moral act tend to the last end interpretatively. Hence man is not bound to love [God] either at the beginning or in the course of his moral life.*

IX. Question III. *Must the love which this precept commands be appreciative, or also intensive?* Answer. The Theologians distinguish a twofold love of charity: the one appreciative, the other intensive — a distinction which is not very ancient. With appreciative love we pursue God when we prefer God to all things, and when, burning with such love, we are prepared to suffer and endure all evils, and to lose whatever goods, lest we offend God. Intensive love adds a more vehement fervor, a more intense endeavor, and even a sensible tenderness, as it were, greater or less. It is agreed among all that this precept does not command intensive love explained in this manner — that is, insofar as intensity impels the soul beyond the observance of the precepts to the execution of the works of counsel, and to the traversing of the sublimer way of perfection, and insofar as it constitutes delights in mutual embraces. What is commanded, however, is appreciative love, by which we choose God before, and

prefer him to, all other goods; and in this way we love God with the whole heart, with the whole soul: since God alone rules in our heart, and subjects to himself all our affections. This love, since it fights against carnal love and earthly cupidity, is not severed from some fervor, intensity, and endeavor. Yet this charity increases, and its fervor is kindled more. Therefore the Theologians, with Augustine and Thomas, distinguish three states of charity: namely, of *beginners*, of *proficients*, and of *the perfect*. Beginning charity subjects the man to God, restrains concupiscence, desires, and appetites, pursues all sins, and removes all the impediments of heavenly love. Proficient charity rises higher, lifts its flames upward, attempts great things, and applies itself wholly to the exercises of piety and of the virtues: it studies not only to keep the law exactly, but strives also to execute the counsels of evangelical perfection. Perfect charity, as though triumphing over prostrate enemies, enjoys God, and, tranquil, overflows with heavenly delights. But all these things are expressed by the experience and exercise of divine love more than by the pen.

X. A deliberate desire of remaining perpetually in this life several authors do not excuse from mortal sin; which opinion I judge true, when with deliberate mind one should truly desire to dwell perpetually in this world: because such a one would prefer the state of this life to God, and would therefore violate the precept of loving God above all things. Nor may you reply that such a one does not prefer this life to God, but only desires not to be deprived of this life, and not to fall into hell — that he directly desires, therefore, to avoid the eternal punishments. This, I say, you shall not object. For the way of avoiding hell is not the perpetuity of this life, but the flight of sin and the exercise of the virtues. Those who would wish to remain perpetually in this life would in very deed — though they do not express it — desire to enjoy the pleasures of sins, and at the same time to escape hell. That desire of the perennity of this life proceeds from a perverse love of carnal pleasures; therefore it is evil and vicious, and hostile to charity.

Chapter IV — The times are designated at which this precept of loving God presses

I. Question I. *Does this precept oblige at any determinate time?* Answer. Some have denied it, who contended that this precept is not special; but this opinion has now been proscribed by the Church.

II. Question II. *Is it enough to elicit an act of the love of God once in a lifetime?* Answer. The affirming opinion the Venerable Innocent XI proscribed in this thesis: *Whether he sins mortally who should elicit an act of the love of God only once in his life, we dare not condemn.* This opinion deserves detestation rather than confutation. The greatest and first commandment, imposed by God with such severity and emphasis of words — the precept which is the soul of the Christian life, by which alone we truly live to God — imposes the duty of exercising its vital acts only once?

III. Question III. *Does this precept oblige only once in each five-year period?* Answer. The affirming opinion certain men formerly championed; but this too the Venerable Innocent XI condemned: *It is probable that the precept of charity towards God does not, of itself, rigorously oblige even once in every five years.*

IV. Question IV. *Does this precept oblige of itself at the first instant of the use of reason?* Answer. The graver Theologians commonly affirm it, with St. Thomas. Since at some determinate time of life this precept of loving God obliges of itself, as the Church has defined, therefore this obligation presses above all at the first instant of the use of reason, morally taken. For the light of reason opens to the child his

entrance into this world, and shows the way that leads to the harbor. Then, therefore, he must deliberate about himself, and set before himself his last end. This last end is God: therefore he is to be loved, and to be chosen before all. And surely, when that first light of reason shines forth, the young person is bound to do something. And what can he do more apt and better than to salute, to love his Creator, his Redeemer, and the divine Parent of his eternal felicity, and to pant after his embraces? No time, then, can be designated more opportune for loving God than that interval in which deliberation must be made about the way to be taken and the last end to be chosen. And this is that time at which the use of reason is acquired.

V. The opposite opinion the Probabilists commonly defend; and among the many sophisms which they obtrude, one is this: that too heavy a burden is imposed on children; but Christ says: *My yoke is sweet and my burden light*: Matthew 11. Now they contend that the yoke is sweet when it is accommodated to human appetites and to liberty. As often as some divine commandment imposes a burden hostile to concupiscence, to cupidity, and to the other allurements, so often do they throw back the said oracle: *My yoke is sweet*, etc.

VI. These authors abuse the aforesaid oracle in a false sense. All the Fathers to a man testify that the yoke of Christ is sweet because it is a yoke of love, of charity, of friendship, and of benevolence. Hard is the buffeting of the flesh, the endurance of persecutions, the crucifixion of concupiscence and cupidity, the guarding of chastity, and very many other things which the Gospel commands. Most hard and most rough are these things — not merely hard and rough. But all things become sweet and pleasant then only when divine charity, when heavenly love, pours out the unction, the sweetness, and the delights of the divine friendship. If the affections of weak women render sweet and pleasant to their lovers the gravest inconveniences which these endure to please them, with what sweetness, with what delights will not God fill his lovers? The benign Casuists make the yoke of Christ most hard and most rough, since they take away from it the frequent exercise of charity, which alone removes roughness and hardness. All the commandments of the divine law are hostile, inimical, and burdensome to flesh and blood. Add charity, friendship, benevolence — and all things grow sweet to lovers. This is the doctrine of all the Fathers.

VII. I adduce a few out of many texts of St. Augustine. On Psalm 67: *For whatever is difficult in the precepts is light to him that loveth. Nor for any other reason is that saying of Matthew 11, verse 30 — My burden is light — rightly understood, except because he gives the Holy Spirit, through whom charity is poured forth in our hearts.* He speaks at greater length in Sermon 96, chapter 1: *Hard it seems, and grievous, what the Lord has commanded, that if anyone will follow him, he must deny himself. But it is neither hard nor grievous which he commands, who helps that what he commands may be done. For both that is true which is said to him in Psalm 16: Because of the words of thy lips, I have kept hard ways; and that is true which he himself said, Matthew 11, verse 30: My yoke is easy and my burden light. For whatever is hard in the precepts, charity makes easy. We know how much love itself accomplishes ... how much men have suffered, how many unworthy and intolerable things they have endured, to arrive at that which they loved.* Likewise, in the book On nature and grace, against the Pelagians, chapter 69: *Very good, however, are the precepts, if we use them lawfully. For by that very fact by which it is most firmly believed that God, just and good, could not have commanded impossible things, we are admonished both what to do in easy things, and what to ask in difficult ones. For all things become easy to charity, to which the burden of Christ is light; or it alone is that very burden which is light, according to what is said, 1 John 5, verse 3: And his commandments are not heavy. And what is said in Deuteronomy 30: The word is nigh thee, in thy*

mouth and in thy heart ... Everyone, therefore, being converted, as is there commanded, to the Lord his God with his whole heart and with his whole soul, does not find the commandment of God heavy. For how is it heavy, when it is the commandment of love? For either one does not love, and therefore it is heavy; or he loves, and it cannot be heavy. But he loves, if, as is there admonished, Israel be converted to the Lord his God with his whole heart and with his whole soul. A new commandment (he says) I give unto you: that you love one another: John 13. He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law; and: Love is the fulfilling of the law. According to this it was said: If they had walked in good paths, they had surely found the paths of justice easy. How then is it said: Because of the words of thy lips, I have kept hard ways (Psalm 16), except because both are true? They are hard to fear, easy to love.

VIII. Thus far it has been shown: 1. that the precept of charity is special, and imposes an express act of love; 2. that it obliges several times in life; 3. that it presses of itself within a five-year period. Other times must now be designated at which this commandment presses.

IX. Question V. *Does the precept of charity oblige to frequent acts of the love of God?* Answer. If the words in which God commands this love be regarded, the proposed question appears temerarious. Not frequency merely, but even a moral continuation of divine love does the divine commandment enjoin — so perspicuously that it cannot even be called into disputation. Let the words of Deuteronomy 6 be read. In John 15 Christ says: *Abide in my love.* These words betoken a constant perseverance in the divine love. More clearly St. Peter expresses this, first epistle, chapter 4: *But before all things have a constant mutual charity among yourselves: for charity covereth a multitude of sins.* And in truth Christians, by force of their own profession, are bound to live the Christian life. What is this Christian life, but the conjunction of the soul with God, just as the bodily life is in the union of the soul with the body?

X. Question VI. *Is it enough to elicit acts of charity once in a year?* Answer. When I read these and similar questions, unknown to all the Fathers, proposed by the Theologians of this latest age, I am filled with no light astonishment. For this question seems to me most like this one: Whether a living man is bound to produce acts of life once in a year? or: whether it be enough that he elicit acts of life once in a year? Would not the question be utterly ridiculous? But more ridiculous still would the question be, if the disputation were instituted about a dead man.

XI. The proposed question, then, is either about a just man, or about a sinner. If about a just man, it appears too vain. For the just man lives a divine life: therefore he morally continues the offices of charity. For there is no deliberately willed work in the just man which is not either meritorious or demeritorious, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, on the second book [of the Sentences], distinction 40, question 1, article 5: *There can be no act proceeding deliberately from the will which is not good or evil — not only according to the Theologian, but also according to the moral Philosopher. And there can be no voluntary act proceeding from a deliberate will, in one having grace, which is not meritorious. But in one not having grace there can be some deliberate act which is neither meritorious nor demeritorious.* And a little below: *Yet an act perfect with civil goodness is not susceptible of the efficacy of merit, except in him who has grace; and therefore in him who lacks grace it is indifferent to merit and demerit; but in him who has grace it must be either meritorious or demeritorious: for as an evil act will be demeritorious, so also a good one will be meritorious. For since charity commands all the virtues, as the will commands all the powers, whatever is ordered to the end of any virtue must be ordered to the end of charity. And since every good act is ordered to the end of charity, it will remain ordered to the end of charity, and so will be meritorious. And thus to eat and to drink, the measure of temperance being kept, and to play for recreation, the measure of eutrapelia being kept — which holds the mean in games, as is said in the second [recte fourth] book of the Ethics — will be meritorious in him who has charity, through which he has established*

God as the last end of his life. This same he teaches in several other places. Question XI On evil, article 5 [recte question 2, article 5], ad 11: *For an act to be meritorious in one having charity, it is not required that it be actually referred to God; but it suffices that it be actually referred to some fitting end, which is habitually referred to God. Just as if someone, wishing to make a pilgrimage for God's sake, should buy a horse, thinking actually nothing of God, but only of the journey which he had already ordered unto God — this too is meritorious. But it is evident that he who has charity has ordered himself and all his things unto God, to whom he cleaves as to his last end. Therefore whatever he shall have ordered either to himself or to anything of his, he does meritoriously, even if he think not actually of God — unless he be impeded by some inordination of the act, which is not referable to God. But this cannot be, unless it be a sin, at least venial. Therefore every act of one having charity is either meritorious, or is a sin*. The same he has in question XIV, article 5 [recte On charity, article 11, ad 2]: *It must be said that in one having charity there can be no act of virtue except formed by charity: for either that act will be ordered to the due end — and this cannot be, in one having charity, except through charity; or it is not ordered to the due end — and so it will not be an act of virtue.*

XII. The act of charity is the efficacious love of the last end, namely of God: therefore it directs all things unto God — and above all the just man himself, and his will and free choice. For this is to love God with the whole heart, with the whole soul, and with the whole mind: namely, to offer the whole soul as a victim to God. If it gives the whole plant, then also the fruits — namely, all the acts and offices which proceed from that same will. The Theologians dispute how long that act of charity, by which the just man directs himself and all his things unto God, endures in the impression left in the will and in the other virtues. The Salmanticenses answer that it endures through the whole of life, unless it be retracted. Be it so. But it will quickly be retracted, unless it be fostered by a frequent repetition of acts. From this negligence in breaking forth often into these acts of love proceed the most frequent relapses of the Just into sins. Who would say that the love of friendship burns between two men present to one another, if they exchanged the offices of love once in a year?

XIII. Add to this that the love of charity in the just soul suffers perpetually the tumult of carnal appetites. Continually the demon sends in specters and paints illusions, kindles lust, that he may extinguish this heavenly love. We can, not undeservedly, compare the fire of divine love, which burns in the will of the just man in this state of corrupted nature, with the heat of fire which clings to heated water. Heated water quickly grows cold, on account of the continual conflict by which the coldness of the water fights against the heat inimical to it; and unless that heat received in the water be strengthened by continual flames, the water falls back into its native coldness. By the same reason, proportion being preserved, the heat of divine love burning in the will of the just man gradually grows lukewarm, and loses its strength in the continual fight against the most impure flames of concupiscence, and against the enticements and illusions of the world and of the demon, and grows utterly cold, unless it be restored with opportune nourishment, unless it be inflamed by the frequent heat of acts.

XIV. Hence it is ascertained and established that that question is vain — whether the Faithful ought to elicit an act of love once in a year, or on each Lord's day. For if the discourse be of the just, these, since they live a divine life, perform the offices of charity every day. And if they should elicit an act of love only once — I do not say in a year or in a month, but in a week — they will gradually become lukewarm, then cold, and at last sinners. What? Amid so many floods of tempests, against so many assaults of temptations, will they come off victors, unless the divine love be fervent and glowing? At

the first sight of the enemy, at the first allurement of a seducing woman, they will fall, unless they be strong and robust in the heavenly friendship. If the discourse be of sinners, these cannot fulfill the divine precept unless they be reconciled to God, and, their faults blotted out, restore themselves to grace. And they sin by deferring their conversion long, from day to day. The question, therefore, is not of sinners, but of the just. Now if we say that the just ought to elicit acts of charity several times in a week or a month, do we impose any burden or rigor beyond what the just in fact perform in practice? For who of the just will neglect, even for a single day, to salute his most loving God, and to recite the Lord's prayer — which he cannot pronounce with a sincere heart without loving God his Father? But if they neglect this, they will easily relapse into sins, and those most grave. The Faithful, then, are to be exhorted and urged to pursue God continually with ardent love — not to be made the subject of disputes whether they ought to exercise this love once in a year, in a month, in a week. Those disputations proceed from the brain of men, not from the holy Scriptures, which command a continued and perennial love.

XV. Question VII. *Are all bound, by the precept of charity, to direct their works unto God?* Answer. The disputation is of virtual, not actual, direction. That the precept of charity commands this direction of all works unto God, the last end, is evident from the words of the precept itself: *Thou shalt love thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul.* If God demands the whole heart, the whole soul, by the same right he requires all its offspring, fruits, and works, as St. Thomas interprets, I-II, q. 100, art. 10: *Under the precept of charity is contained that God be loved with the whole heart, to which it pertains that all things be referred unto God.* This precept St. Paul expresses more luminously, 1 Corinthians 10: *Therefore, whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God.* Again, in chapter 16 he adds: *Let all your things be done in charity.* To this doctrine all the Fathers subscribe, whose testimonies I have given in Tome I on the Decalogue, book 1, dissertation 4, chapter 12.

XVI. Into the extreme error fell Baius and Jansenius. Baius taught this proposition, which is the 25th: *The works of Infidels are sins; and the virtues of the Philosophers are vices.* Baius defended the view that all works must be referred unto God by force of theological charity, properly so called — which surely is not found in Infidels. Hence he inferred that all the works of Infidels are sins; which error all Catholics condemn. Not a few Theologians of the Catholics — above all Cardinal Noris, Francesco Macedo, Vincent Contenson, and many others — teach that without theological faith and charity properly so called there can be found morally good works; but not without an actual, special aid, or charity generally and commonly so called. They teach that some works of Infidels are good and honorable from their office and object; but that whenever, by force of the special divine aid, they are not referred unto God, a sin of omission occurs, which does not infect the operation, provided the one acting halt in the honesty of an operation good by its own nature, and do not twist it to a depraved end: for then all confess that the work is depraved. Take the matter in few words. All confess that the works of Infidels are for the most part sins, because in practice they commonly refer them to a depraved end. All likewise confess that Infidels sometimes work certain moral goods — either by force of a special aid, as many contend, or by the powers of nature with a general aid, as others more commonly maintain. The authors of the former opinion teach that the precept of referring all works unto God, either actually or virtually, obliges only under venial sin. The whole disagreement, then, comes down to this: whether Infidels sometimes commit a venial sin of omission, for the reason that they neglect to refer the work unto God.

XVII. Since these things stand thus, who can sufficiently marvel at certain Theologians who are carried away with so unbridled an assault against the former opinion, which the whole school of the Augustinians and other most grave Theologians defend? The opinion, on the one side, is of lighter moment; on the other, it enjoys its own great probability. Nevertheless certain Theologians, patrons of the more benign Ethics, are not afraid to brand the said opinion with the mark of heresy, and to bring its authors under suspicion of heresy.

Chapter V — Consequences, which urge the exercises and offices of the theological virtues

I. Hither Pastors and Confessors ought to direct their endeavors: that they imprint more deeply upon the souls of the Faithful the images of the theological virtues, and exercise them in their practice. And that they may perform this the more easily, I have resolved, at the end of the treatise on these three virtues, to touch briefly on a few things to this end — desiring to approach, if not wholly, at least in part, the method of the holy Fathers of the Church. For all the Fathers nowhere teach that the doctrine of morals is merely to be disputed about, but apply themselves above all to persuading its observance.

§ I. How the excellence and the exercise of faith are to be urged

II. Awake, then, O men of God, Pastors of souls, and Confessors, and, according to the zeal with which you burn, instruct your flock in the perpetual exercise of faith. The true and perfect faith of Christ is light in the mind, love in the heart. That the light of faith may shine in the mind, the oil by which that light is fostered and nourished must burn in the lamp of the heart. The sun is darkened by the vapors of the earth; and the light of faith grows dim when impure exhalations burst forth from a corrupted heart. The vices do not assail faith directly, but they prepare the way to impiety. Teach the Faithful, therefore, to purge their hearts and souls from vices, if they desire their minds to be illumined with the splendor of a living faith. If by the apparatus of words, by the force of eloquence, by the efficacy of disputations, they cannot subdue the minds of Heretics into the obedience of the faith, let them study to soften their obstinacy by innocence of life and by sanctity of virtues and of works, and to conquer their haughtiness by their own humility.

III. But this must be inculcated in them more deeply: that they keep before their eyes the Son of God made man, and subjected to the reproaches, the mockeries, and the maledictions of men; that, standing, walking, laboring, they frequently meditate the Cross, and the Son of God hanging upon it — who willed to die for this end, that he might redeem our souls from the servitude of the demon, and lead them through to eternal felicity. This Cross is the torch, this the lantern, which they must hold in the hand of the mind, that in this valley of darkness they may be able to direct their journey to the heavenly Jerusalem.

IV. Let them study to represent vividly the incredible excellence of faith, and the infinite mercy of God, which has imparted so great a benefit to us; and let them address them in this or a similar fashion. Shake off your slumber for a little while, O Christians, and consider that your faith is a most precious ring, with which the espousals of your souls with God are to be sealed. Your faith reserves for you the more secret mysteries of God, communicated now under a cloud, but in their own time — the cloud driven away and the darkness dispersed — to be seen in themselves; which is the last

argument of intimate friendship. This faith, purchased by the death of Christ, grown up by the blood of the Martyrs, confirmed by the testimonies of miracles, defended by the wisdom of the Doctors, God imparts to you, moved by his clemency alone. Run through in your mind so many regions of the world, so many kingdoms, provinces, empires, and nations covered over with the gloom of the darkness of Infidelity and of Heresy. Consider that out of so many thousands of thousands you have been chosen into a holy nation, into a royal priesthood, into the sons and spouses of the deifying Trinity. But remember at the same time that those kingdoms, empires, and nations which now pay the tremendous penalties of Infidelity and Heresy were once, no otherwise than you now, bathed in the light of faith. Look about you on every side at the formidable wreckage of faith and religion taken away. They who once were your brethren, sons of God, and heirs of Paradise — their successors have now become your enemies, slaves of the divine vengeance, heralds of the demons, betrayers of Religion. Temples have been leveled to the ground, altars torn down, sacrifices abolished; and crimes, schisms, heresies, impiety unfurl their banner where once the faith of Christ shone the holier and held dominion. What is it, that before thousands of thousands God has sealed your souls with the ring of his faith? that, saved from the universal shipwreck, he has placed them in the ark of his religion? that he has embraced them with so great a predilection? This vicissitude and revolution of Religion — by which God exercises the fury of his wrath upon the very vessels of mercy, and his goodness upon the victims of vengeance — while the Apostle Paul was considering it, terrified and trembling he exclaimed: *O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways!* Fix your mind, then, upon so great a mystery, that thence you may gather the immense riches of the divine mercy poured out upon you.

V. After explaining the loftiness and majesty of so great a gift, instruct them to repeat acts of faith frequently, every day — above all in the morning, at midday, and in the evening. Let the image of the Crucified never depart from their mind, considering that after his example their morals and life must be conformed: *Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son*. Here let the sacred Pastors drive the nail home; let them expound the meanings of the profession made in baptism; let them teach them that for this reason their foreheads are sealed with the sign of the Cross, and anointed with the sacred chrism: that before the whole World, even with the loss of life, if need were, they may intrepidly confess the Religion of Christ. Let Pastors be solicitous and diligent, and let them aim their desires chiefly at this: to urge upon their Faithful this imitation of Christ and of the Saints. Let them press and commend this doctrine of morals the more deeply.

§ II. The manner of exercising Christian hope

VI. *For thou, O Lord, singularly hast settled me in hope*, said the holy Prophet David, Psalm 4. Hope tends toward arduous, difficult, and sublime things. Consider seriously what obstacles the confidence of enlarging empires and of triumphing over enemies assails. It counts as nothing to drain treasuries and squander patrimonies; it makes nothing of the tears of wives, of the lot of children; with glad mind it endures dire tempests, the changes of the seasons, and the blows of adverse fortune, that it may attain the glory won by war. What inconveniences and troubles does the confidence of acquiring fleeting merchandise not undertake? What seas, what distant regions does it not traverse; what floods and what tempests does it not endure? If this earthly hope digests things so hard, so rough, so grim, that it may procure things vain and empty, with what fortitude of soul ought theological hope to assail the obstacles which delay the entrance into the heavenly Fatherland? With what fortitude of

breast is it constrained to repel the struggle of the flesh, the enticements of the senses, the illusions and witcheries of the siren women, the frauds of the world, the wiles of enemies, the ambushes of the demon? All these things men would strenuously overcome, if they were certain that after the victory they would attain some principality, kingdom, or empire. Now the faith which they profess reveals to them an eternal kingdom, an infinite empire, to be possessed after the very brief course of this life. Christian hope pledges itself a certain possession, provided those things be fulfilled which Religion prescribes to be believed and to be done.

VII. Raise up your soul, O Christian men; put forth your strength and your endeavors, that you may attain God. Christian hope rests upon fortitude, by which it routs enemies, repels impediments, and overcomes all difficulties. Perverse is the hope which pledges impunity in sins, without removing from sins. The root of perverse hope is the want of fear. Christian hope walks between fortitude and fear. Fear removes from dangers, represses audacity, and represents the severity of the divine justice. *In the fear of the Lord is confidence of strength*, says Solomon. Fear turns the soul aside, lest it freely run into dangers. Fortitude raises up the soul, that it may fearlessly repel the dangers which it cannot avoid.

VIII. But to whom can it come to mind that reasons are needed to persuade Christians of fear, the companion of hope? Dangers surround us on every side. Dangers on land, says the Apostle, dangers on the sea, dangers in masters and directors, dangers among false brethren, dangers in ourselves — in our hearts, in our senses, in our thoughts; and shall we, senseless, pass our days in delights and pleasures? Whence, I ask, so great a madness? Weigh well, O Christians, that you are placed in the prison of this world. Consider the offenses of youth and of manhood. All of us, placed in this exile, await the sentence either of eternal death or of eternal life. On the one side the crown of glory, on the other the sword of eternal punishment, hangs over our head. Let us lift up the eyes of faith, that we may meditate the crown hung up for good works, and the punishment destined for depraved works. The seasons run their course; the days flow by; the hours and moments slip away: the moment is at hand and imminent, either of attaining the eternal crown, or of laying our neck beneath the eternal and tremendous punishment. And are we not shaken, do we not tremble, are we not aghast?

IX. Let the evangelical Pastor, that he may exercise the souls entrusted to him in hope, make plainly known the immensity of the reward and prize to be attained, and the omnipotence and infinite mercy prepared to confer the aids and the grace by which the prize may be obtained. Let him teach them to repeat frequently, daily, the acts of this confidence — just as exiles and pilgrims continually pant after their fatherland — so that they may easily be able to frequent those same acts when the floods of adverse fortune and of calamities rush in.

§ III. The rule of exercising charity

X. Theological faith represents the goodness of God, his clemency, his mercy, and the infinite benefits of creation and redemption already conferred upon us, and the eternal rewards to be conferred, which hope desires to attain. Unless the human heart be of iron and of stone, it can scarcely contain itself from pursuing with love a God so good, so clement, so beneficent, and so most liberal a giver. *There are two loves*, says Augustine, book 11 On Genesis according to the letter, chapter 15, *of which the one is holy, the other unclean.* The love of charity makes citizens of Jerusalem; the love of iniquity constitutes slaves of Babylon. These loves fight with one another, and the one drives out the other.

XI. That God must be loved I acknowledge, you say; but how he is to be loved, I know not. You would have said more truly that you know not how to express in words the manner in which you love God. Love is a movement by which the will is borne toward a known good — either by desiring it, or by rejoicing over it, or by taking complacency in it, and by desiring good things for it. If you love God because he created you, redeemed you, preserves, protects, nourishes you — in one word, because he is beneficent toward you — the love is called a love of chaste concupiscence. If you burn with love of him because he is good, because he is worthy that all should burn with his love, that they should will good to him, that they should sing his praises and worship him, the love is one of charity and of friendship. The love of chaste concupiscence is the more imperfect, and the more intimate to our nature; therefore the beginning is taken from it, and thereafter the ascent is made higher. What is it that kindles you to the love of a man? The benefits, you reply, which he has conferred upon me, and his love toward me poured out first; and finally his endowments of justice, equity, goodness, sincerity, and many other prerogatives. Stir up in your mind the light of the Christian faith, which vividly sets before your eyes both the infinite benefits conferred upon you by God, and his goodness, equity, majesty, clemency, mercy, wisdom, benignity, and innumerable other endowments. Faith precedes charity. The more splendid the light of faith, the more ardent the flame of love. When the mind has been bathed in the light of faith, and the will raised up by the strength of hope, straightway it is kindled with the flame of love, which the soul, adorned and stirred by the two aforesaid virtues, can scarcely repress.

XII. There have been those who, in order to kindle the purest flame of this love, taught that God is to be loved with the exclusion of every hope of possessing him. They contended that the confidence of possessing God makes the love mercenary. Wherefore, to render this love pure, they wished it empty of all desire of attaining the reward. But this doctrine Innocent XII condemned. Our God is our reward, our beatitude. *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God.* Men without God are nothing. Men would be desiring their own destruction, as often as they would wish to separate themselves from God. That love is impure and mercenary which loves other things besides God without relation to God. But that love is pure and perfect which loves God because he is good. We will God for ourselves, because he himself has constituted himself our crown and our reward. He has chosen us as his sons, his heirs. *If sons, heirs also*; if heirs, possessors also. We love God as our supreme good. The two respects are distinct; but the one does not exclude the other — rather the one is subjected to the other. The soul kindled with the fire of charity loves God now under the one, now under the other relation; and at last refers itself and all its things unto God, and there rests, as in the center of its eternal felicity.

XIII. Let Pastors of souls, and all the ministers of God, if they wish to purge the evangelical flock from vices and to keep it in the safe path, exercise it in these theological virtues. After hearing sacramental confession, among the satisfactory works which they must impose upon penitents, let them prescribe the task of these three virtues to be offered to God. They do not know, you will say, how to exercise the offices of these virtues. They do not know? Then they are not Christians. Then they are not capable of absolution, since the exercise of these virtues must precede and accompany the sacrament. Who, then, is so rude that he cannot meditate, on bended knees, the Son of God made man and crucified? Instruct them to fix their mind upon this cross, upon this passion of Christ, considering that Christ the Lord underwent this death for the love of men, for their redemption, and that he might lead them through to eternal felicity. Instruct them to recite the creed, considering and meditating each article for a little while. Admonish them to recite the Lord's prayer, imploring from

God this living faith, this invincible hope, and this ardent love. The exercise of these virtues is the foundation and soul of the Christian Religion. The other devotions are ornaments, and, as it were, added flowers; but if the bases and foundations of the Christian edifice be wanting, all things end in smoke. But above all let them inculcate that those believe in God, hope in him, and love him, who conform their morals and life to the exemplar of Jesus Christ.

Dissertation III — On charity towards the Neighbor

Chapter I — The propositions condemned against the charity of the Neighbor are recounted

Since some have gravely whittled down, and almost taken out of the way, the precept of charity towards God, it is no wonder that they have published lax opinions against the charity by which we are bound to love our Neighbor. The propositions proscribed by Innocent XI in this matter are the following:

10. *We are not bound to love our Neighbor by an internal and formal act.*
11. *We can satisfy the precept of loving our Neighbor by external acts alone.*
12. *Scarcely in secular persons will you find, even in Kings, anything superfluous to their state; and so scarcely anyone is bound to almsgiving, when he is bound only out of what is superfluous to his state.*
13. *If you act with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened over someone's life, and rejoice over his natural death, seek it with an inefficacious desire, and long for it — not indeed from displeasure at the person, but on account of some temporal advantage.*
14. *It is licit, with an absolute desire, to wish for the death of one's father — not indeed as an evil to the father, but as a good to the one wishing it: because, namely, a rich inheritance will fall to him.*
15. *It is licit for a son to rejoice over the parricide of his parent, committed by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches thence obtained by inheritance.*

Chapter II — Lax propositions of the Casuists

I. Marcos Vidal, in his *Ark* on the precept of charity, inquiry 11, number 57: "Although the Doctors commonly assert that one affected by an injury is sometimes bound to exhibit particular signs of love to his enemy — both to avoid scandal, and also when from the exhibiting of such a sign the spiritual salvation of the enemy might probably be hoped for: because if we ought to correct an erring brother when there is hope of his amendment, that we may gain him for the Lord, then, in order that we may reconcile to God and to ourselves one who is an enemy, we are rightly constrained, for example, to greet him, since there is probable hope of gaining him by our greeting — nevertheless I myself admit neither, nor concede it. First, as to grave scandal, which in these times almost never intervenes, since it is held in practice among nearly everyone not to greet an enemy, nor to speak with him," etc.

Number 58: "But as to the second I say: just as I myself ... am not bound under mortal sin to provide for the spiritual salvation of my Neighbor, short of his extreme necessity, with grave temporal loss to myself ... so neither am I bound to yield up my honor and reputation — which are goods of a higher order than temporal goods — under mortal sin, that I may provide for the spiritual life of my Neighbor outside extreme necessity ... But if anyone were bound to exhibit special signs of love to an enemy when by these signs his spiritual salvation might be hoped for, he would also be bound to yield up his honor and reputation short of extreme necessity ..."

This author imposes two things upon the cultivators of the Christian Religion: the one, that he blurts out that the custom of denying a greeting to enemies prevails, as it were, among all; the other, that a loss of honor and reputation is incurred when we embrace our enemies with these offices, that we may gain their eternal salvation.

II. Tamburini, book 5 on the Decalogue, chapter 1, § 3, number 29: "Can a son wish for the death of his father, or rejoice over it — not as an evil to the father (for this would be an execrable hatred), but that the son himself may enjoy the paternal inheritance? Can a mother desire the death of her daughter, lest she be compelled to feed or to dower her? Can a subject desire the death of his Prelate, that he may himself succeed to the prelacy, or that he may be freed from that Prelate who is hostile to him? ... If you only desire, or receive with joy, effects of this kind — the inheritance, the freedom from trouble, the prelacy — you licitly wish for or embrace these things: because you rejoice not over another's evil, but over your own good ... If you desire it under a condition, the answer is likewise easy: you can do so licitly. Finally, if with an absolute desire you desire in this manner: *I wish for my father's death, not as it is an evil to my father, but as my own good, or as the cause of my good — namely because from his death I shall enter upon his inheritance*; or thus: *would that my daughter would die, for thus I shall shake off six hundred anxieties*, etc. — if, I say, you so desire, the difficulty of resolving is greater: because then you choose to will evil to them, though as the cause of your own advantage, which does not seem free of fault; and so indeed Bonacina thinks ... Nevertheless Castropalao teaches that the contrary opinion is sufficiently probable."

III. Fernando de Castropalao, treatise 6, disputation 4, point 1, number 11: "Nevertheless I believe that, if you act with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened over someone's life, and rejoice over his natural death, and seek and desire it with an inefficacious affection — not indeed from displeasure at the person, but on account of some temporal advantage following from it. So Emmanuel Sa seems to teach, at the word *Charity*, number 8, where he teaches absolutely that you can wish bodily evil to your Neighbor for the salvation of his soul, and death for the good of the Commonwealth, and death to an enemy otherwise very harmful to you — not out of hatred, but to avoid your own loss — and likewise to rejoice over his death on account of the good following from it. Azor, part 1, book 3, chapter 12, question 2, and Bonacina, disputation 3, question 4, last point, number 7, affirm that it is lawful for a mother to wish for the death of her daughters, because on account of their deformity or her poverty she cannot give them in marriage according to her desire; and they say the same holds if on their account she were ill-treated by her husband: she could wish for their death, that she might be freed from that harm."

IV. Juan Sánchez, select disputation 2, number 9: "Hence it is inferred that it is lawful to wish death for oneself or for one's Neighbor, in order to avoid a troublesome infirmity, beggary, a penal life inflicted upon a woman by her husband, and other things of this kind — provided the death be desired as to be inflicted by God, not unjustly by man, or by the demon. For health is not worth so great a pain, and a prolonged death is what a life filled with miseries is called."

V. Marcos Vidal, in the *Ark* on the precept of charity, inquiry 1, number 85: "It must be noted, however, that this precept is fulfilled by this, that no evil be inflicted upon the Neighbor: and therefore there is no precept obliging to have an internal act of love toward the Neighbor, since it does not of itself lie open to the Neighbor, as it does to God."

VI. The same, in the same place, number 88: "It is gathered, secondly, that those living together in some college, or in some religious order, can without the stain of mortal fault mutually deny particular signs of love — namely, greeting, address, and things like these."

VII. The same, inquiry 11, number 46: "Fifth conclusion. It is licit, order and manner being preserved, to wish a temporal evil to another for the honorable end of obtaining some temporal good."

VIII. The same, number 65: "It is gathered, fourthly, that one can licitly imprecate a temporal evil upon another from the motive only of his own or another's utility — as to wish infirmity upon someone, lest he squander everything in gaming; or death, to avoid poverty, or a troublesome infirmity, or a penal life, and the like."

IX. The same, number 66: "It is gathered, fifthly, that one can licitly wish for someone's death, and rejoice over it, on account of an inheritance to be had ... For the object of this act is not the evil, but the advantage following from the death, which is a good and conformable to right reason, as is supposed. Whence the death itself, conducing as a means to such an advantage, and following from natural causes, will be something good."

Chapter III — On the divine precept by which we are commanded to love our neighbor with an internal act of charity

I. By the name of *neighbor* are understood all rational creatures capable of eternal beatitude — whether they be infidel men or just, unjust, friends or enemies, predestined or reprobate. Demons and irrational creatures are not comprehended absolutely under the neighbor to be loved; but we can love irrational creatures only insofar as we will that they remain unto the glory of God and the utility of men, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 25, art. 3.

II. Question I. *Is there a precept of loving the Neighbor?* Answer. All affirm it. *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself*: Matthew 22. And John 15: *This is my commandment, that you love one another.* That this mutual love is the most splendid character of the Christian profession, Christ the Lord adds in the same place: *By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another.* And St. Peter, first epistle, chapter 4: *But before all things have a constant mutual charity among yourselves, for charity covereth a multitude of sins.* St. Paul, to the Galatians, chapter 5: *For all the law is fulfilled in one word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.* It is therefore of faith that there is a precept of loving the Neighbor. This precept is natural, insofar as it commands a natural love; but supernatural insofar as we are commanded to love our neighbor not only according as he is akin to us in nature, a neighbor, and by other titles, but also as he is a man redeemed by God and capable of eternal beatitude.

III. Question II. *Does this precept oblige us to love our neighbor by peculiar internal acts?* Answer. Not a few have denied it; but their doctrine was condemned by Innocent XI in these two theses: *We are not bound to love our Neighbor by an internal act.* 2. *We can satisfy the precept of loving our Neighbor by external acts alone.* Exterior works are dead unto eternal life, unless they be vivified by charity. *If I have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.* Therefore, interior charity being taken away, the exterior works of liberality and beneficence toward the neighbor are inept for fulfilling that divine precept by which we are commanded to love the Neighbor.

IV. Question III. *Must the act by which we are commanded to love our neighbor be distinct from the act of love by which we love God?* Answer. Certain authors of a more benign turn deny it; but their opinion is false. For there are two distinct precepts, of which one commands the love of God, the other the love of the neighbor. By two distinct acts, then, must the two precepts be fulfilled? Assuredly. The divine goodness is the reason *under which* the neighbor is loved; and it is not the reason *which* is loved. God is the primary object of charity, and the Neighbor the secondary. He who loves God with his whole heart above all things virtually loves his Neighbor. But this does not suffice. Nay, the doctrine contained in this thesis was condemned: *We are not bound to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act.*

V. Question IV. *Does this precept oblige of itself to the love of the neighbor?* Answer. If the discourse be of the neighbor in general, it is certain that everyone is bound of himself to love his neighbor by a formal act, prescinding from any circumstance whatsoever. On the contrary, if the neighbor be regarded in particular, it is agreed among the Theologians that he is to be loved by force of the precept only when necessity presses.

VI. *Per accidens* this precept presses when a grave temptation of hatred assails the soul, and the opposite love is judged an opportune remedy for expelling the hatred. Secondly, when we are bound to succor a neighbor in peril, or to bring help to one pressed by any grave necessity, whether in spiritual or in temporal things: then we are bound to love our neighbor with an internal act, because the law of charity is not fulfilled without internal acts. Thirdly, when a grave injury, whether in the goods of reputation or in the goods of soul or body, is inflicted upon our neighbor, on account of which he is most gravely disturbed and afflicted. Fourthly, when our neighbor, placed in extreme necessity, needs our counsel, or spiritual or temporal aid.

VII. We ought to have our mind prepared to love our neighbor in particular, if necessity should occur. And this promptitude of soul is placed in this, that our soul burn with charity in general. This charity excludes no one from that community. But if you desire to know whether charity toward your neighbor in general burns in your heart, see whether, occasion being given either of an injury received or of one inflicted, you be prompt to love. For the plant is known by its fruits.

VIII. Question V. *How ought you to love your neighbor as yourself?* Answer. This phrase *as thyself* St. Thomas expounds, II-II, q. 44, art. 7: *Now the mode of the love is touched when it is said, as thyself: which is not to be understood as though one should love his neighbor equally with himself, but in a like manner to himself. And this in three ways. First, on the part of the end: namely, that one love his neighbor for God's sake, just as he ought to love himself for God's sake; so that thus the love of the neighbor may be holy. Secondly, on the part of the rule of love: namely, that one should not comply with his neighbor in any evil, but only in good things; just as a man ought to satisfy his own will only in good things; so that thus the love of the neighbor may be just. Thirdly, on the part of the reason of the love: namely, that one love his neighbor not for his own utility or delight, but for this reason, that he wills good to his neighbor, as he wills good to himself; so that thus the love of the neighbor may be true.*

IX. Certain rules are prescribed for loving the neighbor. 1. The neighbor must be loved with an affective and an effective love — one, namely, which, proceeding from the heart and from a conscience not feigned, brings aid to the neighbor according to one's powers and the circumstances. 2. The characters of fraternal love St. Paul sets forth, 1 Corinthians 13: *Charity is patient, is kind; charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely, is not puffed up, is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not upon iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth: beareth all things, believeth all things,*

hopeth all things, endureth all things. It is God who speaks with the voice of Paul. Meditate these things seriously, O reader and teacher, that you may become a doer of charity. In these words the whole of Theology is comprehended. Charity is *kind* in the conversion of the brethren and in the care of their salvation. *Patient* in bearing the defects of the neighbor. *Envieth not*, neither openly nor secretly and by mines — whether by keeping silence about the neighbor's merits, or by disparaging his virtues and casting little clouds upon them. *Dealeth not perversely*, by contriving frauds against him, or throwing impediments in his way. *Is not puffed up* on account of any endowments whatsoever, whether of soul or of body, whether riches, or nobility, or knowledge. *Is not ambitious*, so as to lord it arrogantly over the neighbor and to stand out above him. *Seeketh not her own*, that she may succor the needy neighbor and relieve his necessity. *Is not provoked to anger* when assailed by injuries, so as to take vengeance or to repay any evil. *Thinketh no evil*, but interprets all things in the better part — the truth, however, being preserved: therefore it is added: *rejoiceth not upon iniquity*, but detests and bewails sins, disapproves indifference and deadly negligence, and lifts up her voice against it, because she *rejoiceth with the truth*. This truth she prefers to all things. *Beareth all things*, that she may attain eternal life. *Believeth all things* on account of the authority of God revealing and of the Church proposing. *Endureth all things*, that she may please God, keep his law, and attain eternal felicity. St. Paul adds, Galatians chapter 6: *Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of Christ*. These few words, seriously pondered, instruct you more luminously than the many volumes of certain men. For they were dictated by God, and on these the whole law depends, and the prophets.

X. Question VI. *What order is to be observed in charity?* Answer. To each object of love his own place must be assigned: if he be of a higher bench, a higher place; if of a lower, a lower place must be granted him in the heart. The measure of the lover's love is the goodness of the person loved. The order is twofold: one of loving, the other of succoring. The order of loving flows from the dignity and goodness of the person; the order of succoring flows from the need of the neighbor who lacks our help. Both orders fall under the precept, says St. Thomas, II-II, q. 44, art. 8: *Now the order of charity pertains to the very nature of the virtue, since it is taken according to the proportion of the love to the object of love. Whence it is manifest that the order of charity ought to fall under the precept*.

XI. Each one ought to love his neighbor as himself, as is plain from the evangelical text itself: *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.* Love toward yourself, then, is the rule and measure of love toward your neighbor. *He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?* says Ecclesiasticus, chapter 14. For a man is nearer to himself than all others. Fire cannot burn external matter unless it first burn in itself. If your own life and the life of your neighbor be regarded absolutely, your own is to be preferred; but if the life of your neighbor be more useful to the glory of God, your own can be exposed, from a motive of virtue, to the danger of death, that the life of the neighbor may be saved. The same must be said if you were to expose your life to save the life of your father, of your lord, of an intimate friend, of a signal benefactor, in testimony of Christian gratitude. But for the reputation, honor, and other goods of the neighbor it is not licit to expose your own life, because such goods are of an inferior order, whereas life is of a superior order.

XII. We are bound to succor the extreme spiritual necessity of our neighbor with the loss of life and of temporal goods. Extreme spiritual necessity is that in which the neighbor is eternally damned unless you bring him help. This doctrine St. John teaches, first epistle, chapter 3: *As Christ laid down his life for us, so we also ought to lay down our lives for the brethren*. Hence we are bound to baptize, with

danger of life, a child abandoned among those infected with plague. If, however, your life be necessary to the common good of the Church or of the Commonwealth, then by the order of charity the common welfare is to be preferred to the welfare of one Private person. Similarly, if you were guilty of mortal sin, and contrition were difficult for you, or you doubted of it, then your own salvation is to be preferred to your neighbor's.

XIII. One condemned to die of hunger cannot refuse food secretly offered him; nor, if the judge were to command this, would he have to be obeyed, because it would be a horrendous and inhuman precept. Nor are you bound to neglect the defense of your own life, lest the killing of another follow. God must nevertheless be prayed to, that he permit us not to fall into such straits, since I count it most difficult to observe the laws of blameless self-defense. Midwives who have baptized children invalidly are bound, even at the danger of death, to make the offense manifest — whatever Fr. Laymann says to the contrary.

XIV. A pregnant mother who is unable to give birth is not bound to suffer a deadly cutting of the womb, that the child enclosed in the womb may be baptized: because evils are not to be done that goods may come. This opinion St. Thomas teaches, on the fourth book, distinction 6, question 2, article 1, ad 4: *Therefore a man ought rather to let the infant perish, than that he himself should perish by committing the crime of homicide upon the mother.* The graver Theologians subscribe to the Angelic Doctor. Nor is this opposed to the former opinion, in which it was said that a child must be baptized even at the danger of death: because a child existing in the mother's womb has no right to baptism, such as belongs to a child brought forth into the light. In order to provide for the spiritual salvation of your neighbor, you are not bound — nay, you ought not — to expose yourself to a probable danger of sinning; nor is it lawful to will the privation of grace, even for a time, for the salvation of others.

XV. Question VII. *Who are to be preferred in love?* Answer. First of all are to be preferred father and mother; then wives and children. Wives are to be preferred to parents only as regards habitation and a more tender love. Brothers are to be set before other blood-relations; and among these, those must be preferred who are nearer. Blood-relations must be set before relations by marriage; the faithful before infidels; friends before enemies; benefactors before non-benefactors; spiritual benefactors before temporal benefactors; fellow-citizens before strangers. But the precept of this preference presses only when extreme necessity presses of succoring one or the other of these neighbors. Hence a stranger placed in extreme necessity must be succored before a father who does not labor under such necessity. A community laboring under grave spiritual necessity you must succor even at the danger of life, because in such a community someone is always found placed in extreme necessity.

Chapter IV — On the love of enemies

I. Question I. *Did the precept of loving enemies press in the old law?* Answer. St. Thomas affirms it, on the third book, distinction 30 [recte], question 1, article 1; and before St. Thomas, St. Augustine, book 19 against Faustus, chapter 24. Wherefore Maldonatus blurted out too inconsiderately that the following interpretation of the Angelic Doctor came forth from the workshop of the Heretics. The Angelic Doctor says, then: *In the old law also men were bound to the love of enemies, as is plain from the authority. Whence what is said — Thou shalt hate thy enemy — was not taken from the law, because this is nowhere found in the letter; but was added from the depraved interpretation of the Jews, who, from the fact that the love of*

the neighbor was commanded, concluded that enemies were to be hated. The very law of nature, still more the divine positive law, commands this mutual love.

II. This precept Christ the Lord set forth more luminously in the Gospel, saying: *But I say to you: Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that persecute and calumniate you, that you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven*: Matthew 5. These are the reasons of that love: the necessity of society, which cannot subsist without mutual love; the authority of God, supreme Lord, Benefactor, Creator, Preserver, Redeemer, Father, and Master, who commands it; the reward of the remission of faults, of divine sonship, of an eternal inheritance.

III. Enemies are to be loved with a love both affective and effective. *Do good to them that hate you.* The precept is twofold: the negative prohibits hatred and vengeance, and this presses always and for always; the affirmative commands interior love and exterior beneficence. The love of enemies is included in the universal love by which we are bound to love our Neighbor for God's sake. For from this universal love it is not lawful to exclude an enemy. Then a promptitude of soul is necessary for loving an enemy in particular, when grave necessity presses.

IV. Question II. *What signs of benevolence are to be exhibited to enemies?* Answer. Of two kinds. Some are general, which are exhibited to all, and these are always due by force of the precept. Others are special, which do not always, but only sometimes, fall under the precept. To greet an enemy met on the way, where the custom of greeting prevails, falls under the precept. Wherefore, if before the enmities and dissensions a greeting passed between them, after the quarrel or the enmities the common signs of benevolence ought to persevere. And although in some places greeting and address are not common signs of benevolence, they are nevertheless such among friends, kinsmen, blood-relations, companions, and associates of the same body, college, and community. And then, if enmity arises, the said common signs are not to be suspended. Yet those who omit these signs are not straightway to be condemned of grave fault; but the circumstances must be regarded, especially if scandal arise from it, and if the omission of the signs proceed from internal hatred. For often greeting and other signs of benevolence are omitted not for the sake of hatred, but from a certain shamefacedness or from meanness of spirit. Sometimes neither party has that fortitude of soul as to be willing to be the first to exhibit such signs. These signs fall under the precept when they are opportune for placating an enemy and reconciling minds boiling with hatred. To return the greeting of one who greets you is a duty, which cannot be neglected with deliberate mind without grave fault. Everyone desirous of his own salvation ought to be liberal in rendering these signs. Never is the omission of greeting and of address licit for the sake of hatred. But that such signs can be omitted by a Superior for the sake of punishment, the Theologians commonly teach — when such an omission is judged opportune for the amendment of the enemy, or when the offense is public and very enormous, as a sign of detestation. Fathers, Superiors, and masters can rightly suspend these signs in punishment of offending members of their household, provided hatred be absent. Many circumstances also excuse from grave fault the omission of such signs — for instance, inadvertence, brevity of time, parvity of matter, gravity of grief, and things of that sort. Hence they excuse a noble Matron if she does not return the greeting of her husband's murderer, on account of the bitterness of her grief. Yet the circumstances must be regarded.

V. Question III. *Is one who has been offended bound to exhibit signs of love to the offender who asks for peace?* Answer. A Christian man cannot deny signs of love to an offender asking pardon — common signs, I

say; but special signs of benevolence, just as no one is bound to exhibit them even to those who are not enemies, much less does he owe them to enemies. The circumstances must nevertheless be regarded — of avoiding scandal, or of procuring spiritual salvation, or of laying aside hatred: for if these testimonies of benevolence were fitting means for gaining a brother's soul, then they would have to be exhibited.

VI. He who has unjustly injured another is bound, by the title of justice, to ask pardon and to exhibit satisfaction to the one offended. A manner, however, must be observed. When a quarrel and dissension happen between two equals, he who injured first ought first to ask pardon and to offer signs of reconciliation. If they be of unequal condition, there is need of prudence. Sometimes the reconciliation can be deferred — namely, when the offended party, stricken with excessive grief, is foreseen to be less apt for granting pardon. Sometimes also the reconciliation must be deferred until the fury cools; sometimes, finally, it must be solicited — the diversity of persons and circumstances being regarded.

VII. Question IV. *Is the offended party bound not only to lay aside hatred, but also to remit satisfaction and compensation?* Answer. Hatred must be laid aside forthwith — nay, must be repressed before it is kindled. But temporal damage inflicted by the offender the offended party is not bound to remit without compensation. The matter is nevertheless full of danger. Under the title of just recompense the appetite of vengeance often lies hidden. Absolutely, it is wiser to remit all things. Yet cases can occur in which it would by no means be expedient to condone satisfaction: as if the offended party be poor and suffer grave detriment; if he be a member of a community or of a family whose temporal losses cannot be repaired unless the guilty party make satisfaction; if the offender be hostile to the community. If the offender spontaneously exhibits fitting satisfaction, the offended party cannot reject it in order to exact it before a judge, as not a few contend: since, the injury being repaired and the damage compensated by the offender himself, full satisfaction has been made to all justice. Therefore, when the offended party appeals to the tribunal, he does not seek to have his injured right repaired, but to indulge vengeance and hatred.

VIII. Question V. *Is it licit to rejoice over the evil of our neighbor on account of the good which thence accrues to us?* Answer. Castropalao, Tamburini, Moya, and others affirm it; whose opinion has been condemned by the Church. Fr. Viva, in his commentaries on thesis 13 of Innocent XI, whittles down the proscription of the condemnation more laxly than is fair, as it seems to me. Read Tome I on the Decalogue, book 1, dissertation 5, chapter 8, number 6. Never, then, is it licit either to rejoice over, or to wish, evil to one's neighbor — and much less to oneself. Wherefore false is the doctrine of Juan de la Cruz and of Tamburini, who teach that anyone can wish death for himself, that he may escape the hardships of this life. But to sinners it is licit to desire some temporal evil, that they may come to their senses from their sins, as St. Thomas teaches on the third book, distinction 30, article 1, ad 4. Which doctrine the holy Scriptures confirm: *Let all my enemies be ashamed, and be very much troubled: let them be converted and be ashamed very speedily.* Psalm 6. Care must nevertheless be taken lest hatred lie hidden, and lest, under the pretext of the conversion of sinners, vengeance be fostered.

Chapter V — On corporal Almsgiving

I. Question I. *What is almsgiving?* Answer. It is *a work by which something is given to one in need, out of compassion, for God's sake*; or it is the relieving of another's misery for God's sake. This act is elicited by

the virtue of mercy, and commanded by charity, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 32, art. 1. In almsgiving there is a twofold respect: one to God, the other to the Neighbor. Insofar as it regards God, it pertains to legal justice, because God imposes upon all the riches which he grants to men a tribute to be paid to the poor. According as it regards the relieving of the Neighbor's misery, it is a work of mercy, commanded and directed by charity, as has been said. For what to the Latins is *misericordia*, to the Greeks is *eleemosyna*.

II. Now there are seven offices of corporal mercy: 1. to visit the sick and those detained in prison; 2. to give drink to the thirsty; 3. to feed the hungry; 4. to redeem captives; 5. to clothe the naked; 6. to receive pilgrims with hospitality; 7. to bury the dead — all of which are enclosed in this verse:

I visit, give drink, feed, redeem, clothe, gather in, and bury.

III. There are likewise seven offices of spiritual mercy, namely: 1. to give counsel to the doubting; 2. to teach the ignorant; 3. to correct offenders; 4. to console the afflicted; 5. to remit offenses; 6. to bear patiently the injuries inflicted and the defects of one's neighbor; 7. to pray for all — all of which are comprehended in this other verse:

Counsel, reprove, teach, console, forgive, bear, and pray.

All these things St. Thomas teaches at greater length, II-II, q. 32, art. 2, and we shall expound them below.

IV. Question II. *Is almsgiving commanded by natural and divine law?* Answer. It is affirmed. The poor man and the rich are two contraries, but two things most necessary. If all abounded in the same riches, or all were in need, there would be no bond of necessity among them, no society: no one would need another's help, nor would one be subject to another; no one a servant, no one a master; the occasion of exercising charity and mercy would be wanting, and the patience of need and poverty would be absent. Wherefore it must be that some are rich and others poor, that all may live bound together by a strong and perpetual bond of love.

Chapter VI — Select testimonies of the Fathers, by which the rich are urged to Almsgiving, and their vain excuses are refuted

I. The concupiscence of the flesh and the cupidity of riches are the most frequent and most deadly reefs, upon which the rich above all dash their souls. For either they squander the riches granted them by God — burdened with the charge of laying out what is over and above upon the poor — in glutting concupiscence and satisfying lust, in fattening harlots and fostering luxury and pomps; or they retain and heap them up in the strongbox, that they may indulge an insatiable avarice. Wherefore, just as the holy Scriptures and the Fathers, so also Pastors and Confessors ought to press the rich with every kind of argument and force of eloquence to fulfill this most grave precept. Hence it is by no means to be turned to my fault, if even in this compendium I have inculcated at some length a truth of the highest moment.

II. St. Basil, homily 6, from the various homilies: *Let almsgiving and faith not forsake thee.* Likewise: *Break thy bread to the hungry.* But his barns, weighed down with the multitude of fruits, were bursting, while his sparing and tenacious heart was by no means satisfied ... *What shall I do?* he says ... *Acknowledge, O man, him who gave ... by what grace thou hast been set over so many. Thou art a minister of the most good God, a*

dispenser to thy fellow-servants. Think not that all which thou hast in thy hands is prepared for thy belly; esteem them as another's: for a little while they will gladden thee, then, flowing away, they will pass by; and an account of them will be sharply exacted of thee ... Plainly thou usest imprudent counsel. "What shall I do?" The answer was ready for thee: I will fill the souls of the hungry, I will open my barns, and I will call all the needy, I will imitate Joseph, etc. And a little below: *Imitate, O man, at least the earth: bring forth fruits as it does, that thou be not seen to be worse than that which is without a soul. For surely it strives to minister not to its own use or advantage, but to thine ...* Then he adds a beautiful likeness: *Wells continually drawn from flow with more copious and far more beautiful water, but if left alone and quiet they easily grow foul: so also riches hoarded and at rest are useless; but when they are moved and transferred, they bring forth public advantage and fruit ... Thou wilt say: Whom do I injure, if I keep what is mine? What things are thine, tell me? Whence didst thou bring these in, when thou camest to pass through this present life? ... Didst thou not come forth naked from thy mother's womb, and naked wilt thou return again to the earth? ... Why art thou rich, and he poor? Assuredly for no other cause than that thou mayest receive the reward of benignity and of faithful administration ... It is the bread of the hungry which thou retainest; it is the garment of the naked which thou guardest in thy chest; the shoe of the unshod which molders with thee; the silver of the needy which thou possessest buried in the earth.* Likewise in homily VII against the rich, discoursing of that young man who, hearing from Christ the Lord, Matthew 19, *Go, sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor*, went away sad, Basil writes as follows: *It seems to me that what befell this young man, or those like him, is what is wont to befall one who makes a journey desirous of seeing the spectacle of some city, and hastens as far as the walls: there, finding an inn, he rests, and out of sloth and idleness refuses to go the little that remains of the way — at once rendering vain the labor of the journey he had endured, and shutting himself out from the spectacles of the good things he might have seen in the city. Such also are those men who observe the other commandments, but limp when it comes to the laying out of their goods. I have seen many fasting, praying, sighing in penance for things past — showing, in fine, every piety that costs nothing, but giving not so much as an obol to the needy. What does the rest of their diligence in the virtues profit them? Not for that will they attain the kingdom of God. Therefore, says the Lord, it is more difficult for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven than for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle ... What wilt thou, wretch, answer the judge? Thou clothest thy walls, and clothest not a man? Thou adornest thy horses with trappings, and despisest thy brother clad in torn rags? Thou destroyest thy grain by hoarding it, and lookest not upon the hungry?*

III. St. John Chrysostom, above the other Fathers, most eloquently sets forth and amplifies the duty, the force, the merit, and the reward of almsgiving. In homily 35 on Genesis he has these words: *Let us spend the abundance of our money upon the salvation of souls, and lay out what is superfluous upon the needy. For why, tell me, dost thou permit thy son to squander the gold and silver which ought to have been emptied into the bellies of the poor, by storing it up in a safe storehouse, that at the time when thou hast most need of their aid thou mayest find consolation; and that those who have been fed by thee here may elsewhere open the doors of confidence to thee, and receive thee into their eternal tabernacles? Let us also not suffer our garments to be gnawed by worms and to rot unused in our chests, when there are so many who are in need and walk about naked. But let us venerate and give honor to Christ naked rather than to moths; and let us clothe him who for our salvation wills to walk about naked, that when we have clothed him we may hear on that day: I was naked, and you clothed me. Are the precepts burdensome? Those things, he says, which perish, which are gnawed by worms, which are consumed without use or fruit — dispense these, that they may become useful to thee, and that thou mayest escape the harm of loss, and that from them thou mayest gain for thyself the greatest profit.*

IV. The same, homily VII on Luke: *It is robbery not to impart of one's own means to the poor. And perhaps what I say seems strange to you. But wonder not; I will bring you a testimony from the divine Scriptures. Thus the*

Lord, accusing the Jews through the Prophet, says: The earth hath brought forth her increase, and you have not brought in the tithes; but the robbery of the poor is in your houses. Because, he says, you did not give the accustomed oblations, you have robbed the things that are the poor's. And this he says declaring that they possess the goods of the poor, even if they have come to them by paternal inheritance.

V. The same, homily IV on Genesis: *Let us see how great a force of abundance liberal almsgiving possesses, that, when thou hast learned the gain which is born of it, thou mayest do it eagerly. For perhaps its power is so great that it can not only purge sins, but even put death to flight. And who, someone will say, giving alms has been made superior to death? Surely we have all seen them come under the power of death. Be not troubled, beloved; but learn how the force of almsgiving has conquered even the tyranny of death. Tabitha clothed widows, and furnished them other expenses. And it came to pass that, falling ill, she died. But those whom she cared for, and whom she clothed, stood about the Apostle, showed him the garments which Dorcas made for them, and moved the Apostle to compassion: who, kneeling down and praying, said: Tabitha, arise. And she opened her eyes, and seeing Peter, sat up; and giving her his hand, he lifted her up, and calling the saints and widows, presented her alive. Hast thou seen how great is the retribution of beneficence toward widows, even in this present life?*

VI. St. Augustine, in book 1 of the homilies, in the homily on exhorting to almsgiving, homily XIX, inculcates these things: *That reading, brethren, which we have just now heard from the holy Gospel, exhorts us to give alms; and it exhorts us in such a way that in his judgment the Lord imputes to those on the right hand these alms alone as done, and to those on the left these alone as undone — not that the other deeds of men, whether good or evil, do not come into judgment, for it is written that all things shall come to judgment; and yet our Lord Jesus Christ, foretelling to us his future judgment, chose nothing whereby to admonish us but alms alone. Shall it not be said to those on the right hand: because you lived chastely, because you did not seize the goods of others, because you confessed my faith even unto blood? For all these good deeds must needs be honored in the judgment of Jesus Christ. Again, do you think it will not be said to those on the left: because you were unchaste, because you fornicated, because you seized the goods of others, because by your pride and evil morals you caused my name to be blasphemed? And he enumerates all these other things; yet our Lord, foretelling to us his judgment, keeps silence about all the other right deeds of the just, and has deigned to commemorate alms alone. He kept silence about all the evils of his enemies, and judged that the barrenness of almsgiving alone was to be rebuked — for no other reason than to admonish us. Why is this? Because all crimes are redeemed by almsgiving. Therefore he praised that fruitfulness, and blamed and condemned this dryness. But you hear that all evil deeds are redeemed by alms. Do not understand it as certain men perversely understand it. For alms can profit you for blotting out past sins, if you change your ways. But if you persevere in the same evils, you will not corrupt the judgment of God by your alms.* Likewise sermon 42, On the season: *Surely you see that in the evangelical reading the Lord named nothing of all the virtues but almsgiving alone, which works with charity. Of the branches he kept silence; he named the root only, saying thus: Come, ye blessed, receive the kingdom. For I was hungry*, etc. Likewise in his exposition on Psalm 44: *Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth, where the moth and rust destroy, and where thieves dig through and steal; but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven. Come with gifts, give alms, and all things are clean unto you. Come with gifts to him who says: "I will have mercy rather than sacrifice."* Likewise sermon 62, On the season: *Yet in return for the fact that he cannot fast, he ought to lay out the more upon the poor, so that the sins which he cannot cure by fasting he may be able to redeem by giving alms. It is good to fast, brethren; but it is better to give alms. If there be no possibility of fasting, almsgiving suffices thee without fasting; but fasting without almsgiving does not suffice at all.*

VII. Tremendous are the testimonies of the Fathers; but most tremendous are the oracles and threats of Christ. *Woe to you that are rich: woe to you, because you have your consolation: woe to you, for you shall mourn and weep. How hardly* (it is Christ who exclaims, not a Rigorist, nor a Jansenist) *shall they that have money enter into the kingdom of God! For it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire: for I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat*, etc. Who does not tremble, who is not aghast, at these formidable oracles of Christ?

VIII. The rich excuse themselves as lacking superfluous riches. Which pretext St. Augustine routs in this fashion, on Psalm 147: *But we have many superfluous things, if we keep only what is necessary. For if we seek empty things, nothing suffices. Brethren, seek what suffices for the work of God, not what suffices for your cupidity. Your cupidity is not the work of God ... Seek the things that suffice, and you will see how few they are. Two small coins sufficed the widow for doing mercy; two coins sufficed for buying the kingdom of God ... Therefore see how much he has given you, and take from it what suffices. The rest, which lies superfluous, is the necessity of others. The superfluities of the rich are the necessities of the poor. The goods of others are possessed when superfluities are possessed.* Where the rich keep stored that superfluity which they deny they have, St. John Chrysostom shows, homily XI on Paul's epistle to the Romans: *Thou appliest thyself to robbery and avarice, not pressed by poverty, nor driven to it by hunger, but that the bridle of thy horse, the roof of thy house, the capitals of thy columns may be lavishly gilded. But this very thing — how great a hell does it deserve, when thou drivest thy brother headlong into infinite calamities (thy brother who has been made a partaker with thee of the hidden goods, and has been so far honored by his Lord), in order that thou mayest adorn stones and the pavement of thy house, and the bodies of animals lacking reason? That thou shouldst be so solicitous in taking care to feed dogs, while a man — or rather, let me say, Christ himself — is driven for a dog's sake to the utmost hunger? What is more pestilential than this confusion? What more deadly than this iniquity? How many rivers of fire, in the end, can suffice to feed upon a soul of this kind? Behold, he who was fashioned to the likeness of God lies ragged and unseemly through thy inhumanity; while the mules that carry thy wife, and the hides and timbers of which that roof is woven, glitter with much gold; and if a seat or a footstool is to be made, everywhere gold, everywhere silver. But the member of Christ, he for whom God came down from heaven to us and poured out his precious blood, has not through thy avarice even the necessary food? And the little couches are girt about on all sides with silver, adorned on all sides; while the bodies of the saints lack even a necessary covering; and Christ himself is of less account to thee than thy mules, than thy couch, than thy seat, than thy footstool.*

IX. Another pretext of the rich is a certain fictitious will of bestowing upon the poor at the time of death. Which illusion St. Basil thus explodes in homily VII against the rich: *But, thou sayest, I wish indeed to enjoy my goods while I live; but after death I shall inscribe the poor in my testament as heirs and lords of my means. Alas, wretch! Then wilt thou be benign and liberal to men, when thou art no longer among men? When I look upon thee a corpse, then shall I call thee a lover of thy brother? Doubtless thou wilt be worthy of great praise for liberality; great honor or thanks will be owed thee, if, lying in the tomb and turned to earth, thou appearest magnificent and lavish. Tell me, for what time above all wilt thou demand the reward — for life, or for death? For if, having consumed in pleasures the time which is given for earning merit, thou hast by no means looked upon the poor, what action or work wilt thou, being dead, seek reward for? ... Dost thou study to perform fair and commendable works with ink and tablets? Who will announce to thee the time of thy departure? Who is surety for the manner of thy death? How many do we see extinguished suddenly, by violence and by accident, who through the anguish of pain and of breath could not so much as utter a word? How many has fever put beside their senses? Why then dost thou await a time in which thou wilt often not be master of thy own reason? For indeed the night is deep, the sickness grave, no helper at hand: nay rather, he who lies in wait for the inheritance will be present and ready, urging on only*

all the things that make for his own advantage, and seeking to frustrate thy counsels ... And if nevertheless it happen that thy goods be openly disposed of both by word and in writing, one letter transposed, one sign not rightly placed, will be able to change the whole sentence and make it void. Likewise two or three dishonest witnesses will turn the whole inheritance over to others.

X. The third excuse of the rich is love of their children, for whose advantage they believe it licit to lay up treasure for themselves. Which empty invention St. Augustine thus disapproves in his book On the ten strings, chapter 12: *Do not, under the image of piety, increase your money. I am keeping it, you say, for my children. A great excuse: I am keeping it for my children. Let us see. Your father keeps it for you; you keep it for your children; your children for their children, and so through them all; and no one will be doing the precepts of God. Why do you not rather lay out all upon him who made you from nothing? He who made you, he feeds you; from these things which he made, he himself feeds your children too. For you do not commit your patrimony better to your son than to your Creator. And men do indeed lie. Avarice is evil, they say. They wish to cloak and whitewash themselves with the name of piety, so that men may seem to keep for their children's sake what they keep out of avarice. For that you may know that this often happens, it is said of someone: Why does he not give alms? Because he keeps it for his children. It happens that he loses one of them. If he kept it for his children's sake, let him send after that one his portion. Why does he keep it in his purse, and let it go from his heart? Give him what is his; give what you were keeping for him. He is dead, you say. But he has gone on ahead to God: his portion is owed to the poor; it is owed to him to whom he has gone; it is owed to Christ, for to him he has gone; and he said: What you did to one of the least of mine, you did to me; and what you did not do to one of these least, you did not do to me. But what do you say? I keep it for his brothers. If he were alive, was he not going to divide with his brothers? O dead faith! For your son is dead. Whatever you say, you owe to him dead what you were keeping for him alive. My son is dead; but nevertheless I keep my son's portion for his brothers. If you believe that he is dead — if Christ did not die for him, then he himself is dead. But if faith is in you, your son lives. He lives assuredly; he has not departed, but gone before. With what face will you come to your son who has gone before, when to him going before you send not his portion into heaven? Or can it not be sent into heaven? It can, assuredly. Hear the Lord himself saying: Lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven. If, then, that treasure is better guarded in heaven, is it then to be sent to your son when, if it were sent, it would not perish? Is it held here, where it can perish, and not sent thither, where Christ is the keeper? ... You see, brethren, that it is a lie: my brethren, it is a lie: men are avaricious ... How much do you give to hunters, how much to base persons, how much do you give to those who kill you?*

XI. The fourth illusion of the rich is excessive thought about tomorrow; which deception St. Augustine refutes in sermon 43, On various matters: *Avarice says: Take counsel for the future — to a man who will perhaps not live even until tomorrow. But behold, let him live as long as avarice thinks; not as long as she shows, not as long as she teaches, not as long as she trusts, but as long as she thinks — let him have lived, let him have grown old, let him have made an end: still the old man, bent, leaning on his staff, seeks gain, and hears avarice saying: Take counsel for the future. For what future? Now, already expiring, he says: For your children, she says. Would that we might find at least those old men not avaricious who have no children. To them also, even to such men, even to those who excuse their iniquity by no image of piety, avarice does not cease to say: Take counsel for the future.* St. Jerome, epistle 139: *Nothing so deceives the human race as that, while men know not the spaces of life, they promise themselves a longer possession of this world. Whence also that excellent saying, that no one is so old, and of so decrepit an age, that he does not still suppose he will live one year more.*

XII. Lastly, the rich are wont to object the craftiness of the poor, their frauds and wiles, by which they counterfeit wounds and infirmities. This cruelty of the rich St. John Chrysostom routs in these

words, homily 37 to the people: *For if he feigns from want and necessity, he feigns because of thy cruelty and inhumanity, which needs the feignings of such persons, and is moved by no mercy. And so his feigning is the herald of thy inhumanity. For when, entreating and supplicating, with pitiable words, anxious and weeping, going about begging the whole day, he cannot procure even necessary food, perhaps he has found out this art, which brings not so much shame and blame upon him as upon thee. For if we were easily moved, never surely would he choose to endure such things. And why do I mention nakedness and shivering? I will say what is far more horrible: that some have been driven to blind their own sons in the flower of their age ... For since, while enjoying the sense of sight, and begging about naked, they moved neither by their age nor by their calamity men inhuman and unmerciful, to so many evils they added another calamity, and that a greater; and, that they might soften their hunger, they judged it would be the lighter thing to be deprived of this common light and of the sun's rays, granted to all mankind, than to fight perpetually with hunger, and to perish by a most wretched death ... Some walk without shoes, others fix sharp nails in their heads, others beg in the very frost with naked body, others, bearing things graver still, offer of themselves a pitiable spectacle ... But how dost thou say: Have mercy on me, O God, according to thy great mercy — when thou hast mercy not according to great mercy, and perhaps not even according to small?*

Chapter VII — On the time at which the precept of almsgiving presses. Various questions are resolved

I. In time of need the precept of almsgiving presses. The Theologians distinguish three degrees of necessity: extreme, grave, and common. Extreme necessity is when a poor man is in proximate or probable danger of his life; the last extremity of want is not to be awaited, because then perhaps the needy man will not receive the help. To extreme necessity belongs the danger of perpetual imprisonment, of mutilation, and of incurable disease. Grave need is when a grave harm threatens a man in his honor, his life, his state, or his household affairs. Common need is that by which those poor are pressed who beg alms from door to door. To the threefold necessity three kinds of goods are set over against each other. Some goods are necessary for sustaining our own life and the life of those whose care rests upon us. Others regard our state and condition, inasmuch as without such goods a man cannot sustain the grade of his own condition, nobility, and dignity. These goods are of two kinds. Some are so necessary that without them a man would fall away from his state; others pertain to what is becoming and seemly. The last goods, finally, are superfluous either to life, or to state, or to both at once.

II. Question I. *Are the rich bound to succor one laboring under extreme necessity not only out of their superfluities, but even out of what is necessary to their state?* Answer. That those laboring under extreme necessity are to be succored by force of the precept out of what is superfluous to their state, all affirm. The common opinion is also true, that with some detriment to one's own state the necessity of the poor man must be relieved.

III. It is not required that a Nobleman become a plebeian in order to succor the poor. For never is so great an abundance of riches required for relieving the extreme need of a poor man — which is not so frequent — that the Rich and Noble must become poor. Some diminution of state is nevertheless necessary. When extreme want presses, the rich are bound to restrict the multitude of their servants and horses, the splendor of their pomps, the delicacies of their banquets, and the other expenses which they are accustomed to lay out upon the seemliness and adornment of their own grade. There

is need of Christian prudence. A grave detriment of state scarcely ever occurs in order that the poor may be relieved from extreme misery.

IV. Question II. *Are the Rich bound to redeem captives held among the Turks and other Infidels?* Answer. A precise rule can scarcely be designated. Captivity of its own nature does not bring extreme necessity with it. Yet it is a grave evil, to the removing of which the Rich are bound more or less. If to the captivity there be joined a grave accidental evil, such as the danger of losing life or faith; if the captive be useful to the Commonwealth: then a graver obligation lies upon the rich. The circumstances must be regarded, and Christian charity consulted.

V. Out of what is necessary for their own life, the rich are not bound to succor the poor laboring under extreme want: because in equal necessity the order of charity demands that each one prefer himself to a stranger. What if a man pressed by extreme need be greatly useful to the Commonwealth? On this matter Cicero disputes at length; but rarely does it happen that a man in extreme need is reckoned so useful to the Commonwealth that an innocent life ought to be immolated for his preservation.

VI. Question III. *Does a rich man who lends money to one laboring under extreme want satisfy the precept of almsgiving?* Answer. The denying opinion is common and true, because the precept of almsgiving is distinct from the precept of lending; and in extreme necessity all things are common by the law of nature. If, however, one who is pressed by extreme necessity in this place had goods elsewhere, then he would not be absolutely poor, and therefore the precept would be fulfilled if he were freed from such misery by a loan. If one absolutely poor be pressed by extreme want, and the rich refuse to bring help, then he can take away another's goods, that he may provide for himself and escape extreme want.

VII. Question IV. *Is it licit for the rich to retain what is superfluous to their present state, that they may rise to higher things?* Answer. That this difficult and entangled question may be resolved, a few things must be premised. There are found rich men who have superfluities; otherwise the precept would be fruitless: *That which remaineth, give alms*: Luke 11. The changing of states is also licit. For this is the order of divine providence, that those who are rich in this generation should in the next fall into poverty. Not, therefore, are the rich always rich, nor the poor always poor, nor craftsmen always craftsmen, nor merchants always merchants, nor nobles always nobles; but by a perpetual vicissitude and change neither rich, nor poor, nor craftsmen, and so forth, will ever be wanting. Wherefore it is licit, due moderation being preserved, to seek a higher state.

VIII. This must now be discussed: how the rich ought both to distribute their superfluities to the poor, and at the same time can licitly seek a higher state. The accumulation of money from the mere lust and ambition of occupying a higher grade is illicit, and most full of malice. The very seeking of grades also — with no limit set beforehand, and no consideration had of one's own virtue — is illicit, and a spring of crimes. That this ascent, then, may be honorable and licit, it must have an honorable end. I comprehend the matter in few words. If the rich omit almsgiving and liberality toward the poor, that they may accumulate and ascend to a higher state, they sin against the precept of almsgiving. But those rich men whose bowels are vehemently moved over the calamity of the poor bring them succor; who study to relieve and remove not only extreme and grave misery, but common misery also; who in the gathering of riches set themselves a measure and keep a rule, and study to cultivate justice and the other virtues — these are wont licitly to ascend to higher things, because on

account of their cultivation of the virtues and their liberality in almsgiving they receive a hundredfold from the Lord in this world, and eternal life in the other.

IX. Rightly did the Church condemn the following thesis, which certain men taught: *Scarcely in secular persons will you find, even in Kings, anything superfluous to their state.* This doctrine is antievangelical, because if scarcely anything superfluous is found in the rich, then scarcely does the precept of almsgiving imposed by Christ have any place, and it ends in smoke. I distinguish three kinds of rich men. Some there are who squander ample patrimonies upon luxury, pomps, and vain expenses, without remembering the poor. These most gravely violate the precept of almsgiving. Others are noble rich men, who gather treasures not for the sake of ascending to a higher state, but from the ardor of avarice alone, almsgiving being neglected. Third, finally, are those of lower condition, who possess many superfluous riches, but heap up everything for tomorrow, that they may ascend to a higher state. The rich both of the second and of the third class are like the rich man of the Gospel, who said, Luke 12: *I will destroy my barns and build greater, and into them will I gather all things that are grown to me: and I will say to my soul: Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years; take thy rest, eat, drink, make good cheer.* Christ answered: *Thou fool, this night do they require thy soul of thee. And whose shall those things be which thou hast provided?*

X. It is my pleasure to transcribe here the most eloquent and most sharp reproof of St. Basil the Great against those rich men, from his homily on this text: *O most foolish words! O singular madness! For if thou hadst had the soul of a swine, what else couldst thou have announced to it? Art thou so brutish, so ignorant of the goods of the soul, that thou entertainest it with fleshly banquets, and destinest for the soul whatever the recesses of the belly receive? ... Hear the appellation worthy of thee, which no man, but the Lord himself, has given thee: Thou fool, this night do they require thy soul of thee. The mockery of thy folly surpasses the eternal punishment. For what counsel does he silently enter upon, who is a little after to be snatched from life and led to punishment? I will destroy my barns and build greater. To him I should surely say: Thou dost well: for the barns of iniquity are beyond doubt worthy to be torn down. Overturn, wretch, with thine own hands what thou hast evilly built. Dissolve the barns from which no one ever obtained solace. Root out from the foundations the guardian of avarice; tear down the roof, overturn the walls, show to the sun the grain that has contracted rot and must. Bring forth the riches long bound up; lead forth into public triumph the dwellings of mammon wrapped in darkness. I will destroy my barns and build greater. But when thou shalt have filled these too with grain, what, I ask, wilt thou further devise? Wilt thou again destroy, and again build? What is more foolish than to wear oneself out with labors never to be ended, and with the utmost zeal to build, and with no less care to demolish the same? Thou hast, if thou wilt, storehouses: the bellies of the poor. Lay up for thyself treasures in heaven ... Thou hast fixed for thyself long spaces of life. See lest that time, which is wont to hasten on with a certain and appointed term, perchance seize upon thee. And assuredly to promise oneself life in this fashion, over-confidently, is a sign not of goodness, but of malice.*

XI. Many other things the holy Father heaps up against such rich men; then, a little below, he reports the speech of the rich man in these words: *Thou wilt say: Whom do I injure, if I keep and preserve what is mine?* Hear the answer of Basil: *What things are thine, tell me? Whence didst thou bring these in, when thou camest to pass through this present life? For thou dost just as if someone in a theater, having got before the others in seizing a place for viewing, should shut the rest out from entering, adjudging to his own single use what is set forth for the common use of all. Such also are the rich. For having obtained things common by being first, they make them their own by occupying them. For if each one took to himself only so much as would serve the solace of his own necessity, and gave what was over to the needy, there would surely be no one rich, and likewise no one poor. Didst*

thou not come forth naked from thy mother's womb, and naked wilt thou return again to the earth? Whence are these present goods of thine? If thou sayest, by chance, thou art impious, not acknowledging him who created thee, nor rendering thanks to him who gave. But if thou confessest that thou hast them from God, tell me for what cause thou hast obtained them. For God is not unjust, who has divided among us unequally the things that pertain to living. Why art thou rich, and he poor? Assuredly for no other cause than that thou mayest receive the reward of benignity and of faithful administration; but that he may be honored with the greatest prizes of patience. But thou, having embraced all things with the arms of an insatiable avarice, and depriving so many men of them, thinkest thou that thou injurest no one? Who, I ask, is the avaricious man? He who is not content with what ought to suffice. And who is the embezzler? He who transfers to himself alone the things that belong to each. Art thou then not avaricious, art thou not an embezzler, when thou makest thine own the things which thou hast received to dispense and distribute? Shall he who has torn away a garment be named a despoiler, while he who has not covered the naked, though he could, be worthy of the appellation of some other name?

XII. Question V. *In common necessity, are the poor to be succored out of superfluities?* Answer. That I may in few words tear away the lax opinions of certain men, I transcribe the doctrine of St. Thomas. He teaches, on the fourth book, distinction 15, question 2, article 1, question 4: *To give alms out of superfluity falls under precept; likewise to give alms to one who is in extreme necessity.* This doctrine he sets forth, II-II, question 118, article 4, ad 2, where, explaining the opinion of Basil, he says: *Basil speaks in that case in which someone is bound out of a legal debt to lay out his goods upon the poor, either because of the danger of necessity, or also because of the superfluity of what he has.* Likewise, question 87, article 1, ad 4: *But the third tithes, which they had to eat with the poor, are increased in the new law, by this, that the Lord commands not only the tenth part, but even all superfluities, to be given to the poor, according to that of Luke 11: That which remaineth, give alms.* Finally, Quodlibet 8, question 16 [recite 6], article 12: *For supposing that someone has of superfluity, in respect of the individual and in respect of the person, which he is bound to lay out upon the poor: either he sees in the poor man asking evident signs of extreme necessity, or he does not. If he sees them, it is certain that he is bound to give, and sins by not giving. For in this case Ambrose speaks: Feed him that is dying of hunger; if thou hast not fed him, thou hast killed him. But if they do not appear, then he is not bound to give to the poor man asking: because although he is bound to give his superfluity to the poor, yet not to give to all, nor to give to this one; but he is bound to distribute according as shall seem to him opportune; nor is he bound to inquire, because it would be too burdensome that he should inquire about all the poor.*

XIII. The Angelic Doctor establishes two principles from which the precept of almsgiving proceeds. The one is extreme or grave necessity. The other is the superfluity of goods, both to nature and to state. The precept therefore presses both by reason of superfluity, and by reason of extreme, or grave and urgent, necessity. When extreme or grave necessity occurs, then alms must be given to this determinate needy poor man. When the rich do not meet with poor men pressed by such necessity, then they must distribute what is superfluous to nature and to state upon pious uses, according as shall seem good to them in the Lord.

XIV. Hence the Angelic Doctor infers that the rich are bound to lay out what is superfluous both to nature and to state upon the poor pressed by common necessity. I have adduced several reasons in Tome 2 on the Decalogue, dissertation 6, chapter 13. Let it now suffice to point out that the division of goods, which at first were common, was brought in by the law of nations. To what end? Was it to the detriment of the Commonwealth, to its disturbance, and to the confusion of human society? Far from it. Now what confusion, what perversion of right order it would be, if the division of goods

were taken away from the company of the poor, and granted to the rich, that they might indulge avarice, or pomps, allurements, and vices! The law of nations, that is, the consent of the human race in the division of goods, was most equitable, and had for its sole end the advantage and tranquillity of men. But if needy men had to struggle continually with hunger and thirst, and the rich to abound in superfluities and squander their superfluities at pleasure, by what reason could such a division be purged of the stain of injustice?

XV. Fr. Diana objects, with many other Probabilists, that hence it follows that all the rich and their Confessors are damned. I answer that those rich are damned, unless they come to their senses, who do not fulfill the precept of almsgiving; and those Confessors who absolve rich men unworthy and violators of the natural and divine law. Many paradoxes full of laxity Fr. Diana teaches, with certain others, which I have routed in the place cited, chapter XI. But let all who champion the doctrine of Diana hear the answer which Cardinal Cajetan furnishes, treatise 2 on almsgiving, chapter 6: *But if thou objectest to me that the confessions of the rich could not be heard, and that Confessors would incur damnation, hear the Lord Jesus Christ saying in the Gospel to the rich: It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of heaven. And to Confessors: If the blind lead the blind, both fall into the pit.* Most frequently the patrons of a softer Ethics obtrude as an absurdity what Christ Jesus most severely threatens. Christ exclaims: *How hardly shall they that have money enter into the Kingdom of God!* And does Fr. Diana, with the rest, object this divine oracle as an absurdity? The rich and their Confessors would easily be damned, say these new Doctors, if they had to distribute to the poor what is superfluous to nature and to state. But in very deed Christ asserts that the rich are easily damned. Therefore by force of evident reasoning the opinion of those Casuists is false.

XVI. Not only out of superfluities, but even out of what is necessary to the becomingness and seemliness of their state, are the rich bound to succor the poor oppressed by grave necessity, as the more common opinion — and to me the true one — teaches. Read Tome 2 on the Decalogue, dissertation 6, chapter 12.

XVII. Question VI. *Is it licit for a poor man placed in grave necessity to steal the things necessary for him?* Answer. The affirming opinion Vasquez, Lugo, Castropalao, Diana, and others taught, whom Cardenas cites, and whom he followed — but afterwards he himself retracted this opinion, dissertation 23, chapter 1, article 3, number 34; and deservedly, because the Venerable Innocent XI condemned it: *It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave necessity.* Not a few benign Casuists now favor the rapacity of the poor more than is just, now indulge too laxly the avarice of the rich.

Chapter VIII — Who are bound to give alms, out of what goods, and to which poor?

I. Question I. *Who can and ought to lay out alms?* Answer. All who enjoy absolute dominion over their own goods. Wherefore slaves and bondservants, since they lack right over things, have nothing to lay out in alms; but it must be said otherwise if they possessed a peculium: they can also take away from those things which are given them determinately for their own sustenance, and distribute them among the poor. Minors, wards, and prodigals may make only small alms; guardians and curators ought to make those alms which their charges would be bound to lay out.

II. Question II. *Can children under paternal power, and wives, give alms?* Answer. Children under paternal power cannot give alms out of those goods whose dominion is in the hands of their parents; nor out of the goods called adventitious, whose usufruct is in the hands of their parents. But they can and ought to succor the poor out of their castrensian goods; likewise out of those goods which they receive from their parents for honorable recreation, and while they conduct their parents' business, they can make moderate alms, because their parents are presumed to consent. Nay, parents ought to hand over some money to their children to be distributed to the poor, that they may accustom themselves to fulfill the precept.

III. Wives cannot absolutely give alms out of their Husbands' goods. Yet where custom prevails, and with the consent of Christian husbands, wives can make fitting and moderate alms. Likewise, to avert some temporal or spiritual harm they can lay out alms, especially if their husbands be negligent in fulfilling the precept. Again, wives can and ought to succor one in extreme need, even against their husbands' will. But out of their own goods obtained by gift, inheritance, or another just title — which are called paraphernal — wives are bound to make fitting alms.

IV. Question III. *Are Religious bound to give alms?* Answer. If the discourse be of Religious as private persons, it is plain that they can lay out no alms, since they lack all dominion. When extreme necessity presses, they ought to succor the poor even against the will of their Prelates. In other events the license of the Prelate is necessary. But the monasteries of Religious are bound to almsgiving, when they abound in goods.

V. Question IV. *To which poor are alms to be laid out?* Answer. Some poor are necessarily poor, others voluntarily. Both are to be relieved. In an equal cause, those poor are rather to be relieved who shine with greater piety and sanctity. Poor persons who feign misery and need, that they may extort alms, sin, and are bound to restitution. Those who are truly poor, but counterfeit a greater misery than that by which they are pressed, sin, because lies, whether in words or in deeds, are always vicious; yet they are not bound to restitution, since they are in very deed poor. Wherefore Preachers gravely sin who exaggerate feigned necessities to their hearers, that they may extort more abundant alms. Alms collected under feigned poverty must be restored to the poor.

Chapter IX — An admonition to Confessors

I. When I consider the oracles of Christ, and the doctrine of all the Fathers and of the graver Theologians, I tremble in every limb over the salvation of the rich; nor do the benign blandishments of certain men soothe my grief and dread. Extremes indeed must be avoided. Care must be taken lest the yoke of Christ be weighted down more than is right in this cause — which rarely happens. Care must be taken lest we relax it more than is right — which, as is well known, most easily happens from the proscribed opinions, and from others more benign than is fair. Let the Confessors of the rich, then, keep before their eyes the Gospel of Christ Jesus and the doctrine of the holy Fathers.

II. Confessors must beware of flattering the rich. Let them inculcate more deeply the doctrine of Christ concerning their difficult salvation. Let them beware lest the fear of alienating the rich from themselves, and of displeasing them, cause them to soothe and temper the severity of the evangelical doctrine with excessive sweetness. A certain and precise rule cannot be designated, either concerning the acquiring of a higher state, or concerning the increasing of a patrimony within the sphere of the

same state. The superfluity of goods, too, is not fixed at any individual point. The rich can keep more things for the future, for dowering their daughters, for providing for their children, for sustaining the burdens of the City or of the Commonwealth, and for repairing other inconveniences which are wont probably to occur. But under these titles avaricious cupidity, ambition, and self-love feign very many things which reduce a most grave precept to nothing.

III. This is certain: that the rich abound in superfluities, when all their burdens, whether present or future, have been weighed. Vain and lying, then, is the excuse of very many rich men who say that they lack superfluities. Against these let Confessors hurl what St. Gregory Nazianzen writes in oration 14 [recte]: *Those who have resolved to live softly and delicately are necessarily enticed to devising magnificent apparatus of buildings. In constructing and adorning these, the greatest force of money is poured out. To these they gladly summon and invite assemblies of men; they zealously procure splendid and varied furniture, innumerable kinds of cups, buffoons, mimes, harpers, singers male and female, dancers male and female — in short, the whole sport of wantonness. And while these things are carried on within, there sit at the doors of the vestibule innumerable ragged men, some full of grievous ulcers, some bereft of eyes, some maimed in their feet; they cry out together, and yet are not heard. If God beholds these things — as assuredly he does — what end do you think there will be, O enemies of the poor? Do you not know that it is for the sake of these that all the horrendous and terrible examples are set down and commemorated in the holy Gospel?*

IV. In defining the quantity of the alms to be distributed one sticks fast. Christ commands, and the Fathers inculcate, that all superfluities be distributed. But since these superfluities are enclosed within no certain limit, they are not subject to a certain and precise measure. Some of the Theologians assign a tenth part of the revenues, whether coming from landed estates or from industry. Others prescribe a narrower, others an ampler measure.

V. Adriaan Reland, in his *On the Mahometan Religion*, from page 99, narrates that the Turks burden gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates, raisins, camels, oxen, sheep, and plants with a fixed yearly payment of alms, with many conditions added; which payment comes to about five in the hundred. This I note in passing, lest Christian rich men show themselves difficult in laying out alms. But since I cannot myself designate a precise measure, I shall set down what the holy Doctors suggest.

VI. St. Thomas of Villanova, sermon 2 on St. Martin, furnishes this answer: *Hear John: He that hath two coats, let him give one to him that hath none; and he that hath meat, let him do in like manner. You will say perhaps: To give the half is much. I have a wife and a household to feed. For all these the remaining half would not suffice. To which I say: Zacchaeus had all these; yet, with the Lord approving, he laid out half of his goods upon the poor. Oh, you will say, Zacchaeus was a publican: what wonder if he gave all who had first plundered? Give, then, all that is over. But you will say: If indeed my children did not increase, neither would I increase my inheritance and patrimony; but as children come, the patrimony too must be increased. Well, let it be so: reckon up all these things; give what is over. You will say: I gladly accept; if I reckon all things, much is wanting. Truly it is so: to your cupidity much is wanting, and much would be wanting even if you alone, without a partner, possessed the whole world. I do not wish, then, to bring you to a reckoning. Do as Tobias counseled his son, chapter 4: According to thy ability be merciful. If thou have much, give abundantly; if thou have little, take care even so to bestow willingly a little. I do not disapprove if you set aside a certain portion of money, at the judgment of a good man and according to your revenues, to be laid out upon the poor each year.* Since, therefore, a certain and precise quantity of alms cannot be prescribed, let us say at least those things which seem to approach nearest to the evangelical doctrine. And first it is certain that those rich men do not keep the precept of almsgiving who out of

ample riches impart some worthless leavings and a few pennies to the poor, with no regard had to the abundance of their riches; who feed their dogs more sumptuously than the poor; who pour out money with a lavish hand upon luxury, pomps, banquets, games, and other amusements, but succor the poor only moderately. The rule of holy Tobias, therefore, must be kept before the eyes. Let him who possesses much lay out much; and let those whose patrimonies are slender give slender aids to the poor, which they may impart with the desire of giving more, if they had it. Let the rich behold Christ in the poor; let them reckon themselves as brothers of the poor; let them distribute to them not the worthless scraps of their table and of their riches, but a just portion. Besides the crumbs of the table, then, and those pennies which are wont to be distributed to the beggars they meet, let the rich assign a certain portion of their revenues — greater or less, according to the abundance of their riches — to be imparted to the poor each year.

VII. The rich are wont to object the number of their children, and the dowry of their daughters. To whom Augustine furnishes this answer, sermon 43, On various matters: *Make room for Christ along with your children; let your Lord be added to your family, let your Creator be added to your offspring, let your brother be added to the number of your children ... You have two children: reckon him the third. You have three: let Christ be numbered the fourth. You have five: let him be called the sixth. You have ten: let him be the eleventh. I do not wish to say more. Keep for your Lord the place of one child. For what you shall give to your Lord will profit both you and your children. But what you keep ill for your children will harm both you and them. You shall give one portion, which you have allotted to one child.*

Chapter X — On fraternal correction

I. Fraternal correction is described by St. Thomas (II-II, q. 33, art. 1) as a spiritual alms flowing from charity, by which one strives, by a secret admonition, to remove the evil of his neighbour insofar as it is harmful to him. Correction is twofold: fraternal, which I have described; and judicial, which is an act of justice and looks to the good of justice. This correction can be given only by those who are endowed with public authority.

Translated for this site from the Latin of the print, where the English received lacks this passage or departs from the print. (ed.)

II. Question I. *Is there a divine precept of fraternal correction?* Response. All affirm it. For it is said (Matt. 18:15): *But if thy brother shall offend against thee, go, and rebuke him between thee and him alone.* This precept binds both the faithful and unbelievers, because it is divine and natural, included in these words: *What thou wouldst have done to thee, do to another.*

Translated for this site from the Latin of the print, where the English received lacks this passage or departs from the print. (ed.)

III. St. Thomas (II-II, q. 33, art. 2) recounts several conditions, which can be reduced to four, for this commandment to bind. 1. Knowledge of a grave sin. 2. That there be hope of amendment. 3. That there be a fit occasion of person and of time. 4. That it can be given conveniently.

Translated for this site from the Latin of the print, where the English received lacks this passage or departs from the print. (ed.)

IV. The knowledge of the sin that is required must be morally certain; a doubtful or slightly probable knowledge is not enough, unless the danger of grave harm were imminent, or when the sin would turn to the injury of the neighbour and there were hope of amendment: for then a merely probable doubt would suffice for correcting the offender.

Translated for this site from the Latin of the print, where the English received lacks this passage or departs from the print. (ed.)

V. The sin subject to correction is mortal; otherwise venial — unless venial sins carry with them the proximate danger of falling into mortal ones, for then I judge the precept to oblige. If venial sins are habitual not from infirmity but from malice, the precept obliges under light fault.

VI. Lay Superiors are free from correcting the venial faults of their subjects, since it is theirs to guard the tranquillity and peace of the Commonwealth and the Community; and venial sins do not disturb this peace. Those mortal sins above all they ought to correct which are pernicious to the neighbor. But ecclesiastical Superiors, and especially Regulars, are bound to correct deliberate venial sins which proceed from malice, because these cut short the course of that perfection to which Regulars are held by a special title. Nay, they are bound, and that gravely, to correct the frequent transgressions of the constitutions of their own Order, which inflict grave detriment on the Order and dispose toward the dissolution of regular discipline.

VII. Past sins not yet amended are subject to fraternal correction, whatever certain men say to the contrary: since not only the crime about to be committed, but the crime committed, is matter for correction. For the evangelical text says: *If thy brother shall offend* [in the perfect tense, not the future], *rebuke him*.

VIII. Question II. *Are sins committed from ignorance to be corrected by force of the precept?* Answer. All affirm it, if the ignorance be vincible. Of invincible ignorance there is disagreement among the Theologians. But the more common opinion, and the true one to me, is that the precept presses above all when the neighbor labors under a double misery — both that he has committed a sin, material though it be, and that, wrapped in the gloom of darkness, he is ignorant of the sin. The precept of enlightening the neighbor, then, presses greatly at that time. If the invincible ignorance be only of ecclesiastical law, the precept presses even then — especially if that law regard the universal Church, as does the law which commands Lent, the Ember days, abstinence from flesh on Friday, and things of that kind. For ignorance of these is a grave evil, from which the neighbor must be rescued by the benefit of fraternal correction.

IX. Question III. *Who are the persons upon whom the burden of correcting rests?* Answer. All are subject to this precept, as has been said above. But of certain persons, and especially of sinners, there is dispute among the Theologians. It is expedient that correctors be just; nay, holy Scripture seems to require this: for St. Matthew, chapter 7, says: *Hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thy own eye, and then thou shalt see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye*; likewise St. Luke, chapter 4: *Physician, heal thyself*; and St. Paul, Romans chapter 2: *Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself.* All these texts require in the one correcting cleanness from crime, and therefore humility, meekness, prudence, and the other virtues which shine in the just. Sinners, for the most part, driven by hatred, pride, and haughtiness, become the reproachers of others' crimes.

X. I answer, nevertheless, that sinners are not immune from the precept of correction, but bound by it, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 33, art. 5: *The correction of an offender belongs to someone insofar as the judgment of reason has force in him; and according to this it can belong to subjects to reprove a fault. But nevertheless, through a preceding sin, a certain impediment to correction is brought about, for three reasons. First, indeed, because from the preceding sin he is rendered unworthy to correct another — and especially if he has committed a greater sin, whence he is not worthy to correct another for a lesser sin ... Secondly, the correction*

becomes undue on account of the scandal that follows from the correction, if the sin of the one correcting be manifest: because it seems that he who corrects does not correct out of charity, but rather for ostentation ... Thirdly, on account of the pride of the one correcting, insofar as someone, making light of his own sins, prefers himself to his neighbor in his heart, judging his neighbor's sins with harsh severity, as if he himself were just ... From these things, then, it is plain that if a sinner corrects an offender with humility, he does not sin, nor does he acquire for himself a new condemnation — although by this he may show himself, either in his brother's conscience or at least in his own, to be condemnable for his past sin.

XI. It is the duty of sinners, before they correct others, to detest their own crimes, and with great humility of soul to rebuke the vices of others. Sometimes sinners endowed with natural prudence and good sense have more energy, persuasion, and efficacy in stirring up a hatred of sin than not a few of the just, who are destitute of the gifts of nature and excessively tiresome. Sinners, then, just as they are bound to corporal almsgiving, are likewise bound to spiritual. It is more probable that ecclesiastical Prelates themselves, stained with sin, do not sin in exercising judicial correction. Yet they do sin, and gravely, when they do not amend themselves, and do not put themselves in a state opportune for making correction. For either they ought to abdicate their prefecture, or to set their own morals in order and remove the impediments that stand in the way of the right and useful administration of their office.

XII. Question IV. *Do Preachers polluted with grave fault sin mortally by preaching the word of God from the public pulpit?* Answer. Cajetan, Navarrus, Paludanus, Sylvester, and others affirm it. I do not dare to subscribe to this opinion: because when mortal sin is in question, it is dangerous to make a definition unless the truth manifestly lies open. Now if the quality of the ministry be regarded absolutely, it does not seem to require so great a sanctity that a Preacher stained with a deadly fault cannot discharge it without perpetrating sacrilege or a mortal crime. This, however, I say trembling and hesitant, since it is an apostolic and sublime ministry. Wherefore, as to practice, if a Preacher has fallen from infirmity into some crime, and must of necessity give sermons, I would not believe that he sins gravely. But those Preachers who, full of shameful deeds, discharge the apostolic ministry, seem to me more probably to commit a grave profanation, and, so far as lies in them, to render the word of God sterile. Nor is there anything to object, that wicked Preachers sometimes call back inveterate sinners to a better way: since it is hidden from no one that God can use the work of iniquitous Preachers for the conversion of sinners. Does it follow from this that wicked Preachers do not disgrace their ministry? Does it follow that they are exempt from the law of cleansing their own crimes, that they may remove the impediments of their office, and render themselves fit for the holy handling of holy things? Preachers ought to correct public sins, even though they should hope for almost no fruit — which can rarely be presumed, when the reproof is made before a multitude. For contempt of correction is an argument of reprobation. But how can it prudently be presumed that all the hearers are reprobate? Only then can Preachers licitly omit correction, when from it they prudently foresee that a greater evil will follow.

XIII. Question V. *Are subjects bound to correct their Superiors?* Answer. I propose to discuss a most grave question of the highest moment. All the Theologians to a man champion the affirming opinion, though they treat it in passing, whereas it deserves a severe discussion. If the fear of displeasing, if the hope of worldly things, if self-love, are often the cause why the precept of fraternal correction is

neglected, by a stronger right do these and many other things far more remove us from the observance of that same precept when our Superiors, under whose rod we live, are to be corrected.

XIV. St. Augustine, book 1, chapter 9, On the City of God, observes that even holy men themselves for the most part neglect the observance of this precept, saying: *For very often it is ill dissembled by them, as to teaching, admonishing, sometimes even reproving and correcting them: whether because we are loath for the labor, or because we are ashamed to offend them to their face, or because we avoid enmities ... lest they hinder and harm us (N.B.) in these temporal things, whether such as our cupidity still desires to attain, or such as our infirmity dreads to lose; so that, although the life of the wicked displeases the good, and therefore they do not fall with them into that damnation which after this life is prepared for such — nevertheless, because for this reason they spare the sins of others more damnably, while they fear them in their own faults, though light and venial, they are rightly scourged with them in temporal things, although they are by no means punished in eternity ... This is culpable: that those who live differently, and abhor the deeds of the wicked, nevertheless spare the sins of others, which they ought to unteach and rebuke, while they guard against their offenses, lest they be harmed (N.B.) in those things which the good and innocent themselves use, but with more cupidity than was fitting for those who are pilgrims in this world and carry before them the hope of the heavenly Fatherland.* Correction is omitted, he adds a little after in the same place, *because the flattering tongue and the human day delight, the judgment of the crowd is dreaded, and the excruciation or destruction of the flesh — that is, on account of certain bonds of cupidity, not on account of the offices of charity.* At last he concludes the chapter, reproaching both Superiors and subjects with the crime of neglected correction: *In which matter they by no means have an equal, but a far graver cause, of whom it is said by the Prophet: "He indeed shall die in his sin, but his blood will I require at the hand of the watchman." For to this end watchmen — that is, the rulers of peoples — are established in the Churches, that they spare not in reproving sins. Nor for that reason is he entirely free from a fault of this kind who, though not a ruler, yet among those with whom he is joined by the necessity of this life, knows many things that ought to be admonished or reproved, and neglects it, avoiding their offenses on account of those things which in this life he uses — not undue things, but which he delights in more than he ought*. Finally, in book 10, chapter 29, he observes that all the proud despise correction: *Or perhaps they are ashamed to be corrected? And this vice belongs only to the proud.*

XV. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 33, art. 4, assigns the reason: *Correction*, he says, *is an act of charity. Therefore it extends to all those whom we are bound to pursue with charity.* Now Superiors must be loved with a more fervent charity, since, the more they shine in a loftier place, the greater the danger in which they stand, says St. Augustine. Therefore, above the rest, they need the almsgiving of spiritual correction. If all must be corrected with meekness and humility, Superiors above all must be corrected with the utmost reverence and lowliness of soul, as St. Thomas says in the same place. Few Superiors are corrected, because few furnish those proofs of humility whence subjects can presume and hope for the fruit of amendment. Few subjects fulfill the precept of correction, because few are found free from fear and hope, few so unstained by faults that they cannot be reproved by their Superiors. Let Superiors consider that they will render an account to God for all the sins committed by their subjects on account of their own negligence in correcting. Let subjects turn over in their mind that they are by no means free from correcting their own Superiors in a spirit of humility, if a hope of profit shines forth — a precept which presses above all those who assist Superiors by office in the government of subjects.

XVI. Question VI. *Who are the Superiors bound by a peculiar right to correction?* Answer. Prelates their subjects, Parents their children, Masters their servants, Husbands their wives, Guardians their wards,

Parish priests their people, Confessors their penitents, Curators their minors, are bound by a peculiar right to correct. These are bound to correct their inferiors not only by the title of charity, as all the rest are, but also by the law of justice. For Superiors, besides the bond of the common precept, are bound by the tie of their office. Prelates, moreover, ought to perform a twofold correction — one judicial, the other fraternal.

XVII. Question VII. *What hope of profit must be conceived, that the precept of fraternal correction may oblige?* Answer. That four conditions must precede fraternal correction has already been indicated above. Their meaning must now be briefly discussed. Of judicial correction, which must be made even without hope of profit, there is no discourse now, but of fraternal correction. The end of this correction is the amendment of the offender. If the hope of this amendment be wanting, the precept does not oblige, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, II-II, q. 33, art. 6. For fraternal correction, whose end is the amendment of the offender, has no coercion, but simple admonition. And therefore where it is probably reckoned that the sinner will not receive the admonition, but will slide into worse things, one must desist from correction of this kind: because the things that are for an end must be regulated according as the reason of the end requires.

XVIII. It is agreed among all that a certain hope is not required, but a probable one suffices. Frequently men violate the precept of correction because they despair of the profit of amendment. Iniquity lies to itself. Sometimes men say that all must be judged well of, and the salvation of all must be hoped for. Sometimes, when they ought to fulfill the precept of correction, they judge rashly of everyone, and say that they are not bound by such a precept, because no hope of profit shines forth. These do not perceive that they are judging as proud and reprobate those whom they conceive will scorn correction. Rare is the amendment of offenders — not so much on account of their malice, as on account of the defect of correctors. I do not deny that many sinners are stubborn and obstinate, and unwilling to understand so as to do well. But it is also true that correctors are wanting who either are willing to fulfill the precept, or are endowed with charity, prudence, meekness, and true zeal. As for me, I have found more who have received correction than who have scorned it. If the first correction does not profit, it must be repeated as often as hope of amendment is conceived. Repeated blows often break hardness. When it is doubted whether the correction will bring forth more evil than good, one must abstain from it. But if the doubt is not of a greater evil, but only of the profit, correction must be made. In gaming, if you do not doubt loss but only gain, you cast the die. In extreme necessity, correction must be made, even though you doubt whether it will harm rather than profit.

XIX. Question VIII. *Must correction be deferred, that it be performed at an opportune time?* Answer. The other condition which ought to accompany correction is the opportunity of time. Correction must be hastened or deferred, according as, the circumstances weighed, it is judged that correction at this or that time will profit more. We are not freed from the precept of correction because we foresee it will be made by others: since the precept binds all and each. *And he gave a commandment to every one concerning his neighbor*: Ecclesiasticus 17.

XX. Question IX. *What order must be kept in correction?* Answer. This order is prescribed in chapter 18 of the Evangelist Matthew: *If thy brother shall offend against thee, go, and rebuke him between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother. And if he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two more, that in*

the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may stand. And if he will not hear them, tell the church. And if he will not hear the church, let him be to thee as the heathen and publican.

XXI. Three things are commanded to be observed. 1. That the correction be made secretly. 2. That if the correction is useless, witnesses be summoned. 3. That the offense be reported to the Superior, when the two aforesaid do not profit. This order is not of counsel, but of precept, as the Theologians commonly teach with St. Thomas, II-II, q. 33, art. 7. For the Angelic Doctor shows that this order is consonant with the law of nature. For this order regards first eternal salvation, then the reputation of the neighbor. This order must be kept in the best manner. Witnesses are not to be summoned if private and secret correction profits; if one witness suffices, two are not to be summoned. In keeping this order the kinds of crimes must be regarded. If the sin is public, or inflicts damage upon a neighbor, it must be publicly reproved, as St. Paul teaches, 1 Timothy 5: *Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may have fear.* It must then also be reported to the Superior.

XXII. Question X. *Does the precept of keeping this order oblige, when it is reckoned safer that the Prelate will correct the offender?* Answer. The Theologians dispute on both sides. Some defend the position that the crime should be reported to the Superior, as to a father, when it is foreseen that correction will be better made by him.

XXIII. The more probable opinion to me is that this order must commonly be kept: because the precept of keeping the order is both natural and divine; and because it rarely happens, all things weighed, that it is done better by the Prelate than by a private person. Opponents concede that correction can be well made by a private man, and therefore say that it is done better by the Prelate. The sinner is certainly rendered infamous before the Prelate, while the sinner's crime is revealed to him. Now this defamation disturbs the offender, and renders him unfit for the fruit of correction. If this greater fitness of the Prelate be compared with the disturbance of the one being corrected, the latter commonly overcomes the former. The efficacy of correction depends very much on the disposition of him who must receive the correction. But who is there who would not rather wish to be corrected by his own brother, conscious of the sin, than by a Prelate, who is ignorant of the offense? The one to be corrected undergoes two burdens. One, that his sin, known only to a private man, be manifested to another. The second, that this manifestation be made to a Prelate, whose favor is commonly of more account than that of many private persons. Therefore men commonly desire to be corrected rather by private brethren than by Prelates. Therefore private persons are commonly fitter than Prelates, as fathers, for correcting, for the reason that the efficacy of correction depends on the greater disposition of those to be corrected; and these, as I have said, more willingly receive the correction of private persons than of Prelates. Wherefore Christ the Lord absolutely, and without limitation, prescribed that this order be kept.

XXIV. St. Thomas luminously teaches our opinion, II-II, q. 33, art. 7, ad 5: *It must be said that the Prelate is not to be obeyed against the precept of the Lord, according to that of Acts 5: We ought to obey God rather than men. And therefore when a Prelate commands that whatever anyone knows deserving of correction be told to him, this precept must indeed be understood as safe, the order of fraternal correction being preserved — whether the precept is made commonly to all, or to someone specially. But if the Prelate should expressly command against this order instituted by the Lord, he himself would sin in commanding, and one obeying him, as it were acting against the precept of the Lord. Whence he would not have to be obeyed: because the Prelate is not the judge of hidden things, but God alone. Whence he does not have the power of commanding anything concerning hidden things, except insofar as*

they are manifested through some indications — for instance, through ill repute, or through some suspicions: in which cases the Prelate can command in the same way as a secular or ecclesiastical judge can exact an oath of speaking the truth.

XXV. If, in the judgment of St. Thomas, not even a Prelate commanding the reporting of a hidden crime, the order of secret correction being omitted, is to be obeyed, by what reason can a private man spontaneously omit this order? The precept of this order is divine; therefore, unless an evident and manifest necessity shows that correction will be better performed by the Prelate, the order must always be kept. Rarely, however — nay, most rarely — is this correction better performed by the Prelate, for the reasons which I touched on above; therefore the precept must be fulfilled. What they object from Quodlibet II, article 13 [recte question 8, article 2] of St. Thomas is of no weight. For we too concede that, the case being admitted in which the Prelate would correct more efficaciously than a private person, the order can be omitted; but we repeat that this rarely happens, and that private men very easily deceive themselves and feign this greater efficacy at their pleasure.

XXVI. Question XI. *What sins ought to be reported to the Superior, the order of correction being neglected?* Answer. Sins known and public ought to be reported to the Prelate as judge. Sins are said to be known either by notoriety of law, when they have been reported to the tribunal, or by notoriety of fact, when the deed happens before many. If a sin is committed before two or three witnesses, it cannot be called public. It can indeed be proved in judgment, and become public; but before it is reported to the tribunal, it is not public: therefore correction must be sent ahead, if there is hope of amendment, provided the sin is not to the harm of a third party. For the brother must be gained with the least detriment to himself.

XXVII. Public sins must be reported to the judge, as St. Paul commands, 1 Timothy 5: *Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may have fear.* He who sins publicly offends against the common good. If, however, someone should sin publicly from a sudden impulse, and a most probable hope of amendment were present, then he should be corrected secretly, scandal being removed. Then indeed someone is presumed to sin from a sudden impulse, when he is a man of good repute in public estimation, and from some unexpected event falls into some sin which does not redound to the harm of a third party or of the Community. For the precept of the order prescribed by Christ must always be kept before the eyes.

XXVIII. Offenses of heresy, of the betrayal of a city, and the like, must be denounced to the Superior as judge. The opposite opinion was condemned by Alexander VII in this thesis: *Although it be established for you that Peter is a heretic, you are not bound to denounce him, if you cannot prove it.* Although the crime of heresy be hidden, it must be denounced to the judge — not that he may punish the offender, but that he may take precaution for the public good, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 33, art. 7. For there are certain hidden sins which are to the corporal or spiritual harm of one's neighbors — for instance, if someone secretly plots how a city may be handed over to enemies, or if a heretic privately turns men away from the faith. And because he who sins in secret sins not only against himself, but also against others, one must proceed at once to denunciation, that a harm of this kind be prevented. There is added the precept of Alexander VII, who in his Bull given in the year 1660, whose beginning is *Licet alias*, commands that the crime of heresy, even hidden, be reported to the Tribunal of the holy Inquisition. Of the obligation of denouncing heresy to the Superior, then, there exists an ecclesiastical precept. Of manifesting the crime of betrayal there stands no precept of the Church.

Wherefore if certain arguments of amendment occurred, secret correction could be sent ahead. But solid arguments of amendment rarely occur for those crimes which redound to the harm either of the Community or to the detriment of a third party; therefore these sins must commonly be reported to the Superior, that the innocent may be preserved. Sometimes it suffices that the innocent be warned to guard against snares laid for them, the guilty party not being manifested, when the circumstances permit this.

XXX. Of carnal faults which can be committed by Religious, the Theologians dispute whether, the order of fraternal correction being neglected, crimes of this kind ought to be reported to the Superior. A certain and general rule cannot be designated. When a probable hope of amendment can be conceived, the divine precept must always be observed. In a doubtful cause, one must stand for the precept. Those who, fired with the spirit of charity, study to obey Christ and to preserve their neighbor's reputation embrace the safer part.

XXXI. I would wish that Christians and Religious were more courageous in reproving public sins, in modestly and reverently reproving the deadly indolence of those Superiors who permit crimes to rampage. In reporting to the Superior the hidden faults of the brethren, emulation, envy, and hidden hatred can often have a place. But rarely is there sin in admonishing those Superiors who neglect openly and before all the offices of government. For from this correction all human respect and political considerations withdraw men: since commonly all subjects can hope or fear something from their Superiors. How can the spirit of evangelical charity be presumed, if the hidden crimes of private persons are reported to the Superior, but the public dissimulations, the indolences and negligences of Superiors, whence innumerable evils, ruin, and the desolation of the Community proceed, are covered over with silence?

Dissertation IV — On the vices opposed to charity, and especially on scandal

Chapter I — First, the condemned propositions are recounted; then those which seem lax

I. Innocent XI condemned the following theses:

13. *If you act with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened over someone's life, or rejoice over his death; seek it and desire it with an inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure at the person, but on account of some temporal advantage.*
14. *It is licit, with an absolute desire, to wish for the death of one's father — not indeed as an evil to the father, but as a good to the one wishing it — because, namely, a rich inheritance will fall to him.*
15. *A servant who, with bowed shoulders, knowingly helps his master climb through windows to ravish a virgin, and many times abets him in this, carrying the ladder, opening the door, or cooperating in some similar way, does not sin mortally, if he does this from fear of notable detriment — for instance, lest he be ill-treated by his master, lest he be looked upon with fierce eyes, lest he be expelled from the house.*

II. "Coninck believes that no fear whatever makes it licit to paint an idol, or to make a priestly vestment at the request of an Infidel ... But I believe that it can be excused by a most grave fear, if these things are not demanded of you in contempt of Religion, and there is no scandal in your not scorning them. For the fabrication of an idol, and the painting of a concubine, are not intrinsically evil, but can often be rendered honest." Castropalao, treatise 6, disputation 6, point 12, number 7, page 434.

III. "Of the sculpture or painting of an idol there is a doubt: and indeed it is licit, when idolatry is neither sought nor feared; but when it is feared, I say that he sins against Religion who furnishes it without a most urgent loss. This is proved both from the law of charity, and because every virtue obliges that all occasions of violating it be avoided. But if I cannot myself refuse to furnish the idol without grave and proportionate loss, I do not sin in giving it." Hurtado de Mendoza, on the second part of the Second Part, disputation 66, section 6, § 181, in Diana, coordinated edition, Tome 7, treatise 5, resolution 64.

IV. Fr. Antonino Diana, Tome 7, coordinated edition, resolution 9, number 6, frees from the sin of scandal women using superfluous and excessive adornment. "But I" (he says) "think that there is no sin, even if the adornment were superfluous and excessive, provided it be according to the custom of the country." Does the custom of the country, then, prevail over the Gospel which prohibits such superfluity?

V. That women's cosmetics, and the exquisite adornments of face and head, hold a middle nature, removed both from honesty and from malice, Lessius writes, book 4 On justice, chapter 4, doubt 14, number 114. "Finally, to paint the face, and to apply various colors to it, is not evil of itself, but indifferent." But the divine Scriptures cry out against ornaments and allurements of this kind. He

answers: "Those Scriptures either contain an exhortation, since they have no word of precept ... or certainly it was expedient at that time, for the edification of the Heathen, that this be commanded." Place cited, number 114.

VI. Caramuel, in his *Theologia Praeterintentionalis*, Tome II, precept 6, question 8, chapter 2, case 2, writes the following conclusions: "First. Servants can, with the knowledge that she is a prostitute or a concubine, minister foods at table — not only common foods, but also warm ones, and season food that provokes to Venus, and make ready a private bed." At number 297 he praises for his opinion Azor and Diana, and adds: "I have advisedly spoken not only of common foods, because I know that there is altogether greater difficulty if there were such foods as would excite Venus — for then, according to certain Theologians, servants would have to desist from such service, lest they cooperate indirectly toward illicit Venus. But we, the more prudent, believe that even such foods can be seasoned without fault." Is it licit, then, to incite Venus? To cook foods that kindle it? And is Caramuel to be held the more prudent for teaching these things? But hear the reason he brings forward. Such foods can be eaten without fault even by one who foresees the future pollution, provided he is prepared not to give consent: therefore the foods can be seasoned and ministered. Let this suffice to have pointed out, that it may be detested.

"Second. They can make the bed for their master and his mistress without venial fault," consonant with Azor, whom Diana cites.

"Third. It is not a mortal sin to procure for one's master and his concubine, about to have intercourse, a lodging, or to prepare a bed better than usual, or to strew it with flowers."

"Fourth. It is not a sin to hire a mistress into one's master's house, even though you foresee that she will sin in it."

VII. Fr. Tommaso Tamburini, book V on the Decalogue, chapter 1, § 4: "If my friend wishes me to carry little gifts and the like — namely incitements of shameful love — which he himself sends to his concubine, can I carry them without sin? The answer was absolutely negative: because on the one hand this action, though otherwise indifferent, is conjoined with the sin of the friend and of his concubine; and on the other hand there is no excusing cause, drawn from servitude (for this he grants to servants) or from another detriment, as we suppose. Nor indeed, if there is some modest blush of shame, does this seem regularly to be of such moment as sufficiently to excuse. I confess, however, that if such a friendship were of great value to you, and you truly feared to lose it, you could be excused: because then a just fear of notable detriment is added."

The same, number 30: "Can those who by office carry litters on their shoulders, or drive carriages, licitly, hired for a price, bring a girl to a lascivious young man? Answer: I say they cannot. Nor does the reason of servitude excuse this: for these are not servants or subjects; nor does the loss of gain excuse it, because this is quite small. I have, however, one point from Navarrus, from which something more benign can probably be gathered. From these things," he says, "there seems to be gathered a reason for defending many from sin, at least deadly sin — provided, as in the case proposed, the sin does not please them, and they perform the aforesaid services for some good end — for instance, because they render what belongs to their office, or for a just wage. For although these offices and services are very much conjoined with sin, they are not, nevertheless, in themselves and

by their own nature sins; and therefore they can be separated from the sin by a different and separate end. Thus he." Note that phrase: *of their office, or for a wage*.

VIII. Fr. Antonino Diana, Tome 7, coordinated edition, treatise 5, resolution 48: "Is it licit, for some just cause, to lend a bedchamber to someone asking it for fornication; or to let a house to a prostitute, even if, on account of the circumstance of the place, someone should commit a sin; or if the prostitute, hiring that house, should do great harm to honest women neighbors? On this case I was once asked; for a certain most noble man was insistently seeking his friend's house for the purpose of fornicating. But if he had denied him this, he would have fallen into most grave harm. He asked whether he would sin by doing this. And I answered in the negative: because without a proportionate loss to himself he could by no means deny this; and to lend a bedchamber is not, from its object, intrinsically evil, but indifferent, and is ordered to evil only from the depraved intention of the one abusing it. Therefore, etc. And thus Merolla teaches this same opinion most recently, in specific terms."

"Hence it is inferred, a fortiori, against Navarrus, chapter 17, that it is licit, for a just cause, to let a house to a prostitute — even if, on account of the circumstance of the place, someone should commit a sin, which he would by no means perpetrate if that place were not granted to him, by reason of its situation, etc. — or if the prostitute, hiring that house, should do great harm to honest women neighbors."

The same Diana, resolution 50: "Is it licit to give a gift to a judge's mistress, that she may intercede with him, since she herself would go to speak with the judge, and it is mortal by reason of scandal, since she exposes herself to a most vehement danger of sinning? Sanchez, most recently, answers in the negative ... But I judge the affirming opinion no less probable, if the business is grave, and you see that the judge is not favorable to you, but you hope that through the mistress's intercession he will become well-disposed, and no other way appears by which you could bend him to preserve your right: because you are not asking for something which she herself could not licitly furnish. For although by that intercession the judge and the mistress foster a shameful love, this you do not intend, nor are you the cause of any harm. All these things Castropalao teaches, Tome I, treatise 6, point 15, number 2."

The same, resolution 42: "I have adduced Francesco Merolla in his moral-theological disputations, Tome I, disputation 2, where he speaks thus. From these things it is gathered what must be said of coachmen who carry a prostitute from one place to another, when they know that she seeks that place in order to sin. For these are regularly excused from sin: because there is a cause of not losing the gain which they procure from that ministry. So he, and I."

IX. Fr. Patritius Sporer, treatise 5 on the fifth precept of the Decalogue, chapter 1, section 3, number 92: "Without doubt painters sin mortally, regularly speaking, who paint very filthy and obscene things; and much more actors representing such very filthy things ... But I say 'regularly speaking': for in a rare case, if the necessity of the painter or actor were so great that he needed such gain for food, clothing, or some other necessary thing, certain Doctors, with Tamburini, permit it once or twice, until another means of livelihood should occur — provided there be absent the mortal danger of impure venereal delight." This opinion is more than lax, as will be said in its place. For according to these Theologians, regularly speaking, very filthy and obscene scandal is not licit. But if food, or

clothing, or something of the kind presses, then a very filthy scandal will be honest, until another means of livelihood occurs.

Chapter II — What is hatred of God, and of the Neighbor. On discord, contention, schism, and sedition

I. Hatred of God is twofold: one which is included in every sin; the other peculiar, which is described as an aversion from God, by which the will detests God insofar as he prohibits sins and inflicts punishments. This hatred of God is the gravest of all crimes, since it is opposed to the most excellent virtue of charity according to its primary act, namely the divine love. It is by its kind mortal, nor does it admit the excuse of parvity of matter; but it can turn out venial only from imperfect deliberation.

II. Hatred of the neighbor is an expressed malevolence, by which we wish him evil. It is by its kind deadly; yet it can become venial, both by parvity of matter and by imperfect deliberation — as if you wish a light evil to your neighbor, or if with imperfect deliberation you desire it for him.

III. It is licit to abominate the sinner, as sinner, according to Proverbs 29: *The just abominate a wicked man.* For then the sin is hated, not the man. For it is never licit to wish evil to a man, insofar as it is his evil, even with an inefficacious affection; nor is it licit to be saddened over his good, or to rejoice over his evil, as is plain from the proscribed thesis of Innocent XI recounted in the preceding chapter.

IV. Although it is never licit either to desire or to rejoice over the neighbor's evil, it is nevertheless licit, with an inefficacious affection, to wish some temporal evil to another, and to rejoice over it, insofar as this temporal evil conduces to his spiritual good — for instance, that he desist from sin, that he be called back to a better way — as St. Thomas teaches, on the third book, distinction 30, article 1, ad 4. For charity has an order, and each one ought to love himself more than another, and his kin more than strangers, and friends more than enemies, and the common good of many more than the good of one.

One can, without violating charity, wish some temporal evil to another, or rejoice if it should happen — not insofar as it is his evil, but insofar as it is an impediment of evils to another whom one is more bound to love, or to the Community, or to the Church. Similarly of his temporal evil, according as by the evil of punishment the evil of fault is frequently prevented. Hence it is licit to wish for victory in a just war, for the destruction of the Turks, for the common good of the Church or of the Principality; it is licit to wish that a punishment be inflicted by the judge on a malefactor, that he desist from inflicting harm on the Community or on a neighbor. Yet the utmost vigilance is needed in desires of this kind, however inefficacious, lest under the appearance of the common good the cupidity of private vengeance lie hidden. Similarly it is never licit to wish a lesser evil to oneself or to others in order to avoid a greater. Wherefore they gravely sin who deliberately desire death for themselves in order to avoid other troubles.

V. Question I. *Is it a sin to speak ill of one's neighbor?* Answer. He who with deliberate mind imprecates a grave evil upon his neighbor sins mortally. Weak women, and base men, frequently burst forth into these imprecations, and, to excuse themselves, allege the impulse of anger, as though anger were not a sin. That anger can at times forestall reason is true; but frequently, from a depraved habit and from grave negligence in restraining anger, women and men break forth into such curses. They often say, when their anger has cooled, that they are displeased at having hurled such curses; but this is not a

sign that they did not sin: for when the anger has been poured out, the mind perceives the evil it has committed, and therefore is then displeased. Parish priests and Confessors, then, should instruct such persons, and show them the necessity of curbing the savage beast of anger: since their frequent curses flow from a depraved habit of becoming angry. But this wicked habituation does not excuse them, but accuses them. That Confessors may be able to discern whether they have offended gravely or lightly, let them weigh all the circumstances, the deliberation of mind, the scandal, the gravity of the evil wished, and the rest of that kind.

VI. Question II. *What is discord?* Answer. It is a dissension of wills from the divine good and the good of the neighbor, in which they ought to agree. It is opposed to concord, which unites hearts and wills. By its kind it is a mortal sin. For God, Proverbs 6, detests him who sows discord among brethren. It is required, however, that someone knowingly dissent from the good of God or of the Neighbor, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 37, art. 1. Wherefore there is no discord when one, in good faith, judges that this pertains to the honor of God and the utility of the Neighbor, and another judges otherwise. For this frequently happens even among the holier men themselves.

VII. Question III. *What is contention?* Answer. It is an altercation of words for impugning the truth; or it is an impugning of the truth with a confidence of clamor, as the Angelic Doctor says, II-II, q. 38, art. 1, where he opportunely adds: *But if contention is called an impugning of falsity with a due measure of acrimony, then contention is praiseworthy.* Acrimony must never be poured out upon persons, but only, with due sparingness, upon errors. This acrimony is like a seasoning, which must be used with great prudence and moderation, especially in vocal disputations. For when men dispute with mutual words, if they clamor with an immoderate outcry of voices, if they rub each other with mutual wit, the disputation easily ends in criminal contention, because the persons are present. But when errors are refuted in writing, often the authors of the errors are either dead or absent; therefore there is no danger of culpable contention. Hence it is that the mildest Fathers — Augustine, Bernard, and others — often used a style sprinkled with wit. For the reader is wearied by a cold reading; but, on the contrary, writing seasoned with a moderate pepper of acrimony sharpens his palate.

VIII. Question IV. *What is Schism?* Answer. It is a deliberate separation from the unity of the Church. Now he is separated from the Church who refuses either to communicate with her members, or to render due obedience to the Roman Pontiff, her visible head. Not every disobedient man is a schismatic, because pertinacity can be lacking. But every schismatic is disobedient; just as every heretic is a schismatic, but not conversely. Yet in practice these two crimes, schism and heresy, are scarcely separated, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 39, art. 1, ad 3.

IX. Question V. *What is sedition?* Answer. It is an aggressive war of one part of the Commonwealth against another part, or against its own Prince. It is by its kind a mortal sin, because it is gravely adverse to peace, to unity, and to the common good. Of war and duel I shall treat in explaining the fifth precept.

Chapter III — On Scandal

I. Question I. *What, and of how many kinds, is scandal?* Answer. It is a word or deed less right, furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin. Under the name of word or deed, omission also is comprehended. For those inflict most grave scandals who, in a grave matter, neglect to fulfill their parts. What incredible

and irreparable losses and spiritual ruin proceed from this! It is called *less right*, that we may understand that not only evil, but also the appearance of evil, can beget scandal. *Furnishing an occasion of ruin.* It is not required that the ruin actually follow, but it suffices that an occasion of spiritual ruin be furnished, whether it follow or not.

II. Scandal is twofold, active and passive. Active is that which I have described, and which can be committed in three ways. 1. Directly and formally, when someone expressly intends the spiritual ruin of his neighbor; and this is called the scandal of demons. 2. Directly but not formally, when someone induces another to sin, not because he intends the malice, but because he wishes to satisfy his own appetite. 3. Indirectly, when it is foreseen, or can be foreseen, that from such an occasion the neighbor will take occasion of spiritual ruin.

III. Passive scandal is the very spiritual ruin of him who suffers the scandal, an occasion having been accepted from another's word or deed. Passive scandal is often joined with active, as when one gives, and another accepts, the occasion of sinning. Sometimes there is active scandal without passive, as when someone furnishes an occasion of sinning, but the other, scorning such an occasion, remains constant in virtue. Passive scandal without active occurs when someone, from an innocent occasion, seizes a handle for sinning — either from ignorance and infirmity, and this is called the scandal of the little ones; or from malice, and is called pharisaical scandal.

IV. To scandal placed in a word are referred lewd songs, immodest conversations veiled with allurements of words, with metaphors and allegories very significant, contumelious words, mocking or in whatever way unjustly irritating; likewise obscene books, commonly called *romances*, immodest Poets, and the like, which even today are worn thin in the very hands of weak women. Lascivious pictures, and innumerable other deeds which furnish the neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin, are referred to the scandal of deed. It is not required that the sinner have an express intention of inducing the neighbor to sin; but it suffices that he perform an action, or utter a word, which by its own nature induces to sin. This is called indirect and interpretative scandal.

V. Question II. *Is scandal a special sin?* Answer. All affirm that it is a peculiar sin, distinct from the evil work itself, and opposed to charity. Wherefore in confession this twofold malice must be expressed — one against charity, the other against the virtue to which is opposed the depraved deed or word that generates the scandal. And this is plain from holy Scripture: *Woe to the world because of scandals: for it must needs be that scandals come; nevertheless, woe to that man by whom the scandal cometh. And whosoever shall scandalize one of these little ones…*

of these little ones that believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea. Matthew 18. That word *woe* sets forth the enormous malice of scandal. In the other clause, *woe to the world because of scandals*, the Evangelist indicates the multitude of scandals. For the greatest part of Christians is damned by reason of scandals. Men infect one another with malice, no otherwise than lepers, and entice one another to sin. On every side the contagion of scandals rages and creeps everywhere. The earth and the air resound with the clamor of blasphemies and of oaths. The poison of unchastity pours itself out in words, in dress, in deeds, into the eyes, into the ears, and pervades the inmost senses. On every side floods of simonies, of the crimes of calumnies, of detractions, of oppressions, and of persecutions of sound doctrine, and the plague of lax opinions flattering the senses, inundate all things.

VI. Question III. *How grave is the duty of declining scandal?* Answer. A most grave obligation, and the utmost vigilance to be applied in avoiding scandal, Christ the Lord expresses, Matthew chapter 5, in these words: *If thy right eye scandalize thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee*; and again, Mark 9, he adds: *And if thy hand scandalize thee, cut it off. It is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell.* What could be uttered by Christ more forcefully, more vehemently, to express the most grave duty of avoiding scandal? Hence gather how much the opinions of certain men oppose the doctrine of Christ, who, by various petty distinctions and inept inventions of remote and proximate scandal, frequently foster and confirm Christians in occasions of sinning.

VII. Question IV. *Must the truth of life be kept silent, that scandal be avoided?* Answer. The Angelic Doctor distinguishes a threefold truth, II-II, q. 43, art. 7, ad 3: of life, of doctrine, and of justice. In the truth of life, of doctrine, of justice is comprehended not only what is of the necessity of salvation, but also that by which salvation is more perfectly attained. Of these three there is discourse; now the truth of life is explained, which is placed in the conformity of human actions to the life of Christ and to his divine law. This divine law is one affirmative, another negative. It is never licit to violate a precept of the negative natural law for the sake of avoiding scandal. A precept of the affirmative law can sometimes be set aside for the sake of avoiding scandal. By this reason the precept of fraternal correction is omitted, when it is foreseen that the brother will come off worse — because then the precept does not press. Good works must never be omitted on account of pharisaical scandal. Works absolutely necessary to salvation can never be neglected on account of any scandal whatsoever, even of the little ones. But good works, without which we can still attain eternal salvation, can sometimes and must be concealed or deferred, that the scandal of the little ones be avoided, until they are instructed.

VIII. Question V. *Must the truth of doctrine be kept silent, that scandal be avoided?* Answer. The truth of doctrine must be preached, whether by voice or in writing, especially when from the falsity of opinions detriment threatens the integrity of morals. The precept of confessing the truth, and spiritual almsgiving, then presses. Wherefore Preachers, Theologians, and Confessors gravely sin who, either seized by a vain fear, or allured by the hope of catching popular favor, or in order to gain the favor of the World, either hide the truth of evangelical doctrine, or accommodate it, with the pigments and allurements of a harmful benignity, to the time and the temper of men. Against these Christ inveighs: *He that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty.* Luke chapter 9. I do not deny that there is need of prudence and dexterity, and that sometimes certain things must be deferred or omitted on account of various circumstances — provided this be done charity impelling, not cupidity seducing.

IX. Question VI. *Must the truth of justice be set aside for the sake of avoiding scandal?* Answer. The truth of justice directs those human actions which regard our Neighbor, and which render to each his own rights. Prelates, Superiors of a higher grade and dignity, not rarely neglect to correct offenders on account of fear of future evil and scandal. But for the most part the scandal itself is fictitious. Frequently the People suffer a most grave scandal because they see minor offenders severely punished even for light crimes, while, on the contrary, the sources of graver crimes go unpunished and free from any penalty whatsoever, because they are of some grade and dignity.

X. Question VII. *Must temporal things be set aside on account of scandal?* Answer. Either the discourse is of another's goods committed to our keeping, or of our own goods; as the Angelic Doctor wisely teaches

and resolves, II-II, q. 43, art. 8: another's goods, of which we are keepers or administrators, are not to be set aside on account of scandals. On the contrary, goods of which we are the owners are sometimes to be neglected for the sake of avoiding the scandal of the little ones, or the scandal is to be removed by another way.

XI. Question VIII. *Must spiritual works be either concealed or deferred on account of scandal?* Answer. Works which are altogether necessary to salvation must never be omitted on account of any scandal whatsoever. But works of counsel, that the scandal of the little ones be avoided, must sometimes be concealed and deferred — unless, however, greater evils follow from this. Wherefore, since the preaching of evangelical doctrine is necessary to the salvation of many, it cannot be licitly dissembled or neglected, even if some little ones should thereby suffer scandal. But pharisaical scandal is to be despised.

XII. Question IX. *What must be said of the scandal of Naaman the Syrian?* Answer. I have treated this question at large in Tome 2 on the Decalogue, dissertation 9, chapter 7. Now I touch on it briefly. The sacred text is this: *For thy servant will not henceforth offer holocaust, or victim to other gods, but this one thing there is, for which thou shalt pray to the Lord for thy servant: when my master goeth into the temple of Remmon, to worship there, and he leaneth upon my hand, if I bow down in the temple of Remmon, when he boweth down in the same place, that the Lord pardon me thy servant, for this thing. And he said to him: Go in peace.* Naaman pledges that he will never in the future sacrifice to other gods. But since he was still bound to the King's service, he feared that he might have to accompany the King entering the temple, and stretch out his hand to him as he prostrated himself before the idol, and prostrate himself with him, as he had been wont to do before. This deed he feared; yet he did not know whether it must happen. Just as those who dwell in a necessary proximate occasion fear a future fall, though they be truly contrite. For Naaman did not say *when I shall worship*, but *if I shall worship*. When Elisha saw his proselyte agitated by scruples and anguishes, he answered: *Go in peace*; as if he had said: Take courage; nothing of the kind will happen. Be strong. God, in whose power are the hearts of Kings, will not permit you to serve the King prostrating himself before the idol. Trust in the Lord, go in peace. So we ourselves are wont to console and animate penitents converted from some depraved habit, and fearing a relapse at the sight of a mistress, or at the encounter of another occasion. Fear not: trust in the Lord; he himself who has begun will perfect his work.

XIII. Question X. *Is it licit to sell idols and incense to the Heathen, to build shrines and Synagogues, and other such things whose evil use is foreseen?* Answer. Several affirm that a craftsman struck by a most grave fear can construct an idol for an Infidel who asks for it. This opinion is false. The construction of an idol, and the building of a synagogue or a shrine, are works evil by their own nature, all circumstances considered, since they have no other use besides a worship polluted with superstition. By no fear, then, not even of losing one's life, can they be purged of crime. Similarly forbidden is the selling of an idol to him who buys it not for the adornment of his house, but for the purpose of practicing idolatry. Similarly they sin who sell incense to the Heathen, a lamb to the Jews, when it is certainly or probably foreseen that such merchandise will be applied to superstitious use. What several teach on this matter is opposed to the doctrine of all the ancient Fathers.

XIV. Question XI. *Do Christians who row in the Turks' galleys against Christians sin gravely?* Answer. The Theologians dispute on both sides. I judge the affirming opinion the more probable, explained in the true sense. Different times of rowing must be distinguished. The first, when it is known to the

Christian captives that in the battle to be joined the Christians will be victors over the Turks. The second, when the war is unjust, and there threatens to the Christians the loss of liberty, of goods, and of life. The third, when there threatens to the Christians only the loss of external goods, but to the captive rowers the loss of life or the mutilation of limbs. In the first and third cases all affirm that Christian captives can licitly row. Of the second case the Theologians dispute; and the opinion which condemns as guilty of grave fault the captives rowing against innocent Christians is the more probable to me. For by no right is it permitted to bring aid to another against the innocent, whom it is a crime to injure. Now the Turks sin, killing Christians in an unjust war; therefore Christians also sin who furnish aid to the Turks in this unjust action. Nor do I see by what reason the opposite opinion is not contained in the condemnation of Innocent XI. If servants cannot help their masters, going in a boat to ravish virgins, by rowing, or, climbing through windows to fornicate or to kill, hold the ladder or support them with their shoulders — by what reason can Christian captives, by their rowing, drive the Turkish fleet forward to the destruction of Christians? Rowing is indifferent, absolutely regarded, just as holding a ladder and supporting another with one's shoulders; but, the circumstances being regarded, it is harmful, as is plain from innumerable examples.

XV. Question XII. *Is it licit to receive money as a loan from a usurer ready to lend at interest?* Answer. St. Thomas answers, II-II, q. 78, art. 4, in these words: *To induce a man to sin is in no way licit; but to use another's sin for a good end is licit: because God uses all sins for some good, as is said in the Enchiridion, chapter XI. And therefore Augustine, to Publicola asking whether it would be licit to use the oath of one who swears by false gods ... answers that he who uses the faith of one who swears by false gods, not for evil but for good, does not associate himself with that man's sin, by which he swore by demons, but with his good pact, by which he kept faith. If, however, he induced him to swear by false gods, he would sin. So also in the matter proposed it must be said that it is in no way licit to induce anyone to lend at interest; yet it is licit to receive a loan at interest from one who is ready to do this and practices usury, for the sake of some good which is the relief of one's own necessity or another's.* A man pressed by necessity asks for a good thing, namely a loan; that the other is unwilling to grant it without interest is his own fault, which rests in him, and which does not infect the exterior action of the one receiving. Rowing performed by Christian captives against innocent Christians is harmful, because it regards an exterior object that is evil, namely the ruin of guiltless Christians; climbing through windows to ravish a virgin is evil, because the object is depraved. But the borrowing of money regards a good object, namely the relief of a needy Neighbor. Hence, necessity being absent, to seek money even from a usurer ready to lend is a sin, as the more probable opinion teaches. On the contrary, grave necessity pressing, it is licit to seek a loan from anyone whatever, even one not ready to lend at interest, even though he be unwilling to lend the money without usury.

XVI. A merchant cannot seek usurious money to increase and amplify his business; but he can licitly seek it, grave necessity pressing, by which he may be relieved, that he may sustain himself and his family. Nor is it licit to deposit money with a usurer, when the depositor foresees that he will disburse that money for lending at usurious interest. Similarly it is not licit to give wine to an innkeeper, when it is certainly foreseen that he will sell it mixed with water. That if you cannot sell wine to another without grave inconvenience, you can sell it to the aforesaid innkeeper, Sanchez and Castropalao teach. But in practice it scarcely occurs that the seller cannot prevent unjust sales of this kind: because he can make such innkeepers known to the Judge or to the Community. However, if, pressed by urgent necessity, you could not sell wine to others, then you could use your right, and permit the unjust sales.

XVII. Question XIII. *Is it licit to persuade one who will certainly sin to sin more lightly, that he may omit a graver crime?* Answer. The more probable opinion, and the true one to me, denies it: since it is never licit to counsel an evil, however small. An offender can be asked to desist from a grave crime, by permitting a lesser and light one; but this can in no way be persuaded. Wherefore it is not licit to persuade a poor man ready to steal to snatch money by theft from a rich man rather than from a poor one, whatever Molina and Sanchez say to the contrary, for the reason given: that it is never permitted to counsel an evil. Now the theft of the rich man's goods is an evil, though the theft committed against the poor man be graver.

XVIII. Question XIV. *Is it licit to invite to supper one who is ready to break his fast?* Answer. The common opinion denies it, because he is invited to an action which, the prohibiting law being considered and the circumstances regarded, cannot be separated from malice. Now it is a sin to invite anyone to an action which, all things considered, is objectively harmful. Wherefore neither can servants licitly serve meat to their masters, nor innkeepers to their guests, at the time of a fast, nor can they furnish supper to those already well dined, while they know that they are not exempt from the fast either by dispensation or by necessity. In doubt, favor must be shown to the accused, and it must be presumed that they have been legitimately dispensed.

XIX. Innkeepers are excused who sell wine to soldiers who abuse it unto drunkenness, when they cannot refuse without loss either of life or of goods: because they are not bound, at so great a risk, to prevent others' sins. This grave danger being removed, innkeepers cannot...

sell wine to those whom they foresee will be made drunk by it. These sellers frequently sin, since they desire to sell wine for the sake of gain. A Parish priest is bound to refuse to administer the Eucharist to a hidden sinner publicly asking for it, that public scandal may be avoided.

Chapter IV — On the vain adornment of women

I. I undertake to discuss a most grave question, the knowledge of which is especially necessary to Confessors and Preachers. I shall touch on it in few words, so far as can be done.

II. Question I. *Can women licitly adorn themselves?* Answer. St. Paul, 1 Timothy 2, says: *Women in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety.* St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, art. 2, ad 4, discourses luminously on this matter. Women can licitly adorn themselves, either to preserve the decency of their state, or to add something further, that they may please their husbands. Garments were instituted not only for covering the shameful parts and preserving nature, and guarding it from cold and heat, but also for distinguishing grades and sexes. Wherefore noble men and magistrates use more refined garments than others. Noble women too can licitly adorn themselves more elegantly than plebeians, either to please their husbands, or to enter into marriage.

III. Question II. *Is immoderate adornment of women disapproved by holy Scripture?* Answer. Vehement and most sharp are the declamations of the Prophets against the superfluous and immodest adornment of women. Isaias, chapter 3, has these words: *And the Lord said: Because the daughters of Sion are haughty, and have walked with stretched-out necks, and wanton glances of their eyes, and made a noise as they walked with their feet, and moved in a set pace: the Lord will make bald the crown of the head of the daughters of Sion, and the Lord will discover their hair. In that day the Lord will take away the ornaments of shoes, and little moons, and chains, and necklaces, and bracelets, and bonnets, and bodkins, and ornaments of the legs, and tablets, and sweet balls, and*

earrings, and rings, and jewels hanging on the forehead, and changes of apparel, and mantles, and fine linen, and crisping pins, and looking-glasses, and lawns, and headbands, and fine veils. And instead of a sweet smell there shall be stench, and instead of a girdle a cord, and instead of curled hair baldness, and instead of a stomacher a hair-cloth.

IV. St. Peter, chapter 3, restrains the adornment of women in these words: *Whose adorning let it not be the outward plaiting of the hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel.* St. Paul, 1 Timothy 2, says: *Not with braided hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire, but as it becometh women professing godliness.* I pass over very many other oracles of Scripture against the vain pomps of women.

V. Question III. *Do the holy Fathers detest the pomps of women?* Answer. Tertullian, Cyprian, Chrysostom, Augustine, Jerome, and the other Fathers published whole books against the ornaments of women. Would the holy Fathers have inveighed so vehemently against the pomps of women, unless these were criminal? Tertullian, book On the dress of women, chapter 11, says: *For the very sake of assembling together and of seeing and being seen mutually, they bring forth their pomp into public, so that either luxury may drive its trade, or glory grow insolent.* St. Cyprian, book On discipline and the dress of virgins, cries out: *If you adorn yourself too sumptuously, and go about in public in a notable manner, drawing the eyes of youths upon you, dragging after you the sighs of young men, nourishing the lust of desire, kindling the fuel of sighing — so that, though you yourself do not perish, you yet destroy others, and offer yourself as a sword and poison, as it were, to those who see you — you cannot be excused, as though you were of chaste and modest mind.* For brevity's sake I pass over the testimonies of the other Fathers.

VI. Question IV. *Do women sin who adulterate their face with cosmetics and antimony?* Answer. All affirm it. Tertullian, in the place cited, chapter 5, inveighs sharply against so great a corruption: *In this too they offend, that they anoint the skin with medicaments, stain the cheeks with rouge, and darken the eyes with soot. Doubtless the workmanship of God displeases them. In their very selves they reprove and reprehend the artificer of all things. For they reprove him when they amend, when they add — taking, of course, these additions from an adversary craftsman, that is, from the devil ... I see certain women also turning their hair yellow with saffron. They are ashamed even of their own nation, that they were not born German or Gallic women: thus do they transfer their fatherland to their hair.* Even in Tertullian's time the women of Gaul led the rest in luxury, vanity, rouges, antimony, and white lead.

VII. Cyprian, book On the dress of virgins, has similar words: *God says: Let us make man to our image and likeness. And does anyone dare to change, to alter, what God has made? They lay hands upon God, when they strive to reform and transfigure what he has fashioned, not knowing that whatever is born is the work of God; whatever is altered, of the devil.*

VIII. Passing over the testimonies of Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine, St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, art. 2, ad 2, teaches this: *The painting of women ... cannot be without sin ... Yet such painting is not always with mortal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of wantonness, or in contempt of God.* St. Bernardino of Siena, with Alexander of Hales, Tome I, sermon 47, article 1, writes as follows: *Women who smear themselves with vermilion, or wear counterfeit hair, sin mortally for three reasons ... For Alexander of Hales asks, on the fourth book, distinction on the Sacrament of the Eucharist: Whether women painted, or wearing counterfeit hair, whether of the living or of the dead, taken up for their adornment, ought to approach sacred Communion? And he answers that such women sin mortally, and render themselves unworthy of sacred Communion. And this he says is so chiefly on account of three things that follow from it: first, an offense against God; second, an offense against one's neighbor; third, an offense against oneself.* Let this suffice to have touched on briefly, out of the many things I ought to have adduced from the Fathers.

IX. Question V. *What do certain men teach on this argument?* Answer. Fr. Diana, Tome 7 of the coordinated edition, resolution 9, number 6, writes this on the adornment of women: *But I think that there is no sin, even if it were superfluous and excessive, provided it be according to the custom of the country.* Can the custom of the country, then, derogate from the holy Scriptures, from the doctrine of all the Fathers, and from nature herself, which abhors superfluities?

X. Fr. Lessius, in answer to the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers, book 4, chapter 4, doubt 14, number 114, answers: *Those Scriptures either contain an exhortation, since they have no word of precept; or, if they contain a precept, the discourse is of those who adorned themselves that they might please others, as Doctor Thomas notes in the Gloss; or certainly it was expedient at that time, for the edification of the Heathen, that this be commanded.* This method of interpreting the Scriptures being admitted, they come to nothing. Was it expedient at that time that an honorable and modest adornment of women be commanded, but not in ours? Why should not a similarly graceful answer be furnished to many other oracles of divine Scripture as well? Are the divine precepts, then, matters of the times? Are they exhortations, not precepts? The universal tradition of the Fathers cries out to the contrary. But this invention is so vain that it collapses of itself.

XI. Question VI. *When is the adornment of women to be judged superfluous and deadly?* Answer. From various heads the adornment of women can be deadly: 1. From the excessive affection of displaying beauty. 2. From the depraved end of pleasing and of kindling the fire of lust. 3. From its effects. Debts are not paid, alms are not laid out, the wages of craftsmen are defrauded, patrimonies are squandered. Women addicted to vain ornament most frequently prostitute their chastity, and beneath the most splendid apparatus of garments the most putrid harlotries are hidden. For commonly men are not ignorant of the incomes of families; hence, beholding wives burdened with so many pomps, they infer that these women acquire them by harlotry, whence they shine with the splendor of their pomps.

XII. A certain and precise rule cannot be designated for when the superfluous adornment of women is a mortal sin. This, however, is certain: that most frequently women sin mortally in this kind, especially in our time, on account of the continual mingling of women and men. For to this end such women devote their study, that they may shine in these gatherings, and each strives to outdo the rest in outlandish fashions of dress. The malice of such adornment must be gathered not so much from the superfluous price and value of the clothing, as from the vain and immodest form of the ornament. For clothing can be costly, elegant, and of great price, and at the same time modest and becoming, as can happen in a noble matron and a princely woman. But commonly the clothing of these women is vain, immodest, and unchaste, and proves such women to be shameless, proud, and lost to modesty. These women are fans of concupiscence, routers of modesty and chastity, the scandals of cities, and a perpetual subject of murmuring.

XIII. Cajetan, in this matter, gave the reins too loosely, and teaches a lax doctrine. Many more benign writers have gone further still. Their reading, especially in this matter, must be neglected; and the doctrine of the divine Scriptures and of the holy Fathers must be kept before the eyes. Would the Scriptures, would the Fathers, have inveighed so vehemently against these allurements and enticements of women, if their adornment were indifferent, or only lightly harmful?

XIV. Most opportune is the argument of Denis the Carthusian, who, Tome I, work, article 14, writes thus: *The holy and glorious Fathers, and the most illumined Doctors, would not have written so rigorously against*

superfluous and exquisite adornment, against curious and superfluous dress, unless they had judged that mortal fault existed in it. For venial sins do not deserve such reprehension and condemnation. Hence a certain Noble writes in his treatise: *Women adorning themselves vainly harm themselves more than others: because they sin mortally, even if they entice no others ... Moreover, if a woman neither desires a man, nor wishes to be desired, but nevertheless indiscreetly and inordinately displays her adornment and beauty, laying a snare for others, she sins mortally — just as it is written in Ecclesiasticus: He that layeth a snare for another shall perish in it; and he that diggeth a pit shall fall into it ... Finally the Apostle commands: A woman ought to have a covering upon her head because of the Angels — that is, of Priests, and Clerics, and spiritual men, lest they fall on her account.* In the preceding article, too, it is proved from the words of the holy Cyprian, Jerome, Chrysostom, and Ambrose, that women and virgins so adorning and displaying themselves furnish men and youths with fuel for sin, incitements of lust, and expose themselves as a sword and a poison, as it were, to those who look upon them. Furthermore Jerome says: *The polish, the adornment, and the beauty of a woman is fire to the young, fuel for lusts, a sign of an unchaste mind. How can she weep for her sins, who bares her skin and draws furrows upon her face? Such adornment is not the comeliness of God, but the veil of Antichrist. With what confidence does she raise to heaven a face which her Maker does not recognize?*

XV. Blessed Henry Suso, of the Order of Preachers, a prodigy of evangelical penitence, and greatly illumined with the light of divine Wisdom, in his treatise entitled *Spiritual Colloquies between Jesus and Brother Henry Suso*, chapter 10, teaches this: "But moreover consider to what women have fallen, and how by the female sex in these times the fear and honor of God are despised and trampled underfoot. For so many women are found in the World who, stripped of all modesty, are more unchaste and shameless than men themselves. I speak not of honorable, pious, and religious women; but of those who, given over to the World, wear away their time in words, deeds, garments, and manners, sacrifice the hearts and senses of men to their loves, and study to please men more than God. These are the dens of robbers, and the abysses of hell. God dissembles their crimes, and sustains them with great patience, without any profit. Meanwhile they themselves wish to be held for honorable and well-mannered matrons; and yet they smell fouler to God than public harlots. For these latter at least often tremble, and pass their life in fear and trembling, and are struck by anguish for their salvation. But those, with a shameless brow, walk about secure on the great road of perdition, and, caught in an unbridled and silent dishonesty, pass their days in a tremendous blindness toward God and their own souls. Wherefore they are dearer to demons than harlots. For, going forth clothed in proud garments, always unchaste and dishonest in gesture, gait, words, and eyes, they incite and move men to Venus more than prostituted women. By this means they gain more souls for the Devil, by their allurement, than those do. Believe me, I would have you know, a hundred deadly crimes are perpetrated in the mind by these women every single day; nor for that do they recognize even one of them, but reckon themselves modest and well-mannered. And yet how many young men, how many men, blinded by their beauty and by the sight of so free an immodesty, desire them with deliberate mind — which very often happens, even if they cannot obtain them. Wherefore these women are guilty and partakers of all these consents and deadly crimes. For by their lascivious dress, their shameless gait, and their unchaste eyes, they furnish to those who see them an occasion of sinning, and a handle for desiring them. Nay, if a man, gazing on these vain women in the streets and in the churches, is so kindled to lust that, to extinguish the fire, he seeks a harlot, these wretched women are guilty of all these crimes, however much they may be unwilling to believe or to understand this. Know that, death being at hand, the demon thrusts before the eyes of their mind specters of pride, of pleasures,

of unworthy vanities, and of other crimes which they never acknowledged, that he may thrust them more securely into despair and the abyss of eternal death. Nor do the paschal sacraments profit their salvation, nor the sacred viaticum, since in life they receive the sacraments with the intention of persevering in the abuse of luxury, of pomps, and of depraved habits. Nor in the extremity of death do they remember the sins which through their own malice they do not know. Therefore they receive me into a filthy and putrid heart; and it would be better for them to have a hundred thousand demons than to admit the living and tremendous God into a breast polluted with mortal crime. But woe to the Confessors who neglect to enlighten these wretched and most unhappy women."

XVI. You have heard, O Confessors, the testimonies of the holy Scriptures, of the Fathers, and of the graver Theologians. Let the petty distinctions cease, then, by which certain men contend to ally the World with the Gospel. They renounced pomps in the profession of Christian Baptism. What are these pomps? Surely none other than those which savor of worldly vanity, which soften the hearts of men, which kindle concupiscence. Come. If Christian women had promised to Satan and to the World that they would pursue more exquisite pomps; if they had pledged that with their whole zeal and every effort of their powers they would devote their labor to luxury, haughtiness, ambition, and vanity — could they rave more impotently? Are Mahometan, pagan, or Lutheran women vainer, more ambitious, and more unbridled than Catholic women? What, then, did they promise to Christ in Baptism? What is the obligation of the profession of renouncing pomps and the works of Satan? What is its meaning? Woe, woe to the Confessors who admit to the sacraments of Christ these vain and theatrical little matrons, women lost to shame and to the ruin of Christian modesty.

XVII. Question VII. *Do women sin mortally who walk about with bared breast?* Answer. Several more recent writers defend this nakedness of the bosom as innocent of grave fault, if it be according to the custom of the country. Hence I judge this opinion false, improbable, and lax. The custom of the country is a mere invention. What? Will the custom of the country render honest a corruption most full of scandal, and disapproved by the divine Scriptures, by the Fathers, and by the Theologians? If the divine Scriptures and the Fathers command that a woman's head be veiled; if they condemn curled and crimped hair — what darts of zeal would they not have hurled against this most putrid custom? The Fathers do not mention so great an impudence, because in their time women were not so wanton and unbridled. As soon as this most unchaste abuse appeared, all the men of God execrated it alike.

XVIII. I compress the matter into few words. That adornment of women is asserted to be forbidden by natural and divine law which is an enticement to lust, and a proof of wantonness. But bare breasts provoke men to lust; therefore the open display of them is forbidden. Nor does it matter that women, most craftily and most immodestly, adorn their breasts with small black and translucent bands: because they do not conceal or cover them, but with these devices rather irritate and entice men more to contemplation. Those veils are diabolical incitements, which the more efficaciously kindle curiosity. Nor may you babble that, custom having been introduced, these bared breasts lose the force of enticing and kindling lust, because things familiar move less. These are surely ravings, and the specters of madmen. Do sumptuous, familiar, and daily banquets lose the force of irritating the hungry? Human appetites are not restrained by use, but strengthened and fattened. Abstinence alone, and the withdrawal from dangers and incitements, brings concupiscence into servitude. The custom, then, or habit that is urged is a detestable abuse, and a monument of ruined honesty and of

unchastity. Let Confessors, then, refuse absolution to these weak women who unfurl the banners of prostitution and harlotry along the public ways.

XIX. Question VIII. *Do women sin who show themselves to be gazed upon by men by whom they foresee they will be shamefully loved?* Answer. If a woman, led by no just cause of necessity or utility, goes out of doors, and foresees that she will be shamefully loved by this or that man, she sins gravely, according to the common opinion of the Theologians. Nor is the will of exercising liberty a just reason to free her from fault. For human liberty is subject to the laws of charity. Charity...

...however, commands that the spiritual loss of the Neighbor be avoided, especially when this can be secured without grave detriment. Nor can a brief impediment to one's own liberty be counted in place of notable detriment. Some other reason, then, besides the exercise of one's own liberty, must be assigned, that she licitly go out in this case. But a legitimate cause of going out would be the necessity of going to Church, of visiting the sick, of transacting one's own business.

XX. The scandal of the little ones must nevertheless be distinguished from pharisaical scandal. To avoid the former, a woman, when she foresees that she will be shamefully loved by this determinate man, must for some one occasion either omit Mass, or go to another Church, or defer hearing Mass: since the precept of avoiding scandal prevails over the precept of hearing Mass. But in practice this rarely happens, because the scandal of the little ones — of those who sin either from ignorance or from mere weakness — rarely occurs. For men commonly sin from malice, and so the scandal is pharisaical, which, according to all, must be despised when it cannot be avoided without a disturbance of order. A girl, or a beautiful woman, foresees that she will be shamefully loved by certain men at such a banquet, because she knows that certain immodest men, burning with lust, will attend there: if she can abstain from such a banquet without grave inconvenience, she is bound to restrain herself, because the precept of charity presses, that the danger of a mortal sin being perpetrated by the Neighbor be avoided, when this can be secured without notable detriment. Read more in Tome II on the Decalogue, dissertation 9, chapter 10.

XXI. Question IX. *Do women sin mortally who allow their little gallants to serve them, and enjoy their familiar conversation, while from many indications they probably gather that these men burn toward them with the love of Venus?* Answer. All affirm that such women sin deadly, even though they themselves be altogether alien from any lust whatsoever, because they cooperate in the sin of others, and furnish scandal. Wherefore the women and little matrons of our age who receive their handsome and pretty clients and candidates of Venus daily into familiar conversation, keep them seated at their sides, and enjoy their service in walking, in going up, and in going down — these women, I say, in the case supposed, are in continual mortal sin. Let them, then, either come to their senses, or bid farewell to the sacraments, lest, as often as they thus receive them, they multiply sacrileges. Let Confessors think to themselves that a hard account must be rendered to the eternal Judge for the absolutions which they have given to feigned penitents.

XXII. Question X. *Is it licit for sailors and coachmen to carry their masters to the house of a mistress, or a mistress to the house of her master?* Answer. Fr. Diana, Tome 7 of the coordinated edition, treatise 5, resolution 42, testifies that this case occurs frequently, and, with Merolla, defends the affirming opinion. This opinion is false to me, and contained in thesis 51 proscribed by Innocent XI, concerning servants who help their master climb through a window to fornicate — which thesis has been transcribed above. Unless sailors and coachmen render this service, they lose their gain, says

Diana. What an excellent reason! When sailors and coachmen evidently know that this is a mistress, and that the master practices concubinage, they help the master, and contribute to fornications evil by their own nature. Sporer, treatise 5 on the Decalogue, chapter 1, section 3, number 99, contends with Diana, Tamburini, Castropalao, and others, that these actions are licit. But these authors are deceived: because although these actions, precisely, are indifferent as regards the circumstances, yet in the case set forth they are in very deed shameful, as is plain from the same thesis condemned concerning servants who help their master to fornicate.

XXIV. Question XI. *Can love letters be carried to a friend's mistress?* Answer. Fr. Tamburini, book 5 on the Decalogue, chapter 1, § 4, number 20, absolutely denies it; but he adds immediately: *I confess, however, that if such a friendship were of great value to you, and you truly feared to lose it, you could be excused: because then a just fear of notable harm is added.* This doctrine is false to me, like the other which the same author teaches in the same place, concerning those who carry a girl on their shoulders by office, whom he probably excuses from mortal sin when they bring a girl to a lascivious young man — provided the sin does not please them, and they perform the aforesaid services for a good end, for instance for a just wage. Tamburini adds: *If these carriers or porters were so religious as to be unwilling to hire out themselves and their services in such conveyances, they would easily suffer notable harm to their gain.* As my very small opinion suggests, this doctrine occasions scandal. A husband sins when he furnishes his wife an occasion of sinning that he may catch her in adultery — although he can permit an adultery which he cannot prevent, that a wife caught in the actual crime may come to her senses. It is likewise forbidden to carry love letters containing base things, or a book provoking to a duel, whatever certain men blurt out to the contrary: because such persons become partakers of the sins.

XXV. Question XII. *Is it licit to serve prostitutes, to accompany them to the house of a lover, to open the door for the lover, to make the bed?* Answer. Laymann, Tamburini, Sporer, Caramuel, and other Probabilists teach a lax — some a most lax — doctrine on this argument. I transcribe a few words from Caramuel. *Servants can, with a safe conscience, minister foods at the table of a prostitute or a concubine — not only common foods, but also warm ones, and season food that provokes to Venus, and make ready a private bed ... It would not be a mortal sin to procure for a master and his mistress, about to have relations, a lodging, or to prepare one better than usual, or to strew it with flowers.* The reason is that it is one thing to fornicate, another to have a greater delight, in the genus of luxury, in the fornication itself. Read Tome 2 on the Decalogue, dissertation 9, chapter 12, where you will find the lax theorems of certain authors.

XXVI. To the question I answer that not only can servants and maids not licitly open the door for a lover entering to fornicate with his mistress, nor bring her into the master's house, nor carry a torch before them, accompany her, or make the bed; but I say that it is in no way licit to serve or minister to a prostitute at all. Seriously weigh the words of the condemned proposition, and especially these: *or cooperating in some similar way*; and thence you will gather that the opposite opinion of many is proscribed. What of the fact that holy Scripture itself forbids and execrates this servitude? *Depart from the tents of these wicked men, and touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins*: Numbers 16. Again Isaias, chapter 52 [recte], cries out: *Depart, depart, go ye out from thence, touch no unclean thing, go out of the midst of her*; and Jeremias, chapter 48: *Flee, and save your lives.* Whence I argue thus:

XXVII. God commands that the fellowship of the wicked be declined. Let those who teach that service rendered to prostitutes is licit tell us: is there a fellowship worse than that of prostitution, and a more wicked society? They reply that maidservants serve prostitutes not insofar as they are

prostitutes, but insofar as they are women; that they minister to them not in their prostitution, but in indifferent matters, such as cooking food, sweeping the house, making the bed, and the like. Be it so. But while these maidservants render these services, do they not dwell in the house of Babylon, in the tents of the wicked, in the houses of harlots, from which the holy Scriptures command us to depart? Navarrus, says a certain most recent writer, speaks more benignly, and indeed, he adds, perhaps in some circumstances an excuse could be found. This writer, frequently doubting and bashful, insinuates a benignity pernicious to souls. In no circumstance can Christian maidservants licitly serve prostitutes: since both the divine Scriptures and the law of nature command that we flee the fellowship and society of the wicked. The same must be said of servants who serve public usurers, whom the aforesaid writer excuses when they count out the money to be lent, since they fear expulsion from service and the difficulty of finding another master. These servants cannot licitly serve public usurers in usurious dealing. Therefore they ought at once to give up such service, and sustain their life by another way.

XXVIII. Question XIII. *Is it licit to let a house to prostitutes?* Answer. The Probabilists commonly affirm it — Sanchez, Azor, Diana, Vasquez, Castropalao, Tamburini, the Salmanticenses, Sporer, and others. A certain most recent writer defends the same opinion, when the house is in a part of the city not much frequented and quite exposed, and the landlord would otherwise be burdened, being of slender fortune, unless he let the house: since the house is not granted for sinning, but for dwelling. These are the enticements by which the poison is concealed from the soul. Even the Benignists, who defended the thesis proscribed by Innocent XI, said that the servants held the ladder and helped their master not to fornicate, but to climb up. The authors cited, to obscure the truth, speak sophistically. Who would deny that the letting of a house for dwelling is licit? The dispute now is whether it is licit to let a house to a prostitute who intends to open a brothel in the aforesaid house, and to make gain by the prostitution of her body. This we assert to be illicit and vicious. Princes permit prostitutes. What of it? If the letting of a house made to prostitutes is illicit, then, just as the permission of the Prince does not purge prostitution from crime, so neither does it purge the letting of the house — unless perhaps in more remote places already designated by the Prince himself for prostitutes specially deputed.

XXIX. What has been said of prostitutes must likewise be said of public usurers and of pimps, and of those who let garments, bed-hangings, and the ornaments of an entire bedchamber to prostitutes, that, clad in the finest garments and shining with elegant adornment, they may receive richer fornicators. What? Is it not licit to clothe a prostitute, and to furnish the little bed on which she sleeps? Licit indeed. But it is one thing to clothe a poor woman, another to let out splendid ornaments for her to practice prostitution. The first is an office of charity; the other, a trafficking in iniquity.

XXX. Question XIV. *Is it licit to lend someone a bedchamber for fornication?* Answer. Fr. Diana defends the affirming opinion, resolution 48, in these words: *A most noble man insistently sought from his friend his house for the purpose of fornicating; and if he had denied him this, he would have fallen into most grave harm. He asked me whether he would sin by doing this? And I answered in the negative. Because to lend a bedchamber is not, from its object, intrinsically evil.* To lend a bedchamber, not only is it not evil from its object, but it is good. But to lend it for fornication is a most shameful crime. No less lax is the opinion which the

same Fr. Diana defends, alleging Castropalao for it, saying that it is licit to give a gift to a judge's mistress, that she may intercede with him.

XXXI. Question XV. *A mistress painting a picture of herself to be given to her lover — does she commit the sin of Scandal?* Answer. Fr. Sporer, treatise 5, chapter 1, section 3, number 93, citing Tamburini, Diana, and other Probabilists, teaches that a painter can paint a mistress's picture for her lover under a most grave urgent necessity, for instance fear of death, of mutilation, or of another similar evil. This opinion is also defended by the Salmanticenses, who cite Azor, Sanchez, Castropalao, Bonacina, and others. And they speak in that sense in which the painter knows that he is painting a mistress's picture for her lover, whom he probably foresees will abuse it for kindling his lust for her. This opinion, by its manifest laxity, destroys itself, without needing confutation.

XXXII. Question XVI. *Do painters licitly depict shameful pictures?* Answer. All absolutely deny it. Fr. Sporer, in the place cited, number 92, reports Tamburini, teaching with other more recent writers, that a painter can licitly paint very shameful and obscene things once or twice, if the painter's necessity were so great that he needed such gain for food, clothing, and other things of this kind. This opinion is false, and full of scandal. Will it be licit, then, according to these men, to sin once or twice for the sake of procuring food and clothing? How absurd this is, everyone sees. A precise rule for defining...

...what obscene painting is cannot be designated. The image of a beautiful girl, with face, breasts, and bosom expressed in vivid colors, incites by its own nature to lust, even though the shameful parts be covered. The nudity which is licit in women and men while they live is, more or less, likewise licit in their images. There is need of Christian prudence.

XXXIII. Question XVII. *What must be said of those who keep obscene pictures openly displayed in their houses?* Answer. Fr. Diana, Tome 7, treatise 5, resolution 63, affirms indeed that they sin mortally — unless, he says, they retain them for the sake of ornament, and covered with some veil. What ornament can they present, if they are covered and hidden? Lascivious images are idols of Venus, and simulacra of demons. The devil attempts to play the ape of Christ. The Christian Religion brought in sacred pictures, to rouse the Faithful to piety and to the imitation of the heroic deeds of the Saints. The devil, that he might more powerfully kindle worldly men to lust, devised lascivious images of Venus, of Dido, of Cleopatra. What remedy is there for so great a scandal? One only. Either to erase with the brush everything that savors of obscenity, or to burn such images. This is the sole remedy. It is by no means enough to cover them with a veil and keep them shut up within a closed chamber; but they must be burned altogether, or everything obscene must be effaced with the brush. Nor can they be sold or given away, just as goods infected with plague cannot be sold or given as gifts. Those who keep these obscene images must be altogether rejected from the sacraments, until they have removed these scandals and substituted other sacred images, that they may, so far as they can, compensate for past scandals.

XXXIV. Question XVIII. *Is it licit to seek the undoing of a bewitchment from a sorcerer or a witch?* Answer. Some affirm it, provided it can be removed without sorcery — even if you foresee that the sorcerer will probably use the help of the demon. This opinion is false to me. For while you foresee that the sorcerer will probably use the art of the demon, you contribute to his sin, and consent to his iniquity. You ought, then, to seek the undoing of the bewitchment from the sorcerer with an express protestation that it be done without the demon's help.

XXXV. Question XIX. *What must be said of the frequenting of comedies, and of the promiscuous conversation of men and women?* Answer. I shall give the resolution of this question in the text of the Decalogue's commandment. Against theatrical spectacles I have published two dissertations, with a third added on personating Priests. Public theaters, which today are commonly, or at least most frequently, put on, are obscene and shameful; therefore those who frequent them sin. Of the pestiferous conversation of women and men I shall speak in the place cited, and I shall explain the ignorance and negligence of Confessors who admit such little women and beardless youths to the sacraments.

XXXVI. Question XX. *What must those do who have pushed others into sin by false doctrine or fraud, or have drawn them back from good, from entering Religion?* Answer. They are bound, so far as can be done, to compensate the damage: and first to retract the false doctrine, and to withdraw from sin — since those who by deceit, fraud, or false doctrine impel others into sin, sin not only against charity, but also against justice. He who, without fraud or false doctrine, has seduced others to sin by bad example alone, sins only against charity: because these others, knowingly and freely — though allured by the bad example — consented to the sin. He who draws others back from entering Religion by depraved means commits a scandal, which he is bound to repair. But he commits no sin, if he draws someone back from Religion with the intent of consulting the other's eternal salvation. Those who, knowingly and for human reasons, hinder candidates from entering Religious Orders in which the spirit of evangelical perfection flourishes, sin against charity, if they use only persuasions and entreaties which do not take away liberty. For if they employ force and frauds, they sin also against justice. In which case they ought to apply all diligence to repair the harm inflicted, both to the one wishing to enter and to the Religious Order.

Dissertation V — On Religion

Chapter I — The nature and acts of Religion, which the first commandment of the Decalogue prescribes

I. Two things the first commandment of the Decalogue prescribes. As affirmative, it prescribes the worship of God: *The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve*: Matthew 4. As negative, it forbids that worship be shown to other gods: *Thou shalt not have strange gods before me. Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing; thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them*: Exodus 20.

II. Question I. *What is Religion?* Answer. The common definition of Religion is this: *Religion is a virtue which renders to God the worship due to him as the first principle of all things.* St. Thomas, II-II, q. 81, art. 1, derives the etymology of Religion from *re-reading* [relegendo] those things that pertain to divine worship, because such things must frequently be turned over again in the heart. Religion is not a theological virtue, because it does not regard God proximately, but a moral virtue — and indeed the chief among these virtues, whose object is the worship to be shown to God, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, II-II, q. 81, art. 5.

III. Question II. *How many are the acts of Religion?* Answer. There are two kinds of the acts of Religion: one of interior acts, such as devotion and prayer; the other of exterior acts, which are divided into three classes. Some subject the very body to God, as adoration; others immolate exterior things to God, as sacrifices, oblations, tithes, first-fruits, and the rest of that kind, which are commonly comprehended under the one name of oblation; the last are those by which something is applied in protestation of the divine honor, such as oaths, by which the name of God is invoked, and vows, by which something is promised to God. Of all these there must be discourse.

IV. Question III. *What is devotion?* Answer. St. Thomas hands down this definition, II-II, q. 82, art. 1: *A certain will of promptly delivering oneself to those things which pertain...*

to the service of God. The word *will* placed in the definition expresses not a power, but an act. The remaining words betray the peculiar nature of devotion. For this promptitude, which renders the soul ready in the divine service and swift in the execution of the things that redound to God's honor, is the singular token of devotion.

V. Question IV. *What are the effects of devotion?* Answer. They are gladness of heart, an interior sweetness of soul, savor, and delight. It is not necessary, however, that devotion always bring forth these effects, since pious and holy men are often, not rarely, deprived of all these, and are not for that reason less fervent and ready in the offices of Religion. The more mature fruit of devotion is the exact observance of the commandments, which frequently produces the effects just recounted.

VI. There is a twofold cause of devotion. The first and chief is God, who breathes where he wills, and pours out a more abundant supply of graces. The other is the interior meditation of the divine goodness, clemency, and the other attributes of the divine nature, and, at the same time, of our own need and weakness. From the former meditation follow gladness, cheerfulness, and joy. From the latter, humility, lowliness of soul, and contempt of vanity and pride. Of the time at which the precept of devotion presses, I shall speak presently.

Chapter II — On Prayer, and its necessity

I. Another act of Religion is prayer, which St. Thomas thus defines, from Damascene, II-II, q. 83, art. 1: *Prayer is a petition of fitting things from God.* The word *petition* holds the place of the genus; the other clause indicates that fitting things are to be sought in prayer; the last clause, *from God*, constitutes prayer an act of Religion. For from God both natural and supernatural gifts must be sought. By this petition we confess God the principle of all things, revere his excellence, subject ourselves to him, and implore from him the succors of our need. Prayer is an act of the intellect, although Religion resides in the will.

II. Prayer is one interior, or mental; the other exterior, or vocal. Holy Scripture commends each. Of the former the royal Prophet says, Psalm 38: *In my meditation a fire shall flame out.* This prayer is by no means placed in a certain mental idleness, or in a mere suspension of the intellect and in a certain passive inertness, as the Quietists contended; but in acts of the intellect and of the will, by which we recall with fervent zeal the divine attributes — his goodness, clemency, justice, and the infinite benefits which God confers upon us — and by which we weigh our own weakness, need, and poverty: in acts of love, desire, confidence, and other pious affections by which we long for heavenly things, it shines forth entire. The other prayer is vocal, which is accomplished by mind and words together. Of this St. Paul speaks, Hebrews 13: *By him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of praise always to God, that is to say, the fruit of lips confessing to his name.* Although words are not absolutely necessary, since nothing is hidden from God, and he knows our weakness; nevertheless these exterior signs are necessary — both because man consists of mind and body, and according to both parts he ought to subject himself to God and serve him; and because not the soul alone, but the body also, needs divine aids; and finally because these exterior words kindle interior affections the more easily, and foster them, and entice the neighbor's reason to devotion.

III. Question I. *Is prayer necessary with the necessity of means?* Answer. St. Thomas affirms it, II-II, q. 83, art. 2, ad 1, and on the fourth book, distinction 15, question 4, article 1, to whom the graver Theologians subscribe. The Angelic Doctor drew this doctrine from Gennadius, who, book On ecclesiastical dogmas, chapter 56, says: *We believe that no one comes to salvation unless invited by God; that no one who has been invited works his salvation unless God aids him; that no one deserves aid unless he prays.* Finally the Council of Trent confirms our opinion, session 6, chapter 11, saying: *God commands not impossible things; but by commanding, he admonishes you both to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot, and he aids you that you may be able.*

IV. This necessity is also drawn from the very weakness of human nature. For so great is the rebellion of human appetites against reason, and so great the struggle, that without grace we can scarcely fight, much less conquer. Now this is the order instituted by divine providence, that this grace not be granted unless it be entreated by prior prayers. That God can give his gifts to those who do not ask, who is there who could call this into controversy? But at present our discourse is of the necessity of prayer, the order of divine providence being regarded. Does not the very instinct of nature excite both the beggar to the petition of alms, and the sick man to imploring medicine from the Physician? Finally, the conjunction between God and man, and their mutual commerce, proves it. For if God distributed his gifts to the slothful and the mute, men, prone to earthly things, would scarcely remember their divine Benefactor. Wherefore the mercy of God shines forth greatly in this very

burden imposed of asking for his gifts, since this burden looks to this end: that men be bound to God by a stricter bond, a perpetual tie, and a mutual conjunction.

V. God forestalled Paul, not praying, but persecuting Christ. What follows from this? We freely confess that God bestows the first illuminations, and the first prevenient and stirring grace, without prayers. But we defend the necessity of prayer for obtaining the second grace, for persevering in it, and for obtaining glory.

VI. Question II. *Is there a precept of praying?* Answer. All affirm it, and the holy Scriptures show it luminously: *Watch ye, and pray, that ye enter not into temptation*: Matthew 26 [recte]; and St. Luke, chapter 18: *We ought always to pray, and not to faint*; and St. Paul: *Pray without ceasing*: to the Thessalonians [recte], chapter 5; and again to Timothy, chapter 2: *I will therefore that men pray in every place ... in like manner women also*. This precept St. Thomas thus explains, II-II, q. 83, art. 3, ad 2: *Not only to ask what we desire, but also to desire something rightly, falls under precept; but to desire indeed falls under the precept of charity, while to ask falls under the precept of Religion*: which indeed is set down, Matthew 7: *Ask, and you shall receive*. The reason is plain from what has been said. Prayer is necessary with the necessity of means, as has been said; therefore, by a stronger right, it is necessary with the necessity of precept.

VII. Question III. *At what determinate time does the precept of prayer press?* Answer. All the Fathers, in accordance with the oracles of the divine Scripture, persuade that we pray continually. Not a few recent Casuists, with their petty distinctions, all but take away the precept of praying from the midst. They distinguish an obligation *of itself* and an obligation *by accident*; directly, and indirectly. And, that I may not seem to impose upon them, let us hear Tamburini, easily the prince of the more benign Casuists, who, book 2 on the Decalogue, chapter 4, § 2, number 4, writes this: *I hold here what I said above, chapter 1, § 1, number 8, concerning the precept of faith, hope, and charity: namely, that there is no certain and determinate time at which it obliges directly; but that it is that time at which it obliges indirectly — namely, when the necessity presses of acquiring some good, or of a threatening evil, or of a temptation to be averted, which we then perceive we cannot acquire or avert without the help of God.* The doctrine of this author concerning faith, hope, and charity — to which he refers back this his opinion on the precept of prayer — has been proscribed, unless everything deceives me, by Alexander VII in the first thesis: *A man is at no time of his life whatever bound to elicit an act of faith*, etc.; and by Innocent XI in the sixth thesis: *It is probable that the precept of charity towards God does not, of itself, rigorously oblige even once in every five years.* That the obligation of prayer is the same as that of the said precepts, Tamburini himself confesses. The former opinion has been proscribed; therefore so has the second. From this doctrine of Tamburini it follows that Christians are of necessity exempt, of themselves, from the precept of Religion of worshipping God. For the primary act of Religion is prayer. If...

Christians were absolutely, directly, and of themselves not bound to invoke God and to give him thanks for benefits received, it is established that Religion is of itself and directly reduced to nothing: for, the primary act of Religion being taken away, Religion itself must needs fail.

VIII. Setting aside, then, the lax doctrine of Tamburini and of others like him, all the Fathers and the graver Theologians affirm that the precept of prayer obliges of itself. The more recent Theologians are divided in designating the time at which this precept presses. Many defend the position, as do the Salmanticenses and others, that it obliges only once in a year. This opinion I reject as evidently false.

Others teach that it obliges once each month — an opinion which the Salmanticenses and others disapprove as harsh and hard. But even in this censure they are shamefully deceived.

IX. These opinions set aside, the doctrine of the divine Scriptures must be kept, which commands us to pray without ceasing. Does he pray without ceasing who prays only once, either in a year or in a month? Continually, then, must we pray — not physically, but morally. This moral continuation consists in this, that we pray frequently. But how great and what kind of frequency is required, that prayer be morally continuous, cannot be precisely defined. I set down what is certain.

X. That the precept of praying presses on every Lord's day is certain to me. For the precept of sanctifying the Sabbath, and now the Lord's day, is divine. It cannot be sanctified without prayer. Therefore, by the same worship with which we ought to honor the Lord's day, we are bound to pray on such a day, since without an elevation of the mind to God, that is, without prayer, the precept cannot be kept. Does the institution of feast days pertain to this — that Christians dissolve in idleness, and devote their effort to vain solaces and recreations? Christians, then, are bound by a twofold precept of praying to God: one natural and divine; the other ecclesiastical, by force of which, on feast days, while they assist at the sacrifice of the Mass, they ought to add their own prayers to the prayers of the Priests, as St. Thomas teaches on the fourth book, distinction 15, question 4, article 1, question 3 [recte]: *Prayer falls under precept both determinately and indeterminately. Determinately indeed to certain prayers are bound by precept those who by office are constituted mediators between God and the people, as the ministers of the Church: whence it lies upon them by office to pour forth prayers to God in the person of the Church; and therefore by the statute of the Church they are bound to recite the canonical hours. But indeterminately anyone is bound to prayer from this very fact, that he is bound to procure for himself spiritual goods, which are given only from on high; whence they cannot be procured in another way except by being asked of him: and also from this very fact, that by the precept of charity one is bound to love his Neighbor as himself, he is bound to be beneficent to him in necessity, not only through corporal alms, but also through spiritual ones, of which one is prayer, as has been said before. But upon all, even those who do not exercise the ministry of the Church, a determinate time of praying seems to have been established by the Church, since by the statute of the canons they are bound, on feast days, to be present at the divine offices, that they may conform their intention to that of the ministers praying for the people.*

XI. Certain men will obtrude the specter of Rigorism. But that I may stop their mouths, I ask: what burden, I pray, do we impose upon Christians, which in very deed even sinning Christians themselves — not to speak of the well-mannered — do not render? What Christian, illumined by the light of nature alone, would not count it a fault in himself, if on the Lord's day, if throughout an entire week, he poured out no prayers to God? What of the fact that even sinners themselves accuse themselves in sacramental confession, as I have frequently heard, of omitted daily prayers, and reckon themselves guilty of fault, when they do not recite the Lord's prayer and the apostles' creed daily? Christians instructed in the best morals pray to God every day, not once, but at least twice a day. Beggarly, proud, sick, and stupid Christians, who on any given day do not remember God, nor implore the aids by which they might decline the continual floods of temptations, wallow in the continual mire of vices, and frequently violate the precept of praying. For who would not be accused of pride, folly, and blindness, if, pressed by extreme necessity, they were unwilling to open their lips to demand the medicines and aids necessary for relieving their own infirmity?

XII. Hence you may gather that this doctrine contains nothing of severity, but interprets the holy Scriptures sincerely and in their obvious sense. God commands that we pray without ceasing. This

continuation of prayer is not physical but moral, as I have said — namely, at a fitting time. This affirmative precept admits the exception of parvity of matter. Wherefore Christians ought not to torment themselves with any scruples as to whether they have gravely offended against the precept of praying; but let them busy themselves in correcting their negligence, and in kindling the fervor of prayer. Nor ought Confessors, if they find some lukewarm and negligent in praying, straightway condemn them of grave fault; but let them instruct them to pray frequently, to raise their mind to God at least twice a day, namely in the morning and in the evening. All the precepts of Christ are most sweet to those who observe them, who in very deed bear the yoke of the Law. But the yoke is rough and hard only to those who are unwilling to carry it, and who, after the manner of beasts, are the slaves of shameful deeds.

XIII. Question IV. *Does he sin against the virtue of Religion who, assailed by a grave temptation, neglects to pray to God?* Answer. Someone suffers a most grave temptation, for example, against chastity. He neglects to implore divine aid, and consents to the temptation. Does he here perpetrate two crimes — one against chastity, the other against the virtue of Religion? Lessius, Villalobos, Prado, the Salmanticenses, and others deny it. Graver Theologians, with St. Thomas, affirm it. This opinion is more probable to me, and true. For the precept of praying obliges of itself several times at least in a year; and, according to the adversaries themselves, it presses by accident at the time of a most grave temptation. Therefore it is violated when prayer is neglected in such an event. Therefore this Christian commits two sins: one against chastity, the other against the virtue of Religion. The precept of praying to God at a time of grave or most grave temptation regards not only this — that the temptation be overcome — but also that the worship due to God be offered. For this order seems to have been instituted by divine providence for this reason: that the tempests of tribulations, and the floods of temptations, compel us to flee to God, and to worship him, and to call upon him for our help and defense. Would not a poor man be accused of a cruelty of grave fault against himself, if, pressed by extreme misery, he neglected to implore alms from one ready to give them? And will not he be guilty of grave fault who, about to perish eternally, refuses to ask the necessary defense from a God most ready to succor him? For the Lord says: *Ask, and you shall receive.* Do you multiply sins? you will say. Nay, that sins may not be multiplied, I press the precept of applying the remedies by which sins are prevented. For this is why men frequently fall into sins: because they refuse to apply the remedies of not sinning; because they neglect fervently to ask for the grace by which they may come off victors over temptations. Without a peculiar grace of God we cannot overcome the gravest temptations; therefore the precept of praying is equal to the precept of overcoming temptations. Those multiply sins who whittle down the precept of prayer, who take out of the way the remedies against sins established by the divine Physician, who deny the frequent obligation of praying. Let Confessors, then, admonish their penitents that they fall frequently into shameful deeds for this reason: because they neglect to pray sincerely to God, because they wear away and squander in idle conversations, in vain solaces, the time which they ought to consecrate to prayer. For the life of Christians is a life of prayer, and of perpetual commerce and dealing with God, from whom arms and defenses against the devil, the flesh, and the world must be sought.

Chapter III — On the conditions of Prayer. Is God alone to be prayed to? Are the Saints to be invoked? And for whom must we pray?

I. Question I. *What, and how many, are the conditions of prayer?* Answer. 1. A condition of prayer is that it be made with deliberate will. This deliberation must be either express or virtual. If you were to read the Psalter merely to study it, you would not be praying. If you take up the Breviary with the intention of paying to God the debt owed, although you lack an express formal intention, a virtual one is present, and suffices. 2. The condition is attention, which likewise must be either express or virtual. The Theologians distinguish a threefold attention: the first to the words, the second to the sense, the third to God. Any one of these suffices. 3. The condition is piety, which looks to this — that pious, honorable, and fitting gifts be sought from God, and for a good end. 4. There is humility, by which the one praying, with lowly soul, presents himself before the divine Majesty, to whom he manifests his extreme poverty. *But I am needy and poor: help me, O God,* says the royal Prophet, Psalm 69. 5. There is the fervor with which we pour out our prayers to God. For a lukewarm and cold prayer is no prayer at all. The rich themselves disdain the languid prayers of the poor, as signs of a soul that makes little of what it seeks, and cares little to be heard. 6. The condition is faith, by which we firmly believe that we shall obtain what we ask. *Whatsoever you ask when you pray, believe that you shall receive.* Likewise hope, or confidence, which accompanies faith. 7. There is perseverance, which the Evangelists frequently inculcate, and especially Luke 11 [recte], by the parable, or example, of the friend who at midnight asked three loaves from his friend, and who, though not by the title of friendship, at least on account of importunity, obtained them.

II. Question II. *What are the effects of prayer?* Answer. Three: merit, satisfaction, and impetration. Merit is owed to it insofar as it proceeds from charity, through the medium of Religion. Satisfaction accompanies any meritorious work. Impetration of the thing we ask is the proper fruit of prayer. This prayer, too, as impetrating, has its efficacy from grace, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, II-II, q. 83, art. 15: *But it has efficacy from the grace of God, whom we pray to, who also induces us to pray.* Four conditions are necessary for impetration: namely, 1. that one pray chiefly for himself; 2. that he ask things necessary to salvation; 3. that he ask piously; 4. that he ask perseveringly. God hears the prayers of sinners, not from justice, but from mercy, as the same Angelic Doctor says there, article 16.

III. Question III. *Is God alone to be prayed to?* Answer. St. Thomas affirms, II-II, q. 83, art. 4, that God alone is to be prayed to, and that indeed as triune — in this sense, that God alone is the author of grace, of glory, and the all-powerful maker and preserver of all things. For prayer is an act of Religion. But Religion regards God alone as its end, to whom it exhibits worship.

IV. Question IV. *Are the Saints to be invoked?* Answer. The Saints are not to be invoked as authors of divine benefits, or of grace, or of glory. Nothing under this respect is to be asked of them, as all Catholics teach. But the Saints are to be invoked that they may pray and intercede for us with God. This is the sense of all Catholics, whatever the Calvinists and the rest of the Protestants fable and calumniate. Wherefore when we sometimes break forth into such words as "St. Peter, save me," we understand nothing else than that by his intercession he may procure our salvation from God. Similarly, when we address the most holy Virgin, "Mary, protect us from the enemy," we invoke her as a mere suppliant and mediatrix. Nay, in this class of intercessors, Christ the Lord is the first and chief, our advocate and intercessor, who alone reconciled the world to God, and alone offered to God a worthy and superabundant oblation for our sins. When, then, we invoke the Saints, we ask that

through the merits of Jesus Christ they intercede with God for us, and we ask that they themselves pray for that which we pray for; but because they themselves are nearer to God, and more worthy, therefore we flee to their patronage and intercession.

V. The Council of Trent, session 25, defined that it is pious and useful that the Saints, whether Angels or Men, be invoked. The Theologians dispute whether this invocation is imposed upon Catholics by force of some precept. I have treated this question at length in Tome 2 on the Decalogue, book 2, dissertation 1, chapter 8, and you may read it there.

VI. Question V. *Must we pray for all wayfarers, even for the souls detained in Purgatory?* Answer. All Catholics affirm it. Of those who dwell on earth, not even the Heretics call this into question. For St. James, chapter 5, says: *Pray for one another, that you may be saved*; and St. Paul, in 1 Timothy 2, adds: *I desire, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all men.* We must pray, then, for all — whether friends or enemies, whether faithful or infidel, whether just or sinners. As Christ died for all, so we too ought to pray for all. We must pray for sinners, that they be converted, and for the just, that they persevere and make progress, says St. Thomas, II-II, q. 83, art. 7.

VII. From our prayers are excluded the Blessed, who are at their term, just as also the damned, who are likewise at the term of damnation, where no hope of salvation is present.

VIII. That we must pray for the souls of Purgatory all Catholics teach, against the Lutherans and Calvinists; and this they draw luminously from the second book of Maccabees, chapter 12. For Judas Maccabeus sent twelve thousand drachmas of silver to Jerusalem to have a sacrifice offered for the sins of the dead, thinking well and religiously concerning the resurrection. To free themselves from this argument, the Lutherans deny that this book is to be reckoned among the divine books. But the catholic Church, led by the Spirit of God, has defined that this book is divine. The catholic doctrine is also confirmed by reason. The Church, whether militant or triumphant, constitutes one body, whose head is Christ. Therefore all the members ought to have communion with one another, and with the head. If, then, the souls of Purgatory are members of the Church, it follows that the living ought to help these same souls, just as a member of one body helps the other members. There is added the perpetual and universal custom of the Church.

IX. Question VI. *Do suffrages certainly profit the souls of Purgatory to whom they are applied?* Answer. Just as it is held from the divine law that these suffrages profit the departed, so it depends upon the divine will how much, more or less, they bring help to this or that departed soul. This is certain: that suffrages offered for the dead take away, either wholly or in part, the punishment of some departed soul, because God has so disposed it. But that these suffrages bring help to this or that soul — that they take away the whole or part of the punishment — depends entirely upon the divine will.

X. Question VII. *Should sinners pray? Are they heard by God?* Answer. Sinners who pray in public ministries in the name of the Church are certainly bound to recite the prayers, and to obtain something from God for those for whom they pray. It is likewise certain that private sinners ought to pray. As to impetration, St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 83, art. 16, that if a sinner asks something of God according to the desire of sin, he is never heard from mercy, but sometimes unto vengeance. Wherefore David said, Psalm 65 [recte]: *If I have looked at iniquity in my heart, the Lord will not hear me.* On the contrary, sinners who detest their sins, and are affected with a pious desire, generally obtain what they implore. Thus were heard Manasses, the Publican, the sinful Woman, the Thief, and

innumerable others. Nor does it stand in the way that sinners are destitute of sanctifying grace: since from this it is only inferred that their prayer is not meritorious, not that it is not impetratory, as has been indicated above. When it is sometimes said in Scripture that God does not hear sinners, this is understood of sinners insofar as they are sinners, and love sin — not of sinners who detest their sins.

XI. Finally, it is certain that the Angels and Saints reigning in heaven can pray for us, and that in very deed they do pray. They pray both by asking for what they see will profit us, and by offering our prayers to God. All wayfarers, whether just or sinners, can and ought to pray. For we are all beggars, and laboring under extreme want; therefore all of us must of necessity implore from our divine Father the daily aids we need.

Dissertation VI — On the Canonical Hours

Chapter I — The condemned propositions are recounted

Alexander VII, proposition 34: *One reciting the office of Palm Sunday satisfies the paschal precept*. The same, proposition 35: *With a single office one can satisfy a twofold precept, for the present day and the next*. Restitution imposed by Pius V on Beneficiaries not reciting the office is not owed in conscience before the declaratory sentence of the judge, since it is a penalty. Proposition 20: *One having a collative Chaplaincy, or any other ecclesiastical benefice, if he devotes himself to the study of letters, satisfies his obligation if he has the office recited by another.* Proposition 21: *Restitution of fruits for the omission of the Hours can be supplied by whatever alms the Beneficiary has previously made from the fruits of his benefice.* Proposition 33: *He who cannot recite Matins and Lauds, but can recite the remaining Hours, is bound to nothing: because the greater part draws the lesser to itself.* Proposition 54, Innocent XI.

Chapter II — Lax propositions of certain Authors

I. Fr. Tommaso Tamburini, book 1 on the Decalogue, chapter 3, number 10: "We shall say below, book 2, that a Beneficiary possessing a slender benefice is not obliged, according to a probable opinion, to pay the canonical Hours. What, then, will happen, if, all things weighed, it is doubted whether a benefice is slender or not? Answer: I think it probable, with Vasquez, that he is obliged; and equally probable, with Caramuel, that he is not obliged. Wherefore it is lawful to embrace whichever of these opinions pleases you."

II. The same Tamburini, book 2, method of celebrating Mass, chapter 6, number 5: "Thus he who, while hearing Mass by precept, or paying the divine office, should voluntarily turn over in his mind a philosophical question, or think about his own affairs, provided he kept an external attention — that is, provided he did not set up external distractions of the kind we spoke of at number 1 — would, according to the probable opinion stated, sufficiently fulfill the precept."

III. Fr. Georges Gobat, treatise 5, number 821: "It is far more probable that the essence of prayer consists with perpetual distractions, or wanderings of mind. So Cardinal de Lugo from principle. Tamburini, book 4 on the Decalogue, chapter 2, § 1."

IV. Juan Caramuel, in *Theologia Fundamentalis*, number 442: "I am a man, more fragile than myself, endowed with a keen and fiery temperament. In one moment I turn over the heavens, in the next I descend to the underworld. No fly moves in the Oratory which is not an impediment to me. I desire to attend to the reading, and I attend so far as I can; but I do not avoid distractions — involuntary a thousand times, sometimes even voluntary; and nevertheless I am tortured by no scruple, troubled by no doubt: because I prudently suppose that I am not bound to the internal act; that to have it is a good thing, and that to lack it is not even a light fault; that I am bound only to the reading and to external attention: that I have recited all that the Rubrics command I know so certainly that I could swear it: therefore that I have not sinned even venially in this matter I know so certainly, and so certainly that I could swear it."

V. Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament, treatise 8, disputation 5, question 37: "I answer, secondly, that it is also more probable that even the daily Preacher, who preaches daily in Lent only voluntarily, or even for a wage, is excused from saying the daily Hours, if he cannot conveniently recite them. And surely if this our opinion were not probable, and safe in practice, woe, woe to the Lenten Preachers: a thousand times woe to them."

VI. The same Leander, place cited, question 45: "One can excellently exercise and occupy himself in the contemplation of divine things, even if from it he be so carried away into ecstasy that afterward he can by no means recite — either because he is rapt for the whole day, or because from it he remains so fatigued and worn out that he cannot easily do so."

VII. Gobat, treatise 5, disputation 11, number 842: "It is more probable that one is bound to no restitution who has recited all the Hours with voluntary and perpetual distractions."

Chapter III — On the number and definition of the Canonical Hours

I. Question I. *How many are the Canonical Hours?* Answer. Some contend that there are eight, because they distinguish Lauds from Matins; but the common opinion restricts them to seven, and they are: Matins with Lauds, Prime, Terce, Sext, None, Vespers, and Compline. Fitting reasons are assigned for this number seven. David, Psalm 118, says: *Seven times a day I have given praise to thee.* Likewise there are seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, and seven petitions of the Lord's prayer, seven mortal sins, seven demons, and seven wickednesses, seven trumpets by whose sound the city of Jericho fell, seven candlesticks of the Church, which foreshadow the seven Canonical Hours. Several other figures are commonly adduced, which seem in some way to indicate such seven Canonical Hours.

II. Question II. *What is the definition of the Canonical Hours?* Answer. The divine office is a certain manner of publicly praising God, with mind and voice together, instituted by the authority of the Prelates of the Church. It is called a *certain manner*, because it is prescribed by the Church with designated psalms, hymns, and prayers. There is added *publicly*, since the divine office is paid publicly, in the name of the whole Church, for the common good, by public ministers. There is added *of praising and beseeching God*, which shows that the divine office is to be paid to God alone, since in every office, whether of the Saints, or of the season, or for the dead, God is praised. The last words declare that the divine office must be recited with mind and voice together, because the Church has prescribed this form in several Councils.

IV. Question IV. *What are the major and minor parts of the divine office, and at what time were they anciently celebrated?* Answer. The major parts are Nocturns, Lauds, Prime, Terce, Sext, None, Vespers, Compline. The minor: psalms, hymns, lessons, canticles, antiphons, responsories, chapters, collects. As to the time, anciently among the Jews time was divided into twelve nocturnal and as many diurnal hours. The nocturnal hours were divided into four watches, of which the first began at sunset and ended at the third hour of the night; the second ran from the third to the sixth; the third flowed from the sixth into the ninth; the fourth, finally, which was properly called the morning watch, began at the ninth hour and ended at the twelfth. Of these watches the Evangelists make mention. To the four nocturnal watches correspond four hours of the day, namely the third, sixth, ninth, and the evening.

V. Question V. *Is it a sin to separate Matins from Lauds?* Answer. This separation includes no sin, but is altogether licit: since from the earliest institution this separation was always permitted, and no

reason occurs why it should not be permitted, especially outside choir. Nay, it is better that those who recite the nocturnal Hours at the beginning of the night, or toward evening, defer the recitation of Lauds until the dawn of the following day.

of dawn, that the hymns may be recited at the opportune time according to their meaning. The method must nevertheless be observed in this separation, namely that the Collect be recited at the end of the Nocturns.

VI. Question VI. *Is the custom of reciting the Canonical Hours in choir ancient?* Answer. By the name of ecclesiastical choir is understood the assembly of Religious who come together to pour out prayers to God according to the form prescribed by the Church. That this manner of praying took its origin from the Apostles themselves is certain, the substance of the matter being regarded. Of the first Christians it is read, Acts 1: *They were persevering with one mind in prayer.*

VII. The Waldensians, the Wycliffites, and other more recent Heretics have raved against this rite of the Church, and have carped at ecclesiastical chant. But the holy Scriptures stop their mouths. For in Moses' time the custom prevailed of singing sacred canticles. The Davidic psalms were recited with the harp and with song. Chrysostom, homily 83 on Matthew, says of Christ the Lord: *He sang a hymn, that we too might do likewise.* Isidore, Basil, and the other Fathers describe the usefulness of this chant.

VIII. Question VII. *Are musical instruments to be used in ecclesiastical chant?* Answer. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 91, art. 2, ad 4, answers in these words: *As the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the Politics, neither pipes are to be brought in for teaching, nor any other artificial instrument, such as a harp, or anything else of that kind; but whatever things make good hearers. For musical instruments of this kind move the soul more to delight than they form within it a good disposition. But in the Old Testament there was a use of such instruments, both because the people were more hard and carnal, whence they had to be roused by instruments of this kind, just as by earthly promises; and also because instruments of this kind, being corporeal, figured something.* Cajetan observes, in his commentary on this passage, that in St. Thomas's time the use of organs did not prevail in the Church, just as the Roman Church did not use organs before the supreme Pontiff. But Cajetan adds this: *And if we have meditated more attentively the reason brought forward in the text from the eighth book of the Politics, it will appear that in the ecclesiastical office, to which we come together for the sake of receiving divine interior discipline, according to that word, "The sacrifice of praise shall honor me, and there is the way by which I will show him the salvation of God," musical instruments are not to be admitted. And they are to be excluded all the more, in that the interior divine discipline is more excellent than all human disciplines that reject instruments of this kind. And although this be true, speaking of itself, yet the now widespread custom of organs can, per accidens, be tolerated, on account of the excessive alienation of men from divine worship, that being thus enticed at least they may attend the divine offices.*

IX. The custom, now universally introduced, renders the use of organs and of musical chant licit, provided such chant be of a kind by which the hearers can perceive, beyond the sound of the voice, the divine praises that are being recited. Fr. Suárez teaches that harmonic concert alone sometimes excites more devotion than the psalms and hymns themselves. Sensible things, he says, move us more. Assuredly the senses are moved more, and more carnal pleasure is brought about. But that musical instruments excite the mind and soul to God more efficaciously than the psalms dictated by the breath of God, seems false to me. Nor do I dare to approve musical instruments. Benedict XIV, happily reigning, has prohibited many things. What if effeminate men, exercising a theatrical profession, should pass from the theaters to singing in the Churches? What if they should sing the

divine psalms and hymns in theatrical fashion, with gesture and modulation? What then? Will you dare to disapprove such a custom? Or shall I approve it? Far from it. I shall rather bewail with bitter tears what I cannot abrogate. Hear what Cajetan writes on this matter, in the Summa, under the word *Organ*: *Nor are they excused by the fact that sound is abstracted from all matter, and any melody of sound can be applied to sacred words: both because, according to the truth of the matter, these sounds are made to be accommodated to the delight of the hearers, who know them only as the sounds of profane or shameful words — a sign of which is that hearers, from that sound, are aroused to those profane or shameful things, as experience attests, so that there is no room for denial; and also because chant too is abstracted from all matter, and yet the Church has forbidden profane chants in the Church, such as theatrical chants, as is plain from distinction 92, chapter "Cantantes." Remember here the apostolic sentence: Be not deceived; God is not mocked, nor deceived. And there are involved in the same crime not only those who play, but those who hire, and consent to those who play these things, so that the Scripture may be fulfilled: They that hated thee have gloried in the midst of thy solemnity.*

X. As often as more evil than good follows in the exercise of any art, that art must be taken away, teach Plato, St. Thomas, and common sense itself. Let us hear St. Augustine, who, book 10 of the Confessions, chapter 33, writes this: *The pleasures of the ears had more tenaciously entangled and subjugated me. But thou didst loosen and free me. Now in the sounds which thy words animate, when they are sung with a sweet and skillful voice, I confess I rest a little — not indeed that I remain there, but that I rise, when I wish ... But the delight of my flesh, to which the mind ought not to be given over to be enervated, often deceives me, when the sense of feeling does not so accompany reason as to follow it patiently; but, because for its sake it deserved to be admitted, it strives even to run ahead and to lead. Thus in these things I sin without perceiving it, and afterward I perceive it. But sometimes, guarding too immoderately against this very deception, I err with too much severity — so much so, at times, that I would wish all the melody of the sweet chants with which the Davidic Psalter is commonly sung to be removed from my ears, and that of the Church itself; and it seems safer to me what I remember was often told me of Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria, who made the reader of the psalm sound it with so slight an inflection of voice that he was nearer to one pronouncing than to one singing. Nevertheless, when I remember the tears I shed at the chants of thy Church in the first days of my recovered faith, and now, when I am moved not by the chant, but by the things that are chanted, when they are chanted with a clear voice and the most fitting modulation, I again acknowledge the great usefulness of this institution. Thus I waver between the danger of pleasure and the experience of its wholesomeness, and I am led rather — not indeed pronouncing an irrevocable sentence — to approve the custom of singing in the Church, that through the delights of the ears a weaker soul may rise to an affection of piety. Yet when it happens to me that the chant moves me more than the thing that is sung, I confess that I sin penally; and then I would rather not hear the singer.*

XI. Fr. Suárez, book 4, chapter 8, number 2, answers that the sin which Augustine recognized in himself was either penal or venial. Be it either. What follows from this? Augustine's doctrine always stands, namely, that that chant which by its immoderate harmony and inflection of voice impedes the perception of the sense of the words and of the divine praises is illicit. Read more in Tome 2 on the Decalogue, book 2, dissertation 2, chapter 4.

XII. The Fathers, the Councils, and the graver Theologians disapprove and detest that the divine praises be celebrated with theatrical chant by effeminate men. Whether the musical concerts with which the greater Solemnities are today commonly celebrated are just so many profanations of temples and treadings-down of divine worship, let others judge. To this end men gather, and the vainest women, adorned with the enticements and illusions of the world and of the devil, that they

may see and be seen, and they show no less impudence than if they were sitting in a theater. Who will purge from crime this depraved abuse and sacrilegious corruption?

XIII. There must be kept, then, an ecclesiastical chant grave and simple, and a use of organs approved by the custom of the Church; but measure and manner must be applied. A general rule cannot be prescribed. Those who preside over Churches and choirs will render an account to God, unless they hinder, so far as lies in their power, their profanation.

Chapter IV — On the obligation of reciting the Canonical Hours in choir; and on the time, order, and place at which they must be recited

I. By the name of choir is understood not only the material place in which the divine praises are sung, but also, nay chiefly, the assembly of Religious who sing such Hours. These are indeed bound by precept to sing the Canonical Hours in choir — a precept denied by no Theologian, and which binds all cathedral, collegiate, and Regular Churches.

II. Question I. *Are all cathedral, collegiate, parochial, and regular Churches bound under grave fault to recite the Canonical Hours in choir?* Answer. The rigor of the law being regarded, all are bound. But custom being considered, which has tempered the precept, some are subject to this burden only on Sundays or feast days; others are altogether exempt, as the Theologians commonly teach, and usage makes plain.

III. The Orders of Regulars who frequent choir are bound under grave fault to recite the Canonical Hours in choir. This obligation is founded on the common Law, from which there has never been derogation. This precept regards the whole Community, whose head is the Prelate, who by force of his office is bound under grave fault to see to it that the divine praises be celebrated in choir. He can dispense his subjects, as shall seem expedient for the common good.

IV. Question II. *How many Religious are required that the precept of reciting the Canonical Hours in choir be fulfilled?* Answer. Tamburini, with others, says it is probable that a Community is excused from choir if it consists of only four or five. This opinion is false and lax. That four Religious, not to say five, suffice for fulfilling the precept of choir, the common opinion teaches. Some teach that three suffice, so that they be bound to choir for some not-lengthy time. For it is too burdensome that three or four alone should sustain the yoke of choir for a long time. Wherefore, in this case, the Religious ought to urge the Prelate to increase the number.

V. Question III. *Can Novices alone fulfill the precept of choir?* Answer. The Salmanticenses, Pellizzari, Tamburini, and others affirm it: because, they say, in favorable matters Novices, though not yet professed, enjoy the privileges of the professed. This opinion does not seem true to me. For this precept affects the Community of Religious. Novices, before profession, are not part of the Community, nor are they bound by precept to recite the office. If, therefore, professed Religious are present in the Monastery, at least some of them ought to be present in choir.

VI. Question IV. *At what time must the Canonical Hours be recited in choir?* Answer. In the Clementine constitutions On the celebration of Mass it is commanded that the Canonical Hours be paid devoutly in the Churches at their due hours. The fitting times at which, the ancient law being regarded, the Canonical Hours must be celebrated, are these. Matins about midnight, as is gathered from chapter 1, On the celebration of Mass — a time always designated by the ancient Fathers Athanasius, Basil,

and others, and indicated by David: *At midnight I arose to give praise to thee.* This custom has varied with the passage of time. Let each Church keep its own approved custom.

VII. In the four Mendicant Orders of Regulars a very ancient custom has prevailed of reciting Matins about midnight. This time not only suits the state of Regulars, which is one of penitence and perfection, but also brings the advantage of applying oneself to the study of letters, since more time remains free for it. This point of time moderates all the other hours of regular discipline. Religious who must rise for Matins are compelled to go to sleep at the due hour, and thus superfluous conversations are prevented.

VIII. Question V. *Is it a grave obligation to recite the divine praises at fixed and definite hours?* Answer. Cajetan, Bonacina, Laymann, Diana, Caramuel, and others deny it, because the circumstance of time is extraneous to the divine office. The opposite opinion, which Navarrus, Suárez, Soto, Tamburini, Castropalao, and others defend, is more probable. This time is not indivisible, but admits latitude. The Prelate can, for a legitimate cause, anticipate or postpone the recitation of these Hours. Parvity of matter is also given both with respect to time and with respect to one or another Hour. These things being established, a Prelate who, without legitimate cause, and from mere caprice or negligence, notably anticipated or deferred the recitation of the divine office, would sin gravely. For not only do the sacred canons command that the divine office be recited in choir, but also at fixed hours and times. Doubtless the circumstance of time is extraneous to the recitation of the office, but this circumstance has been prescribed by the sacred canons.

IX. A disturbance of the order of reciting the Canonical Hours, if it happen for an urgent cause, is free of fault; if it happen without cause and from caprice, it is nevertheless, in choir, a grave fault, as the Theologians cited defend.

X. The place for reciting the Canonical Hours is the Church, or the choir, which is a part of the Church. The Salmanticenses defend that those who celebrate the divine office in the Sacristy or the Chapter room sin gravely. But if the Sacristy be adjacent to the Church, and custom prevails, as in very deed it does prevail in some places, as it seems to me, no fault occurs. Those who come to choir after the office has begun are bound to supply the part of the office recited before their arrival. If those who serve in choir should omit a notable part of the office — for instance one or another psalm — they would have to supply it. The choir must recite in a subdued voice the verses that are played on the organ.

XI. Question VI. *Is it a grave sin to omit in choir the office of the dead, and the little office of the Blessed Virgin?* Answer. St. Pius V declared that those who recite the Roman Breviary do not sin mortally if they omit the aforesaid offices in choir, as is plain from the Bull prefixed at the beginning of the Breviary. But those who follow a rite other than the Roman Breviary the Pontiff does not exempt from the obligation by which they are bound either by force of their constitutions or by force of custom. The precept of reciting the aforesaid offices affects the Community and the choir, but not private persons, unless there be a peculiar law commanding this — as there is in the Order of Preachers, in which the general Chapter celebrated at Bologna under Master Cloche declared that individuals outside choir are bound to recite this office of the Blessed Virgin. On the second day of November all are bound under grave fault to recite the office of the dead. This office, however, cannot be recited on the feast of All Saints after Vespers in choir, unless the Bishop be present, or custom favor it on account of the concourse of the people; but Matins with Lauds must be recited on the 2nd of November, as the

Rubrics and the Decrees of the Sacred Congregation declare. But the private recitation of the office of the dead, for their general commemoration, can licitly be discharged after the evening hours of the feast of All Saints, as the Sacred Congregation of Rites answered on September 4, 1745, in the case of Ratisbon. Those who follow the Roman rite are bound to recite the Litanies on the feast of St. Mark and on the three Rogation days, as the more common and more probable opinion holds.

XII. When the divine office is recited in choir, one part of the choir ought to listen attentively to the other, because each one is bound to recite the whole office; but he who neither pronounces nor hears half the office in no way recites it. If one part of the choir should recite the office so confusedly and in so subdued a voice that it could not be heard by the other, then the precept would not be fulfilled. For then there would be no communication between these two parts. Each part is bound to recite its verses so clearly and distinctly that it can be heard by the other part of the choir. But it does not matter if one or another individual pronounces in so subdued a voice that he cannot be heard by the other part, provided he pronounces clearly and distinctly.

it be pronounced. For it suffices that the whole part be heard by the other part, even though individuals do not hear individuals.

XIII. Question VII. *What rite must those who recite the Breviary keep?* Answer. All ecclesiastics, both secular and regular, must pay the divine praises according to the form of the Roman Breviary published by order of Pius V — those alone excepted who enjoy a peculiar privilege. The Churches of Milan and of Laodicea, and others, have a peculiar rite, as do also the Benedictine and Dominican Orders. Those who should change this rite would sin gravely, necessity being absent. For he who lacked the Roman Breviary, and had in his hands the Dominican Breviary, or the contrary, would have to use it. Now the precept of reciting the office prevails over the precept of reciting according to this or that rite. And although there were but one precept, the principal part must be kept, such as the recitation of the divine praises — whatever the Salmanticenses, with certain others, say to the contrary. I likewise reckon false the other opinion of the Salmanticenses, who teach that private Religious of some Order — for instance Dominican or Benedictine — who have their own Breviary, can use the Roman Breviary. Orders can indeed renounce their own privilege; but so long as the privilege stands, and the rite is commonly kept, all and each must keep such a rite, even while dwelling at Rome. Otherwise great confusion and deformity would follow. Wherefore neither can the Benedictines use the Breviary of the Dominicans, nor conversely. A Religious made a Bishop must use the Breviary of his own Church, of which he is the head, the rite of his own Order being left aside. A Bishop of several Churches, which use different Breviaries, ought to keep the rite of that Church in which he resides. Read St. Thomas, Quodlibet I, article 13, where he distinguishes several points. No one can recite the Breviary before the appointed time with a companion having the privilege of so reciting it, nor more briefly than usual, because the privilege of one does not extend to another — whatever Leander says to the contrary, with others. A Cleric attached to a Church, and initiated with a patrimony into sacred orders, cannot choose a Breviary, but is bound to use the Roman by the precept of St. Pius V. Nor can a Bishop dispense Clerics to embrace a rite other than their own. Those would also sin who altered the rite of the Roman Breviary, and those who, in the Latin Church, should pay the office in Greek, or Hebrew, or the Vernacular tongue, because they would violate the rite prescribed by St. Pius V.

Chapter V — On those who are bound to recite the Canonical Hours privately

I. Question I. *Are Clerics established in minor orders bound to recite the Canonical Hours, or any prayers?* Answer. All commonly deny that these Clerics are bound either to the Canonical Hours or to other prayers, unless in some Church a custom prevailed which bound Clerics, on account of alms received, to recite the office of the Blessed Virgin. Nor can Bishops absolutely compel Clerics to any task of prayers: since Clerics are subject to Bishops in those things that regard their own state, but not otherwise in things beyond their state.

II. Clerics who have been initiated into sacred orders are bound to pay the divine office, at least by force of a general custom gravely obliging. Nay, even if, through fear unjustly inflicted, they had received the sacred Orders, they would be bound to this burden, because fear extrinsically inflicted does not take away the voluntary. By a stronger right they would be bound, if the fear had been justly inflicted.

III. A Subdeacon who receives Orders, and a Cleric who either receives a Benefice or makes profession, on the day on which he is initiated into sacred orders, or receives profession or the Benefice, is bound to recite that part of the office which remains to be recited — whatever anyone too laxly fables to the contrary. A Bishop, for a grave cause, can dispense private Clerics from the recitation of the office, as from other precepts. Those about to be initiated into sacred Orders, or about to receive a Benefice, ought to have the Breviary ready, and know the manner of reciting it: otherwise they would expose themselves to the danger of violating the precept.

IV. Question II. *Are Religious not yet in sacred orders, and Nuns who have made profession, bound under grave fault to recite the Hours privately outside choir?* Answer. That Novices before profession are exempt from this burden, the common and true opinion teaches. Bordoni, Caramuel, Marchant, Lessius, Martín de San José — whom Diana cites — deny that professed Religious, before the reception of sacred Orders, are bound under grave fault to pay the Canonical Hours. But this opinion is false: since all Regulars, and Nuns professing choir, after profession has been made, are bound, by force of a perennial custom and by force of their own constitutions, to pay the divine praises privately outside choir.

V. The authors cited object that a custom introduced by those who lack the power of introducing it has no force. Now the custom of reciting the office was introduced by Nuns and by Youths, who possess no faculty for introducing it. Therefore it is null. These are trifles. For this custom flows from the authority of the holy Fathers and from the Patriarchs of the sacred Orders. Wherefore a professed Religious chorister not yet initiated into sacred orders, dispensed to remain outside the cloister, is bound to recite the Canonical Hours. A fugitive professed Religious, before the reception of the sacred Orders, is bound to pay the Canonical Hours. The same must be said of Religious choristers ejected from the Monastery by sentence of a judge. What of Religious condemned to the galleys, and initiated into sacred orders? Several Theologians affirm that they are bound to pay the Canonical Hours. But the more probable opinion to me is that these unhappy men, whether or not they are initiated into sacred orders, are exempt from this burden — both on account of continual impediments, and because, since the Pontiff subjects them to so great a punishment, he seems tacitly to dispense them from the burden, lest the religious state be exposed to opprobrium.

VI. I had indicated a privilege in Tome 2 of the Christian Theology, book 2, dissertation 2, chapter 7, § 2, number 18, question 7, page 404, granted to professed Benedictines, by which they are exempted from reciting the Canonical Hours until they have been initiated into sacred orders. But I have now discovered that this privilege is not sufficiently authentic. Wherefore I retract what I wrote in the place cited concerning this privilege.

Chapter VI — On the obligation of reciting the Canonical Hours, by which Beneficiaries are bound

I. Question I. *Is one who holds a benefice, whether simple or with cure of souls, bound under grave fault to recite the Canonical Hours?* Answer. Ecclesiastical benefices are Episcopates, Canonries, Plebanates, Rectorships, Provostships, Dignities, Prestimonies, and a Chaplaincy erected by the Bishop's authority. That all these beneficiaries are bound to pay the divine office was defined in the Lateran Council under Leo X, session 9, "We ordain"; and rightly, because he who freely takes upon himself some benefice ought to undergo its burdens: but the benefice is conferred with the burden of reciting the Canonical Hours; therefore he is bound to pay them. Wherefore a Beneficiary omitting the divine office, if he be initiated into sacred orders, perpetrates a twofold crime, one against Religion, the other against Justice. If he takes the benefice under compulsion of fear, and receives its fruits, he is bound to recite the Canonical Hours; if he is unwilling to receive the fruits, he comes off free from reciting the office.

II. He who holds a benefice reduced to commendam, until it be given to another, or a manual or regular one, is bound to recite the office: because it is a benefice, and he receives its fruits. For it does not matter that it can be revoked at will. For the burden lasts as long as the advantage lasts. If a benefice is given to someone that he play the organ, he ought to recite the office. If only the fruits of the benefice are conferred as a wage, then there is no duty of reciting the office.

III. Question II. *Is one who receives prestimonies bound to the Canonical Hours?* Answer. Some deny it; but the more probable and more common opinion affirms it, because these prestimonies are portions deducted from the revenues of a benefice, and so true benefices, as St. Pius V declared by motu proprio. If they are reckoned among benefices, they are subject to the burdens of a benefice. Similarly, those who have obtained a Chaplaincy erected by the Bishop's authority, and conferred by him, are bound to pay the Canonical Hours. But if it is neither erected by the Bishop nor conferred by him, he who holds it is free from the burden of paying the office. But if, by its institution, it is not collative, and afterwards is conferred once or twice by the Bishop, it does not thereby become collative, and so the holder is not subject to the recitation of the Hours. On the contrary, if Prelates frequently confer it — that is, at a fitting time for prescription — then those retaining it would be bound to the Canonical Hours, because through this frequent conferral it puts on the character of an ecclesiastical benefice.

IV. He who, before the legitimate age, obtains a collative Chaplaincy by dispensation of the Pontiff, is bound to recite the Canonical Hours; but he must have Masses celebrated by others.

V. Question III. *Are pensioners bound to recite the Canonical Hours?* Answer. If the pension is altogether lay, and is conferred by the title of a wage for service rendered to the Church, there is no obligation of reciting the office; on the contrary, if it is conferred on a Cleric as Cleric, and some order or tonsure is

necessary in the recipient, then the recipient is bound not to the Canonical Hours, but to the little office of the Blessed Virgin, since St. Pius V so decreed, under the burden of restoring the fruits of the pension. But he is exempt from reciting the little office of the Blessed Virgin in whose person the pension is reserved for another's advantage: because only he who enjoys the advantage ought to undergo the burden of reciting the office.

VI. He who obtained a pension by clerical title, if he afterwards contracts marriage, is bound to recite the office of the Blessed Virgin, since it is an ecclesiastical pension, which requires clerical title in the recipient; and the same must be said of one who, after contracting marriage, obtains a pension by clerical title. He who resigns the whole pension is bound to nothing; if he resigns only part of the pension, he remains subject to the burden of reciting the office. A beneficiary Cleric, if he obtains a pension, is not bound to recite the Marian office, provided he recites the Canonical Hours. For the mind of St. Pius V is that one or the other office be recited, but not both.

VII. Question IV. *Are Bishops and Cardinals bound to recite the Canonical Hours?* Answer. Of Bishops there is no disagreement, but all affirm that they are bound. Of Cardinals Fr. Diana remains undecided, and suspends his judgment. But all the Theologians affirm that Cardinals are bound to pay the divine office, since the Cardinalate is a very great and eminent benefice. If all Beneficiaries are subject to the burden of reciting the office, Cardinals are bound by a stricter right, and undergo this burden on the day on which they receive the red biretta.

VIII. Question V. *Are coadjutors of benefices bound to the Canonical Hours?* Answer. A coadjutorship is not a benefice, even while some suitable stipend is assigned, because the benefice remains with the titular holder, nor can it be in two persons at once. But if some fruits are assigned to coadjutors, not as a stipend, but by way of a pension, then, like other pensioners, they are bound to recite the little office of the Blessed Virgin. If a coadjutor is given to an absent or sick Parish priest, to hold his place, he is then bound to discharge all the duties of the Parish priest. Finally, if coadjutors have expressly bound themselves, and have entered into a pact with the titular holder, the Pontiff dispensing, then they are bound to the Canonical Hours.

IX. Question VI. *Is one who holds a benefice without fruits bound to the Canonical Hours?* Answer. If he lacks the fruits by his own fault, he is bound, because he ought not to gather fruit from his own iniquity. That if the benefice lacks any fruit whatever, even then he is bound to the Canonical Hours, Medina, Paludanus, and Torquemada defend: because he who spontaneously accepts a benefice destitute of fruits also spontaneously and freely takes upon himself its burdens. Others deny it. I would say to the Beneficiary: either give up the benefice, or recite the office.

X. If a Beneficiary, against the order of law, does not reside, he is bound to the Canonical Hours. But if, the order of law being kept, he does not reside for a just cause, that even then he is bound to the Canonical Hours, Paludanus, Soto, Torquemada, Ledesma, Navarrus, and Córdoba teach. Leander, however, denies it. If the cause of absence is for the common good of the Church, then perhaps he could be said to be exempt. But if he is absent for his own peculiar advantage, even though an honorable one — for instance for the sake of studies, that he may become a Doctor or Master — he is nonetheless bound to recite the Canonical Hours. Nor may you object that study and the acquisition of knowledge redound to the honor and advantage of the Church: for these evasions are vain. Only in the case of defending the Church, or of protecting her rights, could it be disputed whether the Beneficiary were exempt. And even then, if he could recite the Canonical Hours, I see no solid reason

why he should not. If a Beneficiary resigns the fruits to friends or blood-relations, he is beyond doubt subject to the recitation of the divine office. Similarly a Beneficiary who, on account of excommunication, does not receive the fruits, is bound to recite the divine office. But he who unjustly holds a benefice — as through simony, or because he is excommunicated, irregular, or lacking the legitimate age — is not bound to recite the Canonical Hours; but he must give up the benefice and restore the fruits. But he who, having legitimately obtained a benefice, is deprived of it by a judge's sentence for a year or a longer interval, is bound throughout that whole time to pay the Canonical Hours: since he ought not to gather advantage from his own fault.

XI. He who accepts a slender benefice is subject to the obligation of reciting the Canonical Hours, as the common and true opinion teaches. For this burden arises not from the revenues, but from the benefice. Therefore he who wills the benefice, wills by that very fact the burdens of the benefice. If the burden displeases him, let him give up the benefice.

XII. A Beneficiary who, having taken possession of the benefice, is impeded for some time from receiving the fruits, is bound to recite the Canonical Hours. For he who is deprived for some time of receiving the fruits, and probably hopes that he will receive them in due time, has the benefice, and the right of receiving the fruits. Those Beneficiaries are bound to recite the Canonical prayers whose first-year fruits, by statute of the Church or by custom, are distributed among their seniors: both because they voluntarily subject themselves to this burden, and because they have a right to receive the fruits. Yet the Council of Trent, session 24, chapter 14, and St. Pius V, in the constitution *Dudum* of the year 1570, disapproved this custom as depraved. But when a Beneficiary is impeded by force and fraud from receiving the fruits, without hope of receiving them, he is exempt from the burden of the divine office, and can give up the benefice. If, however, the impediment were not perpetual, nor for a very long time, and the Beneficiary wished to retain the benefice, then he would be bound to the Canonical Hours: because he both possesses the benefice and has hope of receiving the fruits.

XIII. A Beneficiary who, after the benefice has been conferred, is impeded by a lawsuit brought against him from taking possession of the benefice, is not bound to the Canonical Hours. For the burden of reciting the Canonical Hours arises not from the conferral alone, but from the peaceful possession of the benefice. From conferral a right is born, but a mutilated and imperfect one; it is perfected, however, by possession. From this absolute title the burden of the Canonical Hours arises. When, therefore, the beneficiary is in no way the cause why he is impeded from possession, but by a lawsuit brought against him is in very deed impeded from possessing the benefice, he is exempt from the burden, until he attains possession. For so long as possession is under litigation, the benefice, together with its fruits, is a contingent matter; and from a contingent matter a certain debt cannot flow.

XIV. If, on the contrary, a Beneficiary has obtained possession of the benefice and the administration of the fruits, and is afterwards sued in a lawsuit, then he is bound to the Canonical Hours: because then he enjoys the title, the possession, and the administration of the benefice. And this is the common opinion.

XV. Question VII. *One who is in doubt about the slenderness of a benefice — is he bound to pay the burden of the Canonical Hours?* Answer. Several of the Probabilists deny it. Fr. Tamburini, book 1 on the Decalogue, chapter 3, § 7, verse *Beneficiarius*, writes this: "We shall say below that a Beneficiary possessing a slender benefice is not obliged, according to a probable opinion, to pay the Canonical Hours. What,

then, will happen, if, all things weighed, it is doubted whether a benefice is slender or not? I answer: I think it probable that he is obliged, and equally probable that he is not obliged. Wherefore it is lawful to embrace whichever of these opinions pleases you." It is worthwhile to set before the eyes of readers, even in this very Compendium, the sweetest fruits of Probabilism. "To embrace whichever of these opinions pleases you." If one is true, the other must needs be false. It is lawful for you, then, most sweetly to sip the poison of falsehood according to your inclination. But these things must be bewailed with tears rather than served up for mockery. Hence let the reader gather how true is what I said above: namely, that Probabilism is — saving a better judgment — antievangelical, because it establishes as a system that the use of falsity is licit, which must needs be found in one or the other of contrary propositions. The most benign Probabilist Leander follows Tamburini's doctrine. He who has two benefices, each of which is so slender that it does not suffice, but both together suffice for an honorable sustenance, is bound to the Canonical Hours, as all affirm. But those who have several rich benefices are bound to pay not two, but a single divine office. If, however, a Beneficiary unjustly holds several benefices, then several Theologians teach that he must recite several divine offices. I myself would say that such a Beneficiary must retain one benefice, and give up the rest. If a Beneficiary is a Priest, and has several benefices, does he perpetrate several sins if he omits the office? Not a few Theologians affirm it. But it is more probable to me that he commits only one sin against Justice, and another against Religion.

Chapter VII — On the restitution owed by Beneficiaries on account of the omission of the divine office

I. Question I. *Does a Beneficiary who omits the divine office in the first six months sin mortally with the burden of restitution?* Answer. He who omits the Canonical Hours after six months have elapsed is bound, according to all, to restore the fruits corresponding to the omissions of those days on which the office was omitted — either wholly, or in part, for a proportionate share. If Matins with Lauds are omitted, half the fruits of that day; if all the other Hours, the other half; and for each single Hour, a sixth part; and for the whole office omitted, all the fruits of that day must be restored, as St. Pius V declared. This is to be understood of culpable omission, legitimate impediment being absent.

II. Of omission within the first six months, Soto, Suárez, Medina, Grassi, and several others defend that the Beneficiary sins mortally, and is bound to restitution. On the contrary, Navarrus, Toletus, Lessius, Castropalao, the Salmanticenses, and others concede indeed that this Beneficiary sins mortally, but deny that he is bound to restitution. Because, they say, the Lateran Council and St. Pius V define that he who omits the office within the first six months indeed sins mortally, but make no mention of restitution. Formerly I openly showed myself inclined to this second opinion. Yet in the same place I observed that the restitution of fruits proceeds from commutative justice. For ecclesiastical law declares that to which divine law binds Beneficiaries, who, omitting to discharge their own duties, sin against God and against the Christian people. Although the Council and St. Pius V make no mention of restitution for the first six months, it cannot for that reason be evidently inferred that Beneficiaries omitting the office within this interval are exempt from the burden of restitution, which arises from divine law. Wherefore, since the matter is doubtful, the safer part must be chosen, and, with the former opinion, it must be said that this Beneficiary is subject to restitution. For what is to be presumed of such a Beneficiary, who profanes even the very beginnings of his

benefice with shameful deeds? Just as he sins more gravely, so he must be more severely punished, and struck with the penalty of restitution.

III. Question II. *A Beneficiary who, six months having elapsed, omits to recite the office without fault — is he bound to restitution?* Answer. In corporal matters, the obligation of restitution arises not only from unjust acquisition, but chiefly from the thing acquired. But in restitution arising from spiritual law this title has no place. Wherefore he who omits the office without fault is free from restitution. And this is gathered from the very constitution of St. Pius V, in which the Beneficiary is obliged to restitution who, legitimate impediment being absent, has not said, etc.

IV. Some teach that a Beneficiary who should omit the office for one or another day is not bound to restitution; nay, some of them extend the omission to eight days. But this opinion is altogether without probability, since it is evidently contrary to the constitution of St. Pius V, saying: "Whoever shall have omitted all the Canonical Hours for one or several days." A Beneficiary who omits one entire Hour is bound to restitution, as is established from the cited Pian constitution. Nay, one who should neglect a notable part of an Hour, since he would sin mortally and would not have recited the Hour, would have to restore the fruits corresponding to that entire Hour.

V. Question III. *A Beneficiary who should omit a light part in each Hour — would he be subject to restitution?* Answer. The Salmanticenses deny it, even though such light omissions taken together would constitute a grave sin. But this opinion is false to me. As often as a Beneficiary omits such a part of the office as suffices for a mortal sin, so often is he bound to restore the part corresponding to the omission.

VI. Question IV. *One who today omits the office, and tomorrow recites a double office — is he bound to restitution?* Answer. The Salmanticenses and others deny it. Because, they say, just as a Chaplain omitting Mass today satisfies if he afterwards celebrates two, so too if he afterwards recites the omitted office. The Beneficiary sinned, they say, against the precept of daily recitation, but not against the precept of restitution, since he compensates the omitted office with another office. This opinion is false to me: since the Church commands the restitution of fruits, and has declared that one who today omits the office does not make the fruits his own. If he does not make the fruits his own, he is bound to restore them. He who has acquired the gross income of a Canonry, as they call it, or certain revenues, if he omits the office, is bound to restitution, whatever the Salmanticenses say to the contrary. Because although a Canon acquires, and by right possesses, the revenues, yet this acquisition and possession is burdened with the duty of restitution, if the recitation of the office is omitted. For it makes no difference whether these fruits are received before or after the recitation. For these fruits are always burdened with the debt of reciting the office. Therefore, when the debt of the office is not paid, restitution must be made.

VII. Question V. *Must the aforesaid restitution be made before the judge's sentence?* Answer. The Theologians, even the more benign, commonly affirm it. The reason is evident. Those who omit the office do not make the fruits their own, as the law of the Church has defined. But no one can rightly retain what is not his own. Wherefore Alexander VII deservedly proscribed the following thesis: *Restitution imposed by Pius V on Beneficiaries not reciting the office is not owed in conscience before the declaratory sentence of the judge, since it is a penalty.* These Beneficiaries, then, are bound to restore the fruits unjustly received.

VIII. Question VI. *A Beneficiary reciting the office without any attention — is he bound to restore?* Answer. Some deny it. But the opposite opinion, and the more common, is more probable. For he who deliberately recites the Canonical Hours with a distracted mind does not fulfill the precept of recitation, just as the precept of annual confession is not fulfilled by a sacrilegious confession: therefore the precept of restitution presses, just as if the office had been omitted. But those who, stained with mortal sin, recite with an attentive mind, fulfill the precept, and are bound to restore nothing.

IX. Question VII. *A Beneficiary with cure of souls who omits the Canonical Hours — is he bound to restore all the fruits of the benefice, or only the fruits corresponding to the omitted recitation?* Answer. Several patrons of a more benign Ethics defend that only the part of the fruits corresponding to the omitted Hours must be restored. But the graver Theologians defend the affirming opinion, relying on the Pian constitution which says: *Whoever shall have omitted all the Canonical Hours for one or several days shall forfeit all the fruits of the benefice or benefices which correspond to that day or those days*. Let us suppose the hypothesis that St. Pius V wished to declare that the Beneficiary must restore all the fruits of the benefice — could he have used clearer words? Therefore these are bound to restore all the fruits of the benefice or benefices, both those corresponding to the recitation and those corresponding to other ministries. There is added that restitution would be too arbitrary, according to the authors of the opposite opinion, if it were left to the discretion of each Parish priest and Beneficiary. For if each Beneficiary had to separate out and retain those fruits that correspond to other ministries, and restore only the rest, restitution corresponding to the omitted recitation would scarcely ever occur, and would come to nothing. Wherefore, all things weighed in an equal balance, this second opinion is more probable.

X. Question VIII. *One who recites one office in place of another — is he bound to restitution?* Answer. He who voluntarily recites one office in place of another — for instance, of a Saint when it should be of the Feria — does not fulfill the precept, because this precept must be fulfilled according to the form prescribed by the Church. Now he who does not fulfill the precept is subject to restitution. The opposite opinion is included, in my easy judgment, in the condemned proposition which said that one office avails in place of another.

XI. Question IX. *To whom must restitution be made — to the fabric fund, or to the poor?* Answer. The answer is plain from the Pian constitution commanding that Beneficiaries must lay out these unjustly received fruits either upon the fabric of their own benefices, or upon alms for the poor. It is in the liberty of the Beneficiary omitting the office, then, to restore the unjustly received fruits either to the fabric fund or to the poor. Under the name of *fabric* come the house, the fields, the revenues of the benefice, or the Church itself to be repaired — but not the churches of another benefice. Of the poor the constitution decides nothing. Yet natural reason dictates that the poor of the Locality be preferred to poor strangers. The circumstances of greater poverty must nevertheless be regarded. If the Beneficiary who must restore is himself truly poor, he can, in good faith, apply some part of the fruits to himself as a poor man. In this matter, however, the Beneficiary ought to consult a pious and prudent man, because avaricious cupidity, innate in all, easily feigns poverty where it does not exist. The Beneficiary must also apply to himself only a part of the fruits, in proportion to his greater or lesser poverty, as one truly poor — not that he may become richer or more comfortable, but only that he may succor his own poverty; otherwise he deceives himself. False to me is the opinion of those who teach that this Beneficiary can apply the fruits to be restored to sisters, to brothers, to a mother,

not only if they are beggars, but even if they lack what is necessary for the decency of their person or state. This doctrine being admitted, scarcely will a case be given in which either the fabric of benefices or the poor receive anything: for the decency of a mother, sisters, and brothers scarcely admits of limits. The Theologians teach, besides, that fruits of this kind can be laid out in suffrage for the dead. I say that the fruits must be laid out upon the poor on this condition: that they pour out prayers for the souls of Purgatory. By this arrangement the law is more securely observed.

XII. Some dispute whether a Beneficiary can retain fruits given to him by the poor, before he has conferred such fruits upon them. The Beneficiary has promised the fruits to be restored to this or that poor person; before the poor receive the fruits, they give them to the Beneficiary. If the gift is made before the delivery of the fruits, they do not dare to assert that the retention is licit; but if it is made after the delivery of the fruits, then some assert it is valid. These are questions unknown to the ancient Fathers. If the poor are truly such, how can they give away the subsidy which they themselves need? This question is futile.

XIII. Question X. *Can the restitution of fruits be supplied by alms made by the Beneficiary before he omitted the Canonical prayers?* Answer. Leander affirms it, and for this his opinion cites Suárez, Pellizzari, Pasqualigo, Laymann, and Busembaum. This opinion is contained in this thesis condemned by Alexander VII: *Restitution of fruits for the omission of the Hours can be supplied by whatever alms the Beneficiary has previously made from the fruits of his benefice.* Fr. Viva, in his commentaries on this proposition, number 9, strives to defend Fr. Suárez's doctrine from the condemned thesis. With what happy success he achieves this, let others judge. Fr. Viva teaches several other things there which seem lax to me, because they take out of the way the precept of the Lateran constitution and of St. Pius V. Read Tome 2 on the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 8, question 16, number 29. A Beneficiary who, with no regard to his debt of restitution, bestows alms, gives liberally. But by a liberal and gratuitous donation what is owed from justice is not paid.

XIV. Question XI. *Is a pensioner bound to restore the fruits of his pension proportionately, if he omits to recite the office?* Answer. All affirm it. If the Beneficiary omits to pay the pension, the pensioner must urge him to pay — not that he may retain these fruits for himself when the Beneficiary omits the office, but that he may lay them out upon the creditors, namely the poor, or upon the fabric of the benefice. Nor can the Beneficiary absolutely refuse payment of the pension to the pensioner who does not recite: since the Beneficiary is a debtor, not a judge.

Chapter VIII — On the attention, intention, voice, time, and place to be kept in reciting the Canonical Hours

I. Question I. *What attention is required for the recitation of the divine office?* Answer. A twofold attention: exterior and interior. Exterior attention is prescribed in the chapter *Dolentes*. Of interior attention the Theologians dispute on both sides. Diana, Machado, Tamburini, Coninck, Cardinal de Lugo, Gobat, and many others, whom Fr. La-Croix cites, deny it. The affirming opinion is defended by Cajetan, Navarrus, Vasquez, Valentia, Suárez, Genet, Van Roy, Henri de Saint-Ignace, Natalis Alexander, Antoine, and very many others.

II. The Salmanticenses report both opinions, and contend that the Theologians of each opinion hold the same view. They distinguish a threefold attention: 1. that by which one attends to the words; 2.

that by which one meditates the sense of the words; 3. that which regards God, and is the most perfect of all, because it joins the mind to God. All confess that one of these three suffices. In place of a principle these Theologians establish that a voluntary distraction is not opposed to attention to the words, which attention suffices for due recitation. For only the will, by which one deliberately determines that he expressly does not wish to attend to the words, retracts the prior attention. They contend that the human mind can attend at once to disparate things, and therefore that voluntary distractions do not interrupt the prior attention. Only in this case, they say, is the prior attention to the words interrupted and retracted: when someone says within himself, "I do not wish to attend," or through exterior acts of chatting, writing, reading, etc., in very deed interrupts virtual attention.

III. This doctrine, by which it is asserted that virtual attention — which they themselves admit — is not interrupted by voluntary distractions, is false to me. For he who with deliberate mind distracts his attention elsewhere interrupts whatever attention, both formal and virtual. Most vain is the invention which the adversaries establish in place of a principle — namely, that the human mind can at the same time deliberately meditate contrary and disparate things at once. And since they oppose experience to us, I call the case back to this test. Apply your mind, seriously and with deliberate intent, to some question or business while you recite the psalms, and you will straightway experience that your tongue stammers, that the mind suffers a strain, that the eyes wander, and that you yourself appear, to the bystanders, as it were carried off elsewhere. When we suffer involuntary distractions, our intellect, by a most hidden inclination and a certain natural weight, is carried away into those objects toward which it more inclines; and since no contrary act then fights against it, the tongue for that reason pronounces the words without impediment. But let it meditate a disparate question or business, and continually, even outwardly, in the countenance, the internal struggle appears. It is evident, then, and established by experience itself, that a man cannot at the same moment, with deliberate mind, meditate contrary things.

IV. From these things it is inferred that the opinion of the Salmanticenses is false and lax; nevertheless the most recent Compiler of these same Salmanticenses has transcribed it, and inserted it into his recent Marrow.

V. To the question proposed, then, I answer that there is a precept of reciting the Canonical Hours with internal attention. This precept includes two things: a purpose of attending, and that this purpose not be revoked either by a contrary act, or by a voluntary distraction, or by an external action which by its own nature carries the mind elsewhere. This opinion the graver Theologians commonly defend. Several of these contend that this interior intention has been commanded by the Church. Whether or not the Church can command interior acts, I now pass over; this seems more likely to me — that in this matter she has not commanded, at least directly, this interior attention: this obligation of reciting the divine office attentively and devoutly proceeds from elsewhere than from a human positive precept. I say, then, that this intention has been prescribed by natural and divine law. And this is drawn from the holy Scriptures. St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 14, says: *He that speaketh in a tongue, let him pray that he may interpret. For if I pray in a tongue, my spirit prayeth, but my understanding is without fruit. What is it then? I will pray with the spirit; I will pray also with the understanding: I will sing with the spirit; I will sing also with the understanding.* Christ the Lord, Matthew 15, rebukes the Pharisees: *Hypocrites, well hath Isaias prophesied of you, saying: This people honoreth me with their lips: but their heart is far from me.* Again,

John chapter 4: *The true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth: for the Father also seeketh such to adore him.* The testimonies of the Fathers, that I not be long, I pass over.

VI. The weights of the reasons are obvious. Prayer is an act of the virtue of Religion; but any act of virtue must be performed with due circumstances. Now the chief circumstance that must accompany prayer is attention. The virtue of Religion, whose act is prayer, regards God as the end to which it offers its worship. This worship, or adoration, shown to God, must be made in spirit and in truth: otherwise, if it were done with the body alone, it would be hypocrisy and a mask of adoration. What of the fact that prayer itself is defined as an elevation of the mind to God, and a petition of the things we need? These cannot be rendered without an elevation of the mind. There is added that, according to all, an intention of praying, at least virtual, is necessary. This virtual intention cannot consist without at least virtual attention. For it then ceases to consist even virtually, when a man, knowing and adverting that he is thinking of other things and not attending to what he pronounces, neglects to recall his mind to himself. For in this state he in very deed wills not to pray, but, after the manner of a blackbird, a parrot, or a magpie, to produce the sound of words, not to honor God in a human manner.

VII. That virtual attention to the words of the prayers suffices has been said. This virtual attention, which is the fruit of the first purpose by which we resolve to apply our mind to what we are about to pray, perseveres so long as it is not retracted by a deliberate choice. Now this retraction can occur in two ways. First, if, while discharging the burden of the Hours, you occupy yourself with some other business which by its nature is opposed to attentive prayer — as if you should paint, write, read, or do something similar. For if for a brief time you dress, wash, or look at some objects, you do not violate the precept of praying attentively, provided you do these things in passing. Secondly, the prior intention of attending is retracted when someone praying perceives that he is distracted toward other things, and does not restrain his mind, but voluntarily persists in the distraction. Nor is it required that he say "I do not wish to attend," as the Salmanticenses contend; but it suffices that, in very deed perceiving and willing, he persist distracted.

VIII. The Adversaries are wont to heap up many arguments to prove that prayer consists without attention, and that voluntary distractions do not stand in the way of fulfilling the precept of praying. But I have refuted all these things at length, Tome 2 on the Decalogue, book 2, dissertation 2, chapter 9, § 1. For the sake of brevity I now pass them over. For they are so lax that a reader illumined by natural light alone would detest them. Hear what Fr. Gobat writes, treatise 5, number 821: "It is far more probable that the essence of vocal prayer consists with perpetual voluntary distractions, or wanderings of the mind. So Cardinal de Lugo, from principle. Tamburini, book 4 on the Decalogue, chapter 2, § 1. Cotton, and all who, granting that the recitation of the Breviary is commanded by the Church by way of prayer, excuse from mortal sin [those who recite it with distractions], teach: It is more probable that one is bound to no restitution who has recited all the Hours, or one, with voluntary and perpetual distractions, provided he does so entire, and with the intention of praying." Very many other things I pass over. It suffices, one after another, to indicate the fruits of Probabilism, inventing perpetual distractions, at number 843, that readers may become more cautious in reading these books. For who is not moved when he reads such paradoxes? Imbued with these lax opinions, which are published not only as probable but even as more probable, so many wretched Priests do not celebrate the Breviary and the Mass, but babble and mutter through them.

IX. Question II. *Does habitual attention suffice for fulfilling the precept?* Answer. All who defend the necessity of interior attention deny it. When you read in St. Thomas that habitual attention suffices, know that by "habitual attention" he means virtual attention, as is clear from very many testimonies.

X. Question III. *Does it suffice, for fulfilling the precept, to meditate on the mysteries of Christ's passion, or on the acts of the Saints or of the Blessed Virgin?* Answer. The more common and more probable opinion affirms it. For of the three attentions — to the words, to the sense, to God — this third is the most perfect of all, as has been said elsewhere. Now when someone meditates on the mysteries of Christ's passion, or the acts of the Saints, which express a relation to God, he has his mind elevated to God.

XI. Question IV. *Do Christians sin who recite prayers with a distracted mind?* Answer. When the precept of prayer presses, as it presses on feast days, then attention is necessary by precept. Wherefore the doctrine of certain men, which establishes that the Faithful hearing Mass on a feast day are not bound to apply attention, must be rejected as enormously lax. This doctrine being admitted, Christians, like animals, subject to God only the body, but not the soul. Unless, at the time when the precept of assisting at the unbloody Sacrifice presses, Christians elevate their mind to God, when will they render this? And unless they meditate on God and on the mysteries of Christ, what difference is there between them and brute beasts? In the other prayers which the Faithful recite from devotion, distractions do not exceed venial fault. Prayer can be omitted without fault; but it cannot be recited with a distracted mind without some fault. You are not bound to address the supreme Pontiff; but, supposing that you wish to address him, you must observe those things that befit the pontifical Majesty. Prayer without attention is a mere simulacrum of prayer. Yet this fault is light, especially since distraction is rarely altogether deliberate. For those who pray from devotion omit prayer when they desire to attend to other things.

XII. Question V. *What exterior actions impede interior attention in one reciting the Canonical Hours?* Answer. Exterior devotion is directly commanded by the chapter *Dolentes*, as has been said. Wherefore all affirm that one must abstain from exterior actions while the divine office is recited. The difficulty is to designate those actions which impede interior attention. All affirm that to write, to paint, to read or hear something else, fight against interior attention. Those who recite part of the office while dressing or washing satisfy the precept of attention. For the more common opinion, and the more probable, teaches that actions of this kind do not fight against internal attention. For such works are so easy and familiar that they require no attention beyond habitual practice. Understand this, however, of familiar and customary dress. For if the discourse were of exquisite and elegant adornment, the precept would in no way be fulfilled. I say nothing now of vain adornment, and of the artificial arrangement of pomps, because it is certain that all these things fight against the elevation of the mind to God necessary in the recitation of prayer. We speak, then, of Christians and Religious who, rising from bed, sign themselves with the sign of the cross, and recite prayers while dressing. The very Rubrics of the Roman Missal prescribe certain prayers to be recited by Priests while they wash their hands and put on the sacred vestments.

XIII. Question VI. *Is it licit to recite prayers amid the labors of the hands?* Answer. All things are clean to the clean, and holy things to the holy. If Christians, from a fervor of devotion, offer their manual and bodily labors to God, and pray to God, and sing sacred hymns, who will disapprove of this pious custom? But if Clerics and Religious, dedicated by a peculiar rite, who have leisure time in which to be free for God, should mix the divine praises with their fatigues, necessity being absent, they would

doubtless sin, and would do injury to their own state, which is set apart from earthly cares. The circumstances and the principles from which these prayers flow, then, must be regarded.

XIV. Question VII. *Does one who at the same time hears Mass by precept satisfy the precept of reciting the Canonical Hours?* Answer. The more common opinion affirms it. For hearing Mass has nothing peculiar which fights against the recitation of the divine office. Rather, both precepts conspire to the same end, and regard the same purpose, namely the worship of God. For if Mass is heard from devotion, can one not recite the divine office imposed by precept? The hearing of Mass, then, does not fight against the recitation of the Office. It is nevertheless wiser to fulfill the distinct precepts at different times.

XV. Question VIII. *What must be said of one who in choir is troubled by sleep?* Answer. It is certain that he does not satisfy the precept who sleeps through a notable part of the office. He who in choir is troubled by sleep, yet recites all the verses and strives to shake off sleep, though he should omit some verse through inadvertence, is not to be obliged to repeat the office. For such a repetition would be too heavy a burden, and would give occasion for abstaining from choir. He who outside choir is troubled by sleep should defer the recitation to a more opportune time. Those who are subject to sleep, and defer the recitation of the divine office to near midnight with a foreknowledge, founded on past experience, that they will succumb to sleep, sin deadly, as the Theologians commonly teach.

XVI. Question IX. *Is an intention necessary for reciting the Canonical Hours?* Answer. All affirm it. There is a twofold intention: one formal and express, when someone elicits this act: "I wish to fulfill the precept of reciting the Canonical Hours"; the other implicit and virtual, which is contained in the very deliberate will of executing the work commanded. All affirm that a virtual and implicit intention suffices. This, however, is had by this very fact, that you take up the Breviary to recite the said Hours. Wherefore the opinion of those must be rejected who say that one who begins to recite the divine office with the express intention of not satisfying the precept is not bound to repeat the office. For he who recites the office with the express will of not satisfying does not in very deed satisfy — just as, if you owe a hundred gold pieces to Paul, and you give him another hundred with the express will of not paying the debt, would you thereby pay the debt? The same must be said in our case.

XVII. Question X. *Does it suffice to recite the Canonical Hours with the mind alone, without exterior voice? And do Regulars enjoy the privilege of reciting the divine office mentally, while they pay it privately outside choir?* Answer. All teach that the divine office must be recited vocally, and this has been commanded in several Councils, and in the chapter *Dolentes*. Yet some cited by Leander defend that, the common law being regarded, it is probable that the Canonical Hours can be recited with the mind alone. This opinion Leander does not reject; nay, he laments that Fr. Suárez declares it improbable — an opinion, however, which is not only improbable, but even utterly false and most ridiculous.

XVIII. As to Regulars, Leander himself answers that it is more probable that they enjoy the privilege of reciting the Breviary mentally; and for this opinion he cites Tamburini, Hurtado, Juan de la Cruz.

XIX. The Salmanticenses, treatise 16, chapter 3, point 8, number 51, reckon this opinion more probable, not merely probable, and report a privilege of Leo X, confirmed, they say, by St. Pius V; and they conclude that Regulars can, in very deed, by force of this privilege, pay the office mentally.

XX. This opinion is false to me, resting on a fictitious privilege. I have said that this privilege is fictitious in the sense alleged by the authors cited. For, as Pejerinus himself, who reports this

privilege, testifies, the Pontiff grants only that scrupulous brothers may recite mentally certain things which are recited secretly in choir, the condition being added, if they experience greater devotion. See Tome 2 on the Decalogue, book 2, dissertation 2, chapter 9, § 5, where several other privileges reported by the Salmanticenses are refuted.

XXI. Question XI. *Does he sin deadly who omits a single one of the little Hours?* Answer. Several deny it, whose opinion is false to me, and the Theologians commonly teach the contrary. Some dispute whether they would sin mortally who omitted either half, or a third, of an Hour — for instance of Sext or None; and each affirms or denies according to his pleasure. These petty questions are superfluous. For who, unless he be out of his mind, will recite half a Canonical Hour — for instance of Prime or None — and omit the other half or third? Caramuel defends that he does not sin mortally who omits one Nocturn at Matins with Lauds. The Theologians commonly disapprove this opinion as manifestly false. For the omission of a single Nocturn is indeed grave. Leander, Sanchez, Diana teach that he does not sin mortally who at the Matins of a feria, or of the simple office of some Saint, should voluntarily omit three lessons with three responsories, because this is a small matter. Francisco Pellizzari defends that he does not sin gravely who omits the Vespers of Holy Saturday. All these opinions the graver Theologians reject as false.

XXII. Question XII. *Do those who recite a shorter office in place of a longer sin mortally?* Answer. Caramuel, Antonio of the Holy Spirit, Leander, Vasquez, Azor, the Salmanticenses, and others defend that those do not sin mortally who, without cause and from mere desire of dispatching themselves more quickly, change the divine office at their pleasure, and choose a shorter in place of a longer — for instance, of a Saint, when it should be of the feria or of the Sunday.

XXIII. The opinion just recounted is false, and, unless everything deceives me, is contained in this thesis condemned by Alexander VII: *One reciting the office of Palm Sunday satisfies the paschal precept…*

satisfies the paschal precept. Not only does the precept of reciting the divine office press, but there is also present the precept of reciting it according to the form prescribed by the Church. The junior writers cited reply that St. Pius V did not impose a precept, but only prescribed an exhortation; or that the precept is in a light matter. Is a matter to be called lighter which moderates the rite of reciting the divine praises? It is a precept, and indeed in a grave matter.

XXIV. Would you condemn of grave fault one who in good faith recited the office, thinking that it truly was the office of that day, if he were unwilling to repeat it? I would not dare to assert that this man, unwilling to repeat the office of the same day, is guilty of mortal sin. I myself, however, would repeat it. Those who through error omit a double office, and above, ought to recite it on the first free day, if they recite privately outside choir; not so those who recite in choir. In practice, let each see what befits order, what is farthest from confusion. He who today recites the divine office which through error should be recited tomorrow must recite it tomorrow, because a private error ought not to pervert the order prescribed by the Church. He who omits the whole office commits one sin, not several.

XXV. Question XIII. *What continuation and order must be kept in reciting the Canonical Hours?* Answer. The Salmanticenses defend that one never sins gravely who recites the divine office within the natural day, even though a very great interruption occur — even though the interruption happen in the middle of one psalm, or one lesson. You begin in the morning to recite one psalm; in the middle of

the psalm, or the lesson, you take up some business; at noon, or at Vespers, you resume the other half of the psalm or the lesson: if you do this without cause, you sin venially, but never mortally, say the cited Fathers, and for this opinion they cite Leander, Bonacina, Lessius, Diana, Laymann, and others. This opinion is not approved by me, because it takes away the continuity of prayer, and savors of the greatest deformity. Wherefore the graver Theologians condemn so enormous an interruption as a grave fault. But in practice these things scarcely occur. For who would join a psalm which he recited in the morning with a psalm to be recited at sunset, or the half of one lesson recited in the morning with the other half to be recited in the evening? A light interruption without cause is venial; with cause, no fault at all.

XXVI. The order to be kept is that first Matins and Lauds, then Prime, Terce, Sext, None, Vespers, and Compline be recited. That this order does not fall under precept the common opinion teaches; so that he who should recite Prime, Terce, Sext, None, Vespers, Compline before Matins would not sin mortally, but only venially, a just cause being absent. For if a just cause be present, no fault at all is committed. Yet he who should from custom disturb this order could scarcely be excused of contempt for the order prescribed by the Church. Wherefore I do not approve the opinion of the Salmanticenses, who say that the disturbance of this order never reaches to mortal fault. Mortal fault never occurs, because in practice this habitual disturbance scarcely, or not even scarcely, occurs. For who is so stupid as to wish, without cause, from mere custom, to pervert this order? In choir this disturbance would be too deformed, and would occasion scandal; and if it happened frequently, I would not excuse it from grave fault.

XXVII. Question XIV. *At what time must the Canonical Hours be recited?* Answer. The whole office must be recited each day. The day begins, by custom, after the hour of Vespers of the preceding day, for reciting Matins with Lauds of the following day. But the time for reciting Prime and the other Hours takes its beginning from the point of midnight of the preceding day, and ends at the point of midnight of the following day. Some defend that it is licit to recite, after the evening hour, not only Matins with Lauds but all the other Hours of the following day as well. But this opinion seems false, because by laudable custom only Matins with Lauds is licitly recited at the aforesaid hour. The other Hours, however, must be recited on the following day. He who anticipates or postpones the Canonical Hours excessively, without cause, sins venially; yet it is a lesser evil to anticipate than to postpone. A just cause of anticipating is public reading, a sermon, study, the danger of an impending occupation, manual labor, and other things of that kind; and then no fault is committed, not even a venial one.

XXVIII. Leander, with other junior writers, teaches that he fulfills the precept who begins to recite a little before midnight of the following day, and then continues to pay the whole office of the preceding day; but this opinion is manifestly false to me. For the office is the task of the day. But he who begins to recite a little before midnight of the following day recites the greatest part of the office when the day has already elapsed. Therefore he does not fulfill the daily precept. Caramuel teaches this opinion: *With a single office one can satisfy a twofold precept, for the present day and the next* — which thesis Alexander VII condemned.

XXIX. Question XV. *Does one who celebrates Mass before reciting Matins sin mortally?* Answer. Gabriel Biel, St. Antoninus, Ledesma, Tabiena, Navarrus, and Zanardo defend the affirming opinion. Fr. Antoine agrees with these. The denying opinion is more probable to me, and true. For the precept of the Mass

and the precept of the office are two disparate precepts. He does not sin mortally who perverts the order of the Hours; and yet there is a greater order among the Canonical Hours themselves than there is between the divine office and the Mass. Finally, the Mass not having been celebrated, the Breviary is recited without fault. Therefore between the Mass and the Breviary there is no such connection that he sins mortally who perverts this order.

XXX. The custom which the adversaries oppose does not oblige under grave sin. Doubtless the Rubrics prescribe that Matins be recited before Mass. But it is not therefore inferred that the violation of this order is deadly. All the Rubrics taken together, which prescribe the form of the rite, oblige indeed under grave sin; but by no means do individual ones, taken separately. Are the other Rubrics, whether of the Breviary or of the Missal, so many precepts obliging under mortal sin? By no means. The disturbance, then, of this or that Rubric taken separately is a venial, not a mortal, fault. There would be a greater deformity if a choral Mass were celebrated before Matins. Yet if scandal be absent, I do not recognize a mortal crime here either. Care must nevertheless be taken against the custom of transgressing any laws whatever, even those which regard order and pious rites: because a continued violation carries with it contempt. Human precepts are not to be multiplied; nay, so far as can rightly be done, they should be restrained, especially by Superiors. But neither should the indolence and negligence of the lukewarm be fostered.

XXXI. For private recitation any opportune place will do, the Psalmist saying: *In every place of his dominion, bless the Lord, O my soul.* Yet a place removed from noise and clamor should be chosen, that the occasion of distractions be avoided. The place destined for public recitation is the Church, or the Choir, or the Sacristy joined to the Church.

Chapter IX — On the causes excusing from reciting the Canonical Hours

I. Several are the causes excusing from reciting the office, such as inability, infirmity, sudden and continual grave occupation, and things of that kind. Several have amplified these causes beyond what is fair.

II. Question I. *He who cannot recite alone, but can with a companion — is he bound to procure a companion, that he may be able to pay the Hours?* Answer. This question is understood when a companion can conveniently be had. For if it were necessary to seek out a companion at a price paid, it is more likely that no one is bound with so great a burden. He would do this best if the one reciting were rich: for he would help a poor cleric, and...

both would praise God — Laymann, Filliucci, Lessius, Villalobos, and others distinguish. If, being well, you were using a companion, you must likewise use one while you labor under an inconvenience of the eyes, or another impediment; but not if, being well, you were reciting without a companion. Leander, Juan Sánchez, Diana absolutely deny that a companion must be procured. The true opinion affirms it. Because the precept of the Church must be fulfilled in the best way it can be. Therefore he who can conveniently have a companion must procure one. A blind man is not bound to commit the office to memory in order to be able to recite it. But if a blind man, or others lacking the Breviary, know the office by heart, they are bound to recite it. Hence, if they know by heart the office of the common, blind persons or others bound by impediment, when the office of the feria, or the

proper office of some Saint, is in course, must recite that. These, however, to avoid the difficulty, commonly implore from their Superior a commutation into the office of the Blessed Virgin. A blind man holding a prebend is bound to attend choir, and to recite the Hours there so far as he can.

III. He who lacks the Breviary without fault is excused from the recitation; yet if he knows the Hours by heart, he is bound to recite them. He who by his own fault deprives himself of the Breviary, so as to become unable to pay the burden of the Hours, not only sins gravely by that action by which he stripped himself of the Breviary, but sins so long as he persists in the depraved determination of not reciting. But as soon as he changes his will, and repents of his prior action, he then ceases to sin, and is excused from recitation, since he is unable to recite. He who obtained a benefice before knowing how to recite the office sinned in obtaining it, and is bound diligently to learn the manner of reciting the office.

IV. Question II. *What infirmity excuses from reciting the Hours?* Answer. A certain and precise rule cannot be designated. The precepts of the Church, like the evangelical precepts, are precepts of charity, insofar as all things promote charity; wherefore they do not oblige with grave detriment to one's own health. A sick man lying abed must be treated benignly. He who has suffered a fever for several days is exempted from the office for a fitting interval of time. Some speak too laxly on this argument. They teach that those do not sin who read tales or histories, or converse with friends, even though they omit the office, while they labor under a quartan fever: because, they say, the reading of tales and conversations with friends recreate the soul, while the recitation of the office afflicts the sick man. To remove doubts and perplexities, dispensation must be sought from a Superior.

V. Question III. *What occupation exempts from reciting the office?* Answer. An occupation which cannot be deferred, and which redounds to the spiritual good of the Neighbor, exempts from the Canonical Hours. Leander excuses from saying the office those who are about to give a public lecture for obtaining a chair or a degree. This opinion is altogether false to me. I do not deny that a case of exemption can sometimes occur; but this happens very rarely. Leander teaches things more lax still concerning daily Preachers in the time of Lent, all of whom — even those who preach not from obedience, but voluntarily and for a wage — he exempts from reciting the divine office. Hear his own words: "I answer that it is also more probable that even the daily Preacher, who preaches daily in Lent only voluntarily, or for a wage, is excused from saying the daily Hours, if he cannot conveniently recite them ... And surely if this our opinion were not probable, and safe in practice, woe, woe to the Lenten Preachers; a thousand times woe to them." Thus far Leander, the most benign among the Probabilists. But woe, and a thousand times woe, to those Casuists who dare to write such things. Is he who preaches voluntarily and for a wage every day exempt from reciting the Canonical Hours? Who can hear these things without scandal? If the precept of prayer presses most frequently, when does it oblige more strongly than when the apostolic ministry is being exercised? And besides, the contrary experience of all pious Preachers proves that this debt can also be paid during that time.

VI. Pious works voluntarily undertaken, urgent necessity being absent, do not excuse from the office. He who foresees a future impediment is bound to anticipate the office, whatever certain men say to the contrary.

VII. Question IV. *He who cannot recite the greater part of the office — is he bound to recite the lesser?* Answer. Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament, treatise 8, disputation 5, question 52, defends the denying opinion as not only probable, but more probable. Fr. Tommaso Tamburini, book 2 on the Decalogue,

chapter 5, § 8, number 3, defends the same, and cites for it Azor, Castropalao, Sanchez, Filliucci; and Leander alleges many others. This opinion was condemned by Innocent XI. Its falsity is manifest. For the divine office is a certain moral whole, consisting of seven parts, each of which constitutes a certain peculiar whole. For each of the seven Hours completes an entire and perfect prayer. He who cannot pay an entire debt — say a hundred — but can pay twenty, is he not bound to pay the twenty? "The greater part," they say, "draws the lesser to itself: the accessory follows the principal." Ineptly are axioms of this kind applied to decisions of morals. When things are indivisible, the accessory follows the principal; not so when they can be divided and separated. That other axiom has its place in reckonings, where the greater part decides the matter; not so in other divisible matters, as is established from the condemned proposition.

VIII. He who cannot recite half the office, but can recite the other half, is bound to this, whatever Leander, Castropalao, Diana, and others say. He who lacks the Breviary, but has the Diurnal, is bound to recite the psalms of Matins, although for the denying opinion Leander, question 60, cites Pellizzari, Tamburini, Filliucci, Diana, and others.

IX. Question V. *Who can dispense from reciting the office?* Answer. The supreme Pontiff, as the supreme guardian of the laws and the maker of ecclesiastical law, can dispense, for a just cause, throughout the universal Church. Bishops too, in their own diocese, can dispense — not in perpetuity, but according to the variety of circumstances, a just cause occurring. Similarly, Regular Prelates can dispense their Religious for a time, a just cause pressing.

Chapter X — On the obligation of Canons to frequent choir, that they may earn the daily distributions; and on the causes excusing them from the frequenting of choir

I. Question I. *Does a Canon, or Prebendary, sin deadly who, legitimate cause being absent, is absent from choir?* Answer. The Theologians commonly affirm it, and gather this from the Council of Trent, session 24, chapter 12. For these are bound to choir by a stricter tie than Regulars. Wherefore Tamburini does not excuse Canons from choir even if there were only two, as he excuses Regulars. Canons are also guilty of sin who are absent from choir with the intention of forgoing the distributions owed for the time during which they are absent, because prebendaries are bound to frequent choir not only for the distributions, as though hired for a wage, but chiefly on account of the primary institution of the benefice. And this opinion the graver Theologians defend — Suárez, Vasquez, the Salmanticenses, and Leander. But whether a Canon sins mortally who, beyond the time of his vacation, is absent from choir once or twice, or for a single day, without just cause, I do not dare to define: because questions of mortal sin are not to be decided without evident reason.

II. Question II. *Are Canons bound to chant the psalms and sing in choir, in such a way that they do not satisfy by mere presence, or by reciting privately in a subdued voice?* Answer. Canons are not bound to sing the chant called figured, but are bound to chant the psalms and sing according to the customary rite of their own Church.

III. The Salmanticenses teach that, by a custom introduced especially in Spain, Canons or Beneficiaries are not bound of themselves to sing or chant in choir; but it suffices for fulfilling their duty and earning the distributions...

to attend, the burden of singing being left to the Ministers and Chaplains. They also allege Suárez, but falsely.

IV. This opinion is false to me, and disapproved not only by the graver Theologians, but also by several Councils. St. Charles Borromeo, part 2, title 38; the Council of Bordeaux in the year 1582; the Council of Tours in the same year; the fourth Council of Milan, part 2, chapter 13; the Council of Basel, session 21; the provincial Council of Florence in the year 1573 — all command that Canons and Prebendaries chant the psalms in choir according to the rite prescribed by the Church. Canons, then, do not satisfy by mere presence, but by vocal psalmody and chant. "They sing," you will say, "through the Mansionaries and Chaplains." But the burden of frequenting choir and of paying the divine office touches and affects Canons first. Just as their residence and presence cannot be supplied by others, so neither can the debt of reciting the office in choir together, in a clear and raised voice.

V. Our opinion is confirmed by the supreme Pontiff Benedict XIV, who in his constitution *Cum semper*, which stands in the Bullarium, Tome 1, number 103, page 366, prescribes these things, § 24: "Indeed I know that in some metropolitan and cathedral Churches this opinion has prevailed among the Canons, that they contend they sufficiently fulfill their duty while they are present in choir — even if they impose silence upon themselves, and do not join in the chant with the Beneficiaries or Mansionaries who are chanting the psalms. In confirmation of this opinion, inveterate customs, peculiar statutes, or even alleged privileges of their Churches are commonly adduced by these same men. But since the Tridentine Synod, session 24, chapter 12, speaking of the Dignitaries and Canons who must be present in choir, says that one of their offices is, in the choir instituted for chanting the psalms, to praise the name of God reverently, distinctly, and devoutly with hymns and canticles; and since there are altogether few Chapters in which the Canons attend choir in that manner, and therefore it is recognized that those few dissent from the discipline received in the universal Church; and since, moreover, that opinion, having never been proposed for interpretation to the Congregation of the Council of Trent, has been examined only to be at once exploded and disapproved — although it was upheld by presumed customs and other foundations and reasons, with the Canons even of the patriarchal Churches of this our city pressing the point; and since, finally, the same judgment is found to have been pronounced by several provincial Councils, approved and confirmed even by this apostolic See — nothing now seems to remain but that the fewer conform themselves to the law of all. Indeed it is by no means clear to us by what peculiar title supported the Canons of this or that Church have persuaded themselves that they satisfy their office by simple presence in choir without singing the divine psalmody. But unless there stands ready for them an apostolic privilege or indult — not presumed or abrogated, but legitimate and in force — it is rightly and deservedly to be feared that these men, while so conducting themselves, do not at all make their own the fruits of the prebends and distributions, and consequently that they are bound to their restitution. Wherefore it will be yours, venerable Brothers, to lay all these things open to them, that it be a fraud neither upon us nor upon you before the divine Judge, if in a matter of such great moment — since it regards proximately the very worship of God — we are found to have fostered and confirmed by our dissimulation and silence the abuses and corruptions which we ought to have uprooted by arguing and rebuking, etc." Given at Rome, at St. Mary Major, on the 19th day of August, 1744, the fifth year of our Pontificate.

VI. Of a cast-away and desperate conscience would those Canons be who, blind in so great a light, and stopping their ears to such luminous documents, should persist in a depraved corruption. The supreme Pontiff explodes the mask of the opposite custom by the authority alleged of the Council of Trent. He adds that the sacred Congregation of the Council, erected at Rome, has disapproved this putrid custom as often as it was proposed to it. Whither now will Canons and Prebendaries betake themselves?

VII. The Pontiff, they say, does not define the matter. For he concludes: *It is rightly and deservedly to be feared that these men, while so conducting themselves, do not at all make their own the fruits of the prebends and distributions*. "To be feared," says the Pontiff, not "to be defined." Must what the Pontiff declares has been so often defined by several Councils be defined anew? Does the Pontiff not declare that the Congregation of the Council, and several Provincial Councils confirmed by the holy See, have disapproved the lax opinion and the depraved corruption? Do the Vatican thunderbolts alone bend down the necks of the obstinate? Unless these darts seek the throat, certain men by no means acquiesce in reasons, however most luminous — men who cavil at words, and do not seriously and with a docile mind meditate the spirit of the apostolic constitutions.

VIII. Let them hear again, then, Benedict XIV, who in another of his diplomas, given to the Patriarch Daniele Delfino of Aquileia, whose beginning is *Dilecte Fili... Preclara decora*, confirms what he said in the aforesaid constitution, and closes every crevice for escape. "Furthermore, we do not wish it to be numbered among so many and so great privileges granted to that same Chapter and Canons, that which — as is known equally to you as to us — introduced by ancient tradition against the sanctions of the sacred canons, and especially against our constitution whose beginning is *Cum super oblatas*, is not only contended for but even observed by the Canons themselves: namely, that of being present in choir only, and assisting with the other Mansionaries, Chaplains, Acolytes, and Clerics who chant and sing the psalms, but never of chanting or singing the psalms with them — although we have learned that some of these, holding a different opinion, are agitated by anguishes of conscience from this, that they judge they have not for that reason made the fruits their own. We therefore ask and urgently require of you, beloved Son, that you not only strive utterly to uproot and eradicate this abuse and corruption, discordant with ecclesiastical discipline and contrary to the canonical ordinations and also to our own constitution, but that you also sweetly and firmly admonish and exhort them that henceforth they attend and assist in choir with that reverence which is fitting and which they are bound to, and with equal piety, attention, and vigilance strive and contend to sing or chant the psalms with the rest. Then you shall proclaim to them, and make known, that we — as we declare and enjoin to you by these our letters in the form of a Brief — decree and ordain, as we have intimated in the same our constitution, that they and their successor Canons, being present and assisting in choir but not chanting or singing the psalms, do not in any way make the fruits their own from the prebends and distributions, and are and will be subject to restitution. But, mercifully indulging those who, agitated by the stings of conscience over this matter, take refuge with you, we grant and impart to you the faculty that, either through yourself or through others to be deputed by you, each and every Canon who perceives that he has failed in singing or chanting the psalms in choir with the others (provided he promise that he will henceforth take entire care to be present and assist in choir, and to sing or chant with the others) may be able and empowered to obtain absolution from the fault, and a dispensation from all the fruits unduly received. Furthermore, we will and command that no indults or privileges of this kind — which we grant and bestow, by these same present letters,

upon each present and future Canon, in regard of your merits — shall avail those Canons who, although present and assisting in choir, nevertheless do not sing or chant the psalms at all. Furthermore we ask you, our beloved Son, and exhort you in the Lord, that with the same zeal with which we, inclined by your supplications..."

by your supplications, have increased these same Canons with new privileges of apostolic benignity and authority, take care to satisfy our own reasoning and yours as Pastors, to be rendered to Jesus Christ the eternal Judge, the Prince of Pastors; and, this abuse and corruption being utterly removed, that you strive to promote and increase divine worship through the chant of divine psalmody, so that not less the Canons themselves than we ourselves may in turn deserve to obtain an eternal reward from God, the bestower of all good things. Meanwhile we desire the apostolic blessing to be the auspice of heavenly protection, and the pledge of our zealous will to gratify you, which we most lovingly impart to you, our beloved Son, and to these same Canons. Given at Rome, at St. Mary Major, under the Fisherman's ring, on the 19th day of January, 1747, the eighth year of our Pontificate."

IX. If the Pontiff in the earlier constitution said *it is to be feared*, in this latest diploma he pronounces that they do not make the fruits their own in any way, and declares the Canons subject to restitution. This petty opposite opinion runs contrary not only to reasons, to Councils, and to pontifical authority, but to common sense itself. Pious Faithful, Christian Princes, have given goods and rich revenues to Churches, that Ecclesiastics, set apart from worldly cares, established as intercessors and advocates between God and the people, might celebrate the divine praises, and render God propitious to the people. What then? Have the Faithful enriched Churches with revenues, and indeed most abundant ones, so that lord Prebendaries and Canons might exhibit themselves in choir as statues, trunks, and stocks? These things, say the cited authors, savor not of unseemliness, but display comeliness and splendor: since the Canons and Dignitaries adorn and grace the Church by their own presence and mute lips, especially in the more celebrated Basilicas; while the Chaplains and Mansionaries chant and sing. Is it unbecoming for the lord Canons to address, praise, and celebrate the praises of God with their own lips? Through their ministers, the Chaplains and Mansionaries, they dare to address God. Come now. If you had appointed an Advocate, a price paid, to plead your cause before the Prince, and to render him favorable to you, would he be discharging his office if, no word having been made to the Prince on your behalf, he presented himself to the Prince as a statue? What if he addressed the Prince only through his servants? You would cry out: I hired you, I paid you, that you should plead my cause. Hurl the same against Canons and Prebendaries mute in choir. Why did Christians and Princes enrich you with annual revenues? Why did they bind you to frequent choir? What is the purpose of choir? The psalmody by which God is praised, and made propitious to the faithful people. For this reason, then, you ought to be present in choir: that by psalms and hymns you may avert the divine vengeance from the people. Therefore, if you do not chant the psalms, the presence of your body is a mockery and a laughing-stock. You sin, if you are absent in body; therefore you sin, if you are silent in mouth, and your spirit wanders elsewhere. These things are so luminous that they could illumine even the blind themselves.

X. Question III. *Do those absent from choir for a legitimate cause acquire not only the distributions owed for their own presence, but also those that accrue from others who are absent without cause?* Answer. Some affirm it; but

the more probable and true opinion denies it. It suffices that they acquire what is owed for their own presence. If in some place the opposite custom prevails, that custom must be kept.

XI. Question IV. *Can Prebendaries who are present rightly give to those absent without cause the distributions?* Answer. This gift, and mutual collusion, the Council of Trent, session 24, chapter 12, forbids. The Theologians dispute whether the Tridentine so forbids these things that they are invalid, and not merely illicit. Some deny it; but the affirming opinion is true: since the Council forbids all collusion, remission, and donation, so that all hope be cut off from the absent of obtaining, in whatever way, the distributions lost on account of unjust absence. Can each not give his own goods? True enough. A Prebendary can give the distributions he has received to whomever he wishes; but before receiving and possessing them, since he has only a right to them, he would be remitting, not giving. But remission is forbidden by the Council. Moreover, donation is forbidden if a tacit collusion intervenes. Canons absent and present could enter into a mutual collusion, and under the mask of a gift mutually remit the distributions to one another. Let them give to one another, if they wish, their own goods, outside this case of the distributions.

XII. Question V. *What are the causes excusing Canons from the frequenting of choir?* Answer. Three are assigned: infirmity of body, a just and reasonable necessity, and the evident utility of the Church. As to the first, only a grave, not a light, infirmity excuses. What infirmity is grave, and what light, cannot be absolutely defined, but must be left to the judgment of a prudent man. If a Canon dwells outside the place of his residence without just cause, and there falls ill, he does not enjoy the privilege granted to the sick, because he is reputed absent through his own fault, and so does not make the distributions his own. Those laboring under gout, which impedes going out of the house and access to choir, acquire the distributions. The same must be said of old men who cannot leave the house without probable danger of a grave infirmity. It is a lax and false opinion of those who assert that men of seventy are exempt from choir, on the ground that their very advanced age is itself a disease. In some it is a disease which can excuse; not so in others. Therefore the proposition, stated absolutely, is false: for the septuagenarian, as above, if he has strength, is bound to recite.

XIII. A reasonable necessity is reckoned when the frequenting of choir would bring about some grave harm to honor, life, or fortune. He who by a Physician's counsel stays at home to take medicine, or to be bled, does not lose the distributions; nor does he who is captured by enemies, who is detained by force, or who does not leave his house from a just fear of an enemy. Those absent from the place of residence out of fear of a plague can receive the fruits of the benefice, but not the distributions: since, if they do not wish to be subject to the common danger, neither ought they to receive the advantage. He who has the care of souls can in no way be absent. One unjustly detained in prison acquires the distributions, but not one justly detained. Similarly, one justly excommunicated loses the distributions, but not one subject to unjust excommunication, provided he takes care to be absolved from the excommunication. One justly excommunicated, though present in choir, does not acquire the distributions, nor the fruits of the benefice. Garcia asserts that the contrary custom prevails in Spain. One justly suspended loses the fruits of the benefice and the distributions, although he attends choir; not so one unjustly suspended, who acquires the distributions even absent from choir. Similarly, when a Church is under interdict, if the Canons did not give cause for the Interdict, they acquire the distributions. But in the time of cessation from divine offices, during which the Canons cannot celebrate the divine praises, they lose the distributions, because Gregory X so declared,

chapter *Si Canonici*. Nor is the reasoning the same for an Interdict and for a cessation: because with respect to the latter there is a prohibition, but not with respect to the former. When a Church is polluted, the Canons acquire the distributions, because it is not through their fault that it is polluted. An irregular person acquires the distributions, because irregularity does not impede attending the divine offices.

XIV. The third cause excusing from the frequenting of choir is the evident utility of the Church, which must be grave and manifest, and of one's own Church, not another's. A doubtful utility does not confer this privilege. The utility of the universal Church produces both fruits and distributions, provided it be manifest. Now there is grave and manifest utility when, by the consent of the Chapter or the Ordinary, it is so judged; and then the absent person acquires the distributions and fruits, even if he be outside the place of the benefice. A Canon sent by his own Bishop to visit the thresholds of the Apostles acquires the distributions, because he then does the business of the Church. The same must be said of a Canon accompanying his Bishop to the same thresholds. A Bishop can send only one...

but he can take two with him to the aforesaid thresholds. But a Canon who accompanied another Church's name, or another Bishop, to the aforesaid thresholds, would not acquire the distributions. If a Parish priest were sent by the Bishop to visit the thresholds of the Apostles, he could receive the distributions only for a period of two months, because beyond this interval the Bishop cannot occupy the curate of souls in other business if the pastoral ministry is thereby impeded. A Canon sent by the Bishop to a general or provincial Council as Theologian, Canonist, or Procurator would acquire the distributions. But if the Canon be a Bishop, and go as Bishop, not as Canon, then he would not acquire the distributions, unless he transacted the business of his own Church. Similarly a Canon occupied by the Chapter in computing the Church's revenues, of the common fund or of the fabric, acquires the distributions. A Canon elected Vicar by the Chapter, or provisor, when the See is vacant, acquires the distributions while absent from choir on account of the evident utility of the Church; not so if he were elected Vicar of the Bishop, because then he would serve the Bishop, not the Church. An Archdeacon too, visiting the Church or the Church's estates, acquires the distributions. He who at the time of the divine office confesses his own sins does not acquire the distributions. The Cathedral Penitentiary, who at the time of the divine office hears confessions, does not lose the distributions; nor do other Prebendaries who, by mandate of a Superior, on account of a great concourse, are occupied in such a ministry; but other Prebendaries who spontaneously hear confessions would lose the distributions. A Prebendary to whom the cure of souls is annexed acquires the distributions while he devotes himself to administering the sacraments, just as one who is occupied in defending the rights of the benefice acquires them.

XV. A Canon Theologian absent from choir to give lectures or to preach acquires the distributions on the days on which he exercises these duties; not so on the days on which he prepares himself for these same ministries. The reasonable customs of localities must nevertheless be regarded. Prebendaries lecturing on Theology in some University, or in a General House of Studies, acquire the fruits of the prebend, but not the distributions. For only the Prebendary who lectures in his own Church acquires the distributions. Parish priests publicly lecturing on Theology do not enjoy this privilege if they are absent from their own parishes for the sake of lecturing. Prebendaries devoted to study in some University acquire the fruits of the benefice, but not the distributions — provided they

apply themselves to Canon Law, to Theology, to sacred Scripture; if they study Civil Law, they do not enjoy this privilege. Such studying Prebendaries must, however, obtain license from the Ordinary, that they may be able to receive the fruits. If these Prebendaries are Parish priests, they cannot be absent from their own parishes even by license of the Bishop, as the Tridentine prescribes. Those who are absent from choir for the sake of study acquire the fruits of the benefice for five years, even if the benefice consists solely of distributions: because in this case the distributions take the place of the fruits, and put on their nature. Non-curate Canons who are absent for three months each year gain the fruits, but not the distributions. To enjoy this privilege, it is required that they reside for the whole year and frequent choir. Hence a Canon who takes possession in the middle of the year does not enjoy the privilege of three months, but only half of that same privilege. This privilege can be used either before or after a residence of nine months. Those who are absent from choir for a notable part of the year are unworthy of this privilege. A Canon who holds a double benefice, such as a Canonry and a Deanery, acquires simple, not double, distributions, which are given on account of attendance, which, since it is single, one distribution alone ought to correspond to it. And let this suffice concerning the Canonical Hours. For of the various customs of Churches nothing occurs to be said, since almost every Church has its own usages and customs.

Dissertation VII — On adoration, and the worship of God and of the Saints

Chapter I — On adoration, its division, and its precept

I. Question I. *What, and of how many kinds, is adoration?* Answer. Taken generally, it is an act by which someone subjects himself to another in testimony of that other's excellence. There are as many adorations as there are kinds of dignity. There are two dignities, uncreated and created. To the uncreated divine Majesty is owed the adoration called Latria. To creatures, on account of the supernatural excellence of grace and sanctity participated from God, is owed an adoration far inferior, which is called Dulia. To the Blessed Virgin, who after God stands eminent above all the Saints, is owed the adoration called Hyperdulia.

II. Adoration is one interior, the other exterior. The former subjects the spirit inwardly to God; the latter breaks forth into exterior acts. Again, one adoration is absolute, and the other respective. The absolute is owed to God alone; the respective, to the Saints: for we worship the Saints for God's sake, or we adore God in his Saints. For the worship which we offer to the Saints is always referred to God, as to the supreme Lord, from whom the Saints receive a share in their dignity and excellence.

III. The adoration which is shown to creatures on account of their natural gifts and dignities is commonly called *observance*, and can be shown by the same exterior signs by which God is worshipped. For the exterior actions of the body are absolutely indifferent of themselves. By kneeling, by prostration of the body, God is adored. Similarly, by these signs Judith, having seen Holofernes, adored him, prostrating herself upon the earth: chapter 10. By kneeling, and by bending the body, we worship supreme Pontiffs, Princes, and Kings. Exterior adoration, then, that it be made divine, depends upon the intention of the one adoring, unless it be destined, by some peculiar law, rite, custom, or circumstance, for the adoration of God. Wherefore, when private persons perform such actions publicly, it does not suffice that they have a good intention, but the circumstances of time, place, nation, and custom must be regarded.

IV. Question II. *Is there a divine precept of adoring God with acts both internal and external?* Answer. The affirming opinion is certain, of faith. This commandment is affirmative insofar as it commands the worship of God, and negative insofar as it forbids that the worship owed to God alone be paid always and forever to creatures. This precept, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges of itself at fixed times. God must be worshipped in every place; yet temples have been erected in which sacrifices and the solemn rites of divine worship are celebrated.

V. Question III. *Must Christ the Lord be adored as man with the worship of latria?* Answer. The worship of latria is owed to the one and triune God alone: *The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve*: Matthew 4. Each divine Person, then, can and must be adored by us both conjointly and severally. Wherefore that Christ, as the second Person of the Trinity, must be adored by us with the worship of latria is certain. It could only be disputed whether he must be adored with such worship as man. And this too the Theologians affirm, in this sense: that in Christ the Lord there is one hypostasis, and one subject of infinite dignity, to whom the worship of latria is owed. But to the humanity of Christ, as abstracted from the divine Word, only the worship of hyperdulia is owed,

because thus it betokens only a finite dignity. During the three days of death, the body of Christ had to be adored with the worship of latria, because it was conjoined with the divine Word. The same must be said of the body of Christ in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, hypostatically conjoined to the divine Person, as the Council of Trent defined against Luther. The consecrated Host must be adored absolutely, no express condition being added. It suffices that a Catholic be so disposed in affection that, if he knew it were not consecrated, he would abstain from adoration.

VI. Question IV. *Must the Cross of Christ be adored with the worship of latria?* Answer. All Catholics affirm it: since the Cross of Christ is his image. Now the image of Christ is adored with the same worship as Christ himself. But the Cross to which Christ was affixed must be adored with the worship of latria, not only because it is a symbol and image of Christ, but also on account of physical contact, and that precious blood with which it was sprinkled. The other inanimate instruments of Christ's passion too must be adored with the worship of latria, on account of physical contact.

VII. The arguments which the Heretics are wont to object — that we worship wood and metals — are lies and calumnies: for in the recounted figures and symbols we worship Christ himself. The Cross of Christ is worshipped, not as the infamous gibbet chosen by the Jews to punish Christ with a most shameful death, but as the banner of victory, and the instrument which Christ used to free us from the power of the devil. Nor is there anything for them to snarl about, that the hands of the Blessed Virgin, of Joseph, of the Disciples, which touched Christ's body, would have to be adored with the worship of latria: since instruments destitute of soul are not capable of worship, considered in themselves; therefore the whole worship which we show to them is referred to Christ. The Blessed Virgin and the other Saints are adorned with an intimate excellence, and so are worthy of worship, although we refer even the very worship which we render to the Saints unto God, as St. Thomas teaches, III, q. 25, art. 5, ad 3. We adore those Crosses which have been instituted and destined to represent Christ's passion. Other crosses which by chance arise fortuitously in wood, straw, or other things are not to be adored, but must be disregarded like other pieces of wood.

Chapter II — On the worship owed to the Blessed Virgin, the Angels, the Saints, sacred Images, and the Relics of the Saints

I. Question I. *Is worship owed to the Blessed Virgin, the Angels, and the Saints?* Answer. Although God alone must be adored with the worship of latria, this by no means prevents us from venerating other persons with an inferior worship, on account of their peculiar conjunction with God. The Blessed Virgin stands eminent above all creatures, next after God; therefore she is worshipped with a peculiar worship, which we call hyperdulia. The Angels and the other holy men of God are adored with the worship of dulia. It is, then, of faith that the Blessed Virgin and the Saints reigning with God are to be worshipped with some adoration; and this was defined in the second Council of Nicaea, actions 2 and 3, and in the Tridentine. Innumerable testimonies of the Scriptures and of the Fathers the catholic Theologians adduce in confirmation of this truth against the most recent Heretics. Natalis Alexander, dissertation 25 of the fifth-century history, brings forward documents of every age.

II. The Angel, Apocalypse 22, forbade himself to be adored, as also did SS. Peter and Paul, as is had in the Acts of the Apostles. St. Thomas answers, II-II, q. 84, art. 5, ad 1: *With one veneration we venerate God, which pertains to latria; and with another veneration we venerate certain excellent creatures, which pertains to dulia ... Therefore, according to the reverence which is owed to an excellent creature, David adored Nathan; but*

according to the reverence which is owed to God, Mardochai refused to adore Aman, fearing lest he should transfer the honor of God to a man, as is said in Esther chapter 13. And similarly, according to the reverence owed to an excellent creature, Abraham adored Angels, and so did Joshua, as is read in Joshua chapter 5 — although it can be understood that they adored, with the adoration of latria, God who was appearing and speaking in the person of the Angel. But according to the reverence which is owed to God, John was forbidden to adore the Angel, in the last chapter of the Apocalypse: both to show the dignity of man, which he has attained through Christ, so as to be made equal to the Angels — whence it is added there: I am thy fellow servant, and of thy brethren; and also to exclude an occasion of idolatry — whence it is added: Adore God.

III. By this angelic doctrine all the sophisms of the Heretics are routed. What they obtrude — that this distinction of the worship of latria and dulia is nowhere indicated in the holy Scriptures, and was unknown in the first centuries of the Church — is of no weight. Doubtless the verbal distinction is not found in the holy Scriptures, but it is taught in very deed. St. Augustine mentions our distinction, book 10 of the City of God, chapter 1, and book 20 Against Faustus, chapter 21, where he has many things against the Heretics who calumniate us for erecting temples and altars to the Saints. For we erect temples and altars to God alone, and to him alone we offer sacrifices, although we do this under the invocation and name of the Saints.

IV. Question II. *Is the use of sacred images licit and pious?* Answer. All Catholics affirm it, and the Tridentine Synod defined this, session 24, decree 2. All adoration of sacred images is respective. It is licit to form an image of God the Father, and of each Person of the Trinity. Wherefore Alexander VIII deservedly condemned this thesis: *It is a nefarious thing for a Christian to place a simulacrum of God the Father seated in a Temple.* These sacred symbols are painted, that our mind be excited by these sensible signs to the worship of God. For the invisible things of God, understood, are seen through the things that are made.

V. Question III. *Can sacred images be adored?* Answer. Not only is the use of sacred images pious, but their worship too is pious and useful, as the sacred Councils have defined — especially the second of Nicaea, of Florence, and of Trent. Yet no other worship, as Bellarmine contends with others, is shown to sacred images than that which is attributed to the prototype.

VI. Question IV. *Is there a precept of having and adoring sacred images?* Answer. Of the use of sacred images there is no precept, whether natural or divine. But that an ecclesiastical precept has been introduced by custom with respect to the community of the Faithful is certain. We are commanded to adorn temples and altars with sacred images, and it is forbidden that a sacrifice be celebrated without an image of the Crucified. This precept, however, does not seem to bind individual Faithful, although a Catholic who should abstain from all use of sacred images could scarcely be excused from fault. The precept also presses that forbids their contempt. Now in practice a Catholic either adores or scorns them: for in practice one can scarcely prescind from either extreme.

VII. Question V. *Are sacred relics to be adored?* Answer. All Catholics affirm that sacred relics are worthy of adoration, as has been defined in several Councils: the second of Nicaea, action 3; the fifth of Carthage, chapter 5; the second Lateran, chapter 42; the Tridentine, session 24. And sacred relics must be worshipped with that adoration with which the persons whose parts they are, are worshipped. For relics are particles of the bodies of Saints — such as hairs, bones, nails, blood, teeth, ashes, garments, veils, cloths, and other things which touched their bodies, or which the Saints used. It is not licit to worship the worms of Saints' bodies, either privately or publicly, whatever Vasquez,

Sanchez, and Castropalao say to the contrary. That sacred relics may be licitly and publicly worshipped, they must be of some Saint or Blessed by the public judgment of the Church; and, that the certainty necessary for showing worship may be had, the testimony of a Bishop asserting that this relic belongs to this or that Saint is required. The stealing of sacred relics is sacrilegious theft; and the selling of them is not free of simony. Similarly, sacred lambs, blessed with solemn rite by the supreme Pontiffs and destined for sacred use, are worthy of veneration. It is forbidden to paint them with colors and vermilion, and by a stronger right to sell them. A price can be exacted only for the material of which they are made. Care must nevertheless be taken lest, under the pretext either of the material or of the case in which they are enclosed, the price be increased, and simony lie hidden.

VIII. Priestly vestments, sacred vessels, and temples are worthy of veneration, since they are destined for the worship of God. Chalices and Corporals cannot be touched by Laymen, except by force of a privilege granted to lay Regulars, while they serve in the sacristy.

IX. Confessors and Preachers must instruct the Faithful...

diligently in the worship of the Saints, and warn them that all worship must ultimately be referred to God, whom they must worship in his Saints. The Blessed Virgin, the Angels, and the Saints are all creatures, who are worshipped only for God's sake, or on account of their intimate conjunction with God. The people are prone to superstition; therefore they must be diligently instructed.

Dissertation VIII — On superstition, and its species

Chapter I — The definition and division of superstition. Various cases in which superstition creeps in are explained

I. Question I. *What, and of how many kinds, is superstition?* Answer. Superstition is a vice opposed to Religion by way of excess — not because it shows more toward the divine worship than true Religion, but because it shows divine worship either to that to which it should not, or in a manner in which it should not, as St. Thomas says, II-II, q. 92, art. 5.

II. First, it is divided into two species. The one worships God in an undue manner; the other attributes to a creature the worship owed to God. The first superstition is divided into other superstitions. The first consists in this, that a false, or pernicious, worship is attributed to God — as if someone should now worship God with the ceremonies of the Jews, or if someone should intend to confirm the catholic Religion with false miracles, or should mix shameful things with the divine offices. The other species of superstition, on the part of the undue manner of worshipping God, is when superfluous worship is attributed to God — as if someone should establish, at his own pleasure, certain manners of praying, such as wishing to pray only after sunset, or only after sunrise; or to hear Mass only of a Priest called Anthony, and no other name; or with just so many candles, no more and no fewer; or of this color, and no other; or if, neglecting the ceremonies prescribed by the Church, he should invent others for himself at his own pleasure — he would be guilty of superstition.

III. The second species of superstition, on the part of the thing worshipped, is when worship is shown to that to which it ought not to be shown — as if worship instituted for divine reverence be attributed to any creature whatever; then it is called idolatry. If, God being spurned, someone consults demons, some pact being entered into either expressly or tacitly, there is had, on the part of the thing worshipped, another species of superstition, which is called divination. The third species of superstition, on the part of the object worshipped, is when the divine worship, which is ordered to the direction of human acts according to the institutions of God, who is worshipped, is offered to the demon, from whom help is sought, and is called vain observance.

IV. Superstition on the part of the manner of worshipping God, by showing him false worship, is by its nature a grave sin. Likewise it is a sin to mix profane and shameful things with divine worship. A most grave crime too is perpetrated by those who preach fictitious miracles, and propose false relics to be adored.

V. Several cases occur in which superstition lurks. 1. Guilty of superstition are those who ring a bell with a pregnant woman's belt, that the delivery may turn out prosperous — as are those who throw an image of a Saint into a river, or hang it on the riverbank, that they may obtain rain, since there is no connection given between cause and effect. It is otherwise if a sacred object were thrown into a river or fire in the hope that, by that Saint's intercession, God might be moved to extinguish the fire, or to check the flooding waters. 2. Superstitious are the prayers by which witches bless Rosaries for women in labor; similarly, to recite certain fixed verses of some Psalm to check a dog's barking, or to

stop a flow of blood, or another disease, with a vain credulity of a certain outcome, savors of superstition; it is otherwise if someone recites prayers to implore divine help. 3. Superstitious are the words that are breathed into horses' ears to expel intestinal pains. 4. Superstitious is the gathering of herbs on the day of St. John the Baptist, if it is done with the credulity that these herbs are reckoned to have more virtue because they were gathered on the day of such a Saint. 5. It is superstition to refuse to sit at table if there are thirteen, with the persuasion that one of them will die within that year; and to refuse to cut one's nails on a Friday. 6. Guilty of superstition are those who anoint and treat with medicaments the sword with which they wounded an enemy, that the wounded man may recover his health; likewise those who use a thread hung from the fingers, from which hangs a ring inside a glass vessel or jar, for striking and distinguishing the hours. Finally, the general rule is: when there is no connection between cause and effect, then such actions are at the very least suspect of superstition.

VI. Question II. *What is idolatry, and in how many ways is it perpetrated?* Answer. It is divine worship shown to a creature, not as it is an image of God, but as it is a creature. There are five ways of perpetrating idolatry: 1. the adoration of simulacra; 2. the adoration of creatures, for instance of the sky, the earth, etc.; 3. the adoration of dead men; 4. the adoration of demons; 5. the adoration of the world, as though animate. The crime of idolatry is most grave.

VII. Question III. *What, and of how many kinds, is divination?* Answer. Divination is the foretelling of future things. Future things can be foreknown in one way in their causes, in another way in themselves. Of causes, some are natural and necessary, which necessarily produce effects. He who knows these causes cannot be ignorant of the effects. Other causes produce effects not necessarily, but probably, or for the most part. These effects can only be foreknown by probable conjecture. The contingent effects of free causes are known by God alone. The prediction of future things from divine revelation is called prophecy. The prediction of future things by force of natural causes is called natural divination. The prediction of future things which is made neither by force of natural causes, nor by God revealing, but by the help of the demon alone, is properly divination, which constitutes a species of superstition, and is defined as *the foreknowledge of future things by the help of the demon*. Demons know all the effects that necessarily depend upon natural causes; those that do not necessarily depend upon them they can only conjecture. But they can in no way know what depends upon the sole will of God, or the free choice of man. Yet because in man the order of liberty is in some way connected with natural causes, demons are wont to predict conjecturally some things that pertain to free causes. Demons instruct their diviners in various ways: namely either with express words, or by producing words in the air, and sometimes with the voice of animals. Similarly diviners sometimes expressly invoke demons, renouncing Religion; sometimes they invoke the demon with certain formulas prescribed by that same demon. In both ways the pact is express. The pact is implicit when someone tries to know things that flee the keenness of the human mind, and uses vain, incongruous means forbidden by God, even though he does not wish help to be brought him by the demon: since, by the very fact that he applies the aforesaid vain and insane things, he wills in very deed to be taught by the demon. For the demon of himself mixes himself into such vain signs and chimerical observations, beyond the man's intention. All these things pertain to the implicit pact.

VIII. St. Thomas recounts various species of divination, II-II, q. 95, art. 3, which are made by an express pact. 1. There is prestige, accomplished by certain apparitions: for by these specters the eyes

of men are struck. 2. It is done through dreams, and is called the divination of dreams. 3. It is through the apparition of some dead person, and is called necromancy. 4. It foretells future things through living men, and is called divination through pythons. 5. It uses iron, wood, stone, and other inanimate things, and is called geomancy. 6. It uses water, and is called hydromancy. 7. It uses air, and is called aeromancy. 8. It applies fire, and is called pyromancy. 9. It foretells future things through the entrails of animals sacrificed to demons, and is called haruspicy.

IX. Divination which is made without an express invocation of the demon...

*is divided into two kinds. The first kind foreknows future things in causes altogether disparate, and is divided into six species. 1. There is genethlialogy, which pertains to astrologers called genethliac, who from the movement of the stars predict the births of men and their outcomes. 2. There is augury, which is done from the chattering of birds. 3. Auspice, by which future things are predicted from the flight of birds, or from the movement of other animals. 4. It is called an omen, and is a prediction from words of men uttered without intention. 5. There is chiromancy, from the lines of the hands. 6. It is called spatulamancy, when divination is made from certain signs appearing in the shoulder-blades of animals.

X. To the second kind of divination without express invocation of the demon pertain two other species: through the consideration of figures. The first is geomancy, which foretells future things from the drawing of points. The other is called through figures which arise from lead melted and thrown into water, or from certain slips of paper written and hidden secretly, or from unequal straws set out, or from the throwing of dice — all of which go under the name of "lots."

XI. Divination with a pact, whether express or tacit, is a mortal sin, as all teach. What must be said of those who set up computations of numbers and verses, and practice what is commonly called the Cabala in games, that they may divine future numbers? That these sin mortally when, with faith placed in it, they practice this Cabala, no one can deny.

XII. Question IV. *What is judicial astrology?* Answer. It is divination through the stars; and the Theologians distinguish a twofold kind. One natural, by which men, from the position, rising, movement, and setting of the stars, foretell things that happen naturally, such as rains, storms, eclipses. That this is licit no one denies. Yet this astrology can only predict effects that necessarily follow. For if the discourse be of storms, of drought, of rain, of fair weather, this astrology is for the most part vain, on account of the unknown force of the stars, and on account of the obstacles of winds and vapors, which often impede the influences of the stars. The Ephemerides, which come out each year, and which bewitch the unlearned and empty their purses, show by experience the fallacy of their predictions.

XIII. The other is judicial astrology, by which men, from the movement of the stars, the aspect of the planets, and the course of the heavenly bodies, divine certain future things — namely contingent and fortuitous events depending upon liberty alone. And this is fourfold. 1. That which from the aspect of the stars foretells the sterility of the earth, the abundance of goods, the diseases and deaths of men. This is superstitious, if such things are predicted not as certain, but only as conjectural. 2. There is the genethliac, which foretells the dignities and grades of men. 3. There is that of elections, by which in every business it is divined what is to be done, what to be omitted, when one should go out of doors, that fortunate outcomes may correspond. 4. There is that of fabricated images, by which

astrologers make figures, numbers, and characters, and compare them with the figures which they fancy are found in the sky, and from the comparison and mutual sympathy predict future events.

XIV. That these last three divinations are superstitious and forbidden, all Catholics affirm. To predict future free things even probably is a sin: because probable assent is determinate. Nor can astrologers predict future free things even conjecturally.

XV. Diviners are bound to restore the price received, for the reason that they predicted future contingent free things. Too lax is the opinion which Fr. Sanchez defends, book 2 on the Decalogue, chapter 38, number 96, saying: "But if that astrologer or diviner applied his labor, and by the devil's art the thing so came to pass, he is not bound to restore the price, because he applied his labor, even though shameful," etc. The diabolical art, then, is to be valued at a price!

XVI. Question V. *Is it licit to divine future free things through dreams?* Answer. All deny it, because future free things depend upon the will alone. Physicians licitly observe dreams which proceed from natural causes, that they may search out the causes of diseases from the abundance of humors, from the quality of the temperament. He who from dreams he has had takes occasion sometimes to moderate his morals, without placing faith in them, commits no superstition. Care must nevertheless be taken lest this happen frequently, because then there would be danger at least of superstition. Extremes are to be avoided.

XVII. Question VI. *Is it licit to predict future things from the song, flight, and movement of birds?* Answer. That natural effects can be gathered from this without the mark of superstition, all affirm. For the song and flight of birds are sometimes signs of natural effects. But it is manifest superstition to predict future contingent free things from the aforesaid signs of birds and of any animals whatever.

XVIII. Superstitious too is the prediction of future contingent things from human voices uttered by chance, or from the members of men. There are three, namely the head, the hands, and the feet, which astrologers are wont to observe. Prediction from the observation of the lines of the hand is called chiromancy; that from the lines of the feet, podomancy; that from the quality of the forehead and countenance, metoposcopy; that from the whole body is called physiognomy. To divine future contingent free things from all these is superstitious. It is otherwise if from the aforesaid someone should conjecture, by mere natural astrology, temperament, health, diseases. Wherefore those sin gravely who place faith in Egyptians, commonly called Gypsies.

XIX. Question VII. *Is the use of lots licit in the election to ecclesiastical benefices or secular dignities?* Answer. There is a threefold lot: divisory, consultative, divinatory. Divisory lots are licit, since they are nothing else than a mutual pact by which men agree that, from the outcome of the lots, it be decided to whom honor, dignity, or property is owed. Wherefore lay dignities, when merits are equal, can licitly be conferred by lots; not so ecclesiastical benefices, because this is guarded against in the chapter *Ecclesia*, extra, On lot-casting. Yet this election to ecclesiastical benefices by lots is illicit only, not invalid. But the election of a Prelate of the Church, who has jurisdiction both in criminal and in civil matters, made by the ministry of lots, is null: because this is so determined in the chapter *Quia propter*, On elections. It is similarly licit to settle lawsuits about temporal goods by force of lots; not so lawsuits about elections to ecclesiastical benefices, unless this be done by public authority to declare an obscure matter.

XX. Question VIII. *Is consultative lot-casting licit?* Answer. There is a twofold cause of consultative lot-casting, namely God, or the demon. If the outcome of consultative lot-casting is awaited from the demon, it is called divinatory lot-casting, which is superstitious. If the knowledge of a future event is implored from God, it is licit, as is established by many testimonies of divine Scripture, the conditions of urgent necessity, obedience to God, and the exclusion of anything profane being kept.

XXI. Question IX. *What, and of how many kinds, is vain observance?* Answer. Vain observance is a superstition which uses vain and inept instruments to produce some exterior effect. This is threefold: 1. notorial; 2. observance of health; 3. observance of future events. The notorial is both illicit and vain, because it uses inept means for acquiring knowledge, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 96; and so it needs the help of the demon, and an implicit pact intervenes with the demon. The healing art, or observance of health, similarly applies disparate means — namely ceremonies, astronomical images, arbitrary prayers for curing diseases, no hope being had in God; and therefore it is full of superstition. For if sacred images and the relics of Saints are applied to the sick, and prayers are recited to implore divine aid, any vain observance being excluded, then the matter is not only licit, but even commendable.

XXII. It is a superstitious thing to utter sacred words for...

moving a ring hanging from a thread, because these words have no virtue for producing such a movement. Wherefore if movement occurs, it is from the demon. Superstition is also committed by those who wear hung about the neck amulets, or ligatures of remedies, which are by their own nature inept for driving away diseases.

XXIII. Observance of future events is the prediction of prosperous or adverse fortune from signs altogether vain for foreknowing such things — as if someone should observe days, times, chance meetings with men, and things of that kind, and be moved by these to do or omit something as ill-omened. St. Augustine, book 2 On Christian Doctrine, recounts several species of this kind of superstition.

Chapter II — On natural and superstitious magic, witches, and hags

I. Question I. *What, and of how many kinds, is magic?* Answer. Magic, taken generally, is a certain wondrous and unusual art of operating, and is twofold: natural, and superstitious. The former uses the application of natural causes; the latter, the help of the demon. Natural magic is licit, since it is natural philosophy, which penetrates the force and efficacy of natural causes, and their effects. It is most difficult to discern and distinguish natural magic from superstitious. The general rule is: when the cause is inept for producing the effect, then the magic is superstitious.

II. Question II. *What must be said of those called "healers"?* Answer. The Theologians call "healers" those who display a power of healing several diseases and deadly wounds, by the sign of the Cross imprinted, or by breathing upon, or by other signs. Azor, with others, contends that there are found such healers who induce health by natural virtue. Others hold that this is done by the virtue of the demon, which is more likely. Let Christ's faithful implore health from God, the intercession of the Saints having been invoked, not from these tricksters and crafty enchanters, who lyingly claim to restore health with fictitious prayers concocted from their own brains. The natural fascination of women who by mere sight infect onlookers rests on no sufficiently firm foundation.

III. Question III. *Is there such a thing as a superstitious magic art?* Answer. Christ's Gospel, Matthew 7 and Mark 9, and all catholic Doctors, testify that a magic art exists. Superstitious magic is divided into maleficence of poisoning and of love: the former is directed to harm, the latter to arousing carnal love. The maleficence of love, which the Greeks call a philtre, is executed in two ways, namely either through food or drink inflaming to Venus, or through sacred objects appended, which are sometimes bound to garments, or placed beneath the bed on which the person to be bewitched lies.

IV. It is not licit to cure a bewitchment through sorcerers, whatever some men fable. Yet it is licit to compel a sorcerer to remove a bewitchment by a licit means, when it is certainly established that the sorcerer has ready honorable means by which to remove the bewitchment; not so if you are uncertain and doubt that the sorcerer has licit means by which to remove it. It is also licit to destroy the signs of a bewitchment, because this can be done without the demon's help. A sorcerer who has handed the demon a document signed with his own blood ought not to demand it back from the demon, but should detest and abjure it, and perform sincere penance, and implore pardon from God with bitter tears.

V. Question IV. *What must be said of witches and hags?* Answer. Bewitching women are commonly called by three names. They are called *Lamiae*, from an analogy with the Lamia, which is a monstrous animal bearing a woman's countenance. From craftiness and destructiveness they are called *Sagae*. They are called *Striges* from the little bird so named, the *strix*. They are also called poisoners, since they use bewitchments. Women are more given to bewitchments than men, both on account of their greater credulity and curiosity, and on account of impotent anger and lust.

VI. Question V. *Are witches transported from place to place?* Answer. No one can rightly deny that this transportation is possible, since it does not exceed the powers of the demon.

Chapter III — On the temptation of God, and sacrilege

I. Question I. *What is the temptation of God?* Answer. It is a disordered proof, or experiment, of some divine perfection, by words or deeds. The word *disordered* distinguishes licit temptation from illicit. It is licit when, urgent necessity pressing, it is done by God's instinct — as when Abraham, Gideon, Elias, and several other holy men obtained a pledge that God would be propitious to them in arduous trials. But it is illicit and disordered when, without necessity and from mere caprice, an experiment is made of some divine perfection — of justice, of mercy, of omnipotence. This temptation is twofold: express, as when someone throws himself headlong from a window with the intention of testing whether God is willing to free him. The other is tacit, and interpretative, when someone acts in such a way that from the deed it is gathered that he wills to tempt God. By this reasoning, he tempts God who, without necessity, exposes himself to grave danger, hoping to be freed by God. When someone tempts God with deliberate mind, it is a grave fault; if with a half-deliberate mind, for the most part light.

II. Question II. *Does he tempt God who contends to manifest his innocence by the proof of hot iron or boiling water?* Answer. The true and common opinion affirms it. For natural means are at hand by which innocence can be manifested — namely spontaneous confession, and the proof of witnesses — as St. Thomas proves, II-II, q. 95, art. 8, ad 3. The examples of the adulterous woman to be tested by bitter waters, as is had in Numbers 5, and of the Monk suspected of theft, commanded to manifest his

innocence by receiving the Eucharist, as is established in the chapter *Saepe*, question 2, cause 5, are of no weight. For the precept concerning the adulterous woman was ceremonial, which has been abrogated. To the second authority St. Thomas answers, III, q. 80, art. 6, ad 3, that those decrees have been abrogated by the contrary documents of the Roman Pontiffs. For Pope Stephen says: "of hot iron," etc., and the same is had extra, On purgations, chapter *Ex tuarum*: "For in all such things there seems to be a temptation of God. Whence they cannot be done without sin." That if miracles were sometimes seen in these proofs, God worked them for the defense of the innocence of the accused, the sin being permitted in the men making the trial.

III. He who offers a miracle to be worked by God, that he may convert a Heretic, tempts God: because there are readily available most luminous arguments of truth by which the catholic Religion can be confirmed. That if holy men have sometimes shown these miracles to Heretics, this happened by a singular instinct of God. Nothing, however, forbids that with humble obedience and due submission such miracles sometimes be sought from God.

IV. Question III. *What is sacrilege, and of how many kinds?* Answer. Sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing. A thing is called sacred which is deputed to divine worship. And therefore *everything that pertains to irreverence toward sacred things pertains to injury against God, and has the character of sacrilege*, says the Angelic Doctor, II-II, q. 99, art. 1.

V. St. Thomas distinguishes a threefold sacrilege, in the same place, article 3. The first is an injury inflicted upon a sacred person, such as a Cleric, a Monk, a Nun, or fornication with a person bound by a vow of chastity. The second regards a sacred place, such as a Church or a Cemetery. The third is committed against sacred things, singularly dedicated to divine worship, such as the sacraments, chalices, vestments destined for the performance of sacred rites, images of the Saints, relics, etc.

VI. The first sacrilege against sacred persons can be committed in four ways: 1. If such sacred persons are forcibly detained and struck. 2. If they are brought before a lay tribunal. 3. If, without legitimate authority, tributes and taxes are imposed upon them...

upon them. 4. If fornication or unchastity is committed with persons bound by a vow of chastity. To this species of sacrilege is also reduced unchastity committed by a Confessor with a spiritual daughter.

VII. The second species of sacrilege is committed in many ways as well. 1. If someone burns, breaks, or tears down a sacred place, or demolishes altars. 2. If, from a Church even threatening ruin, or polluted, or interdicted, and from its cemeteries, courtyards, cloister, and any place not separated from it — likewise from Oratories founded by legitimate authority, from Bishops' palaces, from the Convents of Regulars and their enclosed precincts — someone forcibly drags out a man. 3. If someone kills a man there, or forcibly sheds human blood there; if someone commits voluntary pollution, either openly or secretly. 4. If someone conducts trade and markets in a Church, opens banquets, games, shameful conversations, and theatrical scenes. 5. If someone steals in a Church a sacred thing from a sacred place, or a non-sacred thing from a sacred place, or a sacred thing from a non-sacred place.

VIII. The third species is real sacrilege, by which a sacred thing is treated unworthily. Sacred things are distinguished into four classes, as it were. 1. There come the sacraments. 2. Sacred vessels, sacred images, the relics of Saints. 3. The ornaments of the Church, or of the Ministers, such as chasubles,

veils, and other things of this kind. 4. Movable or immovable goods deputed to the sustenance of ministers, such as Tithes, First-fruits, etc.

IX. To this too are referred the abuses of the words of sacred Scripture. Those who twist sacred words to spread heresies, who mix them into profane sermons, or abuse them to compose scurrilous pamphlets, or to express profane things, are sacrilegious, as is had in the Council of Trent, session 4.

X. Sacrilege can also be committed by omission. Guilty of this sacrilege are sacristans who neglect to guard, with due vigilance, the sacred chrisms and the Eucharist, with locks applied according to the prescriptions of the sacred canons; likewise while they do not keep the Corporals, sacred vessels, altars, and ecclesiastical vestments clean and neat, but offer them stained, soiled, and filthy for performing the unbloody sacrifice. They are also sacrilegious, if they negligently allow the sacred particles to spoil in the pyx.

XI. Sacrilege is by its nature a deadly crime. It can be venial on account of either lack of deliberation or parvity of matter. There are penalties of two kinds enacted against the sacrilegious. Some are pecuniary, which are not inflicted before the judge's sentence; others are spiritual, which the sacrilegious undergo by the very fact, and are as follows: excommunication enacted against strikers of Clerics; likewise against those who violate ecclesiastical immunity, usurp the immovable goods of the Church, impose tributes on ecclesiastical persons, and bring them before a lay tribunal; and against those who break down the doors of a Church to steal sacred things.

Dissertation IX — On the Vow

Chapter I — The condemned and lax propositions are recounted

I. The Wycliffites, Lutherans, and Calvinists have raved against sacred vows, especially the monastic ones, whose errors the Council of Trent condemned. Michael Molinos too was impious concerning vows, of whom Innocent XI proscribed these two following theses, the first of which is: *Vows about anything to be done are impediments of perfection.* The other is: *Superiors are to be obeyed in exterior matters, and the breadth of the vow of obedience of Religious extends only to what is exterior. But in interior matters the thing stands otherwise, into which God alone and the director enter.*

II. "Can a married person, impeded from asking the debt on account of a vow, or incest, or spiritual kinship, ask for it, whenever he is agitated by vehement stimuli of the flesh, lest he be exposed to the danger of falling into grave sins of lust? ... I follow the affirmative, if a married person is so agitated by vehement stimuli of the flesh that he exposes himself to the proximate danger of falling into the sin of fornication, or something more shameful, unless he asks for the debt ... Because since, from the observance of the vow, one is exposed to the proximate danger of falling into some sins of lust intrinsically evil, and then the non-observance of the vow (namely, asking the debt from one's own wife) is not intrinsically evil, it is manifest that neither the vow nor the observance of the vow is of a better thing, etc. This and far more the most learned Fr. Quintanadueñas [teaches] on this matter ... It seems to me most difficult now to deny all practical probability to Fr. Quintanadueñas's opinion ... So the most expert Casuist Gobat, to whom I rightly assent." Fr. Patritius Sporer, treatise 3 on the second precept of the Decalogue, chapter 2, section 2, § 3, number 65, page 234.

III. "Whether a vow of chastity, or of Religion, or of not marrying, hidden from the one to whom marriage was promised, on account of incontinence, is valid, and impedes marriage from being licitly entered upon? The denying opinion — namely that such a vow is neither valid, nor impedes marriage — can be urged by these arguments... Because a vow of chastity or of Religion made by one whom frequent troubles of the flesh and ruinous falls precede is not concerning sufficiently suitable and just matter; nay rather it is against the counsel of St. Paul.

"The authors of this opinion would perhaps teach the same thing in the case where, the three said vows having been made, or one of them, it would be wiser for someone, on account of frequent temptations of the flesh and supervening lapses into venereal matters, to contract marriage ... Because what, before the vow was made, causes the promised thing to be an unfit matter for a vow, if it supervenes after the vow has been made, removes the obligation of the vow ... Therefore these same lapses will invalidate the antecedent vows ... This opinion is more probable speculatively ... But I answer that the aforesaid opinion, speaking even practically, is probable to some degree, and can be safely embraced. The reason is that it is probable (whatever Diana doubts undeservedly) that what is here and now speculatively probable is also practically so ... Therefore here and now such an opinion will also be practically probable. Therefore it can be safely embraced by one for whom marriage is more wholesome than the vows of Religion or of chastity are on account of his incontinence, etc. Therefore he will be able to enter marriage without dispensation. So expressly held the aforesaid Juan

Sánchez." Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament, treatise 9 on marriage, disputation 24, question 2, page 324, § 3, page 325.

IV. "Sometimes a vow of running bulls in honor of the Saints can be valid, even in Spain ... Whence in Spain we see the canonizations of Saints solemnized with bull-runnings, besides the solemnities of Processions, Masses, and the like." Juan Martínez de Prado, Tome II, chapter 31, § 4, summary number 30, and at the end of it, page 640.

V. "A vow made in thanksgiving for a shameful act already done is valid." Leander, treatise 2 on the vow, disputation 4, question 31, page 341, from Filliucci, treatise 26 on the vow, chapter 2, question 6, number 54.

VI. "What obliges a vow of abstaining from wine? It would suffice under grave fault that wine be drunk temperately, in that quantity which is used by those who drink for one meal." Castropalao, treatise 15, disputation 1, point 12, number 21, page 72.

VII. "It is probable that he who has vowed virginity is not bound to perpetual chastity, but only to preserving the integrity of the flesh, which that word 'virginity' properly signifies." Marín, treatise 9, disputation 3, section 2, number 39, from Burgh, century 1, case 9.

VIII. "If you wished to redeem the loss of time, you comprehended even moderate play, and likewise play for another's sake: because you would truly be playing with a loss of time. Yet you can play through another, although you lose time watching ... If you vowed to this end, that..."

that you would avoid quarrels, blasphemies, oaths ... it will be licit for you to play under another's name, or through another; nay, it will even be licit to play through another, even if these inconveniences are feared, because in very deed you are not playing." La-Croix, book 3, part 1, number 454, page 175, from Tamburini, Palao, and others.

Chapter II — The notion of the vow, and its conditions

I. Question I. *What is a vow, and what its conditions?* Answer. It is a deliberate and spontaneous promise made to God concerning a better thing. Five conditions are assigned: 1. deliberation; 2. the will of promising and of executing the promise; 3. the promise itself; 4. that this promise be made to God; 5. that it be concerning a better thing, or one pleasing to God. Each condition must be explained.

II. For a vow, full deliberation is required, which consists in this: that the one vowing be master of himself, and advert to and know what he promises. Not to say more: that liberty which suffices for committing a sin, for perfecting a contract, suffices for a vow. Wherefore vows, even sudden ones, can be valid, when they proceed from a deliberate will. Vows of this kind, however, suffer from imprudence, which, on account of such a precipitate emission, according to the variety of circumstances, can be dispensed with or commuted. A virtual deliberation suffices, however, as in all other actions, contained in other preceding actions, provided the one vowing be master of himself. A mere purpose does not suffice for a vow, since a purpose is nothing other than a will of doing something. A promise, then, is necessary. Often the unlearned confuse a purpose with a promise, and conversely. Wherefore a prudent director of souls will gather from the circumstances whether a vow has been made or not. If someone should vow with the mind of promising and binding himself, but

with the will of not fulfilling the promise, he would elicit and constitute the vow: because the latter purpose of not fulfilling is inefficacious and inept.

III. The other clause, *promise made to God*, indicates that vows are made to God alone. When someone pledges that he will do some work in honor of some Saint, this is not a vow properly so called, but the matter of a vow. Wherefore vows which are made in honor of some Saint are called vows in a broader signification, which nevertheless have the force of binding. These vows are not acts of latria, owed to God alone, but of dulia, or hyperdulia. Catholics, then, vowing to the Blessed Virgin, to SS. Augustine, Benedict, Dominic, etc., vow to God before these Saints as witnesses, patrons, and helpers.

IV. Question II. *What does the other clause, "concerning a better good," signify?* Answer. The matter of a vow must be honorable, possible, free, not indifferent, and not impeding a greater good. Things which are commanded by divine or ecclesiastical law can be the matter of a vow, as the common opinion teaches. The clause "concerning a better good" has a twofold sense: first, compared to another good — as it is better to succor an endangered girl than another poor person exposed to no danger of soul. Secondly, with respect to the omission of that same good — as it is better to give alms than not to give. For fitting matter of a vow it suffices that it be a better good in this second way. Matter opposed to the evangelical counsels is in no way fit for a vow. Hence a vow of contracting marriage is invalid, because it is opposed to the evangelical counsel. If marriage were necessary for preserving the Commonwealth, for confirming peace between Princes — which scarcely, or not even scarcely, happens — they say that then the vow would be valid: because the matter of the vow is not so much the marriage, as the common good of the Commonwealth and of the Church. A vow of marrying, in order to bridle and restrain concupiscence, is null.

V. If a married person, impeded by a vow made from asking the debt, is troubled by stimuli of concupiscence, can he ask the debt? Fr. Sporer affirms it, citing Fr. Gobat. But this opinion is lax and false. Even laxer is the other opinion of Leander, denying that a vow of chastity, of religion, or of not marrying is valid when made by one for whom marriage is more wholesome, and who suffers grave rebellions of concupiscence. Nay, the same most benign Leander adds that supervening temptations and anxieties of the flesh render a vow of not marrying null. Read Tome 3 on the Decalogue, book 4, dissertation 1, chapter 4, number 12 and following. A vow of not vowing is invalid. That a vow of not seeking a dispensation is valid, if it is more useful to the soul not to seek a dispensation; on the contrary, that it is null, if it is more wholesome to the soul to request a dispensation, St. Antoninus and Richard teach.

VI. Question III. *Are indifferent, useless, or vicious things the matter of a vow?* Answer. All deny it. Yet if a thing which is by its own nature indifferent should, on account of some circumstance, put on honesty, it is fit matter for a vow. A vow whose execution is a sin is null. Wherefore Jephthah sinned in killing his daughter. Similarly, a vow made concerning a good thing for a depraved end is null: since then the vow is taken as an instrument for procuring a depraved end. Invalid too are vows of offering God gifts, of celebrating Masses, of laying out alms, which certain Christians are wont to make, this condition being added: if they come off victors in a duel, or in an unjust war. Likewise a vow made in thanksgiving to God for a shameful act already committed is invalid, and unbefitting God — as for a gain procured from unjust gambling. But valid is a vow made to obtain the safety of a son begotten of a concubine: because the health of the son is a good, although sin has preceded it.

Equally valid are vows of punishing one's own crimes. Vows of a good thing for an indifferent end are null. A vow concerning an impossible thing is null.

VII. Question IV. *If one who cannot fulfill the whole vow is bound to fulfill a part?* Answer. You vowed to build a Church: unable to build the whole, are you bound to a part? That this one vowing is bound to nothing, Tamburini, Leander, Castropalao, and others teach. But a distinction must be made. If the separated part redounds to the honor of God, then the one vowing must execute it; but not if the separated part would be useless. But in this case the one vowing should build a Chapel in another Church, or something else in some temple, which would redound to God's honor. When the matter of a vow is mixed, partly good and partly evil, or vain, the good part must be fulfilled, the other neglected. Hence a vow of coming to Rome with a naked body is valid as regards the making of the journey; only the manner of nakedness must be omitted.

VIII. Question V. *Is a vow of not gaming valid?* Answer. The true and common opinion affirms it, because it concerns a better good. For gaming is something fortuitous in order to gain, or loss, and a source of evils. Therefore abstinence from gaming concerns a better good.

IX. Fr. Claude La-Croix teaches lax opinions on this argument, book 3, part 1, number 453 and following. An error crept into my Tome 3 on the Decalogue, page 117, number 8, where, in editing the lax opinion of this author, in place of "you wished" [voluisti], by an error certainly of the printers, "you vowed" [vovisti] was printed. This material error, although trivial and of no moment, I now correct, that I may satisfy my censors, and give thanks, since by objecting such very light blemishes to me they make plain to the whole World that Christian Theology is free both from Rigorism and from Laxism.

X. "If you vowed to this end" ("vowed" here, not "wished," says Fr. La-Croix, place cited, number 454) "that you would avoid quarrels, blasphemies, oaths ... it will be licit to play through another, even though these inconveniences are feared, because in very deed you are not playing." You are not playing, indeed, under your own name, but under another's; so neither do you blaspheme, quarrel, or swear with your own mouth, but with another's mouth. How lax these things are, and others which La-Croix teaches in the same place, let others judge.

XI. Question VI. *Is a vow of never sinning valid?* Answer. If the vow is of abstaining from every mortal sin, it is most valid. But if the vow is of avoiding all faults, even venial ones, taken collectively, the vow is null, inasmuch as it concerns a matter humanly...

impossible to human weakness. Valid, however, is a vow of avoiding this or that determinate deliberate venial sin — for instance, of not lying. But there is no need to dwell on unraveling these vows, since Christians must be persuaded to abstain in very deed from sins, not to burden themselves with a load of vows.

Chapter III — On the distinction of vows

I. A vow is divided: 1. into absolute, conditional, and penal; 2. into solemn and simple; 3. into necessary and free; 4. into common and particular; 5. into real, personal, and mixed; 6. into affirmative and negative; 7. into perpetual and temporal; 8. into reserved and non-reserved; 9. into public and hidden; 10. into express and tacit, or into mental and vocal.

II. An absolute vow is free from every condition. A conditional vow has a condition attached — as if you say: "I vow alms, if I recover." Penal is when a penalty is attached, as if you say: "If I gamble, I vow a scourging." A penal vow differs from a conditional one, in that in the latter a condition is attached as condition, in the former as penalty.

III. A solemn vow is made in the sight of the Church, by which it is accepted through a Superior. A simple vow is made privately by a person. A necessary vow is that which all make in Baptism, renouncing the devil and his pomps. It is called necessary, because it concerns the observance of the evangelical law necessary for salvation. Free is that concerning a matter not necessary for salvation, such as entering Religion; or, if it concerns something already commanded, someone freely adds a vow. Common is the same as necessary, and particular the same as free.

IV. A real vow is that by which an external thing is offered to God. A personal vow is that by which an action or omission affecting the person is promised to God. A mixed vow concludes both, namely both a thing, such as alms, and an action, such as a pilgrimage. An affirmative vow is that by which something positive is pledged to God, such as alms. A negative vow abstains from something, such as from flesh, from gaming, from a sin.

V. A perpetual vow lasts until the death of the one vowing, such as a vow of monastic profession, of a perpetual alms, etc. Reserved vows are called those from which interior Prelates cannot dispense, but can from those not reserved. An express vow is that which is made in conceived formulas. An implicit, or tacit vow is that which is not made in express words, but is attached to another thing or state, such as the vow of chastity which Subdeacons make in receiving sacred Orders. A public vow is that which is made openly. A hidden vow, that which is made secretly. All these are obvious.

Chapter IV — On the obligation of vows, and various questions concerning vows

I. It is a truth of faith that a vow produces an obligation, and indeed a grave one, by which the one vowing is bound to execute what he pledges to God, as is had in Deuteronomy 23: *When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it.* This obligation pertains to the virtue of religion and of fidelity. An action done from a vow is of greater merit than one done without a vow, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 88, art. 6.

II. Question I. *Is there parvity of matter in a vow?* Answer. The obligation of a vow is by its nature grave; its violation can become light from imperfect deliberation, from an unwitting slip of mind. The difficulty is whether it can be light on the part of the matter. If the matter of the vow is divisible — as if you vowed to recite the whole Rosary and omit one decade — the omission is light from parvity of matter. If the whole matter of the vow is small — such as a vow of reciting one Our Father — then Cajetan, with others, teaches that the omission is mortal; but the opposite opinion is more probable. This little question, as regards practice, is inept. For men commonly make their vows concerning a grave matter, both on account of the end and on account of the dignity of the vow itself. The Theologians dispute whether the one vowing can bind himself gravely in a light matter, and lightly in a grave matter. To the first part of the question I say that when the matter is on every side light, one cannot bind himself gravely under mortal sin. On the contrary, when the matter is by its own nature grave, one cannot bind himself only lightly. For he who wills a vow wills, by that very fact, what

necessarily follows from a vow. But a grave obligation follows from a vow in grave matter. Now it is not in the power of the one vowing to pervert the natures of things. St. Thomas is ineptly alleged for the contrary opinion. Men can freely make vows or not make them, says St. Thomas; but, this being posited, that they make vows, they must conform themselves to the nature and law of vows. Nor is the question of such moment that it needs greater discussion. Read Tome 3, book 4, dissertation 2, chapter 1, number 20.

III. Question II. *Does he who violates several vows in a light matter on the same day sin gravely?* Answer. The more common and more probable opinion affirms it. For although vows differ in number, they nevertheless pertain to the same virtue, and are of the same nature. When, therefore, from several light matters subject to a vow a grave matter is made, then a grave injury is inflicted upon God. Would not he who pledged to a man a grave sum of money in several promises sin deadly if he retained for himself a notable sum of the promised money? They also dispute whether one who has vowed to recite one Our Father and Hail Mary daily for several years sins mortally if he omits it for several days: and commonly they affirm it — although some distinguish concerning a vow that affects the day, and one that does not; but these disputes have been devised by the disputants themselves to exercise the keenness of their wit. Wherefore, these petty distinctions set aside, I say that the deliberate violation of a vow through an entire year is mortal.

IV. Question III. *Must children fulfill the vows of their parents?* Answer. Personal vows must be fulfilled by the one who made them, because they affect that very person. These vows of parents in no way bind children. For vows must be free. The vows of parents sometimes bind children, insofar as the children consent to those same vows. Hence it follows that the one vowing, who cannot fulfill the vow, is not bound to have it fulfilled through another. Real vows can be fulfilled by others, even without the knowledge, but not against the will, of the one vowing. If the one vowing has become unable to pay a real vow, he comes off free, as is plain in other debts. When a vow is mixed — namely, partly personal and partly real — if the one vowing has become unable to fulfill the personal vow, he must fulfill the real vow through another.

V. Question IV. *Are heirs bound to fulfill the vows of the testator?* Answer. To personal vows they are not bound. But heirs are bound to pay real vows, even if the testator expressly said that he did not wish to bind his heirs to pay such vows. For once the inheritance has been burdened with a just debt, it is no longer in the power of the testator to free it. But heirs are not bound to pay these real vows beyond the resources of the inheritance, nor before the inheritance has been entered upon, since they can repudiate it. Nor is an heir bound, to the detriment of his own Legitim, to fulfill the vows of a testator who could not burden the Legitim. Heirs can fulfill the real vows of the testator through others, just as the testator himself could have done. A Monastery too, succeeding by hereditary right to the goods of a professed Religious, is bound to fulfill the real vows which he made before his profession, because the inheritance passes to the Monastery with this burden. When the inheritance is burdened with several debts, first debts of justice must be paid, and afterwards legacies and vows. If there are several vows, those of greater moment must be paid first. If there are several heirs, each is bound to pay his own part. If, however, the thing owed to God is in the hands of one heir, the other heirs are bound to make compensation...

A donee is bound to fulfill real vows which affect the thing donated, if the donor has become unable, whatever several say to the contrary: because a debt always follows the thing to which it is attached.

A legatee, according to all, is bound to pay the real vows of the one leaving the legacy.

VI. Question V. *At what time must vows be fulfilled?* Answer. When a determinate time is set for execution, then it must be fulfilled at that time. When the time is indeterminate, then the one vowing must fulfill it as soon as he conveniently can, as is said in Deuteronomy 23 — unless a reasonable cause of deferring is present, so that the vow may be better fulfilled. If you foresee that you will be impeded in the future from fulfilling a vow attached to no particular day, you are bound to anticipate the execution of the vow. A vow not fulfilled at the designated time must be fulfilled after that time has elapsed. You vowed to repay Peter a hundred, which you owe within a month; the time having elapsed, you are bound to fulfill it. If, however, you vowed to fast on the vigil of such a feast, the feast having passed, the vow is extinguished. But those who vowed to fast on each Friday of this month — it is more probable to me that, the month having elapsed, they are bound to fast on each Friday of the following month: since all the Fridays of the whole year are of the same nature. He who vowed to fast on the vigil of St. Francis is not bound to anticipate it, even if he foresees that on that day he will not be able to keep the fast: because the vow is attached to a determinate day.

VII. Question VI. *What must be said of a doubtful vow?* Answer. You can doubt: 1. whether you made a vow; 2. whether you fulfilled it once made; 3. concerning the quantity of the thing promised. The discourse is not of a light suspicion, or vain scruples, but of a grave doubt, arisen from probable opposing reasons, which keep the intellect in suspense. The Probabilists, relying on that principle, "The condition of the possessor is the better," absolve this one vowing, when doubtful, from the obligation of the vow. This opinion is no less false than the Probabilism on which it rests. Wherefore the Antiprobabilists defend the opposite. St. Thomas, on the fourth book, distinction 38, question 1, ad 8 [recte], has this: *But if he doubts how he conducted himself in vowing, he ought to choose the safer way, lest he commit himself to danger.* The same St. Antoninus and the sacred canons teach. See Tome 3 on the Decalogue, book 4, dissertation 2, chapter 4.

VIII. If you are certain of the vow, and doubt whether the execution has been fulfilled, according to all you are bound to fulfill the vow. If you doubt the quantity of the thing promised, you must choose the safer part, as the sacred canons prescribe. You doubt whether you vowed a hundred, or fifty; you are bound to pay a hundred. He who vowed to give a chalice to the Church, but doubts whether a golden or a silver one should be given, ought to offer a golden or silver one according to the custom known to him of the Church to which he promised, bronze or copper being excluded. He who vowed that he would not approach a woman, but doubts whether the approach was fornicatory or conjugal, should abstain from either approach. He who doubts whether he made the vow before the age of seven, or the use of reason, is bound to the vow, as the common opinion teaches: since it is established that a vow was made, and it is only doubted at what time it was made. Scarcely anyone vows before the use of reason: therefore it must be presumed that, the use of reason having been completed, the vow was made. One certain of having made a vow, but doubting whether he had the intent of binding himself, is bound to fulfill the vow: because, the deed being proved, all things that naturally accompany such a deed are presumed. Similarly, he who made a vow extorted by fear must be presumed, in a doubtful case, to have had the intention of binding himself: because to presume simulation in one vowing or swearing is to presume a crime; but no one is to be presumed guilty of a crime. If the one vowing doubts, in the aforesaid event, whether he used amphibology of words, or mental restriction, some say the vow does not bind; but this opinion is false for the reason given, and

because in doubt the safer part must be chosen. He who, provoked by anger, makes a vow, but afterwards doubts whether he had the necessary use of reason, is bound absolutely to fulfill the vow: because anger rarely so disturbs reason as to take away the liberty sufficient for sinning, and so for vowing. Wherefore if the doubt cannot be laid to rest, the rule must be kept: In doubts the safer part is to be chosen.

IX. Question VII. *He who vowed to abstain from wine — is he bound to abstain from beer, and other liquors distilled from wine?* Answer. He who vowed to abstain from wine to avoid drunkenness must abstain from all liquors that produce drunkenness. Wherefore Fr. La-Croix is mistaken, who, book 3, part 1, number 459, with his Gobat, teaches that the one vowing, although he intended in his vow to avoid drunkenness, can take any other drinks apt to inebriate. No less lax is the opinion of Fr. Castropalao, who, treatise 15, disputation 1, point 12, number 21, teaches that he who vowed to abstain from wine can drink only so much wine as would suffice for temperate drinkers at one meal. Fr. Patritius Sporer, treatise 3 on the second commandment of the Decalogue, chapter 2, section 3, § 2, number 86, page 238, delivers this judgment: "Surely Castropalao, too laxly, even by German reckoning, requires that quantity which would suffice for some man drinking temperately at one dinner." The laxity of certain Probabilists is sometimes so ample that it displeases even the Probabilists themselves.

X. He who vowed to fast, determining nothing, must keep the vow according to the rite of the Church. Wherefore Sanchez and Tamburini teach too laxly that this man need not abstain from milk-foods in the time of Lent. This opinion falls, it seems to me, into the following condemned thesis: *It is not evident that the custom of not eating eggs and milk-foods in Lent obliges.* He who vowed to fast, no fixed number of days being set, satisfies the vow if he fasts a single day. He who vowed several fasts does not seem to satisfy it with two fasts: because plurality is not signified by the number two, according to common signification. He who vowed to fast for a month is free from the fast on Sundays: because the fast must be interpreted according to the rite of the Church. Yet some Catholic, led by a singular devotion, all superstition being removed, could fast on Sundays too — and especially to tame the flesh and concupiscence, as so many holy men have done, keeping a continual fast.

XI. He who vowed to hear Mass daily satisfies the vow on feast days by hearing one Mass: since the reasonable intention appears to be that he wills to let no day pass without hearing Mass. A girl who vowed virginity is bound to preserve it after the first shameful act committed. It is otherwise if she had vowed expressly only to avoid the first shameful act: because the vow depends on the will of the one vowing. He who made a vow of pilgrimage satisfies it by an equestrian pilgrimage: because this is a true pilgrimage, provided he did not intend to bind himself to a journey on foot; but he would by no means satisfy it if hired for a wage, or forced by violence: because the execution of a vow is an act of virtue; yet if he consented in mind and intention, even though outwardly compelled, he would fulfill the vow.

XII. He who vowed alms, without determining its quantity, can determine it after the vow was made, just as he could have before the vow. He who vowed to give one of his animals, or of the Church's vessels, can offer whichever of the promised things he pleases: for he is not bound to give either the more precious vessel or the better animal. A moderate mean must be kept in these cases. If, of the things promised, all but one should perish, this one must be offered. If you vowed to give to one of two Churches, designating neither, you can select whichever you prefer.

XIII. Question VIII. *Does an error concerning the substance of the vow render it invalid?* Answer. The common opinion affirms it: because error takes away the voluntary; for nothing is willed that is not first known. But error concerning adventitious matters and the circumstances of a vow does not render the vow null. But whence is it to be gathered whether circumstances redound to the substance of the vow, or not? Those redound to the substance of the vow which regard the end of the vow; but those are occasions of vowing, which excite one to vow. You vow alms to be conferred upon an honest poor man. The relief of poverty is the end of the vow...

the vow. The honesty of the poor man is the occasion which excites and impels you to the vow. In doubt whether some circumstances have the character of the end of the vow, or of the occasion, one must examine whether, these being removed, the end of the vow would still stand: for if it stands, all the other things have merely the character of occasion. But if, on the contrary, these being absent, the end of the vow would collapse, then they would have the character of the end.

XIV. Question IX. *Is a vow extorted by fear valid?* Answer. One fear is grave, falling upon a constant man; another is light. A grave fear can arise intrinsically, as from infirmity, a storm, or an imminent shipwreck. A vow made by force of intrinsic fear is valid both by natural law and by positive law: because then the one vowing is compelled by no one but himself. Valid, then, are vows made to avoid death, shipwreck, or another misfortune. A vow is also valid on account of fear justly inflicted from outside: because when fear is justly inflicted in order to extort a vow, the one vowing is unreasonably unwilling. Light fear does not invalidate a vow, because it lightly injures free consent.

XV. The difficulty is concerning a vow made from a grave fear unjustly inflicted from outside, in order to extort it. That this vow is valid by natural law is the common opinion of the Theologians, given that the man, though unjustly compelled, truly and sincerely wills the vow, and in very deed makes it. For fear diminishes, but does not take away, the voluntary, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 89, art. 7, ad 3. To this the Theologians commonly subscribe. As to ecclesiastical law, if the discourse be of a solemn vow made in monastic profession, all affirm that this vow is null, as all the laws declare. If the discourse be of other vows, the Theologians dispute on both sides, and all affirm that each opinion is probable. The former opinion holds that vows of this kind are valid, because the laws speak only of a solemn vow, and moreover the invalidation of a vow is odious, since it derogates from the law of nature. And this opinion seems more probable, because in very deed the adversaries have adduced no text of this kind that declares such vows null.

XVI. Question X. *What must be said of a conditional vow?* Answer. In any vow, even an absolute one, certain general conditions are included, such as: if I shall be able, if it please God, if the Superior decree nothing else. Particular conditions depend on and are added by the free will of the one vowing himself. The execution of a conditional vow is suspended until the condition occurs. But a condition concerning the present, or the past, or a necessary future, does not make a vow conditional; only a condition concerning a contingent future event does so. A shameful condition, against the substance of the vow, invalidates it, because an error of the substance of a contract renders the act involuntary — not so if it is against the accidents of the contract. A vow under an honorable contingent future condition does not oblige until the condition occurs. If the condition depends solely on the will of the one vowing, he can suspend it at pleasure before it occurs, and free himself from the vow; if it depends on another's will, he is bound to await its arrival — as if he had said: "I vow Religion, if my father consents; if my sister marries," etc. If by his own malice he impedes the occurrence of a

condition that depends on another's will, he is bound to fulfill the vow: because he who by his own fault becomes unable to execute a vow is bound to compensate for the vow, as St. Thomas teaches on the fourth book, distinction 38, question 1, article 3.

XVII. Question XI. *What is a penal conditional vow?* Answer. It is that which someone makes not from an affection toward the thing which he pledges, but from a zeal of avoiding the action which he detests — as if you vow in this manner: "I promise that I will build an altar, if I gamble, if I fornicate." By this vow you intend above all to avoid the sin. He who is absolved from a vow of this kind is also absolved from the penalty. He who vowed to avoid another thing, say gaming, if he violates the vow, is not bound to undergo the penalty as many times as he gambles, but must pay the penalty only once, unless he had expressly imposed upon himself as many penalties as times he would gamble.

XVIII. Question XII. *What must be said of a vow to assume the religious state?* Answer. He who vowed to enter Religion must apply all care that he be received into it, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 189, art. 2 [recte 10]. If the one vowing has any impediments, he is bound to manifest them to the Prelate of the Religion. If the Religion which the one vowing designated has been relaxed in the substantials of its rule, he is not bound to enter it: because then the vow does not concern a better good, as the Theologians commonly teach. If you desire more on this matter, see Tome 3 of the Christian Theology, book 4 on the Decalogue, dissertation 2, chapter 9.

Chapter V — On the cessation, invalidation, dispensation, and commutation of vows

I. Question I. *Who can make vows?* Answer. Those who possess the use of reason, and have dominion over those things which they pledge to God. Wherefore the vows of minors, since they lack dominion, can be invalidated by their parents: nor are they firm except under the tacit condition that they please the parents.

II. Question II. *Are vows made by Religious, without the Prelate's license, concerning an honorable matter which disturbs neither jurisdiction nor discipline, valid?* Answer. Several deny it; but the more probable opinion affirms it, since they bring no detriment either to the jurisdiction of the Prelates, or to the discipline of the Order, and concern an honorable matter. Prelates can indeed invalidate these vows, once they have come to know of them. But subjects are not bound to manifest them; and so, as long as they remain hidden, they are valid, and those vowing are bound to execute them. But vows of Religious opposed either to the Rule or to the jurisdiction of Superiors are null. Similarly, vows made by Religious to give away in alms anything of the goods granted for their own use, without the license of the Prelates, are altogether null.

III. Question III. *Can the Church make laws declaring certain persons unable to make vows?* Answer. If the discourse be of solemn vows, which regard the public discipline of the Church, there is no difficulty. For it is plain from the Church's sanction that no monastic profession is valid if made before the completion of the sixteenth year. With respect to simple vows, even internal ones, the Church can prescribe certain conditions, which not being observed, the vows are null; and thus indirectly she can invalidate even internal promises. Bishops cannot, without consulting the supreme Pontiff, vow the abdication of their Episcopate, because such abdication is forbidden to them. Nor can they vow a pilgrimage beyond that interval during which they can rightly be absent from their Churches, without

consulting the supreme Pontiff. Parish priests and Beneficiaries, bound by the tie of residence, can vow entrance into Religion without consulting the Bishop. But that the one vowing cannot enter Religion without consulting the Bishop, some grant. But this opinion is destitute of all foundation, since no law exists which prohibits this. Yet by the law of fittingness and courtesy, Parish priests ought to consult their own Bishop.

IV. Question IV. *Does a vow cease when the moving cause ceases?* Answer. One cause is moving, another impelling. The proximate moving cause ceasing, the vow ceases, as all commonly teach. Because, the final cause altogether ceasing, the matter of the vow ceases. This is plain by an example. You vowed alms to be given to such a poor man: this man has become rich: the end of the alms altogether ceases. The vow, therefore, also ceases. But the impelling cause ceasing, the vow does not cease.

V. Question V. *Does a notable change of matter suffice to invalidate a vow?* Answer. The common opinion affirms it, with St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110 [recte 88], article 3, ad 3, provided the change of matter be very grave. It is reckoned very grave when the state of the promised thing is varied. This change, moreover, must be evident and manifest. Hence, if, the vow having been made, there occurs in its execution a danger to life, or to honor, or a detriment of another matter of grave moment, the vow ceases.

VI. Supervening difficulties, which can be overcome in the execution of a vow, do not invalidate the vow, although, had the one vowing known of them, he would have abstained from the vow. Since there are few contracts in which grave difficulties do not afterwards occur, which, had they been foreseen, the contracts would not have been entered into.

VII. Question VI. *Is some cause required for the invalidation of vows?* Answer. Several affirm that no cause is required for the valid invalidation of vows. Invalidation, they say, is the removal of a vow made by one who possesses ruling power, such as fathers have over children, and Superiors over subject Religious. There is a twofold invalidation: one direct, which I have described; the other indirect, which regards the promised matter, and impedes its execution. The opinion which affirms that a cause is required for the invalidation of vows is very probable to me. For invalidation is an act of jurisdiction. An examination, then, ought to precede, so that this act may be judged fitting or not. Finally, he who acts honorably ought to be moved by some right end.

VIII. Question VII. *Is the faculty of invalidating vows a matter of natural or of positive law?* Answer. Several stand for positive law, saying that the solemn vows of Regulars are indissoluble only by ecclesiastical law. The contrary opinion is more probable to me, which St. Thomas defends, II-II, q. 189, and with him the graver Theologians. Children, by force of natural law, are subject to paternal power. Religious are subject to the will and dominion of their Prelates, by force of solemn profession, or the vow of obedience. Therefore, by natural and divine law, fathers and Superiors hold dominion over children and Religious; and by force of this dominion they can invalidate the vows of their subjects. There is added that although some law be only of ecclesiastical positive law, yet, that being posited, natural and divine law arises. The consecration of a chalice is a matter of ecclesiastical law. But that being posited, by divine law, reverence and homage are owed to the consecrated chalice.

IX. Question VIII. *To whom does the power of invalidating vows belong?* Answer. Some are Superiors who have ruling power, as parents over children, masters over servants, as has been said; others are those who possess the power of jurisdiction over those vowing. The supreme Pontiff can directly invalidate

the vows of Regulars and Nuns, because he is the supreme Prelate of all Religious; likewise the vows of all Ecclesiastics which pertain to ecclesiastical benefices; but he can invalidate the vows of laymen only indirectly, by forbidding the matter.

X. Bishops can directly invalidate the vows of Nuns subject to them; but not of Nuns who are not subject to their jurisdiction, or of exempt Regulars; nay, nor of their own Clerics, and still less of Laymen. Only those, then, can directly invalidate vows who have what is called ruling power over those vowing. Thus the Prelates of Regulars can invalidate the vows of Religious, parents the vows of children, guardians the vows of wards, curators the vows of minors, masters the vows of slaves, husbands the vows of wives: because all these possess ruling power. A Superior can invalidate the vows of subjects, the subjects being unwilling.

XI. The Superiors of Regulars who can invalidate vows are the Generals throughout the whole Order, the Provincials throughout the whole Province, the Superiors of Convents or houses within them. Secondary Superiors, such as Vicars and Sub-priors, cannot invalidate the vows of subjects when the Prelates are present, but can when these Prelates are absent. Now they are not said to be absent when they leave the house to return the same day; but they are understood to be absent when they are away from the Convent for one or two natural days. Abbesses and Prioresses of Nuns can invalidate the vows of subject Nuns, just as Regular Prelates can invalidate the vows of their subjects. Regular Prelates cannot invalidate the vows of Novices before profession, because they have no ruling power over them.

XII. Question IX. *Can parents invalidate the vows of minor children?* Answer. The infancy of children begins from birth and ends at the completion of the seventh year. The age of wardship, or non-puberty, takes its beginning from the seventh year, and ends, in sons, at the completed fourteenth year; in daughters, likewise at the completed twelfth year. Puberty in women begins at the twelfth year, in men at the fourteenth, and, according to common law, has its end at the completed twenty-fifth year. Within this interval — from the twelfth and fourteenth years up to the twenty-fifth — both daughters and sons are called pubescent and minors, just as from the seventh year up to the twelfth and fourteenth they are called non-pubescent. Now the vows of non-pubescent sons and daughters, made after the use of reason, and so valid, parents can invalidate, whether they be personal vows, real, or mixed. But the vows of pubescent sons and daughters, which do not disturb domestic governance, parents cannot invalidate, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 88, art. 8, ad 2. But vows which disturb domestic governance, since they bring harm to paternal power, parents can invalidate. Vows of non-pubescent children once confirmed by the father cannot afterwards be invalidated by him.

XIII. Question X. *Are the real vows of pubescent children subject to paternal invalidation?* Answer. So long as children are of minor age, that is, within the time of puberty, they are subject to paternal administration, and can in no way dispose of paternal goods. Null, then, are their real vows by which they pledge paternal goods, the consent of parents not being added. Likewise of mixed vows, as to that part which is real. But the vows of pubescent children which concern castrensian goods cannot be invalidated by the father; nor vows concerning adventitious goods, whose administration the children have. But if the father has the administration of these goods, he can invalidate vows concerning them: because then the vows would be contrary to right administration.

XIV. Question XI. *Can guardians and curators invalidate the vows of minors and wards?* Answer. Guardians and curators can invalidate the vows of minors and wards in the same way that parents can rescind

the vows of children, because they are reckoned as fathers, as it were. A curator given to a major on account of his fault of prodigality can invalidate real vows: because all administration, taken from the major, is subject to the curator's dominion.

XV. Question XII. *Can a mother invalidate the vows of minor sons and daughters?* Answer. While the father lives and is present, the mother lacks the power of invalidating the vows of sons and daughters: because the father alone is the head of the family, as the more common and more probable opinion teaches. The father having died, the grandfather, guardian, or curator succeeds, and while these exist, the mother cannot invalidate the vows of her children. But grandfathers, guardians, and curators being absent, and the father dead, then the mother can invalidate the vows of her minor children, since by natural law she has care of the children. But the mother of pubescent children cannot invalidate real vows, unless she has been instituted a curatrix. Parents, guardian, and curator being absent, a grandfather and grandmother can invalidate the vows of minor grandchildren: since they succeed in the place of parents. Masters of disciples, lords of servants, employers of hired men, cannot invalidate personal vows made in minority, as the more common opinion teaches.

XVI. Question XIII. *Can a husband invalidate the vows made by his wife after marriage?* Answer. A husband can invalidate those vows of his wife which concern things subject to his authority. For a wife is not subject to her husband in all things, but only in those which regard marriage, the governance of the family, the administration of goods, and the education of children. Therefore a husband can invalidate only those vows which disturb the aforesaid order; not others which in no way stand in the way of the things I have recounted. A contrary opinion grave and numerous Theologians defend — namely that a husband can invalidate all his wife's vows. This opinion, if the discourse be of real vows which wives can make concerning things and paraphernal goods, is false: for just as they can dispose of these goods without consulting their husbands...

so too they can make vows concerning them. Similarly a husband cannot invalidate his wife's vows of hearing Mass on feast days, of not lying, of not committing adultery, of making confession, and other things already commanded. Nor can a husband invalidate a vow which his wife made, without consulting him, of not asking the debt. Yet the wife would imprudently make this vow, since it diminishes conjugal benevolence and mutual love, at least indirectly. A husband cannot invalidate his wife's vows which he himself has once approved. Similarly, when by mutual consent they have vowed chastity, neither retains the power of withdrawing from the vow. Again, when both by mutual consent vow Religion, they can no longer invalidate such a vow, either by mutual consent or separately. Vows made by a wife before marriage, but to be fulfilled once marriage has been entered upon, a husband cannot invalidate, but can only suspend their execution, if they are absent from the conjugal duty. The same must be said of vows made during the time of a legitimate divorce. A wife too can invalidate her husband's vows which conflict with matrimonial right; just as she can invalidate a vow which her husband might make of adopting the habit of a Hermit or of some Religion, because such a wearing of the habit diminishes conjugal love, and paves the way to separation. A wife can also invalidate her husband's vows of a longer pilgrimage, except a vow of pilgrimage to Jerusalem made for a time on account of the public good. For then the wife is bound to keep continence for the sake of defending some public good, or recovering something lost. This cause being absent, vows are to be dissuaded in married persons which either indirectly oppose conjugal

benevolence. Let married persons bear, with Christian patience and a reciprocal love of charity, the most heavy matrimonial yoke, and they will be holy Christians.

XVII. Question XIV. *Can masters invalidate the vows of servants?* Answer. Domestic servants must be distinguished from slaves. The former serve their masters by a paid agreement, and are their own masters, and can make vows, whose execution alone the masters can suspend, if they impede due domestic service. The latter, namely slaves properly so called, are chattels reduced to servitude, and enjoy no liberty as regards the bodily service to be rendered to their masters. The first opinion defends that masters can invalidate all the vows of slaves. The more probable opinion is that masters can invalidate all the vows of slaves which impede due servitude: since a master has the right that the offices of servitude be rendered to him by the slave. Therefore he can invalidate those things which derogate from this right. But they cannot invalidate vows of keeping the divine precepts, of chastity, of prayers, of giving alms from goods of which the slaves have dominion, nor other similar vows, which in no way impede due servitude.

XVIII. Question XV. *Does the faculty of dispensing from the obligation of vows flourish in the Church?* Answer. All Catholics say so, alleging Matthew 16: *To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven: whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven.* Now this dispensation is the removal of the bond of a vow, made in God's name by one having spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum, for some reasonable cause. This notion of dispensation is by its own nature clear. How this dispensation is made, St. Thomas declares, II-II, q. 88, art. 10, ad 2. Those who can dispense can also commute vows.

XIX. Question XVI. *To whom, by ordinary law, does the faculty of dispensing in vows belong?* Answer. It belongs first to the supreme Pontiff, Pastor and Head of the universal Church, and Vicar of Christ on earth; then to a general Council, to the supreme Pontiff's Penitentiary, to Legates a latere, to pontifical Nuncios with respect to the whole Province or Kingdom, to Archbishops, Bishops, the cathedral Chapter with the see vacant, Abbots having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, and all Prelates of Regulars with respect to their own subjects. All these can, by ordinary law, dispense their subjects in vows both personal and real, reserved vows excepted. Cardinal Protectors of Orders cannot, by ordinary law, dispense in vows. The vows of a Community can be dispensed by a Bishop, a just cause occurring.

XX. Question XVII. *Those who impart dispensation from a vow to others — can they apply this same privilege to themselves?* Answer. Concerning the supreme Pontiff there is no difficulty, since he has no superior from whom he could be dispensed. The Salmanticenses defend that any Prelates who can dispense others can use the same privilege upon themselves, and for their opinion cite Sanchez, Tamburini, Azor, Suárez, and others. The opposite opinion is more probable to me: because no one is a judge in his own cause; therefore these Prelates ought to have recourse to their own Superiors.

XXI. Question XVIII. *Can Regular Prelates dispense their subjects in vows made with the license of greater Prelates?* Answer. It has already been said that Regular Prelates can do what Bishops can do throughout their whole diocese — namely, the General throughout the whole Order, the Provincial throughout the whole Province, and the Superiors of houses throughout the whole family. To the question proposed some answer, denying this faculty to Prelates. But the common and true opinion teaches that in the case proposed Regular Prelates can dispense. Because although a license granted by a greater Prelate withdraws the vow made from the ruling power of the inferior Prelate, who

cannot invalidate it, it does not thereby remove it from spiritual jurisdiction. Therefore the inferior Prelate can dispense from it. Regular Prelates can also dispense their own Novices.

XXII. Question XIX. *Can Regular Confessors dispense secular men in vows?* Answer. Almost all Casuists commonly affirm it, alleging several privileges; but in Tome 3 of the Christian Theology, book 4, dissertation 3, chapter 11, I made plain that privileges of this kind are fictitious and of no authority; and so that Regular Confessors can in no way dispense secular men from any vows whatsoever, whether reserved or not reserved. And this our opinion Passerini, Martínez de Prado, and Lezana teach, which in the place cited I confirmed by the authority of Benedict XIII, who in his constitution *Pretiosus in conspectu Domini* imparts to Confessors the faculty of commuting vows, but not of dispensing. Fr. O. P. wrangle over the word "relaxed" [relaxari] contained in the constitution. But I exploded this cavil in the place cited, where I showed that in a matter of jurisdiction, the safer part must be chosen.

XXIII. Question XX. *What must be said of vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff?* Answer. The common opinion is that there are five vows reserved to the supreme Pontiff, namely the simple vow of perpetual continence, of Religion, and of a threefold pilgrimage — to Jerusalem, to Rome, and to Compostela. No other vow, besides these five, is reserved to the supreme Pontiff. Except, however, simple vows made in certain Religious Orders of not seeking, nor accepting, dignities. That these vows be reserved to the supreme Pontiff, they must be certain, express, absolute, and perfect. If there be doubt about them, they are not reserved. For this reservation, since it is odious, must be interpreted strictly. Wherefore if someone made one of these five vows with the express intention of binding himself only under venial sin, it would not be a perfect vow, and therefore not reserved either.

XXIV. Bishops, urgent necessity pressing, can dispense in vows of this kind — as when there is danger of violating the vow, of infamy, of scandal, or of another grave harm, either temporal or spiritual, if the dispensation is deferred. You violated a virgin while bound by a vow of chastity. For the reparation of her honor, marriage is necessary. Impediments are feared to be raised, if the marriage is deferred. In this and similar cases, Bishops can dispense, provided the imminent harms cannot be repaired in another way.

XXV. The Salmanticenses grant this same faculty of dispensing from reserved vows to Regular Prelates...

But this opinion is false: because even the privileges admitted, which are commonly alleged, and which we have rejected as apocryphal, grant Regular Prelates no faculty in reserved vows. These privileges being excluded, Regulars have no power even of commuting the vows of Seculars. A vow of not contracting marriage is not reserved, because it is not perfect in this kind. For it does not exclude fornication, pollution, and other acts contrary to chastity. By force of custom a Bishop can grant the faculty of asking the conjugal debt to one who, bound by a vow of chastity, has contracted marriage. A vow of an unapproved Religion is not reserved.

XXVI. Question XXI. *How are the reserved vows of the threefold pilgrimage understood?* Answer. They are reserved when they were made on account of a peculiar devotion toward the aforesaid places. These vows, made with some circumstance, remain whole and reserved when the circumstance is removed. You vowed a pilgrimage to Rome on foot: the Bishop can dispense in the circumstance of the journey

on foot, but not in the vow of pilgrimage, which can be made by carriage. A disjunctive vow is not reserved before one part is chosen by the one vowing. You vowed Religion, or alms; chastity, or fasting, without having chosen either part. In this case a Bishop can dispense. But once a reserved part has been selected by the one vowing — say, perpetual chastity — then it seems to us more probable that it is reserved.

XXVII. These vows: "If I gamble, I vow chastity"; "If my father dies, I will enter Religion" — this second the authors commonly teach to be reserved, because the vow is in very deed absolute, and only expresses an apparent condition: namely, when my father dies, I will enter Religion. This other vow, and similar ones, once the condition is fulfilled, seem more probably to be reserved. Thus this is reserved: "I vow Religion, if I come off unharmed" — once the condition is fulfilled, not before. The opposite opinion the Salmanticenses defend at length, whose reasons I exploded in the place cited.

XXVIII. When the aforesaid five vows, on account of some condition attached, are not reserved, Regular Confessors can relax them by commuting, but not by dispensing, as has been said above. For "to relax" does not include "to dispense," as not a few falsely suppose. For when Pontiffs grant the faculty of dispensing, they expressly use the word "dispense." In the faculty granted of dispensing or commuting all vows, reserved vows are not understood, unless they are expressed.

XXIX. Question XXII. *Is a reasonable cause required for a valid and licit dispensation?* Answer. The power given to a dispenser is for edification, not for destruction, as the Councils, Canons, Fathers, and Theologians teach. Therefore a dispensation of a vow granted without a reasonable cause is not only illicit, but invalid, because it would be for the destruction, not the edification, of the Church. If it is doubted whether or not there is a cause for dispensing, then the Theologians commonly teach that dispensation has no place. For a vow is certain, and cannot be undone for an uncertain cause. But if some certain cause exists, and it is only doubted whether it is sufficient, then the common opinion teaches that dispensation can be granted. When a dispensation has been given in good faith both on the part of the one asking and on the part of the one granting, if you afterwards discover that the cause which each party judged legitimate at the time of the granting and the asking is false and null, what is to be done? The Salmanticenses, Sanchez, Tamburini, Leander, Sporer, Roncaglia, and others defend that the dispensation is valid. But the contrary opinion is more probable. For even the adversaries cited themselves confess that a just cause is required for valid dispensation. Therefore, as often as this cause is lacking, there is no dispensation. There was good faith both in the one asking and in the one granting; what follows from this? Only this follows: that these did not sin. Did good faith perhaps make a false cause become true? Far from it, you say. Therefore, a false cause existing, there is no dispensation. But it belongs to divine benignity to confirm and ratify what was asked and granted in good faith. Is this so indeed? Will divine benignity, then, confirm an error? This surely does not befit divine benignity. But souls are tortured with scruples, consciences are disturbed. These are trifles. Errors, fictions, and false interpretations do not settle consciences, do not uproot scruples; but the true observance of the Law brings tranquility.

XXX. Question XXIII. *What are legitimate causes of dispensation?* Answer. Three things must be noted: 1. what is lawful according to equity; 2. what is fitting according to honesty; 3. what is expedient according to utility. The graver the vow, the graver the causes required for dispensation, so that there be a fitting proportion between the vow to be relaxed and the cause of relaxation. Hence it is that in the aforesaid five vows dispensations are rarely granted, but the supreme Pontiffs themselves are

wont to mix in something of commutation. Nor is it to be inferred from this that a dispensation is never to be granted; but only that it is to be granted when a legitimate cause occurs. Nor is an evident cause always required, since in moral matters it can often not be had. It suffices that a likely cause appear solid, so that, all things seriously weighed, it be judged expedient, both to the common good and to the honest advantage of the one vowing, that the vow be relaxed.

XXXI. The peculiar causes which can suffice for granting a dispensation are: doubt about the vow having been made, imperfect deliberation in vowing, the very great difficulty of its execution, a moral danger of frequently violating the vow on account of the fragility of the one bound by the vow, even a light fear unjustly inflicted to extort the vow.

XXXII. Imperfect deliberation either was so sudden and weak that it rendered the vow null, and the question ceases; or it was such that it rendered the vow valid, in which case it does not by itself suffice for a dispensation. But when perfect deliberation is doubted, and difficulty of execution is added, then there is room for dispensation. A vehement fear of shipwreck, of a most grave danger, can sometimes so disturb the mind that it impedes perfect deliberation, so that it can sometimes be a sufficient reason for granting a dispensation. Similarly, a most grave difficulty, not foreseen beforehand, but appearing entirely after the vow was made, can be a cause of dispensation. Tamburini, the Salmanticenses, and Sporer contend that even a foreseen difficulty suffices for dispensation; but this opinion is false to me. If to the difficulty is added a grave danger of violating the vow, then there can be room for dispensation. Doubt about a vow having been made is not a sufficient cause for dispensing, but only for commuting.

XXXIII. Question XXIV. *What is the commutation of a vow, and who can commute vows?* Answer. It is the exchange of one matter for another, under the same obligation of the vow. It differs from dispensation, which takes away the whole obligation, and from invalidation, which can be validly done even without cause. Commutation is an effect of spiritual jurisdiction. Anyone can increase, but not diminish, his own vows. You vowed a hundred gold pieces; you can give two hundred: because this is a more abundant payment, not a commutation. They dispute whether anyone can commute his own vows. Some affirm it; but St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and other ancient writers deny it. For commutation is an act of spiritual jurisdiction. Secular persons lack this spiritual jurisdiction; but ecclesiastical persons cannot exercise spiritual jurisdiction upon themselves; and therefore they cannot commute their own vows. The patrons of the opposite opinion gratuitously assert that this commutation is an act of prudence, not of spiritual jurisdiction: for in a true commutation the prior bond is rescinded, and another substituted. But the rescission of a contract is an act of jurisdiction. It is so, they say, when the commutation is not evidently for the better. Several of the adversaries confuse the state of the question. When...

the promised matter is increased, it is not commutation, but a more abundant payment. True commutation is when, in place of one matter — say a fast — another is substituted, such as alms. Now that jurisdiction is required for this exchange is evident. The adversaries concede this when the matter to be substituted is either inferior or equal: why not also when it is greater, and of a different kind? There is added that no one is a judge in his own cause; and men can with difficulty know what is more pleasing to God. Therefore promises must be stood by, which cannot be broken without falsehood, unless jurisdiction intervenes, which rescinds the bond of the contract. No one, then, can by his own authority commute the matter of his own vow into another matter of a different kind; but

spiritual jurisdiction is necessary. Hence he who has vowed one Religion cannot, by his own authority, enter another.

XXXIV. Question XXV. *In the commutation of vows, must an equality of matter be kept?* Answer. Bonacina, Leander, Diana teach that vows can be commuted into a lesser matter; but the more common and more probable opinion defends that a moral equality must be kept. For commutation is indeed a contract: but in every contract equality must be kept, more or less according to the diversity of contracts. This equality is not to be taken arithmetically and mathematically, but morally — that is, as is prudently judged equivalent to the matter which was previously subject to the vow.

XXXV. Question XXVI. *What cause is required for a licit and valid commutation?* Answer. When the commutation is made into something evidently better, by a Prelate endowed with legitimate authority, all concede that no cause is required; and they add that the same must be said when the matter to be substituted is evidently equal, and probably better. But when the supreme Pontiff, in a Jubilee or in the Bull of the Crusade, or by some privilege, gives the faculty of commuting vows, no peculiar cause is required, but the execution of the works prescribed in the aforesaid Bulls suffices: because the supreme Pontiff imparts such a faculty for the common good of the whole Church. But when Prelates, by ordinary power, commute vows into matter of a different kind, some just cause is always required; yet a grave one is not always necessary, but sometimes a light one can suffice, that the commutation be licit: for when it is into equal matter, it is valid even if made without cause, though not licit; but if it is made into inferior matter without cause, it is both illicit and invalid, as the more probable opinion teaches. But a Prelate commuting vows without cause sins gravely, because he abuses the faculty granted to him.

XXXVI. Question XXVII. *What must be said of the commutation of vows by force of a Jubilee, or of the Bull of the Crusade?* Answer. In the Bull of the Jubilee a broader faculty is granted, namely of commuting vows of the threefold pilgrimage — to Rome, to Compostela, and to Jerusalem — and only vows of chastity and of Religion are excepted. In the Bull of the Crusade, besides these two vows, a vow of an overseas pilgrimage is also excepted. The two vows of chastity and of Religion, which are excepted in each Bull, are perfect and absolute. Wherefore vows of not marrying, of not fornicating, of conjugal chastity, of chastity for a limited time, are not excepted, nor vows made by deceit, fear, or error. This commutation can be made both within and outside of confession: because the privileges which grant the faculty of commuting vows do not bind this commutation to sacramental confession, unless Superiors decree otherwise. In this commutation the general rule must be kept: to commute either into something better, or into a good morally and prudently equal.

XXXVII. Question XXVIII. *Can a vow of giving alms to such a Church, or to such a poor person, be commuted, after that party's acceptance, by virtue of a Jubilee, or of the Bull of the Crusade?* Answer. To me the affirming opinion is false. Since either the poor person, or the Church, after the acceptance of a promise confirmed by a vow, acquires a right to the promised thing. But the aforesaid privileges do not grant the faculty of injuring justice. He who, after receiving the Jubilee, remembers some vow, can take care that it be commuted for him, because his forgetting of it was innocent. But once the year of the Bull of the Crusade has passed, the graces granted in it cannot be obtained. He who, at the beginning of the week of the Jubilee, has his vows commuted with a sincere intention of gaining the Jubilee, has the commutation stand, even if afterwards, through negligence or forgetfulness, he does not fulfill the works of the Jubilee. Since an obligation once extinguished does not revive. He who, at the time

of the Jubilee, refuses to commute his vows without just cause, sins more or less according to the variety of circumstances.

XXXVIII. Question XXIX. *Is a return to the former matter licit after a legitimate commutation has been made?* Answer. If the commutation was made into a lesser obligation, and a dispensation was mixed in, the one vowing can return to the original matter, the substituted matter being abandoned: because no one is compelled to use a privilege of dispensation that favors him, as is commonly taught. But the Theologians dispute whether a return to the prior matter is free, when the commutation was made, by legitimate authority, into something better or equal. The Salmanticenses, Leander, Castropalao, Laymann, and others affirm it. Because, they say, the commutation is made in favor of the one vowing. The contrary opinion is more probable to me: since indeed the commutation is in favor of the one vowing precisely because the prior bond is removed and another substituted. Here the whole favor to the one vowing is concluded. Now when the one vowing has accepted the commutation, or the substituted burden, he has bound himself to it by the bond of Religion. Therefore he cannot free himself from this debt, especially when the commutation was made into something better, since he freely accepted this greater burden, and bound himself to it.

The End of the First Tome.