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Volume III: On the Decalogue

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BOOK III

On Adoration, Superstition, Tempting God, Sacrilege and Blasphemy

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Book Three — On the Decalogue

Dissertation I — On Adoration, and the Worship by which God and the Saints are to be Honored

Proem

Thus far we have disputed concerning the acts of faith, hope, and charity, by which God is chiefly worshipped, and concerning prayer, which is a peculiar office of religion. At present, discourse must be undertaken concerning another office of religion, which is called adoration. Many things will occur to be examined, not only for the forming of Catholic morals, but also for the refuting of the errors of heretics. But I shall fix my step within the bounds of my own undertaking, and shall touch only in passing, and cursorily, on those matters which regard the vain fabrications, or rather deliria (to speak more truly), of the heretics. I shall apply myself more seriously to this: that I may set forth our Catholic doctrine concerning the worship of the Saints, of images, and of relics, more closely, and more clearly. This perspicuous explanation is indeed sufficient to overthrow the novators' sophisms, which are almost all impostures, and calumnies, fabricated from a false exposition of Catholic doctrine. I would be doing a useless work, if I wished to repeat what innumerable Catholic Theologians have already strenuously accomplished, and I would depart altogether from the goal I have set for myself. Let us come, then, to the matter.

Chapter I — What adoration is; its division, and the precept, are explained

I. Adoration, taken generally, is an act by which someone subjects himself to another in testimony of that other's excellence. The chief reason of adoration is the excellence, or dignity, of the person adored. There are, then, as many adorations as there are kinds of dignity. There are, moreover, two dignities: one uncreated, the other created. Adoration, then, is divided, first, into that which is owed to uncreated majesty, or to God, and is called *latria*; and into that which is shown to creatures on account of the excellence of the supernatural order participated from God, of grace, of sanctity, of beatitude, by which the Saints and the blessed spirits are honored; and this is called *dulia*. But because the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of Christ the Lord, is wonderfully eminent above all the Saints, and heavenly spirits, she is therefore adored with a peculiar worship, which is called *hyperdulia* — that is, above the worship of *dulia* to be shown to the Saints, and below the worship of *latria* owed to God.

II. Adoration, again, is distinguished into internal and external. The former is an interior act by which the spirit subjects itself to God, as the supreme founder of all things. By this reasoning, Angels, and blessed souls, adore God. This bursts forth outwardly, and manifests itself by external signs, such as the bowing of the head, the prostration of the body, kisses, genuflections, and similar signs of this kind. Internal adoration can exist without external; the reverse cannot. Indeed, exterior adoration, destitute of interior, is not adoration, but flattery, feigning, and mockery. We are bound to show both to God, as St. Thomas excellently teaches (II-II, q. 84, art. 2): "*Since man is composed of a twofold nature, namely intellectual and sensible, we offer God a twofold adoration: namely, a spiritual one, which consists in the interior devotion of the mind; and a corporeal one, which consists in the exterior humiliation of the*

body. And because, in all acts of latria, that which is exterior is referred to that which is interior, as to what is principal, therefore the exterior adoration itself is done for the sake of the interior, so that, namely, by the perceptible humility which we show corporeally, our affection may be excited to subject itself to God: since it is connatural to us that we proceed through sensible things to intelligible ones."

III. Adoration is divided, third, into absolute and relative. Absolute, say the theologians of Salamanca, with other more recent writers (tract. 21, ch. 1, punct. 1, n. 3), is that which is shown to creatures who are, of themselves, capable of excellence, and sanctity. Only rational creatures, however, are capable of this dignity, and sanctity; and therefore to them alone is absolute adoration owed. This description, according to the common mind of Theologians, can hold a sound sense; but, so that the calumny with which the heterodox reproach us may be entirely removed, it must be said that all religious worship regards God, is resolved into God, and rests, and finds quiet, in God. Wherefore, if we wish to speak exactly, only the adoration shown to God is absolute in every respect; but the worship which we offer to the Saints is referred to God as to the true and first principle: for we honor the Saints on account of God, on account of the dignity, grace, and sanctity intimately conjoined with, and participated from, God. Wherefore the worship of these always expresses a reference to God. It is called by Theologians, however, absolute adoration shown to the Saints, in relation to images, and relics, which, being inanimate things, are destitute of intimate excellence; and the worship which is offered to them regards the persons whom they represent: for this reason the worship shown to them is relative.

IV. Adoration which is shown to creatures on account of natural gifts and dignities is customarily called reverence, and can be made by the same external signs by which God is worshipped. For external bodily actions are indifferent, and can be employed both for worshipping God, and for honoring men. By genuflection, by prostration of the body, God is adored; and yet by these same signs Judith, seeing Holofernes, adored him, prostrating herself upon the ground (ch. 10). By genuflection too we adore Supreme Pontiffs. We stretch out our hands to heaven, so that we may adore God: "I spread out my hands to the Lord my God" (Esdras 1:9); and the Royal Prophet says: "The lifting up of my hands as evening sacrifice." And yet we also use this sign to implore men's aid. The striking of the breast is likewise, of itself, indifferent; although, according to common use, it is more properly determined for obtaining pardon of sins from God, nothing nonetheless prevents us from using the same sign to appease a man whom we have offended, and to ask forgiveness for the offense inflicted. But this sign pertains more to the virtue of penance than to that of religion. Private external adoration, then, unless it is made divine by the intention of the one adoring, depends on that intention, unless some peculiar law, use, or custom has already destined it to divine worship. Hence it is that, while private persons perform such external actions publicly, it does not suffice for them to have a good intention; but the circumstances of place, time, persons, and custom must be observed. Of all these kinds of external actions, the most excellent, and which is owed to God alone, is sacrifice, by which God is proper to himself owed.

V. Question I. *Is there a divine and natural precept of worshipping God by both internal and external acts?* Response: The affirmative conclusion is certain, of faith. That there is a divine precept is established from several texts of Scripture, chiefly from Exodus 20, and Deuteronomy 5: "I am the Lord thy God.... Thou shalt not have strange gods before me. Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing." This commandment is affirmative, insofar as it prescribes worship; and negative, insofar as it forbids

the worship of other gods. It is more congruently expressed in negative words, because man, by natural instinct, is so borne toward the worship of God, that he needs rather the rein of prohibition, to restrain him lest he slip into superstition, than to be urged by goads, that he might adore his Creator. That this precept, moreover, is natural, is likewise clear. For what is more implanted in us by nature than to venerate him from whom we have received all things? Since, moreover, we have received a twofold nature from God, spiritual and corporeal, it follows that he ought to be worshipped by us with the acts of both natures, or by internal adoration, or by internal and external mixed together. All of which are more certain than to need proof.

VI. Question II. *When does this precept, of itself, oblige?* Response: This precept, insofar as it is negative, obliges always, and for always, as do all negative precepts, which forbid actions evil by their own nature; but, insofar as it is affirmative, it obliges at fixed times. Certain more recent Probabilist writers — Fr. Thomas Tamburini (Bk. II, on the Decalogue, ch. 4, §2, n. 4), Fagundez (Bk. I, on the Decalogue, ch. 32), Bassaeus (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 5, dub. 2), and others whom Roccaberti, whom Leander cites, teach that this precept, of itself, at no time imposes adoration directly, and per se; but only presupposes it. This lax opinion is not worthwhile to expound in words; I will only say that it betrays laxity, and horror. The common opinion of Theologians teaches that this precept, of itself, and directly, imposes adoration. At what time, and how often it must be exercised, see what has been said concerning the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for the reasoning of both precepts is the same. For we have been brought into the light for this reason: that we might worship our God by faith, hope, charity, and acts of religion; and thus our moral, and Christian, life ought to live by these actions. We ought, then, to repeat these offices of religion with such frequency as suffices to nourish and foster our moral and Christian life. Besides the natural and divine precept, there is likewise given an ecclesiastical mandate, on feast days, by which we are bidden to worship God with all our resources. For all feasts regard this worship of God, and all the faithful, on these days, together with the Priest, offer sacrifice to God.

VII. Question III. *Is there a determined place in which God must be worshipped?* Response: If the discourse concerns a place prescribed by natural or divine right, it is certain that no place is designated; but, since God is present everywhere, we can, and ought to, adore him everywhere. The Church, however, God himself so prescribing, has erected temples, in which sacrifices, and the solemn rites of divine worship, might be celebrated. The Angelic Doctor adduces three congruent reasons, by which he establishes the fitting and becoming institution of temples (II-II, q. 84, art. 3, ad 2): "*A determined place is chosen for praying, not on account of God who is adored, as though he were enclosed in a place, but on account of the ones adoring; and this for a threefold reason. First, indeed, on account of a special consecration of the place, from which those praying conceive special devotion, so that they may be better heard, as is clear from the adoration of Solomon (3 Kings 8). Second, on account of the sacred mysteries, and other signs of sanctity which are contained there. Third, on account of the concourse of many adoring, from which prayer is made more likely to be heard.*" He adds, in the same place, ad 3: "*It is more fitting for us to adore God with the temple's face turned toward the east, both on account of Christ, who is the light of the world, and is called the East; and on account of paradise, established in the east — as though, wishing to return to paradise, we, while we pray, turn ourselves in that direction.*"

Chapter II — The worship of latria is owed to God alone, one and triune, and to Christ the Lord

I. God alone is of infinite dignity, which can be communicated to no creature. This infinite dignity, moreover, is common to all three Persons; therefore the worship of latria is owed to God alone, one and triune, according to that saying (Matthew 4): "The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve." For latria is the servitude which we are bound to show to God alone. Hence it follows that the individual Persons can be adored separately by the worship of latria, since each individually is God; provided, however, that none is explicitly excluded — for each can be conceived without the other. Wherefore the Church has dedicated to each individually a feast day, so that we might adore them distinctly.

II. Since, however, external adoration, generally considered, is indifferent, it is necessary to designate some sign by which we manifest the worship owed to God alone. This, moreover, is sacrifice, which it is unlawful, without superstition, to offer to any creature, however excellent. For, as the Angelic Doctor says (II-II, q. 84, art. 1): "No one ever thought to sacrifice, except to him whom he either worshipped, or thought, or feigned, as God" — which Augustine had already taught (Bk. X, *On the City of God*, ch. 4). It is certain, then, among all, that both the one God, and the three Persons individually, can, and ought, to be adored by us both jointly, and separately.

III. Question I. *Can Christ the Lord, as man, be adored with the adoration of latria?* Response: That Christ, as the second Person of the Trinity, ought to be worshipped with the worship of latria, is established from what has been said. This alone is brought into controversy: whether, as man, he ought to be adored with the same worship. All Theologians, with St. Thomas (Part III, q. 25, art. 1), affirm this, and give this reason: "*Since in Christ there is only one divine person, and the human nature is also one hypostasis, and one supposit, there is indeed one adoration of him, and one honor, on the part of him who is adored; but on the part of the cause by which he is honored, several adorations can be said to exist, so that, namely, he is honored by one honor on account of his uncreated wisdom, and by another on account of his created wisdom. Christ, taking specifically both his divine nature, and...*" his human nature, comprehends both; therefore in him shines infinite dignity, by which he claims for himself the worship of latria. For, that we may adore some whole, and its parts constituting that whole, it is not necessary that the reason of adoration be present in each and every part; but it is enough that the reason of adoration reside in some part. We adore the Eucharist with the worship of latria, because there is found there the flesh, which is the reason of adoration. And, while we worship some holy person, we venerate all his parts with the worship of latria, although the sanctity which is the cause of adoration is not present in all of them. Therefore, that we may adore Christ with the adoration of latria, even considered specifically as man, it suffices that his humanity be terminated by a divine subsistence, which is the formal reason of adoration.

IV. Question III. *Is the humanity of Christ, considered as abstracted from the Word, to be adored with the worship of latria?* Response: Theologians deny this, with the same St. Thomas — since humanity, considered as precisely abstracted from the Word, betrays only a created, and limited, dignity. Therefore, according to this reasoning, not the worship of latria, but of dulia, is owed to it. Here are the words of the Angelic Doctor (III Part, q. 25, art. 2): "*The proper adoration of latria is owed to the hypostasis of infinite dignity; but the reason of honor can be that which does not subsist, on account of which the subsisting person is honored. Adoration of Christ's humanity, then, can be understood in a twofold way. In one way, so that it is the*

adoration of that which is adored, and thus to adore the flesh of Christ is nothing other than to adore the incarnate Word of God — just as to adore the King's garment is nothing other than to adore the clothed King; and according to this, the adoration of Christ's humanity is the adoration of latria. In another way, the adoration of Christ's humanity can be understood, so that the perfection of Christ's humanity itself is the reason for which Christ is adored, and thus the adoration of Christ's humanity is not the adoration of latria, but of dulia."

V. Question III (bis). *Is it lawful in practice to adore the humanity of Christ with the worship of dulia, on account of the created perfections with which it shines?* Response: Several deny this, such as Vázquez, Sylvius, and others. The contrary opinion affirms this, resting on the authority of St. Thomas, who says that the same person of Christ is adored with the worship of latria on account of his divinity, and with the worship of dulia on account of the perfection of his humanity (loc. cit.). That such a twofold adoration can be shown to Christ the Lord on account of the two natures is already established from what has been said. But whether they can, and ought, really to be offered separately in practice is not a question of such great moment as to need a more severe discussion. While we adore Christ with the worship of latria, we honor, by a supreme and more excellent worship, both his divinity, and the humanity conjoined to it. If someone wished to meditate separately on Christ's humanity, and to worship it with a peculiar veneration on account of its created perfections, he would perform a true office of religion. Nonetheless, as it seems to me, it is better, these distinctions set aside, to adore Christ the Lord with the worship of latria according to the common, and obvious, manner.

VI. Question IV. *Was the body of Christ, during the three days of his death, to be adored with the worship of latria?* Response: The common opinion affirms this, because it was united to the divine Word. The same must be asserted of the natural blood shed in his passion, since this was never separated from the Word. The same, too, must be said of the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which the body of Christ is coupled, in an ineffable manner, to the divine person by hypostatic union. And this the Council of Trent defined, against Luther and Calvin.

VII. Question V. *Is the host to be adored by the Priest, elevated in the Mass, absolutely, or under an added condition?* Response: This is St. Thomas's own response: "*It must be said that one who adores a non-consecrated host can adore it under a condition, namely, if it is consecrated. It is not, however, necessary that this condition always be actually explicit; but it suffices that he hold it habitually. Whence one adoring it does not sin, because he does not adore a mere creature, but Christ according to his intention. The priest, however, so far as it is in him, makes the people commit idolatry, because he offers them a mere creature.*" It is not necessary that this condition be expressly added; but it suffices that it be present habitually, and implicitly. It is absolutely lawful to adore it, since no prudent reason of suspicion occurs that the Priest failed to consecrate it. It suffices that he be so disposed, as a Catholic, that, if he knew it was not consecrated, he would abstain from adoration. He, however, who adores a host really not consecrated, does not exercise an act of the virtue of religion, but an act of idolatry, which is not imputed to him as fault, on account of invincible error.

VIII. Question VI. *Is the flesh, or blood, which sometimes appears in a consecrated host by miracle, to be adored with the worship of latria?* Response: The common opinion affirms this. Because that flesh, or blood, either is Christ's, or is something divinely produced referring to Christ. No one doubts that the former is to be adored with the worship of latria; if it is something divinely produced, it represents Christ himself. Now every image of Christ is to be adored, if it truly is one, with the reverence of latria. And in all these apparitions which are narrated to be made divinely, Christ the Lord is

represented; indeed they are instituted for the purpose of representing him, so that faith and devotion may be wondrously increased. To this opinion St. Thomas accedes (III Part, q. 76, art. 8), where he asks whether, when flesh, or a child, miraculously appears in the Eucharist, the body of Christ is truly there. To this question he responds thus: "*But on the contrary is this, that by such an apparition made, the same reverence is shown to that which appears as was shown before — which indeed would not happen, if Christ were not truly there, to whom we show the reverence of latria.*" If all confess that the consecrated host, under the species of bread, presented to us, is to be adored with the worship of latria, by a stronger right we owe such worship to it once the miraculous apparition has occurred. Would God, then, work a notable prodigy so as to diminish the worship due to the most august sacrament? For we suppose the apparition to be wrought by divine power, for the greater glory of God, the confirmation of faith, and the devotion of the people.

Chapter III — On the worship of the Cross, and whether the other instruments of Christ's most sacred Passion can be worshipped, and with the worship of latria

All Catholics affirm it.

I. Question I. *Is the Cross of Christ to be adored?* Response: All Catholics affirm this. For the Cross of Christ is an image of Christ. But the image of Christ is worshipped with the same worship as Christ himself. That the Cross is a special sign, or symbol referring to the person of Christ, is clear from that text of Matthew 24: *then shall appear the sign of the Son of Man* — from which text all the commentators teach that the Cross of Christ is meant. The Angelic Doctor explains this matter excellently. He says: it must be said that no reverence is shown to the image of Christ insofar as it is a mere thing (say, a carved or painted sign); for reverence is owed only to a rational nature. It remains, then, that reverence is shown to it only insofar as it is an image; and thus it follows that the same reverence is shown to the image of Christ as to Christ himself. Since, therefore, Christ is adored with the adoration of latria, it follows that his image is to be adored with the adoration of latria (III Part., q. 25, art. 3).

It should be added that the Cross to which the incarnate Word was affixed must be adored not only because it is an image of Christ himself, but also on account of its physical contact with his members, and on account of that precious blood with which it was sprinkled, as the same Angelic Doctor teaches in the place cited, art. 4. If, then, we speak of that very Cross on which Christ was crucified, it is to be venerated by us in two respects: in one respect insofar as it represents to us the figure of Christ, which is present in it; in another respect from its contact with the members of Christ, and from the fact that it was drenched with his blood. Hence in both respects it is adored with the same adoration as Christ, namely the adoration of latria.

II. Question II. *Are the other inanimate instruments of Christ's most sacred Passion — the lance, the cords, the nails, the scourges, the crown, the reed, the sponge, and the like — to be adored with the worship of latria?* Response: All Catholics affirm this, on account of their physical contact with the body of Christ. For it is from this contact that they become notable relics, and acquire a special relation to Christ himself, as St. Thomas explains in the place cited, ad 3: *the precious wood, as sanctified by contact with the sacred body and blood, is fittingly to be adored; likewise the nails, the garments, the lance, and the like.* These, however, do not represent the image of Christ as the Cross does, which is called the sign of the Son

of Man that shall appear in heaven. It is, then, contact with the most sacred body of Christ that brings it about that we worship these inanimate instruments with the same worship as Christ, because it is entirely on account of Christ that we adore them; for they are not capable of any intrinsic adoration in themselves, since they possess no intrinsic dignity.

For this reason, animate instruments — such as the hands of those who crucified him, or the lips of those who kissed [Judas' kiss] that same Christ — are not to be adored, on account of the crime perpetrated by such members. For sins defile even the external members through this contact. Wherefore, although they would otherwise be worthy of adoration, on account of the crime committed they are worthy not of adoration but of detestation.

III. Azor adduces the authority of St. Augustine, drawn from Sermon 8 on the Words of the Lord, to argue that Augustine taught that inanimate instruments are to be adored not with the worship of latria but of dulia; and Leander presses the same authority — a man who marks even the smallest faults of other casuists with his censorious pen. But that sermon is in fact spurious, and is placed among the apocryphal works, as may be seen in the Appendix to Tome X [of Augustine's works]. Indeed, the very words that Azor and Leander cite in opposition are not even found in that sermon, as the theologians of Salamanca note (tract. 21, cap. 10, punct. 10).

IV. The arguments customarily raised against us by heterodox writers — namely, that we worship wood and metal — are wretched falsehoods, refuted so many times already. For in these symbols and figures we worship Christ himself, and we venerate these signs on this one ground alone: that they call to our memory the exemplar which they represent. Equally worthless is the other fabrication they blurt out, that no son worships the gallows or the noose by which his father was hanged. To this argument St. Thomas replies that in the Cross of Christ, insofar as it is considered according to the intention or opinion of the unbelievers, one sees the reproach of Christ; but insofar as it is considered according to its effect for our salvation, one sees in it the divine power by which he triumphed over his enemies. The Cross of Christ, therefore, is worshipped not as an infamous punishment chosen by the Jews to put Christ to a most shameful death, but as the standard of the victory which Christ won over the enemy of the human race, and as a triumphal monument of our salvation. Finally, as to the objection that the hands of the Virgin, of her spouse Joseph, and of the disciples, which touched the body of Christ, would likewise have to be adored with the worship of latria — the reply is that the case is not parallel. For instruments devoid of a soul are not, considered in themselves, capable of veneration; hence the whole of the worship we show them is referred entirely to Christ. The Virgin, her spouse, and the disciples, however, are themselves adorned with intimate excellence, and are therefore worthy of worship in themselves — though of the worship we show to the Saints, not of latria — because the Blessed Virgin, according to herself, is capable of veneration; and so the reasoning is not the same (III Part., q. 25, art. 5, ad 3, where he explains this more fully in the body of the article).

V. As to the Cross itself, a distinction must be drawn between that Cross on which Christ hung and other crosses fashioned in its likeness. The former is worshipped on a twofold ground: by reason of the image of the extended Christ which it bears in itself, and by reason of its contact with that same most holy body. Wherefore even if that Cross were broken into pieces and lost the very shape of a cross, it would still be to be adored with the worship of latria, on account of that distinct contact. All other crosses, made to represent that first one, are adored on the single ground of the image; hence,

if they should lose the figure representing Christ, they are in no way to be worshipped. Finally, in order for the Cross of Christ to be worshipped, it must have been deliberately made for the purpose of recalling the sacred mystery. For this reason other crosses that happen to arise by chance — from timbers, straws, or other things crossing one another fortuitously — are not to be worshipped; rather, like any other wood, they may be disregarded or put to ordinary use. The names of God are to be venerated insofar as they refer to what they signify, and are honored as representing those persons; for they signify God, Christ, Jesus Christ, and the Blessed Virgin — names that make known persons worthy of holiness and veneration. Therefore, just as images are to be honored, so too such names, due proportion being kept, are to be honored. So the theologians commonly teach.

Chapter IV — On the adoration owed to the Blessed Virgin Mary, the Angels, and the Saints

I. God alone is to be adored by us with the religious worship of latria. This does not prevent us, however, from venerating other created persons with another, interior worship, on account of their special union with God himself, and on account of the heavenly gifts which God has communicated to them. The Blessed Virgin Mary shines above all creatures; she is therefore to be adored with a special worship, which we call the worship of hyperdulia. Countless Catholic theologians, against the modern innovators, bring forward the monuments of sacred antiquity by which they prove the most ancient tradition of devotion to Mary. Natalis Alexander adduces the testimonies of the Fathers of every age in his history [of the Church]. Splendid are the encomiums by which Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen extol her excellence and dignity. St. Gregory of Neocaesarea, in Homily III on the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin, expresses in these words the worship owed to her: "*To you every nature — heavenly, earthly, and of the world below — offers, with trembling, its tribute, and venerates you. For you have truly been made a throne...*" etc. St. Ephrem the Syrian, in his sermon on the praises of the Blessed Virgin, invokes her in this manner: "*Under your protection... have mercy on us, who are defiled by crimes and by the filth of very many sins, who have offended our God and the judge of all...*" Wondrous are the praises which Epiphanius composes for her in many places, above all in his treatise on the praises of the same Blessed Virgin. And what of the fact that even the heretics themselves...

II. There is, then, no doubt on this point: that it has been the practice of the Catholic Church to hold the Virgin, Mother of God, worthy of a worship set apart in this way [reading uncertain at this point in the scan] in prayer, as is likewise held by the Council of Trent, session 25, on the invocation of the Saints. Beyond the countless texts of Sacred Scripture confirming this truth — texts encountered throughout innumerable polemical theologians — natural reason too stands ready to hand. For the ground of adoration is the dignity and excellence of the person adored. On this ground, because God is of infinite majesty and dignity, we venerate him with the highest worship. Now the Angels, the Blessed, and the Saints reigning in heaven shine with a singular grace and dignity. Why, then, should worship be denied them? Is it because worship is owed to God alone? To God alone, indeed, is owed the worship of latria — that is, God alone is to be adored as God, and therefore with latria. This worship can be offered to no creature without the crime of idolatry. But why should a lesser worship be denied the Saints — the worship we call dulia, a worship proportioned to their created dignity and limited excellence, and which is ultimately referred to, and rests in, God himself? Why do heretics charge this worship with the stain of idolatry, when we testify, both by word and in writing, that we

venerate and honor the Saints on account of the friendship they have with God, and on account of the gifts he has communicated to them — when we testify that we venerate the Saints with a worship distinct from, and vastly inferior to, that with which we worship God?

III. The heterodox object: the Angel in Apocalypse 22 forbade that he be worshipped, as did St. Paul, and St. Peter. That these and similar texts may be more fully understood, it is worth transcribing what St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 84, art. 1, ad 1: "*Those [who were worshipped in the Old Testament] were worshipped so far as it pertains to latria in one sense; in the other veneration, by which creatures are venerated, which pertains to dulia... According to the reverence owed to an excellent creature, David worshipped [Saul, or Jonathan]; but according to the reverence owed to God, Mordecai refused to worship Haman, fearing lest he transfer the honor of God to a man, as is said in Esther 13. Likewise, according to the reverence owed to an excellent creature, Abraham worshipped the Angels, as did Joshua also, as is read in Joshua 5. It cannot, however, be understood that they worshipped with the worship of latria the God who appeared and spoke in the person of the Angel; rather, it was according to the reverence owed to man — so as to show the dignity which man has obtained through Christ, whereby he is made equal to the Angels; whence it is added there: 'I am your fellow-servant, and the fellow-servant of your brethren.' John, however, was forbidden to worship the Angel, in part also to remove any occasion of idolatry; whence it is added: 'Worship God.'*"

By this angelic teaching all the heretics' sophistries on this matter are overthrown.

IV. From this it likewise follows that the adoration by which we worship the Saints differs from that owed to God not merely in its object, but in the very virtue [habit] it exercises. The Angelic Doctor gives the reason for this diversity: where the ground of what is owed differs, a different virtue is required to render it. Adoration is owed to God because he is the Creator of all things, and on account of his uncreated and eminent majesty; it is owed to the Saints on another ground, on account of a created, finite dignity received from God — and these two grounds are wholly different. Distinct virtues must therefore correspond to them. Let us cite the Angelic Doctor's own words: "*Dominion belongs to man on one ground, and dominion belongs to God on another... for God has dominion in the principal sense, since every creature is wholly subject to his power; man, however, participates in a certain likeness of this, according as he has some particular power over another man, or over some other creature. And therefore dulia, which renders the service owed to a man who holds lordship, is a different virtue from latria, which renders the service owed to the divine Lord*" (II-II, q. 103, art. 3). Much else bearing on this may be read in the same Angelic Doctor, where he shows that, although God and one's neighbor are loved with the same charity — since the ground of loving is the same, namely goodness — God is nonetheless worshipped by a different virtue from that by which the Saints are worshipped, on account of the different ground of the worship.

V. The worship owed to any creature whatsoever, then, is not latria but dulia. But because the Blessed Virgin Mary surpasses all creatures — Angels and Saints alike — in glory, grace, and dignity, she is worshipped with the most perfect form of dulia, which we call hyperdulia. This too is taught by the Angelic Doctor, III Part, q. 25, art. 5: "*Although the Blessed Virgin is a mere rational creature, the worship of latria is not owed to her, but the worship of dulia — yet in a more eminent manner than to other creatures, inasmuch as she is the Mother of God. And so it is said that not just any dulia, but hyperdulia, is owed to her.*"

VI. The heretics object that this distinction between the worship of latria and of dulia is a fabrication, unknown in the earliest ages of the Church and nowhere indicated in Scripture; and indeed the following proposition was proscribed by Alexander VIII: "*The praise that is paid to Mary, as Mary, is*

empty." It is true, indeed, that this verbal distinction is not found in Scripture; but the reality itself is found there — namely, that worship is to be rendered both to God and to the Saints. What, then, does it matter to wrangle over words, so long as we hold fast to the realities themselves? Scripture and the ancient Fathers approve the worship shown to God, and to the holy Angels and men. The distinction — which teaching usage introduced for the sake of greater clarity — is therefore not to be condemned, but praised. Nor is it true, as the Lutherans and Calvinists allege, that this distinction was recently invented by the Popes. Augustine mentions it in Book X of the *City of God*, chapter 1, and in Book XX *Against Faustus*, chapter 21, where he says:

VII. Augustine repels a second calumny in the same Book XX *Against Faustus*, chapter 21 — namely, that Faustus also slanders us on this point, saying that we have turned the memorials of the Martyrs into idols: "*This does not so much move me to answer the calumny,*" [Augustine says] "*as it moves me to show that Faustus, out of his zeal for slander, was willing to depart even from the follies of Manichaeus himself... The Christian people, however, celebrate the memorials of the Martyrs with religious solemnity, both to arouse imitation, and that they may be joined to their merits and aided by their prayers; yet in such a way that we set up altars to none of the Martyrs, but to God alone — even though it be at the memorials of the Martyrs. For which of the bishops, standing at the places of the holy bodies, ever said: 'We offer to you, Peter, or Paul, or Cyprian'? Rather, what is offered is offered to God, who crowned the Martyrs, at the memorials of those whom he crowned — so that, from the reminder of those very places, a greater affection may be kindled to sharpen our love, both toward those whom we can imitate, and toward him by whose help we can do so. We honor the Martyrs, therefore, with that worship of love and fellowship with which holy men of God are honored even in this life... I could transcribe a great deal more to this effect from the other Fathers.*"

VIII. It remains now to explain to which Saints the worship of dulia is to be rendered. To this question we answer briefly: first, that the worship of dulia is owed to Saints canonized by the Church. For canonization is the Church's public testimony to the true sanctity of some person already deceased. As soon as certain Saints have been entered in the catalogue of the Saints, they are invoked in the public prayers of the Church; churches and altars are dedicated to God in their memory; prayers or offices are recited for them; their images and relics are exposed to public worship — all of which may be done, not because a precept requires it, but because the law permits and approves it.

IX. That the Church's judgment, or that of the Supreme Pontiff, in the canonization of Saints is subject to no error, all Catholics teach, against the more recent heretics who are the bitterest enemies of papal infallibility. Setting aside the many arguments theologians heap up on this point, I will cite the most prudent judgment of St. Thomas: "*The canonization of Saints is a mean between the Pope's judgment defining matters of faith and his judgment on particular facts... Yet because the honor we show the Saints is a kind of profession of faith, whereby we believe in the glory of the Saints, it is to be piously believed that the Church's judgment cannot err even in these matters*" (Quodlibet IX, art. 16). The opposite is claimed by the heterodox on the authority of Augustine, who says: "*The bodies of many are venerated on earth, whose souls are tormented in hell*" — a text which, even if it were found in Augustine, would not at all tell against our position, but would rather fit the Lutherans and Calvinists, whose bodies are honored on earth with great sculpted stones and proud tombs, while their souls, having died in the Lutheran faith, are tormented in hell. Augustine is not speaking of souls who, by the judgment of the Catholic Church, reign in heaven, but of others who are worshipped merely in popular opinion. Theologians dispute many further points about the canonization of Saints, which, as foreign to our present purpose, I pass

over. They likewise dispute at length about the beatification of Saints, its distinction from canonization, and the worship to be shown a beatified Saint. I will set all this out briefly.

X. Beatification is commonly held to be distinguished from canonization only accidentally, as an imperfect thing from a perfect one — for beatification is the proximate road to canonization. It is not the Church's final judgment, by which she definitively settles the worship of the Blessed; she only approves it provisionally. The Church, and the Pope, are illumined by the same heavenly light in beatification as in the canonization of Saints. Nothing prevents one declared "Blessed" by the Church from also being called "Saint," as common usage allows. The worship to be shown the Blessed is expressed in the Bull of beatification, and no other is to be rendered. Just as sacrifice is offered to God under the name of the Blessed, so churches and altars may likewise be erected in their memory. Whether it is lawful, in processions in honor of the Blessed, to carry their relics, or to invoke them in the public litanies, one must consult the custom of the Roman Church, and whatever common usage permits in these and similar matters.

XI. Theologians also carry on a lengthy dispute about the worship that may be offered to men or women who have died with a reputation for sanctity. On this point, while it is certain that no public worship can be offered to anyone not yet entered by the Church into the roll of Saints or Blessed, it is equally certain that private worship may lawfully be offered to them; and this is established by the universal and most ancient custom of the Christian people. Indeed, the very first door, so to speak, opening the way to beatification and canonization is the devotion of the people, their resort to the tombs of such deceased persons, and their invocation of them in sickness. And if, while such persons were still living, it was lawful to ask them privately to intercede for us, why should it not be lawful to do the same after their death for one who has been so declared by decree of the Church? Only public worship cannot be rendered to those who have not been designated Saints or Blessed by any authority of the Church. Hence, for such persons, the divine offices may not be recited, nor altars erected, nor sacrifices offered under their name, nor may their images be painted with rays and haloes of glory — because such worship requires the Church's authority, by which persons are designated Saints or Blessed. To such persons, then, neither publicly nor privately can the aforesaid worship be offered, for all of it is forbidden. Neither in churches nor in private oratories, therefore, may such images, painted with rays and haloes, be kept; nor may lamps or candles be lit at their tombs — as is laid down in the Decree of Urban VIII, which forbids these and many other things. As for practice, however, in the matter of hanging up votive tablets depicting favors and wonders obtained through some deceased person's intercession, the local Ordinaries are to be consulted, to whose care is committed the duty of watching against abuses that may creep in. It is likewise forbidden to call "Saints" or "Blessed" those not yet entered on the roll of Saints or Blessed. It is not forbidden, however, to say, with due qualification, that such a one "was a holy man" — a phrase indicating nothing more than that his life was upright and unblemished. To call someone "Saint" or "Blessed" absolutely, without qualification, is forbidden. It is, however, lawful to keep the garments, hair, and other similar relics of deceased persons of piety, to venerate them privately, and to kiss their feet and hands. The Church's custom confirms this: for when the Saints and Martyrs were put to death, even in the earliest ages of the Church their relics were seized upon by the faithful and honored, although the Martyrs had not yet been granted public worship by the bishops, as was then the custom. It is lawful, therefore, to venerate them, even in the sight of others, so long as scandal is avoided. It is likewise lawful to lay the bodies of those who have died with a reputation for public

sanctity in a more honorable place, even raised above the ground; but it is forbidden to place those same bodies beneath an altar, or on its steps. The Church's practice also shows it lawful to keep the bodies of such deceased persons unburied for some days, so that the devotion of the faithful may be satisfied; and history records that many miracles have been worked by God to manifest the sanctity of some deceased person. Likewise, the faithful may lawfully fast, or offer private vows to God, in memory of such deceased persons, because these are private acts of worship, as Bellarmine teaches (*De Reliquiis*, Bk. I, ch. 10), along with other theologians.

This scattered material, however, has been ordered, illustrated, and every difficulty in it thoroughly resolved, in a manner surpassing all others, by the most learned Cardinal Lambertini, in his immortal work — comprised in four volumes of vast bulk, and first published while he held the office of Archbishop of Bologna — who now, under the name of Benedict XIV, most wisely governs the universal Church. Consult that work, worthy of cedar and gold, for anything that gives you difficulty.

[A few short phrases above are flagged as uncertain readings owing to the degraded scan/OCR — chiefly the opening clause of §II and one or two single words elsewhere. These are worth checking against the original when you have it to hand; everything else has been read directly off the page images.]

Chapter V — On the worship with which the images of the Most Holy Trinity, of Christ the Lord, and of the Saints are to be honored

I. That the use of sacred images is lawful and pious is defined by the Council of Trent, session 25, decree on the invocation of the Saints, in these words: "*That the images of Christ, of the Virgin Mother of God, and of the other Saints are to be had and retained, especially in churches, and that due honor and veneration is to be paid them — not because it is believed that any divinity or power resides in them for which they are to be worshipped, or that anything is to be sought from them, or that trust is to be placed in images as was once done by the pagans, who set their hope in idols; but because the honor shown to them is referred to the prototypes which they represent, so that through the images which we kiss, and before which we uncover our heads and prostrate ourselves, we adore Christ, and venerate the Saints whose likeness they bear.*" At the sight of this decree, all the impostures of the heretics vanish. The honor shown to images we refer to their prototypes. All our adoration of images is relative: it looks, that is, to the prototypes they represent. There is, then, no taint of idolatry in this.

Moreover, very many good things flow from this practice. First, these icons recall above all, for the unlearned, the deeds of our forefathers and their triumphs over the enemy. "I know indeed," says Calvin (*Institutes*, Bk. I, ch. 11, §7), "that it is more than commonly said, that images are the books of the unlearned." Gregory said this. But the Spirit of God pronounces quite otherwise. Calvin admits — and after him Daillé, and the other innovators — that the use of sacred images prevailed by the fourth and fifth centuries. Yet they do not blush to blurt out that all the Fathers of the Church were stained with the taint of idolatry. The reckless audacity of the Protestants, who set themselves above the whole of sacred antiquity, is no small proof of the fabricated character of their religion. Will they, after twelve centuries, understand the customs and practices of the first Christians better than those Fathers — Gregory and the others — who lived nearest to those times, and of whom the Spirit of God pronounces otherwise? Did not God himself command Moses to make golden Cherubim, with faces extended from either side of the mercy-seat (Exod. 25)? Did he not also order a bronze serpent to be

made (Num. 21)? Did not Solomon fashion Cherubim, oxen, and lions (3 Kings 6)? But why heap up more texts to refute an empty fabrication so often demolished?

II. It is lawful, then, to fashion an image of God the Father himself, and of any Person of the Most Holy Trinity. Wherefore Pope Alexander VIII rightly proscribed the following proposition: "*It is unlawful for a Christian to set up in a church an image of God the Father seated.*"

The reason such an image is permitted is that no Catholic intends, in images of this kind, to depict the nature of God. For who is so besotted as to persuade himself that the Person of the Trinity can be painted by human skill? We fashion such pictures only so that, making use of them as a kind of sacred symbol, the mind may be roused to worship God. Are not the invisible things of God perceived through the things that are made? We depict the eternal Father under the likeness of an old man, to show that he is the first Person of the Trinity. On the Father's breast is painted the Word, to signify that he is begotten of the Father. Under the form of a dove the image of the Holy Spirit is fashioned, because it was under this symbol that he deigned to appear. We likewise depict Angels as winged, in the guise of most beautiful youths, because it is often under this form that they have appeared. We testify that no power resides in these images, and that we place no trust in them. All our hope is in God, through the merits of Christ. We implore the intercession of the Saints, that we may the more easily obtain from God what we ask through such powerful intercessors. What, then, is the sense of Calvin's mad and reckless snarling, that we imagine some power of the Godhead to dwell within such icons — when this has always been openly denied by Catholics? What does he gain by objecting that the pagans too did not regard their idols as gods in themselves, but worshipped gods in their idols, adoring their statues? Well enough — but the gods those wretched pagans represented were false. When the Jews built idols, it was not the true God they venerated in them, but the false divinities of the nations. It is, then, an open falsehood of Calvin's to assert that the Jews, in fashioning such images, believed they were worshipping the one true God, Lord of heaven and earth. The Hebrews, rather, in constructing idols, were turning aside to worship the gods of the nations — a thing the Prophets reproach them for again and again: "*They went after strange gods*"; "*he followed strange gods*"; "*they served strange gods*"; "*put away the strange gods.*" Reproaches of this kind, made to the Jews by holy men, occur everywhere in Scripture. They were not, then, held guilty of idolatry for worshipping the true and eternal God in images, as Calvin falsely imagines, but for venerating the gods of the nations in idols. As for Calvin's further reproach — that many images are patterns of obscenity, and that such images show harlots dressed more modestly and decently than the images in our churches meant to represent virgins — this is a deceitful and malicious slander, flung at the Roman Church out of Calvin's hatred for her. If any abuse occurs here, it arises from the fault of the painters. But so that no such corruption should be found in our churches, the Council of Trent itself, and many other Councils, charge the bishops to keep watch against such sacrilegious monstrosities of profanation. But why should I labor further to blunt Calvin's audacity, who pleads a desperate case with nothing but abuse and slander?

III. Let us, then, settle the matter briefly. God forbade the Israelites: "*Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth*" (Exod. 20). Likewise St. Paul (Acts 17): "*...that the Divinity is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, the graving of art and device of man... Being therefore the offspring of God, we must not suppose the divinity to be like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and the device of man.*" The sense of this and similar texts is made

clear by what has already been said. Such images were forbidden to the Israelites as representations of the false gods of the pagans — a point so evident that only the shameless Calvin dares deny it. The same passage makes this plain: "*Thou shalt not have gods of gold or silver... nor strange gods with thee*" — for when the people fell into idolatry in the desert, it was gods, and not mere images, that they demanded of Aaron: "*Make us gods to go before us*" (Exod. 32). But all this is already sufficiently established and well known.

IV. Question I. *Are such images to be adored?* Response: That the use of sacred images is lawful has been briefly shown. It remains now to establish that their veneration is likewise lawful and useful. St. Thomas gives a splendid and cogent account of this matter, III Part, q. 25, art. 3: "*There is a twofold movement of adoration: one toward the image itself, considered as a certain thing; another toward the image, insofar as it is the image of another. And between these two movements there is a difference: for the first movement, by which one is moved toward the image as it is a certain thing, is distinct from the movement toward the thing itself; but the second movement, which is toward the image insofar as it is an image, is one and the same as that toward the thing. It must therefore be said that no reverence is shown to the image of Christ insofar as it is a certain thing (say, a carved or painted piece of wood); for reverence is owed only to a rational nature. It remains, then, that reverence is shown it only insofar as it is an image; and thus it follows that the same reverence is shown to the image of Christ as to Christ himself. Since, therefore, Christ is adored with the adoration of latria, it follows that his image is to be adored with the adoration of latria.*" From this it follows that we cannot approve the opinion of Bellarmine and others, who attribute to images some worship distinct from that shown to the prototype. For St. Thomas expressly teaches that the image is to be adored only as an image, precisely because it represents the prototype; and so the worship of the image is wholly relative, and is referred entirely to the prototype.

V. The Calvinists and Lutherans raise their customary sophistries: that Scripture — Exodus 20, Deuteronomy 4, Romans 1, and six hundred other places — forbids the worship of images and idols. Yet neither the Jews nor the pagans were so dull and stupid as to believe that stones, wood, and the works of men's hands were gods. Though this fabrication has already been demolished, it is still worth transcribing the solution given by St. Thomas. That commandment forbids not the making of any carved image or likeness, but making it *for the purpose of adoration* — hence it adds: "*Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them.*" And since, as has been said, the movement toward the image and toward the thing itself is the same, the adoration of the image is forbidden in the same way that adoration of the thing of which it is an image is forbidden. It is to be understood, then, that what is forbidden there is the adoration of the images which the pagans made in veneration of their gods — that is, of demons; and hence it is prefaced: "*Thou shalt not have strange gods before me.*" To the true God himself, since he is incorporeal, no bodily image could be assigned; for, as Damascene says, it is the height of folly and impiety to depict what is divine. But because in the New Testament God was made man, he can be adored in his bodily image (III Part, q. 25, art. 3, ad 1). Let the whole article be read, whose teaching overthrows all the trifles and sophistical quibbles of the heretics. Indeed, everything that Catholic theologians have heaped up and learnedly discussed, the Angelic Doctor had already grasped beforehand, in a few and most significant words, and explained with wondrous clarity.

VI. The Angelic Doctor's teaching rests on the perpetual tradition of the Church, and on the authority of the Second Council of Nicaea, of Florence, and of Trent. It is therefore a matter of faith that sacred images are worthy of adoration. Many other proofs, which I might adduce both from the

aforesaid Councils and from the Fathers, I pass over, since they are readily available in the authors; and because, from what has already been said, this truth remains sufficiently established.

VII. Let us hear one more of Calvin's fabrications. "Why," he says, "such a difference between images of the very same God, that one is neglected, or honored only in a popular way, while Catholics pursue another with the whole honor of their devotion? Why do they wear themselves out with votive pilgrimages to visit images like those they could have at home? Why do they fight to the point of bloodshed and slaughter over them today, as though for their altars and hearths?" These and similar objections Calvin raises (*Institutes*, Bk. I, ch. 11, §10) — a piece of raving that collapses of itself the moment one looks at the Angelic Doctor's teaching. For if we show images no worship other than that with which we worship the God they represent, it is evident that all images representing God are adored by us with the very worship we show to God. That some images are frequented by a greater concourse of worshippers does not arise because some peculiar power is believed to reside in them, or because they merit greater worship in themselves; but because God, for his own hidden and wondrous reasons, chooses to work miracles and confer benefits through the use of this image rather than that one. Some images, too, are said to have been painted by holy men — by St. Luke, by Nicodemus, or by Angels. Hence, in memory of such painters, whose intercession with God the faithful also trust in, people venerate one image above another with special devotion, and it is said to aid them in a singular way. Yet no Catholic believes any image to be endowed with some special excellence, or to surpass another; but since all equally represent the prototype, all are adored with the same relative worship.

VIII. The arguments of Bellarmine (*On Images*, Bk. I, ch. 24), Suárez (disp. 54, sect. 5), and others who contend that images of God, of Christ the Lord, and of the Saints are not to be adored with the very same adoration as their prototypes, but with a lesser worship, since as images they are inferior to what they represent — these arguments, if we wish to speak exactly, carry no weight at all. For their point would only stand if we worshipped images with some special worship considered as things in themselves, rather than as images. Images are signs and symbols that rouse our minds to worship their prototypes; it is not the images but the prototypes represented in them that we worship. In the Cross we kiss Christ; in the Book of the Gospels, eternal truth; in images of the Martyrs and the Saints, we worship the Saints themselves. So teaches the Council of Trent, the Roman Pontifical, and — as the celebrated Bossuet rightly notes in his exposition of Catholic doctrine, ch. 1 — as St. Thomas had already taught with great clarity. When the Councils of Mainz and Sens, and other writers, assert that images of Christ are not to be adored with the worship of latria, they are speaking of the *absolute* worship shown to the images considered in themselves.

IX. Question II. *Is there any precept commanding the use of sacred images?* Response: It is certain that no natural or divine precept exists to this effect, since no trace of such a precept is found anywhere in Sacred Scripture, nor does any reason suggest that this use is commanded. As for an ecclesiastical precept, Fr. Paolo Nazario (III Part, q. 25, art. 3, controv. 2) affirms that one exists. This view would be entirely true if understood of the common practice with respect to all the faithful generally. For although this command has not been laid down in express words, it has become established by a custom holding the force of law, that churches and altars are to be adorned with sacred images. It is forbidden to offer sacrifice on an altar on which there is no image of the Crucified. The faithful would suffer grave scandal if churches and altars were stripped of every image. There is no doubt, then, that

such a precept binds with respect to the community of the faithful as a whole. This precept does not, however, seem to bind each individual member of the faithful, such that each one is bound by the precept to make use of images. Yet a Catholic who abstained altogether from any use of images could scarcely be excused from fault: for if he neglected them as superfluous and useless, he would fall into heresy; if he thought it advisable not to use them, he would not be free of a kind of superstition, would give scandal, and would not be free of the suspicion of error. If, however, out of a certain carelessness, negligence, or even avarice, he simply did not employ images privately, he would not, in my present opinion, be a transgressor of any precept. The precept to make use of these images can, nevertheless, bind particular individuals accidentally — as when the necessity of professing the Catholic faith requires it. This view is shared by Suárez (Vol. I, on III Part, disp. 54, sect. 3), Leander (disp. 5, q. 3), and the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 10, punct. 8, n. 91).

X. Question III. *Is there a precept commanding that these images be adored?* Response: The common opinion affirms that a twofold command exists. One is negative, forbidding at all times and in all places that any injury or irreverence be done them. The other is affirmative, obliging one at certain times to pay them worship — as when an occasion arises for professing the faith, or an occasion to join with other of the faithful in venerating an image publicly exposed for adoration, or when some action must be performed toward sacred images that would require veneration. It seldom happens, I think, that a Catholic could violate this affirmative precept without at the same time violating the negative one, by holding those same images in contempt. For in practice one either adores or holds in contempt. I do not deny that both extremes can be avoided absolutely; but in practice this scarcely happens.

Chapter VI — On the worship of relics

I. Just as sacred images, so also the relics of the Saints have been defined as worthy of adoration, in several Councils: the Second of Nicaea, act. 3; the Fifth of Carthage, canon 5; the Second Lateran, ch. 62; and Trent, session 25, decree 2, among many others. This worship is clearly gathered from Scripture also. By contact with the bones of Elisha, a man was restored to life (4 Kings 13). Who would say that the bones of a Prophet, by which God worked so great a miracle, are not worthy of veneration? Isaiah proclaims that his own sepulcher shall be glorious (ch. 11). Who but a heretic would call the perpetual custom of venerating the sacred sepulcher of Christ, running from the very beginnings of the Church, a monument to superstition? Did not the woman with the issue of blood obtain her health merely by touching the hem of Christ's garment — a faith and an act of reverence that Christ himself commended? Did not the faithful apply St. Paul's handkerchiefs and aprons to the sick, to heal them (Acts 19)? Were these handkerchiefs of Paul's not held in greater price and veneration than the ordinary belongings of other men?

II. When Christ (Matt. 23) reproaches the Pharisees and Scribes for adorning the tombs of the just, he condemns the hypocrisy involved, not the practice of honoring them — and condemns them for doing a good thing with a wicked and deceitful mind, as Ambrose and Jerome explain in commenting on this passage of Matthew. God likewise hid the tomb of Moses from the Jews, because they were too much inclined to idolatry and superstition — a danger far removed from Christians.

III. That the worship of sacred relics prevailed from the earliest ages of the Church is proved by clear and celebrated testimonies which Catholic theologians adduce. In the second century of the Church, as Eusebius records (*Ecclesiastical History*, Bk. IV, ch. 15), the Church of Smyrna venerated the relics of

St. Polycarp the Martyr, who suffered around the year of Christ 167. Christians also venerated the chair once occupied at Jerusalem by James the Apostle, as the same Eusebius relates (Bk. VII, ch. 19). By the fourth century, this worship flourished throughout the whole Church — a fact the Lutherans and Calvinists themselves are forced to admit. Yet how astonishing, how altogether beyond measure, is the mad audacity of these heretics, who prate that the Bishops and Fathers of the third century had already fallen away from the faith of their forebears and lapsed into idolatry! If you ask them for proof of so great a change, they can produce nothing but the fact that they themselves have not read that the worship of relics was already in use in the first three centuries. Calvin, then, and the Lutherans and their followers, are pretending to understand better, after thirteen and more centuries, the discipline of that earliest age than did the holy bishops, and the whole Church of Christians who lived nearest to it! Who but a madman would say such a thing? These matters have been treated with the richest erudition by Natalis Alexander, Bellarmine, and countless others, whose findings are foreign to our present purpose.

IV. Sacred relics are to be honored with the same worship as the persons whose relics they are, since these relics represent the persons whose bodily parts they are. Just as we adore images on account of their prototypes, so too we venerate relics on account of the persons they belonged to. Let us hear the Angelic Doctor, who writes thus (III Part, q. 25, art. 6): "*It must be said that, as Augustine says in Book I of the City of God, ch. 13: if a father's garment, or ring, or anything of this kind, is dearer to his children the greater their affection for their parents, then in no way are their bodies to be despised, which are certainly nearer and more closely joined to us than any garment. It is manifest, moreover, that we ought to hold the Saints of God in veneration as members of Christ, sons of God, and our friends and intercessors. And therefore we ought to venerate their relics, of whatever kind, in their memory — and especially their bodies, which were the temples and instruments of the Holy Spirit dwelling and working within them, and which are destined to be conformed to Christ's own body through the glorious resurrection. Wherefore God himself fittingly honors such relics, by working miracles in their presence.*"

V. Question I. *What is meant by the term "relics"?* Response: Sacred relics are portions of the bodies of Saints, such as hair, bones, flesh, nails, blood, teeth, ashes; and also garments, veils, cloths, and other things that touched their bodies or which the Saints used.

VI. Question II. *Is it lawful to adore the worms into which the bodies of the Saints decompose?* Response: Vázquez (*On Adoration*, Bk. III, disp. 3, ch. 8, n. 114), Sánchez (Bk. II, ch. 43, n. 1), and Castropalao (disp. 1, punct. 1, n. 1) affirm this, provided the intention is upright; for since the ashes and dust into which the bodies of the Saints dissolve may be honored, why not, they say, the worms as well?

VII. This opinion is commonly rejected. And provided the same reasoning applies to dust and ashes as to public worship — the very authors cited concede that this too is not at all permitted. No adoration, public or private, of such worms is lawful. For although such worms are generated from the bodies of the Saints, they nonetheless carry an indecency that prevents their being worshipped. It is indecent to honor the Saints in something so repellent. Those worms are, moreover, foul creatures; and being alive, they would seem to be adored for their own sake. The adoration of these worms, whether public or private, must therefore be rejected as an imprudent superstition. And indeed, if private adoration were permitted, why not public as well? And if public adoration is judged unworthy, why not private too?

VIII. In order for sacred relics to be adored with public worship, they must belong to someone canonized or beatified by the Church. For since no one can be publicly worshipped as a Saint unless he has first been solemnly entered by the Church into the roll of the Saints, still less can his relics be worshipped, since relics are honored on account of the Saints to whom they belong.

IX. Question III. *What certainty is required in order that relics be venerated as belonging to some particular Saint?* Response: In order to venerate relics prudently, we must know that they are in fact relics — that is, portions or things belonging to some Saint or Blessed. Our worship must be prudent, lest we worship profane things as sacred. This certainty, however, need only be moral certainty. In moral matters, only moral certainty is to be required; and this suffices for a prudent act, as all theologians agree. What testimonies are required to obtain this moral certainty cannot easily be defined in general. A distinction must first be drawn between public and private worship. For public worship to be paid to relics, the souls of the deceased must have been entered into the roll of the Saints or Blessed by the Roman Pontiff. Furthermore, the sacred relics must have been officially recognized by the bishop before being exposed to public worship. For your own private certainty, however, that a relic belongs to a Saint canonized by the Church, it suffices that it has been so declared by the bishop. For private devotion, it is enough that a trustworthy and serious man attest that this relic belongs to some Saint — provided, however, that no arguments to the contrary arise. In this matter two extremes must be avoided: an overly easy credulity, and an excessively severe scrutiny. Since instances of fraud and imposture do not occur so rarely, greater care in giving credence is called for. But if no prudent suspicion of trickery or fraud arises, there is no reason to withhold belief. Why should you reject the testimony of a serious and trustworthy man, unless you have an equal or comparable ground for doubt? "Many," you say, "frauds and deceptions are perpetrated by impostors out of greed and gain." True enough — but from this it only follows that you must exercise caution and prudence before giving your assent. In every kind of commerce, frauds and deceptions occur through the wickedness of dishonest men; must we therefore abstain from all society and dealings? Bring, then, to the veneration of relics the same prudence you exercise in other serious affairs.

X. Question IV. *Which relics may a bishop approve, so that they may be publicly exposed to worship?* Response: As already indicated, only the bishop can officially recognize relics and approve them for public worship — namely, those belonging to some Saint or Blessed canonized by the Roman Pontiff, as is held from the chapter *Fin.* on relics and the veneration of Saints. This holds true of recently discovered relics. As for the relics of ancient Saints, which have always been adored by the universal custom of the Christian people, there is no reason why bishops should not approve them, even though those Saints were not entered into the roll of the Saints by the usual solemn rite of canonization by the Roman Pontiff — since this perennial and universal tradition is regarded as equivalent to a solemn canonization. The Council of Trent decrees this. If some grave doubt or difficulty should arise concerning the abuse of relics, the bishop, before he settles the controversy, is to await the judgment of the Metropolitan and the neighboring bishops in a provincial Council — yet in such a way that nothing new, or hitherto unusual in the Church, is decreed without consulting the Most Holy Roman Pontiff (session 25, on the invocation of the Saints).

XI. Question V. *Is it lawful to wear authentic relics suspended from the neck?* Response: All agree that this practice is lawful, since it redounds to the honor and veneration of the Saints whose relics they are. But for this practice to be lawful, there must be no danger of indecency or pollution — and such

danger is, as a rule, absent. For however much the wearer himself may sin, the relics themselves are not thereby polluted, nor do they suffer indecency; rather, indecency or pollution of relics occurs only when irreverence, mockery, or contempt is exercised directly against the worship of the relics themselves. Hence one who commits fornication, theft, or some other crime while wearing them is not to be called sacrilegious with regard to the relics he carries with him for devotion's sake, since these sins are not opposed to that worship; nothing prevents a thief, an adulterer, or other wicked Catholics from venerating their relics, however many crimes they may commit besides. That some measure of irreverence attaches to a Christian adorned with these sacred symbols offending God in this way, no one can deny; but there is no solid ground for calling it a grave sacrilege.

XII. Question VI. *Does one who steals sacred relics out of devotion sin?* Response: The common opinion is that a Christian who steals sacred relics from an infidel commits no sin at all — because he removes them from an irreverent and unjust possessor, and unjust exposure to pollution, and vindicates them from one who unjustly holds them, since it is unbelievers who hold these sacred pledges. But one who steals relics from another Catholic undoubtedly commits a sacrilegious theft. For although relics are not subject to a temporal price, they are nevertheless held in such great esteem by the faithful that it constitutes a grave loss to the possessor who unwillingly suffers deprivation, however small the relic, since he is stripped of so great a treasure. What, then, of the malice of such theft — is it not also a grave sacrilege in itself? The gravity of relic-theft is measured not by size or bulk, but by rarity and the esteem in which the relic is held. The smallest particle of the Holy Cross, or of the Crown of Thorns, or of some other rare relic, is held in the highest price; and one deprived of it against his will is afflicted with great sorrow and grave harm. The theft of such relics, therefore, even in the smallest quantity, is a grave sacrilege. Nor should this give occasion to quibble that not all relics of the Saints are of the same value — since we measure the gravity of the theft not by the absolute worth of sacred relics considered in themselves, but by the injury done to the possessor by such theft: for all sacred relics of any kind whatsoever transcend the bounds of any temporal price. But because one relic may be harder or easier to obtain than another, the one deprived of it suffers greater or lesser distress and injury accordingly.

XIII. Question VII. *Is it lawful for a prince waging war to carry off relics, and transfer them elsewhere?* Response: Fr. Juan Fernández (*On Relics*, Bk. II, ch. 8, art. 3) affirms this, on the grounds that goods lawfully taken in a just war belong to the victors, even as between Christian states. But this opinion is rightly rejected by theologians. For relics are goods of the Church, which cannot be seized on account of a crime; they are exempt from lay jurisdiction, being annexed to the Church and destined for the worship of God. Custom too confirms this: for princes themselves refrain from despoiling such sacred repositories even in cities lawfully taken by right of war. A just war concerns temporal rights, not spiritual ones.

XIV. Question VIII. *Is the sale and purchase of relics lawful?* Response: The negative opinion follows from what has already been said. Spiritual things are subject to no temporal price, and whoever purchases spiritual things for a temporal price is stained with the taint of simony. In the use and gift of relics, then, all suspicion of base gain must be avoided. Wherefore the Council of Trent (session 25, decree on the invocation of the Saints) prescribes: "*In the veneration of relics, let all base gain be eliminated.*" From this, however, it does not follow that it is forbidden to purchase sacred relics from unbelievers by paying a price; for the price is not paid for the value of the relics, but so that the relics may be

withdrawn from the irreverence and profanation of unbelievers. It is the vexation that is bought off, not the sacred thing itself, that is purchased. Nor does it seem unlawful to give some money to the custodian of relics, so that he may allow the sacred relics to be viewed — provided this money is given without any bargain, and as compensation for the inconvenience and bodily labor the custodian undergoes, and as a token of gratitude. It would, however, be unlawful to strike an explicit or tacit bargain to induce a custodian to show relics for a set price.

XV. Question IX. *Is it a sin of simony to expose sacred relics to be viewed, so that more generous alms may thereby be obtained?* Response: Some theologians distinguish a twofold intention in one who exposes relics: one more principal, the other less so. If the intention of gathering alms is the less principal one, no fault at all is incurred; but sin is committed if this intention becomes the principal one. Others hold this to be absolutely unlawful. On the contrary, Castropalao (tract. 8, disp., punct. 6, n. 18), Leander (disp. 4, q. 33), and the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 10, punct. 3, n. 115) hold that one who, even principally, aims at the acquisition of alms by exposing relics does not sin mortally — provided no bargain is involved — because, they say, exposing relics does not amount to selling them, nor is there any base gain, since no pact or agreement intervenes. One who moves the faithful by this intention merely intends that alms be given, not that they be obligated to give them. But to intend the liberal bestowal of alms through the exposition of relics is not simony. This will therefore be lawful, or at least not a mortal fault: for, say the Salmanticenses, "at most a venial defect is present here, since a certain relaxation from the strict end of the virtue of religion is granted."

XVI. This opinion does not convince me, since the Council of Trent prescribes that in the veneration of relics all base gain is to be principally eliminated. Now one who principally intends gain in this veneration does not eliminate all base gain — rather, such a person really pursues gain through the ample bestowal of alms, with a view to which, and for which very purpose, he exposes the relics to be viewed. This man has a corrupt intention. What, then, is missing for it to be sacrilegious simony? "A pact and agreement," the Salmanticenses reply. But this proves nothing more than that there is no real, extrinsic simony on both sides. It shows only that those who give alms are free of fault, since they offer their goods to God in memory of the Saints without any wicked intention. But can he who exposes relics for mere and pure gain not sin, absent such a pact? Is mental simony not a sin? He who mentally intends a temporal gain from a spiritual thing, and with this as his principal intention exposes relics to be viewed — on what ground can he be excused from mental simony, merely because he does not intend the alms as a price, but as a free gift? This distinction contributes little to clearing such an intention of the taint of simony. For whoever principally intends a temporal thing in exchange for a spiritual one is truly guilty of simony. What more is there to say? Do not the Salmanticenses themselves admit that this intention is disordered, and not free of venial fault? But if they admit that this intention departs from the right end and order of religion, why should this be only a venial, and not a mortal, intention — since a temporal gain sought for a sacred thing is by its very nature vicious matter, and a grave one? One who principally intends this, therefore, sins gravely.

XVII. Question X. *Is any penalty established against thieves of relics?* Response: Suárez (Vol. 5, on III Part, disp. 22, sect. 2, n. 5) and Sánchez (Bk. II, ch. 43, n. 6, punct. 21) deny that any penalty in common law has been established. Others, however, commonly hold that excommunication has been established by Gregory XIII, in the constitution beginning *Pontificia sollicitudo*, chiefly against those who steal sacred relics from Roman cemeteries, crypts, or catacombs — a penalty which the same

Pontiff extends against all who steal sacred relics from any sacred place whatsoever. Superiors of Regulars are taught to be subject to this penalty when they cut off particles from the bodies of the Blessed resting in their own churches, in order to give them away or alienate them — since such relics are reckoned among the precious goods of the community. This, however, is to be understood of notable relics enclosed in reliquaries.

XVIII. Question XI. *Is it lawful to venerate certain [wax] Agnus Dei [medallions]?* Response: All Catholics affirm that such sacred Lambs are worthy of veneration, like other sacred things; for they are designated by the Supreme Pontiffs, with a solemn rite, for sacred worship, and are images of God, whose veneration he has repeatedly confirmed by many miracles.

XIX. Question XII. *Is it forbidden, under pain of excommunication, to paint, sell, or touch these Lambs?* Response: Gregory XIII, under pain of excommunication *latae sententiae*, forbade the painting of these sacred Lambs with colors or vermilion, or adding gold or any color to them — the wording of this constitution being "*With all due diligence*." It is not, however, at all forbidden to enclose them in reliquaries, even precious ones, provided they are kept white and unblemished, with no color or vermilion added. As for their sale, it is certain among all Catholics that sacred things are not subject to sale or purchase. It is, however, lawful to receive and give a price for the material of which such wax Lambs are made — just as candles and chalices, and other sacred things, are sold for the material alone. Care must be taken, though, that avarice and simony do not lurk beneath this pretext of "material": for if anyone, under pretext of the material or the reliquary in which the Lamb is enclosed, raised the price beyond its just limits — knowing beforehand that the buyer intends the price to be understood as for the sacred object — he would not escape the taint of sacrilegious avarice. As to whether it is afterward lawful for laypeople to touch these wax Lambs, some deny it. But it seems to me that men and women commit no fault at all who touch them reverently, out of devotion or necessity — and I hold the same regarding other sacred relics which the faithful carry with them and keep habitually at hand. It would indeed seem quite absurd to condemn as guilty of fault those Catholics who, out of devotion to relics, wear them suspended from the neck, merely for the reverent contact this involves. What if the reliquary in which the enclosed Lamb is kept should break? Let laypeople, then — and clergy too — abstain from touching them in a profane and less decent manner; but let them kiss and touch them when devotion or necessity requires.

XX. Question XIII. *[Are sacred vessels, temples, priestly vestments, and the like, being dedicated to the worship of God, worthy of the adoration of latria?]* Response: That sacred vessels, churches, priestly vestments, and other such things, being wholly dedicated to the worship of God, are worthy of the adoration of latria — since God is worshipped in them — is plain, and no one denies it. This too was defined in the Seventh General Council, act 6, where it is stated: "*Lord, besides thee we know no other; we call upon thy name...*" — bearing witness to the choirs of Apostles, Prophets, Martyrs, and holy Fathers, and to the hosts of the blessed Angels. "*...that our senses may, for thy glory, be led to a due sense of thy majesty, we have the figure of thy divine Cross, the Gospel narrative, and the painting of images; we likewise have many other consecrated vessels, which, because consecrated in thy name, we kiss.*" See how, in a few words, the Council removes all danger of idolatry, declaring that Catholics adore none but God, one and Three; that we make use of images to raise and rouse our senses to the worship of God; and that for this end we have the sacred books of the Gospel, sacred vessels, and other ornaments, and kiss them as consecrated things. Just as, then, we adore images of God with the worship of latria, so too we honor

with the same adoration churches, sacred vessels, and other ornaments dedicated to the divine service. Epiphanius teaches this yet more clearly, speaking in the name of the Council in the passage cited: this is proper to heretics [to misconstrue]. We, therefore, who show latria to God alone, in spirit and in truth, trusting in him, embrace and venerate whatever is consecrated to the one God — whether it be the venerable figure of the divine Cross, or the sacred Book of the Gospels, or a venerable image, or sacred vessels; and we show them an honorific adoration on this account, that we may hope for the sanctification to be rendered us by them. For, says the Psalmist (Ps. 98), "*Adore ye his footstool, for it is holy.*" For this reason Gregory the Theologian, in a homily on Bethlehem, says: honor the very site of such things, present as it is before us. For sacred images of God and of Christ the Lord are worshipped with the adoration of latria for this reason: that they are sacred symbols instituted to lead us to the worship of God — and are therefore to be adored with that same worship by which God himself is worshipped, both the manger and the divine mysteries there represented being made holy by their sacred consecration. Consult, if you wish, St. Thomas also (II-II, q. 99, art. 3). The heretics' trifles have already been refuted above.

XXI. Question XIV. *How may chalices, corporals, and other sacred things be touched by the laity?* Response: There exist many decrees forbidding the laity to touch sacred vessels — chalices, palls, corporals, chasubles, and other ornaments blessed by a bishop — notably the chapter *Sacratas*, Dist. 23, and likewise the chapter *Sancta haec apostolica*. These decrees, however, do not now have full force in every respect. For it has become received by common usage that both men and women may lawfully touch a chasuble, or other sacred vestments blessed by a bishop — especially when there is a just cause for washing or repairing them, and so on. Unconsecrated vessels, too, may be touched reverently by the laity, though not after their consecration. Hence the laity cannot, without at least venial fault, touch a consecrated chalice — even an empty one — the paten, or the corporals. Suárez proves this: for the Supreme Pontiffs have granted a privilege to the lay Religious of the Minors and of the Society of Jesus, permitting them to touch directly the empty chalice, paten, and other consecrated vessels, especially while serving in churches — which is proof that, by common law, they otherwise could not touch them at all. Those, however, who have received the first tonsure are not forbidden this contact. The chalice containing the Blood of Christ, however, may lawfully be touched, apart from necessity, only by a priest or deacon. In case of urgent necessity, even the Body of Christ itself may be touched by the laity — as when a consecrated host falls to the ground in the absence of a priest: it must then be raised by someone with the utmost reverence, and handed to the priest as soon as possible, to be replaced in the sacrarium. Similarly, if a consecrated particle should fall into a woman's lap while she is receiving communion, it ought to be raised by her, reverently, rather than by the priest. For the Lord, who allows his own most sacred Body to be touched by the fingers of that same woman, does not disdain — when urgent necessity requires it, for the sake of preserving modesty and avoiding danger and scandal — to be touched by her tongue, mouth, and throat.

XXII. We have said that corporals and purificators may be touched by laypeople of the Regular Orders in virtue of privilege, while serving the sacristy. May they also wash them? Authors commonly distinguish three washings. Several privileges are usually cited by which lay Brothers of the Regular Orders, and also nuns, may touch and wash corporals and purificators. Setting all these aside, however, one must abide by the custom that prevails everywhere: namely, that the first washing is to be done by priests or deacons. From the privileges adduced in favor of lay Brothers, nothing more can be drawn than that they may touch these things while serving the sacristy — not that they may also

wash them. The laws forbidding such washing, moreover, are quite clear, and are only reinforced by the very practice and custom just mentioned. It must therefore be held as certain that the first washing of corporals and purificators is reserved to priests and deacons — and this is the more common opinion among theologians.

XXIII. Question XV. *Can sacred things lawfully be converted to profane uses?* Response: It is certain, first, that it is a grave crime to use sacred things, so long as they retain their proper form, for profane purposes — as if one were to use a chalice as a common drinking-cup at table; such use would be a manifest act of contempt. King Belshazzar was struck dead by God for using the vessels of the house of God at his banquet-table — since, as Leviticus 27 has it, whatever has once been consecrated shall be most holy unto the Lord. See St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 11); the matter is so well established that it needs no lengthy discussion here.

XXIV. The opinion of Juan de Dicastillo, therefore, is to be rejected outright — an opinion he draws from Henríquez (*Treatise I on the Sacrifice of the Mass*, disp. 4, n. 231), who teaches that it does not appear to be mortally sinful, but rather a custom, to use such vestments for decent theatrical performances (which I would understand as sacred plays) even within a church — and this pleases me, he adds, especially for representing some holy Priest, Deacon, or the like, the matter being left to prudent judgment. This "custom," which Dicastillo alone seems to know of, and which is unknown to everyone else, is so evidently a sacrilegious abuse, stripped of every circumstance, that it needs no proof. What could be more wicked than to bring sacred vestments and vessels dedicated to God onto the stage? See the Council of Trent, session 25, decree on the choice of books. Dicastillo attempts to excuse this on the grounds that it covers the indecency of the stage with the sanctity of the church. But whoever brings sacred vestments onto a profane stage commits sacrilege. And what of those who turn churches into theaters, altars into stage-sets — who profane churches together with their sacred vestments — who allow the shameless art of comic actors and players to be practiced in sacred places? Are these free of iniquity? Pious ears shrink from such things, and they deserve rejection with detestation rather than mere argument. Sacred things are to be represented with a sacred rite approved by the Church — not a comic and theatrical one.

XXV. Although sacred things lose their blessing and consecration when broken or cut apart, it does not therefore follow that it is lawful to convert their use to something profane. The Angelic Doctor proves this by the authority of the canons (III Part, q. 83, art. 5, ad 5): "*Because they also acquire a certain spiritual power through consecration, it is laid down, in the same collection, ch. 36, 'Ligna Ecclesiae': 'The timbers of a dedicated church are not to be put to any other use, except for [building] another church, or to be burned, or [given] to the brethren in a monastery; but they must not be given over to the work of laypeople.*'" And in the same place it is written (ch. 39): "*The altar-cloth, the chair, the candlestick, and the veil, if worn out through use, are to be committed to fire; and their ashes are to be placed in the baptistery, or thrown into a wall or into the joints of pavements, lest they be defiled by the feet of those entering.*" It is likewise added that the timber of a demolished church is not to be applied to the common uses of monasteries — not for kitchen fires, nor for propping up vines — but rather to the chapter-house, dormitory, or other religious places, so that the reverence due to sacred things may be preserved. What is laid down in the cited chapter concerning the altar-cloth and chair applies equally to priestly vestments and other church ornaments. Sylvester adds (s.v. *Benedictio*, q. 7) that the stones of a demolished church may be

converted to the buildings of monasteries. Consult Suárez (III Part, disp. 81, sect. 1), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 22, ch. 10, punct. 12), and Azor (Vol. II, Institutions, Bk. IX, ch. 9, q. 7).

XXVI. Question XVI. *May such sacred vessels, once broken, lawfully be sold?* Response: In order for such vessels to be converted to profane use and offered for sale, they must entirely lose their former form, so that nothing of it remains — so that only the common material of gold or silver appears. For then, since nothing sacred can be discerned in them, there is nothing to be profaned either. It is not, therefore, free of irreverence and sacrilege to sell — or even pawn for sacred uses — chalices under the pretext that they are being sold not as consecrated objects, but merely as so much precious material. The circumstances must be weighed, however, especially the purpose and the necessity involved. Sacred vestments, even when cut up, must not be converted to profane uses or sold — because their material cannot, unlike that of a chalice or other vessel, be entirely transmuted. They must, therefore, either be burned, or used to mend other sacred vestments. As to when precisely a chalice or other sacred vessel and church ornament loses its blessing and consecration, consult Barbosa (*On the Power of the Bishop*, Part II, alleg. 27).

XXVII. Question XVII. *Can profane things be transformed for sacred use?* Response: Theologians commonly affirm this, provided that, once their former artificial form has been removed, they are reshaped into a form suitable and customary for sacred functions. No difficulty stands in the way; indeed, all sacred ornaments are made from ordinary material to begin with. This is confirmed by common practice, whereby the precious garments of laywomen — married or widowed — are in the end converted into priestly chasubles and other church ornaments. For sacred blessing removes every profane stain. Even the Popes themselves have on occasion consecrated private houses to God as churches; and Boniface IV converted that vast and most magnificent Pantheon — once a pagan temple — into a church, its outward form unchanged, but with blessing and consecration added. St. Pope Marcellus and [St.] Cecilia likewise transformed [pagan buildings]; and Urban...

Dissertation II — On the Vices Opposed to Religion, or On Superstition and Its Species

Chapter I — Definition and division of superstition

I. Superstition is described by St. Thomas (II-II, q. 92, art. 1) in these words: "*Superstition is a vice opposed to religion by way of excess — not because it renders more than true religion does, but because it renders divine worship either to one to whom it is not owed, or in a manner in which it is not owed.*" All this is clear enough.

II. The Angelic Doctor first divides superstition into two species (loc. cit., art. 2). One is named from the undue manner of worshipping God; the other from the object which is worshipped. The first offers to God the worship owed him, but in an undue manner; the second offers to a creature the worship owed to God. The species of superstition are therefore differentiated, first by manner, and second by object. "*For divine worship can be offered either to him to whom it should be offered — namely, the true God — but in an undue manner (and this is the first species of superstition); or to one to whom it should not be offered at all — namely, any creature whatsoever (and this is another kind of superstition, which is divided into many species according to the different ends of the divine cult).*" The Angelic Doctor further divides this first kind — superstition of undue manner — into further subspecies (q. 93, art. 1): the first of these is false, or pernicious, in that a false and pernicious worship is rendered to God on account of the thing signified — as if someone were to worship God now with the ceremonies proper to false gods, or intended to confirm the Catholic faith by false miracles, or offered shameful sacrifices in divine rites; and it is pernicious also by reason of the worshipper's intention — as if someone were to pretend to be a priest of the Church, to whom a false worship would then be attributed. This can occur not only in public, but in private as well. Cajetan, in his commentary on this article, gives examples drawn from fasting and prayer: as if someone fasted on a Sunday contrary to the Church's practice, or prayed in such a purely private a manner as to have no regard at all to the Church — since the precept of praying in the person of the Church has been laid down by the Lord himself: "*You shall pray: Our Father... Give us this day our bread... Forgive us...*" Whoever, then, offered this prayer to God for himself alone would worship God with a false worship. This, however, is to be understood only in the sense that one positively intended to exclude the rest of the faithful from a share in that prayer; or intended to fast on a Sunday with no regard whatsoever for ecclesiastical discipline, but simply to institute a private rite of his own. No one, however, would be guilty of any superstition who, moved by a spirit of penance, fasted on Sundays — not to introduce some private discipline, but to bring the flesh more firmly into subjection to the spirit, and to pay the penalties owed for his sins; likewise one who offered the Lord's Prayer to God for himself, without any intention of excluding his other brethren.

III. The other species of superstition, arising from an undue manner of worshipping God, occurs when a superfluous worship is rendered to God, as the same Angelic Doctor adds: "*But if there be something which, considered in itself, contributes nothing to God's glory, nor helps the mind of man to be directed toward God, nor serves to restrain the disordered concupiscence of the flesh; or again, if it falls outside what God and the Church have instituted, or is contrary to the common custom which, according to Augustine, is to be held as law — all this is to be reckoned superfluous and superstitious; for, consisting only in externals, it does not pertain to the*

interior worship of God. Whence Augustine, in his book On True Religion, cites the text of Luke 17, 'The kingdom of God is within you,' against the superstitious — that is, against those who devote their principal care to externals" (II-II, q. 93, art. 1). Thus one who devised for himself, at his own whim, certain particular ways of praying — wishing, say, to pray only after sunrise, or to hear Mass only from a priest named Anthony and no other, or with just so many candles, no more and no fewer, or of one color and no other; or who, setting aside the ceremonies established by the Church, invented others for himself — would be guilty of superstition; nor would it help him to plead that his intention in arranging all this was directed to his own spiritual profit, since an external worship contrary to the Church's ordinances is vicious in itself, and therefore cannot be cleared of the fault of superstition by any intention whatsoever. Ignorance, however — especially in lighter matters, when joined to a good intention — can, in my own opinion, serve as an excuse from fault.

IV. The second species of superstition, arising on the side of the object worshipped, occurs, says St. Thomas (II-II, q. 92, art. 2), when worship is rendered "*to one to whom it should not be rendered — namely, to any creature whatsoever: this is another kind of superstition, which is divided into many species according to the different ends of divine worship*." If a worship instituted for divine reverence is offered to a creature, it is called idolatry. In another way, divine worship is instituted so that man may be instructed by the God he worships; and if, spurning God, he consults demons instead, having entered into some tacit or explicit pact with them, this constitutes a second species of superstition regarding the object worshipped, which is called divination. A third species of the same superstition, again regarding the object worshipped, occurs when the divine worship that is meant to guide human acts according to the ordinances of the God who is worshipped is instead offered to a demon, from whom aid is sought — and this is called vain observance. These three, says the Angelic Doctor, are touched upon by Augustine (Bk. II, *On Christian Doctrine*), where he says that superstitious is whatever has been instituted by men pertaining to the making and worshipping of idols — which pertains to the first; and afterward he adds: "*or to consultations and pacts concerning meaning agreed upon and struck with demons*" — which pertains to the second; and a little further on he adds: "*To this class belong all amulets and remedies of this kind*" — which pertains to the third.

V. Question I. As is clear from what has been said, there are two genera of superstition: one regarding the manner of worshipping God, the other regarding the object worshipped. It is the first genus of superstition that concerns us here. And first we say that to render to God a false worship — whether by reason of the thing signified, or by reason of the worshipper — is by its nature a mortal sin; since a pernicious falsehood in a grave matter is a mortal sin. Now superstition is a pernicious falsehood in a grave matter — namely, in the matter of religion — to which it does grave injury. It is therefore, by its very kind, a grave sin. So hold Cajetan (on II-II, q. 93, art. 1), Suárez (Vol. I, *On Religion*, tract. 3, Bk. 3, ch. 11), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 11, punct. 1), and Leander (tract. 9, disp. 1, q. 4). Hence those would sin mortally who sacrificed a calf to God, kept the Sabbath, or circumcised themselves according to the rite of the Mosaic law.

VI. Question II. *Is it a grave sin to mix profane and shameful things into divine offices?* Response: All affirm that this is a sin of undue worship — a superstition — which is false with respect to the worshipper, and altogether contrary to the end of divine worship. For divine worship aims at raising and moving hearts toward heavenly things; whereas shameful and profane things incite toward carnal ones. It should be noted, however, that if the things mixed in carry no shameful character, but are merely vain

and not sacred, they are not therefore immediately to be condemned as a mortal fault — though they are never free of venial fault. I would add, moreover, that those are not in slight danger who recite the divine praises, or even the most sacred Passion itself, with a musical and profane style of chant, in churches, during the very sacred week of the Lord's Passion, declaiming from the pulpit and courting and stirring up the applause of a frenzied crowd. What a sacrilegious practice! Has the state of our religion come to this — that our most sacred mysteries should be celebrated with a profane rite, merely to soothe the ears and tickle the senses of the common rabble, together with play-actors? What, indeed, has the Church to do with theaters, and with actors? But of this, elsewhere.

VII. Question III. *Does one who proposes false relics for adoration, or preaches fabricated miracles, sin mortally?* Response: All affirm that this is a most grave crime of superstition, since it does grave injury to the faith and to religion; nor does a pious intention of increasing devotion remove the guilt of this crime. For the worship of religion is diminished, not increased, by needing to be propped up by such fabrications — whether feigned miracles or false relics.

VIII. Question IV. *Is it a mortal sin to abstain from meat, and to fast, on a Sunday?* Response: [Some] condemn as superstitious those who abstain [from meat on Sundays, provided they attach] no [further superstition to the practice, and] defend such a fasting-custom; Leander (tract. 9, disp. 1, q. 9) commends this view, along with other supporters of it, and teaches that fasting on a Sunday is no sin at all. The former, absolute view, however, [that it is always sinful] is [rejected] — as is proved by the experience of several sacred Orders, which abstain from meat perpetually. Far from condemning this practice as superstitious, the Church rather approves and commends it as a form of penance. It is the intention of those who fast that must be examined. The fasting of the Manichees, appointed for Sundays, was tainted with superstition, because it was instituted in contempt of the Lord's Resurrection. But those who fast in order to restrain the flesh and unbridled desires do not show contempt for, but rather honor, the Church's discipline. Hence one who spent Sundays in fasting with this intention of mortifying the flesh would sin neither mortally nor venially — especially since the Manichaean heresy is now extinct, and so there is no occasion for scandal. It is, nevertheless, more advisable to conform oneself to the Church's own practice, and to abstain from fasting on these days, unless some particular reason presses otherwise — as it does press upon those bound by vow or by law to abstain from meat even on these very days. From this you may gather that the superstition of a superfluous worship can be either mortal or venial, according to the gravity of the matter and the intention of the one performing it. For when a superfluous worship is offered to the true God with a pious mind, no grave injury is done to religious worship, scandal being absent. The magnitude of the fault, therefore, is to be gathered from these circumstances.

Chapter II — Various cases are here examined, in which it is determined whether superstition, properly speaking, is present

I. In resolving all the cases we are about to discuss, this must always be kept before our eyes: that superstition occurs in some action whenever a cause is employed to produce an effect which it can, by no means whatsoever — neither by its own power nor by divine institution — actually influence. The connection between the cause and the effect must therefore be examined; and where none appears, but the two are altogether unrelated, there the crime of superstition creeps in. For the sake of clarity, I will append a few examples to confirm this teaching.

II. Guilty of superstition are those who ring a bell at a pregnant woman's waist, so that her delivery may go well — since no connection at all exists between this cause and that effect. Superstitious too is the casting of some Saint's image into a river, or hanging it upon the riverbank, to obtain rain, for the reason already given. There would, however, be no superstition if a sacred object were cast into a river or into fire in the hope that God, through that Saint's intercession, might be moved to extinguish the fire, or to keep a swollen river within its banks. Superstitious, likewise, are the prayers by which witches bless rosaries for women in labor. It is likewise superstition to recite certain fixed verses of some psalm to stop dogs from barking, to check a flow of blood, or to cure some other ailment, with a vain confidence in an infallible outcome — unless one recites them devoutly, imploring divine aid. Superstitious equally are the words that are customarily whispered into horses' ears to expel intestinal pains.

III. Those who fast on bread and water on the feast of St. Stephen the Protomartyr, with the fixed conviction that, even if struck by grave illness that year, they will not die — do not sin, provided they do not place excessive trust in such prayers, but rather also offer prayers to God to be delivered from a sudden death; in this they commit no fault at all, but rather render worship to God and perform a good work.

IV. It is a manifest superstition to observe certain days, months, or seasons as fortunate or unfortunate, as the Apostle says (Gal. 4): "*You observe days, and months, and times, and years. I am afraid of you, lest perhaps I have labored in vain among you.*" That such observance of days is indeed superstitious is sufficiently clear from experience: for among the Hebrews, Monday is held unlucky, because they believe Cain was born on that day; among the Athenians, Tuesday is unlucky; among the Medes, Wednesday; among the Phrygians, Thursday; among the Trojans, Friday; among the Persians, Saturday — while each of these very days is held lucky among other nations. The same days, then, are both lucky and unlucky. All days are of the same nature, and it is by our own idleness or industry that they turn out well or ill for us. What of those who observe the feast-days of the Conversion of St. Paul, of St. Urban, and of St. Vincent, to divine the outcome of the coming year? All this is expressed in the well-known verses: "*A clear day of Paul betokens a good season of the year; if there be snow or rain, it points to a dear season; if there be winds, they portend war among the people; if there be mists, the flocks will perish.*" The more common opinion teaches that no superstition is contained in these verses, and that those who observe them are not superstitious — provided they do not presume to draw any certain conclusion from such observance. For these are but idle popular observations, deserving no attention at all, but rather to be wholly disregarded. For what has the feast of Paul, or of Urban, to do with the other days of the year? Yet such conjunctions of the stars can indeed occur at these times, making the sky cloudy or clear.

V. The observance of the days called "critical" involves no superstition, since it rests on natural causes. Physicians call "critical" those days on which they are accustomed to form a judgment about the nature of a disease — namely, the fifth, seventh, and eleventh. If a fever worsens on these days, they predict death; if it abates, recovery. It would, however, be superstitious if these days were observed for the purpose of obtaining an inheritance.

VI. The observation of the days of the moon, for the preservation of natural things, is entirely free of superstition — contrary to what certain modern philosophers contend. Nor indeed is it vain, since experience confirms that timber cut on a certain phase of the moon is more quickly eaten away, while

that cut on another day remains sound. Many other effects could be recorded, were they not all so well attested. These same philosophers admit these effects, but attribute them to other causes. I recall once reading in a certain pamphlet that plague is in no way contracted by contact, and that it is a vain precaution to separate the healthy from those infected with the plague; I judged that this author deserved nothing but to be placed among plague-victims himself, so that he might confirm, at the risk of his own body, the doctrine he had spread to the ruin of others. A similar refutation is deserved by those who deny that the moon has any influence at all upon things here below.

VII. Likewise lawful is the observance of the dog-days for the reduction of blood [by bleeding], and of the climacteric years — since the human body undergoes a particular change at these times, as physicians maintain. The observance of these years is therefore not superstitious, since it rests on natural causes. The "climacteric years" are certain sets of seven years, during which — as some hold — the body may perhaps undergo some vain and empty change. This much, in my own opinion, may be true.

VIII. It is superstitious to gather herbs on the feast of St. John the Baptist, if this is done out of the conviction that the herbs will have greater power and efficacy for being gathered on that day. If, however, it is merely believed that herbs gathered at that time of year have a stronger effect, without ascribing this to the sanctity of the day, there will be no superstition. It is more advisable, however, for a preacher to caution the common people against such credulity. The same must be said of dew gathered on that same feast of St. John the Baptist. It is likewise a superstitious delusion for women to believe that eggs laid by a hen on Good Friday possess a particular power to extinguish fire when thrown into it; or that vegetables touched on certain days with a broom, or spun on a Saturday, are preserved from worms. It likewise smacks of superstition to refuse to cut one's nails on a Friday, or to cut down a tree on the feast of St. John the Baptist; or to make a ring from coins offered to a Crucifix on Good Friday, so that a child afflicted with a wasting disease of the limbs might pass through it three times to regain health.

IX. Those invited to a banquet who refuse to sit down at table if there are thirteen at the gathering, fearing that one of the company will die that year, are guilty of superstition — since this odd number can in no way have any bearing on death. What, then? Are we to condemn such observers of vain omens for mortal fault? If they acted from some vain fear, led on by popular rumor, without any firm conviction that the event would actually occur, then ignorance would excuse them from grave fault — especially if the diners are simple, uneducated people. But if they were persons of standing, under a particular obligation to root out such vain observances, I would scarcely excuse them from the offense.

X. Guilty of superstition are those who treat with medicines the very sword by which someone was wounded, so that the wounded man may recover his health; likewise those who use a thread hung from the fingers, from which a ring is suspended within a glass vessel or jar, to strike and count the hours; and those who firmly believe that some evil is impending for them because they hear birds chattering, wolves howling, or oxen lowing. There is, however, no superstition — or at least none that is grave — if someone, moved by popular rumor and only a slight fear, took precautions against such events, without any firm conviction, but merely indulging a certain innate tendency to nervousness.

XI. Superstitious are certain fixed prayers which some are accustomed to offer with the express purpose, and firm conviction, that the Blessed Virgin will appear to them at the moment of death — both because such a request is a rash presumption, and because a demon is capable of transforming himself into an Angel of light, and, under the appearance of Christ the Lord or his Mother, of deceiving them. Those who charm cattle by the utterance of certain fixed words, to protect them from wolves, likewise commit a manifest superstition — since such an outcome cannot occur except through the art of a demon.

Chapter III — The nature of idolatry, and the gravity of its malice, are here set forth

I. St. Paul charges all sinners with idolatry — above all the sensual, whose god is their belly, and the greedy, who serve the idol of money. This idolatry, however, taken in this general sense — one that runs through every mortal sin, inasmuch as anyone who sins mortally sets a creature up as his ultimate end — is not a distinct, particular sin in itself, separate from the sin actually committed. Idolatry, as a distinct species of superstition, is described by St. Thomas (II-II, q. 94, art. 1) as occurring "*when divine worship is exhibited to a creature.*" For the crime of idolatry properly to be committed, the worship shown a creature must be a truly divine worship; for if a lesser honor — one not owed to God alone — is offered a creature, it will not be idolatry, but merely a superstition. By the term "creature" is meant a creature considered absolutely as such. But if a creature is taken as an image of the Creator, and worshipped as such, there is no superstition at all in showing it divine worship — since God is worshipped in his image, as has already been said elsewhere.

II. St. Thomas assigns five ways in which idolatry may be committed. The first is the worship of creatures — the heavens, the earth, and the like. The second is the worship of images. The third is the worship of the dead. The fourth is the worship of immaterial creatures — namely, demons. The last is the worship of the world as though it were animate. To these five species, as it were, all idolatry ever devised can be reduced. See St. Thomas, who treats the whole matter at length here, and praises St. Augustine, who discusses this subject in several chapters of Book VIII of the *City of God*.

III. St. Thomas (loc. cit., art. 4) assigns a twofold cause of idolatry: one on the part of man, the other on the part of the demon. He teaches that the first, on man's part, is threefold. The first, he says, arises "*from a disordered affection — namely, when men, either loving or venerating some man excessively, paid him divine honor.*" And this cause is assigned in Wisdom 14: a father, grieving bitterly, made an image of the son suddenly snatched from him, and began to worship as a god one who had shortly before been but a dead man; and it is added there that men, whether serving their own passions or their kings, bestowed the incommunicable Name — that is, of divinity — upon stones and wood. Secondly, this occurs because man naturally delights in representation, as the Philosopher says in his *Poetics*; and so from the very beginning, uncultivated men, seeing through the skill of artists lifelike images of men expressively made, paid worship to them in imitation. Thirdly, this occurs through ignorance of the true God, whose excellence men, failing to consider, attributed to certain creatures on account of their beauty or power, the worship due to divinity. Another cause of idolatry, consummating it from the side of the demons, was that these showed themselves worthy of worship to erring men, giving them oracular responses, and performing certain things that seemed marvelous to men. As to the

time when the crime of idolatry first arose in the world, commentators are not agreed; St. Thomas, in the second objection of the cited article, reviews various opinions, and finally answers as follows: in the first age there was no idolatry, on account of the still-recent memory of the world's creation, from which the knowledge of the one God still flourished vigorously in men's minds. In the sixth age, idolatry was excluded through the power and teaching of Christ, who triumphed over the devil.

IV. That the crime of idolatry is most grave is proved by the same St. Thomas (loc. cit., art. 3), on the grounds that by its very nature it is directed against God, from whom the worship owed him is stolen away and bestowed instead upon a creature. For whoever gives to a creature the worship owed to God treats that creature as God. Let us hear the Angelic Doctor himself, who draws the gravity of this sin both from the nature of the sin itself and from the disposition of the sinner. "*The gravity of a sin,*" he says, "*can be considered in two ways: in one way, on the part of the sin itself; and thus, just as in an earthly commonwealth it seems a most grave matter for someone to render royal honor to another than the true king — since, so far as lies in him, he thereby overturns the whole order of the state — so too among the sins committed against God (which are nonetheless the gravest of all), it seems the gravest of all that someone should render divine honor to a creature: for, so far as lies in him, he sets up another god in the world. In another way, the gravity of a sin may be considered on the part of the sinner; and in this respect it is said to be graver for one to sin knowingly than for one who sins in ignorance. Accordingly, nothing prevents heretics, who knowingly corrupt the faith they have received, from sinning more gravely than idolaters who sin in ignorance. And likewise, other sins can be graver on account of the greater contempt of the sinner.*"

V. Idolatry is, therefore, the gravest of all the crimes opposed to religion, being a crime of high treason against the divine majesty. It should be noted, however, that idolatry admits of a threefold degree. The first is when idolatry is joined with actual unbelief, as when someone truly believes a creature to be God, and worthy of divine honor; and this, on the side of the sin itself, involves the highest degree of malice. The second is when someone, without such unbelief, nonetheless offers to a creature — say, to a demon whom he knows not to be God — the worship due to God, in order to render that demon favorable to himself; this too is an enormous crime. The last degree is when someone, to avoid the danger of death or of some other grave harm, outwardly worships and adores a creature with external divine worship, but without any internal unbelief; this too is a grave crime, but is not true idolatry in the strictest sense. From this you may gather that idolatry, in malice, surpasses all other sins opposed to the theological virtues, but not necessarily all other vices opposed to the moral virtues — except insofar as the Angelic Doctor, in the passage cited, considers idolatry together with all that is committed directly against God, as when he treats it alongside unbelief and hatred of God, from which it proceeds, and as the culmination of all other crimes. Elsewhere, however, the Angelic Doctor plainly teaches (II-II, q. 10, art. 3) that hatred of God, heresy, unbelief, and despair are the gravest of all crimes, being opposed to the theological virtues, which far surpass the moral ones. If, then, idolatry is considered in its second and third degrees, greater malice can appear on the part of the sinner in the first degree, to which is attached a culpable ignorance of the true God. For this reason, one who sins knowingly sins more gravely than one who errs through ignorance.

Chapter IV — What divination is, and how many its species are

I. Marcus Tullius Cicero wrote two entire books on divination. At the very outset he describes it thus: "*This opinion has already been common from the earliest ages, confirmed by the agreement of the Roman people and*

of all nations, that a certain divination exists among men" — that is, a foreknowledge and knowledge of future things. St. Thomas also devotes eight articles to this subject (II-II, q. 95), and gives the very same definition Cicero offers, saying that it consists in the foretelling of future things. Future things, he says, can be known beforehand in two ways: one, in their causes; the other, in themselves. Some causes are natural, producing their effects necessarily, such as the motions of the heavenly spheres and eclipses; others, though they do not produce their effects necessarily, nevertheless rarely fail to do so — as when the aspects and conjunctions of the stars bring on rain or drought. Now one who knows necessary causes can also know for certain the effects that necessarily follow from them. But one who knows causes that do not necessarily produce their effects, but only usually and rarely fail to, can foretell such things only by probable conjecture, not with certainty — in this way astrologers can foretell rain or drought from the observation of the stars, and physicians health or death. The effects of free causes, however, God alone knows; wherefore Isaiah (ch. 41) attributes the foreknowledge of future contingents to God alone: "*Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.*"

II. The foretelling of future things through divine revelation is called prophecy — "*Divination is in the lips of the king; his mouth shall not err in judgment*" (Prov. 16). The foretelling of future things by the power of natural causes is called natural divination. But that foreknowledge of the future which occurs neither through divine revelation, nor through the power of natural causes, but solely through the agency of a demon, is properly called "divination" in the species of superstition. Hence St. Thomas concludes that the term "divination" is nearly always taken in a bad sense. It is of this divination that we now speak, which is commonly defined by theologians, following St. Thomas (II-II, q. 95, art. 1), as "*the foreknowledge of future things by the agency of a demon.*" It is called "foreknowledge" because it can be conveyed by words or by signs. The words "by the agency of a demon" are added so that it may be understood that one who seeks knowledge of future things from God, not from a demon, does not commit this fault. It is called "of future things" because it chiefly foretells what is to come, although it can also concern the past.

III. Question I. *What future things can demons foretell?* Response: All those things that depend on natural causes — such as the conjunctions of the stars, the motions of the heavens, and the eclipses of the sun and moon — demons can foretell with certainty. Things that arise only contingently from natural causes — such as rains, droughts, plagues, storms, and the like — they can only conjecture probably. Things, however, that depend solely on the divine will, or on the free choice of men — such as the thoughts of the human heart, and future contingents — they cannot know at all, as St. Thomas teaches (I Part, q. 57, art. 3). Nevertheless, those demons who, by the sharpness of their intellect, grasp natural causes, and who penetrate men's native dispositions, temperaments, and inclinations, can foretell many things, even among those that proceed from men's free will. The order of freedom certainly lies beyond the bounds of natural causes, and escapes the grasp even of the subtlest demonic intellect; yet, on account of the connection between the order of free acts and the order of nature, demons can often foretell, through their own diviners, much that pertains to human freedom. They can likewise know future things through divine revelation. They can also foretell things happening in distant regions, on account of the speed of their movement. This much only can they teach their own diviners.

IV. Question II. *In what manner do demons teach their diviners?* Response: Demons instruct their diviners in many ways — sometimes by express words, making themselves visible to them; sometimes without any sensible appearance, uttering words in the air, or producing the same effect in sleep. Sometimes they instruct them through writings, or through the voice of animals. Diviners, for their part, prepare themselves to obtain such knowledge in various ways — now by burning incense, sometimes by offering sacrifices, now through signs and instruments, according to their various established conventions with the demons.

V. Question III. *Is a demon's assistance always invoked by an explicit pact?* Response: This invocation is sometimes explicit and solemn, whereby diviners enter into a mutual contract with a demon, who appears to them in royal guise, as it were seated upon a throne. Here the diviners renounce the divine religion, the sacraments, and the other mysteries, and promise the demon worship, pledging themselves to fulfill his wishes — a sacrilegious pact which they are accustomed to seal with a document signed in their own blood. Sometimes they enter into the pact with this solemnity omitted, but the demon prescribes certain formulas by which he promises to lend them help and assistance — either way, this is called an explicit pact. But when someone seeks to know things that lie beyond the grasp of the human mind by means of various vain and unsuitable methods forbidden by God — even though he does not wish to be instructed by a demon's agency — the demon nonetheless insinuates himself uninvited into such vain observances and signs, beyond the man's own intention; and this is called an implicit pact. St. Thomas explains the whole matter in a few words (II-II, q. 95, art. 4): "*The counsel or help of demons is sought either explicitly or implicitly; a demon insinuates himself secretly, beyond man's intention, in order to foretell certain future things unknown to men.*"

VI. St. Thomas (loc. cit.) further enumerates various species of this divination, in which an explicit pact with a demon is involved. I cannot express these species more clearly than by citing the Angelic Doctor's own words. "*Demons, when invoked, are accustomed to foretell future things in many ways. Sometimes indeed, by certain apparitions, they present themselves expressly to men's sight or hearing, in order to foretell future things: and this species is called prestige [illusion], because men's eyes are thereby deceived.*" The bodies, however, which are presented to diviners in this way are not true human bodies possessing real flesh, as Cajetan explains most excellently in his commentary on this article. Such simulated bodies, he says, fall short of true bodies in two respects. First, in the very substance of the flesh: for the father of lies himself confessed, when his flesh, as if made of ice, was exposed to touch, that he could not truly fashion human flesh — since he cannot combine natural elements without true human generation so as to produce real human flesh; and by similar reasoning he cannot produce human semen, but only transfer it. And from this it is made most clear how true was Christ's saying after his Resurrection: "*Handle, and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones,*" as a demon has not. Secondly, in the pleasure of touch and of intercourse: for the natural union of human persons is the more pleasurable, the more the real surpasses the merely apparent. Thus far Cajetan, with a few omissions. St. Thomas adds that the second species of divination is through dreams, and this is called the divination of dreams. The third species is through the apparition or speech of the dead, and this species is called necromancy. The fourth is that which foretells future things through living men, as through those possessed — and this is divination by "pythons," so called from the Pythian Apollo, who was said to be the author of divination. The fifth species of divination is when a demon makes use of signs or figures of inanimate bodies — wood, iron, or stone — to foretell the future; and this is called geomancy. If, however, he makes use of water, this is the sixth species, called hydromancy; if of air, there arises the

seventh species, called aeromancy; if of fire, the eighth species, called pyromancy. The ninth, finally, is called haruspicy, when future things are foretold through signs appearing in the entrails of animals sacrificed to demons.

VII. Divination that occurs without an explicit invocation of a demon is divided into two kinds. The first is when, in order to foreknow future things, we consider something in the dispositions of certain things which have no power at all to produce such knowledge; this kind of divination contains six species under it. The first is genethlialogy, which pertains to the astrologers called "genethliac," when they foretell men's fates, and what is to come to them, from the motion of the stars at their birth. The second is augury, which is done from the chattering of birds. The third is auspice, in which future things are foretold from the flight of birds, or the movement of other animals. The fourth is called omen, which is a prediction drawn from words uttered by men without any such intention. The fifth is chiromancy, from the lines of the hands. The sixth, finally, is called scapulimancy, when divination is made from certain signs appearing on the shoulder-blade of some animal.

VIII. To the second kind of divination belongs that in which future things are foretold from the consideration of things which men seriously undertake in order to inquire into something hidden, without any express invocation of a demon. If future events are foretold from the drawing of points or marks, this is called geomancy, and is the first species. The other is called sortilege (casting of lots), when future things are investigated either by considering the figures that arise from molten lead cast into water; or from certain slips, written or unwritten, hidden away, and it is observed which one each person draws; or by observing who draws the greater or lesser number, whether by the casting of uneven sticks, or by the throwing of dice; or finally, when, upon reflection, it is determined which page of a book will fall open when one considers what is to be revealed. All these go by the name of "lots."

IX. St. Thomas concludes this matter in almost these very words (loc. cit.): "*There is a threefold kind of divination: the first is through the manifest invocation of demons, which pertains to necromancers; the second is through the mere consideration of the disposition or movement of some other thing, which pertains to augurs; the third is when we do something ourselves so that something hidden may be made manifest to us, which pertains to lots. Under each of these, however, many further kinds are contained, as is clear from what has been said.*"

X. Question IV. *Are all the aforesaid species of divination morally distinct, such that they must be explained individually in confession?* Response: From what has been said, the answer is clear. St. Thomas reduces divination to three genera: namely, to necromancy, augury, and lot-casting. That not all the recognized species of divination are morally distinct is established by the fact that, in whatever manner divinations are carried out — whether by the use of the stars, of fire, of water, or of dreams — they are opposed, in the same way, to the worship owed to God and to the end of religion. This diversity, then, is a material, not a moral, one — provided we are speaking of all the species enumerated together.

XI. Question V. *Does divination carried out by an explicit pact with a demon differ, in moral species, from that carried out by a tacit pact?* Response: The more common opinion teaches that these divinations do not differ in moral species, since a tacit and an explicit pact do not differ in kind. From this not a few draw the conclusion that the circumstance of an explicit pact need not be disclosed in confession, since aggravating circumstances need not necessarily be specified. But — setting aside the more rigorous discussion of the strict specific moral difference — I hold that a pact explicitly entered into

with a demon must indeed be disclosed [in confession]... This explicit agreement and solemn compact, mutually struck between man and demon, betrays a malice so distinct from that of a merely tacit pact that even common sense itself perceives it. I therefore cannot agree with the opinion of the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 11, punct. 3, §2, n. 45), who, with others, teach that this explicit pact need not necessarily be disclosed in confession in every case, since it is merely an aggravating circumstance. First, even if it were merely an aggravating circumstance, it would not follow, on the opinion I hold more probable, that it may be passed over in silence in confession. Second, it is by no means so well established that these two pacts do not differ in moral species that one could conclude, without qualification, that such a difference need not be disclosed in confession. Indeed, St. Thomas himself, in the words cited above (n. 9), seems to indicate a specific, not merely a physical, distinction; for he adds there: "In all these it is graver to invoke a demon expressly than to do something by which one exposes oneself to becoming the object of such [demonic] insinuation, whatever it may bring." The theologians of Salamanca reply that the Angelic Doctor is speaking of a physical, not a moral, diversity here — a claim so patently absurd that no one fails to see it, since St. Thomas is not discussing physical controversies here, but moral theology. They add that this must be understood of a greater malice within the same species — but this response seems no better than the last. The Angelic Doctor plainly says that the reason for sinning is not the same; therefore, if the reason for sinning is not the same, the formal grounds of sinning are different, and therefore there is a specific moral distinction here, and not merely a material one — which always falls under the same formal ground, whichever way one turns it. It should be added, moreover, that whether or not there is a specific distinction, when a confessor hears of an express and solemn pact, he necessarily forms an altogether different, and more severe, judgment of the penitent. It matters little, say the theologians of Salamanca, whether this judgment is distinct. To this I answer that their response misses the truth by a great deal, not a little. This difference in judgment is given great weight by Sánchez, Castropalao, and very many other Probabilists themselves.

XII. Even the theologians of Salamanca themselves, however, along with other theologians, admit that this explicit pact must in practice be disclosed to the confessor — on the grounds that other sins commonly accompany such a pact: for there arises a grave danger of pernicious deception, both of the one who invokes the demon and of others, thus exposing oneself to grave danger of deception, whether of oneself or of others — a grave malice against charity. Likewise, the crime of idolatry is frequently committed in the express invocation of a demon, on account of the worship offered him. Heresy, too, is often contracted, whether by placing a certain trust in the demon, or by denying the true faith, religion, and the sacraments; and it not infrequently happens that an abuse of sacred things occurs in this invocation. On account of these crimes — of which at least one nearly always accompanies an explicit pact — all agree that such a pact must be disclosed in confession. I would add, following the more probable opinion, that this explicit pact must be disclosed in confession absolutely, even apart from these other crimes.

XIII. Question VI. *Is it a mortal crime to divine by a pact, whether explicit or tacit?* Response: The affirmative opinion is certain among all, and is clearly gathered both from Deuteronomy 18 — "*Let there not be found among you anyone who consults soothsayers, or seeks oracles from spirits*" — and from Isaiah 28: "*You have said: We have entered into a covenant with death, and with hell we have made a pact.*" All likewise affirm that no invincible ignorance of an explicit pact can ever exist. For who could be ignorant that entering a covenant with the enemy [of mankind] is treacherous betrayal and monstrous treason? That

invincible ignorance of a tacit pact can occur, several affirm; nor do I myself deny it — though I say this happens very rarely, especially once one has heard the aforesaid warnings. What, then, of those who make use of lots, of numerical calculations (commonly called "cabala"), and other such unsuitable means of divining the future, without any superstitious intention, indeed expressly professing that they place no faith in such vain signs? The theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit., n. 33), together with Sánchez, Bonacina, Navarro, De Lugo, and others, teach that these are excused from mortal sin when they do this once or twice. I myself would not dare to condemn them of mortal fault either. But what of those who indulge frequently in such nonsense with these vain signs? Let them consider, then, what danger they expose themselves to who indulge in such things not once or twice, but rather often, out of a certain vain and dangerous curiosity. What sort of speech is it, then, that requires the formula "once" or "twice" for the graver fault? Whoever plays at such games even once sins venially, all the surrounding circumstances lurking beneath. Why, then, should no one consider them safe from mortal guilt? What is it, then, that they ought not do, so that they might withdraw themselves from a certain light fault, and from the danger of a graver one?

XIV. Theologians commonly also teach that one must abstain from that pact whereby two people agree that whichever of them dies first will appear to the survivor and reveal to him the state of his soul's salvation. For although this pact, entered into with due submission to the divine will, is absolutely lawful in itself, yet on account of the danger of illusion — since a demon, aware of this pact, could deceive the survivor — it is more advisable to restrain such useless curiosity.

Chapter V — On judicial astrology, or divination by the stars

I. Theologians distinguish a twofold astrology: one natural, whereby men foretell, from the motion, rising, position, and setting of the stars, those things which occur naturally — such as rain, storms, and eclipses. This is acknowledged by all to be lawful, together with St. Thomas (II-II, q. 95, art. 5), who, after reviewing various views, concludes as follows: "*If someone makes use of the observation of the stars in order to foreknow future bodily effects, caused by celestial bodies — such as drought or rain — this will be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination.*" Although this is absolutely true of those effects which necessarily follow from the position and aspect of the stars and planets, nevertheless, as to storms, droughts, rains, fair weather, and other such things to be foretold — such an astrology is generally vain and useless, though not harmful, both because the power of the stars is not fully known, and because of the obstruction of winds, vapors, and other things, which often impede the influence of the stars. This is well established and proven by experience. Nor do the almanacs published yearly certainly predict any outcome other than the emptying of the purses of the ignorant and unlearned, as the aforesaid theologians of Salamanca observe. I am often inclined to laugh at those who waste their time and money hunting down these trifling pamphlets, and who read and reread them with such curiosity and greed as to seem to place real faith in them. Such people do not escape a light fault of frivolity, rashness, and idle curiosity — not, indeed, for consulting such pamphlets as such, but for their excess and overcredulity.

II. The other astrology is judicial — whereby men divine, from the motion of the stars, the aspect of the planets, and the course of the heavenly bodies, certain future things that are contingent, occurring by chance, or depending solely on human will and choice. Theologians teach that this too is twofold. One is that whereby, from the aspects of the stars, the fertility or barrenness of the earth,

the diseases and deaths of animals and men, are foretold — not with certainty, but only as probable; and this is not superstitious, provided these future things are foretold only as probable. The second is called genethlialogy, whereby dignities, ranks, the beauty or ugliness of one's future spouse, are foretold for individuals. The third is that of elections, whereby it is divined, in every undertaking, what is to be done, what omitted, when one should leave the house, so that fortunate outcomes may follow. The fourth is that of fabricated images, whereby astrologers construct figures, numbers, and characters, which they combine, by a supposed mutual sympathy, with figures they claim to find in the heavens; and from this combination they foretell fortuitous events. St. Thomas treats all these matters at length (II-II, q. 96, art. 2), which the reader may consult.

III. All persons of sound mind hold these last three practices to be forbidden — indeed, altogether disparate from reality — since heavenly bodies have no power whatsoever over the human will, which is spiritual, whose free acts, whether honorable or harmful, meritorious or blameworthy, can in no way be traced back to bodily causes. For celestial bodies neither influence the will by their natural power (which would violate freedom, since such influence would be necessary), nor can they serve as signs — since there is no connection whatsoever between such altogether disparate things that would allow them to concur in producing these effects. The Angelic Doctor teaches all this (II-II, q. 95, art. 3). And, setting aside the many prohibitions of Sacred Scripture against this astrology, let it suffice to cite the words of the constitution of Sixtus V, issued in the year 1586, beginning "*Coeli et terrae Creator Deus*" ["God, Creator of Heaven and Earth"], where, among other things, it is stated: "*We ordain and command that... those who presume to affirm that anything will come to pass concerning nativities and the dependent judgments of men — even if they do not claim to affirm this with certainty, but merely assert or hold it as probable — concerning contingent events, successes, and chance occurrences, or actions proceeding from human free will, are to act and proceed against, and to punish more severely, in accordance with the canonical penalties.*" The objections astrologers commonly raise are too frivolous to merit a refutation.

IV. Question I. *Is it superstitious to divine free future events, not with certainty, but probably?* Response: The affirmative opinion is common and true. The reason is that a probable assent is a determinate one, even though it admits some fear of the opposite. But no determinate influence of the stars upon the will can be given, even probably. Therefore even a merely probable foreknowledge of future things from the stars is superstitious. Wherefore, whether astrologers foretell free future events with certainty or with probability, they are always superstitious, since there is no connection whatsoever between the stars and human freedom.

V. Question II. *Is a prediction that is merely conjectural free of superstition?* Response: Fr. Castropalao (tract. 17, disp. 1, punct. 4, n. 8) teaches the affirmative, citing Vázquez and De Lugo in support; he seeks to prove this, first, on the grounds that Sixtus V did not prohibit this merely conjectural and slight prediction, since the Pontiff only forbade that foreknowledge of the future which had already been forbidden by divine and canon law, as is gathered from the preamble of the constitution. Secondly, he adds that this conjectural and doubtful prediction of a contingent future event is not an absolute prediction, but only a prediction resting on some rather slight conjecture — which is more a prediction of a contingency than of an effect.

VI. Against this opinion one could object that in the Sixtine constitution prediction is forbidden even if they do not assert or profess it as certain. Therefore even conjectural foreknowledge seems to be forbidden. What of the fact that this conjectural divination is as pernicious to the commonwealth and

to divine worship as the probable kind? Indeed it is scarcely distinguished from it, except by a greater or lesser degree of probability. For if the lawful use of that conjectural divination were admitted, men inclined to the knowledge of hidden things would devote themselves to this vain science as though it were certain; since they would flatter themselves that they could advance beyond conjectures, and approach the bounds of probability, and from these reach the summit of certainty: and so under this most slender veil of conjectural prediction the crime of superstitious divination would be hidden and fostered. What of the fact that Castropalao himself concedes that such diviners are to be punished in the external forum? Why should they be punished, if once any prediction of contingent future things from the stars were lawful? Indeed scarcely anyone could be punished, the opinion of Castropalao once admitted: for anyone could excuse himself under the pretext of a conjectural prediction. Therefore Pope Sixtus, as we have seen, forbids divination whether certain or conjectural: which conjectural prediction has always been forbidden both by divine and by natural law, for the reasons alleged.

Translated for this site from the Latin of the print, where the English received lacks this passage or departs from the print. (ed.)

VII. These objections I have raised, however, are not so pressing as to render Castropalao's opinion false in every sense. For St. Thomas teaches that astrologers can, in general, conjecturally predict wars and other chance events — because heavenly bodies, though they do not act upon the intellect and the will, do nevertheless influence the passions; and since few people resist these, astrologers can in general conjecture certain future events, though not with respect to this or that particular case. For the Angelic Doctor says (II-II, q. 95, art. 5, ad 3): "*The greater part of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, to which celestial bodies can indeed contribute; but there are few wise men who resist such passions. And so astrologers can, for the most part, predict truly, especially in general matters, though not in particular ones — since nothing prevents some individual man from resisting his passions by free choice. Whence astrologers themselves say that the wise man will rule the stars, insofar, that is, as he rules his own passions.*" If, therefore, one considers the nature of these things — namely, celestial bodies, and bodily or sensory passions — a connection does exist between them, since the former really do influence the latter; and although all men can master their passions, few in fact do so; hence, if this is what is considered, astrologers can conjecturally foretell, from the common influence of the stars upon bodily appetites, various general movements of the passions. But nothing regarding matters that depend on free choice can they foretell with any certainty in particular cases — since any given man can, by conjectural reasoning, resist several bodily impulses of appetite. Indeed, not even the common prediction of astrologers, which alone can be lawful, is worth attending to, but rather to be wholly disregarded — for although astrologers might, from the motion, aspect, and position of the stars, and their influence upon the passions, be able to divine something, since this can nonetheless be impeded and the passions restrained by countless accidental circumstances, all such divination — whether general or particular, probable or conjectural — with respect to matters depending on free choice, is altogether to be despised, as Jeremiah says (ch. 10): "*Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear; for the laws of the people are vain.*"

VIII. Question III. *Are astrologers permitted to predict a person's temperament, inclination, and bodily characteristics from the sign of their nativity?* Response: Theologians dispute much on this point; I will settle the matter briefly. It is established from what has been said that astrologers cannot, in any way — whether probably or conjecturally — predict free future events. Moreover, that astrologers cannot

certainly predict an infant's temperament and inclinations from the horoscope of its nativity is likewise clear. For the exceedingly rapid motion of the heavens, the aspects of the stars, their retrogradations and oppositions, escape the grasp of the mind, as even the most expert mathematicians themselves admit. It should be added that the precise moment of nativity is exceedingly difficult to determine, on account of the exceedingly rapid revolution of the heavens. What, moreover, of the fact that the influences of the heavens at the time of conception contribute more to temperament and human inclinations than those at the time of birth? And this moment is altogether unknown to astrologers. Finally, men's temperaments are changed by diet, by upbringing, and by very many other factors. All these considerations, taken together — along with many others I pass over — prevent astrologers from being able even probably to predict children's temperaments and inclinations.

IX. Having shown the uselessness of astrologers' divination, it remains to say whether such divination is superstitious. It has been established above that natural astrology is lawful with respect to those events which necessarily follow from the motion and aspect of the stars. But that astrology which divines a person's future constitution, temperament, and inclination from the horoscope of their nativity, we hold — and maintain — to be unlawful. The theologians of Salamanca cite Trullench, who asserts that this divination is by its very nature unfit, and a mortal sin; they themselves, however, with Suárez, Layman, Fagundez, and Tamburini, deny this, saying that by its very kind it is only a falsehood and a rash error, not superstition. Now to lie in the abstract is not a mortal sin, but only venial. It will therefore be only a venial fault, against prudence and truth, to divine a future temperament from the horoscope of a nativity. They add (loc. cit., n. 43) that this divination is lawful, provided the astrologer predicts future inclinations only probably and conjecturally. But once it is granted that there exist no grounds at all upon which a probable judgment about a future temperament and inclination could be formed, it follows immediately that this divination is altogether useless and false — as the aforesaid theologians themselves readily admit. Now if such divination is useless and false, I do not see why it should be called free of superstition.

Whether it is afterward always a mortal sin, I would not venture to decide. As for practice, Christians are to be advised to abstain from seeking such divinations, and from listening to such astrologers who whisper their falsehoods and fables through tubes into the ears of the ignorant and foolish in public squares, and thereby extract their money. For although they profess with their mouths to place no faith in such things, their actions indicate the contrary: for it is hard to believe that they would spend their money merely out of curiosity to hear things they themselves regard as fables. Let them, then, keep their money, and mock this most ignorant and worthless breed of men, wholly ignorant of letters and of the astrological art.

X. Those who consult astrologers to reveal to them some hidden crime — a theft, a murder, or other crimes, whether committed or merely alleged — sin most gravely, because such things cannot be discovered without the art of a demon; and thus those who consult them induce astrologers to practice superstition. What, moreover, of the fact that it is not even lawful to induce a man who truly knows of an altogether hidden crime to reveal it, bypassing the due order of justice?

XI. Question IV. *Is it lawful to ask that hidden treasures, underground waters, or corpses hidden beneath tombstones be revealed by those who boast of knowledge of such things?* Response: That waters flowing within

the veins of the earth can be discerned by natural signs — vapors, and other emanations given off — no one denies. Metals too, present in mines, can be discerned by natural power through several signs, chiefly from the character of the plants that tend to grow there. The knowledge of both, then, can be sought without superstition, since knowledge of either can be obtained without the fault of superstition. But treasures, or corpses hidden beneath tombstones, cannot be discovered without a pact with a demon. Those, therefore, who demand that these be revealed sin gravely, since they induce diviners to commit superstition. What deep roots of folly are these! If God, in his providence, rarely permits a demon to reveal such things, it is so that the endless evils which wicked men are accustomed to perpetrate, once furnished with an abundance of riches, might be prevented. What, then, if others were disappointed of their hope of treasure?

XII. Question V. *Are diviners bound to restore the price received for their divination?* The singular opinion of Fr. Sánchez is here refuted. Response: When diviners foretell things that escape natural knowledge — as when they predict things that depend solely on free will — they are bound to restore the price received for such prediction, because those who received it were unjustly deceived by such impostures; and if others were led by them into this same practice through foolish credulity in such deceptions, they must compensate the resulting damages, since they were the cause of the loss.

XIII. Fr. Thomas Sánchez (Bk. II, *On Decalogue*, ch. 38, n. 36) holds a singular opinion on this matter. Lest I seem to misrepresent him, I transcribe his own words. He says: "If we speak of the price received for rendering this judgment, Gratian (ch. *Qui habetis*, 14, q. 1) teaches that it must be restored to the poor as base gain. But a distinction must be drawn here. If that astrologer employed no effort at all, and knew, by the diabolical art, what could be known by no other means, then — whether or not the predicted effect came to pass — he is bound to restore the price to the giver, since he applied no diligence of his own, but the effect happened by chance, or did not happen. But money is given on account of the labor expended by him, labor useful for achieving the effect — just as, if someone entirely ignorant of medicine applied useless remedies to a sick person, he would be bound to restore the price of the cure to the patient, even if the patient happened by chance to recover from the illness. And although the one who consulted the astrologer erred in this, offering a price for a shameful thing, the truer opinion holds that the price must be restored to him, until he is condemned by a judicial sentence to forfeit it. But if that astrologer, or diviner, applied his own effort, and BY THE ART OF THE DEVIL... he is not bound to restore the price received, because the thing so happened; for he applied his own effort, however base, and it is not subject to restitution according to the truer opinion." Manuel (Bk. 1 of the Summa, 1st edition, ch. 7, n. 4), and Salas (Bk. 3, q. 12, art. 5, tract. 5, disp. 22, sect. 8, n. 79 at the end) teach the same. Navarro (ibid., n. 163–164) adds that the price must be restored without distinction, when the thing does not turn out as predicted. But this I do not believe, when he himself applied the diligence necessary for that effect through the art of the devil: just as a physician who treats a patient according to the rules of his art is not bound to restore the price to a patient who dies, since the diligence applied by that sorcerer [N.B.] is to be valued at a price. Nor in this case is he bound to compensate for damages and expenses to the one who consulted him; but [he is bound] when he applies no effort at all, or is himself ignorant of the DIABOLICAL art.

XIV. Is the diabolical art, then, to be valued at a price? If diviners have no dealings whatsoever with the devil, they are bound to restore the price received for divination, whether or not the effect occurs

— because in that case they are ignorant of the divinatory art, and deceive their clients, to whom they render no effort at all, and undergo no trouble in learning the secrets of their supposed art. On the contrary — if they consult the devil, and learn the secrets of the art from so great a master, then, as skilled practitioners of the divinatory art, they are free of the obligation of restitution, and may lawfully keep the price received, whether or not the predicted effect follows — just as a physician who treats a patient according to the rules of his art is not bound to restore the price received, whether the patient recovers or dies. This seems to me a monstrous paradox, repugnant to common sense. In the end, an opinion has been devised that teaches that dealing with the devil can be useful and profitable, and that the profit acquired from such diabolical commerce may be retained. What an erroneous fabrication!

Chapter VI — On divination by dreams

I. There are various kinds of dreams, commonly divided into the oracular, the dream proper, the "insomnium," and the phantasm. An *oracle* occurs when God, through the ministry of the Saints or Angels, reveals to someone in sleep a vision of some future thing; such was the dream of Abimelech (Gen. 20), of Abraham (Gen. 28), of Samuel (1 Kings 3), and of St. Joseph and the Magi (Matt. 2). A *vision* occurs when what one sees in a dream comes to pass in the very manner in which it was seen; such was the ancient dream of Joseph (Gen. 37), of Jacob (Gen. 46), and of Gideon (Judg. 7). An *insomnium*, properly so called, is that which appears in figures, and requires interpretation in order to be understood — such was the dream of Nebuchadnezzar (Dan. 2), and of the butler and the baker (Gen. 40), which, having occupied their waking thoughts, then presented itself to them again while sleeping. Hence Ecclesiasticus (ch. 5) says that many are led astray by dreams. A *phantasm* occurs when someone, scarcely having fallen asleep, and thinking themselves still awake, seems to see various and discordant figures. These kinds of dreams, apart from the oracular, nonetheless amount to nearly the same thing.

II. Four causes are commonly assigned to dreams, two of which are intrinsic, two extrinsic. The intrinsic cause of dreams is called *animal*, arising from internal passions — for this reason animals too are accustomed to dream, from this same cause; the other is *bodily*, since dreams arise from the body's varying condition, as the Angelic Doctor explains (II-II, q. 95, art. 6): "*The intrinsic cause of dreams is twofold. One is animal — namely, insofar as those things which a man's imagination was occupied with, and had an affection for while awake, recur in sleep... The other intrinsic cause of dreams is bodily. For according to the interior disposition of the body, some movement arises in the imagination corresponding to that disposition; just as in a man in whom cold humors abound, there occur in dreams things pertaining to water or cold. And for this reason physicians say that dreams are to be attended to, in order to discern interior bodily dispositions.*" Experience confirms this: for those who abound in blood dream of things that bring joy — treasures, banquets, gardens; those troubled by bile dream of slaughter, quarrels, assaults, and warlike encounters; those full of viscous humors sense themselves being crushed and suffocated in their dreams; those prone to melancholy see darkness and drowning in theirs. And whenever the bodily humors are disturbed, dreams tend to be grave and mournful — signs of the body's ill health.

III. The extrinsic cause of dreams is likewise twofold. One is *bodily*, as the Angelic Doctor says, "*when the sleeper's imagination is altered either by the surrounding air, or by some celestial influence, so that certain images appear to the sleeper corresponding to celestial impressions.*" The other is *spiritual*, which, as St. Thomas adds,

comes from God, who, through the ministry of Angels, reveals certain things to men in dreams, according to that text (Num. 12): "*If there be a prophet of the Lord among you, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.*" Sometimes too, as the Angelic Doctor continues, by the operation of demons certain images appear to the sleeper, from which they sometimes reveal certain future things to those who have an explicit or tacit pact with them.

IV. Question I. *Is it lawful to divine the future by dreams?* Response: To this question St. Thomas responds as follows (loc. cit.): "*It must be said that if someone observes dreams in order to foreknow future things, insofar as dreams proceed from divine revelation, or from an intrinsic or extrinsic natural cause, to the extent that the power of such a cause can extend, this will not be an unlawful divination. But if such divination is extended beyond the point to which such a cause, or revelation, can extend — as, for instance, if one were to seek to foreknow future contingents or hidden matters of the human heart through dreams that do not proceed from divine revelation — this will be an unlawful and superstitious divination, since such divination is extended to matters where an explicit or tacit pact with demons is present, insofar as they would be invoked for this.*" It is therefore lawful to observe dreams sent by God, and through them to divine the future. But one must first determine whether the dreams are sent by God or by a demon — and this is the difficult task. No infallible rule can be given for this; several probable conjectures, however, are available. The chief of these is this: if the dreams are honorable, and incline the mind toward spiritual good, they are to be believed sent by God, as St. James says (ch. 3): "*The wisdom that is from above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, persuadable, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits, without judging, without dissimulation.*" If, on the other hand, they disturb the mind, or incline it toward evil, they must be believed to be suggested by a demon. If, after sufficient diligence, they remain doubtful, they are to be disregarded — this being the safer course. The character and integrity of life of the one who experiences the dreams also contribute greatly to discerning whether they are sent by God or by a demon. Those who experience such dreams ought to reveal them to a prudent confessor, and, pouring out prayers to God, ask of him the true understanding of them — for God does not allow those who do not wish to be deceived to be deceived.

V. Question II. *Is the observation of natural dreams lawful?* Response: Theologians commonly affirm this, since such dreams proceed from natural causes — namely, from an abundance of humors, or from the quality of one's temperament. It is, moreover, lawful to seek out, from natural causes, the effects that flow from them. Physicians, accordingly, lawfully observe dreams, in order to discern the causes of illnesses, and to remove them.

VI. Question III. *Is it lawful to divine free future things from dreams?* Response: All teach that this is a grave crime, since free future events depend solely on the will... — future contingents — and dreams have no connection whatsoever with them; nor can dreams attain to any certain or determinate knowledge of such effects by their own nature, but only offer some conjecture. Nothing, then, that is free is to be divined from dreams. Superstitious, accordingly, are those who observe dreams, or who place themselves in bed in a certain manner so that future events may be revealed to them in dreams; likewise those who place the horns of animals under the pillows of the sick, so that they may obtain a calm and restful sleep — for there is no connection whatsoever between dreams and such instruments.

VII. Question IV. *Does one who, on the occasion of a dream, conducts his affairs and business in a certain way, sin?* Response: Extremes are to be avoided here, as in other matters. Whoever makes a habit of

observing dreams, and constantly uses them as a kind of rule for conducting his affairs, undoubtedly commits superstition. If, however, someone occasionally omits or undertakes something on the occasion of a dream — not out of a firm belief in the dream's predictive power, but taking the occasion from it to reflect more seriously upon some matter, and to reform his ways — he is not tainted with any superstition. Suppose a sinner sees in a dream that he will die suddenly unless he corrects his ways and repents at once; he would not be superstitious in the least — rather he would act prudently if he immediately went to confession and reformed his ways. For it can be prudently believed that such dreams are infused by God, and that one is thereby admonished through the ministry of dreams, as we have already noted, to turn to a better way of life — provided the dream is simple, and inclines toward the good. Prudence is nevertheless required, to discern whether this apparent good is indeed a certain, necessary good, bringing with it no evil at all. For an evil angel sometimes proposes a good, in order to lead one thereby to a greater evil. This, however, is easy to discern. In the example given, no evil at all can be feared, since it is, by its very nature, good for a sinner to give up his sins, to wash them away by penance, and to turn to God — so that nothing insidious lies concealed in it.

VIII. Question V. *When outcomes correspond to dreams, is it permissible to observe this correspondence?* Response: It not infrequently happens that someone observes that events correspond to dreams he has had. He may then be tempted to pay attention to such things, and place faith in them. Is he to be said, in that case, to be tainted with the stain of superstition? St. Thomas answers (II-II, q. 96, art. 8, ad 2): "*Although at first men experienced something true from such observations by chance, afterward, once men began to apply their minds to such observances, it happens that many things come to pass according to such observances, through the deception of demons — so that men entangled in such observances may be more firmly bound by manifold errors.*" Vain dreams, then, are to be avoided; and in matters of faith, morals, and worldly affairs we ought to be guided by those other principles which are well established for us — namely, Scripture, and other sure and reliable sources. We have no need of dreams to correct our morals, or to undertake worthy deeds and good works. This must always be kept before our eyes: that Scripture forbids putting faith in dreams. "*Unless it be a vision sent by the Most High, set not thy heart upon dreams*" (Ecclesiasticus 34). It must also be observed that, when God sends a dream, he provides some sign by which it may be recognized as truly sent from him. Unless, therefore, certain or highly probable signs occur that the dream descends from above, it is to be disregarded.

Chapter VII — On divination by augury, omens, and other such observations of external things

I. St. Thomas treats this question (II-II, q. 95, art. 7). "Augury" is commonly understood in reference to the chattering of birds. It is threefold. When future things are foretold from the flight, song, and number of the chattering, it is called, absolutely, augury. If this prediction is made from the flight, feeding, cry, or movements of birds, it is called auspice. If, however, the divination is made from the entrails, organs, or innards of birds sacrificed or slaughtered, it is then called haruspicy. When, however, divination is made from words uttered by men without any intention regarding the future, it is called an omen. Marcus Tullius writes much on this art in his books on divination, and praises the Etruscans as most skilled in it, whom he says the Romans often summoned to instruct them. I

could transcribe much more from this source for erudition's sake; but I think it better to touch only briefly upon those points that pertain to the formation of our own moral conduct.

II. Question I. *Is it lawful to foretell the future from the song, flight, or cry of birds?* Response: If the discussion concerns certain future effects that depend on natural causes — such as rains, storms, droughts, and the like — it is lawful to conjecture such things from the song, flight, and movement of birds, since these are natural signs of such effects. For the senses of these animals are more strongly affected than those of men by changes in the air and the influences of the stars; and for this reason these creatures are accustomed either to sing or to fly more swiftly when such changes in the weather are impending. There is, then, no superstition, but a prudent observation, in gathering from the song, chattering, and flight of birds indications of rain, fair weather, and storms. The Angelic Doctor explains all this (loc. cit.): "*The cause of the actions of brute animals is their instinct, by which they are moved, in a certain natural manner: for they do not have dominion over their own acts. This instinct, however, can proceed from a twofold cause. In one way, from a bodily cause: for since brute animals have only a sensitive soul, all their acts must be the acts of bodily organs, and consequently of animal bodies, and primarily of celestial bodies. And so nothing prevents some of their operations from being signs of future things, insofar as they conform themselves to the dispositions of the celestial bodies and of the surrounding air, from which certain future events arise.*" Hence it is, adds the Angelic Doctor, that when the crow caws frequently, it indicates coming rain; other creatures give similar signs foretelling such effects.

III. Manifest superstition, however, is committed when one attempts to foretell free future contingent events from the aforesaid signs of birds or other animals. The reason has already been given several times: namely, that free future events depend on the will. Hence God commands (Deut. 18): "*Let there not be found among you one who observes auguries.*" Certain scriptural authorities that are commonly cited in opposition are interpreted by St. Thomas (loc. cit.) — as when Joseph said (unaware [of the true reason]): "*Do you not know that there is no one like me in the science of augury?*" — Augustine likewise teaches that this was said by Joseph merely as a pretext.

IV. Question II. *Is it lawful to foretell future things from words uttered by chance, or from fortuitous events?* Response: The negative conclusion is certain and common. For human words uttered by chance are signs at will, having no relation to, and no influence upon, any future thing whatsoever. It is therefore in no way lawful to predict anything from such a chance utterance of words. That Eliezer observed the girl's words, and [that St. Thomas cites] the case of Gideon (loc. cit., ad 3), is to be explained by a special revelation from God, as Augustine also teaches. Similar observations, then, are tainted with superstition: as, for instance, interpreting it unfavorably if alms are requested on the first day of the week; if a dog or cat crosses one's path first thing in the morning; if one sneezes in the morning; if one's clothes are gnawed by mice; if one bumps one's head against a doorway; and six hundred other similar observances, handed down from the pagans to ignorant and unlearned Christians. For because something sad or unlucky sometimes happens by chance after similar signs, men, prone to superstition and deceived by a demon, immediately establish such signs as ill omens.

V. Question III. *Is it superstitious to foretell the future from parts of the human body?* Response: There are three principal parts of the body commonly observed in divination: the hands, the head, and the feet. Divination whereby a person's future is predicted from the lines of the hands is called chiromancy; that whereby something is foretold from the lines of the feet is called podomancy; that which conjectures from the lines of the forehead and the character of the face is called metoposcopy; and

that, finally, which draws auguries from the whole body and its members, is called physiognomy. Each of these is twofold: one natural, the other astrological. The astrological kind predicts free and altogether contingent future events from the features of the members; the natural kind, on the other hand, conjectures health, temperament, and disease from the body's disposition and the size of the hand. With these preliminaries noted, we say...

[Physiognomy, which conjectures from the body's habitual bearing the signs of weakness, courage, strength, or timidity, is lawful — as Ecclesiasticus 19 says: "*A man is known by his look, and a man of understanding, when thou meetest him, is known by his countenance. A man's attire, and excessive laughter, and gait, shew what he is.*" Just as the strength, agility, and speed for racing of other animals — horses, oxen, and the like — are gathered from the excellent disposition of their bodies, so too men's natural inclinations, temperaments, and the like are discerned from the variety of their features and other bodily members. And this no one doubts to be lawful. But to divine, by astrological physiognomy, future contingent, chance, and free events is superstitious, as all agree, for the reason so often given: namely, that the body's disposition and that of its members has no influence at all upon future contingent and free events, which depend on the will alone. What has been said of physiognomy is likewise to be said of natural and astrological chiromancy, and of the other two. Though what authors commonly teach concerning the lines of the hands I consider a fabrication, from which I think no probable conjecture at all can be drawn regarding natural inclinations, or a longer or shorter lifespan.]

VI. Question IV. *Do the Egyptians — those called by the common name of Gypsies — sin gravely by predicting good or bad fortune from the lines of the hand?* Response: If they do this seriously, they undoubtedly sin mortally: for, as we have often said, this is a species of superstition, since no natural cause can be assigned that could produce such effects. If it is done merely for amusement, the more probable authors teach that only a venial sin of curiosity is committed. But in practice this is scarcely done without grave fault, both on account of the scandal involved, and on account of the credulity that people — women especially — place in such charlatans. All, therefore, ought to be urged to abstain altogether from consulting them. For while such fortune-tellers ply their predictions, they support a wicked art, and provide wicked men the occasion to sin.

Chapter VIII — On divination that is carried out by the use of lots

I. This is described by St. Thomas (II-II, q. 95, art. 8), who asserts it to be threefold. The first is *divisory*, which occurs so that, by an action of some kind, the outcome of the lot may reveal something hidden — namely, when it is determined, by the outcome, what is to be assigned to whom — an office, an honor, a rank, and the like. The second is *consultative*, when the divine will is consulted, that we may know what to avoid, what to undertake, what to do in this or that affair. The third is *divinatory*, when it is sought that some hidden future thing be revealed by a demon, tacitly or expressly. "*A lot,*" says the Angelic Doctor, "*is said to be divisory when it consists in some action, such that, from its outcome, something hidden is made known to the one to whom it pertains. And likewise if the inquiry regards a possession, or an office, or something of this sort, it takes the character of a divisory lot. If, however, the inquiry regards what ought to be done, it takes the character of a consultative lot. But if it is inquired what will be the case — as though such an act of human inquiry were vain and false, unless the lots are used according to the*

disposition of the stars to produce the effect (which is a fantastical opinion), and consequently not without a demon insinuating himself — then such divination is superstitious, or unlawful."

II. Divisory lots are lawful, since they are nothing other than a certain agreement of wills whereby men come together, so that it may be decided, by the outcome of the lot, to whom a thing, an honor, a rank, and the like ought to be assigned. There is here no pact whatsoever, express or tacit, with a demon. Very many examples of this kind of lot occur in Sacred Scripture, both Old and New Testament. In the Old: "*And Samuel brought the tribe of Benjamin by lot*" (1 Kings 10). Likewise Deuteronomy: "*He himself shall divide the land by lot*." From the New Testament: "*They cast lots, and the lot fell upon Matthias*" (Acts 1); "*Upon my vesture they cast lots*" (Matthew 27).

III. Question I. *Is it lawful to use divisory lots in the election to secular offices?* Response: The affirmative opinion is common with respect to the election to lay offices — since such a casting of lots is forbidden by no law, and is otherwise, by its very nature, entirely free from any taint of superstition. In order, however, for it to be lawful, the lot must be cast among candidates who are equally suitable and equally deserving. For if, through the use of the lot, rewards should fall to unsuitable candidates while suitable ones are passed over, this would then be a sin against distributive justice. It is lawful to cast lots, then, when several suitable candidates present themselves, and no distinction of merit among them can be discerned, so that it cannot be known which of them ought to be preferred.

IV. Question II. *Is it lawful to use lots in the election to ecclesiastical benefices?* Response: The negative opinion is common, since ecclesiastical law forbids this, in the chapter *Ecclesia*, on lot-casting, where the following is stated: "*We condemn the use of lots in elections by a perpetual prohibition.*" No elections, then, whether to dignities, benefices, or ecclesiastical offices, can lawfully be carried out by the use of lots — and this holds true even for the election of compromise-electors chosen to carry out such elections. The Angelic Doctor expressly teaches this view; for although he admits the use of lots to be lawful for settling disputes, he denies that this is lawful for elections to ecclesiastical benefices. "*One can sin in this matter in four ways,*" he says (loc. cit.). "*First, if one has recourse to lots without any necessity at all: for this seems to pertain to tempting God. Whence Ambrose says, commenting on Luke: 'He who is chosen by lot is not subject to human judgment.' Second, if even in a case of necessity one uses lots without due reverence for God.*"

V. Question III. *Is an election to an ecclesiastical benefice carried out by lot altogether void?* Response: The election to ecclesiastical offices and benefices, although unlawful, is not for that reason void, since it is prohibited only by law, but not declared invalid. The election of a Prelate of the Church who holds jurisdiction, however, is [treated otherwise, per the chapter *Quia propter*, on elections]. And this is the common and true opinion, since in matters of prohibition one must always look to whether the prohibition adds, beyond an absolute prohibition, an express declaration of nullity as well — since a mere prohibition alone does not entail nullity, unless this is expressly stated. And since it is only in the election of a Prelate of the Church holding both jurisdictions that an election carried out by lot is declared void — while in elections to benefices and offices merely [the election] is void only in that specific sense — it follows that other cases, which are merely prohibited, are not void.

VI. Question IV. *Is the use of lots lawful for settling disputes over ecclesiastical property or benefices?* Response: If ecclesiastics dispute over temporal goods, there is no doubt that they may settle the dispute by the use of lots, with the due conditions observed, just as laypeople may — since, in this hypothesis, their goods are not distinguished from those of the laity. The question proposed, then, concerns disputes arising over elections to ecclesiastical benefices and offices; and on this difficulty two opinions are

found. The first holds that a penal law ought not to be extended beyond the cases expressly stated. Now ecclesiastical law forbids the use of lots only in elections to benefices and offices, not in settling disputes. The other opinion denies this, on the grounds that if disputes were settled by lot, elections would in effect be made, or at least completed, by the use of lots.

VII. This second opinion is the more probable one, if the discussion concerns a casting of lots done on private authority. If, however, it is done on public authority — namely, that of a judge — so that lots may be cast in disputes so difficult and so entangled, and their legal merits so obscure, that no judgment can be reached by discerning them, then the use of lots becomes more respectable: for an absolute casting of lots is not forbidden. For Solomon says (Prov. 18): "*The lot suppresseth contentions, and determineth even between the mighty.*" Whenever, then, the best possible outcome — namely, the settling of the dispute — is achieved, the casting of lots will not be unlawful. The law, in the chapter *Ecclesia*, on lot-casting, forbids elections to benefices and ecclesiastical offices to be made by lot; it also forbids disputes to be settled by lot when the legal merits are not so entangled that they cannot be discerned, and the case decided by the sentence of a judge. But when disputes are so obscure that the judges themselves cannot tell which party's rights are favored, who would say that ecclesiastical law forbids an end to be put to such disputes by the use of lots? Otherwise one would have to say that the law wills such disputes to remain endless forever — something no one can suspect. In order to avoid the difficulties that might be raised against it, such a casting of lots ought to be done on the authority of an ecclesiastical judge. For then there will be no danger of anyone obtaining a benefice without just title — since the authority of the judge competent to confer the benefice, in prescribing the casting of lots, itself pronounces the judgment; and whoever obtains the benefice does so, not so much through the effect of the lot, as through the sentence of the judge who prescribed such a casting of lots. There is likewise no suspicion of simony, which is removed by the judge's authority. This is the more common opinion, and the more probable one in my own view. It is defended by the Gloss (on the chapter *Licet Causam*, on the proposition "Uti possidetis"), Suárez (*On Religion*, Vol. I, tract. 3, Bk. 2, ch. 12, n. 33), Sánchez (Bk. II, ch. 38, n. 79), Castropalao (tract. 17, disp. 1, punct. 6, n. 7), Leander (tract. 9, disp. 12, q. 13), and the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 22, ch. 11, punct. 3, n. 88), among others. From these it is recorded that, once, when a dispute was raging as to which of two men had been lawfully elected Pope, it was decided, by the agreement of the Cardinals, to settle the discordant claim by lot. But would it not have been better, in such a case, to elect a third candidate, setting aside both rival claimants? This, we know from ecclesiastical history, is indeed what was done; and we believe the Cardinals would do the same, should such a case arise again. Nor do we know of any instance where a dispute over the Papacy was ever actually settled by lot. This, however, we submit to the judgment of the wise.

VIII. Question V. *Is a consultative casting of lots lawful?* Response: A twofold cause of consultative lot-casting exists, both spiritual — namely, God, or a demon. If the outcome is expected from a demon, it is called a divinatory lot, which is superstitious, and was forbidden by Pope Sixtus V in his own bull. We have already given the reason for this several times: namely, that such lots have no connection with future events, whether as causes or as signs of them. Since, then, this knowledge is not obtained from God, it remains that it is obtained from a demon; wherefore, in such lot-castings, there is always present a pact with a demon, either explicit or implicit.

IX. It is called *consultative*, when the knowledge of a future event is sought from God. That this is lawful is proved by many examples from Sacred Scripture, already indicated above. For Joshua made use of a lot to detect the hidden culprit, as is related in ch. 7. Saul discovered, by lot, that his son Jonathan had tasted [the forbidden honey], as is gathered from 1 Kings 14. The Apostles, having first cast lots, enrolled Matthias in the number of the Apostles. Other examples have already been indicated. For the lawful use of consultative lots, St. Thomas prescribes four conditions, which we have already described, and will briefly recall here. The first is a pressing necessity, whether spiritual or temporal; absent such necessity, God is tempted. The second is that the utmost reverence and deference toward God be preserved in such a casting of lots — namely, that it be preceded by mature deliberation, and that prayers be offered to God, as the Apostles did before the election of Matthias. The third is that sacred things not be mixed with profane ones — as if one were to make use of the pages of the Gospel, or the relics of the Saints, for temporal affairs. The last is that this casting of lots not be employed in elections to ecclesiastical benefices. Theologians note that these conditions are scarcely ever observed in practice. For this reason, such castings of lots are altogether to be rejected; and in doubtful matters, the laws, prudent rules, and wise men are to be consulted, lots being set aside.

X. Theologians commonly also note that, when lots are used — even with God's aid invoked — if no necessity is present, the sin will not be one of superstition, but of tempting God. When the other conditions are lacking, beyond the sin of superstition, other crimes can also occur — as when lots are used to detect a hidden thief, murderer, or other culprit, in which case, beyond superstition, the crime of injustice is also committed.

XI. Regarding the superstition involved in the use of duels, and of trial by red-hot iron or boiling water, St. Thomas teaches (II-II, q. 95, art. 8, ad 3): "*The trial by red-hot iron, or of boiling water, is indeed ordered toward the investigation of some hidden sin, through something done by man; and insofar as some miraculous effect is expected from God, it agrees in this respect with the casting of lots — but it exceeds the common character of lots. Whence such a judgment is rendered unlawful: both because it is directed toward the discernment of hidden things, which are reserved to divine judgment alone, and also because such a judgment has not been sanctioned by divine authority.*" See II-II, q. 5 [i.e., other relevant passages]. In the Decree of Pope Stephen V it is said: "*The extortion of a confession from anyone by the trial of red-hot iron, or of boiling water, is not sanctioned by the sacred canons; nor is it to be presumed, since it has not been sanctioned by the teaching of the holy Fathers, being a superstitious invention. Public crimes, once a spontaneous confession or the testimony of witnesses has established them, having the fear of God before our eyes, are granted to our own governance to judge. But hidden and unknown things are to be left to him alone who knows the hearts of the sons of men.*" The same reasoning seems to apply to the practice of dueling — except that it approaches more closely to the common character of the casting of lots, insofar as no miraculous effect is expected there, except perhaps when the combatants are very unequal in strength or skill.

XII. Question VI. *Why do sleepers divine more than those who are awake?* Response: A fitting reason for this can scarcely be assigned. Many contend that sleepers, being more withdrawn from the external senses and from things presented from without, are thereby more inwardly recollected. The soul, then, gathered within itself, and undistracted by external things, contemplates its own images more vividly. Hence it is that God sometimes reveals certain future things to those who are asleep — not because sleep of itself has any power for prophecy, but because the soul in sleep, being more tranquil

and free from external hindrances, is more receptive. There is also a further, natural cause, arising from the food by which men are nourished. Let us hear Marcus Tullius (Bk. I, *On Divination*): "*Plato accordingly wishes that men go to sleep with their bodies so disposed that nothing may bring error or disturbance to their minds. For this reason it is thought that the Pythagoreans were forbidden to eat beans, since this food produces great flatulence, quite contrary to the tranquility of mind that seeks the truth. When, then, the soul is withdrawn from the senses in sleep, and from contact with the body, it remembers the past, discerns the present, and foresees the future. For the body of one asleep lies as if dead, while the soul is vigorous and alive — a thing it will do far more fully after death, when it has departed wholly from the body.*" Cicero has much more to say on this subject.

XIII. Question VII. *Why do fools and simpletons divine more easily than those endowed with sound reason?* Response: It is a common proverb that fools, children, and simpletons divine — a view held by Plato and Aristotle. This divination, however, which is attributed to fools and the mad, is neither prophecy nor divination properly so called, but a certain prediction resting on natural causes. For fools and simpletons, being devoid of prudence and sharpness of mind, are led by a kind of instinct, like brute animals, which excel men at indicating future things that arise from natural and necessary causes. Certain fish portend storms to sailors; birds foretell rain to farmers; herds to shepherds; mice fleeing a house in a body foreshow its collapse. This arises from the fact that brute animals have a greater affinity with bodily causes, and perceive their impressions and influences more vividly; and so they sense future effects better and more surely. Similarly, fools and simpletons, being devoid of prudence, are closer to brute animals, and are more strongly affected by the impressions of natural causes; and so they tend to foresee natural future events better than prudent men. Contemplation withdraws much from the senses; and conversely, the application of the external senses weakens the power of contemplation, while the privation of one sense sharpens another. Thus the blind hear more acutely, and recall things more easily. In fools and simpletons, then, natural divination is sometimes more frequent than in the prudent, on account of their greater kinship with brute creatures. It should be added that fools and simpletons are talkative, and chatter continuously, blurting out whatever comes into their mouths; hence it is that, amid such a flood of words, they sometimes by chance foretell something true — just as street peddlers, who, narrating all the events to which men are commonly subject, and which occur most frequently, often reveal things that do in fact come to pass; a revelation which the unlearned take for prophecy, though it is entirely a matter of chance.

XIV. Question VIII. *Why do men close to death often divine the future?* Response: Plato, and other philosophers, observed that those closer to death foretell future things. Marcus Tullius relates this (Bk. I, *On Divination*). That the dying can divine, Posidonius confirms even by the example he cites, of a certain Rhodian, who, while dying, named six of his contemporaries, and said which of them would die first, which second, and so on in order. St. Gregory, as Azor relates (Bk. IX, ch. 24; *Dialogues*, Bk. IV, ch. 26 and 27), adduces many examples proving that the dying have foretold future events. He relates that a lawyer, near death, called his servant boy to prepare his clothes, since he wished to go out. The boy refused to obey, thinking his master delirious. But the man, rising from his bed, dressed himself, and declared that he would proceed by the Appian Way to the Church of St. Sixtus. But as his illness worsened, he met his death. It had been arranged that his body should be carried for burial along the Praenestine Way, to the Blessed Martyr Januarius; but because this route seemed too long to those who had charge of his funeral, they suddenly changed their plan and carried him instead to the very church the deceased had named — being wholly unaware of his prediction. He adds (ch. 27) that Count Theophanius foretold to his wife that there would be fair weather after his death, even

though, while he was still alive and near death, the weather was extremely stormy, so that his body could not be carried out for burial. If these things are true, it must be said that, when the dying foretell things that cannot be known by natural power, God reveals these things to them, illuminating their minds to foresee the future. St. Gregory proves this also by the examples of Jacob and his sons, and of Moses, who, drawing near to death, foretold many future things — the latter to the people of Israel. When, however, the dying foretell future things that depend on natural causes, this occurs because their minds, the senses being dulled, contemplate things more exactly, and their bodies are more strongly affected by the influences of natural causes; and so they perceive better than others the changes of season and weather.

XV. St. Augustine (Bk. XII, *On Genesis, Literally Interpreted*, ch. 17) proposes many examples... in which he notes that those raving with a burning fever divine future things. Their prophesying, however, is nothing but chance: for since the delirious are talkative, blurting out everything that comes to their mouths, they sometimes hit upon what is to come. They are guided by no prudence, restrained by no fear; they conceal nothing hidden, but blurt out everything. It is no wonder, then, if they sometimes predict some future event — just as those who often throw javelins sometimes hit the mark even with their eyes closed. Those seized by black bile divine more frequently, since their minds are more easily drawn away from the senses, and thus withdrawn, they contemplate things with a more intense effort. They also more readily perceive the influences and changes of the air and the celestial bodies. I pass over many other examples, since they are of scarcely any use. For even Marcus Tullius himself, though he defends many superstitious things, writes as follows (Bk. I, *On Divination*, near the end): "*If anyone's soul could perceive the entire connection of all causes, nothing at all, surely, would escape it — for he who grasped the causes of things to come would necessarily grasp all things that are to be. But no one can do this except God; it must therefore be left to man to foresee future things by certain signs that indicate their consequences.*" In this, however, Cicero errs — setting aside his other errors — in that he attributes too much weight to these signs.

Chapter IX — On vain observance

I. Vain observance is the third species of superstition, which attempts to produce some external effect by the consideration of vain things. St. Thomas treats this question fully in four articles (q. 96). From the first article it is gathered that this vain observance is a kind of superstition, since it employs instruments unsuited, and not instituted by God or by nature, to produce some external effect. He divides this observance into three species. The first is the *notory art*; the second, the *observance of health*; the last, the *observance of future events*. In these, as in the other species of superstition, a pact with a demon — tacit or explicit — may be involved.

II. Question I. *Is the notory art lawful?* Response: St. Thomas answers this question thus (loc. cit.): "*It must be said that the notory art is unlawful, because it makes use of certain signs to acquire knowledge — but not signs divinely instituted... Whence it remains that these are empty and vain signs, and consequently pertain to certain pacts of signification, agreed upon and struck with demons. And so the notory art is to be altogether repudiated, since it does not use these things*" as effective causes, but as vain signs "*...and so this art is also ineffective for acquiring knowledge. For since through such an art the acquisition [of knowledge] is not intended in a manner connatural to man — namely, by discovery or by learning — it follows that this effect is expected either from God or from demons. Now it is certain that some have had wisdom and knowledge from God through infusion, as is*

read of Solomon (3 Kings 3)... The Lord also said to his disciples (Luke 21): 'I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist.' But this gift is not given to whomever, or by means of a fixed observance, but according to the will of the Holy Spirit, as is said (1 Cor. 12): 'To one indeed, by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit'; and it is added afterward: 'But all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will.' It does not, however, pertain to demons to illuminate the intellect... Now the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom occurs by the illumination of the intellect; and therefore no one has ever acquired knowledge through demons. Whence Augustine says (Bk. X, City of God) that Porphyry admits that nothing of purification accrues to the intellectual soul from the theurgic arts — that is, the operations of demons — that would render it fit to see its God, and to discern truly the things that are true, such as the theorems of all the sciences. Demons could, nevertheless, in conversing with men, express certain teachings of the sciences; but this is not what is sought through the notory art." Though it has been rather lengthy to transcribe all this, it seemed worth doing, given its usefulness on many points. It should be observed that demons, being angels of darkness, cannot illuminate the intellect toward God, since this illumination is directed toward manifesting truth in relation to God; every truth, indeed, is from God. But it is the demon's aim, on the contrary, to separate men from God, not to lead them to him. Wherefore those who enter into a pact with a demon for the acquisition of knowledge, beyond the most grave crime of superstition, are also defrauded of their hope. As for what is related of the Anabaptists — namely, that after partaking of the sacrilegious morsel at their supper, they discourse on the Scriptures — if this is true, it must be said that a demon takes possession of their bodies, and speaks through their mouth and tongue, as in those possessed. And this is so true that, once they have abjured their heresy, they remain as stupid and ignorant as before. But if they retained this knowledge even after abjuring the heresy, its use would then be lawful — provided it were certain and established that its continuation did not depend on the demon. Vain observance, then, or the notory art, is unlawful, and all agree that this is a certain and grave crime of superstition.

III. Question II. *Is the observance of remedies for health lawful?* Response: It is called the observance of health when unsuited instruments — ceremonies, prayers, astronomical images — are employed to cure diseases, soothe pains, stop the flow of blood, and ward off other such afflictions. Since, in fact, the aforesaid means and similar things of this kind have no power at all to produce such effects, either by their own nature or by divine institution, it follows that every effect that such things are wont to produce is from a demon. There intervenes, then, a pact — either explicit or implicit — with a demon; and thus the crime of superstition is committed. Guilty of superstition, likewise, are those who carry with them written charms, wrappings, amulets, or prayers, with the firm conviction that they will not die without confession, or that they will not be wounded by a firearm or cannon-shot. The reason is the same: for these signs have, of themselves and by no institution of God, any power to produce such effects. As for relics, however, it must be observed, with St. Thomas (II-II, q. 96, art. 4, ad 3): "*If it is expected from faith in God, and the veneration of the Saints whose relics they are, this will not be unlawful. But if something else is attended to in this regard — as if the relic were, say, triangular in shape, or something of this sort, that had nothing to do with reverence for God and the Saints — it would be superstitious and unlawful.*" The Angelic Doctor further warns that, when sacred images or pages on which the Gospel is written are carried, care must be taken, first, that they contain nothing false, contrary to Sacred Scripture, the custom, and the tradition of the Church; and second, that nothing be written that pertains to the invocation of demons, and that no unknown names, characters, or figures be mixed in

— the sign of the Cross excepted. In a word: the carrying of relics and sacred images is lawful when hope is placed in God alone, and in the intercession of the Saints; and honor and reverence is shown to sacred things on this account alone, and for no other vain observance.

IV. It is superstitious to utter sacred words in order to move a ring off a suspended thread — since these words have no power at all to produce such a motion. If, therefore, motion occurs, it is from a demon. Superstition is likewise committed by those who wear phylacteries, or bound-up remedies, suspended from the neck, which are by their very nature unfit to drive away illnesses; likewise those who cast images of the Saints into a river, and keep them there until they obtain rain from God. If you wish to read more on this, consult Del Rio (Bk. III, *Disquisitiones Magicae*, part 2, q. 4).

V. The observance of future events is the prediction of good or bad fortune from signs altogether unsuited to foreknowing such things: as if someone observed days, seasons, chance encounters with people, and other similar things, by which he was moved to do, or to omit, something as though it were ill-omened. It is worth transcribing a few things here from St. Augustine, who, in Book II *On Christian Doctrine*, gives a full account of many examples of this superstition. I will pass over for now what pertains to the other species of superstition, and briefly present some of what pertains to vain observance. Augustine writes as follows (ch. 20 and following): "*To this class belong also all amulets and remedies, which the discipline of physicians also condemns — whether in incantations, or in certain marks which they call characters, or in certain things to be hung up and bound on, or even in a kind of dancing not for the tempering of the body, but for certain significations, either occult or even manifest, which they call, by a gentler name, 'physics' — as though these things were not superstitiously entangling, but seemed to be of benefit by nature; such as earrings at the top of each ear, or rings of ostrich bones on the fingers, or telling you, when you hiccup, to hold your left thumb with your right hand. To these are joined a thousand vain observances: if some limb twitches; if, while walking together, a stone, or a dog, or a boy comes between two friends. And that stepping on the stone, as though it were a divider of friendship, is less troublesome than that they strike the innocent boy with a blow, if he happens to run between them while walking together. But it is a fine thing that boys are sometimes avenged by dogs — for many are so superstitious that they even dare to strike the dog that came between them, not without being bitten in turn. For a vain remedy will sometimes quickly send the striker to a real doctor. Hence come also these: stepping on the threshold when one passes in front of one's own house; returning to bed if one sneezes while putting on one's shoes; returning home if one, having set out, stumbles; fearing a future ill omen more than one grieves over a present loss, if one's garment is gnawed by mice. Whence that remark of Cato is elegantly said: when consulted by someone who told him that his boots had been gnawed by mice, he replied that this was no portent — but it would indeed have been a portent if the mice had been gnawed by the boots.*" Very much else that Augustine pursues in this place I pass over, since from the reasons already given it can be understood by anyone what is to be condemned as superstitious, and to be purged from this vice.

Chapter X — On natural magic and its effects

I. Magic, taken in a general sense, is a certain wondrous art of operating, divided into two species: natural, and superstitious. Natural magic is that which, by the use and application of natural causes, produces hidden and marvelous effects; superstitious magic is that which, with the help of a demon, produces unusual effects.

II. Question I. *Is natural magic lawful and genuine?* Response: The affirmative opinion is common, and can be established both by reason and by examples drawn from Sacred Scripture and from profane

history. Natural magic is, in fact, a philosophy which, penetrating the power and efficacy of natural causes, produces by their use effects that seem unusual and marvelous to the unlearned and inexperienced, who are ignorant of the hidden powers of causes. Hence philosophers and wise men were formerly called Magi. It is related, in Genesis 30, that Jacob made use of this art, fixing peeled rods in the watering-troughs, so that the sheep, gazing upon them while in the heat of mating, would bear spotted young. For the most weighty authors teach that an animal seized by the ardor of lust attracts and imprints images upon its offspring by the power of vivid imagination in mating; and it is more truly to this impression, conceived during vehement coition, that those spotted markings sometimes observed in certain men and women too may be attributed. That Jacob learned this natural magic while he attended the schools of Melchizedek is taught by Tostatus, commenting on Genesis 30. Tobias likewise made use of this art, restoring his father's sight with a fish's gall. Whoever wishes to know more on this subject may consult, among others, Albertus Magnus (Bk. VIII and Bk. XXIV), if indeed that work is genuinely his.

III. Question II. *By what means may natural magic be distinguished and separated from the superstitious kind — namely, that one may know whether an effect proceeds from a natural or from a superstitious cause?* Response: All admit that it is exceedingly difficult to discern this, or to distinguish superstitious effects from natural ones. For to distinguish their effects would require a comprehension of the power of natural causes. Three signs, however, are commonly assigned. The first is knowledge of the cause — namely, whether the cause is, by its own nature, judged wholly unsuited to producing such an effect. Now a cause is judged especially unsuited to producing an effect when the one bringing it about, in applying the cause, employs ligatures, characters, apocryphal words, unknown names, and other such things — as if so many knots, and no more, so many crosses, so many words, and other such things, must be employed a set number of times, and no more. For it is then certain that such characters, ligatures, so many knots, and the rest, when so, and only so, many times repeated, have no power at all to produce such effects. The second sign is drawn from the manner of operation: namely, if this occurs in a matter far removed, or if the effect is caused within an extremely brief interval of time — as if an animal, or a man, suddenly cured of a grave illness, or a long journey of several leagues completed within a quarter of an hour. The third is gathered from the very nature of the effect, when it is known for certain that such an effect exceeds human power and skill.

IV. Question III. *When it is doubtful whether an effect proceeds from a natural or from a superstitious cause, what is to be presumed?* Response: The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 11, punct. 9, n. 111) contend that it must be presumed to proceed from a natural cause, on the grounds that doubtful matters are to be interpreted in the better part; and they cite in support the authority of St. Thomas (II-II, q. 60, art. 4), where he raises the question whether doubtful matters ought to be interpreted favorably, and they transcribe these words from him: "*Where the signs concerning a man's character are not manifestly evil, we ought to regard him as good, interpreting in the better sense whatever is doubtful.*" This teaching is true, but its application to the present little question is not correct, and runs contrary to the express intention of the Angelic Doctor himself. For one rule is to be observed in interpreting a man's evil or good will, and another in the interpretation of doubts that arise regarding things themselves. No one ought to be presumed evil unless it is proven. Therefore, when it is doubted whether a man's will is good or evil, judgment ought always to be given in the better part. But when it is doubted whether certain predictions are true or false, whether the nature of certain things is honorable or base — then we ought to embrace what is true, and safer. Let us hear the Angelic Doctor himself: "*It is one thing to*

judge of things, and another to judge of men. For in judging of things, what is attended to is not what is good or bad on the part of the thing itself of which we speak — since it makes no difference to the thing itself how we judge of it — but rather what is attended to there is only the good of the one judging, if he judges truly, or his evil, if he judges falsely; for the good of the intellect is the true, and the false is its evil, as is said in Book VI of the Ethics. And therefore everyone ought to strive to judge of things according to what they are. But in the judgment by which we judge of men, what is chiefly attended to is the good or evil on the part of the one who is judged — who is held honorable by this very fact, that he is judged good, and contemptible if he is judged evil. And therefore in such a judgment we ought rather to tend toward this: that we judge a man to be good, unless manifest reason appears to the contrary" (II-II, q. 60, art. 4, ad 1). In the question proposed, then, a distinction is called for. If it is doubtful whether a man acts with a superstitious and wicked will, or with an upright intention, the doubt is to be interpreted in the better part. But if it is doubted whether an effect produced is superstitious or natural, then the truth must be sought, and what is more correct, according to the more probable and true doctrine, must be embraced. And in a similar case, one must be advised that, so long as the doubt persists, a man should abstain from such actions. For in doubtful matters we ought to choose the safer course.

V. We too affirm that the powers of nature are hidden, and that it is not rare for men, through ignorance of natural efficacy, to attribute to the magic art certain effects that in truth proceed from a natural cause, in the case of many unusual effects produced. But in that case, the ignorance of men must be corrected, and the powers of nature, and the views of the learned, consulted; and, all things weighed, it must be determined what is to be credited to art, and what to nature. If, however, doubt remains, it will be safer to choose the position free of controversy. To resolve doubts, the reading of learned authors — St. Thomas above all, who discusses this subject learnedly and wisely, as is his custom — is of great help. St. Augustine too recounts marvelous portents of nature. It is worth quoting some of his words at length; for he writes thus (Bk. XIV, City of God, ch. 24): "*We know of the natures of certain men, greatly unlike others, and remarkable for their very rarity, some doing things with their own bodies which others are utterly unable to do, and can scarcely believe when they hear of them. For there are those who can move their ears, either one at a time, or both together. There are those who, without moving the head, can pull down the whole scalp, as far as the hair covers it, to the forehead, and bring it back again at will. There are those who, of the many and various things they have swallowed, can, by lightly working their chest, bring up whatever they please, whole and unmixed, as if from a bag. Some so imitate the voices of birds, cattle, and other men, that unless they are seen, they cannot be distinguished at all. Some, without any shame, produce so many varied sounds from their lower parts at will, that they seem to sing even from that region. I myself have known a man who was accustomed to sweat whenever he wished. It is known that certain men can weep, and shed tears abundantly, whenever they wish. But that which very many of our brethren experienced quite recently is far more credible. There was a certain priest named Restitutus, in the parish of the Church of Calama, who, whenever it pleased him — and he was asked to do this by those who wished to witness so marvelous a thing — upon hearing imitated wailing sounds of some lamenting person, would so withdraw himself from his senses, and lie as if dead, that he not only felt nothing when pinched or pricked, but sometimes even when burned with applied fire, without any sense of pain except afterward from the wound; and it was proven that he did not fail to move his body out of resistance, but from not feeling it at all — since, as in one dead, no breathing at all could be detected in him; yet he later reported that he had heard, as if from a great distance, the voices of men, if they spoke loudly enough.*" Augustine recounts very much else here and elsewhere, which he judges to be attributed to hidden natural powers, not to superstitious art. We do not, then, say that the wonders of nature are to be reckoned superstitious

without mature and serious examination beforehand; we affirm only that the safer course is to be chosen, if, after serious study and prudent examination, doubt still remains.

VI. Question IV. *What is to be said of those called "healers"?* Response: Theologians call "healers" those who display a power of curing many diseases — rabies, or hydrophobia, and mortal wounds — by the sign of the cross impressed, or by breathing upon them, or by the utterance of certain words, or other signs. They dispute this matter at length: whether such a power is natural, and whether such healers, who cure diseases, are really found to exist. That they are indeed found, hardly anyone calls into doubt. Pliny (Bk. XXVIII, ch. 2), as Azor relates, discusses this question, and concludes that it is uncertain whether incantations and charms have any power to heal; and in ch. 1 he writes that gum-diseases and cataracts of the eyes are cured by human gall. He adds (ch. 3) that in Africa there were Psylli, whose families, from which they derived their origin, cured, by mere touch or saliva, those wounded by snakes; and that a certain man, thrown by way of experiment into a barrel full of snakes, emerged entirely unharmed by their darting tongues. He also relates that there were found in Italy the Marsi, whose sweat was effective in driving away many diseases. Azor, then, along with others, maintains that such healers are indeed found, and that their power is natural.

VII. Others hold the contrary view — that all these things are accomplished by demonic power; since natural power is not capable of curing diseases in an instant, and of producing such marvels; nor does the same power operate identically upon the disposition of all the sick alike. Nor, moreover, is such a power from God, as is gathered from many signs: for these healers are for the most part exceedingly wicked men, who gape after other people's purses — though they often feign, with practiced cunning, to offer their remedies for free, so that, under this mask of generosity, they may the more easily and abundantly empty people's purses.

VIII. A third opinion holds that such a power is indeed a grace freely given by God, not a natural power. The first part of this they establish from the fact that Inquisitors and Bishops permit such healers to practice their art freely. That they do not confer health by any natural power, they gather from the fact that this would otherwise arise either from the quality of their temperament, or from the fact that such men were conceived under this or that aspect of the stars and planets — but this cannot stand, since all men born under such a constellation would be endowed with a similar power; nor is it the case that only one or another family in the whole world is propagated under this aspect of the stars, in the way that all herbs, all magnets of the same species, possess the same, more or less, power. There is, then, no reason to say that these healers cure the aforesaid diseases by a natural power. That this power is freely conferred by God upon certain persons, they prove by the authority of Scripture, which says: "*To another is given the grace of healing in one spirit... the working of miracles*" (1 Cor. 12). No reason at all can be assigned, moreover, that would suggest God does not confer upon certain families a power, universal or at least particular, of curing certain diseases.

IX. That God can confer this power on whomever he wishes — universal, or at least particular, for the curing of certain diseases only — no one doubts. But that he actually confers it, and has conferred it, upon certain families over the span of several centuries — this is what raises the difficulty. For no reason, no origin of such a divine privilege, and no authentic document, is adduced by those who defend this perennial power. One of these families is reported to be found in Umbria, whose members are said to cure, by mere blessing, those suffering from a contraction of the sinews and other similar diseases. All this seems suspect to me. For from no properly established history is it

read that such privileges were granted to entire families. What, moreover, of the fact that we do not know of any similar privilege granted, over the span of many centuries, to entire families of the Prophets, or of the Apostles, or of other Saints — as these more recent theologians claim was granted to the families of those healers? For this reason the opinion of the theologians of Salamanca does not convince us, in which (tract. 21, ch. 11, punct. 9, §2) they defend that such healers are indeed found who cure diseases, not by natural power, but by a grace freely given by God. Their chief and principal reason is that Bishops and Inquisitors permit these men to practice their art freely, and that several theologians approve them. How much weight this reasoning deserves, let others judge.

What seems more probable to us is that no families possess this power of curing the aforesaid diseases at all — with the exception, perhaps, of the privilege granted by God to the Kings of France to cure scrofula, commonly called "the king's evil," as approved historians relate, and which is therefore believed admissible. St. Thomas (Bk. II, *On the Governance of Princes*, ch. 16) writes that the Kings of the Franks worked such wonders by the power of the sacred anointing with which they were anointed. "*Of whose sanctity,*" he says, "*we also take an argument from the deeds of the Franks, and from the Blessed Remigius, over Clovis, the first Christian king of the Franks and his descendants — and by the descent of oil from above, by a dove, the aforesaid king was anointed, and his successors are anointed, with signs and wonders, and various cures, appearing in them from the aforesaid anointing*."

X. The aforesaid theologians of Salamanca adduce several further signs by which the superstition of such healers ought to be more carefully examined by superiors: if they touch burning coals, or handle iron plates, without harm; if they extinguish, or merely warm, a furnace; if they show a mark or brand impressed upon them; if they claim to recognize such healers as themselves, though they have never seen them before; if they assert that they cannot heal diseases in the presence of another healer; if they claim to have learned this art from breath alone; if they predict future events; if they claim, or add, that they possess this same power because they are seventh sons, born of males, with no female birth intervening; finally, if they assert that they can heal diseases only by using certain fixed words, and not others. These and other signs are commonly used to discern the superstition of such healers. Let the faithful, then, seek health from God, and implore the intercession of holy men, setting aside such charlatans — who, in my own opinion, if they produce anything unusual, do so either with the help of a demon, or by chance and by a natural power that sometimes so operates.

XI. Question V. *Is a charm ("ensalmus") to be reputed lawful?* Response: An "ensalmus" is a prayer composed of sacred words to drive away diseases; and since it is for the most part composed of the words of the Psalms, this prayer is called an "ensalmus." Theologians distinguish a twofold kind of "ensalmus." One is invocative, when prayers are poured out to God to implore his divine mercy, that God may deign to remove from us, or from our neighbor, diseases or other temporal harms — yet in such a way that we do not place infallible trust in these prayers over others, but place our whole confidence in the divine goodness. The other is a prayer composed of certain, fixed words for curing diseases, and this "ensalmus" is called constitutive. The "ensalmus" of the first kind is lawful and honorable, whether composed on public or private authority: there is nothing in it that could rightly be reprobated. For it is not only lawful, but holy, to ask of God health from illnesses and pains, and other temporal goods, insofar as they lead to eternal ones. That prayers should be composed under a certain fixed formula of words presents no evil at all — provided that no efficacy for obtaining the effect is attributed to that particular arrangement and formula. The "ensalmus" of the other kind is

unlawful, and superstitious; since God has conferred no infallible power of producing any effect upon any words (the sacramental ones excepted), nor does such a power reside naturally in these words. It remains, therefore, that those who utter such sacred words have an explicit or tacit pact with a demon. For those who practice charms are guilty of superstition precisely in this: that they firmly believe such words contain some certain healing power, or that such a power has been communicated to them by God. God indeed promised to the ministers of the Church that they would cast out demons, speak with new tongues, take up serpents, and lay hands upon the sick, and they would recover — but not in the sense that a certain healing power is attached to the utterance of some fixed formula of words by cunning and most wicked charm-practitioners; but rather, insofar as God himself, according to the counsel of his own will, will sometimes grant their petitions, and sometimes not. All this is common doctrine among theologians. Read St. Thomas, II-II, q. 96, art. 1 and 4.

XII. Question VI. *Is there a natural power by which someone can be bewitched by a look?* Response: "Fascination" is, as it were, a certain wicked quality inherent in the eyes, arising from some malignant disposition of the soul of the one who looks. Theologians divide it into the popular kind, which arises from popular opinion — namely, when the common people believe that men can, by a look conceived with an envious mind, bewitch frail infants; and into the physical or natural kind, which arises from a vehement imagination, followed by corrupted humors, and an alteration of the body — so that the eyes, being thus tainted, emit noxious emanations, infecting the persons looked upon, especially those of tender age and weak constitution: and this occurs by an explicit or tacit pact with a demon alone, whose mere gaze inflicts harm.

XIII. On the question proposed, theologians dispute on both sides. Those who affirm that this can naturally occur produce several examples — both of the basilisk, which kills men by its gaze alone, and of several men who, as Pliny testifies, were endowed with the same power — namely, of bewitching by sight alone; and of menstruating women, who, gazing into a mirror, stain it with bloody spots. Those who deny that such effects can be produced by natural power prove this from the fact that sight, being an immanent act, is incapable of producing an external effect.

XIV. The more common and more probable opinion is that this natural power does indeed exist — not because the sight itself of the one who looks infects others, but because from the eyes, and from other parts of the body, poisonous emanations can issue, which, permeating the nearby air, can inflict harm upon bodies close by. Let us hear what the Angelic Doctor writes on this matter (I Part, q. 117, art. 3, ad 3): "*It must be said that Avicenna assigns the cause of fascination to this: that bodily matter is naturally apt to obey a spiritual substance...*" to obey a spiritual substance more than contrary agents in nature. And so, when the soul is powerfully affected in its imagination, bodily matter is altered accordingly. And this is the cause he assigns for the bewitching eye. But it has been shown above that bodily matter does not obey a spiritual substance so as to be transformed into it, except by the Creator alone. And therefore it is better to say that, by a strong imagination, the spirits of the body united to the soul are altered — and this alteration of the spirits occurs chiefly in the eyes, to which the subtler spirits arrive. Now the eyes infect the surrounding air up to a certain distance — in the same way that mirrors, if new and clean, contract a certain impurity from the gaze of a menstruating woman, as Aristotle says in his book *On Sleep*. Thus, when some soul has been vehemently moved to malice — as happens most in old women — the gaze of the eye becomes harmful in the manner already

described, especially to children, who have a tender body, readily receptive of such impression. It is also possible that, by God's permission, or even by some hidden pact, the malice of demons — with whom a sorcerous old woman has some compact — cooperates to this effect.

XV. It follows from this that the popular kind of fascination is superstitious. Sight alone cannot produce an external effect. Indeed, though natural fascination can occur, as has been said following St. Thomas, we hold that it is very rare. In animals, venom is found, and so the spirits, or emanations, that issue from them can easily be tainted and infect nearby bodies. In men, and even in women, no venom exists, nor is it easy for the bodily humors to be so corrupted and depraved, through emotional agitation and a wicked disposition, that they issue forth through the eyes, mouth, and nostrils, and infect those looked upon. We do not deny the possibility; but that this actually happens, at least frequently, we consider false. We therefore commonly judge that such instances of fascination as do occur happen through the art of a demon. Guilty of superstition, too, are those women who hang little sacks around children's necks, or other signs, against fascination. It is likewise superstitious to bring bewitched children to old women, so that they may be freed by their blessing. This wicked custom traces its origin to pagan superstition, against which the Patriarch Chrysostom declaims (Homily 8 on the Epistle to the Colossians): "*The Cross of Christ is dishonored, superstitious characters of the elements are preferred; Christ is cast out, and a drunken old woman brought in; our mystery is trampled upon, and the devil's seduction dances in triumph.*"

Chapter XI — On superstitious magic, or on sorcery

I. Sacred Scripture (Matt. 7, Mark 9, and elsewhere passim) and all Doctors alike bear witness to the existence of sorcery. Sorcery is magic that, by the art of a demon, inflicts harm. Sorcery is twofold: harmful, and amatory. The former is employed to injure men, animals, and plants; the latter sorcerers use to arouse carnal love, or hatred, toward those we ought instead to love. Harmful sorcery is sometimes worked by a powder cast into food or drink, or sprinkled upon clothing. According to the varying color of this powder, different afflictions are induced: if the powders are reddish or ash-colored, illness is contracted; if black, death follows. This variety of diseases and of death, however, arises not from the diversity of the colors, but from the malice of the demon — the various colors being merely signs, at whose placement demons produce the effects. Sorcerers sometimes use poisons, by which they can naturally inflict harm. Countless are the ways by which sorcerers can harm men, which you may see in Sprenger's *Malleus Maleficarum* (Part 1, q. 2), Del Rio (Bk. III), and many others — though I would not have you place full trust in everything they relate. Amatory sorcery, which is also called by the Greek term "philter," is customarily carried out in two ways. The first is when things to be eaten or drunk are given, which by their own nature tend to stimulate desire. No food or drink, however, can, of itself, determinately arouse love and inflame the will; it can only heat the body, stir the humors, alter the senses, and present to the senses those qualities apt to stir love — while it is the demons themselves who arouse love and inflame the will. In the second manner, such amatory sorceries are worked upon the most sacred sacraments and rites of our religion — as upon consecrated hosts, incense, oil, and holy water. Nor are such love-charms always given to be eaten or drunk by the intended victim; sometimes they are bound externally to garments, or hidden beneath the bed on which the person lies, or beneath the threshold of the door, or in some other place through which the person to be bewitched must pass. Various devices which women have

used to arouse desire are described by the Prophet Baruch (ch. 6): Babylonian women, seated in the streets, burning olive-stones as incense, are approached by a passer-by; and if one of them, drawn aside by someone passing, sleeps with him, she reproaches her neighbor for not having been thought equally worthy, nor having had her cord broken like her own. All such things done to them, however, are false and worthless. These and similar illusions can in no way move the will; they are merely signs, at whose placing demons inflame men's desires.

II. To drive away such sorceries, our Holy Mother the Church proposes the meditation on the four last things, continual prayers to God and the Blessed Virgin, frequent reception of the sacraments, fasting, hairshirts, disciplines, almsgiving, humility of spirit, and bodily mortification, and other such pious works; likewise the avoidance of dangerous occasions, especially of young women and girls, who are truly incitements to unchaste love, and enchantments. The remedies which philosophers commonly propose against such unchaste love kindled by sorcery are vain, and full of superstition: the herb "promethea," wolf's-bane, a toad bound in the skin of a sheep, goat's urine, and other things Pliny mentions (Bk. XXVIII, ch. 38 and following) are superstitious — as are many others they heap up, such as a lover's hair enclosed in one's shoe: a foul remedy, which only the mad and the foolish would employ. Theologians commonly add, however, that beyond the sacred remedies which the Church prescribes in her rituals against any sorceries (of which, besides those already mentioned, faith in Christ, the sign of the Cross, and the invocation of the Blessed Virgin and the Saints are chief), it is also lawful and useful to make use of natural remedies — not because demons, the authors of sorcery, could be countered by them, but because natural remedies can soothe and check harmful humors, and drive them out, as is gathered from Sacred Scripture. For David, with his sweet music, brought joy to Saul, from whom the evil spirit thereupon departed; and Tobias drove away Asmodeus with the smoke of a fish's liver. Many herbs, too — sage, rue, vervain, and others — are taught by Pliny, Galen, Aristotle, and physicians generally, to be beneficial against sorceries, insofar as they expel, correct, or purge harmful humors.

III. Question I. *Is it lawful to cure a sorcery by means of another sorcerer?* Response: There have not been wanting those who taught that it is lawful to seek the dissolution of a sorcery from sorcerers prepared to provide it — just as, in a case of necessity, it is lawful to seek money at interest from a usurer, or the sacraments from a priest in a state of mortal sin. But the common and sound opinion denies that it is lawful to seek the dissolution of sorcery from sorcerers, however willing they may be to provide it. The reason is clear: for just as sorcery is worked by the aid of a demon, so too it is undone by an explicit or tacit invocation of a demon. But the invocation of a demon is by its very nature evil. Therefore it is always unlawful and superstitious. For evils that are evil by their very kind, and which can in no way be cleansed of their malice, are never to be done, that good may come of it, as the Apostle says (Rom. 3). Hence God commands (Lev. 19): "*Turn ye not to magicians, neither ask anything of soothsayers, to be defiled by them.*" And against those who commit such a crime, he establishes a punishment (ibid., ch. 20, v. 6): "*The soul that shall go aside to magicians and soothsayers, and shall commit fornication with them, I will set my face against that soul, and destroy it out of the midst of its people.*" By the term "fornication," Scripture means commerce and communion with sorcerers.

IV. All this is clear, and needs no further lengthy explanation. The arguments raised against it are of no weight at all. For it is lawful to seek the sacraments from a sacrilegious priest, and money from a usurer; because it is lawful, honorable, and holy by its very nature to administer the sacraments, and

to lend money — and it is only through man's own wickedness that either can be rendered shameful. What is required is only what is honorable, what is holy, what can be done without fault; the crime and wickedness lie entirely outside the intention of the one who requests it, and proceed solely from the malice of the other party's wicked will. As for the further claim — that it is lawful to ask a demon to desist from a sorcery, as exorcists do; and that what is sought from the demon is not the wicked deed itself, but the destruction of the sorcery, which is by its own nature good — these and similar claims are sophistries. For any communication whatsoever with a demon is unlawful. One communicates with a demon, and even acknowledges him as a superior, the moment one asks him to desist from a sorcery. Exorcists command by divine power, and subject the demon to that dignity and authority — which is lawful. But when you ask him to desist from the sorcery, you implore his aid, and subject yourself to him — which is wicked. The destruction of sorcery obtained by lawful means is good; obtained by unlawful and superstitious means, it is not. The destruction of a sorcery achieved through exorcism, then, is good; achieved through another sorcery, it is wicked. Nor may you say that you are not subjecting yourself to the demon, but merely compelling him to remove the sorcery. For either you do this on the authority of the Church, or on private authority. If on the authority of the Church, you compel him in the name of Christ and of God, and this is lawful — provided you are duly invested with such authority. If you do this on your own authority, this very fact is proof that some tacit pact exists there. If, however, in the faith and hope of Christ you rebuked the demon, that he might desist from inflicting harm, you would not be guilty of superstition. It is likewise unlawful to induce sorcerers to remove sorceries by means of a blessing, as though by a sign — for sorcerers abuse this blessing, having previously arranged with the demon that he will cease from the sorcery, or remove it, upon the sign being given. Only the remedies prescribed by the Church, then, are to be used to drive away sorceries. It is, finally, unlawful to remove sorceries by other vain rites, if these are used to induce the effect; since vain rites, being unsuited to the purpose, imply the intervention of a demon's aid.

V. Question II. *Is it lawful to seek from a sorcerer that he remove a sorcery, when it is established that he can remove it by lawful means?* Response: It is established among theologians that it is lawful to compel sorcerers to remove sorceries by lawful means, insofar as they are approached, not as sorcerers, but as men skilled in a good art suited to producing a good effect. Just as, on the contrary, all assert that it is unlawful to seek the dissolution of a sorcery if one is uncertain, or doubts, whether the sorcerer knows a lawful means of removing it — since then a lawful means is not employed, but it becomes a matter of indifference whether the sorcery is removed by lawful or unlawful means. And for this reason it is likewise unlawful to seek the dissolution of a sorcery, not from the one who worked it, but from another sorcerer, who is ignorant of the signs of that sorcery, since such a sorcerer cannot recognize the sorcery except by first working another sorcery of his own — and so you would be asking that a new sorcery remove the old one. Nor, finally, is it lawful to permit a sorcerer to apply a vain and superstitious remedy to the bewitched person.

VI. Cajetan responds to the question proposed (*Opuscula*, tract. 12, *On Sorcery*, q. 1) that it is unlawful to seek from a sorcerer the dissolution of a sorcery, because such a dissolution is then sought from the sorcerer as sorcerer, just as one seeks a work of art from an artisan. Now a sorcerer, as such, is a minister of the devil, whose invocation is always unlawful.

VII. The contrary opinion is common, and seems to me more true. For it is false, what Cajetan puts forward as the reason for his opinion — namely, that in the question proposed, it is asked whether a sorcerer, as sorcerer, may be sought for the dissolution of a sorcery — this is rather taken for granted as the point at issue. For we are asking whether it is lawful to seek the dissolution of a sorcery from a sorcerer, in the case where he knows, and has ready at hand, a lawful means to this effect. If, indeed, the sorcerer lacks a lawful means, all agree that such a request is unlawful. When, then, it is established for us that a sorcerer really does possess lawful means by which he can remove the fascination, what prevents us from asking him to free the bewitched person by lawful means? For it is clear that in that case we do not make use of the sorcerer as sorcerer, but as a man who has, and knows, lawful means to an excellent effect — namely, the health of the bewitched. Indeed, on this same principle, we say that it is lawful to seek money from a usurer, and the sacraments from a sacrilegious priest — because he can lawfully administer the sacraments; although we know from other sources that neither the usurer will lend money without interest, nor the priest administer the sacraments without sin. Why is this, unless because the whole malice is thrown back onto the wicked will of the moneylender, or of the priest? The very same, then, is to be asserted of the sorcerer in our case: the sin of the new sorcery would fall entirely upon his own malice alone, since we could lawfully seek the necessary actions to remove the earlier sorcery. Nor are we bound to avoid our neighbor's sin, which arises solely from his own obstinate malice, and not from any pressing necessity of our own health. Christ himself taught us that the scandal of the Pharisees is to be disregarded. The only difficulty in this matter is that we should know for certain that the sorcerer possesses a lawful remedy by which he can dissolve the sorcery — just as we know for certain that a usurer can lawfully lend money, and an unbeliever can lawfully take an oath. Nor should faith be placed in a sorcerer who merely claims to have such remedies, since no trust is to be placed in such people. It must, therefore, be established for us by certain evidence that the sorcerer knows lawful remedies by which he can remove the sorcery. And because this is rarely established for us, I would never permit anyone to seek the dissolution of a sorcery from a sorcerer. But if the sorcerer testified that he had such remedies, I would permit him to reveal them to me, or to another, so that some upright man, without his help, might use these remedies and apply them. Otherwise I would place no trust at all in the sorcerer, if he refused to reveal these harmless remedies to another upright man, who, applying them, might remove the sorcery.

VIII. Question III. *Is it lawful to destroy the instruments of sorcery?* Response: The common opinion, and the true one, affirms this. This is clearly gathered from Scripture (Deut. 12), where it is commanded that the idols, statues, temples, and altars of the pagans be destroyed, and their sacred groves burned. Now these are the very signs and monuments of superstition, and, as it were, of diabolical magic. By the same reasoning, then, it will be lawful to destroy the signs and instruments of sorceries. Nor can it be said that this removal of such signs entails a pact with the demon, or an invocation of him, or any communication with him — since such a destruction of these signs breaks whatever pact one might have had with the demon. For the very purpose of destroying these signs — namely, the bindings, papers, hair, and other such things — is to break whatever pact was made with the demon. This destruction of signs, then, is not the effect of the sorcerous art, or of the sorcerer as sorcerer, but of a man restoring health to the bewitched. All, therefore, who recognize such signs, can and ought to remove and destroy them. Sorcerers are bound to do this out of justice, let alone charity; all others, out of charity, by which all are bound to remove harm from their neighbor. Nor

can any harm that might befall the sorcerer as a result rightly hinder this destruction — since such harm falls outside the intention of the one dissolving the sorcery; and the sorcerer must attribute to himself whatever loss he suffers, if it arises from his pact with the demon. All this is common doctrine, and many theologians are cited in favor of this opinion, including the Fathers of Salamanca (tract. 11, ch. 11, punct. 10, §3, n. 158).

IX. The contrary opinion is attributed to Jean of Louvain, who contends that this destruction is unlawful, on the grounds that he supposes a twofold pact to be entered into in sorcery: one, of inflicting harm once a sign is placed; the other, of desisting from harm once that same sign is removed. This, however, is not absolutely true. But even granting this twofold pact, it does not follow that the destruction of the sorcery becomes an unlawful violation of the pact with the demon; rather, it more likely constitutes a desisting from it. For if a person who is not himself a sorcerer destroys these signs, there can be no suspicion at all that he does so by imploring the demon's aid; rather, by driving him away, and removing his instruments, he prevents him from inflicting harm. If, however, the sorcerer himself destroys these signs, he can do this without seeking the demon's aid; rather, in breaking the pact he had entered into, and repenting of it, he shows that he wishes to have no further communication with the demon in the future. Nor does the one who destroys these signs ask the demon for health, or for any benefit; rather, by destroying the sign, he compels him to desist from causing harm. If you wish to know more, see Del Rio, Bk. VI, ch. 2.

X. Question IV. *Must a sorcerer who has handed a demon a document signed with his own blood redeem it, in order to be able to make a true confession?* Response: Owing to the impiety of sorcerers, many descend so far that they renounce Christ, the sacraments, and the other mysteries of the Christian religion; and, to bind themselves the more firmly as slaves of the demon, they enter into a mutual pact, and confirm the writing with their own blood, which they afterward hand over to the demon for safekeeping, as a pledge of their promised fidelity. A common error prevails, that a sorcerer cannot make sincere confession unless he arranges for the demon to restore this writing to him. This is a false and mistaken persuasion; for there is no sin of which one cannot repent, with the aid of grace. In order for the sorcerer to truly repent, it is enough that he detest the crime committed with his whole heart, that he renounce the demon, submit himself to God, and keep his commandments. If the sorcerer had some sign given him by the demon in his possession, he ought immediately to burn it, in token of the broken pact and future enmity. But sorcerers could lawfully make use of knowledge, money, and other things acquired by the demon's art, whose possession and use would in no way depend on the demon — because, although their acquisition was tainted, once the fault has been removed by penance, their use can become lawful, as theologians commonly teach. They note, however, that it very often happens that riches conferred by a demon's aid turn out to be false, and illusory. I would add that if the money conferred by a demon were procured by theft, it would then have to be unlawfully retained, and it would be a matter of injustice [to keep it]. Likewise health, and any knowledge acquired by a demon's art, may certainly be retained — since these cannot be discarded. For no one made healthy through some sorcery is bound to make himself sick again voluntarily, and cast himself back into his former illness; nor can anyone erase from his mind the knowledge he has acquired. This knowledge, however, ought to be used only for an honorable end, not to be inquired into out of vain or morbid curiosity. As for money, whether it be real, or falsified by the demon's art, procured for an honorable purpose, I hold entirely that it may be used for such a purpose. If you ask for the reason, perhaps I do not know how to present it with full evidence. Nor

am I unaware that many things unlawfully acquired can nonetheless be retained, as is commonly said of wages received for prostitution. But the innermost sense, so to speak, of the Christian profession seems to demand a contempt and casting away of such riches. For if the Lord teaches us to despise all riches; if St. Peter rebuked Simon's money, saying, "Thy money be with thee to perdition" (Acts 8:20) — in my own opinion, a repentant sorcerer ought to cast away all such money. But, you say, is it not a waste to throw away money that could serve some good use? This proves only that such money may be handed over to some upright man for a pious use — which I would not dare to disapprove — but by no means that it ought to be retained by the sorcerer himself, so that he might be enriched by it.

Chapter XII — On witches, sorcerers, and "striges"

I. It is customary for wicked women who practice magic, or superstitious sorcery, to be called by these names. They are called "lamiae" on account of a certain analogy with the lamia, a monstrous animal, bearing a woman's face, and showing breasts and milk, and beautiful in its whole body, by which it lures men to devour them, and slaughters children, in whose blood it delights. And since wicked, sorcerous women are cruel, and suck the blood of children, they are compared to lamiae by Jeremiah himself (Lamentations 4): "*Even the sea monsters have drawn out the breast, they have given suck to their young: the daughter of my people is cruel, like the ostrich in the desert.*" They are called "sagae" [witches] from their cunning and craftiness — or, as Marcus Tullius says, from "sagire" [to perceive keenly], insofar as, panting after the foreknowledge of future and hidden things, they demand the demon's art to attain it. They are called "striges" from the "strix," a small bird which flies about at night with a shrieking cry, and attacks children's bodies, sucking out their blood. And this is exactly what those women called "striges" do, who set out chiefly by night, and lie in wait for infants' bodies. They are also called "poisoners" [veneficae], since they employ sorceries, and are harmful to the whole human race. For these most filthy concubines and mistresses of demons, whom they devote body and soul to the devil, abjure the sacraments and mysteries of religion; they defile, tear apart, and trample sacred images, the crucifix, crosses; they tear to shreds, with every insult, the most holy names of God and of the Blessed Virgin; they sacrifice the sacred host to the devil, steeped in urine within the vilest vessels. They carry off to their homes the corpses of murdered infants, pierced through with long needles; they boil them in pots, cooking them down until the joints dissolve, and let them simmer until they have congealed into a certain thick liquid — from which liquid they extract a twofold juice: one, thinner, which they drink, and by which they bind themselves to the devil in a solemn rite; the other, thicker, kept in a certain vessel, with which they anoint their own bodies at night, when they must go, at set times, to attend gatherings with the demon, so as to practice a general debauchery of every vice and lust.

II. Question I. *Why are women more given to sorcery than men?* Response: Theologians give several reasons. First, women are more prone to belief; hence they are more easily deceived by a demon than men. Second, they labor under the vice of curiosity, and burn more ardently with the desire to know future and hidden things; hence they most readily believe those who reveal their secrets, and predict future things, and implore the demon's aid, that they may know them. They are also of a more pliable nature and disposition, and readily receive impressions and revelations. Women, again, are seized by an ungovernable anger, as Scripture testifies, that there is no wrath above the wrath of a woman; and since they lack the strength for revenge, they seek the demon's help. They also burn with a more

intense heat of lust than men, once corrupted, on account of their greater moisture [of humoral temperament]. To satisfy this unbridled passion of lust to the full, they give themselves over to nocturnal embraces with demons. Finally, they are weaker both in intellect and in will, and more prone to deception; hence a demon appears more frequently to women, and more easily enters into pacts with them. From this you may gather how true is that oracle of Ecclesiasticus (ch. 25): "All wickedness is short to the wickedness of a woman" — and consider, at the same time, how great is the folly of men, who submit their bundles and their very minds to these wretched little women, obey their command, serve them day and night, and become their most miserable slaves — so that, in the end, from commerce with them, their bodies become tainted, and their minds bewitched by illusions.

III. Question II. *Why do old women, rather than younger ones, more often devote themselves to sorcery?* Response: Authors assign a twofold reason. One is that, bitterly resenting the loss of the flower of their youth, they are carried away to the height of hatred against adolescence and youth; hence, in order to harm the young, they have recourse to the demon. The other is that, prompted by the demon, they believe the blood of children suited to prolonging their own lives further.

IV. Question III. *Why does God permit witches, or "striges," to harm infants and the young rather than adults?* Response: All authors admit that a solid reason for this cannot be assigned. For what reason can be brought forward for things that depend on God's will? This much only we know for certain: that God arranges all this for the greater confirmation of the faith, and for the testing of the good, so that men may be deterred from sin. Some say God permits it as a punishment, or trial, of the parents; others assert it happens on account of children's weakness, which cannot resist. Others, finally, add that "striges" lie in wait for infants because, from the severed limbs of such little bodies — the feet and hands — they prepare an ointment, smeared with which they go to the demons' gatherings and feasts — or imagine that they go.

V. Question IV. *Are witches really transported from place to place, or does this movement occur only through a fantastic illusion?* Response: All Catholics teach that such a transit can indeed occur, since this transportation does not exceed the powers of a demon, as is established by many examples. For a demon really did transport Christ the Lord to the pinnacle of the Temple, as the Fathers commonly teach, following St. Thomas (III Part, q. 41, art. 4). We also read that Simon Magus was carried up into the air, and, by the prayer of the divine Peter, cast down to earth. This is even clearer in the case of the good Angels: for the Prophet Daniel says (ch. 14): "The Angel of the Lord took hold of Habakkuk by the hair of his head, and carried him by the vigor of his spirit, and set him down in Babylon, over the lake." And St. Luke (Acts 8): "The Spirit of the Lord caught away Philip, and the eunuch saw him no more... but Philip was found at Azotus." Now evil Angels have lost none of their natural powers through their sin. Wherefore, in this order of possible transportation, they can accomplish entirely what the good Angels can. There is, then, no dispute about the fact itself; the whole question concerns witches.

There are certain over-zealous individuals who, without first distinguishing between the fact and the mere possibility, cry out against the fact as altogether impossible, disparaging all such transportations which authors relate as true — treating them as mere fables, without giving any reason, and without regard for the authority of other writers who testify to the contrary. But why do they screech against Inquisitors and judges, arguing that they have often punished witches severely — as if these women

could be punished only for such transportations, and not for apostasy from the faith, or for the worship offered to a demon?

Let this be said only in passing — not that I consider all such transportations, as related, to be true; indeed, I hold that they are frequently mere illusions — but so that I may check the ignorance and audacity of certain persons, who, with incredible rashness, extend their censorious pen against far greater theologians than themselves — though such theologians ought not to be trusted even in the slightest particulars. But setting all this aside, it is worth recording what Cajetan long ago taught (II-II, q. 95, art. 3), so that these new men may learn that the older theologians were not so credulous as to consider all such transits genuine. Of the incidents Cajetan himself relates, I will transcribe one. "I too," he says, "know of a certain woman in love, whom the devil anointed while naked, persuading her that thus he would lead her to the house of her beloved; and afterward, having been beside herself for a long time, and believing that she had been with her beloved, etc., she found herself in her own place so bruised that she needed to be revived, etc. And had I not explained to her that this was mere imagination, and that she had been so injured by lying naked in that condition, she would perhaps not know to this day that it was not real. By this, however, we do not deny that the devil, God permitting, sometimes really does transport some willing person bodily from place to place. But this seems to happen VERY RARELY." For when this transvection occurs by mere fantastic illusion, the demon (whom sorcerers thus call by their own name, "Martinet") enters and penetrates the bodies of witches, and so overwhelms their senses that they feel nothing at all, even when injured and scourged; and the demon impresses upon their imagination such species, images, and phantoms, that upon waking from their stupor they truly believe they have flown about, entered other people's houses, and lain with their lovers, and so on.

VI. From this you should gather how very careful you ought to be in placing faith in women, whether wicked or even good. For although accounts of women's [dealings with demons] are found everywhere... concerning women — whether wicked or good — confessors and spiritual directors, far from becoming more cautious on that account, frequently slip into the opposite extreme of excessive credulity. I have learned from experience that little women who are eager to display a reputation for special devotion and holiness seek out credulous and easy-going confessors, so as to draw them more securely into error; they submit to them as handmaids and slaves, promise obedience, and pretend to hang upon their every word — so that, by this means, they may in the end win over even confessors less alert than themselves, and bring them entirely under their own influence. Such women are wont to excuse their own dullness and foolish credulity by the examples of Catherine, Teresa, and other female Saints — although they have imbibed not even half the spirit of a Catherine or a Teresa. Let them see to it that these devout women of theirs perform deeds of outstanding virtue, and confirm their visions by miracles worthy of Catherine and Teresa — and only then let them place firm faith in them. But of this only in passing here; I shall treat it more fully in its proper place.

VII. The opposite opinion is defended by Luther, Melanchthon, and many of that heretical rabble, whom certain Catholics also follow. But all these fight, as it were, blindfolded, inventing an enemy to strike at. For indeed, if they deny that such transportations are even possible, they err shamefully and manifestly. If they merely assert that such transportations, and the other things that follow from them, occur most frequently through mere fantastic illusion, they will find scarcely anyone to contradict them, or at most a few. For that such transits consist most frequently in mere fantastic

illusion, we ourselves freely admit. They object with the authority of the Council of Ancyra, cited in the chapter *Episcopi*, cause 26, question 5, where it is forbidden that anyone give credence to such illusions of women. Several reply, with Severinus Binius in his notes on this Council, that the aforesaid chapter is spurious, and of no authority. Others reply that the Council forbids only the belief that witches ride about upon beasts, transformed by the goddess Diana.

VIII. Question V. *Can a demon transform witch-women, or men, into a cat, a weasel, a hare, or some other beast?* Response: Before answering, I will first transcribe the teaching of St. Thomas (I Part, q. 114, art. 4, ad 2), which paves the way for the decision of the question proposed. He says: "*Bodily matter does not obey the good or evil Angels at will, so that demons could, by their own power, transmute matter from one form into another; but they can apply certain seeds which are found in the elements of the world, to bring about such effects, as Augustine says (Bk. III, On the Trinity). And therefore it must be said that all transmutations of bodily things which can be brought about by certain natural powers, to which the aforesaid seeds pertain, can be brought about by the operation of demons, these seeds being applied — as when certain things are transformed into serpents or frogs, which can be generated by putrefaction. But those transmutations of bodily things which cannot occur by any natural power can in no way be truly accomplished by the operation of demons — as, for instance, that a human body be changed into the body of a beast, or that a dead man's body be revived. And if something of this sort sometimes seems to occur by the operation of demons, this is not according to the truth of the thing, but only in appearance — which can occur in two ways. In one way, from within: insofar as a demon can alter a man's imagination, and even the bodily senses, so that something appears otherwise than it is, as has been said above — and this too is sometimes said to occur by the power of certain bodily things. In another way, from without. For since a demon can form a body from air, of any form and figure whatsoever, so that, assuming it, he appears visibly in it — he can, by the same reasoning, place around any bodily thing whatsoever any bodily form he pleases, so that it appears in that likeness. And this is what Augustine means (Bk. XVIII, City of God), when he says that the imaginative faculty of man, which even in thinking or dreaming is varied through innumerable kinds of things, appears, as if embodied, in the likeness of some animal, to the senses of others. This is not to be understood as if the very imaginative power of the man himself, or its image, were, numerically the same, embodied and shown to another's senses; but because the demon, who forms some image in the imagination of the man himself, can also present a similar image to the senses of another.*"

IX. From this teaching alone it is established that demons cannot at all transform a man or a woman into a beast. St. Thomas's teaching is expressly conveyed by Augustine (Bk. XVIII, City of God, ch. 18), where he concludes that many such illusions are merely fantastic: "*For we ourselves,*" he says, "*when we were in Italy, heard such things told of a certain region of those parts, where women innkeepers, versed in these arts, were said to be accustomed to give something in a piece of cheese to travelers, by which they would be transformed on the spot into beasts of burden, and carry whatever loads were needed; and afterward, once the task was accomplished, would return again to themselves — nor, however, did their minds become bestial in these cases, but remained rational and human, just as Apuleius, in the books he entitled 'The Golden Ass,' relates having happened to himself: that, having taken a drug, while his human mind remained, he became an ass, or indicated that this was so, or feigned it. These things are either false, or so unusual that they are rightly not believed... I would not, therefore, believe that either the mind, still less the body, can, by any art or power of demons, truly be converted into the limbs and features of beasts; but rather that the imaginative faculty of man, which even in thinking, or in dreaming, is varied through innumerable kinds of things, and, though it is not itself a body, nonetheless takes on with wondrous swiftness forms resembling bodies...*"

X. To the question proposed, then, the answer is that a demon can in no way transform witches into a cat, a weasel, a goose, a dog, or other animals; but either he alters the senses both of the onlookers and of the witches themselves, who believe they have been turned into beasts, or he fashions bodies out of air closely resembling animals. This is the common opinion of theologians.

XI. Question VI. *Can demons bring witches through closed doors into the bedchambers of their lovers?* Response: Demons cannot bring it about that two bodies interpenetrate one another; but they can indeed bring women in through closed doors in this sense: that they can open and shut them again with such speed, just as they can remove and replace stones from walls, with such swiftness that it can scarcely be perceived by human eyes; small openings, too, can be widened, through which bodies can pass. When they carry off witches, they do so sometimes visibly, sometimes invisibly. While the husband lies in his bed, they transport the wife away, oppressing the husband's senses in a deep sleep, and sometimes lay a body fashioned of air down beside the husband in her place. The wounds that not infrequently appear on the bodies of witches, who seem to have been transformed into beasts in the manner described, arise from the fact that the witches' true bodies are joined to the airy body representing the beast; and any blow inflicted on the airy body passes through into the true body of the witch. But when this occurs by mere fantastic illusion alone, the demon himself either injures and wounds the witches' bodies directly, or... As for actually leading witches out of prison, demons cannot do this, God preventing it — as is clear from experience.

XII. Question VII. *Are the gatherings of witches truly celebrated with demons, and what do they do at such gatherings?* Response: Del Rio, along with others, records certain fixed places where demons celebrate their gatherings with their witches — as, in Italy, it is said there is the Mountain of Venus near Lake Orsino. On this matter one may consult Spina, *On Witches*, ch. 20. They have not only fixed places, but fixed times as well, at which they hold such gatherings — during Lent, especially Holy Week, the Ember Days, and other feasts. What they do at these gatherings is related at length by Del Rio and other authors. First of all, the witches approach the Prince of demons, seated upon a lofty throne, presenting a terrifying form, most often in the guise of a goat or a dog, to worship him — now on bended knee, now with their backs turned toward him, sometimes with their legs thrown up and their heads bent back, chin turned toward the sky. As a token of servitude and homage, they kiss him on his hindquarters; they offer up their own children, and sometimes kill them. Once this is done, they sit down at tables, and feast — the food sometimes most delicate, sometimes tasteless, often prepared from the eyes of infants, boiled without salt. Their bellies sated, they give themselves over to lust, mingling most foully and frequently with demons; the women submit to incubi, and the men perform an unspeakable act of intercourse with succubi, no filthy and abominable species of lust being left untried. I have touched on these few things only briefly in passing. I judge that most of this is fabulous and fantastical, as I said above; yet that it can indeed sometimes really occur is not to be denied.

XIII. There are those who deny that demons can perform carnal acts, since they lack bodies and are pure spirits. But the common opinion of Catholics teaches that this commingling of demons and women really does occur. St. Augustine attests this openly, in these words (Bk. XV, City of God, ch. 23): *"And since it is a very widespread report, and many either affirm that they have themselves experienced it, or have heard it from those who have experienced it, and whose reliability there is no reason to doubt, that Silvans and Fauns, commonly called incubi, have often behaved wickedly toward women, seeking and accomplishing intercourse*

with them; and that certain demons, whom the Gauls call Dusii, are said to attempt and effect this uncleanness assiduously — a matter attested by so many, and by such persons, that it would seem impudent to deny it..." As for the children born from such intercourse, however, St. Thomas explains and confirms the following doctrine (I Part, q. 51, art. 3, ad 6), adding that the offspring born from such intercourse of demons and women are not the children of the demon, but of that man whose seed was taken; for a demon who acts as a succubus toward a man, and afterward as an incubus toward a woman, does this by means of the semen so received, since it is the same seed. The offspring, then, born from this transported semen, is not the demon's son, but the son of the man from whom the semen was received.

XIV. From what has been said, it is settled that this whole transportation is momentary, and effected by demonic art in such a way that these emanations, being extremely fine and subtle, and dispersed with utmost speed from their vessels, do not, in so brief a moment, vanish or dissipate — a claim of no weight, which adversaries commonly raise in objection. As for their further claim — that the generative power resides in the spirits, or in the seeds of things — this is disproved by St. Thomas: for he says that demons sometimes assume certain spirits and seeds of other things for the generation of certain effects, as Augustine says (Bk. III, On the Trinity, ch. 8), so that the demon may sometimes perform the act of intercourse without true semen — as, for instance, some demons who become succubi to a man, and afterward transfer the semen thus received to a woman, so that the demon himself is not the parent, but rather the man whose semen was taken. Should some question arise as to whether the witch experiences pleasure in this commingling, it is of no relevance.

There are those who deny that demons can transport true seed thus received without it dissipating in so short a time, especially since the demon, being skilled in the power of these vital spirits, can prevent such dissipation. Many examples are adduced by philosophers and physicians, in which it is related that women have been found with child in the womb without having lost the flower of their virginity. Here is the example recounted by St. Thomas, Quodlibet 6, q. 3, art. 18: "*A woman might, perhaps, conceive without a miracle, her virginity remaining wholly intact — as is said to have happened to a certain pubescent girl, whom, to guard her modesty, [her parents] kept in a bed of her own; and while she slept, semen descended to her womb, and the girl conceived... A man, however, could naturally become a father through such a nocturnal emission, by whatever chance it reached the womb, provided virginity was preserved entire.*" It is likewise related, on the testimony of certain most reliable authors, that other women were found to have become pregnant in a bath, from semen shed there by men. Much else could be said on this subject; but since this concerns curiosity rather than useful and honest knowledge, I pass over it entirely in silence, since no clear reason appears against it, that it should be discussed further here.

Chapter XIII — On the penalties established against witches, and against all who enter into a pact — explicit or tacit — with demons

I. All human and divine laws decree that sorcerers are to be punished. God commands (Lev. 20): "*A man, or woman, in whom there is a pythonic or divining spirit, dying let them die: they shall stone them with stones.*" Likewise (Exod. 22): "*Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live.*" There are many civil laws — Book 9, title 18, law 7, "Nemo" — which decree that all soothsayers are to be punished with death. Canon law establishes the same penalty.

II. Theologians dispute whether an excommunication has already been decreed against sorcerers, or whether it must be freshly imposed. The more common and true opinion holds that all such persons are already, in fact, excommunicated by the law itself — which is proven from the chapter *Si quis hariolos,* where it is stated: "*If anyone shall have observed soothsayers, haruspices, or enchanters, let him be anathema.*" These words, "let him be anathema," signify a censure already imposed, not one to be imposed. For a law does not merely express a wish; it commands. Wherefore, although the aforesaid words might, taken absolutely, be understood as an expression of mere wish, nevertheless, as employed by the law, they absolutely decree and impose the penalty. There is also cited the Extravagant of John XXII, beginning "*Super illius,*" as related by Eymerich in his *Directorium Inquisitorum,* in which excommunication is expressly established against all sorcerers. Others reject this constitution, since it is not found in the Bullary. Setting aside, then, this uncertain constitution, I will transcribe the constitution of Gregory XV, issued March 20, 1623, beginning as follows: "*But by the will of Almighty God... Of our own accord, therefore, and from certain knowledge, and mature deliberation, and from the plenitude of apostolic power, by the tenor of these presents We decree, ordain, and command: that whensoever anyone shall have entered a pact with the devil, and, having apostatized from the faith, shall have injured one or more persons by sorceries or witchcraft, such that death has followed upon such sorceries or witchcraft — even for a first offense, he is to be handed over to the secular court, to be punished with the penalties owed him. But whoever, having likewise apostatized, and entered a pact with the devil, shall have committed sorcery or witchcraft, though death has not followed, yet illness, divorces, impotence to procreate, or notable harm to animals, crops, or other produce has resulted — he is to be confined for life, or perpetually imprisoned, in the strict custody of the Office of the Inquisition, where it exists, to be provided. Those, moreover, who have true knowledge of such offenders are bound to denounce them to the Bishop, or Inquisitor...*" etc.

Since, then, sorcery is joined with the crime of apostasy, it pertains to the tribunal of the Inquisition to inquire into and take notice of such sorcerers — nor is there any doubt about this — since, when sorcerers fall into apostasy, or rush headlong into heresy, they thereby become subject to the excommunication *latae sententiae* pronounced in the Bull "In Coena Domini," or else, if they do not actually fall into heresy, they at least give rise to a strong suspicion of it. Now the signs of a vehement suspicion of heresy are these: an explicit pact with the demon; the abuse of sacred things; the worship of the devil; his invocation, in order to know things that exceed the natural power of knowing. And when either heresy, or a grave suspicion of it, is attached to sorcery, the judges of such a crime are the Inquisitors of heretical depravity. And since it is scarcely found that a sorcerer is not guilty of heresy, or at least vehemently suspected of it, sorcerers are for this reason to be remanded to the Inquisitors.

Dissertation III — On Tempting God, on Sacrilege, and on Blasphemy

Chapter I — What the tempting of God is

I. Theologians give this definition of tempting God: it is an inordinate test, or experiment, of some divine perfection, by word or by deed. This word "inordinate" distinguishes lawful from unlawful temptation. For if this experiment, or test, is inordinate — that is, made without necessity — it is unlawful and irreverent toward God; but if it is ordinate, it is lawful. It is considered ordinate, either if a just cause presses; or if it proceeds from a divine instinct, for the honor and benefit of the Church. In this manner Abraham, Gideon, Elijah, and several other Israelites tempted God. St. Thomas (II-II, q. 97, art. 1) defines temptation absolutely in these words: "*To tempt is to take a trial of some quality in the one tempted. This trial, however, is taken by both words and deeds: by words, as when we ask whether he knows a thing, or whether he can, or wills, to do it; by deeds, as when, by what we do, we test another's prudence, will, or power. Each of these, moreover, can occur in two ways: in one way, openly, as when someone professes to be tempting, as Samson (Judges 15) proposed a riddle to those he wished to test; in another way, secretly — as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as is read (Matt. 22)*." It is added in the definition, "of some divine perfection," because whenever God is tempted, it is always to test some attribute of his — either his mercy, or his justice, or his omnipotence — which men who wish to test one of these divine attributes are in need of; and this occurs by words, or by deeds.

II. From St. Thomas's teaching it is gathered that this temptation is twofold: explicit, and tacit, or interpretive. The explicit kind expressly intends to test one of God's attributes — as when someone throws himself headlong from a window with this very intention, testing whether God will wish to deliver him, and preserve him from harm. This person tempts God expressly. The interpretive kind is when someone does not intend to make a trial of any attribute of God, yet acts in such a way that he really does tempt God nonetheless. The same must be said of one who exposes himself, without necessity, to manifest and evident danger, hoping that he will be delivered by God. Hence the Angelic Doctor concludes: "*When, therefore, someone, on account of some necessity or usefulness, seeks a trial of divine aid, by words or by deeds, without a lack of due reverence — this is not tempting God, especially since such a trial proceeds from divine instinct*." This is said in 2 Chronicles 20: "*As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to thee*." But when someone exposes himself to grave and evident danger, without necessity, in order to test whether God will wish to preserve him, he sins both against charity toward himself, and against religion, tempting God. But if, without such expectation of preservation, but simply out of contempt of life, one acts, all such actions are, by their very kind, mortal sins. Man, indeed, would in that case wish to bind God to some attribute of his for a vain end, or so as to indulge the tempter's curiosity — all of which is unbecoming to the divine majesty.

III. This temptation of God is, by its very kind, a grave sin. The difficulty is this: whether this temptation of God is always a mortal sin when the deliberation and consent are complete.

IV. Question I. *Is it a light fault to tempt God in a matter of slight consequence?* Response: This depends on whether the temptation arises out of doubt, and thus carries with it the malice of heresy — for to doubt is grave. If it occurs without such doubt, it is nevertheless a grave sin. If, however, it arises from an imperfect deliberation, with only a slight consent, the temptation of God can be venial, when

the matter concerning which God is tempted is itself trifling — as if, in a light illness, you refused medicine, hoping to be freed by God, or acting with a divided mind, hoping nonetheless to obtain from God what you ask. Some authors affirm that only a venial fault is committed in this case, since, they say, in such cases there does not appear to be a grave disruption of order, nor an injury to the divine majesty. But the more probable opinion is that this is always a grave fault: since the divine majesty is offended whenever God is tempted; and however slight or grave the matter for which one seeks to be freed, the divine majesty is injured by this very means — the temptation of God — always in the same way, however light or grave. So, then, the measure of gravity of the fault is not to be judged, more or less, from the natural triviality or gravity of the illness or affliction, but rather from the injury done to God's majesty, which is the same regardless. Let us set out this example more clearly, that it may seem lighter. You suffer from a slight illness; you reject every natural remedy, spurning all such help, and ask God to restore your health by a miracle. Do you not, then, wish God to work a miracle, to indulge your curiosity, and to expel a slight illness from you? Who does not see that you then tempt God more gravely than if you asked him to cure you of a mortal illness? For in this hypothesis you demand that God exercise his omnipotence in the most trifling of matters, working miraculous deeds. Whether the affliction, then, for which you ask, without any necessity, that God work a miracle to remove it — an affliction which could easily be removed by means provided by nature — be light or grave, you gravely tempt God, and gravely sin. This opinion is defended by Suárez (Vol. I, On Religion, tract. 3, Bk. 1, ch. 2, n. 16), Sánchez (Bk. II, ch. 34, n. 5), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 12, punct. 1, n. 4), and many others. Yet in practice this formal temptation of God scarcely occurs. For who, unless a fool, would wish God to work a miracle merely because he refuses customary remedies? But in practice, many spurn the use of medicine, especially in lighter illnesses, trusting in the divine physician, who is able, if he wills, to cure them without such means. They do not intend that God work miracles, but with a humble spirit hope that God will dispose things so that whatever happens will redound to his greater glory.

V. Question II. *Does one tempt God who seeks to demonstrate his innocence by the trial of red-hot iron, or of boiling water?* Response: The common opinion says yes, since natural means are available by which the truth can be made manifest — namely, the testimony of witnesses, or a spontaneous confession. Let us hear St. Thomas answer this question (II-II, q. 95, art. 8, ad 3): "*The judgment by red-hot iron, or of boiling water, is indeed ordered toward the investigation of some hidden sin through something done by man; and insofar as some miraculous effect is expected from God, it agrees in this respect with the casting of lots. But such a judgment is rendered unlawful: both because it is directed toward judging hidden things, which are reserved to divine judgment, and also because such a judgment has not been sanctioned by divine authority. Whence, in the Decree of Pope Stephen V, it is said: 'The extortion of a confession from anyone by the trial of red-hot iron, or of boiling water, is not sanctioned by the sacred canons; nor is it to be presumed, since it has not been sanctioned by the teaching of the holy Fathers, being a superstitious invention. Public crimes, once a spontaneous confession or the testimony of witnesses has established them, having the fear of God before our eyes, are granted to our own governance to judge. But hidden and unknown things are to be left to him alone who knows the hearts of the sons of men.' The same reasoning seems to apply to the law concerning duels — except that it approaches more closely to the common reasoning of lots, insofar as no miraculous effect is expected there, except perhaps when the combatants are very unequal in strength or skill.*" All this is clear. Nor are the examples commonly adduced against it any obstacle — namely, that God prescribed (Num. 5) that an adulterous woman be tested by bitter waters; and that it is decreed (2, q. 5, ch. *Saepe*) that a monk suspected of theft is to be given the

Eucharist, to be cleared by receiving it. As to the first example, the answer is clear: that this ceremonial precept concerning the trial of an adulterous woman was proven lawful because God himself so prescribed it; but that precept has since been abrogated. As to the second authority, St. Thomas responds (III Part, q. 80, art. 6, ad 3): "*That decree has been abrogated by the contrary teaching of the Roman Pontiffs. For Pope Stephen says: 'Of red-hot iron,'*" etc. And the same is held in the *Extra*, on purifications, ch. *Ex tuarum*: "*In all such matters there appears to be a tempting of God. Whence they cannot be done without sin. And it would seem graver still, if in this sacrament, which was instituted as a remedy of salvation, someone should incur a judgment of death. Whence it is decreed that the body of Christ not be given to one suspected of a crime, by way of examination.*" If, at times, miracles have been seen in such trials, God worked them for the defense of the accused's innocence, the sin of temptation on the part of those men being permitted [but not the cause of the miracle].

VI. Question III. *Does one who, in order to convert a heretic, asks God for a miracle in confirmation of Catholic truth, tempt God?* Response: The common opinion affirms this, since such miracles are asked without necessity. For there are ready at hand the most splendid arguments by which the truth of the Catholic religion can be shown; and it is granted that such a request for miracles is, for the most part, useless. How many myriads of miracles did God not work in the deaths of the Martyrs, and yet tyrants and Jews, though beholding them with their own eyes, were not converted to the true religion! They saw Lazarus, four days dead, raised by Christ, and even sat at table with him afterward — yet they did not for that reason embrace the faith of Christ. If holy men have sometimes shown such miracles to heretics, they did so from a particular divine instinct. Nothing, however, prevents one, having employed the usual means — arguments both explicit and, in another respect, tacit — from also asking God, at times, for a miracle, should it seem good to God's glory that this be granted, and may it please him.

VII. Theologians dispute on both sides whether this temptation of God, when explicit, is a distinct sin from that committed when it is tacit — namely, whether explicit temptation and implicit temptation differ in species; for explicit temptation arises from a different cause than that from which implicit temptation arises. Suárez affirms this (Vol. I, On Religion, tract. 3, Bk. 1, ch. 3, n. 6). If it were true that a doubt concerning some divine attribute were involved in explicit temptation of God, it would undoubtedly differ in species from the interpretive kind, since the sin would then also be, in addition, against faith. It does not, however, seem that doubt concerning some divine attribute is so bound up with the temptation of God, such that God cannot be tempted without simultaneously doubting his omnipotence, justice, and so on. And so the contrary opinion teaches that, if the discussion concerns explicit temptation alone, it does not differ in species from the interpretive kind, but only adds a greater gravity of malice — since explicit temptation, properly speaking, does not differ from implicit. The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 12, punct. 1) contend that this opinion is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas (II-II, q. 95, art. 3, ad 1), where they wish the Angelic Doctor to teach that an explicit pact with a demon does not differ from an implicit one. But St. Thomas there rather teaches the contrary. Here are his words: "*It must be said that in all the aforesaid cases the reason for sinning is generically the same, but not specifically the same. Many demons insinuate themselves, without being invoked, into certain actions men perform, whereby they render themselves worthy of being subject to such insinuation.*" From this teaching it follows that explicit and tacit temptation, or explicit and implicit pacts, agree in their general nature, but not in their specific character... That, however, this particular distinction reveals a difference of species is not, in our judgment, established by the

aforesaid authors. It seems rather consistent with the other words added — namely, that the sin of tempting God is committed — without any indication of whether it was explicit or implicit temptation of God. For it is certain among all that explicit temptation of God is a considerably graver crime than the interpretive kind. The dispute, however, is whether this difference is specific or merely one of degree. Neither opinion is evident. It is safer, therefore, in confession, to follow the more grave opinion — the one I hold to be true — since aggravating circumstances within the same species are, in any case, to be disclosed in confession. For this reason, everyone is bound to disclose, in sacramental confession, both an explicit or implicit pact, and an explicit or interpretive temptation of God.

Chapter II — On sacrilege, and its species

I. Sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing. A thing is considered sacred which is dedicated to divine worship. And so, says the Angelic Doctor (II-II, q. 99, art. 1): "*Everything that pertains to irreverence toward sacred things pertains to an injury against God, and has the character of sacrilege.*"

II. St. Thomas distinguishes a threefold sacrilege (II-II, q. 99, art. 3), which theologians commonly describe further. The first is an injury inflicted upon a sacred person, such as a Cleric, Religious, or Nun; or fornication with a person bound by a vow of chastity. The second concerns a sacred place, such as a church or cemetery. The last is committed against sacred things, and things specially dedicated to divine worship, such as the sacraments, chalices, vestments destined for the performance of sacred rites, images of the Saints, relics, and the like. That this division is into members specifically distinct is taught by St. Thomas in the same place, and theologians commonly follow him — since, the Angelic Doctor says, given the differing rationale of the sanctity of sacred persons, places, and things, toward which irreverence is shown, it is necessary that the species of sacrilege be distinguished accordingly; for sacrilege is the graver, the greater the sanctity of the sacred thing against which one sins. Now sanctity is attributed both to sacred persons and to sacred places, and to certain other sacred things. But the sanctity of a place is ordered toward the sanctity of the man who, in that sacred place, renders worship to God.

III. It is said in 2 Maccabees 5 that the Lord chose the nation, not the place, on account of the nation; and so, for this reason, the Angelic Doctor's teaching holds that the sacrilege by which one sins against a sacred person is judged graver than that by which one sins against a sacred place. This is briefly summarized as follows: the ground of sanctity is different in each case. For a person is holy absolutely and formally; a place is called holy because holy persons dwell there, and worship is shown to God in it; the sacraments contain holiness in themselves; sacred things are ordered toward the sanctity of the persons, place, and worship. There is no need to dwell longer here on this scholastic dispute.

It is also disputed whether this division is into lowest, or "atomic," species, or into subalternate ones. St. Thomas teaches that these species of sacrilege are lowest, or atomic — within any one of which, however, different degrees of sacrilege can be found. For he says in the body of the article: "*There are, nevertheless, within either species of sacrilege, different degrees, according to the difference of persons and of sacred places. Likewise, within the same species of sacrilege, according to the difference of sacred things; among which the sacraments themselves hold the highest place — the chief of which is the sacrament of the Eucharist, which contains Christ himself, by whom man is sanctified; and there are also other sacred things, concerning which the third species*

of sacrilege is committed, which nonetheless can vary in degree accordingly." Similarly, the same Angelic Doctor adds (loc. cit., ad 2): "*Two sins can likewise differ in species according to one material aspect, while agreeing in species according to a single formal ground — as, for instance, if someone violates a Nun by striking her, or by lying with her.*"

IV. Having explained the generic notion, and division, of sacrilege, it remains to run through, as briefly as possible, the sacrileges contained under each species. Under the first species, which concerns sacred persons, is included the injury inflicted upon a Cleric, Religious, or Nun — which can occur in four ways. First, if such sacred persons are violently struck. Second, if they are brought before a lay court. Third, if taxes and tribute are imposed on them without legitimate authority. Fourth, if fornication, or unchastity, is committed with persons bound by a vow of chastity — for the violation of any vow is sacrilege. To this species of sacrilege also belongs the immodesty committed by a confessor with his spiritual daughter — since St. Thomas says (Supplement, III Part, q. 56, art. 2, ad 8) that a certain bond, similar to a spiritual kinship, is contracted through penance between a consenting woman and the priest, such that carnal union with her would be as much a sin as if it were with his own spiritual daughter. Hence carnal commingling with a spiritually united person is likewise [sacrilege], just as spiritual kinship is contracted in solemn baptism and confirmation between the godparents and the baptized and confirmed person, and between the father and mother of the one baptized and confirmed.

V. To the second species of sacrilege are referred all those things committed against the reverence owed to a sacred place. This sacrilege is committed in several ways. First, if someone burns, breaks into, or demolishes a sacred place, or destroys its altars. Second, if someone forcibly drags a man away from a church, even one destroyed, or polluted, or under interdict, or from its cemeteries, atrium, or cloister, or from any place adjoining it not otherwise separate; likewise if from Oratories legitimately erected, from Bishops' palaces, from Convents of Religious and their enclosed precincts. Third, if someone kills a man, or by violence sheds human blood; if someone commits an act of pollution, whether public or secret. Fourth, if people conduct trade, business, and feasts in churches, hold plays, and engage in shameless and indecent conversation there. Fifth, if someone commits theft in a church. Theologians dispute, however, whether it is sacrilege to steal something not sacred — say, a purse — in a sacred place. But, setting aside the disputes of certain casuists, we must hold to what is established, as we read in the constitution of Pope John VIII (cause 17, q. 4, ch. *Quisquis*): "*Sacrilege is committed by taking a sacred thing from a sacred place, or a non-sacred thing from a sacred place, or a sacred thing from a non-sacred place.*" The law is clear, and cannot be evaded by any sound interpretation. Whoever, then, steals money from a rich man in a church commits sacrilege. If things entrusted to the Church's keeping, or for its adornment, are stolen, sacrilege is likewise committed.

VI. Does one who harbors internal, vicious acts thereby contract the malice of sacrilege? One who, outside a sacred place, has the will to kill, steal, or fornicate within a sacred place, commits sacrilege — since the internal act is of the same species as the external one, and this is the more common opinion. But one who, while actually present in a sacred place, deliberates fornicating, stealing, or killing outside a sacred place, is free of sacrilege, since the sanctity of the place is not violated by an internal act, if external acts are absent. This opinion is quite common. It seems to me, however, difficult to hold, from the very principle stated, that the sanctity of the place is not violated. For a temple is instituted so that in that particular place we may worship God with special worship — not

merely external, but especially internal — since we ought to submit our mind to God even more than our body. Why, then, should one who defiles his mind in this sacred place, whether internally or externally, not be considered guilty of sacrilege? It seems to me, then, altogether obvious that whoever, while in a church, forms a deliberate resolve to fornicate, steal, or kill outside it, is not free of the guilt of sacrilege.

VII. The third species is real sacrilege, whereby a sacred thing is dishonorably treated. What sacred things are, both persons and place, has already been established above, and discussed in detail. They are divided into four degrees, as it were. First come the sacraments, of which the chief is the sacrament of the Eucharist, which contains Christ himself, by whom man is sanctified; then sacred vessels, sacred images, and the relics of the Saints; then the ornaments of the Church, or of its ministers, such as chasubles, veils, and other such things; and fourth, finally, movable or immovable goods set aside for the support of ministers, such as dedicated properties, first-fruits, and the like. Hence one who irreverently handles the sacraments, whether by receiving them, or by administering them unworthily, is stained with the gravest sacrilege; or if one throws them away, or tramples upon them. Although Christ the Lord is really present in the Eucharist, its unworthy treatment is nonetheless not called sacrilege against his most holy person directly — since he is not there in his own proper bodily form, as he is in heaven. For this reason the unworthy handling of the Eucharist is called a real sacrilege, not a personal one. One would likewise commit a grave sacrilege who used sacred vessels for drinking, or converted sacred vestments unworthily into his own clothing, or tore or cut them up.

VIII. To this also belongs the abuse of the words of Sacred Scripture. Wherefore those who twist sacred words to spread heresies, and to confirm them; who mix them into vulgar songs, or misuse them to compose slanderous pamphlets, or to express profane matters, are guilty of sacrilege. Their sacrilegious audacity is checked by the Council of Trent, in these words (session 4): "*Wishing likewise to repress that impudence whereby the words and sentences of Sacred Scripture are twisted and turned to all manner of profane uses — namely, to scurrilous, fabulous, vain matters, flatteries, slanders, superstitions, godless and diabolical incantations, divinations, sortileges, and even to slanderous pamphlets — [the Synod] commands and enjoins, for the removal of such irreverence, that henceforth no one presume in any way to appropriate the words of Sacred Scripture to such and similar uses; so that all men of this kind — profaners and violators of the word of God — be restrained by the Bishops through penalties of law, or of their own discretion.*" There are, likewise, painters in certain cities of Italy who are accustomed to use sacred words to depict the shortcomings of preachers and other persons; and are therefore not free of the guilt of sacrilege. Sacrilege is again committed by those who defile sacred images with indecent and harlot-like nakedness. Guilty of sacrilege, too, are those who break, tear apart, or crush sacred images or relics.

IX. Sacrilege can also be committed by omission. Sacristans not infrequently commit this species of sacrilege, when they neglect the due vigilance owed in guarding the holy chrism and the Eucharist, using the keys prescribed by the sacred canons; when they fail to keep the corporals, sacred vessels, altars, and ecclesiastical vestments clean and neat, but instead hand them over, stained, dirty, and foul, for use in celebrating the unbloody sacrifice. Guilty of sacrilege, likewise, are those who negligently allow the sacred particles in the pyx to spoil.

X. Is the sacrilegious omission of the reception or administration of the sacraments at the due time, or under a pressing precept, [also a sacrilege]? Theologians dispute this on both sides. Some affirm

that, since a person neglects to show the sacraments the reverence due them, he must be called sacrilegious. The more probable opinion, however, denies this — since, when someone fails to receive a sacrament, he does no injury at all to the sacrament itself; he merely transgresses the precept of receiving the sacraments. For this reason, one who merely omits [confession or communion] on a feast day is not to be deemed sacrilegious, but only a violator of the precept. Due reverence is indeed shown to the sacraments when they are received or administered worthily, holily, and rightly; but when they are neither administered nor received at all, there appears no reason to say that they are thereby unworthily treated.

XI. Theologians inquire what sin sacrilege is: all agree that it is, by its very kind, mortal — and the graver, the holier the sacred thing that is violated. It can be venial either on account of the smallness of the matter, or on account of a lack of due consideration. In confession, the circumstance of sacrilege must always be disclosed.

XII. The penalties established against the sacrilegious are of two kinds: pecuniary, and spiritual. The pecuniary penalties do not require a judge's sentence before they take effect. The spiritual penalties, which are incurred *ipso facto*, are excommunication, which those who violate ecclesiastical immunity incur, and likewise those who lay violent hands on Clerics; those, too, who usurp Church goods, impose tribute on ecclesiastical persons, or drag them before a secular court; and finally, those who break down doors to plunder sacred things. Other penalties may be imposed at the judge's discretion.

Chapter III — On blasphemy: what it is, and how many kinds there are

I. Various definitions of blasphemy are given by the Doctors, all of which nonetheless amount to the same thing, and convey the same sense. St. Augustine (Bk. II, *Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets*, ch. 11) gives an extended discourse on blasphemy, and describes it in these words: "*What, then, is blasphemy, but when evil things are said of things good? Now blasphemy is commonly understood as nothing other than to speak evil of God.*" St. Thomas (II-II, q. 13, art. 1) defines it more precisely: *Blasphemy is a derogation of the divine goodness*. This can occur in two ways. First, by attributing to God what he neither has, nor could have. Second, by removing from him what he cannot lack. This can occur either by the intellect alone, or accompanied also by a depraved affection of the will. If it remains in the heart alone, it will be blasphemy of the heart; if it breaks out into words, it will be blasphemy of the mouth. When this wickedness is conceived only in the mind, by attributing to, or removing from, God something in the manner described, it is opposed to unformed confession of faith; if a wicked affection of the heart is added, it is opposed to faith formed by charity.

II. It should be noted, following Cajetan's commentary on this article, that derogation of the divine goodness can occur in three ways. First, by the intellect alone, holding a false opinion about God. Second, by adding to this false opinion the will's detestation. Third, finally, without a false opinion, exercising the will's detestation alone — as most often happens among Christians, whether the blasphemy remains internal, or breaks out into external words. For someone, believing God to be omnipotent, can nonetheless wish to say, in order to insult God, that God cannot do this or that. Finally, the sin of unbelief is opposed to faith; but blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, not to faith by its very nature. Blasphemy, properly speaking, consists in words. As for what St. Paul says (Titus 1): "*They confess that they know God, but in their works they deny him,*" and St. Peter (2 Peter 2): "*By whom the way of truth shall be evil spoken of,*" these do not express blasphemy properly so called.

III. The common division of blasphemy is into heretical and simple. Heretical blasphemy is that whereby, with the mind's assent, something is attributed to God, or something proper to him is removed from him — as, for instance, if someone blurts out that God is unjust, or that he is not omnipotent. Simple blasphemy is that whereby, without the mind's assent, but only through the perversity of the will, something is attributed to, or imprecated against, God — as if someone says, "Cursed be God." Theologians commonly teach that heretical blasphemy is committed when such propositions are asserted, and simple blasphemy when they are merely imprecated. But note that blasphemy would by no means be heretical unless the propositions "God is unjust," "God is a fool," and the like are asserted with pertinacity, and with the mind's actual assent. It scarcely happens, however, except through slip of the tongue, that such propositions are asserted without the mind's assent; the external forum, then, would condemn such a person as guilty of heresy — since judgment on internal matters is reserved to God alone.

IV. Blasphemy is further divided into that which is against God, and that which is against the Saints. The former is opposed immediately to God; the latter concerns the Saints. Moreover, blasphemy can be enunciative — as when someone says, "I wish to do this to injure God"; detestative — as if someone says, "May God perish"; derisive — as, "Ha, may the temple of God be destroyed"; and finally, injurious — as when someone blasphemes while swearing, "May God perish, if..."

V. Question I. *Does blasphemy against God differ in species from that against the Saints?* Response: The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 124) deny this, along with Sánchez, Azor, Bonacina, and others — citing in support Cajetan, Bañez, Diana, and others. Their reason is that blasphemy is a sin opposed to religion; and religion is one virtue. Therefore there is but one species of blasphemy. They confirm this by the parallel of an oath, which is of one species, whether one swears by God or by the Saints.

VI. The opposite opinion seems to me more probable. For although several vices may be opposed to a single virtue, they can nonetheless differ in species among themselves. Moreover, that the aforesaid two forms of blasphemy differ in species is proven from the very definition of blasphemy itself. For blasphemy is a derogation of the divine goodness. But divine goodness is not univocal to God and to the Saints; rather, the goodness that is in God differs by more than mere kind from the goodness that is in the Saints. The former is infinite, the latter finite; the latter created, the former uncreated. Moreover, blasphemy is opposed to the honor and worship owed to the person against whom it is hurled. But the worship owed to God differs by more than species from the worship owed to any creature. The worship due to God is latria; the worship due to the Saints is dulia, and to the Blessed Virgin, hyperdulia. Now these forms of worship differ by more than mere species. Therefore so do the corresponding forms of blasphemy. Finally, the definition of blasphemy applies, per se and primarily, to the injury done to God, and only secondarily to that done to the other Saints. This is defended by Sánchez (Bk. IV, q. 9), Fr. Paolo Comitoli, Leander (tract. 1, q. 19), where he cites in support Aragón, Hurtado, and others.

VII. Fr. Suárez (Vol. I, On Religion, tract. 4, Bk. 1, ch. 6, n. 19) most excellently adds that, whatever the case may be, this much is certainly true: that it must be explained in confession whether one's blasphemies were against God, against the Virgin, or against the Saints. This is likewise admitted by the aforesaid theologians of Salamanca, together with Sánchez, Bonacina, and others. Wherefore the excessive laxity of Fr. Tommaso Tamburini, who writes as follows (Bk. II, Method of Confession, ch.

3), cannot be tolerated: "*Although it is more probable, with Suárez and Sánchez, that blasphemies against God, against the Blessed Virgin, and against the Saints differ in species, it being probable nonetheless, following Azor as cited in Diana, that they do not differ, it will suffice if the number of blasphemies is disclosed in confession; nor will it be necessary to explain... whether they were against God, or the Blessed Virgin, or the Saints*."

Chapter IV — On the gravity of blasphemy, and on blasphemies arising from habit and from anger

I. Question I. *Is blasphemy, by its very kind, a mortal sin?* Response: The common opinion affirms this. Since blasphemy is opposed to the divine goodness, and to charity toward God. "*Whatever,*" says the Angelic Doctor (II-II, q. 13, art. 2), "*is repugnant to charity is, by its very kind, a mortal sin*." But blasphemy, by its very kind, is repugnant to divine charity, since it derogates the divine goodness. St. Thomas confirms his view by the authority of Sacred Scripture: "*Whoever shall blaspheme the name of the Lord, dying let him die*" (Lev. 24). Now the penalty of death is not inflicted except for a mortal crime. Blasphemy, then, will never, on the side of its matter, be a venial sin — since this matter admits of no degree of smallness — though one blasphemy, within the genus of mortal crime, may be graver than another. St. Augustine (Bk. Against Lying, ch. 19) writes this of blasphemy: "*It is worse to blaspheme than to perjure oneself; for in perjury, God is called falsely as witness to a matter; but in blaspheming, false things are said of God himself. And the more inexcusable is anyone, whether perjurer or blasphemer, the more they knew, or believe, that what they assert, in perjuring or blaspheming, is false*."

II. St. John Chrysostom (Homily 95 on the Psalms): "*Nothing is more impious than blasphemy against God*" — and on the Apostle's words, "Use a little wine" (1 Tim. 5): "*Nothing is worse than blasphemy; no good is equal to the act of thanksgiving*." St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 8, ch. 7): "*Blasphemy,*" he says, "*is a most grave sin*." And the reason, following St. Thomas, is that blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, and therefore carries the gravity of unbelief — a gravity increased still further if the detestation of the will is added, and increased yet further if it breaks out into words — just as the merit of faith is increased through confession and love. Whence, since unbelief is, by its very kind, the greatest of sins, so too is blasphemy. Hence the Gloss on Isaiah 18 says that every sin, compared to blasphemy, is lighter; and indeed, as regards the object of the sin, it is graver than homicide, since blasphemy is directly against God, while homicide is against one's neighbor.

III. Question II. *Is blasphemy the greatest of all sins?* Response: The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 121) deny that blasphemy is, by its very kind, the gravest of sins, and teach that it is lighter than heresy, hatred of God, and despair; and they contend that this is the common opinion of St. Thomas and of theologians. What ought, in my judgment, to be said on this, I will briefly explain.

IV. Perfect blasphemy, which involves an error of the intellect together with hatred, or detestation, of the divine goodness, is the greatest of all crimes — since, under this consideration, it is opposed both to faith and to charity, and is the proper sin of the damned. Blasphemy that arises from hatred of God, even without including the error of heresy, is opposed to charity, and is worse than heresy — since charity is a more perfect virtue than unformed faith. Finally, blasphemy, by its very kind, is graver than heresy itself. For although it does not involve a false assent of the intellect, it nonetheless involves a wicked will toward God, and includes unbelief, and increases it, as St. Thomas teaches (art. 3): "*Blasphemy... has in it the gravity of unbelief; and the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added; and*

still more, if it breaks out into words — just as the merit of faith is increased through love and confession. Whence, since unbelief is, by its very kind, the greatest sin, it follows that blasphemy too is the greatest sin, belonging to that same genus, and aggravating it." St. Thomas is speaking here of blasphemy according to its kind. This opinion is defended by St. Antoninus (loc. cit.), Navarrus (in his *Summa*, ch. 12, n. 51), Trovamala (s.v. *Blasphemia*, n. 4), Armilla (s.v. *Blasphemia*, n. 2), Comitoli (Bk. 4, q. 9, ch. 5).

V. Question III. *Does one who blasphemes out of an inveterate custom and wicked habit sin?* Response: The laxity of certain casuists on this question inspires horror. Fr. Tommaso Tamburini writes as follows (Bk. II, *On the Decalogue*, ch. 7, §4, n. 17): "*Words against God uttered in drunkenness, or in madness, or through inadvertence arising from an inveterate custom, are not blasphemous in the least.*" He teaches the same in Bk. III, *Method of Confession*, ch. 3, §3, q. 22.

VI. Leander a Santissimo Sacramento (tract. 1, on oaths, disp. 5, q. 17) copies out this exceedingly lax opinion of Tamburini's, and teaches it in these words: "*When one blasphemes out of habit, without full and sufficient awareness of committing a mortal sin, he does not then commit a new mortal sin, but has sinned only in the cause, insofar as he did not remove the habit, to which he did pay attention.*" He cites, in support of this opinion, Bonacina, Filliucci, Toledo, Sánchez, Tamburini, and others.

VII. Question IV. *Does one who blasphemes inadvertently, and who is so habitually disposed that even were he to notice, he would still blaspheme, sin mortally?* Response: Hear Leander, declaring this probable with the utmost and most horrifying laxity: "*New words must be found to express this unheard-of kind of doctrine. I answer that it is probable — indeed more than probable — that he does not sin mortally by an actual sin in this proposed case. For in order for someone to sin actually, and to commit a new sin, it does not suffice that he be habitually disposed, and prone, to sin; it is necessarily required that he be actually, and in a 'second act,' [conscious of it]; for God, as St. Augustine says against the Semipelagians, does not impute to us what we would do, if this or that occasion arose, but what we actually do. Otherwise, men given to lust or avarice, who, given the opportunity, would give their consent to these sins, would always be actually sinning — which is altogether false.*" He cites, for this lax opinion of his, Valentia, Sánchez, Filliucci, Layman, Trullench, and others. See our second Theological-Moral Letter, and the Decree of the Holy Office against the book of a certain young author, containing false and scandalous propositions — among which, in my own judgment, are those defending unchaste touches, and blasphemies uttered out of inveterate habit, as though lawful.

VIII. Who could read, or transcribe, such things without feeling a certain indignation rise within him? Are we at fault, if, to arouse a similar hatred against such teachings, we ourselves have been somewhat harsh and bitter in tone? Such things, indeed, deserve rejection more by detestation than by mere refutation. This author, to shield his own laxities, calls upon Augustine himself as his patron, and does not blush to foist upon so great a Doctor so monstrous an error. What has the Semipelagian heresy concerning conditional sins to do with this matter? Is this good faith, in citing the Fathers — neither the word, nor the place, indicated? Is the present discussion not about future conditional matters? Is not the question proposed rather about one who actually blasphemes inadvertently, out of habit? Does one who fornicates out of inadvertent lust go free of the guilt of fornication? What, then, does he mean by claiming it follows from this that a man given to lust is always actually sinning, because, given the opportunity, he would give his consent? Do we say that one animated by a spirit of blasphemy does not actually break out into blasphemy?

IX. We answer this little question briefly: one who, from habit not removed or renounced through penance, utters blasphemous words — however inconsiderately and inadvertently — is guilty of

blasphemy. For the inconsiderate utterance of blasphemy is voluntary in that habitual disposition toward blaspheming, even if the person would notice it were he to attend to it. The sin, then, is not conditional, but absolute; and an indirect and interpretive voluntariness is present, as theologians of the schools put it. Now for sinning, an indirect voluntariness suffices. Therefore, whoever is accustomed to blasphemy, and does not strive to root out the custom, sins — even though he does not realize that he is blaspheming. For one bound by a wicked habit, who does not detest it, has an implicit deliberation. He sins, then, a mortal sin, as often as he blasphemes — even if he does not advert his mind to the blasphemy, whether through a fit of anger, or through the inclination of that same habit. But one who is not accustomed to blaspheme, and who, through a slip of the tongue, utters a blasphemous word without attending to its sense — such that, had he attended to it, he certainly would not have uttered such words — does not sin, at least not gravely, since the blasphemy will then be merely material. One who repents of the habit of blaspheming, and who labors to root out the custom, if, with no prior thought at all, he should fall into blasphemy, will sin only lightly.

X. Question V. *Does jest remove from blasphemy the character of a mortal sin?* Response: The common opinion draws a distinction. If the jest does not remove from the blasphemy the character of an insult, or of irreverence toward God, it will always be a mortal sin. If the jest is such that, all things considered, it removes from the blasphemy the character of an insult and a reviling of God, then it will not be a mortal sin. So teaches Leander (q. 14), citing in support of this opinion Castropalao, Tamburini, Bassaeus, Sánchez, and others.

XI. This distinction seems to me empty and worthless. Is it permissible to jest and trifle with God, and against God, and to utter blasphemous words for the sake of amusement? Can jest strip blasphemy of every character of insult and reviling against the divine majesty? On the contrary, jest does not diminish, but increases, the wickedness of blasphemy: for, in my own opinion, one who deliberately, for the sake of a jest, breaks out into blasphemous... words sins worse than one who blasphemes out of anger, or some other passion. For what could be more wicked than to tear apart the majesty of God with blasphemous and insulting words purely for the sake of a jest? What, indeed, is more contrary to reason than to say that blasphemies and insults against God, because uttered in jest, diminish the guilt of the offense? This holds true, in my view, when someone with deliberate mind twists real blasphemy against God. It is otherwise when someone utters words which, taken strictly, smack of blasphemy, but which, according to common understanding, are not blasphemous — as when men call some woman a "goddess," their own "divine one." For although it would be an enormous blasphemy to attribute to a creature what belongs to God alone, such expressions are nonetheless universally regarded as mere hyperbole, and are in no way considered blasphemy. Men ought nonetheless to abstain from them, and should be ashamed to dignify the lowest of all rational animals with such a title.

XII. It is worth exposing another of Leander's laxities, especially since he falsely attributes it to St. Thomas himself. This author writes as follows (q. 16): "*But if someone blasphemes somewhat, following the judgment of reason, yet not fully and altogether deliberately, he will then sin, but only venially — even in the case where the lack of full deliberation arose from an unjust and unlawful cause. So Navarrus, following St. Thomas, II-II, q. 13, art. 2.*" Leander here misrepresents both Navarrus and St. Thomas. For Navarrus is speaking of one who blasphemes out of an anger that forestalls all use of reason — and it is for this opinion that he cites St. Thomas — not of one who, in some way aware that he is blaspheming, neglects to

restrain his tongue; for in that case, on account of his negligence in restraining his tongue and attending to so grave a matter, and on account of his failure to remove the unlawful cause of his inconsideration, he sins gravely, as has been said above.

Chapter V — On the various formulas of blaspheming against God and against the Saints

I. To swear seriously by false gods, by Jupiter, by Mercury, and the like, is blasphemy, since the worship owed to God alone, or to the Saints on account of God, is thereby attributed to false gods and demons. But one who, for the sake of jest, and with the intention of mocking rather than worshipping the false gods, swears by Jupiter, does not blaspheme, nor commit any fault. Blasphemous words are those by which the faith, or those things which must be believed by divine faith, are denied — as when someone says: "I renounce God, the sacraments, the virginity of Mary," and the like. Blasphemies also include all those words that derogate from the divine omnipotence — as when someone blurts out, "Whether God wills it or not, this will happen" — commonly, "in spite of God" [al dispetto di Dio]. To praise God with obscene words, or to swear by the shameful parts of Christ or of the Saints, is blasphemy. But to swear by the honorable parts of Christ — by his head, by his body — is not blasphemy. And since Christ is God, the oaths of Christians sworn absolutely by his head, or by the body of God, are not blasphemous to unbelievers; for they know, and believe, that Christ is God. Nevertheless, because such oaths are full of scandal — especially since those who swear them almost never make such fine distinctions — such swearers are to be most severely rebuked, and kept from the sacraments, until they amend themselves. But those are especially to be considered blasphemers who, in fits of indignation, exclaim, "O blood of God! O body of God!" And although some casuists distinguish indignation against God from that directed at the man they are addressing when swearing — holding that it is blasphemy in the first case, but not in the second — it seems to me, however, more certain that such swearers are, absolutely speaking, to be reckoned as blasphemers. This is also taught by Fr. Suárez (Vol. I, On Religion, tract. 3, Bk. 1, ch. 6).

II. It is likewise blasphemy to declare the devil omnipotent, or holy. To call a beloved girl a "goddess," as we have already said, is not commonly blasphemy, since no real divinity is attributed to her; such expressions are nonetheless unworthy. Free of the guilt of blasphemy, likewise, are these words: "I was born under this fate," or "It was fated to be so" — since this manner of speaking by no means denies contingent events, nor implies absolute necessity, but the common sense is that it was so ordained by God to happen, human freedom remaining unharmed. Not blasphemous, either, are such expressions as "May it please God," "By the power of God," "God's will be done" — since those who utter these words do not mock, but admire, God's power. Many also deny that this is blasphemy: "In spite of that goat who feeds and sustains me in this world" — meaning, in Latin, "In defiance of that billy-goat who feeds and sustains me, I shall act thus in this world." This locution, however, seems to me to carry, though indefinitely, a strong presumption of blasphemy — for he alone who nourishes and sustains men in the world is God.

III. Question I. *Are expressions such as these blasphemy: "I do not believe in God," "I deny God, the Cross, the Gospels, the sacraments" — even if they are only conditional?* Response: Tamburini (Bk. II, On the Decalogue, ch. 7, §4, n. 12) denies this. But the affirmative opinion is common, and true — since the existence of God is denied for the present, even under a future condition; but that condition does not

affect the negation, but only the future circumstance. Guilty of blasphemy, likewise, are those who swear by the life of God, or of the Saints, saying, "May God perish, if this is not so." When, however, they say, "By the life of God, this is so," according to some Doctors they do not blaspheme, but pronounce not an execratory oath, but an assertory one; whereas one who says, "May God perish," does blaspheme. Yet just as in the external forum such formulas are judged blasphemous, so too, unless the swearer's express intention plainly indicates that he does not wish God's life to be otherwise than it is — namely, unchangeable — nor does he place it in jeopardy, as if it were capable of perishing, they must likewise be judged so in the internal forum. "God lives" is a formula of swearing employed in Scripture, and includes no blasphemy. But formulas such as, "This is as true as the Trinity, as God, as that Christ was born of the Virgin," are not blasphemies, according to some casuists, who press the swearer's intention. But intention is wrongly invoked as an excuse when the words themselves, by their very nature, present a manifest blasphemous sense. Now the formulas cited are indeed really blasphemous, since they equate the truth of a creature to divine truth, and attribute to a creature what is proper to God alone. Heretical blasphemies are such words as: "By the body of God the Father," "By his beard," "By the entrails of the Holy Spirit" — this is clear enough.

IV. Question II. *Is one who swears falsely thereby a blasphemer?* Response: Some affirm this. But the contrary opinion is true, which St. Thomas holds (II-II, q. 13, art. 3, ad 2): "*One who commits perjury does not say, nor believe, something false of God, as a blasphemer does; but he calls upon God as a witness, not indeed thinking that God is a false witness, but hoping that God will not manifest this by some evident sign.*"

V. Question III. *Does one who, in a single fit of anger, utters several blasphemies, commit one sin, or several?* Response: Fr. Leander, according to his custom, asserts absolutely, as more probable, that this angry blasphemer commits only a single sin, citing several authors in support, and concludes at last: "*See on this matter the most wise and most learned Amadeo Guimenio, treatise on penance, prop. 7.*" See the eloquence of casuists in mutual praise! Fr. Leander extols a booklet stuffed full of laxities, errors, and impostures, so often condemned by anathema by the Holy See. To this question I answer that the circumstances of time, of person, and of the customary habit of blaspheming must be weighed. For if the anger is prolonged — say, for a quarter of an hour, during which time the blasphemer could notice, and could, if he wished, check his anger — who doubts that there are several sins? But this question is of lesser importance in practice. For practical purposes, it suffices that the blasphemer disclose the duration of his fit of angry blasphemy, and his habit of blaspheming.

Chapter VI — On the penalties established against blasphemers, and on their judges

I. Under the Old Law, blasphemers were punished with death: "*He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die: all the multitude shall stone him, whether he be a native or a stranger*" (Lev. 24). Likewise, the common civil law decrees that all blasphemers are to be punished with the ultimate penalty. Although these laws, as regards this ultimate penalty of death, have fallen out of use through disuse, nevertheless kingdoms and principalities generally still punish blasphemers with the gravest penalties. In some places, common blasphemers are first flogged, then have their lips branded with a hot iron, and, for a third offense, their tongues are cut out. Elsewhere they are exposed to public derision. Canon law (ch. *Statuimus*, on maledictions) commands that blasphemers stand before the doors of the church for seven Sundays while the sacred rites are being performed, and, every Sunday,

without their cloak, barefoot, a rope bound about their neck, present themselves to public view; and that on seven Fridays they fast on bread and water. If they neglect to do this, they are to be barred from entering a church, before which they must stand; and, living, are to be barred from entering the church, and after death, deprived of ecclesiastical burial. The Fifth Lateran Council (session 9, ch. *Abusum*) punishes blasphemous Clerics for a first offense with the forfeiture of a year's income from their benefice; afterward it removes them from the benefice; and finally declares them incapable of holding any ecclesiastical revenues whatsoever. For noble laymen, it imposes a fine of twenty ducats for a first offense, fifty for a second, and finally pronounces them stripped of their nobility. Common people who have blasphemed twice must stand before the doors of the church with a shameful miter placed on their head. If they have become habitual blasphemers, they are condemned to the galleys, or to prison.

II. Question I. *Is one who hears a blasphemer bound to denounce him to a judge?* Response: The common opinion affirms this; and this is prescribed both by Julius III in his constitution beginning "In multis," and by the Lateran Council, in these words: "*Whoever shall hear a blasphemer is bound to rebuke him sharply with words, if this can be done without danger to himself; and he is bound to report, or notify, this to an ecclesiastical or secular judge within three days; and if several hear the same blasphemer together, each individually is bound to accuse him, unless perhaps they all agree that one should perform this office on behalf of all.*" Several points arise here concerning this denunciation, which I prefer, however, to postpone to another place. This much only I will say here: that fraternal correction is enjoined on everyone, and that it is only to be omitted for a truly urgent reason, or under the pretext of a fleshly prudence. Prudence is indeed necessary; I do not deny this in correcting one's brethren; but I would likewise warn that love of earthly things, worldly regard, and considerations of convenience must not be allowed to disguise themselves as Christian prudence. If you hear a blasphemer overcome by anger, correct him once his anger has subsided. Sometimes correction ought to be made immediately, depending on the character of the one blaspheming. If the blasphemies are heretical, they must be denounced to the legitimate judge, in accordance with the pontifical precepts on this matter. The judges of heresy are either the Inquisitors, or the Bishops. But more on this in its proper place.

III. Question II. *How ought a confessor to conduct himself with blasphemers?* Response: If the blasphemies are simple, the confessor can absolve the penitent of them, since such simple blasphemies are commonly not reserved. The Bishop, however, may reserve even these simple blasphemies, and once such a reservation is made, an ordinary confessor cannot grant absolution.

IV. Blasphemy is sometimes external and heretical in form, insofar as the words uttered smack of heresy; yet the blasphemer harbored no internal error in his mind while blurting them out. In this case, the common opinion teaches that a regular confessor can absolve the penitent in the internal forum, just as he can absolve from sortilege, magic, or sorcery — provided there was no error in the mind. On this matter, see the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 131). But more on this in the treatise on penance.

V. Question III. *What penance ought a confessor to impose on penitent blasphemers?* Response: The Lateran Council decreed that blasphemers are not to be absolved except with a most rigorous penance imposed by confessors. These are the Council's own words (session 9): "*To be abolished. In the forum of penance, let no one guilty of blasphemy be absolved, except with a most rigorous penance imposed at the severe confessor's discretion.*" More recent Probabilist authors answer that this decree is not received in

practice. And this is true in a sense. For if blasphemers were subjected to the gravest penalties, as the Council commands, and as the equity of judgment demands, God's holy name would not be blasphemed so frequently. But because not a few confessors absolve false penitents of the crime of blasphemy, as of other crimes, with only a light penance imposed, crimes of every kind run rampant, and flood the whole earth. But it is one thing to say that this decree is not received in practice, or that casuists and confessors, in fact, rarely impose the most severe penances on blasphemers as its prescription requires; it is quite another to say that the decree itself has become obsolete. This latter claim we deny, against Leander (disp. 5, q. 16), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 131), Castropalao (disp. 2, punct. 1, §3, n. 2), Sánchez (Bk. II, On the Decalogue, ch. 32, n. 44), and many others. If you ask them why this decree has no force, they answer only that it is not received in practice. This is their sole reason — which, if it held good, would mean the death and burial of every law that transgressors fail to receive in use, or execution. Ought not satisfaction to God be the graver, the graver the offense? Does not the Council of Trent command that penances be imposed proportionate to the gravity of the crime? Since blasphemy is a most grave crime, why should the gravest penances, which the Council commands, not be imposed on blasphemers? Both divine and natural law prescribe this equality of proportion. See, Christian reader, where the leniency of casuists tends! They make both the prescription itself, and the divine and natural laws themselves, subject to disuse. Away with so cruel a kindness! Let confessors, then, take care not to grant absolution without subjecting penitent blasphemers to worthy penances.

VI. Question IV. *Are those bound by a habit of blaspheming obliged to abstain from confession beforehand, until freed from the habit?* Response: Leander affirms, according to his custom (disp. 5, q. 17), that it is more probable, in his own view, that blasphemers ought to be absolved even if they have not amended, provided they truly grieve for their sins — even if often admonished, they have not reformed; and for this opinion of his he cites Sánchez, Castropalao, Hurtado, Trullench, and others. How lax this opinion is, everyone can see. They believe they escape every mark of laxity by saying, "provided they truly grieve for the blasphemies committed." But on what basis can you presume that a penitent is affected by sincere sorrow, if, having repeatedly spurned admonition, he has in no way turned to a better way of life, and shown no sign at all of amendment? Let the confessor, then, seriously consider with what zeal, effort, and diligence blasphemers have striven to restrain their tongue. Let him weigh whether they have put into practice the remedies prescribed for their amendment by other confessors. If he perceives progress, if he discerns a real effort at amendment in the penitent, he may absolve him. If not, let him defer absolution, and prescribe remedies more surely by which the penitent may abstain from blaspheming. An inveterate custom of long standing cannot be entirely rooted out all at once. It must, then, be broken and interrupted little by little, until, with the utmost diligence applied, it is entirely uprooted. Let him prescribe an alms to be given at once, if the penitent's means allow, as often as he happens to blaspheme; or let him impose the marking of so many crosses with the tongue on the bare ground, or some similar or harsher penance. If penitents truly grieve by this method, they will quickly amend themselves; and within a week or two, each will find himself reformed. The opinion of Leander and others cited above has been proscribed by Innocent XI, in this proposition: "*To one who has a habit of sinning against the law of God, of nature, or of the Church, even though no hope of amendment appears, absolution is neither to be denied nor deferred, provided he says with his mouth that he intends to amend.*" Our younger casuists will, no doubt, clamor as usual for us to consult the theologians they cite, or will claim that similar teachings are found in other theologians

too (which, if true, is only worse), or that their opinions have been reported without due fidelity. This is a rather stale objection, which we have several times, quite rightly, dismissed as ridiculous.

VII. But more on this when we come to discuss proximate occasion [of sin]. For now I will indicate what Comitoli teaches (Bk. IV, ch. 9, q. 9). He was accustomed to require his penitents, habituated to blasphemies against God and the Blessed Virgin, to recite the seven penitential psalms and the litanies with prayers, thirty, forty, or fifty times more or less, on bended and bare knees, touching the ground. He likewise required them to beg pardon of God, the Blessed Virgin, and the Saints ten times, on their knees; to mark a cross with the tongue on the ground ten times each day; and to strike their breast ten times. Confessors may impose these and similar penances on blasphemers, so as to free them from the habit of blaspheming. If they are wealthy, let confessors order them to give twenty solidi in alms for each blasphemy or perjury. If poor, let them oblige them to trace twenty crosses on the ground with the tongue, and to recite as many prayers. By these or similar means, some remedy will be found against this most wicked vice of blasphemy.

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A

Adoration (*Adoratio*). Adoration is the act by which one subjects oneself to another in testimony of his excellence, p. 2, n. 1. — One kind is of latria, another of dulia, another of hyperdulia, ibid. — One is internal, another external, ibid., n. 2. — One is absolute, another relative, ibid., n. 3. — Another is that shown to creatures on account of natural gifts and dignities, p. 3, n. 4. — There is a natural and divine precept of worshipping God by internal and external acts, ibid., n. 5. — That precept, as negative, obliges always and for always; as affirmative, at set times, p. 4, n. 6. — The lax doctrine of Tamburini and of certain more recent writers is rejected, ibid. — The worship of latria is owed to God alone, one and triune, and to Christ the Lord, p. 5, n. 1 ff. — Christ the Lord as man can be adored with the adoration of latria, ibid., n. 3. — But the humanity of Christ, as abstracted from the divine Word, is not to be adored with the adoration of latria, p. 6, n. 4. — In practice it is lawful to adore the humanity of Christ with the adoration of dulia on account of its created perfections, ibid., n. 5. — The body of Christ during the three days of his death was to be adored with the worship of latria, ibid., n. 6. — It is lawful to adore absolutely the host elevated by the Priest in the Mass, p. 7, n. 7. — The flesh, or blood, which sometimes appears in a consecrated host by miracle, is to be adored with the worship of latria, ibid., n. 8. — The Cross of Christ is to be adored with the worship of latria, p. 8, n. 1. — As also the other instruments of Christ's Passion, ibid., n. 2. — Objections are resolved, p. 9, n. 3 ff. — The Blessed Virgin is to be worshipped with the worship of hyperdulia, but the Angels and Saints with the worship of dulia, p. 10 f., n. 1 ff. — The objections and calumnies of the heterodox are blown away, p. 11 ff., n. 3 ff. — Men or women who have died with the reputation of holiness, but are not yet beatified or canonized, cannot be honoured with public worship, but only with private, p. 14, n. 11. — The use of images of the Trinity, of Christ the Lord, and of the Saints is lawful and pious, p. 16 f., n. 1 ff. — Their adoration also is lawful and pious, whatever the heretics may babble, p. 18 f., n. 4 ff. — With respect to the community of the faithful there is a precept of the use of sacred images, which can incidentally press upon individuals, p. 20, n. 9. — The same holds of their adoration, ibid., n. 10. — The relics of the Saints are worthy of adoration, p. 21 f., n. 1 ff. — Namely, the same adoration with which the persons whose relics they are are worshipped, p. 22, n. 4. — What such relics are is indicated, ibid., n. 5. — It is not lawful to adore the worms into which the bodies of the Saints decompose, ibid., n. 6 f. — Moral certainty is required, and suffices, for relics to be venerated as particles of some Saint, p. 23, n. 9. — That they may be exposed to public worship, the Bishop can approve only the relics of someone Beatified, or of a canonized Saint, p. 24, n. 10. — It is lawful to wear authentic relics suspended from the neck, ibid., n. 11. — In this all irreverence must be avoided, ibid. — One who steals relics from a Catholic commits a sacrilegious theft, ibid., n. 12. — Not even in a just war is it lawful for a Prince to carry off relics from the cities he has taken, and transfer them elsewhere, p. 25, n. 13. — The sale and purchase of relics is not lawful, ibid., n. 14. — They may, however, be bought from unbelievers for a price paid, ibid. — One who exposes sacred relics to be viewed principally so that more generous alms may thence be offered sins gravely, ibid. ; p. 26, n. 5 [=15] ff. — Thieves of relics who take them from any sacred places whatever are punished with the penalty of excommunication, ibid., n. 17. — It is lawful to venerate the wax Agnus Dei, p. 27, n. 18. — Those who paint them with colours and vermilion are excommunicated, ibid., n. 19. — It is lawful to take a price for their material, ibid. — They may be devoutly touched and kissed even by laymen, ibid. — Veneration is owed to priestly vestments, sacred vessels, and churches, p. 28, n. 20. — Consecrated chalices cannot be touched by laymen without venial sin, except by those of the Religious Orders that have privileges, ibid., n. 21. — Laymen of the same Orders may also touch corporals and purificators, while they serve in the sacristy, p. 29, n. 22. — Sacred things, so long as they keep their form, cannot be converted to profane uses, ibid., n. 23. — The lax opinion of Fr. Dicastillo concerning sacred vestments is rejected, ibid., n. 24. — These cannot be converted to profane uses even after their form is

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Equivocation (*Aequivocatio*). See: Lying.

Amphibology (*Amphibologia*). See: Lying.

Annibaldus (*Annibaldus*). Annibaldus, in the work commonly ascribed to St. Thomas, in no way favours lying, p. 546, n. 8.

Astrology, judicial (*Astrologia iudiciaria*). Judicial astrology, by which one divines contingent future things from the motion of the stars, the aspect of the planets, and so forth, the sterility of the land, men's diseases, and so forth, as probably to follow, is not superstitious, p. 47, n. 2. — Genethliac astrology, that of elections, and that of fabricated images, is superstitious, and forbidden by Sixtus V, p. 48, n. 3. — To divine free future things, though not with certainty but only probably, is superstitious, ibid., n. 4. — A merely conjectural prediction is not free of superstition, ibid., n. 5 ff. — Astrologers cannot lawfully predict temperament, inclination, and bodily characteristics from the sign of nativity, p. 50, n. 8 f. — Those who consult astrologers that they may reveal to them some hidden crime sin most gravely, p. 51, n. 10. — It is lawful to ask that underground waters, but not treasures or corpses lying hidden beneath tombs, be revealed by diviners, ibid., n. 11. — Astrologers, or diviners, who foretell things that escape natural knowledge are bound to restore the price received for the divination, ibid., n. 12. — The lax and monstrous doctrine of Fr. Sánchez is reported and disapproved, ibid., n. 13 f. See: Divination.

Augustine, St. (*S. Augustinus*). St. Augustine recounts wonderful prodigies of nature, p. 70, n. 5.

B

Bauny, Étienne (*Bauni (P. Stephanus)*). Fr. Étienne Bauny wrongly teaches that to call God to witness to a light lie is only a light sin, p. 408, n. 2. — This proposition is condemned by Innocent XI, ibid.

Benedict XIV (*Benedictus XIV*). Benedict XIV is praised for his immortal work On the Beatification and Canonization of the Servants of God, p. 15, n. 11.

Blasphemy (*Blasphemia*). Blasphemy is a derogation of the divine goodness, either by attributing to God what he does not have and cannot have, or by removing from him what he cannot lack, p. 99, n. 1. — It can derogate from the divine goodness in three ways, ibid., n. 2. — One kind is heretical, another simple, p. 100, n. 3. — One is against God, another against the Saints, ibid., n. 4. — That against God more probably differs in species from that against the Saints, ibid., n. 5 ff. — In confession it must be explained whether it was against God, against the Virgin, or against the Saints, p. 101, n. 7. — It is by its kind a mortal sin, ibid., n. 1 ff. — Perfect blasphemy is the greatest crime of all, p. 102, n. 3 ff. — Those sin who blaspheme out of an inveterate custom and a wicked habit, p. 103, n. 4 ff. — Tamburini's most lax opinion is disapproved, ibid. — One who, from a habit not retracted by penance, utters blasphemous words even thoughtlessly is guilty of blasphemy, ibid. ; p. 104, n. 7 ff. — Blasphemy uttered in jest is a mortal sin, ibid., n. 10 f. — The laxity of Leander, who imputes it to St. Thomas and to Navarre, is disapproved, p. 105, n. 12. — Various formulas of blaspheming against God and the Saints are reported, ibid. ; p. 106, n. 1 ff. — These expressions are blasphemies: "I do not believe in God," "I deny God, the Cross, the Gospels, the Sacraments, if it is not so", ibid., n. 3. — To say "May God perish, if it is not so" is blasphemy, ibid. — But not to say "By the life of God it is so," "God lives", ibid. — It is more probably blasphemy to say "This is as true as the Gospel, as that Christ was born of the Virgin", p. 107, n. 3. — These are heretical blasphemies: "By the body of God the Father," "By his beard," "By the wings of the Holy Spirit", ibid. — One who swears falsely is not a blasphemer, ibid., n. 4. — One who in a single fit of anger, adverting each time, utters several blasphemies commits several sins, ibid., n. 5. — The old law, the civil law, and the canon law have established several penalties against blasphemers, ibid., n. 1. — One who hears blasphemers ought to denounce them to a judge, p. 108, n. 2. — Simple blasphemies, unless reserved

by some Bishop, can be absolved by a simple Confessor, ibid., n. 3. — As also blasphemy that is only outwardly heretical, by a regular Confessor, p. 109, n. 6. — A Confessor ought to enjoin a most grave penance on blasphemers, by the decree of the Lateran Council, ibid., n. 7. — The laxity of the more recent Probabilists, who say that decree has fallen into disuse, is disapproved, ibid. — Absolution is to be deferred for habitual blasphemers until they have fulfilled the remedies prescribed by the Confessor, ibid. ; p. 110, n. 6. — The laxity of Leander and of the recent Probabilists is disapproved, ibid. — The penances rightly imposed on them by Fr. Comitolus are praised, ibid., n. 7.

Bonacina (*Bonacina*). Bonacina teaches lax propositions concerning lying, p. 471, n. 17.

C

Cabala (*Cabala*). See: Divination.

Caramuel (*Caramuel*). Caramuel shrewdly, and for the best of reasons, sets himself against mental restrictions, p. 530, n. 9.

Cárdenas, Juan de (*Cardenas (P. Ioannes de)*). Fr. Juan de Cárdenas is to be read with caution in what he has on certain propositions condemned by Innocent XI, p. 520, n. 12.

Casnedi, Carlo Antonio (*Casnedi (P. Carolus Antonius)*). Fr. Carlo Antonio Casnedi upholds that purely mental restrictions are not condemned, p. 524 ff., n. 10 ff. — He favours the Jansenists, p. 525, n. 12.

Castropalao, Fernando (*Castropalaus (P. Ferdinandus)*). Fr. Fernando Castropalao wrongly defends that a vow made in thanksgiving on account of an unjust thing is valid, p. 161, n. 27. — He is attacked, and at the same time it is shown that Suárez is wrongly alleged by him in his own favour, p. 162, n. 28 ff. — He laxly excuses from mortal sin one who, after a vow to abstain from wine, drinks only as much wine as a temperate man is accustomed to drink at one meal, p. 227, n. 4. — He teaches lax propositions concerning the oath, p. 380, n. 7 ; p. 410, n. 5.

Casuists (*Casuistae*). Their outcry, with which they trumpet that the words of their fellows which inspire horror at their laxity are not sincerely reported, is turned back upon themselves, p. 497 f., n. 14. See: Propositions, condemned; Propositions, lax.

Cattaneo, Ambrogio (*Cattaneus (P. Ambrosius)*). Fr. Ambrogio Cattaneo embraces the doctrine of material locutions, p. 476, n. 9 f. — He says this suffices to tear up all difficulties, ibid. — But it is shown to be improbable and false, p. 485 ff., n. 1 ff. — His opinion, comparing a lie with a theft committed in extreme necessity, is opposed to the doctrine of the Church, p. 492 ff., n. 1 ff. — It is wrongly defended by an anonymous confrère, the text of St. Thomas being cut short, p. 497 f., n. 13 f. — As also by false interpretations of the condemned propositions, p. 518 ff., n. 8 f.

Celladei (*Celladei*). See: Elizalde, Miguel de.

Wax Lambs (Agnus Dei) (*Cerei Agni*). See: Adoration.

Certainty, moral (*Certitudo moralis*). Moral certainty ought to exclude every prudent doubt, p. 412, n. 7. — That certainty is wrongly explained by the probabilist Casuists, p. 410, n. 5 ; p. 412, n. 8.

Cicero (*Cicero*). Cicero assigns the causes why sleepers divine, p. 63, n. 12.

Clergy of France (*Clerus Gallicanus*). The Clergy of France condemned the proposition by which it was asserted that the Patriarchs, the Prophets, the Angels, and Christ himself used equivocations, or amphibologies, and restrictions, p. 541, n. 15.

La Colombière, Claude de (*Columbier (P. de la)*). The piety of Fr. de la Colombière is praised, p. 174, n. 57.

Comitolus, Paulus (*Comitolus (P. Paulus)*). Fr. Paulus Comitolus rightly and prudently enjoined penances on habitual blasphemers, p. 110, n. 7.

Commutation of vows (*Commutatio voti*). The commutation of a vow is the substitution of one thing for another, p. 344, n. 1. — Those who can dispense can also commute vows, ibid., n. 2. — One who has vowed cannot by his own authority commute his vow even into something evidently better, p. 346 ff., n. 5 ff. — The objections are answered, ibid. — One who by his own authority commuted his vow into a lesser or an equal good would sin mortally, p. 350, n. 16. — One who vowed to enter one religious order cannot by his own authority enter another equally good, ibid., n. 17. — In things which are consumed by use, one cannot be substituted for another promised by vow unless it is within the same species, p. 351, n. 18. — Much less in speaking of things which are not consumed by use, ibid. — One who vowed to hand over a determinate son to religion cannot by his own authority substitute another, ibid., n. 19. — Neither a layman nor a married Cleric is capable of the jurisdiction of commuting vows, except by dispensation of the Pope, ibid., n. 20. — Vows are more probably to be commuted into morally equal matter, p. 352, n. 3 f. — Sporer's lax opinion is disapproved, p. 353, n. 5. — When the equality is doubtful, commutation has place, p. 354, n. 6. — A commutation into a lesser matter, and without due equality, is not free of mortal fault, ibid., n. 7. — A commutation into something evidently better, made by a Prelate endowed with the power, requires no cause, ibid., n. 9. — As also one into something evidently equal, and at the same time probably better, ibid., n. 10. — A Prelate cannot make it into an equal thing except with some cause, ibid., n. 11. — If the commutation is made by virtue of the jubilee, of the crusade bull, or of another pontifical privilege, the execution of the works prescribed in it suffices without a cause, p. 355, n. 12. — For a commutation to be made into an equal good, the petition of the one vowing alone does not suffice, ibid., n. 13. — But it is required that there be a cause, at least a light one, ibid., n. 14. — Otherwise the commutation, though valid, would yet be unlawful, ibid., n. 15. — But if it is made into a lesser good without a reasonable cause, it is null, p. 356, n. 18 ff. — Much more if it is made by one's own authority, p. 357, n. 20. — One who commutes a vow into a lesser, or an equal, good without a reasonable cause sins only venially, unless the diminution of the thing substituted for the vow is notable, ibid., n. 21. — But one who so commuted his vow for himself would sin mortally, ibid. — When a commutation appears illegitimate, as being manifestly into a lesser thing, it is not to be presumed that the commutation was mixed with a dispensation, ibid., n. 22. — Commutation is broader in the jubilee than in the Crusade bull, p. 358, n. 1. — The vows of chastity and of religion excepted both in that bull and in the jubilee are perfect and absolute vows, ibid., n. 2. — Commutation can be made both within and outside confession, p. 359, n. 3. — Not, however, into something less, ibid., n. 4. — The vows of religion and of chastity cannot be commuted by force of the jubilee or of the bull, even when necessity presses, ibid., n. 5. — As neither can a vow and oath of giving alms to a determinate Church, or poor person, after its acceptance, ibid., n. 6. — One who has once gained the jubilee can obtain the commutation of vows after it, p. 360, n. 7. — A commutation obtained at the beginning of the jubilee stands even if the enjoined works are afterward omitted through negligence, ibid., n. 8. — But one who culpably omits them sins mortally, ibid. — A Confessor who, asked in the time of the jubilee, refuses without just cause to commute vows sins, p. 361, n. 9. — When a vow is commuted into another matter, the prior obligation is not extinguished, but changed, ibid., n. 1. — A commutation of the vow having been made, the one vowing is not bound to carry out the prior matter if the substituted matter has become impossible, ibid., n. 2. — He is bound to it, however, even after the defined time has elapsed, if it can be fulfilled, ibid. — After a commutation made into something better, and accepted, the one vowing cannot return to the former matter, p. 362, n. 6. — The same holds after a commutation made into an equal thing, p. 364, n. 7. — In the commutation of a vow only the matter promised by the vow is to be regarded; but in dispensation, the bond of the promise also, p. 365, n. 2. — This is explained, ibid. — The greater or lesser dignity of the matter is to be judged both from the excellence of the virtue whose fruit it is, and from the circumstances, ibid., n. 3. — This is explained, ibid. — In any vow, the end, the quality, and the dignity are chiefly to be considered, p. 366, n. 4. — The difficulty of carrying out a vow is to be considered also from this, that such difficulty increases merit, ibid., n. 5. — This is explained, ibid. — Though it is fitting, it is not necessary that a personal vow be commuted into a personal one, and a real into a real, p. 367, n. 6. — In the commutation of conditional vows, it is to be considered how contingent

the coming of the condition is, when they are to be commuted into absolute ones, ibid., n. 7. — This is explained, ibid. — In any commutation of vows, the frailty of the one vowing is always to be regarded, and care must be taken that he be not too heavily burdened, or remain exposed to the danger of sinning, p. 368, n. 8. — This is explained, and illustrated by examples, ibid. ; ibid., n. 9. — In a pilgrimage it is to be considered whether the journey is on foot or not, ibid., n. 10. — The manner of commuting a vow of entering the Dominican Order is assigned, from Medina, ibid., n. 11. — As also of a vow not to marry, and of receiving the priesthood, p. 369, n. 12 ff.

D

Daniel, Gabriel (*Daniel (P. Gabriel)*). Fr. Gabriel Daniel wrongly contends that Innocent XI condemned the propositions as they lie, not as they stand in the books of the authors from whom they were excerpted, p. 472, n. 1. — In this way he favours the doctrine of the Jansenists on the five propositions, ibid.

Dicastillo, Juan (*Dicastillus (P. Ioannes)*). Fr. Juan Dicastillo laxly teaches that it is lawful to use sacred vestments within the church for honest comedies, p. 29 f., n. 24.

Dispensation of vows (*Dispensatio in voto*). A dispensation in a vow can be granted by the Church, p. 313, n. 1. — Such a faculty resides with the Prelates of the Church, p. 314, n. 3. — And it is of spiritual jurisdiction, not of order, ibid., n. 4. — It is the removal of the bond of a vow, made in the name of God by one having spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum, for a reasonable cause, ibid., n. 5. — Such removal is rightly explained by St. Thomas, ibid., n. 7. — One who can dispense can more probably also commute, p. 315, n. 9. — This power can be delegated to all Priests, and to Clerics initiated by the tonsure, provided they are not married, p. 316, n. 2. — Not, however, to married ones, unless it is delegated by the Supreme Pontiff himself, ibid. — Those to whom this power belongs by ordinary right are reviewed, ibid., n. 3. — Vows made by a community can for a cause be dispensed by the Bishop; but the successors of the community are not bound by force of the vow, but by the precept of the Bishop, who can dispense them, ibid., n. 4. — One who can grant a dispensation from a vow more probably cannot apply this privilege to himself, but must have recourse for it to his superiors, p. 317, n. 6. — Regular Prelates can dispense in their subjects' vows made with the license of the major Prelates, p. 318, n. 2. — As also with their Novices, ibid., n. 3. — Not, however, with their subjects in a vow of passing to a stricter religious order, if they are in a laxer one, that is, one collapsed from regular discipline in substantial matters, ibid., n. 4 ; p. 319, n. 5. — Nor in solemn vows, and those which affect the state of their own religious order, ibid., n. 6. — The many privileges alleged by many to prove the faculty of Regulars to dispense in all vows of seculars not reserved to the Supreme Pontiff do not stand, p. 320 ff., n. 2 ff. — They are reviewed, and attacked, ibid. — The opinion granting such privileges to Regulars is altogether false, p. 325 ff., n. 16 ff. — This is shown, ibid. — The Salmanticenses also falsely teach that Regulars can dispense in any vows whatever with Religious, even of another Order, by force of the privileges of Eugene IV and Sixtus IV, p. 327, n. 24. — Only five vows are reserved to the Pontiff: namely, the vows of perpetual chastity and of religion, and of the threefold pilgrimage, to Jerusalem, to Rome, and to Compostela, p. 328, n. 1 ff. — Objections drawn from St. Thomas are resolved, p. 329, n. 4 f. — Oaths made to God concerning these things are more probably reserved to the Pontiff equally with vows, p. 330, n. 6. — Bishops, and Prelates having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, can dispense in the five aforesaid vows when necessity presses, ibid., n. 7. — This is declared, ibid. — The Salmanticenses and Crousers wrongly ascribe the same privilege to all Prelates, ibid., n. 8. — In the cases in which Bishops can dispense, the dispensation ought not to exceed the limits of the necessity, p. 331, n. 9. — They can dispense as above, even if a pontifical Legate or Nuncio is in the province, unless these have power over the said vows specially delegated by the Pontiff, ibid., n. 10. — The reservation of vows is to be interpreted strictly, ibid., n. 11. — And for vows to be reserved, they must be absolute, certain, express, and perfect, ibid. — Vows to which someone intended to bind himself only under venial sin would not be reserved to the Pontiff, ibid., n. 12. — Or if they were made out of fear, even light fear, p. 332, n. 13. — If some such vow, or its reservation, is doubtful, it is to be judged in favour of non-reservation, ibid., n. 14. — A vow of not contracting marriage is not reserved, ibid., n. 15. — A Bishop can, by force of custom,

grant the faculty of asking the conjugal debt to one who, bound by a vow of chastity, contracted marriage, ibid., n. 16. — A vow of conjugal chastity is not reserved, ibid., n. 17. — Nor a vow of an unapproved religious order, p. 333, n. 18. — Vows of the threefold pilgrimage are reserved when they were made out of devotion, not in general, but toward the aforesaid places, ibid., n. 19. — A vow made with some circumstance is also reserved, if it remains whole when that circumstance is omitted, ibid., n. 20. — A disjunctive vow, while the choice remains open, is not reserved, ibid., n. 21. — It is otherwise once the one vowing has afterward chosen the reserved part, ibid. — A vow of entering religion if one's father dies is reserved, p. 334, n. 22. — Truly conditional vows, and penal ones too, are reserved once the condition is fulfilled, p. 335, n. 24. — The pious work into which a reserved vow is commuted is not reserved, p. 336, n. 25. — When the aforesaid vows are not reserved on some head, regular Prelates can commute them, ibid., n. 26. — One who receives by a bull, or jubilee, the faculty of dispensing, or commuting, all vows cannot relax even reserved ones, unless the faculty over them is expressed, ibid., n. 27. — For a valid and lawful dispensation a reasonable cause is necessary, ibid., n. 1 ; p. 337 ff., n. 2 ff. — In doubt of the existence of a cause for dispensing, the Prelate cannot dispense, p. 338, n. 6. — If the cause is certain, and it is doubtful whether it is sufficient, it will be better to commute the vow, ibid. — A dispensation given in good faith, both on the side of the one asking and of the one granting, for a cause afterward found false and null, is more probably null, p. 339, n. 8. — That a dispensation may be lawfully imparted, three things are required: that it be lawful according to equity; that it be becoming according to honesty; that it be expedient according to utility, p. 340, n. 9. — For particular causes occurring, the Bishop can dispense, p. 341, n. 10. — They are reviewed, ibid. — Imperfect deliberation of the one vowing alone is not a sufficient cause for granting him a dispensation, p. 341, n. 11. — Even if it arises from fear of death, of shipwreck, or of some other grave danger, p. 342, n. 12. — A grave difficulty in carrying out the vow, not foreseen before the vow, suffices for granting its dispensation, ibid., n. 13. — But if it was foreseen, it regularly does not suffice, ibid. ; p. 343, n. 14. — In a negative doubt about a vow made, there is a just cause for dispensing; not, however, if there are more probable reasons for the vow, ibid., n. 15. — For the increase of the common good, or to avoid its harm, a dispensation can be granted, ibid., n. 16. — A cause adequate for dispensing a vow absolutely rarely occurs, p. 344, n. 17.

Divination (*Divinatio*). What divination is is set forth, and its species are indicated, p. 41, n. 1 f. — Demons can foretell those future things which depend wholly on natural causes, ibid., n. 3. — Demons teach their diviners in many ways, p. 42, n. 4. — Diviners invoke the help of demons sometimes by an explicit, sometimes by a tacit pact, ibid. ; p. 43, n. 5 ff. — This is explained, ibid. — Divination by an explicit pact with a demon does not differ in moral species from that carried out by a tacit pact, p. 44, n. 11. — Yet on account of the aggravating circumstance, and because other sins commonly accompany this one, it is to be explained in confession, ibid. ; p. 45, n. 12. — It is a mortal crime, whether it is by an explicit or a tacit pact, p. 46, n. 13. — Those who rather often use the cabala for the sake of a jest sin gravely, ibid. — Natural divination by the stars, though for the most part vain, is yet lawful, p. 47, n. 1. — It is lawful to divine the future by dreams sent by God, p. 54, n. 4. — Whether they are sent by God or by a demon is difficult to know, ibid. — They are to be made known to a prudent Confessor, ibid. — The observation of natural dreams is lawful, ibid., n. 5. — To divine free future things from dreams is a grave crime, ibid., n. 6. — One who, on the occasion of dreams, prudently orders his conduct and business does not sin, p. 55, n. 7. — This is explained, ibid. — Even if dreams are borne out by events, they are not to be observed, ibid., n. 8. — From the song, flight, and movement of birds it is lawful to foretell future things which depend on natural causes, p. 56, n. 2. — But not free contingent ones, p. 57, n. 3. — Nor future things from human words uttered by chance, or from other fortuitous events, ibid., n. 4. — Natural physiognomy is lawful, ibid. ; p. 58, n. 5. — But to divine free contingent future things from astrological physiognomy is superstitious, ibid. — Those who seriously consult the Egyptians, commonly called Gypsies, that they may announce good or bad fortune to them from the showing of the hands, sin mortally, p. 58, n. 6. — Divination by the use of lots is of three kinds: divisory, consultative, and divinatory, p. 58 f., n. 1. — This is explained, ibid. — Divisory lots are lawful, p. 59, n. 2. —

In the election to secular dignities it is lawful to use divisory lots, ibid., n. 3. — Not, however, in the election to ecclesiastical benefices, ibid. ; p. 60, n. 4. — An election to those benefices carried out by lot is unlawful, but not null, ibid., n. 5. — The casting of lots to settle disputes over property and ecclesiastical benefices is lawful if it is done by public authority; otherwise if by private, ibid. ; p. 61, n. 6 f. — A consultative casting of lots, in which the effect is expected from a demon, is superstitious, p. 62, n. 8. — But it is lawful when the knowledge of a future event is implored from God, ibid., n. 9. — Four conditions required for this are reviewed, ibid. — Divination made by the use of duels, of red-hot iron, and of boiling water is unlawful, ibid., n. 11. — Sleepers divine more than those who are awake, p. 63, n. 12. — The causes are assigned, ibid. — Fools and simpletons divine more easily than those endowed with sound mind, ibid., n. 13. — The causes are assigned, ibid. — Men near to death divine the future, p. 64, n. 14. — As, according to St. Augustine, do those raving with a burning fever, ibid., n. 15. — The notory art, the observance of remedies for health, as also of future events, is unlawful, p. 55 [=65] ff., n. 1 ff. — This is explained and shown, ibid. See: Astrology, judicial.

E

Elizalde, Miguel de (*Elizalde (P. Michael, vulgo Celladei)*). Fr. Miguel de Elizalde (commonly "Celladei") says that the Casuists' distinction between the doctrine of the Fathers teaching in the schools and that by which they preach in the churches is the chief origin of the present laxity, p. 480, n. 7.

F

Fascination (*Fascinatio*). See: Magic.

Francolino, Baldassarre (*Francolinus (P. Balthassar)*). Fr. Baldassarre Francolino falsely writes that our Casuists write from the doctrine of the Fathers where the Fathers have gone before, and from a doctrine not contrary to the Fathers where the Fathers have not gone before, p. 479 f., n. 7. — The distinction he places between the Fathers teaching in the schools and the same preaching from the pulpit is the origin of laxity, ibid. — That distinction lessens the authority of the Fathers, and favours the Lutherans and Calvinists, ibid.

Fuente Hurtado, Diego de la (*Fuente Hurtado (P. Didacus de la)*). Fr. Diego de la Fuente Hurtado upholds purely mental restrictions even after their condemnation, p. 522 ff. — His doctrine is reported and disapproved, ibid. — He offers the Jansenists a handle for eluding pontifical decrees, p. 524, n. 8. — He rashly attributes the doctrine of purely mental restrictions to Sts. Augustine, Thomas, and Gregory, ibid., n. 9.

G

Gobat, Georg (*Gobat (P. Georgius)*). Fr. Georg Gobat teaches a lax proposition concerning the vow, p. 170, n. 47.

Grotius, Hugo (*Grotius (Hugo)*). Hugo Grotius wrongly contends that the promissory oath is not lawful, p. 419, n. 1.

H

Heir (*Heres*). Whether an heir is bound to pay the vows of the testator. See: Vow.

Hesselius, Joannes (*Hesselius (Ioannes)*). Joannes Hesselius of Louvain wrongly contends that it is by no means lawful to destroy the signs of sorcery, p. 80, n. 9.

I

Idolatry (*Idololatria*). Idolatry is a particular species of superstition, and a grave crime, p. 38 ff., n. 1 ff.

Images, sacred (*Imagines sacrae*). See: Adoration.

Invalidation of vows (*Irritatio voti*). The invalidation of a vow is its removal, made by one who holds dominative power, p. 287, n. 1. — For such an invalidation to be valid, some cause is required, ibid., n. 3. — But for it to be lawful, there are two opinions, each true in its own sense, ibid. ; p. 288, n. 4 f. — The faculty of invalidating vows is more probably of natural law, p. 289, n. 7 f. — The Supreme Pontiff cannot invalidate whatever vows a father, guardian, prelate, and master can, p. 290, n. 10. — Bishops can invalidate the vows of Nuns subject to them, but not of those not subject, nor of exempt Regulars, nor of Clerics not their own, and much less of laymen, p. 291, n. 11. — Only those can invalidate vows directly who have dominative power over the persons subject to them, ibid., n. 12. — This is illustrated by examples, ibid. — To act prudently, a superior is bound to know specifically the vows to be invalidated, ibid., n. 13. — He can invalidate them even against the subjects' will, ibid., n. 14. — Even internal vows of Regulars, which in no way disturb the government nor the observance of religion, can be invalidated by their Prelates, p. 292 f., n. 3. — The objections are answered, p. 293, n. 4. — Those vows are excepted which constitute a state, and the vow of passing to a stricter religious order, p. 294, n. 5. — The Prelates able to invalidate the vows of subjects of Regulars are enumerated, ibid., n. 6. — Neither Legates a latere nor the Congregations of Cardinals can invalidate the vows of Religious, ibid., n. 7. — When the chief Prelates are present, the secondary ones have no right of invalidating vows, ibid., n. 8. — Abbesses, or Prioresses, can invalidate the vows of their Nuns, p. 295, n. 9. — Regular Prelates cannot invalidate the vows of Novices, ibid., n. 10. — Parents can invalidate the vows of non-pubescent children, p. 297, n. 2. — Not, however, the personal vows of children who have attained puberty, if these do not hinder the government of the household; otherwise he can, ibid., n. 3. — Vows made by children who are wards, and confirmed by them at puberty, cannot be invalidated, except as above, p. 298, n. 4. — The vows of non-pubescent children once confirmed by the father more probably cannot afterward be invalidated by him, ibid., n. 6. — Vows made by natural and illegitimate children can be invalidated by the father, unless they have been placed under a guardian or curator, p. 299, n. 7. — The real vows of pubescent children can be invalidated by the father, ibid., n. 8. — Not, however, if those vows concern goods of a military kind (castrensia), ibid., n. 9. — Or adventitious goods, of which they have the administration, p. 300, n. 10. — As neither a vow of going to Rome, if it is necessary to go there to obtain absolution from an excommunication, ibid., n. 11. — Guardians and Curators can invalidate the vows of non-pubescent children and minors as fathers can, ibid., n. 13. — A curator given to an adult on account of the fault of prodigality can invalidate his real vows, p. 301, n. 15. — A mother, the husband being present or living, cannot invalidate the vows of the children, p. 302, n. 19. — Nor when he is dead or far absent, if a grandfather, guardian, or curator of the children exists, ibid., n. 20. — She can, however, when all these are lacking, p. 303, n. 21. — Not, however, the real vows of pubescent children, ibid., n. 22. — In default of parents, a grandfather and grandmother can invalidate those vows which a mother can, ibid., n. 23. — Masters of disciples, owners of servants, and masters of household staff cannot invalidate personal vows made in childhood, p. 304, n. 25. — A husband can more probably invalidate only those vows of his wife made after the marriage was contracted which regard the marriage, the education of the children, the administration of goods, and the government of the household, ibid., n. 1 ; p. 305 f., n. 2 ff. — He cannot invalidate the vows and oaths of his wife concerning commanded works, p. 307, n. 7. — Nor can he more probably invalidate a vow of not asking the debt made by his wife without his consent, ibid., n. 8. — Nor a vow of chastity which the wife made with his consent, ibid., n. 9. — Or which both made by mutual consent, ibid., n. 10. — Even if they have afterward sacrilegiously performed the conjugal act, ibid., n. 11. — It would be otherwise if the spouses only granted each other leave to vow, without the kind of vow being specified, p. 308, n. 12. — When each spouse by mutual consent vows religion, one alone cannot, nor can both by mutual consent, invalidate that vow, ibid., n. 13. — Vows which the wife made before the marriage was contracted, but to be fulfilled after the marriage was entered upon, the husband cannot invalidate, but only suspend, inasmuch as they are inconvenient to the marital office, ibid., n. 14. — Vows which the wife makes, to be fulfilled after the marriage is dissolved, the husband more probably cannot invalidate, ibid., n. 15. — A wife can invalidate those vows of her husband which are repugnant to the matrimonial right, p. 309, n. 16. — A wife cannot invalidate a vow

made by her husband not to ask the debt, ibid., n. 17. — Such a vow would for the most part, and almost always, be unlawful, ibid., n. 18. — A wife can invalidate a vow which her husband made of wearing the habit of an Eremite, or of some religious order, p. 310, n. 19. — Not, however, a vow of giving ample alms and of pouring out lengthy prayers, ibid., n. 20. — She can invalidate a vow of keeping frequent fasts which would make the husband unfit to render the debt, ibid. — As also a vow of a long pilgrimage, ibid., n. 21. — She cannot, however, invalidate vows of the husband made before the marriage, but only suspend them, p. 311, n. 22. — Masters of household servants cannot invalidate their vows, but only suspend them, inasmuch as they hinder the service owed to them, p. 312, n. 1. — If the servants are truly slaves, the masters can invalidate vows that hinder the service owed to them; otherwise not, ibid., n. 4. — Not, however, vows of chastity and the like, ibid., n. 6. — The same is to be said of sons of a family who have slaves as goods belonging to their military peculium, p. 313, n. 7.

Oath (*Iuramentum*). Several heretics have condemned the oath as unlawful, p. 375, n. 1. — And this relying, as they think, on Scripture and on reason, p. 374, n. 2. — But it is a truth of faith that not every oath is forbidden, or unlawful, for Christians, ibid., n. 3 ff. — The arguments of the heretics are answered, p. 375 ff., n. 5 ff. — An oath is the invocation of the divine name to give credence to an assertion, or to confirm a promise, p. 383, n. 1. — This is explained, ibid., n. 3 ff. — The various formulas of swearing are reduced to three classes, p. 384, n. 7. — They are explained, and their force is laid bare by many examples, p. 385 ff., n. 8 ff. — Various ways of speaking that sound the same as "By God" are reviewed; and it is shown, chiefly against Sporer and Tamburini, that they are true oaths, p. 389 ff., n. 1 ff. — Those who everywhere take the name of God in vain, though they affirm or deny nothing, sin gravely, p. 391, n. 4. — These formulas, "By my soul," "On my soul," imply an oath; but not these, "By my conscience," "On my conscience", p. 391, n. 5. — One swears who says, "I swear by my conscience", p. 392, n. 6. — As does one who says, "I swear by the life of this horse," or by the preservation of an inanimate thing, ibid., n. 7. — One who, asked thus, "Do you swear to me by God that the matter is so?", answers "The matter is so," swears, p. 393, n. 8. — One swears who uses expressions taken for an oath according to common estimation, ibid., n. 9. — In an ambiguous matter, the intention of the one uttering it is to be attended to, ibid., n. 10. — It is not lawful to swear by false gods; nor does such an oath oblige, p. 394, n. 11. — Some formulas containing an execratory oath are reviewed, p. 395, n. 12. — They are to be weighed as they are commonly uttered, ibid., n. 13. — In an oath, the mind and intention of the one swearing are to be attended to, ibid., n. 15. — But if the formula of words by its own nature expresses an oath, it is an oath, even when the intention of swearing is lacking, ibid. — For an oath the word "I swear" is not required; an express invocation of the divine testimony suffices, p. 396, n. 16. — Words which can be used in a double sense are to be interpreted with regard to those who pronounce them, ibid., n. 17. — So too ambiguous words; as also they are to be interpreted from the circumstances, p. 397, n. 18. — That divine rule is explained: "But let your speech be Yea, yea; No, no", ibid., n. 19. — The division of oaths is to be taken from the side of the thing sworn, and from the manner of swearing, p. 398, n. 1. — On the side of the matter, the oath is divided into assertory and promissory, ibid., n. 2. — An assertory oath is that by which God is invoked in confirmation of a truth, either present or past, ibid. — A promissory oath is that by which one confirms the promise of a future thing, so as to make the other more secure, ibid. — Both are explained, ibid. — The promissory is divided into absolute, and confirmatory, which is also called a sworn vow, ibid. — One who violates a vow sworn to God sins both against the vow and against the oath, ibid. — On the side of the manner of swearing, the oath is divided into attesting and execratory, p. 399, n. 3. — This is explained by examples, ibid. — One oath is simple, another solemn, p. 400, n. 4. — Several rites of the Jews for the use of the oath are reported, ibid. — Various rites for solemn oaths are prescribed in civil and canon law, ibid., n. 5. — A solemn oath is either verbal, made by words alone, or judicial, which is taken in judgments, ibid., n. 6 ; p. 401, n. 7. — The judicial is either of calumny, ibid., n. 7. — Or of malice, p. 402, n. 8. — Or suppletory, ibid. — Another is "in litem," another necessary, another voluntary, ibid., n. 9 ff. — The suppletory oath is to be tendered to the defendant, not to the plaintiff, in a doubtful case, p. 403, n. 12. — And indeed only in the gravest necessity, ibid., n. 13. — There is no place for the suppletory oath in criminal cases in which a

corporal penalty is to be inflicted on the defendant, ibid., n. 14. — The aforesaid oaths are all of the same species, p. 404, n. 16. — Not seldom, however, they contain another malice too, as of blasphemy and so forth, ibid., n. 19. — That an oath be lawful, three conditions are required: truth, justice, and judgment, p. 405 ff., n. 1 ff. — This is explained, ibid. — Six cases are assigned in which an oath is not only free of fault, but even has the merit of virtue, p. 407, n. 4. — The truth required in an assertory oath need not be such in the thing; it suffices that it be thought such, p. 408, n. 1. — One who swears falsely in the lightest matter sins mortally, ibid., n. 2. — The opposite proposition of Fr. Bauny is condemned by Innocent XI, ibid. — One who swears a doubtful matter as certain, or the contrary, sins mortally, p. 409, n. 3. — One who swears by hyperbole something which, as it sounds, is not true, swears unlawfully, ibid., n. 4. — It is not lawful to swear something which you judge only probably to be true, p. 410 f., n. 5. — The lax opinions of Leander, Sánchez, and others are disapproved, ibid. — That someone may lawfully swear, moral certainty is necessary, which excludes every prudent doubt, p. 412, n. 7. — Moral certainty is wrongly explained by the Casuists, ibid., n. 8. — No one, whether in judgment or out of it, can swear as absolutely true a thing which he has heard only from a single trustworthy witness, p. 413, n. 9. — The norm of the diligence required in inquiring into the truth necessary for an oath ought to be, not the nature of the thing sworn, but the supreme gravity and dignity of the oath, p. 414, n. 10. — One who is notably negligent in inquiring into the truth of the thing he swears sins mortally, even if it happens to be true, ibid., n. 11. — That students may lawfully swear that a fellow student attended the schools for the time required by the university, it is enough that they know he commonly heard the lectures, p. 415, n. 12. — Tamburini's tangled doctrine, taken from Hurtado, is disapproved, ibid. — It is not lawful to persuade someone to swear a truth of which he himself is ignorant, ibid., n. 13. — The defect of justice in an assertory oath is more probably a mortal sin when the assertion of the one swearing is a mortal sin; otherwise not, p. 416, n. 3. — But the defect of judgment is light, if it is only in weighing the necessity of swearing, p. 418, n. 5. — But if it is in the inquiry into the truth, it will be grave or light according as the negligence was grave or light, ibid. — Grotius wrongly contends that the promissory oath is not lawful, p. 419, n. 1. — In it too truth, judgment, and justice are required, ibid. — In a promissory oath the defect of present truth is always a mortal sin, ibid., n. 2. — One who does not fulfil a thing promised and confirmed by oath in grave matter sins mortally, p. 420, n. 3. — The same holds even if the matter is light, p. 421 ff., n. 5 ff. — The failure to carry out such an oath brings in a falsity not material, but formal, p. 423, n. 9. — The objections of the adversaries are answered, p. 425 f., n. 12 ff. — One who promised something under oath with a doubtful intention of fulfilling it would sin mortally, p. 427, n. 16. — Oaths by which men commonly swear that they will, or will not, do something are to be interpreted according to the common sense in which they are taken, ibid., n. 17. — One who swears that he will fornicate, or perpetrate some grave crime, sins mortally against religion, p. 428, n. 2. — He more probably sins so too if the crime is light, ibid., n. 4 f. — One who swears that he will do something against the evangelical counsels sins only venially, p. 429, n. 6. — The matter of an oath must be lawful, possible, and good, p. 430, n. 1. — This is explained, ibid., n. 2 ff. — If an indifferent matter is sworn for an honest end, or for the benefit of one's neighbour, the oath obliges, p. 431, n. 6. — In a liberal promise, and in one sworn of contracting marriage, the condition "unless I choose a better state" is always included, p. 432, n. 8. — An oath concerning an unlawful thing needs no relaxation, ibid., n. 9. — Two objections drawn from canon law are answered, ibid. — Absolutely speaking, the obligation of a vow is greater than that of an oath, p. 434, n. 6. — It is not lawful to swear without the intention of swearing, p. 436 f., n. 9 f. — Fr. Tamburini's doctrine is disapproved as a condemned doctrine; and so is the explanation of it which Fr. Viva offers, ibid. — One who swears something false in grave matter without the intention of swearing sins mortally, p. 437, n. 11. — As also in light matter, ibid., n. 12 f. — Fr. Viva seems wrongly to defend the opposite as probable, ibid. — One who swears something true without the intention of swearing sins mortally, even if he swears in light matter, p. 439, n. 16. — One who deliberately swears, for example "By God it is so," utters a true oath, even if he has the intention of not swearing, ibid., n. 17. — An objection is satisfied, p. 440, n. 18. — One who swears something false by a slip of the tongue is not guilty of perjury, nor does he sin mortally; otherwise if from a

wicked habit, p. 441, n. 19. — One who swears without the intention of binding himself is more probably in fact bound, p. 442, n. 21.

L

La Croix, Claude (*La Croix (P. Claudius)*). Fr. Claude La Croix teaches a lax proposition concerning the vow, p. 117, n. 8. — And other lax ones on the same, p. 170 f., n. 47 ff. — He laxly teaches that one who omits the whole Rosary promised by vow sins only lightly, p. 183, n. 13. — He laxly teaches that one who vows abstinence from wine to avoid drunkenness may take any other drinks apt to inebriate, p. 226, n. 3. — His doctrine and Fr. Cattaneo's, comparing a lie with a theft committed in extreme necessity, is opposed to the doctrine of the Church, p. 492 ff., n. 1 ff. — His doctrine of mental restrictions falls back into that which teaches that the danger of losing life is a cause able to make a purely mental restriction not purely mental, p. 504, n. 14. — And into that which teaches that a lie in grave necessity is not a lie, and so is lawful, p. 505, n. 15. — His interpretation of the condemned amphibologies is reported and disapproved, p. 517 f., n. 7 ff. — His method of writing opens the way to excessive laxity, p. 520, n. 12.

Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament (*Leander a SS. Sacramento*). Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament most laxly teaches that one who blasphemes from an inveterate custom does not sin, p. 103, n. 6. — Another horrible laxity of the same on this, ibid., n. 7. — He wrongly calls on St. Augustine as patron in defence of his laxity, ibid., n. 8. — Another laxity of the same, which he falsely imputes to Navarre and to St. Thomas, is disapproved, p. 105, n. 12. — He praises Amadeus Guimenius, full of laxities, errors, and impostures, p. 107, n. 5. — Another laxity of the same, and of the recent Probabilists, on absolving habitual blasphemers at once, is disapproved, p. 109 f., n. 6. — Other lax propositions of the same on the vow, p. 116 f., n. 3 and 5 ; p. 136 f., n. 17 ff. — And on the oath, p. 379 f., n. 3 and 8 ; p. 410, n. 5.

M

Magic (*Magia*). Natural magic, by which certain wonderful and unusual things are done, is lawful, p. 68, n. 1 f. — Natural and superstitious magic can be distinguished by three signs, p. 69, n. 3. — They are reviewed, ibid. — In doubt whether an effect proceeds from a natural cause or from a superstitious art, one must abstain from procuring it, ibid. ; p. 70, n. 4 f. — The equivocation of the Salmanticenses, who wrongly fit the doctrine of St. Thomas to the question, is exposed, ibid. — That there are "healers," so called, who heal diseases not by natural power but by a grace freely given by God, is more probably not the case, p. 71 f., n. 6 ff. — Their superstition can be discerned by several signs, p. 73, n. 10. — They are reviewed, ibid. — An invocative charm (ensalmus) is lawful, but not a constitutive one, ibid., n. 11. — Both are explained, ibid. — One fascination is vulgar, another physical, or natural, p. 74, n. 12. — That there is a natural one is more probable, ibid., n. 14. — The vulgar is superstitious, p. 75, n. 15.

Sorcery (*Maleficium*). One sorcery is poisonous, another amatory, p. 76, n. 1. — The Church proposes remedies for expelling these, p. 77, n. 2. — The remedies proposed by the Philosophers against amatory sorcery are vain and full of superstition, ibid. — Yet the use of natural remedies is useful, ibid. — It is not lawful to ask the dissolution of a sorcery from a sorcerer, even one ready to do it, ibid., n. 3. — The objections are satisfied, p. 78, n. 4. — It is lawful to ask a sorcerer to take away a sorcery, if it is established that he can do it by lawful means, ibid. ; p. 79, n. 5 ff. — It is lawful to destroy the signs of sorcery, p. 80, n. 8. — Hesselius's opposite opinion is disapproved, ibid., n. 9. — A sorcerer who handed a demon a document signed with his own blood is not bound to redeem it in order to do true penance, p. 81, n. 10. — Money, whether genuine or counterfeit, obtained by the demon's art, must altogether be thrown away, ibid. — Women given to sorcery are called some "lamiae," some "sagae," some "striges", p. 81, n. 1. — This is explained, ibid. — Women are more given to sorcery than men, for several causes, ibid., n. 2. — These causes are reviewed, ibid. — Two reasons are assigned why old women rather than younger ones devote themselves to enchantments and sorcery, p. 83, n. 3. — A solid reason why God permits lamiae, or striges, to harm infants and the young rather than adults,

ibid., n. 4. — Striges can in fact be carried from place to place by the help of the demon, ibid. ; p. 84, n. 5. — This rarely happens, ibid. — Little faith, too, is to be given to women in these matters, ibid., n. 6. — Luther and his followers wrongly accuse Catholics of giving credence to some transports of this kind, p. 85, n. 7. — The Council of Ancyra does not favour them, ibid. — Witch-women, or men, can by no means be changed by the demon into a cat, a weasel, a hare, or other beasts, ibid. ; p. 86, n. 8 f. — Only the senses of those who see, and of the witches, can be changed by him, ibid., n. 10. — Demons cannot bring witches through closed doors into houses and the bedchambers of their lovers, ibid., n. 11. — The place is assigned in which the gathering of witches with demons is held, and what they do at such meetings, ibid., n. 12. — Intercourse of demons with women does in fact happen, p. 87 f., n. 13. — The usual objections of the adversaries are washed away, p. 88, n. 14. — Human and divine laws decree that sorcerers be punished, p. 89, n. 1. — They are in fact excommunicated by the law, ibid., n. 2. — They are to be denounced to the Inquisitors, ibid.

Marín, Juan (*Marin (P. Ioannes)*). Fr. Juan Marín teaches a lax proposition concerning the vow, p. 117, n. 7. — He laxly teaches that one who vows virginity is not bound to chastity, p. 234, n. 22.

Martínez de Prado, Juan (*Martinez de Prado (Ioannes)*). Juan Martínez de Prado teaches a lax proposition concerning the vow, p. 116, n. 4. — And another, p. 153, n. 11 f.

Lying (*Mendacium*). Plato, and some Fathers of the Church, taught that a lie is lawful when a most grave cause presses, p. 445 ff., n. 1 ff. — Their testimonies are reported, ibid. — Chrysostom was not free of this error, p. 446, n. 5. — Such an opinion was common in St. Augustine's time, p. 448, n. 8. — It is wrongly proved hence by the heretics that the Fathers are of no authority, ibid., n. 9. — Before, or around, Augustine's time, several authors declared war on lying, p. 449 f., n. 1 ff. — They are reviewed, ibid. — All that St. Augustine writes on lying is narrated compendiously, p. 451 ff., n. 1 ff. — All that the same holy Doctor wrote to Consentius against lying is likewise narrated compendiously, p. 458 ff., n. 1 ff. — In that book all lies are expressly routed, ibid. — Augustine's doctrine is most opportune for settling the controversy over the deceitful oath, against the doctrine of very many more recent writers on equivocations and mental restrictions, p. 464 ff., n. 1 ff. — Their doctrine is either the same as, or worse than, that which St. Augustine disapproved, ibid. — The doctrine devised by very many more recent writers for concealing the truth is narrated historically, p. 467, n. 1. — A synopsis is given of this doctrine, contained in various lax propositions of Thomas Sánchez and of Tamburini, p. 468 ff., n. 2 ff. — Innocent XI condemned the principles of the aforesaid propositions when he condemned mental restrictions, p. 472, n. 1. — That this Pontiff condemned only the propositions as they lie, and not as they stand in the books of the authors from which they were excerpted, Fr. Gabriel Daniel wrongly asserts, ibid. — After mental restrictions were condemned, very many more recent writers took refuge in the distinction of purely and not purely mental restrictions, as also in amphibological and equivocal words, p. 473, n. 3 ff. — This is explained, ibid. — Not a few others, in communicable and incommunicable knowledge, p. 474, n. 5. — Others, finally, in locutions employed materially, that is, with the intention of signifying nothing, ibid., n. 6. — The doctrine of Fr. Tanner and of Fr. Stoz is explained, p. 475, n. 7. — And the doctrine of Fr. La Croix, especially with respect to a Confessor questioned about a matter he holds under the seal, ibid., n. 8. — Fr. Ambrogio Cattaneo extends this doctrine to cases not only grave, but to avoiding any notable inconvenience whatever, p. 476, n. 9 f. — Yet the doctrine of these more recent writers is the same as the doctrine of Cassian, who would have lies lawful in extreme necessity, p. 477, n. 1 ff. — And it is opposed to the doctrine of St. Augustine, who condemns lies in every event, ibid. — This is shown by a comparison of the cases proposed by the same Augustine and by the more recent writers, and resolved by contrary doctrine, ibid. — The doctrine of the more recent writers on purely mental restrictions is false, and rightly condemned by the Church, p. 481 ff., n. 1 ff. — The objections are answered, p. 483 f., n. 6 ff. — It is improbable and false that words, by the common law of the commonwealth, signify nothing if they are employed to conceal a truth which cannot be made known without grave harm, p. 485 ff., n. 1 ff. — That law was unknown to all the ancients, ibid., n. 2. — The opinion of Tamburini, who says that a man may at will utter words materially, is laxer than the very proposition condemned concerning mental restrictions, p. 489 ff., n. 1 ff. — The opinion of

Fr. Cattaneo, of Fr. La Croix, and of others, comparing a lie with a theft committed in extreme necessity, is opposed to the doctrine of the Church, p. 492 ff., n. 1 ff. — The common opinion of very many more recent writers, which defends restrictions not purely mental by the help of communicable and incommunicable knowledge, useful and not useful for speaking, is brought under examination, p. 499 ff., n. 1 ff. — It is shown not to differ from the opinion of those who uphold purely mental restrictions, ibid. — What Fr. Viva has published on it is attacked, ibid. — His doctrine falls back into the condemned proposition, p. 502 f., n. 9 ff. — The causes are reviewed why very many more recent writers in fact defend the proscribed purely mental restrictions, p. 506 f., n. 1 f. — The doctrines of Fr. Sánchez are reported and disapproved, together with the defence of him that Fr. Viva offers, ibid. ; p. 508 ff., n. 5 ff. — Very many more recent writers in fact teach mental restrictions because they wrongly put life before truth, p. 515, n. 1. — When the use of mental restriction is rejected as unlawful, it is wrongly inferred that some precepts of God are impossible, ibid., n. 2. — St. Augustine's doctrine is shown, p. 516, n. 3 f. — The single and peculiar case of Confessors is wrongly confused with other cases, ibid., n. 5 f. — It is false that the condemned propositions were not condemned as they stand in the authors, p. 517, n. 7. — Extraordinary senses are wrongly fastened on the aforesaid propositions, in which it is contended that they were condemned, ibid. ; p. 518 ff., n. 8 ff. — The senses attributed to them by Fr. La Croix and by the anonymous defender of Fr. Cattaneo are reported and disapproved, ibid. — Fr. Moya, Fr. Cárdenas, Sporer, and very many other more recent writers are on that account to be read with caution, p. 520 f., n. 12. — Purely mental restrictions are not lawful even for an honest cause, but are pure lies, p. 522 ff., n. 1 ff. — Fr. Diego de la Fuente Hurtado upholds them after the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, and Fr. Casnedi teaches that they are not condemned, ibid. — Their doctrines are reported and disapproved, ibid. — An amphibology which, either by force of the words or of the circumstances, admits a double sense, both intelligible to the hearer, is not a lie, but is lawful, p. 526 ff., n. 1 ff. — This amphibology does not always occur, or suffice to conceal the truth, especially when the questioner presses that we speak without equivocation, p. 528 ff., n. 8 ff. — Secrets which cannot be revealed without sin must therefore be concealed by another way, ibid. — Nine rules to be observed are assigned, p. 531 f., n. 10 ff. — The texts of Scripture which the ancients put forward in defence of lies, and the more recent writers in defence of mental restrictions, are expounded, p. 533 ff., n. 1 ff. — Some Gospel texts are wrongly brought forward in favour of mental restrictions, p. 536 ff., n. 1 ff. — This is shown by the explanation of all of them, ibid. — And likewise by the solution of the objections drawn from reason, and from the examples and doctrine of the Saints, p. 543 ff., n. 1 ff.

Molinos, Miguel de (*Molinos (Michael)*). Miguel de Molinos taught two errors concerning the vow, afterwards condemned by Innocent XI, p. 115, n. 1.

Moya, Mateo de (*Moya (P. Matthaeus)*). Fr. Mateo de Moya, who first spread lax opinions under the mask of Amadeus Guimenius, afterwards coined them anew under the splendid colour of probability, p. 145, n. 30. — He contends by an empty distinction that one who vows virginity is not always bound to chastity, p. 234, n. 22. — He teaches a lax proposition concerning the oath, p. 380, n. 10. — Fr. La Croix rightly warns that he is to be read with caution, p. 520, n. 12.

O

Opinion (*Opinio*). See: Propositions, condemned; Propositions, lax.

Orsi, Giuseppe Agostino (*Orsi (P. Ioseph Augustinus)*). The works of Fr. Giuseppe Agostino Orsi are praised, p. 444 ; p. 497, n. 13.

P

Probabilists (*Probabilistae*). The Probabilists, whether the Church condemns lax propositions full of scandal or does not, have escapes by which to defend them, p. 526, n. 13.

Probability (*Probabilitas*). Not every probability makes moral certainty, as Leander wrongly contends, p. 410, n. 5. — Probability does not suffice for swearing, ibid.

Propositions, condemned (*Propositiones damnatae*). The condemned propositions contained in this work. On the habitual sinner, p. 110, n. 6. — On the vow, p. 115, n. 1. — On the oath, p. 373, n. 1 ; p. 377, n. 1 ; p. 408, n. 2 ; p. 410, n. 5 ; p. 436, n. 9.

Propositions, lax (*Propositiones laxae*). The lax propositions concerning the vow contained in this work, p. 116 ff., n. 2 ff. — On these and other lax propositions. See: Bauny, Étienne; Bonacina; Casnedi, Carlo Antonio; Cattaneo, Ambrogio; Castropalao, Fernando; Daniel, Gabriel; Dicastillo, Juan; Francolino, Baldassarre; Fuente Hurtado, Diego de la; Gobat, Georg; La Croix, Claude; Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament; Marín, Juan; Martínez de Prado, Juan; Moya, Mateo de; Sánchez, Tomás; Sporer, Patritius; Tamburini, Tommaso; Torrecilla, Martín de; Viva, Domenico.

La Puente, Luis de (*Puente (P. de la)*). Fr. Luis de la Puente's vow never to sin venially deliberately was made by a special leading of the Holy Spirit, p. 174, n. 57.

R

Raymond of Peñafort, St. (*S. Raymundus de Pennafort*). St. Raymond of Peñafort in his Summa does not favour lying, p. 545, n. 7. — These words, "to go against the mind," are taken by him for these others, "to go against conscience", ibid.

Religion, the religious state (*Religio*). Religion, or the religious state which one professes, is a thing praiseworthy and full of merit, p. 251, n. 1. — One who vows it ought to apply every diligence to enter it, ibid., n. 2. — So one who vows, if he hopes to be received into it by making his vow known, is bound to make it known to the Prelate, ibid. — This vow is explained: "I promise to enter religion, unless God should decide otherwise concerning me", p. 253, n. 1. — And this other: "I vow to enter this religious order, if I shall have entered any", ibid., n. 2. — A vow by which one vows that no person shall be an obstacle to him, so that he should not enter religion, is valid, p. 254, n. 3. — Whether one who made a vow of wishing to enter religion is bound to enter it depends on the intention of the one vowing, ibid., n. 4. — A vow of dying in religion is equivalent to a vow of religion, p. 255, n. 5. — A vow of eremitic and solitary life induces an obligation, ibid., n. 6. — One who vows religion absolutely does not fulfil the vow if he assumes the habit of the Knights of St. James, of Calatrava, of Alcántara, of Montesa, and of St. John, ibid., n. 1 ; p. 256, n. 2. — He would fulfil it by entering an order of military Clerics, ibid., n. 3. — He would not fulfil it if he entered a relaxed religious order, ibid., n. 4. — A relaxed religious order is one that fails in substantial matters, ibid., n. 5. — This is explained, ibid. ; p. 257, n. 6 f. — One who vows to enter a stricter religious order does not satisfy by entering a laxer one, ibid., n. 8. — Nor can he lawfully persevere in the laxer, if he has professed in it, p. 258, n. 9. — No religious order collapsed in substantial matters has the privilege of receiving those who vowed a stricter one, p. 259, n. 10. — What one who vowed religion indefinitely ought to perform is assigned, ibid., n. 11. — One who vows to enter this determinate convent, if he suffers a refusal, is bound to approach other monasteries, unless he was moved by a special reason to vow so, p. 260, n. 12. — One rejected for ever, if invited again by the religious order, is more probably free of the vow, p. 261, n. 14. — He is not free of it if, the petition being made, the religious order asks for time to deliberate, ibid. — One bound by a vow can be repelled by a regular Prelate with the same facility as one not bound, ibid., n. 15. — One who vowed religion that he might be a Cleric in it is free of the vow, if the religious order will not admit him except as a layman, ibid., n. 16. — An illegitimate son who, ignorant of the constitution of Sixtus V by which illegitimate sons are repelled from ranks and dignities, vows religion, seems to be bound to the vow once the constitution is known, p. 262, n. 17. — One who vowed religion in the priestly state is bound to learn grammar, that he may be admitted to it, ibid., n. 18. — One who, having made a vow of religion, contracts marriage can still, and ought to, abstain for two months from asking and rendering the debt, and enter religion, ibid., n. 19. — The marriage consummated, he can render and ask, ibid. — If such a vow follows the marriage, he can render, and

ask, ibid. — A vow of religion is not fulfilled by accepting the Episcopate, p. 264, n. 20. — One who enters religion with the intention of leaving does not satisfy the vow, ibid., n. 2. — Even if he entered together with the resolve of praying God that he might change his heart, p. 265, n. 3. — A vow of entering it, and of leaving it at once, is null, ibid., n. 4. — One who vows to enter it with the liberty granted by law to Novices can leave once the trial is made, ibid. — He does not, however, satisfy the vow if, the trial made, he leaves without any cause, p. 266, n. 5 f. — The just causes for withdrawing from religion are reviewed, p. 267, n. 7. — One who, beyond religion, vows also perseverance in it cannot leave it except on account of evident inability to profess, or of his expulsion from the religious order, ibid., n. 8. — If, however, he leaves otherwise, he is not bound to keep chastity in the world, unless he vowed this too, at the same time and principally, p. 268, n. 9. — One who vows entrance into religion is bound to enter it as soon as he conveniently can, ibid., n. 1. — If, an opportunity being given, he defers it beyond half a year, he sins mortally, p. 269, n. 2. — If he cannot fulfil this vow at the time prefixed for himself, and foresees it, he is not bound to anticipate that time, ibid., n. 3. — Unless the defined time admits latitude, p. 270, n. 4. — If the designated time runs out, he is still bound once it has elapsed, ibid., n. 5. — It would be otherwise with a vow of fasting fixed to a day, ibid. — If the end of a vow of religion was the whole and only cause of vowing it, you are not bound by the vow once that end ceases; otherwise you are bound, p. 271, n. 6. — The same holds of the condition under which the vow was made, ibid. — One who spontaneously places impediments so that the condition under which he vowed religion may not come to pass is not exempted from fulfilling the vow, ibid. ; p. 272, n. 7 ff. — Vows of Religious made without the Prelate's permission, concerning honest matter which disturbs neither jurisdiction nor the religious order, are valid, p. 275 f., n. 4. — It is otherwise if they concerned things forbidden either by the Rule, or by the precept of Superiors, p. 277, n. 5. — A vow made by Prelates of Regulars of giving alms is valid, ibid., n. 6. — Vows of subjects of Regulars, made without the Prelates' permission, of giving something in alms from the goods granted them for their use, are not, however, valid, p. 278, n. 7 f. — A Religious, profession having been made, does not escape free of the bond of the vow on account of a right he acquires to the royal crown, p. 286, n. 11 [=9]. See: Invalidation of vows.

Relics of the Saints (*Reliquiae Sanctorum*). See: Adoration.

Reservation of vows (*Reservatio votorum*). See: Dispensation of vows.

Mental restrictions (*Restrictiones mentales*). See: Lying.

S

Sacrilege (*Sacrilegium*). Sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing, p. 95, n. 1. — It is threefold: one by which a sacred person, another by which a sacred place, another by which sacred things are violated, ibid., n. 2. — This division, from St. Thomas, is into the lowest, or atomic, species, p. 96, n. 3. — The sacrileges contained in the violation of sacred persons are reviewed, ibid., n. 4. — Likewise those contained in the violation of a sacred place, ibid., n. 5. — One who, outside a sacred place, has the will to kill in a sacred place contracts the malice of sacrilege, p. 97, n. 6. — But not one who in a sacred place deliberates, for example, about fornicating in a place not sacred, ibid. — Sacred things are divided into four degrees, ibid., n. 7. — To abuse the words of Sacred Scripture is sacrilege, p. 98, n. 8. — The decree of Trent against this abuse is reported, ibid. — Sacrilege can be committed even by omission, ibid., n. 9. — This is explained by examples, ibid. — The omission of the reception or administration of the sacraments at the due time is more probably not sacrilegious, ibid., n. 10. — Sacrilege is by its kind deadly, p. 99, n. 11. — It can be light on account of the smallness of the matter, or of inadvertence, ibid., n. 11. — The penalties established against the sacrilegious are some pecuniary, others spiritual, ibid., n. 12.

Salmanticenses (*Salmanticenses*). In a doubt about the honesty of an action, the Salmanticenses wrongly apply another doctrine of St. Thomas, p. 69 f., n. 4. — They wrongly allege St. Antoninus and Sylvester, p. 129, n. 2.

Sánchez, Tomás (*Sanchez (P. Thomas)*). Fr. Tomás Sánchez laxly and monstrously teaches that what is received for divination need not be restored, provided the diviner used the devil's art, p. 51, n. 13 f. — He laxly teaches

that things we know by a merely probable conjecture can be sworn as true, p. 410 f., n. 5. — He teaches many lax propositions, and some condemned ones, concerning equivocations and mental restrictions, p. 468 ff., n. 2 ff. — They are reviewed, ibid. ; p. 509 ff., n. 9 ff. — Fr. Sánchez is proved to be, with just cause, the author of propositions 27 and 28 condemned by Innocent XI, p. 512 f., n. 15 f.

Dreams (*Somnia*). Their various kinds, and four causes, p. 53, n. 1 f. See: Divination.

Lots (*Sortes*). See: Divination.

Sporer, Patritius (*Sporer (P. Patritius)*). Fr. Patritius Sporer teaches a lax proposition concerning the vow, p. 116, n. 2. — And another on the observance of the vow, p. 135, n. 2 [=12]. — Likewise another, p. 183, n. 13. — He laxly excuses from mortal sin one who vows abstinence from wine, unless he drinks as much wine as a temperate man is accustomed to drink at one meal, p. 227, n. 4. — In this he expressly contradicts himself, ibid. — He teaches a lax proposition on the commutation of a vow, p. 353, n. 5. — And on the oath, p. 378 f., n. 1, 11, and 15. — And another, p. 389, n. 2. — He is to be read with caution on account of the condemned doctrines which he praises in others and copies from them, p. 521, n. 12.

Religious state (*Status religiosus*). See: Religion, the religious state.

Superstition (*Superstitio*). What superstition is, and its division, is set forth, p. 32 f., n. 1 ff. — From an undue manner of worshipping God it is a grave sin, p. 34, n. 5. — To mix profane and shameful things into the divine office is a grave sin; but light, if they are only vain, ibid., n. 6. — One who proposes false relics for adoration, or preaches false miracles, sins gravely, ibid., n. 7. — One who fasts on Sunday only to restrain the flesh and the senses does not sin, ibid., n. 8. — Several common cases in which superstition lies hidden are reported, p. 35 ff., n. 1 ff. See: Divination.

T

Tamburini, Tommaso (*Tamburinus*). Tamburini laxly teaches that the precept of adoring God of itself and directly never obliges, p. 4, n. 6. — He most laxly teaches that one who blasphemes from an inveterate custom does not sin, p. 103, n. 5 f. — He laxly teaches that one who omits the whole Rosary promised by vow sins only lightly, p. 183, n. 13. — A want of diligence in reporting the opinions of authors is familiar to him, p. 342, n. 12. — He teaches lax propositions concerning the oath, p. 379 f., n. 2, 4, and 14. — And another, p. 390, n. 2. — And another, from Hurtado, p. 415, n. 12. — And another, condemned, on one who swears without the intention of swearing, p. 436, n. 9. — And other lax ones likewise on the oath, p. 470 f., n. 15 f. — He laxly teaches that a man may at his pleasure utter words materially, that is, stripped of all signification, p. 489, n. 1. — This doctrine is laxer than the condemned one on mental restrictions, ibid., n. 2 ff.

Tempting God (*Tentatio Dei*). The tempting of God is an inordinate trial of some divine perfection, by words or deeds, p. 9 [=91], n. 1. — One kind is express, another tacit, ibid., n. 2. — It is by its kind a grave sin, p. 92, n. 3. — To tempt God even when the matter is light is more probably mortal, ibid., n. 4. — One who strives to make his innocence manifest by the trial of red-hot iron, or of boiling water, tempts God, p. 93, n. 5. — The examples usually adduced are answered, ibid. — One who, to convert a heretic, offers a miracle to be wrought by God in confirmation of Catholic truth tempts God, p. 94, n. 6. — Express and tacit tempting of God are not two distinct sins, ibid., n. 7. — In confession it must be disclosed whether the tempting of God was express or tacit, ibid.

Torrecilla, Martín de (*Torrecilla*). Torrecilla teaches lax propositions concerning the oath, p. 382 f., n. 24 ff.

V

Wyclif, John (*Wicleffus*). Wyclif wrongly asserts that oaths made to strengthen human contracts and civil dealings are unlawful, p. 373, n. 1. — This proposition is condemned in the Council of Constance, ibid.

Viva, Domenico (*Viva (P. Dominicus)*). Fr. Domenico Viva teaches lax propositions concerning the oath, p. 381 f., n. 16 and 23. — He wrongly denies to Tamburini the condemned proposition on one who swears without the intention of swearing, p. 436, n. 9. — He is to be read with caution in his exposition of the condemned propositions, ibid. — He does not depart from the sense of proposition 25 condemned by Innocent XI, ibid. — He seems wrongly to defend as probably lawful swearing something false in light matter without the intention of swearing, p. 437, n. 12. — He defends restriction not purely mental by the use of a twofold knowledge, communicable and incommunicable, p. 500, n. 4. — And he extends it to all men when a grave cause presses, p. 501 f., n. 5 ff. — And to rustics, when no convenient external restriction occurs, ibid. — Such a doctrine falls back into the very proposition proscribed, p. 502, n. 9. — He wrongly contends that the propositions condemned on mental restrictions were condemned only in their obvious sense, and not as they stand in their authors, p. 506, n. 2. — This doctrine favours Jansenism, and is shown to be false, p. 507 ff., n. 3 ff. — His commentaries on the condemned propositions are to be read with caution, p. 520 f., n. 12.

Wolff, Christian (*Wolfius (Christianus)*). Christian Wolff, a Lutheran, wrongly denies that an oath produces a new obligation of performing something to the one to whom one swears, p. 433 f., n. 3.

Vow (*Votum*). The Lamperians, Wyclif, Luther, and Calvin condemned the vow, p. 112, n. 1. — A vow of abstaining from wine is not made by us as though some holiness lay beneath wine, as Calvin slanders, ibid., n. 2. — Other ravings of Calvin about the vow are reported, and turned back upon him, p. 113, n. 3 ff. — A vow can rightly be made both for a defined time and for ever, p. 114, n. 5. — This is shown from the Scriptures and by reasons against Calvin and Luther, p. 114, n. 5. — The condemned, and some lax, propositions on the vow are reviewed, p. 115 ff., n. 1 ff. — A vow is a deliberate promise made to God of a better thing, p. 118, n. 2 ; ibid., n. 3 ff. — Full and perfect deliberation is necessary for a vow, p. 119, n. 5. — If these are present, even sudden vows must be fulfilled, ibid., n. 6. — One who hastily makes a vow of great moment sins venially, p. 120, n. 7 f. — The Salmanticenses are attacked, ibid. — A vow made deliberately, though hastily, is valid, ibid. — For no vow, though in the lightest matter, does half-full deliberation suffice, p. 121, n. 9. — Virtual deliberation, or liberty, suffices for a vow, ibid., n. 10. — A resolve, though firm, is not a vow, and induces no obligation, p. 122, n. 1 [=11]. — The Fathers often use "vow" for "resolve", ibid. — The nature of a vow lies in the promise, p. 123, n. 1 [=12]. — How it differs from a resolve is explained, ibid. — The resolve of the one vowing can be considered in different ways, ibid., n. 13. — One who vows with the intention of vowing, and of binding himself, is bound by the vow, though he has at the same time the will of not carrying out the promise, p. 124, n. 15. — The same holds, though he had at the same time no intention of binding himself, p. 125, n. 18. — Vows made in honour of the Saints are valid, p. 126 ff., n. 1 f. — This is explained, and at the same time Erasmus, Luther, and Calvin are attacked, ibid. — The vows we pronounce to the Saints are properly made to God alone, p. 128, n. 6. — All those things which are commanded by divine or ecclesiastical law can be the matter of a vow, p. 129, n. 2 f. — The promise made at the reception of baptism, to renounce the devil and his pomps, is not a vow except in a broad sense, p. 130, n. 4. — For a vow to be of a better good, it suffices that it be such compared with the contrary omission of the same vow, ibid., n. 5. — Things opposed to the evangelical counsels are not fit matter for vows, p. 131, n. 6. — In some circumstances a work which, speaking absolutely, is opposed to them is in fact not opposed, ibid. — A vow of contracting marriage, speaking of itself, is not valid, p. 132, n. 7. — This is explained, ibid. — One who, agitated by the stings of concupiscence, vows marriage to avoid fornication and other acts of lust, more probably does not vow validly, ibid. ; p. 133, n. 8 ff. — The arguments of the contrary opinion are resolved, p. 134, n. 11. — A married person hindered from asking the debt by a vow (as by incest, or spiritual kinship) cannot ask the debt even if he is agitated by vehement stings of the flesh, lest he fall into grave sins of lust, p. 135, n. 12 f. — Sporer's opposite lax opinion is attacked, as also another of his much like it, ibid. ; p. 136, n. 15 f. — Vows of chastity, of religion, or of not marrying, made by those for whom it is more salutary on account of incontinence to enter marriage, are valid, and oblige even after supervening vexations of lust, ibid. ; p. 137 ff., n. 17 ff. — The opposite opinion of Leander, Moya, Fr. La Croix, and others is shaken out and attacked, ibid. — Vexations of lust can best be overcome by other means than marriage, ibid. — A vow not to vow is invalid,

p. 146, n. 32. — A vow not to seek a dispensation, commutation, or invalidation is valid; it does not, however, oblige when it is more useful to the soul to seek them, p. 147, n. 34. — Whether those who vow not to seek a commutation may seek a dispensation, or an invalidation, is to be gathered from the intention of the one vowing, p. 148, n. 35. — Indifferent things are not the matter of a vow, p. 149, n. 1. — A vow of a thing whose execution is a sin is invalid, ibid. ; p. 150 ff. — The objection drawn from Jephthah's vow is answered, as are other objections, ibid. — A vow of running bulls in honour of some Saint is not valid, p. 153, n. 11 ff. — The opposite opinion of Martínez de Prado, improbable and false, is rejected, ibid. — A vow of women not to comb their hair on such-and-such a day, and similar vows, are invalid, p. 154, n. 14. — A vow of nocturnal vigils is valid; not, however, one of not going to sea, ibid., n. 15. — A vow made for a wicked end, or for the attainment of a wicked end, is always evil and void, p. 156 f., n. 18 ff. — Soto's doctrine is explained, p. 157, n. 23. — A vow of offering God a good gift for a future effect attached to a shameful condition is invalid, p. 159 f., n. 25. — A vow pronounced in thanksgiving to God for a shameful act already done is invalid, p. 160, n. 26. — As also a vow made in thanksgiving for victory in an unjust war, and for gain from an unjust game, p. 161, n. 27 ff. — The lax opinion of Castropalao, who wrongly cites Suárez in his favour, is refuted, ibid. — A vow made for a son received from a concubine is valid, as also for safety brought back from a duel, p. 163, n. 31. — As also a vow of punishing one's own crime, ibid., n. 32. — And also a vow for an indifferent end, if it is made in thanksgiving to God, ibid., n. 33. — A vow for the end of obtaining temporal things is null, if the one vowing stops in them, ibid., n. 34. — It is valid if it is directed to obtaining temporal goods from the liberality of God, as is commonly done, ibid. — One who vows to God what is evil sins now gravely, now lightly, p. 164, n. 35. — One who makes a vow to sin mortally, even without the intention of fulfilling it, sins mortally, ibid., n. 36. — The matter of a vow must be not only physically, but also morally possible, p. 165, n. 37. — A vow partly of a possible thing, partly of an impossible, is valid in the possible part, unless the one vowing intended the conjunction of both, ibid., n. 38. — A vow of a divisible thing must be fulfilled in the part which can be fulfilled, ibid. — One who vows to build a church, and cannot build the whole, is bound to build a part, unless the part is useless: and if so, he is bound to build a chapel in another church, or something else for the worship of God, p. 166 f., n. 39 f. — The objections of the Salmanticenses are answered, p. 167, n. 42. — A vow of matter partly good, partly evil, must be fulfilled in the good part, unless the one vowing intended otherwise, p. 168, n. 43. — One who makes a disjunctive vow, one part of which is fit and the other unfit, in practice makes a double vow, one valid, the other void, ibid., n. 44. — A vow of going to Rome barefoot obliges to its substance, though not to its manner, p. 169, n. 45. — A vow not to gamble is valid, ibid., n. 46. — A vow not to gamble excludes even moderate play, and play done through another, p. 170, n. 47 ff. — The opposite lax opinion of Gobat, La Croix, and others is attacked, ibid. — A vow never to sin mortally is valid; not, however, one of avoiding all venial sins collectively, p. 171, n. 50. — In practice, those who vow to avoid all mortal and venial sins understand it so far as human frailty permits, ibid., n. 51. — A vow of avoiding all sins distributively, either mortal or venial, is null, p. 172, n. 52. — A vow of avoiding some kind of venial sin is valid, ibid., n. 53. — Not, however, one of avoiding all venial sins, even distributively, ibid., n. 54. — The reasons of the opposite opinion are reported, p. 173, n. 55. — And refuted, ibid., n. 56. — St. Teresa's vow never to sin venially was by divine instinct, p. 174, n. 57. — As also the vow of Fr. de la Colombière and of Fr. Luis de la Puente, ibid. — The vow of a mother who learns that her unmarried daughter is pregnant, and promises the Blessed Virgin a thousand coins if, to avoid infamy, she dies before the birth, is impious, ibid., n. 58. — A daughter's vow not to marry another unless she marries him by whom she was violated, and who had promised her marriage before their union, is valid, ibid. — A vow is divided into absolute, conditional, and penal, p. 175, n. 1. — Some conditions customarily attached to vows are reported, ibid., n. 3. — This vow, "I promise to enter religion, if my elder brother has had children," is not conditional, as the Salmanticenses would have it, but absolute, ibid. ; p. 176, n. 4. — A vow is divided into solemn and simple, necessary, common, particular, real, and perpetual, p. 177, n. 5 ff. — One is reserved, another not; one express, another implicit; one public, another occult, p. 178, n. 10. — That a vow induces an obligation is a truth of faith, p. 179, n. 1. — The obligation of a vow pertains to the virtue of fidelity, or of religion, but not to

that virtue to which the promised matter belongs, p. 180 f., n. 2 ff. — This is shown, and an objection is satisfied, ibid. — It is of greater merit to undertake some work to be carried out under the law of a vow than without a vow, p. 182, n. 8 ff. — The obligation of a vow is by its own nature grave, p. 183, n. 12. — One who omits to fulfil a light part of the matter promised by vow sins venially, ibid., n. 13. — To omit a whole Rosary would not be light matter, as La Croix, Tamburini, and Sporer laxly teach, ibid. — The transgression of a vow whose whole matter, being absolutely small, is omitted, is only venial, p. 185, n. 15 f. — In practice, however, chiefly by reason of the ends of the one vowing, it scarcely happens without mortal sin, ibid. — The one vowing cannot bind himself gravely in light matter, p. 186, n. 17. — And more probably not lightly in grave matter, ibid. ; p. 187, n. 18 f. — The opposite reasons are refuted, ibid. ; p. 188 ff., n. 20 ff. — A vow to avoid a venial sin obliges under mortal, p. 190, n. 25. — One who violates several vows in light matter on the same day sins mortally, p. 190 ff., n. 26 ff. — The opposite lax opinions of Fr. La Croix and of Castropalao are refuted, ibid. — One who vowed to recite one "Our Father" and "Hail Mary" daily for several years sins mortally if he daily omits this prayer for several years, p. 193 f., n. 31 ff. — When a vow in fact attaches to the day, and when not, is assigned, p. 194, n. 32. — The vows of parents do not bind the children, p. 195, n. 2. — The one vowing is not bound, nor can he, to fulfil through another his personal vow, which he himself cannot fulfil, p. 196, n. 3. — One who has become unable through his own fault to observe a personal vow is not bound to fulfil it through another, ibid., n. 5. — As neither is one who before the vow was certain that he would never be able to fulfil it, p. 197, n. 6. — Real vows can be fulfilled through another, even without the knowledge of the one vowing, but not against his will, p. 197, n. 7. — One who has become poor is not bound to ask money of his friends in order to fulfil his vow, p. 198, n. 8. — One who gives the promised thing to another, who then omits to offer the thing received to whom he owes it, satisfies the vow, if he applied all moral diligence to give it to an upright man, ibid., n. 9. — A mixed vow, consisting of personal and real elements, can be fulfilled through another, not as personal, but as real, p. 199, n. 10. — One who has become unable to pay a vow without fault is not bound to apply a compensation, ibid., n. 11. — Heirs are not bound to the personal vows of testators, ibid., n. 12. — An heir is bound to pay the personal vows of the deceased, supposing the testator commands it of him, if he is a voluntary heir; not, however, if a necessary one, ibid., n. 13. — Either heir can be compelled, under penalty of privation of the inheritance and of excommunication, to pay the real vows of the testator, p. 200, n. 14. — Those vows are to be paid even if this burden was not imposed on the heir by the testator, or if he was unwilling to bind his heir to them, p. 201, n. 15. — Not, however, before entering upon the inheritance, nor, in the internal forum, beyond the means of the inheritance, though the heir be condemned to it by a judge for having omitted the inventory, ibid., n. 26 [=16]. — Law resting on presumption is twofold, p. 202, n. 17. — Yet the omission of the inventory must have been without fault to be apt to give rise to an injustice, p. 203, n. 18. — An heir is not bound, to the detriment of his legitimate portion, to pay the real vows, nor any debts of the testator, ibid., n. 20 [=19]. — An heir, if he cannot do it himself, can and must fulfil the real vows of the testator through another, p. 204, n. 21. — They cannot be commuted by a Confessor, ibid. — A monastery made heir by the profession of the one vowing is bound to the real vows of the professed, p. 205, n. 24. — Likewise when the one vowing, before profession, willed that they be fulfilled by the monastery left as heir, ibid., n. 25. — Real vows are to be paid before legacies, p. 206, n. 26. — Vows of greater moment are to be preferred to others, if the inheritance is insufficient to pay them all, p. 207, n. 27. — If there are several vows, and it is not established which was made first, the heir may choose those which please him more, ibid., n. 28. — If there are several heirs, each is bound to pay the testator's vows insofar as he is heir, p. 208, n. 29. — A donee is not strictly bound to carry out the vows of the donor, ibid., n. 30. — Yet he ought to carry them out out of religion, ibid. — A legatee is bound to fulfil the real vows of the one bequeathing, p. 209, n. 31. — The Prince, or the treasury, is bound to pay the real vows of the one vowing, p. 210, n. 32. — The one vowing ought to fulfil the vow as soon as he conveniently can, ibid., n. 33 [=2]. — This is explained, p. 211, n. 3 f. — A vow not fulfilled at the designated time you are bound to fulfil, unless it was bound to the time, ibid., n. 5. — A rule is handed down for knowing when it was so bound, p. 212, n. 6. — In doubt whether it was so bound, it is still to be fulfilled once

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