PASTORAL QUESTIONS

VI

Questions Concerning Various Sins to Be Healed in Sacramental Confession

Proposed for the benefit of the clergy

by Fr. Benedict H. Merkelbach, O.P.

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which he collected for the utility of the clergy

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To the Benevolent Reader

In the little work "Concerning Various Categories of Penitents," we considered penitents exclusively according to their various dispositions or conditions of body and soul. It remains that we consider them according to their diverse state itself or according to the kind of sin.

Therefore the present little book is a complement of the doctrine of its predecessor, so that from both there may be produced one practical work. It is entitled: "Concerning Various Sins to Be Healed in Sacramental Confession"; these sins are various both according to the duties of the several states to which they are opposed, and according to the diverse virtues or precepts to which they are contrary, and according to the causality which vices exercise in diverse other things.

The little work, announced several years ago, until now could not see the light, since in the meantime we were wholly occupied in publishing our *Summa Theologiae Moralis*. This, however, by God's gift, having been happily completed, we intend to complete the series of pastoral writings begun with this little book, of a practical character, prepared for the use of confessors.

Let it not be thought to be a mere repetition of those things which are found set forth in the *Summa Moralis*, or a reproduction of some part of it. The latter proceeds more speculatively, although concerning things to be done in practice; the little work is almost entirely in practical application, so that the practical value of the principles of moral theology may shine forth more fully.

But as we warned when writing concerning the various categories of penitents, so again we say concerning sins to be healed: If, friendly reader, you seek anything new concerning these matters, perhaps you will depart empty; but those things which you will be able to find scattered among authors of better note, we have wished carefully to collect for the use of confessors. Nor should it be judged that this redounds to the detriment of esteem or to a lessening of the value of our little work; since thus it is not the work of our smallness, but appears fortified by the authority of approved men and by received usage.

Therefore, excellent confrere, be willing to receive both little works with equal kindness, and may it be for you, God grant it, a help for the sacred ministry and for the salvation of souls.

The Author.

Concerning Various Sins — To Be Healed in Sacramental Confession

The sins which are to be healed can all easily be reduced to those which are directly opposed to the duties of the several states, to the more principal sins which are opposed to the diverse virtues and to the precepts of the Decalogue, and to those which are wont to be the cause of many others and which therefore are called capital.

It is certainly not our mind to speak concerning all and each of these, but only concerning some which present a peculiar difficulty, or demand special attention or care of healing. Therefore concerning the manner of healing them and concerning remedies to be suggested against them, we here set forth certain things from approved authors.[1]

[1] Cf. the list of authors which we gave in the little work *Concerning Various Categories of Penitents*, in the introduction.

Moreover the questions to be treated can be reduced to the following:

I. Concerning diverse sins according to state and condition of life:

1. Concerning spouses.
2. Concerning children and parents.
3. Concerning masters and servants.
4. Concerning public officials.
5. Concerning physicians and pharmacists.
6. Concerning merchants and soldiers.
7. Concerning priests and pastors.
8. Concerning religious and nuns.

II. Concerning various sins against the virtues and the precepts of the Decalogue:

Section A. Concerning sins against God:

1. Concerning certain sins against faith.
2. Concerning certain sins against reverence for God.
3. Concerning the sin against the service of God, or concerning the violation of Sunday.

Section B. Concerning sins against one's neighbor:

1. Concerning sins against the internal goods of life and body.
2. Concerning scandal, which is opposed to spiritual goods.
3. Concerning adultery, which is opposed to the good of marriage.
4. Concerning sins against the external goods of fortune and concerning restitution owed for them.
5. Concerning hatred of neighbor, which is a cause of harming reputation, honor, and friendship.

III. Concerning capital sins, which are the cause of other sins:

1. Concerning pride and vain-glory.
2. Concerning avarice.
3. Concerning gluttony.
4. Concerning lust.
5. Concerning sloth.
6. Concerning envy.
7. Concerning anger.

Chapter I: Concerning Diverse Sins According to State and Condition of Life

Just as obligations and dangers are diverse in different conditions and states of life, so too sins are wont to be different; therefore it will not be useless to give them special attention. We shall consider successively the proper sins which can occur in spouses, children and parents, masters and servants, public officials, physicians and pharmacists, merchants and soldiers, priests and pastors, religious and nuns.

Question I: Concerning Spouses

I. The special obligations of spouses are usually numbered as three:

1. Mutual love and assistance: namely an intimate and special love, and one conformable to the order of charity, so that it inspires in the wife reverence toward her husband and obedience in good morals and in the governing of the house, because the man is the head of the woman; but the husband should be a protection to his wife and should show benevolence to her, because she is not his servant or maid, but a suitable companion. Hence in daily life they ought patiently to bear each other's defects; nevertheless at times the wife can charitably admonish and exhort the husband, while the husband can correct, reprove, and chastise the wife, that she may fulfill her duties, even authoritatively, but moderately, and ordinarily only lightly.

2. Cohabitation, because they have entered marriage unto an undivided sharing of life; hence regularly they ought to dwell together unless a grave reason excuses; and the wife is bound to follow the husband if it can be done without grave harm, but not if the husband wishes to wander about, unless this was his condition before the marriage, because then the wife is presumed to have consented in this.

3. Chaste fidelity as to the conjugal due, so that at the same time every approach to adultery may be closed off, and also imprudent familiarity with another person, and likewise every vice against nature may be avoided; concerning this we have spoken sufficiently in the little work *Questions concerning Chastity and Lust*, q. 8.

II. Spouses sin gravely:

A. Generally: 1. those who hate one another, or provoke one another with insults or quarrels;

2. those who indulge unjust jealousy;

3. those who deliver their heart to an outside person of the other sex and withdraw it from their spouse, even if they leave the body to the spouse for conjugal acts;

4. those who are accustomed to deny to one another due assistance, especially if in grave necessity;

5. those who habitually do not cohabit without a sufficient reason;

6. those who deny the conjugal due without a grave reason, all the more if they break matrimonial fidelity.

B. In particular, the husband sins:

1. if he denies his wife food and support, or, when he can, does not provide it, unless she has departed by her own fault;

2. if he treats his wife very harshly and roughly, or compels her to labors which are altogether unbecoming to her condition;

3. if he afflicts his wife with insulting or defamatory words;

4. if without grave cause he impedes her as to the practice of religion;

5. if he beats her gravely;

6. if he greatly afflicts her by his drunken revels and other disordered passions;

7. if he is very negligent in the governing of the family estate.

C. But the wife sins:

1. if she provokes her husband by quarrels or words to grave anger or blasphemy;

2. if, despising her husband, she herself wishes to govern and is notably disobedient, unless the husband commands altogether unreasonably;

3. if she gravely neglects the household, indulging sloth or amusements; or, being given to luxury, she exasperates her husband;

4. if she habitually thrusts herself into the administration of the house, not in the manner of one helping but of one ruling; unless there is a just cause, such as if the husband as a spendthrift dissipates the goods of the family or is unfit for management; but let her not easily think this latter thing.

What can be lawful for spouses as to their goods of fortune, and how they can be guilty of injustice, is declared in the treatise on Justice.[1]

[1] Cf. *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, II, nn. 181-182.

III. Spouses are to be questioned:

1. Each one, whether he or she lives well with the consort, so that they are of one mind; whether they employ every solicitude and care for the Christian education of the offspring; whether they permit themselves nothing which is opposed to the ends of marriage.

2. The husband, whether he keeps faith with his wife, and supplies the family the sustenance due to it.

3. The wife, whether she obeys the husband in honest and lawful things; whether she has not provoked the husband to anger or blasphemy; whether she has not defrauded him of the conjugal due.

As far as possible, such questioning should be done in more modest words, especially to a wife; for example, whether she has not been disobedient to her husband as regards marriage, whether perhaps she has some doubt which troubles her concerning marriage, and so on. This questioning can generally be omitted with persons who are truly pious, unless nevertheless there is some special reason for doubting.

IV. Special tribulations occur for spouses, which arise from three sources: from vices, from the evil morals of children, and from adverse fortune.[2]

[2] Cf. Aertnijs, *Th. P.*, n. 144-147; Reuter, *Neo-conf.*, n. 130-135.

As to the first: a) If one spouse complains against the other, the confessor should not at once believe that the complaining one is free from fault, nor condemn the other while the cause is unknown, nor in the presence of the wife cast blame upon the husband, even if he is certainly guilty; because women by their nature, being forward, easily object faults to their husbands, especially if these have been condemned by the judgment of the confessor. Therefore it is better, while passing over the matter, to commend prayer, patience, meekness, and greater solicitude in showing services to the husband.

b) If the wife complains of the severity and anger of the husband, the confessor should persuade her to pray for the husband, to be diligent in rendering services to him, and to add extraordinary things to ordinary ones, for example by preparing foods pleasing to him and saying that she does this so that it may be well with him; that she be exactly obedient; that she be silent while the husband is angry or drunk. Let her try to lead the drunken man to bed with gentle words so that he may sleep; and on the following day, if an admonition seems likely to profit, let her lovingly admonish the husband while he is well disposed. If an angry man must be answered, let her answer gently, for "a soft answer breaketh wrath, a harsh word stirreth up fury" (Prov. XV, 1). If nothing is of avail, there is need of patience, by which she may obtain consolation from God and merit.

c) On the other hand, if the wife attempts to dominate the husband, the husband should be advised to dissuade the wife gently, but by no means to show himself timid, otherwise the woman would become more insolent; if gentle words do not profit, let him resist graver things and do contrary to what the wife wills, yet let him sometimes consent; let him discharge his own office well, lest he provide the wife any occasion of complaint.

As to the second: If a parent complains that the children are disobedient, fierce, and given to idleness, the confessor should exhort him to examine whether perhaps this has happened by his own fault from neglected education, for example because in childhood he indulged them too much, did not restrain them from wicked companionships, or, on the contrary, treated them too harshly and addressed them with curses and disgraceful words; then it is not strange that the children have become stubborn and disobedient. Let him remember his own youth, whether he himself did not err.

The correction of children should have paternal kindness mixed with rigor. Moreover, while the offspring is being punished by one parent, if it is not done beyond measure, let the other beware lest he openly oppose it, or afterward flatter the offspring as though it had suffered innocently; this removes the fruit of correction and makes children refractory. If one parent seems to need admonition from the other, let this be done secretly from the children.

As to the third: If they complain of a defect of means for sustenance, the confessor should console them and stir them to patience and conformity with the divine will; let him say that the salvation of the soul is to be preferred to all things; let him exhort them to educate their children in the fear of God; let him stir them to confidence in God, who said: "Seek first the kingdom of God, and the rest shall be added unto you." In the service of God there is true happiness; and mediocrity is sufficient for man, since riches are for many an occasion of perversity and damnation.

V. Spouses are to be admonished according to opportunity concerning their obligations; and indeed:

1. That not all things are lawful for married persons, but that the sanctity of marriage can be defiled.

2. That in this matter a threefold rule holds: those things are lawful which of themselves are ordered to the primary end of marriage; things contrary to this are gravely evil, such as adultery, pollution, sodomy, onanism; but useless things are only lightly evil if they are done without great danger of pollution.

3. That doubts occurring concerning this matter are to be explained to the confessor with great confidence.

4. Let it be said to the husband that he should not ask the due at a time when it is gravely harmful to the wife; but to the wife, that she is bound under grave sin to render the due, unless she is excused by infirmity or special harm.

5. When occasion is also given, let speech be made concerning the obligation of carefully avoiding causes of abortion, of baptizing the fetus in a case of abortion, of not taking a little infant into bed lest it be suffocated, nor older boys or girls, that is, those already enjoying the use of reason or approaching it, lest scandal be given to them.

6. Especially in modern times they are to be admonished and questioned concerning onanism, even if the confessor "foresees that several are to be driven from good faith and that many will desert the sacraments," as the Sacred Penitentiary responded, 10 May 1886; but those who are in a proximate occasion of sin because they act against nature are to be treated as habitual sinners and recidivists; hence if they always relapse in the same way without hope of amendment, they are not to be absolved. See those things which we said in the little work *Concerning Various Categories of Penitents*, especially c. 1, q. 3, n. V.

VI. Admonition concerning the limitation of offspring to be generated. - Since the matter is of great importance and in our days much agitated, let it be pleasing to make some observations concerning it. Now the limitation of offspring to be generated can be obtained in a threefold way:

1. By observing continence. This mode is lawful, provided that it is done by the common counsel of both spouses and without proximate danger of incontinence. Indeed, to observe continence from a motive of virtue is of itself better than to generate offspring, as is clear from the example of the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph. But in practice it will rarely be opportune to counsel this mode, on account of the frequent danger of incontinence. The Apostle wrote, I Cor. VII, 5: "Defraud not one another, unless perhaps by consent for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer; and return again together, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence."

2. By using means contrary to nature, such as onanism. This is always gravely illicit, so that it can never be legitimized for any reason. Concerning this we have spoken sufficiently in the little work *Concerning Chastity and Lust*, q. 8, a. 4.

3. By exercising the conjugal act exclusively in the time of agenesia, so that every conception of offspring may thus be avoided. This is not contrary to nature, and therefore not gravely or always illicit.

The time of agenesia is called that in which conception happens more rarely, indeed not at all; whence by this practice generation becomes little probable or even impossible.

Formerly this time was determined by the physician Capellmann and others in this way: from ten or fourteen days after the beginning up to three or four days before the new menstruation of the woman. For they thought that ovulation in the woman, and therefore fertility, coincided with menstruation, so that during the month the woman was fertile from day 1 to day 14, sterile from day 15 to day 25, and again fertile from day 26 to day 28.

But afterward it was discovered that menstruation does not coincide with ovulation, although it is a connected phenomenon; but that it takes place between two ovulations. Concerning this matter diverse computations made by physicians are found. According to the most recent experiments of Doctor Knaus, the woman would be fertile from day 11 to day 17 after menstruation has occurred, sterile from day 1 to day 10, and from day 18 to day 28. According to Doctor Ogino she would be fertile from day 12 to day 19 before the following menstruation (exceptionally to day 24), but sterile for 11 days before the following menstruation, and for 9 days (exceptionally only for 4) after menstruation has occurred. Hence certain persons would wish that the theory, as they say, of Ogino-Knaus be widely spread, so that human generation could be subjected to certain rules, and an effective remedy be provided against the horrible practice of onanism so widely diffused.

Concerning this it must be noted:

A. As to the very dissemination of the matter, general diffusion and broad propagation among the people, especially if to be done by priests, does not seem praiseworthy:

a) because it is apt to harm the common good;

b) because it easily provokes scandal, and leads to onanism: for since the effect of each practice is the same, is there not a danger that they may not sufficiently perceive the difference between the two, and finally make use of the unnatural mode, as easier and more certain?

B. As to the matter itself:

1. Although day by day the said theory approaches more to certainty, nevertheless the computation seems only approximate; whence, in order certainly to avoid conception, even in the said theory, spouses would have to abstain from union for a rather long time, namely from day 4 to day 19 or 20 after menstruation: certainly longer than is sometimes proclaimed by those promoting the theory.

2. The experiments do not seem sufficiently certain, because a) the time during which the ovum and semen remain apt for fertilization is not yet certain; b) the experiments are not numerous enough to produce every kind of certainty; and c) several were made not in the human species but in animals, whence from them one can conclude only by analogy.

3. Early, later, or supplementary ovulation is always possible, whence in fact fertilizations have occurred at other times.

4. Hence others say that there is no general law, but that the matter depends on the diverse condition of the woman; but others say that there is no time in which conception is not strictly possible.

From these things it is clear how cautiously the confessor ought to proceed in affirming or counseling in this matter; in particular, let him avoid proposing the time of agenesia as if through it generation were altogether certainly avoided.

C. As to morality:

1. From the fact that an act is not contrary to nature, it does not yet follow that it is plainly lawful and, a fortiori, honorable; in the case, voluntarily exercising conjugal union only at that time when conception cannot occur is indeed not an act contrary to nature, since in that mode it is instituted as nature indicates, but it is an act indifferent of itself, yet ill-sounding, which, in order to be lawful and honorable in the concrete, requires a co-honestating reason.

2. In particular, that act, indifferent of itself, is not lawful and honorable unless it be done from a good end: such an end is not to seek pleasure without a burden, to wish to avoid offspring without a just reason, or from egoism more easily to enjoy all the conveniences and pleasures of modern life. In these cases there is venial sin, since according to the common doctrine of theologians to exercise the conjugal act for pleasure alone is venial.

3. Even if a right end is present, the act will not be good unless it is done with due circumstances, and therefore by mutual consent, without danger of incontinence and without detriment to conjugal love and fidelity; otherwise mortal sin would be present.

4. In a particular case, in which a sufficient reason is present for avoiding procreation, the aforesaid practice can cautiously be suggested, rather by a physician than by a priest, only to those who cannot observe continence: let it be said to them that in this case it is lawful.

5. Finally, to inveterate onanists, whose amendment cannot be hoped for, the same practice can cautiously, as the Sacred Penitentiary said, 16 June 1880, be suggested: as a lesser evil in those who are determined to commit a greater one.

The doctrine proposed in this way is sufficiently common among moralists.

VII. Observation concerning betrothed persons. - Just as spouses, so betrothed persons are to be instructed concerning their present and future obligations. Generally they are to be admonished to celebrate marriage as soon as possible: thus very many sins are prevented; but as to the preliminary intimacies of preparation for marriage, we spoke in the work *Questions concerning Various Categories of Penitents*, c. 2, q. 3, n. VI.

1. Let the confessor especially see whether there is any prohibiting or diriment impediment, ecclesiastical or civil, so that it may be opportunely removed if this can be done; otherwise marriage and keeping company must be renounced.

2. When occasion is given, let him explain the true nature of Christian marriage and its dignity and sanctity, and let him inculcate that civil marriage is nothing but a mere formality, necessary for obtaining civil effects.

3. Let him use every zeal so that betrothed persons prepare themselves for the great sacrament of marriage by prayer, the practice of virtues, and the reception of the sacraments, or at least, purified by confession, receive it well; hence if a betrothed man, making confession in order to contract marriage, is doubtfully disposed, he is to be absolved conditionally; if he is indisposed, he cannot be absolved, but according to opportunity he can be admonished concerning the obligation of disposing himself for the sacrament through perfect contrition.

4. Let him admonish concerning the most grave end of marriage and concerning the obligations of spouses and parents. Nevertheless let him speak with great prudence concerning the use of marriage; and indeed:

a) let him send a girl who labors under ignorance to her mother or another pious woman, and exhort her, once marriage has been contracted, to have recourse to him in doubts;

b) but let him instruct one corrupted or one who knows, in an honorable manner.[3]

[3] Good counsels are found in St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction a la vie devote*, III, c. 38-39; Ciolli, *Direttorio*, nn. 94-96; Stohr, *Pastoralmedizin*, and others. For the instruction of spouses and betrothed persons, innumerable little works have been published in the vernacular language. It is enough to indicate certain ones: Joseff, *Conseils pour la preparation au Mariage*; Nysten, *Ce que les fiances et les epoux doivent savoir*; *Instructions familieres sur le Mariage*; De Smet, *Het christelijk Huwelijk* (French: *Le Mariage chretien*); *Voor de Trouwers*; Mervillie, *Trouwersboekske*; Aertnijs, *Bruidsexamen en Bruidsonderricht* (in *N. K. St.* 1906); Appelman, *Voor en in het Huwelijk*; V. d. Burg, *Ouderzorg en Ouderweelde*; for the educated: Schim Van der Loef, *Het voortplantingsleven van den Mensch*; together with W. J. Duynstee, *De Leer der Kuischheid*; Ehrler, *Gluckliches Eheleben*; *Ehelehre*; Holler, *Ehekatechismus*; Baur, *Gluckliches Eheleben*; under the title *Brautsunterricht* various authors have written: Glockes, Rist, Sommer, Krick; also Wilhelm, *Das Eheleben*, or the anonymous writing: *Die Ehe* (translated into Dutch: *Het Huwelijk*), published in Donauworth, but these last two seem to be commended only with some discretion.

As to precautions to be used in the confession of betrothed persons, so that it may be made with perfect sincerity, it will not be unwelcome to report what the Mechlin *Theology*, *de Poen.* (4), n. 97, q. 2, has:

"As to the confession of a sin committed by mutual consent between betrothed accomplices, that they may be brought to confess their offenses integrally, certain precautions are indicated by theologians, which are usefully employed.

"The first is that confessors should set for themselves a rule of always questioning those about to marry concerning sins which are opposed to the sixth and ninth precepts of the Decalogue; this can be done in about this way. 'For the greater disposition and tranquility of conscience of those who are to be joined in marriage, I am accustomed to propose certain questions to them: I ask that you answer them sincerely and with confidence, and that you do not fear, even if you have sinned gravely, that absolution is to be refused to you. On the occasion of your approaching marriage, have there not arisen in you immodest thoughts? have illicit familiarities not occurred? God has seen all things, and to Him alone do you confess here,' etc.

"The second precaution consists in this, that the one should be heard first who is believed likely to confess more confidently and more integrally, either because he blushes less, which is proper to men, or because she is more fearful, as women are wont to be, or because he or she is accustomed to confess candidly to this confessor.

"The third precaution is indicated by some, namely, that the one who has confessed first be induced to say to the other, before this other approaches, that he or she has openly confessed that sin, and that therefore it is also to be declared confidently by the other.

"The fourth precaution seems to some to be that the confessor should ask, from the one who first confesses the sin, permission to question the other concerning it. This, however, could seem odious to many penitents; hence it is not to be used if it is to be feared that the penitent would bear it badly, or if this penitent is foreseen to be about to confess candidly of himself or herself.

"But when permission of this kind has been given altogether spontaneously and with the other conditions recounted above, let the confessor use it prudently and kindly, so that the accomplice may draw consolation from this in confession rather than any burden."

The author adds: "A similar difficulty can arise for the confessor of two spouses or of others who have together committed a grave sin of incontinence, injustice, etc.; and the same principles must be applied to them."

These things indeed are not always to be employed, nor toward everyone, which would not be equitable, but according to opportunity.

Question II: Concerning Children and Parents

I. Obligations of children. - Children ought to render four duties to parents: special love, reverence and honor, obedience, and assistance in spiritual and temporal necessities, as is usually set forth in moral theology.[1]

[1] Cf. *Summa Theologiae Moralis,* II, nn. 810-817.

These constitute the necessary foundation or formal exercise of the virtue of piety.

II. Children sin against parents, and indeed by a special sin grave of itself:

1. Against love, if they hate them or despise them, if they show signs of hatred toward them or treat them harshly as if they hated them, if they are the cause that they are deservedly saddened, especially if gravely, if they wish a grave evil to them or deliberately rejoice over it against the order of charity.

2. Against reverence and honor, if they afflict them with harsh or insulting words, or with words by which they know them to be gravely offended; if they look upon them with a grim eye; if they cast curses or abuse upon them; if they strike them or raise a hand to strike them, unless this would be necessary for preserving their own life or integrity of body; if they are unwilling to acknowledge poor parents from contempt or shame, or with grave sadness to them, unless this is done from true grave necessity and contempt being excluded; if they accuse them in judgment of a crime even true, unless the crime were of such a kind against the common good that it had to be denounced.

3. Against obedience, if they are rebellious or contumacious against the express and just commands of parents; if in a grave matter pertaining to morals, education, salvation of the soul, or governance of the house they do not listen to them; if against their right will they contract marriage with an unworthy person, from which, all circumstances considered, grave disgrace would follow for the family; if they choose a state without consulting parents in circumstances in which these can deservedly be offended.

4. Against assistance, if they do not supply food and other necessities to poor parents who cannot honestly support themselves; if they neglect parents in infirmity, or do not call a physician when they can; if in danger of death they neglect to admonish them or to provide the necessary sacraments; if they maliciously impede them from making pious legacies, or do not fulfill those made; if they do not assist the dead by Christian suffrages.

They sin: a) by a special sin, because hatred of or injury against parents adds to the sin a new species against the special love or piety due to parents;

b) grave of itself, for hatred, malevolence, contempt, or injury, which with respect to another would be light, are easily graver with respect to parents, to whom before others we owe love, reverence, and dutiful service more strictly. Nevertheless the sin can be light either from lightness of matter, or accidentally by reason of age, infirmity, dull judgment, or deficient education. Hence Reuter notes, *Neo-conf.*, n. 138:

If someone accuses himself in general of disobedience or irreverence against parents, the disposition and age of the penitent are to be considered.

a) Therefore if the age is tender, the offense can be supposed not grave.

b) But if the age is more advanced and the disposition seems bold, one must inquire concerning the manner of irreverence and the matter of disobedience; for those things which with respect to others, in the matter of hatred, insult, malevolence, and contempt, are moderate, with respect to parents are grave for children, because after God they are nearest to them.

c) Moreover, custom and the estimation of the people must also be considered, so that judgment may be made concerning the gravity of children's irreverence against parents.

d) But if a child doubts whether the cause for doing or omitting something by which a parent can be gravely afflicted is just, he is bound to abstain, because possession is in favor of the parent; indeed, although it is certain that the parent's exacerbation arises from malevolence or from his difficult and

morose nature, nevertheless piety requires that the child avoid, so far as he can, every occasion of exacerbating him.

e) If, however, the exacerbation arises beyond the child's foresight, it is not imputed to him.

III. Children are to be questioned, especially older ones:

1. Whether they have not gravely injured the love due to parents by gravely saddening them or by denying assistance to them.

2. Whether they have transgressed express commands of parents in a grave matter, "as it would be, that they should not go out of the house at night, that they should not play harmful games, that they should not keep company with bad companions, or persons of the other sex, and the like," as St. Alphonsus has, *Praxis Conf.*, n. 34.

3. Whether they have committed grave irreverence against parents by words or deeds, such as by imprecations or grave injuries inflicted in their presence.

In a case of insult inflicted, children are bound to restore the injured honor to them, and indeed of itself by asking pardon in the presence of those in whose sight they sinned. In practice, however, this act is for the most part not to be enjoined, but only advised, especially to boys; for afterward they often either fear to execute it or do not care to, and therefore parents are presumed for the most part to remit this obligation to their children, lest the children again incur an offense of God.[2]

[2] Aertnijs, *Th. P.*, n. 36, according to St. Alphonsus, *l. c.*

IV. Children are to be admonished concerning their obligations toward parents:[3]

[3] See Reuter, *Neo-conf.*, n. 147.

1. If a child accuses himself of disobedience, let him be admonished to remember the greater benefits of parents, and the command of God requiring obedience toward those who hold His place on earth; wherefore a disobedient child has no blessing of God to expect. Especially if the parents are of modest condition, let him remember how many things they have borne for the children, how many nights they have passed sleepless, how many troubles they still sustain so that they may be able to support them honestly and provide for them in the future; wherefore he is unworthy to increase these inconveniences, or to deny them help or the required labor.

2. If a child has gravely offended parents either by disobedience, or by imprecation or injury of honor, let him be admonished, on returning home, to ask pardon and promise amendment; or, if he seems likely to do this only with difficulty, to satisfy his debt by gentle words and ready services, and to reconcile them to himself. Generally, however, it is not expedient to impose on younger persons the obligation of asking pardon for a determinate matter, because it is beyond their strength.

3. If a child complains of a parent's partiality, and thinks that he is treated more harshly while another is favored, let him be asked whether that other is perhaps more reverent toward the parent: if so, let him do likewise; otherwise let him strive in all things to gratify the parents, so that he may not be loved less. Nor is greater love of one child always marked by partiality:

thus, if one more virtuous is esteemed more, or if one younger or weaker is loved with more tender affection, another or the older by birth is not therefore objectively loved less than he ought to be. But if the parent truly treats him more harshly, let him be commanded either to be silent or to answer kindly and reverently; for nevertheless the parent remains an eminent benefactor after God and one representing Him among children, who is to be treated with every reverence; and the kindly reverence of the child will be crowned with God's blessing, just as it is apt to conquer and soften the parent's mind.

4. But if, to excuse disobedience and irreverence, the child complains of the father's unfitness for managing the household and his dissipation of it, let him be admonished that he himself should watch over matters more diligently; that when the father is drunk or angry he should be silent; that when he is well disposed he should kindly and reverently ask him to take counsel for his own affairs and for theirs, if this seems opportune; or that he should take care that the father be brought back to better things through a prudent man, such as the pastor, confessor, or a friend; meanwhile let him not omit to pray often and fervently to God for him.

5. If a child is detected as unjust toward the goods or rights of parents, let him be admonished:

a) that concerning things granted to him by the father he cannot dispose except according to the will of the father; but concerning his own things, if he has any, he is bound to provide for his own sustenance, indeed to assist the grave necessity of parents or siblings;

b) that to take secretly from the goods of parents unduly is a sin of injustice, and indeed grave if it concerns a grave thing and they are gravely unwilling, as easily happens if money is taken for forbidden games, drinking bouts, luxury, and other things merely useless or vicious;

c) that injustice committed of itself induces the obligation of restitution. Yet in practice he is not to be forced to this unless he can restore and the grave obligation is certain, nor unless the father is rightly judged not to have condoned it. But what quantity in the case is grave cannot be defined by one rule, but must be judged according to the state of the parents, their resources, affection toward the children, the multitude of children, and the end for which the thing was taken. Thus, if the parents are rich, liberal toward their own, the children few, and the thing is taken for honest uses, the parents are less unwilling, at least as to the substance, than if they are of moderate fortune, frugal, have numerous offspring, or the thing is taken for dishonorable uses.[4] Therefore all these things are to be considered, lest either a conscience of mortal sin be too easily thrust upon children, or the reins be loosened for stealing.

[4] Ibid., nn. 143-144.

Concerning this argument it is customary to speak more fully and accurately in the treatise on Justice.

V. Duties of parents. - Parents owe to children: special love, true and sincere, but moderated by Christian prudence; bodily education or care of life, food, and good health; instruction and spiritual education; and provision of a state suitable to the condition and disposition of the children; these things are declared in moral theology.

VI. Parents sin against children:

1. Against love: by defect indeed if they hate them or afflict them with insults, wish evil to them, do not care to provide a good necessary to them or to avert evil from them if they can; but by excess if they love them too much so that they permit them all things, or prefer one to others without sufficient reason.

2. Against bodily care: if they harm offspring already conceived, the mother, for example, by working immoderately, dancing, carrying heavier burdens; the father by exasperating or gravely beating a pregnant wife with danger to the fetus; if the mother, when she can, is unwilling to nurse the offspring, especially with great harm to it, or, when she cannot, does not provide concerning a nurse of good health and honest life, or concerning another suitable means; if parents deny food and other necessities to children or do not employ diligence in procuring them; if without grave necessity they expose offspring in public ways or at the doors of a hospital so that they may free themselves from the burden of providing for it.

3. Against spiritual education, if they compel a child to enter religion, or impede him from it without a just reason; likewise if they truly compel children to determinate marriages; or if they prohibit marriage, unless this is done for a grave and just cause; if they do not care that children be instructed in the true religion and in Christian life; if they send them to heretical or non-Catholic schools, or even to neutral or mixed schools without grave reason and sufficient caution by which the danger of perversion is averted; if they give children bad example; if they do not watch over them, permit them to frequent wicked company, foster illicit loves, make dangerous readings, and do not procure that they fulfill their duties; if they do not correct delinquent children, or, where it is necessary, do not punish them; or, on the contrary, inflict excessive punishments.

4. Against provision of state, if they do not care that children learn a trade or letters so that they may be able to live honestly according to their condition; if they dissipate their goods and have no care of the household estate, by which they may provide for children or leave them an inheritance, so that they may be able to arrive at a suitable state and live honestly.

The sins are grave from their kind; but in individual cases whether parents sin gravely or only lightly must be judged from the gravity of the matter, harm, injury, and from the accompanying circumstances.

VII. Parents are to be questioned:[5]

[5] Aertnijs, *Th. P.*, n. 36, according to St. Alphonsus, *Praxis conf.*, nn. 35 and 177.

1. Whether they have been negligent in the education of children, by not taking care that they learn Christian doctrine, attend Mass, frequent the sacraments, and avoid wicked companions.

2. Whether they have sent children to Catholic schools, if such are present.

3. Whether they have taken care that they learn a trade, or exercise honest labor in the home.

4. Whether they have corrected them concerning sins, especially concerning theft, if they have committed any.

5. Whether they have given scandal to them, for example by blaspheming, quarreling, or speaking foul things in their presence.

6. Whether they have permitted untimely or incautious courtships, especially so that one alone is with another alone.

7. Whether they have kept boys or girls with themselves in bed, or permitted boys and girls to sleep together.

8. Whether they have permitted children to go out at will, to frequent theaters, dances, or other dangerous societies, or to read wicked books.

VIII. Parents are to be admonished and instructed, according to opportunity, that they have careful concern for the good formation of the whole family; but specifically:[6]

[6] Reuter, *Neo-conf.*, n. 136.

1. That they take care that their children be instructed in good morals and also in skills according to their capacity; that they send them to catechism, examine them on their return, praise those who have merited well, or even encourage them by some little reward.

2. That they furnish good examples to the whole household, and do or say nothing by which children could be scandalized.

3. That on holy days they diligently send them to divine things; that they not occupy them in servile labors without necessity; that they recommend the reading of a pious book; that they recite evening prayers or the Rosary of the Blessed Virgin together with them in common; and that they take care that they be enrolled in a pious association.

4. That both among themselves and among their own they esteem and care for concord very greatly. Let them also beware lest, without a special cause of necessity, they favor one of the children while the others notice, because this begets envy and aversion. Nor, when offspring is rebuked by one, should the other openly oppose it, or afterward flatter the offspring, because this altogether removes the fruit of correction.

5. That according to their means they be merciful toward the poor, and by example teach Christian charity to the children; it is also expedient that they commit a small alms to the children to be given to the poor or to good works, by which from tender years they may put on an affection of mercy.

IX. Observation concerning pupils and teachers. - Between pupils and teachers there are obligations similar to those between children and parents. Wherefore they are to be questioned:

A. Pupils: 1. whether they have preserved reverence toward their teachers, or, on the contrary, have borne themselves insolently toward them, treated them irreverently, detracted from them, mocked them, or been troublesome to them;

2. whether they have given obedience to those strictly commanding as to studies, good morals, and scholastic discipline;

3. whether they attended to lessons, studied diligently, and did not waste time uselessly.

B. Teachers: 1. whether they have employed due diligence in preparing and giving lessons;

2. whether they have corrected the bad morals of pupils, and nevertheless have not punished them excessively or unjustly;

3. whether they have not given bad example and have not scandalized them.

Question III: Concerning Masters and Servants

I. The duties of masters toward servants and workers are:

A. Of justice: 1. faithfully to furnish those things to which they bound themselves by contract explicitly or implicitly, first of all to pay the wage due;

2. not to impose work upon them beyond their strength;

3. not to dismiss them before the time without a just cause.

B. Of charity: 1. to acknowledge human dignity in subjects and to treat them kindly;

2. in no way to impede them from their religious, moral, and family duties;

3. to beware lest they provide scandal to them, and lest scandal be provided to them by others on the occasion of work or service.

C. Moreover, of piety toward servants properly so called, domestic servants:

1. to furnish suitable food to them and have care of their health, and even to provide a remedy for those who are sick for a short time, if custom has it so; but not if for a long time, unless it has been specially agreed;

2. to watch over them so that they may lead a good and Christian life, and to ward off the danger of perversion and occasions of sin, especially if they are younger persons whose education masters ought to care for in the place of parents;

3. also to correct them if by blasphemies, foul speech, impious discourse, illicit familiarities, they give scandal to others.

II. Masters sin toward servants and workers:

1. If they do not give them suitable food or a just wage, or due insurance against misfortune or dangers.

2. If before the time they dismiss them without a just cause.

3. If they do not pay salary at the time due, or without just cause subtract something from it.

4. If they treat them harshly or afflict them with insults.

5. If they furnish scandal or an occasion of sin to them, or do not avert it from them.

6. Especially toward domestic servants, if they do not take care that they observe the precepts of God and of the Church, do not correct delinquents, and do not admonish those negligent in the matter of salvation.

Hence, Reuter notes:[1] "if circumstances bear it, masters are to be admonished to satisfy their obligation, to treat servants kindly, not to call them by insulting words; to correct their errors, sometimes to overlook lighter ones, mindful of human frailty; to consult their reputation and not divulge their defects or vices, unless perhaps charity demands that they be revealed to another to whom they would thereafter wish to devote their labor; in which case also, no more is to be said than what conduces to the caution of the future master." And Aertnijs:[2] "Masters should be questioned whether they have corrected their servants when they were blaspheming, were not present at Mass, were not satisfying the paschal precept, were speaking foul things? Whether they permit the courtship of a male servant with a female servant in the same house, or clandestinely? Whether they have paid servants the agreed wage?"

[1] *Neo-conf.*, n. 150.

[2] *Th. P.*, n. 36.

III. The duties of servants and workers are:

1. To show the reverence due to the master.

2. To furnish obedience to the master's commands, given concerning work or service in order to the execution of the contract.

3. Not to harm the master's things, by abusing them or by inflicting damage.

4. To furnish integrally and faithfully the labor agreed upon, and indeed with diligence and at the appointed time.

5. Not to cease work or leave service before the appointed time, unless there is a grave and just reason; if nevertheless they did this because of grave fear or notable inconvenience, sometimes they could be immune from fault.

6. Moreover, if they are servants properly so called or domestics, to obey in those things which pertain to the governance of the house and family, good morals, and peace, and, if they are minors, also in those things which pertain to their education and instruction.

IV. Servants and workers sin:

A. Against observance: if they treat the master irreverently, afflict him with insults, contemn him, mock him, detract from him, divulge those things which are done at home, or violate a secret known from their office.

B. Against obedience: if they do not obey the master's commands as to work or service, and, for servants strictly so called, also as to the governance of the house and good morals.

C. Against charity: if they scandalize the master, or also if they cooperate in his sin, unless from a proportionately grave cause this is done merely materially and only mediately.

D. Against justice: 1. if through negligence they omit to furnish the service or work due.

2. If they inflict real damage on the master, or even do not prevent it from being inflicted in those things which have been specially committed to their care.

3. If, not content with the salary due, they strive to earn more than is just, or even secretly compensate themselves, unless it is certain that more is owed from justice and cannot otherwise easily be compensated.

4. If they appropriate to themselves the things of the master, or dispose of them by giving or selling against the master's will.

5. If in the name of the master they sell things more dearly or buy more cheaply and reserve the profit to themselves, unless the master consents, or the premium was certainly made in their favor.

In a case of injustice committed, they are of themselves bound to restitution for emergent damage and ceasing profit. Let them attend that several damages or light thefts against the master can coalesce into one grave matter. Yet this ordinarily does not hold concerning things of lesser moment, as concerning common foods, because masters are not very unwilling about the surreption of them, or only about the mode; on the contrary, concerning things carefully guarded, large sums, exquisite foods, extraordinary things, or things of great value, it does hold.

Concerning all the aforesaid they are to be admonished when opportunity is given and questioned, for example, whether they have faithfully fulfilled their duties, have well furnished the labor due by agreement, have not handed over work affected with a hidden or harmful defect, have labored diligently and not spent working time idle, have not called others away from work, have had care of the master's things and have not stolen from him.

V. Admonition: concerning masters who preside over larger industrial workshops and more abundant stores of things. - Let these take special care not to act unjustly toward workers, and to use great riches well, lest they be a scandal to workers and the poor. As Lehmkuhl notes,[3] the confessor ought to watch: whether they fulfill the duties of a good father of a family and duly watch over their own, whether they abstain from depraved or dangerous amusements. But let him take care: that they lead a life useful to the common good and use money for founding works truly useful to human society, abstaining from excessive prodigalities; that they make large alms to the poor and to charitable works; that in honor and imitation of Christ crucified they abstain from worldly amusements and lead a simple life.

[3] In the edition of the work of Reuter, *Neo-conf.*, n. 156a.

Question IV: Concerning Public Officials

I. Who public officials are. - Under the name of officials here come all those who are constituted in a public function or office, such as judges, advocates, notaries, guardians of public order, etc.; who, if they do not discharge their office well, harm the common good and can inflict unjust damage upon private persons. Hence certain things concerning them must be noted.[1]

[1] Cf. St. Alphonsus, *Praxis conf.*, nn. 55-56; Aertnijs, *Th. P.*, nn. 44-45; Lehmkuhl in the new edition of Reuter, *Neo-conf.*, n. 167a; Salsmans, *Rechtelijke Plichtenleer*, that is, juridical deontology.

II. Judges are to be questioned, if they seem of laxer conscience:

1. Whether they have not shown acceptance of persons.

2. Whether they have expedited cases.

3. Whether before sentence they have premised or omitted suitable study.

4. Whether they have not pronounced sentence from passion: hatred, aversion, affection toward one party.

5. Whether they have not decreed penalties graver than is just, by not attending to attenuating circumstances, if any were present.

6. Whether for rendering sentence, whether just or unjust, they have exacted or accepted money or gifts.[2]

[2] Several other things can be seen in *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, II, nn. 632-634.

Let it be noted: a) Judges, if they lack competent knowledge, are bound to leave the office, or to learn juridical knowledge and meanwhile, as far as they can, to abstain from exercising the function, or at least to take counsel from a doctor if they cannot abstain altogether.

b) Jurors, who among certain nations are constituted to judge concerning the guilt of crimes according to the persuasion of their own conscience, sin if they pronounce against the accused either from private knowledge alone, when the crime has not been judicially proven, or from judicial proof while by private knowledge they know that he is innocent.

III. Advocates sin especially:

1. Those who undertake to defend civil causes openly unjust, or, after they have known them to be unjust, continue to defend them: but if they have been victorious in the cause, they are bound to the defeated party as to damage; if they have been defeated, they can be bound as to the expenses of the client, if he was ignorant of the injustice and pursued the cause from ignorance.

2. If they do not faithfully teach their clients the conditions of the cause.

3. If they do not preserve fidelity and secrecy for their clients.

4. If in defending a just cause they commit negligence, or employ bad arts.

5. If by their negligence they are at fault that clients have fallen from the cause, when otherwise, all things being duly and aptly brought forward, they would have prevailed.

6. If they demand a salary too exaggerated.

In all these things, if the advocate has inflicted unjust damage, he is bound to repair it.

IV. Notaries and public scribes are suitably to be questioned:

1. Whether through negligence they have been the cause of grave damage.

2. Whether they have committed infidelity or injustice in noting depositions of witnesses or in drawing up instruments.

3. Whether they have violated secrecy.

V. Ministers and guardians of public order are to be questioned according to opportunity:

1. Whether they have watched over public morality.

2. Whether they have not abused their office for sinning.

3. Whether, while inspecting brothels, they have had depraved desires.

4. Whether they have reported delinquents within the determined time.

5. Whether they have not accepted gifts in order not to report.

6. Whether they have not reported innocent persons from hatred or vengeance.

7. Whether they have denounced someone for a merely casual damaging.

VI. Observation. - Public officials of whatever kind are bound by office, and therefore from justice:

1. to employ ordinary diligence and diligence proportioned to the gravity of matters in fulfilling their function;

2. to act conformably to those things which are explicitly stated in their contract or special statute;

3. not to abuse their office or knowledge acquired by force of their office, in favor of blood relatives or friends, for example by revealing a matter to them sooner than to other citizens, or, on the contrary, by deliberately delaying a public manifestation which ought to be made. But merely to use such knowledge for one's own advantage is held by many as not unjust: this indeed we do not wish to approve, but neither do we dare condemn it, unless nevertheless it were positively prohibited by law.

Therefore officials must especially attend to these things; likewise their confessor. But if they have not satisfied their function, or have even permitted themselves to be corrupted by others with money

or gifts, they can be bound to restitution:

a) by reason of salary unduly accepted. He who does not do, or does badly, what he ought, is the same as if he stole a stipend, and he ought to restore in proportion to his defect;

b) also by reason of damage inflicted from grave negligence or depraved will, whether public, which comes upon the community, or private, by burdening someone unjustly or violating his strict right;

c) moreover, by reason of money or a gift accepted from private persons: for if they accepted it for faithfully fulfilling the office, they are bound to restore to those who gave it, since a stipend is given to them for fulfilling the office, and therefore they have no right to obtain anything else; but if they accepted it for fulfilling the office unjustly, they are bound to restore to him upon whom they inflicted unjust damage, and indeed for the whole damage inflicted.

Question V: Concerning Physicians and Pharmacists

I. Reason for the question. - There is a special reason for raising a question concerning physicians and pharmacists, since public health depends much upon their manner of acting.[1]

[1] On these matters St. Alphonsus, *Praxis Conf.*, nn. 57-58; Aertnijs, *Th. P.*, n. 46; Lehmkuhl in the new edition of Reuter, *Neo-conf.*, n. 167, a, III; Salsmans, *Geneeskundige Plichtenleer*.

II. Physicians sin against the obligations of their state:

1. If they are not sufficiently versed in the science and practice of their art, or in more difficult cases do not apply study or do not seek more learned persons.

2. If in curing diseases they do not employ due diligence.

3. If they apply a dangerous remedy to a sick person, unless in a desperate case, a safer remedy being lacking.

4. If they employ illicit means, for example directly procuring abortion, or embryotomy, or sterilization, or if they suggest those things which contradict good morals, or use morphine or narcotics in a harmful quantity.

5. If they perform useless surgical operations, or dangerous ones without a proportionately grave reason.

6. If in a difficult birth, or when danger exists, they do not confer or procure Baptism for a fetus, whether mature or immature, not certainly dead, or if they do not know the right manner of baptizing such fetuses.

7. If, when danger of death exists, they do not take care to warn the sick person in due time, so that he may consult his eternal salvation.

8. If without just cause, or from human respect, they pronounce permission to eat meat or to omit Mass.

9. If they neglect the care of the poor, especially in grave necessity.

10. If they exact an immoderate fee, or also multiply visits uselessly, unless this contributes to the consolation of the sick person and is pleasing to him.

More concerning these matters is declared more fully in chapter 2, section B, q. 1.[2]

[2] The *Summa Theol. Moralis*, II, nn. 376-379, can also be seen.

III. Pharmacists can be questioned, among other things:

1. Whether they have supplied remedies to pregnant women for procuring abortion.
2. Whether they have sold one medicine for another and at a price dearer than it is worth.
3. Whether they have prepared or sold unsuitable remedies.
4. Whether they have sold contraceptive remedies or instruments.
5. Whether they have handed over narcotics or other harmful things, unless to those for whom a physician had prescribed them, or whom they know by certain knowledge will not abuse them.

These things hold concerning those who in their own name furnish or sell remedies; but if in this they are serving others, merely material cooperation could be lawful on account of a very grave proportionate reason, at least until they have opportunely sought another service for themselves.

Question VI: Concerning Merchants and Soldiers

I. Reason for the question. - Because it is difficult in the business either of trade or of military service to preserve justice and to lead a Christian life, the confessor will give special attention and care to merchants and soldiers.

II. Merchants are especially to be questioned:[1]

[1] Cf. St. Alphonsus, *Praxis Conf.*, n. 59; *Theol. Moral.*, l. III, tr. V, n. 801 sq.; Reuter, *Neo-Conf.*, nn. 157-160.

1. Whether they have deceived in weight and measure.
2. Whether they have sold things beyond the highest price, unless by reason of emergent damage, ceasing profit, or special affection or need of the thing.
3. Whether they have abused the necessity or need of the buyer in order unduly to increase the price.
4. Whether they have used frauds in trade.
5. Whether they have manifested grave and hidden defects of the thing to be sold, or defects about which they were specially questioned.
6. Whether they have not substituted for the thing sold another substantially different thing, or have not sold things mixed with another of lesser quality without diminishing the price.

7. Whether they have sold defective merchandise soon to be corrupted; or goods in litigation without warning concerning this.

8. Whether they have not sold at the lowest price, but while giving a smaller measure.

9. Whether they have not established unjust coalitions or monopolies for excessively increasing the price, or exacting more than the highest price, especially in things of necessity.

10. Whether they have not used unjust or fictitious means, or false rumors, to increase or diminish artificially the price of things.

These last points especially have place in great businesses.

In all the aforesaid cases they are bound to restitution, if thereby they have unduly become richer, or if they have voluntarily inflicted unjust damage. Concerning this it will also be said below, c. 2, section B, q. 4.

III. Soldiers are especially to be questioned:

1. Concerning blasphemies and undue oaths.

2. Concerning omissions in fulfilling the precepts of the Church, especially concerning Sunday Mass neglected, if they were not impeded by reason of military service.

3. Concerning quarrels and duels; if these are entered by agreement, excommunication is incurred.

4. Concerning lust, and indeed not only concerning pollution, but also and especially concerning fornication, or even concerning stuprum, and sometimes, especially among cavalrymen, concerning sodomy.

5. Concerning immodest, depraved amusements or readings.

6. Concerning thefts and injustices.

7. Concerning damages unjustly inflicted.

This especially holds for time of war. On which occasion it can be asked: whether they have not harmed the innocent, have not seized the goods of private persons or inflicted damage upon them, have not occupied goods without necessity of sustenance or legitimate requisition of the leader, have not destroyed things belonging to another without necessity, etc. For those things which they would unjustly seize or destroy, they would be bound to restitution.

Question VII: Concerning Priests and Pastors

I. Importance of the question. - To hear confessions of priests is a work of highest importance, which must be fulfilled with great discretion and prudent zeal, both on account of their dignity and on account of the great influence which they were born to exercise. For just as their holy life contributes to forming the morals of the people, so their evil examples or neglected duties contribute to the

corruption of the people. For they must preside over others in virtue and not cease to feed the sheep of Christ with doctrine, prayer and example, and the sacraments. Hence the confessor must take pains to retain them in the fervor of priestly life, and to preserve them from tepidity or relaxation.[1]

[1] On this argument St. Alphonsus, *Homo apost.*, app. IV, section 1, n. 9; *Praxis Conf.*, nn. 49-52, 183, 196 sq.; Aertnijs, *Th. P.*, nn. 153-162 and n. 42; Reuter, *Neo-Conf.*, n. 154.

II. Manner of conducting oneself with priests. - The confessor, in receiving the confessions of priests:

1. Let him conduct himself altogether reverently.

2. If they are upright, since they know moral theology, there is generally no need to question them concerning the species and number of sins, unless their confession is manifestly insufficient or they are of neglected conscience; in doubt concerning the gravity of fault, it can be asked of them whether they thought themselves to sin gravely.

3. The exhortation is not to be omitted, but let it be brief and modest, and made indirectly, saying for example: "we priests."

4. Let him proceed firmly in making corrections if they should be necessary, and let him be constant in denying absolution if it should be fitting, for example if some were recidivists or occasionaries without amendment.

5. Nor let him be disturbed if at times he hears many sins. Priests live in the midst of solicitations, and it would be a wonder if, among so many priests, some did not sometimes fall, at least secretly.

III. Admonitions to be furnished to priests. - The confessor can persuade priests before other things:

1. That they apprehend well the dignity of their vocation and its obligations.

2. That they devote themselves wholly to the sheep and try to profit them by prayers, example, and ministry; especially that they have special care for the sick, the poor, and children.

3. That with the greatest zeal they avoid four vices which are most unbecoming to a cleric and more dangerous to him, namely idleness, lust, drunkenness, and avarice.

IV. Means opportunely to be inculcated. - To lead a truly priestly life, there contributes much, first of all, the firm purpose of such a holy life; if this purpose is lacking, life will be unstable, fruitless, and full of dangers; but if it stands, there will arise cheerfulness in discharging ecclesiastical duties, delight in the exercise of virtues, strength against rushing temptations, and perseverance in all these things.

For putting the purpose into execution and standing firm in it, the following are especially powerful:

1. Zeal for prayer, both mental meditation and consideration of divine things ordered to pious affections: without mental prayer, says St. Alphonsus,[2] a priest will most difficultly be good, since there will be lacking light in the mind for understanding supernatural truths and the warmth of fervor in the will by which he may be moved to live holily; and also prayer strictly

so called and vocal prayer, necessary so that he may obtain graces for himself and for his ministry, and others may understand this necessity of praying.

[2] *Praxis Conf.*, n. 183.

2. The divine office, than which, among prayers to be poured forth, nothing is more excellent and salutary after the Most Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. And indeed, in it the priest uses words inspired by the Holy Spirit in Scripture or composed by the Church of God, joins himself to the heavenly court, continues the work of Christ, performs the work of the whole Church whose legation he bears, by his praises repairs sins, elicits acts of the theological virtues, and implores divine help for himself and the whole human race.

3. The Sacrifice of the Mass, which is the center of our religion, to which all ceremonies and prayers of the Church are ordered, and to which the priest ought to refer every care. Let him avoid a threefold abuse: celebrating in an incongruous manner, namely too slowly or too hastily, which contains irreverence; celebrating from mere custom, without preparation and thanksgiving, with tepidity and coldness; celebrating with consciousness of mortal sin, so that, as the Apostle says, he is guilty of the Body and Blood of the Lord.

4. Frequent confession, every week or fortnight, necessary for greater purity and for safer direction. Let every priest have a confessor in whom he places full confidence, and to whom he perfectly lays open his conscience.

5. Love of study, according to that saying, I Tim. IV, 13, 16: "Attend to reading, exhortation and doctrine... Attend to thyself and to doctrine; be earnest in them. For doing this, thou shalt save both thyself and those who hear thee." Hence all priests ought to take pains that for several days in the week, indeed daily, they devote some time to the study of sacred doctrine, chiefly dogmatic and moral theology, as is required for their own salvation and that of neighbor. For they must propose doctrine to the people, explain the sacraments, inculcate the precepts to all and proper duties to individuals, and judge concerning cases of conscience. Nor let them pretend that all time for study is lacking to them: for how much time is worn away uselessly!

6. Spiritual exercises held every year, for exploring the state of conscience more diligently and ordering the state of the soul, for healing languor and stirring up fervor, in solitude and perfect separation from every business, so that the priest may be able to be wholly for God, to meditate on eternal truths, to pray in secret, and to hear the voice of God.

V. The principal obligations proper to priests are usually numbered as:

1. To lead a holy and perfect life, in imitation of Christ, whose ministers they are on earth.

2. To recite the divine office daily.

3. Also to observe continence, if they belong to the Latin Church.

4. To celebrate the Sacrifice of the Mass at least several times in the year: thus by reason of the priesthood; for they can be bound more often by reason of a special office, benefice, or stipend.

5. To exercise the sacred ministry and administer the sacraments, if necessity is present or a special office falls upon them.

6. To abstain from those things which are unbecoming to their state, as from worldly spectacles, dances and pageants, business and trade, games of chance, etc. (can. 138-142).

7. To expend revenues superfluous from ecclesiastical goods for the poor and for pious causes (can. 1473).

VI. A priest is to be questioned concerning his obligations if he seems to be of neglected conscience:[3]

[3] St. Alphonsus, *Praxis Conf.*, n. 49 sq.; Aertnijs, *Th. P.*, n. 42.

A. A simple priest: whether he has recited the canonical hours, whether he has satisfied Mass burdens or has deferred celebrating these for a long time, whether he does not finish Mass too hastily, whether he has observed ecclesiastical law as to business transactions, games of chance, or speculations, worldly affairs which are unbecoming, whether in a case of necessity he has not refused to exercise the sacred ministry, whether he has lived piously and ordered his time well.

B. A confessor: whether he has acquired the knowledge necessary for hearing confessions, whether he has given sufficient labor to study and whether he continues to study, whether he has absolved those who remained in a proximate occasion of sin, or were recidivists and brought no extraordinary signs of their disposition, whether he administers the sacrament of Penance with great care, and is neither more rigorous nor more benign toward penitents. But if he confesses a grave sin against chastity committed with another person, let him be questioned whether it was with his own penitent, whether he heard the confession of the accomplice and absolved from that sin, whether perhaps he solicited a penitent.

C. A pastor: whether, as far as he can, he corrects the vices of subjects, especially of those who provide public scandal; whether he watches that all fulfill the paschal precept and has admonished those who have neglected it; whether he has administered the sacraments in danger of death, or when he himself was requested; whether he has furnished due assistance to the dying; whether on Sundays he has held sermons; whether he has instructed the people concerning Christian doctrine, especially the ignorant concerning the mysteries of faith and the means to salvation, and those about to marry on the occasion of future marriage, but midwives and physicians concerning the right manner of baptizing in a case of necessity; whether he has rightly instructed children in the catechesis of Christian doctrine and prepared them for holy communion at the age when they can already be suitable; whether he has given good example and avoided everything which could scandalize the sheep; whether he has also promoted the faithful to piety and devotion; whether he has celebrated Mass for the flock and bestowed the alms due.

VII. Observation. - Since a pastor and other priests upon whom the ministry of souls rests must always be ready for administering the sacraments, they must always be in the state of grace, lest they minister sacrilegiously.

Question VIII: Concerning Religious and Nuns

I. Special obligations of religious. - Religious of either sex are bound by reason of their state:

1. To tend to perfection conformably to their rule and constitutions.

2. To observe the three vows of obedience, perfect chastity, and poverty.

3. To devote themselves to mental prayer, daily assistance at the Sacrifice of the altar, and other offices of piety.

4. At least every week to make sacramental confession, and frequently to approach Holy Communion.

5. To recite the divine office in choir, if this belongs to their religious institute; but those who have emitted solemn vows are bound in conscience also to private recitation.

6. To wear the habit of their religious institute.

7. To observe cloister.

8. To lead the common life.

9. To abstain from secular affairs, unbecoming arts, and worldly delights which are unbecoming to them, in the same way as was said for priests.

Superiors are bound to watch over all these things, and are moreover bound by special precepts.

II. Religious are to be questioned and admonished concerning their obligations, if any are of neglected conscience:

A. A religious of any kind: whether he has admitted any defect against the vows: against poverty, by receiving, giving, or using without permission; against perfect chastity, even by indulging impure fantasies or desires, by not avoiding occasions of sin, or by not sufficiently guarding his heart; against obedience, by not obeying special precepts of superiors or by despising them; whether he has not indulged tepidity or has not contemned the perfect life.

B. A nun in particular: whether she has recited the divine office; whether she has not nourished some dangerous friendship, for example if there have been at least words, or amorous letters, or dangerous familiarities; whether she is not held by some aversion toward her sisters; whether she has carefully fulfilled a particular office, if she has any, and does not abuse it.

C. A superior: whether she employs due diligence when men enter the monastery or stay there; whether she shows great goodness together with firmness in governing the monastery; whether she does not connive at abuses, especially new ones; while observing, says St. Alphonsus,[1] that although individual nuns sin lightly by transgressing a light rule, nevertheless superiors who do not take care to impede, when they can, the relaxation of observance, sin in a grave matter.

[1] *Praxis Conf.*, n. 54.

III. The superior is especially to be admonished: 1. that she love all the religious without distinction as most dear daughters, and willingly hear each one and assist her; 2. that she not show herself credulous to denunciation, but inquire cautiously, and if she must correct, that she do this for the most part privately; 3. that she procure regular observance and herself go before all by her example;

4. that she take pains prudently to cut off abuses, if there are any; 5. that she have at heart that the sick be well cared for and often visited by their fellow sisters; 6. that she abstain from avarice and at the same time from luxury and superfluity; 7. that she use great consideration in admitting or dismissing novices; 8. that in extraordinary circumstances she consult the Ordinary in good time; 9. that she not prohibit to her subjects the liberty, sanctioned by the canons, of approaching an outside confessor for tranquility of conscience (can. 522); likewise that she not prohibit them from frequent or daily communion, except in the case of grave scandal until they have approached the sacrament of Penance (can. 595, sections 2 and 3).

IV. Counsels for the confessor of religious women, especially nuns.[2] - Certain things are to be observed by the confessor of religious women, certain things to be avoided.

[2] Aertnijs, *Th. P.*, nn. 149-150.

A. Things to be observed. 1. Let the confessor strive to know those things which pertain to the perfection of the religious state, and those which pertain to the proper vocation of the respective religious institute.

2. Let him provide that religious women lay open their conscience to him with full confidence, which is supremely necessary, since they have almost their only refuge, especially if they are nuns, in the confessor; and if they are deprived of this, they are exposed to various anxieties and temptations like sheep destitute of a shepherd. Hence let his patience and paternal meekness be great; and if a religious woman shows signs of shame, let him earnestly help her.

3. Let him strive that religious women advance in virtues, such as: love of God, not sensible, but strong, impelling them to do the will of God even in arduous things; humility and modesty, both internal and external, joined with spiritual joy; obedience toward the rule, constitutions, superiors, and confessor, so that they obey promptly, faithfully, cheerfully, and blindly; charity toward sisters, so that they offend or sadden no one, forgive from the heart offenses received, bear the defects of others patiently and meekly, and help them when they can; chastity, which guards against every affection and familiarity.

4. Let him procure regular observance, exhorting them to perform all prescribed things accurately and from a true religious spirit.

5. Let him guard safe and intact the authority of the superior.

B. Things to be avoided. 1. Let the confessor converse with nuns rarely rather than frequently, and, where conversation is necessary, let him strive for brevity.

2. In giving responses let him not be too hasty, but in graver or doubtful questions let him take time for reconsidering.

3. Let him be too familiar with no one, nor show himself favoring one rather than another; otherwise dangers, aversions, and disturbances are apt to arise.

4. In hearing confessions let him disclose no weariness, impatience, or haste, because this diminishes confidence.

5. Let him not be disturbed or scandalized if at times he hears that graver sins have been committed, for example of the flesh or sacrilege; persons consecrated to God are more vehemently tempted, whence they are worthy of compassion rather than indignation.

6. Let him give no suspicion that he uses knowledge from confession for doing something external.

7. In no way let him involve himself in domestic governance, or in affairs pertaining to the Ordinary or to the superior, but let him remain within the limits of his office. Let him remember that he enjoys no authority in the external forum; wherefore let him beware lest he introduce novelties, unless perhaps for grave reasons and with the counsel and will of the superior and of the greater part of the community.

V. Observation concerning directing penitents in piety and perfection. - In this direction the confessor will be able to use those things which we have said in our little work *Concerning Various Categories of Penitents*, where concerning the pious and devout, and concerning the perfect and contemplative, c. 3, q. 1 and 2.

Chapter II: Concerning Various Sins Against the Virtues and the Precepts of the Decalogue

Besides the duties proper to particular states, there are others common to all men, to which the theological and moral virtues, and the precepts of the Decalogue, order us. But just as the diverse virtues dispose us so that we may be rightly ordered toward God, toward our neighbor, and toward ourselves, so too there are other sins against God, against neighbor, and against ourselves.

In the present chapter we shall speak concerning certain sins against God and against neighbor; concerning the principal sins against ourselves it comes to be said in the third chapter, where capital sins are treated.

Section A. Concerning Certain Sins Against God

Sins against God are committed directly against the theological virtues and against religion. The theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, are not formally and expressly proposed in the Decalogue, but are presupposed to it as principles to conclusions, the intention of the end to the ordering of means, and the recognition of the legislator to submission to the law. The virtue of religion is proposed in the first three precepts of the Decalogue, namely as to the three duties of fidelity toward God, reverence, and service.

In the following we shall speak:

1. concerning certain sins against divine faith, which in the present supernatural order is necessary for perfect fidelity toward God revealing;

2. concerning certain sins against reverence for God;

3. concerning the sin against the service of God, or concerning the violation of Sunday.

Question I: Concerning Certain Sins Against Faith

I. Object of the question. - The sin of infidelity is directly opposed to divine faith; in the baptized this is heresy and apostasy. Many things are indirectly opposed, namely whatever constitutes a danger or an occasion of losing or suppressing faith, such as communication with unbelievers and heretics, especially in sacred things, cooperation toward infidelity and heresy, the publication and reading of writings contrary to faith, and opinions dangerous to faith, concerning which in the Treatise on Faith.[1]

[1] Cf. *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, I, nn. 733-780.

In the present matter there is especially treated: concerning liberalism and socialism, which for the most part constitute an indirect danger to faith from which the faithful are to be kept away; concerning heresy, which is a direct obstacle to faith, from which those who have fallen into it are to be converted; concerning doubt in faith, which can be either one or the other. Hence we shall consider penitents of three kinds:

a) those infected with liberalism or socialism, to be admonished or even dismissed,

b) heretics, to be received into the Church and to sacramental confession,

c) those doubting and wavering in the true faith.

II. Of how much importance it is to meet Liberalism and Socialism. - Not rarely does it happen that certain Catholics are imbued with the spirit of liberalism and adhere in some measure to its theories; similarly, to those of socialism. Therefore it is necessary that the confessor know those errors, and be able to bring forth a prudent judgment concerning the stain of liberalism or socialism by which perhaps penitents are infected, and to set before himself the right mode of acting with penitents of this kind.

For the matter is full of dangers. Ordinarily, indeed, someone does not become a complete liberal or socialist immediately from the beginning. He begins to read newspapers or other writings of liberals or socialists; he associates with their societies, perhaps without an evil intention, or gives them his vote in political elections. Nor for this reason does he necessarily become impious or indifferent in the matter of religion; but ordinarily his faith grows cold and religious practice is gradually diminished. In the sons of men of this kind religious indifference is wont to grow; and their sons are still baptized, make first Communion, enter marriage before the Church, and call a priest at the end of life, but besides these things there is almost no practice of religion. In the third generation there will already be complete indifference, or even hostility toward religion, so that in practical life paganism as it were prevails.

Against these dangers priests must seriously admonish and fortify the faithful, both publicly and also privately in confession.

In present times, indeed, the matter perhaps becomes less practical in our regions, because many liberals no longer frequent the church or the sacraments, nor is the struggle against them so sharp as formerly; nevertheless the principles always hold, and new circumstances could occur in which they would again serve more in practice. Indeed, because of the absence of struggle the dangers are perhaps greater, since the faithful do not so easily perceive the imminence of danger and the greatness of the evil. Hence one must never desist from opportune admonition.

III. Notions concerning Liberalism.[2] - In general, all those are called liberals who confuse the physical liberty of choosing with independence from God and from those sharing divine authority, which moderns call moral liberty; hence, under the false name of liberty, they pursue a certain absurd and most deadly license or independence.

[2] Concerning Liberalism, cf. Pius IX, const. *Quanta Cura*, 8 Dec. 1864, and the *Syllabus*; Leo XIII, const. *Immortale Dei*, 1 Nov. 1885, and enc. *Libertas*, 20 June 1888; Moulart, *L'Eglise et l'Etat*; Daris, *L'Eglise et l'Etat*; Villada, *Casus Conscientiae*; Aertnijs, *Th. P.*, nn. 94-101; Bouquillon, *Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis*, n. 246 sq.; Ballerini, *Opus Morale*, II, tr. 4, n. 164 sq.; *Theologia Mechliniensis*, *de Fide*, nn. 44-46. Certain things are also found in Genicot, *Th. M.*, I, n. 205, and in Lehmkuhl and Ferreres, in their respective work: *Casus Conscientiae*.

A. One kind is doctrinal or philosophical liberalism, which applies in the moral and civil matter the principles of rationalism or even naturalism, which place the principate of human reason, private or public, individual or universal, as the highest principle and judge of truth.

And indeed in such a way that it denies every divine power and law and follows a morality fully independent; or at least denies every revelation and positive and supernatural divine law, but admits

a merely natural morality. This is not treated here, because it pertains to those who are not faithful and therefore do not confess.

B. Another kind is merely economic, which denies divine and moral law in economic matters and in the production of riches.

This is not considered in the present matter, because it is opposed more to justice than to faith and religion or to the first precept of the Decalogue.

C. Another kind is merely political, which admits divine law, even supernatural law, for private persons, but not for civil society and its laws; hence it defends liberty of conscience, of cults, of the press, of doctrine, and of association.

Namely, it proclaims the separation of the State and the Catholic Church, and the State's indifference concerning various religious confessions. But by the name of separation from the Church, they understand and signify an absolute divorce between the two powers, all mutual concord and all mutual help being taken away, so that the Church, despoiled of every influence, of all goods, and of all external prerogatives, lives in hiding, while the State governs all things as if the Church did not exist. Hence it professes the separation of marriage from the Church, and its subjection under the civil power; the separation of the school from the Church and its subordination under the direction of civil authority; the abrogation of the immunity of clerics from the burden of undergoing and exercising military service, etc. In one word: it is a political system which professes the full independence of the State from the Church or from religion.[3]

[3] Cf. encyclical of Leo XIII, *Libertas*, 20 June 1888.

In this form of liberalism a threefold grade can be distinguished:

1. Radical liberalism, which so exaggerates this independence that it wishes the Church to be subject to the State. Its watchword is: the Church in the State, that is, the Church subject to the State.

2. Moderate liberalism, which professes the simple separation of the State from the Church and from every religion, using this formula: a free Church in a free State.

3. So-called Catholic liberalism, which professes that from the nature of the thing religion is not to be separated from civil society, but that each power ought to govern the human race by a concordant effort; yet in the general hypothesis of the present age, attention being paid to progress and the condition of men, that it is no longer expedient to desire and defend that conjunction, but that simple separation is to be approved and sought, together with the modern liberties flowing from it, especially those of cults and of the press. Let the words be noted well: in the general hypothesis, to be sought, to be approved; because it is not liberal but truly Catholic to profess that in special circumstances these liberties are to be tolerated in order to avoid greater evils or to obtain greater goods.

Now the errors of liberalism in every grade have been condemned by the authority of the Church;[4] hence those who knowingly profess such errors sin gravely.

[4] Cf. the encyclical of Pius IX, *Quanta Cura*, and the *Syllabus*; likewise the encyclical of Leo XIII, *Libertas*.

The word liberal is of itself equivocal; hence if in certain regions it is taken in an entirely different sense, or designates a merely political party which in no way defends condemned principles, those things which we have said would not hold concerning such liberalism. Nor do we intend to speak of it, but we speak in the theologically received sense.

IV. Whether there is invincible ignorance of liberalism. - The answer is:

1. As regards the radical form of liberalism, ordinarily this must be denied, because its errors are so open, and so opposed to the fundamental principles of morality, that even the more unlearned cannot fail to recognize its falsity and impiety.

2. As regards the other milder forms, if the unlearned are excepted, most who call themselves liberals are not in good faith, and therefore are to be treated as such by the confessor.

The reason is that the documents of the Holy See condemning Liberalism are publicly known, and have been so propagated that invincible ignorance among most people seems morally impossible: this holds especially and generally concerning those who by reason of office are bound to know the falsity and condemnation of liberalism, such as kings, ministers and counselors of the kingdom, senators, deputies, prefects of provinces and cities, judges, advocates, and similar officials who have a part in making laws or putting them into execution; and also editors of political newspapers.

3. Nevertheless, more unlearned persons and, exceptionally, certain educated persons are found who profess milder Liberalism in good faith.

This happens both because, having been preoccupied by the doctrine of their parents, teachers, and companions, they judge liberalism of this kind harmless, and because they do not know how to distinguish between thesis and hypothesis, and confuse the liberty of evil which is owed by right with the toleration of evil which is done for the sake of avoiding a greater evil or increasing or preserving good.

V. Is the confessor bound to question penitents concerning the sin of liberalism? - The answer is: Affirmatively, as concerning other sins. And indeed, if liberals everywhere are admitted to the sacraments without question or admonition, and confessors in the sacred tribunal keep deep silence concerning this matter, the faithful will think the matter is not of great importance and will not sufficiently perceive the depravity of liberalism. Hence, although the matter, as we have noted, has become less practical because of circumstances, nevertheless it is not to be consigned wholly to oblivion: otherwise concerning the evil doctrine and dangers of Liberalism the same will happen as concerning bad readings, which are no longer sufficiently held as evil, because priests have omitted sufficiently to admonish concerning their depravity. Therefore:

1. A penitent is to be questioned, whoever he may be, whether unlearned or learned, whether poor or prince, who is silent about the sin of liberalism of which he is certainly known to be guilty, for example from the confessor's own knowledge or from public knowledge. And if, when questioned, the penitent denies it and appears formally to lie, he can in no way be absolved.

2. Likewise he is to be questioned who is probably thought to be a liberal or a favorer of liberalism, for example if he is held as such by many grave men, or if he belongs to a liberal assembly or party which is opposed to religion or the Church, or if ordinarily he reads truly liberal newspapers without just cause. If a penitent of this kind seriously denies that he is a liberal, ordinarily he is to be believed: unless, because of special circumstances, a grave doubt remains, in which case the principles are to be applied which govern those doubtfully disposed, and he is to be absolved only under condition if a grave cause is present, or absolution is to be deferred if this is not feared to be harmful to the penitent.

3. Nevertheless not all penitents are to be questioned: for a mere suspicion of sin does not suffice, even from rumors of the crowd or from a reputation arising from no certain source, but true and solid probability, or a prudent and grave doubt, is required.

As to the manner of questioning, let the confessor proceed cautiously, beginning by asking generally, for example whether he feels any troublesome temptations against faith or against declarations of the Supreme Pontiffs or bishops or the doctrine of the Church; if the penitent denies this, let him ask further, for example, thus: do you not have relations with enemies of the Church, or sympathy for those who attack her? do you not frequent adversaries of the Church? are you therefore not a follower of liberalism?... From the response it will be clear what sort he is; then, if there is need, let him ask whether he reads liberal newspapers, frequents or supports an assembly of liberals; likewise concerning speaking against the doctrine, ministers, and precepts of the Church and concerning transgression of these.

VI. Must the confessor admonish penitents who seem to be in good faith concerning the malice of liberalism? - The answer is: Affirmatively, of itself, that is, unless at some time greater harm would follow from the admonition. Given opportunity, he is bound to admonish them, especially if the penitents are persons who, because of office, learning, or honor, exercise great influence upon others. The reason is both because they are rarely in invincible ignorance, and because the errors of liberalism are very harmful to the liberals themselves as to faith, to their family for the education of children, and to the common good because of public scandal and the depraved influence which they exercise upon others.[5]

[5] Nor ought it create business for the confessor that such penitents will be deterred from the sacraments in the future; for by admonition precisely this is intended, that either they abstain from the sacraments, by the reception of which they provide scandal to the faithful, or they abandon the sin of liberalism now known to them.

But if, after the admonition has been made, someone refuses to obey and pertinaciously adheres to Liberalism, he is unworthy of absolution, and to grant it would be a great scandal for him and for other faithful.

We said: of itself, for:

1. it can happen that this penitent, not solidly pious, would be turned away more from the Church and inflict great harm upon her because of his influence: in which case it will be more prudent to abstain;

2. penitents lightly infected with liberalism can be in good faith, and, if no fruit is hoped for from admonition, be left in good faith. Then nevertheless the confessor should generally inculcate

the necessity of believing the doctrine of the Church and of obeying all her precepts.

VII. Cooperation toward liberalism. - Just as liberalism itself is evil, so cooperation toward it is evil of itself and is to be avoided. This can be furnished in several ways:

1. through bad liberal newspapers, not only by writing, collaborating, printing, supporting, spreading, and selling them without a grave cause proportioned to the evil, but also by reading them; and this will be gravely evil if one very bad article is read, or if someone habitually reads them, or even rarely but with grave danger or grave scandal;

2. through patronage or subsidy of liberal works (for example schools) given without a grave cause;

3. through the election of liberal deputies, which will also be gravely evil if it is done from conviction; or even without conviction, if the outcome of the election appears doubtful and probably can depend on the vote;

4. a fortiori through the office of the deputies themselves, namely by effectively giving a vote to laws infected with liberalism.

VIII. Case concerning a dying liberal. - It is asked what is to be done by a confessor called to a dying man who is counted among the leading liberals. The answer is:

1. if the dying man, destitute of his senses, sought a priest or gave signs of a desire for confession, absolution and Extreme Unction are to be conferred absolutely; but under condition if he gave no signs, provided that he did not expressly refuse the confessor immediately or almost immediately before he was deprived of his senses;

2. if he can speak or respond by signs, of itself the confessor must instruct him concerning the error of liberalism and admonish him concerning the obligation of repairing scandal, unless no fruit of the admonition is hoped for and the dying man is in good faith, which nevertheless can rarely be supposed. Then nevertheless let him suggest a general sorrow concerning all things, if there are any, done against religion, and a purpose of doing nothing against it.[6]

[6] Cf. those things which we said concerning the dying, in the little work *Concerning Various Categories of Penitents*, c. 2, q. 6.

But if he belongs to a Masonic sect:

a) he must be questioned whether perhaps he has fallen into heresy or into apostasy;

b) likewise, whether he knew that Masons incur excommunication;

c) regularly it will have to be required that he break off every communion with them;

d) likewise, that he send a formal renunciation to the sect - for if he wished to persevere in frequenting it, generally he could not be absolved. (Cf. Holy Office, 5 July 1837.)

The clauses which the Sacred Penitentiary is accustomed to require in the faculty granted for absolving Masons are the following:

1. that they separate themselves from the sect and abjure it, that is, detest it;

2. moreover, that they hand over books, manuscripts, and signs of Freemasons to the confessor, who is to transmit them to the Ordinary or burn them;

3. likewise, that they denounce hidden leaders to the Ordinary;

4. likewise, that a grave penance be enjoined upon them, and the other things to be enjoined by law, so that reparation of damage or scandal be procured in the better way by which it can be done.

Nevertheless a grave reason can excuse from several of the aforesaid, which can more easily be present at the moment of death.

IX. What concerning Socialism? - Similar principles hold for socialism, for socialists also admit the theory of liberalism, at least political liberalism, concerning the separation of religion and the State: liberals often are such in the merely political matter, but socialists in the economic matter. Moreover:

1. Socialism which is called scientific adheres to atheism and materialism, so that on this side it is heretical.

2. Economic but perturbative socialism, which admits collectivism or communism and violent means (a fortiori anarchism), was also openly condemned by the Church; hence good faith will be rare. (Cf. what was said n. IV.)

3. Merely reformative socialism of itself is not necessarily hostile to the Church, yet in fact in our regions it is a party which is opposed to the Church; hence concerning it those things hold which we said concerning political liberalism (n. V and VI).

4. Formal cooperation toward socialism, by which someone thinks socialistically, is gravely evil; merely material cooperation and even material aggregation to works, not only political but also economic, of itself is illicit, but by grave and urgent necessity it can be lawful, provided that there is no proximate danger of perversion in faith (n. VII).

Hence: a) Let pastors and preachers not fail in the office of admonishing concerning the fleeing of bad societies and the avoiding of evil companions and papers.

b) Those who are imbued with the principles of scientific socialism profess materialism and atheism, and therefore are to be held as sinning directly against faith.

c) Those following the political party of socialists from conviction commit, of itself, grave sin: namely, good faith will rarely be present, unless perhaps in regions altogether dechristianized.

d) Those enrolled in socialist syndicates are easily guilty because of cooperation, scandal, and the grave danger to which they expose themselves. Nevertheless accidentally it can be lawful for a time, if scandal is lacking, the danger of perversion is only remote, and there is an urgent necessity from which they could not free themselves, such as if a worker otherwise would have to bid farewell to the labor of his profession and therefore to his daily sustenance. Thus, unless the bishops of some region should judge otherwise and universally prohibit any aggregation whatever to the works of socialists.

Then, namely, they would have to be obeyed, as judging authoritatively concerning the necessities and dangers of religion.[7]

[7] Cf. Tessens in *Vie diocesaine*, Dec. 1921.

e) Those workers who from good faith do not perceive the gravity of the offense of cooperation are of themselves to be admonished; nevertheless accidentally they may be left in good faith for a time, in a case in which the admonition is foreseen as not going to profit and scandal is lacking. Then nevertheless a general admonition should be made concerning avoiding the proximate occasion of sin and concerning suitable remedies by which they may be morally removed, such as conversation and association with good men truly Christian and the reading of good newspapers.

Conditions and possibilities in this matter are not everywhere the same, but most diverse. Nevertheless, as far as they can, let the bishops wish to declare that in this matter insistence is to be placed rather upon rigor than upon benignity, and that indulgence is not to be given easily. Experience shows that from that great benignity it happens that always less and less can be obtained and exacted from the faithful, and finally the indifference or defection of many follows. Here also the axiom holds: Resist beginnings! Nevertheless there are sometimes circumstances in which benignity alone, at least for a time, can be fitting.

X. Admonition. - The pastor and priests generally must abstain from frequent visitation of those liberals and socialists who are confirmed in error. But if some intercourse is necessary, let them not begin to speak about religious and political questions or to dispute about them; but if they are asked about these things, not indeed maliciously but sincerely, let them speak boldly, yet not too much or at greater length, but briefly, clearly, and solidly.

XI. Of how much importance it is to meet and heal the sin of heresy. - Heresy keeps Christians from the right way of salvation and separates them from the Church; hence priests ought by all means to take care that those who have fallen into heresy or are detained in it, having been converted from it, may be led back into the bosom of the Church. This work indeed presents less difficulty if they have not yet passed over to a heretical sect; but it is of longer and more prudent labor if they have already been admitted into some sect, or have been baptized or educated in it.

For this in a priest there is required:

1. great charity, which inspires immense mercy toward the miserable state of a soul adhering in error, and prevents every manifestation of suspicion concerning the sincerity of the one to be converted, even if he were a perverse Catholic; unless nevertheless he gives contrary signs;

2. much patience, since a long time is often required for heretics to overcome the old life and acknowledge the truth;

3. fervent and continual prayer, to obtain divine help altogether necessary for conversion;

4. a prudent manner of acting in proposing doctrine, by which, namely, he in no way diminishes Catholic truths, but neither proclaims them unseasonably, being content to affirm those things which are necessary;

5. discretion in selecting books which clearly and opportunely set forth Catholic doctrine and are to be recommended to the one being converted;

6. untroubled serenity in refuting objections, by which he in no way shows himself burdened by them.

XII. Notions concerning heresy. - Heresy is defined as an error in Catholic faith, voluntary and pertinacious, in one who has professed the Christian faith by reception of Baptism; but if someone has totally cast off the faith, heresy is called apostasy.

It therefore contains at once contempt of the authority of God revealing, and contempt of the infallible authority of the Church proposing faith, and is therefore most grave.

Heresy is either material or formal, according as one denies the authority of the Church in proposing faith without pertinacity, because it was not sufficiently proposed; or, on the contrary, sufficiently knows it and nevertheless denies it in at least one point. It is internal if it so lies hidden in the mind that it is manifested by no external sign, or external if it manifests itself by external signs, even if no one sees them; this is occult if to no one or only to one or another, public if it is externally manifested openly and before several.

According to can. 2314, formal and external heresy incurs by the fact itself excommunication reserved to the Supreme Pontiff; and heretics, unless after being admonished they come to their senses, are to be deprived of benefice, dignity, pension, office, or any other function, if they have any in the Church, are to be declared infamous, and clerics, after repeated admonition, are to be deposed; indeed, if they have given their name to a non-Catholic sect or have publicly adhered to it, by the fact itself they are infamous, and clerics, after previous admonition, are to be degraded. Moreover all are irregular (can. 985), and are deprived of ecclesiastical burial (can. 1240, section 2). If a Catholic has fallen into external but occult heresy, namely one which has not been divulged and probably will not be divulged, and has not incurred the censure of excommunication, for example because of ignorance, any confessor can absolve him from the sin. On the contrary, if that sinner has incurred the censure, and the confessor does not have the faculty of absolving from it, and there is not an urgent case, he can seek this faculty from the Sacred Penitentiary, or even ask it from the local Ordinary, and then in the sacrament of Penance absolve from the censure and the sin (can. 2314, section 2).

XIII. How one must proceed with heretics wishing to return to the Church. - In this case several things come to be attended to, as to precautions to be employed, instruction to be given, and proximate preparation.[8]

[8] Cf. Reuter, *Neo-Conf.*, nn. 197-203; Aertnijs, *Th. P.*, nn. 108-115.

1. Precautions to be employed.

a) The priest ought prudently to question the heretic wishing to be converted concerning the cause or motive of his conversion, and to watch lest under the veil of piety he chiefly seek temporal advantages, such as marriage or support, and, once these have been obtained, live badly or return to error.

b) Therefore, lest the priest be deceived, let him test by various questions made at different times whether the sayings of the heretic cohere with one another; but let him say or do nothing which he

would not wish said or done if the one to be converted should perhaps return to heresy.

c) Let him strive to win the confidence of the heretic for himself, so that the latter may more willingly and more sincerely open his errors and miseries and falls, and commit himself wholly to his direction.

d) Let him place before his eyes the very great importance of this business, in which the hinge of eternal salvation turns, and therefore let him inculcate upon him the necessity of praying, and also pray fervently for him and ask the prayers of others.

2. In the instruction to be given the following things are to be observed:

a) Before all things it must be investigated whether he was a material heretic, from simplicity, ignorance, or sinister information; or formal, from sufficient knowledge and pertinacity.

b) Likewise it must be inquired how much he has been instructed in the doctrine of his sect, so that his errors may be known and the mode by which he is to be instructed may be determined: for if he is simple and unlearned, he needs right instruction in Christian doctrine, but not in controversies of faith; but if he is more skilled, satisfaction must be given to him as to the individual articles and all difficulties.

c) Since the assent of faith is prudent and reasonable and firm, the priest ought to set forth the motives of credibility of the dogmas, which are to be believed if the Catholic Church alone is the true Church of Christ. Hence let him not descend at once to particular dogmas, but first show the true Church of Christ.

This can be done in a twofold way; hence the circumstances must be considered so that it may be judged which method is to be employed. Namely, it can be done:

1. from the notes of the Church, by successively showing: that the true faith is necessary for salvation; that there is only one true religion and Church of Christ; that it is the secure rule of faith, indeed that it is infallible; that it ought to be distinguished by certain notes by which it is discerned from the false; that the notes of the true Church are four; and finally that these are found in the Catholic Church alone;

2. from facts, perhaps more easily and more suitably to the capacity of many:[9] by showing that the Catholic Church is a fact naturally inexplicable, but divine, and therefore the true religion: because of her stability unconquered by adversaries, her inexhausted fecundity in goods and the heroic sanctity of many in her, her universal unity in faith from the obedience of all to one head, and the many miracles performed in her favor.

[9] The prior method ordinarily is proposed in theological or apologetical treatises; the other was especially employed by Cardinal Dechamps.

d) Afterward let the priest descend to the individual articles, especially those in which heretics differ from Catholics, such as the necessity of good works, the number of the sacraments, the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, the cult of the Blessed Virgin and of the saints, the Roman Pontiff and his infallibility.

e) Finally, when access to conversion already appears near, rather than permit objections against the truth, it is better to suppress this cause of temptations, and to require total submission toward the ecclesiastical magisterium for the full expulsion of the spirit of free examination.

3. Proximate preparation. - When he has been fully instructed in matters of faith, the petitioner is to be prepared for making the profession of faith, which is to be explained to him, and for reception of the sacraments; wherefore he is to be instructed concerning Baptism, concerning Penance with confession, and concerning the Eucharist and their fruits. But since neoconverts for the most part vehemently dread confession, therefore let there be explained:

a) the obligation strictly binding the priest to observe the sacramental seal;

b) that this confession, which God wished us to undergo by confessing our sins to one man, is part of penance and satisfaction;

c) that it is no wonder if a heretic has failed in many things, since he has lacked the sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist and the other helps which are wont to be supplied to Catholics;

d) nevertheless, that in examining conscience he is not to torture himself, since the confessor will supply by questions, to which it is enough to respond sincerely.

Reconciliation of a Heretic and Reception into the Bosom of the Church

Let the priest admit no notorious heretic, or one enrolled in any sect, into the bosom of the Church, unless the matter has first been brought to the local Ordinary, and the knowledge and firmness in religion of the one to be converted have been well explored. Moreover, in his reconciliation with the Church, a threefold order is to be observed according to the various case.

A. If it is certain that the convert was not baptized, or that his Baptism is certainly invalid, only Baptism will have to be ministered to him, without abjuration of heresy or absolution.

According to can. 744: "the Baptism of adults, where it can conveniently be done, is to be referred to the local Ordinary so that, if he wishes, it may be conferred more solemnly by him or by his delegate"; and according to can. 755, section 2, "the local Ordinary can, for a grave and reasonable cause, grant that the ceremonies prescribed for the Baptism of infants be employed in the Baptism of adults."

B. On the contrary, if he was certainly validly baptized: a) before the local Ordinary or his delegate and at least two witnesses (Holy Office, 8 Apr. 1786, 28 Mar. 1900), let there be made only the abjuration of heresy with absolution from censures in the external forum, by the local Ordinary himself or by a priest delegated by him for this, in the case in which the convert is of puberty (can. 2314, section 2); or only the profession of faith, if he is before puberty (can. 2230); b) confession of sins; c) absolution from sins in the internal forum.

C. Finally, if the Baptism previously conferred is doubtful, whether positively or even negatively: a) let there be made the abjuration of heresy with absolution from censures or the profession of faith, in the same manner as was said in the preceding case; b) confession of sins, always prescribed,[10] and exhortation to contrition (Holy Office, 17 Dec. 1868; S. C. de P. F., 12 July 1869); c) Baptism to be renewed under condition, which by the indulgence of the Ordinary can be done privately according to

can. 759, section 2; d) confession summarily repeated and absolution from sins under condition. Thus Holy Office, 20 July 1859; 20 Nov. 1878; 2 Dec. 1874.

[10] That confession is to be required from those doubtfully baptized was called into doubt by some, because the obligation is uncertain. But the Holy Office constantly requires confession from converted heretics to be rebaptized under condition, as is established directly from the decrees of 14 June 1715 and 17 Dec. 1868, which expressly establish this, and indirectly from the decrees of 20 July 1859 and 2 Dec. 1874, which suppose that one must act in this way generally. Therefore the decrees contain a universal law, as moreover the Prefect of S. Cong. P. F. declared, 12 July 1869. Hence by far the greater part of theologians teach that confession is certainly to be required, even in the more benign school of St. Alphonsus, to which among others belong Lehmkuhl, Noldin, Pesch, Ferreres, Arendt, etc. Nevertheless certain others, as formerly Ballerini and Bucceroni, to whom even today Vermeersch in some measure approaches, attribute a certain probability to the denying opinion; and De Smet would not dare to call it improbable, because the decrees of the Holy Office are particular, as for the decree of 17 Dec. 1868 was declared by the Secretary of the Holy Office, but about 30 years after that decree was issued. We do not deny that the decrees are particular; but since in diverse circumstances the Holy Office always gives the same response and since it supposes that one must act generally in that way, the decrees depend on common reasons, not on particular reasons, and therefore must be said to contain a universal law. Namely, the Holy Office judges that the denying opinion is not probable; otherwise it would not respond so constantly. For Baptism is presumed valid until the contrary is established, and therefore the Church urges upon the baptized the observance of the obligations of divine law and ecclesiastical law, from which the repetition of Baptism under condition, done as a mere precaution, does not exempt. And it would be imprudent to act otherwise. Some would wish not to urge the precept of confession, lest, namely, heretics to be converted be deterred. But if at the very moment of conversion it were to be feared that confession could not be obtained, it would be obtained far more difficultly afterward. Therefore it is altogether imprudent and inopportune to postpone this obligation.

It would indeed suffice before Baptism to stir up to contrition, and to postpone confession until after Baptism is renewed under condition; nevertheless it is better if it is made already before Baptism, for the sake of greater facility and opportunity (Holy Office, 2 Dec. 1874).

In the confession itself let the confessor treat the neoconvert kindly, take away from him, as far as can be done, every fear, inculcate confidence that all sins are to be blotted out, and help him by his questions, yet taking care lest he make a rigid examination. First of all let him discreetly inquire whether he was a material or formal heretic: if he was formal, let him inquire from what time he was such, whether he thought himself to sin by not observing the precepts of the Church, whether he said blasphemies or calumnies against the Catholic Church, whether he perverted others. If he was doubtful concerning his own religion, let him ask whether and how long he contemned or neglected to inquire after the truth. If the penitent has committed many and grave sins, let him not chastise them with a rigid rebuke, but exhort him to try henceforth to begin a truly Christian life. Let him also not impose a very grave penance, lest the penitent be frightened away.

XV. Observations. - 1. The zealous priest, when opportunity is given, will study to lead heretics back to the Church. For this end he will pray and exhort them to pray, will lead them when occasion is given to flight from sin, likewise that they frequent churches and sermons, and read books setting forth Catholic doctrine; and in friendly conversation he should uncover their false dogmas, not by attacking directly, but by showing for what causes they seem difficult to believe.

2. The priest who would not be sufficiently apt for instructing a heretic or for resolving his difficulties, should send him to a more learned man.

3. In the same manner as for heretics, one must proceed in the reconciliation of apostates and schismatics.

XVI. Concerning those doubting and wavering in faith.[11] - At the present time there are many who seriously doubt concerning the truth of religion or foster and preach errors contrary to revealed truths, but nevertheless think themselves to be faithful Catholics and fulfill Christian offices in their own way. Concerning these three things are asked: 1) whether and concerning what they are to be questioned; 2) whether they always commit the sin of formal heresy; 3) whether in their good faith they can be admitted to the sacraments.

[11] Cf. Noldin, *Th. M.*, II, n. 33; Berardi, *Praxis Conf.*, ed. 3, n. 87 sq.; Aertnijs, *Th. P.*, n. 166.

1. Are those confessing such things to be questioned, and concerning what? Resp. Those who accuse themselves of doubts in faith or of speech against faith: a) are to be questioned concerning what matter they doubted or spoke about; for often they erroneously think that things are truths of faith which are not such, in which case they can sin against faith only from an erroneous conscience. b) When in fact the matter is of faith, against which they spoke, they committed heresy if, knowing that the doctrine had been proposed by the Church as to be believed of faith, they seriously attacked truths of faith (indeed, supposing knowledge, they contracted excommunication); but if they were ignorant, they did not commit the sin of heresy, although nevertheless they could have sinned, and gravely, insofar as their ignorance was voluntary from preceding negligence.

But if they spoke thus either from human respect or from vanity, they sinned gravely against external faith. If finally they spoke thus in order to explain their difficulties and better understand truths of faith, they sinned in no way.

2. Whether those seriously doubting or certainly erring in faith always commit the sin of formal heresy, or on the contrary can be in good faith? Resp. From defect of sufficient instruction it can happen that they do not advert that doubts or errors of this kind are gravely sinful, as being against the infallible authority of the Church and therefore against the authority of God revealing. This is possible, for example, if a pastor has set forth the truths to be believed merely materially, without the reason for believing.

Indeed, according to some authors, it seems able to happen that certain persons persuade themselves that they have a just cause for departing from faith, so that without the sin of formal heresy they fail entirely from adherence to faith. Given that the case is possible, nevertheless it will be most rare; hence in practice, not good faith but bad faith is to be presumed in those saying farewell to faith.[12]

[12] Entirely diverse under this respect is the condition of a Catholic and of a non-Catholic. In the faithful person the light of faith effects that he firmly believes with tranquil conscience; nor has it been heard that anyone, whether in life or in death, or in the sight of eternity, was agitated by remorse because he is a Catholic. On the contrary he will feel remorse if he thinks of deserting the Catholic faith. For the non-Catholic there are reasons for changing religion; the Catholic cannot truly need a change, neither on the part of the thing, nor on the part of the conscience urging him. A non-Catholic, as long as he is merely doubting, ought to remain in his religion, since he is in a state of perplexity; if the Catholic religion already seems more probable, he is bound to inquire more, even to certainty, at which, with divine help confidently and perseveringly implored, he will arrive.

3. Whether those erring who seem to be in good faith can be admitted to the sacraments? Resp. Let the confessor judge what would more contribute to the salvation of a penitent of this kind, who in confession says that he doubts concerning faith or that he cannot believe all things;

whether he should absolve him, or send him away without absolution until, having put aside doubts and errors, he embraces the faith fully. In this last case, works elucidating true doctrine are to be indicated to him, or oral instruction is to be provided.

Since absolution can be valid, with an admonition added to believe all things which God has revealed and the Church proposes, and to beware lest he lead others into doubts or errors against faith, he will also licitly be able to be absolved as often as a greater spiritual detriment is to be feared from absolution being denied.

XVII. Admonitions for confessors. - 1. The preceding things are to be understood concerning a true positive or grave doubt, but not concerning a negative doubt which is founded on no or a slight reason, and therefore is in no way to be attended to but is to be contemned as empty.

2. But those who labor under a serious or grave doubt against faith are to be treated with great charity.

3. Yet the confessor should not easily say to them that such deliberate doubting concerning faith is a grave sin, unless he is specially asked about this.

4. Nor should he say that grave doubts or temptations against faith are easily comprehensible, or almost natural, nor that he himself or others have suffered the same; but let him counsel the reading of books defending or well setting forth faith.

5. Let him also insist upon the solidity of faith which rests upon the word of God Himself.

6. Nevertheless confessors should know that the faithful more rarely accuse themselves of doubts against faith.

7. But when a penitent occurs who opens doubts or temptations against faith:

a) Before all things it must be examined whether he gave perfect consent, which can be clear from the confession itself and the responses of the penitent; but if this is not sufficiently established from them, the presumption will be taken from the penitent's usual life, so that a man of languid faith, leading a life little Christian, not avoiding occasions dangerous for faith, in doubt is rather to be judged to have consented; on the contrary, one who leads a truly Christian or devout life, or labors under scruples or neurasthenia or a similar pathological state, is to be judged not to have given perfect consent.

b) In the case in which the penitent, by deliberately doubting, has committed a grave sin against faith, he cannot be absolved unless he has put aside the doubt and has a firm purpose of avoiding all proximate occasions of sins against faith. To this let the confessor help and dispose him, by correcting errors, by instructing him concerning the particular point from which the doubt arose, by proposing solid motives of faith according to the capacity of his understanding, by indicating suitable remedies against future temptations, such as prayer and humility, by recommending the reading of a good book concerning religious truths; in this, nevertheless, discretion is needed, so that account be taken of the condition and character of the penitent, and the book not put forward weak arguments, but truly solid ones, and aptly respond to objections.

c) But when a truly pious person is troubled by various but troublesome temptations against faith: if he indulges in some measure the vanities of the age and of a life too worldly, let him be admonished to hand himself over more diligently to God alone; meanwhile let him not cast down his soul, since temptations are not a sign of weak faith, but God permits them for our progress in humility, as is also established from the life of the saints; but let him learn to repel them. For this end let the confessor suggest that one must not struggle with them, or dispute against them, or have recourse against them to motives of credibility to the contrary; but that they are merely to be fled and contemned without positive effort, simply by turning away to other honest occupations, even merely profane ones.

But if after temptation the penitent wishes to elicit an act of faith, let there be one merely general act concerning the whole revealed doctrine, for example: I firmly believe whatever God has revealed and Mother Church proposes as to be believed; nor afterward let new acts of faith be formed, lest agitation grow and thence the temptation rather be fostered, or at least lest a scrupulous estimation gradually arise that consent had been given unless contrary acts were continually repeated.[13]

[13] Thus Leroux, in *Rev. Eccl. de Liege*, Jan. 1927.

Question II: Concerning Sins Against Reverence for God

I. Matter to be treated. - Sins committed against reverence for God are prohibited in a general way by the second precept of the Decalogue. They are very many; among them blasphemies, imprecations, and illicit oaths come more often to be attended to and healed by the confessor.[1]

[1] Concerning these matters see all moralists. Especially to be seen are: Aertnijs, *Th. M.*, I, l. II, concerning the second precept, n. 64 sq., *Th. P.*, nn. 80-83; Reuter, *Neo-conf.*, nn. 118, 185-186; Marc, *Th. M.*, I, nn. 596-613; Haine, *Th. M.*, I, concerning the second precept, nn. 39-59; Genicot, *Th. M.*, I, nn. 292-303; Prummer, *Th. M.*, II, n. 437 sq. and 529 sq.

II. Notions concerning blasphemy.[2] - Blasphemy is insulting speech against God, whether it immediately touches God Himself, or mediately through the saints or other creatures, insofar as their dishonoring redounds upon God.

[2] We are content with a brief and simple exposition and recollection of notions; for a more profound and accurate notion we refer to our work: *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, II, n. 781 sq.

It can be committed chiefly in five ways:

1. to attribute to God what is repugnant to Him, for example that He is cruel, a tyrant, unfaithful, lying;

2. to deny what belongs to Him, for example that He does not provide concerning human things; such is the expression: Whether God wills or not! or: *Malgre Dieu*;

3. to say true things but in an insulting or mocking manner, or with indignation or anger against God, for example: Bah! the goodness of God; or: blood of Christ; Bah! Thou who destroyest the temple of God; Thou hast suffered!; Thou hast conquered, Galilean;

4. to attribute to a creature what is proper to God alone, for example to say: I would do this as well as God; or to call the devil omnipotent, more faithful;

5. to utter abusive words against the saints or other creatures with a special relation to God, for example: Blessed Mary is not a virgin, she is a mother like the rest.

By reason of the sense of the words, blasphemy:

a) is sometimes heretical, which states a heresy or falsity against faith, for example: God does not wish or is not able to help me;

b) sometimes imprecatory, by which evil is wished to God immediately or mediately, for example: cursed be God! - may God perish!

c) sometimes dishonoring or simple, which contains only insult and is customarily uttered in the manner of despising or indignation, for example to say in this manner: the name of God!; Hail, king of the Jews; the blood or death of Christ; or also to spit into heaven, to trample on a cross.

On the part of intention, one kind is directly intended or diabolical, which is done from the explicit intention of dishonoring God and inflicting insult upon Him; another is indirectly intended, when it is done with sufficient deliberation without the express purpose of dishonoring God.

III. Principles for judging the malice of blasphemy. - The following points especially come to be attended to:

1. Blasphemy against God is a most grave mortal sin from its whole genus, because it inflicts the highest injury upon the supreme Majesty, even if it is mediated through the saints or creatures. If nevertheless the saints were not regarded as saints, but as men, without considering their relation to God, there would not be blasphemy properly so called against religion, but a sin against dulia alone, mortal from its genus, which admits smallness of matter, for example if it were done in jest and without contempt or indignation against the saints.

2. Those expressions are blasphemous which, either from their proper signification, or from the common acceptation of the words, or from the mind of the one uttering them, inflict injury upon divine honor.

3. For the sin of blasphemy a direct intention of dishonoring God is not required, but the assertive utterance of a blasphemous word suffices; consequently he blasphemes who deliberately utters a word which turns to the reproach of God, even if he speaks it from anger against neighbor alone.

4. To utter corrupted or halved words is not blasphemous by force of their proper signification, because for this it is necessary that the expression have a complete sense insulting against God: thus, for example, *sacre nom*, *santo di*, *saterment*, *sangi de Dio*, *jarnidie*, *potverdomme*, *sangbleu*. In these cases the conscience of the one uttering them and the mode of uttering them are to be attended to.

5. Equivocal expressions are not blasphemous, at least of themselves, for example: sacred name of God; it is as true as God; but the sense depends upon the intention of the one uttering it and the circumstances. Thus in the expression: true as God, the created and uncreated truth are not necessarily equated, but only a likeness mixed with some hyperbole is indicated.

6. To utter sacred words nakedly from anger or indignation, not against God but against men or creatures, is not blasphemous: the name of God, *sainte croix*.

7. In our regions there are formulas which of themselves are not blasphemous, though by their proper signification they can be insulting against God, because generally they are not held by men as blasphemous, for example: *mort Dieu, mille Dieu, mille nom de Dieu, sacre milliard de Dieu, tausend Herr Gott, tausend sakrament!*

IV. Applications. - 1. To curse creatures (saints, priests, creatures considered in themselves, the devil) is not blasphemous, unless it is done insofar as they have a special relation to God. "Hence," says Marc, *Th. M.*, I, n. 598, 3: "a) it is blasphemy to curse the saints, sacraments, sacred days or things, the Catholic faith, the Church of God, or even priests insofar as they are ministers of God; b) but to curse creatures insofar as they are creatures is not blasphemy, unless the word God is added, for example, cursed be the rain of God; or unless divine power shines forth in them in a peculiar way, as the soul, heaven, the whole world, etc.; in which case in them He would be indirectly contemned; c) to curse a man, living or dead, without uttering the word soul, is not blasphemy, unless the intention of the speaker refers the curse to souls; wherefore to say: may God damn me, may God damn you, is not of itself blasphemy, but a dire imprecation; d) to curse the devil, as author of evils, is not blasphemy; e) in anger to imprecate against oneself or others the devil, thunderbolts, etc., is likewise a dire imprecation, which for the most part, because of defect of serious will, is only venial fault. Nevertheless it is grave irreverence if subjects thus curse superiors, children parents, even if only materially, especially to the face."

2. The French expression *Sacre Nom de Dieu* from its proper and absolute signification can be taken in a good or bad sense, either as: blessed..., or as: execrable or cursed be the name of God. The sense depends upon the intention of the one uttering it. Nevertheless commonly it is not blasphemous, because those uttering it abstract from any sense whatever of the word, and ordinarily are indignant not against God but against men or creatures.

3. The Flemish expression *God verdomme* of itself is not blasphemy, but an imprecation which signifies: May God damn, or may God damn me; hence of itself it is venial, but mortal if someone seriously imprecated eternal damnation against himself.[3]

[3] This also holds concerning the English expression: *God damn me*; but something altogether different must be said concerning the formula: *God be damned*, which signifies: let God be damned.

4. The vain usurpation of the name of God in the manner of an oath, for example *per Deum, par Dieu, bij God,* or in the manner of an interjection, for example, the name of God!, without indignation against God, is venial.

V. Practical rules for confessors. - 1. Those who accuse themselves in confession of blasphemies are often excused from mortal sin: a) because the expressions do not have a complete sense but are corrupted, and those uttering them do not have the intention of blaspheming or dishonoring God; or b) because they are equivocal expressions or rather non-serious imprecations; or c) because they are uttered without sufficient advertence and perfect consent, for example from a sudden movement of

anger, or sudden pain; or d) because on account of their ignorance they do not understand the expressions and for the most part do not judge themselves to sin mortally.

2. As regards blasphemies uttered from custom, a distinction must be made: those who have not yet retracted the custom are easily to be blamed for blasphemies which they seem to utter inadvertently, if the formulas are truly blasphemous, because they are voluntary in their cause, and often in themselves on account of sufficient advertence; on the contrary, those who have retracted the custom and have seriously proposed to amend themselves, and have applied themselves to this by using means for this purpose, are not in the cause with respect to blasphemies which they utter inadvertently. See n. IX.

3. Let confessors beware lest they hear the fictitious excuses of blasphemers as legitimate: I do not utter the words with the mind of dishonoring God but from custom or anger. For the custom must be taken away and anger expressed otherwise.

4. Penitents are to be questioned a) concerning the words uttered: for often they confuse imprecations, curses, oaths, and blasphemies; and moreover it must be established whether the blasphemies proceeded from infidelity, desperation, or anger against God or the saints; b) concerning the times and occasion, so that they may thus know whether they are recidivists or in an occasion; c) concerning circumstances: whether they did this before children, servants, or others, because then scandal is present.

5. The confessor must take great care not to condemn as certainly sinful what in itself is doubtful; likewise lest those who sin gravely because of erroneous conscience be left in their error. Hence those who accuse themselves of equivocal expressions, such as: sacred name of God, or of imprecations which by many are held as blasphemies, such as: may God damn me, are to be questioned concerning what sense they attributed to them; and if they did not pronounce them from an explicit intention of dishonoring God, it is to be said that those formulas are not blasphemous, but are to be left as venial things.

6. For amendment the cause of the evil is to be considered. Blasphemies arise from irreverence toward God, from anger, from custom; these therefore are to be removed: irreverence, by considering the rights of God to our reverence, and the enormity, temerity, and uselessness of blasphemy; anger, by removing the causes which excite it and disposing oneself as far as possible to tolerate any injuries whatever; custom, by frequently renewing the purpose not to blaspheme (for example every morning) and by praying to this end, by imposing upon oneself some penance each time (for example a small alms, an act of contrition, striking the breast, asking pardon, an ejaculatory prayer, etc.), by not mixing the name of God into expressions, by substituting innocent expressions, etc. The confessor will opportunely be able to impose a penance to be recited for 7 or 14 days.

VI. Notions and principles concerning imprecations. - An imprecation or curse is an act by which someone calls down evil upon another under the aspect of evil. This sin is not always opposed to divine reverence, religion, and the second precept of the Decalogue, but only when it imports a

dishonoring of God; otherwise it will be against charity or also justice, and thus against the precepts of the second table, for example against the fifth or eighth. Hence in particular:

A. Against religion and the second precept of the Decalogue are, and are grave sin:

1. imprecations directed immediately against God, because they are great imprecatory blasphemy;

2. likewise imprecations against creatures, but considered in relation to God, because then the curse redounds upon God: this easily happens concerning wind, rain, heaven, thunder, the whole world, etc., for example, cursed be the rain of God; and almost always concerning sacred things or persons; if nevertheless holy persons are considered in themselves, the sin will not be against religion but against dulia;

3. likewise curses against creatures considered in themselves, but by something divine or holy which exists not for cursing but for blessing, for example: may God's blood, death, head, wounds, passion, etc., destroy you.

B. They are not against religion, but against charity of neighbor and justice:

1. to curse rational creatures or any neighbors whatever considered without relation to God, which is mortal sin from its genus, if it is done from the heart; otherwise it will be venial, as for the most part happens: thus, for example, may the devil carry you off, may God damn you;

2. likewise to curse irrational creatures insofar as they serve the utility of men, for example cattle, because in fact this is to curse men;

3. much more to curse parents, which is not only mortal if a grave evil is wished seriously, but sometimes if a light evil is wished, because it is also great irreverence against piety; likewise to curse children or before children, which in parents is also a sin against piety, because they easily provide scandal and are the cause that children thereafter have no reverence and obedience toward them; likewise to curse superiors, especially when present, which also easily is grave and against observance.

C. To imprecate evil upon oneself is against charity toward oneself, which is mortal from its genus if it is done seriously; otherwise it is venial: thus, for example, may God damn me.

D. It is not a sin of itself, on account of an honorable end:

1. to curse the devil as author of evils, unless sometimes by reason of immoderate anger or scandal;

2. to curse irrational creatures insofar as they are the cause of evil, unless by reason of impatience or anger.

E. Of itself it is vain and idle, and by this reason venial: to curse irrational creatures considered according to themselves.

Observation. - The custom of imprecating is to be extirpated: under mortal sin if the imprecations are against God; under venial sin if imprecations against men are pronounced without intention.

VII. Notions and principles concerning the morality of an oath. - An oath is the invocation of the divine name in testimony of truth, whether this is done directly, by immediately invoking God, or indirectly by means of creatures considered in relation to God (for example by faith, the cross, the Gospel, etc.); whether God is invoked as witness for manifesting truth (a contestatory or invocatory oath), or also as judge for punishing falsity (an execratory oath), as in the very well-known oath: so I swear, so may God help me.

On the part of matter, an oath can be merely assertory if only an affirmation is stated, or also promissory if a promise is also affirmed.

Now:

1. Three conditions are required for the liceity of an oath:

a) Truth, which excludes not material error but lying, so that the assertion is conformed to the actual mind of the one swearing, and the promise is also made with the present intention of fulfilling it.

b) Justice or honesty, so that the assertion made under oath is lawful, or also the thing promised itself.

c) Judgment or discretion, so that the oath is not made vainly and lightly but on account of a grave motive, and moreover the thing promised is in the power of the one swearing.

2. A fictitious oath without the intention of swearing, the first two conditions being verified, is reduced to an oath without judgment, as the expression usual among us: by God.

3. If some condition is lacking, to swear is a sin; and indeed:

a) A false oath, without truth, is mortal sin from its whole genus, because it is grave direct irreverence against God, who is supposed either not to know something or to be able to testify to falsity; this is perjury strictly so called.

b) An iniquitous oath, without justice, if it is promissory, is mortal sin, because it makes God the patron of sin; if it is merely assertory, it is of itself venial, unless it is directly used as a means of sinning, for example to affirm impure love in order to seduce a girl, because this is to make God a cooperator in sin.

c) An incautious oath, without judgment, is of itself venial, and is not mortal except by reason of scandal or danger.

VIII. Observations. - 1. One who accuses himself of oaths is to be questioned concerning what words he used, especially if he is unlearned. For often they say that they have sworn when they have simply affirmed something more firmly without any intention of invoking God as witness, for example by saying: God knows; God sees my conscience; I speak before God; it is as true as I sit, as the sun shines, as God, as the Gospel; I swear; I expose my head, may my ears be cut off if it is not so; indeed by my soul (*mijn ziel*), because ordinarily they do not regard the special relation between the soul and God. All these things of themselves are not oaths; unless nevertheless someone wished to invoke God as witness or avenger.

2. In this matter, the formulas and common estimation must be attended to most of all, for there are usual formulas which are not oath-formulas, and, on the contrary, there are truly oath-formulas which by common estimation are not such.

3. Since the whole matter depends upon the intention of the one swearing, the confessor a) should question him clearly, not indeed: whether he wished to swear (*jurer, zweren*), but more distinctly: whether he wished to offer an oath (*faire serment, zijnen eed doen*); b) should teach that for an oath there is required the intention of invoking God as witness; c) should turn him away from using formulas even doubtful and uttered without the intention of swearing, on account of irreverence toward God and the danger of scandal and deception.

IX. The custom or habit of blaspheming, imprecating, and swearing is evil, because it proximately inclines to sinning, namely to blasphemies, imprecations, or false, dishonorable, vain oaths. Hence there is an obligation of removing it (Eccli. XXIII, 9; Mt. V, 34); and he sins who voluntarily acquires such a habit or neglects to eliminate it: internally in affection, as often as, adverting to the obligation of retracting the habit, he does not retract it; externally and in effect, as often as from the habit he utters vicious oaths sufficiently foreseen by morally interrupted acts.

He sins gravely if by the custom he is disposed to blaspheme, to imprecate gravely, or to swear anything whatever indiscriminately, even false and gravely dishonorable things; lightly if he is disposed only to a vain usurpation of the name of God, to lightly evil imprecations, or to vain or lightly dishonorable oaths.

One who swears from custom:

a) either attends to the act of swearing and to its defect, and then the vicious oath is voluntary in itself;

b) or attends only to the act of swearing and not to its defect, and then the oath is gravely or lightly culpable in its cause, namely in the custom, as was said;

c) or attends to nothing, and then properly he does not swear because the intention of swearing is lacking; but nevertheless the expression is voluntary in its cause, or custom, and culpable insofar as externally it sounds like an evil oath or at least a vain usurpation of the name of God;

d) or, if he has efficaciously retracted the custom, the oath is neither voluntary in its cause nor a sin.

The custom is retracted by the will by which someone is sorry for it and proposes to himself to employ efficacious means for removing it, which purpose he usefully renews several times; but if after the purpose he does not employ the means, the custom again becomes indirectly voluntary for him, because he shows that he does not wish to remove it.

Question III: Concerning the Sin Against the Service of God, Or Concerning the Violation of Sunday

I. Object of the question. - Just as fidelity toward God is commanded by the first precept, and reverence by the second, so service is commanded by the third precept of the Decalogue. Natural reason itself dictates, and the law of nature prescribes, that some time in human life be reserved for the service of divine worship; but by positive law that time and the manner of worshiping God are to be determined more. In the old law, indeed, positive divine law commanded: Remember to sanctify

the sabbath day; this precept together with the other ceremonial prescriptions of the Old Law was abolished by the death of Christ; but now by ecclesiastical law the first day in the week is established to be observed, which by this reason is called the Lord's day.

The precept is at once negative and affirmative: namely, it prohibits servile and forensic works because they are more wont to draw away from the service of God, and it commands assistance at the sacred sacrifice of the altar as the most excellent work of public worship. These things are customarily set forth sufficiently completely in manuals of moral theology; hence here we only set beneath certain practical admonitions for confessors.

II. Rules and principles to be attended to by confessors. - As regards the third precept it is altogether necessary to note that it is opportune for confessors to act not more indulgently but rather more severely, because if the unlearned transgress it habitually, they will now never pray, nor any longer care sufficiently about religion; indeed they will shortly lose due knowledge of the truths of faith and morals because they are never present at sermon or religious instruction. As Berardi well says, *Praxis confessariorum*, n. 367:

"Very many, occupied the whole week in affairs and labors, if on a feast day they do not provide for the most grave necessities of their own soul by serious reflections and effective remedies, when will they provide? Especially as regards the obligation of hearing the word of God, which being neglected, innumerable Christian faithful live immersed in the mire of vices until death, we have the following from Trent, sess. 24, c. 4: 'Let the Bishop diligently admonish each one that he is bound to be present in his own parish, where this can conveniently be done, for hearing the word of God.'"

Wherefore:

1. Those who are always bound to work on Sundays and can never be present at the sacred rite must obtain another office or service for themselves, at least if they can without great inconvenience, and meanwhile employ means so that they may satisfy the precept both of knowing the doctrine of religion and of praying.

2. Those who on Sundays can never be present at the sacred rite, even if this does not altogether harm their religious life, must obtain another service for themselves insofar as they can without great inconvenience; or, if this is not possible, several times in the year they must assist at the sacred rite during the week, because there is also a natural and divine precept of assisting at the sacrifice several times.

3. Wives and children of families should not easily yield to the husband or father prohibiting the hearing of the sacred rite, even to avoid blasphemies or anger or great indignation, at least if this happens frequently, because otherwise no religious practice would be permitted to them; unless nevertheless they feared grave striking or beating. But if it were demanded in contempt of religion, even then it would not be lawful to do it, but they should never yield.

4. Those who labor on account of legitimate reasons should take care, to avoid scandal, that they do not do this publicly; or, if this is necessary, that the legitimate excuse at least be known by others.

5. Let them also know that a small labor, continued for a brief or at least not long time, nevertheless can, by reason of scandal, be gravely sinful: thus, for a very brief time, for example, publicly to plow land for a quarter of an hour, and similarly to command several persons to labor for one hour, can be a grave sin by reason of scandal.

6. Those are to be blamed who voluntarily place a proximate impediment to the fulfillment of the precept, as if by reason of curiosity, recreation, or a lighter motive they begin a journey on Saturday evening or on Sunday before the first Mass and arrive at another place after the last has ended; for this is not lawful unless the journey is truly necessary and at the same time cannot be made on another day.

7. In practice one must especially attend to certain categories of works:

a) Lest women or girls think lighter feminine works lawful for themselves, such as spinning, sewing, weaving by hand, making lace-work, artificial flowers or images of wax, silk, paper, etc., because they easily exercise such things and thus gradually pass over to many other things. But if they think they have some motive, let them ask a dispensation from the pastor.

b) Lest tailors and shoemakers, without a valid reason, pretend a necessity of working on Sunday to finish a work lest they lose customers: if this is truly so, there is a sufficient reason for working; but often they spontaneously bring themselves into such a necessity, by not employing due solicitude or by losing time at the beginning of the week, or by undertaking more works than they can complete; indeed they work also for those who would not in fact be alienated at all by a delay of the work.

c) Lest farmers exercise rural works and the cultivation of gardens, unless permission has first been obtained from the pastor.

III. Observations. - 1. "Let confessors carefully note that, especially as regards persons of conscience little careful, they ought not easily to approve their manner of acting, as many do who, with the matter by no means weighed, immediately say: go, act, if you have necessity you can work. The matter is on one side too harmful, and on the other too subject to hallucinations: for each one very easily persuades himself that he works from necessity, even when a true, grave, and unavoidable necessity is by no means present... Indeed let them admonish lest, relying on vain reasons, they think themselves not to sin mortally." Thus Berardi, o.c., n. 409.

2. Let confessors know that they have no power in dispensing concerning the precept of observing Sunday; but that this is reserved to the pastor and to those who are in the place of the pastor, and indeed only in particular cases.

3. Let those reading books of moral theology attend lest from theologians of other regions they introduce new customs into their own.

§ B. Concerning Certain Sins Against Neighbor

Sins against neighbor are opposed to charity or justice with their annexed virtues. But they can harm the neighbor in his various goods: in the internal goods of his own person, whether of body or of soul; in the goods of marriage, as regards the person joined to him; in the external goods of fortune;

in the goods of reputation and honor, and of friendship and peace. To these various goods diverse sins are opposed.

Question I: Concerning Sins Against the Internal Goods of Life and Body

I. General view. - Charity and justice command that the right of the neighbor to the internal goods of life be preserved unharmed, and the opposite sins are prohibited by the fifth precept of the Decalogue. We call the internal goods of man the goods both of the body and also of the soul, namely, the natural use of reason and liberty, and moral and supernatural life. To the good of moral and supernatural life scandal is opposed; to natural good, whatever harms bodily life, or natural reason or free will. Concerning these things it is necessary to recall that not man but God alone has dominion over human life and over the human body, just as over the soul with its natural powers; and therefore:

1. an action directly killing, against the life of an innocent person, is never lawful, and consequently the life of an innocent person can in no case be directly taken away, as would happen in every species of embryotomy or direct abortion, that is, direct expulsion of an immature fetus;

2. likewise direct mutilation is illicit, not only for the sake of utility or profit, but even for the sake of virtue, unless it is for preserving the life or health of the whole body, insofar as the part is for the whole, and the good of the part ought to yield to the good of the whole, lest this be corrupted. Wherefore operations which render sterile or impotent, such as vasectomy, ovosectomy, sterilization, must of themselves be held intrinsically and gravely illicit, as being grave mutilations, unless otherwise health could not be hoped for;

3. likewise harmful actions are illicit unless at the same time and immediately, or not by means of the evil effect, they procure a greater good which compensates the evil and harmful effect;

4. a fortiori it is illicit directly to intend harm to the moral or supernatural life of the soul; likewise to posit an act which can harm it, unless it is done for a proportionately grave reason.

These principles come to be considered more attentively, as regards natural goods, in the actions of physicians generally, in the use of hypnotism, in surgical operations, in the use of certain narcotic medicines, in the use of chloroform and anesthetic means, in actions, potions, and incisions which bear relation to the procreation of the human race.[1] As regards spiritual goods, which are harmed by scandal, it will be said in the following question.

[1] Concerning all these matters especially may be consulted Capellmann, *Medicina Pastoralis*; Noldin, Tanquerey, Vermeersch, and Prummer in their manual of moral theology; Saesmans, *Geneeskundige Plichtenleer*, i.e., medical deontology.

II. Concerning the actions of physicians. - The following rules bind under grave obligation:

1. The physician must always use the safer means, i.e., those which, according to what science teaches, are certain; but if such means are not known, that is to be preferred which is more likely and, other things being equal, more quickly conduces to health. There also comes to be attended to, according to the diverse circumstances of persons, the great utility or necessity of a quicker cure, for example in a laborer; likewise also whether the remedies cause less pain or

are of less price, so that that is to be preferred which, all things considered, is more profitable and less burdensome.

2. It is illicit for a physician to seek experience from a man by those means concerning which he himself is ignorant whether they are harmful or truly useful, as for example by vaccination from secretions of syphilitic ulcers for the diagnostic end concerning the existence of syphilis;[2] however, he can employ means which he certainly knows cannot harm, although it is not established for him whether in the present case they will be useful. Nevertheless Noldin adds, *Th. M.*, II, n. 744: it would be lawful to test a remedy with the consent of the sick person, if the matter concerned slight harm which can easily be repaired.

[2] It is lawful in animals; likewise in malefactors condemned to death, if the civil power establishes this.

3. To a sick person whose recovery now cannot be hoped for, even such a remedy can be provided, when it is not established for the physician whether it will be harmful or useful for curing the health of the sick person: not in order to take an experiment for other sick persons, for it is illicit to seek an experiment in another's life, since evils are not to be done, even to one, so that goods may come to others, even many; but because it is more conformable to prudence and to the will of the sick person to apply that doubtful remedy than to omit it with the certainty of death. For such a remedy, as also for other extraordinary means to be employed, consent generally is to be sought from the sick person, and, if he is not able to consent, from relatives, especially if there is much fear of the danger of great and perpetual harm.

4. It is illicit to take away or notably shorten the life of those lethally wounded, the old, the sick, the dying, lest they suffer longer, even with their consent, by an action directly tending to this, because one must not use an evil means for a good end, nor are evils to be done that goods may come: for all these retain the right to life, and must be committed to God, who alone is Lord of life and alone can dispose directly of their life.

5. Consequently it is illicit in the article of death to provide morphine or a similar soothing means to a sick person directly so that the painful exit of his life may be shortened and be terminated in quiet euthanasia, i.e., a happy death. Indeed, also so that the dying person merely be deprived of reason and depart without the sense of pain; for for this there is not present, at least regularly, a sufficient proportionately grave reason, and certainly not if he is not yet prepared for death, since thus he would be deprived of the opportunity of doing penance and so perhaps would be placed on the way of eternal damnation. Concerning this more will be said below, under n. IV.

6. Puncture of the heart or artery (*ponction du coeur*, *steek door het hart*, *Herzstich*), which sometimes relatives or connections of the deceased, sometimes on account of the testament of the deceased himself, ask for lest perhaps he be buried alive:

a) cannot be done by a physician, if he does not have indubitable signs of death but seriously doubts concerning it, because this is to expose oneself to the danger of killing a man;

b) but if there are certain signs of death, of itself it is not illicit,[3] since this is done only to free the relatives from fear and vain anxieties;

[3] If it were illicit, by equal right it would be illicit to bury the deceased.

c) nevertheless the relatives cannot licitly ask for it, because they do this from an evil intention of shortening life if it were still present and of hastening death if it had not yet supervened; with which, therefore, it is not lawful for the physician to cooperate. Wherefore let him try to lead them away from this useless purpose; and if they are unwilling, let him declare to them that he will by no means perform the puncture, unless because he is wholly certain concerning death and solely to dissipate their vain anxiety.

7. The physician is bound, by himself or through others, efficaciously to warn the sick person concerning the proximate danger of death, so that he may dispose concerning temporal affairs and provide for spiritual necessities.

That office of charity is personal; hence, if others are lacking who can or will efficaciously persuade the sick person, the physician himself is bound to warn him by himself. Nevertheless he can be excused if the warning is certainly useless, whether because the sick person certainly does not need the warning, or because the warning certainly will in no way be useful, which nevertheless can rarely be affirmed with certainty.

III. Concerning the use of hypnotism. - Hypnotism is usually described thus: the induction of a peculiar state, analogous to sleep, which is called hypnosis, in which state the man who has been placed in it merely undergoes the suggestions of the hypnotizer. It is induced by very diverse means, which nevertheless probably are all reduced to one, namely the suggestion of sleep; but it has several grades, from simple sleepiness to perfect somnambulism. Concerning this it is useful briefly to note that its practice sometimes is illicit, namely, as often as it is employed unjustly or without a grave cause and great caution. For:

1. The hypnotized person is deprived of the ready use of reason and of dominion over the lower powers, which ordinarily by his own powers he will recover with difficulty without the nod of the hypnotizer; he hands himself over to the judgment of the hypnotizer, by whom he can be led sufficiently efficaciously and often invincibly to perpetrating illicit things, and ordinarily he can be reduced to the same state even while resisting. But such a deprivation of the use of reason and abdication of liberty, involving of itself a grave danger for morals, is illicit as often as a proportionately grave cause and cautions are lacking to remove the danger.

2. Hypnotism, unless it is employed with great prudence, exposes the health of soul and body to grave harm; hence there is required the removal of such danger, or at least a founded hope of obtaining a greater good.

3. But if someone by abuse of hypnotism subjects a non-consenting person to his commands, or exercises the art in circumstances in which it is harmful, he commits grave injury, and from justice is bound by apt means to restore that person to his own right and to repair all damages.

A sufficient cause for exercising hypnotism is not a cause of recreation or of profit alone; but:

a) sometimes the cause of scientific investigation (Holy Office, 26 July 1899), provided that the expert chooses a person to whom hypnosis appears not harmful but rather useful;

b) more frequently the cause of medication, whether for putting the senses to sleep in a surgical incision, or for curing a disease of the nerves or rheumatism; nevertheless let it be noted that in more recent time the salutary effects of hypnotism are now more restricted or called into doubt;

c) also the cause of removing or diminishing evil propensities, for example to suicide, drunkenness, lust, theft, etc., when in an extraordinary case they as it were take away liberty or weaken the will. In an extraordinary case, we have said; otherwise the proportionately grave reason is lacking. The ordinary means, namely, of formation, education, and self-mastery is the exercise of one's own reason and liberty; otherwise suggestions weaken the will more than they strengthen it.

In the aforesaid cases caution is to be employed: let there be employed only a physician very expert and prudent and supremely trustworthy, who uses only honorable and harmless suggestions and only for the intended end; let a trustworthy witness also be joined, who assists present or at least remains nearby: thus for the good reputation of the hypnotizer himself, but especially on account of the good of the hypnotized person.

IV. Concerning the use of morphine and other narcotic medicines. - The matter concerns not only physicians but also nurses, indeed patients who can administer medicines to themselves, for example as a remedy for sleeplessness or against the pains of rheumatism.

For in modern times narcotics (*νάρκωσις*, i.e., sleep, stupor) are often employed, whether for soothing pains or for provoking pleasure, as opium, morphine, cocaine, or for putting the senses to sleep, as ether and chloroform; their effects can be harmful or even intercept the use of reason for a time, and therefore their use can be illicit.

Soothing or stupefying means (*calmants, stupefiants; verzachtende, verdoovende, bedwelmende middelen*), concerning which we are here treating exclusively, are medicines which cause a temporary suppression or diminution of the activity of the nerve centers, from which there arises a certain state of physical and moral inertia. They are opium, morphine, cocaine, and other derivatives or mixtures of this sort.[4] These are taken not only by way of absorption or chewing, by smoking or inhalation, but also by subcutaneous injection, and they are very efficacious for soothing pains; indeed they provoke a certain sense of cheerfulness and pleasure, but at the same time they weaken the nerves.

[4] The International Geneva Conference, 17 Nov. 1924 - 19 Feb. 1925, reserved exclusively the name *stupefiants* to certain things. They are: opium, or the latex collected from the immature fruits of the white sleep-bearing poppy, which is cultivated in Asia Minor, India, China, Egypt, Persia; morphine, which is a certain principal alkaloid extracted from opium, and heroin obtained from it by chemical operation; coca naturalis, or *erythroxylon coca*, which is a certain plant from the Peruvian region; cocaine, or a certain alkaloid derived from coca; hashish, or cannabis from India, which secretes a toxic resin or oil enjoying excitatory properties. Very recently also peyotl is denounced, a certain Mexican cactus plant, of which a certain extract comes into use in the United States of America and is called "mescal buttons." This first effects alacrity and vigor, but then nervous languor and depression, with illusions and disturbances, yet without loss of consciousness, so that the man knows his state to be fictitious. Nor does the use of this remedy render a man dull as the others are apt to do. Concerning these see Dupre and Logre, *Intoxications par l'opium, l'ether, la cocaine*, in *Nouveau Traite de Medecine*, fasc. VI, Paris 1922; Dr. De Block, *Toximanies*, Liege 1927; Dr. Lewin, *Paradis artificiels*, Paris 1928; Mgr. Beaupin, *Le Probleme des Stupefiants*, in *Vie intell.*, 1930; Brouillard, *Stupefiants et Anesthesiques*, in *Etudes*, 1929; Dr. Vervaeck, *Le Peril des Toximanies*, in *Dossiers de l'A. C.*, 1930. Likewise the periodical *La Cite Chretienne*, 1928; *S. Luc medical*, 1934; Kothen, *Les Toximanes*, in *Coll. Mechl.*, 1931-32; St. Willems, in *Coll. Brug.*, 1932; Meunier, *Les stupefiants et la morale*, in *Rev. Eccl. de Liege*, 1934.

If they are taken in great quantity, they are deadly by acute intoxication in the same way as poison; in lesser quantity they cause a sleep of the senses and privation of the use of reason, which effect differs in nothing from drunkenness; in moderate quantity but taken repeatedly for a long time they gravely harm health by slow and progressive intoxication, notably shorten life, and provoke a most vehement desire, for example for repeated use (morphomania), which can be overcome much more difficultly than even the habit of long-standing drunkenness, and scarcely can be cured except in hospitals erected for this end;[5] indeed they cause abulia, or paralysis and as it were atrophy of the will, indolence, indifference toward the duties of state and negligence, dulling of the mind, irritability of spirit, perversion of the moral sense, and diminution of responsibility.

[5] A moderate quantity of morphine is judged permitted at 0.1 gr., but not for a long time. One who uses 0.2 gr. or 0.5 soon comes to 1.0 and 3.0, which quantity equals 20 or 50 small bottles in a day. Thus Capellmann, *o. c.*

From all these things it is evident that the use of remedies of this kind is dangerous, and is to be avoided unless necessity requires otherwise; and therefore a physician cannot supply or leave with a sick person an injection syringe or morphine.

Certainly it is lawful to diminish pains, provided that by the remedies employed the healing of the disease is not delayed, or damage or danger is not directly brought to health or life. Hence in employing remedies someone can sin either from the fact that he takes too great a portion, harmful to health, or from the fact that he employs remedies too frequently.

In particular:

1. Transitory use, and so slight that it produces no other effect except restoration of strength and calming of the nerves, is lawful.

2. Use in greater quantity or frequency, employed without just cause, or for pleasure alone, or for quieting the desire for narcotics, is a grave sin if notable detriment of health and life can or probably will follow from it; venial if the detriment of health or abbreviation of life certainly is not notable; but it is lawful in decreasing quantity for him who has contracted so long-standing a custom of use, for example of opium, that he cannot abstain from it without grave detriment to health.

3. Use in such quantity that the senses are put to sleep and temporary privation of the use of reason follows: employed without just cause, it is a grave sin just as drunkenness is; but from a proportionately grave cause of necessity or utility it is lawful with the consent of the sick person, as if it is done so that he may not feel bitter pains, or in a major surgical operation so that the sick person may permit himself without resistance.

4. Especially in the article of death: a) to provide a remedy so that the sick person may be deprived of reason and depart without the sense of pain is gravely illicit, especially if he is not yet prepared for death, because he would be deprived of the opportunity of doing penance and would incur the danger of eternal damnation; also generally if he is duly disposed, because thus he would lack the opportunity of meriting and of immediately preparing himself for death and notably increasing heavenly glory. Hence a proportionately grave reason for permitting this

is lacking; indeed, if there is danger that he will not return to the use of reason, this is equivalent to an abbreviation of life.

b) According to some, however, this could be tolerated, presupposing the consent and good faith of the sick person, who is already well prepared for death, namely on account of bitter pains,[6] especially if he is very liable to movements of impatience, so that it can probably be feared that he may fall into grave sin; indeed, as has sometimes been said, even if at the same time an indirect abbreviation of life would follow in a sick person certainly soon to die. But this is more doubtful and rather to be omitted.

[6] Not on account of agony alone, says Noldin, *Th. M.*, I, n. 349.

c) Certainly, however, euthanasia properly so called, namely directly and in itself intended, or directly procured, is gravely illicit, namely a direct acceleration of death, so that insensibility and privation of the use of reason is only the effect of induced weakness and of abbreviation of life. For evils are not to be done so that goods may come. In the case there is rather intoxication than anesthesia.

Hence the Holy Office, 11 May 1852, declared the trade and use of opium, as they are exercised in the Chinese empire, to be illicit; and the S. C. P. F., 29 Dec. 1891, declared that in that region the cultivation and commerce of opium, likewise regular use, are to be prohibited to Christians, except in the case of avoiding graver harm.[7]

[7] Consequently the Synod of Peking of the year 1880 commanded: 1. that absolution is to be denied to those who have not yet contracted the custom of smoking opium, if they are unwilling to renounce this; 2. that the customary users can be absolved if they promise to diminish the quantity; 3. that to those who do not keep the promise, absolution is to be deferred until they have fulfilled it; 4. that from those who exercise the cultivation and commerce of opium, it is to be required that they entirely leave it.

V. Concerning incisions and surgical operations. - Surgical operations are those which are performed by vivisection, extraction, mutilation, amputation, resection, or another lesion of the body, done according to the rules of the surgical art for meeting some bodily defect.

Concerning these the following principles come to be attended to:

1. Operations which bring danger of life are lawful if they are a necessary means for averting an immediate or mediate certain danger of life, and in the place of foreseen death they set a probability or at least a possibility of safety;[8] also when the danger of life is remote, provided that, if one waits longer, the power of resistance decreases in the body and therefore the hope of a successful operation is diminished. In this case, however, there must be proportion between the harm which is feared and the good which is hoped for. But dangerous operations are not lawful for removing evils in no way deadly, but only deforming or very troublesome, unless perhaps the evil is very grave and the danger of life minimal.

[8] Even, for example, if according to statistical calculations there were 70 or 80 percent probabilities of death and only 20 or 30 possibilities of safety.

2. But to perform useless operations, as also dangerous ones, without true necessity, for example for the sake of profit or experiment, is illicit.

3. Nevertheless there is not always a strict obligation of undergoing an operation for preserving one's own life, namely if the means is extraordinary, for example if the operation is very painful or if it inspires great horror in the patient. Hence an operation is not to be done except with the consent of the sick person, if it can be requested.

Let it be noted that on account of the progress of the surgical art and on account of antiseptic remedies, several operations which formerly were extraordinary are now to be held as ordinary means. In this case let the priest recommend the operation; nevertheless, for the sake of prudence, let him not warn concerning a grave obligation, on account of the danger lest perhaps, by denying consent, the sick person formally sin and die in the state of sin.

VI. Concerning the use of chloroform and other anesthetic means. - Soporific, hypnotic, or anesthetic means (*soporifiques, hypnotiques, anesthesiques, analgesiques; gevoelloosmakende, slaapwekkende middelen*) are so called because they are apt to induce sleep or a certain insensibility and are customarily employed for this; although also if they are employed in great quantity or frequency, they can have harmful effects similar to those which were described above for narcotics. Means of this kind are: first of all chloroform, also ether and nitrous oxide (*protoxyde d'azote*, commonly: *gaz hilarant, lachgaz*), and various other similar things, for new ones can come forth from new combinations every day.[9]

[9] Thus today are named: chloral, sulfonal, veronal, luminal, dial, alidial, sandophal, etc., which also cause deep narcosis and reduce into coma; others, as urethane, a weak narcosis. Some are truly analgesic, as chloroform and ether; others antispasmodic, as pyramidon, hypnal, chloral. Certain ones bring danger to those who suffer from disease of the heart. Concerning these see the periodical *S. Luc medical*, 1934.

Now:

1. Chloroform or another similar means employed in surgical operations induces sleep and insensibility, and from this head operations are completed much more easily and safely; but sometimes, although rarely, death is caused from it.[10] Therefore this remedy is to be used only for a grave cause and cautiously, and indeed in such a way:

[10] Prummer notes from Capellmann: according to a modern statistical review, in every 2907 times in which chloroform was employed, death occurred once. Therefore always some danger of life, although not so proximate, is joined with the use of medicines of this kind.

a) that before use diligent inquiry be made, lest perhaps the constitution of the sick person be such that, chloroform being employed, it would easily bring death;

b) nor let chloroform be employed except when it is necessary, i.e., only then when the manner and gravity of the operation, very vehement pains, or the duration of the thing make the use of chloroform very useful or necessary. Cf. those things which are said at the end of the number.

2. In childbirth, at least difficult childbirth,[11] even the moderate use of chloroform seems lawful, provided that there is no danger from it for the life of the mother or child, which belongs to an expert physician to judge.

[11] In ordinary childbirth, such as in the ordinary course of nature is had of itself, there seems to be lacking for this a proportionately grave reason.

Concerning this we read in Damen in the more recent edition of the moral work of Aertnijs, I, n. 259: If "narcosis is neither too profound nor too prolonged, it does not seem to create danger for the child. Nor is the manner of employing the narcotic which is called *chloroforme a la reine* (because Queen Victoria is said thus to have undergone childbirth) harmful. This manner consists in this, that at the beginning of each pain (for the pains are interrupted), some chloroform or ethyl chloride is ministered, by which for the time of that pain the sense is diminished, without however the use of reason being taken away.

But chloroform employed imprudently, or by one not sufficiently expert, creates grave danger for the child. It is evident that in this case its use is wholly illicit."

3. Likewise, danger being excluded, Prummer says it is lawful "for soothing pains not so atrocious, at least if the matter concerns a very brief narcosis, such as that which is caused by means of weaker narcotics, e.g., *Lachgas*; or if the matter concerns an imperfect narcosis in which the use of reason is not completely taken away. Such narcoses seem lawful in the extraction of a tooth, in childbirth even ordinary."

Likewise also for calming pains or nervous digestive disturbances, or nervous affections, provided that it is done in lesser quantity and without danger of inconveniences.

On the contrary: a) immoderate, excessive, or frequent use of hypnotics, or use employed indiscreetly, for example without the prudent counsel of a physician, is wont to bring diminution of physical, intellectual, and moral life; now it is illicit even to weaken the body if from this the activity of the soul is impeded.

b) Use sought on account of pleasure alone is illicit, even if it were not harmful, because it is illicit to act exclusively for delight or pleasure alone.

c) Physicians sin who indiscreetly or imprudently, or without distinction to all, prescribe means of this kind.

d) Moreover they themselves and others can sin by cooperation, whether positive, for example by inducing to harmful or more frequent use or by ministering the remedy, or negative, by not impeding harmful use; which is altogether to be attended to by nursing sisters.

But since the use of hypnotics in certain cities has now increased unrestrainedly, it is altogether necessary that stricter and more efficacious vigilance be exercised on the part of public power, and that their public sale be subjected to the ordering of law and be able to be done only by prescription of a physician, and that pharmaceutical shops be submitted to due vigilance.

VII. Concerning operations which bear a special relation to the procreation of the human race, it was said in the little work: *Questions concerning Embryology and the Ministration of Baptism*.

VIII. Duties of the pastor and confessor. - Various obligations fall upon the pastor:

1. Let him induce physicians to perform their duties duly, namely to take diligent care for the bodily and spiritual health of the sick, and likewise to abstain from every harmful or illicit action or operation, such as the direct procurement of abortion and embryotomy.

2. Let him take care to have physicians as cooperators for himself, who may warn him about the sick, be willing to watch over their eternal salvation, and rightly instruct nurses and midwives concerning their duties.

3. Let him take care that physicians learn the right manner of baptizing in a case of necessity (can. 743), in particular when and how Baptism is to be conferred in the mother's womb, or on aborted fetuses, or, the mother being dead, a Caesarean section is to be done for this.

4. Let him oppose euthanasia with every effort, especially if the sick person is not yet prepared for death; outside this case, if warning does not seem opportune, the matter can be tolerated, provided that the silence of the pastor is not taken as approval; but if he is asked concerning the lawfulness of the matter, for example by a doubting physician, he cannot be silent, but must respond according to the truth.

5. Generally let him warn those physicians who do illicit operations or intend to do them, at least if fruit is probably hoped for; and also, even when fruit is not hoped for, if they frequently act thus or are a scandal to the faithful, or if they are not in good faith, as if they ask the pastor concerning this matter, or if silence would be equivalent to approval.

Similarly the confessor: 1. generally, opportunity being given, should induce physicians to perform their duties duly, just as was said concerning the pastor;

2. especially should warn a physician who in a particular case has done or is about to do an illicit operation, provided that fruit is hoped for; otherwise let him be silent, unless the physician frequently acts thus and is a scandal to the faithful, or if he is not in good faith, or if he would think the silence of the confessor equivalent to approval;

3. indeed let him deny absolution to a physician who refuses to do his duties, in particular to him who, lacking the due knowledge, is unwilling to acquire it or to abstain from the exercise of the art.

Question II: Concerning Scandal, Which Is Opposed to Spiritual Goods

I. Notions. - Scandal is a saying or deed less right, furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin, or an external action (or omission), whether evil in itself or having the appearance of evil, because, namely, it is apt to induce and draw the neighbor into sin.[1]

[1] There may be consulted St. Thomas, II-II, q. 43; St. Alphonsus, *Th. M.*, l. II, n. 33-58; Aertnijs, *Th. M.*, I, l. II, n. 57 sq., II, l. VI, n. 316-321; Noldin, *Th. M.*, II, n. 102 sq.; Berardi, opusc. *De Occasionariis*.

This definition is of scandal which is active or given. For passive scandal, or scandal received, is the spiritual ruin itself or sin of the neighbor, into which he has fallen by occasion taken from another's word or deed; and this is either received because given, when it arises from active scandal, or from the less right word or deed of another, or received only, when someone takes occasion from another's action altogether right: whether this happens from his own weakness, i.e., from ignorance or frailty, and then it is called scandal of the little ones, as if a young man from the modest adornment of a girl takes occasion of desiring her; or whether it happens from malice, and then it is called pharisaical, as if someone from the good works of another takes occasion of detracting from him or of hating him.[2]

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 43, a. 1, ad 4.

Hence sometimes it happens that there is at once active scandal in one and passive scandal in another, as when by the inducement or evil example of one another falls into sin; sometimes active without passive, as if someone induces another to sin and the latter does not consent; sometimes on the contrary passive without active, as in the scandal of the little ones and pharisaical scandal.

Active scandal is distinguished as twofold: direct and indirect.[3] It is merely indirect if the sin of another is not intended but only foreseen as probably going to follow from a less right action, which of its own nature impels to sinning, as if someone publicly commits sin or furnishes an evil example. On the contrary it is direct if the sin of another is intended and, so far as is on the part of the scandalizer, procured and caused, as happens by command, persuasion, counsel, seduction, praise, or petition that a sin be committed. This again is twofold: material, or intended simply, if the sin is intended materially on account of some advantage, i.e., utility or pleasure of the scandalizer, as if a lustful person seduces another to sin, or a prostitute or seller of evil books intends to profit by an evil business; and formal, or formally intended, if the sin is intended precisely insofar as it is sin, as is done by the impious, which truly is and therefore rightly is called diabolical.[4]

[3] In handing down the division we follow the manner received among moderns; for a more accurate manner of speaking see in our *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, I, n. 960-961, and in Waffelaert, *Etude sur l'Espece morale du scandale*.

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 43, a. 3.

II. Principles. - 1. Active scandal is a grave sin from its genus. For charity binds under grave obligation, by an affirmative precept, to procuring the amendment of the neighbor by correction and to impeding his sin; hence much more, by a negative precept, to not impelling him to sin by counsel or example. Hence Christ says, Mt. XVIII, 6-7: "But he who shall scandalize one of these little ones who believe in me, it is expedient for him that a millstone turned by an ass be hung about his neck, and that he be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals! For it must needs be that scandals come. Nevertheless, woe to that man through whom scandal comes!" - Cf. Rom. XIV, 13, 19 (printed: Rom. XI, 13, 19); I Cor. VIII, 13.

Nevertheless it can be venial, not only on account of the imperfection of the act or on account of indeliberation, but also from smallness of matter, if another is induced to venial sin, even if this is formally intended, or from the lightness of the influence which the action exercises upon the sin of the neighbor: thus if someone gives an evil example to persons whom he knows will not be much moved from it.

2. Active scandal, therefore, of itself is a sin against charity toward neighbor; but per accidens it contracts several other accidental malices, sometimes also against justice, namely if the scandalizer is bound not only from charity but from office to guard against the ruin of subjects, or has used unjust means, such as force, fear, threats, fraud, or deceit.

Thus because of the quality of the person scandalizing, for example if a father scandalizes children, a superior subjects, a teacher pupils; or because of the quality of the person scandalized, as if someone directly induces to base things a married person, or one bound by a vow of chastity, or a superior so that he neglects his office; or because of the manner in which it is committed, if unjust means, such as force or threats, are employed.

3. Indirect scandal of itself seems, at least probably, to be against charity alone; for of itself charity alone commands that we procure the good of the neighbor and impede his evil, and consequently prohibits us from giving him an evil example. Direct scandal, however, in addition certainly is against the virtue which it induces the neighbor to violate: for every virtue obliges us not to act directly against it, and consequently not to intend and be the cause and positively procure that it be violated by others. But if scandal is formally intended, it is also a special sin, i.e., having a distinct species and diverse malice, against charity, and a most grave one, which is directly opposed to fraternal correction, because it explicitly intends as an end, and has as its proper object to which it tends, a special and most grave harm of the neighbor, namely his spiritual ruin: but the end and object give species to a human act; in other cases the character of scandal in a less right action is a circumstance adding and changing the species.

Moreover scandal is so much graver: a) the graver is the ruin of the neighbor, as in the corruption of an innocent person; b) the more that ruin is intended, and thus direct scandal is graver than indirect; c) the more the ruin follows from it or is more efficaciously induced by it, and thus the evil examples of parents, of a priest, of a religious, and of others who are of greater authority or esteem are wont to be graver; and d) the more numerous are the persons who are moved to sin.

III. Corollary. - Therefore a penitent in confession ordinarily does not satisfy by saying: I gave grave scandal, but in addition he ought to express:

1. his own sin by which he gave scandal;

2. at least in direct scandal, the species of mortal sin to which he induced another by command, counsel, persuasion, praise or vituperation, seduction, etc., where the quality of the scandalized person comes to be attended to as often as a different species of sin is had from it, as if someone induces to base things a married person or one bound by a vow of chastity;

3. in formally intended scandal, also the special sin against charity;

4. the quality of himself, if from this an accidental species is added because by office he is bound to guard against scandal, as if a father scandalizes a son, a superior subjects, a teacher pupils;

5. likewise the unjust manner, if he employed force, fear, threats, etc.

But the penitent is not bound to express merely aggravating circumstances, such as are, whatever several have said:

a) the circumstance of solicitation by which he led an accomplice to sin, for the accomplice by consenting becomes guilty of the same scandal, although in a lesser degree; hence scandal is sufficiently accused when complicity with another is expressed;

b) the determined number of persons whom he efficaciously induced to sin, but it suffices to accuse their plurality, because from this scandal is not multiplied but only its gravity is increased.

IV. The reparation of active scandal comes to be considered especially. It, insofar as it can be done, is obligatory: for if from charity we are all bound to guard against the fall of the neighbor and to procure the amendment of one sinning, a fortiori he who by scandal was the occasion why another

sinned is so bound. The obligation arises of itself from charity alone, because the neighbor sinned knowingly and willingly, and to one knowing and willing no injury is done; and therefore the scandalizer is not bound from justice or office, unless he used unjust means, for example deceit, force, fear, or unless a superior gave scandal to subjects whose spiritual good, by force of his office, he ought to care for.

Moreover reparation generally demands two things: a) that the further influence of scandal, insofar as it can be done, be taken away; b) that the amendment of him who suffered scandal be efficaciously cared for.

To this the following principles are valid, which of themselves bind under grave obligation:

1. He who gave direct scandal and by persuasion, counsel, prayers, etc., induced the neighbor to sin or into harmful error, is bound explicitly and especially to repair it, and therefore to take away its further influence; otherwise he would persevere in being the voluntary cause of those things. Thus, for example, he who gave unjust counsels still efficacious must render them inefficacious by a revocation to be made known by himself or by another; he who proposed false doctrine must retract it; he who wrote or spread evil, impious, or obscene books is bound to impede the diffusion of the books and publicly retract them, or, if he can, to take them from the hands of others; he who ordered a plot against the Church must detest it, etc.

2. He who gave ordinary or indirect scandal by evil example alone, which is wont to cause not full perversion but only passing sins, of itself suffices to repair it implicitly and by general reparation, which is contained in the cessation itself from scandal, in good example, in public reception of the sacraments, in prayer for the one scandalized, and in other similar things.

3. He who induced the neighbor into stable perversion is bound to labor for his conversion, so that he may lead him back to virtue, whether by himself, or through others if that can more opportunely be done; namely so that the evil caused may thus be compensated.

4. He who gave public scandal is bound to repair it publicly, both so that the further harmful influence of it may be taken away, and so that the reparation, by which they are warned concerning the evil, may become known to all the scandalized and be of use to them. Wherefore notorious excommunicates and interdicted persons, or manifestly infamous persons, such as prostitutes, concubinarians, or other sinners of that kind, are to be constrained to public reparation of scandal as far as they can, if it can be done; nor can they be admitted to the sacraments unless first they have left the unspeakable business and its occasion and have publicly removed the scandal.

But the manner of public reparation can be diverse according to various circumstances: either a retraction drawn up in writing and to be spread by public papers; or pronounced before two witnesses who will afterward spread the matter; or also before the pastor or confessor, who will make known that the sinner has satisfied his obligations, etc., provided it suffices for taking away the scandal. As to the manner, it is often better to consult the Ordinary.

5. Superiors who gave scandal to subjects are bound from office to repair it. Thus, for example, the father of a family or master who scandalized his domestics is ordinarily to be bound to repairing the scandal, if it still exercises a harmful influence, so that he manifests to them displeasure concerning his evil example and paternally exhorts them not to follow it in the future.

6. He who by an unjust means, such as force, deceit, fraud, or fear unjustly inspired, induced another to sin, is bound from justice to restraining the influence of scandal, namely: a) to take away the unjust means; indeed b) also to recall the other to good, if he cannot of himself return to his former state: for although by sinning he consented, nevertheless the consent is not full, because he did not consent to the deception or violence employed. Namely each one has a strict right not to be injured unjustly in spiritual goods.

V. The case of scandal through concubinage frequently occurs and presents a special difficulty in practice.[5] It is scandal by which the accomplices not only mutually scandalize themselves, but truly also others if the concubinage, as it is apt to happen, is now public.

[5] There may be consulted: St. Alphonsus, *Th. M.*, l. III, n. 432, 436, 437, 441; Segneri, *Instructio confessorii*, c. 5 and 6; Berardi, op. *De Occasionariis*, n. 139-141; Aertnijs, *Theol. Moralis*, II, l. VI, n. 316-321; Noldin, on the sixth precept, n. 16.

Concubinage is repeated intercourse with the same woman, whom someone keeps after the manner of a wife in his own or another's house. Commonly it is exercised between unmarried persons; nevertheless it can be found in adultery and in other species of lust.

Besides the public scandal which they are wont to furnish, concubinarians are placed in great danger of damnation, because they have a firm purpose, at least virtual, of persevering in sin, and therefore with greatest difficulty can return to true penance and free themselves from the bonds of the accomplice. To this, therefore, by the pastor, or also by the confessor, an opportune and efficacious remedy of serious warning and cure is to be provided.

Among remedies: 1. before all things marriage is to be counseled, when it is morally possible and an unhappy outcome is not feared: for this radically cuts off the occasion of sin and sometimes is the only remedy. This is chiefly to be urged: when the concubinarians cohabit, as if the concubine is supported by the paramour in the same house and in another way scarcely can procure support for herself; likewise when the concubinarians pursue one another with a great ardor of true love, especially if the concubinage is long-standing or has been apparently legitimized or confirmed by civil marriage; most of all in danger of death of either party.[6]

[6] Nevertheless secret marriage, or as they say, marriage of conscience, is rarely to be permitted, except in the case of lethal sickness, or in the case where the concubinarians are publicly thought to be spouses. Generally it is to be avoided because of the danger either of divorce, or of scandal if offspring should be born, or of onanism lest scandal arise.

But let it be noted that, in a case of necessity on account of grave evil, if a canonical impediment obstructs the celebration of marriage, and there is not time for recourse to the Holy See, the Ordinary can dispense from all impediments of ecclesiastical law, except the presbyterate and affinity in the direct line, and, if the Ordinary cannot be approached, even the pastor or also the confessor can dispense (can. 1043-1044). Thus, theologians say: if from delay of the marriage great scandal and great infamy would be feared; if delay would be the cause that the marriage would no longer be contracted and therefore either the concubine would be left pregnant, or the offspring would not be

legitimized, or the concubinarians would remain in perpetual concubinage; most of all if the marriage urged in order to consult for the eternal salvation of a dying counterpart.

2. When the possibility or opportunity of marriage is lacking, or when the delay of it for some time stands, separation is to be urged, which, where it can be done, is a necessary remedy for removing the proximate and free occasion.

Separation will be easier if the concubine is supported in a different house, and the concubinarian frequents her not from love of the person but from desire of pleasure. In this case, besides the general remedy against the occasion and danger of sin, it must generally be required that the concubine's partner no longer enter the house of the concubine nor have any intercourse with her. But the concubine can refuse to open the door to the partner arriving, always cohabit with some person so that she is never found alone, or also change domicile. But if they cohabit, separation will be more difficult, but for that reason the more to be urged; but if it is impossible and the occasion is necessary, for example from very great harm, during this time opportune remedies are to be employed by which the formal danger may be warded off and the occasion may become remote from proximate.

3. When even separation is lacking, several helps are numbered as to be employed. And indeed, if the concubinarians dwell in the same house, they generally ought to avoid being alone, man with woman, at least for a long time, or also by a firm declaration and serious reproach to forestall future sin, to flee every familiarity, even, insofar as possible, the sight of the accomplice, not to think about him or her, to finish truly necessary business swiftly, and other similar things; and to exercise mortification and live more piously in prayer and frequentation of the sacraments.

Especially let the concubine, particularly if she stays with the concubinarian under the title of maidservant, openly declare that she is unwilling any longer to lead such a life, and from the beginning resist him in every way, and at night shut and secure the door of the chamber so that the master cannot open it. The same principles otherwise hold concerning a male servant with respect to a mistress. And if the maidservant afterward is cast out of the house by the master and has nowhere to turn nor the means by which she may be supported, let the pastor or confessor take care that she be placed in some refuge founded for endangered girls or in another honorable house.

VI. Especially as regards the absolution of concubinarians and their admission to the sacraments:

A. In public concubinage: 1. If the occasion is voluntary, they are not to be absolved before they have separated themselves, because otherwise they are in proximate danger of breaking their purpose, and a public sinner ought not to be absolved unless he has done penance publicly and has satisfied for the scandal. Hence before he is absolved, the concubine's partner should dismiss the concubine, or, if she dwells outside the house, he ought for some notable time not to have gone to her; but the concubine ought to depart from the house of the concubinarian, or, if she does not cohabit, it is necessary that for some notable time she have broken off intercourse with him.

2. If the occasion is necessary, absolution is to be deferred until the penitent has contained himself for a notable time and has satisfied for the public scandal. This can be done: by making

known the necessity of the occasion if it is not known; by publicly showing signs of conversion through frequentation of church and a more pious life or other similar things; and, if it can be done, by entering marriage with the accomplice. And if the shameful intercourse has now long ceased, and scandal, while the reputation of concubinage remains, cannot be taken away immediately, but nevertheless the penitent is prepared to take it away as soon as possible and in a better manner, he will be able to be absolved before the scandal has been repaired, provided that he promises that he will not publicly approach Holy Communion, at least in the place where he is known.

Nevertheless the necessity of the occasion is not easily to be admitted except for a very grave cause. For the affection by which concubinarians adhere to their pleasures causes them either to oppose specious pretexts to separation or to exaggerate them; therefore let the confessor diligently examine how much the obstacles alleged are worth, so that he may discern the truth.

B. In occult concubinage: 1. If the occasion is voluntary, the accomplices regularly are not to be absolved before they have in reality separated themselves; otherwise, as experience establishes, they are in proximate danger of breaking and not carrying out their promises. This also holds if they do not dwell in the same house, because in the case the occasion properly is not interrupted, but morally continuous, and because the concubine is had after the manner of a wife, and because of continuous frequentation.

Exception is made if there is a grave and urgent reason of avoiding a greater evil, namely: a) danger of death so urgent that time or means of separation is lacking; b) or difficulty of returning for a long time; or c) danger of infamy from non-reception of the sacrament; d) or great danger of alienation from the sacrament. In these cases nevertheless the penitent is to be warned that he will not obtain absolution any longer unless he has stood by his promises; but if he has been warned uselessly, he is to be held formally as a relapser.

2. If the occasion is necessary: a) regularly the penitent can be absolved, provided he is duly disposed and is prepared to employ efficacious means, necessary or prescribed, so that the occasion may become remote from proximate; unless sometimes it is more opportune to defer, with his consent, so that he may resist more promptly and efficaciously and employ the means.

b) But if he is a relapser and, warned several times, has neglected the prescribed remedies and has relapsed in the same way, absolution is to be deferred: both because he is doubtfully disposed, and so that he may better apprehend the gravity of the sin and be compelled to amendment. Unless perhaps he offers extraordinary signs of disposition, or is prepared to employ new and more efficacious special means.

Nevertheless let the occasion not easily be believed necessary, as they sometimes use as a pretext, by reason of avoiding scandal or infamy; indeed, on the contrary: 1. if the people have not yet noticed the familiarity, dismissal of the concubine will not produce a greater mark than if a maidservant is dismissed from the house; 2. on the contrary, in long-standing concubinage it is often morally impossible that the matter not become known to others; hence separation will impede infamy and scandal.

C. In the article of death: 1. When the dying person is now deprived of the senses, generally he ought to be absolved under condition: if you are capable, and also, at least if it can be done without scandal or secretly, anointed with Holy Oil; because it can seem somewhat probable that perhaps he is disposed, and it cannot be affirmed that he is dying in manifest mortal sin; unless nevertheless not so long before the deprivation of the senses he contemptuously refused the sacraments. See the little work *Concerning Various Categories of Penitents*, c. 2, q. 6.

2. When he uses the senses and time and manner are at hand, first scandal and the occasion of relapse are to be taken away, insofar as he can; and therefore:

a) if he is able to join the accomplice to himself by marriage, let the sick person execute this as quickly as possible;

b) if marriage is impossible, separation is to be required; for example, in public concubinage the concubinarian ought, if it can be done, to cast out the concubine and, insofar as there is need, to hire another honorable woman who may minister necessary things to him; the concubine ought, if infirmity and condition permit, to try to be received into a public hospital.

3. When even separation is impossible, whether physically or morally, for example because infamy is to be feared, the confessor ought to try to remove the danger insofar as it can be done; for this end, besides the general remedies, these will be able to help: let the accomplice and the image of him or her be removed from the chamber, or at least let the sick person, by himself or through the confessor, ask pardon from the accomplice for the scandal given to him or her and ask that person to do penance. Moreover, publicly the concubinarian, even before witnesses, ought to declare the impossibility of separation, to be made known as soon as possible, and at the same time promise that he will remove the scandal as soon as possible and, if perhaps he recovers, will effect separation and will have no further intercourse with the accomplice.

And then he will be able to be absolved: absolutely if he certainly seems disposed, under condition if only doubtfully; and in addition to be fortified with the other sacraments.

But let it be noted: a) In the case of public concubinage, the sacraments are not to be brought publicly unless after the scandal has already been sufficiently repaired publicly; otherwise they are to be brought secretly.

b) These rules are indubitable, and therefore are altogether to be observed; nor is it understood how, as has been asserted to us, certain pastors or confessors do not observe them.

VII. Observation. - In the case in which someone is publicly thought to be a concubinarian and is not, separation is not to be urged, if no active scandal, or less right action, has given occasion to the rumor; but it suffices that he make known that an opinion of this kind is false. Then scandal will either cease, or will become pharisaical scandal of malice alone. On the contrary, if by an evil or less right work he has given occasion, separation will be urged as long as it can be done without grave harm: for the natural law obliges one to take away scandal if it is possible; but if it cannot be done, by the practice of Christian life and by the spreading of the truth the scandal will gradually be taken away.

VIII. The case of merely civil marriage is reduced to concubinage. - Merely civil marriage entered by Catholics, since it is not a valid contract of marriage, nor a legitimate union, is nothing but concubinage; hence the same principles set forth above are generally to be applied in the case.

Nevertheless there can be a special difficulty if spouses joined by a valid marriage, after obtaining civil divorce, have attempted a new marriage before the civil law; this is not only invalid, but, while the legitimate counterpart is living, cannot be convalidated. Hence separation without doubt is of itself altogether to be urged; indeed, if it can be done, civil divorce of the second marriage will have to be obtained. But these things do not always seem possible, for example on account of offspring born and hence the danger of evil education or also scandal to be furnished to the offspring, or on account of great detriments in temporal goods, or also on account of infamy if those joined are held by all as legitimate spouses. Therefore then at least they are to be separated from the bed, and to be as cohabitants brother and sister. And therefore this new question arose: can spouses who, after obtaining civil divorce, have entered a new civil marriage, be admitted to the sacraments if they cohabit as brother and sister and the nullity of the marriage is unknown?

Concerning this question we were not able to find anything explicit in manuals of moral theology; they are wont to state the general principle without exception: those joined by civil marriage give public scandal, and consequently cannot be admitted to the sacraments unless the scandal has ceased by separation and has been sufficiently repaired. Schmitt alone, in the recent edition of Noldin's moral work, II, n. 677, puts a certain restriction, saying: "at most, if the fact were wholly occult, and in that place they were commonly held to be joined by true marriage, it could be permitted for a grave cause that, continence being preserved, they dwell together." He indeed does not add that they can be admitted to the sacraments, but perhaps this can be held as implicitly contained in these words. But that this is lawful was affirmed in the periodical *L'ami du clerge*, 1926, p. 424, if namely separation is morally impossible, the fact is altogether occult, and there is no danger that it will be manifested, for example if those joined have gone away into a far distant region or live unknown in a very great city, since then in reality there is no scandal. From this it happened in certain regions, especially in France, that some confessors applied this manner of acting to cases wholly occult in a great city; but certain ones, proceeding more imprudently, are reported to have dared to admit to the sacraments also those who only propose to live as brother and sister and strive for this, although at times they carnally couple.

Concerning this case it seems that one must speak thus. Regularly indeed it cannot be done thus. But given a wholly occult case, and one in which there would be no danger of manifestation, not even then would it belong to the confessor to pass sentence concerning it; for the cohabitation of those civilly joined is an external and public fact, which does not pertain to the internal forum of confession but to the external forum and consequently is subject to the judgment of public authority; moreover the case concerns very grave causes, which it is in no way opportune to leave to the mind of individual confessors, but it is better to refer them to ecclesiastical authority; but so that in this matter a certain uniform and constant practice, as is fitting, can be had, the Ordinary is not to be approached, but the matter will have to be submitted to the Sacred Penitentiary, to which otherwise recourse must be had if any wish to obtain absolution from infamy of law, which by the fact itself they incurred from merely civil marriage (can. 2356). To the Sacred Penitentiary, we say, because the matter concerns an occult case; for if it were public, it would pertain to the Holy Office.

The Sacred Penitentiary will diligently inquire about three things:

1. about the absence of danger of protestation and manifestation on the part of the abandoned spouse, and of injury perhaps inflicted upon that spouse and not repaired;

2. about the absence of every danger of manifestation of occult scandal. Certain ones falsely assert that in the case there is truly no scandal. Passive scandal indeed is lacking because of ignorance; but active scandal is by no means taken away. It consists in this, that the woman continues to bear the name of the man, that both in contempt of divine law remain together as spouses, and that in addition they publicly live in a proximate occasion of sin. Nor does it suffice that they conceive the purpose of living as brother and sister, because that is not an apt means of taking away scandal: namely the fact of cohabitation of those who are civilly joined is of itself an evil example and necessarily inducing to evil. And although here and now it does not induce to evil, as being unknown, this is wholly per accidens, because it is always of itself inductive: an external fact of itself less right, furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin, and which, being of itself public and notorious, is apt to be spread and to move others to sin;

3. about the practical possibility of cohabiting as brother and sister; hence it will subject those joined to a long probation, for example of one year, during which time they must show continence faithfully preserved.

These things being verified, the Sacred Penitentiary will exceptionally be able to grant permission of admitting them to reception of the sacraments.

This seems the prudent and right solution of the aforesaid case; and we can affirm that this solution is approved as right in the Sacred Penitentiary itself.

We wish to insist somewhat on the great inconveniences and dangers which would threaten if the aforesaid new practice of certain confessors were spread or greatly extended. The danger, namely:

1. lest spouses or confessors no longer seek a means of completing real separation;

2. lest to spouses who promise to cohabit as brother and sister, but do not fulfill the promise, absolution nevertheless be granted under the pretext that they are in a morally necessary occasion;

3. lest esteem be diminished for that great evil which is merely civil marriage;

4. lest the fact not remain occult but the practice be spread in public: for since such a fact does not easily remain secret, when cases are multiplied the probability of revelation increases;

5. finally, lest the practice be extended too much. A simple warning of theologians does not meet this danger: that it can be done thus only very rarely. For since there are confessors not sufficiently prudent, this is not so rare, it will easily happen that several, in our times very inclined to laxer benignity, will imagine that precisely that very rare case occurs to them, and thus the practice would be unduly multiplied.

IX. Other special cases. - A. Concerning evil associations by reason of faith or morals, Aertnijs, *Th. M.* II, on Penance, n. 332, has these things:

1. Associations in which discourses against religion and its ministers are wont to be held, or evil newspapers are wont to be read, can constitute an occasion of losing faith, and then are to be avoided under grave sin. Therefore enrollment in and frequentation of societies or circles of this kind is wont to be gravely illicit; and the same must be said concerning frequentation of unbelieving and sectarian men, who strive to weaken faith.

2. Those associations constitute a proximate occasion of lust in which evil companions either draw one on to sins of deed, namely to self-pollution, to sodomy, to approaching prostitutes, or utter foul speech of such a kind that they cannot be uttered or heard without the greatest danger.

Therefore let the confessor weigh whether this occasion is voluntary or necessary; it can be necessary if companions of this kind are found in the same college, in the same workshop, etc., or if they are one's own neighbors, insofar as (as often happens in the countryside) it is morally impossible altogether to avoid encounters with them. In this case let the confessor warn the penitent that, if it is possible, he should break off base conversations or certainly not participate in them. Finally, let him especially strive to remove adolescents still innocent from the custom of evil companions, and let him not omit to stir up the vigilance of parents in this matter.

B. Concerning service, the same author says, l. c., n. 348-349: service can be an occasion of sin, either because it is done among non-Catholics or indifferent persons, or on account of persons soliciting to sin, as especially happens to women and girls.

1. A person exposed to the temptations of a man, if because of her frailty she is exposed to proximate danger of consenting, is to be treated as constituted in a proximate occasion, and that either necessary or voluntary according as the service can be left with or without grave difficulty.

2. A person, if endowed with such piety that she constantly repels temptations, is not living in a proximate occasion, and consequently is not bound to leave the house; nevertheless it is necessary that she employ opportune remedies for cutting off solicitations of this kind.

The remedies are: a) to threaten the man tempting, namely the servant, son, or master, that she will report the matter to the master, father, or wife; b) if threats do not suffice, actually to report the matter if from this an efficacious remedy can be hoped for; c) also to take away the occasions of temptations, by not speaking to the tempter, by not remaining alone with him without a witness, by closing the door of the chamber, etc.

3. A person who, because of the frequency of falls, lives as it were in concubinage, is to be treated as a concubine.

Service among non-Catholics, impious, or indifferent persons, if danger of perversion is absent both in faith and in morals, and servants regularly are not impeded from observing the precepts of the

Church, is not illicit; otherwise, as soon as they can without grave inconvenience, they are bound to leave the service. Hence at the threshold of the contract they ought to stipulate liberty for the exercise of religion.

C. Concerning dances, spectacles, evil books, and immodest dress, we have spoken in the little work *Concerning Various Categories of Penitents*, where it treats of the worldly, c. 3, q. 6, n. VIII, 5; concerning obscene images, in the little work *Concerning Chastity and Lust*, q. 5, n. V.

Question III: Concerning Adultery, Which Is Opposed to the Good of Marriage

I. Notions. - The sin which is opposed to the good of marriage, as regards the person of the spouse joined by marriage, is called adultery, which is prohibited by the sixth precept of the Decalogue and is defined as the violation of another's bed, and consists in carnal union with another's spouse.

Besides the malice of fornication, by which someone approaches one not his own and therefore offends against chastity, this sin imports the malice of injustice, and indeed:

1. injury inflicted on the other spouse, from the fact that someone approaches another's wife;

2. furthermore, temporal damage, in the case in which offspring also should be born from adultery, namely on account of the expenses which come to the husband from the birth, nourishment, and education of another's offspring, or also on account of the inheritance of the father handed over to this offspring, by which legitimate children or other heirs are unjustly deprived;

3. but if the adulterer by force, grave fear, or deceit led the wife to carnal union, the sin is increased because an unjust manner was employed.

Hence from adultery there usually arises an obligation of reparation, which, since it more often presents a difficult case, it seems opportune to add a few things about that argument.

II. Principles. - Three things are to be attended to in the present matter:

1. The adulterer who by force, grave fear, deceit, or another unjust means led the wife to carnal union is bound from justice, he alone, to repair all damages which from this come of themselves to the husband and legitimate children, because he is the sole truly efficacious and formally unjust cause of these.

2. The adulterer who did not use an unjust means, but obtained consent from the wife wholly freely, is bound from justice in solidum with the wife to repair the damages inflicted on the husband and children, because both together are the unjust, efficacious, and culpable cause of them.

3. Several adulterers who, from carnal union had at a time apt for conception, can be the father of offspring certainly adulterine, are bound to reparation in proportion to the doubt, at least if they acted thus by common counsel or with advertence, because then they are the voluntary cause of the uncertainty of the father, which already is a damage certainly inflicted and to be

repaired; otherwise it is uncertain whether they are bound to restore, since rather the mother is the cause why the father cannot be established.

III. The manner of restitution is altogether to be attended to, since in practice it is often difficult because of the danger of suspicion by which the peace of the family would be disturbed. Wherefore:

1. The male adulterer can restore by laboring for the family, or by giving to the husband or legitimate children, whether among the living or by testament, according to prudent estimation.

2. The adulterous mother can restore: a) from her own goods if she has those of which she can dispose without prejudice to the husband; b) from the profit which she makes from her own labor, or by exercising a business or art; c) by diminishing customary expenses, by caring for the family property more diligently, and by living more sparingly insofar as can be done according to her condition, to which, if another manner is lacking, she is also bound; d) by applying to the adulterine offspring the alms which according to her state she can give, or by asking from the husband an alms for a poor relative; e) by secretly taking, as much as she safely can, from the goods which are to come to the adulterine child or have already come to him, and by compensating the legitimate children with them; f) or also by prudently giving counsel to the illegitimate child concerning religious life.

3. If it is possible for the adulterine offspring to be educated in a hospice or foundling house without suspicions arising, care must be taken that it happen thus, since in this way the expenses of education are greatly limited and division of the inheritance is avoided. Nor generally is there an obligation of restoring to the hospice, unless in the case in which it is sustained only by public expenses of the city and is destined exclusively for poor infants, and the parents are not truly poor.

4. Restitution for damage already following is to be made as soon as possible. For damage not yet inflicted but to be inflicted it suffices that the guilty party so arrange matters that he restore at the opportune time, unless nevertheless he is near death; in which case he is bound immediately to restore, by himself or through another, according to the proportion of probability of the life of the adulterine child, attention being given to his age and strength, and according to the proportion of damage to be inflicted on others.

Thus also he could commit it to the confessor, or to another trustworthy man, that he restore the whole damage from goods to be handed over to him, yet in such a way that, if the adulterine offspring dies before the putative father, he would dispose otherwise of the goods received, as the adulterer had determined.

IV. Observations. - 1. There is no obligation of restoring: a) for the injury inflicted on the husband through adultery, if he has suffered no moral detriment from it, as in the case of secret adultery, or if he does not care for reparation; b) for temporal damage, if none has followed, as if offspring has not been born, or, having been born, by his own labor has compensated the expenses of his education; c) if the husband consented in the adultery; unless nevertheless to necessary heirs, in the case in which on account of adulterine offspring born they would be frustrated of part of the legitimate inheritance.

2. Detriments which come from adultery merely per accidens are not to be restored, from the fact that other relatives or friends give or leave certain things to the adulterine child which otherwise would have come to the legitimate children.

3. Nor is there to be restitution in the case in which the offspring born is doubtfully adulterine; for in doubt offspring received in marriage is presumed to be from the legitimate husband, according to the axiom: the father is he whom marriage indicates. And otherwise restitution is not to be made as long as it is uncertain that the action was efficaciously damaging.

4. An adulterous woman can sometimes be bound alone to repair the damages which happen by reason of inheritance: namely if she could easily remove the adulterine child so that he would be nourished outside the family, for example in a foundling house or hospice, and the adulterer did whatever he could to obtain this; for then he effectively retracted the cause of the damage and did not sin against the family, and the adulterous woman alone efficaciously caused the damage.

5. Nevertheless, regularly, even if it is necessary for avoiding or repairing damages, the mother is not bound to manifest her crime: namely she is not bound with danger of life, nor with danger of graver infamy unless she is already suspected and has partially lost reputation, nor with danger of great hatred on the part of the husband and relatives and of graver discord, nor without hope of fruit, when the manifestation will be of no use, whether because the son will not believe his mother, or because he will not restore, since it is foreseen that he cannot or will not wish to do this.

Nevertheless the mother would be bound if the aforesaid dangers of death, graver infamy, indignation, and scandal were absent, and the son were thought likely to believe his mother and to restore.

6. The illegitimate son is not bound to believe his mother affirming his adulterine origin, even under oath, but can consider himself as legitimate, unless from circumstances or indications the testimony of the mother produces such certainty as would suffice in a public judgment, as if the absence of the putative father at the time of conception is certainly proved. But if this is thus established, the son cannot retain the paternal inheritance, nor gifts which come to him from error, unless meanwhile he has lawfully prescribed.

7. The confessor to whom a dying adulterous woman would wish to entrust that after death he declare the offspring spurious cannot accept that office, both lest confession be rendered odious, and because the offspring would not be bound to give faith to his words, and thus the manifestation would be useless.

V. Corollary concerning Forcible Violation and Fornication. - Similar things hold for unjust or violent violation, which is carnal union with an unwilling unmarried woman, or the oppression of an honorable woman, even if not a virgin or not a minor; to whom damaging injury can be inflicted by reason of future marriage and by reason of offspring perhaps to be born. Now the unjust violator is bound to restore from justice:

1. On account of temporal damage, as inability or difficulty of marrying, infamation and dishonoring, syphilitic infection, etc., if in fact it has been inflicted, provided that it arose of itself from his action and consequently was foreseen in confused fashion. To this the one who oppressed the woman is also bound: to marry her, if he promised this, even fictitiously, and therefore truly deceived the woman, or if the damage cannot be repaired otherwise and graver evils are not prudently feared; otherwise he ought to dower her or increase her dowry, or otherwise take care that she can marry according to her condition, or contribute to her support, according as the damage was inflicted and it is possible to repair it.[1] Nevertheless he is not bound to compensation if in fact the woman has suffered no damage, as if she has already married well, or even otherwise could not have married, or has entered religion, or has been defamed from her own indiscretion, or has now died by premature death.

[1] See more in *Summa Theol. Mor.*, II, n. 382.

2. On account of offspring born, so that, if he is the certain father, he ought from justice to provide for the whole support and education, according to the condition of the mother, until the offspring can suffice for himself. But if the father is uncertain, because several have had carnal union, he is bound to restore in proportion to the doubt, at least if they acted thus by common counsel or knowingly, because the voluntary cause is of the uncertainty of the father, which already is a great damage for the mother and offspring; otherwise he cannot be obliged to restore anything, since rather the mother is the cause why the father cannot be established.

In the case in which the woman has suffered violence or injury in no way, but has freely consented, the man contracted no obligation from justice of itself, but can be obliged from piety and charity. And indeed:

1. To the support of the offspring, according to the condition of the mother, by natural right he is bound for half the part, if he is the certain father, even if the civil law prohibits inquiry concerning the illegitimate father; but he is bound in solidum with the mother, so that, if she supplies nothing, he ought to provide for the whole; but if the civil law or the civil judge petitioned according to law should determine the quantity of support to be paid by the illegitimate father, this would have to be paid. But if there are several uncertain fathers, they are bound to half the support in proportionate part, at least if they acted thus by common counsel or knowingly, as was said above; otherwise none can be obliged to compensate for the support of the offspring.

2. To acknowledgment of the offspring and to its legitimation through subsequent marriage, unless graver inconveniences stand in the way.

Let it be noted that the man of himself owes nothing to the woman:

a) on account of the carnal union had, because to one knowing and consenting no injury is done; unless per accidens, as if he promised something, or, by indiscreetly manifesting the crime, defamed her;

b) on account of the expenses of childbirth, because by offering her body the woman is judged to have taken this burden upon herself.

Question IV: Concerning Sins Against the External Goods of Fortune, And Concerning Restitution Due for Them

I. The question to be treated. - Sins against external goods are committed by theft, robbery, fraudulence, usury, and other unjust damaging acts, which are prohibited by the seventh precept of the Decalogue and are customarily explained sufficiently in moral theology. In practice, a special difficulty usually arises in the case of restitution; therefore we judge it opportune that this be inspected, especially as regards compensation in material goods.[1] We do not indeed deny that even from injuries committed against other goods, and from other precepts toward the neighbor besides the seventh, there can arise an obligation of restitution; nevertheless in practice, even then the principal obligation is usually reduced to material compensation in real goods, or at least frequently has that joined to it.

[1] Moralists may be consulted where they treat of restitution, especially St. Alphonsus in *Th. M.*, l. III, tr. 5, c. 2; Marc, Aertnijs, Tanquerey, Genicot, Noldin, Prummer, Vermeersch in their manuals; Waffelaert in his work *De Iustitia*; Reuter, *Neo-conf.*, n. 232-235; Berardi, *Praxis-conf.*; Aertnijs, *Th. P.*, n. 84-87.

II. Principles and rules to be regarded in the case of restitution. - The confessor ought especially to have these before his eyes:

1. First of all let him attend to this principle: to dispense in these matters and to concede delay does not belong to the confessor himself, but only to the owner. Hence excuse from restitution or delay is to be defined by sole and true necessity, unless the circumstances were such that the confessor could prudently presume the consent of the creditor to delay, or reasonably interpret the intention of the owner.

2. Let him diligently ask what is the nature, the adjuncts, and the conditions of the case, so that he can define whether, how, and how much must be restored, how long the injustice lasted, whether it has already been declared in confession, why it has not yet been restored, etc.

3. When a more difficult case occurs, let him not resolve it immediately, but ask for delay to examine the matter more deeply or even to consult others, and let him enjoin the penitent afterward to return to him. But if the penitent cannot conveniently do this, let him be ordered to consult another learned and God-fearing man; and if he promises that he will do this and shows himself prepared to execute the decision and to perform those things which would be imposed on him, he will be able to be absolved.

4. If, inquiry having been made, the obligation of restitution remains doubtful or uncertain, it cannot strictly be imposed on the penitent; although sometimes a certain partial compensation to be made from equity can opportunely be advised for the various adjuncts.

5. If the obligation of restoring is certain and no cause excusing from it appears, but the penitent, although able, raises difficulties, let the confessor warn him that the sin is not forgiven unless restitution is made, because it is no less evil to retain another's goods against the will of the owner than to take them away, since it is a continued taking away; and consequently that the penitent must choose between these two: whether he prefers to undergo the eternal punishment of hell, or rather to lack the thing belonging to another.

6. When the debtor asserts that he cannot restore either altogether or at least immediately, let the confessor diligently examine the alleged impossibility, and let the one asserting not be believed unless he efficaciously proves it; nor let him be absolved unless he seriously promises that he will restore as soon as he will be able and will make an effort toward this. Namely only grave and ineluctable difficulty is a sufficient cause. Hence the debtor a) is bound to diminish superfluous expenses, to labor insofar as the decency of his state permits, to employ parsimony in food, clothing, and necessary expenses; b) if he objects that he will suffer gravely in reputation, let there be suggested a manner by which reputation may be cared for; c) if there is no sufficient cause of temporary delay, this cannot be conceded; but if there is a sufficient cause of delay alone, definitive remission cannot be conceded; d) if the whole cannot be restored at once, let it be returned by parts as soon as possible.

7. Therefore let the confessor beware lest he be credulous as to difficulties which penitents of this kind are wont to oppose: for some pretend impotence to restore, but often it is weakness of will rather than incapacity or weakness of powers; others with every effort solicit delay; but let the confessor know that it is not in his power to concede delay, because it is not only illicit to snatch away another's goods but equally illicit to retain them.

8. Namely, as moralists teach, the following are unworthy of absolution: a) those unwilling to restore when they can do this; b) those not able to restore, but neglecting to obtain for themselves the faculty of restoring; c) those delaying restitution much without an excusing reason, or committing to the heir a restitution which they themselves can do by themselves; d) those able to restore in full and restoring only a part.

9. But if the penitent certainly is in good faith, either because he believes that he owes nothing, or because he thinks that he is bound only to a part, not to the whole or in solidum, or because he judges it enough that he restore by several payments, although he could do so by one, if there is no probable hope of fruit to follow from warning, which nevertheless is not easily to be presumed, let the confessor leave him in ignorance; but if the penitent doubts or asks, the confessor cannot be silent.

10. In certain cases he will reasonably be able practically to presume total and absolute condonation, namely as regards children of a family and spouses who have snatched away things not of great value and have now consumed them; likewise for thefts of servants as regards edible and drinkable things, at least ordinary ones, not sold to others but consumed; indeed as regards other things if the master has rebuked or expelled the servant convicted of theft and has said nothing about restitution; likewise concerning small thefts of the poor committed against diverse persons, or against one person but not very frequently.

11. Ordinarily let him not absolve one who holds another's thing with himself unless he first has restored it, namely on account of the danger in which otherwise he lives of delaying restitution, or of consuming the thing and converting it to his own use. But if someone already seems so constituted and firmly disposed that he is deservedly believed soon to satisfy, he will be able to be absolved, but by fixing for him the space of time within which he is to restore and the manner in which he is to accomplish this; for indeterminate promises easily perish.

But one who, previously warned, did not restore, regularly is altogether to be dismissed for a time, absolution being delayed until he has restored, because although he may say that he proposes restitution, nevertheless there will easily be doubt concerning this disposition, and too much danger of relapsing and of changing the purpose.

III. There are various practical modes or means by which restitution can be made more opportunely, namely:

1. Through the public or postal course, so that, whether by means of an inscribed letter or by means of an order or check (*mandat, cheque*), he sends the sum under a fictitious name. But if the sum is owed to some society, it is better, for sufficient security, to write at the same time to the treasurer and to the president or syndicate.

2. By testament, if the dying person without any infamy can leave a legacy to such and such a person. And if it cannot be done without infamy, it must be seen whether an heir or fiduciary legatee can be constituted.

3. By a fictitious donation, provided that gifts are not compensated by gifts, and that they bring true profit or utility to the creditor, so that he is truly rendered unharmed: for it would not suffice, for example, that he be invited to drink or eat superfluously, or that sweets be given to him.

4. By undue labors useful to the creditor, for example by setting vines for a farmer, making a trip with a wagon for a master, whitening either linens or other things for him, laboring beyond what is owed with the master's profit and without pay. This manner is often practical for servants or workers. Nevertheless let mere favors without true utility not be confused with labor.

5. By alms, whether given to the poor or to priests who will celebrate Masses; nevertheless this is valid only for cases in which either it is impossible to restore into the hands of the creditor, or he must be presumed content with this manner of restoring. Nevertheless let the confessor beware lest he ask alms of this kind for himself or for his own convent. But if the sum is not very great and the debtor is of slender fortune, for restitution he will be able to give alms even of the kind he is otherwise accustomed to give; thus likewise he can remit to some poor debtor of his as much as he is bound to give to the poor: namely it is easier to yield that which one does not yet have than to deprive oneself of that which he now holds.

6. Through a trustworthy third person. It is not opportune that the confessor spontaneously offer himself for exercising this office of mediator; indeed, when asked by the penitent, let him not easily undertake the burden, and let him attend lest the seal be violated. To avoid this, sometimes he will be able to make restitution through another priest, or transmit it from another place. Indeterminate restitutions, for example those to be performed for the poor, he should ordinarily leave to be made by the penitent; restitutions to be made to a determined person he will easily be able to undertake in a case of necessity lest the reputation of the penitent be injured, but let him require the testimony of the creditor concerning the thing or sum restored, which he may transmit to the penitent.

Thus let the confessor himself not incur suspicion.

Especially A. If the injured person is not certainly known, inquiry is to be made diligently concerning him. But doubt remaining after diligent inquiry:

1. if the doubt is among a few, the thing or its price is to be divided among them, nor can it be given to the poor; thus, for example, money lost or taken from one of three or four persons;

2. if the doubt is among several of the same place, restitution is to be made to them, if morally it can be done: thus merchants defrauding in weight, measure, or quality of goods ought to restore by increasing weight and measure, if the same buyers are accustomed to return; otherwise, if it cannot be done in another way, let restitution be made to the poor or to pious works of the same place in which the injustice was committed; thus in war, if unjust requisitions have been made and it is unknown who suffered damage;

3. if the doubt is among many scattered persons or among altogether unknown persons, so that there is no probability that restitution can be made to the true owners, restitution is to be made to the poor or to any pious causes.

B. If the injured person has died, restitution is to be made to heirs or to those having care, nor can the goods be expended for the poor or in Masses for the deceased[2] (who otherwise is no longer the owner of the goods), unless the heirs consent or there are absolutely none.

[2] Thus the Sacred Penitentiary, 7 Feb. 1899.

C. If a community or society has been injured, restitution is to be made to this society itself, unless it is essentially evil and pursues only an altogether evil end, so that it cannot have the right of possessing. Excepting this case, therefore, restitution cannot be made to the individual members but to the administrators of the society. Nevertheless it is better to warn several of the administrators or members, lest restitution be defrauded by an unfaithful administrator. This also holds concerning an insurance society, although on account of a contract of reinsurance entered among several societies, it is impossible to know which society in fact suffered damage. In this last case certain theologians have said that restitution is to be made to the poor or to pious causes. But as Vermeersch notes,[3] this is not the practice of the Sacred Penitentiary; hence Genicot says:[4] "Practically it seems to suffice that restitution be made to the administrators when the injured person cannot be better detected, and if this is regularly done, a certain compensation among the various societies exists." Therefore restitution is by no means to be made to the poor, unless it cannot be done otherwise; nevertheless one who in good faith in this case has already restored to the poor would not seem to be disturbed.

[3] *Th. M.*, II, n. 494.

[4] *Th. M.*, I, n. 658, VII.

D. If restitution must be made to the State or municipality, restitution can be made through official administrators or those set over taxes, provided that sufficient care is taken lest they keep it for themselves, for example by warning several. It can also be done by destroying titles of public debt issued by the State or municipality, or postal stamps, provided that they belong to the government; but not by destroying banknotes, because they are only protected by the State. Nor can it be made to those who have been unjustly injured in goods by the civil power, as sometimes religious or Catholic

schools are, unless the injustice committed against determinate persons is altogether indubitable and has not been repaired or condoned; nor can restitution be made to the poor under the pretext that civil society ought to assist them, because it satisfies that obligation in another way, nor does it belong to private persons to dispose of public goods by private authority; unless nevertheless no other way lies open by which restitution could securely come to the public treasury.

IV. Corollary. - Therefore confessors err:

1. who never or almost never ask concerning the sin of injustice;

2. who generally say nothing concerning restitution but pass over it in silence;

3. who from those unable to restore do not require a firm and efficacious purpose of restoring, nor impose on them the obligation of seriously striving and employing apt means so that they may restore as soon as possible;

4. who, after hearing the declaration of a sin or of adjuncts which can induce the obligation of restoring, from negligence do not examine whether it must be made;

5. who do not warn concerning restitution to be made, even when the obligation is certain and there is no serious reason for doubting the capacity or probity of the penitent;

6. who too easily and without grave reason either suppose good faith in the penitent, or fear that the warning will not be useful;

7. who too easily either presume condonation, or admit an excusing reason of delay or impossibility, or even exempt from the obligation of restitution;

8. who think that in light matter no obligation of restitution is given, when on the contrary it is owed under venial sin, and must in some measure be urged, if otherwise there would be danger that the penitent would fall into grave injustice or would multiply light matters greatly;

9. who do not care about light matters added to one another and coalescing into one grave matter, although nevertheless they can induce grave fault and a grave obligation of restoring, not only by reason of intention, but also by reason of grave damage inflicted on one person, and by reason of notable detention or accumulation even from things belonging to several;

10. who, when the injured person is unknown, do not care to inquire concerning him or to institute inquiry, and at once pronounce that restitution is to be made to the poor;

11. who, when restitution must be made to a deceased person, or to a society, do not take care that restitution be made to heirs or to administrators, but are content with restitution made to the poor or in alms for Masses, although another way of restoring is by no means impossible.

In the case in which from vincible or invincible error the confessor either negatively did not warn concerning the obligation of restoring, or positively pronounced that an owed obligation was not to be done or that an undue one was to be done, he is bound to correct the error in that degree and manner which we stated in the little work *Concerning the Minister of Penance*.

V. Case concerning restitution to be made in the article of death. - One must act cautiously with the dying person:

1. If the penitent seems to be in good faith, and time is not left prudently to warn him concerning his obligation, or it is foreseen that the warning will not be useful, it is to be omitted.

2. But if the warning is hoped to be useful, or if the penitent lives in bad faith or in vincible ignorance, he is to be warned strongly and at the same time gently concerning his obligation and helped to fulfill it immediately.

3. If the obligation is occult and cannot be fulfilled immediately, the dying person is to be induced to entrust the money to the confessor himself, or rather to another faithful man, so that it may be handed over to the creditor in secret; or, if it can prudently be done, to leave that sum in his testament to the same creditor, with mention of restitution omitted.

4. If the obligation is not occult, nor can it be fulfilled immediately, let the confessor effect that it is certainly fulfilled either through the heirs or through a note to be handed over to the creditor.

VI. Observations. - 1. To a penitent asking concerning grave matter, before the fact of injustice inflicted, one must respond more rigorously so that he may be efficaciously turned away from it, saying, for example, that it is imprudent to expose oneself to acts which perhaps contain grave injustice; but after the fact of injustice committed, the obligation of restoring under grave sin is not to be imposed unless it is certain.

2. But if the penitent in this matter does not easily acquiesce in the opinion of the confessor, it will be opportune to address him in this manner: would you not have such damage as grave; would you not judge such a lesion very harmful; would you too not be gravely unwilling that the same be done to you?

3. In contracts, in which there are many varieties and nevertheless innumerable frauds occur, sometimes a certain grave obligation of restoring is more difficultly established. For judging this the custom or intention of those contracting is very useful; hence, unless there is a special and grave reason for doubting, the confessor will not deviate much from the right if he chiefly attends to that which among truly honest men is accustomed to be done in such a case.

But so that he may discern in practice whether a grave obligation of restitution arises, let him attend to three things: a) whether the damaging is truly, formally, and efficaciously unjust, and this in grave matter; b) whether the thing handed over or the action performed is at least morally the same as what the other contracting party thought; c) what is the custom prevailing in such a region. Nevertheless let not an iniquitous manner of acting by certain merchants be called a received custom.

Question V: Concerning Hatred of Neighbor, Which Is the Cause of Harming Reputation, Honor, and Friendship

I. Matter to be treated. - There are several sins which harm reputation, honor, friendship, such as false testimony brought forth against the neighbor, detraction and calumny, whispering, contumely,

derision and cursing, namely injuries of words, which generally are prohibited by the eighth precept. For the most part they arise from hatred, concerning which therefore before all things a brief word must be said.[1]

[1] There may be consulted: St. Alphonsus, *Th. M.*, l. II, n. 28-30; l. III, n. 962 sq.; Aertnijs, *Th. M.*, I, l. II, n. 56 and 36 sq.; l. III, n. 530 sq.; *Th. P.*, n. 88-90; Lehmkuhl, *Th. M.*, I, n. 369-375; Genicot, *Th. M.*, I, n. 229-230; Marc, *Th. M.*, I, n. 498-503; Noldin, *Th. M.*, II, n. 100 and 81-85; Reuter, *Neo-conf.*, n. 78-79 and 228-230; Berardi, *Praxis-conf.*, n. 194-195; Mechlin Theology, *De Poenitentia*, (4) n. 75.

II. Notions. - Hatred is a movement of the appetite by which we are evilly affected toward someone. It is distinguished as twofold:

1. hatred of abomination or of quality, by which we turn away from the neighbor, not according to himself but according to some quality of his disagreeing with us, as evil and harmful to us (or to others);

2. hatred of malevolence and enmity or of the person, by which we turn away from someone according to himself, and from that displeasure will evil to him insofar as it is evil to him, namely so that it may be ill with him and by resting in his evil.

It is said: insofar as it is evil, both because it is not hatred, nor against charity, to will evil insofar as it is impeditive of a greater evil or insofar as it procures a greater good; and because hatred differs in this from envy, since it tends toward evil as evil, while envy tends toward the good of the neighbor as diminishing our own excellence. Therefore hatred is to will evil to someone as evil, and to rejoice concerning this evil, and likewise to grieve concerning the good of the neighbor precisely as it is good.

Hatred ordinarily arises from offense, and manifests itself externally by denial of signs of love.

III. Principles. - 1. Hatred of enmity, by which we will evil to the neighbor or refuse to love an enemy, is a grave sin from its genus, because it is directly opposed to charity; nevertheless it is light if a light evil is desired or only a light offense is betrayed. Hatred of abomination, however, of itself is indifferent, but in fact is good or evil according to object and circumstances.

Therefore it will be evil if the neighbor is hated according to something good; on the contrary it will be good if he is hated according to something evil, unless nevertheless the hatred exceeds the just proportion of that evil, or gradually is converted into hatred of the neighbor himself. Hence the common saying: You will hate the vice and love the person.

2. The precept of loving enemies imposes no special obligation diverse from that by which we are bound toward all men;[2] for special love is not of the necessity of charity except according to preparation of soul, insofar as we ought to be prepared to love them especially if it is necessary. Hence they sin from hatred:

[2] Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 8.

a) who wish evil to the neighbor insofar as it is evil to him, or repay evil for evil, or take vengeance or foster a mind of vengeance;

b) who refuse pardon to an enemy, or do not accept a fitting satisfaction or demand more than is fair, or rejoice concerning an enemy's evil;

c) private persons who, turned away from another, flee him, if they do this so that they may deprive him of conversation and solace and thus sadden him, so that it may be ill with him.

On the contrary, they do not sin from hatred:

a) who wish temporal evils to the neighbor insofar as it is good for him, or insofar as it is good for the community or for another innocent person, the order of charity being preserved; nevertheless one must beware lest these desires arise from hatred;

b) who do not wish to remit the reparation which is owed to them for injury and damage;

c) who flee the neighbor, wishing no evil, but because he is troublesome, and not without reason, provided contempt and scandal are absent.[3]

[3] Reuter, *Neo-confessarius*, n. 79, puts the conclusions: "Hence 1. you illicitly wish death to the neighbor, so that you may avoid particular temporal damage. 2. You illicitly wish death to yourself, so that you may be freed from a cough, a moderate headache. 3. A son illicitly rejoices concerning the death of his father or wishes it on account of the rich inheritance that will come to him, because the lesser good is preferred to the greater. 4. A father licitly wishes death to a son now existing in the state of grace, whom he certainly foresees will turn out wicked. 5. I licitly wish death rather to a persecutor of the Church than that he conquer and prevail, because spiritual good prevails over temporal, public over private. 6. I licitly wish death to another, from whom I certainly foresee that otherwise I will be unjustly killed (understand: by comparing my death with his). 7. I licitly wish death to myself, foreseeing that otherwise I will suffer a grave evil of soul. 8. Someone can licitly wish death for himself, lest he further offend God, lest he be delayed so long from beatitude, that he may avoid misery more bitter than death, for example perpetual prison, spoliation of all goods. Namely, it is lawful to wish these things, speaking of themselves, when the evil to be avoided is preponderating, at least if the order of charity is preserved even among persons, which requires that I love more those who are more joined to me. The reason for these is that thus evil is not wished as evil, but insofar as it impedes a greater evil."

3. Of themselves there are owed to enemies the common signs of love and common benefits, but not special ones, except per accidens. Hence we are bound of ourselves to return greeting to an enemy greeting us, to respond to one asking and writing, to sell exposed goods to one wishing to buy, not to exclude him from common prayers and alms, to render him common services, and, if it can easily be done, to avert damage from him; because to do otherwise of itself and ordinarily is a sign of hatred. Per accidens for a time we are not bound when charity or justice asks something else and a reasonable cause excuses.

Thus a) charity, if from denied signs the enemy is hoped to be amended, if it is believed that he will interpret them badly, if from speech it is feared that quarrels will be repeated.

b) Justice, if parents or superiors for just punishment and correction deny to a son, for example because of an unworthy marriage, or to subjects, because of an infamous crime, sight, speech, entrance into the house, even after a petition for pardon, provided that such a penalty does not exceed the gravity of the crime and lasts only for a time.

c) A reasonable cause, for example, if they are omitted for a short time, not from hatred but from great sadness. Hence Lehmkuhl says, *Th. M.*, I, n. 624: To exhibit a positive sign of rancor, or to look with grim eyes, to pass by with contempt, is never lawful. To avoid an enemy deliberately for a longer time can often denote a mind of hatred and vengeance, if it proceeds from a will to avoid occasions in

which common signs of benevolence are to be exhibited. But if there is a just cause on the part of the enemy, for example a contentious man, it is not sin but prudent caution.

IV. Rules to be observed in reconciliation. - They are the following:

1. If injuries intervened on one side only, the one offending is bound to seek reconciliation by himself or through another, and to repair damages if there are any; likewise if between two offenders one has offended more gravely or first. Exception is made if a legitimate reason excuses, for example if the offense was not grave, or the offended person is absent, or does not care for the petition of pardon, or does not accept it, or for another reason he is judged to have been satisfied.

2. If injuries from both sides were morally equal and simultaneous, each is bound, when occasion is given, to begin reconciliation by greeting, conversation, benefit, etc., according to the case, for example that one first who passes before the other or comes upon him.

3. An opportune time is to be sought; for although the offended person is bound from the beginning to condone the offense, nevertheless he is not bound, at least under grave obligation, to suffer it with such calm spirit that he is immediately prepared for reconciliation. That seems as it were violent and above human frailty.

V. Practical observations for confessors. - 1. Unworthy of absolution is he who positively does not wish to put away deliberate and gravely sinful hatred, i.e., who deliberately wishes grave evil to another under the aspect of evil and by resting in the evil itself; likewise he who negatively does not wish to love as the law of God commands, for example to wish the good of one's own beatitude, to forgive a personal injury, to furnish the common and necessary signs of love, in those circumstances in which denial is held as a sign of grave hatred or causes grave scandal: for he injures charity in a grave matter.

But a) penitents who accuse themselves of hatred are not at once to be charged with sin, especially grave sin: for often they confuse hatred properly so called, of malevolence, with horror and recollection of a true or apparent offense committed by the neighbor, or with the wishing of evil from an honorable end, or also with natural and invincible antipathy toward the person of the neighbor, so that they cannot see him without vehement disturbance. These do not sin gravely, provided that they do not desire notable evil nor refuse the ordinary signs of love; but then there is danger that a passage may easily be made to true hatred, concerning which danger the confessor should warn them.

b) Therefore when someone accuses himself of hatred against the neighbor, let the confessor diligently inquire whether the discourse is about true hatred. For there are those who accuse themselves of hatred, and nevertheless do not labor under hatred; there are also those who foster hatred and nevertheless say that they desire every good to those by whom they have been offended. Therefore those accusing themselves of this are to be examined. If the one examined has none of those things by which hatred is expressed, although he complains that he experiences aversion against someone and that his blood is moved when he meets the other, or that he cannot forget, look at, or speak to him, he is not detected as laboring under voluntary hatred: for there can be a

movement of the sensitive appetite which precedes reason, although the free will does not consent. Nevertheless the penitent is to be warned that he pray for the other, seek speech with him, speak well of him among others, excuse his defects, etc.; for thus the aversion or displeasure, which, if secretly preserved, is fostered and remains, will soon be dissipated.

c) Those who on the contrary say that they condone, but refuse to speak to the enemy and to furnish other common and owed signs and offices of charity, cast suspicion of hatred upon themselves: with them let the confessor proceed cautiously lest he absolve unduly. Likewise, those who before promised to seek reconciliation and to exhibit common signs of charity to the adversary and did not do this, ordinarily ought not to be absolved, but absolution generally is to be deferred for them.

2. Men implicated in hatred and enmity are wont to be hard in spirit. In treating a penitent of this kind, much patience and prudence are needed.

Therefore first of all let the confessor beware of every austerity of words; rather let him strive kindly to sympathize with the penitent on account of the injury received, let him permit him to complain, exaggerate, etc., lest the penitent be exasperated; let him beware lest he seem to act as advocate of the adversary, but rather let him show that he seeks the good of the offended person.

3. The obligations of one guilty of hatred are to be declared to him, once the cause is well known from responses to these or similar questions: from what time he has fostered hatred, whether he has wished evils, whether he has wished to inflict them, what ones, whether he has not rejoiced concerning the evils of the other, whether he has not grieved concerning goods, whether he has denied the common signs of charity: whether he has spoken to the adversary, whether he has responded to one greeting him, etc.

Let the confessor warn the penitent that satisfaction can be exacted, that it is not lawful to will evil to the neighbor so that it may be evil to him, that the common signs of love are to be exhibited, and that every sign of enmity is to be taken away.

4. The penitent is to be induced to perform this by various reasons, such as: the necessity for salvation, the Lord's Prayer, the example of God forgiving sin and especially of Christ forgiving on the cross, the good which follows from forgiveness, namely peace of conscience and consequent joy, glory before God and men in such an exercise of virtue, utility, because it opens the door of divine mercy, the consideration of human frailty and of the disposition of divine providence which permits such things to happen for our good, forgiveness to be made to Christ asking this, who took all sins upon Himself and said: What you have done to one, you have done to me (Mt. XXV, 40).

Briefly: a) the necessity of forgiving and of satisfying charity, according to what we ask in the Lord's Prayer: forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors (Mt. XVIII, 35); b) how glorious it is to forgive, for it is the greatest victory and a sacrifice most pleasing to God (Mk. XII, 33); c) the utility of forgiveness and the consequent delightfulness (Mt. V, 7; 44, 45); d) the example of God forgiving our sins and desiring that we forgive our enemies, likewise of Christ praying for His adversaries on the cross.

But if the penitent does not yield to these, let it be said that he cannot be absolved nor hope for pardon from God unless he forgives.

5. Let the confessor indicate the means for putting away hatred, namely prayer for the enemy and for grace for himself, and services of charity.

VI. Concerning vengeance Berardi asks, *Praxis confessariorum*, n. 195: "When, whether in desire or in joy concerning the evil of the neighbor, or in avenging injuries received, will sin be present?

Resp. In practice the more common cases are the following.

1. If this is done from a cause not honorable or not at all reasonable, for example from envy, as Cain acted against innocent Abel..., or from impatience, weariness, and anger, as those act who wish death to their own querulous, tedious, sick relatives, etc.

2. If vengeance is... excessive: namely if between the injury received and the quantity of punishment inflicted or desired there is no proportion, for example by extending signs of indignation too long; by exceeding too much in rebukes, in blows, or in other deeds having the character of vengeance; by from the heart imprecating most grave evils, for example death, hell, etc., against him who has inflicted on you a damage not so grave.[4]

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 2; q. 159, a. 1.

3. If vengeance is indeed just, but induces scandal of the little ones: for in this case care will have to be taken that, at least by explaining the matter, scandal be removed.

4. If one wishes vengeance to be done by private authority, even in those cases in which this is altogether not lawful, namely a) if it can be obtained by means of tribunals; b) if it is too great; c) if it is useless, namely if it is no longer apt to protect our rights, but rather to provoke new injuries and to effect that discords and suits never have an end, as too frequently happens in practice.

5. If vengeance is done or sought either from profound hatred, or from an end not so much of obtaining reparation and protection of one's own rights, as of delighting oneself concerning the punishment of the neighbor. Moreover this is wicked. St. Thomas said[5] that vengeance indeed is lawful, but not with the intention of harming; truly, with the intention of removing harms. It is also to be noted that delight concerning the punishment of the neighbor can degenerate into cruelty and savagery."[6]

[5] II-II, q. 108, a. 3.

[6] Ibid., q. 159, a. 2.

VII. Practical notes concerning sins against honor and reputation. - Concerning sins of the tongue, or injuries of words, and other things which can harm honor and reputation, just as they can dissolve friendship and peace, and which frequently arise from hatred, it is useful to observe a few things.

A. Imprecations against one's own offenders:

1. are not grave if they are uttered by mouth alone without full advertence, or, as among the rude, are understood as uttered without mind; unless nevertheless they cause grave scandal, as could happen in parents imprecating before children, who would be moved from this to sin gravely;

2. on the contrary, they are mortal sin if they are pronounced from the heart, from hatred or excessive vengeance.

B. Contumelies, namely those which unjustly harm honor:

1. among the rude are not always held grave;

2. if they are truly grave, especially if they concern secrets, they constitute mortal sin. Thus if they are false; if they are done against one who brought forth no injury; if by one offended, but in such a way that the limits of indignation are exceeded.

C. Rash judgment also is mortal sin:

1. if it is greatly important to the person that it not be formed;

2. if it proceeds from hatred;

3. if it is done with great malevolence;

4. if it is in great contempt of a superior or otherwise has grave consequences.

But it is required that it be formed with great temerity and be perfectly rash, i.e., that there be great disproportion between the reasons and the assent, so that firm assent is furnished by light motives.

D. Detraction, or the unjust blackening of another's reputation by hidden words, can be done in many ways, whether directly: by falsely imputing evil, or exaggerating it, or revealing what is occult, or attributing good to an evil intention; or also indirectly: by denying good, or maliciously keeping silent about it, or diminishing it, or praising coldly. Nor are the direct modes always more efficacious, but the indirect modes of speaking or keeping silent sometimes are more malicious.

But detraction is mortal sin from its genus, and not only against charity but also against justice; its gravity is to be weighed from the gravity of the harm of infamy, or of the damage which the injured person suffers in reputation.

But to manifest to another who is ignorant of it a public crime is not against justice:

a) in the place where it is notorious by notoriety of law, or by force of a judicial sentence promulgated for this region;

b) also in the place where it is notorious by notoriety of fact alone, unless the delinquent has recovered reputation;

c) also in another place in which it is foreseen that it is soon to be legitimately manifested.

Otherwise a public crime, just like an occult one, cannot be manifested except for a grave and indeed proportionate reason.

E. Of itself there is an obligation of restoring reputation unjustly taken away, especially if the injury redounds upon others, just as also of repairing other damages which are strictly and of themselves connected with defamation.

Nevertheless, per accidens there is no obligation of restoring reputation:

1. if reputation remained uninjured, as if faith was not given to the detractor, or his detraction was not understood or not spread;

2. if the other has recovered reputation, or infamy has now been deleted by oblivion;

3. if the other inflicted a greater injury which he does not care to repair;

4. if by prudent estimation the other is judged to have condoned;

5. if reputation either cannot be compensated at all, or only with a much greater inconvenience; in which case nevertheless a certain compensation is to be made in some better manner, whether by honoring the other, or by saying good of him.

Restitution of reputation sometimes is done more opportunely through a third person of great authority.

Those cooperating in detraction, who in some way induce the detractor to defaming, are subsidiarily bound, just as he himself is, to restitution; but not those who only internally approve the defamation, or merely take delight in it, or only do not impede it.

F. Nevertheless there is an obligation of charity to impede detraction as far as one can; nevertheless in practice this will rarely be grave. It will be grave if three conditions are verified: a) another is certainly detracting unjustly; b) there is a founded hope of impeding the detraction; c) this can be done without relatively grave inconvenience; which conditions are rarely present.

Often it will be more opportune to employ indirect means of impeding rather than direct ones, unless the matter concerns superiors who can intervene authoritatively.

G. A sin most damaging to the neighbor is false testimony brought forth in judgment, which is wont to contain a threefold deformity: against legal justice, namely as harmful to public justice and to the good of the community; against commutative justice, because it is apt to cause unjust damage to the neighbor; and against religion, if it is done under oath, because then it is perjury strictly so called.

A false witness is bound to revoke the testimony and to reparation of damage following from it.

VIII. Observation: concerning womenfolk who mutually offend one another in families and thus live in continual discord. Concerning these Berardi again notes, l. c., n. 196, III:

"Those mutual offenses, although in themselves they would be light, can have great weight because of the consequences; for they can 1. beget and foster grave internal malevolences, and perhaps also produce habitual hatred and thus altogether break the bond of charity; 2. gravely disturb the peace of the family, furnish occasion of blasphemies to husbands, and perhaps also give grave scandal to children; 3. that woman especially, who is the more powerful cause of discord, can contract grave guilt because of the very disturbance which she furnishes to the other woman: for continual

disturbance is wont to be something very troublesome. In practice nevertheless for the most part women do not contract grave guilt from this last head, because they do not advert to it. But if on one side grave hatred is not present or is altogether put away, and on the other side the peace of others is not gravely disturbed, then mortal sin will by no means be present."

Chapter III: Concerning the Capital Sins, Which Are the Cause of Other Sins

I. How sin has a cause. - Since sin is a disordered human act, it consists of a twofold element: a positive element, which is the material element of sin, namely the act itself tending toward some created good; and a privative element, which in sin is formal, on account of which, namely, sin is sin: it is the disorder or deformity of the act with its rule, that is, with right reason and the eternal law, and an aversion from God, the last end.

Now, on the part of the act, sin has, as every act and every being does, an acting cause per se, namely a power of man, especially the will insofar as it intends some created good; on the part of the disorder it has a cause in that way in which a privation can have a cause, namely a deficient and per accidens cause.

For upon the positing of one effect there follows the absence or privation of another; and thus a cause intending the positing of something is, per accidens, the cause of the privation following, which it does not intend: "as fire, by causing heat by its principal intention, consequently causes the privation of coldness." Thus, therefore, the will, intending some created good which is not conformed to reason but is opposed to the eternal law, and failing from the direction of the rule of reason and of the law of God, causes the act of sin per se; but to this act there is joined the privation of conformity with reason and law, which privation nevertheless the will does not intend; and therefore, together with the act, it causes the privation joined to it, but only consequently, per accidens, and beyond intention.

As is clear from the foregoing declaration, "every per accidens cause is reduced to a per se cause; therefore... it follows that the disorder of sin follows from the very cause of the act." It suffices, therefore, that we consider how one sin can be the cause of another on the part of the act; for in this way it will also consequently be the cause of another on the part of the disorder.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 1.

II. One sin can be the cause of another sin, just as one human act can be the cause of another. But this happens in three ways:

1. one sin can be the material cause of another, insofar as it supplies and prepares matter for another, as gluttony prepares matter for lust, and avarice for litigation, because it multiplies temporal goods which are the matter of litigation;

2. it can be the efficient cause of another, and indeed in a twofold way, namely per se and per accidens:

a) per accidens, that is, by the removal of what prohibits: "for when by one act of sin a man loses grace, or charity, or shame, or any other thing drawing him back from sin, from this he falls into another sin (because, namely, he no longer has that which drew him back from sin), and thus the first sin is the cause of the second per accidens";

b) per se, insofar as from some sin, for example of lust, a man is disposed, by way of inclination, to others of the same species: "for from acts there are caused dispositions and habits inclining to like

acts";

3. and especially it can be the final cause of another, insofar as for the end of one sin someone commits another sin, as if a woman commits fornication for the sake of theft, or, on the contrary, someone commits theft in order to procure fornication for himself. And because the end in moral matters gives form, because it gives species,[2] thus one sin which is the final cause is also the formal cause of another, because it gives form to the other: "because the end gives form in moral matters... from this it also follows that one sin which is the end of another is the formal cause of the other; for in an act of fornication which is committed for the sake of theft, fornication is as the material element, but theft as the formal element."[3]

[2] The end gives species to human acts because it is the object of the act of the will and the terminus to which the motion of the will tends; but an act has species from its object, and a motion from its terminus. The end gives species and consequently form, not only to the interior act of the will, but also to exterior acts commanded by the will; for the act of the will and the exterior act are one moral act, in which the interior act is the formal element, and the exterior act is the material element which is determined and, as it were, informed by the other. The interior act of the will is the formal element, both because it moves and determines the exterior members to acting, for the intended end is the reason for doing those things which are for the end; and because the exterior act is not voluntary except dependently on the interior will. Hence it is universally true that the species of human acts, formally considered, are considered according to the end. Cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 3, and q. 18, a. 6.

[3] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 4.

III. Capital sins are naturally apt, for the most part, to be the cause of several others, especially the final cause. - A capital sin is so called from the head, which is the principle and directive of the whole animal: "whence, metaphorically, every principle and directive is called a head; and also men who direct and govern others are said to be heads of others." Therefore a capital sin is that which is the cause or principle, and at the same time the directive, of others.[4]

[4] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 3.

But this belongs to those sins which, for the most part and frequently, are the cause of several others, especially the final cause, because they have a very lovable object or a most appetible end, whence for the sake of it other sins are easily committed. For sins of this kind are especially the principle and cause of others, for the end is the principle and form in moral matters; whence in this way "sin is caused by sin actually and formally" and perfectly. They are also directive of others: by the end human acts are directed, because the end commands those things which are for the end.

"For it is manifest," says St. Thomas,[5] "that a prince orders those subject to himself to his own end, as an army is ordered to the end of the commander... Whence according to Gregory, *Morals*, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), the capital vices are, as it were, commanders, and the vices which arise from them are, as it were, an army."

[5] St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 8, a. 1; cf. I-II, q. 84, a. 3.

From these things it is concluded:

A. Not every sin which is the cause of another can be called capital, and indeed:

1. not that which is the material cause of others, because that which ministers matter is not the cause of sin in act, but occasionally and in potency;

2. nor that which is the efficient cause of others per accidens, both because no science considers per accidens causes, and because a head designates a per se cause, which, namely, is naturally apt to cause and rule others, and because in this way any mortal sin can be the cause of any other;

3. nor even that which is the efficient cause of others per se; for every sin inclines to one like itself, and thus again every sin would be capital;

4. indeed, not even that which is the final cause of others but only from the condition of the sinner, because this happens per accidens to the sin itself. For "an origin of this kind can be attended to in a twofold way: in one way, according to the condition of the sinner, who is so disposed that he is most affected toward one end, from which for the most part he proceeds into other sins. But this mode of origin cannot fall under art, because the particular dispositions of men are infinite. In another way, according to the natural relation of the ends themselves to one another; and according to this, as in the majority of cases, one vice arises from another. Whence this mode of origin can fall under art. According to this, therefore, those vices are called capital whose ends have certain primary reasons for moving the appetite."[6]

[6] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 4.

B. Hence a capital sin is not to be confused with that which they are accustomed to call the dominant vice, or the sin which is wont to be committed more frequently by a determined individual and to whose end he himself orders and commits other sins; for this happens per accidens on the part of the sinner himself, not per se and on the part of the nature of the sin. "One sin is ordered to the end of another in two ways: in one way, on the part of the sinner himself, whose will is more prone to the end of one sin than to that of another, but this is accidental to sins. Whence according to this they are not called capital sins. In another way, from the very relation of the ends, of which one has a certain agreement with another, so that in the majority of cases it is ordered to it... and according to this capital vices must be assumed."[7] From their own nature, therefore, they have a highly appetible end, and indeed one highly appetible to all; and for this reason they move all men, and frequently, toward other sins.

[7] St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 8, a. 1.

C. Nevertheless, capital sins are not the greatest of all, since several others are graver than they, for example those which are directly against God or are directly opposed to the theological virtues; nor are they necessarily grave, even if done deliberately, as is clear concerning anger and gluttony, which often are venial.

D. Nor are the capital sins those which are opposed to the fundamental or cardinal virtues, because "there is not the same account of origin in virtues and in vices. For virtues are caused through the order of the appetite to reason, or also to the immutable good, which is God; but vices arise from the appetite for a mutable good. Whence it is not necessary that the principal vices be opposed to the principal virtues."[8]

[8] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 4 ad 1.

IV. Seven capital sins are customarily numbered. - A usage has already prevailed from the time of St. Gregory, by whom in the place cited there are enumerated "the principal vices, namely vain-glory,

envy, anger, sadness (or acedia), avarice, greediness of the belly (or gluttony), lust."

Nevertheless several place pride first in place of vain-glory; others comprehend both under one word. But St. Thomas, following St. Gregory, has pride as the final cause, the queen and mother of all sins, even capital ones, insofar as all are naturally apt to be done and ordered to the end of pride and thus to arise from pride; but he places vain-glory as a capital sin which is the final cause of several vices:

"Certain men, considering pride according as it is a certain special sin, numbered it with the other capital vices. But Gregory, considering its universal influence, which it has upon all vices,... did not number it with the other capital vices, but posits it as queen of all vices and mother; whence he says...: pride itself, queen of the vices, when it has fully seized the conquered heart, at once hands it over to be devastated by the seven principal vices, as by certain of its commanders, from which multitudes of vices arise."[9]

[9] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 8. Cf. a. 2.

Rightly indeed: for besides pride there are still seven sins of which the definition of capital sins is verified, namely that they are the cause of several others, especially the final cause, since this is true concerning vain-glory; then, the first opinion arises from this, that some authors did not sufficiently consider the universal causality of pride in all vices; finally, by reckoning pride with vain-glory under one word, neither the universal influence of the former nor the special causality of the latter with respect to certain particular sins is sufficiently seen. "And therefore pride, as a quasi-universal vice, is not numbered with the others, but rather is placed as a certain queen of all the vices."[10] It is indeed mother on the part of the end, because it is the principle of all in the order of intention;[11] queen on the part of command, because it directs all to its own end.

[10] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 4 ad 4.

[11] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 2.

In practice, nevertheless, as regards the direction of souls in avoiding sins or eradicating vices, it does not matter so very much whether pride is distinguished from vain-glory as the cause of all vices, or, on the contrary, is considered together with it as the first capital sin.[12]

[12] By certain persons there has been doubt concerning the opinion of St. Thomas: 1. because after, in I-II, q. 84, a. 2, he taught that pride as a special sin is the beginning of every sin, since it is naturally apt to be the end of all sins, in II-II, q. 162, a. 8, he seems to suggest the contrary, saying that pride as a special sin is capital, and as a general sin is the mother of all vices; 2. because in several places he reckons pride together with vain-glory as one capital vice. Reply to the first: after in I-II he had refuted the opinion of those who asserted that pride is called both a general sin or condition of every sin, and also an inclination to any sin whatsoever from corrupt nature, and thus is the beginning of every sin, and against them had taught that even as a special sin it is the cause of all the others, this now being supposed, in II-II he teaches that that special sin can be viewed in two ways: a) incompletely, that is, solely as a special sin according to its proper species, abstracting from its general influence upon all vices; and thus it still has a special causality upon certain sins which proximately and frequently arise from it, and can be held as a capital sin; b) completely, that is, also in some way as a general sin; for the special sin of pride has a general influence. If this influence is viewed, it is not a capital sin, that is, the cause of several others, but the beginning of every sin. From these things it is clear that the expression "general sin" is not taken by St. Thomas in the same sense in each place; in the first place it signifies any sin whatsoever or the condition of every sin; in the second place it signifies a special sin insofar as, on account of the diffusion of its command, it extends causality to all. This is clear from the very words of St. Thomas, for in the second place he uses the same words to describe the general sin of pride which in the first place he used to describe the special sin of pride. Therefore it is false that St. Thomas ever denied that pride, as a special sin, is the mother of all the others; indeed it is manifest that he constantly taught this. Reply to the second: When the holy Doctor reckons pride together with vain-glory as a capital vice, he speaks not from the opinion

which he chose as his own, but as reciting the opinion of others. Thus in *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 8, a. 1: "To the good of the soul, namely the excellence of honor and glory, pride, or vain-glory, is ordered," that is, according to some, pride; according to others, vain-glory. He speaks in the same way in II Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 3; and in I-II, q. 84, a. 4, in the other mode of considering the goods which capital sins pursue (see p. 117, in the note). But if once he wrote (II Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 3) that pride is a capital vice, he did this in passing, nor did he assert it simply, but with a certain addition and quasi-restriction: "as a special sin, seeking one's own excellence especially in dignity and honor," signifying that he was considering it while abstracting from its general influence, insofar, nevertheless, as in a more special sense it is the cause of certain sins, namely presumption, ambition, and vain-glory, which for this reason are specially called daughters of pride. Besides, St. Thomas is not to be opposed to St. Thomas, but reconciled with himself. Whenever he treats the question expressly, he manifestly inclines to the opinion of Gregory and simply prefers it. Thus he did in I-II, q. 84, a. 2, teaching that pride, as it is a special sin, is the beginning of all the others; likewise in *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 8, a. 1: "Charity, which is love of God, commands all the other virtues. And thus, although it is a special virtue if its proper object is considered, nevertheless, according to a certain diffusion of its command, it is common to all virtues; whence it is called the form and mother of all virtues. And similarly pride, although it is a special sin according to the account of its proper object, nevertheless according to a certain diffusion of its proper command is a common sin with respect to all. Whence also it is called the root and queen of all sins"; likewise in the reply to the fourteenth. Then in I-II, q. 84, a. 4, he proves the statement of Gregory placing vain-glory among the seven capital sins; and to the fourth objection: "As avarice is the root of sin, so pride is the beginning of sin... But avarice is posited as one of the seven capital vices. Therefore pride should be numbered among the capital vices," he replies by denying the consequence, because pride is rather the beginning of all vices than a capital vice: "pride, as a quasi-universal vice, is not numbered with the others, but rather is placed as a certain queen of all the vices." In the same way in *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 9, a. 3, ad 1: "It must be said that pride ... is placed generally as the mother of all vices, and under it are placed the seven capital vices, among which vain-glory is most akin to it." Similarly in II-II, q. 162, a. 8, although he reports each opinion, he manifestly prefers the opinion of Gregory, as is clear to one reading, and besides it is clear both from the fact that the objections of the article intend to prove that pride is a capital vice, which objections nevertheless he judged should be solved, and from the fact that he says: "but on the contrary is that Gregory does not number pride among the other capital vices," which assertion, since he lets it pass without response, he approves. Still more clearly in II-II, q. 132, a. 4: "I answer that certain persons speak about the capital vices in two ways. For some posit pride as one of the capital vices; and these do not posit vain-glory among the capital vices. But Gregory posits pride as queen of all vices; and vain-glory, which immediately arises from it, he posits as a capital vice. And this reasonably: for pride ... imports an inordinate appetite for excellence. But from every good which someone desires, he obtains a certain perfection and excellence; and therefore the ends of all vices are ordered to the end of pride; and on account of this it seems that it has a certain general causality over the other vices, and should not be counted among the special principles of vices which are the capital vices." Therefore there can be no doubt concerning the mind of St. Thomas.

That there are seven capital vices St. Thomas shows nearly as follows, I-II, q. 84, a. 4: Capital sins are those from which others arise chiefly according to the account of final cause, whose ends, namely, are most appetible and have, as it were, principal reasons for moving the appetite. But something moves the appetite either directly and per se, namely a good to be pursued and an evil to be fled; or indirectly and, as it were, through another, when someone pursues an evil because of a good joined to it, or flees a good because of an evil joined to it.

Now:

a) The good which man most desires is:

1. a good of the soul, namely the excellence of praise and honor, which vain-glory inordinately desires (1);

2. a good of the body by which the individual is conserved, namely food and drink, which gluttony inordinately desires (2);

3. a good of the body by which the human species is conserved, namely the use of venereal things, which lust inordinately desires (3);

4. an external good, namely riches; and avarice is concerned about this (4).[13]

[13] St. Thomas adds: "Or otherwise. Good chiefly moves the appetite from this, that it participates in something of the property of happiness, which all naturally desire. Of its account, first, is a certain perfection; for happiness is a perfect good, to which excellence or clarity pertains, which pride or vain-glory desires. Secondly, of its account is sufficiency, which avarice desires... Thirdly, delight is of its condition... and gluttony and lust desire this."

b) But the good which man flees because of some evil which he greatly fears is:

1. either a proper spiritual good, which acedia flees because of the bodily labor joined to it (5);

2. or another's good which impedes one's own excellence, from which a man flees by envy (6);

3. or against which anger rises up (7).

The same can also be shown in another way. The principle of every sin on man's part is inordinate love of self, which inordinately desires temporal goods and is the root of the threefold depraved concupiscence: the concupiscence of the flesh tending inordinately toward a good of the body, the concupiscence of the eyes or cupidity inordinately desiring external goods, and the pride of life tending inordinately toward a good of the soul.[14]

[14] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 4 and 5.

Now inordinate love of self is the cause of sin insofar as man turns himself unduly toward a created good:

A. Either toward a good of the soul:

a) whether considered in itself:

1. as excellent, through pride and vain-glory (1);

2. as contemning a participated divine good, through acedia (2);

b) or considered in another:

1. as possessed by him, through envy (3);

2. as injured by him and inordinately avenged, through anger (4).

B. Or toward a good of the body:

1. in the delight of food or drink, through gluttony (5);

2. in venereal delight, through lust (6);

C. Or toward an external good, through avarice (7).

The last sin belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes, the two preceding to the concupiscence of the flesh, the first four to the pride of life.

V. Practical importance of the doctrine. - For healing sins it greatly matters to know the origin and genealogy of sins; wherefore it is of great interest to the director of souls to know which sins are wont to be the cause of others, and which arise from them. For when the cause has been removed, the effect also is taken away; but one who tends wholly to healing the effects, and does not care to eradicate the cause, will provide a remedy neither for the cause nor for the effects.

Question I: Concerning Pride and Vain-Glory

I. Pride is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence. It is called:

1. an appetite, because pride resides in the appetite, namely principally in the will, if it seeks excellence in spiritual things; secondarily in the irascible appetite, which tends toward a sensible good that is arduous and excellent;

2. inordinate: to desire excellence according to itself is not evil, but it is contrary to the order of reason that someone should desire greater excellence than he has, and should tend above that which he is, as the proud man does: "for right reason has this, that the will of each one be borne toward that which is proportioned to himself";[1]

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 1.

3. of excellence, both relative, by which someone wishes to surpass others, at least implicitly by contemning them, and absolute, by which someone simply wishes to excel above that which he is, even while not thinking of others;

4. one's own: the special object, or proper appetible thing, from which pride receives its species is the loftiness of one's own person; for not in this or that matter, but commonly and in all things, the proud man bears himself as lofty. Pride therefore desires a certain universal excellence, and by this it is distinguished from presumption, ambition, and vain-glory, which inordinately desire some particular excellence, whether in works, or in honors and dignities, or in fame and glory.

II. The gravity and species of pride. - Pride of itself is contrary to the law of subjection toward God and to charity, and therefore is a mortal sin; for the proud man lifts himself above that which he is, that is, above that which has been fixed for him by God. Whence at least implicitly there is included in pride contempt of God, insofar as man is unwilling to be subject to God and to His rule. But "this very thing, not to be subject to God, has the account of mortal sin; for this is to be turned away from God," which is proper to mortal sin and is contrary to charity, by which we are turned toward God. Whence it follows that pride according to its genus is mortal sin.[2] This contempt, if it is explicit, formal, and perfect, from the intention of contemning God because one disdains to be subject to God and His law and it seems injurious to one's own excellence, is always mortal. But if it is only implicit, without the intention of contemning God, it can indeed be mortal, namely in a grave matter; but often it is venial, not only from lack of deliberation, but also from lightness of matter.

[2] St. Thomas, ibid., a. 5.

Now, according to St. Gregory, *Morals*, book 23, c. 6 (or 4), pride is committed in four ways, diverse in species on the part of the object: 1. by judging that the goods which someone has he has from himself, not from God, or at least by acting as if he had them from himself; 2. by judging that he has received them from God, but on account of his own merits, or by acting as if it were thus; 3. by attributing to himself goods which he does not have; 4. in the goods which he has, by wishing, with the rest despised, to be preferred by them more than is fitting. The first two modes, since they include formal contempt of God, are mortal sin; the last two often are only venial, because to magnify oneself in affection and to raise oneself above what is just, while one does not refuse to be subject to God, is not a grave disorder, unless it be done with grave irreverence toward God, or renders one prepared to sin mortally, or there is present grave contempt of one's neighbor or notable detriment.

III. The general influence of pride upon other sins. - It is said in Sirach 10:15: The beginning of every sin is pride.

These words are to be understood of pride properly so called, as it is a special sin.[3] It can truly be called the beginning of every sin, not only in the historical order, because the angels and the first man were guilty of that thing, but also from the nature of the thing; and not only:

[3] Certain persons have interpreted this of pride improperly so called, and indeed a) of aversion or actual contempt of God, by which someone does not wish to be subject to His rule, which is found implicitly in all sins because they tend toward some created good opposed to the law of God. This is the general condition of every sin and the cause of sin or beginning on the part of aversion; for from this sin has that it is evil, and therefore on the part of aversion the account of evil begins. Also b) of the inclination of fallen nature toward contempt of this kind, from which all sins come. These things are true, but they do not hand down the sense of Scripture, which manifestly from the context speaks of pride properly so called, which is a special sin, namely the appetite of one's own excellence. I-II, q. 84, a. 2.

1. indirectly and per accidens, by removing what prohibits, insofar as, namely, through pride man contemns the divine law by which he is prohibited from sinning; but also:

2. directly and per se, insofar as other sins are ordered to the end of pride, which is one's own excellence, to which everything that someone inordinately desires can be ordered. Whence all sins can arise from it as from a final cause. For the temporal goods which man seeks in other sins he can will so that through them he may have a certain singular perfection and his own excellence, which is the end of pride. Pride is therefore the final cause of all sins, not indeed in this sense, that any sin whatsoever singularly arises from it, but insofar as any genus of sin is naturally apt to be ordered to the end of pride and thus to arise from it.

And since the end is first in the order of intention, and intention precedes execution, pride is rightly called the beginning of all sins.[4]

[4] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 2; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 8, a. 2.

And because it is the final cause of all sins, in the strict sense it is not a capital sin from which only several genera of sins arise according to the account of an end, but rather the cause of all the capital sins and the queen of all vices. Nevertheless there are certain sins which immediately and more frequently arise from it according to the account of an end and immediately serve it, because they seek a certain special excellence and have an object very close to the object of pride; and therefore those alone are customarily called its daughters. For "those vices which of themselves are naturally apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters."[5]

[5] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 5.

IV. Pride has three daughters: presumption, ambition, and vain-glory. - Those are daughters of pride which inordinately seek a certain special excellence; but this can be sought either in works, or in dignity and honor, or in fame and glory. Whence there are three daughters of pride: 1. presumption, which is the inordinate appetite of excellence in works, namely of undertaking something above one's powers; 2. ambition, which inordinately desires the excellence of dignity and honor not owed, or greater than is owed; 3. vain-glory, which inordinately tends toward fame and glory, that is, toward a vain manifestation of excellence.

Of themselves they are venial sins, because they are not against charity, but are an excessive appetite for a thing good or indifferent according to itself; and they are not mortal except per accidens, whether by reason of the cause, as if they proceed from an affection toward mortal sin, or by reason of the effect, if they are done with grave harm to oneself or to another.

On account of its importance, something must be said specially concerning vain-glory.

V. Vain-glory is the inordinate appetite of glory and fame, that is, the appetite of vain glory, or of a vain manifestation, and of a good estimation by others concerning one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is called:

1. an appetite: the word glory is taken here not for the object of the evil act, that is, for the glory itself which is sought, but for the sin which is a movement and tendency toward vain glory, an excessive desire for esteem and praise;

2. of glory and fame: glory signifies a certain clarity; but clarity and comeliness have a certain manifestation, because what is clear can be seen by many and from afar, and therefore the name glory properly imports the manifestation of someone concerning that which seems comely among men.[6] Hence it is customarily defined: clear knowledge with praise, or fame, that is, distinguished knowledge and the good estimation of others concerning one's own excellence; if this is expressed in words, it is properly praise; but praise conveys that knowledge to others, and this is fame. This glory and fame is the special object of this sin, by which it is distinguished from all others, especially a) from pride, which desires every and universal excellence; and b) from ambition, which inordinately seeks honor and reverence. Glory is the effect and end of honor, since through it someone is rendered clear in the knowledge of others; for from the fact that testimonies of honor are exhibited to someone, his excellence becomes clear among men;

[6] "Nevertheless, if the name of glory is taken more broadly, it consists not only in the knowledge of a multitude, but also of a few or of one, or of oneself alone, when namely someone considers his own good as worthy of praise." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 1.

3. inordinate: to desire glory according to itself is not something evil but indifferent. For it is not a sin that someone know and approve his own good, while he considers it as worthy of praise, nor that he wish a good work to be approved, for it is said, Matt. 5:16: Let your light shine before men. But it is a sin that he seek vain glory.[7]

[7] St. Thomas, ibid., and *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 9, a. 1.

Now it is vain in three ways: a) when it is sought concerning a thing which is not worthy of glory, or not worthy of so much glory, as concerning an evil, false, fictitious, fragile thing, concerning wealth, trifles, etc.; b) when it is sought from those who are unable to discern what is worthy of glory, for example from him whose judgment is not certain; c) when it is sought and is not referred to its due end, that is, to the honor of God or the utility of one's neighbor. For glory of itself is an indifferent thing, and consequently to rest in it as in an end and to seek it for its own sake is illicit; for to desire an indifferent thing is not good unless it be done for a good end extrinsic to the thing, as to desire glory insofar as it is useful for something; otherwise it would be an idle and vain act, and consequently sinful.[8] Hence St. Thomas:

[8] Ibid.

"It belongs to the perfection of man that he know himself; but that he be known by others does not belong to his perfection, and therefore it is not to be desired per se. Nevertheless it can be desired insofar as it is useful for something, either for this, that God be glorified by men, or for this, that men profit from the good which they know in another, or from this, that the man himself, from the goods which he knows in himself through the testimony of another's praise, strive to persevere in them and to advance to better things. And according to this it is praiseworthy that someone have care for a good name and provide good things before God and men; not, however, that he be vainly delighted in the praise of men."[9]

[9] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 1 ad 3.

VI. Vain-glory is of itself a venial sin, but per accidens can be mortal. - Of itself it does not import something against charity or the love of God or of neighbor, but is only a disorder of the appetite for a thing indifferent according to itself. Per accidens, however, that is, by reason of another thing or an adjunct, it becomes mortal:

1. On the part of the one glorying himself:

a) by reason of the effect, for example if someone is prepared to sin mortally in order to acquire glory, or establishes his last end in glory, or grave damage to the neighbor follows from it, as if on account of it a physician refuses to have a colleague, with grave danger to the health of the sick person, or a teacher refuses to retract a great error which he taught;

b) by reason of the end, as if he seeks glory from an affection toward a mortal sin.

2. Also on the part of the matter concerning which someone glories:[10]

[10] Matter here is not understood as the object itself of the sin: this is glory itself; but as the objective cause from which glory proceeds.

a) if someone glories concerning a good, but falsely, which is against reverence for God, or concerning goods as if they were not from God, or concerning a temporal good loved more than God, or concerning the testimony of men which he prefers to divine testimony;

b) if he glories concerning evil, namely concerning a mortal sin committed.[11]

[11] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 3; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 9, a. 2.

VII. Vain-glory is a capital sin, because it has a most appetible end, near to the end of pride. For pride desires one's own excellence; "but among the goods through which man obtains excellence, glory seems especially to operate toward this, insofar as it imports the manifestation of someone's goodness; for good is naturally loved and honored by all... for through the glory of men a man obtains excellence in human things. And therefore, on account of its nearness to excellence, which men most desire, it follows that it is very appetible. And because from its inordinate appetite many vices arise, therefore vain-glory is a capital vice."[12]

[12] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 4.

VIII. There are seven daughters of vain-glory. - According to St. Gregory, *Morals*, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), there are seven vices which more commonly arise from vain-glory, and therefore are called its daughters. For by vain-glory the manifestation of one's own excellence is sought, which can be done:

a) Directly: 1. either by words, through boasting, by which someone glories concerning a work committed; or by deeds: 2. through presumption of novelties, by which someone devises novelties which excite the admiration of others; and 3. through hypocrisy, by which someone does good so that he may seem good, although he is not.

b) Indirectly someone seeks the manifestation of his excellence by showing that he is not less than others, and this is done: 4. as to the intellect, through pertinacity, by which someone adheres too much to his own opinion; 5. as to the will, through discord, by which he does not wish to recede from his own will so that he may agree with others; 6. as to speech, through contention, by which he litigates noisily; 7. as to deed, through disobedience, by which he does not wish to execute the precept of a superior.[13]

[13] Ibid., a. 5, and *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 9, a. 3.

IX. The origin and progress of pride. - The matter is described thus by Lehmkuhl, *Theologia Moralis*, I, n. 884, 2:

"Man begins to consider the good which he has in himself, but beyond measure; he considers his own perfections and at the same time considers neither imperfections nor dependence on God; then he apprehends in himself a greater excellence than he has in reality; then he loves or is complacent in that apprehended excellence; finally he judges himself above that which he is, which estimation does not consist in judgment alone, but at the same time in affection, by which man is affected toward himself as toward something great.

1. This excessive estimation of self is the first complete act of pride (I do not say 'of completed pride'); the other acts are the way and beginning.

2. The proud man, progressing further, judges himself worthy of great things, exceeding himself, his condition, and his powers in reality (to which presumption pertains).

3. He inordinately desires honors and other things as congruent to himself: ambition.

4. He wishes to be considered great, honored, esteemed by others: ambition and vain-glory.

5. If he sees that he does not obtain this, he grieves, is angry, is indignant.

6. Comparing himself with others, he esteems himself more highly; he thinks little of others and their acts, and contemns them.

7. He refuses to subject himself to superiors, as if this were unworthy of him, persuading himself that he is more prudent, better, etc.

8. He refuses to be subject to God Himself, apprehending this as contrary to his dignity, wishing to live by his own judgment, as if he had no need of God: this act is of completed pride."

In this progress St. Bernard posits twelve degrees of pride, in opposition to the twelve degrees of humility which St. Benedict posited. For:

The first degree of humility is always to show humility in heart and body, with eyes fixed on the ground; to this is opposed curiosity, through which someone curiously and inordinately looks about everywhere.

The second degree of humility is that someone speak few and reasonable words, not with a clamorous voice; against this is opposed levity of mind, by which, namely, man bears himself proudly in speech.

The third degree of humility is that one not be easy or prompt to laughter; to this is opposed foolish joy.

The fourth degree of humility is silence until interrogation; to this is opposed boasting.

The fifth degree of humility is to hold what the common rule of the monastery (or society) has; to this is opposed singularity, by which, namely, someone wishes to appear holier (or better).

The sixth degree of humility is to believe and pronounce oneself lower than all; to this is opposed arrogance, by which, namely, man prefers himself to others.

The seventh degree of humility is to confess and believe oneself useless and unworthy for all things; to this is opposed presumption, by which, namely, someone judges himself sufficient for greater things.

The eighth degree of humility is confession of sins; to this is opposed defense of sins.

The ninth degree of humility is to embrace patience in hard and rough things; to this is opposed simulated confession, by which, namely, someone does not wish to undergo punishment for sins which he confesses in simulation.

The tenth degree of humility is obedience, to which rebellion is opposed.

The eleventh degree is that man not be delighted to do his own will; to this is opposed liberty, by which, namely, man is delighted freely to do what he wills.

The twelfth or last degree of humility is fear of God, to which is opposed the custom of sinning, which implies contempt of God.

Thus St. Thomas, in II-II, q. 162, a. 4 ad 4, who adds: "in these twelve degrees there are touched not only the species of pride, but also certain antecedents and consequents," just as is also verified concerning the degrees of humility.

X. Remedies against pride and vain-glory. - A twofold kind of remedy can be indicated: one on the part of the mind, another on the part of work.

A. On the part of the mind:

1. The intimate and sincere knowledge of oneself and consideration of one's own nothingness, and of one's own infirmity, absolute and relative: absolute indeed from past sins, present defects of the moral order, and uncertainty of the future; but relative, both comparatively to God, without whose help we can do absolutely nothing, and comparatively to others whom we see better than ourselves.

2. Consideration of the vanity and transitoriness of the goods in which we are wont to glory: bodily vigor and beauty; knowledge, exposed to ignorances, doubts, and errors; human honor, praise, and glory; and a fortiori riches or earthly power, birth from a noble family.

3. Contemplation of the perfect humility of Christ, "who, when He was in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal to God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and... humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross" (Phil. 2:6-8; printed citation: Phil. II, 7).

4. The baseness, dangers, and damages of pride, which is "the beginning of every sin" (Sir. 10:15); wherefore the Scriptures warn: "God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble" (1 Pet. 5:5).

B. On the part of work:

1. Assiduous prayer.

2. The external exercise of humility, or acts exercised before others by which we hold ourselves of little account.

3. Especially, interior acts of humility by which before God we sincerely judge ourselves vile, desire lowly things for ourselves, and wish all glory exclusively to God alone.

The Scriptures suggest such affections: "Why is earth and ashes proud?" (Sir. 10:9); "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received?" (1 Cor. 4:7); "Not to us, O Lord, not to us, but to Thy name give glory" (Ps. 113:9); "Unless you be converted and become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. 18:3).

Question II: Concerning Avarice

I. Avarice is the inordinate appetite for riches, or immoderate love of having. It is called:

1. an appetite for riches, under the name of which come not only monies but all exterior goods, insofar as they are useful to man and their price is measured and estimated by money: "all exterior things which come into the use of human life are understood under the name of money insofar as they have the account of a useful good";[1]

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118, a. 2 ad 1.

2. inordinate, that is, immoderate and excessive. For riches are a useful good for the sustaining of life according to someone's condition. But the useful is good insofar as it is commensurated to the end, and the excess of this measure is evil. Whence the appetite for riches insofar as they are necessary or useful for life is good, but to desire them beyond this is evil.

"In all things which are for an end, the good consists in a certain measure; for those things which are for an end must be commensurated to the end, as medicine is commensurated to health... But exterior goods have the account of useful things for an end. Whence it is necessary that man's good concerning them consist in a certain measure, namely while man seeks to have exterior riches according to some measure, insofar as they are necessary for his life according to his condition. And therefore sin consists in the excess of this measure, namely when someone wishes to acquire or retain them above the due mode, which pertains to the account of avarice, which is defined as immoderate love of having. Whence it is clear that avarice is a sin."[2]

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118, a. 1.

II. The gravity and species of avarice. - The love or appetite for riches can be immoderate in two ways:

a) in one way, in receiving and retaining riches, insofar, namely, as man acquires or preserves them more than is due. Thus it is directly a sin against the neighbor and is opposed to justice, and it is mortal from its genus, while nevertheless admitting lightness of matter;

b) in another way, in interior affection, if someone loves riches too much, desires them, or is delighted in them, even if he does not wish to snatch away the goods of others. Thus it is a sin of man in himself, and is opposed to liberality, and according to itself is venial, unless on account of affection for riches someone does not fear to commit some mortal sin, or establishes his last end in riches.[3]

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118, a. 1 ad 2; a. 3 and 5; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 13, a. 1 and 2.

From these things it is clear that avarice, or immoderate love of having, is not only the love of retaining riches, but of desiring them in any inordinate way whatsoever.

III. The general influence of avarice upon other sins. - The Apostle says in 1 Tim. 6:10: Cupidity is the root of all evils; this is to be understood of avarice properly so called.[4] The reason is that through riches man acquires the faculty and facility of perpetrating any sin whatsoever, and the occasion of desiring any sin whatsoever, because man can be assisted by money in order to have any temporal goods whatsoever, according to Ecclesiastes 10:19: All things obey money. Whence just as a root furnishes nourishment to a tree, so money nourishes the desire of every sin. And therefore avarice is the root of all sins, not indeed in this sense, that every sin viewed individually arises from it, but because every genus of sin can arise from it and more frequently does arise from it.[5]

[4] Several indeed have understood this of avarice improperly so called, namely a) of inordinate conversion or tendency toward any temporal good whatsoever, which is found in every sin. This general cupidity is called the cause of sins on the part of conversion toward created good, from which sin is nourished and fostered, whence it is called the root. Also b) of the inclination of fallen nature toward inordinately desiring temporal goods, from which all sins come. These things are true, but they do not hand down the sense of Scripture, which manifestly speaks of avarice properly so called, which is a special sin, namely the inordinate appetite for riches. I-II, q. 84, a. 1.

[5] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 1.

Therefore avarice properly so called, like pride properly so called, is the cause of all sins, not indeed on the part of aversion, but each on the part of the act or of conversion toward a created good which is in sin. Nevertheless they differ: 1. in the account of causality, for pride is the final cause of all, while avarice is a disposing cause toward all, insofar as it procures the means of acquiring all things which the other vices desire; whence 2. each is first in a different order: pride in the order of intention, in which the end is the principle that precedes the means; avarice in the order of execution, in which, on the contrary, the means precede the end, which is their term: "It must be considered that in voluntary acts a twofold order is found, namely, of intention and of execution. In the first order (pride) has the character of principle and of end. . . . But on the part of execution, that is first which furnishes the opportunity of fulfilling all the desires of sin, which has the character of a root, namely riches. And therefore on this side avarice is said to be the root of all evils."[6]

[6] Ibid., a. 2.

IV. Avarice is a capital sin. - A capital vice is that from which other vices arise according to the character of an end, that is, because it has a supremely desirable end: whence, to obtain it, a man does many other things, even evil ones. But the supremely desirable end is happiness, "and therefore the more anything participates in the conditions of happiness, the more desirable it is." Now one of the conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficient, a condition which is verified in riches: for money, which all things obey, most of all gives a man what suffices for himself. Therefore avarice is a capital vice. - Money, namely, although by its nature it is a useful good, and hence is not an end but a means to the end, nevertheless because of its universality, inasmuch as it is useful for acquiring all external goods, virtually contains all things, and so has a certain likeness to happiness, and is exceedingly desirable.[7]

[7] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118, a. 7; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 13, a. 3.

Nor does this stand in the way: that pride is not numbered among the capital vices because it is itself the cause of all; therefore, by parity, avarice too is not to be placed among the capital vices, since it is the root of all sins. - For pride is the cause of all sins under the character of an end, and therefore it is not a capital vice, which is the final cause of some sins only; avarice, however, is not the root of all sins inasmuch as it is their end, but inasmuch as it disposes toward all and furnishes the faculty and the means of desiring and perpetrating all, and under this respect it is not a capital vice; but because it is besides the final cause of some, it is rightly numbered among the capital vices.[8]

[8] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 4, ad 4.

V. Avarice has seven daughters. - From avarice, as from a final cause, seven vices more frequently arise, according to Gregory, *Morals*, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), which are called its daughters. Inasmuch as it is immoderate in retaining, there arises: 1. hardness of heart, or inhumanity against mercy toward one's neighbor; - inasmuch as it is immoderate in taking, there arises 2. in the affection: restlessness, or superfluous solicitude about goods to be acquired; in effect: 3. violence, when someone uses force to acquire goods; 4. deceit and 5. perjury, when he uses guile in words, whether simple words or words confirmed by oath; 6. fraud, when he uses guile in deed as to things; and 7. treachery, when he uses guile as to persons, as is clear concerning Judas, who from avarice betrayed Christ.[9]

[9] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118, a. 8; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 13, a. 3.

VI. Remedies against avarice. - Besides prayer, there is customarily proposed a twofold kind of remedy: one internal, in the mind; another external, in work.

A. In the mind: consideration both a) of the loftiness of heavenly things and the vanity of earthly things; and b) of the example of Christ the Lord, who, though He was rich, became needy, that He might show us that the contempt of riches is the more certain way of salvation; and c) of the baseness, unhappiness, and dangers of avarice; and d) of death, which will despoil us of all earthly things.

In particular, think:

1. how inconstant are the riches of this world, which pass away "as a shadow" (Wis. 5:9), and like things possessed in sleep, after which, when it has passed, "all the men of riches have found nothing in their hands" (Ps. 75:6);

2. whither riches acquired with such solicitude will go: strangers will snatch away my labors, my heirs and those born of them will squander them. God warns the avaricious man: "Thou fool, this night do they require thy soul of thee; and whose shall those things be which thou hast prepared? So is he that layeth up treasure for himself, and is not rich toward God" (Luke 12:20-21);

3. how vile are the goods of this world: they are extrinsic, they make the possessor neither better nor blessed, but for the most part restless, forgetful of heaven, proud, luxurious, a contemner of divine things, hard also toward the miserable, as Sirach 10:9-10 testifies: "There is nothing more wicked than the avaricious man... Nothing is more wicked than to love money; for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale."

B. In work: a) largess of alms, b) visitation of the miserable, and c) conformity to the divine will in the loss of goods: namely, let the poor love poverty; let the rich be drawn back from riches by the good use of them.

In particular, call to mind the sayings of Scripture:

1. "He that giveth to the poor shall not want; he that despiseth him that asketh shall suffer want" (Prov. 28:27).

2. "He lendeth to the Lord who hath mercy on the poor" (Prov. 19:17); "As long as you did it to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me" (Matt. 25:40); "And do not forget beneficence and communication, for by such sacrifices God is merited" (Heb. 13:16).

3. "The Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away: blessed be the name of the Lord." He is truly rich who possesses God; poor is he who lacks God.

4. "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth,... but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven... Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you"

(Matt. 6:19-20, 33; printed citation: Mt. VI, 19, 20, 23). "For what doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his own soul?" (Matt. 16:26).

Question III: Concerning Gluttony

I. Gluttony is the inordinate appetite for food or drink. It is called:

1. an inordinate appetite, that is, exceeding the mode prescribed by right reason. But the mode prescribed by reason is that nourishment be taken so that it may be useful for right life and for preserving health; namely, insofar as foods are necessary or fitting for preserving good health and a fitting disposition of the mind for its functions. Therefore one who exceeds this mode on account of delight and seeks that delight more than is fitting, or even adheres to it as an end, so that he rests in it and wills it for its own sake, acts inordinately;

2. for food or drink, and indeed drink whether non-intoxicating or intoxicating; whence there is distinguished: a) gluttony strictly so called, which is also called crapula or excessive feasting, and is the inordinate appetite for food or common drink; b) drunkenness, which is the inordinate appetite for intoxicating drink.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 148, a. 1; cf. Luke 21:34.

II. The species and gravity of gluttony. - There are five diverse modes by which the delight of gluttony is unduly sought: too soon, sumptuously, too much, ardently, daintily. These are five distinct and proper species of gluttony, because they proceed from diverse motives opposed to the very virtue of temperance. For the appetite for nourishment can be inordinate a) as to the nourishment itself, either 1. concerning the substance, by seeking, namely, delicate or too costly foods, attention being given to the state of the man (sumptuously); or 2. as to the quality, by seeking foods too carefully and tastily prepared (daintily); or 3. as to quantity, by exceeding too much in the very quantity (too much); b) as to the taking, either 4. when it is done before or outside the due time (too soon); or 5. when it does not observe the due mode, but is done voraciously and with excessive eagerness (ardently).[2]

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 148, a. 4.

Gluttony strictly so called is per se a venial sin from its genus, even if it be carried through even to vomiting, because it is only an excess in the appetite for a thing of itself licit. Whence the five aforesaid modes are distinct venial species, and consequently they are not necessarily to be declared in confession.

Per accidens, however, other modes can be present from the conjunction of another species, by reason of which gluttony can even become mortal: a) if someone establishes his last end in it, whether explicitly or implicitly; b) if he is prepared to sin mortally, for example to steal, so that he may have the delight of food (Phil. 3:19); c) if he inflicts grave harm on his health; d) if he renders himself unfit for fulfilling an office to which he is bound under grave obligation; e) if he renders himself unable to pay debts, or dissipates the goods of the family; f) if for the sake of excessive feasting he violates the precept of fasting or of abstinence from flesh-meats; g) if excessive feasting is the cause of another grave sin, for example of grave scandal, as if a cleric casts himself into public banquets.

Several add: if someone provokes vomiting so that, for serving pleasure, he may be able to eat and drink again, because this is more than bestial and greatly dishonors a rational creature. We indeed admit that this is rather often an indication that he is delighted in foods as in the last end; nevertheless this is not necessarily and always so, and consequently it is not always mortal, unless it were grave scandal to others.

III. Drunkenness and its gravity. - Drunkenness is the inordinate appetite for intoxicating drink, or voluntary excess in intoxicating drink.

It is called:

1. an inordinate appetite or excess, because it is a species of intemperance;

2. in intoxicating drink, that is, violently inducing privation of the use of reason. Thus drunkenness is distinguished from gluttony strictly so called, which is excess in food or in non-intoxicating drink;

3. voluntary, whether intended in itself, when someone expressly wishes to be deprived of the use of reason, for example in order to forget pains, or only in the cause, when someone foresees that from it perhaps he will be deprived of the use of reason and nevertheless prefers to incur drunkenness rather than to abstain from drink.

Fully voluntary drunkenness is a mortal sin from its genus, both on account of the grave intrinsic disorder of the act by which someone voluntarily and without necessity deprives himself of a most excellent good, namely the use of reason and the proximate power of recovering it, and renders himself unfit for acting in a human mode and according to virtue; and on account of the grave evils which it brings with it, such as lust, blasphemies, quarrels, grave affliction of the family, neglect of children, defrauding of creditors, omission and neglect of the duties of Christian life; and the drunken man, if he has foreseen these at least in a confused way, is guilty of them.[3]

[3] Cf. Gal. 5:21; 1 Cor. 6:10; Rom. 13:13; Luke 21:34; Isa. 5:11; Prov. 23:20, 21, 29. The printed text has "Prov. XXII, 20, 21, 29"; the cited drunkenness passage is Prov. 23.

Hence a) perfect drunkenness, which totally removes the use of reason, is of itself mortal; nevertheless it could be venial either on account of a certain inadvertence or ignorance of the drink, which nevertheless cannot be admitted in those having a habit; or on account of lightness of matter if the drunkenness does not last long but only for some moments. This, however, scarcely holds in practice, because no one can know how long it will last;

b) imperfect drunkenness, which only somewhat disturbs reason, is of itself a venial sin; per accidens it becomes mortal either on account of scandal, or on account of an evil end, or on account of damage to be inflicted on health or family, or on account of grave sadness to be brought to wife, children, or parents, or on account of the danger of another grave consequence.

Signs of drunkenness are customarily indicated by authors:

1. The signs of perfect drunkenness are: a) if someone by reason no longer discerns between moral good and evil; this is a certain sign, while the rest are conjectural, namely b) if he does unusual things which he would never do while master of himself, for example swears, speaks

shameful things, stirs up quarrels, breaks vessels, strikes his wife; c) if the following day he does not remember notable words or deeds, for example what quarrels he excited, how he returned home, by what road, with what companion; d) if someone scarcely, or hardly even, suffices for directing common or easy actions; e) if he has lost the use of the senses and members, for example of sight, walking, speech.

2. On the contrary, probable signs of imperfect drunkenness, or ambiguous signs, are: staggering of gait, some stammering of the tongue, an apparent whirling of things, the sight of doubled objects, forgetfulness of minute things, difficulty in executing due offices, a certain disturbance of the head or of the imagination, vomiting; for these also occur while sufficient presence of reason remains.

IV. Warnings for confessors. - 1. Penitents who accuse themselves of eating or drinking for pleasure are not always guilty. For it is not illicit to intend and seek the pleasure which God willed to be present in foods and drinks, provided that it is ordered, at least implicitly, to the principal honorable end of sustenance; but it is a sin to eat for pleasure alone, sought for its own sake and by resting in it, excluding the principal end, or principally for pleasure, not for an honorable good, so that the honorable good is subordinated to delight.

2. Rarely do penitents sin mortally from gluttony. More easily they sin from drunkenness, not in the sense that they often drink even to the privation of the use of reason, indeed if this happens once or again, commonly it happens beyond intention, but that certain persons too much given to drinking, by this reason, fail in their duties and functions, create grave affliction for the family, dissolve its bonds, do not provide for the education of offspring, cannot pay debts, etc. The confessor, nevertheless, can presume drunkenness to have been voluntary in him who is accustomed frequently to become drunk, for example ten times in single months. But if some man sufficiently intelligent confesses that within a month he was drunk once or again, let him be asked whether he foresaw the drunkenness. One who has been drunk once or a second time, without any habit, is to be presumed not to have foreseen the drunkenness.

3. Drunkenness, even when carried to perfect privation of the use of reason, is not so essentially evil that it cannot be induced in any case; but it can be licit to commit oneself to drunkenness, if it is a necessary means for obtaining a proportionate good, for example for driving away a disease, such as typhus, or for restraining the force of poison from the bite of a serpent, because the good of the part yields to the good of the whole man. On the contrary, it can be a sin, although per accidens privation of the use of reason does not follow. Whence, says St. Alphonsus, *Theologia Moralis*, book V, n. 78, he is not excused from mortal sin who takes a quantity of drink of itself apt for inducing perfect drunkenness, although, before he is deprived of his senses, he commits himself to sleep, by which he escapes the effect of the wine; because that drinking of itself is intrinsically evil, since of itself it is apt to deprive that man of the use of reason, and it is per accidens whether he is deprived of his senses by sleep or by intoxication. Namely, he posited the whole cause of the evil, and there will remain an incapacity of recovering the use of reason which would not have arisen from natural sleep.

4. A sin similar to drunkenness is to bring on privation of the use of reason from another cause than from drink, for example by smoke, the smoking of tobacco, the odor of hops, the use of opium or morphine, etc., concerning which it was said above, c. 2, sec. B, q. 1, IV and VI.

5. Those sin gravely, by cooperating in the drunkenness of others, who invite others to draughts by which they are probably foreseen to become drunk; likewise those who provoke or compel them to equal draughts with probable danger of drunkenness; likewise those who without grave proportionate cause minister drink to drunkards or to those near drunkenness. Nevertheless it can be licit, for a grave cause, to set wine before another with foresight of drunkenness. But those who lead others to drunkenness by their example alone sin by the sin of scandal.

6. To the gluttonous and drunken properly, or rather grossly, so called, let there be recalled to mind the proximate effects of gluttony and drunkenness in body and soul: in the body, uncleannesses and illnesses; in the soul, dullness of mind and the defacing of the image of God. To them let there be strictly prescribed avoidance of occasions, mortification of the flesh, prayer to God, confession after relapse, together with a severe penance voluntarily imposed on themselves; and sometimes enrollment in a society of sobriety or abstinence will be counseled. For the vice of drunkenness is counted among those from which men emerge with difficulty, unless they labor in eradicating it with all their strength and divine help.

7. To spiritual men who manifest a propensity to gluttony, let there be earnestly commended the avoidance of incitements of gluttony, the subtraction at table of some food more pleasing to the palate, moderation of the appetite which is borne toward foods more ardently than is just, serious expiation of faults of gluttony, even slight ones, and the reduction of the quantity of foods to a just estimation to be taken from experience.

8. Let priests strive in every way against the vice of alcoholism, insofar as they can, by warning parents that they turn their children away from it; by inculcating strength of soul and mortification, by which virtues of the will they are disposed to resist strenuously the temptation of abusing liquors; by frequently teaching temperance and sobriety in the pulpit and also in the sacred tribunal; and by corroborating the doctrine by their own example.

V. Gluttony is a capital vice. - A capital vice is a sin from which others arise according to the account of final cause, insofar as it has a most appetible end, whence from the appetite for it man is excited in manifold ways to sin. But that end is very appetible in which there is some condition of happiness; but delight pertains to happiness. Whence gluttony, which is concerned with the principal delights, namely of touch, is a capital sin.

Food indeed is a means to an end, namely to the conservation of life; but because this end, which cannot be conserved without food, is most appetible, thence food itself also is most appetible. Moreover and chiefly, it is appetible on account of delight.[4]

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 148, a. 5; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 14, a. 5.

This is to be understood of gluttony taken in the broad sense, which also comprehends drunkenness.

VI. Gluttony has five daughters. - St. Gregory, *Morals*, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), enumerates five daughters of gluttony. For gluttony, through the immoderate taking of food or drink, produces a disturbance of the inferior part of man, and thus impedes reason and consequently those things which ought to be directed by reason.

Hence a) it produces in the soul: 1. as to reason, whose keenness is dulled from immoderation of food and drink: dullness of mind, that is, stupidity as to speculative things; 2. as to the appetite, which, the helm of reason being lulled to sleep, is inordinately affected: foolish joy, or wandering and uncomposed joy, by which man rejoices concerning those things which according to the judgment of right reason are not naturally apt to cause delight; as to external acts: 3. many words, by which man cannot restrain words; and 4. scurrility, that is, a certain jesting arising from defect of reason, which cannot restrain or compose external gestures; b) but in the body it produces 5. uncleanness, that is, the inordinate emission of any superfluities, especially of semen; for although vomiting is useful, for example, after superfluous eating, nevertheless it is vicious that someone subject himself to this necessity through immoderate food or drink.[5]

[5] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 148, a. 6; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 14, a. 4.

Nor does it stand in the way that the aforesaid sins are not means for procuring the delight of gluttony, and thus are not desired for the sake of gluttony, nor that gluttony is not their final cause. Nevertheless they are means to gluttony in this sense, that man subjects himself to them and accepts them, provided that he may obtain the delight of gluttony. For the gluttonous man does not hesitate to incur foolish joy, many words, uncleannesses, etc., provided that he obtains the end of gluttony, that is, the delight of food and drink.

This also holds concerning certain sins which arise from lust or anger.

VII. Remedies against gluttony. - The principal remedies are customarily enumerated as the following:

1. to beware of the incitements of gluttony, such as seasonings or delicate foods, and not to mingle oneself with the gluttonous;

2. to grow accustomed to common foods, not to eat or drink outside the time of refection, sometimes to fast, or at least at table to subtract something from one's own will; to set for oneself the measure of foods;

3. to meditate upon the examples of Christ poor, fasting in the desert, thirsting on the cross; the vileness of those things which are desired; and the basenesses and miseries which greediness carries with it;

4. to pray to God before approaching the table.

Question IV: Concerning Lust

I. Lust is the inordinate appetite for venereal things. It is called:

1. An appetite for venereal things, or the love of venereal delight and of the use of the organs of generation, to which this delight is joined: a delight, namely, not merely spiritual, nor merely

sensible, but at once carnal and venereal or sexual, which, namely, is proper to the generative parts of each sex and can be perceived in them alone;

2. inordinate, that is, exceeding the mode prescribed by right reason. But the mode prescribed by right reason is that the movement of the generative organs and venereal delight be sought in order to the due propagation of the human race in legitimate marriage. Therefore one who exceeds this mode on account of delight and seeks that delight more than is fitting acts inordinately.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 153, a. 1; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 15.

Venereal delight, namely, as also the use of the generative organs, from its nature is essentially ordered to the propagation of the human race. But this cannot be done in a due mode except in a permanent matrimonial union, which is altogether necessary for the right education of offspring. Therefore the appetite and use of venereal things is inordinate if it is sought: 1. without order to the act of legitimate marriage; 2. in that act, but in an illegitimate and undue mode, outside the rules prescribed by nature and reason.

II. The species and gravity of lust. - Lust is external or merely internal, according as the use of the generative organs and venereal delight is unduly admitted in reality, or, on the contrary, represented only in the mind, pleases or is desired.

External lust is perfect or complete, or imperfect or incomplete, according as the use of the generative organs is complete and reaches its natural terminus and satiative delight, or, on the contrary, the use is incomplete and is not brought through to its terminus and does not attain perfectly satiative delight. Complete or perfect lust is according to nature or against nature, according as the act of itself is apt for obtaining the natural end of generation, or is not apt for this end, since this end, on the contrary, is rendered impossible. Each comprehends several distinct species.[2]

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 154, a. 1 and 11.

Now, according to the principles of moral science, lust is a grave sin from its genus, since it is opposed to the due propagation of the human race and thus is naturally apt to harm the common good,[3] and indeed:

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 153, a. 3; cf. Gal. 5:19-21.

1. Every lust outside marriage, directly and sought for its own sake, is a grave sin, even incomplete and imperfect lust, since every venereal delight from its nature is ordered to perfect and complete delight and is its beginning; whence directly and in itself to will it is implicitly to will the perfect act. But indirectly, or in a cause willed, it can sometimes be only venial, if the influence is light and the danger light.

2. Lust in the use of marriage is grave if it is against nature, as being impeditive of generation; otherwise it is of itself only venial, as if spouses exercise intercourse in the natural mode but for pleasure alone.

All these things are abundantly declared in our little work *Concerning Chastity and Lust*.

III. Lust is a capital vice. - A capital sin has a highly appetible end, by whose appetite man proceeds to perpetrate many sins. But the end of lust is the delight of venereal things, which is the greatest of all and most appetible, both on account of the vehemence of the delight and on account of the connaturality of this concupiscence. Therefore lust is evidently a capital sin.[4]

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 153, a. 4; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 15, a. 4.

IV. Lust has eight daughters. - St. Gregory, *Morals*, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), enumerates eight interior daughters of lust. For since the appetite of lust is most vehement, it follows that it most of all impedes the use of the higher powers, that is, of intellect and will. For all powers proceed from the soul as from one source and root; whence the intense exercise of one power diminishes the force of acting in the others and draws vigor away from them. And therefore "when the lower powers are vehemently affected toward their own objects, it follows that the higher powers are impeded and disordered in their own acts." Hence lust:

A. In the intellect produces:

1. blindness of mind in the right consideration of the end and its goodness, or alienation from thinking of heavenly things;

2. precipitation in counsel and deliberation concerning the choice of means;

3. inconsideration in judgment concerning things to be done, which are unbecoming to one's state or person;

4. inconstancy in commanding the execution of judgment, or in good purposes; for it softens the heart of man and renders it weak.

From these things it appears that lust most of all overturns prudence.

B. In the will it produces, concerning the end:

5. love of self, not indeed as to all things, but as to the delight of the flesh which it inordinately desires;

6. hatred of God, insofar as He prohibits the desired delight;

concerning the means to the end:

7. affection for the present age, that is, excessive love of the present life on account of its pleasures;

8. horror and despair of the future age, that is, of spiritual goods, because while someone is too much detained by carnal delights, he does not care to arrive at spiritual ones, but disdains and despises them.[5]

[5] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 153, a. 5, together with q. 53, a. 6; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 15, a. 4.

To these Isidore, on Deut., c. 16, adds four exterior inordinate acts, principally pertaining to speech. For speech can be inordinate in four ways:

1. as to matter, and thus shameful speech is posited; for because the mouth speaks from the abundance of the heart, therefore the mouth of the lustful man, whose heart abounds with shameful concupiscences, easily speaks shameful things;

2. on the part of the cause: for because lust causes precipitation and inconsideration, it makes one break forth into words lightly and inconsiderately spoken, which are called scurrilous words;

3. as to the end: for because the lustful man seeks delight, he orders his words to carnal delight, and thus breaks forth into sportive words. "Whence," says Billuart, *De Temperantia*, diss. 5, a. 3, "we see those given to this vice gather from books certain shameful and slippery narratives, which they relate before others as if playing and entertaining";

4. as to the meaning of the words, which lust perverts on account of the blindness of mind which it causes; therefore the lustful man breaks forth into foolish speech, as when by his words he prefers the delights which he desires to any other noble and heavenly things.[6]

[6] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 153, a. 5 ad 4.

V. The office of the confessor. - The confessor, for the sake of prudence and honesty, should inquire and ask concerning the sin of lust sparingly indeed, and yet sufficiently.[7]

[7] Cf. St. Alphonsus, *Praxis Confessarii*, n. 40, 41, 206; Reuter, *Neo-confessarius*, n. 68-73; Aertnijs, *Theologia Pastoralis*, n. 30 and 33.

In particular:

1. If a penitent accuses himself of shameful thoughts, let him be asked whether he voluntarily and with voluntary delight adhered to them. If he denies this, nothing further is to be inquired. If he says: I felt delight, let it be asked whether he gladly and voluntarily admitted it, or resisted it. If he affirms, let it be asked concerning the object, whether it truly was venereal and against chastity, or whether it was merely something immodest, indecent, scurrilous, and foul. If it is established that there was venereal delight, the penitent ought to declare the number, at least approximately; also the distinct species, if the delight was concerning some special circumstance of person or mode. Moreover he is to be asked whether he proceeded further, and what shameful thing he did, or wished or desired to do.

2. If someone accuses himself of a shameful look, it is to be inquired whether the look was voluntary, concerning a truly shameful object, and without reasonable cause; and if this is so, whether venereal delight was voluntarily admitted. But if the object is not truly shameful, was the look perhaps done from an evil intention or shameful end?

3. If someone accuses movements of concupiscence, it is to be investigated whether he consented to them, or whether he placed their cause without a just reason, and indeed a cause gravely or efficaciously influencing per se, such as a very shameful reading or at least continued shameful touch. To place a cause influencing lightly or only per accidens, such as reading of a lighter character or excess in drink, does not exceed venial sin, if consent to the venereal movement and proximate danger of consent are absent.

In the same way, if someone accuses passive pollution, it must be seen whether he intended it or placed a cause efficacious per se without reasonable cause.

4. If someone accuses himself of a shameful action, he is to be asked whether he had it alone or with another person, of a different or of the same sex, and of what quality, as far as full consummation: namely pollution for men, full pleasure for women. Nor should the question concerning shameful thoughts or desires, had separately from the action, be omitted.

5. If someone accuses shameful speech, attention must be given to his intention and to his affection: whether he said these things from levity, or with venereal affection, or from a mind of seducing another person to a shameful act; whether he provoked depraved delight and consented to it, or gave grave scandal to others, especially innocent children.

These questions are not always and without choice to be asked, but are proposed after the manner of a general rule to be applied according to opportunity; for penitents are to be questioned in diverse ways according to their age and condition, as was declared in the little work *Concerning Chastity and Lust*, q. 7, n. V.

VI. Remedies against lust. - Many remedies against lust and means of preserving chastity are customarily indicated, which are reduced to certain genera. They are:

A. Chaste education, by which we learn to reverence our body, which belongs to the dominion of God, has been incorporated into Christ, and has been made into a temple of the Holy Spirit; by which we fear the great damages of lust and are persuaded concerning the necessity of struggle and the possibility of victory.

B. Flight from occasions and causes: idleness, sadness, solitude, the reading of depraved books and of those which they call novels, familiarity with persons of a different sex, vain or illicit love, etc., according to the adage: "He who loves danger will perish in it" (Sir. 3:27).

C. Vigilance and mortification, according to 1 Cor. 9:27: "I chastise my body and bring it into servitude" (Rom. 8:12-13; Gal. 5:24).

1. Custody of the senses, first of all of the eyes, according to the warning of Augustine: "Even if your eyes are cast upon someone, let them be fixed upon no one"; also of the ears, still more of the hands and touch, most of all of the imagination and heart.

2. Discreet mortification of the flesh: "lust is fed by banquets, nourished by delicacies, kindled by wine, inflamed by drunkenness."

3. Labor and bodily weariness.

4. Prompt repulsion of thoughts and resistance against temptations, especially indirect resistance, by turning the mind to those things which hold it more strongly.

D. Humble and continual prayer, according to Wis. 8:21 and Matt. 26:41; in particular:

1. Frequent and express petition of chastity from the Lord.

2. Memory of the last things, of the Passion of Christ, and of the presence of God.

3. Frequent confession, and with the same confessor; for the more the state of the sick person is known, the more aptly the remedy can be applied.

4. Frequent and devout reception of the Holy Eucharist.

5. Constant devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary conceived without stain.

Several other special means can be added, as we noted in the little work *Concerning Chastity and Lust*, q. 7, n. III. Let the confessor select from all these the more opportune ones for diverse adjuncts and persons; let him inspire in penitents a great desire for chastity, and a firm purpose, to be renewed rather often, of avoiding lust and its immense damages and dangers for salvation. For our salvation depends on a twofold will: namely, God's and man's. The divine will is very hostile to the sin of lust, but our will is especially weakened by this vice. Therefore this sin is most dangerous for our eternal salvation.

Question V: Concerning Acedia

I. Acedia is sadness concerning spiritual good, especially divine good.

For sour things are cold, whence acedia imports tedium or tepidity in working, which so depresses the mind of man that nothing pleases him to do.

Hence spiritual acedia denotes torpor, languor, tepidity, tedium concerning spiritual things, which are therefore burdensome because they require bodily labor. Whence it is sadness concerning spiritual things because they impede bodily rest and delight; for acedia prefers to do nothing rather than to impede the rest of the body, and from this is born flight, horror, and detestation of spiritual things.

This sadness is always a sin, both 1. by reason of the object: for sadness concerning evil is good, but to be sad concerning that which is apparently evil but truly good is a sin, because good does not deserve that we be sad concerning it; and 2. by reason of the effect, for it draws man back from due works.

II. The species and gravity of acedia. - Acedia is twofold:

1. That by which we are sad concerning the good of any virtue whatsoever. This is not a special sin, even if it is done on account of the bodily labor joined to it, but is a circumstance of every sin, because every vice flees the opposed spiritual good, even insofar as it impedes bodily rest.

2. That by which we are sad concerning the spiritual good to which all other things are ordered, namely concerning divine good, not indeed in itself, but insofar as it is internal to us and pertains to us and seems evil to us: namely, if someone is sad concerning beatitude or concerning the friendship of God, because they must be preserved by laborious exercises of the virtues, and thus does not care for that friendship; or if on account of labor he is sad concerning the means to it, for example concerning the sacraments, the grace of God, good works, divine precepts, etc., insofar as they are necessary or useful for the friendship of God.

> This is a special sin because it has a special object and is directly contrary to a special act of a special virtue; for it is opposed to joy concerning divine good, in which charity delights.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 35, a. 1 and 2; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 11, a. 1 and 2.

Now: a) Acedia as it is a general sin is mortal or venial according as the sin of which it is a circumstance is grave or light.

b) Special acedia is a mortal sin from its genus, because according to its proper account it is opposed to charity. For the proper effect of charity is joy concerning God; whence acedia, by which we are sad concerning divine good, is directly opposed to charity. Therefore, just as envy is a mortal sin because it is sad concerning the good of the neighbor, concerning which charity rejoices, so a fortiori is acedia, which is sad concerning internal divine good.[2]

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 35, a. 3; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 11, a. 3.

Nevertheless it can be venial if it is not perfectly deliberate, or also, as it seems, when it is concerned with goods not necessary for salvation.

III. Acedia is a capital sin. - A capital sin is that from which other vices are naturally apt to arise, chiefly according to the account of final cause. But as men do many things on account of delight, both that they may obtain it and because from its impulse they are moved to act, so also on account of sadness they are wont to do many things, either that they may avoid it, or that they may satisfy it, or because from it they are moved to do certain things. Whence, since acedia is a certain great sadness, it is deservedly numbered among the capital sins, in the same way as envy.

This is to be understood of acedia which is a special sin. A general sin or circumstance of every sin cannot be the cause of special vices.

IV. Acedia has six daughters. - From special acedia, as from a final cause, according to St. Gregory, *Morals*, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), six sins arise.

For from sadness it happens that man flees those things concerning which he is sad, indeed that he attacks them, and that he passes over to other things concerning which he is delighted.

From acedia man flees divine goods: 1. the last end, eternal salvation or the hoped-for divine good, which is done through despair; he also flees 2. the spiritual good to be done, or the common and ordinary means to the end, which they call torpor concerning the precepts; 3. he flees arduous means, for example those which fall under the counsels, through pusillanimity. He attacks 4. saddening spiritual goods by detesting them, which is called malice; or also 5. he attacks priests and God-fearing men who lead others to spiritual goods, and is indignant against them, and this is rancor. Finally, 6. on account of sadness he passes over to exterior delightful things, in which the carnal mind is delighted, and this is wandering of the mind concerning illicit things.[3]

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 35, a. 4; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 11, a. 4.

V. Remedies concerning acedia. - A manifold remedy can be indicated against acedia and spiritual tepidity, whether on the part of the mind or on the part of work.

A. On the part of the mind: Frequent thought concerning the necessity of doing good and of laboring strenuously for salvation (Matt. 7:19; 25:26; Rom. 8:18; 2 Cor. 4:17; printed citation: I Cor. IV, 17), concerning the sterility of life without fervor (Matt. 3:10; 7:19), concerning the dangers of tepidity

from its harmful effects and the progressive infirmity naturally born from it (Apoc. 3:15-17; Sir. 33:29).

B. On the part of work: Frequent and sincere confession, daily examination of conscience, pious readings and meditations, the establishment of a useful and laborious life according to a predefined order, a fervent purpose often renewed, diligent fulfillment of the duties of one's state, and spiritual exercises to be performed in total retreat.

Especially: "1. Consider how many things Christ your Savior and King, not needing you, did for the glory of the Father and the salvation of your soul; and do you think little of these things? 2. Whatever God works outside Himself, He works for the salvation of our souls: all His desires, all the care of providence, all the effects of mercy tend to this, that we love and worship Him, and thus be saved. Does not this paternal care and affection deserve love and service? 3. How slight, how brief a labor is required for an immense and eternal reward! Are you not worthy of every confusion if you are unwilling to expend even that for your happiness? 4. The smallest action done for God is worth a thousand times more than all the deeds of heroes undertaken for vanity; you weary yourself for vain things; what is it not fitting to do for eternal goods? 5. What would you think of your servant, who served negligently for a great reward? And you serve God, who prepares such things, more negligently than worldly men serve the devil offering lies? 6. The tepid man does injury to God, defames His service, as if it did not deserve service or had not prepared a just reward; he is a disgrace to Christ, whom he serves less fervently than the world..."[4] For how many labors are assumed by many for worldly glory and riches! Therefore let us not do less for the kingdom of Christ and the riches of eternal glory.

[4] Reuter, *Neo-confessarius*, n. 98.

Question VI: Concerning Envy

I. Envy is inordinate sadness concerning the good of another, estimated as one's own evil, insofar as that good seems diminutive of one's own excellence. It is called:

1. sadness: this is concerning an evil viewed as joined to us, and thus envy differs from hatred, which concerns the good of the neighbor considered in the neighbor as absolutely evil;

2. concerning the good of another estimated as one's own evil: "the object of sadness is one's own evil; but it happens that what is another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and thus there can be sadness concerning another's good";

3. insofar as it is diminutive of one's own excellence. Sadness concerning another's good, which is considered as an evil, can happen in four ways: a) when someone grieves concerning another's good because from it he fears harm to come either to himself or to other goods, and such sadness is an effect of fear; b) when someone is sad concerning another's good, not because the other himself has the good, but because we lack that good which he has, and this is zeal or emulation, which, if it concerns honorable goods, is praiseworthy; c) when someone is sad concerning another's good because he to whom the good happens is unworthy of it, and this sadness is called nemesis or indignation, which is good if it is done for a right end and with due subjection to the ordering of divine Providence; d) when someone grieves concerning

another's good, insofar as the other exceeds him in goods and this is estimated as one's own evil, because it is diminutive of one's own glory or excellence; and this properly is envy. "And therefore men especially envy concerning those goods in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be in reputation";

4. inordinate: envy is always evil, because it grieves concerning that concerning which one ought to rejoice, namely concerning the good of the neighbor.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 1 and 2; cf. *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 10, a. 1 and 2.

II. The gravity of envy. - Envy is a mortal sin from its genus. For the genus of a sin is taken on the part of the object. But envy according to its object is opposed to charity, because as charity rejoices concerning the good of the neighbor, so envy is sad concerning it. Nevertheless it can be venial not only from lack of deliberation or imperfection of the act, but also from lightness of matter, if someone envies a slight good of the neighbor, for example that he wins in a game, say by running with him, or doing something of this kind.[2]

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 3; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 10, a. 2.

"There is a certain envy which is counted among the gravest sins, namely envy of fraternal grace, according as someone grieves concerning the very increase of the grace of God, not only concerning the good of the neighbor. Whence it is posited as a sin against the Holy Spirit, because through this envying man in some way envies the Holy Spirit, who is glorified in His works."[3]

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 4 ad 2.

III. Envy is a capital sin. - A capital vice is a sin from which other vices are naturally apt to arise, especially according to the account of final cause. But as men are wont to do many things on account of delight, both so that they may obtain it and because from its impulse they are moved to act, so also on account of sadness they do many things, either so that they may avoid it, or because from it they are moved to do certain things. Whence, since envy is a certain sadness, it is deservedly numbered among the capital sins.

IV. Envy has five daughters. - Five, according to St. Gregory, *Morals*, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), are the sins which generally arise from envy.

For envy, because it is sadness concerning another's glory insofar as it is one's own evil, attempts to do something against the neighbor. But in this which it attempts to do, something is as beginning and principle, something as means, and something as terminus. The principle is that someone intends to diminish the glory of another, which happens secretly through whispering, openly through detraction. The means is that one wishing to diminish another's glory either can do so, and then there is born exultation in adversities, that is, joy in the evils of the neighbor; or he cannot do so, and then there arises affliction in prosperities, which is not envy itself, but its daughter, when the neighbor's prosperous things happen contrary to the attempt of the envying man who strives to impede them. Finally the terminus is in hatred of the neighbor, for as delight causes love, so sadness causes hatred.[4]

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 4; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 10, a. 3.

V. Observations. - 1. Envy is especially concerning those goods in which there is glory and in which men love to be honored and to be in reputation, such as dignities, magistracies, insignia of titles, riches, beauty, adornment, celebrity of name, eloquence, condition, friendship, piety, virtues, etc., especially wisdom and happiness. Whence it arises from vain-glory, although it itself also is a capital sin.

2. The sin of envy is wont especially to be found among the ambitious and women, and among those who in some way are equals, for example of the same family, or at least approach in some respect, for example in learning, knowledge, virtue, etc.; for such persons wish to be equaled with or preferred to one another.

3. The penitent who accuses himself of envy is to be asked concerning the affection in which he thinks his envy was; for there are penitents who cannot sufficiently distinguish various affections, such as emulation, zeal, indignation, and dread of harm, from envy itself.

VI. Remedies against envy. - Several remedies can be numbered against envy, which are reduced to four:

The first is consideration of the insanity and irrationality proper to this vice, because envy does not diminish the good of the one envied but of the envying man; for it is torture without fruit and with great damage, on account of the evils which accompany it and on account of the root from which it arises, pride. From this we shall be readier to repel every movement of envy immediately.

The second is consideration of the dogma of the communion of saints, and of the spiritual society among the faithful and the incorporation of all into Christ; whence the good of each is in some way the good of all, and the goods of others are ours, concerning which it is not fitting to grieve but necessary to rejoice.

The third is a right estimation of goods, by which it happens that we do not value so highly temporal goods which are wont to be the occasion of envy, but prefer to all things the good of Christian virtue, and thus convert envy into noble emulation and zeal for progress in the spiritual life.

The fourth is the exercise of charity toward the neighbor, by which we give thanks and rejoice concerning his good, pray for his good, and strive to procure it; to these is to be added prayer for obtaining from God greater charity for ourselves.

Question VII: Concerning Anger

I. Anger is the inordinate appetite for vengeance.

To be angry of itself is not evil; for anger is properly a passion of the irascible appetite, and passions as such are not evil. Nevertheless a passion can be evil:

a) from its object or according to its species, as envy is evil from its object because it is to be sad concerning the good of another, which according to itself is repugnant to reason. In this way anger is not evil of itself, since its object, vengeance, can be desired well or badly;

b) from the mode, if it rises up more or less than reason dictates. In this way anger is evil if it abounds more than reason dictates, or also if it is lacking when reason dictates.

Whence anger is good and praiseworthy, provided that it is according to the mode of reason and that legitimate vengeance is desired according to right reason, for example so that another may be corrected, that the order of justice may be preserved, that reason may more strongly execute justice, that the rest may be deterred, etc. Then it is called zeal: anger through zeal. On the contrary, it is evil if illegitimate vengeance is desired, or if in legitimate vengeance the mode of reason is exceeded: anger through vice. Hence anger is rightly defined: the inordinate appetite for vengeance.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 1 and 2; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 12, a. 1 and 2.

II. The species and gravity of anger. - Anger can be evil in two ways:

1. On the part of the object: a) by desiring unjust vengeance against him who has not merited it, or beyond what he merited; b) by desiring vengeance not according to the legitimate order, but to be executed by one's own authority; c) by seeking it, not for the due end or the conservation of justice and the correction of fault, but, for example, from hatred as satiative of one's own evil mind, or intending the extermination of the sinner more than the abolition of the sin.

This anger from its genus is mortal, because it is contrary to charity and justice; nevertheless it can be venial, not only from lack of deliberation, but also from lightness of matter, when someone desires to avenge himself in some slight matter, for example he pulls a boy a little by the hair or by the ear, or something of this kind.

2. On the part of the mode, anger is evil if it is too ardent interiorly, or is manifested too much exteriorly. This of itself is venial; nevertheless it becomes mortal on account of an effect prohibited under grave obligation, such as scandal, blasphemy, notable harm to health, etc.

But let it be noted that anger is not necessarily inordinate because it is great, but because it is too great; whence a vehement movement of anger is good, provided that it is required by right reason or conformed to it, for example if it is proportioned to the quality of the fault, the condition of the sinner, and other circumstances. Whence also Christ was moved by grave anger when He cast the merchants out of the temple.[2]

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 3; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 12, a. 3.

III. Anger is a capital vice. - A capital sin is that from which many others arise, especially according to the account of final cause.

But from anger many other sins arise: a) on the part of the object or end, which is very appetible, insofar as vengeance is desired under the account of what is just and honorable, which allures by its own dignity; b) from its impulse, by which it precipitates the mind to do any disordered things whatsoever. Whence anger is a capital vice.

Nor does it stand in the way that anger, because it takes away the use of reason, is the cause not of several sins but of all sins, whence it is called their gate. For it is the cause of all per accidens, as removing what prohibits, that is, insofar as it impedes the use of reason by which man is drawn back from evil; but directly and per se it is the cause of certain special sins, and according to this it is a capital vice.[3]

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 6; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 12, a. 5.

IV. Anger has six daughters. - According to St. Gregory, *Morals*, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), from anger more commonly arise six sins. Insofar as it is in the heart, from it are born: 1. on the part of him against whom a man is angry on account of the injury inflicted, indignation, by which in his mind he magnifies the injury of another and considers him unworthy that he should have inflicted such an injury on him; and 2. on the part of the angry man himself, swelling of mind, by which he fills his mind by meditating on various means of vengeance. Insofar as it is in the mouth, from it arise: 3. clamor, or inordinate and confused speech by which man demonstrates anger in words; 4. blasphemy, by which he breaks forth into words injurious to God; 5. contumely, or injurious speech against the neighbor. Insofar as it proceeds even to deed, 6. from it arise quarrels, by which name are understood all harms, such as woundings, homicides, beatings, etc., which are inflicted on neighbors by deed from anger.[4]

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 7; *Quaestiones disputatae de Malo*, 12, a. 5.

V. Observations. - 1. According to itself and on the part of the appetible object, "anger seems to be the least of sins," says St. Thomas.[5] For:

[5] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 4.

a) It is a lesser sin than hatred and envy. "On the part of the evil which it desires, anger agrees with those sins which desire the evil of the neighbor, for example with envy and hatred; but hatred desires absolutely the evil of another as such, while the envious man desires the evil of another on account of the appetite for his own glory; but the angry man desires the evil of another under the account of just vengeance." But "it is worse to desire evil under the account of evil than under the account of good; and it is worse to desire evil under the account of an exterior good, which is honor and glory, than under the account of the rectitude of justice." Therefore it is clear that hatred is graver than envy, and envy than anger.

b) On that part "the sin of anger also seems to be less than the sin of concupiscence, insofar as the good of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the delightful or useful good which the concupiscent man desires."

2. But on the part of the mode of becoming angry, anger has a certain special disorder beyond those vices, and an excellence on account of the vehemence and speed of its movement.[6] And under this respect three species of anger are distinguished:

[6] Ibid.

a) of those suddenly becoming angry and from any light cause: this is choleric anger, which belongs to the sharp;

b) of those remaining in anger and sadness from a memory of the injury inflicted that is too much retained: this is mania, which is called insanity, and is found among the grave and bitter;

c) of the obstinate, who do not cease from anger unless they complete revenge: this is fury, which belongs to the difficult and grave, who seek vengeance with an obstinate appetite and do not dismiss anger until they punish.

VI. Remedies against anger. - Several remedies can be indicated against anger, whether on the part of the mind or on the part of work.

A. On the part of the mind:

1. To consider how many evils and damages are naturally apt to follow from anger.

2. To propose to oneself the example of the benevolence of God and the meekness of Christ, who spared us.

3. To think that it cannot happen that burdensome, injurious, and ignominious things do not occur in this life.

4. To hold oneself prepared to tolerate anything whatsoever.

B. On the part of work:

a) Before anger, to remove the interior and exterior causes of anger, namely:

1. To guard, insofar as it can be done, against the first movements.

2. Not to speak and act except with a tranquil mind, and after mature consideration and deliberation.

3. Not to inquire what is said or done against us.

4. To flee things or persons which are occasions of anger.

b) In anger:

1. To restrain immediately from the beginning the movements as they are arising or have arisen, especially by turning to other things.

2. To contain the tongue and movement, so that while anger lasts we do or say nothing.

3. To direct a small prayer to God.

c) After anger:

1. To excite in oneself an affection of charity toward the neighbor, to be loved on account of God.

2. To cast away every inordinate purpose of vengeance.

3. Frequently to ask for patience and meekness.

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Publisher's Notices

Little Works Published by R. P. Merkelbach, O.P.

Little works published by R. P. Merkelbach, O.P., in the collection "Pastoral Questions," were everywhere received with gratitude and approved by many praises.

I. Concerning Chastity and Lust: third edition

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The Month.

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Collationes Namurcenses.

We commend this little work of the distinguished Author in the best terms: for he has skilfully and coherently resolved a matter already much and long discussed, and indeed a difficult one.

Divus Thomas, Piacenza.

No theoretical digressions, but the proper, certain exposition of all that is required to form the trustworthy counselor and confessor.

Ons Geloof.

II. Concerning Embryology and the Ministration of Baptism: second edition

This volume brings together and develops, somewhat more than general treatises of morals do, the questions relating to abortion, to surgical interventions, and to the administration of baptism. In these matters, which give rise to so many distressing cases of conscience, one will learn with great interest the opinion of the eminent professor, whose fineness of analysis and rigor of reasoning are well enough known. He solidly proves the severe solutions proposed by the Church; he very happily refuses to proclaim a certain obligation when it cannot be proved in a sufficient manner.

J. Salsmans, S.J., Nouvelle Revue theol.

The doctrine in general is sound, the exposition clear and ordered, the end intended by the Author excellent. The little work will certainly prove useful, especially to priests who exercise the care of souls. We gladly recommend it.

Felice M. Capello, S.J., Gregorianum.

III. Concerning Various Categories of Penitents: second edition

...The doctrines are clearly expounded, the arguments briefly but solidly proposed, the solutions frankly given. And we shall open this work with the certainty that we shall find what we are seeking. For everything is there which ought to be there, and there is more than one expected to find. All kinds of penitents are reviewed, from children, the simple, those in occasions, relapsers, the habitual, the sick, etc., etc., even to the abnormal, the devout, the contemplatives, etc., etc. The author profits from these diverse questions to sketch small special treatises: ...on contemplation and its degrees, ...on the morality of dances and attire, ...on the absolution of excommunicates, ...on temperaments. How many instructive things professors of pastoral theology have no time to develop before their pupils! Here this is done by a master. Let confessors consult it: they will not repent of it.

G. Kiselstein, Revue Eccl. de Liege.

A truly excellent pastoral-theological treatise concerning the administration of the Holy Sacrament of Confession is given to us by Father M.... Through his clear expositions and right judgment this book obtains a proper value, of great use for every confessor.

Studien.

IV. Concerning the Minister of Penance and His Duties

Most Reverend Father,

...It is with lively gratitude that I have received your book *De Poenitentiae Ministro*; thank you for having sent it to me, and thank you also for having published it. I am persuaded that it is worthy of your previous works.

Your studies of pastoral theology will thus constitute a whole of the very first value. I wish for your books the widest and most lasting influence.

- J. E. Card. Van Roey.

Archbishop of Malines.

The learned Author, professor of Theology at Louvain, expounds with depth and clarity, both from the speculative and from the practical side, the questions of moral and pastoral theology which concern the jurisdiction and duties of the confessor, most important questions which are accustomed to be treated too briefly in the common scholastic treatises of moral theology.

Osservatore Romano.

They are both Pastoral treatises, and will be acceptable to all shepherds of souls. The former deals with the confessors' treatment of various classes of penitents, much as St. Alphonsus did so well in the "Homo Apostolicus." Father Merkelbach has given us the benefit of wide reading and a long experience. The second monograph deals with the confessor himself, his powers, jurisdiction, reservation, the Seal, etc... Though the Seminarist will hardly have time to read them with all his other work, the priest on the mission should find time to do so.

The Month.

V. Concerning the Parts of Penance and the Dispositions of the Penitent

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C. Salmon, O.P. — VII. Concerning the Sacrament of Marriage — Concerning the Sacrament of Marriage

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A. C., Collationes Namurcenses.

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Revue Eccl. de Liege.

The treatise on the "Sacrament of Marriage" by R. P. Salmon yields in nothing to those of R. P. Merkelbach: the same concision, the same clarity, the same precision in the exposition of the theory. We could add, the same concern to attach practice to theory, and to illuminate the latter by the former.

Revue Dominicaine (Canada).

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