SUMMA THEOLOGIAE MORALIS

according to the mind of St. Thomas and the norm of the new law

I

On Principles

by Fr. Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P.

Second edition, revised and emended

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Summa of Moral Theology — According to the Mind of St. Thomas — And According to the Norm of the New Law — Which for the Use of Schools — Was Edited by — Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P.

Professor of Moral Theology in the Angelicum College of the City.

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Approbations

We, the undersigned, by command of Superiors, have attentively read the second edition of the first part of the work whose title is: *Summa of Moral Theology according to the mind of St. Thomas and according to the norm of the new law*, written by the Very Reverend Father Master Friar Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P., Professor of Moral Theology in the Angelicum College of the City. We judge the aforesaid work to be most highly commended to all, and we hold it worthy that it be published.

October 10, 1935.

P. fr. B. M. Bonte, O.P., S.T.L.

P. fr. H. M. Bisschop, O.P., S.T.L.

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fr. M. S. Gillet, O.P.

Master General.

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V. Dupin, V.G.

Prologue

Good manuals of moral theology are not lacking. Yet few in the past century have proceeded from the Thomistic school. And those which have their origin elsewhere generally fail in the method or doctrine of St. Thomas, or also in the accurate declaration and demonstration of notions and principles. Many of the moralists are more attentive to practical applications, or are content to recite the more or less probable opinions of others; and very many of their works, it has quite recently been said, by their slightness or by the very catechetical form of questions and answers, have seemed to profess a less mature age of the science.

The return to the doctrine and method of St. Thomas, which has had such salutary fruits in metaphysics and dogmatics, has not extended itself in the same degree to moral theology, because of the harmful and persistent divorce between speculative and practical theology.

Having considered these things, perhaps it will not be unwelcome to hear from the Thomistic school a voice which, more than may be in the wishes of some, sets forth doctrine scholastically and by principles, yet within the limits of a certain moral summa. But since again and again they affirmed that the lectures which we were delivering in the theological college of Louvain for the elementary course answered, however imperfectly and deficiently, the aforesaid end, we now intend to make these public. They are according to the mind of St. Thomas, the Common Doctor; and according to the norm of the New Law, canonical and civil.

Roman law has everywhere been abolished, and to expound it practically in this work would rather generate confusion in minds than scientific usefulness. Therefore we consider only present-day law, especially French law, which, having been worked out earlier and being partly in force in our own country, has in many things been the model of others, although certain very recent codes may seem capable of having been more aptly formed and more perfectly.

In like manner, leaving aside the Decretals and the Corpus Iuris, we consider only the Code of Canon Law promulgated by Benedict XV, without, however, choosing that its order should be followed, because, however much it may be congruent with the science of law, nevertheless in moral questions all things must be adapted and subordinated to the order of theology, the supreme science.

May God grant that, under the patronage of the Blessed Virgin, mediatrix of all graces, this work may be able to contribute to the instruction of the clergy and the usefulness of schools.

Rome, in the Angelicum College, on the feast day of the Sacred Heart, June 27, 1930.

The Author.

General Moral Theology

Introduction

1. Notion of Theology. - Theology is a science deduced from the principles of revelation concerning God and other things in order to God. For, led by the light of supernatural revelation, it treats scientifically of the deity itself, that is, of God as God. Now God, under the aspect of deity, is a supernatural being, inasmuch as He is elevated absolutely above every created nature and natural knowledge, and knowable by revelation alone, and is the supernatural principle or cause and end of things, especially of man.

Theology embraces a twofold part: first, one is merely speculative, "concerning God in Himself and as He is the principle and end of things," which treats of God in Himself, one and triune, and of His works ad extra, especially of man, whom God has destined to a supernatural end: the intuitive vision of Himself, to which man can come through divine grace, which Christ bestows upon us. From this, secondly, there spontaneously arises the other, practical part: for if God is our principle and end, duties follow in us toward Him; namely, we must acknowledge Him as our author and tend toward Him as our ultimate end. This part immediately treats of human acts by which we tend toward God, and also, but consequently, of their rules and principles. Hence it is inscribed by St. Thomas: "concerning the motion of the rational creature toward God."

Thus in I, q. 2, in the proemium. - It is a treatise on man as the image of God "insofar as by image is signified what is intellectual, and free by choice, and possessing power over itself" (Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, 12), that is, "insofar as he himself is the principle of his acts, as having free choice and power over his works." St. Thomas, I-II, in the prologue.

In brief: theology is the science of supernatural religion. Religion is the moral bond between God and man. Hence theology treats not only of God, the author and end of supernatural things, and of man destined to a supernatural end, but also of the bonds and duties by which man is bound to God, and of the moral relations also which intervene between the two.

2. Difference between Speculative and Practical Theology.

Speculative and practical theology differ:

1. In end: speculative theology directly and solely tends to the knowledge of truth, which it seeks for its own sake, that is, for the perfection of the intellect, and in which it rests; practical theology tends further to right operation and seeks truth for the sake of something else, that is, for the perfection of the will. Namely, it seeks those truths which are necessary for acting well; indeed, because it is a rule of acting, it directly and principally intends to direct human acts and morals. Hence it speculates concerning practice.

2. In matter: speculative theology treats of those things which are merely to be known or also believed, which are called matters of faith or dogmas, and therefore it is called dogmatic;

practical theology treats of things to be known and at the same time to be done, which are called matters of morals, whence it is called moral.

3. Definition of Moral Theology. - Moral theology is defined: the part of theological science which treats of human acts to be ordered to God as supernatural end according to revealed principles. It is said:

1. Of science: for it is an evident and certain knowledge of truths which are deduced from certain principles and are coordinated among themselves into a synthesis by a logical connection and order; and thus it is distinguished from common and catechetical knowledge, which all the faithful in some way have concerning human acts and their duties.

2. Theological, that is, deduced from the principles of revelation; and thus it is distinguished from human and merely rational sciences, which proceed from the light of natural reason alone.

3. Part, because it is not a distinct species but only an integral and constitutive part of theological science. For theology does not embrace several sciences as philosophy does, but is an entirely one science, because it has one subject: God, and one formal reason (formal object by which): revelation. Hence moral theology is one and the same science with dogmatic theology, although they are different parts.

4. Which treats of human acts: this is the special matter of which moral theology treats and about which it is immediately occupied, namely, all human acts; and therefore it regards all things which pertain to them, and thus it is distinguished from dogmatic theology.

5. To be ordered to God as supernatural ultimate end: moral theology considers all things in order to God, the supernatural ultimate end, or to God as God. For theology has one principal subject, God, of whom dogmatic theology treats; and all other things, even human acts to be ordered, it considers in order and conformably to God, who is their supernatural principle, exemplar, and end. Hence moral theology is not a merely descriptive science, but a normative one, which judges human acts and directs them to the ultimate end; and yet it differs in species from natural ethics, which directs them to the natural end.

6. According to revealed principles: this is the formal reason, or the proximate motive and immediate medium by which the subject, which is the supernatural end, and the acts necessary for it are known. For revealed principles, admitted by the divine light of faith, are the medium for arriving at theological conclusions and for understanding them.

The conclusions themselves are properly the object of theological science, and they are concerning God and concerning things in order to God, especially, for the moral part, concerning human acts; although these are also customarily called by moderns the object: namely, God the primary object, other things the secondary object. But they understand the object about which theology treats, not the object which it asserts: the latter is theological conclusions.

4. Relation between Moral Theology and Other Disciplines.

From the preceding definition it is understood:

A. How moral theology differs:

1. From Moral Philosophy: the latter considers human acts in order to the natural end and relies on the principles of reason alone; the former, however, considers human operations as they are ordered to the supernatural end, and its proper medium of knowledge is divine revelation; whence they differ in matter and end, and at the same time in the formal motive.

Nevertheless, a) the supernatural end does not exclude but rather contains the natural end, as the perfect contains the less perfect; likewise b) revelation does not destroy reason but rather perfects it; finally c) revelation also teaches and expressly confirms many rational moral truths, and has others connected with itself. And therefore moral theology agrees in many things with moral philosophy and includes the matter of the latter. But it exceeds it, because it extends more widely even to revealed things, namely, to supernatural actions, virtues, and laws, and because it directs us by a higher light.

2. A fortiori, from the Science of Civil Law, Politics, Sociology, Economics, etc., which have a proximate end that is temporal, or also particular, not the ultimate end itself.

3. From Dogmatic Theology, as has already been said, n. 2.

4. From Ascetical and Mystical Theology: moral theology in the stricter sense treats more of acts necessary to the end insofar as they are under precept (according to the purgative way from sin); ascetical and mystical theology treat of acts insofar as they are of perfection and counsel, that the end may be attained better and more fully. For they teach the ways of perfection, either for progressing in virtue and acquiring perfection (according to the illuminative way), or for exercising perfection and contemplative union with God (according to the unitive and mystical way).

Yet if moral theology is considered in its full and complete sense, it includes ascetical and mystical theology, which rest upon the same principles. But, just as dogmatic and moral theology are now usually treated separately, although they are two parts of one and the same theological science, so nothing prevents those things which are more of precept and those things which are of perfection and counsel from being specially and distinctly explained, as is usually done, yet as integral parts of one practical science ordered to the supernatural ultimate end.

5. From the Science of Canon Law and of Liturgy, which study the scientific knowledge of laws, that is, of their origin, interpretation, and mutual relation to one another and to their proper end. For they are immediately concerned with the laws by which the external order of the Church or public worship is determined, and consequently certain acts of the faithful are directed, but proximately to the order and governance of Christian society, not to the ultimate end. Hence they directly regard the social order and the external forum; moral theology, however, is immediately concerned with acts, and only consequently with laws, even ecclesiastical laws, but it takes these laws in relation to the ultimate end and treats of their value in the forum of conscience. And considered in this way, positive laws already pertain to moral science, of which they are an integral part.

6. From Pastoral Theology: this properly is not a science, but a practical method and art by which the pastor of souls, according to the principles of moral and ascetical theology, leads the souls entrusted to him to salvation and perfection.

B. That it excels the other practical sciences 1) in end and necessity, for unlike them it does not tend toward a further end but is concerned with the ultimate end itself; 2) in extension, for it touches all operations in order to the ultimate end; 3) in certitude, for it rests upon the divine light itself. Hence it is the supreme practical science, and therefore is a) the norm of the others, by which they are to be regulated, insofar as, with respect to their proper end and with respect to the choice and use of means, they must be honorable, conformable to the ultimate end; likewise b) their mistress, because the others serve it insofar as it uses them as aids, disposing of them for its own end.

C. That moral theology, since it is concerned with the ultimate end itself, is the true science of happiness.

D. That, unlike Ethics, which hypothetically supposes and feigns man such as he could have been but never was nor will be, namely, in the natural state, Moral Theology considers man such as he truly is. And therefore it alone is absolutely the practical science of morals.

Vermeersch, *Theologia Moralis* I, n. 1.

E. That it is inferior to Dogmatic Theology: 1) for it treats of human acts, which are a certain secondary matter, whereas dogmatic theology treats of God, who is the chief and proper subject of theology; whence 2) dogmatic theology is the foundation of the moral part; indeed 3) the end, since the moral part is ordered to speculative theology perfected in heaven, where, namely, the motion into God ceases, and there is now perfect rest in God.

5. Division of Moral Theology. - Moral theology is divided into a twofold part:

a) The general part explains the general and common notions and principles upon which one must rest as upon a foundation in solving various moral questions. Hence it treats:

1. Of the last end of man, to which and according to which all human acts must be ordered. For although it is last in execution, nevertheless it is first in intention; knowledge of it must be presupposed as the source, root, and hinge of all the rest, because nothing is willed unless it has been foreknown. Hence it stands as a kind of principle in morals and in operable things, since we are moved from the end to the means, and our acts have their impulse from the end, and thus all things depend upon the end and are ruled by it.

2. Of human or voluntary acts, to be ordered to the end.

3. Of their rules, to which they must be conformed, proximate and remote, namely, conscience and law.

4. Conversely, of acts discordant with conscience and law, or of sins.

5. Of the principles of human acts, or good and evil habits, virtues and vices. - Concerning all these it treats not in particular but in general.

b) The special part treats specifically of individual good and evil acts, of individual species of conscience, of individual virtues and vices, and of individual precepts pertaining to all these.

6. Method.

In moral theology a threefold method is used: a) positive, when proofs are drawn more from the documents of revelation and canons are enunciated; b) scholastic, when principles are more illustrated by reason, conclusions are established, and all things are proposed systematically and in order; c) casuistic, when principles are especially applied to practical cases. But it is preferable to use the threefold method together, so that we do not neglect the documents of revelation, especially insist upon founded reasons and systematic proposition, and, for the sake of clarity, also apply principles to certain cases.

7. Sources of Moral Theology are the same as for dogmatic theology, which in fundamental theology are usually explained under the theological places. For theology rests upon revelation as its proper and principal source, which from the Council of Trent, session 4, we know "to be the source of all saving truth and discipline of morals" and "to be contained in written books and in unwritten traditions"; as upon a subordinate source it rests upon reason, which deduces conclusions from these.

A. The properly theological sources contain or attest revelation; they are:

1. Sacred Scripture. For "all Scripture, divinely inspired, is useful for teaching, for arguing, for correcting, for instructing in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, furnished for every good work" (II Tim. III, 16-17). For Scripture provides, as Leo XIII says (*Providentissimus*), "full precepts of holiness, exhortations seasoned with sweetness and force, examples outstanding in every kind of virtue; there is added, with the name and words of God Himself, the most weighty promise of rewards unto eternity, and the denunciation of punishments."

It hands down:

1. The fundamental notions and principles of morality in the perfect clarity of light.

2. Moral truths, not systematically as in a manual, but as the doctrine of God or of His legates, or as a practical norm for some or for all, or under the form of prayers, oracles of wisdom, promises, punishments, or praise and approval of persons.

3. Examples also of moral life, and certain cases practically solved.

Yet it is to be noted: a) that the doctrine of the Old Law is more imperfect than in the New Testament (Ezech. XX, 25; Gal. IV, 9);

b) that the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the law, by difference from the moral precepts, were to be abolished in the New Law;

c) that examples of the saints are not always commended by Scripture, nor are they always to be approved, since error in their moral life was possible;

d) that in the New Testament revealed moral doctrine could grow until the death of the apostles; thereafter there was present only a fuller recognition, explanation, and fecundation of the same doctrine, namely, by adapting it to diverse nations, cultures, questions, and necessities of times;

e) that mere counsels must be carefully distinguished from precepts strictly so called;

f) that certain things are also reported which are only particular and temporary statutes, as for example Acts XV, 28.

2. Divine Tradition, which, if it is doctrinal, directly; if merely practical or disciplinary, only indirectly makes moral science known, insofar as doctrine can be deduced from it.

It completes the Scriptures: moral norms, especially as regards the worship of God, from the beginning were handed down orally rather than in writing. It also confers firmness and interpretation upon the written word, because it certifies its divine authority and right sense.

3. The decisions of the Supreme Pontiffs, namely, infallible definitions concerning revealed or natural practical truths; condemned theses; practical laws established for the universal Church, which, even if they should not seem opportune to someone, cannot be evil or perverse, since that would be repugnant to the holiness of the Church; finally, the decisions of the Roman Congregations, which not only establish ecclesiastical laws, but also authentically interpret natural or divine law.

4. The decrees of ecumenical councils, whether they are infallible doctrinal definitions or disciplinary laws or decrees; likewise the decrees of particular councils, especially if they have been universally received.

5. The sense and practice of the Church, which become known either from the exercise of the ordinary magisterium of the Pontiffs and bishops in universal preaching or catechetical doctrine, or from the liturgy, piety, morals, custom, and life of the Church herself.

6. The unanimous consensus of the Fathers in moral questions, if they attest the doctrine of the Church itself, or if the Church confirms some doctrine of theirs in particular; otherwise to depart from their unanimous opinion would be nothing but temerarious.

7. The unanimous consensus of theologians, in the same way and under the same conditions as we have stated for the Fathers.

But it is to be noted: a) that the general approval of some Doctor, by which his doctrine is proclaimed as conformable to the doctrine of the Church, does not therefore have force for absolutely every single point; b) that special approval was given to St. Thomas on account of his authority in all theology, even moral theology, far eminent above all, by which he merited to be declared the heavenly patron of all Catholic schools and the common doctor of the whole Church, so that one must always adhere to his principles and in all things recur to his principles; c) that in the practical order the doctrine of St. Alphonsus also was specially approved, insofar as those who generally follow all his opinions are not to be disturbed; yet without those being reprehended who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors (Sacred Penitentiary, July 5, 1831).

B. The subsidiary sources, or those common to all rational and human sciences, are:

1. Human reason, which deduces conclusions from revealed practical principles, or demonstrates and illustrates natural moral truths, and from both makes applications.

Revelation itself teaches that reason is the proximate norm of morality, which is indicated by nature as such; whence moral theology must also consider the principles and conclusions of reason. Moreover, in order that moral discipline rule life, it must hand down not only general norms, but also descend to the concrete practice of private life; this is altogether impossible without rational knowledge and its use.

2. The science of philosophers, which serves theology, especially of those who cultivate ethics, and the other related human disciplines which bring assistance, such as juridical, social, and economic disciplines.

3. History, especially of the Church and of theology, of human moral science, of canon and civil law.

8. History of Moral Theology

The history of moral theology is divided into three epochs, according to the history of human culture. Moral doctrine indeed remained the same in its general principles and rules, but its knowledge and proposition were diverse. Systematic science itself did not exist from the beginning, but in the course of the centuries was slowly elaborated.

Besides special works, Bouquillon, *Fundamental Moral Theology*; likewise Koch, Mausbach, Prummer, and Vermeersch in their manuals, can be consulted.

I. The origin and beginnings of moral theology are in the age of antiquity and of the Fathers. The first testimonies for the most part are of edification, pronounced in a popular style, and given as occasion offered by way of instruction, exhortation, or application; only exceptionally, against false systems, do scientific dissertations concerning moral matter sometimes exist.

1. Before the Council of Nicaea, during the persecution, Christian ethics, conformably to the ascetical method, has a practical and parenetic character. Thus the *Didache*, or *Teaching of the Apostles*, setting forth the two ways (of life and death) and various admonitions, is a brief summary of moral doctrine; and the *Shepherd* of Hermas hands down twelve commandments in order to penitential practice. To these afterward were added those parts of the *Apostolic Constitutions* which reach back to this time.

Scientific exposition began in the Alexandrian catechetical school. Clement of Alexandria in the *Paedagogus* hands down an almost complete ethics; and in the book *Stromata* he philosophically investigates fundamental moral rules and defends them against pagan science and laxism. In the West Tertullian arises, whose moral writings present an aspect at once philosophical, juridical, and religious. Each is endowed with a rather rigorous spirit; the writings of St. Cyprian are more balanced and clearer.

2. The greater Fathers, after Nicaea, in sermons, commentaries on Scripture, letters, and special moral works, left abundant matter for the future science. Many wrote specifically on virginity: Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom, Methodius, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine; Ambrose wrote on the duties of clerics; Chrysostom on the priesthood. The writings of St. Augustine were of the greatest moment for moral matters, such as: *On the Morals of the Catholic Church*; *On the Work of Monks*; *On the Good of Marriage*; *Against Lying*. He deeply expounded the philosophical character of ethics, the intimate nature of supernatural ethics, and the psychological and ascetical realization of perfect moral life, while at the same time handing down many useful things in mystical and casuistic matters.

After him the most noted is St. Gregory the Great, whose writing *On Pastoral Care* was, as it were, the first casuistic theology, and who through his letters and the most celebrated work *Moralia* constituted a primary source of ascetical science for the time of the Middle Ages, in the same way as Dionysius the Mystic furnished the primary source of mystical science. They exercised an immense influence upon the following age.

II. The very construction of the edifice of Christian moral science was made by the Scholastics, in the time of the Middle Ages. At the beginning the writers are wholly engaged in collecting the sentences of the Fathers; various books of sentences appeared after the manner of Isidore of Seville and John Damascene. The joining together of moral and juridical matter was promoted by the penitential precepts of the Church, which were collected and ordered in penitential books both in the East and in the West.

From the eleventh century, in all theology a more penetrating intellectual method came to be used, which reached its height in the thirteenth century, no less for the moral part than for the dogmatic. Thus the scientific exposition of moral doctrine was separated from mystical and casuistic exposition.

The *Book of Sentences* of Peter Lombard is the textbook upon which even the greatest doctors wrote commentaries, such as St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Giles of Rome, and others after them. Theological summas were elaborated by William of Auxerre, by Alexander of Hales, by St. Thomas, two by Albert the Great, and by Henry of Ghent. In all these works they unite moral and dogmatic theology, and to the positive documents of Scripture and the Fathers they join rational and speculative foundations, upon which they chiefly insist according to the dialectical form and scholastic method. To the primitive tendency, which was rather Platonic-Augustinian, there succeeded the Aristotelian-Thomistic, which uses a sounder and deeper philosophy to illustrate revealed doctrine. The most perfect work, not yet surpassed, is the *Summa Theologica* of Aquinas, which stands forth among all by synthetic unity together with amplitude of doctrine, psychological keenness of genius, metaphysical depth, and measured judgment concerning even practical and juridical matters.

The doctrine of St. Thomas was attacked by the Scotistic school, from which arose Nominalism, which brought Scholasticism almost to ruin.

They also published special writings on virtues and vices, for example William Peraldus and Hervaeus Natalis; William of Auvergne and John Gerson wrote various moral treatises. At the end of the Middle Ages stands St. Antoninus, displaying in his *Theological Summa* scholastic art together with casuistry.

Ascetical and mystical theology generally remains under the influence of Augustine, Dionysius, and Gregory the Great; it was especially cultivated by Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, St. Bernard, Eckhart, Tauler, Suso, Ruusbroec, Dionysius the Carthusian, and Thomas a Kempis.

Collections of canons and penitential precepts furnished the occasion for exercising the casuistic-juridical method. Many moral summas of cases and penitential summas appeared, in which a great part is pastoral or canonical. The more celebrated is the summa of St. Raymond of Pennafort; after him Astesanus, Angelus de Clavasio, St. Antoninus, Sylvester Prierias, Tabiena, and Bartholomaeus Fumus deserve to be recalled.

III. From the time of the Council of Trent a new theological flowering arose: in Spain, at Salamanca, under the leadership of Francisco de Victoria, Melchior Cano, and Dominic Soto; in Italy, where Thomas de Vio Cajetan had already flourished earlier, who, second to none in commenting on St. Thomas, also published several practical writings.

From this time in the schools they commented on the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas. Commentaries upon it were written, among others, by Seraphinus a Porrecta, Bannez together with Bartholomew de Medina, Sylvius, Arauxo, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart, etc., all of whom pertain to the Thomistic school; likewise from the Society of Jesus: Toletus, Gregory of Valencia, Vasquez, Suarez, Tanner, Arriaga, etc.; also the doctors of the Sorbonne: Gammachaeus and Ysambert. Others followed Scotus.

Moral monographs of greater bulk were published: Suarez wrote on Laws and on Virtue and the State of Religion; Molina, Dominic Soto, Lessius, and Lugo wrote on Right and Justice, touching also questions of natural right, in which Francisco de Victoria had already gone before them.

Apologists and polemicists, such as Eck, the great Louvain theologians, Bellarmine, Becanus, and Bossuet, vindicate not only dogma but also Catholic morals.

At the end of the sixteenth century, moral discipline began to be handed down separately from dogmatic theology. Thus, for example, Azor, Thomas Sanchez, Peter de Ledesma, Laymann, Castropalao, Bonacina, Candidus, Sayrus, Sporer, Amort; afterward Martinez de Prado, Reiffenstuel, Lacroix, the moral Salmanticenses, Roncaglia, Cuniliati, Concina, Patuzzi.

This was the occasion of cultivating principles less, and of following the casuistic method, so that moral works were filled with many cases and practical observations. Thus arose very many collections of cases, marrow-books, directories of confessors, etc.; known to all are Azpilcueta Navarrus, Busembaum, Elbel, Wigandt, etc.

Ascetical and mystical theology came forth in innumerable writings. The more celebrated are held to be Louis of Blois, Louis of Granada, St. John of the Cross and St. Teresa, St. Francis de Sales, and finally St. Alphonsus.

From the middle of the seventeenth century a great controversy concerning the formation of conscience and the use of probable opinions flourished among Rigorists and Laxists, Probabiliorists and Probabilists, until St. Alphonsus, led by zeal for holy peace together with a balanced and practical genius, showed, at least for many questions, a middle way by which generally we can proceed safely in practice.

Now the unhappy process of separating moral theology from dogmatic theology, the preponderance given to the casuistic method, and the sharp controversy among moralists, together with political upheavals, brought theological morals to ruin.

In the most recent times, however, theological science has been restored, even in its moral part. They return to positive and supernatural ethics; and, with the Pontiffs promoting this from Leo XIII onward, also to the scholastic theology of St. Thomas. Many excellent manuals have been published, whose catalogue it seems rather idle to make. Yet larger and truly scientific works on moral matters are still very much lacking. And if the return to scholastic theology has borne fruit in dogmatic matters, that this has not yet sufficiently happened for the moral part is clear to the eyes of all. Outside the Thomistic school, in which the *Summa Theologica* is usually subjected to commentary throughout, that harmful separation of dogmatic and moral theology, of speculative and practical theology, always persists, which harms the deeper and truly scientific study of practical doctrine.

Three duties now seem incumbent upon moralists: 1. that, with the scholastic method restored, they strive to perfect rational investigation more fully and to inspect more the intrinsic reason of things; 2. that they treat not only of sins, especially mortal sins, but also set forth the doctrine concerning virtues, even in those matters which are of perfection or counsel; 3. that they attend more to new facts and present-day necessities, which have arisen from psychological, political, social, or economic conditions, and pursue more accurate solutions.

Bibliography. For the whole general part the following can usefully be consulted:

1. St. Thomas, with the commentaries of Cajetan, Medina, John of St. Thomas, Sylvius, the Salmanticenses, Billuart.

2. From the philosophers: Goudin, Roselli, Zigliara, Gredt, *Neo-Scholastic Philosophy* (of the Louvain school) in the noted manuals; among special works: Meyer, *Institutions of Natural Right*; Cathrein, *Moral Philosophy*; Beysens, *Ethics or Moral Doctrine*; Lehu, *Moral and Social Philosophy*; De Bie, *Moral Philosophy*; Van Hoonacker, *Moral Philosophy*; Sertillanges, *The Moral Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*; Wittmann, *Ethics*; E. Janssens, *Course of General Morals*; Van Oorschot, *Principles of Christian Moral Doctrine*.

3. From more recent theologians: Bouquillon, *Fundamental Moral Theology*; Raphael of St. Joseph, *Fundamental Institutions of Moral Theology*, and other general works known to all, such as Ballerini, Lehmkuhl, Noldin, and Vermeersch; Haine, *Mechlin Theology*, and Tanquerey; Prummer; Goepfert, Mausbach, and Schilling.

4. From historiographers: De la Barre, *Morals According to St. Thomas Aquinas*; Dom Lottin, *The Elements of the Morality of Acts in St. Thomas Aquinas*; Wittmann, *The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas*.

5. From sacred orators: Janvier, *Conferences of Notre-Dame*.

Treatise: On the Last End of Human Acts or On Beatitude

Introduction

9. Notion of End. - End etymologically signifies any terminus whatever, and thus death is called the end of life; but in the strict sense it designates that which finishes or terminates a tendency or action, upon the obtaining of which the agent ceases to act and rests from acting. But because a rational being directs itself to a terminus which it knows as good, therefore the end is also the cause which impels to acting, insofar as it excites desire or appetite for itself and thus allures the efficient cause to acting: "the end," says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, "although it is last (or the terminus) in execution, nevertheless is first (or the principle) in the intention of the agent, and in this way has the nature of a cause"; indeed, it is the first of all causes. Hence it is defined: that to which or on account of which, that is, for the sake of which, something is done.

In the end there can be considered: a) the thing which we desire to obtain (the end which, or objective end); b) its attainment, or the action by which possession of it is obtained (the end by which, or formal end); c) the person for whom possession of the thing is desired (the end for whom, or subjective end). These three, however, are not distinct and separate ends in the concrete, but elements integrating one total end: for we do not desire a thing except as to be possessed by someone.

10. Division of End. - The end is distinguished:

1. By reason of the subject: the end of the work, or intrinsic end, to which the work is ordered from its nature, which is identified with the object, as the relief of misery with respect to almsgiving; and the end of the one acting, to which the one acting orders the work, or which he intends. This is sometimes the same as the end of the work, sometimes diverse; and then, in relation to the object and the end of the work, it is extrinsic and accidental, whether it too is intended along with the former and is joined to the former, as if someone wills almsgiving on account of mercy and the glory of God, or whether, with the former neglected, it alone is intended and directs the act, as almsgiving given solely for fornication.

2. By reason of the terminus, the end is ultimate or intermediate. The former is that which is intended on account of itself and in which one rests, whether it is simply and absolutely ultimate, that is, in every genus of action and with respect to the whole of life, or is ultimate in a certain respect, that is, in some series of actions, as health or victory in the operations of medicine or war. But if it is referred to a further end, it becomes intermediate: this is intended on account of another end to which it is referred, as the relief of a poor man to the honor of God. But the intermediate and proximate end, and the ultimate and remote end, must not be confused: an end is proximate if it is intended immediately, with no other end interposed; remote, if it is intended by the will but through another end. Hence the ultimate end can be proximate or immediately intended, as happens in an act of charity.

3. By reason of causality or influence, the end (especially of the one acting) is total or adequate if the one acting acts on account of it alone, for example almsgiving on account of mercy; or

partial or inadequate if he acts at the same time on account of another, for example on account of mercy and vain glory. Partial ends either a) are equally principal if they exercise equal influence collaterally and move concomitantly to acting, so that each would suffice for placing the act, as to go to a city for business and for an extraordinary spectacle; or b) one is primary, or moving, and the other secondary, or impelling, according as the one acting is moved to acting per se, first, and principally, as a priest about to celebrate Mass on account of the worship of God, or less principally, consecutively and subordinately, and with another presupposed, even if otherwise he would not act, for example a priest at the same time celebrating on account of a stipend, who would not celebrate without the stipend.

4. By reason of effect, the end is called effected or produced, or obtained, according as it is made and produced by the operation of the agent, as health by the operation of the physician, or is obtained by the operation of the agent but is not produced, since, on the contrary, it is effected by the intervention of another, as the prize of a contest. These ends do not differ according to final causality, for each moves insofar as it is in intention, but according to being, because one exists before the operation, although it is not yet obtained, and is called antecedent; the other exists after the operation by which it is effected, and is called consequent.

11. Notion and Division of Good.

That to which a being tends as to a terminus cannot be anything except that which is suitable to it; likewise nothing can move someone to acting except what is known as apt to perfect him and seems suitable to him, whether it is truly suitable or according to appearance. Hence end and good are the same in reality, although they are distinguished in concept.

1. "The notion of good consists in this, that something is perfective of another by way of end." *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate* 3, a. 2. "The end is that in which the appetite of the agent rests... But it belongs to the notion of good that it terminates appetite, for good is what all things desire. Therefore every action and movement is for the sake of good." *Contra Gentiles* III, 3.

By reason of perfection, good is supreme or perfect, which fully perfects nature and is the absolutely ultimate end; and imperfect or participated, which perfects in some respect.

But by reason of appetibility it is threefold: a) honorable or rational, which is appetible in itself and for its own sake to a rational nature and is suitable to it: this is always a true good; b) useful, which is appetible for the sake of another, insofar as it serves another, or helps toward attaining another, for example medicine toward health; c) delightful, which is appetible insofar as it quiets appetite by the enjoyment of itself; this can be an apparent and false good if it is dishonorable, for we can also be delighted in dishonorable things.

2. It is an analogical division, for I, q. 5, a. 6, ad 3: "Good is not divided into these three as something univocal predicated equally of them; but as something analogical, which is predicated according to prior and posterior. For it is predicated first of the honorable; secondarily of the delightful; thirdly of the useful."

These three are diverse but not opposed, so that they can be found together: thus the exercise of virtue is honorable in itself, useful for salvation, and procures delight.

12. What We Suppose from Dogmatic Theology. - Besides the notions handed down, from real philosophy and dogmatic theology we suppose as known:

1. That God, in the production of the universe of things, necessarily intended as the end of the one acting His own intrinsic goodness, not as to be increased, but as to be communicated and manifested; and therefore God Himself is the first final cause, or the absolutely ultimate external end for whom, of the whole universe and of all creatures. Hence Prov. XVI, 4: The Lord has wrought all things for Himself (Rom. XI, 36; Apoc. I, 8; XXI, 6; XXII, 13; Hebr. II, 10). It is of faith from the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 1.

1. Cf. St. Thomas, in II *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1 and 2.

2. That God also intended the end of the work, fixed for the creatures themselves, and that this is His external glory, namely, the manifestation and glorification of His perfection by creatures. This is the primary end which of all creatures (Ps. XVIII, 2; Is. VI, 3; XLIII, 7; Eccli. XVII, 7). It is of faith from the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 1, canon 5.

3. That all creatures procure this glory of God in their own proper way conformably to their nature; specifically, irrational creatures procure only objective glory, which consists in the representation and manifestation of the perfection of God which they participate; rational creatures also procure formal glory, by acknowledging, praising, and loving the divine perfection.

4. That from His positive will and gratuitous goodness God has destined us to His supernatural glory, which is procured through habitual grace and infused virtues here on earth and through the intuitive vision of God Himself in heaven (I Cor. II, 6-12 and XIII, 12; I John III, 2). It is of faith from the Council of Vienne, articles 4 and 5, and from Benedict XII, the constitution *Benedictus Deus*, and from the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 2.

5. That God has furthermore given to individual creatures an end proper and internal to them, proportioned to their nature, which is the perfection itself or good of creatures. When they attain it, by that very fact they concur, as parts of the universe, toward the universal end of the whole created order and thus toward the glory of God. To the rational creature God gave as proper end happiness. This is the secondary end which, subordinated to the primary end (Gen. I, 27 sq.; Wis. XI, 24-25; XII, 13; Ps. VIII, 5). It is of faith from the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 2, and from the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter 1.

6. That man, unlike other beings which are moved and led into an end, properly and formally acts for the sake of an end, that is, by knowing the end as such and by freely moving and leading himself to it by the will (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 2).

13. Object of the Treatise.

In the present treatment we do not inquire concerning the primary end of the universe, which man has in common with other creatures, but concerning the secondary end which is proper to man, namely, concerning his beatitude: for from the fact that he was created for the vision and glory of God, it is not yet affirmed that the beatitude of man consists in this. And this end can be considered in two ways: 1) externally and passively, insofar as from the intention of the Creator it has been fixed for man, and this aspect is ontological and therefore metaphysical and dogmatic; 2) internally and actively, insofar as man is inclined to the end and ought to intend it by his own will and is morally obligated to this; and therefore insofar as the end is the source and root and, as it were, the norm of human actions, and this aspect is psychological and moral. And in this sense we inquire concerning the end or beatitude of man. Furthermore, it can be considered in two ways: a) formally and in the abstract, according to the very notion of ultimate end (what it is); b) materially and in the concrete, according to the very thing which is the ultimate end (in what it is). Now we inquire not only concerning the end in the abstract, but especially in what it consists in the concrete.

14. Division of the Treatise. - The treatise is divided into five questions:

1. On the ultimate end of man in common and beatitude in the abstract (that it is);
2. On objective beatitude (in what it is);
3. On formal beatitude (what it is);
4. On the qualities or dowries of beatitude (what things are required for it);
5. On the mode of attaining beatitude (how it can be obtained).

Question One: On the Ultimate End in Common

1. Unless otherwise noted, the places indicated in the text are from St. Thomas's *Summa*, in I-II, in the questions which we submit to commentary.

15. Thesis I. In all deliberate and voluntary, or human, actions, man, in the mode proper to himself, acts for the sake of some end or good. - It is proved:

a) From the notion of good: all actions which proceed from some power are caused by it according to the reason of its object. But the object of the will is good and end. Hence voluntary or human acts must be for the sake of an end (q. 1, a. 1).

b) From the notion of end: in causes subordinated per se, of which one does not move unless it is moved by another, there is no process to infinity; but when the first is removed, the others must necessarily be removed. But the end is first among causes, because nothing acts except from a determinate intention of an end: for if the agent were not determined to some effect, it would no more will or do this than that. Therefore all human acts depend upon and are derived from the intention of the end, and thus are done for the sake of the end (a. 2 and 4).

c) Billuart brings an argument from induction: all human acts are elicited or commanded by the will. Elicited acts are occupied either about the end, and then they are for the sake of the end, which by its goodness allures the will to love it; or about the means, and then they also are for the sake of the

end, since the will does not will them except for the end. Likewise commanded acts, because the will commands them from love of the end, so that through them as through means it may attain the end. Therefore.

2. Billuart, diss. 1, art. 2.

1. The aforesaid doctrine is not opposed by the fact that the ultimate end itself consists in certain actions, and therefore that all human actions are not for the sake of an end. - Response: St. Thomas, a. 1, ad 2: "If a human action is the ultimate end, it must be voluntary, otherwise it would not be human... But some action is called voluntary in two ways: in one way because it is commanded by the will, as walking or speaking; in another way because it is elicited by the will, as willing itself. But it is impossible that the very act elicited by the will be the ultimate end; for the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is color. Hence, just as it is impossible that the first visible thing be seeing, because every seeing is of some visible object, so it is impossible that the first appetible thing, which is the end, be willing itself. Hence it remains that if a human action is the ultimate end, it is itself commanded by the will; and thus some action of man, at least willing itself, is for the sake of an end. Whatever, therefore, man does, it is true to say that man acts for the sake of an end, even by doing the action which is the ultimate end."

16. Corollary.

From this it follows that all human acts receive their species (at least their physical species) from the end, whether a) they are considered actively, as an action proceeding from an agent, or as the motion by which man moves himself; and then they have their species from the formal principle. But the principle of an act of the will is its object, which is the good and the end (in intention); or b) they are considered passively, as a passion tending to something, and the motion by which man is moved by himself to a term; and then they are specified by the term. But that at which the human act is terminated is that which the will intends as an end (in execution) (a. 3).

17. Thesis II. In all deliberate acts man, at least implicitly, acts for the sake of the ultimate end of the whole of life, at least conceived abstractly and in common, or for the sake of perfect good. - It is proved:

a) From the notion of good: everything that man seeks, he seeks under the aspect of good. But good is sought either as a perfect, satiating good and ultimate end, or as an inchoation and part of perfect good, and therefore as tending to perfect good and the ultimate end, because the inchoation of anything is always ordered to its consummation, as every part to the whole (a. 6).

b) From the notion of ultimate end: the ultimate end stands in moving the will as the first mover stands in motions, because it is first in intention. But among movers there is no process to infinity, because second movers do not move except insofar as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary goods, or intermediate and subordinated ends, do not move the appetite except in order to the perfect good, which is the ultimate end (a. 6). And indeed, if there were a process to infinity in ends, and if all were intermediate and subordinated ends, there would be no end which the will would intend for its own sake and in which it would ultimately rest, none from which the will would first begin to be moved, and therefore it would never will anything, would never begin to do

anything; just as neither would an action once begun ever be terminated. And thus there would be no human act; and even if there were some act, it would be altogether vain (a. 6 and 4).

18. Thesis III. Man cannot at the same time choose two ultimate ends, but only one.

This is to be understood not only of the ultimate end taken formally and in the abstract, or of beatitude in common and the very notion of the supreme good, which evidently is one; but also of the ultimate end taken materially in the concrete, that is, of the thing in which man places the supreme good. Not indeed if the end is considered partially, because several things collectively taken can concur toward it as parts, which together constitute one perfect and integral good; but if it is considered totally, because the notion of the supreme good cannot be attributed to several things dividedly and separately, so that man would tend into several disparate things as into ultimate total and adequate ends not subordinated to one another, as if each one alone without the others were the whole ultimate end. And therefore Christ says (Mt. VI, 24): No one can serve two masters, namely, not subordinated to one another.

It is proved: a) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the perfect: someone seeks as ultimate end that which he seeks as a perfect good, completing himself and fully satiating him (from the intention of the one seeking); otherwise he would not rest in it and it would not be the ultimate end. Therefore the ultimate end so fills and satiates the whole appetite of man that nothing outside it is left to be sought.

But it would not fill nor fully satiate if something outside it, namely another end, could be sought and were required for its perfection.

Hence it cannot be that the will tend into two in such a way as if each were its perfect good and ultimate end.

This is confirmed: if there were two ultimate ends, neither would be the supreme and full good of the one seeking, neither would perfectly satiate the appetite, since with one obtained the other would be appetible. Whence they would at once be fully satiating, because ultimate ends, and they would not be, because outside each there would remain something appetible which would not be subordinated to it, namely, the other end.

b) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the first natural good: that which is naturally desired cannot be except one, because nature is determined to one and does not tend except to one; whence just as there is only one form and one species of one thing, so neither is there except one natural inclination.

But the ultimate end or supreme good is naturally desired.

Therefore the ultimate end is one.

The minor is clear from internal experience, and is also understood: just as in reason the principle is that which is known as naturally implanted, so in the will the principle is that which is desired by natural tendency; whence love of the end or of the supreme good is implanted in the will, because it is the principle in appetible things.

c) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the first thing specifying: in every genus of causing and operating, there is one principle from which all things are derived; otherwise there

would not be one genus.

But all human acts constitute one genus of operating and causing, because all appetible things of the will are of one genus, namely, a good befitting man; but the ultimate end is the first principle in this genus because appetible for its own sake.

Therefore the ultimate end is one. "Since voluntary actions receive their species from the end," says St. Thomas, "they must receive the notion of genus from the ultimate end, which is common" (a. 5).

19. Thesis IV. The ultimate end of man truly is happiness or beatitude. - It is proved:

The ultimate end is the highest and perfect good of man. But beatitude or happiness is nothing other than the possession of this highest good, sufficient and complete, which ultimately perfects and terminates every tendency and fully satiates and totally quiets the whole appetition of an intellectual nature, which consciously knows this full sufficiency of its own in the good and rejoices in it (I, q. 26, a. 1). Therefore the ultimate end of man is beatitude.

Hence beatitude can be defined, both objective: the perfect good totally quieting and satiating the appetite (q. 2, a. 8), or the most complete good which completes the whole appetition of a rational agent, so that nothing is left to be desired, or the perfect and sufficient good, excluding every evil and fulfilling every desire (q. 5, a. 3), the ultimate perfection of rational or intellectual nature (I, q. 62, a. 1); and formal: stable possession and rest in ultimate perfection, possession of the perfect good which totally quiets our desire, or a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods (Boethius).

That this beatitude truly exists and is possible for us is proved: man by an innate appetite and instinctive necessity tends to perfect beatitude, so that it is impossible not to think of it frequently and not to desire it, or sincerely to will the opposite. But an innate appetite cannot be vain, for otherwise our nature would be badly constituted; furthermore it is repugnant to the wisdom, truth, and goodness of God that He should have implanted in us an inclination and appetite for something which does not exist or which we are unable to attain. Therefore.

20. Corollaries.

1. The end is the cause, origin, and root of all affections. This "can be declared more fully not only by the example of light, which, because it is the first and highest visible thing, is the reason for seeing all differences of colors; or by the example of the motion of the heart, which, because it is the first motion of life, is the cause from which all vital motions flow; but still far more brilliantly by the comparison, most frequent in St. Thomas, of the intellect with the will. For the love of the ultimate end is related among appetible things as the knowledge of principles is among intelligible things; whence, just as first principles are the first things known, so beatitude or the ultimate end is the first thing willed. And just as we do not assent to particular conclusions except insofar as they cohere with first principles, so neither do we will particular goods except insofar as they are connected with the ultimate end, namely, beatitude. And finally, just as the knowledge of principles moves to all other cognitions, insofar as, enlightened by it, we understand the rest, and therefore it is the root of all cognitions, indeed the other cognitions are nothing but certain propagations and diffusions of that first light, so that first love of beatitude moves to other loves, insofar as, stirred up by it, we seek those things which lead to it, and it is the first root of all affections; indeed the other affections are

nothing but certain branches, shoots, and diffusions of that first love; or lines born from this circumference and terminated in its center, namely, beatitude. Whence Boethius excellently says, *On the Consolation*, III, prose 2: Every care of mortals, which the labor of manifold studies exercises, proceeds indeed by a diverse path, but nevertheless strives to arrive at one end of beatitude. And St. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book XIII, chapter 5: All men will to be blessed, and they most ardently desire this, and for the sake of this they desire the rest." Thus Goudin, *Philosophy*, part 3, q. 1, a. 1, § 1, conclusion 2.

2. Beatitude can be considered:

a) In the abstract, and thus it is the universal and complete good which man necessarily wills and cannot not will, and therefore in this all agree.

b) In the concrete, for the thing whose possession ought to render us blessed and perfectly good; and thus man, who does not possess it, freely tends to it, because he does not necessarily see the necessary connection of this or that good with beatitude. Hence under this respect men do not agree in the ultimate end (q. 5, a. 8; q. 1, a. 7).

Question Two: On Objective Beatitude

21. Thesis I. According to Catholic doctrine, the beatitude of man does not consist in created goods, neither external goods, nor internal goods of the body or soul, whether these are taken distributively or collectively.

This must be proved by parts. For the proof it is necessary to consider the conditions required for beatitude, which are not found in the aforesaid goods. For beatitude is the state perfected by the aggregation of all goods, or the stable possession of the perfect good which totally quiets the soul. Hence, that some good may be able to beatify man, perfectly complete and satiate him, it must be:

a) perfect in itself, or ultimately appetible for its own sake and not for the sake of another;

b) sufficient and supreme, or filling all legitimate aspirations of the intellect and will;

c) stable and unfailing.

These things being posited, it must be said that man cannot obtain his beatitude in created goods: whether external goods of fortune, or goods of the body, or goods of the soul, which, although under a manifold respect they are desirable, lack the three aforesaid conditions (q. 2, a. 4).

22. The first part A is proved: Beatitude does not consist in external goods, such as riches, dignities, honors, reputation, glory, power, etc. For these:

a) Are not desirable per se, but only on account of another, namely, on account of man, insofar as they either help toward acquiring goods of soul or body: thus riches are sought for sustaining life or enjoying pleasures; power is given on account of the republic and serves happiness as a means; or they rather suppose and follow perfection: thus honors, reputation, and glory do not make excellence, but suppose some excellence to be in man, of which they are the sign and testimony.

b) They are not sufficient, because they do not exclude every evil, since they are common to good and evil men; indeed evil can come from them. For often the more riches and honors abound, the more

they inflame desire; not rarely also, after some time, they bring in disgust and weariness; furthermore they are indifferent to good and evil, so that someone can use them badly, whence perfection is more in the good use of them than in the things themselves. Besides, those who have all these can lack many other things necessary for happiness, such as health of body, wisdom, tranquility of soul, etc. Therefore they do not fulfill all the legitimate aspirations of man.

c) Nor are they stable: for they are easily lost by some misfortune; hence they are acquired with labor, retained with solicitude and anxiety of fear, lost with sorrow, and at last at the time of death they pass away.

d) Beatitude is acquired by interior principles, namely, by our studious acts of intellect and will, and perfects man intrinsically, since man is naturally ordered to it; but those things are rather from exterior causes, indeed often from fortune.

This the Scriptures teach: concerning riches, Mt. V, 3; Eccli. XXXI, 8; Eccles. V, 9; Ps. LXI, 11; concerning honor, III Kings X, 24 and XI, 4; concerning reputation and glory, Is. XL, 6 sq.; concerning power, Wis. VI, 1 sq.

23. The first part B is proved: Beatitude does not consist in goods of the body, which consist in health, strength, vigor, beauty, sensual pleasure, and delight of the senses:

a) By their nature they are subordinated to goods of the soul, whence they are not to be sought on account of themselves; nor are they truly useful except insofar as they serve the operations and perfection of the soul. The very being of the body is not the end, because it is not the highest good: for the being of the soul is more principal, because the being of the body depends upon the soul and not vice versa. Hence goods of the body are ordered to the soul.

b) They do not fulfill all the legitimate desires of man, for they are common to beasts and men, and therefore they do not satiate the nobler appetites of the soul, nor constitute the proper end of man, nor exclude all evils, but are common to the good and the evil. Indeed, when someone immoderately indulges bodily delights, the powers of the soul are depressed, and man becomes like a beast, since he is delighted with the same pleasures and rests in them against the right order of reason.

Moreover, delight per se is not principally beatitude, but its accident, which follows total or partial beatitude; a fortiori bodily delight, which follows a sensible good that pertains to the body, and therefore is not the perfect good of man.

c) Besides, how uncertain and unstable they are, there is no one who has not experienced it (cf. Gen. III, 19; Wis. II, 1-9).

24. The first part C is proved: Beatitude does not consist in goods of the soul.

a) It is not the very substance of the soul, because this must be completed from without, as being in potency to act and to further perfection, for example wisdom and virtue; whence it is not the ultimate end of itself.

b) It is not faculties or habits, because these also are in potency to act.

c) It is not the acts themselves, because they are something finite. But the human appetite tends to universal and complete good; yet any good inhering in the soul itself, even an act, is a participated and consequently particularized good. Hence it is impossible that any of them should be the ultimate

end of man. Moreover, acts depend upon the object, and therefore they are perfect and can satiate the human appetite only if they attain the universal true and highest good, which cannot be found in finite things intrinsic to the soul. And therefore the very thing which renders us blessed is not a created good intrinsic to the soul, but exists outside the soul, although the attainment and possession of it is an act of the soul.

Hence specifically beatitude is not wisdom and virtue, which, moreover, in this life do not place us in possession of the complete good. For virtue does not satiate, but makes the appetite right, and can be lost; it is the way to beatitude, and happiness itself is the reward of virtue. Wisdom is a means of acquiring truth, tending toward total and perfect truth. But those things cannot perfectly quiet the appetite.

25. The second part is proved: Beatitude does not consist in created goods taken collectively.

Their unsuitability for beatitude comes not from their quantity, but from their nature, intrinsic imperfection, and limitation, and therefore it cannot be removed by mere accumulation. And no one has possessed or will be able to possess all these things at once. Cf. Eccli. I, 2; XII, 8; 13-14; Ps. LXXII; Eccles. II, 11; Wis. II; Mt. XVI, 21-26.

26. They object that there are many who care little about God and place happiness only in created things. - Response: This moral perversion is a fact of humanity corrupted by sin. This is explained from a twofold cause: 1) from the fact that eternal goods, as invisible and future, seem to us more remote, and therefore affect the mind less; while, on the contrary, created goods, visible and present, appear nearer and procure actual delight. Nevertheless, right reason teaches that eternal and future goods are to be preferred to these transitory and imperfect goods, and faith teaches the same, the Apostle admonishing in II Cor. IV, 17: "For that which is at present momentary and light in our tribulation works above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory in us"; 2) from the fact that men, by indulging earthly pleasures against conscience, have become animal, pursuing sensual delights more than spiritual things; "but the animal man," says the Apostle, I Cor. II, 14, "does not perceive the things which are of the Spirit of God." Yet reason shows that intellectual goods, as higher, are to be preferred to sensible goods, and that all sensible and earthly things will have an end; these things considered, the man who intends to act rightly desires eternal happiness that will endure perpetually.

1. Tanquerey, *Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis*, n. 17.

27. Thesis II. God alone is the true and complete beatitude of man. - It is proved:

1. Indirectly, from the fact that beatitude does not consist in any created good; therefore in uncreated good, God.

2. Directly: "For beatitude is the perfect good, which totally quiets the appetite; otherwise it would not be the ultimate end, if something to be desired still remained. But the object of the will, which is the human appetite, is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal truth. From this it is clear that nothing can quiet the will of man except universal good; and this is not found in anything created, but only in God, because every creature has participated goodness. Hence God alone can fulfill the will of man... Therefore in God alone

does the beatitude of man consist" I-II, q. 2, a. 8. Hence St. Augustine, *Confessions*, book I, n. 1: God, "You have made us for Yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in You." Cf. Ps. XV, 2, 5, 10; LXXII, 25-26; CII, 5.

They object that the aforesaid argument is not valid. For universal good is either abstract (universal in predicating), and then the conclusion does not follow, because such a good is found in any created good whatever; or it is concrete or complete universal good (universal in being), and then there is a begging of the question, for concrete universal good is nothing but God. - Response:

1. In the argument of St. Thomas, universal good is taken abstractly, but not formally as abstracted from concrete existence, or as good in common, which can be any good whatever; but most broadly as unlimited, and absolutely as every good, prescinding from finite and infinite and not contracted to this or that good. But what is limited exists in individual created beings. Therefore those things are not the universal good which is the beatitude of man. Namely, the power of the intellect extends to every true thing, and therefore the power of the will to every good; whence it is not satiated if it possesses one good, since it can still extend itself to another. Some participated and finite good does not exhaust the extension of the object; only infinite good does this.

1. Thus Cajetan, on q. 2, a. 7 and 8; Sylvius, Medina, the Salmanticenses, Lehu.

2. Even if concrete universal good were understood, the argument could be valid, by understanding good not absolutely, but the complete good of man. But man is able to know not only created and finite truth but also uncreated and infinite truth, and therefore he can also seek uncreated or infinite good. Therefore the complete good of man is not finite good but infinite good.

28. Corollary. - From all these things it follows that the supreme beatitude of man truly coincides with the ultimate end of the universe, and essentially consists in attaining it; and not only in the same object, but also in the same act of knowledge and love, namely, in knowing, loving, and therefore glorifying God. Thus while man pursues the glory of God, the primary end, by that very fact he promotes his own happiness, which is the secondary end because the good of the creature must be subordinated to the good of the Creator as ultimate end; and by attaining his own good, he also glorifies God, and by tending toward his proper good, by that very fact he tends toward the good of the universe. Hence the two ends are really identified, but differ in reason. The highest glory of God is our beatitude, and our highest good can be nothing other than His highest glory. Thus through beatitude man fulfills the ultimate end of the universe, because he proximately seeks objective beatitude as his own good, but at the same time ultimately as divine good.

29. Observations.

1. That God may be the object of human beatitude, there is not required a proportion of entity (that is, of quantitative commensuration or equality) between human nature and God, but a proportion of objective habitude and final relation (of proportionality) suffices, that is, the capacity and ordination of the appetite for attaining Him. Supplement III, q. 92, a. 1, ad 6.

2. In this sense the human appetite can in some way be called infinite according to object and appetition and habitude and capacity, although subjectively, as to being, it is finite. Thus also subjective beatitude is a good of which man is capable as of a thing intrinsic and inhering and therefore finite; objective beatitude is a good of which he is capable as of an object, which is infinite. I-II, q. 2, a. 8, ad 3.

3. Nevertheless man does not seek God so as to possess Him in an infinite mode (which is impossible for a creature), but tends to possess Him as much as is possible by his powers, namely, in various degree according to each one's proper capacity, disposition, and preparation. Ibid., q. 3, a. 8, ad 2.

4. Man does not seek God as a mere means which he uses for beatifying himself, as if God were a useful good which is loved only for the sake of something else, but as the highest good, the cause of beatitude and the source of all perfection and the ultimate end, who is loved for His own sake and to whom, therefore, man himself is ultimately subordinated. In other words, he does not so much seek God for the sake of beatitude, but rather beatitude for the sake of God.

5. On the part of the object, no created goods besides God are essentially required for man's beatitude, because He is the infinite good capable of satiating all appetitions. Yet there are several created, sensible, and bodily goods which pertain to beatitude consequently, but follow as if spontaneously from essential beatitude. For by force of divine possession the blessed one will certainly have the things he reasonably desires.

6. The beatitude of the soul is also the beatitude of all the sensitive and bodily faculties. For man is a being truly substantially one, one nature tending to one end. And therefore the sensitive and vegetative parts do not have a diverse end exclusively proper to themselves, but are subordinated to the intellective part and attain their perfection and their true end when, in the attainment of rational good, they perfectly serve and aid the superior part. Hence when the rational part obtains its ultimate perfection in the possession of God, it attains the end of the whole nature, and by that very fact the other parts are completed immediately or mediately in a mode proportioned to their nature. This will be done perfectly in the other life after the resurrection, because there will no longer be any struggle among the human faculties, but a perfect subordination to one another.

Question Three: On Formal Beatitude

S. Th. I-II, q. 3; C. Gent. III, 35, 26, 37, 40, 44.

30. State of the Question. - Formal beatitude (*eudaimonia*) is the possession or fruition of the Highest Good. The Highest Good is God. But since God is a good distinct from us and external, we shall not be blessed unless in some way we are joined to Him Himself. Hence, although as to cause or object it is something uncreated, nevertheless beatitude itself according to essence or form is something created existing in man himself.

Whence it is now asked by what created mode that attainment is made, or what is that union with God by which subjective beatitude is constituted (q. 3, a. 2).

31. Thesis I. Formal beatitude consists in the most perfect knowledge of God which man can acquire according to his capacity, and in the love following upon it. - It is proved:

1. Formal beatitude consists in the conscious conjunction of ourselves with the beatifying object, God.

But God, as immaterial, cannot be attained directly and formally by sense, but only by the mind, that is, by immaterial faculties, intellect and will; for He is an intelligible good, not a sensible one.

Therefore formal beatitude cannot consist except in an act of intellect and will, or in knowledge and love. But it is knowledge relatively most perfect according to each one's capacity, so that nothing remains to be desired by him; otherwise it would not be our ultimate perfection or true beatitude.

2. From St. Thomas after Aristotle: formal beatitude consists in an act, not of the inferior and sensitive part, but of the intellective part, and indeed in the contemplation of God and the love following upon it. For:

a) it is not in potency or habit, but in act, because the ultimate perfection of man is in act and operation, which is the ultimate act of the one operating. For since potency is ordered to act, nothing is perfect unless it is in second act. Whence a thing is said to be for the sake of operation (a. 2);

b) it is in the operation, not of the sensitive part, which man has in common with beasts and by which he cannot be joined to God, but in the operation of the most excellent part, which is especially proper to man, namely, of the intellective part (a. 3);

c) it is in the best operation of the intellective part, namely, with respect to the best object: spiritual faculties are fully perfected and satiated only when they fully attain this object, through contemplation of the Highest Truth and fruition of the Highest Good. Therefore beatitude consists in the knowledge and love of God; and indeed in the most perfect degree possible (a. 5).

3. "Each thing tends into the divine likeness as into its proper end" (or proper good; for every being is perfect insofar as it participates, according to its capacity, in the goodness of the highest good). "Therefore that through which each thing is most assimilated to God is its ultimate end. But the intellectual creature is most assimilated to God by the fact that it is intellectual: for it has this likeness before other creatures, and this includes all others. But within the genus of this likeness, it is more assimilated to God according as it actually understands... God Himself; for God, by understanding Himself, understands all other things. Therefore to understand God is the ultimate end of every intellectual substance" (*Contra Gentiles* III, 25).

4. Hence the Scriptures and the Fathers call the end of man eternal life. But life is the motion of a living being proceeding from itself, and is not in habit but in operation: namely, it is the vital operation by which it lives in second act. This life is the knowledge of God, according to John XVII, 3; it is the love of charity (I Cor. XIII, 8-13) and intimate friendship (Apoc. XIX, 7; XXI); and in this our beatitude consists (Mt. V, 8; XXV, 21, 34, 46).

32. Thesis II. In the present order of Providence, beatitude is not natural, consisting in the abstract, mediate, and analogical knowledge of God, even though most perfect, but supernatural, consisting in the immediate, intuitive, and proper vision of the divine essence.

The natural end is that to which we would have been destined if God by gratuitous goodness had not elevated us to the supernatural end, the vision of Himself in Himself. Now the natural end is the attainment of God known by reason alone, or abstractive contemplation of God through creatures, but in the most perfect mode by which it could be done by our powers, namely, by a science of the whole universe so perfect that nothing naturally knowable would remain; for if nature possesses all things to which it can arrive by its own powers, now all its absolute desires are fulfilled and nothing remains to be desired. This is our natural happiness, owed to nature.

But now we are destined to a supernatural end beyond the exigencies and powers of our nature, namely, to seeing God in an intuitive mode, face to face, without medium, that is, to seeing and loving God and enjoying Him in the same mode (although not in the same degree) as God sees and loves Himself and enjoys Himself, so that we participate in the divine life itself (St. Thomas, I, q. 62, a. 1; Q. D. *De Veritate* 27, a. 2).

Thus we shall have not only natural happiness, but we shall be sharers of divine happiness itself.

It is proved:

1. From the Scriptures. a) St. Paul, describing the state of final perfection, teaches that it is in the vision of God, face to face (I Cor. XIII, 12). The expression "face to face," according to Hebrew usage, always indicates the presence of person to person; and to see face to face signifies intuitive vision in itself, especially because it is opposed to mediate knowledge (through a mirror), and to imperfect and obscure knowledge (in an enigma), and to analogical knowledge (in part). Hence the Apostle adds: then I shall know even as I am known, that is, by God; but God sees us intuitively; therefore we also shall intuitively see God.

b) St. John, who called eternal life the knowledge of God (XVII, 3), adds that in it we shall see God as He is, because we shall be like God (I John III, 2), who sees Himself; but God sees Himself intuitively; therefore we also, being like Him, shall so see Him.

2. From Tradition, whose witnesses are Benedict XII in the constitution *Benedictus Deus* (1336), and the Council of Florence (for the union of the Greeks) after the Council of Vienne (a. 5), which define as a dogma of faith that beatitude is the vision of God. But this is supernatural, as we know from the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 2 and canon 3.

3. These things being posited, St. Thomas proves from reason that the natural end can no longer satiate man, nor therefore be perfect happiness: man is not perfectly blessed so long as there remains for him something to be desired and sought. But the intellect seeks perfect knowledge of the very essence of things: thus, seeing an effect, it naturally desires perfectly to know the very essence of the cause, insofar as this is possible to it. But the human intellect knows the effects of God and thus knows that God is. Hence there remains to it a natural desire to know perfectly the very essence of God (which we know from revelation to be possible), and thus it is not yet perfectly blessed unless it sees that essence (a. 8).

1. We add: insofar as it is possible..., which we know from revelation to be possible. For the argument of St. Thomas is not stringent and rigorous unless it is first known that the vision of God is in fact possible for us in the present order; and this we know only from revelation, but it was proved in I, q. 12, a. 1; otherwise there would not be an efficacious and absolute desire of seeing God, but merely an inefficacious and conditioned desire of seeing Him "if it were possible," a desire of such sort as does not impede beatitude and need not be fulfilled, since that is naturally impossible. But if you should say that such a restriction is not added by St. Thomas, and therefore is not to be supplied in his argumentation, then the argument would have to be regarded either as one of mere fittingness, not as apodictic, or as showing that special obediential potency which is naturally in man and by which he is capable of being elevated to the vision of the divine essence.

From this it follows that natural beatitude is not happiness simply and absolutely perfect, as being not the whole happiness possible in itself which can befall man, but is only perfect in a certain respect and relatively for the natural state alone; but in the supernatural order of elevation to the intuitive vision of God, it can no longer in any sense be called perfect. Whence the Scholastics are not accustomed to call the natural ultimate end perfect happiness, but reserve the name for the supernatural ultimate end of the vision of God.

33. Thesis III. Beatitude, although according to its quasi-physical essence it embraces the three acts of vision, love, and fruition, according to its logical or metaphysical essence consists in the knowledge of God alone.

This is the opinion of St. Thomas, while Scotus places beatitude in the act of love alone, but St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, and Suarez require both acts, of intellect and of will.

In beings, essence can be considered in two ways: a) completely in the concrete, for the complex of all the elements which constitute a thing in its species and distinguish it from others, and this is physical essence; b) abstractly and in its fundamental element, for the perfection which first and per se constitutes a thing and distinguishes it from others and is the root of all things which pertain to the thing, and this is metaphysical or logical essence. These notions can be applied to beatitude, but analogically, because it is not a per se being but only an action and therefore an accident. Now we say that beatitude, if it is considered completely according to all essential and necessary elements, embraces an act not only of the intellect but also of the will; but if it is considered according to its fundamental element as the very attainment of the highest good from which the other goods flow, or as the action by which man primarily attains and possesses the highest good, we say that it is only an act of the intellect.

It is proved:

1. Negatively: beatitude does not consist in an act of the will, namely, of love or joy, because that act cannot be the attainment of the highest good.

For the will is inclined to something and by affection alone is terminated at the thing and attains it, but not effectively and really. But inclination is not the attainment of the good; otherwise it would suffice to will something intensely in order to possess it (a. 4).

And indeed every act of the will toward the good is either an inclination toward an absent good, and then it is not the attainment of the thing; or a quieting in a present good, and then it supposes possession and attainment already. Thus in species: fruition or rest in a possessed good does not make the possession of the good but follows it; desire is a tendency toward an absent good; and love abstracts from the presence and absence of the good, by which therefore no good is made present. Therefore no act of the will makes us possess God, nor is it the essence of beatitude.

2. Positively and assertively: beatitude consists, at least partially, in an act of the intellect.

For the essence of beatitude is the act of the power most proper to man and most noble. But this is the intellect, both because its object is more universal, more simple, more immaterial, and more abstract, and because it is the power nearer to the soul and from which the will itself arises. Therefore (a. 5).

Nor should you say that the will is nobler, which moves the intellect itself. For, on the contrary, "first and per se the intellect moves the will: a) For the will as such is moved by its object, which is the apprehended good; but the will moves the intellect as if per accidens, namely, insofar as understanding itself is apprehended as good and so is desired by the will. From this it follows that the intellect actually understands, and in this very thing precedes the will: for the will would never desire to understand unless first the intellect apprehended understanding itself as good. b) And again, the will moves the intellect to operating in act in the mode in which an agent is said to move; but the intellect moves in the mode in which an end moves, for the understood good is the end of the will. But the agent is posterior in moving than the end, for the agent does not move except on account of the end. Whence it is apparent that the intellect is simply higher than the will, but the will is higher than the intellect per accidens and in a certain respect" (*Contra Gentiles* III, 26).

3. Positively and exclusively: beatitude consists in the act of the intellect alone. - For:

a) The essence of happiness is the attainment of the highest good, which is an intelligible good. But the highest intelligible good cannot be possessed except by the act of intellect alone: for the will is borne toward an object outside itself and is only an inclination toward it, whereas the intellect apprehends the object and draws it to itself, and thus sets it before itself as present and is joined to it really and effectively, and so truly possesses it. Therefore the essence of happiness is obtained not by the will but by the intellect alone.

b) The essence of beatitude is the first act which truly attains God Himself and is the root of all the other things which are required for beatitude. But this is the act of the intellect alone, because it first attains God and is the root from which love and joy necessarily arise. Therefore the essence of beatitude is the act of the intellect alone, not of the will (a. 4).

34. Corollaries.

From the aforesaid things it can be concluded with St. Thomas:

a) That beatitude consists more in the speculative intellect than in the practical (a. 5), which is clear from three things: first, because the best object of the intellective power is the divine good, which is not the object of the practical intellect but of the speculative; whence beatitude especially consists in the contemplation of divine things; secondly, because contemplation is especially sought for its own

sake, whereas the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action; but actions themselves are ordered to some end. Whence it is manifest that the ultimate end cannot consist in the active life but in the contemplative; thirdly, because in the contemplative life man communicates with higher beings, namely, with God and the angels, to whom he is assimilated through beatitude; but in those things which pertain to the active life, animals also communicate in some way with man. And therefore ultimate and perfect beatitude wholly and principally consists in contemplation.

b) That beatitude nevertheless does not consist in human speculative sciences (a. 6).

c) Nor does it consist in the knowledge of spirits (a. 7).

35. Observations.

1. Love joins one to God in a new and thus more perfect mode, but only affectively, not really. And although the will tends to the possession of God, it tends to this mediately, through the act by which God can be possessed, namely, through the act of knowledge.

2. Beatitude is the object of the will as appetible, but not as attainable. Likewise beatitude is the attainment of the ultimate end, not as of an appetible good alluring the will, but as really possessed by the intellect.

3. The act of the intellect is ordered to love and delight, not as a means to an end, but as cause to effect and essence to the consequent property.

4. Beatitude is ultimate perfection by way of attainment of the good, but not by way of property and complement.

5. The metaphysical essence need not be the highest good, nor fulfill all desires, nor render one perfectly blessed formally, but only radically and fundamentally: in the same way, rationality alone does not render man perfect formally but fundamentally.

6. The act of the will is more perfect than the act of the intellect by moral perfection, but not by physical and natural perfection except in some way per accidens; and it is never more perfect in the genus of attainment and possession.

7. For the beatific vision there is required on the part of our intellect the divine light of glory, which elevates and strengthens the intellect and renders it capable of intuiting God (Council of Vienne, a. 5); on the part of the object no intelligible species is required. These things are explained in dogmatic theology.

8. The beatific vision is not owed to nature, because there is not given an innate appetite for obtaining it, but only an elicited natural appetite, not efficacious, however, but inefficacious and conditioned, that is, insofar as that vision is possible; namely, there is innate in the rational creature only an immediate obediential potency, which by positive ordination does not postulate the vision of God or incline to it, but which is apt to be elevated to seeing God. This is explained in the same dogmatic theology.

9. Beatitude does not consist in the insertion of God into the essence of the soul (as Henry of Ghent and John of Ripa said), because only operation renders us perfect and conscious of the possession of God; nor in the uncreated vision of God communicated to the creature (as the Master of Bonne-Espérance willed): for the act must be from within and proceed from the one operating; the action of God is not intrinsic to us and does not proceed from us; therefore it does not render us blessed nor seeing God.

Question Four: On the Qualities of Beatitude

S. Th. I-II, q. 4, and q. 5, a. 4.

The qualities of beatitude, which necessarily follow from its very essence, are distinguished as three in the soul, namely, supreme delight or joy, impeccability, and unlosableness; besides, a perfect body seems to be required, adapted to the perfect state of the soul, which therefore must be raised by God.

36. Thesis I. Supreme delight, or ineffable joy, which supposes and includes love, necessarily follows from the essence of beatitude.

This is clear from the Council of Vienne (a. 5) and from Benedict XII: they declare that in beatitude there are the vision and fruition of God.

For by beatitude man attains perfect knowledge of the highest truth and possession of the highest goodness, and understands that nothing is better for him. Hence the will is borne toward this with all its powers in the highest degree, and therefore by loving, it rejoices in that highest good and rests in it.

And indeed he necessarily loves and rejoices, so that he cannot not love nor rejoice. Thus we speak against the Scotists. For the intellect, with the highest evidence, proposes God as the highest good, supremely lovable, and the love of Him as the embrace and fruition of infinite good; nor can it represent otherwise, because it is immune from error, so that there cannot appear even a shadow of evil or of what is unsuitable or impeding a greater good in God and the fruition of God. Indeed, the intellect cannot fail to think of this. But the will is essentially an appetite following the intellect. Hence necessarily and at every moment it necessarily loves the highest good and rejoices in its possession. - In other words, the blessed one necessarily and without interruption sees his beatitude to consist in God, namely, the necessary connection of this object, God, with his beatitude. But no one can will not to be blessed. Therefore the blessed one necessarily wills God, and loves and rejoices.

This the Scriptures declare (John XVI, 22; Mt. V, 12; Rom. VIII, 18), and by various metaphors of satiety, inebriation, and a torrent of pleasures (Ps. XXXV, 9; XVI, 15), so that every evil, pain, and sadness is taken away from the blessed (Apoc. VII, 16-17; XXI, 4), and they possess the kingdom (Apoc. XXII, 5; Mt. V, 3, 10).

Thus contemplation of the highest truth, God, is the root of all things required for happiness (Boethius, *On the Consolation*, book 3; St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* III, 63; Goudin, *Philosophy*, part 3, q. 1, a. 3, c. 3): for excellently it grants a) the sufficiency which riches promise, for God is possessed, who alone suffices, and truth is perfectly known as intellectual nature desires; b) the joy which delights promise, because contemplation of truth is the one pleasure of the mind, and greater than all

pleasures by as much as it is more spiritual and purer (without mixture of sadness and solicitude); c) the celebrity which reputation promises, because it makes man distinguished before God and intellectual creatures; d) the reverence which wisdom promises, for he is supremely wise who perfectly contemplates the highest truth and is joined to God; e) security from evils and in goods, which power promises, because that highest contemplation is eternal and unlosable, and most closely joins one to God, in whom is every good and to whom no evil can approach.

37. Observation. - The delight which accompanies beatitude is caused by the fact that the appetite rests in the good possessed; nevertheless it is not principal in beatitude, but vision is more excellent than delight, both because cause is more excellent than effect, and because delight is on account of operation and not conversely. For delight consists in a certain quieting of the will; but that the will is quieted in something is only on account of the goodness of that in which it is quieted. Therefore if the will is quieted in operation, it does this on account of the goodness of the operation, and seeks delight in the operation because the operation is its good. And thus the more principal good is the very operation in which the will is quieted, rather than the quieting of the will in it.

38. Thesis II. From beatitude there also follows impeccability, or rectitude of the will.

This is of faith from Benedict XII, and is indicated by the Apostle saying that charity never falls away in the other life (I Cor. XIII, 8); hence this is called an undefiled inheritance (I Pet. I, 4). - It is proved:

1. Sin is the greatest evil; but this is excluded while possession of the highest good stands.

2. Sin supposes error or inconsideration: for the will wills nothing except under the aspect of good; therefore for sin it is required that the intellect represent some evil under the appearance of good, or fail to attend to something to which it ought to attend. From this it happens that it proposes to the will something to be willed here and now, or to be willed in this way, which was not to be willed. But error or inconsideration, as an intellectual evil, cannot be admitted in the state of the highest good. Therefore.

1. We say this because some assert that not every sin is from error, but that it can arise from mere inconsideration. The question seems to be about words: for although it does not always arise from speculative error or from explicit practical error, nevertheless there always seems to be supposed and implicitly included an erroneous practical judgment, namely, that it is good to act so inconsiderately without due consideration.

3. If the blessed could sin, they could lose glory and beatitude, although these cannot be taken away from them, as will be said in the following thesis.

This impeccability arises from within, as the Thomists explain against Scotus:

a) From the contemplation of God. Man necessarily wills the ultimate end or beatitude in the abstract, and cannot will anything except in order to the ultimate end or happiness. But the blessed one unceasingly and necessarily and always sees that God is the highest good and perfect beatitude. Therefore he cannot will anything except what is in order to God. But sin is something not ordered to God. Therefore the blessed one cannot sin (I, q. 62, a. 8 and ad 3; I-II, q. 4, a. 4).

Or also: the intellect, contemplating God, clearly sees that God and His will are the highest and every good, necessarily to be loved; and therefore that nothing outside God is good if it is against Him or is not ordered to Him. Whence sin, which is against the will of God, cannot appear good to it. But man cannot will anything except under the aspect of good. Therefore the blessed one cannot will sin.

1. "To whomsoever what he has suffices, he does not seek something else outside it. But whoever is blessed, that in which true beatitude consists suffices him; otherwise his desire would not be fulfilled. Therefore whoever is blessed seeks nothing else which does not pertain to that in which true beatitude consists. But no one has a perverse will except through this, that he wills something which is repugnant to that in which true beatitude consists. Therefore the will of no blessed one can be changed into evil." C. Gent. IV, 92.

b) From the love of the blessed. By beatific love man is converted by a continuous act and without interruption to God as ultimate end. But through sin man is turned away from God, the ultimate end, or at least deflects from Him. But actual aversion and defection from God cannot stand at the same time with the actual conversion and adherence which excludes it. Therefore beatific love by a continuous act excludes sin (*Contra Gentiles* IV, 92).

2. "It cannot be at the same time that he is turned away from the end and enjoys the end." Ibid.

39. Thesis III. Beatitude is unlosable and eternal (q. 5, a. 4; *Contra Gentiles* III, 62).

Faith teaches this, as is clear from the Creeds, and from the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter 1, and from Benedict XII, and the Scriptures clearly indicate it in many places (Mt. XXV, 46; VI, 20; John X, 28; I Thess. IV, 17; II Cor. IV, 17; Apoc. III, 12); hence beatitude is called an unfading and incorruptible inheritance (I Pet. I, 4), and an incorrupt crown (I Cor. IX, 25). And indeed:

Beatitude must exclude every evil, which it will not do unless it is perpetual. For the blessed one either would know that his state is not perpetual, and then he would be affected by the greatest evil of sadness and pain; or he would not know, and then either he would err by persuading himself that it is perpetual, and this would be the most grave evil of error; or he would doubt and greatly fear lest he be deprived of so great a good, and this fear of losing it is also an evil. Therefore beatitude necessarily must be perpetual.

But it is so from within, as the Thomists hold against Scotus:

1. From the nature of beatitude in common. Perfect beatitude, from its nature (and therefore from within), answers to the natural desire of man which it must quiet. But man, because he will always exist and naturally desires to retain the good and to obtain security of retaining it, desires beatitude not limited by time but circumscribed by no limits. Therefore beatitude, in order to answer to that desire, from its nature must be perpetual.

2. From the nature of supernatural beatitude. There is given no cause by which the beatific vision can be lost. Therefore of itself it is unlosable. For it cannot cease:

a) on the part of the subject seeing; because, clearly seeing God to be the highest good, he cannot for that reason will to cease from that vision, since he perceives no evil or inconvenience in it, just as

neither can he will not to be blessed;

b) on the part of a created cause; because the immediate vision of God is above every created cause, which therefore cannot act upon it nor take it away or impede it;

c) on the part of the object, God; because God always bears Himself in the same way and is not removed from us except insofar as we are removed from Him. For the subtraction of beatitude is a punishment, whence it cannot be inflicted by God as just judge except on account of fault; but fault cannot be in the blessed one, since he is impeccable.

Specifically, the light of glory, as being a habit in itself permanent and permanently given by God, cannot cease: a) neither through corruption of itself, since it is a simple quality; b) nor through corruption of the subject, since that is wholly immaterial, wherefore the light is received incorruptibly according to the condition of the recipient and of the giver; c) nor through a contrary disposition, which would be nothing but sin, by which one would voluntarily turn himself away from God; but sin is impossible, because he who sees God necessarily loves Him.

40. Thesis IV. The body is in no way required for the very essence of beatitude, even physical essence; nevertheless it is required for the integrity and perfection, or for the well-being, of it.

The first part is of faith from Benedict XII and from the Council of Florence, and is clear from the Apostle, II Cor. V, 6-8: While we are in the body we are away from the Lord: for we walk by faith, and not by sight. But we are confident, and have the will to be away from the body and to be present with the Lord. - It is proved:

a) For supernatural beatitude: the intellect, for its operation, does not need the body except on account of sensible images in which it intuits intelligible truth. But God cannot be seen through sensible images. Hence perfect beatitude, which is in the vision of God, does not depend upon the body. And therefore without the body the soul can simply be blessed as to substance.

b) For beatitude in common: the soul is blessed not insofar as it is the form of the body, but according as, being intellectual, it transcends all bodily organs and exercises spiritual operations which from their nature are independent of the body. Therefore, as to the essence of beatitude, it does not need the body (a. 5, ad 1).

The second part, namely, that the body is required for the perfection in every way, or the well-being, of beatitude, in the same way as beauty of body or quickness of genius pertain to the perfection of man although not to his essence, is held by St. Thomas after St. Augustine; Scotus, Suarez, and many more recent authors contradict him.

1. Scotus, in IV, dist. 43, q. 2, and Suarez, in I-II, disp. 15, sect. 2, n. 7, and in III, disp. 44, sect. 7, attack St. Thomas in their usual way; many more recent authors follow them, such as Mierts, *De Resurrectione corporum*, and De Bie, *Philosophia Moralis* I, p. 527 sq. Several, such as Ferrariensis, Billot, and Terrien, follow St. Thomas, yet deny that his arguments are strictly demonstrative. The necessity of the resurrection is defended by Athenagoras (second century), *De Resurrectione mortuorum*, XVIII-XIX; Freppel, *Les Apologistes chretiens au IIe siecle*; Costa Rosetti, *Philosophia Moralis*, p. 41 sq.; Mercier, *Psychologie*, 7th ed., n. 291; Reindstaedler, *Elementa Philosophiae*.

"For since," says the holy Doctor, a. 5, "operation depends on the nature of the thing, the more perfect the soul will be in its nature, the more perfectly it will have its proper operation in which happiness consists." But the soul with the body is more perfect in its nature, which it has complete. Therefore it is more perfect in its operation and beatitude, which it has complete, insofar as it also extends itself to the body so that the body participates in it in its own mode.

"The soul desires so to enjoy God that the enjoyment itself may also be derived to the body by overflow, as is possible; and therefore, as long as it enjoys God without the body, its appetite so rests in Him that nevertheless it would still will its body to reach to participation in Him" (ad 4). "The desire of the separated soul wholly rests on the part of the appetible, because it has that which suffices for its appetite" (God); "but it does not wholly rest on the part of the one desiring, because it does not possess that good according to every mode in which it would will to possess it. And therefore, when the body is resumed, beatitude increases, not intensively but extensively" (ad 5).

2. There St. Thomas tacitly retracted what he wrote when younger in the Commentary on the Sentences, and what is reported in Supplement, q. 93, a. 1: "the separated soul naturally desires conjunction with the body and on account of this appetite... its operation by which it is borne into God is less intense."

But the body must be perfect: "For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it cannot be that the perfection of the soul exclude its natural perfection; and therefore... for beatitude perfect in every way, there is required a perfect disposition of the body," both "antecedently," lest the body weigh down the soul and thus in some way turn it away from the beatific vision, and "consequently, because from the beatitude of the soul there is an overflow to the body, so that it too may obtain its own perfection" (a. 6).

41. The resurrection of the body is necessary and is demanded by nature itself, whence, says St. Thomas, evident reason favors it (*Contra Gentiles* IV, 79). - It is proved:

1. Certain men have attempted to turn the master to another sense. Ferrariensis interprets evident reason as probable; Billot and Terrien understand evident reason by way of persuading, but not of demonstrating. But no one calls a probable or persuasive reason evident.

1. From the very nature and immortality of the soul. The immortal soul is naturally united to the body because according to its essence it is the form of the body (Council of Vienne), and therefore it naturally knows only with the concurrence of imagination, and indeed not pure intelligibles but intelligibles in sense. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of the soul to be without the body, as is clear from the fact that our soul vehemently recoils from death. But nothing which is contrary to nature can be perpetual, at least in those who attain the end. Therefore the soul will not perpetually be without the body. But it remains perpetually because it is immortal. Therefore it must be joined again to the body.

2. Ferrariensis responds that that which is contrary to nature is perpetual if there does not remain in nature a natural active principle for removing it. But this is not to the point, because it is against the wise providence of the author of nature to destine something to a perpetual state contrary to nature. Whence God, as author of nature, owes it to Himself to remove such a

state, and is bound to restore the body to the blessed, just as He also must infuse ideas into the separated soul so that it may be able to exercise the act of intellection. Likewise it does not stand in the way that, according to nature, the soul desires to be united to a corruptible body, from which separation from the body necessarily follows, as Suarez objects. For the soul is ordered to the body as such, which first is corruptible according to the nature of matter on account of which the soul is created, but in the resurrection is incorruptible because it is produced on account of the incorruptible soul to whose nature it must be conformed.

2. From the end of man, or the natural desire for happiness. There is in us a natural desire for complete happiness. But happiness is the ultimate perfection not of the soul alone, but of the whole man. But the soul separated from the body is in some way imperfect, as every part existing outside the whole is imperfect: for the soul naturally is part of human nature. Furthermore, it cannot have the complete beatitude of man. Therefore man cannot attain complete happiness unless the soul is again united to the body.

1. Let it not be said with Ferrariensis that it is an inefficacious desire or a mere velleity, because the soul knows that it cannot be united to the body on account of the defect of a natural active principle which is capable of effecting this; or with Suarez, that it is a conditioned desire, because man does not desire to attain his happiness otherwise than while he exists, whence for the body he desires temporal beatitude in this life, eternal beatitude for the soul alone. - Response: the desire is absolute and most efficacious because it is from the soul's innate appetite by which it wills to be with the body, because the soul is essentially a part, and from the very essence of the soul it is that it be a form and be destined for union with the body. But an innate appetite, because it is from the inclination of nature, and consequently implanted by the very Creator of nature, cannot be in vain, because it would be against infinite wisdom to give to something an inclination never to be satiated.

3. From fitting retribution. "By divine Providence punishment is owed to sinners and reward to those acting well. In this life men composed of soul and body sin or act rightly. Therefore reward or punishment is owed to men both according to soul and according to body. But it is manifest that in this life they cannot attain the reward of ultimate happiness... often also sins are not punished in this life. Therefore it is necessary to posit a renewed conjunction of soul to body, so that man may be rewarded and punished in body and soul."

Namely, the body is the partner and instrument of the soul, not merely passive and external, which would not participate morality, since it is a part of the human composite, but truly animated and a participant in its works, whether good or evil. For operation is not of the soul alone but of the whole composite; the soul does not act, nor the body, but the man himself as such according to soul and according to body does good and evil. But to the one operating the wage of the work is owed. Therefore reward or punishment is owed to men, both according to soul and according to body. And therefore the conjunction of soul to body will be repeated, so that man may receive reward and be punished in body and in soul.

The last argument is valid also for sinners, but is one of fittingness alone, because the works of the body per se are not good or evil, but only from communication with the will. But the two former

arguments seem compelling to us, at least for the resurrection of the just; for as regards the impious, perhaps it could be said that God punishes them by the privation of their body. And although per se they are valid for natural beatitude, they also prove for supernatural beatitude or the beatific vision, because the supernatural order does not destroy the natural order but perfects it.

But the adversaries object to them that the soul has a twofold mode of being, equally perfect, and a twofold mode of operating; indeed that it has a more perfect natural knowledge of God when it is separated from the body, whence it prefers separation. - We deny this: for then it is not understood why the soul so vehemently seeks to be with the body and recoils from separation; nor is it understood why the soul, even in this life, cannot know without dependence upon the body. For if the body contributed nothing to the perfection of the human intellect, union with it would be against the nature of the soul. Likewise the mode of understanding of the separated soul, although absolutely and in itself more perfect, nevertheless is not more perfect relatively to the soul, but less perfect for it, because it is not proportioned to its imperfection. Cf. I, q. 84, a. 7; q. 89, a. 1.

42. Observations.

1. The fact of the resurrection is not a mystery properly so called, since reason sees its possibility and even its necessity; but the mode in which the resurrection is made, in a glorious body, is a mystery which reason is able neither to discover nor to understand. Concerning this see dogmatic theology in the treatise on the Last Things.

2. St. Thomas notes, in articles 7 and 8, that external goods, which serve for the support and propagation of animal life, are in no way required for beatitude. For the beatific vision will be either in the soul without the body, or in the soul united to a body not animal and corruptible, but incorruptible and spiritualized, as befits heavenly life. Nevertheless the society of friends is required, not of necessity for the essence of beatitude, because man has the whole fullness of his perfection in God, but for the perfection in every way or well-being of beatitude, because man is a social being, and therefore it is fitting that the blessed see one another and rejoice concerning their society.

Question Five: On the Mode of Obtaining Beatitude

S. Th. I-II, q. 5.

43. Thesis I. Man is capable of arriving at beatitude, even supernatural beatitude; nevertheless he cannot attain this by natural powers, but by the help of divine grace he is able to obtain it, and indeed in various degrees. - It is proved:

1. Man is capable of arriving at beatitude, even supernatural beatitude, because he is capable of perfect good, since his intellect can know universal and perfect good and his will can seek it (a. 1). It is of faith, explicitly defined in the Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 2, canon 3; and it is included in the fact that the vision of God is the ultimate end of man, which is of faith from the Council of Florence, from Benedict XII, and from the Council of Trent, session 25.

2. Nevertheless he cannot attain supernatural beatitude by natural powers. It is of faith from the Council of Vienne, article 5, and from the Second Council of Orange, canons 7, 10, 18, 19, 20

(cf. Vatican Council, session 3, canon 3; and the condemned propositions of Baius). To see God through His essence is above the nature not only of man but of every creature. For natural knowledge is proportioned to the nature of the one knowing and therefore comes about according to the mode of the one knowing. Every knowledge which comes about according to the mode of a created substance cannot know God as He is in Himself, but falls short of the vision of the divine essence, which infinitely exceeds every created substance. Hence neither man nor any creature can attain supernatural beatitude by natural powers, but needs the help of divine grace (John I, 18; VI, 46; Mt. XI, 27; I Cor. II, 11; I John IV, 12). - From this it also follows that we cannot attain beatitude immediately by the action of creatures, but only by that of God, although we can be aided by them ministerially and disposed toward its attainment (a. 5 and 6; I, q. 12, a. 4).

3. Man can obtain beatitude in various degrees, so that one is more blessed than another: not, indeed, according to objective beatitude, because there is only one Highest Good, God, by whose fruition all are blessed; but as to possession and fruition, because the more someone enjoys God, the more blessed he is. But it happens that someone enjoys God more perfectly than another from the fact that he is better disposed or ordered to His fruition according to diversity of grace and charity and merits (a. 2). This also is of faith from the Council of Florence (decree of union) and from the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 16, canon 32 (cf. John XIV, 2; I Cor. XV, 41-42).

44. Thesis II. Perfect beatitude is not possible in the present life, but only in the other life. This is of faith from the Council of Vienne, article 4 (cf. Benedict XII and the Second Council of Orange). - It is proved:

1. From the notion of beatitude in the abstract: beatitude, since it is the perfect and sufficient good, excludes every evil and fulfills every desire. But in this life a) not every evil is excluded, such as ignorance on the part of the intellect, disordered affection and concupiscence on the part of the appetite, infirmity and afflictive labor on the part of the body; b) not every desire is fulfilled, since goods are essentially unstable, even spiritual goods, such as virtue, which is liable to vice because of the mutability of freedom, and science, which is lost by forgetfulness; indeed earthly life itself, although we would will to remain perpetually and naturally flee death (a. 3).

2. From the notion of beatitude in the concrete: a) the vision of God in Himself is now impossible (I Tim. VI, 16; I Cor. XIII, 12; I John III, 2); indeed even perfect natural knowledge of the highest truth and of God is impossible, because it is liable to very many impediments and difficulties, is often obscured and mixed with doubts and errors, nor does it give certainty of permanence, without which happiness is not had.

b) On earth the will is not so firmly established in goods that it never deflects from the true object of beatitude and sins, but by the cupidities and necessities of the present life it is impeded from being borne unceasingly by supreme love into God.

Nevertheless there can be in this life an inchoate or imperfect happiness, and a state of inchoate perfection and imperfect beatitude, which more or less approaches to perfect beatitude and consists

in the knowledge, love, and imitation of God, or in rectitude of will and the operation of virtue, for which, as if instrumentally, goods of the body and the help of other men are also required (q. 4, a. 7): these furnish to man the friendship of God and the joy flowing from it, peace of conscience and tranquility of heart, and the hope of future beatitude, which surpass all earthly delights. Therefore it is the way and tendency to perfect beatitude or God; just as an intermediate end naturally and necessarily tends to the ultimate end whose goodness it participates;

45. Thesis III. Beatitude can be obtained from God by the good works of the present life preceding it. It is of faith from the Second Council of Orange, canon 18; the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter 1; and Trent, session 6, chapter 16, canon 32.

Thus it is not done necessarily: for absolutely God could have immediately given beatitude and at the same time disposed man for it, that is, in the same moment made the will rightly tending toward the ultimate end and obtaining it, just as at the same time in an instant He can dispose matter and infuse the form (for example, in the resurrection of a dead man). But He did not do so, as is clear from the fact that we do not obtain beatitude in the present life. And moreover the order of divine wisdom demands that it not be done thus.

It is proved: for to have perfect good without preceding motion and disposition belongs naturally to him who has it. God alone possesses beatitude naturally. Therefore it is proper to God that He is not moved and disposed to beatitude by a preceding operation. And therefore, since beatitude exceeds every created nature, no pure creature fittingly obtains beatitude without the movement of a preceding operation by which it tends into beatitude; and thus beatitude becomes the reward of virtuous operation (a. 7).

Hence in the Scriptures good works are constantly presented both as the reason and title on account of which eternal glory is granted (Mt. XXV, 21; 34-36; II Cor. IV, 17), in the same way as punishment is given for evils (Rom. III, 7, 8), and eternal glory as wages for the works of the just (Mt. V, 12; XIX, 29) and as the repayment of the heavenly inheritance (Col. III, 24; Heb. X, 35; XI, 16), as prize (I Cor. IX, 24; Phil. III, 14), crown (Jas. I, 12; Apoc. II, 10), indeed crown of justice (II Tim. IV, 8), which is proportioned to works, greater or lesser (Mt. XXV, 14 sq.; Lk. XIX, 11 sq.; II Cor. IX, 6; Gal. VI, 8; Apoc. XXII, 12). Hence the Apostle, I Cor. XV, 58, says: Labor in the Lord is not vain.

46. Corollary: Earthly life is the way to the end and beatitude. - Therefore earthly life, as being something to be ended, is not the state of ultimate perfection and happiness, but the way by which we must tend to that perfection and happiness by our acts. For exercising these acts:

1. In order to attaining the natural end, man would have:

a) internal means, namely, human nature itself with its powers, especially reason and free will, and the moral virtues acquired by the aid of these powers, for operating the good more easily under the ordinary motion of God;

b) an external means: society, whose role is to promote man to a good at once spiritual and temporal.

2. But in the present order, in relation to the supernatural end, God bestows upon us:

a) internal means proportioned to this end, namely, habitual grace, both with the theological and moral virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit connected with it, and actual grace both of intellect and of will and the special motion of the Holy Spirit;

b) an external means: the supernatural society, the Church, whose founder and head is Christ, and which leads men to the supernatural end by the proposition of faith, laws, and sacraments.

Treatise: On Human Acts in Themselves

Introduction

S. Th. I-II, q. 1 and q. 21.

47. Notion of a Human Act. - After the treatise on the ultimate end, human acts must be considered, by which we must arrive at that end.

According to St. Thomas, who first of all wrote a distinct treatise on human acts:

1. Cf. our article: *Le traite des Actions humaines dans la Morale thomiste*, in *Revue des Sc. phil. et theol.* 1926.

1. Those actions alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man, or which proceed from a man acting insofar as he differs from irrational creatures, not only as to substance but also as to the mode of operating.

But he differs in the mode of operating from irrational creatures insofar as he acts freely, and thus is master of his acts.

2. Hence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master.

But he is master of his acts through deliberation of reason and election of will.

3. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. Other actions, however, which are done by man, are called acts of man; and although some are human as to substance, for example necessary actions of intellect and will, nevertheless they are not human as to the mode of operating, nor properly human, since they are not of man acting as man (q. 1, a. 1).

Therefore a human act can be defined as an act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man (q. 1, a. 1), or as an act which, proceeding from reason, is voluntary (*De Malo* 2, a. 6).

1. St. Thomas sometimes asserts that acts are human insofar as they are from reason (e.g., Q. D. *De Malo* 2, a. 4 and 6; I-II, q. 88, a. 6; q. 63, a. 2; q. 19, a. 1, ad 3; q. 18, a. 5 and 9; q. 58, a. 2; III, q. 19, a. 2), sometimes insofar as they are from deliberate will (*De Malo* 2, a. 5; a. 4, ad 10; a. 7, a. 3; I-II, q. 18, a. 5 and 6; q. 19, a. 1; Q. D. *De Veritate* 5, a. 10; II Sent. d. 24, q. 3, a. 2; d. 41, q. 2, a. 1; C. Gent. II, 23; III, 9-10). But there is no contradiction. They are from deliberate will as from the immediate and formal principle and proximate foundation; from reason as from the first, radical principle, and therefore the higher regulating principle: for reason, as the first principle, is their measure, and it also is the very thing which can order to the end, which is the principle in things to be done. Hence all acts which proceed from rational powers are human, whether through essence, or through participation, as is the concupiscible and irascible appetite. Cf. II Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 3.

Hence:

1. The following are not human:

a) acts (of vegetative or sensitive life) which man has in common with beasts both as to substance and as to mode of operating, such as eating, seeing, walking, sensing without deliberation;

b) acts of one who is incapable of deliberating: an infant, one fully sleeping, one delirious, drunk, or mad, one perfectly dependent upon the influence of hypnotism;

c) acts of one who can deliberate but which are placed without any deliberation, e.g., by a man fully distracted: these are called first-first movements.

2. Acts proper to man as to substance, such as understanding, willing, laughing, weeping, wondering, speaking, nevertheless are not human unless they are done from deliberation; on the contrary, acts common with beasts, such as eating, drinking, rubbing the beard, walking, are human if they are done from deliberation.

3. Beatific love, although it is an act proper to man as to substance, nevertheless is not such as to the mode of operating, because it is not free; whence it is not a human act.

2. It can nevertheless be called eminently human: for the necessary voluntary in the love of the highest good with full universality is the root of freedom, and therefore contains the free virtually and eminently, and so such an act is human eminently but not formally. Cf. Billuart and Gredt in o. c.

48. Properties of a Human Act.

Human acts, so called insofar as they are posited according to the mode of acting proper to men, are also called free insofar as they proceed from a free will; moral insofar as they are conformed or deformed with the rules of morals, inclination to the ultimate end, right reason, law, and therefore have the character of rectitude or sin; imputable insofar as they can be attributed to man as author and master, who must render an account of them, and thus are worthy of praise or blame, praiseworthy or culpable; meritorious insofar as they are referred to another into whose profit or harm they yield, whether an individual person, or a community, or God, the ruler of the universe and ultimate end.

3. Imputability and responsibility differ. Imputation is the attribution of a moral act, or the judgment by which a moral act is attributed to the author as master of the act itself; whence imputability is the property of a human act by reason of which it is attributed to the author as master of the act itself. - The concept of responsibility is related; but imputability is on the part of the act, responsibility on the part of the agent: the act is imputable, man is responsible in his act. Responsibility is the property by force of which man is obliged to answer for his acts. It is twofold: moral and juridical, according as someone must answer in the forum of conscience or in the external forum before a judge. Thus Lehu, *Philosophia Moralis et Socialis*, c. 4, a. 2.

All these acts are really the same, although they are distinguished by reason insofar as they are considered under a diverse respect (q. 21).

1. Cajetan, in I-II, q. 21, a. 1: "A human act is constituted in the being of good or evil as if from a formal cause, and upon this is founded that from order to the end it has the notion of right or sin, from order to the efficient cause, of praiseworthy or culpable, from order to another, of meritorious or demeritorious." Conformably to St. Thomas: "Thus therefore it is clear that a good or evil act has the notion of praiseworthy or culpable according as it is in the power of the will; but the notion of rectitude and sin according to order to the end; but the notion of merit and demerit according to the retribution of justice toward another" q. 21, a. 3.

49. Division of the Treatise. - The treatise is divided into three parts:

The first treats of human acts according to material or physical and psychological being:

A. Concerning the condition of human acts: 1) concerning the subjective element of the human act: a) concerning the voluntary, both according to itself, and positive and negative, direct and indirect, and in itself and in cause; b) concerning the impediments of the voluntary, that is, violence, fear, concupiscence, ignorance; c) concerning the free; d) concerning the impediments of the free, namely, passion, habit, and more remote impediments; 2) concerning the objective element of the human act: a) the object, b) circumstances.

B. Concerning the division of human acts: a) elicited acts; b) commanded acts.

The second part treats of human acts according to formal or moral being:

A. Concerning the morality of human acts in general: 1) concerning the essence and species of morality; 2) concerning the foundations of morality: a) concerning the intrinsic distinction between good and evil; b) concerning the subjective criterion or norm of morality; c) concerning the objective criterion and ultimate foundation of morality; d) concerning errors to be noted in this matter; e) concerning the cognitive faculty of morality; 3) concerning the principles or sources of morality in general; 4) concerning the specific distinction between a good and an evil act; 5) concerning the specific distinction between various good or evil acts a) from the object, b) from circumstances, c) from the end.

B. Concerning the morality of human acts in species: 1) concerning the goodness and malice of the interior act; 2) concerning the goodness and malice of the exterior act; 3) concerning the goodness and malice of the external effect; 4) concerning the goodness and malice of the passions; 5) concerning the goodness and malice of other circumstances.

The third part treats of human acts according to supernatural and meritorious being: 1) concerning supernatural merit; 2) concerning the conditions of merit.

50. The Treatise Is at Once Theological and Philosophical.

In the established division, the first part is rather philosophical, providing notions necessary for the understanding of the remaining parts; the third is wholly theological, as treating of the supernatural element; the second is at once theological and philosophical, because it is taken not only from reason but also from revelation. For revelation, by divine oral tradition and partly by the sacred Scriptures, also and more certainly teaches us the most universal moral principles and their immediate and more general conclusions, from which the whole moral science is deduced. Whence to declare, confirm, explain, and apply these belongs to theology as to philosophy.

51. Importance of the Treatise.

The treatise is the most principal of all, because it is:

1. More universal, since it hands down the most general notions and principles of the whole moral science, to be applied in all parts; and therefore

2. More fundamental, because upon it the edifice of the whole moral science is built. For moral science treats of nothing except human acts, and all other things, whether ends, means, rules or counsels, virtues or vices, it considers only insofar as they pertain to human acts. Whence the treatise is entitled concerning human acts in themselves. Hence

3. It is more necessary: for it is impossible to acquire for oneself a knowledge, not common or merely historical, of moral things, but scientific, founded in reasonings, unless the doctrine concerning human acts is well understood and rightly applied.

First Part: On Human Acts According to Material and Psychological Being

Section A: On the Condition of Human Acts

52. Elements of a Human Act. - In a human act we can distinguish essential being, or the elements which constitute it, and accidental being, which is added to it once already constituted; likewise the subjective element, or the very activity of the agent, and the objective element, or the object (that is, the end or good) considered totally with all things that pertain to it.

1. The whole subjective element is essential; for it three things are required:

a) Deliberate reason, that is, the previous knowledge of the intellect proposing the good, because nothing is willed unless it is foreknown, and indeed deliberate knowledge, without which man would not be master of his act;

b) The tendency of the will toward the good proposed by reason;

c) The freedom of this tendency, for otherwise the will would not choose nor act in the mode proper to men.

Concerning deliberate knowledge nothing special must be said, because the will supposes knowledge, and freedom supposes deliberation; hence it suffices to explain the other two elements. Therefore the essence of the human act is that it be voluntary and free.

2. The objective element, however, is twofold:

a) one essential, namely, the object itself, or the end or good to which the agent tends;

b) another accidental, namely, the circumstances which are added to the object and affect it.

Concerning all these things we must now speak specifically.

Chapter I: On the Subjective Element of the Human Act

Question One: On the Voluntary

Article I: On the Voluntary in Itself

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 1 and 2.

53. The voluntary, from Aristotle, Ethics III, chapter 1, is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. It is said:

1. That which, that is, anything whatever, whether an act, or the omission of the act itself, or an effect proceeding from either;

2. Which proceeds, namely, in any way whatever, whether immediately or mediately, whether directly or indirectly: for he who places the cause, or omits it when he ought to place it, wills and causes the effect which he foresees will follow from it;

3. From an intrinsic principle, that is, from the proper power and inclination of that which operates;

4. With knowledge of the end or good: since the principle of acting is twofold, efficient and final, that properly proceeds from within which has an intrinsic efficient and final principle, so that it is not only moved but moves itself into the end. Hence for the voluntary it is required not only that it be from its own efficient principle by natural inclination, but also from some previous knowledge of the end by intentional inclination, by which the being acts for the sake of a known good. Hence for something to be totally voluntary, it must be known according to all circumstances; but if one is unknown, according to this it will not be voluntary, as if someone kills a man, not knowing that he is a cleric, he is guilty of homicide, not sacrilege.

Therefore the voluntary differs:

a) from the natural, whose efficient principle is within, but not the final, such as the motion of the heart, of vegetative life, which are done without knowledge of the end;

b) from the violent, whose principle is from without, with the subject resisting, as if someone is dragged by external force against his will;

c) from the simply willed: for this is an intentional object, but not a real effect of the will proceeding from it as from a cause, that into which the will tends affectively, but which does not proceed from it effectively, that which it wills but does not cause; thus rain is willed by the farmer but not voluntary, likewise the natural death of an enemy at which someone rejoices: indeed every voluntary is in some way willed, but not conversely;

1. Although the simply willed does not proceed from the will, the very volition proceeds from it and consequently is voluntary and sufficient for the notion of sin; but since that volition is not the cause of the willed thing, it does not suffice on this part to induce an obligation, for example, of restitution.

d) from the permissive, which is neither voluntary, or proceeding from the will, nor willed as its object, but only is not impeded by him who can but ought not: thus for just reasons and for a greater good, God or a governor do not impede sins which nevertheless displease them and are not done by them.

54. Division of the Voluntary According to Knowledge of the End. - Since the voluntary proceeds from knowledge of the end, hence according to the diverse knowledge of the end, the voluntary is diverse:

1. Knowledge of the end is material, or improperly so called, when that which is the end is known but not as end; but knowledge is formal, or properly so called, when the thing which is the end is known as end, that is, the very reason and dignity of the end and the proportion of that which is ordered to the end, or the proportion of means to end. Hence the voluntary is divided into the properly so called or perfect, which proceeds from formal knowledge of the end and is found only in the higher appetite of man; and the improperly so called or imperfect, which proceeds from material knowledge of the end and is also found in the sensitive appetite alone, and even in beasts: this is also called spontaneous.

2. Formal knowledge can be deliberate and indeliberate; hence the necessary voluntary is distinguished, which proceeds from judgment and will determined to one thing; and the free, which comes about from indifferent judgment with the power of the will to the opposite. The free is not always more voluntary, for the intentional inclination of the will toward beatitude is greater than toward other things, and yet it is necessary.

3. Deliberate knowledge can be more or less perfect; hence the perfectly free voluntary is distinguished, which comes about with full deliberation, such as prudent persons are accustomed to use in matters of some importance, and with full consent; this is required for mortal sin. And the imperfectly free voluntary is distinguished, which comes about with some deliberation and some consent, as is found in the half-asleep, the half-drunk, the distracted, and those laboring under vehement passion; this suffices for venial sin. Hence theologians are accustomed to distinguish: first-first movements, which precede all deliberation (and are not properly voluntary or human acts); second-first movements, which come about after some deliberation and before perfect deliberation; and second movements, or deliberate movements, which proceed from perfect deliberation.

55. Division of the Voluntary According to the Intention of the Will. - The voluntary is from the proper intentional inclination of the appetite; hence according to the diverse intention of the will from which it proceeds, the voluntary is diverse. For something can proceed:

1. From an actual intention had here and now, whether explicit, as when a priest baptizing says, I will to baptize, or implicit, contained actually in another, as when he wills to go to the baptistery and perform all things according to custom;

2. From a virtual intention, had previously but here and now still influencing and persevering in force, as when a distracted priest baptizes from the intention had at the beginning;

3. From a habitual intention, had previously and not retracted, but in no way remaining in force and influencing the present act: as when a catechumen desiring to be baptized, deprived of the senses, is voluntarily baptized.

1. Namely, the effect of the will once had endures, which is the condition or necessary disposition of the present effect caused by another.

The first is actually willed, the second virtually, the third only habitually.

2. We say: willed. There is no virtual or habitual voluntary; every voluntary proceeds and therefore is actual, but it proceeds from a virtual or habitual intention.

For a human act, habitual intention is not sufficient (nor, a fortiori, interpretative intention): for this does not flow into the act, nor therefore make it proceed from deliberation of reason and the influence of freedom and be done in a human mode; but at least virtual intention is necessary. For this three things are required: a) that the agent act in a human mode, for otherwise he would not act from intention; b) that the first intention has not been retracted; and c) that it remain active in some effect of itself, so that one effect flows from another and all from the first.

In the case in which contrary or incompossible intentions are present, the predominant remains and influences or obtains the effect. Of simultaneous intentions, the predominant is that which, according to the present disposition, would be chosen if the incompossibility were known; but if they are equal, none persists, because they destroy one another. Of two successive intentions, the later will prevail if someone formed it remembering the prior, because then the prior was knowingly revoked; also for the most part if he was forgetful of the prior, unless the prior was made in such a way that he wills at least virtually to exclude the subsequent one.

56. Division of the Voluntary by Reason of Principle. - The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle, and therefore by reason of the diverse principle it is distinguished into elicited, which proceeds immediately from the will itself and is consummated in it (to will, to consent, to choose), and commanded, which from the motion and command of the will proceeds immediately from another power, whether internal (for example, voluntarily to think or to be angry), or external (for example, voluntarily to walk).

Therefore by reason of terminus it is internal or external, according as it is consummated in an interior rational or sensitive power, or in the senses or members, or even in exterior effects. Hence the elicited and internal voluntary, and the commanded and external voluntary, are not one and the same.

57. Division of the Voluntary by Reason of Manifestation. - Both the voluntary and the willed are manifested in diverse ways, and thus it is divided into 1) expressed, which is manifested by words or signs; 2) tacit, which is manifested by silence, or rather is known certainly from the circumstances of silence according to rule 43 of law: He who is silent seems to consent; 3) presumed, which from certain reasons, as from the inclination or disposition of mind, is prudently conjectured to be present now, or is gathered conjecturally by reasonable indications: for presumption is a probable conjecture of an uncertain thing. Examples are: a religious who buys a book with consent received from the

superior; or with the superior present and silent; or with the superior absent, whom he cannot approach, when he wholly needs the book.

Not everyone who is silent consents, for in rule 44 it is said: He who is silent does not confess, but neither indeed does he seem to deny. Therefore silence not per se but only according to various circumstances prudently to be considered signifies consent or dissent. Hence the one silent is judged to consent a) in favorable matters when there is question of a benefit or favor, such as a donation or gratuitous promise, but not if there is question of a burden, inconvenience, or prejudice; b) also in prejudicial matters, if someone can without great inconvenience and at the same time ought to contradict, e.g., if he is questioned by a judge, or a superior if he observes a transgressed rule and is silent, or if several come together to deliberate about a common opinion: for then the silent are judged per se to support those consenting; c) in comparison: if several things have been proposed and someone denies all and is silent about one, he is judged to affirm it; if he affirms all and is silent about one, he is judged to deny it; d) if it has been so determined in law, which nevertheless has force only in the external forum, provided the contrary is not proved.

58. Observation. - From all the aforesaid things there is distinguished both the merely interpretative voluntary and the merely interpretative willed: so called from an intention in no way had, but which only would be had. But this in no way is, but only would be, willed or voluntary; namely, in fact it is not intended by the will nor does it proceed from it, but it would be intended or would proceed if something were known, for example, a priest would will to celebrate Mass for his father if he knew him to be dead, and a bishop, if it were requested from him, would grant jurisdiction. It differs from the presumed willed, because this indicates that which, according to prudent estimation, exists or existed; but the former indicates that which, the condition being supposed, would exist.

It is said: merely interpretative. For even the presumed voluntary is called by others, and can also be called under some respect, interpretative. And many scholastics call the voluntary in cause interpretative: for he who wills the cause is judged to will the effect; and others so call the voluntary from virtual (or habitual) intention: he who voluntarily begins is judged to will to persevere.

Article II: On the Voluntary Both Positive and Direct, and Negative and Indirect

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 71, a. 5; q. 77, a. 7.

59. Notions. - Man is master not only of his willing and acting, but also of his not acting and not willing, insofar as "by willing and acting he can impede this, namely, not willing and not acting." Hence:

1. Therefore the negative and indirect voluntary always coincides with the free.

1. According to the diverse things which proceed from the will, the voluntary is rightly called positive if the placing of an act proceeds; negative if the omission of an act proceeds. For voluntary omission is not to be confused with the will of omitting; for the omission of fornication or of Mass is not voluntary to him who is held in prison, and yet he can have the will of omitting fornication or Mass, while saying within himself: I would not do it, or I would not hear it, if I could. On the contrary, omission can be voluntary even if someone does not say: I will not to hear, provided that, at the time when he can hear Mass, he voluntarily does

something else. In the first case there is the placing of an act or commission, namely, of desire, which is positively voluntary (I do not will to act, that is, I will not to act); in the second case there is the omission of an act, and this is negatively voluntary (I do not will to act). Yet both can exist at the same time, when from the will of omitting someone omits a work.

The positive voluntary essentially includes an act, because it proceeds from the will through a real influx. The negative voluntary essentially does not include an act: for in its essence it is not constituted by an act but by a negation, because it is not an act but the omission of one; nevertheless this, so that it can proceed from the will, supposes a preceding or concomitant act of the will as cause or occasion of itself: for either man intends the omission itself in itself, or at least voluntarily places another act incompossible with the omitted act, such as playing, sleeping, remaining at home, when the celebration of Mass is imminent. St. Thomas says aptly, q. 71, a. 5: "If in a sin of omission there is understood only that which per se pertains to the notion of sin, then sometimes the sin of omission is... without every act, either interior or exterior... But if in a sin of omission there are also understood the causes or occasions of omitting, then it is necessary that there be some act in the sin of omission."

1. St. Thomas adds: "Judgment about things must be given according to that which is per se, and not according to that which is per accidens. Whence it can more truly be said that some sin (or voluntary thing) can be without every act."

2. By the same name of positive and negative voluntary, more recent authors call either that which proceeds from the will as from a positive cause, namely, from a voluntary act through a true and positive influence; or that which proceeds from it as from a negative cause, namely, from a voluntary omission, or that which is judged to proceed from the will not operating and omitting to act when it can and ought to act. These proceed from the will according to a diverse mode, and therefore by St. Thomas they are respectively called: the direct voluntary, that which directly proceeds from it insofar as it is acting (as heating from heat) and toward which the will is borne; and the indirect, that toward which it is not borne but which proceeds from it indirectly insofar as it could have prevented but does not prevent, or does not act when it ought to act, as the sinking of a ship is said to be from the helmsman to whom the steering was entrusted, insofar as he ceases from steering.

2. It is called indirect because the will causes it by way of removing what prevents, namely, by removing that which can impede another thing.

Therefore the direct voluntary is from the acting will; the indirect from the will not acting when it ought to act.

60. Principles. I. In order that omission be voluntary, it is required and sufficient that someone be able to place the act which is omitted and advertently omit it; nor is it required that he ought to place it. For he can just as voluntarily omit Mass on a weekday as on a feast day. But in order that it be imputed to him, something more is required: for praise, that he intended the omission for a good end, for goodness is not contracted unless it is willed and intended as such; for fault, that he ought to have placed the omitted act, for there is no fault unless someone transgresses some precept.

3. By the name of omission also comes the negation which necessarily and directly coheres with it, such as ignorance from the omission of learning, weakness of powers from the omission of eating: for such a negation seems rather one thing with the omission than its effect. Thus St. Thomas, in II Sent. d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; and I-II, q. 76, a. 3, ad 5.

II. In order that the effect of an omission be voluntary, it is required:

1. That the effect could and ought to have been morally foreseen, that is, that it was in some way foreseen at least confusedly, obscurely, or indistinctly, insofar as someone at least doubted or suspected that it would follow, or knew the obligation of adverting: for nothing is willed unless it is foreknown;

2. That it could have been avoided, and therefore that the omission freely took place: for the effect is not more voluntary than its cause;

3. That it ought to have been avoided, or that there was an obligation not to omit but to place the omitted act, and indeed to place it lest the effect follow: for a positive effect is not contained in an omission, and therefore an effect from a negative cause cannot be voluntary unless there is an obligation of impeding it. For if the aforesaid obligation is lacking, since a simple omission cannot have a real influence upon a positive effect, every connection, even moral, of causality between the omission and this effect is now lacking, and therefore this is only permitted, but not willed in the omission nor voluntary. On the contrary, if someone ought to avoid the effect and does not avoid it, he is morally judged, and imputably is, its cause, namely, its privative cause. - But if the aforesaid conditions are present, the effect is also imputed to fault, because some precept is violated.

61. Observation.

The intention of the agent cannot change the nature and causality of things, nor make some effect proceed from a certain action or omission as from a cause. Hence if, with the third condition lacking, the obligation of avoiding the effect is lacking, that effect does not become voluntary even if someone intends the omission precisely as a means on account of an evil effect, or even a good effect. The effect will then be willed in itself, but it will not be voluntary, because the connection of causality between the effect and the omission is lacking, and the omission is not its true cause. Thus if someone, precisely so that another may be immersed in waters, abstains from bringing help, although he ought not bring help, because, for example, the danger is greater for himself. The intention, like the omission or the act placed with it, will be imputed for fault or praise, but not the effect itself; indeed the good effect which follows an omission will never be imputed for praise because, although it can be done with a good intention, nevertheless it does not arise from the good intention from the omission as from a cause.

Article III: On the Voluntary in Itself and in Cause

S. Th. I-II, q. 77, a. 7; q. 20, a. 5; II-II, q. 43, a. 3; q. 46, a. 2, ad 2; q. 64, a. 7 and 8; q. 79, a. 3, ad 3; q. 150, a. 4.

62. Notions. - By reason of the mode in which the will is borne toward it, the positive and direct voluntary is either:

1. Voluntary in itself, when the will is directly borne toward it, that is, immediately wills something in itself and at the same time causes it by acting, whether as an end (on account of itself), for example when someone wills to kill an enemy, or as a means to an end (on account of another), for example when a thief wills to kill a traveler in order to take money; or

2. Voluntary in cause only, when the will is immediately borne toward the cause and not toward the effect, that is, it does not will the effect in itself as end or means, but nevertheless that effect proceeds from the will insofar as the will wills and does something else with which it is joined as with a cause, for example when someone wills to become drunk, foreseeing that in drunkenness he will commit blasphemies, impurities, homicide. The cause can be physical or moral, immediate or mediate, proximate or remote, a cause per se which is apt to produce the effect although by accident the effect can fail (thus excessive drinking produces drunkenness), or a cause per accidens which not from its nature but by the intervention of another can sometimes produce it (thus drunkenness, when a quarrel intervenes, produces homicide).

1. Hence it exists only in rational creatures, because it supposes it to be known how one thing follows from another.

The more commonly received prefer to say direct and indirect voluntary; but they would speak better if they said immediate and mediate: for that which proceeds from the will through a positive cause nevertheless proceeds directly from it.

2. Therefore the voluntary in cause, which many more recent authors call indirect, is called direct by St. Thomas, because it is from the will as acting. I-II, q. 77, a. 7.

63. Principles. In order that an effect be voluntary in cause, it is required:

1. That the effect was foreseen in some way, at least confusedly, as was said in no. 60, II: for nothing is willed unless it is foreknown;

2. That it could have been avoided, and therefore that the cause was freely placed or could have not been placed: for the effect is not more voluntary than its cause;

3. That there be a nexus of causality between this freely placed cause and this effect. This:

a) is always verified of a cause per se if the two prior conditions are present: for he who wills the cause is judged to will the effect which naturally and necessarily follows from it;

b) is also verified of a cause per accidens, provided that, besides, there is a third condition: that the effect ought to have been avoided, or that there was an obligation not to place the cause, and indeed not to place it lest the effect follow. For since the effect is not sufficiently contained in such a cause (except by means of another cause), and therefore there is no physical nexus with the effect, if the said obligation is lacking, every nexus of causality, even moral, between cause and effect is lacking, and therefore the effect will not be willed nor voluntary in cause, but only permitted. On the

contrary, if someone is bound not to place the cause lest the effect follow, and nevertheless places it, he is morally judged, and imputably is, the cause of this effect.

But if the aforesaid conditions are present, the axiom is verified: An evil effect foreseen in the cause communicates its malice to the cause, namely, if it itself can and ought to be avoided. For an effect voluntary only in the cause is not imputed for praise, because it is not intended; but for it to be imputed for fault, it is required that there be an obligation of avoiding the cause lest the effect follow; otherwise no precept regarding the effect would be violated.

64. Corollaries.

From the aforesaid things it follows:

1. That an effect voluntary in the cause can be in itself non-voluntary, if it is not intended, indeed involuntary in itself, if it displeases, as if someone places the cause of killing (for example, to shoot an arrow with some foresight of killing) and the killing is not intended or displeases him, for example, if he does not will to kill but wills to shoot the arrow without employing sufficient diligence lest he kill a man.

2. On the contrary, that an effect can be willed in itself, if it pleases, is desired, or even intended, and not voluntary, if it follows from a cause per accidens and the obligation of avoiding it is lacking because, for example, a greater good effect which follows from the cause is also intended. For then the evil effect willed in itself is not voluntary, but only permitted in the cause (cf. n. 173).

Thus if someone digs a pit on his own land, remote from the road, foreseeing and desiring that his enemy could fall into it; if this happens, the fall is not voluntary to him, because he was only its cause per accidens.

3. That an effect, for example the sin of a neighbor, of which we in no way place the cause per se but only a mere occasion or condition or cause per accidens, is not voluntary in the cause nor imputable, even if it is willed and intended in itself, unless nevertheless there is an obligation of avoiding the effect: for our intention does not change an occasion into a cause, nor a cause per accidens into a cause per se.

Thus if someone takes from a miser a thing of slight value, foreseeing or even intending that from grief he may become ill or die, and this happens, the illness and death are not voluntary, because he was their mere occasion or cause per accidens, in no way their cause per se.

Question Two: On the Impediments of the Voluntary or On the Involuntary

65. The involuntary is that which does not proceed from knowledge of the end, or, if knowledge of the end is present, nevertheless not from an intrinsic principle, or: that which does not proceed from an intrinsic principle or at least not with knowledge of the end. If only knowledge of the end is lacking, in one who is capable of knowledge and of the voluntary, the involuntary is negative, or non-voluntary, and is that which the agent does not know and therefore neither pursues nor turns away from: thus a dishonorable movement before the advertence of reason

is properly non-voluntary. But if inclination from an intrinsic principle is lacking, the involuntary can be positive, or contrary in the proper sense, and is that which the agent turns away from by a positive act and which is against his inclination: thus a base thought had unwillingly is properly involuntary.

66. The involuntary is distinguished as involuntary simply, which the agent in no way causes nor desires but rather turns away from and tries to impede absolutely and efficaciously; and the involuntary in a certain respect, which the agent would not will but which would displease him when certain circumstances are considered, yet, all things weighed, he wills and it pleases him. In other words: that which he turns away from by a conditioned will, yet embraces by an absolute and efficacious will, so that the involuntary in a certain respect is voluntary simply. This voluntary is not pure, but mixed with the involuntary. Thus the throwing of merchandise into the sea is voluntary by reason of the storm, but in a certain respect is involuntary, for if the danger were lacking, the throwing would not be done.

1. Others also divide the voluntary thus: they call voluntary simply that which someone wills absolutely; voluntary in a certain respect, that which he wills or would will conditionally, although now he absolutely wills the contrary. But that which he conditionally wills is only the object of velleity or the willed thing, not voluntary, because it does not proceed from the will. Whence there is no voluntary in a certain respect; but every voluntary is voluntary simply. Therefore when St. Thomas, II-II, q. 142, a. 3, writes that those things which are done from fear are not simply voluntary but mixed, he takes simply for that which is the same as purely, altogether, from every part, and as it is opposed to mixed, as is clear from the terms. But here he takes simply for that which is actual in reality, says Billuart, diss. 1, art. 7. Whence St. Thomas understands voluntary simply in diverse ways: either in the sense explained by us above (I-II, q. 6, a. 6), or as pure voluntary (II-II, q. 142, a. 3).

67. Impediments of the Voluntary. - The following impede the voluntary and thus the human act: 1) all those things by which man is not master of himself, such as defect of reason, alienation of mind, sleep, drunkenness, the state of perfect somnambulism or hypnotism, diabolical obsession, etc.; certain of these, however, can be voluntary in cause; 2) in a man master of himself there are four proximate principal causes (to which the others are reduced) which impede the voluntary, that is, remove or diminish it: violence and fear, which impede the inclination of the will; concupiscence and ignorance, which impede intellectual knowledge, that is, remove or diminish it. Hence they are called enemies of the voluntary.

Article I: On Violence

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 4 and 5.

68. Violence, which is called coercion when it is exercised toward a being that has knowledge, is properly a motion which proceeds from an extrinsic principle, with the patient resisting, that is, with that which suffers force resisting. It is said:

1. From an extrinsic principle, and thus the violent differs from the natural and the voluntary, which are from within: for nothing properly inflicts violence on itself, for otherwise it would at the same time tend and not tend toward the same thing;

2. With the patient resisting, that is, while the one suffering resists with every effort. For if something is naturally or voluntarily disposed, or not indisposed but indifferent, to suffering that which is from without, the passion will be natural or voluntary or permitted, not violent.

Hence violence is distinguished as a) violence strictly so called, or absolute and perfect, when the patient resists as much as he can, for example death inflicted on one who defends his life; and b) violence broadly so called, imperfect and in a certain respect, when he resists but not as much as he can, for example death inflicted on a martyr.

It differs a) from the necessary, to which it adds that it is from an extrinsic principle, while the necessary can also be from within;

b) from the involuntary, because this can be from within, from the knowledge of evil or defect of knowledge of the end. Indeed, every violent thing is necessary, and, if there is question of a knowing being, involuntary; but not conversely;

c) from that which is called moral violence: with properly so called physical violence (which by St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, is called sufficient and compelling) there is not to be confused the improperly so called or moral (it is called insufficient and impelling), which is inflicted by threatening and rebuking and which coincides with grave fear instilled, especially when something would not be impeded by resisting but would then be effected by external force, e.g., departure from a house made by someone who otherwise is expelled by military hand.

69. Can Violence Be Inflicted on the Will? - There is a twofold act of the will: one immediately elicited by it, namely, to will; the other commanded by it, exercised through another power, for example voluntarily to think, to walk, to speak. As to the former, violence cannot be inflicted on the will: for an elicited act is the very inclination of the will to something, proceeding from an intrinsic knowing principle; but a violent act proceeds from an extrinsic principle. Therefore it is impossible for an act of the will to be violent. And indeed, the violent is against the inclination of the patient; but the elicited act of the will, since it is the inclination of the will itself, cannot be against its own inclination. Hence Anselm says, *De libero arbitrio*, chapter 6: "No one can unwillingly will something, because he cannot will while unwilling to will." - But as to commanded acts, it can suffer violence, insofar as by violence our external or internal powers are moved against the command of the will, or are impeded lest they execute it, for example the foot lest it make a step, the eye, by closing it, lest it see, etc. Hence:

a) No one can coerce the will itself, not even God Himself.

b) God alone, as cause both of the will and of the act itself, can change it, that is, transfer it from one thing into another and make the unwilling willing, and the one willing this to be willing that; nevertheless He then does not inflict violence, or coerce the will against its inclination, but makes one inclination of the will succeed another.

c) God, angels, and the devil can, against the will, move the intellect, imagination, and sensitive appetite toward some object; in this case that movement with respect to these faculties is not violent, but it is violent with respect to the will.

d) All these, and men, can move the exterior members and external senses against the will.

70. Principles. The violent is directly opposed to the voluntary, and therefore makes the involuntary: for the violent (when it is inflicted on a knowing being) is from an extrinsic principle against the inclination of the willing subject; but the voluntary is from within, that is, from the proper inclination of the will (cf. can. 2205, § 1).

"Common to the voluntary and the natural," says St. Thomas, a. 5, "is that each is from an intrinsic principle" (i.e., from the proper inclination of the agent); "but the violent is from an extrinsic principle" (against the inclination of the subject). "And because of this, just as in things which lack cognition violence makes something be against nature" (unnatural), "so in knowing things it makes something be against the will... which is called involuntary."

Hence that which happens from an extrinsic principle:

1. If the subject resists externally and internally as much as he can, is absolutely violent and altogether involuntary;

2. If he resists externally, but consents internally, it is not voluntary nor involuntary, but willed;

3. If he does not consent nor resist, or does not resist as much as he can, but bears himself passively, while he ought not to resist or to resist more, it is not voluntary but permitted;

4. If he does not consent, but neither does he resist as much as he ought, it is indirectly voluntary (no. 60, II);

5. If he does not resist as much as he can but consents, it is violent in a certain respect but simply voluntary, yet less so the greater the violence was or the more he resisted. For the voluntary is "in one way according to action, when someone wills to do something; in another way according to passion, when someone wills to suffer something from another. Hence when an action is inflicted by someone exterior, while there remains in him who suffers the will of suffering, it is not simply violent, because although he who suffers does not contribute by acting, nevertheless he contributes by willing to suffer; hence it cannot be called involuntary" (a. 5, ad 2).

A girl oppressed by force, if she resists as much as she can, is oppressed involuntarily; if she does not resist as much as she ought or if she consents, voluntarily and culpably; if she does not resist as much as she can but as much as she ought, not involuntarily but permissively. Danger of consent being excluded, she is not bound to resist by useless means, or extraordinary means (the killing of the aggressor), or even by shouting if there is danger of notable harm, e.g., death, excessive shame: in these cases the oppression is not voluntary. But if internally she consents, externally she resists as much as she ought, the external oppression is not therefore truly voluntary, but only willed.

Article II: On Fear

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 6.

71. Fear or dread is a passion of the irascible sensitive appetite by which we flee a future sensible evil difficult to avoid. Here it is taken for every movement by which we flee from evil, whether it is a movement of passion or of will; and it is usually defined: a trembling of the mind (that

is, unrest and disturbance) on account of an imminent or future evil or danger. It differs from coercion, because the latter physically acts upon the powers of man and is from an extrinsic principle; but the cause which provokes fear is a moral cause which influences by way of a known object, namely, by proposing danger. Hence fear is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge.

72. Fear is divided:

1. By reason of cause, it is either taken up, if it comes from a natural cause, whether intrinsic, such as sickness or weakness of mind, or extrinsic, such as shipwreck, fire, or an encounter with beasts; or inflicted, if it comes from an external free cause, God, the devil, or man. This, by reason of mode, is just when the one causing fear has a right to cause fear and causes it in a legitimate mode, for example a father or judge by due punishments; or unjust when he does not have the right to cause fear or causes it in an illegitimate mode, whether it is done to extort something, for example a contract or vow, or for another end, for example revenge.

2. By reason of intensity, fear is grave when the evil which is feared is great and certainly or probably imminent; and light when a light evil is feared, or a grave one but not probably imminent.

The former is absolutely grave, when the evil considered in itself from its nature is great, e.g., death, grave wounding or mutilation, harsh prison, exile, rape, notable infamy, loss of status or of a great part of goods: this is accustomed to fall upon a constant man and a man of strong spirit; or relatively grave, when the evil is grave only with respect to the person fearing, with attention to his age, sex, condition, character, etc.: this does not fall upon a constant man, but upon a fainthearted one who easily fears; thus a fearful person, a boy, a woman, an old man greatly fears things which a man does not dread.

Reverential fear toward superiors, e.g., of children toward parents, wife toward husband, ward toward guardian, religious toward prelate, cleric toward bishop, per se is judged and generally is light, unless grave threats, blows, or most urgent prayers are added, because then vexation can be reputed hard and grave, or long-lasting indignation can be feared.

3. By reason of the work, fear is antecedent or impelling, while someone acts from fear, when it is the motive of operating, for example if a traveler gives money to a robber from fear of death; and concomitant, or repelling or drawing back, while someone acts not from fear but with fear, when it is not the motive of the work, although it accompanies it, indeed rather would be a motive of not operating, for example if a robber steals with fear of prison, or a merchant with fear boards the high sea.

73. Principles. I. That which is done with fear is perfectly voluntary and free: for then there is present a strong and deliberate will which overcomes and conquers fear.

II. That which is done from fear is regularly mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary, because it is done partly from inclination, partly against the inclination of the will. It is voluntary simply, because the will, all things considered, wills and places it; but involuntary in a certain respect, because it wills and places it with some repugnance, for it would not will it considered according to itself and apart from certain circumstances.

This is clear from the example of a merchant who from fear of shipwreck throws merchandise into the sea. In this case four things concur: 1) love of the lesser good, namely, the merchandise; 2) love of the greater good, namely, life, whose loss is feared; 3) efficacious consent to the loss of the lesser good (the merchandise) for conserving the greater (namely, life); 4) nevertheless an inefficacious love for the lesser good perseveres, from which arises an inefficacious displeasure at its loss. Now the consent is conformable to the second inclination and therefore simply voluntary, but it is against the first, which in some way perseveres, and according to this it is in some way involuntary; whence it is mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary.

We said regularly, because a) sometimes it is not involuntary in a certain respect, if fear also excludes affection toward the lesser opposed good; and then what is done from fear is purely voluntary, not mixed with the involuntary. For other reasons besides fear of the evil to be avoided can be added, on account of which the action becomes lovable in itself, and fear itself can be a motive which demands that an inefficacious affection toward the opposite be excluded. This is clear concerning a sinner who sorrows for sins because of fear of hell, but nevertheless does not retain affection toward sins (Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4), and similarly a noble man fleeing theft from fear of infamy does not necessarily say: if there were no infamy, I would steal; b) by accident it is not voluntary simply, if the fear is so vehement and so disturbs reason that it totally removes its deliberation and use, and then it removes the voluntary properly so called and the free.

74. Corollaries. - From the aforesaid things it is easily understood:

1. That fear per se and regularly does not excuse from the whole sin, because it leaves the voluntary simply, which suffices for sin; nevertheless it diminishes insofar as the work is involuntary in a certain respect and therefore less voluntary and free (fear excuses from so much but not from the whole; cf. can. 2205, § 3), yet it does not so diminish that it makes a mortal sin venial, because generally it leaves sufficient deliberation for mortal sin.

2. That fear by accident excuses from mortal sin if it removes perfect deliberation, indeed from every sin if it removes all deliberation.

3. That grave fear, because it does not remove the free voluntary, per se from the nature of things does not invalidate human acts (can. 103, § 2), except perhaps sometimes for those acts which from their nature require a more perfect free act (vow, gratuitous donation, marriage).

75. Observations. - 1. Light fear in the external forum is never judged an efficacious cause of action.

2. Grave fear never excuses from an intrinsically evil work which is prohibited by natural law as being evil in itself; it often excuses from the observance of a positive law, or from those things which are evil only because prohibited (can. 2205, § 2 and 3).

Article III: On Concupiscence

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 7; q. 73, a. 6; q. 77, a. 5 and 7; q. 78, a. 2 and 4.

76. Concupiscence: 1) in the broadest sense is either a) habitual disorder, that is, the privation of rectitude left by original sin in the sensitive appetite, especially when it tends toward sensible good, and consequently in reason and will; or b) any passion or disordered movement of the appetite,

preceding deliberation, especially when it tends toward evil or rises up against reason (a first-first movement);

2. In the strictest sense, it is the special passion by which the concupiscible appetite tends toward an absent sensible delectable good, and is opposed to fear, which is the movement of the appetite fleeing evil;

3. In a less strict sense, here it is taken not indeed for every passion, but for any affection or movement of the sensitive appetite or of the will tending toward a delectable good in order to pursue it.

1. Many modern authors think concupiscence is to be understood only as passion, and indeed every passion. Yet this is not true, for fear is also a passion, and St. Thomas teaches precisely the opposite about it and about concupiscence. They err because they confuse two very diverse questions: 1) whether any passion whatever (even fear) diminishes the free, concerning which we shall speak later, n. 93; 2) whether concupiscence diminishes the voluntary. In this question, concupiscence is understood not only as a movement of passion, but also of the will, as is clear from I-II, q. 73, a. 6, ad 2; and from II Sent. d. 22, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5.

By reason of the act of the deliberate will, concupiscence is antecedent, which (in the order of causality) precedes the free consent of the will and causes it: then something is done from concupiscence, as when, having seen a beautiful woman, lust draws the will so that it takes delight in her. And it is consequent, which (in the order of causality) follows the free consent of the will and proceeds from it, as if one, willing to sin with a woman, excites concupiscence for perpetrating the sin: then something is done with concupiscence. It is plain that consequent concupiscence, since it follows upon the voluntary, in no way impedes it nor causes the involuntary, but is only a sign and effect of the voluntary. Therefore the question concerns only antecedent concupiscence, how it is related to the voluntary and involuntary.

77. Principle I. Antecedent concupiscence causes the voluntary rather than the involuntary. - For something is called voluntary from the fact that the will is borne toward it. But by concupiscence the will is inclined to willing that which it desires. Therefore concupiscence rather makes toward this, that something be voluntary, than involuntary.

Therefore, unlike fear, concupiscence per se never makes the involuntary simply or in a certain respect, because in him who acts from fear there remains a prior will repugnant to that which he does, but in him who acts from concupiscence there does not remain a prior will which was rejecting that which he desires; and therefore the concupiscent person acts against what he was willing, while the fearful person acts against what even now, according to itself, he wills. Yet concupiscence makes the involuntary by accident when some evil is joined to the object which is desired, for example when a lustful man is at the same time avaricious and wills fornication, for procuring which he must spend money.

78. Principle II. Antecedent concupiscence increases the voluntary, diminishes the freely voluntary; whence that which is done from concupiscence is more voluntary, less free. - For such concupiscence:

1. Ballerini and his disciples, such as Bucceroni, Genicot, and Noldin, on account of the confusion spoken of in the preceding note, teach that antecedent concupiscence simply diminishes the voluntary, and not only under the aspect of freedom. Yet they do not speak rightly in this way. Whence Schmitt, in the more recent editions of Noldin's work, I, n. 53, corrected this somewhat, writing: antecedent concupiscence diminishes freedom. And Salsmans, in the very recent edition of Genicot's work, changed one word, and in place of concupiscence put passion; but for that reason the doctrine is not more adequate nor less ambiguous.

1. Always increases the improperly so called voluntary, because concupiscence itself, as an indeliberate movement of the appetite, is voluntary in this way from its nature.

2. Generally it increases the properly so called voluntary as to inclination or propensity, because our will is borne more into the object which we desire, since the intellect proposes it as more desirable and to be pursued with greater efficacy; nevertheless it diminishes it as to the indifference of judgment and therefore as to deliberation. For it makes the intellect perceive less the reason of evil in the object and propose it as more lovable; hence it also diminishes freedom, and consequently the goodness of the act and the sin.

3. Sometimes, if it is very vehement, it takes away knowledge and deliberation and the use of reason, and therefore the properly so called voluntary and the free; yet it does not make the involuntary: for in him who does not use reason, there is neither the properly voluntary nor the involuntary.

79. Observation. - Consequent concupiscence in no way diminishes the voluntary properly so called, nor the free, nor consequently goodness or sin, because it itself is the effect of the free will. Whence what is done with concupiscence is not less voluntary nor free. Nevertheless it can diminish deliberation and freedom as to the act following from it; but as to that act it is antecedent.

Article IV: On Ignorance

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 8; q. 19, a. 6; q. 76.

80. Ignorance properly is the lack of knowledge in a subject capable of it, for example of astronomy in a priest. It differs:

1. From nescience, which is the simple negation of knowledge in an incapable subject, for example in a child or a madman;

2. From error, which is not a mere lack but a positive act of the intellect judging a thing to be otherwise than it is; it arises from ignorance or rashness;

3. From inadvertence, which is the lack not indeed of habitual knowledge but of actual consideration;

4. From forgetfulness, which is the privation of knowledge previously had.

But since moralists treat only of due duties and undue sins, they often take ignorance more strictly, not indeed for a negation, but for the privation of knowledge which ought to be in someone, such as

theology for a confessor. Hence some distinguish negative ignorance, privative ignorance, and even positive ignorance or ignorance of false disposition, if it includes error.

81. Ignorance is divided:

1. By reason of the object which is unknown, it is ignorance of law, whether natural or positive, whether divine or human, whether of the law itself or of the penalty joined to it, by which, namely, the existence or extension or sense of the law itself is unknown; and ignorance of fact, by which a fact or a concrete circumstance of fact determining the present application of the law is unknown.

Thus he who does not know that on the vigil of Pentecost one must fast, or that heretical books are prohibited, is in ignorance of law; he who does not advert that this day is the vigil of Pentecost, or that this book is heretical, is in ignorance of fact.

2. By reason of the subject or person who is ignorant, ignorance is invincible or vincible. Invincible or involuntary ignorance is that which could not be removed by moral diligence; but vincible or voluntary ignorance is that which could have been so removed.

Moral diligence is that which prudent persons are accustomed to employ, and which varies according to the various circumstances or quality of the business, person, place, etc.; for example, it will be greater in a priest for rightly executing his office than in a rustic, greater where there is question of the goods of life than of fortune, where there is question of notable harm to a third party than of a small one.

Vincible ignorance is inculpable if it ought not to have been removed; but culpable if it ought to have been. But moralists, attending only to due and undue things, use the words culpable and vincible indiscriminately, and often call culpable ignorance vincible, and call inculpable ignorance invincible.

1. Speculatively one can still distinguish absolutely invincible ignorance, if it can in no way be removed; morally invincible and absolutely vincible ignorance, if absolutely it can be removed but only with toil and difficulty (because there is not given a proximate moral power for overcoming it); and morally vincible ignorance, if it can be removed morally and by ordinary diligence. But moralists do not treat of these.

Invincible ignorance can arise from a twofold head: either because someone has not thought at all about the truth to be sought or about the danger of error (for the first idea is not in man's power), or because, if he has thought and employed diligence, nevertheless he has not arrived at the truth. Whence it is not voluntary.

On the contrary, vincible ignorance is voluntary, whether directly and in itself, as if someone wills to be ignorant; or only indirectly from negligence, as if he omits to inquire when he ought to inquire; or only in the cause, if he wills something upon which ignorance follows (for example, drunkenness). But there are many degrees in it, which are usually reduced to three: a) ignorance strictly or simply vincible, when diligence is employed to overcome it, but not sufficient diligence, or not the whole diligence which is morally possible, or not all that which the quality of the business and person demands: it is indirectly voluntary; b) crass ignorance, when no or scarcely any diligence has been

employed for acquiring knowledge, and supine ignorance, if this was so for driving away ignorance: it is voluntary, either indirectly, or in the cause; c) affected, malicious, or directly willed ignorance, when someone expressly and deliberately wills to be ignorant for any end whatever: whether so that he may act at pleasure and not be drawn back from his purpose, or so that he may have an excuse in sins committed or to be committed, or because of disgust, etc., especially if he studiously wills not to know so that he may not be drawn back from sinning but may sin more freely.

2. Several modern authors regard that three-membered distinction as not correct, because it is made with respect to a twofold diverse terminus: for ignorance is antecedent or consequent relative to the will itself of being ignorant; but it is antecedent or concomitant relative to the will of the work to be known. Nevertheless it seems that it can be rightly understood and defended by saying that the three aforesaid ignorances are distinguished by reason of both termini at once, namely, by considering at once the act of the will concerning ignorance and the act of the will concerning the work.

3. By reason of the act of the will together with the work, ignorance is:

a) Antecedent, which does not follow from the will but precedes its act, and yet is the cause to it of willing and doing what it would not will nor do if knowledge were present (according to the present disposition). Hence ignorance is the cause of the work because it removes knowledge which would impede the work, for example if someone, thinking he is killing a beast, kills a friend whom he would not have killed if he had known: such a person acts from involuntary ignorance. For all antecedent ignorance is invincible, but not conversely, because invincible ignorance is not always the reason for doing that which otherwise would not be done.

b) Concomitant, which precedes the act of the will and is joined to it, yet not as the cause of willing and doing that which is done, because even if it were not present, nevertheless the thing would be done (according to the present disposition), for example if someone, thinking he is killing a beast, kills an enemy whom he would also have killed if he had known: such a person acts with involuntary ignorance. It is also invincible.

c) Consequent, which in some way follows from an act of the will directly not willing or indirectly neglecting to inquire, and is directly or indirectly voluntary and at the same time precedes the work so that it can be the cause of willing and doing it, for example if someone voluntarily neglects to inquire about the danger of killing a man, whom, if he knew, he would not kill, or about a day of abstinence, although, if he knew that abstinence was required, he would abstain; such a person acts from voluntary ignorance. Consequent ignorance is vincible, as voluntary, whether it is vincible at the moment when the work is placed, or was formerly vincible, provided that the work was foreseen and because of it ignorance ought to have been guarded against. Otherwise it would be invincible with respect to the work, although vincible in itself, and therefore antecedent or concomitant with respect to the work which is placed.

82. Principles. I. Antecedent ignorance removes the voluntary according to that which is unknown, because it is invincible; indeed it renders the work positively involuntary simply, because it makes something against the habitual inclination of the will: for the work would not be done if ignorance were absent.

Hence: that which is done from involuntary antecedent ignorance is positively and simply involuntary; therefore such ignorance excuses.

We said: according to that which is unknown, for under another respect it can be voluntary: thus he who kills a man or a friend, thinking him to be a beast or an enemy, voluntarily shoots the arrow, but does not shoot it into a man or into a friend; and he who sins with a woman, not knowing that she is joined in marriage, although he is not guilty of adultery, nevertheless is guilty of fornication.

II. Concomitant ignorance removes the voluntary because it is invincible, but does not render the work positively involuntary, because this is not against the inclination of the will but would also be done if ignorance were not present; therefore it makes the non-voluntary. Hence: that which is done with involuntary concomitant ignorance is non-voluntary; and of this ignorance it is said: it does not accuse, nor does it altogether excuse, namely, from the habitual disposition of the will.

III. Consequent ignorance does not make the simply involuntary, but renders the work simply voluntary, because it itself is vincible and voluntary. Yet it generally (even if it is affected) makes the involuntary in a certain respect, because it is against some inclination of the will, insofar as it is the cause of doing that which would not be done if knowledge were present; hence it diminishes the voluntary and the sin according to the degree of vincibility, so that sometimes it even makes a mortal sin venial.

But it must be well noted: ignorance exceptionally in no way diminishes the voluntary, namely, if it is so affected that someone precisely chooses it in order to sin more freely or so as not to be drawn back from sin. Namely, this in no way makes the involuntary, nor therefore diminishes the voluntary and sin, but rather increases it, not by reason of itself but by reason of the cause, because there is a greater affection toward evil. For then it comes from a greater intensity or more intense inclination of the will toward sinning that someone wills to undergo ignorance.

Hence: that which is done from voluntary or consequent ignorance is simply voluntary, but ordinarily involuntary in a certain respect, and then less voluntary. This ignorance does not excuse, but accuses.

83. Observations. - 1. The general doctrine concerning ignorance is briefly expressed in canon 2202, § 1: "The violation of an unknown law is in no way imputed, if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise imputability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself."

2. The things which we have said about ignorance can be applied to inadvertence and forgetfulness, and to error. Error includes ignorance; full inadvertence and perfect forgetfulness are equated with invincible ignorance; but if they are not perfect, but arise from negligence, they are equated with vincible ignorance. Whence canon 2202, § 3: "The things which are established concerning ignorance also hold for inadvertence and error."

Question Three: On the Free

S. Th. I-II, q. 10 and 13.

84. The free is that which is immune from a bond. But the bond is twofold:

1. An external bond, that is, an extrinsically acting and determining cause, from which whatever is voluntary is immune; and therefore it is called free from coercion and violence, or from an extrinsic force compelling to the act against the inclination of the will. Freedom from coercion, or of execution (spontaneity), therefore is inseparable from the human will, because the will cannot be coerced, not even by God; for no one can unwillingly will, because no one can will while unwilling. It is freedom of acting rather than of willing.

2. An internal bond, or intrinsic necessity and natural determination of the power to one thing; hence the free properly so called, from natural necessity, is that which proceeds from election of a will not naturally determined, or that to which the will determines itself through deliberation. Hence there is called free choice "which is the cause of itself," that is, of its own movement, namely, through its own judgment and its own determination (*De Veritate* 24, a. 1; *Contra Gentiles* I, 72 and 88); and freedom properly so called is called freedom from necessity, of indifference (to opposites), of election, and of exercise. It is true freedom of willing.

But in human acts the voluntary is always free, and therefore these terms are often used indiscriminately by moralists.

85. Freedom is the abstract quality which belongs to the will insofar as it is furnished with free choice; but free choice is a rational power (choice) toward opposites (free), as St. Thomas says, *De Veritate* 24, a. 3; and it is defined by him (I, q. 83, a. 4; and q. 62, a. 8, ad 3): an elective power of means, the order of the end being preserved, that is, an active faculty of acting, not acting, or doing another thing at pleasure. It is said:

1. A power, that is, an active potency or faculty, not an act, because free choice is natural and permanent in man even when he is not acting.

2. Elective: it consists in taking one thing while the other is refused. But election is an act of the will: namely, to seek something (that is, to will one thing before another) for attaining another; although it presupposes choice or practical judgment and therefore counsel or deliberation of the intellect, by which motives of acting are comparatively estimated (according to the diverse reason of good and advantage or evil and disadvantage), and it is judged what is to be preferred to another.

Therefore freedom formally is in the will, which from the judgment of the intellect freely determines itself to this or that, while it can will or choose another thing; radically and presuppositively it is in the intellect, which proposes objects with some indifference. For it is "in the will as in the subject, because the adequate object of the will by which its capacity is filled is not any good whatever but universal good; whence it does not efficaciously and necessarily will whatsoever things are proposed to it as particular, participated, and relative goods. Therefore that from which freedom immediately arises is the eminence of the will above particular goods, and its amplitude and capacity for all goods: therefore particular goods cannot satiate its capacity nor equal its amplitude.

But it is originatively from reason directing and ruling as from a cause: for from this the will can freely be borne to diverse things, because reason can have diverse conceptions of good (I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2). For in various particular objects it sees at once advantage and defect; whence it can propose

them as appetible and choosable under one respect, and as hateful and avoidable under another respect. And therefore the will can choose them insofar as they are goods, but also can not choose them insofar as they have the notion of disadvantage or defect. For the will is essentially a rational appetite, and therefore it is borne not freely but necessarily into an object which is proposed by the intellect as simply good without defect (I, q. 82, a. 1 and 2; I-II, q. 13, a. 6).

3. Of means: election in operable things stands as conclusion in speculative things, and the end as principle; therefore the end as end is not chosen, because it stands as principle in operable things, but only the means are chosen, just as a conclusion is not about principles but about things consequent upon them. But if sometimes the end is chosen, then it is considered as a means to the ultimate end; but the ultimate end as such, or complete good as such, is not chosen, because it cannot be ordered to another.

4. The order of the end being preserved: for means are for the sake of the end; hence if freedom turns aside from the end, there is defect, which is not of the essence and perfection of free choice, just as a conclusion which departs from principles.

86. Division of Freedom.

By reason of object, freedom is:

1. One of contradiction or exercise (concerning the very act of the will), by which we can choose between two contradictories, or will to love and will not to love, will to act and will not to act, will to will and will not to will, etc.;

2. Another of specification (concerning the objects of the act of the will), by which we can choose between two acts diverse in species, or between two diverse goods, for example to will to stand or sit, to walk or study, faith or hope, to do this or that;

3. Another of contrariety or moral freedom (concerning the order of the end), by which we can choose between two contrary acts in relation to the end, for example to love and to hate, to will good and evil. This is not a new species of freedom, but the very freedom of specification for choosing between contraries (cf. St. Thomas, Q. D. *De Veritate* 22, a. 6; on John VIII, 34).

1. Moral freedom among modern authors is taken in a diverse sense, namely, in opposition to freedom from a physical bond, or natural and physical freedom, as immunity from a moral bond, that is, from law and obligation (cf. Leo XIII, enc. *Libertas*). And thus physical freedom is the foundation of moral freedom.

The first is of the essence of freedom, without which freedom cannot exist; the second is of its perfection; the third is a defect proper to the state of wayfaring, whence it is called an imperfection and sign of freedom, just as sickness is a sign of life. For the way of means to the end is more perfect the more securely it attains the end.

87. Thesis. Man has free choice, even in the present state of fallen nature. - It is of faith from the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 1 and canons 4, 5, and 6; and from the Vatican Council,

session 3, chapter 3, canon 5 (cf. the condemned propositions of Baius 39, 66, 67; the third proposition of Jansenius; and the first condemned by Alexander VIII).

The first part is proved: the will is the power by which man can seek every good. Therefore, if a particular good is shown to it, it can seek it because it is good, and not seek it because a defect is joined to it, or because it is not complete good itself nor perfectly satiating. Cf. St. Thomas I, q. 82, a. 2; q. 83, a. 1; I-II, q. 10, a. 2; q. 13, a. 6; *De Malo* VI, a. 1.

The second part is proved: 1) from the Scriptures, in which the faculty of choosing is asserted formally and directly (Eccli. XV, 14; XXXI, 10; Gen. IV, 7; Deut. XXX, 15, 19; I Cor. VII, 36-37), and also virtually and indirectly, namely, by precepts and counsels, exhortations, trials, rewards, and punishments;

2. from the testimony of conscience and the common sense of men;

3. from the perpetual tradition of the Church:

a) It is proposed by the apostolic Fathers, especially by the Apologists. Cf. Justin, *Apology* I, 43; *Dialogue* 102; Tatian, *Against the Greeks*, or. 7; Theophilus of Antioch, *To Autolycus* II, 27; Irenaeus, *Against Heresies* IV, 37.

b) It is defended and vindicated among the Fathers:

Against the Gnostics: thus Tertullian, *De anima*; Methodius, *De libero arbitrio*; Origen, *De Principiis*; Ephraem, etc.

Against the Manichaeans: thus Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine.

1. For the doctrine of St. Augustine the theologians can be consulted where they treat of grace.

Against the Predestinarians of the eighth-ninth century: thus Adrian I, ep. *Instit. universal.*, the Council of Quierzy, the Council of Valence. Cf. Leo IX, symbol of faith.

c) In the Middle Ages the Scholastics also prove freedom by philosophical arguments.

d) Later Luther, Baius, and Jansenius were condemned, denying the freedom of fallen man.

4. by reason: fallen man does not cease to be of intellectual nature. But free choice inseparably follows intellectual nature.

88. Observation.

The will a) as to specification is naturally and necessarily moved by some object, as St. Thomas says, q. 10, a. 1: those things which are not in something per se, but can be in it and not in it, are reduced to something which is in it per se and necessarily as to a first; otherwise there would be a process to infinity. And therefore it is necessary that always the principle in those things which belong to a thing be natural. Whence the principle of the movements of the will must be something naturally willed. But this is:

1. Good in common, or indeterminate universal good (any good whatsoever, so that it is nothing but good), toward which the will naturally tends as any power tends toward its object;

2. The ultimate end itself or beatitude in the abstract, as our highest and complete good, because it is the first principle in operable things;

3. Those things which are necessary to the one willing according to his nature, such as to be and to live and to know truth, insofar as they are thus considered according to themselves and by reason of themselves as suitable to nature (on the part of the object), because thus they appear only as good; nevertheless per accidens and by reason of circumstances they can appear as evil, and then they are not naturally sought (for example, in suicide).

b) As to exercise, at least in the present state, it is moved necessarily by no object, not even by good or beatitude in common, because man can always not think of that object and thus not actually will it (a. 2). It is not so in the state of the term, in which the intellect is always in act and necessarily understands God to be its beatitude (I, q. 82, a. 2).

Hence it is understood: 1) that the will necessarily wills that which is thought by the intellect as absolutely and under every respect good; 2) if something evidently appears to be so necessarily connected with the end and beatitude that without it the end cannot be had, then the will cannot not will it; 3) nevertheless, because all particular goods, even those in which the ultimate end is constituted, do not necessarily and always appear as good from every side and necessary, but can appear as connected with evils (for example, on account of difficulties), therefore they are freely sought as to specification; and because man can fail to consider them, they are freely sought as to exercise.

Question IV: On the Impediments of Freedom

89. The causes which more greatly impede freedom, and in this way the human act, are of different kinds. Some proximately diminish or remove it, and these are only two: 1) one actual principle alone, namely the passions or movements of the sensitive appetite, for the movements or acts of reason and of the will concur in constituting the human act; 2) another habitual principle, namely habits (and habitual dispositions) with the attached custom, and these can also be found in reason and will. Besides these, 3) there are other causes which more remotely influence freedom, insofar as from them passions or habits or habitual dispositions can arise, such as bodily constitution, heredity, education, drunkenness and imperfect hypnosis, and several pathological or nervous states.

Article I: On the Passions

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 9, a. 2, and q. 10, a. 3; q. 22 and q. 23, and q. 24, a. 3, ad 1; q. 73, a. 6; q. 77, a. 6 and 7; q. 78, a. 2 and 4.

90. Passion is a movement of an appetitive power from the imagination of a sensible good or evil, with a certain change of the body; or, an act of the sensitive appetite pursuing sensible good or fleeing sensible evil, under the direction of imagination, with a certain bodily transmutation. It is said to be:

1. We are treating not of bodily passion, but of animal passion: the soul cannot properly suffer per se, but by reason of the composite.

1. a movement or act, as genus; 2) of the sensitive appetite, in order that its subject may be indicated; 3) pursuing good or fleeing evil, in order that the twofold object and the proximate genus may be indicated; 4) under the direction of imagination, that is, of a sensible representation by the help of a certain sensitive faculty, in order that the principle of passion which indicates good and evil may be noted; 5) with a certain bodily alteration, in order that the effect may be indicated by which passion is distinguished both from movements of the will, which take place without bodily transmutation, and from sensible cognition, which takes place with only an intentional transmutation, without physical transmutation.

Passion comprises a twofold element: the material, which is the very transmutation of the body; the formal, on the part of the appetite, which is an act of the soul, without which it would be nothing but bodily passion, by which the body alone would suffer. Thus in anger the material element is the heating of the blood around the heart; the formal is the appetite for vengeance. For passion is from the soul as from an effective principle, from the organism as subject (I, q. 20, a. 1, ad 2).

91. There are eleven principal passions, to which all can be reduced, as the Scholastics teach after Aristotle. For passion is an act of the sensitive appetite. But this is twofold: concupiscible and irascible. For in man, as in animals, there is not only an inclination to pursue the sensible thing which is suitable and to flee what is unsuitable, but also an inclination to resist contrary and impeding things. Whence there is a twofold inclination: the inclination of the concupiscible concerning sensible good and evil taken absolutely as such, namely, concerning the delightful and painful; and the inclination of the irascible concerning sensible good and evil as it is arduous and difficult.

2. This division is not absolutely certain nor scientifically demonstrated; but thus far, says Mercier (*Psychologie*, n. 121), no better has been discovered.

Now there are six passions in the concupiscible appetite: if the appetite is borne toward good or evil simply, abstracting from whether it is present or absent, there is 1) love of good, and 2) hatred of evil; if the appetite is borne toward absent good or evil, there is 3) desire or concupiscence of good, and 4) flight from evil; if the appetite is borne toward present good or evil, there is 5) delight in good, and 6) sadness over evil.

There are five passions of the irascible appetite, which is borne toward arduous good and evil: if it is borne toward arduous good, either this will be possible to obtain, and then there is 1) hope, or impossible, and there is 2) despair; if it flees arduous evil, either that evil is possible to repel, and there is 3) daring, or impossible, and there is 4) fear; or finally it is concerned with present evil to be avenged, and there is 5) anger, to which no passion is opposed.

The passions of the concupiscible differ in species, both 1) according to the contrariety of good and evil because they are borne toward opposed objects (for example, love and hatred), and 2) according to diverse active power, or diverse degree in the process of appetitive movement toward the same object (for example, love, desire, and delight). Cf. q. 23, a. 1 and 4. The passions of the irascible differ both 1) according to the contrariety of the object (for example, hope and fear), and 2) also according to contrary movement, namely, according to approach and withdrawal with respect to the same object (for example, hope and despair, daring and fear). Anger has no contrary (a. 3).

1. Besides the eleven, there are other less principal passions which have a more determinate and particular object, among which there is considered a quasi-accidental difference (Q. D. *De Veritate* 26, a. 4). This happens in two ways: 1) according to intensity and remission: thus zeal is intense love, fury intense anger; 2) according to the material difference of good and evil: envy is sadness concerning another's prosperity insofar as it is esteemed one's own evil; mercy is sadness concerning another's adversity insofar as it is esteemed one's own evil.

92. Passion is divided in relation to the free will or to the human act: it is either antecedent, which precedes the deliberation of reason and the free consent of the will and causes it or entices it to the act: then something is done from passion; or consequent, which follows upon the free consent of the will and proceeds from it: then something is done with passion. This occurs a) by redundance, when the will is borne vehemently and intensely toward the object; for such vehemence naturally excites passion in the sensitive appetite: this is voluntary in the cause only; b) by direct excitation, when the will deliberately excites or fosters passion so that it may pursue the object more ardently and intensely, for example, love in order to tend toward something more intensely, hope in order more easily to obtain victory, anger in order more easily to take vengeance, concupiscence in order to pursue more intensely, fear in order to yield at once: this is voluntary in itself.

The will is not moved directly by an antecedent passion of the sensitive appetite, but indirectly and mediately, namely, by means of the object of the intellect. Once passion has been aroused, man is affected in a certain way and changed to some disposition, by which it happens that the intellect apprehends as fitting and good what it would not so have apprehended if passion were absent, just as to an angry or concupiscent person that seems good which does not seem so to one who is quiet (Jas. I, 14). A change of this sort happens in two ways: 1) sometimes, but more rarely, reason is totally bound, so that man does not have the use of reason, as happens in those who because of vehement anger or concupiscence become furious or mad, as through some bodily disturbance: for in these there is not any use of reason, nor consequently of will; 2) more often reason is not totally absorbed by passion, but the judgment of reason remains free as to something, and then the movement of the will also remains free, which does not tend of necessity to that to which passion inclines. And although reason is clouded by passion, nevertheless the judgment of reason remains free as to something, and according to this man can either totally repel passion, or at least hold himself so that he does not follow passion (q. 9, a. 2, and q. 10, a. 3).

93. Principles. I. Antecedent passion diminishes freedom, and consequently goodness or sin, because it diminishes the indifference of judgment and clouds reason, insofar as it shows the object so that it appears very delightful and fitting, or very troublesome or unfitting, and more so than it is. Indeed sometimes, if it is very vehement, it removes the cognition and deliberation of reason and therefore not only freedom but also the voluntary, properly so called. Hence the principle: What is done from passion is less free.

II. Consequent passion in no way diminishes the voluntary or freedom, nor consequently goodness or sin, because it is itself the effect of the free will; but a) it is a sign of a greater voluntary, if it proceeds from the will by redundance; b) if, however, it is directly excited by the will, it also simply increases the voluntary (extensively and intensively), because it makes one pursue good or evil also through passion and more intensely, and will it freely; and consequently it increases goodness or sin: for the more, according to St. Thomas, q. 77, a. 6, someone freely wills to pursue something with a greater

inclination, the more perfectly he does good or evil. Hence the principle: What is done deliberately with passion is not less free but more voluntary.

94. Observations.

1. The general doctrine concerning passion is briefly expressed in can. 2206: "Passion, if it was voluntarily and deliberately excited or nourished, rather increases imputability; otherwise it diminishes it more or less according to the diverse heat of the passion; and it altogether removes it, if it precedes and impedes every deliberation of the mind and consent of the will."

2. It can happen that consequent passion diminishes deliberation and liberty as to the act following from it, insofar as the one acting proceeds further than he had previously determined, and, for example, kills him whom he had intended to wound. But as to that new act or further effect it will be antecedent, and the principles concerning antecedent passion are to be applied to it.

Article II: On Habit and Custom

St. Thomas, I, q. 83, a. 1, ad 5; I-II, q. 78, a. 2 and 4.

95. A habit is a firm and permanent disposition acquired from the repeated performance of acts, by which someone easily and promptly breaks forth into similar acts, and it can be defined: a facility and promptness, acquired by repeated acts, for placing similar acts. Custom is the very repetition of acts or the accustomed mode of acting; hence it is properly distinguished from an acquired habit and stands to it as cause to effect, indeed also as effect to cause: for custom is the cause of acquiring and strengthening a habit; but once the habit has already been acquired, it is itself the cause why the custom is continued. In the present question, however, moralists rather often use one for the other indiscriminately.

Custom can be contracted inadvertently and therefore without deliberation and involuntarily; or knowingly and freely contracted, and therefore voluntarily and deliberately. Moreover, once the habit has already been contracted, after its subject becomes conscious of it, either he retracts it efficaciously, that is, with a firm purpose of applying remedies suitable for uprooting it, in which case the habit is actually involuntary, although perhaps antecedently acquired voluntarily and freely; or he freely accepts and conserves it, or does not retract it but neglects to uproot it, in which case it is actually voluntary and free, although perhaps antecedently involuntary or not deliberate.

96. Principles. I. A custom that is not deliberate and is involuntary influences in the same way as antecedent concupiscence; hence it increases the voluntary as to propensity, but diminishes it as to freedom.

It should be noted: 1) if someone places an act solely from such custom and therefore altogether inadvertently, this will be non-voluntary and in no way deliberate, and consequently neither good nor evil; 2) deliberate custom, or custom freely admitted, if it is efficaciously retracted, that is, not by displeasure alone but by a firm purpose of acting to extirpate it, becomes actually involuntary; whence acts following from it alone are involuntary and not imputable, just as the cause itself or custom is; 3) if the habitual person afterward neglects in due time to employ efficacious remedies,

the custom (from that negligence) again becomes indirectly voluntary and free, and consequently the acts following from it will be voluntary and free and imputable.

II. Deliberate and voluntary custom 1) always increases the voluntary as to propensity; 2) if, which is rarer, it removes all actual advertence and deliberation in the following acts, it diminishes freedom and consequently goodness or sin, because it removes the voluntary and free in itself and leaves only the voluntary and free in the cause, if the custom was deliberately acquired, or the indirect voluntary and free, if it was acquired without deliberation but is freely neglected so that it is not removed; 3) if, however, which is more frequent, it leaves sufficient advertence here and now, it does not remove freedom in itself but diminishes it somewhat, because ordinarily it clouds the intellect and its actual deliberation, and diminishes indifference; yet this diminution of liberty is perfectly compensated in the cause, because man freely contracted the habit and conserves it, and thus freely wills the very diminution of deliberation and liberty, which shows a choosing will intense and confirmed in good or in evil. Hence simply the voluntary and goodness or sin are increased. Hence St. Thomas says that one who sins from habit, that is, not from inadvertence or passion, but uses his habit by his free will alone, sins from mere malice. Hence two principles:

1. What is done advertently from an involuntary custom, or inadvertently from a voluntary custom, is under some respect more voluntary, but less free.

2. What is done advertently from a voluntary custom is not less free, but simply more voluntary.

97. Observation.

Good custom diminishes freedom toward evil; this, however, is an imperfection of the will; whence good custom perfects the will more.

Article III: On the More Remote Impediments of Freedom

1. Theologians are not accustomed to hand down many things about these; the principal things which we set forth here are taken from Vermeersch, Prummer, Tanquerey, Damen, and Wouters.

98. Bodily constitution, which can depend much upon heredity and undergoes change from education, can be enumerated first among the causes which more remotely influence freedom.

1. Bodily constitution (*temperament*) is the complex of those propensities which belong to each one from his own organism and constitute his special character; but since native dispositions of this sort can in some way be changed by one's own efforts, by education, and by external circumstances, character is called the complex of native propensities insofar as they have been changed by one's own will and by the instruction of others and have acquired some firmness. Hence St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles* II, 63): "The soul rules the body and resists the passions which follow the bodily constitution: for from bodily constitution some are more apt than others for concupiscences or angers; yet they abstain from these more, on account of something restraining them, as is clear in the continent." Accordingly bodily constitution diminishes the exercise of free choice, but does not remove it; as was said of the passions and

habits of which it is the cause. This, moreover, is established by one's own experience and that of others.

2. The constitution of the body depends much upon heredity, by which propensities that depend more upon the organism are transmitted from parents into children, and indeed not only physical defects or bodily or sensible qualities, but also mental aptitudes, even moral propensities such as inclinations to anger, drunkenness, sins of the flesh, suicide, so that in very many regions examples are alleged of families in which certain virtues or vices have been transmitted through many generations.

Now, although sometimes from vicious parents a certain species of madness can be transmitted which entirely removes liberty, ordinarily nevertheless the use of reason and of liberty remains. Against modern determinists, who contend that by the law of heredity the liberty of children is destroyed, into whom propensities are transmitted without their consent, it must be held that by hereditary propensities free choice is diminished, insofar as by them reason is clouded and the force of the will is in some way weakened, as we have said about passions and habits, to which hereditary inclinations can give rise and therefore can be assimilated. Nor is there only an influence of the body upon the soul; but conversely there is also an influence of the soul upon the body.

3. Natural propensities which arise from bodily constitution or heredity, and are strengthened by character, are much increased and diminished by education. Education influences free choice in three ways: by inculcating principles, whether good or evil, which easily turn into prejudices, or by omitting to inculcate good principles; by providing examples by which the intellect is indirectly led little by little to approve that which is done by many, or even the will is directly drawn to consent; finally, by exciting the passions and directing them to good or evil (for example, by counsels or the reading of books). Now with regard to inculcated principles, the things we said about ignorance must be applied, for ignorance does not always render a thing involuntary simply, if that ignorance is consequent; but with regard to examples and excited passions, the things handed down about passions have force, for they generally do not remove liberty but diminish it.

99. Another cause is pathological states or diseases of the mind, which are so called, not because the soul itself or the spiritual faculties can be sick in themselves, but because, on account of badly affected organs, especially the centers of the brain, and on account of the organic sensitive powers, they are impeded in their action, either transitorily or permanently. Some are merely functional, without lesion of an organ, and are called psychic; others are organic, with lesion of an organ, and are called physio-psychological. They are distinguished:

1. These things are not altogether according to the most recent determinations of the sciences. We have not wished to declare the diverse and manifold terms which they use and new classifications, as being indications sufficiently useless for our purpose. Exposition according to the natural sciences is to be held in great esteem in moral doctrine if it contributes to the elucidation of the matter and to establishing practice; otherwise it is rather to be left aside as useless or even as adding difficulty. Besides, the sense of terms is not the same among all, to which indeed attention must be given lest they be wrongly understood.

A. Psychoses, which habitually disturb the use of reason, at least in a determinate matter, so that the sick are not conscious of their abnormal state. Thus:

1. Dementia, which is a growing weakness and dullness of mind.

2. Phrenesis, of which various species are counted. In it the sick bring forth false judgments which are radically incurable, because they are deceived by perpetual or temporary hallucinations or have disturbed associations of imagination, so that their psychic life can be equated with the life of dreamers.

Hence in delirium, even if it is monomania or a hallucination restricted to one subject, they are not free; during the intervals of deliriums nothing of itself impedes liberty.

B. Psychasthenias, which impede practical judgment and the will, but in such a way that the infirm are conscious of their abnormal state and psychic weakness. And indeed:

1. Obsession occupies the mind in such a way that the obsessed person is bound to thinking about or doing certain things. It disturbs practical judgment sufficiently, so that, if it is vehement, often only room for light fault is left, and grave sin can hardly be present in them. But besides perpetual obsessions, there are others which arise only in certain circumstances; hence outside the state of obsession the infirm are bound by the precept of fleeing occasions of morbid excitation toward committing dishonorable acts, and if they freely violate this, they are guilty.

Phobias, fixed ideas, more intense scruples are reduced to obsession.

1. Concerning remedies and education against obsession and phobias, cf. Prummer, *Th. M.* I, n. 95, and Vermeersch, *Th. M.* I, n. 85.

2. Blind impulses or invincible propensities can be present in a morbid state, whether they immediately obtain a non-deliberate act, or overcome vain resistance so that the act is nevertheless elicited. Hence some are merely mechanical or motive, which often are without affection, as for example in an idiot; others are psycho-mechanical or even merely psychic, which occur with a more distinct perception and a stronger affection, and often leave partial liberty.

All suppose a suggestible person, for his passive docility depends upon the intensity of a certain phantasm which rather easily produces an insuperable movement. Thus some are known to be prone to lies, others to internal blasphemies, others to suicide or homicide, others to thefts, drunkennesses, or fires, according as they labor under kleptomania, dipsomania, or pyromania; yet these are not to be confused with those who from habit are thieves, drunkards, liars, etc.: for these certainly are not abnormal, but sinners from malice.

It is not easily discerned whether impulses are truly irresistible, but it must be judged from all the circumstances whether liberty is only diminished or removed. The latter can easily be supposed a) if the action cannot be explained by natural concupiscence, b) if after the evil action the mind has remained quiet and content, c) if something is done which otherwise someone wholly abhors;

nevertheless liberty is not always removed. Whence the things we said above concerning violence, fear, and concupiscence can be applied.

3. Abulia renders the will impotent for willing and for effectively commanding what is desired, whether it remains idle, or, as though unwilling, is compelled contrary to its own practical judgments to do or omit certain things. In the first case, the infirm person is often excused from certain positive duties, because liberty is at least sufficiently diminished; in the second case the things said about impulses have force.

Abulia, however, is sometimes not universal, but is limited to certain acts or certain times. Furthermore, it can be voluntary and free in the cause, when someone knowingly and freely has induced this state, for example, by constantly abdicating his will without sufficient reason.

C. Psychoneuroses or disorders of the nervous system itself:

1. Neurasthenia is a pathological state consisting in habitual fatigue of the nervous system from an organic or psychic cause; in this state the nerves appear weakened and exhausted, so that the agent, although in possession of himself, suffers from the greatest inconstancy and is much depressed physically and morally. Therefore liberty is diminished, though it is not removed. Hence the infirm can rather easily be excused when, yielding to weariness, they neglect certain positive precepts, especially those that are merely ecclesiastical, as too great a burden. But if, because of sadness, they seek shameful pleasures to which the disease itself does not impel them, they are to be judged as sinning in themselves.

2. Hysteria, although men dispute about its cause, also brings with it a disorder and disturbance of the nervous system, but much graver than neurasthenia, which consists in a great morbid suggestibility, from which sensibility is diminished or for a time extinguished in certain parts of the body (*anesthesia*), while in others it is rendered much more intense (*hyperesthesia*); there also arise bodily movements more or less disordered, as well as vivid hallucinations or vehement passions which are very unstable and greatly impede the free exercise of the will, just as they impede right judgment and the moral sense. Therefore hysterical persons easily deceive themselves and others. Hence in practice, only from circumstances and from the declarations of the hysterical persons themselves can it be known how much liberty remains in them. A hysterical agitation (*crise, acces de grande hysterie*) cannot be combined with full responsibility and grave guilt.

3. Epilepsy is still graver, that masked or hidden form which impels one to perpetrate various strange, shameful, and atrocious things: to inflict injury, blasphemies, shameful conversations, assault, homicide, etc.; not indeed constantly, but with longer intervals interposed, without the infirm person retaining the memory of all these things. An epileptic agitation or crisis certainly cannot be combined with full responsibility and grave guilt. But outside the times of fury the mind is sound and perfectly free, unless sometimes a transitory psychic disturbance is added.

All the aforesaid disturbances, even if they affect emotion or will, seem to draw their origin from a clouding or diminution of intellectual cognition.

1. Conformably to St. Thomas, I-II, q. 10, a. 1: "insofar as reason remains free and not subject to passion, so far the movement of the will which remains does not tend of necessity to that to which passion inclines."

Therefore, in a general view, as to pathological states, "cases in which imputability remains whole, or in which it is altogether removed, come to be considered as exceptions. For generally imputability neither remains intact, nor is it altogether removed, but is diminished.

This proposition regards acts which proceed from abnormality, and does not regard acts which are placed outside the influence of abnormality, for example, concerning other matters or in lucid intervals; ... moreover it regards actual imputability, and intends to prejudice nothing concerning indirect imputability or imputability in the cause, both as to the abnormality itself and as to the effects of abnormality. But this imputability cannot be neglected.

Even in practice, for example in direction, although one must proceed gently, this imputability is not to be too much diminished by excuses...

As to care, once the state of those laboring under abnormalities has been inspected, the role of priest, physician, friends, and family, and the collaboration of all these, must be determined. As to this collaboration, care should be taken lest the confidence of the sick person in one of the indicated persons harm the confidence which the infirm person ought especially to have toward the priest and physician. On the contrary, it is to be desired that, for example, friends in whom the sick person confides, take pains, insofar as can be done, that confidence in the physician and priest always increase.

Care should also be taken lest there be opposing "remedies" (counsels, suggestions, etc.), so that their action would be mutually weakened or practically have no efficacy. And therefore, by questioning the physician or the family or prudently the sick person himself, the priest should know, insofar as can be done, what the physician has thought and determined. Friends and family also should have suitable indications. Thus all, in a positive and best way, can work toward healing."

2. *Theol. Mechl., Tractatus de Actibus humanis*, 5th ed., edited by H. De Mesmaecker, n. 41.

100. The third cause is hypnotic sleep. This a) in the perfect or deep state greatly diminishes the exercise of liberty, indeed, as long as it lasts, almost removes it, except perhaps with regard to things to which the person is wholly opposed; b) in the imperfect state of lighter sleep, liberty is diminished; c) with regard to suggestions, however, to be fulfilled afterward in the waking state, the matter is disputed: for the Nancy school contends that the hypnotized person, even in this case, cannot morally resist the suggestion, while the Paris school asserts that liberty is not entirely removed but only diminished.

In practice, therefore, the hypnotized person must be questioned carefully and cautiously so that, from his own testimony, it can be discerned whether and how far he was in some measure free in performing the action. Yet actions which are perpetrated in hypnosis can be free in the cause, when he freely abdicated his will and gave consent to hypnotic sleep, foreseeing that actions of this sort would be suggested or exposing himself to this danger.

Chapter II: On the Objective Element of the Human Act

Question I: On the Essential Element or Object

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2.

101. Etymologically, an object is that which is set before someone; hence the object of a human act is everything that is set before the deliberation of reason and the choice of the will, and thus it also includes circumstances. In the present matter, however, it is taken in a stricter sense and designates that which, whether the thing is a thing or a person, is first and per se attained by the act, and thus it is distinguished from circumstances, which are not attained except secondarily and per accidens and by reason of another: to take another's property is the object of theft; little or much is a circumstance.

Concerning the essential objective element nothing general can be said, because, since all objects are singular, it varies with the different objects.

Question II: On the Accidental Element or on Circumstances

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 7.

102. Circumstance, by force of the word, signifies that which stands around something; hence it designates something extrinsic to a thing, which nevertheless touches it or approaches it according to place. Hence that which is outside the substance of an act and yet in some way touches it, as an accident of it, is called a circumstance of the act, and is therefore defined: an accident of a human act affecting it as already constituted in being.

Of the substance of theft are the man taking, the property of another, and the appropriation of it against the owner's will; but that the man be a priest or a layman, rich or poor, that he steal a sacred or profane thing, a precious or cheap thing, where he steals, in a church or in a street, are circumstances.

103. Seven circumstances are customarily enumerated: who, what, where, by what helps, why, how, when; to which Aristotle adds: about what, which by others is comprehended under what.

For circumstances can touch either the human act itself, or its cause, or its effect. The act itself is affected both by the two measures, namely place or where and time or when, and by the quality or mode of acting: how; on the part of the final cause there is the circumstance why or on account of what; on the part of the principal agent: who; on the part of the instrument: by what helps; finally, on the part of the material cause: about what, and on the part of the effect: what.

It should be noted that circumstances designate not essential but accidental conditions of place, time, mode, effect, agent, etc., likewise an accidental end.

104. Observations.

1. Circumstances must be considered by the theologian. For he considers acts 1) in order to the ultimate end, 2) according as goodness or malice, and indeed greater or lesser goodness or malice, is found in them, 3) according as they are meritorious and demeritorious. But a) human acts are proportioned to the end according as they are done with due circumstances; b) according to these they are good or evil, better and worse; indeed c) meritorious and

demeritorious: for acts are voluntary, and therefore meritorious, or involuntary according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances. Therefore.

These things will be clearer from what is to be said below.

2. The most principal of all circumstances is "on account of what," or the end, because it is the motive and object of the will; there follows the circumstance "what," which indicates the effect of the act and at the same time the quantity and quality of the object, and thus touches the very substance of the act.

3. There is not given a circumstance "how often," because it does not affect the same act but multiplies acts.

Section B: On the Distinction of Human Acts

105. Elicited and commanded acts. - By reason of the principle from which they proceed, human acts are elicited by the will or only commanded.

Elicited acts are acts of the will itself, namely, those which proceed from the will as from their proper cause, are produced immediately by it, and are received and consummated in it (whether they are commanded by no other act of the will, or depend upon another preceding act): they are diverse acts or modes of willing. Acts only commanded are those which do not proceed immediately from the will, but from another internal or external power subject to the will and moved by it.

By reason of the terminus an act can be internal or external; whence an internal act and an elicited act, an external act and a commanded act, differ: every elicited act is internal, but not every commanded act is external; an internal act, for example, of the intellect or of the sensitive appetite or of the internal senses, can be commanded.

Question I: On Elicited Acts

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 8 and q. 11-16.

106. There are six elicited acts of the will: three concerning the end: simple volition, intention, and fruition; three concerning the means: consent, election, and active use. But every act of the will depends upon a previous cognition: for although the will as efficient cause moves the other faculties to exercise (that is, to acting or not acting), nevertheless it is itself moved by the intellect as by a final cause as to specification (or determination of the act), insofar as the intellect proposes to it goods or actions diverse in species and moves the will to operate in this species of action rather than in another. Therefore there are also six acts of the intellect which precede the elicited acts of the will.

107. By these twelve acts the moral work is completed both in intention and in execution. In intention:

A. concerning the end, there is 1) the simple apprehension of the intellect by which it knows something, for example health, as good (or evil); 2) there follows simple volition, that is, bare complacency and an inefficacious appetite of the proposed good (or an inefficacious displeasure at evil); 3) if the volition is strong, the intellect is moved to examine whether the good is fitting and can

be acquired (or whether the evil is not fitting and can be fled): this is a judgment proposing the good in such a way, namely, as fitting and possible; 4) there follows the intention of the will, which is the efficacious desire of the good (or the efficacious flight from evil), or of the end to be acquired through means.

B. concerning the means, 5) by force of intention the intellect is moved to inquire into suitable means for obtaining the good, and this is counsel, that is, inquiry and deliberation about means, such as, for example, walking, medicine, good eating, bodily exercises; 6) there follows the consent of the will approving the useful means; 7) by force of consent the intellect is moved to discern the more apt means, and this is the discretive or practical judgment; 8) there follows the election of the will, which accepts one means before another, for example walking, and thus the order of intention is completed.

There follows the execution of the aforesaid things in reverse order, which begins:

A. concerning the means, 9) through command: for by force of election the intellect commands the execution of the means, for example of walking; 10) there follows on the part of the will active use, that is, the application of the executive powers, in this case of the locomotive power, to acting; to which in these powers there corresponds passive use, that is, the execution of the means, here the walking itself.

B. From these, 11) there follows the acquisition of the end and the cognition of its acquisition; from which there is had 12) fruition or delight and joy of the will and pleasant rest in the good or end possessed.

108. Observations.

1. All the aforesaid acts concur toward the moral work, when it is not done precipitately, or from imagination or passion, but prudently and maturely, even if they succeed one another so suddenly that they cannot be discerned by the one operating.

2. All acts are for the sake of the end, except the last: fruition.

Question II: On Commanded Acts

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 17; q. 9, a. 2, ad 3.

109. Command properly is an act of practical reason: for it is an expression of the will by which the work to be done is intimated to someone ("do this"), and an ordering necessitating the one to whom command is given to do the work; but to express and to order belong to reason, not to the will. Nevertheless the will is said to command the other powers whose acts are called commanded: a) by taking to command improperly for to move, because the will moves the other faculties to exercise and to the end; b) also properly: for since the election of the will moves reason to commanding, therefore command has from the will the force and efficacy of moving the other powers; but the act is rather to be attributed to the moving power than to the moved power (for example, killing is attributed more to the will than to the hand); hence command is attributed rather to the will than to the intellect.

110. Command and the commanded act are one human act. - For command and the acts commanded by it express an order to one another; and therefore although physically they are several,

morally nevertheless they are simply one and the same human act, as a certain one whole: in which the moving command holds itself as the formal element, the commanded act is had materially; yet they are several according to parts.

111. Acts can be commanded which are in our dominion or power, and to which persuasive reason can move us; namely:

1. acts of the will, which is especially in our power and concerning which the intellect can command just as it can judge: for from one act the will can move itself to another, insofar as it moves reason to proposing or commanding this; in this case that act will be at once elicited by the will and commanded by it. The first act of the will is excepted, to which man does not move himself from another act, but is moved by God alone;

2. acts of reason, not as to perception of the object, nor as to assent or adherence to such or such an object unless the matter concerns things not evident; but as to exercise or application: for the will moves reason to acting, and reason reflects upon its own acts and thus can dispose of its own acts, except for the first act of reason, which precedes every act of the will and does not depend upon it, except as to its continuation;

3. acts of the sensitive life, as to exercise and application, not indeed insofar as they are from a disposition of the body, but insofar as they depend upon the sensitive power and upon imagination, and do not forestall reason and will but follow them;

4. acts of the exterior senses and of the members which are moved by the sensitive powers, such as the eye, the hand, the feet, the tongue.

On the contrary, the following cannot be commanded:

a) the first act of reason and of the will;

b) acts of the sensitive powers that forestall reason;

c) acts of the vegetative life, which follow the natural appetite;

d) acts of the exterior members which are moved by a natural power, such as the movement of the heart and of the genital member; except sometimes indirectly, insofar as by the influence of the nervous system and of the sensitive part an acceleration can occur in the circulation of the blood, and thus a commotion of the heart or of the genital organ.

112. The dominion of the will over the other powers can be perfect or despotic (such as is the dominion of a master over a servant), when it is not resisted: in such a way it moves itself, and in itself the locomotive power, the external senses, and the other exterior members; but after original sin it is often imperfect or political (such as is the dominion of a king over free men), which is sometimes resisted or not obeyed: in such a way it moves the intellect, the internal senses, and the sensitive appetite: for thoughts or passions rise up against the will, nor do they always follow if they are chosen and excited by the will.

Second Part: On Human Acts According to Moral Being

113. The being of a human act is twofold: physical being and moral being; physical being or the being of nature, which is called material, namely, the very physical entity and natural tendency toward the object; and moral being or the being of conduct, which is called formal, because it belongs to the act precisely insofar as it is human and free.

Moral is said from conduct; but conduct is distinguished in two ways: conduct improperly so called, which is a mere custom or usual mode of acting and is found even in brute animals; and conduct properly so called, of which we are speaking here, which is the mode by which a free being is accustomed to act, or even acts, in order to some end according to some norm, and consequently well or badly, and in a mode worthy either of praise and reward or of blame and punishment. Therefore a human act is called moral insofar as it depends upon a deliberate will with subjection of the act to rules; and moral being is the tendency of the act to the object as subject to the rules of conduct.

That which is called moral first of a free act consequently also indicates whatever is founded in free activity, such as moral beings which are fashioned or produced by a deliberate will: moral persons, moral effects, moral faculties; or whatever pertains to that activity, such as a moral cause, impotence, certitude, virtue, law, order, science, etc.

1. Cf. Bouquillon, *Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis*, n. 341. Billuart notes: "The will is denominated moral because it produces the moral act; law, because it directs it; object, because it terminates it; end, because it moves toward it; circumstances, because they affect it. Therefore nothing is called moral except by order to the moral act; therefore in it alone is morality principally and formally. This last consequence is clear, because analogates of attribution are said by order to that in which the denominating form is principally and formally," diss. 4, a. 1.

We shall speak of the essence and species of morality, of its foundations, of its principles, and of specific distinction. And of these in acts in general and in particular.

Section A: On the Morality of the Human Act in General

Question I: On the Essence and Species of Morality

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 1 and 8.

114. Morality is the attribution of human acts according to which they are called good or evil, that is, fitting or unfitting. Good and evil are attended to in a special way in human acts. For good and evil are said by comparison to the end; therefore where there is specially the notion of end, there there is specially the notion of good. But it belongs to man in a special way to act for the sake of an end, insofar as he freely determines the end for himself. Therefore in the human act, besides the metaphysical goodness of the act, common to all beings insofar as they are, there is given another goodness which consists in this, that man rightly determine an end for himself. And this is moral good, to which moral evil is opposed.

1. Cf. St. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 27, a. 2, ad 2.

115. Morality is a condition of every human act and is customarily defined: the conformity or difformity of a human act with its rule, right reason.

It is proved: good is that which is fitting to a being by comparison to the end, and evil is that which is unfitting; hence good in a human act is that which is fitting to a human act by comparison to the end. That which is fitting to a human act is fitting to the acting man insofar as he is man. That which is fitting to the acting man insofar as he is man is fitting to reason, which is the first principle of human acts and to which it belongs fittingly to order toward the end. Therefore good in a human act is that which is fitting to reason, or which is according to right reason, by comparison to the end; and evil is that which is not fitting to reason, or which is against right reason.

Right reason, however, is nothing other than a participation in the eternal law of God, whose foundation is the absolutely ultimate end. Hence a threefold rule can be distinguished, as it were: the ultimate end, the eternal law, and right reason.

Whence St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 4: "Good and evil in acts must be taken according to that which is proper to man insofar as he is man. But this is reason. Hence good and evil in a human act are considered according as the act agrees with reason informed by divine law, either naturally, or through teaching, or through infusion."

116. The Essence of Morality.

Morality does not consist:

a) In the free act or in its freedom, which is attributed to Scotus: for this is a mere aptitude for morality, namely, the matter or foundation and condition of morality, which adds something to this; whence there can be manifold morality in the same act, but only one freedom. Moreover, freedom pertains to the physical being of the act, for even if morality did not exist, the free act would remain.

b) Nor in imputability, as Pufendorf holds: for this is a consequence of morality, since in order that an act be imputed to praise or fault, it is supposed to have been good or evil.

c) Nor is it a mere denomination extrinsic to the act, as Suarez holds, or a relation of reason, as Vasquez holds: for the act by reason of itself is good or evil; and goodness or malice in acts really and properly inheres and exists even if reason does not consider or denominate them. Whence St. Thomas, a. 4, ad 2: "the due proportion to the end and the relation to it inheres in the action."

1. Modern authors from the Society of Jesus unite the first and third opinions, and say that morality is freedom together with a twofold extrinsic denomination. Thus, for example, Frins and Cathrein say that it is the dependence of an act upon a free operating will and upon reason adverting to the honorableness or baseness of the object. Here there are three things: the intrinsic denomination of the voluntary, and a twofold extrinsic denomination: the relation of dependence upon the free will, and the relation of dependence upon reason adverting. Similarly Pesch says that it consists in this, that the will is freely borne toward an object apprehended under the aspect of good or base (*Zeitschrift fur K. Th.*, 1887, p. 867).

d) Nor is it a real relation properly so called, or predicamental: for this is to a term as a pure term, whereas the act is related to the rule as to its perfective principle. Moreover, it does not pertain to the essence of the human act, but is an accident which comes to it, whereas morality is essential to it because it belongs to it by reason of its proper object, from which it has species.

e) But morality is an intrinsic respect or transcendental relation, that is, the intrinsic habitude of the act itself, by which it tends to the object precisely as conforming or difforming with the rules of conduct. This is the opinion of the Thomists.

It is proved: 1) Morality is an order or disposition which deliberate reason makes in voluntary acts. But reason precisely makes in these acts that their intrinsic habitude or physical tendency toward the object be a tendency toward the object as subject to rules. Therefore morality is the respect or intrinsic order which reason makes in human acts and by which they tend toward the object conformably or difformably to their rules.

2. The essence of any act is an intrinsic order to the object. Therefore the moral act essentially is an intrinsic tendency to the moral object. But the object is moral insofar as it is subjected to the rules of conduct. Therefore morality also essentially is the intrinsic tendency of the act to the object as subject to the rules of conduct.

117. Divisions of morality. - Since morality is the habitude of an action to a rule, hence according to a varying habitude to a varying rule, morality is varied:

1. The rule is remote and objective, namely law, whether the eternal law of God or the temporal law or prescribing right human reason; or proximate and subjective, namely the actual conscience of the law and of the conformity or difformity of the act to it. Hence there is distinguished material or objective morality, which is the conformity or difformity of the objective element, that is, of the act considered according to itself, with its objective rule, law, no account being taken of the relation of the agent to the rule, or independently of the practical judgment of the agent; and subjective or formal morality, which is the conformity or difformity of the subjective element, that is, of the act insofar as it proceeds from the agent, and of the one acting himself, with the subjective rule or practical judgment of conscience. One can be without the other, as when someone from invincible ignorance places an evil act which he thinks good, the act will be materially evil but formally good; and conversely. Thus blasphemy uttered by a madman is materially evil; uttered by one in possession of himself, it is also formally evil.

2. The rule is commanding, or approving and counseling, and therefore there is distinguished obligatory morality, when something is prescribed or prohibited, and free morality, when something is only approved and counseled. Evil is always prohibited; but good is not always commanded, but only that which is judged necessary.

3. The rule is necessary and natural, or positive, and therefore there is distinguished intrinsic and necessary morality, arising from the nature of things: this belongs to those things which are good or evil from their own nature, and necessarily commanded or prohibited; and extrinsic morality, arising from the positive free will of the one commanding: this belongs to those things which are good or evil only because commanded or prohibited.

118. Species of morality. - The supreme and fundamental species of morality is twofold: goodness and malice. It is said to be supreme, because there can be many lowest species of morality, which are taken from objects diverse in species, as will be explained below in q. 5.

It is proved: for a human act is either conformed to its rules or difform from them. In the first case it is good: for good and being are convertible, whence something has so much of goodness as it has of being; if therefore an act has the fullness of being due and fitting to it, it is good. But that which is conformed to its rules has everything that it ought to have. Therefore the act conformed to them is good. In the second case it is evil: for that which has something of the fullness of being is according to this a being and good; but insofar as it does not have the whole being which it ought to have, it falls short of goodness and is called evil. But an act which in some way is difform from its rules does not have the whole being which it ought to have. Therefore such an act is evil. Hence the axiom: Good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatever.

Accordingly, good is defined as that which agrees with the rule of reason and with rational nature, evil as that which disagrees.

119. Observation.

In the terminology of modern authors, moral act or morality is often taken in a rather different sense. A moral act is opposed to an immoral act, and then it is the same as an honorable act: thus Kant distinguishes moral, immoral, and amoral acts. In St. Thomas, moral act is never said in this sense, nor is the word immoral ever used, but to a moral act is opposed a non-moral act. Likewise morality among moderns is often taken for honesty and is opposed to immorality. But according to the meaning of the word, just as conduct can be good or depraved, so morality is twofold: goodness and malice.

1. Aptly Ballerini, *Op. theol. mor.* I, n. 135: "Yet these notions (of modern authors) have nothing in common with the first imposition of the name, according to which, just as conduct can be good and depraved, so also a moral act is good or evil, and therefore morality must be called both good and evil. And for this reason one would have to speak of moral acts in the same way as of human acts, namely, that any act is either human or not human, moral or not moral."

Question II: On the Foundations of Morality

120. Object of the Question.

The distinction between moral good and evil having been supposed, it is now to be asked concerning the reason, criteria, and foundations of this distinction, and concerning the fundamental principle. To this we shall speak 1) of the intrinsic difference between moral good and evil; 2) of the subjective criterion or norm according to which morality can be determined; 3) of the objective criterion and ultimate foundation of morality; 4) of the errors to be noted and refuted in this matter; 5) of the cognitive faculty of morality, for the question is connected with the preceding ones.

Article I: On the Intrinsic Difference Between Good and Evil

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 1 and 8; *Contra Gentiles* III, 129.

121. State of the question. - First it occurs to ask concerning the reason for the difference between good and evil, whether, namely, there are some human acts which are objectively good or evil intrinsically, or from the nature of the thing, or on the contrary whether they are such only from an extrinsic determination and positive will. Concerning this there are several errors, which are comprehended under the common name of moral positivism.

They are reduced to two classes:

1. For some say that the positive determination of good and evil was made by men, whether a) by civil laws (Hobbes) or by social contract (Rousseau), or b) by education (Montaigne), or c) by public opinion and the custom of peoples (St. Lambert), or d) by the invention of the wise and powerful (Mandeville), or e) by the evolution of the moral sense or of the collective conscience or of culture (Evolutionists, v. Hartmann, Levy-Bruhl, Durkheim).

2. Others derive the distinction from the free will of God: thus the Nominalists, such as Occam and Gerson, Descartes, Pufendorf, likewise commentators of Grotius, such as Osiander, Gronovius, Cocceius.

1. Among the ancients, Archelaus, the Sophists Protagoras and Gorgias, Theodorus Cyrenaicus, Pyrrho the skeptic, and Carneades are said to have taught thus; in more recent times, A. Comte, Kirchmann, R. v. Ihering, perhaps also Fr. Paulsen; likewise Fr. Jodl, Ed. Westermarck, Bebel, Kautsky, and many others, among whom are M. Stirner and Fr. Nietzsche, who asserted that all morality is an arrogant falsification introduced by fraud in favor of the miserable: for the "superior" man is outside the limits of good and evil.

2. Scotus also is sometimes cited, but he teaches this only concerning the precepts of the second table, in III Sent. d. 27, q. un., sch. 5-8.

Against these Catholic doctrine holds that certain actions are good or evil from their own nature, independently of every positive will.

122. Thesis. Certain actions are given which are intrinsically good or evil, independently of any will whatever, even the divine will.

We indeed admit that there are many actions which are morally good because they have been commanded by some divine or human law, and similarly many which are evil because they have been prohibited; but some are commanded or prohibited as honorable or dishonorable in themselves.

It is proved: 1) by an argument from conscience and historical induction. It is established psychologically and historically that there are certain actions which, from the common conscience and the perpetual and invincible persuasion of men, have always been held as naturally honorable or dishonorable in themselves: thus, for example, to love parents, to do good to one's neighbor, to speak the truth, to keep agreements, etc.; on the other hand, to pursue parents with hatred, to kill the innocent without a legitimate reason, to betray friends unjustly, to break promises, to utter a lie harmful to one's neighbor, and other things of the same kind, are judged as something base and dishonorable. This persuasion indeed flourishes among all peoples, even barbarous ones; nor is it diminished or lost by anyone unless the moral sense is diminished or destroyed. But a persuasion so constant and universal, deeply inhering in minds so diverse and disagreeing about almost all other things, does not arise from civil law or custom, which is diverse among various nations, and besides, laws and customs are called good and evil, for which reason they are not the primary criterion; nor from education, social contract, or public opinion, which likewise are not the same among diverse peoples; but it is derived from nature itself.

Nor can it be said that the morality of these acts depends upon a free institution of God: for this institution is not known by many peoples who do not have revelation, whence it does not explain the universality of the fact. Moreover, certain actions appear of themselves and essentially so honorable or dishonorable that not even the divine will can change their morality (e.g., God cannot make blasphemy be a praiseworthy act, nor piety be a sin): namely, the essences of things do not depend upon the free will of God, and consequently neither do the essential relations among them. Whence St. Thomas, Q. D. *De Ver.* 23, a. 6: "The will does not have the character of the first rule...; for it is directed by reason and intellect, not only in us, but in God...; to say that justice depends upon the simple will is to say that the divine will does not proceed according to the order of wisdom, which is blasphemous."

2. From philosophical reason: the good of a being is that which agrees with its nature; evil, that which disagrees. And there are several actions which per se and naturally agree or disagree with rational human nature. Therefore there are several actions which, from their very nature, per se and naturally, are good or evil.

The minor is proved from St. Thomas, III *Contra Gentiles* 129: "Of whatever things there is a determinate nature, there must be determinate operations which agree with that nature (or on the contrary disagree): for the proper operation of each thing follows its nature. But it is established that the nature of men is determinate. Therefore there must be some operations fitting to man according to themselves" (or on the contrary unfitting).

The conclusion is proved inductively from the three principal matters about which human action is occupied, that is, concerning a) social relations with others, insofar as man is a social being; b) the use of exterior things and the governance of the body and of the lower powers, insofar as he is a rational being; c) relations with God, the ultimate end, insofar as man is a created being. And in these three matters actions are by their own nature fitting or unfitting:

a) concerning social relations with other men: "For anything to which something is natural, that without which it cannot be had must be natural: for nature does not fail in necessary things. But it is natural to man that he be a social animal; this is shown from the fact that one man alone does not suffice for all things which are necessary for human life. Therefore those things without which human society cannot be preserved are naturally fitting to man: of this sort are preserving to each one what is his, and abstaining from injuries. Therefore there are some things in human acts naturally right."

b) concerning the use of exterior things and the governance of the body and of the lower powers: "Man naturally has this, that he use lower things for the necessity of his life. But there is some determinate measure naturally according to which the use of the aforesaid things is fitting to human life, and if this measure is passed over, it becomes harmful to man, as is clear in the disordered taking of foods. Therefore there are some acts naturally unfitting to man.

"Likewise, according to the natural order, the body of man is for the sake of the soul and the lower powers of the soul for the sake of reason; just as also in other things matter is for the sake of form and instruments for the sake of the principal agent. But from that which is ordered to another, help ought to come to that other, not some impediment. Therefore it is naturally right that the body and the lower powers of the soul be so cared for by man that from this the act of reason and the good of

reason itself be in no way impeded, but rather helped. But if it should happen otherwise, it will naturally be sin. Therefore drunkennesses and feastings and the disordered use of venereal things, by which the act of reason is impeded, and to be subject to passions, which do not allow the free judgment of reason to exist, are naturally evil."

c) concerning relations with God: "To each one there are naturally fitting those things by which it tends to its natural end; but those things which have themselves contrariwise are naturally unfitting to it... Man is naturally ordered to God as to an end. Therefore those things by which man is led into the knowledge and love of God are naturally right; but whatever things have themselves contrariwise are naturally evil to man."

"It is clear therefore, as St. Thomas concludes, that good and evil in human acts are not only according to the positing of law, but also according to the natural order."

3. From the consequences of the opposed opinion: if there is no essential and objective difference between good and evil, a broad way is opened to moral skepticism. For a) what today is held as evil, tomorrow, with laws changed, or tradition or education, can be held as licit; and therefore the true notion of moral obligation perishes: for this is conceived as something permanent and universal, prescribing certain actions not hypothetically but categorically, while civil laws or traditions of peoples are something unstable and particular, and can create only a hypothetical obligation. Therefore, once this difference has been removed, by that very fact the moral order collapses; b) certain customs have existed which were very wicked, the attack upon which, led by heroic and holy men, is generally praised as progress. And yet according to positivism all morals are good; nor is an ideal and permanent rule given for measuring progress; c) as a foundation the adversaries must suppose the principle: to obey God commanding (or men commanding) is good, and to resist is evil. Therefore some good or evil must be admitted before the positive precept of God (or of men). And if none is admitted, the foundation of the whole moral order collapses.

123. They object.

The positivists and evolutionists object with certain examples concerning polygamy, human sacrifices, and the killing of parents from piety, namely, to avoid the inconveniences of old age or captivity, which at times are reputed honorable and just; whence they conclude that the public conscience is not injured by a delict because the act is evil, but on the contrary the act is evil because it injures the public conscience.

Reply: Error exists not as to all things intrinsically honorable and dishonorable, but as to some things: namely, nature can fail not in all things but in some, and thus some have a depraved reason from passion, or from bad custom, or from a bad disposition of nature, and they could err as to some things, as in the case of polygamy, or human sacrifice, or robbery, which among some was not reputed unjust, or the killing of parents perpetrated to take away misery. But rather they erred about the mode of cultivating piety than about the obligation itself of helping parents; just as about the mode of worshiping God, preserving justice, or ordering marriage, not about the principles themselves, that it is good to love God, to live justly, and to protect the education of the human race through marriage. Whence already St. Thomas says, in *Ethics*, book 3: "Certain things (not all), which by some are reputed just and honorable, by some are reputed unjust and dishonorable according to

the difference of times and places and persons. For something is reputed vicious at one time or in one region which at another time or in another region is not reputed vicious. And from this difference it happens that some opine that nothing is naturally just or honorable, but only according to the positing of law."

Article II: On the Norm of Morality

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 3 and 4; q. 21, a. 1; q. 71, a. 6; q. 72, a. 4 and 8; q. 74, a. 7; q. 86, a. 1 and 2; q. 63, a. 2; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 4; q. 16, a. 2.

124. Thesis I. The nearer and intrinsic norm of morality is right practical human reason.

It is explained: it is said to be: 1) reason, and not only conscience, which is the rule of the subjective morality of human acts, while here it is a question especially of the norm of objective morality: for conscience is particular reason, by which a determinate person judges concerning the morality of such an act in particular and applies the law to a determinate concrete case; here, however, universal reason is considered more, which judges concerning the morality of acts in the universal and enunciates law, and is by essence common, and is in all men;

2. right, that is, judging conformably to the eternal law, from which it flows as from the source and rule of every good; for, as St. Thomas says, II *Sent*. d. 24, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3: "Corrupt reason is not reason, just as a false syllogism properly is not a syllogism, and therefore the rule of human acts is not any reason whatever, but right reason," which alone is able fittingly to order to the end and as it ought;

3. it is the nearer norm, rather than the proximate norm: for the latter is conscience, which applies the law to the concrete act, and thus is the wholly proximate and immediate rule of acting; and with respect to it, universal reason or law is already a more remote rule; and nevertheless this is a near rule with respect to the supreme and ultimate rule, which is the eternal law of God himself;

4. and intrinsic: for reason is intrinsic to man, while the eternal law of God is extrinsic to him.

The thesis is proved 1) by facts: a moral action must be called good, like any being, when it attains its end or at least tends rightly and ordinately to its proper end. But it belongs to man's practical reason to detect what our ultimate end is, and what means are necessary or useful for attaining this end. Therefore human reason is the norm of the goodness or malice of human acts.

The minor is proved:

a) Generally, by experience;

b) Especially from the difference between rational and irrational nature (I-II, q. 91, a. 2): for it is established that man rules himself and orders his acts to the end; since therefore order is according to a rule, there had to be inserted into man a rule by which he might rule himself and be able to order his acts: and this is nothing other than reason.

c) For just as speculative reason is born to know the true, so practical reason is able to perceive the good (under the aspect of the true), that is, the ordered relation of acts to the ultimate end; for

example, it dictates that blasphemy is evil as contrary to God, the ultimate end, and that intemperance is a sin because men abuse for the pleasure of the senses those things which are ordered to their preservation.

Briefly: the judgment of practical reason has as its object the agreement and disagreement of an act with the end. But the goodness of an action resides in the relation of agreement and subordination to the ultimate end of rational nature; malice, in the relation of disagreement. Therefore the judgment of practical reason showing this relation is the subjective criterion manifesting it, and thus the norm of goodness and malice.

2. By reason taken from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 90, a. 1: in each genus that which is the principle is the measure and rule of that genus. Reason is the first principle of human acts, because to it belongs ordering to the end, which is the first principle in things to be done. Therefore the rule and measure of human acts is reason.

125. Thesis II. The supreme and extrinsic norm and the ultimate rule of morality is the reason of God or the eternal law itself.

It is said to be: 1) the supreme norm, because morality depends more upon that rule than upon the near rule. For an effect depends more upon the first cause than upon the second cause, since the second cause does not act except in the power of the first cause; hence that human reason is the rule of morality, it has from the eternal law. Therefore morality depends more upon the eternal law than upon human reason (q. 19, a. 4);

2. ultimate: namely, the nearer norm is founded ultimately in the remote and fundamental norm or eternal law. Hence human reason is called the near, subordinate, and regulated norm of morality; the eternal law is called the ultimate and supreme and regulating norm (q. 71, a. 6; q. 21, a. 1);

3. it is eternal law, that is, divine reason insofar as it conceives the ordination of all actions and orders them to the ultimate end, the will of God insofar as it necessarily wills this ordination to be observed by man, and the reason of God insofar as it commands this ordination and imposes it upon us.

It is proved: 1) human reason is true or false according as it is conformed to truth or not: for it is cognitive, not productive, of truth.

But the measure of all truth is the reason of God, which is the first truth and productive of every other truth.

Therefore human reason is a true rule according as it is conformed to the reason of God (q. 19, a. 4).

2. In human acts good and evil are said from order to the ultimate end. But the ultimate end is constituted and intended by the author of nature. Therefore the supreme ordination of human acts is from God; and acts are good or evil according to the ordination of God.

3. Hence the third proposition of the *Syllabus* was condemned: "Human reason, with no regard at all had to God, is the only arbiter of the true and the false, of good and evil."

They object: We do not know the eternal law; therefore it is not a rule. - Resp. It becomes known from creatures and especially from the knowledge of human nature, for all things have from the eternal law that they are ordered and moved to their own end and to the end of the whole universe: "Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the divine mind, nevertheless it becomes known to us in some way either through natural reason, which is derived from it (and is known to be derived) as its proper image, or through some superadded revelation" (q. 19, a. 4, ad 3).

126. Corollary.

Human reason is the secondary and near, proper or homogeneous, and immanent rule; the eternal law is the primary and supreme, heterogeneous, and transcendent norm (q. 19, a. 4, ad 2; q. 21, a. 1; q. 71, a. 6).

Article III: On the Objective Foundation of Morality

It is necessary to ask not only about the subjective criterion of morality, or about the norm by which it is discerned, but also about the objective criterion and foundation of the intrinsic distinction between good and evil, or about the ontological principle from which the rule of morality has its origin and force, and upon which right reason rests in order to judge what is good or evil.

127. Thesis. The proximate objective foundation of morality, or of the rule of reason, is human nature with its end and essential relations; the ultimate foundation, or that of the eternal law, is the divine essence itself.

Many more recent authors say that rational human nature itself as such in itself is the proximate norm of morality; or even human nature considered completely with all its essential relations, namely, as rational (and not only sensitive), as social, and as created; indeed some add that it is the fundamental norm or foundation of the eternal law itself and of the will of God. But all these confuse the norm with its objective foundation. On the contrary, others deny that morality depends upon the ultimate end to which human nature nevertheless is ordered, or even upon the essential order of things. But one must say:

1. Thus Vasquez, Suarez, Lessius, Laymann, Lugo, Frins, Schiffini, Costa Rosetti, De Bie, Elter. Liberatore says: the norm is the essential order of things. Tanquerey, who used to say that the norm is reason, in the latest editions unhappily changed his opinion, and now establishes the norm to be human nature. On the contrary, Cathrein, who had formerly taught that it is human nature, later said that it is reason, but under the name of reason he understood conscience. Fr. Lehu in the work *Philosophia moralis et socialis* treats the whole question excellently; likewise very recently in the writing *La raison regle de moralite d'apres S. Thomas*.

1. Thus Vasquez and Frins.

2. Suarez, Frins, Cathrein.

3. Cathrein.

1. Rational human nature as such, or even considered completely with its relations, is not the formal rule and measure or criterion which distinguishes morality (and even if someone

wished to call it a rule, at least it would not be the proximate rule), but the objective foundation according to which reason discerns what is good or evil: for from this the object or act is discerned as good or evil, because it has a relation of agreement or disagreement with rational nature. Hence the near norm and subjective criterion of morality is only the practical judgment of reason.

And therefore St. Thomas distinguishes between physical good and moral good, between works of nature and works of the will, and says that nature is the rule of natural works, reason the rule of acts of the will.

4. I-II, q. 21, a. 1; q. 77, a. 3; Q. D. *De Malo* 2, a. 4.

For reason is right from conformity to the eternal law. The eternal law becomes known from creatures, and especially from human nature. Therefore human nature stands as a medium between the eternal law and reason, and in this sense it is said to be, but it is not, a rule, except fundamentally, that is, the foundation of the rule of reason.

2. Consequently also the ultimate end of man, to which rational nature itself is naturally ordered, and the essential order of things or objective order arising from the necessary relations of the human agent to various beings, for the same reason can be called the objective foundation of morality. They are the rule fundamentally, or the foundation of the rule of reason.

5. I-II, q. 21, a. 2, ad 2; q. 77, a. 8; q. 109, a. 8; Q. D. *De Pot.* 3, a. 6, ad 12.

3. Yet human nature and the essential order of things are not the fundamental rule nor the foundation of the supreme rule and of the eternal law, because before the idea of God and independently of it, created essences and the order among them are altogether nothing and have no being, neither real nor ideal; hence the foundation of the eternal law, as of all things, is the essence of God alone, which is the absolutely ultimate end.

128. Observation.

Let no difficulty arise from the fact that we define good and evil according to conformity or difformity, whether to rational nature, or to reason, or to the ultimate end: for all these things come back to the same thing. For good is that which agrees with some nature; rational nature is constituted by reason; nature also is the principle of operation tending to its proper end. Therefore it is the same to say: moral good agrees with rational nature, or with reason, or with the ultimate end of human nature.

Article IV: On False Systems Concerning the Foundations of Morality

129. False systems are opposed to Catholic doctrine concerning the nature, rule, and foundation of morality.

This doctrine places moral goodness in the honorable good alone and founds it in rational human nature, in the eternal law of God, and in the tendency toward perfect happiness to be obtained in the other life; false systems are opposed to it either by defect or by excess. The Catholic doctrine itself is conformable to Aristotelian philosophy and can be called rational eudaemonism, because it intends rational perfection, the supreme good of man.

To this:

a) by defect is opposed pure eudaemonism (*eudaimonia* = beatitude, *bien-etre*, *welzijn*), or ethical voluntarism (*gemoeds-, begeerte- of strevingsmoraal, geluksmoraal, gelukstrevingsmoraal*), which tends toward earthly happiness and places it either in the delectable good: hedonism or sensualism; or in the useful good for temporal happiness: utilitarianism, which subsists under various forms, for example, individual, social, or evolutionary utilitarianism, sociological ethics, progressivism, pragmatism, etc.;

b) on the contrary, by excess is opposed pure rationalism or formalism, namely autonomistic and ethical rationalism, which proposes an exaggerated honorable good, and indeed of autonomous reason, without respect to human nature considered in its totality, to the eternal law of God, or to happiness, or even to reward in the other life. It exists under various forms, of which the chief are Stoicism and Kantianism.

1. Concerning the various systems, historically and individually, something will be said in an excursus by way of appendix at the end of the volume. The following can be consulted: Fouillee, *Critique des systemes de morale contemporaine*; De Baets, *Les bases de la morale et du droit*; Sertillanges, *Les bases de la morale et les recentes discussions* (in *Rev. de Phil.* 1903); among works of moral philosophy: Meyer, Cathrein, De Bie, Lehu, *Manuel de Philosophie neo-scolastique* (of the Louvain school); likewise Beysens, *Ethiek*; Van Hoonacker, *Grondslagen der Moraalfilosofie*; E. Janssens, *Cours de Morale generale*; M. Gillet, *La morale et les morales*; among theological manuals: Prummer, Tanquerey, and Mausbach; likewise *Annales de l'institut de Philosophie*, III.

130. Hedonism.

Hedonism (*hedone* = pleasure), or moral sensualism (*genietingsmoraal*), says: happiness is the sum of pleasures. Good is in sensual pleasure, evil in pain. The supreme good is the greatest present pleasure of the body, and any pleasure whatever is good, even if it is obtained by a most shameful action. Hence the supreme norm is: pleasure is to be sought, pain is to be fled; nature impels to this. Hence actions are good which bring more pleasure than pain; and therefore virtue is good only as a means to pleasure.

Against this system it can be objected:

1. Hedonism is founded upon the system of moral positivism: for pleasure varies and depends much on circumstances, custom, the laws of times and places, and the character of individuals, and corresponds to particular tendencies: each one is drawn by his own pleasure.

2. It falsely supposes that the ultimate end is in the greatest delight of this life.

3. The delectable good is not the first object of appetite, for delight follows from appetition and operation, which naturally precedes it and generates it. Hence delight will be good or evil according to the nature of the operation itself. Therefore it is not the principle or norm of morality.

4. Hedonism denies the classic distinction among the honorable, useful, and delectable good; yet historically and really there is a difference between what is sensibly pleasurable and what is

fitting to man. Hence the system is opposed to man's natural conscience; and, reduced to the state of the present life, it justifies all crimes.

5. It considers only one element of man: but man is spirit and heart, not heart alone.

6. The delectable good is relative to individuals, and consequently subjective and variable; therefore it does not constitute a criterion of the objective and intrinsic distinction between good and evil.

7. Delight sought without restriction and discretion destroys itself: experience shows that it brings pain and is transformed into pain. But if delight as such is good, it will never be excessive; and nevertheless delight can be excessive: for its quantity displeases in such a way that it is no longer delight.

They object: 1) Natural inclinations are true; therefore the delight to which nature inclines is the true end and the true good. Resp. Those inclinations are true, not because they tend to delight, but because they show the internal nature of man. Hence it is not absolutely good to follow them, but insofar as they agree with human nature as such and with reason itself, to which all other inclinations must be subordinated, as lower things to higher.

2. Not every pleasure is good or an end, but pleasure of a certain character or quality, which is discerned by reason. Resp. Then pleasure itself as such is already not the ultimate norm, but a determined quality or condition of pleasure. This is already the negation of the system.

There is nevertheless something true in it: namely, the connection between virtue and happiness and delight, not indeed the baser delight of sense, but the nobler delight of the mind. The exercise of virtue alone can procure true happiness: it can cause imperfect happiness in the present life and merit perfect happiness in the other life. But an act will not be good because it renders us happy; it renders us happy because it is good.

131. Utilitarianism (*nuttigheidsmoraal*; *Nutzlichkeitsmoral*; *Erfolgsmoral*).

Utilitarianism in general places the end not precisely in pleasure alone, but in the sum of goods; and moral good in any useful good whatever for the earthly happiness either of the individual or of society, even in pleasure which reason approves as truly useful. Thus pleasure remains a secondary criterion of morality.

Now the aforesaid norm, besides falsely supposing that a created good is the end of man:

1. Is not sufficient, as not universal: for several honorable or dishonorable acts exist without respect to private or social good; for example, pledged faith is preserved against utility. Social utilitarianism denies man's duties toward God and toward himself, except insofar as they are ordered to the social good; individual utilitarianism does not prove duties toward God or toward others. But if they say that individual good is connected with social good, resp.: perhaps this may pass in the abstract; in the concrete, I deny it, for in fact they are often opposed and in conflict.

2. It is practically impossible: for all the consequences, of advantage or disadvantage, present and future, would have to be adequately seen and compared with one another, so that it could be established what is truly useful.

3. It is not immutable: for earthly happiness appears subjective and relative, and therefore it is not conceived in the same way by all, but is understood in a diverse way according to various times and regions and individuals, so that nothing is more changeable than a rule of this kind; hence it would render morality subjective and changeable.

4. It is false: for acts held by all as dishonorable can be useful to man, for example, theft and homicide, or can be ordered to the social good, for example, perjury, homicide, lying; and conversely, acts certainly honorable can be useless. Hence the norm of happiness in life is vague and indeterminate, because it can legitimate everything; and at the same time so restricted that it cannot legitimate many duties, as was already said under 1).

5. It is incomplete and maimed: it considers the empirical and affective aspect, egoism or altruism, more than the rational aspect, to which it assigns a second place and which it places after inclination and tendency; although the rational has the first part in morality, as directing and regulating.

In particular:

A. Individual, private, or egoistic utilitarianism (*welbegrepen eigenbelang*) places morality in any good whatever which each one, according to his pursuit of happiness, has proposed to himself to obtain. Hence it is not pleasure alone, but that which according to itself and according to its effects and circumstances offers greater utility, even future utility, for the whole life.

Against individual utilitarianism many things can be brought forward which are opposed to hedonism, namely:

1. It is founded upon moral positivism: utility depends upon many circumstances, laws, custom, and personal character.

2. It falsely supposes that the ultimate end is in the happiness of this life.

3. It denies the classic distinction among honorable, useful, and delectable good. And yet the useful as such is not the end but the means. Hence the end must be either delectable good, which is hedonism, or good considered in order to the end of nature, which is rational ethics. Therefore utility is not the first criterion. Hence the system is opposed to the moral conscience of all times, which refuses to admit pursuit of gain as moral perfection, just as it refuses pleasure.

4. It considers only one aspect of man; but man per se is an individual and per se from his nature is social. Hence individual utility alone is not the end of the moral order.

5. The useful good is not a universal criterion: for it is relative and variable, hence it is not a criterion of objective and intrinsic distinction; indeed it can lead to the greatest crimes. On the

contrary, the best acts, such as to shed blood for God, for virtue, for the defense of one's country, can be useless.

6. Hence individual utility must be ruled by education and legislation.

7. Whence proposition 58 of the *Syllabus* is condemned: "All moral discipline and honesty must be placed in heaping up and increasing riches by any manner whatever and in satisfying pleasures."

B. Social or altruistic utilitarianism establishes common happiness as the norm of morality. Actions, therefore, are good or evil according as they promote or impede common happiness, and the more an action contributes to the common good, the better it is; the more it impedes it, the worse.

Against this form especially it can be objected:

1. In order that the happiness of others be the end, it is necessary to know in what that happiness consists. Hence the system does not hand down the ultimate answer, nor does it definitively solve the question, but leads it back again. The useful, namely, is not the measure, because it is a means, not an end. Therefore it is not the supreme criterion.

2. It is not a universal criterion. Ethics precedes the organization of society. Conscience testifies that, even apart from the social good, there are good and evil actions, such as intemperance, blasphemy, parricide, which are evil even in individual or family life. Moreover, the individual and society remain distinct, although they are not disjoined or separated. Moreover, man is directly referred to society only through external acts; and yet internal acts are moral, indeed morality is first in them.

3. It is not the first criterion. For the end of society is the end of individuals. Hence the distinction between social good and evil is subordinated to the distinction between individual good and evil; and if the good of one is not moral, neither is the good of many. It is natural to man to enter society because it is good, that is, conformable to reason. That is properly the end where there is properly operation. Society is not one per se, but has only a unity of order; and therefore as such it is not apt for attaining happiness.

4. It places the end in the present life and legitimates all crimes, for example, those of powerful nations against weaker ones.

5. According to the very principles of empiricism and utilitarianism, egoism equals altruism; and in a case of conflict between social good and individual happiness, from the principles of utilitarianism the conflict cannot be solved.

132. Pure Rationalism or Formalism.

In general, the followers of autonomic rationalism, rejecting the eternal law and excluding every relation to the reason and will of a personal God, deduce morality and moral obligation solely from the conformity of the act with reason itself or with nature as rational, without respect to utility, delight, happiness, and sanction. Hence they proclaim a purely rational morality, and moral good is

only in the rational part of man; and therefore it consists in rational decency and must be sought solely from the motive of decency, namely, of virtue or of duty, for its own sake. This is formalism.

It first appeared in Greece, in the Cynic school, but there it especially flourished in the Stoic school.

The foundation of morality is: "to live conformably to nature"; and since human nature is rational, virtue is in a life instituted according to reason. The supreme and only good is life according to virtue; hence virtue is an end in itself: for good is to be loved and sought for its own sake, not on account of another. Virtue and happiness are the same in reality: "to live happily and to live according to nature are the same thing," says Seneca; beyond virtue nothing is needed for happiness. Nevertheless virtue is not to be desired on account of happiness; happiness is never to be desired as an end.

All other things are either indifferent things, such as health, riches, sickness, poverty, to be sought or fled according to circumstances; or vices always to be fled, such as passions, which are evil, against reason: to follow passion or affection or delight is contrary to morality. Virtue is wisdom: the truly wise man patiently sustains all inconveniences and abstains from various joys, "sustain and abstain"; he subjects all affections and passions to reason, indeed he extirpates them through a certain apathy or impassibility, so that he is elevated above all things and cannot be disturbed by any influence of pain or pleasure: thus he is freed from affection.

But against this:

1. The identity of virtue and full happiness or beatitude does not exist here on earth, where there are numerous and excessive pains.

2. The fundamental error by which it teaches that virtue is to be cultivated solely for its own sake, so that every consideration of one's own happiness is excluded, is common to it with Kant; and therefore the arguments to be brought against this point of Kantian doctrine also have force here (cf. next n., 2 and 3).

3. The nature conformably to which one must live, it says, is reason; but it understands reason in an entirely exclusive sense, so that there is not merely a preponderance and dominion of reason, but pure rationality, all other things being excluded from morality.

4. Hence the affective life lacks all morality. The passions must be reduced to servitude and extirpated rather than ruled and moderated, so that there may be perfect apathy, by which man is not acted upon by them, and the proper life of each one becomes indifferent to him.

5. Moreover, several other false things are contained in it. Thus no degree of morality is admitted, but goodness or malice is held as equal in all acts; the passions also are held as evil of themselves.

6. Finally, in applying the principles many errors occurred, and indeed most pernicious ones, since in fact they held lying, suicide, and many foul things against nature to be licit.

133. Kantianism.

Kant (1724-1804), the author of critical philosophy, followed Stoicism in some measure. After he had attempted to show that by pure speculative reason we can know only phenomena, not noumena, or what things themselves are in themselves; but that concerning these there is had a merely subjective cognition without objective value, and consequently that the existence of God, the freedom of man, and the immortality of the soul cannot be certainly proved; he determined to establish the foundations of ethics by another way, by the help of pure practical reason.

From the testimony of the conscience of all men, nothing is simply good except a good will, that is, reason-will; and this alone is moral. But the will is good not from the object, but from the motive by which it is moved to acting; this can be nothing other than duty to be fulfilled; and this duty is nothing other than conformity with the universal moral law. Therefore the will, in order to be morally good, must do what is commanded and solely because it is commanded: "to act according to duty and for the sake of duty." Hence morality is from form alone, which alone is universal, independently of matter: for if it fulfills the law on account of some empirical or eudaemonistic end, such as natural satisfaction of a tendency, fear of power, avoiding evil, or on account of some happiness or utility to be obtained, then the will is already pursuing the useful and has an egoistic motive destructive of morality, and therefore morality is not good; but it is good only when it is impelled from pure reverence for the law. Therefore Kant not only formally distinguishes every eudaemonistic element from morality, but excludes it as something incompossible with it.

1. Lehu notes: According to Kant, "material ethics is impossible. For moral law must be universal. But material ethics cannot be universal, because a) either it concludes the goodness of an action from order to happiness, but not all have the same happiness; b) or it is taken from order to some supreme good, but this opinion contradicts the natural appetite for happiness. Therefore the will will not be good except on the part of form, which alone can be universal, and consists in this, that the law is observed on account of the sole motive of law," o. c. n. 320.

Hence ethics a) must be pure from every empirical element of experience and proceed *a priori*; and consequently it does not depend upon concrete human nature and is without respect to psychology; b) obligation does not depend upon morality, but morality upon obligation.

But the universal moral law shows itself to man as something commanding, not conditionally and hypothetically, "if you wish to be happy, do this," but absolutely and categorically, "do good": hence there is the categorical imperative of practical reason, which must be obeyed simply and without any respect to the object and to the consequences of the act or to obtaining a reward, and without further inquiry concerning its foundation or authority; hence it is called the formal imperative. For the moral law proceeds from reason or rational nature as such, which is an end in itself, so that man cannot be ordered as a means to another end. Morality, namely, is essentially autonomous, by which the will observes its own law; reason, just as it alone is the measure of morality, so also is the only foundation. For in heteronomy, if we are subjected to the law of another, even of God, we are always led by a utilitarian or eudaemonistic motive, of love, hope, or fear, and the imperative will not be categorical but conditioned: "if he commands, if you wish to obey, in order to attain something material, act thus." Hence the ultimate end is the fully possible fulfillment of duty, or the autonomous pursuit of duty, which is an end in itself and has absolute value in itself: in the realm of

ends man is both subject and legislator. Autonomy, namely, is the sole foundation of proper value, just as it is the ultimate foundation of morality and obligation.

But the categorical imperative is an unconditioned and universal rule. Hence:

a) the first and fundamental subjective rule, or "maxim," as it is called, which will be the criterion of morality, is this: "Act so that the rule of your will can always become a principle of universal legislation"; that is, before you act, carefully consider whether something absurd would follow from your action, if all were ordered to do the same thing and in fact acted so. From this rule two others follow:

b) the other, which determines the end of morality: "Act so that you hold humanity in yourself and in others as an end, and not as a means which you use"; for if you use yourself or others as a means, by that very fact you act on account of utility or pleasure, not on account of duty, and the imperative will already be conditioned, not categorical;

c) the third, which indicates the source of morality: "Act so that you consider your will, on the part of matter, as universally legislative"; autonomy is altogether necessary, otherwise we would no longer act for the sake of duty.

Now, in order that ethics be possible, there are three postulates of practical reason, which, although theoretically indemonstrable, must be admitted and believed as truths. For:

1. the moral law postulates freedom: for if the will were compelled to act, it could not be morally good; hence there is not phenomenal freedom, but noumenal freedom is given, which determines phenomenal operations;

1. The will in phenomena is not free; insofar as it is above phenomena, belonging to the intelligible world, it is free. Theoretical reason nevertheless does not know freedom, but knows the limitation which furnishes a foundation for thinking the possibility of freedom: it is a notion empty of every objective content, but conceivable. The positive foundation of the existence of freedom is from practical reason. Hence the primacy of practical reason, which reaches the noumenon itself.

2. the necessary object and end of a created will is to effect the supreme good, which consists in the intimate union of happiness and virtue. But this cannot be attained in the present life, for by that very fact obligation would cease. Hence the will is destined to tend by perpetual progress toward the supreme good; for this it is postulated that the soul is immortal;

3. man cannot think the supreme good except joined to supreme happiness. But the moral order is opposed to the order of happiness. Therefore it is postulated that there be some cause which joins morality with beatitude, and this can be nothing other than God. Hence there will be retribution, because virtue is worthy of retribution, although it cannot be exercised with a view to retribution. Retribution in this life is impossible. Therefore it is in the other life, and therefore God exists.

Thus God is introduced as the end of ethics, without being the foundation of morality.

From these postulates there results the primacy of practical reason and of the will over speculative reason.

Many have followed Kant as to the substance, and several of his principles have had influence upon the whole of modern philosophy. Yet not a few things can be objected to his system.

1. Cf. E. Janssens, *La morale de l'imperatif categorique et la morale du bonheur*.

1. It rests upon three false foundations: namely, it supposes a) an ideological and critical system of speculative reason; b) that the characters "universal" and "necessary" cannot be derived from things known experimentally; c) that all "material" principles place the motive in the lower appetitive faculty and that men are not moved by them except through the mediation of delight; hence man cannot act honorably except "on account of the form" of law, namely, from pure reverence for law. Here there is a twofold error, namely, a) that law does not move except through the lower faculty, although good can be appetized by a twofold faculty; b) that one acts either from mere reverence for law or from a motive of delight, for there are many other motives of the higher appetite, for example, agreement with human nature or with right order, love of God, the excellence of virtue, etc.

2. It does not explain morality or the norm of morality; for a) it removes the real end, beatitude; hence it renders impossible the relation of acts to the end and consequently removes the rule of conduct; therefore b) if a moral rule is not present, there will not be a true law or obligatory rule. For obligation is a necessity of acting. But the will is not solicited except by a final cause or by a willed good. Therefore the categorical imperative, which intends to exclude every real end, cannot found real obligation, and therefore is not law; indeed c) the norm handed down is psychologically impossible. For one must act solely from the motive of duty, without consideration of one's own good and without the affection of the appetitive faculty. But this is impossible. The will has good as its proper object, and whatever it wills it wills under the notion of good. Hence it cannot act from pure reverence for law unless this is fitting and good for it; otherwise it would be a good which remained foreign to the will and could not move it. Therefore it is impossible to exclude the affection of the appetitive faculty: that something is good for man and pertains to happiness, if it is not always the principal motive, is nevertheless a condition without which there is no appetition. Hence Kantian ethics mutilates human nature, and therefore is unnatural and fruitless; truly d) it assumes as known from common persuasion that that will alone is simply good which wills both what the law commands and because the law commands. But such a persuasion does not exist, for men often call actions honorable which are commanded by no law, for example, if someone of his own accord devotes himself to the service of the poor and sick or to the service of his country; moreover, they also hold prescribed actions good if they are done from another motive, not prohibited by another law, such as mercy, love of neighbor, etc.: thus a good will is manifested.

3. The honesty of an action is not necessarily corrupted by a eudaemonological intention. For there is a twofold degree of perfection, namely, a) to act for the sake of honesty or on account of a deontological end; b) to act for the sake of happiness, though not exclusively for its sake alone, but with due subordination to the deontological end, using hope of reward or fear of

punishment to pursue honesty more efficaciously. This remains good, because in this way man acts according to nature adequately considered. This nature, by an invincible appetite implanted by the Creator, tends toward its good or happiness. Hence, acting thus in regard to the honorable good, man wills that to which he is brought through nature by the Creator. Otherwise the Kantian rule is not proportioned to nature; for it is impossible that a being which by the whole weight of nature is inclined toward its own happiness should continually neglect this in acting, as is confirmed, moreover, by the universal mode of acting of men, even of the most perfect.

1. If man excluded the motive of honesty, by that very fact he would act badly, and consequently would not obtain reward or avoid punishment. - The question properly pertains to the treatise on hope.

Therefore it is false that reason prohibits following the inclination to happiness or delight; this appetite can be directed by right reason.

4. For it contradicts itself: a) by asserting on one side that an action elicited on account of hope of beatitude is not good, and on the other side that the supreme good consists in the conjunction of virtue and beatitude. For if this is true, why are we prohibited from desiring and seeking it? For it is not evil to seek what is more perfect; but it is more perfect to cultivate virtue and at the same time to be happy. Therefore.

b) Likewise by asserting on one side that the only honorable motive is duty to be fulfilled, and on the other side that man is to be considered as an end, indeed that the rule of acting is to be so constituted by each one that it can have force for all. But this is to introduce a material element distinct from duty, and consequently to render the imperative conditioned.

5. Indeed, from the system several absurdities follow:

a) that human nature is an end to itself, and its perfection is absolute autonomy; for human nature is not autonomous, since dependence is essential to man;

b) that reason is at once superior and inferior, making law and rebellious against itself: "for it is at once rule and at once subject," and "not rarely rebellious";

c) that practical judgments are synthetic *a priori*, by which, namely, the idea of obligation is joined *a priori* with action, and these judgments rest upon a blind faith concerning the goodness and sanctity of the law of reason: it is supposed *a priori* that human reason commands good things, whereas in its judgments it ought to depend upon objective truth. Thus obligation is constructed without an ontological foundation;

d) that the matter of action in no way pertains to morality. For how is it discerned that a rule is apt to become a universal principle, for example, that an act, a lie, is worthy to be prohibited by universal law, unless because the matter or object in itself has baseness and is against reason?

e) that no act is good which is not commanded by the categorical imperative; yet there is a distinction between the licit, the obligatory, and the heroic, between commanded good and non-commanded good; indeed obligation is posterior to morality;

f) that goodness and malice are constituted by the categorical imperative. Is an act evil solely because it is prohibited, good because it is commanded, or on the contrary prohibited as evil in itself and commanded as good in itself?

6. Finally, it leads to fatalism or pantheism. For one must obey reason either blindly because reason dictates, not asking about a further foundation, and this is fatalism; or hold human reason as absolute and God, which is pantheism.

134. Conclusion.

From these things it is now clear what is to be judged concerning morality absolutely independent or lay morality. Besides the fact that it is incomplete, under some respect it seems to include something utopian. For in general:

1. In the logical order, it is impossible to justify ethics without an absolute end which subsists in itself, and which is nothing other than God, the supreme and infinite good; otherwise all our aspirations toward good would go away into emptiness or nothingness. Hence beyond contingent created goods there must be an absolute End, which is the end in itself.

2. In the ontological order, all things are founded in this, that God loves himself with necessary love and cannot will anything except on account of himself; otherwise he could not communicate himself to other beings which participate in his perfection, nor give to them as an end the communication of his goodness.

3. In the order of practical execution, without recourse to God, the observance of morality will not be sufficiently obtained, because of the lack of an efficacious sanction; namely, if man were not certain that God, infinitely just and omnipotent, establishes an eternal harmony and concord between virtue and happiness, vice and unhappiness.

In particular, those who defend independent morality propose, in place of theistic or Christian morality, either:

1. An ethics of solidarity, by which we are bound toward others. Obligation would arise either from contract, or from inheritance by which we obtain all things from preceding generations. Not from contract, for a contract is not valid unless freely entered; but individuals are not bound, because they did not assume the obligation, indeed they did not freely take up society. Not from inheritance, because the patrimony of prior generations does not have determined natural heirs, but pertains to all and to each; hence if we use it, we contract no debt toward others.

1. Lehu notes, o. c. n. 322: "1. It is a law of nature that man live in society; but not all laws of nature induce obligation, for example, winter cold is a law of nature, but man is not obliged not to avoid cold. 2. Certainly man owes something to society, but to determine the quantity of that debt is not so easy. 3. Many men judge society to be badly ordered because from it they have received more evil than good: such persons do not admit society to be the just foundation of obligation."

Or:

2. A sociological ethics, which founds morality upon the idea of society, which is a moral person distinct from individuals and superior to them, which can command. But society is not a person or a being really distinct from individuals, nor is it an absolute end in itself: it exists for the good of individuals, and they are not simply for it. But if individuals are bound to obey, it is not because society has an absolute right of commanding for the sake of commanding, but because the precept contributes to the good of individuals and thus can be legitimated. Or:

3. An ethics of nature, which is founded in man's subjection to his nature. The ultimate end is: to be ourselves, to preserve ourselves and perfect ourselves under the individual respect and in order to society. This can be understood in a right sense of rational nature as such, ordered to the ultimate end, God; but in fact, those who do not acknowledge God and the author of the universe, what do they understand by the name of nature which is the norm? They interpret it in various and opposed ways. Moreover, the instincts which must be reformed for the good ordering of nature proceed equally from nature itself as those which are to be stimulated; therefore there must be another discriminating rule: human reason, an irradiation of divine reason itself.

Article V: On the Apprehensive Faculty of Morality

135. Thesis. The cognitive faculty of morality is nothing other than the intellect, which under this respect is called practical.

It is proved: A. indirectly, by the exclusion of other opinions. The cognitive faculty of morality is not experience, nor sense, nor instinct, nor subjective affection. Therefore (cf. nn. 136-137).

B. directly: 1) morality is conformity or agreement with the rule of reason and the ultimate end, or difformity or disagreement. But that pertains to the object of reason or intellect. Therefore morality is known by the intellect.

2. Judgment concerning moral things is a certain truth. But truth is the proper object of the intellect. Therefore judgment concerning moral things pertains to the intellect.

It is called practical because as its object it has the proportion of means to the end, and thus is ordered to directing the acts of the will toward the end. But the practical intellect is not diverse from the speculative intellect. A faculty is not diversified by an accidental difference of the object. But the object of the speculative intellect and the object of the practical intellect differ merely accidentally: for it happens to something apprehended by the intellect that it be ordered to work or not ordered to it. Therefore the practical intellect does not differ really from the speculative intellect (I, q. 79, a. 11).

136. Moral Empiricism is opposed to the aforesaid doctrine.

Moral empiricism repeats the cognition of morality solely from experimental observation of utility. All things are changeable; the absolute is a metaphysical illusion; and therefore morality is essentially changeable according to circumstances. Hence the system in fact is reduced to evolutionism, which rests upon impulses had and transmitted from repeated sensible experiences through all generations. In this, reason has only secondary parts: for it follows inclinations and experiences what is, but does

not dictate what ought to be. And thus ethics is a descriptive and explanatory science, not a normative one.

Now organic ethics, as it is usually called:

A. As to the foundation, supposes materialism or positivism, and consequently acknowledges only the ethics of utilitarianism or sensualism.

B. As to method, 1) it is incomplete: for determining the rule of conduct, historical and psychological observation of facts and actions is certainly useful, but it does not suffice, because the question is not only what men have done or do, but also and chiefly what it is fitting or necessary to do. To determine this, experience does not suffice, but the exercise of reason itself is required, by which we know the cause and origin of this fittingness or moral obligation;

2. it is maimed: they assert indeed that there is no man who ultimately acts except on account of his own advantage. And yet experience also teaches that there are men who spend themselves and all that is theirs on account of God or neighbor; and that the notion of the honorable and just, at least among many, is distinct from the notion of happiness: for certain acts are held as good, indeed best or heroic, which so far from bringing pleasure cause sadness and detriment; but others are depraved although they procure advantage, as if someone, by using fraud in playing, wins victory for himself and much money.

C. As to the matter: 1) it is insufficient. The value of a necessary principle is not from experience, and instinctive impulses do not constitute the principle of morality. For we must ask whether impulses or organic dispositions are the true manifestation of good, or rather an hallucination. If the first, this will be only because they agree with reason, and thus we return to our criterion. If the second, the universality and persistence of those hallucinations would have to be explained;

2. it is illogical, as opposed to experience: for if moral ideas and inclinations come from heredity, how does ethics give us the faculty, and sometimes the duty, of acting against instincts?

3. it is erroneous: it falsely asserts that duty is a natural or intellectual instinctive necessity; but that obligation arises from an intrinsic sanction, for example harmful effects, and an extrinsic sanction, or fear of punishments, which is threefold: social, by which the stronger impose their will; civil, by which the prince necessary to social order is feared; religious, by which the souls of the dead, especially of the prince, are feared. Now:

a) that is not the notion which we have of duty or obligation;

b) many do not perceive these moral sanctions; but those who know them could say that they yield to force, not however that they acknowledge obligation;

c) such obligation does not have force and efficacy in conscience, but rather is the destruction than the explanation of moral obligation: for it would be nothing except an action extorted by fear alone.

4. Hence the system is not founded upon positive experience, but is constituted rather from a series of hypotheses.

137. Moral Intuitionism is also opposed.

By this general name are designated all who agree in this, that good and evil are immediately affirmed from a certain intuition of some faculty, as the Nativists and Innatists hold in psychology; or who assert that morality is known by instinct or by a special sense, by which man spontaneously affirms good and evil without the induction of experience and without the deduction of reason.

A. Some say that it is known by a physical or bodily sense, such as the Sensists and Phrenologists, who admit nothing except sensitive cognition. Against this:

1. The assertion rests upon a false foundation; it supposes materialism and a false system concerning the criterion of truth.

2. In the sensist system, no freedom remains, which supposes the indifference of judgment, which cannot be given without intelligence. Hence it destroys morality in its principle.

3. Universals, abstract and immutable things, such as the moral norm, are not known by sense, which essentially is changeable and varies according to circumstances and subjective dispositions. Therefore it destroys morality in its essence.

4. The moral rule orders human acts. To order pertains to the intellect. Therefore the cognition of morality pertains to the intellect.

5. Sense experiences nothing from objects except pleasure and pain; therefore logically sensism must lead to hedonism or sensualism.

1. Cf. Roselli, *Ethica*, q. 3, a. 2.

B. Others say it is known by a certain spiritual sense of intuition or by an instinctive sense, which differs from the intellect and corresponds to a blind instinct by which we immediately know first principles, both speculative and practical. This sense is of the affective order and consists in a certain internal affection or sympathy or taste. Thus the Scotist school, the Sentimentalists, and many more recent authors, who all in fact are altruists. This system:

1. For the most part is founded upon a false criteriological system.

2. Is inadequate. It denies the rational element and attributes the first parts to the affective element, which is only secondary. Reason, namely, according to them, only observes, it does not dictate; and social utility must be embraced not because it is conformable to reason, but because affection and instinct incline to it. On the contrary, affection is nothing except a prelude or resonance of the judgment of reason, which is the norm of morality.

3. It does not furnish a certain criterion, but a fallacious one. For we are not always affected with sympathy toward moral good, nor always with antipathy toward evil; but other non-moral causes also, such as talents, qualities, a happy outcome, fruition, joy, can excite the same affections.

4. It does not furnish a universal criterion: for the multitude and society toward which we are bound to be affected with sympathy is subject to change; but what if men toward whom we are

sympathetically affected incline to diverse things?

5. It does not furnish an objective criterion, but a subjective one: sympathy and antipathy are changed according to circumstances and persons.

6. It does not furnish an ultimate criterion: for sympathies and antipathies themselves are good or evil. Why, unless because they are conformable or difform to reason?

7. Just as human reason reasons concerning speculative truth, so also concerning practical truth. But it is absolutely repugnant that the first principles of speculative reason be admitted by a blind instinct and without evidence. Therefore the same is repugnant also for the first principles of practical reason, in practical or moral matters.

8. There are other instincts and intuitions, namely egoistic ones. But why must we pursue sympathetic inclinations, not egoistic ones? Either because they are conformable to reason; or because they are a fact of evolution. In this last case it does not follow that they are legitimate and good. And moreover persons of an egoistic character can provoke antipathy.

The moral sense cannot be distinguished from other experiences unless there is first a certain notion of morality; that is, unless reason has investigated the idea and value of morality, and distinguished it from merely sensitive, aesthetic, or social impressions.

They object: the spontaneity and universality and persistence of moral conscience among all men and through all times, which cannot be explained except by instinct and a special sense; and this is the only argument which they bring forward. Resp.: this proves a constant and native disposition for knowing the first moral principles, namely synderesis or the habit of first practical principles, just as there is the habit of intellect for first speculative principles; but it does not prove a blind instinct or a special sense. It is useless, namely, to recur to a distinct special faculty, because practical reason informed by synderesis is able to explain this, and it itself is not a faculty distinct from speculative reason.

C. Others who profess transcendental objectivism, or the transcendental or absolute idealism arising from it, recur to a blind instinct of the intellect itself, by which abstract and universal truths are admitted in such a way that their value is not demonstrated, because it cannot be demonstrated that they correspond to reality. Thus Kant and after him those who, relying on his principles, fell into pantheism, such as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. Against this:

a) As to the foundation, this is a false criteriological system, or even pantheistic monism, in which case morality will be impersonal and supra-individual.

b) As to method, 1) this is incomplete: for although reason is chiefly necessary for defining what we ought to do, nevertheless historical and psychological observation of human nature must be added, to which the rules of morality must be adapted;

2. therefore it is not accommodated to human nature: thus if an act elicited with hope of reward or fear of punishment is said not to be good, since historically and psychologically it is established that men without respect to beatitude or fear of punishment do not do good, it follows that such a method and norm is not proportioned to human powers;

3. it rests upon blind faith: for if speculative reason is incapable of certainly knowing speculative truths, why will practical reason be more certain concerning the existence of obligation?

c) As to the thing itself, regarding the Kantian system enough has been said in n. 133. Regarding pantheistic systems:

1. in fact moral conscience attributes value to acts which tend solely to the perfection of the individual; in the individual man also there is the exigency of morality;

2. indeed, if it does not exist there, there will no longer be any exigency of morality: for obligation toward others exists so that they can be perfected.

Question III: On the Principles or Sources of Morality

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2, 3, 4, 10.

138. Notions. - After we have spoken of the ultimate foundation and the first objective principle of morality, the immediate principles now come to be considered, which are called the sources of morality; namely, the elements of the human act from which it immediately comes about that it is conformed to the rule and good, or difform from it and evil, and indeed more or less. They are the object (the primary source), and the circumstances (the secondary source), of which the chief is the end, because it most greatly influences the act.

A. The object in the present matter is considered 1) not as the whole objective element or complex of all the circumstances, but in the proper sense as distinguished from circumstances: it is that which is first and per se attained by the act, or the matter (thing or person) about which it is concerned, that into which, primarily and per se from its own nature, it tends; hence it is the same as the intrinsic end;

2. not according to physical being, but according to moral being, that is, insofar as it is conformed or difform to the rule of reason.

Hence the words object, matter, end are used indiscriminately. For, as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 75, a. 3, ad 1: "the object, although it is the matter about which the act is terminated, nevertheless has the notion of end, according as the intention of the agent is borne into it." Cf. q. 72, a. 3, ad 2.

B. Circumstances are secondarily attained by the act as accidents which affect and determine the human act in its constituted being. Some affect the human act according to physical being, and these are indifferent (for example, that someone steals in the morning or in the evening); others according to moral being, which they increase or diminish (for example, that he steals much or little): these are called moral, to which alone we attend here.

C. End is here understood not as the end of the work or intrinsic end, which is the same as the object, but as the extrinsic and adjoined end of the one acting, "by which the agent is moved to the work."

But since reason is not determined to one thing, but can tend first and per se to all things, hence the same thing can be the object with respect to one act and only a circumstance with respect to another, and indeed: a) moral being can be a circumstance of an act considered according to physical being, for

example, that the thing is another's or deposited in a sacred place is a circumstance as to the act of taking, but it is the substance of theft or sacrilege; b) indeed, the circumstance of one act can be the object and substance of another act: thus with respect to theft it is not a circumstance that the thing is another's, but that it is sacred, although this is not a circumstance as to sacrilege.

139. Observation.

The object, and similarly the end and circumstance, can be considered in two ways: physically and materially in the being of a being, insofar as it is something in the nature of things, and thus it is always good, with the goodness of nature or of being; or morally and in the being of conduct, insofar as it is the object of such an act and insofar as it is attained by the one acting, and thus it can be morally good or evil. It is said:

1. As to the objective element: insofar as it is the object of such a human act, or has or does not have due proportion to such an act; that is, insofar as it is subject to the rule of reason and is conformable to it and morally good, or difform and evil, that such a thing or person be attained by such an act. Thus the object of theft is not another's thing considered in itself and physically, but insofar as the rule forbids that it be taken from its owner; the object of temperance is not food considered in itself, but insofar as it is conformable to reason that it be taken as much as is necessary. Hence:

a) An object physically good can be morally evil, and conversely. Thus, although God and sin according to themselves are a good or evil object, nevertheless God as to be hated is an evil object, and sin as to be destroyed is a good object conformable to reason.

b) One and the same physically single object can be morally good or evil, as to seize or to restore another's thing, to love and to hate a man.

c) The same act according to physical being can be of diverse species according to moral being: thus to give money is a donation if it is done as a favor, alms if to relieve misery, payment if to extinguish a debt, restitution if to compensate an injury, recompense if on account of merit.

d) An act physically the same can be morally good or evil according as it is done by diverse subjects, or by the same subject but at diverse times, for example, the act of fornication and the conjugal act, the eating of flesh on Thursday and Friday, the killing of a man by a robber or by a soldier.

e) Acts of the same physical species can be of diverse moral species, for example, to know one's own wife or another's, love of God and of wine, of virtue and of vice; on the contrary, acts of the same moral species can be of physically diverse species, for example, love and desire of the same object.

2. As to the subjective element: insofar as it is attained by the one acting, that is, is known as conformable or difform with the rules, or insofar as the object and its morality is known by the conscience of the one acting as conformable or difform to reason. For it can happen that an object in itself evil is nevertheless from invincible ignorance thought good: thus if someone takes another's thing which he thinks is his own, the act will be formally good; and conversely, as if someone thinks that today one must fast and does not fast, the act will be formally evil.

All the aforesaid things also hold concerning circumstances and the end.

140. Principle I. The object considered morally gives morality to the act, that is, goodness or malice, and indeed fundamental, principal, and primary morality.

It is said: 1) fundamental, because it is intrinsic and essential to the action, just as the object without which the act cannot be;

2. principal, because it gives to the act the moral species by which it is distinguished from others;

3. primary, because it is conceived before every other morality which comes from circumstances, and perseveres even when these are changed. Thus in the theft of a sacred thing on account of vainglory, the malice from the object, or injustice, is first and fundamental; the malice from the circumstances of sacredness and of the end is called secondary and accidental.

It is proved 1) by reason: that is good which has the fullness of being due to it, evil if it does not have the whole being which it ought to have. But something has being and therefore goodness first from that which gives it species, namely, from its form, for example a man generated from this, that he is a rational animal; on the contrary, it has principal and fundamental malice if it does not have the being of the species which it ought to have, for example if instead of a man a monster is generated. But a human act has its species from the object considered morally, as from form. Therefore from a fitting object it has goodness, and indeed primary and fundamental goodness; likewise malice if it does not have the fitting object which it ought to have.

The minor is proved: a human act is a movement or tendency toward the object considered morally, as toward a term. But every movement has species from the term as from its form, because it is to the term as potency to act. Therefore a human act has species from the object considered morally, as from its form.

This can be contracted briefly thus: every thing has fundamental being and goodness (and therefore malice) from its species. But a human act has species from the object, because it is a movement toward it as its term. Therefore the human act, just as in the physical order, so also in the moral order, has its species from the object by which it is terminated.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures and in the doctrine of Tradition it is often affirmed that good things are to be done, all evil things to be avoided; this must at least be understood of those things which are good or evil by reason of matter. Thus, for example, Ps. XXXIII, 14: Turn away from evil and do good; Prov. III, 7: Fear (that is, worship) God and depart from evil; Is. I, 16-17: Cease to act perversely, learn to do good. Alluding to these, the prince of the apostles says, I Pet. III, 10-12: He who wills to love life and to see good days, let him restrain his tongue from evil and his lips lest they speak deceit; let him turn away from evil and do good; let him seek peace and follow it, because the eyes of the Lord are upon the just and his ears unto their prayers, but the face of the Lord is upon those doing evil.

Hence Christ, replying to the young man asking, "What good shall I do that I may have eternal life?" (Mt. XIX, 16), answers (vv. 17-19): "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments:... Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness. Honor thy father and thy mother, and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"; and these are evil or good precisely from the object.

141. Principle II. Moral circumstances as such give goodness and malice to human acts, but secondary and accidental.

It is said: a) moral circumstances, because they are not considered in themselves and physically, but morally, that is, 1) as to this act, insofar as it is conformable or difform to the rule of reason that the act be placed with these circumstances; and 2) insofar as this is known by the agent.

b) as such, because sometimes they also confer the first and essential goodness or malice, as if a work indifferent from the object becomes good by reason of a circumstance, for example, to drink moderately; but then the circumstance is intended first and per se and becomes the object, or that which is first attained.

c) secondary and accidental morality, because circumstances as such supervene upon the act in its being and moral species already constituted.

It is proved 1) by reason: fullness of being and goodness in things is not had only from that which gives them species, but also secondarily from supervening accidents, for example in man from figure, virtue, color, etc.; if something of these is lacking which ought to be present, or if something else is present which ought not to be present, according to this the thing will be evil. Therefore also in human acts the fullness of being and goodness does not consist wholly in the species which comes from the object, but is added secondarily from the arriving accidents which are circumstances; and if some due circumstance is lacking or an undue one is present, according to this the action will be evil.

It is confirmed: circumstances can imply a habitude of agreement or disagreement with the rule of reason just as the object itself can, for example, it is not only unfitting to steal but also to steal in a sacred place; it is not only fitting to pray but also to pray on bended knees. Therefore.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures, Christ himself (Mk. XII, 41-44) declared that the poor widow who gave two mites gave more than the rich who gave many things, because she gave from her want.

And 3) from Tradition we know that in confession the circumstances of sin must be declared which change the species, or so aggravate or diminish that they make a venial sin mortal or the reverse (which the Council of Trent defined, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7). But there would be no reason for this if they did not increase or diminish malice.

142. Principle III. The extrinsic and adjoined end as such and morally regarded gives goodness or malice to human acts, but secondary and accidental.

It is said: 1) extrinsic end: for the end of the work, or intrinsic end, is the same as the object; hence it is a question of the extrinsic and accidental end which is added by the one acting to the object;

1. St. Thomas: "The proximate end is the same as the object... but the remote end is posited as a circumstance," *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 7, ad 8.

2. as such: for the end sometimes assumes the notion of a moral object and gives the first morality, as if someone does an indifferent act on account of a good end or an evil end, or an act good from the object solely on account of the extrinsic end alone;

3. morally regarded, that is, insofar as it is conformable or difform to reason that such a thing be intended as an end and that such an act be chosen as a means to obtain it.

It is proved 1) by reason: a thing which depends upon another not only has fullness of being and goodness from species and accidents, but also from comparison to the cause upon which it depends; and as being depends upon the efficient cause and species, so goodness depends especially upon the final cause. But the human act depends upon an efficient and final cause. Therefore besides the absolute goodness which it has from being and species, it has relative goodness from the end if it has a due end, and malice if it does not have it.

It is confirmed. End expresses conformity or difformity to reason, for example, it is not only conformed to reason to give alms, but also to give in satisfaction for sins; just as it is repugnant to reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to get drunk. Therefore it cannot happen that the end does not influence goodness if it is good, and malice if it is evil.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures Christ says: "Take heed that you do not your justice before men, to be seen by them... The light of thy body is thy eye. If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome. But if thy eye be evil, thy whole body shall be darksome" (Mt. VI, 1, 22-23). These things are to be understood of a depraved intention, which blinds the mind and removes God's pleasure in works; while the right intention, which directs all things, pleases God and is rewarded by him. Hence in v. 33 it is said: "Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you." And the Apostle admonishes, I Cor. X, 31, that all things be done unto the glory of God.

143. Corollary. - Therefore in the human act a fourfold goodness can be found: one according to genus insofar as it is an action, because as much as it has of act and entity, so much it has of (physical) goodness; another is according to species, that is, according to a fitting object; a third is according to circumstances as according to certain accidents; a fourth according to the end as according to a habitude to the cause of goodness (a. 4).

Question IV: On the Specific Distinction Between a Good and an Evil Act

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 5 and 8; I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2; *Contra Gentiles* III, 9; *De Malo* q. 2, a. 4 and ad 10; II *Sent.*, d. 40, a. 1.

That good and evil in the physical order do not constitute a specific difference is manifest: thus a good and bad garment, a healthy and sick man, are not species of garment or of man. Hence it is asked whether in human acts goodness and malice also are a mere accidental difference, or on the contrary differ per se and essentially, and consequently according to species. Concerning this one must hold what St. Thomas first of all taught.

144. Thesis. Human acts differ in moral species according to a good or evil object. - It is proved:

a) From the fact that a human act is rational. An act has species from the object. But an act is human and moral insofar as it proceeds from deliberating reason. Therefore it has species from the object considered as it is set before reason, or by comparison to reason. But good and evil in the object differ precisely and per se insofar as they are compared to reason, insofar as the object agrees with it or is repugnant to it. Therefore a good and evil object make human acts differ in species (a. 5).

1. Let it be noted that specific distinction does not arise from differences per accidens, but from a per se difference in the object according as it is compared per se to the principle of action. "Nothing," says St. Thomas, "which is per accidens constitutes species, but only what is per se." Thus to know color and sound are acts specifically diverse according to sense, because they differ per se by comparison to sense; not so according to intellect, which attains them under one notion of object, namely being and true. Likewise to sense white and black differ in species according to sight, because they differ under the notion of color, not according to taste. But human and moral acts are such according as they are from reason; and good and evil differ per se by comparison to reason. "Whence it is manifest that good and evil diversify species in moral acts" (a. 5). Cf. *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 4.

b) From the fact that a human act is voluntary. An act has species from the object. But an act is human and moral insofar as it is voluntary. Therefore it has species from the object by comparison to the will. But the object of the will is the good or the end. Therefore a human act has species from comparison to the end. But good and evil are said per se according to relation to the end: good insofar as it expresses order to the end, evil insofar as it deprives this order. Therefore in human acts good and evil differ in species (II *Sent.*, d. 40, a. 1, ad 2; *De Malo*, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4; q. 2, a. 4, ad 10).

145. Is indifference a third species of morality? - Resp.: 1) It is certain that not all human acts are good or evil of themselves according to species, but some are indifferent. For an act has species from the object, and a human act from the object compared to reason, from which the act proceeds. Therefore if the object of itself agrees with the order of reason, the act will be good according to species, for example, to give alms; if it includes repugnance to reason, it will be evil according to species, for example, to steal. But there are objects which express nothing that pertains to the order of reason, for example, to walk, to lift a straw from the ground, to give money, etc., and then the act will be indifferent according to species.

2. Acts indifferent from their own nature do not seem to be moral. For indifference, which is midway between goodness and malice, because it is neither conformity nor difformity to the rule, is not a species of morality but the negation of it. For morality expresses a respect to the rule; but the indifferent does not express respect to the rule: for it is that about which the rule does not care, and it is the same as if the rule did not exist. In other words, morality is said in order to reason, to which it has conformity or repugnance; but the indifferent expresses nothing which pertains to the order of reason; therefore indifference exists outside morality (a. 8).

There are nevertheless some who say that it is an incomplete species of morality.

3. Among indifferent acts some are called well- or ill-sounding, whose object, although it is neither good nor evil, nevertheless inclines more toward goodness, and these acts very often have formal goodness, such as to go to church, to visit the poor, to give money, etc.; or on the contrary toward malice, and then it rather often has an attached injustice, such as to take another's thing, to place a cause from which someone's death can also follow, to use amphibological speech or restriction, etc.; and therefore the act cannot be placed unless a reason is present which renders it honorable, for example, in a case of necessity.

146. Observation.

In order that goodness, of the object or of a circumstance, be contracted, it is required that it be intended in itself and for its own sake; but in order that malice be contracted, it is enough that it be foreseen and indirectly voluntary. For right reason dictates that good is to be pursued and loved in itself because it is worthy to be desired for its own sake; consequently, one who does not intend good in itself does not will it well and rightly and laudably, and as it deserves to be intended. Therefore it is required that the good be the end intended by the agent, or the motive by which he is moved to placing the act; or, as St. Thomas says, q. 19, a. 7, ad 3: "in order that the will be good, it is required that it be of the good under the notion of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good." Therefore no one is praised because he visited the sick only for the sake of conversation, or fasted in order to spare money, because the honesty of mercy or of fasting is not formally intended.

Nevertheless one need not explicitly intend that honesty or conformity with the rule as such, but implicitly suffices, by willing the act under some honorable reason, for example, alms because it relieves the poor. On the contrary, evil must not only not be loved, but must be guarded against and avoided, even when it is not intended; and this is not done by him who foresees and does not prevent it.

Hence, in order that an act be good, it must be good from an integral cause and from every part, namely, both of object, of end, and of circumstances; but in order that an act be evil, a defect is enough either on the part of the object, or on the part of circumstances or end.

Question V: On the Specific Distinction Among Various Good or Evil Acts

Article I: On the Object

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2; a. 4, ad 3; a. 6; a. 7, ad 1; a. 10; q. 1, a. 3, ad 3; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3.

147. State of the question.

We have seen that the supreme species in morality, namely goodness and malice, arise from object, circumstance, and end; but the lowest species of moral acts must also be considered, according to which they have such a special goodness or such a special malice. Hence it is asked:

a) whether that distinction arises from the same three sources;

b) indeed, since a natural being is placed in only one species, it is doubted whether several species of morality can be found in one moral act.

To these we shall give an answer, with object, circumstances, and end considered separately.

148. Principle I. The object considered morally gives to human acts not only generic morality but also specific morality.

It is explained. The sense is: the object not only makes the essential distinction between good and evil, and constitutes the supreme species of goodness and malice in human acts, but also the lowest species by which various good or evil acts are distinguished among themselves.

It is proved: a moral act is essentially a movement toward an object considered morally, as toward a term. But every movement essentially has its lowest species from the term. Therefore every human act has its lowest moral species from the object considered morally. And therefore according as

objects express diverse agreement with reason or opposition to it, various species of good acts are distinguished (for example, love of God and of neighbor, faith and charity, fortitude and temperance), or of evil acts (for example, homicide and theft, blasphemy and detraction, lust and anger).

It is no obstacle to this doctrine 1) that a circumstance can constitute the lowest species of morality in a human act, because then it enters into the object and becomes its principal condition and, as it were, the specific difference of the human act, as will be explained more below, art. 2;

2. that a human act receives species from the end, because a) the end is the object of the will; b) as to the exterior commanded act, the end of the work is the same as the object, while the adjoined end of the one acting is a circumstance adding species, which is considered by the agent as an accessory condition of the object arriving extrinsically, insofar as the act takes place under the influence of the will, whose object is the end of the one acting (cf. art. 3).

149. Principle II. One and the same moral act can have a multiple species of morality.

It is proved: 1) This is not verified of a human act according to physical being, because a physical being is specified by a natural form which is determined to one thing and therefore is one in species; but according to moral being an act is specified by an object apprehended by reason, which is not determined to one thing, but under a diverse consideration can be referred to diverse species according to supervening moral conditions, whether the species are per se subordinated to one another, or are disparate, as if theft is ordered to drunkenness (a. 7, ad 1). Thus to take what belongs to another from a sacred place includes a diverse specific repugnance to the order of reason, which dictates that injury is not to be done to a sacred place; and yet one object remains, but one composed of several things.

2. Moral being accedes as a quality to physical being itself, and therefore just as one physical thing can be of diverse species of perfection or defect according to accidents, for example the same man white and musical, blind and deaf, so one physical act can pertain to several moral species. Hence nothing prevents the same act from being in diverse species of virtue or sin.

150. Principle III. One and the same moral act cannot nevertheless be both good and evil at the same time and in the same respect.

It is proved: for an act to be simply good, goodness from every part is required; for it to be simply evil, malice from any part suffices. Therefore.

And nevertheless an act evil from one part is not therefore deprived of all goodness proceeding from other sources: thus an act good according to species can be evil because of a circumstance, or an act good according to species and circumstances can be ordered to an evil end, because, as St. Thomas says, "when the posterior has been removed, the prior nevertheless remains," I *Sent.*, d. 41, q. 1, a. 2 (cf. I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3). The exception is if the act is done from the sole or total cause of evil, because then no goodness is intended or contracted, but the act is considered as a mere means of evil, insofar as the object is considered as wholly evil.

Article II: On Circumstances

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 10 and 11; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 6-8.

151. A moral circumstance is an accident of a human act morally affecting it once it has already been constituted in its moral being.

For this a threefold condition is required:

1. that the act already be constituted in moral being, that is, have morality from the object independently of circumstances: for an accident supposes a substance. Thus, with respect to theft, it is not a circumstance that the thing belongs to another, but that it is notable; similarly, an act indifferent from the object has its first specific morality from a circumstance first and principally intended, which therefore becomes the object because it is intended first and per se under the notion of good or evil;

2. that the circumstance be outside the substance of the act and affect it, and therefore that it not destroy or essentially change the substantial moral being which the act has from the object, as if someone does a good act solely for an evil end: for then it would not be an accident, but would pass over into the substance and object;

3. that the circumstance attain the act according to moral being, by increasing or diminishing goodness or malice: thus that someone steals with the right hand or the left hand is a physical and indifferent circumstance; but that the thing be precious or cheap is a moral circumstance.

Now by reason of influence upon morality, some circumstances change the species, others only aggravate or diminish within the same species.

1. Several authors teach that circumstances truly and properly diminishing moral good or evil are not given; but in this there is only a different mode of speaking.

152. Principles. I. Moral circumstances changing the species are those which add to the act a goodness or malice diverse in species from that which the act has from the object, because according to themselves, separately and independently from the morality which proceeds from the object, they imply some agreement or repugnance with right reason, or a special and distinct conformity or difformity with the rules of morals: thus when someone gives alms in order to satisfy for sin, or steals a sacred thing, the circumstance of end expresses a special conformity with reason and the circumstance of the sacred expresses a special difformity. These circumstances do not remain in the notion of circumstance, but rather are considered as the principal condition of the object (or as a partial object), and become as it were the specific difference of this object: the genus is to take another's property or to give alms; the species is to take a sacred thing, to give satisfactory alms.

II. Moral circumstances only aggravating or diminishing within the same species are those which do not imply something per se agreeing with or repugnant to reason, and according to themselves express no order to the rules of morals, but only by reason of a prior circumstance or condition of the object have the morality which they suppose and only modify it, such as more and less, much and little, intensely and remissly. Thus to take much or little of itself does not express goodness or malice, but to take much or little of another's property does.

Among these some are:

1. Notably aggravating or diminishing. Such are:

a) in quantitative matter, which consists in number, weight, measure, those which, taken separately and separated from the act, suffice for mortal sin, for example, if someone beyond 100 gold coins steals another 100, or steals a gilt watch which he thinks is gold, it will be a circumstance notably aggravating the theft; on the contrary, if he steals a gold watch which he thinks is silver, it is a circumstance notably diminishing;

b) in other matters (duration, intensity, execution), those which notably exceed the ordinary mode of acting well or badly in these matters, for example, if someone perseveres in hatred for a year, or the whole night with a woman in shameless acts; or only for some instant consents to her. Sometimes they so notably increase or diminish that they render a sin from venial mortal, or from mortal venial, and thus are said to aggravate or diminish infinitely, for example, the circumstance of grave harm for one's neighbor from a slight theft, or the circumstance of half-full deliberation in blasphemy, imprecation, shameful delight.

2. Others are slightly aggravating or diminishing, such as:

a) in quantitative matter, those which, taken separately, do not suffice for mortal sin, as if someone instead of 100 francs steals either 101 or 99;

b) in other matters, those which do not much exceed the ordinary mode of acting, as if someone, angry after a quarrel, remains somewhat in hatred.

153. Practical rules follow from the aforesaid:

1. An act indifferent from the object can become good or evil from circumstances: thus to eat temperately to restore one's strength is good; to do this with excess is evil; then the circumstance passes over into the notion of object because it is first and per se intended under the notion of good or evil.

2. An act good from the object is rendered evil by circumstances, gravely or lightly, according to the degree of malice which is in them, for example, commerce in a sacred place, servile labor on the Lord's Day, marriage with a person bound by a vow of chastity. Then the circumstance becomes the principal condition or part of the object.

3. An act good or evil from the object can receive a new species of goodness or malice from circumstances, for example, one who keeps chastity from a vow contracts the goodness of chastity and of religion; one who steals a sacred thing contracts the malice of theft and sacrilege. This circumstance also becomes a condition of the object.

4. An act good or evil from the object can acquire or lose from circumstances some greater degree of goodness or malice, for example, a poor man giving alms, a man outstanding in learning who places himself after others; a priest sinning, a rich man giving alms as though compelled, a poor man committing theft. Such remain mere circumstances.

154. Observation.

From circumstances properly so called, which affect the act, there differ internal or external actions which sometimes are done during the principal action and only accompany it, without influence upon it. These are truly distinct acts, which can be evil, but do not affect the goodness of the principal action. Thus if care of the sick, communion, or hearing Mass is done also on account of sensible affection for the sick person, vainglory, curiosity, it will be an evil circumstance; on the contrary, if they are done with a movement of impatience, affection toward venial sin, distractions, these will only be evils which accompany them.

Article III: On the End

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 6-9; q. 19, a. 7 and 10; q. 20, a. 1, 3 and 6; *Contra Gentiles* III, 26; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 and 11, and a. 3; II *Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 4.

Let the notions concerning ends handed down above, nn. 9 and 10, be recalled.

155. Principle I. Human acts have species of goodness or malice from the end.

It is proved: a human act has species from the object. But a human act is twofold: the interior act of the will, whose proper object is good or the end, and the exterior act, whose object is that about which it is concerned. Those two acts, because they express order to one thing, are one moral act, in which the interior act is the formal element because the will determines the exterior members to acting, and because the exterior act is not voluntary and human except dependently upon the will; hence it is the material element. Therefore they have one and the same goodness or malice, and therefore:

1. the interior act has its principal species and morality from the end and participates in the morality of the exterior object;

2. on the contrary, the exterior act has species and morality from its own object and participates in the morality of the end;

3. the completed act is considered chiefly and formally according to the intended end, materially and secondarily according to the object of the exterior act; hence one who steals in order to commit adultery is more an adulterer than a thief.

Therefore 1) one physical act a) can have, according to moral being, two or more species of goodness or malice, or be multiple in species according to moral being, if it has an object and an end, or even ends of diverse species subordinated to one another, as if someone steals in order to fornicate and this in order to extort a secret; on the contrary, b) if the end is of the same species as the object, goodness or malice is only increased in the same species, as if someone steals one person's key in order to steal another person's gold.

Indeed 2) one physical act, as it seems, can be multiple in number according to moral being: a) if it is done for several ends, not indeed subordinated but equally principal, disparate and independent, for example, alms for mercy and in order to please a friend, a gift for vainglory and for fornication. For there are as many acts distinct in number as there are independent ends, because an act having several total objects is virtually and according to moral being multiple; in other words, there are morally as many acts as there are objects distinct or total according to moral being. Also b) it can be

good and evil under a diverse respect, not only successively through a change of the moral object, as the eating of meat begun before Friday and continued after it, but also simultaneously, if someone acts for a good and an evil end that are disparate and equally principal, because then the evil end does not affect the good, nor conversely. Thus, for example, alms given to relieve misery and at the same time for vainglory.

1. Let this not be thought impossible, on the ground that if there are several objects, the acts also will be physically several. For by one physical act the will can will diverse things not only subordinately, but also things independent of one another or merely coordinate; indeed it can simultaneously will good or the ordination of reason in one thing and evil or the violation of order in another thing, as if someone wills to extinguish a fire in order to save a child and in order to steal. Then, namely, he intends several things on account of one thing, namely, good in common or happiness in the abstract, and thus tends to something physically one, and so by one physical movement of tendency he can tend simultaneously to several morally diverse objects. This seems to follow from the principles of St. Thomas, a. 4, ad 3, and II Sent. d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4; but it is a rare case to which the holy Doctor did not explicitly attend. - Others say that in the case there are two physical acts of the will, and among the ends one is always more principally intended; whence one act of the will intends the principal end to which the external act is ordered, while another act of the will intending the secondary end merely accompanies the execution of the work.

156. Practical rules follow from this:

1. An act good from the object, referred to a good end, has a double goodness if both are intended, as if someone wills to relieve a poor man and does this for penance; if the goodness of the object is not intended, it has only the goodness of the end, because then the object is considered as only a means to the end, for example, if someone abstains from wine, not on account of the good of abstinence, about which he does not care at all, but solely in order to preserve continence more easily.

1. Hence care must be taken concerning intention, so that moral perfection may be increased.

2. An act evil from the object, referred to an evil end, has a double malice of object and end, for example, theft for fornication.

3. An act otherwise good according to itself and from the object, referred to an evil end which is the total and adequate reason why it is chosen, is good from no part but wholly evil, for example, if someone gives alms solely for fornication or in order to turn a poor man away from religion.

It is proved: a) from the Scriptures, Mt. VI, 2, 5, 22-23; Prov. XXI, 27; b) from the general principle: Goodness is not contracted unless it is intended and the agent is moved by it (n. 146). But in the present case the object is intended not as good in itself but as a means to an evil end: for it is not apprehended except as something evil, and consequently insofar as it is the object of this act it is not good but evil. Namely, the object communicates no goodness to the act, but only the intended end passes over into the notion of object. - In other words: to will good under the notion of evil is not

good but evil; but he who acts solely on account of an evil end does not will goodness except under the notion of evil; therefore the act is totally evil.

4. An act good of itself or from the object, which is referred to an evil but partial end, so that this is not the only reason for acting, is evil from the end but good from the object, even if the end is mortally evil, for example, if someone intended to give alms for mercy and also to honor an idol; in practice, however, it almost never happens that a mortally evil act has a good end sufficiently disparate.

It is proved: an act is good from the object if goodness is intended in itself and on account of itself, and that intention is not vitiated. But in the case the goodness of the object is intended in itself and on account of itself, for the act is not done solely on account of the evil end; and on the other side that intention is not vitiated, because the good end is not sought on account of the evil end, to which it is not subordinated, nor is the evil intended on account of the good end. Therefore the act is good from the object. In other words: two independent and equally principal ends are intended, the intrinsic end of the object and the extrinsic end of the one acting, and therefore one physically single act is a twofold moral act.

5. An act evil from the object or circumstance, referred to a good end, remains evil, because an evil means is not proportioned to a good end, and the goodness of the end does not prevent there being a defect in the object and the means being evil, and the will appetizing evil; hence St. Paul, concerning those who slanderously charge us with the contrary, says: "And not (as we are slandered, and as some affirm that we say), let us do evil that there may come good: whose damnation is just" (Rom. III, 8; cf. Eccli. XXXIV, 23-24).

Nevertheless: a) It is less evil, 1) than an evil act ordered to an evil end, and indeed so much less as the good end is better, because the affection toward malice is so much less; also 2) than a good act exercised solely on account of an evil end, because then the goodness of the act is corrupted; but to corrupt good is worse than to order evil to good.

b) The very intention of the good end is good, if this is intended absolutely and on account of itself, to be obtained indeterminately by some means; and therefore at times it was rewarded by God (Exod. I, 20, 21). But it is evil if the end is intended not absolutely but precisely as moving to an evil means, or as to be obtained by an evil and no other means, because then the end is intended not as good in itself but as a cause moving to evil.

6. An act indifferent from the object and circumstances becomes good or evil from the end, which then passes over into the notion of object, which gives the first morality: thus to sing for the praise of God or for lust.

157. Observation.

A partial end can be related to an action in three ways:

a) it can merely precede it, so that it does not influence the action afterward to be placed, but rather is its occasion, as if someone from human respect approaches the sacred rite, which afterward he attends with due intention: this occasional end does not vitiate the action;

b) it can accompany it, so that together with another good end it is the cause of the action, as if someone plays the organ to praise God and for vainglory: this vitiates the action in part;

c) it can follow, if, after the action has already been begun from a good end, an evil end enters in, as if someone begins to sing for the praise of God and afterward something of ostentation also creeps in: this end likewise vitiates the action in part, supposing that it truly becomes the end of the action which is then continued on account of the good and evil end together; otherwise, during the good action, another evil act is placed, for example, of ostentation or vainglory, because this is not a circumstance of the prior action but merely accompanies it (n. 154; q. 19, a. 7, ad 2).

158. Principle II. In order that an act be not evil but good, it is required that it be done for a due honorable end.

It is proved: man acting deliberately, in his human acts, ought to act as man, that is, according to the requirement and dignity of his nature as a rational being insofar as he is distinguished from brutes. But man differs from brutes a) in this, that he positively acts for an end as an end; and indeed b) for the end proper to himself, that is, for the good fitting to his nature, or the honorable. Therefore in all human acts he ought positively to intend an end, and indeed an honorable end. Hence:

1. Idle acts are evil (Mt. XII, 36), which are not so called because they have an evil end, but because they do not have a due end: for an idle person is one who does useless things which he ought not to do while he could, or even ought to, do other useful things. Acts placed solely because it pleases (or does not please) to act in this way are idle, as are acts omitted because they are not commanded; for they lack a good end. They are not idle but good if they are done for a good end, for example, for relief or moderate recreation.

2. Acts which are done solely on account of a useful good, resting in it, are evil, because it is not an end, since it is not appetible on account of itself but only on account of another; hence it is illicit to seek money or honor for its own sake.

3. Acts which are done principally on account of delectable good are evil. For God attached the chief delights as an effect to certain necessary or useful operations, on account of those operations themselves, lest man abstain from operating, but rather so that he would be enticed to operating; and other secondary delights as a better means for the understanding of things, the relief of weariness of the mind, and refreshment and recreation in rational life. Hence delights are intrinsically ordered to the placing of a work. Therefore it is not licit to intend delight as the principal end, but as secondary and subordinated, namely, on account of the honorable good either of the operation or of recreation: not indeed as a mere means for obtaining it, but as its effect on account of the cause, or as a help for placing the work more securely, pleasantly, and easily. In other words, to seek an operation for the sake of delight is to invert the due order of things. Hence theologians after St. Augustine say: it is not licit to enjoy what is to be used or to use what is to be enjoyed.

1. *Contra Gentiles* III, c. 26, n. 7.

4. A fortiori, acts which are done solely on account of delight, resting in it, are evil, both because delectable good ought to be appetized on account of the honorable end, as was said under 3),

and because animals act for delight alone, resting in it: but man in all things ought to follow the rule of reason, and therefore seek delight insofar as reason dictates that it is proportioned and fitting to his nature, and thus it already becomes an honorable good. Therefore to seek delight for its own sake is to pervert the order.

Whence propositions 8 and 9 were condemned by Innocent XI:

1. "To eat and drink even to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health; because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts."

2. "The conjugal act exercised for pleasure alone altogether lacks every fault and venial defect."

Hence:

a) Acts which are done on account of any delight whatever are evil, if another end is excluded.

b) Acts which procure sensible delight are of themselves indifferent, and therefore are evil if they are not referred at least implicitly to honorable good; otherwise, namely, the lower powers, because from their nature they do not tend to honorable good but to delight alone, do not serve the higher powers, but on the contrary reason and will serve lower delight, which is an inversion of order.

c) On the contrary, they are good if from the circumstances or from the custom of acting the honorable end of necessity or utility is sufficiently known, and this is at least implicitly intended: thus one who, without explicitly thinking, at the ordinary hour goes to the place of recreation.

d) A fortiori, acts which procure spiritual delight from an honorable good are good: for this by its nature is connected with honorable good, which therefore is implicitly intended.

The aforesaid evil acts, by which the due end is excluded only in affection or affectively, of themselves are only lightly evil, because the disordered use of a thing not illicit is not a grave disorder. If, however, someone also effectively wished to impede the due end, it could be grave.

159. Principle III. The due intermediate end or ultimate end in a certain respect is any honorable good whatever, because this is conformed to rational nature; but the due simply ultimate end is the supreme Good or God. Hence:

1. In order that an act be good, we cannot positively exclude God, whether explicitly, or implicitly by loving a creature above all things or preferring it to God.

2. But we ought not in every act tend expressly to God; it suffices implicitly, insofar as every participated honorable good from its nature is ordered and tends to the supreme good (cf. propositions 16 and 38 of Baius condemned).

3. Sometimes, however, there is a precept of explicitly tending (or converting oneself) to God through charity; but he who loves God above all things by that very fact refers implicitly to God all things which can be referred to him.

1. Cf. I-II, q. 19, a. 9 and 10; q. 21, a. 4; q. 100, a. 10, ad 2.

But if a sinner omits this, he sins by omission at the moment when the precept urges; yet other works which are done at this moment or afterward will not therefore be sinful, because the omission is not a true circumstance influencing and affecting those works themselves, but only merely accompanies them, unless nevertheless they were its occasion. Otherwise it would have to be said that all the works of infidels are sins; likewise works performed with a view to eternal reward or done from fear of hell would be evil, which has been condemned by the Church.

Prop. 16 of Hus; prop. 22, 35, 38, 40 of Baius; prop. 15 condemned by Alexander VIII; prop. 45 and 59 of Quesnel; prop. 23 of Pistoia; Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 31; sess. 14, c. 4.

4. There is no other precept of explicitly referring all works, or even each single work, to God. But the words of the Apostle (I Cor. X, 31) can be understood either of counsel; or negatively, of the obligation of doing nothing against the glory of God, and of doing nothing which is not referable to God; in other words, of doing nothing except honorable works which are implicitly referred to God; or positively, of an act of charity which implicitly orders the whole following life to God as to the ultimate end.

Yet it should be noted that not all things can be referred to God even by one who has charity: namely, acts which are not proportioned to the glory of God, such as venial sins, and many indifferent acts, for example, walking, eating, etc.; these of themselves are not proportioned to the end of God's glory and of themselves conduce nothing to God's honor, and therefore, that they may be done on account of God, they must first be referred to an honorable end proportioned to them, for example, to health, to sustenance, etc.

160. Are there indifferent acts? - From the aforesaid it follows that no indifferent acts are given, if acts are considered not in the abstract, on the part of the object only and according to species alone, but in the concrete or in the individual, that is, on the part of the thing with all circumstances. For man acting deliberately either acts in due circumstances for a due honorable end indicated by reason and fitting to nature, and then the act is good; or he does not act in due circumstances, or at least does not act for a due honorable end indicated by reason, and then the act is evil. To act for an indifferent end would be an idle act; but neither is an indifferent end given in the concrete, because an end is a good, and this is either a true good, or only according to appearance, and then it is evil.

It is said: man acting deliberately. For many acts are placed from imagination alone, such as rubbing the beard, moving the foot or the hand, etc.; and such acts are not properly human, good or evil, but are indifferent and exist outside the genus of morality.

161. Corollaries.

From the aforesaid it is understood that one should not admit:

1. The opinion of the Scotists, who say that it is illicit to act on account of delight alone when the act from itself, by its intrinsic end, is ordered to something other than pleasure, such as eating, drinking, the conjugal act; but that it is not illicit when delight is the end which the act by its nature intends, for example, the recreation of the ears in music, of the eyes in the vision of beauty, of the nostrils in the smell of a flower: these acts, namely, according to them, are

indifferent in the individual. But we have seen that there are no indifferent acts in the individual.

2. Nor the opinion of Ballerini, whom several Jesuits follow (Genicot, Noldin, Vermeersch), saying that acts exercised on account of the end of delight are morally good even if the will does not intend another honorable end, provided it does not positively exclude the end, nor is there anything disordered in the action itself. But this opinion is too benign. For that man may act as man, it is not enough for him to avoid evil, but it is also required that he will and do the good fitting to his nature, namely, the honorable, which is impossible unless he positively intend it. For a) on one side, good is not contracted unless it is positively intended for its own sake; but the sensitive appetite of itself does not tend to honorable good but to the delectable good alone; therefore the delight of the sensitive appetite will not be good unless it is positively intended on account of honorable good. Otherwise in the concrete it will be evil, as sought without a due end. b) On the other side, to avoid evil is not a positively honorable end, because between the objectively evil and the objectively good there stands the objectively indifferent; therefore it is not enough to will to avoid objective evil in order that the act be objectively good, but a positively honorable end must be intended. Otherwise the act in the concrete will be idle and evil, as lacking the due circumstance of a right end. c) Innocent XI condemned eating or the conjugal action as illicit when done for pleasure alone. And if the Scotists can explain the condemnation of the propositions by Innocent XI by saying that eating, drinking, the conjugal act are not ordered by an intrinsic end to pleasure, Ballerini cannot explain it except by turning the words away from their obvious sense and saying that the positive exclusion of an honorable end is prohibited, not negative exclusion.

Therefore, in order that an act exercised on account of sensible delight be good, it is not enough that it not be disordered in itself, nor that in fact it be fitting to rational nature; it is also required that as such it be known in some way by the agent, and at least implicitly intended as such.

3. On the contrary, some have spoken excessively, saying that a good act requires that someone will the good formally as honorable, or even act from a general intention of living rightly and always acting according to reason. For it suffices that someone in some way intend the good which is honorable and is known as such, without willing it precisely and expressly because it is honorable; and thus he already implicitly tends to the ultimate end.

4. A fortiori the Jansenists and Augustinians erred, such as Noris and Berti, requiring that a good act be referred explicitly to God, the ultimate end.

Practically the opinion of St. Thomas does not differ much from the more recent opinion of Ballerini and his followers, for when someone, in seeking delight, wills to act moderately and admits nothing disordered, ordinarily he not only does not positively exclude the honorable end, but could scarcely fail to include it implicitly. Indeed this opinion is more benign than Scotus's opinion, for the acts which the Scotists consider indifferent, according to us, very easily become good, since in them agreement with rational nature, namely, a good disposition of mind, is easily perceived.

Section B: On the Morality of Human Acts in Species

Question I: On the Goodness and Malice of the Interior Act

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19.

162. Principle I. The goodness and malice of the interior act properly and per se depends upon its object. For moral good and evil are per se and properly differences of an act of the will as moral, just as truth and falsity are differences of reason, because good per se pertains to the will as truth pertains to reason. Hence the will morally good and evil differ according to moral species. But an act properly and per se has moral species from the object proposed by reason, as was proved. Therefore goodness and malice in acts of the will properly and per se depend upon the object.

163. Principle II. The goodness and malice of the interior act depends upon the object alone.

Thus St. Thomas, whom Fr. Lehu explains almost as follows, *Phil. Mor. et Soc.* I, n. 182: "The sense is not that circumstances and the end are altogether irrelevant to the morality of interior acts, which would be altogether false... (for the circumstances of intensity or duration have value for the increase of goodness and malice, q. 20, a. 4)... Thus therefore it must be understood...: The interior act receives morality immediately only from the object, that is, from the willed thing; and in this the interior act differs both from the exterior act and from the human act considered in its integrity, which receive their morality from object, circumstances, and end as from three disparate and independent sources; whence there can be an exterior act good from the object and evil from circumstances or end. But there cannot be an interior act good from the object and evil from a circumstance: 'supposing that the will is of the good, no circumstance can make it evil' (q. 19, a. 2, ad 2)... For, 'when it is said that someone wills some good when he ought not or where he ought not, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that this circumstance is referred to the willed thing. And thus the will is not of the good: because to will to do something when it ought not to be done is not to will the good. In another way, so that it is referred to the act of willing; and thus it is impossible that someone will the good when he ought not, because man always ought to will the good; unless perhaps per accidens insofar as someone, by willing this good, is impeded from then willing some due good. And then evil does not arise from this, that someone wills that good, but from this, that he does not will another good. And similarly one must speak of the other circumstances.'

"Therefore an evil circumstance will make the willed thing evil, that is, the object of the will, and only by means of the object will it render the interior act evil, which does not happen in the exterior act. Therefore we assert: the morality of an elicited act depends immediately upon the object alone."

It is proved: the principle in each genus is something one and simple. But the principle of the goodness and malice of all human acts is from the act of the will, and this of itself has goodness from the object, as was said in the preceding number. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will is attended to according to the object alone and not from the accidents of circumstances.

1. The foundation of the argument is: the principle in each genus is per se, not per accidens, for everything which is per accidens is reduced to that which is per se as to a principle.

Therefore, since the end is the object of the will, in acts of the will the goodness which is from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, except per accidens, if it happens that an end depends upon an end and a will upon a will (a. 2, ad 1), for example, if someone by one act wills medicine for health and health for the good of the republic, or if by a twofold act he wills adultery because he wills theft.

164. Corollary I. - The goodness and malice of the interior act, because it depends upon its object, therefore also depends upon those things upon which the goodness of the object depends:

1. Upon reason, because the object is proposed to the will through reason, which apprehends it as a good proportioned to the will; hence the proposing reason is the measure of the goodness of the will.

2. Upon the eternal law: for every effect depends more upon the first cause than upon the second cause, which does not act except through the power of the first cause. But that human reason shows us what is good and thus is the rule of our will, it has from the eternal law or divine reason, of which there is a participation in the created mind. Therefore the goodness of the will depends much more upon the eternal law than upon human reason.

Hence a twofold rule of human acts is distinguished: the first, fundamental and extrinsic, namely, divine reason by which God from eternity contemplates in his essence the order to be observed by creatures, namely, the essential relations of natures both to God their end and to one another; and the secondary, relative and intrinsic, namely, practical human reason insofar as it dictates that this order is to be observed. The first rule is objective and altogether remote; the other is twofold: for reason can be considered:

a) objectively, insofar as it is common to all men, and is a habitual light which is born to dictate in a universal mode which acts in general are good and which are evil (for example, it is good to praise God, evil to fornicate), and indeed is born to dictate the same thing in all and generally does dictate the same thing: thus it is law or the cognition of law;

b) subjectively, it can be considered insofar as it is proper to each one, and is the act by which someone judges in particular that such an act to be placed here and now in the individual is conformed or difform to law: it is the application of law to particular acts, which is called conscience and often varies in various men.

Reason considered objectively, although it is a nearer rule than the eternal law, nevertheless is more remote in relation to conscience, which is the altogether proximate and immediate rule.

165. Corollary II. - The goodness and malice of the interior act, because it depends upon the end or good, therefore depends upon all those things upon which the goodness of the end depends, namely, upon the ultimate end and upon the divine will.

It is proved: that which is first in each genus is the measure of the others of that genus. But the ultimate end of the human will, which it ought first to intend, is the Supreme Good, which first and per se is the proper object of the divine will. Therefore in order that the human will be right or conformed to the measure, it ought (at least implicitly) to tend to the Supreme Good and thus to be conformed to the divine will.

166. On the way in which our will ought to be conformed to the divine will. - Our will can be conformed to the divine will both negatively, by not contradicting it, and positively, by willing the same thing as it; moreover a threefold willed object is distinguished: the material willed object, or that which we will, for example, the life of one's father; the formal willed object, or the reason, end, motive on account of which we will, and indeed the particular or proximate motive, for example, because the father is good and necessary to the family; the formal willed object or ultimate and universal motive, that is, the glory of God.

Now 1) we are bound in all things to be conformed to the divine will negatively, that is, we can never disapprove the things which God wills (or murmur against them), because he is the supreme Lord who disposes all things wisely; 2) we are bound to be positively conformed to him in the ultimate formal willed object, for God wills all things for the sake of himself and his glory, to which the human will ought at least implicitly to refer all acts (n. 159, 2), as we do when we tend to good under the notion of good (a. 10, ad 1); 3) generally we are not bound to be positively conformed to him in the material willed object and the proximate formal willed object: for the same thing under a diverse respect can be good or evil, for example, the death of a robber considered by a judge or by his wife; but God considers things under universal reasons, that is, in order to the common good and to his glory (for example, damnation, death, disease, hunger of one's father), while a private man is not bound to attend to this but can consider things under particular reasons (that is, in order to a particular good), under which they can be evil; therefore he can will things opposed to what God wills, for example, the life of a father who is about to die, but under a diverse reason. And yet there is no opposition of wills, because we will diverse things but not according to the same reason (ad 3); 4) we are bound to be conformed to him in the material willed object, if God sometimes commands or prohibits something, because then God wills us to will that thing, that is, he wills to oblige us to this willing.

Hence a) we do not have to will positively virginity or other things which God only counsels, but it suffices negatively that we regard them as good and do not disapprove them; b) we cannot will the things which God only permits, for example, sins, but we can will their permission, and we are bound not to disapprove it; c) we can conform our will, even in the material willed object, to the divine will, which is most right, provided we will it for the same reason; indeed from a better motive we act best thus; d) God wills many things by antecedent and conditioned will or by preceptive will (for example, the salvation of one about to be damned, the life of a father about to die), which nevertheless he does not will by consequent or efficacious will; indeed thus he wills the opposite. Hence sometimes we are bound to will the opposite of that which God wills by efficacious will; indeed we are bound to strive to obtain it, because God wills us to will and procure it. Yet once the fact has been posited, we are bound not to contradict the will of God nor disapprove it.

167. Observation.

We can be conformed to the divine will in two ways: according to the notion of final cause, by willing under the same notion of divine good, and according to the notion of efficient cause, by willing that which God wills us to will. "As to both, in some way the human will is conformed to the divine will: because according as it is conformed to the divine will in the common notion of the thing willed (formally), it is conformed to it in the ultimate end; according as it is not conformed to it in the thing willed materially, it is conformed to it according to the notion of efficient cause; because a thing has

from God as from an effective cause this proper inclination... or particular apprehension of this thing" (a. 10).

Question II: On the Goodness and Malice of the Exterior Act

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 20, a. 1-4 and 6; q. 19, a. 8.

168. Principle I. The external act can have a twofold goodness and malice, namely:

1. one subjective and formal, which it has immediately from the end of the agent; and this is prior in the internal act of the will, and from it is derived into the exterior act, and depends wholly upon the will.

2. Another objective and material, which it has immediately from the due object and due circumstances; and this is more from reason than from the will, since on the contrary the goodness of the will depends upon it according as the will is borne toward it as toward an object. Hence in the ordination of reason and intention, objective goodness is prior to the goodness of the will; but in the execution of the work the goodness of the will is prior (a. 1 and 2). Hence sometimes the interior and exterior act are in the same species of goodness or malice; sometimes in a diverse species, and then each, just as the completed act itself composed of both, contracts a double species (a. 3), as was said in n. 155.

Therefore, in order that the external act be simply good, formal goodness from the intention of the end and from the will is not sufficient, but there also can be no defect in the external act on the part of the object and circumstances: for good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatever (a. 2).

169. Principle II. The external act per se, that is, insofar as it is the mere execution of an efficacious internal act, does not superadd to it formal and simply so-called goodness or malice (a. 4).

It is proved: a) from Scripture, which reckons the sincere will as the deed, Gen. XXII, 16; Mt. V, 28.

b) By reason: liberty is the foundation of morality; hence goodness and malice formally are only where there is liberty. But the interior act of the will alone is of itself intrinsically and formally free; the exterior act is not free except from an extrinsic cause and by an analogical denomination: for it is not voluntary except by the voluntariness of the internal act whose effect it is. Therefore formal goodness and malice are not per se in the exterior act, but this is good or evil in this way only by the goodness or malice of the interior act.

1. Understand analogy not of mere attribution (*secundum dici*), which is had by metaphor alone, but of proportionality through real participation (*secundum esse*), as is clear from the examples (a. 3, ad 3).

It was said:

1. Per se, for per accidens or by reason of another it adds accidental goodness or malice, both by reason of the interior act, insofar as the exterior act is often the occasion why the interior act is multiplied, exercised more intensely, continued longer; and by reason of effects, insofar as a

special grace, value, or privilege is connected with it, such as grace given by a sacrament, an aureole by martyrdom, an indulgence by a pious work, or evils and inconveniences follow from it, for example, the burden of restitution, censure, irregularity. Hence:

a) When the will is prepared to operate if it could, and does not operate solely because it cannot or because it does not have the occasion of operating, the will without the external act is as good or evil as with it, because the absence of the external act is simply involuntary; whence it simply and essentially merits the same praise or punishment.

b) One who gives alms, fasts, or afflicts the body does not merit more than one who has the efficacious will of doing this; nevertheless he satisfies more, because satisfactory value depends also upon the exterior work insofar as it is penal, that is, upon the penalty insofar as it is actually inflicted.

2. Insofar as it is the execution of the interior act, and not insofar as it is its object: for thus it communicates its objective goodness (if it has any) to the will which intends it, and so formal goodness is already had. But supposing that it is the object of the will, the external execution itself does not add.

3. Formal goodness or malice; for the exterior act, insofar as it perfects and consummates the goodness or malice of the will, adds material goodness or malice and goodness or malice in a certain respect: for although it does not increase formal goodness or malice, nevertheless it extends that same goodness or malice to the exterior act and so perfects it; hence it merits accidental reward or punishment.

4. Efficacious, that is, which of itself suffices for placing the external act and would operate it, if it could. For if it were inefficacious for this, it would not be a proportionate means for obtaining the external act and its effect: thus the will to convert the whole world, to feed all the poor, to free all the souls of purgatory, although it is very good because it participates in something of the goodness of the external act which is its object, nevertheless does not have the same goodness as the work itself, because a single act of the will is not able to effect it (q. 19, a. 8).

170. It is objected:

The interior and exterior act are two moral acts; therefore there is more morality. Resp. St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 8: "Quantity added to quantity signifies something greater, where both are called quantity according to the same account. But where one is the reason why the other is a quantity, this is not necessary. Thus if wood is long, a line will be long, nor is it necessary that the wood with the line be longer than the line, because the line is the reason of length in the wood: similarly also it was said that the external act has the notion of fault from the act of the will."

171. Observation.

The external act is rightly said and truly is good and evil, because it is conformed or difform to reason and at the same time voluntary; it also has formal goodness or malice, not indeed its own, but derived from the interior act. For with that it constitutes one moral act, to which it concurs as the material element (n. 155). Whence also in confession not only evil wills or intentions are to be

declared, but also external acts: for sins must be confessed not only according to distinct species, but entire, such as in fact they were perpetrated, namely, perfect and consummated. In other words, the whole evil must be said (which is truly evil), even if only participatively and analogically it is evil (cf. treatise on Sins).

Question III: On the Goodness and Malice of the External Effect

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 20, a. 5; q. 73, a. 8; q. 77, a. 7; II-II, q. 64, a. 7 and 8; q. 79, a. 3, ad 3; q. 150, a. 4; *Quodlibet* IX, 15.

In human acts the external effect merits an altogether special consideration, from which, according as it is good or evil, morality can depend, especially in an exterior act. For the doctrine concerning the morality of the effect is of very great moment in practice and is as it were the key by which several difficult cases must be solved, such as concerning cooperation, scandal, damage, etc. Now concerning this matter the following principles have force.

172. Principles concerning the morality of the external effect.

I. A good or evil effect directly and in itself voluntary is imputed to the agent either unto goodness or unto malice, whence it increases the goodness of an act otherwise good, and the malice of an act otherwise evil; but if a good effect is joined to an evil act, it does not remove the malice of the act, although it can diminish it.

II. A good effect willed only in the cause or indirectly is not imputed unto goodness, because good is not done rightly, as right reason dictates and as it deserves to be done, unless it is willed on account of itself; hence goodness is not contracted unless it is intended in itself (n. 146).

III. An evil effect willed in the cause or indirectly is imputed to the agent unto malice, if three conditions are verified:

1. if it was foreseen in some way, at least in confusion: nothing is willed unless foreknown;

2. if it could have been impeded, insofar as the cause could have been not placed, or once placed could have been removed: for the effect is not more voluntary than the cause;

3. if it also ought to have been impeded, that is, if there was present an obligation of avoiding the effect, or of not placing the cause, or of removing the cause lest the effect follow (nn. 60 and 63).

One can be bound to impede an evil effect either from office, for example, parents or a teacher to ward off wicked companions from children entrusted to them, lest they be depraved; or from justice, as a guardian or administrator concerning things or affairs entrusted to him; or from religion, that divine honor be provided for; or from every virtue, lest an effect directly contrary to it be produced; or from charity, which, for example, demands that you cry out lest another unknowingly fall into danger of life. On the contrary, if you do not take necessary care of your health, it will not therefore be imputed to you that on some day you cannot fast, just as neither that you experienced pollution because you ate meat on a forbidden day: for these things are not to be avoided precisely lest such an effect follow.

173. Principle concerning the licit mode of causing an evil effect. - Each virtue generally obliges one to avoid the cause which produces an evil effect opposed to it, for example, harm to a third party, scandal, dishonorable movements; yet not always. It is licit to place a cause which produces at the same time a good and an evil effect, if the good effect follows at least as immediately from the cause as the evil, or not by means of the evil, and there is a proportionately grave reason, with two other things always necessary presupposed, namely, an action licit in itself and a right intention of the agent.

Therefore four things are required: a) two on the part of the effect, so that the evil effect is not imputed; namely:

1. that the good effect follow at least as immediately from the cause as the evil, or not by means of the evil effect; otherwise the latter would be the means for obtaining the good effect, although evil things are not to be done that good things may come (n. 156, 5): hence it is illicit to lie in order to save a man, to procure abortion in order to avoid infamy, or to kill the fetus in order to save the life of the mother, to steal money in order to give alms, etc.

2. That there be a reason for placing the cause, and indeed a proportionately grave one, that is, that the good procured surpass or equal the evil: for reason dictates that a lesser good is not to be procured by an act from which a greater evil follows; on the contrary, if the good compensates the evil, no reason now appears why the evil ought to be avoided: thus it is not licit to kill an invader in order to preserve goods of lesser price; it is licit in order to preserve life. Hence the greater the malice of the effect, the greater must be the excusing reason; and it is always required that the good effect cannot suitably be obtained otherwise, for otherwise there would no longer be a reason for bringing on the evil effect.

b) That not only the evil effect not be imputed, but also that it be caused licitly, or that the action itself be honorable, two other things are further required on the part of the action:

3. That the action in itself (that is, setting aside the circumstances) not be evil, but honorable or at least indifferent: for a cause evil in itself per se includes fault.

4. That the end of the agent be honorable, and therefore that the evil effect not be intended but only the good; otherwise the evil would be voluntary in itself or at least willed. Hence it is also required that there be no proximate danger of consenting to the evil or approving it.

1. Vermeersch well notes, *Th. M.* I, n. 133, that one must take care not to apply the rule stated concerning a twofold effect, good and evil, caused simultaneously, to the diverse case of an action which can be this or that, for example, that which I see is perhaps a man, perhaps a beast. The voluntary discharge of a gun at that thing will be perhaps homicide, perhaps useful hunting. Here it is not a question of partial causality into a harmful effect which nevertheless is not imputed on account of a proportionate reason of a good simultaneously caused; or, by full causality, one of two things disjunctively comes about. Therefore homicide is hypothetically accepted and chosen: it is one probable evil effect. For this reason it is no more licit to inflict it upon a probable man than upon a certain man.

Yet this principle is not always rightly explained by all.

a) Some assert that it is not required that the good effect be immediate, but that it suffices that it not come about by means of the evil, even if it is more remote. But this seems to be a question about the mode of speaking: for then the possibility of obtaining the good effect already results immediately from the action, and this already is a certain good effect.

b) Others understand the principle only of a cause per se as to the good effect and of a cause per accidens as to the evil effect, so that the good effect ought to follow per se and as it were necessarily from the action, and the evil effect only per accidens. But although in this case there can more easily be a reason for placing the action, or compensation of the evil effect by the good, nevertheless it is not proved that this is a condition without which not, so that otherwise one would have to abstain from the action. For it does not seem impossible that there be a cause from which there would follow simultaneously per se a twofold effect: one good, the other evil (suppose health, and drunkenness or abortion); which nevertheless it would be licit to employ if it were necessary for obtaining the good effect, provided that this compensates the evil. Indeed, if the evil effect followed per se from the cause, and the good merely per accidens, why could we not order that cause per accidens to obtaining the good effect, if in this way it is certainly produced and truly outweighs the evil? Therefore by such a restriction they seem to limit the principle unduly.

c) Finally, others apply the principle too materially, and seem to think that the good effect considered in itself must always be equal to the evil effect. But it suffices that the goodness of the effect, together with the utility which it procures for the agent or others, and the inconvenience and damage avoided (which would arise if the cause were not placed), compensate the evil, that is, not always the evil effect but at least the influence of the action upon this effect: for the evil effect must be compensated by the agent because his action influences it; whence it must be compensated insofar as the action influences it. Hence a graver reason for placing the cause is required:

1. the graver or worse the effect is, both in itself and with respect to the harm of others, especially of society; for example, a greater cause is required for killing an aggressor than for slightly wounding him, greater for producing an effect harmful to society than to an individual;

2. the more actively and necessarily the evil effect proceeds from the action, the more closely it coheres with it, and the more probably it follows from it; for example, a greater reason is required in one who concurs proximately, a lesser in one who concurs remotely, in the sin of another (for example, the making of a bad book or drunkenness); greater for reading a bad book than a book of lighter character from which movements of concupiscence more remotely arise; greater for placing a cause per se than a cause per accidens. Likewise a very urgent cause is required for a maidservant to be able to exercise service in a house where she is often enticed to sin by the son; a much lesser motive suffices if an outsider coming into the house at times solicits;

3. the less right the agent has to place the cause and the more certain it is that, if he does not act, the effect will not be produced; in other words, the greater the obligation from office of impeding the evil. For example, a greater reason is required for renting a building to heretics if

they can find no other than if they can easily rent one; a greater reason for a bookseller to be able to sell a bad book if no other seller is found who will give it, than if another will sell it.

All these things are to be considered together so that it may prudently be estimated whether the good compensates the evil.

174. How great is the imputability of the evil effect. - For determining the gravity of the fault incurred by the one who places the cause of an evil effect, the axiom has force: an effect voluntary in the cause is not more culpable than the cause itself. This is not to be understood of the cause considered in itself and independently of the effect: for it can happen that an action in itself good, indifferent, or lightly evil contracts grave malice from the effect, for example, if the throwing of a stone or a slight lie is the cause of homicide; conversely, that an action in itself gravely evil has light malice by reason of the effect, for example, drunkenness which produces light anger, homicide bringing on some other small harm. But it is to be understood of the cause considered as cause, that is, insofar as it influences the effect; hence the nature and gravity both of the influence or causality and of the effect itself are to be considered. Hence:

1. a cause which per se, proximately, and gravely influences an evil effect, besides its proper malice which perhaps it has from itself, further acquires the grave or light malice of the effect; hence a cause per se gravely evil, which proximately influences a lightly evil effect, has a light malice superadded; on the contrary, a cause per se lightly evil, which proximately influences a gravely evil effect, has grave malice from this;

2. a cause which per se but lightly and remotely, or only per accidens, influences even a grave effect, by reason of the influence contracts only light malice, for example, if from the immoderate taking of food or from drunkenness or from morose delectation not prolonged pollution follows. For a small influence upon a grave thing is not of itself something notable. Yet such a cause has grave malice by reason of the effect, if that effect is strictly prohibited so that all things which even lightly concur toward it are to be avoided (as happens in a matter of justice, lest grave harm be brought upon one's neighbor), or if by reason of office or state there is a special obligation of avoiding the effect. Thus the influence of drunkenness upon pollution is lightly culpable, but upon homicide is gravely culpable.

1. Then the malice is grave, not by reason of the influence, but by reason of the special prohibition or obligation.

175. When is the morality of the effect contracted?

The whole goodness or malice of the effect is contracted inchoatively, interiorly and as to affection, when the cause is voluntarily placed, even if per accidens the effect does not follow: for then the effect is intended at least in confusion; consummatively, exteriorly and as to the effect, when the effect truly occurs, unless at this moment the past will, insofar as possible, has been retracted: for then the effect will be only materially good or evil.

176. Observation for understanding the doctrine of St. Thomas. - In q. 20, a. 5, briefly and with several other general principles presupposed, St. Thomas teaches several things concerning the morality of the effect, which can be understood from what has been said:

A. In the order of execution, the following willed event, whether it follows or does not follow, does not add formal goodness or malice to the external action, just as it "does not make an act evil which was good, nor good which was evil; for example, if someone gives alms to a poor man, which he abuses for sin, nothing is lost to him who gave the alms; and similarly, if someone patiently bears an injury done to him, he who did it is not on this account excused."

For morality depends upon the voluntary. That the intended effect follows or is impeded per accidens is involuntary. Therefore it does not change the morality of the act.

B. In the order of intention he teaches three things concerning the event:

1. The following event which was forethought, that is, distinctly foreseen and in some way willed, in the diverse mode which ought to be present for contracting goodness or malice, increases the formal goodness or malice of the exterior act.

1. Thus St. Thomas himself interpreted himself, q. 73, a. 8 and ad 1.

2. The following event not forethought, that is, not distinctly foreseen, if it follows per se and for the most part from such an action, adds directly to the goodness or malice of the act, which is better from its genus from which several good things are apt to follow, and worse from which several evil things are apt to follow. In this doctrine, however, the general principle is presupposed: that this goodness in fact be contracted, it must be intended; that malice be contracted, it must in some way be foreseen, at least in confusion, which nevertheless easily happens if the action of itself is apt to produce the evil effect.

3. The following event not forethought, if it follows per accidens and in fewer cases, does not directly add to goodness or malice, for example, the abuse of alms by a poor man.

These things are to be understood on the supposition that from the same act there does not follow, with equal immediacy, a twofold effect: one evil, and the other good but greater and compensating. For then what was said in n. 173 must be applied.

177. Corollary. - From what has been said it is understood why and how far it is illicit voluntarily to expose oneself to danger of acting badly or sinning: for this is not sufficiently avoiding the evil effect, or even it is placing the cause of an evil effect. That danger can be from an internal cause (as is a depraved imagination or passion) or an external one (namely, an occasion, such as a thing enticing to evil); absolute, that is, commonly for all, or relative to such a determinate person; proximate or grave, which in many cases or at least frequently is connected with sin, or remote or light, which is rarely connected. Now:

1. It is illicit without a just and proportionate reason to expose oneself to a proximate or grave danger of acting badly. For one who without sufficient reason wills a thing, by that very fact imputably wills everything which is probably connected with it, and therefore one who intends to incur the danger of acting badly, by that very fact wills the evil probably connected with it. And one who is bound altogether to avoid sin is also bound to avoid the means which probably leads to it. Hence one who does not avoid such a danger, when he can, is convicted of not sufficiently avoiding but loving that evil whose danger he loves (Eccli. III, 27). Hence everyone

is bound under grave obligation to avoid a proximate danger of committing a grave evil; a proximate danger of committing a light evil, under light obligation.

2. It is licit from a just reason proportionately grave, namely, of a compensating good effect, to expose oneself to the danger, even grave and proximate, of acting badly. The reason is that one who from a just reason exposes himself to danger does not love the evil, but the good cause on account of which he so acts, nor properly exposes himself to danger, but rather unwillingly undergoes the danger. Understand this with the restriction: provided there is a founded hope of overcoming the danger and suitable precautions are applied for this, by which the danger becomes remote; for certain sin is absolutely to be avoided.

3. To expose oneself without reason to a light and remote danger (of some moment), even of committing grave evil, is illicit but lightly; yet it is licit from any reasonable cause, even a light one: for some disorder against reason is had in this, that someone without cause places a useless action, with which in addition a danger of evil is joined.

Question IV: On the Goodness and Malice of Passions

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 24; *De Veritate*, q. 26, a. 6 and 7.

178. Principle I. Passions also can contribute to the morality of human acts, and indeed not only to the morality of the interior act but also to that of the exterior act.

1. Concerning passions the following can be consulted: Mercier, *Psychologie*; Bain, *The Emotions and the Will* (*Les Emotions et la Volonte*, trans. Lemonnier); Paul Janet, *Morale*; Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments*; Janvier, *Conf. N.-D.: Les Passions*; Noble, *Les Passions dans la Vie morale*: I. *Psychologie de la Passion*; II. *Moralite de la Passion*; Gardair, *Les Passions et la Volonte*; Descurets, *La Medecine des Passions*; Payot, *L'Education de la Volonte*; Lejeune, *Les Passions*. Also Bossuet, *Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-meme*; Schram, *Theol. Mystica*; Scaramelli, *Directorium ascetico-mysticum*.

For passions can be considered in two ways:

1. as to the being of nature or physical being, insofar as they are common to us with brute animals, and thus they are physically good, since they are implanted by God;

2. as to moral being, insofar as they are proper to man, and thus a) they are not per se evil, nor good, but indifferent: for the movements of the sensitive appetite are not per se from reason, and consequently are not human; b) if they are considered insofar as they are subject to the command of reason and will, thus they are good or evil, insofar as they are voluntary, either directly insofar as they are commanded by the will, or indirectly insofar as they are not prohibited by it.

It is proved: 1) "For the sensitive appetite is nearer to reason and will themselves than the exterior members are." But the acts of the exterior members are morally good or evil according as they are voluntary. Therefore much more the passions themselves, according as they are voluntary, are morally good or evil (a. 1).

2. From the Scriptures, which a) commend certain passions (Ps. IV, 5; II Cor. VII, 9; Rom. XII, 15); b) assert that they are found in Christ, although bound by reason (Mt. XXVI, 38; Mk. III, 5; XIV, 33; Lk. XIX, 41; Jn. XI, 33); c) and praise men because of them or reprehend them because of their absence (Exod. XXXII, 19; Num. XXV, 11; I Kings II-III).

Hence to be ruled by passions is not evil because they are evil of themselves, but because the order is inverted according to which the superior part ought to rule the inferior; but it is good to rule them provided this is according to the order of reason (a. 2).

179. Corollary. - Therefore passions, if they are considered as to the being of nature, are not morally good or evil according to species, but indifferent; but if they are considered as regulated by reason, they can be, like exterior acts, good or evil according to species, according as their proper object will be fitting to reason or not fitting: thus, for example, shame, or fear of disgraceful things, is good, and envy, or sadness concerning another's good, is evil (a. 4).

180. Principle II. Voluntary passions increase the goodness or malice of the act. - It is proved: the more perfectly the good of reason or the moral good is derived to more things which befit man, the more perfect it is; hence it also pertains to moral perfection that exterior acts be directed by reason. But the sensitive appetite can obey reason. Therefore it pertains to moral perfection that passions be regulated by reason. Thus, just as it is better that man will the good and do it by an exterior act, so it is better that he be moved to good both according to the will and according to the sensitive appetite, in order to operate more promptly (a. 3).

This, however, must be understood of willed passions, which are chosen and commanded by the will (in the respectively diverse way in which this ought to be done for good and evil; cf. n. 146). For a passion which moves man toward sensible good, if it precedes the will, diminishes liberty and consequently goodness and malice; if it follows by redundance, it is not a cause but a mere effect of the will: not a cause, namely, but "a sign of a more intense will (or of a greater voluntary), and thus it indicates a greater moral goodness" or malice; if it follows by election, it adds to goodness or malice (ad 1).

Question V: On the Goodness and Malice of Circumstances

Concerning the more principal circumstance "why" enough has been said where the end was treated; likewise concerning the circumstance "what," where the goodness and malice of the effect was treated. Moreover, the things we noted about the passions already regard the circumstance "how" (as to part of it). Therefore it remains to speak of the remaining circumstances not explained, and indeed in order to the interior act and exterior act together, because all can modify the latter and several the former.

181. The circumstance who does not denote the very person of the one acting according to himself (for thus he pertains to the substance of the human act), but his accidental condition or quality, by reason of which in the moral estimation the act or omission is of greater or lesser moral value, for example, that the agent is religious, a priest or a layman, married or free, superior or subject, rich or poor, a child or an old man, etc.

Often it indicates an office or special obligation (of justice, piety, fidelity), and then it brings to the good or evil act a new species of goodness or malice, as if one bound by vow preserves chastity or a

married person fornicates; otherwise it is only aggravating: thus, other things being equal and the same deliberation or negligence being supposed, a religious acts better or sins more gravely than a secular, the learned man than the unlearned, because he operates more perfectly or sin disgraces him more.

182. The circumstance about what does not signify the object itself or the matter (for that pertains to the substance of the act), but an accident joined to it, for example, quantity or quality, such as that the thing is sacred or profane, of one's father or of a stranger, much or little, grave or light, etc.

Often quality changes the species, namely, if it brings a distinct goodness or malice, as alms given to a poor church, or the theft of a sacred thing, the praise or striking of a father or cleric. Thus in acts concerning another, in the matter of chastity by reason of the accomplice, in the matter of religion toward sacred things. When, namely, a quality on the part of the agent changes the species, the same quality on the part of the object or matter also does this; hence it is understood that there is a double malice in adultery or carnal sacrilege if each person is married or sacred, because a double circumstance changes the species. Sometimes quality only aggravates, as to love an enemy or do good to orphans and widows, to harm one who is plainly innocent.

But quantity of matter only aggravates, for example, to give or steal two hundred francs instead of one hundred, to pray for many hours or to work on the Lord's Day.

183. The circumstance by what helps indicates the accidental instruments or means (also companions) which we use for acting, for example, to employ the help of a saint or a demon, to get drunk with money taken by theft, to use a sacred thing for fornication, to kill with prohibited weapons, with a sword or with poison.

It changes the species if the means imply a special morality, as the use of magicians for seducing a girl, of sacred rites for deceiving another (Gen. XXXIV, 15), of confession for soliciting; otherwise it aggravates, as if you induce a priest to lie, or choose weapons devised for torture in order to kill, or if the feet of the Lord are anointed with precious ointment (Lk. VII, 46; Mt. XXVI, 7; Mk. XIV, 3; Jn. XII, 3).

184. The circumstance how signifies the accidental mode by which the internal or external act is done, for example, with a voluntary that is perfectly or imperfectly deliberate, direct or indirect; intensely or remissly; from malice, passion, or ignorance; from contempt, levity, force, deceit; cautiously or imprudently; in good or bad faith, etc.

Sometimes it changes the species: thus violence makes robbery from simple theft, rape from fornication; likewise the modes against nature in lust. Ordinarily it aggravates, for example, to act from perfect knowledge or from a will confirmed in good or evil, to kill limb by limb; or it diminishes, for example, to act from grave fear, vehement temptation, sudden passion. Thus intensely or remissly does not change the species but increases or diminishes.

185. The circumstance where does not denote bare place (for every act must take place somewhere), but the accidental quality of place conferring upon the act something of goodness or malice, such as that the place is sacred, with respect to prayer and worship, or theft, fornication, homicide, etc.; or public, in scandal or good example (II Kings XVI, 21).

It rather often changes the species in external acts by adding the special morality of religion or charity; it also gives the first species of morality if the work is of itself indifferent and is prescribed or prohibited by reason of place, such as to uncover oneself or to carry on commerce in a church. More rarely it aggravates, namely, in internal acts which do not have so direct a relation with place, for example, meditation performed in church, complacency there in a shameful thought.

186. The circumstance when denotes an accidental condition of time, as quantity or duration if the act lasts long or briefly (for example, love or hatred or desire), or quality if the act is done on a feast day, in sacred time, in a more difficult time.

Quantity of time is an aggravating or diminishing circumstance; but quality of itself, and direct intention of honoring or dishonoring being set aside, does not do much to increase morality, unless the act of itself good or evil has been specially prescribed or prohibited by reason of sacred time (Mass, breakfast), or through it special reverence or irreverence is brought upon divine worship, or scandal is present, for example, if someone on Good Friday exhibited public games or immediately after communion went to a concubine or got drunk.

Time differs from place: the latter, because of stability, is capable of consecration and permanent holiness; time, continually passing, is called sacred only per accidens, by reason of the mystery or action which is then recalled or done; hence of itself it does not change the species.

If an act of itself neither good nor evil is prescribed or prohibited in sacred time, the circumstance of time passes over into the notion of object, and gives the first morality, for example, to work on a sacred day or to abstain from work.

187. Case.

That the concurrence of circumstances in one act may be better understood, we note the following case, classic in theology: "John, the church custodian, violently snatches from the hands of the pastor, in church, on Holy Thursday itself, with companions employed and with the intention of profaning the Sacrament, a consecrated golden ciborium containing Hosts necessary for paschal communion. How many and which circumstances intervene in this case?"

Resp. All of them; namely, 1) the circumstance who: the church custodian; 2) about what, by reason of quantity: a golden ciborium; by reason of quality: a consecrated ciborium; 3) what, by reason of effect: deprivation of paschal communions; 4) where: in church; 5) by what helps: companions employed; 6) why: from the intention of profaning the Sacrament; 7) how: violently; 8) when: on Holy Thursday itself.

Third Part: On Human Acts According to Supernatural and Meritorious Being

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 109, a. 5 and 6; q. 114, a. 2.

188. Necessity of supernatural acts. - Since in the present order we are destined not to a natural end but to a supernatural divine end, it is not sufficient that we place acts morally honorable and proportioned to a natural end; rather it is necessary that we place acts conformable to the supernatural end, which are supernatural and of the divine order:

a) From the principle or subjective element; for eternal life, namely, the intuitive and beatific vision of God, exceeds the proportion of our nature; but acts cannot exceed the proportion of their principle; therefore from his nature man cannot produce acts proportioned to eternal life, but for this there is required a higher principle elevating him, which is grace.

b) Also from the formal object or motive, which is the objective element. Here the principle has force: Acts are specified from the object. For just as an act is not morally good unless the object is conformable to the honorable end and is known and intended as such, so an act will not be supernaturally good unless the object is considered as conformable to the supernatural end and is intended from a supernatural motive; in other words, no one can tend to a supernatural end unless by willing it; no one contracts supernatural goodness unless he wills it; otherwise he would not direct himself to the end in a human mode, but would merely be inclined to it.

Hence in human acts there can be had a twofold goodness or moral being:

1. natural, which is the intrinsic tendency of the act to the object as simply honorable, and consequently as conformable to God as natural end, to be contemplated, namely, by our powers as much as we are able;

2. supernatural, which is the intrinsic tendency of the act to the object as conformable to God the supernatural end, to be seen in Himself; indeed the intrinsic dignity of the act toward divine eternal life, to be lived in the heavens with God.

Therefore in supernatural acts the material element is moral goodness itself; the supernaturalness of the act, both on the part of the object and on the part of the principle, is the formal element.

189. State of the question. - In a supernatural act there can be considered:

a) the subjective element or principle, namely, grace; and this pertains to dogmatic theology, namely, to the treatise on grace;

b) the objective element or object, which is something particular, and therefore pertains to special moral theology, and concerning it there is discussion in the treatises on the individual virtues in species;

c) the very tendency to the end. For every thing attains its end through its own operation, which is the perfectly efficient cause of the end itself when this end does not exceed the power of the one operating; otherwise it is a dispositive cause, or even a moral cause, insofar as it furnishes something on account of which the obtaining of the end is expected from the gift of another. But eternal life exceeds the nature of man. Therefore the human act is only a dispositive and moral cause of eternal life, both meritorious, and satisfactory, and impetratory.

Now satisfactory and impetratory causality belongs to human acts from the particular virtue of penance or of religion, and therefore in special moral theology this is discussed where there is discussion of those virtues; but the causality of merit belongs to all supernatural acts as such, if they are placed under the due conditions.

It indeed pertains to the treatise on grace insofar as it is considered as an effect of cooperating grace, but it also pertains to general moral theology and the treatise on human acts, insofar as it is a

property of the human act and it is due and obligatory for our acts to merit eternal life. And therefore we are bound to know the required conditions, so that we may be able to fulfill the said obligation.

First Question: On Merit, Especially Supernatural Merit

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3 and 4; q. 114, a. 1, 2, 5-10.

190. Merit is etymologically derived from the word *merces*, and accordingly designates a service or laborious work done for the utility of another, which is not usually done except by hired workers for a stipend or wage. In the broadest sense it signifies whatever is sufficient, suitable, worthy for obtaining something, or that which demands something, and thus it is said even of inanimate things, for example, of a painting; more properly it is a human work to which retribution is due from some justice strictly or broadly so called, and thus it is also said of an evil work (Mt. XVI, 26; Job VI, 2; Heb. X, 29; Eccli. XVI, 14, 15); but in the strict sense it is a good work done in the service or benefit of another and therefore worthy of reward and retribution.

It can be regarded in the abstract and in the concrete: in the concrete it is a work of virtue to which a wage is due, a work worthy of retribution; in the abstract it is a property of the human act, namely, the moral value of the work by virtue of which it is worthy that something be repaid to the one operating, a goodness existing in the human act on account of which it is worthy of praise and reward, or the dignity of the work and therefore a right or title in the one operating to retribution.

191. The philosophical foundation of merit is in the exigency of the order of nature, or in the natural law by force of which the activity proper to a being belongs to it and therefore ought to profit it, since it has the perfection of the being itself as its end. Hence when a person acting freely has chosen an act in service or utility of another person, that person has furnished something which is his own; hence it is equitable and just that the other render some good, by compensating the good furnished (II-II, q. 106, a. 3; I, q. 65, a. 2). But if it is demanded and rendered according to equality, the merit is from justice properly so called; otherwise from equity and decency, friendship, and liberality, which in some way pertain to justice.

On the contrary, since every man, in order to his ultimate end, is of the same dignity, as being his own right, and consequently is not a mere means subordinated to others but exists for his own good, therefore he cannot be deprived of his order to his proper good without justice demanding recompense of punishment. Hence St. Thomas (q. 21, a. 3): he who "acts to the advantage or harm of another" "acquires merit or demerit in order to the retribution which is made according to justice."

192. Division of merit. - A. By reason of the one rewarding, merit is civil when the work is done for the utility or service either of an individual or of society; and moral when it is done in the service of God.

a) As to civil merit:

1. An act directed to the good (or evil) of an individual person has merit (or demerit) directly before the person, indirectly before society, into which the good of the person redounds, who in some way is its part and member.

2. An act directed to the good (or evil) of society has merit primarily before society, secondarily before the individual members insofar as they are members.

3. An act directed to the good (or evil) of the agent himself does not have merit before the agent himself (because justice is toward another), but can indirectly have the character of merit before society (q. 21, a. 3).

b) Every human act has moral merit before God (or demerit), insofar as it tends to the profit (or detriment), not of God Himself, but of His honor and the order established by Him; and indeed:

1. By reason of God Himself: for God is the ultimate end of man. But it is due to the ultimate end that all acts be referred to it. Therefore one who does an evil act not referable to God does not preserve the honor which is due to the ultimate end, and conversely.

2. By reason of the society of which God is ruler and guardian: God is governor and ruler of the whole universe. But he who rules a community has care of the common good and ought to render retribution for those things which are done well or badly in society. Therefore human acts have merit or demerit before God; otherwise one would have to say that He does not care about human acts (a. 4).

B. By reason of the reward, merit is one thing natural, which proceeds from the powers of nature and expects only a natural reward; whence if it is done in the service of God, it is done in order to God as natural end; another thing supernatural, which is done from the powers of grace in order to God as supernatural end, and merits a supernatural reward, namely, the good of eternal life. It is also called theological.

They differ in this, that the first follows every good act by reason of its goodness, according to some relation of justice to God, from whom, at least from fittingness, it merits at least a temporal good, and therefore imports a wage from the very notion of the act; the other imports a wage to be rendered not only from the very notion of the act but also from the state of the person operating, and therefore belongs only to supernatural acts and indeed only to the just man, to whom the wage due is eternal life itself or some other good in order to eternal life. We are treating here only of supernatural merit.

1. Del Prado well notes, *De Gratia et libero arbitrio*, I, p. 534: "It must be noted beforehand that merit can be taken broadly, insofar as it imports any wage whatever, whether due from justice properly so called, or from a certain proportion or fittingness, insofar as only the very notion of human acts is considered, and under this relation the Angelic Doctor treated of merit above, I-II, q. 21, and then merit is something consequent upon all and single human acts, that is, free acts, by reason of their goodness (cf. ib. a. 3, and a. 4, ad 3). The notion of merit can also be taken in a strict mode, insofar as it imports a wage to be rendered to free acts, not only from the very notion of the act, but also from the state of the person acting; and then merit is taken by order to eternal life; and the wage due is either eternal glory, or any other good whatever, whether spiritual or temporal, reduplicatively as it is a means for attaining the glory itself of eternal life. And under this higher consideration St. Thomas treats of merit in the whole of q. 114."

C. By reason of dignity, merit is: either merit simply so called, or merit *de condigno*, to which from justice a reward is due, for which it has equal value and equal dignity, or condignity. It is a work

whose value equals the value of the reward, because there is found an equality between merit and reward according to right estimation: an equality, therefore, not always material or quantitative, but moral, which is called equality of power and proportion, as there is between seed and the fruit which is born from it (q. 114, a. 3, ad 3). Or it is merit *de congruo* and in a certain respect, to which in no way is retribution made from justice, but only from a certain fittingness and equity and friendship or liberality of the giver is a gift bestowed which befits the one giving; and therefore it does not infallibly obtain the reward, unless the one repaying has promised, nor then from justice but from fidelity. It is a work whose value does not equal the value of the reward, because equality between reward and merit is lacking.

In the former merit there is an exigency toward reward; in the latter, only fittingness. The former can be compared to the stipend which is due to a soldier and to the wage which is due to a servant; the latter to an honorary distinction (for example, an equestrian order) which a prince bestows upon a soldier for brave deeds, not from justice nor altogether gratuitously, or to a gratuity or gift which inferiors or servants receive on account of occupations more or less supererogatory. This division is not univocal but analogous.

193. What can man merit? - *De condigno* the just man can merit for himself an increase of habitual grace, the remission of venial sin, heavenly glory and its increase. *De congruo* he can merit for himself infallibly actual graces, the first excepted.

Christ alone could merit *de condigno* for others, as being the head of all men. *De congruo* a man can merit for others, but not infallibly: actual graces, even the first, habitual grace and its increase, the remission of sin, and eternal life.

These things are proved in the treatise on grace. Cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114.

Second Question: On the Conditions of Supernatural Merit

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1, 2, 3, 4.

194. Thesis. For supernatural condign merit of eternal life itself, seven conditions are required:

A. On the part of the work or act, that it be:

1. voluntary and free, and indeed with liberty of election, that is, not only from coercion but also from intrinsic necessity (cf. condemned proposition 3 of Jansenius): for merit is a property of a moral act, which is the more moral the more voluntary and free it is. Moreover, retribution is not due to someone except because he himself gives from what is his own in service of the one rewarding; but no one properly gives from what is his own except that of which he is master; and man is not master of his act except that which he acts freely;

2. good or honorable (Mt. VI, 1 sq.) at least formally, for before God, infinitely holy, nothing is worthy of reward unless it is good and right; besides, if evil merits anything, it is not reward but punishment;

3. supernatural and therefore placed from grace; otherwise it would not be proportioned to the supernatural reward of eternal life (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16);

4. likewise done in service of God the supernatural end; otherwise there would be no reason why retribution should be expected from God Himself. But it is done in service of God because it is referred to and commanded by charity toward God. Cf. I Cor. II, 9; X, 31; Col. III, 17; Mt. X, 39-42; XIX, 29; Mk. IX, 40; Lk. IX, 48; Gal. V, 6, 14; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 4.

B. On the part of the one operating:

5. the state of the wayfarer: for one who has arrived at the term and end and possesses it can no longer move and tend toward it or approach it more closely; therefore he cannot merit it. The state of the way has its end with temporal life, as we know with certainty from revelation and from the faith of the universal Church (II Cor. V, 10; Heb. IX, 27; Mt. XXV, 1 sq.; Jn. IX, 4; Lk. XVI, 9, 22; Gal. VI, 10);

6. the state of grace (condemned propositions 12, 15, 17, 18 of Baius; Council of Orange II, can. 18; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16, can. 32): for the value and dignity of a work is principally from the dignity of the one operating (Gen. IV, 4); if therefore he himself is not worthy of eternal life through habitual grace making him pleasing, he is not suited for placing works worthy of eternal life (Jn. XV, 4).

C. On the part of God rewarding:

7. acceptance or preordination of the work unto a wage and a kind of promise, at least implicitly contained in the bestowal of grace. Not that the good work has intrinsic value or condignity from that acceptance, but because beyond the condignity which it has from grace, an ordination or promise concerning merits to be accepted and concerning the wage to be rendered is necessary, so that he who has operated well from grace may have a right to the wage and God may be obligated to render it to him from justice.

Among men no one is bound from justice to remunerate service, however worthy in price, unless he has accepted it and thus has at least tacitly taken on the obligation of repaying. But acceptance is much more required on the part of God, who of Himself is not obligated by any works of men to render a wage, both because our services are already owed to Him, since they are His, and because they confer no profit of utility, and because we have from God every power of operating and our very act; therefore in no way can God be our debtor. But, when an ordination or promise has been added, He is now a debtor of Himself, and He is bound not toward us but toward Himself, insofar as He owes it to His own wisdom, fidelity, and will to fulfill in creatures what by free will He has appointed to give them, and according to the proportion of works to bestow upon the works the reward established (Jas. I, 12; II, 5; Mt. XX; I Tim. IV, 8; Heb. X, 36; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16). Therefore condignity depends upon the internal value of the work, the acceptance of God being presupposed: this does not deny the value of the work, but brings it about that to the work, which by reason of its value is worthy of reward, this reward is now actually due from God by justice (a. 1).

Hence there does not exist justice strictly so called between God and men according to absolute equality, because our works can confer nothing upon God, since their whole goodness (being, ability, and the very operating) is conferred gratuitously by His ordination in such a way that He could claim it for Himself (a. 1). Yet, this preordination having been posited, if the meritorious value of works is

considered according to the power of the Holy Spirit moving us unto eternal life and according to the dignity of grace by which man is a sharer of the divine nature and an adoptive son to whom the inheritance of eternal life is due, there is present an equality of strict justice between the work and the reward promised by God, so that the work is of the same order and of equal value with the wage of eternal life and divine like it (a. 3). Whence eternal life by comparison to the proximate cause, or the works of the just, is a wage due from justice; but by comparison to the remote cause, namely, the power of operating and grace from divine ordination, it is a gift of mercy (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16 and sess. 14, c. 8).

195. In what way meritorious works must be ordered to the service of God.

Not all declare this in the same way:

a) Some, such as Suarez, deny that a formal ordination of charity is required, saying that every act done from any supernatural motive whatever from its nature implicitly tends to the supernatural end, and therefore is equal to this in moral estimation and meritorious.

b) Better, however, with the Thomists and Bellarmine, it is said that this suffices for merit *de congruo*; but for merit *de condigno* there is required an influence from an act of charity: for through that we strictly merit the attainment of the end through which we tend to the end, the Supreme Good as such; but we do this through charity alone, by which we tend to the Supreme Good in Himself. Practically, nevertheless, this opinion does not differ so much from the preceding, because the influence of charity is always present: 1) by way of object or motive: for an act of charity, once exercised and not retracted by mortal sin, refers all the following acts of the whole life to God the supernatural end, and, if perhaps not all honorable acts, at least all which are proportioned to the supernatural end and are supernatural from motive and principle; 2) also by way of principle, because acts of the supernatural virtues do not proceed from grace except through the mediation of charity, just as they do not proceed from a power except through the command of the will, which command proceeds from charity.

c) Indeed, with very great probability several say further that by this single act of charity all honorable acts are referred to the supernatural end, and therefore are done from the motive and principle of charity and thus are supernatural and meritorious, so that in the just man exercising charity an act is either supernaturally good and meritorious, or a venial sin. This seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas, *De Malo* q. 2, a. 5, ad 7, and II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 5.

1. Thus also outside the Order of Preachers several hold, such as the Salmanticenses, Billot, Van Noort, Van der Meersch, Raphael of St. Joseph; to whom His Eminence Cardinal Van Roey comes close.

d) Yet for this the mere presence of the habit of charity cannot suffice, as it seemed to some, such as Ballerini, Noldin, Vermeersch, but its exercise is required, because, as St. Thomas says, II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 6, "from the fact that it is in habit no one merits, but from the fact that he actually operates."

e) Finally, some, such as St. Bonaventure and St. Alphonsus, require that the act of charity be repeated rather often, for example, daily or weekly, or even for each series of actions; and because of the probability of this opinion it is to be counseled that it be exercised more often.

196. Degrees of merit.

Salutary acts are not equally, but more or less, meritorious, according as the conditions of merit are verified more or less. Hence, other things being equal, the merit becomes greater:

1. the worthier the acting person is, according to the supernatural dignity of habitual grace making one pleasing, by which man is pleasing to God;

2. the more voluntary the work is, that is, the more it proceeds from a readier will and is performed with greater intensity; and the freer it is, that is, the more the agent gives of his own and from his proper dominion;

3. the more the work is informed by charity, namely, the more expressly, more proximately, and more actually it is referred to God; hence the practice is best of often exercising an act of charity and offering works to God in order to increase merit, and also to increase charity itself, the root of merit;

4. the better the work is according to species, excellence, and nobility of moral goodness, which nobility depends upon the object; for example, the act is better which regards a more excellent virtue, which has a higher end, which pertains to several virtues. Therefore a precept does not impede merit; indeed obedience increases merit because it adds the goodness of a new virtue;

5. and therefore the more difficult the work is in itself: namely, intrinsic difficulty, which is from the magnitude and arduousness of the work itself and from the elevation of the proper object, increases merit, because the better something is, the more it is elevated above man's powers. But extrinsic difficulty of labor, which the agent experiences in a good work and which comes from a defect of the one operating and of a ready will, does not increase but rather diminishes merit. Otherwise the more someone advanced in virtue and experienced less difficulty, the less merit he would have. Yet per accidens a special difficulty on the part of the agent can be the occasion that someone tends toward good with greater attention and with a greater effort of the will (q. 114, a. 4, ad 2), and then merit is increased not because of the difficulty but because of the intensity of the will.

197. Observation.

For congruity of merit in order to a certain supernatural retribution, the same conditions are required, excepting the state of grace, the influence of charity, and the promise of God; yet this promise, like the state of grace, is required for merit *de congruo* more strictly so called and infallible, which namely consists in a friendly right to some reward, without equality of the work to the reward ever being required.

Treatise: On Conscience in General

Introduction

198. Object of the treatise. - After the consideration of the end and of human acts in themselves (according to the material and formal element), there must be treated 1) the rules of acts according to which they must be directed (the exemplary cause), and 2) their principles (the efficient cause). The principles are the powers of man, concerning which philosophy treats, and habits, whether good or evil, concerning which there is discussion in the treatise on habits and virtues. But the rules are two: remote, objective, and extrinsic, which is law; and proximate, subjective, and intrinsic, or immediate, which is conscience. Hence after the treatise on human acts there logically follows the treatise on their proximate rule, conscience. For just as an archer must know the rules according to which he ought rightly to tend toward the target, so man must know the rules according to which his acts are orderable to the ultimate end.

Now general morals regards conscience only in general, as it ought to be in order that it be the rule of our acts and have for this the required qualities; in no way, however, does it consider the individual particular states or all the species of conscience, nor the modes of prudently forming conscience or of sinning against it: for all these things now pertain to special moral theology, and indeed to the treatise on the cardinal virtue of prudence, whose act is a right and well-formed conscience. Therefore in the present treatise we shall speak of three questions:

1. For the general part of the doctrine on Conscience, cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 3, 5, 6; Q. D. *De Ver.* 17; II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4; d. 39, q. 3, a. 1, 2, 3; *Quodlibet* III, 26-27; VIII, q. 16, a. 13; St. Antoninus, in *Summa*; St. Alphonsus, in *Th. Mor.*; Billuart, Bouquillon, Raphael of St. Joseph, *Theol. Mechliniensis*, Haine, in o. c.; Beaudoin, *Tractatus de Conscientia*; Noble, *La conscience morale*; Dumas, *Theologia moralis thomistica*, I.

1. of moral conscience according to itself (physical or psychological being);

2. of conscience as it is the rule of moral acts (moral being), or of the qualities required for moral conscience, namely, a) of its truth and rectitude on the part of the object; b) of its certitude on the part of the subject;

3. of conscience as it is the rule of supernatural acts (supernatural being).

First Question: On Moral Conscience According to Itself in Psychological Being

St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 13; *De Veritate*, q. 17, a. 1, 2, 3; II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 4.

199. Notions. - Conscience (*syneidesis*), from the word *conscire*, that is, to know together, is etymologically as it were knowledge with another, and therefore sometimes signifies knowledge had with others or the common knowledge of several persons (Cicero, *Or.* 1 *in Catil.*, 1; Tacitus, *Agr.* 2); more commonly, however, it signifies the knowledge of one person kept within himself but

considered and applied to something else, whence properly it imports an order of knowledge to something, and is an act by which we apply knowledge to a particular fact.

This can be done in two ways:

1. by applying knowledge to considering that something is or has been, and this is merely psychological conscience, by which we know that we are doing something, or recognize that we have done or have not done something: this is said to testify and includes intimate sense and memory (Gen. XLIII, 22; Rom. IX, 1; Eccl. VII, 23; II Cor. IV, 2; V, 11);

2. it can also be done by applying knowledge to considering whether something is done or has been done rightly or not, and this is moral conscience, which is a judgment concerning good and evil acts and the application of moral knowledge to our human works. This again is twofold; for moral knowledge can be applied:

a) to examining something which has been done and to judging whether it has been done well or not, and this is consequent conscience, which is said to excuse, or to accuse or gnaw (Heb. IX, 14; Rom. II, 15; Tit. I, 15; II Tim. I, 3; II Cor. I, 12; Is. LXVI, 24 and Mk. IX, 48 [the original misprints IX, 40]: namely, the worm of conscience does not die);

b) to directing something which can still be done, and judging that it is good and to be done, or evil and not to be done, and this is antecedent conscience, which is said to instigate, induce, bind, urge, or impede (Rom. XIII, 5). This is a judgment concerning the morality of an act in the individual, to be placed here and now, and the application of moral knowledge to a determined act. And it is moral conscience in the strict sense, because it alone is the rule of human acts, and concerning it we speak in the present treatise.

Improperly, however, conscience is taken either a) for its object, or the thing known together, that is, for that which is in our conscience (I Tim. I, 5), as when someone says: I will tell you my conscience; to examine conscience, or that it is stained or cleansed; or b) for its causes: both for the habit by which we are rendered capable of judging good and evil, and for the habitual disposition by which we are inclined to judge in such or such a way concerning the honesty of an action; and for knowledge of the law or universal judgment concerning the morality of acts in general without applying it to a determined act; and thus we say that a child at seven years has conscience of good and evil.

200. Antecedent conscience is a judgment.

But not every antecedent judgment is conscience. For there is had:

1. a merely speculative judgment concerning the truth alone of a thing, without respect to operation, for example, whether Peter possesses money;

2. a speculative-practical judgment, that is, speculative concerning practice, concerning the morality of our acts in general and in the abstract, insofar as they are considered according to themselves and without order to a subject here and now active. In other words, it is a judgment concerning objective and material honesty, which is twofold; for man:

a) either makes altogether universal moral judgments by which he assents to the first practical principles, for example, good is to be done, evil is to be avoided; injury is to be done to no one; what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; the Supreme Good is to be loved, etc.; in these the intellect does not err, because it naturally possesses for perceiving and enunciating them the habit, or facility, which is called synderesis;

1. It is called synderesis (*synteresis* = conservation, namely, of the first moral principles), which therefore is called the spark of conscience and a little fire derived from the divine light.

b) or he makes less universal judgments, by which he assents to general conclusions deduced immediately or mediately from the first principles, for example, theft is to be avoided, fornication is illicit, etc.; in these the intellect can sometimes err, although it can acquire for them the habit which is called moral science;

3. a practical-practical judgment concerning the morality of an act in the particular and in the concrete, to be placed here and now by the acting subject, by which we apply the first universal principles or moral science to a particular case in particular conclusions, for example: now to take this sum from Peter without his knowledge and without reason is theft to be avoided. This is the particular judgment of conscience, which is immediately ordered to operation and is concerned with subjective and formal honesty, and is proximately practical in relation to the universal judgments of synderesis and moral science, which are remotely practical; hence by some it is called the last practical judgment, namely, not simply, but among those three judgments which concern honesty;

4. the ultimately practical judgment, or the discretive judgment of election, not concerning morality but concerning the fittingness of the act, namely, concerning that which here and now is to be chosen and is fitting to do, whether it is good or evil: this follows conscience, by which it ought to be directed, but often is contrary to it, for example, I will seize Peter's money, although conscience dictates that it is prohibited.

201. Conscience is defined: the dictate or judgment of the practical intellect affirming that an act in the particular is licit or illicit, and therefore is to be placed (or can be placed) or is to be omitted by us. In this definition there is indicated:

1. the genus to which conscience pertains, namely, dictate or judgment, and thus it is distinguished from reason, which is a power; from synderesis, which is the habit of the first practical principles by which we are capable of having conscience; from moral science, which is acquired habitual knowledge concerning the morality of acts in general; from prudence, which is the virtue inclining one rightly to estimate all the circumstances of the concrete act, and rightly to judge concerning its morality, or to have a right conscience, and to command what it dictates: for conscience is not a habit but an act, and therefore it is easily reformed and laid aside; but if it is said to remain, this must not be understood as though it remains in itself, but in its causes, which are reason and synderesis, or even the other things mentioned above;

2. the subject in which it resides: a) the intellect: for judgment is not in the will, but precedes it so that it may will the good and flee the evil; but if conscience is called good or bad, it is not

such formally in itself (as though it were the subject of goodness), but regulatively and from the effect, insofar as it directs good or evil works;

b) the practical intellect: for it does not stop in the contemplation of truth but directs toward executing a work, and thus it is distinguished from merely speculative judgments and from psychological conscience;

3. the specific object: a) affirming an act in the particular, that is, in the concrete, regarded with its end and circumstances, as it can be placed here and now; and thus it is distinguished from the speculative-practical judgments of moral science;

b) that it is licit or illicit, and thus it differs from other practical judgments which treat of utility, fittingness, facility, etc., among others from the last practical judgment;

c) and therefore that it is here and now to be placed or omitted: for it judges concerning an act to be placed, not concerning an act already placed, and thus it is distinguished from consequent conscience;

d) by us: for conscience regards only one's own acts and not those of others (Rom. XIV, 4; I Cor. IV, 4, 5).

202. Conscience is the conclusion of a practical ratiocination; whose major is from synderesis, for example, evil must be fled; the minor from reason: now to have intercourse with such a married woman is evil; conscience infers the conclusion: therefore for me, here and now, intercourse with her is illicit.

1. More recent authors are accustomed to say that the major of the syllogism from which conscience arises is a principle of right, understanding also a principle deduced from the first and most universal principles of morals; indeed, some even say that the major is always a principle, not indeed of synderesis, but of moral science, and that the minor only enunciates the fact to which the principle is applied. On the contrary, St. Thomas manifestly and constantly teaches that the major is the most universal principle of synderesis in which error cannot exist; but if conscience is called the application of science to a particular case, this must be understood of the minor of the syllogism, which is affirmed by reason, and to the enunciation of which both moral science and the right estimation of particular circumstances concur. Cf. Q. D. *De Veritate* 17, a. 2; and in II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4.

But just as in speculative ratiocinations there can be a false conclusion, so also in conscience, either a) on the part of the form, because it is badly deduced from true principles which are not rightly applied, for example: God must be obeyed; but God commands that one in need must be aided; therefore here and now I must aid such a neighbor; or b) on the part of the matter, because it is deduced from a false principle, for example: what is not prohibited is not evil; but intercourse with such an unmarried woman is not prohibited; therefore it is not evil. For although falsity cannot be present in the major, because synderesis does not err concerning first principles, nevertheless reason can err in the minor concerning particular principles.

1. Yet not every conscience can be false, because falsity cannot always be present in the minor; namely, when there is question of immediate conclusions which are assumed directly from the first principles, and in the minor there is only a particular enunciation of that which is contained universally in the major. Thus: Injury is to be done to no man; Peter is a man; therefore injury is not to be done to Peter. Or: The Supreme Good is to be loved; therefore God is to be loved by me. Let St. Thomas be heard, *De Ver.* q. 17, a. 2: "Nevertheless it must be known that in some things conscience can never err, namely, when that particular act to which conscience is applied has of itself a universal judgment in synderesis. For just as in speculative matters it does not happen that one errs about particular conclusions which are assumed directly under universal principles in the same terms, as in this: This whole is greater than its part, no one is deceived, just as neither in this: Every whole is greater than its part; so in this: God is not to be loved by me, or some evil is to be done, no one can err; because in both judgments, both of speculative things and of operable things, the major is per se known, as existing in a universal principle, and the minor also, by which the same is predicated particularly, as when it is said: Every whole is greater than its part, this is a certain whole, therefore greater than its part."

203. Principle. Conscience is the proximate and subjective rule of human acts, obligating not per se and by force of itself, but by force of the divine precept, because it applies the objective and remote rule, or law, to the particular case in order to the operation of the subject. Thus, if the precept of an emperor did not reach the citizens except by means of a legate, the precept of the legate would not obligate except because it promulgated the precept of the emperor (q. 19, a. 5, ad 2; II Sent., d. 39, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3). Hence conscience is an intimation and as it were promulgation of the law with respect to the act to be placed here and now.

St. Bonaventure says, II Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 3: "Conscience is like God's herald and messenger; and what it says, it does not command from itself, but commands as from God, just as a herald, when he publishes the edict of a king; and hence it is that conscience has the force of binding." - St. Thomas uses another comparison, Q. D. *De Ver.* 17, a. 3, namely, of a physical bond, by which we are not bound except through contact or application to the body; whence the moral bond or law does not bind except through the application of the law, which happens through knowledge of the precept and conscience: "The command of someone governing stands in relation to binding in voluntary matters according to that mode of binding which can occur to the will (namely, the necessity of moral obligation), as bodily action stands in relation to binding bodily things by the necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never induces necessity in another thing except through the contact of the action itself with the thing upon which it acts. Whence neither is someone bound by the command of some king or lord unless the command reaches the one to whom it is commanded. But it reaches him through knowledge. Whence no one is bound by any precept except by means of knowledge of that precept... Just as in bodily things a bodily agent does not act except through contact, so in spiritual things a precept does not bind except through knowledge. And therefore, just as it is the same power by which touch acts and by which the power of the agent acts, since touch does not act except from the power of the agent, and the power of the agent not except by means of touch; so it is the same power by which the precept binds and by which conscience binds, since the precept does not bind except through the power of knowledge, nor knowledge except through the

power of the precept. Whence, since conscience is nothing other than the application of knowledge to an act, it is established that conscience is said to bind by force of the divine precept."

From this it follows that conscience obligates more than the precept of a human superior: "Conscience does not bind except by force of the divine precept... Whence, since the divine precept obligates against the precept of a prelate, and obligates more than the precept of a prelate, the bond of conscience will be greater than the bond of the precept of a prelate, and conscience will bind, though the precept of the prelate stands to the contrary" (ibid., a. 5).

But just as law, so conscience, by reason of the mode by which it binds or of obligation, is obligating (or prescribing), whether negatively prohibiting or positively commanding; and non-obligating (or non-prescribing), which is permitting and counseling.

204. Observation. - Antecedent conscience alone, because it alone influences the act, is the rule of the act, but not consequent conscience, which supposes the act. Hence to the uninstructed, who think the contrary, it should be said that concerning the goodness or malice of a past act one must judge not according to the knowledge which they now have, but according to that which they had before the act.

Second Question: On Conscience as It Is the Rule of Moral Acts

205. Principle. Conscience is the rule of human acts in such a way that we never licitly act against it when it commands or prohibits; but we always licitly act according to it if it has the due qualities.

It is proved: to operate against conscience includes an evil will, for it is nothing other than to do that which is judged to be prohibited by God or to omit a precept (Rom. XIV, 23). Hence the axiom: Whatever is done against conscience builds unto Gehenna. This must be understood of conscience commanding or prohibiting, but not of conscience counseling or permitting, because the latter does not obligate. On the contrary, to act according to conscience is to do what we judge to be commanded by God or at least permitted. But to do what we judge to be commanded or permitted by God of itself includes the will to conform itself to the law and will of God. Therefore it is licit per se; namely, provided that that judgment of conscience have the due qualities, concerning which we are now going to speak.

But they are two: on the part of the object truth and rectitude must be present; on the part of the subject or assent, certitude. For conscience is the rule and measure of human acts. But every measure must be adequate, that is, true and right, not falsified; and certain, not ambiguous. Hence conscience must be true and right on the part of the object, and certain on the part of the subject.

Article I: On the Rectitude of Conscience

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 3, 5, 6; *De Veritate*, q. 17, a. 2, 3, 4; II Sent., d. 39, q. 3, a. 3; *Quodlibet* III, 26, 27.

206. Notions. - Conscience must be right. Now by reason of the object, or of conformity with the law, conscience is distinguished as twofold: true and erroneous, according as it dictates the truth of the thing or falsity. True conscience, namely, is that which from true principles dictates that something in particular is licit or illicit which really is such, namely, which is truly good or evil.

Erroneous conscience is that which from false principles, nevertheless reputed true, dictates that something in particular is licit or illicit which really is not such, for example, that what in itself is good or indifferent is evil, or that what in itself is evil is good. It is erroneously vincible if it can be conquered by moral diligence, but voluntarily is not conquered, whether directly by design, or indirectly from negligence; invincibly, if it cannot be conquered by moral diligence, either because someone has in no way, not even confusedly, thought about the truth to be inquired into, or because, sincerely inquiring into the truth, he has not arrived at it. But if conscience errs from an error which before was vincible, but now is invincible, although the preceding error was a sin and so much graver as the greater evils foreseen as to follow from it were greater, nevertheless the actual judgment of conscience itself is truly invincible.

Now it is asked whether both consciences, true and erroneous, are a rule of acting and in some way sufficiently right. To solve this question, many have distinguished negative conformity and positive conformity with conscience, saying that every conscience always obligates lest we act against it, but that not every conscience, namely erroneous conscience, always obligates us to act according to it: negatively, namely, it is licit to act against no conscience, but it is not always required that we act positively according to it. But that distinction is generally useless: for one who does not act according to a conscience commanding and prohibiting, but does not do what it commands or does not avoid what it prohibits, by that very fact also acts against conscience, because he does what it prohibits or omits what it commands. Hence by equal reason, in the mode of one response, we shall answer both at the same time.

207. Principle I. True conscience is per se the rule of acting, so that if it is commanding or prohibiting, we are bound to conform ourselves to it both negatively, by not acting against it, and positively, by acting according to it.

It is said: a) per se, that is, from its nature, because it faithfully exhibits the law as it is in itself, whence it binds absolutely and in every event, and therefore an act conformed to it is per se good;

b) if it is commanding or prohibiting: for if it counsels or permits, to act against it is not illicit, because we are not bound to do or omit what is commanded or prohibited by no law; for conscience counseling binds us not to contemn it, not that we fulfill it. But we can always act according to a true conscience; indeed we also have the right so to act.

It is proved: 1) from Scripture, Rom. XIV, 23: Everything that is not from faith (*uit goeder trouw*, *de bonne foi*) is sin, that is, he who does not act from belief, persuasion, the judgment of conscience, sins, as the Fathers commonly understand.

2. By reason: conscience, because it intimates and applies the law, is the proximate rule of human acts, according to which their moral being is measured. But true conscience rightly applies the law, for it is a faithful herald. Therefore an act which departs from it is not conformable to the law but is morally evil. This is confirmed: true conscience is the law itself certainly known by us and applied to the act. But we are bound to follow the known law. Therefore.

208. Principle II. Invincibly erroneous conscience is per accidens the rule of acting, so that if it is commanding or prohibiting we are bound to conform ourselves to it both negatively, by not acting against it, and positively, by acting according to it.

It is said: a) per accidens, that is, not from its nature, because it is not conformable to the law, but by reason of ignorance, because it is believed to be conformable to it; whence it does not bind in every event but under a condition, if it endures and as long as it is not laid aside; and therefore an act conformed to it is good per accidens;

b) if it is commanding or prohibiting: for if it counsels or permits, to act against it is not illicit, because invincible error excuses from sin; nevertheless we do not have the right of acting according to it, because there is no right to follow error.

It is proved: 1) from the Scriptures: he who acts against an invincibly erroneous conscience does not act from faith or from persuasion, and accordingly according to the Apostle (Rom. XIV, 23) he sins. This is clearer from the context in which the Apostle, speaking of the eating of foods which in themselves are not evil but by many were erroneously held to be unclean, as if prohibited by the Mosaic law, teaches that those sin who truly think the eating illicit; for in v. 14 he says: I know and trust in the Lord Jesus that nothing is common (that is, unclean) through itself except to him who esteems that it is common; that is, I am certain that no food from its nature is unclean except for him who thinks that it is unclean. And in v. 23: But he who distinguishes, if he eats, is condemned, because not from faith; that is, he who doubts concerning the liceity of food, if he eats what he doubts to be unclean, is condemned because he has not acted from the persuasion (good faith) of conscience; a fortiori he who would eat what he certainly judged to be unclean. Similarly I Cor. VIII, 7: But some, with conscience even now of the idol, eat as idolothyte, and their conscience, since it is weak, is polluted. Likewise Gal. V, 3: I testify to every man circumcising himself that he is a debtor to do the whole law; that is, he who falsely thinks circumcision necessary for himself unto salvation, while this judgment of conscience remains, is consequently bound to observe the whole law. Whence Christ the Lord teaches that invincible error excuses, but not vincible error (Jn. IX, 41; XV, 24).

2. By reason: a) if invincibly erroneous conscience proposes something as the law of God, this is taken by the erring person as the law itself; therefore if he withdraws from this, he wills to withdraw from the law of God and thus contemns it, and acts badly. Thus, if someone falsely believed that the precept of a legate was the emperor's, by contemning the precept of the legate he would contemn the precept of the emperor (a. 5, ad 1 and 2).

b) A human act tends into the object as it is proposed by reason; therefore if erring reason proposes something as evil and man wills it, he does something which he judges evil, and thus is borne toward it under the aspect of evil and wills evil. And conversely concerning good. This is confirmed: the will is a blind power; whence its goodness and malice do not depend upon the object as it is in itself, but as it is proposed by reason and in the mode in which it is proposed (a. 5; *Quodlibet* III, 27).

209. Principle III. Vincibly erroneous conscience is not a legitimate rule of acting. For although it obligates that we conform ourselves to it when commanding, under the condition that it not be laid aside, nevertheless there is present the obligation of laying it aside if perhaps it is a cause of acting evil or of omitting a prescribed good; whence we can neither act against it nor according to it.

1. Let it not be said that in the case man necessarily sins, and is perplexed, not knowing what he should do in order to avoid evil. For, as St. Thomas says, q. 19, a. 6, ad 3: "Just as in syllogistic

matters, when one unsuitable thing has been given, others necessarily follow, so in moral matters, when one unsuitable thing has been posited, others follow of necessity; as, supposing that someone seeks vainglory, whether on account of vainglory he does what he is bound to do, or omits it, he will always sin; nor nevertheless is he perplexed, because he can lay aside the evil intention. And similarly, supposing an error of reason or conscience which proceeds from ignorance not excusing, it is necessary that evil follow in the will; nor nevertheless is man perplexed, because he can recede from the error, since the ignorance is vincible and voluntary." Similarly in Q. D. *De Veritate* 17, a. 4, ad 8: "It must be said that he who has the conscience (vincibly erroneous) of committing fornication is not simply perplexed, because he can do something by which, when it has been done, he will not fall into sin, namely, lay aside the erroneous conscience; but he is perplexed in a certain respect, namely, while the erroneous conscience remains. And this is not unsuitable, that, something being supposed, man cannot avoid sin; as, when an intention of vainglory is supposed, one who is bound to give alms cannot avoid sin: for if he gives from such an intention, he sins; but if he does not give, he is a transgressor."

It is proved: 1) he who acts against such a conscience does what he judges evil and thus sins; but he who acts according to it does that which he cannot rightly judge to be good, because he has negligently judged concerning its morality, and therefore he exposes himself to the proximate danger of acting formally badly and operates rashly and acts badly. This is confirmed: for since he notices that there must be further inquiry concerning the truth, he voluntarily neglects this; whence he ought to fear that his action is evil, and cannot have security concerning its goodness (Jn. IX, 41; XV, 24).

2. He who does not lay aside a vincibly erroneous conscience by this very fact acts badly, because at least indirectly the evil which he operates is willed, since the ignorance itself (or erroneous conscience) from which it follows is willed. And indeed vincible ignorance does not excuse from fault; therefore it does not excuse from actual fault, if it is actually vincible.

210. Which conscience is right.

Many call right only true conscience. Others call invincibly erroneous conscience right if it is conformable to the law, as happens if it proceeds from speculative error, for example, the conscience of Jacob approaching Lia whom he thought to be Rachel, and not right if it is difform from the law, as happens if it proceeds from practical error, for example, the conscience of one who thinks theft is licit. Others call invincibly erroneous conscience right if it is logically deduced from a false principle, not right if it is illogically deduced. Finally, others call every invincibly erroneous conscience, as prudently formed, right, not simply, but in a certain respect, and with respect to the agent or as to us, in order to acting, because it is the right and legitimate rule of acting: for although speculatively it is false, nevertheless practically it is true and dictates practical truth, namely, that which truly is licit here and now, and conformable to right appetite or an honorable will: namely, it is true that in these circumstances this is licit or illicit for me. In other words, the dictate of such a conscience is from the right intention of doing good and avoiding evil, which is conformable to the higher true principle of morality: Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided, and in this way it is conformable to the eternal law of God. That this is true will appear more from the treatise on Prudence.

211. Corollaries.

From the aforesaid it is easily concluded:

1. That conscience binds: true conscience per se, and erroneous conscience until it is laid aside; but invincibly erroneous conscience excuses, not however vincibly erroneous conscience.

2. That man has an absolute right of following an altogether true conscience, and this is liberty which in the strict sense is liberty of conscience. As to invincibly erroneous conscience, although man in the internal forum can and must follow it, he does not have to this truly and properly a right, which is founded in objective relations of things, but only a reputed right; and especially he does not have an absolute right to follow it by an external act: for legitimate authority cannot indeed punish him who is proved to have followed the dictate of conscience, but can prevent him from following it in an external mode, for example, a Catholic State can prevent the exercise of heretical or infidel worship, although adherents not rarely follow the dictate of their conscience.

3. That there can be an act or sin against the law which is not against conscience, when the latter is ignorant of the law, but then the act is not formally but only materially evil. On the contrary, there can be an action or sin formally against erroneous conscience which is not against the law actually existing; nevertheless it is against the reputed law, whence, although it is not materially against the law, nevertheless it is against it formally, and it is against the eternal law, which dictates that one must not act against that which is thought to be commanded or prohibited. Finally, every formal sin against law is also against conscience.

Hence it is understood that conscience per accidens in some sense obligates more than the law of God: "Conscience obligates not by its own virtue but by virtue of the divine precept: for conscience does not dictate that something is to be done by reason of the fact that it seems so to itself, but by reason of the fact that it is commanded by God; hence per accidens, from the virtue of the divine precept, it obligates insofar as it dictates as commanded by God, and therefore conscience obligates more than the divine precept in whose virtue it binds. As is clear if the precept of a king did not reach the people except by means of some prince; if the prince said: this is commanded by the king, although it were not true, his dictate would obligate as the precept of the king" (II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3).

4. Yet purely erroneous conscience, or erroneous conscience as such, cannot per se obligate, for obligation supposes a law not imaginary but existing and applied to the subject. Hence in the case of invincibly erroneous conscience we are obligated, not from the law which is not present and which conscience erroneously affirms, but from the higher certain principle of law, or from the universal natural law: Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided, which forbids acting against that which after diligent consideration we think to be good and commanded by God, or evil and prohibited. Hence such a conscience is in some way true, namely, practically, because it is true that, such a conscience standing, it is licit to act according to it; and it is right, as conformable to a right intention, which itself is right because conformable to a higher principle and thus to the eternal law.

This is to be applied to every erroneous conscience here and now invincible, even if it arises from ignorance antecedently vincible and culpable, provided it is actually invincible because it is not adverted to. Such a conscience was culpable in its cause, but it is a legitimate rule of acting here and now, and the action following from it is not culpable in itself, although it can be culpable in its cause.

1. In this sense, in a. 6, St. Thomas absolutely affirms culpability.

5. On the contrary, vincibly erroneous conscience can in no way be called right or true, because, with sufficient inquiry lacking, the agent cannot sincerely and in truth judge that the act is good or evil, nor sincerely will to do good and avoid evil. Therefore this conscience is simply erroneous.

212. Observation.

Concerning the mode of recognizing and laying aside an erroneous conscience, and concerning the obligation of undeceiving those who err in conscience, as also concerning the sin of acting against conscience, these things will be discussed in the treatise on Prudence.

Article II: On the Certitude of Conscience

St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 21, q. 2, a. 3; *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 16, a. 13.

213. Notions. - Conscience must also be certain. Now by reason of the subject, that is, on the part of the act, assent, or adherence to the object, conscience is either certain if its judgment adheres firmly to something, or uncertain if it does not adhere firmly; and the latter is doubtful if it does not adhere but judgment is suspended, or opinionative if it adheres but with fear of the opposite. Certain conscience, therefore, is that which formally in itself and in all the principles from which it is formed excludes fear of the opposite, and therefore firmly and without fear of erring judges that something in particular is licit or illicit.

Now we ask whether conscience, in order that it be the rule of acting, must be certain.

214. Principle. The only legitimate rule of acting is certain conscience, by which, namely, man prudently forms for himself a certain judgment that the action to be placed here and now is placed licitly and honorably; hence such conscience is required for operating licitly.

It is proved: 1) from the Scriptures, Rom. XIV, 23: Everything that is not from faith is sin; but he who is uncertain does not act from conviction, and therefore what is done from uncertain conscience is not from faith or persuasion; therefore it is sin. The Apostle explicitly states this conclusion, inferring it from the said principle: He who distinguishes (that is, who hesitates or doubts whether it is licit to eat some food), if he eats, is condemned, because not from faith. Hence Eccli. XXXVII, 20: Before all works let a true word go before you, and before every act stable counsel.

2. By reason: a) he who acts with uncertain conscience has a reasonable and founded fear concerning the malice, and uncertainty concerning the goodness, of his act. But he who is uncertain concerning the goodness of his act and nevertheless acts, wills to place it whether it be against the law or not, and thus hypothetically consents to evil, and has an evil will, and contemns the law of God and acts badly. This is confirmed by the example of a servant who, doubting whether something is against the will of his master, would neglect to inquire into the

will of his master if he could and nevertheless would act: he would be judged guilty by all. Likewise, one who would do that which he suspects offends a friend would be judged by this very fact to offend him and contemn his friendship.

b) He who voluntarily exposes himself to the proximate danger of sinning formally and offending God acts badly. But he who says, "It is uncertain whether this is really evil," and acts, operates rashly because he does what he fears offends God, and thus exposes himself to the proximate danger of sinning formally and offending God. Therefore he acts badly. Hence Augustine against the Donatists: "To receive (Baptism) in the party of Donatus... if it is uncertain whether it is a sin, who would doubt that it is a certain sin?"

1. Book *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, c. 5. - Several theologians call the value of this argument into doubt. Nevertheless, to one considering it well, it will appear that it does not substantially differ from the preceding argument; but the special mode of proposing it is already found in St. Thomas (*Quodlibet* VIII, a. 13), in the case proposed in which someone "is led into a certain doubt from contrariety of opinions..., if, while such doubt remains, he has several benefices, he commits himself to danger, and thus without doubt sins, as loving a temporal benefice more than his own salvation." In the same way in IV Sent. d. 21, q. 2, a. 3: "He who commits or omits something in which he doubts there is mortal sin, commits himself to danger." Likewise in Scotus, q. 2, prologue, and in IV Sent. d. 30, q. 1; and in St. Alphonsus, *Theologia Moralis*, l. 1, n. 22.

c) Conscience is the rule and measure of our acts. But a measure cannot be ambiguous, but must be certain. Therefore conscience must be certain.

215. Applications. - From the foregoing it follows:

1. That one who does not have a certain practical judgment concerning the liceity of an action, or certain conscience, cannot act; and if he must act altogether, he is bound to do what is safer, namely, what favors the law (or obligation) more and removes him more from the danger of acting badly. Hence the axiom: In practical doubts the safer way is to be chosen.

2. That one who does not have a direct, speculative-practical, certain judgment concerning the objective and material honesty of the action does not for that reason always lack a certain practical judgment concerning its subjective and formal honesty, but sometimes has a certain conscience from a certain higher principle and from a reflex judgment of the intellect reflecting upon its own act and applying that principle; for example, although the morality of such an action is doubtful to me, it is certain to me that I must place it if a superior commands it, both because presumption stands for the superior, who therefore is not to be deprived, on account of the doubt of subjects, of his right of commanding, which he certainly holds, and because the right order of the common good forbids subjects to deny obedience unless it certainly appears that the superior abuses his power; although I doubt whether such a work is servile, it is certain that I can exercise it if the pastor has said so; although in itself it is uncertain whether a sacrament is validly and licitly ministered in such matter, it is certain to me that regularly, out of reverence toward the sacrament, I must abstain from such ministration, and in a case of necessity employ it; although such a man is probably guilty, it is certain that he cannot be

condemned by a judge unless he is proved guilty with certainty, etc., for there are many similar cases as is determined in the special treatises.

3. Especially, that a practical judgment is held as certain, even while speculative doubt remains, and a certain conscience of special obligation arises whenever there is present a certain and absolute obligation of obtaining a determined end which otherwise perhaps would not be obtained; in other words, whenever a good effect (for example, salvation, a sacrament, health) must be absolutely obtained, or an evil effect (damnation, death, harm) must be absolutely avoided, and there is doubt not only about the honesty but also about the necessity or efficacy of the means required for this and about the validity of the act or fact. Then, namely, a certain higher law intervenes, which dictates that in doubts concerning the validity of an act to be placed, the safer thing must be done. From this reflex judgment an objectively uncertain obligation becomes subjectively certain. The reason is that, if the honesty of an action depends upon our reason and conscience, the value of the action or the averting of harm does not in the same way; for our doubt or judgment is not able to change the nature of things, nor therefore to render a null act valid, or to bring it about that the due effect arises from the action, or to impede harm from following from it; for example, a doubt or an opinion, however probable, cannot bring it about that what is not a sacrament be a sacrament, or that what is rather poison be medicine. Hence in the case a certain natural law prohibits exposing oneself to the danger of not obtaining the end or of bringing in evil, namely, by employing a means which perhaps is ineffective or harmful. To expose oneself to a danger of this sort, in species, is especially illicit in doubts concerning things necessary by necessity of means to eternal salvation: namely, in these things one must especially act more safely and more certainly.

1. Let it be noted that one thing is necessary by necessity of means, another by necessity of precept alone: the latter is only necessary for the end because it has been prescribed, for example, hearing Mass; the former is necessary because it is a means without which the end cannot be obtained, for example, Baptism or contrition for sins.

4. That one who is uncertain, not indeed concerning the value of the act or the necessity of the means, but concerning only its honesty or only the necessity of a precept, must, before he can act, lay aside the doubt either by inquiring into the truth more diligently or by consulting the more learned, and form for himself a certain conscience concerning the honesty of the action, at least indirectly from a reflex judgment applying some general certain principle. Prudence teaches how this can be done in various cases and doubts, all the circumstances being considered, and therefore it will be explained in the treatise on prudence. But if such means here and now are lacking, he must abstain from the action; or if he absolutely cannot suspend it, he must choose what is safer, as was already said above in 1).

Third Question: On Christian Conscience as It Is the Rule of Supernatural Acts

216. What supernatural conscience is. - In the supernatural order, there must also be a supernatural conscience, which judges the supernatural quality and value or supernatural morality of our acts. It can be defined: a judgment or dictate of the practical intellect affirming that an act in

particular, to be placed here and now, is supernaturally good or also meritorious of eternal life, or is not.

1. Cf. Noble, *La conscience morale*.

It differs from natural conscience:

a) in object: natural conscience regards only the natural goodness of the act; supernatural conscience also regards supernatural goodness; namely, it further asks whether the act tends to the supernatural end, or does not tend to it, or even turns away from it;

b) in end or motive: natural conscience proceeds from love of natural honesty, and intends to conform acts to reason; supernatural conscience also proceeds from a certain love of God Himself, at least initial and imperfect, and intends to conform acts to divine life begun or consummated, and to avoid the loss of that life and of God Himself for eternity;

c) in the law of which it is the application: natural conscience applies natural law, or also human law which perfects and determines it; supernatural conscience also applies the positive divine law, or also ecclesiastical law which determines and completes it.

217. Relation between natural and supernatural conscience. - Supernatural conscience does not exist separately and independently from natural conscience, so that in the faithful there would be two disparate and collateral consciences alternating with one another (for example, the philosophical conscience of a Stoic and the Christian conscience of a faithful man); but supernatural conscience includes natural conscience and subordinates it to itself, so that there is harmony and unity in the whole life and activity of man, and this whole life, with all its acts, is ruled by supernatural conscience. Hence in the faithful natural conscience is transformed and becomes supernatural; but once made supernatural, it includes natural conscience but exceeds it, so that the faithful person is bound:

1. to act also as man, and beyond this as a son of God;

2. also to act honorably in the natural life, but also more, namely, to act supernaturally in the divine life;

3. to observe the natural law, but also the new and positive precepts of God and of the Church relative to the sacraments, penance, religious piety toward God, and divine friendship;

4. to do good and cultivate virtue according to the measure of reason, but also according to the more excellent measure of divine law, in order to the more excellent divine life according to the exemplar of Christ Jesus humbling Himself, suffering, and obedient even unto death.

In one word, supernatural conscience does not destroy but perfects natural conscience, just as grace does not destroy but perfects nature.

218. Formation of supernatural conscience. - Supernatural conscience does not follow a process other than natural conscience, since grace does not destroy but perfects nature, but it is ordered to human acts of greater excellence. Whence it is the conclusion of a ratiocination. For just as natural conscience is founded on the first principle of synderesis: Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided,

and on the natural inclination of the will to the honorable or rational good; so supernatural conscience is founded a) on the first practical principles of faith, for example, One must tend to God the supernatural end, or: The Supreme Good, to be possessed in itself by beatific vision, must be loved above all things, or: Happiness which consists in the vision of God must be procured, or: God destining us to His friendship and the fellowship of His life must be obeyed; and b) if it is perfect, on faith formed by charity, which inclines to the divine good, and on grace making one pleasing.

The major is not from synderesis alone, but principally from faith, informing and elevating and subordinating reason and synderesis; but in the just man faith obtains aid from the gifts of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom under the influence of the indwelling and moving Holy Spirit;

the minor is from reason under the influence of grace inspiring supernatural prudence with its annexed virtues; but in the just man it is under the influence of the habit of infused prudence (with the annexed virtues), and also sometimes under the influence of the gift of counsel through the Holy Spirit: for just as, for living life honorably, we seek counsel among the wise and prudent, so, in place of human counselors, the indwelling Holy Spirit Himself deigns to become our counselor in order to eternal life;

the conclusion is enunciated under the influence of supernatural prudence with its annexed virtues.

The immediate principle, therefore, of supernatural conscience is infused prudence with the annexed virtues; the mediate principles are the theological virtues and the gifts of the indwelling and moving Holy Spirit, so that God Himself has immediately bestowed all the powers of this conscience. Christian conscience, namely, in its origin, progress, and perfection, is the work of divine grace.

1. Faith informs reason and synderesis, elevates them, and subordinates them to itself; whence consequently, under the light of faith, synderesis can enunciate the first supernatural practical principles. And indeed, supposing that faith teaches that God has elevated us to a supernatural end, and that our highest good is only in the beatific vision of God Himself, reason now sees that one must tend to that end, and that the supreme good possessed in this way must be loved in all acts. Nor should you say that synderesis does not have the idea of a supernatural end; for synderesis is not given for conceiving ideas, but, ideas having been supposed, it sees and with facility enunciates their fittingness or unfittingness. Nor let it be said that this is against the doctrine of St. Thomas, q. 62, a. 1 and 3. St. Thomas does not expressly speak of supernatural conscience, but everywhere says that the Major is posited by synderesis in conscience; but he speaks not only of the conscience of philosophers but also of the conscience of the faithful. Therefore.

2. II-II, q. 52, a. 2, ad 3.

219. Corollaries.

1. Therefore supernatural conscience is more perfect than natural conscience and perfects it, for a) it exceeds it, as was said in n. 217; b) it is clearer, because it rests upon the principles of faith, is illumined by faith, and is formed under the aid of grace; c) it is more certain, because divine revelation, upon which it is founded, is more certain than human reason, as given to us

by the infallible authority of God and proposed by the infallible authority of the Church, and because it has security from the light of the Holy Spirit.

2. Since Christian conscience includes natural conscience, in order that it be the rule of acting honorably, it must have the same qualities, namely, rectitude and certitude.

3. Yet in order that conscience be the rule of supernatural acts, that invincibly erroneous conscience by which, namely, in good faith someone would think an act to be supernatural or meritorious of eternal life does not suffice. Good faith can suffice for honesty, because honesty depends upon conscience or our judgment, but not so the supernatural value of the act. For the judgment of reason or conscience cannot make an act supernatural and proceeding from grace, nor make it efficacious for obtaining eternal life. The question, namely, is not of honesty alone but also of the validity of the act and the efficacy of the means to the end (n. 215, 3).

Treatise: On Laws in General

Introduction

220. Object of the treatise. - After the consideration of human acts in themselves and of their proximate, immediate, and intrinsic rule, which is conscience, there logically follows the treatise on the remote and extrinsic rule, as the extrinsic and regulative principle of conscience itself, according to which acts must be directed to the end, namely, on law, which conscience must apply in each of our actions and thus be conformed and subordinated to it.

In this treatise we shall speak not of individual laws considered specifically, but of law itself and of its supreme species considered in general, namely:

1. of law in general: a) of law in itself, b) of its division, c) of its effects; then in species:

2. of eternal law, 3) of natural law, 4) of human or civil law, 5) of divine law, 6) of ecclesiastical law; and concerning each we shall speak of their a) essence, b) power, c) mutability.

These six parts are reduced to three sections: the first two regard law rather according to psychological being; the next two regard law as the rule of morally good acts, according to moral being; the last two regard law also as the rule of supernatural acts, according to supernatural being.

1. Besides the authors cited for all general morals, and the better-known recent ones, such as St. Alphonsus with his disciples Aertnijs and Marc; Ballerini, Lehmkuhl, Noldin, Genicot, Vermeersch, all from the Society of Jesus; the Mechlin Theology, Haine, and Tanquerey; Prummer from the Order of Preachers, etc., the following can especially be consulted: Suarez, *De Legibus*; Van den Berghe, *Tractatus de Legibus*; Waffelaert, *De l'obligation en conscience des lois civiles*; Dom Lottin, *Loi morale naturelle et loi positive*; *L'ordre moral et l'ordre logique*; *La definition classique de la loi* (in *Revue Neo-Scolastique*, 1925); *Le Droit naturel chez S. Thomas et ses predecesseurs*; A. Valensin, *Traite de Droit Naturel*; B. Kuhlmann, *Der Gesetzesbegriff des H. Thomas v. Aquin*; Maroto, *Institutiones Iuris canonici*, I; Van Hove, *Commentarium Lovaniense in Cod. I. C.*, t. II-V; Berutti, *Institutiones Iuris canonici, Normae generales*.

Section A: On Law According to Psychological Being

First Part: On Law in General

First Question: On Law Itself in Itself

Article I: On the Essence of Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 90, a. 1, 2, 3.

221. Notion of law. - Law, according to some, is said from binding (*ligare*) (q. 90, a. 1), because it is a rule which binds and necessitates to acting; according to others from reading (*legere*), because it is usually written on public tablets and read, and this is usually done because it is a rule of things to be chosen (Cicero, *De Legibus* I, 19). Hence:

a) in the broadest sense it is a rule and measure according to which something ought to be done, that is, according to which something is inclined to some end and induced to acting or withdrawn from it; in this sense even for all irrational things a law has been fixed beforehand (physical law: Job XXVIII, 26; Prov. VIII, 27; Rom. VII, 23);

b) in a less broad sense, law, because it is an ordination of reason, regards only the rational creature, which alone participates in it rationally; and therefore it is the rule and measure of whatever acts are done dependently upon reason, even of arts, sciences, etc., prescribing either good or evil (Is. X, 1; St. Thomas, q. 92, a. 1);

c) in a stricter sense it is the norm of human or moral acts, that they be right, remote and material; and thus every precept is called law (for example, the precept of a father, of a syndicate, of a master);

d) in the strictest sense it is the rule of human acts given to a community, prescribing to it what is right (Rom. II, 12 sq.; Prov. VIII, 15).

Now in each sense it can be considered both subjectively: 1) according as it is essentially in the legislator as in the one regulating, and thus it is taken altogether properly; 2) according as it is participatively in the subjects as in those regulated (Rom. VII, 23; II, 14); and 3) according as it is in the exterior sign (word, writing, book) expressing it (Lk. X, 26; Jn. XV, 25; I Cor. XIV, 21); and objectively, for the object of the law and the thing itself prescribed, for example, a condition of a contract (Jn. VII, 19; Rom. II, 13). In these last modes it is taken in a less proper sense and one derived from the first.

222. Definition of law. - Law taken most strictly and properly is usually defined: an ordination of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has care of the community (q. 90, a. 4).

In this definition there is indicated:

1. The genus: ordination or disposition to an end through proportionate means, that is, not so much the ordering act itself as its term or the dictate constituted by it; but ordination is to be understood as strictly so called and perfect, that is, a) not merely directive but imperative and efficacious of obligation, and thus law differs from counsel, permission, prayer, etc.; b) of itself firm, stable, and perpetual.

2. The subject in which law essentially and originally inheres: reason, both because it belongs to reason to order or dispose and direct to an end, and to command; and because law is the rule of human acts, but the rule and measure of these is reason, because they are human insofar as they proceed from it, and good insofar as they are conformable to it; therefore law is something constituted by reason, and for this reason in the Scriptures it is called a lamp, light, illuminating precept, judgment, word, utterance (Prov. VI, 23; Ps. XVIII, 9; CXVIII, 105; CXLVII, 20).

1. Reason, namely, is the first principle of human acts; the first principle is the measure of the other things which pertain to this genus: "Law is a certain rule and measure of acts, according to which someone is induced to acting or is withdrawn from it. But the rule and measure of human acts is reason, which is the first principle of human acts; for it belongs to reason to order to the end, which is the first principle in things to be done. But in each genus that which

is the first principle is the measure and rule of that genus... Whence it remains that law is something pertaining to reason" (q. 90, a. 1).

Yet, since the act belongs to practical reason, it presupposes a will regulated by that reason, which it intimates and expresses, and therefore it is everywhere called in the Scriptures the will of God (Ps. XXIX, 6, 8; XXXIX, 9; CII, 7; CXLII, 10; II Macc. I, 3; Mt. VII, 21).

Hence a) the essence of law can be conceived even if the will of the legislator is not known, as we shall see must be said of natural law; and conversely b) the will of a superior, in order to be able to be law, must be regulated by reason or conformable to reason; otherwise it would be rather iniquity than law, as happens in a positive law prescribing evil.

1. Precept is the continuation of judgment; therefore it must be conformable to the prior judgment. A precept not conformable to judgment is not of reason; whence law must be conformable to reason: "Reason has the power of moving from the will... For from this, that someone wills the end, reason commands concerning those things which are for the end (behold law). But the will concerning those things which are commanded, in order that it have the notion of law, must be regulated by some reason, and in this way it is understood that the will of the prince has the notion of law; otherwise the will of the prince would rather be iniquity than law" (a. 1, ad 3).

3. The object or end, by which it is distinguished from every other ordination:

a) to the good, because law is the rule and measure of human acts, but human acts ought to tend to the ultimate end, which is the happiness of human life and beatitude;

b) to the common good: for man is part of a perfect community, by which he can arrive at happiness; but every part is ordered to the whole, as the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore law regards order to common happiness, or to the ultimate end as a good to be obtained commonly.

Thus it is distinguished from the precept of a tyrant, who commands only for his own advantage, or from a simple precept and mandate, which can also be borne toward the good of one person or of some; for by law man is ordered as a part to the perfect community; but it would be disordered to order the good of the whole to the good of a part, since the part is for the sake of the whole and not conversely (III Kings XIII; Ezek. XXXIV, 8; Council of Toledo VIII, can. 10).

Hence a law has force:

a) which was borne from an evil end (of the one acting), provided it really tends to the common good (the end of the work);

b) which is harmful to some, for example, to one province, so long as, namely, it tends to the good of the community, because a part is subject to the whole and the common good is to be preferred to private good, if they cannot be obtained together;

c) which immediately fosters the good of one class of citizens, such as wards, clerics, soldiers, etc., but ultimately is ordered to the common good, insofar as this requires that such persons be defended with special care and favor or be kept in office.

4. The author and at the same time the subject upon which law is imposed: by him who has care of the community.

Thus it is distinguished from a mere precept, which can be imposed upon one person or even by a private person: for to order and procure the common good and to command the community belongs only to the community itself or to him who presides over it. But community is understood as perfect, that is, a society complete of itself, which has in its own order a complete end and sufficient means for pursuing it (the whole human race under God, the Church or the State with respect to the faithful or citizens). Hence laws are established by those who have the public and political power of jurisdiction for governing subjects (by declaring right, making laws, and punishing transgressors even with graver penalties), whether supreme over the whole community, or derived, or over only part of the community (for example, the Roman Pontiff and bishops); not, however, by those who have only private dominative power or economic power in an imperfect society, such as father, husband, master, superior of a religious house, pastor.

5. The essential condition: promulgated, that is, announced to the community.

223. Law differs from precept. - Every law is a precept, but not conversely; whence, as species differs from genus, so law differs from precept, and indeed:

a) in end: law is borne directly and primarily to the common good; precept can also be ordered only to the private good alone of the one commanding or the one commanded;

b) in author: a legislator is a public person enjoying public power of jurisdiction; one commanding can be a private person having only private power;

c) in the subject upon whom it is imposed: law is borne upon the community as such (whether the whole community, or a certain group, that is, determined persons taken collectively, for example, all minors, by reason of the common good); precept can also be imposed upon private persons taken individually;

d) in stability or duration: for although law can also be borne for a time and be abrogated, nevertheless from its nature, like the community itself, it is perpetual, and indeed in three ways: on the part of the law, because it endures until it is abrogated; on the part of the legislator, because it endures after he has died or been removed; on the part of the subjects, because it obligates not only those present but also those future. But a precept can from its nature be transitory, for example, given for one or another day or act, and obligate only those present, and, unless otherwise noted, it expires with the death or departure of the one commanding;

e) in extension or place: for law, since it is borne for the community, if this is local, does not obligate outside its territory; a precept can also be given to a person, and then it accompanies him everywhere.

Among moralists, however, precept is often taken in a restricted sense and as opposed to law, for that which is a mere precept and not law, namely, for a particular or temporary obligating rule.

224. Causes of law.

The cause of law is fourfold: 1) final: the common good; 2) efficient: the legislator himself; 3) material, namely, the object or matter about which it is concerned and concerning which it prescribes; 4) formal, that is, the essence, namely, the ordination or prescription itself and the mode in which it is made, in which can be considered formation, promulgation, acceptance, and interpretation.

225. Observation.

Since laws are the rule of justice or of the just in general, and ought to establish just things, it has been received in usage that the complex of them is called Right; hence we speak of natural, divine, human right, etc.

Article II: On the Promulgation of Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 90, a. 4.

226. Promulgation (*afkondiging*) is a public and authentic testimony concerning the existence of a law and its announcement (*bekendmaking*) made to the community. It is called:

1. authentic, that is, made solemnly or with a certain solemnity by legitimate authority, namely, by the legislator himself or his authentic mandate, so that from the solemnity it appears and cannot be doubted that the law has proceeded from him in whom the power of the society resides;

2. public, that is, so carried out that the law is seen to be directed to the knowledge of the community and that the community can easily come to knowledge of it.

227. Promulgation is necessary in order that law obligate. - For a rule, in order to direct and bind someone, must be applied and imposed upon him, which does not happen unless it becomes known to him (n. 203). But law is not a rule made for one or another person, but borne for a community. Therefore in order that it obligate, it must become known to the community. But it cannot become known to the community except from promulgation, by which it is proposed in a public mode and one proportioned to the community. Therefore law does not obligate unless it is promulgated. Otherwise law would be only in the superior regulating, but not in the subjects regulated.

Hence a) until it has been promulgated, one who would know from elsewhere that it had been established is not held by the law;

b) a doubtfully promulgated law does not obligate: for liberty is not bound except by promulgation certainly proved; in a case of doubt, namely, the doubt is sufficiently promulgated: whether there is a law; but the law itself is not sufficiently promulgated: that it is a law;

c) promulgation differs from the divulgation of law, which sometimes is called, and is as it were, promulgation "in second act," by which the law in fact comes to the knowledge of subjects. Promulgation is necessary so that law can be divulged: from the former objective obligation arises and in the external forum; but knowledge of the law is also necessary so that subjective obligation be present and in the forum of conscience: for no one can sin by violating an obligation which he does not know.

Nevertheless promulgation does not pertain to the essence of law; for 1) it is the application of a rule and measure to the thing ruled and measured, whence it supposes a rule or law already constituted; 2) without promulgation law, because it is the command of a superior, has force from his authority and is apt to direct and bind; whence obligation is not from promulgation as from a cause but as from a condition *sine qua non*. In the same way the application of fire to a combustible thing is the condition required for burning.

1. Haine notes, *Theologia Moralis* I, q. 34: "It is a required condition, such as is the proposal of the object by the intellect, in order that the object move the will to love of itself. Therefore, just as, in order that an object in second act move to love of itself, it is necessarily and indispensably required that it be proposed to the will by the intellect, since nothing is willed unless it is foreknown; nevertheless the reason or power of moving the will is not the proposal of the object but the goodness found in the object; so, in order that law in second act obligate to its observance, it is indeed indispensably required that it be proposed to subjects by promulgation; nevertheless the reason or power of obligating is not the promulgation or proposal itself, but the authority which the law has in itself, as it proceeds from the legislator as bearing the person of the republic." Nor does the principle of law stand in the way: Laws are established when they are promulgated, as the Code puts it, can. 8 § 1, from Justinian. For the sense is: through promulgation laws are definitively established and complete as obligating in second act, although they already are in first act. Besides, the intention of the Code is not to settle a scholastic question.

228. The mode of promulgation is not determined by the law of nature: any mode whatsoever suffices, whether it is done by public reading in an assembly, or by the voice of a herald in the street, or by insertion in a newspaper, or by affixing in a public place, even one which is frequented, chief, and central, provided that morally, in a human mode, the law can rather easily come to the knowledge of the community, if not simultaneously, at least successively. It is more than sufficient if notification is made to individuals in particular, as in the natural law which God has inserted into the minds of men to be known naturally.

229. Once promulgation has been made, law is perfect and complete, and of itself begins to obligate, unless its force is suspended for a time; hence:

a) if the legislator has determined some time at which obligation begins, the law does not obligate before then: for just as it depends upon him whether there is obligation or not, so too it depends upon him whether it begins sooner or later;

b) if he has not determined a time, in a community of small extent, for example, a diocese, it obligates morally at once, because the promulgation can be known at once;

c) but in a sufficiently extended society, for example, the universal Church, law obligates in various regions successively, according to the time which is morally necessary so that knowledge of the promulgation can commonly come to all in those regions by ordinary means; whence it begins to obligate at once in the place where promulgation was made and in neighboring places, but it does not at once obligate everywhere, because it cannot at once be known by all in the whole territory.

From this it follows that, if someone before that time knew the law by an extraordinary way, he would not be bound to observe it.

Second Question: On the Distinction of Laws

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91.

230. Law is divided first and immediately by reason of origin. And indeed by reason of origin together with subject, time, and extension: one law is eternal, supreme, independent, and altogether universal; another is temporal and particular, derived and participated from it in time. This latter, by reason of foundation or necessity together with promulgation, is divided into natural or necessary law, which necessarily arises from the very essences of things and is promulgated by reason, and positive or free law, which, added to natural law and placed beyond it, is placed by the free will of the legislator and needs special promulgation. These are also distinguished by reason of matter: for the things which are commanded or prohibited by natural law are from their nature and necessarily good or evil; the things which are commanded and prohibited by positive law alone are therefore only good or evil because commanded or prohibited. But positive law, by reason of the immediate author, is divine (which by reason of time and perfection is old or new) or human, which is ecclesiastical or canonical, or civil or political; and by reason of origin, promulgation, and expression it is written or preserved by use, that is, introduced by custom.

Between natural law and positive divine law there mediates hypothetical natural law, or natural-divine law, which, namely, participates in both (yet more in natural law than in positive law), because, given some hypothesis which depends upon the free will of God, obligation necessarily arises: thus, given revelation, there necessarily arises the obligation of believing; between natural and human positive law there mediates the law of nations, which in some way participates in the necessity of natural law, and yet has been introduced everywhere by universal custom.

Third Question: On the Effects of Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 92.

231. Effects of law in subjects:

1. The mediate effect, as much as is from the force of law, is to make those to whom it is given good, either simply and in every way, as the law of charity does, or in a certain respect and in a certain matter, as other particular laws do. Thus natural or divine law tends to this, that men be made good by moral virtues proportioned to nature or by supernatural virtues; civil or ecclesiastical law tends to this, that, at least according to exterior acts, they be good citizens or good Christians.

1. Yet all further tend to charity, insofar as charity is the end of every virtue and thus of every law. For the acts of the other virtues are ordered to charity as to the end (II Sent. d. 38, q. 1, a. 1 and 2; *Contra Gentiles* III, c. 115, 116, 117), and therefore it is the end of the law (III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, q. 3).

2. The immediate effect, however, is obligation passively regarded, or to be obligated.

232. Proper acts of law or immediate effects in the legislator:

Four are enumerated, not because they are elicited and produced by law, but because law is, as it were, made integral from them.

For law concerns human acts, because it induces men to this, that it be obeyed by them with respect to certain acts: 1) with respect to acts good from their genus, it has to prescribe or command; 2) with respect to those evil from their genus, to prohibit or forbid; 3) with respect to indifferent acts, and for human law with respect to slightly good or evil acts, to permit; and thus according to these three it has directive force; 4) but that by which it induces to this, that it be obeyed, is fear of penalty, and therefore to punish is posited, and thus law also has coercive force. Nor among these acts is to obligate numbered, which is an act necessarily following from the four aforesaid: from precept or prohibition follows the obligation of acting or avoiding; from permission in some things arises an obligation of not impeding; from punishment there arises in the judge the obligation of inflicting the penalty and in subjects the obligation of undergoing it. Nor are counseling and rewarding numbered, because they are not proper to law but can also pertain to a private person.

Article I: On the Directive Force or Obligation of Law

233. The proper effect of law is obligation. This holds a middle place among the various effects of law: its ultimate effect on the part of the legislator is obligation actively regarded, or the power of binding which resides in the law; to this there corresponds in subjects, as the first effect, obligation passively regarded, that is, the moral bond itself and the necessity of obeying.

But obligation is a moral necessity of doing or omitting something, categorical or imperative. It is called:

1. a moral or objective necessity, which befits a free being and by which something is necessary by the necessity of the end (as means or precept), so that without it the end is not obtained. Whence it is a moral bond or practical necessity of choosing means to the end, by which, on the supposition of the end, such a means must necessarily be furnished; and thus it is distinguished from a physical bond or the physical subjective necessity of efficiency, both natural, which takes away liberty, and of coercion, which also destroys the voluntary;

2. categorical or imperative, that is, not only conditional, on the supposition of the end if someone wishes to obtain it, but absolute, by which the end itself is imposed. Whence obligation arises from a twofold necessity: from the absolute necessity of the act with respect to the ultimate end, and from the absolute necessity of this end. And thus it is made manifest how it does not harm liberty: it binds the will insofar as the intellect proposes the end and the means, while leaving untouched the physical power of acting or not acting.

1. Cf. Q. D. *De Veritate* 17, a. 3; I, q. 87, a. 1; I-II, q. 99, a. 1; II-II, q. 44, a. 1; q. 55, a. 3, ad 2; *Contra Gentiles* I, 67; II, 29; *Quodlibet* V, 19.

In other words, obligation imports a twofold debt: one according to itself, and thus the end is due; the other on account of another thing, that is, without which it is impossible to arrive at the end. And thus "in debt there is an order of exigency or necessity of something to that to which it is ordered" (I, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3).

Hence obligation, like morality, is an intrinsic habitude and real order, or transcendental relation:

a) in the obligatory act, just as morality is the real order of conformity or difformity, so obligation is the real order of necessity to the object and ultimate end (I-II, q. 99, a. 1);

b) in the obligated person, it is not only a relation of subjection to the person of the legislator, which is presupposed, but adds a new relation by which he is subjected as to this or that prescription (II-II, q. 16, a. 1).

Obligation, therefore, is a property of a human act according to which it is said to be necessarily placed or avoided for the ultimate end.

234. Division of law by reason of diverse obligation. - Obligation is diverse according as law has directive force or coercive force, and therefore by reason of effect or diverse obligation, one law is moral or preceptive, which only directs and obligates to placing or omitting an act; another is penal, which only punishes him who has omitted the prescribed act or placed the prohibited act; another is mixed, which does both. Every law obligates in conscience to something which the legislator intends; otherwise it would not be a true law but a counsel. But this is the difference between a purely preceptive law and a purely penal law: the first only obligates to placing or omitting the act established by law, without inflicting a penalty upon transgressors, namely: let everyone do this, for example, hear Mass; the second obligates only to undergoing the penalty which the law exacts from him who has not placed or has omitted the established act, namely: he who has done this, for example, who before this day has hunted or fished, is to pay money. For since in positive law the whole obligation depends upon the legislator, just as he can not obligate, so he can obligate more or less, or to the penalty alone. From these is distinguished mixed law, which is preceptive or moral and also penal, namely, let no one do this under penalty: this obligates in conscience to placing or omitting the act and at the same time to undergoing the penalty if it has not been placed or omitted; but the merely penal law does not obligate in conscience to placing the act, but under the penalty alone, to which nevertheless it binds in conscience.

1. There is not one mode in which they conceive merely penal law. Some say that moral and at the same time penal law, or mixed law, obligates conjunctively to two things: both to doing the prescribed work and at the same time to undergoing the penalty if it has not been done; but merely penal law disjunctively: either to placing the work, or to undergoing the penalty if it has not been placed. Thus Laymann, the Salmanticenses, d'Annibale, Bouquillon, Haine, Marc, and Tanquerey seem to speak. On the contrary, others assert that mixed law obligates to two things: to one absolutely, namely, to placing the prescribed work; but to the other conditionally, namely, to the penalty, if the work has not been placed; while merely penal law obligates only to one thing conditionally and hypothetically, namely, to paying the penalty, if the work intended by the legislator has not been fulfilled. For the legislator thinks and intends that his scope can be obtained by the mere threat and obligation of penalty. But if it is objected that penalty supposes fault, they respond that it does not necessarily suppose fault in the forum of conscience, but juridical fault in the external forum and before human law suffices: a transgression of the order constituted by law. Thus Suarez, Billuart, Noldin, Koch, Wernz, Prummer, Maroto, Vermeersch, and A. Janssen are said to hold. That St. Thomas admitted merely penal laws is clear from II-II, q. 186, a. 9, ad 1.

By reason of form, moral law is distinguished into affirmative or commanding law, which imposes something to be done, and negative or prohibiting law, which imposes something to be omitted; the former obligates always but not for always, that is, only for some time during which it endures; the latter obligates always and for always, that is, for every time during which it endures. And indeed at any time we are bound to abstain from every evil, but not to do every good.

1. Affirmative and negative are to be taken not from the words but from the end.

To preceptive law is reduced the law which, permitting, commands the liberty of someone and prohibits that it be impeded by others; to penal law rather is reduced the law which, invalidating, coerces by invalidating an act placed against the law.

Article II: On the Coercive Force or Sanction of Law

235. A law is sanctioned when it is decreed holy, that is, inviolable; whence sanction (*bekrachtiging*) is that which confirms and urges the law. Hence:

1. among modern jurists, sanction not rarely is called the act by which the king or president of the republic, with his name subscribed, as it were completes the law and renders it firm, so that it can be promulgated and obligate; whence that act precedes promulgation and announcement of the law;

2. among moralists it is rather coercion or penal coercion by which law is confirmed and urged. It can be regarded a) actively (as coercive force), namely, the act or decree of the legislator by which an evil or penalty is established for those violating the law, or, on the contrary, a good or reward for those observing the law; and b) passively, namely, the penal coercion itself or retribution of penalty, or also denial or concession of reward, which is added to the law to confirm it and to compensate the detriment which comes to society from violation of the law: the penalty, or also reward, established by the legislator in those who transgress it or observe it.

236. Sanction differs from obligation: 1) the latter pertains to the directive force of law, the former to its coercive force; 2) the latter equally affects all subjects, the former first per se and immediately affects only transgressors of the law; 3) the latter per se is conformable to the inclination of the will toward good, the former per se is repugnant to the will and is opposed to its natural inclination toward good; 4) obligation is a binding to good order, sanction is immediately the privation of some good.

237. Therefore sanction is the complement of law and of obligation. Its end is threefold:

a) that subjects be moved efficaciously to observance of the law: for knowledge of the law itself and consciousness of obligation do not now sufficiently induce man, insofar as he is subject to the enticements of concupiscence, to keeping the law;

b) that the moral order be completed by retribution of reward, and especially restored by retribution of penalty: for the order of justice demands that penalty be repaid to violation of the law, in order to restore equality; or also sometimes asks that reward be granted to observance of the law;

c) that subjects rebelling against the legislator be subjected to his authority, because those who refused voluntarily to subject themselves to law are compelled against their will to undergo evil. He who rises up against some order, says St. Thomas, must be repressed by the prince of the order (I-II, q. 87, a. 1).

Therefore law, in order to move us efficaciously and direct us to the end, must be confirmed by sanction.

Its influence is twofold: 1) antecedently, under the preventive respect, when before the placing of the act, by means of promise or threats, it induces men to keeping the law; whence the scope of sanction is that the law be kept: thus it is for correction;

2. consequently, under the retributive respect, when after the deed reward or penalty is repaid to those acting well or badly: thus it is for coercion.

Hence a) in the state of threat, the primary end of sanction is amendment or preservation, in one word: the avoidance of sin;

b) in the state of execution, the principal end is the restoration of order; but secondarily it can have amendment.

Second Part: On Eternal Law Which Is the Foundation of Every Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, a. 1.

238. Thesis. Eternal law exists. - It is proved: law is an ordination of reason in the prince who governs a community. But, supposing that the world is governed by divine providence, the whole community of the universe is ruled by divine reason. Therefore the very ordering reason of the governance of things, which is in God as in the prince of the universe, has the notion of law. But divine reason conceives nothing in time but from eternity. Therefore such a law is eternal. Cf. Job XXXVIII-XXXIX; Prov. VIII-IX; Wis. VI-XII; Ps. CXVIII.

Nor should you say that it is not a law, since it has not been promulgated. For promulgation is not of the essence of law; moreover, although eternal law has not been passively promulgated on the part of the term or of the hearing creature (in second act), nevertheless it has been actively promulgated on the part of God promulgating (in first act), because it has everything which is required on God's part for promulgation, so that, once the creature exists, it is applied to this creature by that very fact. For it is not required for promulgation that the law become known, but that it be able to be known. Whence, just as human law obligates future persons because, by the very fact that they become members of the community, they fall under the law without a new promulgation, so eternal law, by the very fact that a creature exists, can be known by it and obligates it (ad 2). In other words: although promulgation has not been received, nevertheless it has been made.

1. Law, namely, is essentially in the legislator (n. 221).

First Question: On the Essence of Eternal Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 93, a. 1.

239. Thesis. Eternal law is rightly defined by St. Augustine, bk. 22, Against Faustus, c. 29: the reason or will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved, forbidding it to be disturbed; and by St. Thomas: the reason of divine wisdom according as it is directive of all acts and motions in order to the common good of the whole universe.

It is proved: just as in an artisan there preexists the concept or reason of those things which are made through art, and this is called the idea or exemplar of things to be made, so in a governor there must preexist the concept or reason of the order of those things which are to be done by those who are governed; and this reason, ordination, and conception of the one governing the acts of subjects is called law. But God by His wisdom is the maker of all things, of which He is the artisan; He is also the governor of all acts and motions. Whence, just as the reason or conception of divine wisdom, insofar as by it all things have been created, has the notion of idea or exemplar, so the reason of divine wisdom ordering and moving all things to the due end, the good of the whole universe, obtains the notion of law.

240. Therefore eternal law differs:

1. from the divine idea: this is the exemplar of things to be made; that is the order of things to be governed, bringing necessity or obligation to them; whence the idea is supposed to law, because a thing is to be made before it is to be governed;

2. from providence: a) because law has the force of obligating, but not providence; b) because law regards the good of the whole universe, providence also the particular good of each thing; c) providence is, as it were, the conclusion of law and follows it: law hands down rules in general for the governance of the world; providence, as a part of prudence, disposes in particular concerning the movements of creatures according to law.

Second Question: On the Power of Eternal Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 93, a. 3-6.

241. Thesis. From eternal law all other laws are derived. - It is proved:

In ordered movers, the power of the second mover is derived from the power of the first mover, because the second does not move except insofar as it is moved by the first; whence in a well-ordered city the reason of governance is derived from the first governor to the secondary governors, and in art the reason of things to be made is derived from the architect to lower artisans. But eternal law is the reason of governance in the first and supreme governor. Therefore all reasons of governance or laws in lower governors are derived from eternal law.

For: a) human reason has from divine reason or eternal law, of which it is a participation, that it be the rule of the will and of human acts (q. 19, a. 4); therefore if law must be conformable to reason, much more must it be conformable to eternal law.

b) For the first is the measure of the others. But eternal law or divine reason precedes every other reason or law as the fountain. Therefore it is the first rule of every reason and law. And therefore honesty must principally be estimated from commensuration to that rule.

Eternal law, namely, is law by essence; all others are laws by participation, which are derived from it, and indeed in three ways:

1. they are derived from eternal law as from an exemplar cause, because all laws, that they be just, must be conformable to right reason and thus to eternal law, as to their norm and measure: thus from eternal law they have that they are a norm of rectitude;

2. they are derived from eternal law as from an efficient cause from which they have the power of obligating, because every inferior legislative power is from God, according to that saying in Rom. XIII, 1: There is no power except from God: thus from eternal law they have that they are a norm of obligation.

Divine wisdom signified both when it said (Prov. VIII, 15-16): "By Me kings reign (as to the second: power), and lawgivers decree just things (as to the first: rectitude); by Me princes rule, and the powerful decree justice." Hence all laws also:

3. depend on and are derived from eternal law as from a directive and actually regulative cause, because eternal law, through the mediation of the light of reason, directs legislators, so that they may see what laws are to be instituted according to diverse circumstances: thus from eternal law they have that they are actually instituted.

242. To eternal law all things are subject which are subjected to divine governance:

1. All natural things, whether necessary or contingent: for God gave not only to intellectual creatures a rule, which is the principle of acting, by impressing upon their mind knowledge of the divine precept, but also to the whole of nature principles and instinct for proper acts; and therefore He is said to command the whole of nature. Thus all movements and actions of the whole of nature are subject to eternal law insofar as all creatures are inclined and moved by divine providence; likewise the defects which occur in nature against the order of one or another particular cause, because these do not occur against the order of the first cause but are also subjected to divine providence, from which nothing escapes.

2. All human affairs: for men are subject to eternal law, not only as to inclination toward that which is conformable to eternal law, but also because they have knowledge of law: the evil imperfectly, in whom the natural inclination to virtue is depraved by a vicious habit and the natural cognition of good is darkened by passions and vices; but the good perfectly, because in them to the natural inclination to good there is added the interior motive of grace and virtue, and to the natural cognition of good there is added the cognition of faith and of the gift of wisdom. Hence the good always act according to law, actually or habitually, but the evil often act against it; yet the more they fall short of it on the part of action, the more they are subject to it on the part of passion, because the more they must be punished according to it.

1. Nothing, namely, can escape the rule of eternal law: for he who acts against one directive precept of eternal law falls into another precept determining penalty, which commands that, insofar as man has failed in action, so much be compensated through passion.

3. But those things which pertain to the divine nature or essence are not subject to it: for these are really eternal law itself. Namely, the act of the mind does not really differ from God Himself; but nothing can be subject to itself.

Nor is it an obstacle that God is bound not to do moral evil, for example, to lie: for He is not bound to this by force of some law prohibiting it, but by reason of the repugnance which arises from His nature and perfection, insofar as if He did evil or lied, He would not be God. Hence it is said that "God is a law to Himself" (I, q. 21, a. 1, ad 2), not properly, because nothing can be subject to itself, but because by Himself He is right without law, as if He were a law to Himself.

Third Question: On the Mutability of Eternal Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 93, a. 2.

243. Eternal law in itself is immutable, but its knowledge in us is mutable. Eternal law, because it is the essence of God, cannot be known in itself except by God and by the blessed; but all rational creatures are able to know it according to a certain greater or lesser irradiation of it. For every knowledge of truth is an irradiation and participation of divine truth and therefore of eternal law; but all know truth in some way, more or less, at least as to the common principles of natural law, and therefore also eternal law.

Hence although eternal law in itself is immutable, nevertheless its knowledge can be increased or diminished in individuals, according as they know more or less the other laws which are its participation, as will be said below.

Section B: On the Laws Which Rule Moral Acts

Third Part: On Natural Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, a. 2.

244. Thesis. In the rational creature there is given a natural law, which is implanted with nature and essentially joined to it, and is known by the natural light of reason.

The first part is certain by faith, since the ordinary magisterium of the Church clearly teaches it from Scripture itself (Ps. IV, 6-7 according to the LXX and Vulgate) against atheists, materialists, defenders of moral positivism, and evolutionists; the other is certain against the traditionalists who asserted that natural law, in the present state of fallen man, becomes known to us only by the light of supernatural revelation or tradition.

It is proved: 1) In Scripture the Apostle teaches (Rom. II, 14-15) that the Gentiles who do not have the law (namely, the positive Mosaic law) naturally (that is, under the guidance of the light of natural reason) do the things which are of the law (which are prescribed by the Mosaic law), are a law to themselves (that is, it is in them), have it written in their hearts; that it is a true law, for whose violation or observance they are accused or defended by conscience; that the law was borne by God, because conscience accuses before God, who according to this will judge them.

2. The Fathers say that natural law is in all; that it is not written but inhering, innate, inserted; that it is inscribed in hearts; that nature is the teacher of good work, etc. Thus Justin, *Dialogue*

93; Origen, on Romans, l. II, n. 7, 8, 9; Tertullian, *Against Marcion* V, 13; Jerome, ep. 121 to Algasia, q. 8; Chrysostom, hom. 12 and 13 to the people of Antioch; Gregory Nazianzen, or. 28, n. 16; Ambrose, ep. 73; Augustine, on Ps. 57, n. 1; on Ps. 118, serm. 25, n. 5; Gregory the Great, on the Gospels, hom. 31, n. 3; Origen, on Numbers, hom. 10, n. 3; Augustine, *Confessions* II, 4; *Sermon on the Mount* II, c. 9; Jerome, ep. 121; Ambrose, *De fuga saeculi* 3, n. 15; ep. 73; Tertullian, *De corona* 6; Basil, on the *Hexaemeron*, hom. 9, n. 3 and 4; Cyril of Alexandria, *Against Julian*, l. 3; etc.

1. Cf. Bouquillon, *Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis*, n. 68; Leo XIII, encyclical *Libertas*.

3. Intimate sense and conscience testify that some actions are good, others evil; that these stand in the way of attaining the end or perfect good, while those are necessary to the end and obligatory, so that one who obeys the command attains peace of soul, while one who transgresses the same is agitated by the stings of conscience; from these arises the consensus of peoples in the existence of a law independent of human power.

4. Reason teaches the same, which St. Thomas shows thus:

Law can be in something in two ways: in one way in the legislator as in the one regulating and measuring, in another way in the subject as in the thing regulated and measured, because insofar as something participates in a rule and measure, thus it is regulated and measured. But all things which are subjected to divine providence are regulated by eternal law. Therefore all things participate in eternal law in some way, insofar as they have an inclination into their own acts and ends. But the rational creature is subject to providence in a more excellent way, insofar as it is made a participant of providence itself, providing for itself and for others. Therefore in it there is a special participation of eternal law insofar as it has an inclination to the due act and end known to it; and this participation is natural law.

It can be defined: the ordination of the rational creature to the ultimate end, founded in its very nature and perceived by the natural light of reason; or the participation of eternal law in rational nature, the ordination impressed upon the created mind by which eternal law is participated in it.

First Question: On the Essence of Natural Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, a. 2 and q. 94, a. 1.

245. Thesis. The participation of eternal law in the rational creature is true law. - For it is:

1. an ordination of reason: the rational creature participates in law intellectually and rationally, and therefore the participation of eternal law in it is properly called law, because it is something of reason: a dictate constituted by reason; in other creatures it is not participated rationally, whence in them a proper inclination is not called law except by similitude;

2. promulgated by God to a community: for although promulgation is made in individuals, by the impression of reason, nevertheless it is made by reason not indeed as it is particular, but as it is common and the same in all, proceeding from the author of nature;

3. it is made for moral honesty, not of one person, but of the whole of humanity.

1. "The common voice of the whole of nature, or rather of its author, who, although He speaks to individuals, speaks as a public person, because He speaks as author of nature itself." Suarez, *De Legibus*, l. I, c. II, n. 4.

246. Essence of natural law. - Natural law is not law insofar as it is in the legislator as in the one regulating, and accordingly it is not eternal law itself; but it is law as it is in subjects as in those regulated, and accordingly it is the participation, manifestation, passive promulgation of eternal law in us.

And indeed:

1. It is not the will of God, whether necessary or free: for actions are not good or evil because they are commanded or prohibited by the willing God, but they are commanded or prohibited as intrinsically good or evil in themselves; and indeed good things which are required as necessary by order cannot fail to be commanded, and evil things cannot fail to be prohibited. Whence, if per impossible God did not will natural law, nevertheless it would become known to us and obligate us in the same way, because human nature would be constituted in the same way by commanding divine reason, and it, as also our acts, would be ordered to the ultimate end. Law, namely, essentially is an ordination of reason, not of will.

2. The Nominalists, such as Ockham, Pierre d'Ailly, Gerson; likewise Descartes and Pufendorf, say: the free will of God. Suarez speaks in the same way. Liberatore, De Bie, and Gutberlet say: necessary will; Meyer: hypothetically necessary will. Cathrein says: will, without further determination.

3. Billuart notes, diss. 1, a. 1: "For law it suffices that it be directive of human actions, and that it have the power of obligating. But eternal law (as to necessary precepts) and natural law have these two independently of every act of will. Concerning the first there is no doubt; concerning the second it is also clear, because, by the very fact that the reason of the divine mind dictates and intimates that God is to be worshiped, parents are to be honored, etc., and that theft, lying, etc. are evil and therefore to be avoided, there arises in man an obligation to do those things in their time and to avoid these things, even if, per impossible, there were no will obligating to these, because from their intrinsic things or from their nature they are either to be done or to be avoided, by the very fact that through the dictate of reason they are intimated as such."

2. Nor does the will or power of God necessarily seem to have to be attended to in order that natural law become known. For moral necessity or obligation is the absolute necessity of a means to an absolutely necessary end (Q. D. *De Veritate* 17, a. 3), so that the means is necessary not only under the condition, if someone wills the end, but absolutely, because the end also is absolutely necessary and altogether imposed upon us. Whence, in order to know law or obligation, it suffices that there be present the absolute necessity of an end which is altogether imposed, and that the necessary connection of means to the end be known, and consequently the obligation to those means. Now the end is imposed upon us by the physical necessity of nature: the highest good of rational nature and highest happiness, so that we cannot fail to will it; and reason a) can know that certain particular goods fitting to rational

nature pertain to that end (as a necessary condition of true perfection and ultimate happiness), while certain others do not pertain to it, and b) thus can perceive the necessary connection of certain acts, as means, with that end. Therefore the absolute moral necessity of means and obligation arising from nature, or natural law, can be known while abstracting from God, namely, without attending to the will or authority of God. This nevertheless does not exclude that natural law remotely and ultimately depends upon God, and that obligation, once God is known, is perceived more fully and perfectly.

1. Thus Vasquez, Gerdil, D'Hulst, Mercier (in an autograph course of moral philosophy); *Manuel de philosophie neo-scolastique* (of the Louvain school); Gillet, *Du Fondement intellectuel de la Morale d'apres Aristote*; Lottin, *Le Probleme des Fins en morale*, p. 164; *Loi Naturelle et positive*, p. 20; *L'Ordre moral et l'ordre logique*, p. 331; Du Rousseaux, *Philosophie morale*, p. 200 and 227; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Dieu*, p. 309; Fonsegrive in *Revue de Philosophie*, 1910; *Vie diocesaine*, 1923, p. 383; *Collectanea Mechliniensia*, 1928, p. 330.

3. Yet it is not the categorical imperative of autonomous reason or will (Kant and the Rationalists). For autonomy cannot be reconciled with the idea of true obligation, because human reason cannot obligate itself. Whence obligation is not constituted by human reason, but is imposed from the necessary inclination of our nature, which cannot be changed by us and which always persists immutable. Furthermore, this opinion rests upon the false foundation that man is an end to himself, or an end in himself (cf. Syllabus, prop. 3 and 50), while nevertheless he is essentially a creature of God, depending upon Him and ordered to Him. The ultimate end, namely, is not constituted by reason but by the author of nature.

Therefore, considered in first act, natural law is the habitual inclination of rational nature to its own acts, namely, to knowing and desiring the end or perfect good, and the means necessarily leading to it, or honorable acts to be chosen; whence nature truly is a law to itself, in this sense, that from the necessary and ineluctable inclination of nature to the end there arises obligation to employ the means. In other words, natural law is the light of natural reason by which we are able to discern what is good to be done or evil to be avoided; this light shows goodness and malice and is the rule of our acts, insofar as it is derived from the divine light and is an impression of the divine light in us. Considered in second act, law is the actual dictate or judgment of reason prescribing in a general mode what is good to be done, what evil is to be avoided. Hence:

a) although natural law is not a habit, since it is not that by which reason acts, but that which it dictates, nevertheless the precepts of the law of nature are not always actually considered by reason, and then they are in it habitually, and thus natural law can be called a habit, because it is held by habit;

b) it differs from synderesis, which is not the innate light of reason or its actual dictate, but is a habit (or facility, not strictly innate but flowing spontaneously from the intellect) by which we easily enunciate not all but the first moral principles; whence it contains these principles virtually;

c) it differs from conscience, which is not a general norm of acting but a judgment concerning things to be done in particular.

247. Foundation of natural law. - One must ask not only about the essence, but also about the foundation of natural law or natural obligation, and consequently of every obligation; for positive obligation is founded upon the obligation of natural law, insofar as this commands that superiors are to be obeyed.

Now from what has been said it is clear:

1. That the sole, sufficient, or ultimate foundation is not the will of God, whether free or necessary: not free, because the question is of necessary law; not necessary, because it depends upon something prior from which it has necessity, namely, upon divine wisdom and essence (Q. D. *De Veritate* 23, a. 6); and therefore it is not the ultimate, sole, and sufficient foundation. Adversaries indeed say that no law is given without a legislator, and that no precept can be conceived without the will and authority of one prescribing. But:

a) this is true of positive law, which is not necessary, not of natural law, whose obligation arises from the nature of things and from the necessary tendency of our nature to the end;

b) besides, by saying that natural law is obligatory because reason dictates that the will of God prescribing is to be obeyed, they will with difficulty free themselves from contradiction, because the said principle, as prescribed by reason alone, is known as obligatory and does not ultimately depend on knowledge of the will of God; otherwise there would be a vicious circle;

c) finally, the first principles of natural law, for example, good is to be done, etc., are known before knowledge of God, just as the knowledge itself of the terms of which they consist and by which, once known, they are immediately enunciated, precedes this knowledge. Whence, although God in the ontological order is the necessary foundation of natural law, He is not so in the logical order of knowledge.

1. Cf. I-II, q. 94, a. 2 and 4; q. 58, a. 5; II-II, q. 47, a. 6; Q. D. *De Veritate* 16, a. 1 and 2.

2. Nor is the foundation human reason alone, because just as an effect depends more upon the first cause than upon the second cause, so obligation depends more upon the author of nature and eternal law than upon nature and human reason participated from God: for the essential order of things is not from reason nor from itself, but is derived from eternal law.

The foundation seems to be distinguished as twofold:

a) One secondary and proximate: human nature itself regarded completely with its essential and necessary relations, or its ultimate end absolutely imposed upon it, or the essential order of things according to which certain things have a necessary connection with the ultimate end; and this is sufficient for conceiving true and properly so-called natural obligation, as we have said.

b) The other primary, remote, and ultimate: the intellect of God itself, or eternal law with its root, the divine essence. For eternal law is the fountain of human nature and reason, and this is not the rule of our acts except from divine reason, of which it is also a participation. In the same way the foundation of the principles of speculative reason and of eternal truths is twofold: namely, the proximate foundation, the nature of things and the relations which hold among them (which suffices for conceiving necessary truths), and the ultimate foundation, which is the essence and intellect of

God. And just as we are able to know the truth of the first principles of speculative reason from the proximate foundation alone, the nature of things, without knowing their ultimate foundation, the divine intellect, so we are able to know the truth and obligation of the first principles of practical reason without knowing their ultimate foundation: the divine intellect and eternal law.

248. Corollary: the system of secular morality, or, as they say, of obligation independent of God, must therefore be refuted, by saying that it is:

1. Here we consider the system under the respect of obligation; above we spoke of it under the respect of morality itself, n. 134.

a) essentially incomplete, since it is silent about God the true ultimate end and about our duties toward God;

b) false, insofar as it affirms natural law to be founded in nature or reason alone, eternal law of God being excluded;

c) ineffective, because law lacks sufficient sanction, and accordingly, the propensities of men to vices being considered, in fact they will not sufficiently observe it.

Yet it does not seem that it should be called contradictory, as if it were impossible to conceive natural law while abstracting from God the legislator, or obligation without God willing and commanding: for that is to say too much, and does not seem true.

But if it is said that obligation cannot be conceived unless the ultimate end to be attained is known, regarded in the concrete, which is God, we think this necessary only for complete knowledge of the whole moral law. For partial knowledge, knowledge of the end considered in the abstract suffices, insofar as it is the supreme and complete good of rational nature. But even granting this, God would not yet have to be regarded as supreme legislator or as commanding by will, but only as the Supreme Good to be pursued.

249. Observation. - Therefore eternal law and natural law differ:

1. subjectively: the former is in God, the latter in the created mind; and therefore

2. materially in physical being: the former is divine wisdom (and essence), the latter is the created light of reason participated from it; and consequently

3. in knowability: the former in itself is known by God alone and by the blessed, the latter is perceived by the light of reason.

But they agree: 1) formally and in the notion of dictate, because the rectitude and obligation of both is the same, since one is a participation of the other; and therefore:

2. objectively, because they dictate the same things, not indeed a) totally according to the whole extension, for eternal law also extends to irrational creatures and to those things which God commands by positive law (or ordains to be commanded by others); but b) partially: for although not everything which eternal law commands is commanded by natural law, nevertheless everything which the law of nature commands is also commanded by eternal law.

Therefore they are the same law, just as the image of the seal and of the sealed thing is the same; yet the seal is more extended than the sealed thing.

Second Question: On the Power of Natural Law

Article I: On the Directive Force or Obligation of Natural Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 94, a. 2 and 3; q. 100, a. 1.

250. Natural law is one, containing several precepts. - Natural law, although by reason of the matter about which it is concerned it contains several precepts, nevertheless in itself is one, both because it tends to one ultimate end and because all those precepts are founded upon one first universal principle: Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided.

It is proved: human reason, both speculative and practical, is essentially deductive. But just as being is the first thing which is known by the intellect, so good is the first thing which is known by practical reason. Whence, just as the first speculative principle is founded on the notion of being: It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, so the first practical principle is founded on the notion of good: Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided; and therefore reason commands or prohibits nothing except what it naturally apprehends as good or evil.

1. Others establish a diverse first principle, for example: Live conformably to human nature considered according to all its essential respects (thus various scholastic manuals); or: Exhibit by free actions also the image of God absolutely holy, impressed upon you through the mode of rational nature (Carl Aeger); or: Preserve the right order of rational nature as divinely sanctioned (Meyer). But these things are to be done because they are good. Furthermore, at least they are not the first principle, because they are not first in the intellect, nor are they had among the common people, who nevertheless know natural law. But the Augustinians, such as Berti (*De Theologicis Disciplinis*, l. XX, c. 4, prop. 3), establish this: Love God as end and the rest on account of Him; but that is first in the ontological order, not in the logical order.

251. Order and division of precepts. - Natural law in a general mode embraces all those things which so befit or are repugnant to rational nature that for the conservation of order they are necessarily commanded or prohibited by the Creator of nature Himself; whence to natural law pertain all precepts to which we are obligated from the nature of the thing and independently of any positive law. Among these there is given a manifold order:

A. By reason of matter, in two ways:

a) according to the threefold natural inclination of man to the good, whether of natural being, that is, of preserving existence, or of animal life, for example, of procreating offspring, or of rational life proper to him.

For good has the notion of end; whence man has as goods all those things to which he has natural inclination. But in man there is a threefold inclination: 1) to good according to the nature which he has in common with all substances, which all seek the conservation of their own being; 2) to good according to the nature which he has in common with animals, such as procreation and education of offspring; 3) to goods according to the nature of reason, which are proper to him, for example, that he worship God and live in society.

Hence precepts are distinguished according to the nature of substance (abstinence, fortitude), according to the nature of animal (chastity, prudence), and according to the nature of man (religion, justice);

b) according to the threefold natural relation or order of man: 1) to God as to his first principle and ultimate end; 2) to himself, for he consists of a twofold part, of which one, the higher, must rule the lower part; 3) to neighbor: made social, man is destined to conjugal, domestic, and political society. Hence precepts are distinguished toward God, toward oneself, and toward neighbor, according as man is regarded as a created, rational, or social being.

Order to God is the order of subjection; order to neighbor is the order of equality and proximity, by which his person in himself or in his things is prohibited from being violated, and he himself is to be loved after the likeness of ourselves; the order of man to himself is the conformity of himself and of his faculties (of which he is not master) to reason and to rational nature and its proper end, and of subordination to the human species and the common good.

1. Vermeersch well observes, *Theologia Moralis* I, n. 240: a) that man is subordinated not only to the end but also to the order on account of the ultimate end; whence one who acts against inclination or order already begins to act against the end; b) and that this order is not immediately imposed upon individuals and through individuals upon nature, but upon individuals through nature: whence generally it is to be observed, even if in a particular case it would not be inconvenient or harmful for some individual, because it always remains of itself inconvenient to nature.

B. Formally, on the part of the mode in which they are contained in the law, or by reason of knowledge and of the logical nexus among the principles of the law of nature:

1. some are general, most universal, most common, indeterminate, self-evident, known to all from the mere understanding of the terms, for example: Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided; What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; One must live according to reason; The Creator is to be obeyed; To each his own is to be rendered; The Supreme Good is to be loved; Injury is to be done to no one; Live conformably to your nature as a rational, created, social being, etc.

2. others are more proper and determined, particular, as conclusions deduced from the first principles, and these are:

a) either immediately, proximately, and evidently deduced from the first principles, which are the precepts of the Decalogue;

b) or more remote, which are deduced not so evidently but mediately and by many consequences, for example, that usury is unjust, that lying is always illicit, that an injury inflicted is not to be avenged by private authority, that found things are to be restored.

C. By reason of force and efficacy, or of necessity to the end, and of the ontological and real nexus:

1. St. Thomas, IV Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, and ad 8; a. 2; and III Sent. d. 37, a. 3.

1. some are precepts primarily intended, which nature altogether demands, because they are altogether necessary to the end which nature directly and principally intends: thus marriage is altogether necessary for due procreation and education of offspring;

2. others are secondarily intended, derived from the first, to which nature inclines much, which either are necessary, not indeed that the primary end be obtained, but that it be obtained decently, fittingly, more easily, or are necessary to a secondary end which nature intends not directly but concomitantly and subordinately to another: thus the unity of marriage befits the education of offspring and is necessary for the peace of the family.

Briefly: some precepts concern necessary things without which the moral order is impossible; others concern things very useful, which are not strictly necessary, so that the order can subsist without them, although less perfectly.

Hence, relative to the altogether ultimate and primary end of natural law, which is God and the love of God above all things, there are distinguished:

a) first precepts, which prescribe things strictly necessary to the love of God, or prohibit those things which directly impede it and turn away from it; of which:

1. some immediately state a necessary order, or repugnance, to the ultimate end, God: these are the precepts of the first table;

2. others immediately state a necessary order, or repugnance, to love of ourselves or of neighbor, but mediately to the ultimate end, insofar as they are means necessary from the nature of the thing to it: love of ourselves, indeed, because it is a necessary predisposition to the love of God and neighbor, since we cannot tend except to our own good, nor love someone except by imitating love of ourselves, and because our life is a necessary condition for obtaining the end; love of neighbor, because society is a means altogether necessary to men from the nature of the thing for obtaining the end, whence here belong those things which are necessary to society and without which it cannot subsist: these are the precepts of the second table.

All these things are gravely prescribed or prohibited as altogether necessary to the ultimate end or altogether opposed to it;

b) second precepts derived from the first, which prescribe those things which are necessary so that the end be obtained decently, better, and more easily, and prohibit those things which retard from it or cannot be referred to it, such as 1) those things which include a certain small irreverence toward God, and only fall short of the due mode of worship; 2) those which detract somewhat from justice or charity; or 3) those which only lack necessity or utility. These are lightly prescribed or prohibited, because they are not strictly necessary to the ultimate end nor do they turn away from it.

From the foregoing it is clear that the precepts which are primary or secondary in knowledge are not the same as those which are primary or secondary by necessity and by intention of nature; for many things secondary in knowledge, which are deduced from the first principles by conclusion (even remote), are primarily intended by nature, such as the prohibition of homicide, adultery, theft; whence one must carefully inspect in what sense those terms are used among authors.

1. Secondary precepts by reason of the universal precept can be primary in their own order, in this genus, according as they regard determined matters, because they regard the principal end of that genus, and are distinguished from secondary precepts, which regard a secondary end or something accessory to the principal end. Those things which are secondary comparatively to one end can be primary with respect to another. Whence, in order to conclude that a precept obligates lightly, one must see that under no respect is it primary.

252. The object of natural law is acts of virtues.

Acts of virtues, according to their genus, insofar as they are virtuous, all belong to the law of nature: for this comprehends all things to which man is inclined according to nature. But each thing is inclined to an operation suitable to its form; and the form of man is the rational soul. Whence man is naturally inclined to operating according to reason, which is to act according to virtue. But if virtuous acts are considered according to themselves, insofar as they are such or such, according to species, not all belong to the law of nature, because many are matters of counsel, or concern those things to which nature does not incline, but which men have discovered by inquiry of reason as useful for living well.

253. Subject of natural law. - Because natural law is implanted with rational nature and essentially joined to it, hence all rational creatures are subject to it and bound by it, not only adults (among whom are the blessed and the damned), but also children and the perpetually insane: these, however, are not bound perfectly and in second act, because they do not have the use of reason and knowledge of the law, but imperfectly and in first act, because they have potency to those things. Hence:

1. although in these there is no formal sin because the use of reason and liberty is lacking, nevertheless they sin materially, by acting against the law of nature habitually inhering in them;

2. the same must be said of those sleeping, drunk, and others who here and now are ignorant of the law, unless they have culpably placed the cause of sin; in which case they also sin formally;

3. those who induce the aforesaid to acting against natural law sin formally: for they are the moral or even physical cause of these sins, and therefore by their will they participate in and embrace them; for the action of the instrument is deservedly imputed to the principal agent. Add that they are often the cause of a bad custom in them, and of scandal in bystanders.

Article II: On the Coercive Force or Sanction of Natural Law

St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* III, 140-141.

254. Notions. - Sanction, a) on the part of the cause or origin, is internal (and concomitant), which proceeds naturally and by the very fact, from the action itself or from the nature of the thing, and follows observance or violation of the law, for example, tranquility and remorse of conscience, good and bad reputation, bodily indisposition from drunkenness; and external (or inflicted), which comes from an extrinsic cause, or is connected by the disposition of law with observance or violation of law, for example, if a drunkard is punished by a judge with a fine;

b) on the part of the effect, it is perfect or sufficient, which by its nature is able to move all subjects (either absolutely, or relatively for certain circumstances) in every case to observance of the law, and has due proportion with merit and demerit; or imperfect and insufficient.

255. Thesis. An imperfect and internal sanction of natural law exists in the present life; the perfect sanction is in the other life, from the attainment or loss of the ultimate end.

a) The first part is proved. Internal sanction is present, for virtue is the perfect good of this life; and fault is rather often followed by 1) remorse of conscience, because "when the impulse of malice or passion by which they do evil has ceased, according to reason they know that they have acted badly and they grieve"; 2) pain in the soul; 3) sickness in the body. Hence Wis. XI, 17: By the things through which one sins, by these also he is tormented. But it is imperfect, both because it does not sufficiently induce to observance of the law, for sometimes we are bound to expose life itself, and there are many seductions in this life, for overcoming which a sanction more excellent than the goods of this life is required; and because, as experience testifies, it does not repay each one according to justice.

1. St. Thomas, on IX *Ethics*, l. 4.

b) The second part is proved: 1) from the essential order of things: where there is a due order to an end, it is necessary that order lead to that end, and departure from order exclude the end. But from the disposition and law of God, human acts are essentially ordered to the ultimate end. Therefore it is necessary that those preserving order attain the ultimate end (which is to be rewarded); but that those departing from order be excluded from the end (which is to be punished). This is confirmed:

a) Just as natural things are subjected to the ordination of divine providence, so also human nature; therefore, just as in natural things the order preserved of necessity produces conservation and good in them, so in human things it is necessary that the order of law divinely imposed, when preserved, lead from the disposition of the governor to the good of retribution, but the order of law passed over, to the evil of penalty.

b) For matter does not attain form unless it has been suitably disposed. But the end is the perfection of the will, just as form is the perfection of matter. Therefore the will does not attain the end unless it has been suitably disposed. But it is disposed by the intention and desire and pursuit of the end. Therefore he whose intention is turned away from the end does not attain it.

c) This also holds of the supernatural end. For he who recedes from the natural end also recedes from the supernatural end, because the natural order is the foundation of elevation to the supernatural end; namely, he recedes from God as the principle of all perfection.

2. from the wisdom of the supreme legislator: God, as the most wise and provident legislator, intends that natural law be observed by all. But, as experience testifies, one efficacious and necessary means of inducing free men, moved by depraved desires and pleasures, to this is perfect sanction, which is so proportioned to every virtue and difficulty of the law that, all things considered, it is never truly useful for man to depart from the law. Therefore God established a perfect sanction. But in the present life such perfect sanction is lacking. Therefore perfect sanction pertains to the future life, or to the state of the term and end, so that the

human will, which naturally tends to happiness, may be efficaciously moved to observance of the law by hope of attaining this and fear of losing it.

3. from the holiness and justice of the supreme Lord: men are distinguished from one another by their acts, to which imputability and merit belong. But divine holiness demands that this distinction resulting from the imputability of human acts be preserved in the future life; and justice demands that reward be assigned to merit, penalty to demerit. Therefore. For if good and evil were related equally to the essential attainment of the end, there would be no essential distinction of morality, because all morality depends upon relation to the ultimate end; and thus: a) practically the intrinsic difference between good and evil would be destroyed, and God would seem indifferent to good and evil, which contradicts His holiness; b) the law of God would be violated with impunity, and the rebellious creature could escape His will and as it were triumph over Him, which is repugnant to the justice of divine dominion.

256. Sanction does not harm morality.

For to do good on account of reward and to avoid evil on account of penalty can happen in two ways: a) so that reward or penalty is the sole motive of the act, without any respect to its goodness or malice, and such a mode is bad because it perverts order, since the means is put before the end; b) so that man uses hope of reward or fear of penalty for pursuing good more efficaciously and avoiding evil more efficaciously, and such a mode is conformable to the order intended by the legislator, who adds sanction as a means for urging the obligation of law. This is confirmed by the universal practice of parents and teachers in educating children (n. 133, 3).

Hence Kantian ethics, which asserts the sole motive of obligation, is not more perfect than Christian ethics, which they say is founded on fear and hope. For on the one hand Christian ethics does not teach that morality depends upon fear and hope, but that these are helps; on the other hand Kant refuses to admit that rational human nature and the essential order of things are the foundation of morality. And yet it does not pertain to ethics to correct nature, but to accept it as it is in fact and so to direct human actions that they be conformable to rational nature.

1. Cf. Lehu, op. cit., n. 27; and D'Hulst, *Conferences de N. D.*, 1891.

Third Question: On the Mutability of Natural Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 94, a. 4, 5, 6; q. 100, a. 1 and 8.

257. Natural law is one among all, regarded in first act: for the same habitual inclination of reason to judging rightly conformably to eternal law is present, whence there is the same participation and conformity with eternal law; but in second act, that is, as to actual judgments of reason:

1. it is altogether the same as to substance, that is, as to the most common principles;

2. but as to application, that is, as to proper principles deduced from the first principles, especially the more remote, it is the same among all generally and as in the greater number; yet because not all always judge and apply principles in the same way, therefore sometimes it is not the same as in the fewer cases, either:

a) as to subjective knowledge: for just as some are ignorant of deductions from speculative principles, so those having depraved reason are ignorant of these practical principles from passion, bad custom, or a bad disposition of nature;

b) also as to objective rectitude: deductions of speculative principles are necessary and the same among all, although they are not equally known by all; but practical reason is concerned with contingent things, in which human operations consist; whence, on account of particular impediments, sometimes principles cannot be rightly applied. Thus, for example, the principle "deposits are to be returned" would not be rightly applied if the depositor asked for return to the harm of himself or of another. And similar exceptions are given for preserving a secret or private dominion. Whence what is right in one case is not right in another.

258. Natural law is intrinsically immutable. - Although it can be changed by the addition of other laws, formally (according to the principles themselves or the tenor of the law) it is intrinsically immutable as to subtraction, so that nothing ceases to be of natural law which previously was of it: for it is founded in rational nature regarded with its necessary relations to other things, especially to the ultimate end, and arises necessarily from the nature of things; whence it contains only that which by its nature is intrinsically good or evil, necessarily leading to the ultimate end or turning away from it, independently of every positive will, even of God. Whence, just as its foundation in itself, its object, and its ultimate end are immutable, so also the law itself is immutable.

Nevertheless the matter of certain precepts, or its circumstances, can be changed; and when these are changed, the law no longer obtains. For some precepts are founded immediately and independently of every condition in the immutable essences themselves of things, and in these there is no change: for these regard those things which are essentially good or evil. But others are founded in the natural and ordinary conditions of things and regard those things which ordinarily and regularly are good or evil, yet not under every condition and for every case. For God through miracle can change the conditions of things which are the matter of the law, and secondary causes also can change the circumstances of things; when these are changed, the principles of the law and the law itself are not changed, but they are not applicable. Whence it can happen that the same action physically regarded which was commanded or prohibited by the law of nature here and now no longer is, because morally it is another, whether on account of a change of matter by a miracle of God, or on account of a change of circumstances.

Therefore 1) no change is given in natural law: a) as to the primary principles in knowledge, altogether general and immediately evident;

b) per se as to the principles primarily intended, which directly and immediately state a necessary order or repugnance to God, because they concern things essentially good and evil: for subjection to the first cause is immutable and order to the ultimate end altogether necessary. Those things are excepted which have had their origin from the free will of men, such as a vow and a promissory oath, whose obligation or debt, as not necessary of itself but voluntarily assumed, can be remitted by God, just as man can yield his voluntarily acquired right.

2. Change is not given generally and as in the greater number; but per se it can sometimes be given as in the fewer cases, in precepts which directly and immediately are concerned with means to the end, because ordinarily they depend upon some conditions. Thus:

a) as to principles primarily intended, for one or another particular case, if the conditions of things are changed (as in the case of a deposit or secret), or also if they can be changed miraculously by God: thus homicide, adultery, theft are evil, but the same actions could be licit if God removed from another the right to life, to the body of the spouse, or to temporal goods. Exception is made if exceptionally they are founded immediately in the essences of things, independently of every condition: thus sins of lust against nature and lying are always evil;

b) a fortiori as to principles secondarily intended, even commonly and for all, during some time: for although regularly they must be observed, nevertheless they can sometimes not obligate because of special causes, even natural ones, impeding their observance. Thus unity generally and per se befits the primary end and is necessary for the secondary end of marriage; nevertheless per accidens polygamy can be licit on account of propagation of the people. Marriage between brother and sister per se is evil, but it was licit at the beginning of the human race: for always an end of lesser moment must yield to the more principal, and a lesser precept to a greater.

Let it be noted further that most principles which are proposed in a general formula are expressed inadequately and are not universal, but include a restriction, condition, or determination understood beneath. Thus, for example, the precept, You shall not kill, adequately expressed, sounds: You shall not kill an innocent person by private authority and by way of aggression. Whence the exceptions of such a principle are only corrections of our mode of speaking, not of the law itself.

259. Natural law is extrinsically immutable or indispensable. - For God cannot change and abrogate it, because He cannot fail to command good or prohibit evil, and moreover His will would not suffice for changing law which is nature itself; but dispensation is a true change and as it were abrogation of the law, namely, its relaxation and the cessation of obligation in a particular case, made by one having power, while the matter of the law remains immutable. But if God is said to dispense, this must be understood improperly or indirectly, either a) of a change of matter, as when He yields His right and thus remits the obligation in a vow or oath, whereby it happens that the promised matter is withdrawn from the law saying that to each his own must be rendered; or b) of an authentic declaration and interpretation that the law does not obligate because of a change of circumstances, as was done for the polygamy of the patriarchs: for often it is dangerous to leave to men the judgment whether the circumstances are verified in which the law does not obligate, and then the power of declaring to what cases it ought not extend is reserved to the author of the law.

A fortiori the Church cannot change natural law or dispense in it. Nevertheless it can interpret it simply, that is, merely explain it, and indeed authentically and infallibly, both because natural law was also revealed and because it is the necessary foundation for Christian morals. It can also, in the name of God, dispense in a vow, oath, and marriage, but improperly, insofar as it declares that in certain cases the law no longer obtains, namely, that God yields His right or annuls the bond.

260. Natural law cannot be abolished from the heart of men, if it is considered in first act as the habitual light of reason; but in second act as to actual knowledge:

1. As to the primary principles in knowledge or the most universal principles, it cannot be abolished and be unknown, because they are self-evident and therefore altogether indelible; nevertheless in application we can err from passion.

2. As to the proper and particular principles proximately deduced from the first principles:

a) per se there is not ignorance in one who uses reason suitably developed, because they can be known with the easiest diligence (Rom. II, 16);

b) nevertheless per accidens there can be vincible ignorance, and even invincible ignorance for a short time, on account of impediments of reason, such as bad persuasions from insufficient development or cultivation of reason in children and the very uneducated, depraved customs, corrupted habits, etc., or also when there is question of the application of principles, especially if certain circumstances seem to make an evil act honorable;

c) indeed perhaps for a long time in the absence of any cultivation whatsoever.

3. As to more remote principles, because they are deduced only by subtler consideration and often require attention to multiple and complicated circumstances, there can be invincible ignorance even among the pious and learned, as experience shows.

Authors admit that the malice of internal acts can be invincibly unknown, namely, at least of depraved delights and perhaps also of desires, of an officious lie, of perjury for protecting life, of theft for relieving the needy, of pollution in boys, and of fornication.

261. Corollary.

Nothing excuses from a negative natural precept, not even danger of death, because it prohibits that which is intrinsically evil. From an affirmative natural precept a proportionately grave inconvenience excuses: for an affirmative law does not obligate at individual moments; therefore ordinarily it does not obligate precisely when grave inconvenience is present, but the moment can be awaited when it is not present. Nevertheless danger of death does not excuse from it in a case in which violation would yield either to great common damage (the common good is to be preferred to a private good), or to the extreme spiritual necessity of one's neighbor (the spiritual good of one's neighbor is to be preferred to one's own temporal good), or to hatred of God and religion or contempt of the Church; as will be said in its places.

Fourth Part: On Human and Civil Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, a. 3; q. 95, a. 1.

262. Human law in the broader sense is that which has been borne by the positive will of any human legislator for directing society and its members to their end; but in the present matter it is taken in the stricter sense for civil law, because this is borne by a power which naturally belongs to man, as being destined to society, and which by its nature is human, and thus is distinguished from Christian and ecclesiastical law, which is borne by man, but by a power positively granted to him by the free will of God.

1. Yet originarily it is from the author of nature, just as nature itself. Cf. n. 267.

263. Human law is necessary for supplying what is lacking to natural law, both 1) according to its directive force: for inculcating natural law, which in many is unknown, for determining it more, and

for completing it with other things useful for living rightly; and 2) according to its coercive force: for obtaining its observance from the wicked, by restraining them. For:

1. The principles of natural law are unknown in many, are somewhat abstract, universal, indeterminate as to mode, time, and place, and do not contain all things by which man is usefully moved to good; whence it is not sufficient for directing society, but needs practical determination and sanction. And this determination, that society may be ordered, does not suffice as casual and particular, but must be common and stable, by which all, with united forces, tend in the same way to good. But such a stable and common determination, supplying the defect of natural law and completing it, is human law.

2. Inclination or aptitude to virtue is in man naturally, but the very perfection and consummation of virtue does not come to man except by industry and discipline. Men ordinarily are not sufficient for themselves for this discipline, because the perfection of virtue chiefly consists in withdrawing men from undue pleasures to which they are most inclined; therefore it is necessary that men be ruled by others. These things being supposed, one can argue thus:

Man, that he may decline from evil and learn virtue, needs the rule of others. And indeed for those who by disposition of nature, or custom, or the gift of God are inclined to virtue, paternal discipline suffices, which is done by admonitions; but many are corrupt or prone to vices who are not easily moved by words and admonitions. Therefore it was necessary that they be restrained from evil by force or fear, says St. Thomas, q. 95, a. 1, "so that at least thus, ceasing from evil-doing, they might render a quiet life to others, and they themselves at length through this sort of habituation might be led to this, that they would voluntarily do the good things which before they fulfilled from fear, and thus would become virtuous." But human law does this.

264. Objection.

Nor should you say that the decisions of judges suffice. "First, indeed, because it is easier to find a few wise men sufficient for laying down right laws than many who would be required for judging rightly about individual cases. Secondly, because those who lay down laws consider over much time what is to be borne by law; but judgments about singular deeds are made from suddenly arisen cases. But from many things considered a man can more easily see what is right than from some one deed alone. Thirdly, because legislators judge universally and about future things; but men presiding over judgments judge about present things, toward which they are affected by love or hatred, or some desire, and thus their judgment is depraved. Therefore, because the animated justice of the judge is not found in many, and because it is flexible, it was necessary, in whatever matters it is possible, for law to determine what is to be judged, and to commit very few things to the discretion of men." Ibid., ad 2.

First Question: On Human Law in Itself

Article I: On the End of Human Law

265. Human or civil law is rightly defined as an ordination of human reason by which society or the State and its members are directed immediately to temporal perfection and happiness by him who has care of it, and mediately are aided toward the ultimate end. Therefore the

immediate and proximate end of law is the common good of civil society and of its members, that is, their conservation, perfection, and temporal happiness. But these imply the practice of virtue: for happiness in this life consists formally in the exercise of virtue, and instrumentally in the abundance of goods necessary for the exercise of virtue (n. 44). But virtue is ordered to eternal beatitude. Therefore the remote and mediate end, to which the proximate end is to be subordinated, is eternal beatitude.

1. St. Thomas, on I *Ethics*, c. 13, lect. 19; c. 10, lect. 10 and 16.

266. It is objected: thus with Machiavelli and other politicians, public tranquility and temporal happiness are the end of political rule. But rules of honesty and precepts of religion are very much opposed to public tranquility and temporal happiness. Therefore a political prince is not bound by such rules and principles.

Reply: 1) I distinguish the major: public tranquility and temporal happiness is the proximate end of society, conceded; the ultimate end, denied. There is no regime which ought not be referred to the glory of God and eternal happiness, according to that saying of Augustine (*On the City of God*, V, 24): "We call those emperors happy if they command just things (that is, honorable things), if they make their power the servant of His majesty, especially for spreading the worship of God." Nor does it follow from this that political rule does not differ from the rule of the Church: for they are two republics adequately distinct by reason of the proximate and immediate end, and of the matter proper to each; but this does not prevent both from conspiring toward the same spiritual end. Therefore, although civil power, insofar as it directly commands, is restricted to its proper matter, nevertheless in its proper matter it rules subjects in order to the end of eternal salvation, as to the remote and ultimate end.

2. I deny the minor. For who, unless he be of a delirious mind, will say that the principles of religion and the rules of honesty are harmful to temporal happiness, since rather they greatly contribute to it, by directing and coercing wicked passions which overthrow common tranquility and temporal happiness? Whence Aristotle says, *Politics* III, c. 6: "all who have care for the good institution of a city publicly consider virtue and vice."

Article II: On the Author of Civil Law

267. Thesis. Legislative power originally is from God as from the author of nature. - This is clear a) from Scripture: Wis. VI, 2-4; Rom. XIII, 1-7; Prov. VIII, 15-16; Eccli. XVII, 14; b) from reason: for man is naturally a social animal; but society needs a power by which it is ruled; therefore this power is from the author of nature (cf. Leo XIII, enc. *Diuturnum*, June 29, 1881; *Immortale Dei*, November 1, 1885; and *Humanum genus*, April 20, 1884).

268. Power is communicated by God as principal cause, but through the multitude as instrumental cause.

The community of itself is bound to hand over that power, not for a time and in a revocable mode, but in a stable mode in perpetuity, not to be exercised in its name but to be possessed as proper: for thus, from the nature of things, it is ordinarily necessary for the good rule of society. But it can be handed over to various subjects according to the various form or regime of society. If it resides wholly

in one, the regime is monarchical; if in an assembly of several nobles, the best or the powerful, it is aristocratic or oligarchical; if in the community itself or in an assembly chosen from every condition and designated by all, it is democratic; finally, if at the same time but partially it resides in several, it is a mixed regime, which flourishes in present-day nations: thus in Belgium it resides partially in a twofold assembly of elected persons who establish laws and in the king who can sanction or not sanction and promulgate laws (Belgian Constitution, art. 26).

Power exists fully in the supreme authority; from that it is sometimes derived restrictedly to certain subordinates, as happens in fiefs, confederated states, etc.

269. Power does not depend per se on faith, probity of life, good morals, nor therefore on sex, age, and other conditions of the subject in whom it resides.

This is clear a) from the Council of Constance, session 8, condemning proposition 15 of Wycliffe;

b) from Scripture, both from the words of Christ commanding tribute to be paid to a pagan prince (Mt. XXII, 21) and to obey the evil and wicked Pharisees (XXIII, 3), and from the words of the Apostles, who teach that unbelieving princes are ministers of God to whom one must obey in conscience (Rom. XIII, 5-7; Tit. III, 1; I Pet. II, 13-15);

c) by reason: man can command not because he is good, but because he is superior.

Nevertheless per accidens power can depend on the aforesaid conditions, if it is so specially determined in law.

Article III: On the Quality of Human Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 95, a. 2 and 3.

270. Principle I. Human law is a derivation of natural law.

It is proved: law, since it is an ordination of reason, must be conformable to the rule of reason; for it is not true law unless it is just; the just is the same as what is right according to the rule of reason; therefore, insofar as law has something of justice or of rectitude of reason, so far does it have something of the power of law. But the first rule of reason is natural law. Therefore human law has the power of law insofar as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in anything it is discordant from it, it will no longer be law but a corruption of law (Gregory XVI, enc. *Qui pluribus*, November 9, 1846; Pius IX, enc. *Quanta Cura*, December 8, 1864).

271. Principle II. Human law is the complement of natural law.

It is proved: from natural law something can be derived 1) as a necessary conclusion from principles, for example, "one must not kill" from the fact that evil is to be done to no one; and this pertains not to human law alone but has the force of obligating also from the law of nature; 2) as a fitting conclusion or particular determination of a common and indeterminate principle, whether for directing men or for coercing them; and this has vigor immediately from human law alone. Thus, for example, that a contract is to be made in such a mode that justice is better provided for is a determination of the directive principle: contracts are to be entered according to justice; and that thieves are to be punished by prison rather than another penalty is a determination of the coercive principle: thieves are to be punished.

It is said: immediately, because all just human laws obligate mediately by force of this natural principle, that inferiors ought to obey superiors.

272. Principle III. Human law must be proportioned both to the end and to natural and divine law.

It is proved: for human law is a means to the end, and is a rule and measure ruled and measured by the superior natural law and eternal law of God; therefore it must be proportioned to these three. Hence:

1. insofar as it is proportioned to the law of God, it must be congruous to religion and consequently honorable, not contradicting eternal law;

2. insofar as it is conformable to the law of nature, it must be fitting to discipline, that is, a) as to object: just, or establishing that which is right according to reason; b) as to the faculty of agents or the power of subjects: possible and according to nature, because impossibilities are not to be imposed upon men, and according to the custom of the country, because man cannot live in society without bearing himself according to the manner of others; c) as to due circumstances: fitting to place and time;

3. insofar as it is proportioned to the end, it must be expedient for the safety or utility of men, and therefore a) necessary for removing evil or useful for attaining good; b) manifest, that is, clear so that it can be understood, lest it be a harm to men; c) conveniently handed down for the republic, that is, ordered to the common good.

Article IV: On the Formation of Human Law

273. Human laws can be formed either by the imperative act of the legislator requiring observance from subjects: these are constituted or legal right, which ordinarily is written; or by the observance of subjects to which the consent of the legislator is added: these are customary right.

1. Custom from the nature of the thing is a legitimate source of right. Namely, it is conformable to reason that manners introduce law: for those things which are spontaneously observed by the members of society and are born from social development are to be held (unless something stands in the way) as accommodated to the character of the subjects and conformable to the common good; whence they cannot fail to be sanctioned by a prudent superior. Hence custom, which is usually defined as "legal right introduced by long-standing manners of the community with some consent of the legislator," was generally admitted in Roman Law; but not so in modern civil law, either for introducing, abrogating, extending, or restricting law, unless exceptionally, if it is expressly indicated in the law, as happens in the matter of contracts and commerce.

2. Written law can be issued in various forms, and by whatever forms of decree, letter, code, or collection; also of response and sentence, although these two are more fitting for interpreting a law already borne than for introducing a new one. Likewise it is formed by a various process for various times among various peoples; today the received process is the following: it is

proposed by ministers of the state or by members of the legislative assembly, is publicly discussed in the assembly and accepted by vote, and is sanctioned by the supreme power.

1. Cf. Belgian Constitution, a. 27, 39, 69.

But it befits the nature of constituted law: a) that the superior not bear a law without the counsel of the prudent; b) that it be expressed in clear and brief words in the language of the society to which it is directed; c) that it be proposed in writing: indeed it could be handed down orally, yet by writing better provision is made for the perspicuity and sincerity of the law. Nevertheless all these things are not strictly required that a law obligate.

274. Promulgation has been made in various modes at various times and among various nations. In Roman Law, from the year 538, under the emperor Justinian, it had to be made in individual provinces or metropolitan cities.

Today, in cultivated regions, it is usually made by an act of the king or supreme magistrate of the republic, by which he testifies concerning the law established and the law itself becomes public right by an announcement had in the official newspaper; but it begins to obligate after the time which has been established.

Thus in Belgium, according to the law of February 28, 1845, art. 2, confirmed by the law of April 18, 1898, modified December 28, 1909, art. 4 (conformably to the Belgian Constitution, art. 129), it is done by an authentic testimony made by the king concerning the existence of the law and by public insertion commanded by him in the official newspaper of the State, *Le Moniteur*; and laws obligate in the whole kingdom on the tenth day after the day of publication, unless otherwise established in the law, or unless accidentally it was impossible for citizens to know it, for example, on account of war, a great inundation, etc., or for subjects who are outside the kingdom: for law openly supposes the possibility of knowing it (art. 1, law of August 2, 1822). In France, from the decree of November 5, 1870, law obligates after one full day has elapsed after the official journal has reached the capital city of each district. In Italy laws obligate on the fifteenth day from the day of publication.

275. Thesis. For the value or obligating force of human law, the approving acceptance of subjects, or acceptance of right, that is, consent to observance of the law borne, is not required per se.

It is proved: 1) The Apostle, Rom. XIII, 2, says without restriction or exception: He who resists power resists the ordinance of God; but he resists power who does not accept the law borne by it.

2. If acceptance were required, this would be either from defect of will in the legislator or from defect of power. Not the first: for if he bears a law in preceptive words and urges it with penalties, it is an open sign that he wills to obligate to it; moreover the common good can require that he break the resistances of subjects. Not the second, because power in its exercise is not restricted at the nod of subjects; otherwise the efficacious direction of society would be impossible; and moreover then it would not be a power of commanding and prescribing in the true sense, but a mere faculty of giving and proposing counsel, by which the common good cannot be sufficiently procured.

3. Whence Alexander VII condemned the proposition (28): "The people do not sin even if without any cause they do not receive a law promulgated by the prince" (cf. Syllabus, prop. 63).

Nevertheless per accidens acceptance is necessary, if the legislator does not will to obligate otherwise, or if that right is reserved to the people in the law (as in Switzerland for certain laws there is a referendum to the people); but then acceptance is not of a law already constituted, but concurs toward constituting it.

276. A fortiori, executive acceptance of fact, or the observance itself of the law, is not required for giving value to a law.

Nevertheless it can be necessary for conserving the force of law, not directly, but indirectly. For if a superior is unable to obtain fulfillment of the law from the greater or saner part of the community, it can be fitting that he not urge observance of the law; for by urging he could be an occasion of ruin to subjects without fruit. In which case the obligation does not fail directly from non-acceptance by the people, but indirectly from the tacit or presumed consent of the legislator, who is judged, if he does not urge the law, not to will the ruin of souls. But when such a law is judged revoked cannot be determined generally, but is left to the judgment of the prudent.

By difference from Roman Law, present-day civil law, because it denies all force to custom, does not admit that after promulgation a law is suspended by recourse to the legislator, nor that it ceases by non-reception or by not being brought into use; whence the consent of the legislator cannot be supposed.

Article V: On the Division of Human Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 95, a. 4.

277. Manifold division.

Each thing can be divided per se according to that which is contained in its notion. But there are many things in the notion of human law, according to each of which human law can properly and per se be divided.

1. For it belongs to the notion of human law that it be derived from the law of nature; and according to this positive right is divided into the law of nations and civil law, according to the two modes by which something is derived from natural law (n. 271). For to the law of nations pertain those things which are derived from natural law as conclusions from principles, such as just purchases, sales, and other things of this kind, without which men cannot live together with one another; this is of natural law because man is naturally a social animal. But those things which are derived from natural law by way of particular determination pertain to civil law, according as any city determines something accommodated to itself.

2. It belongs to the notion of human law that it be ordered to the common good of the city; and according to this human law can be divided according to the diversity of those who give special work to the common good, as priests, princes, and soldiers; and therefore certain special rights are adapted to those men.

3. It belongs to the notion of human law that it be instituted by one governing the community of the city; and according to this human laws are distinguished according to the diverse regimes of cities. One of these is kingdom, when, namely, a city is governed by one, and according to this the constitutions of princes are taken. Another regime is aristocracy, that is, the principate of the best or of the nobles, and according to this are taken the responses of the prudent and also senatus-consults. Another regime is oligarchy, that is, the principate of the rich and powerful, and according to this praetorian right is taken. Another regime is of the people, which is called democracy, and according to this plebiscites are taken. Another is tyrannical, which is altogether corrupt; whence from this no law is taken. There is also a certain regime mixed from these, which is best, and according to this is taken the law "which the elders together with the people have sanctioned" (or the deputies of the people together with the prince) (cf. q. 105, a. 1).

4. It belongs to the notion of human law that it be directive of human acts; and according to this, according to the diverse things about which laws are borne, laws are distinguished on account of the matters about which they are. Thus St. Thomas, q. 95, a. 4.

278. Division of present-day law.

Present-day human laws, according to jurists, are divided according to the diverse persons and things about which they act, and are reduced to a threefold genus:

a) Some constitute public right (the law of the state), which is also called political and administrative right: they chiefly regard the state of the republic, social functions and institutes, and relations between the republic, or its institutes, and citizens.

Thus the Constitution or fundamental law, laws which rule municipalities, provinces, the organization and administration of justice, worship, the army, elections of deputies, the public treasury, tributary and fiscal laws.

1. In Belgium they are called: *la constitution*; *les lois provinciale, communale, de bienfaisance publique, des cimetieres, des cultes et fabriques d'eglise, d'organisation judiciaire et d'administration de la justice, de la force publique (armee, gendarmerie), des notariats, des consulats*; *les lois de comptabilite, des contributions, douanes et accises, les lois fiscales (d'enregistrement, de greffe, du timbre, sur la succession, la transmission, etc.), les lois sur le tresor public, la dette publique, les monnaies, la banque nationale, etc.*; *les lois sur les chemins de fer, postes, telegraphes, telephones, etc.*; *les lois sur les droits politiques*, for example, *les lois electorales, et de naturalisation*; *les lois sur l'enseignement et les langues*, etc.

b) Some constitute private right, or civil right more strictly so called: they are chiefly concerned with those things which pertain to the utility of individuals, and with rights and relations of citizens to one another. Thus the civil code, the commercial or business code, and various laws concerning dominion of property, even literary and industrial.

2. In Belgium they are: *le Code civil* (elaborated in the years 1803-04, but modified several times, for example, in 1854, 1859, 1887, 1891, and still more recently; it contains the theory of ordinary right), *le Code de commerce* (promulgated in the year 1807, but in Belgium almost totally changed in the years 1851, 1867, 1872, 1873, 1874, 1877, 1879, 1883, 1891, 1913,

1919; it contains the theory of the special right of merchants and of acts of maritime and terrestrial commerce); to these are added *les lois sur la propriete litteraire et industrielle, sur les mines, les vices redhibitoires, les brevets d'invention, marques de fabrique et de commerce, warrants*, etc. To the civil code, which is theoretical, there is added the practical code concerning the mode of pursuing civil and commercial rights: *le Code de procedure civile* (in the year 1806).

c) Some constitute penal right, which chiefly regard crimes, delicts, transgressions, or contraventions. Thus the penal code, and various penal and disciplinary laws.

3. In Belgium they are: *le Code penal* (in the year 1810, but in Belgium changed in the year 1867; it determines delicts and penalties theoretically), to which are added *le Code penal militaire, le Code disciplinaire et penal pour la marine marchande et la peche maritime, les lois sur la provocation, l'hypnotisme, les offenses et les attentats contre les souverains etrangers, la protection des enfants, le vagabondage, la mendicite, les falsifications, les armes de guerre non prohibees*, etc. To the penal code, which is theoretical, there is added the practical code concerning the path to be followed for obtaining the punishment of someone: *le Code d'instruction criminelle* (1808).

To civil right rather than to penal right pertain the laws which are called social and sometimes are called new right, which, namely, are concerned with the utilities and rights of some class of citizens and with relations between diverse classes.

1. In Belgium they are: *les lois sur les livrets de travail* (1883), *les salaires* (1887), *le travail des femmes et des enfants* (1889), *les reglements d'atelier* (1896), *les unions professionnelles* (1898), *la securite et la sante des ouvriers* (1899), *le contrat de travail* (1900), *le mesurage du travail* (1901), *les accidents du travail* (1903), *le repos du dimanche* (1905), *le conseil des prud'hommes* (1910), *la journee de 8 heures* (1921), *les associations sans but lucratif* (1921), *le contrat d'emploi* (1922), etc.

To penal right rather than to civil or administrative right pertain the codes or laws which rule fields and rural estates, forests, hunting and fishing, or the sale of certain things.

2. Thus in Belgium: *le Code forestier* (1854), *le Code rural* (1886), *les lois sur la chasse et la peche* (1882, 1883, 1887, 1891, 1900), *la vente des marchandises neuves et les objets mobiliers*.

Second Question: On the Power of Human Law

Article I: On the Matter of Human Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 96, a. 1, 2, 3.

279. Principle. Law must be proportioned to the end, which is the common good (n. 272), and therefore the matter about which civil law is concerned is all acts whose placing or omission is useful to the common good, even those which are indifferent of themselves, insofar as they can be ordered to virtue and good or to vice and evil. But the common good consists of many things: 1) for society is constituted from many persons, 2) it is ordered to a good which consists in many affairs, to be procured through manifold actions, 3) it is instituted not so that it endure for some small time, but so that it persevere for all time through the succession of citizens. Therefore

law must procure the good not of some but of many, not in some one thing or action but in many, not for some time but in a mode of itself perpetual.

280. Acts useful to the common good are only:

1. Acts morally possible, that is, not too difficult and burdensome, but accommodated to the powers of men (their frailty being attended to, not only in common but also according to special condition and circumstances); otherwise law would not be conformable to reason nor promote the public good, but would rather often be the occasion of sins, since it would be observed by few. Hence:

a) Heroic acts cannot be commanded, unless in extraordinary public necessity (for example, a law could command physicians in time of plague to remain in the city), or unless one has freely chosen a state to which they pertain.

b) Although law can prohibit any vices whatsoever, nevertheless not all simultaneously, or all vicious acts: for law must be imposed upon a multitude of men according to their condition in such a way that it is possible for them; but in a multitude the greater part is of the imperfect, and therefore not all vices are prohibited, but only the graver ones, from which it is possible for the greater part of the multitude to abstain, and chiefly those which harm others, such as homicide, thefts, etc., without whose prohibition society could not be preserved.

2. Acts external in some way: for by these alone does man bear himself well or badly toward others constituting the city, for society arises from external relations; whence external acts alone, and not merely internal acts, are directly necessary or useful to the end, which is peace, by which citizens can tranquilly use their rights, and public prosperity.

Nevertheless internal acts can be commanded indirectly and per accidens, insofar as they are joined with external acts and manifested by them, for example, if they are necessary that external acts be human, good, not feigned, etc.; for law cannot command except morally good acts.

3. Future acts, whence it is said: Law does not have eyes backward, and "La loi ne dispose que pour l'avenir; elle n'a pas d'effet rétroactif" (Civil Code, a. 2).

Thus a) according to directive force: for since law is a rule of things to be done, by its nature it regards future acts, not past acts, which cannot be ruled; namely, to command, prohibit, permit past acts, or, if they are irrevocable, invalidate them, would be useless. Likewise b) ordinarily also according to coercive force: because, namely, it is very odious, past acts regularly cannot be punished, nor acts still revocable be invalidated, unless they have already been prohibited by some law, or on account of a great necessity of the common good; for in this case whatever good of the part can be required for the good of the whole, but it will rather be the imposition of a burden than of a penalty. Hence the legislator cannot affect past acts except a) in a penal law which imposes a penalty on an act already prohibited (at least by natural right); b) in a law establishing not a penalty but an inability, if the reason of the common good demands it; c) in a merely declarative law of an earlier law.

281. The common good is manifold:

1. One thing civil society immediately intends, namely, its own and its members' temporal perfection and happiness, that is, to establish a good life in the multitude, to preserve it, and by promoting it to better things to perfect it. To this pertain both the goods of society itself: constitution, regime, administration, defense, and the relations of citizens to it and among themselves; and the goods of the members: a) goods of the intellect: instruction in letters, sciences, and human arts (which greatly contribute to private and public good); b) goods of the will: to coerce delicts, attack vices, and promote virtues, indeed all of them: for all virtues whatsoever, just as they can be referred to private good, so also to the common good, just as all vices can be opposed to it, and therefore there is no virtue concerning whose acts law cannot command. Yet it does not command concerning all acts of all virtues, but only concerning those which are orderable to the common good, either immediately, as those which are done directly on account of the common good, or mediately, as certain things are ordered by the legislator to good discipline, by which citizens are formed so that they may preserve the common good of justice and peace. Hence human law commands only acts of justice, and acts of the other virtues insofar as they assume the notion of justice; c) goods of the body: public health and due propagation; d) goods of fortune and those things which concern the acquisition, transmission, abundance of things, industries, agriculture, and commerce.

2. Another thing society intends only mediately, namely, eternal beatitude; and therefore, although it ought to procure temporal goods in such a way that they do not harm eternal goods, indeed so that they procure them, nevertheless it cannot bear law immediately concerning spiritual things; nor concerning mixed things except in concord with religious society.

282. Observation.

In all the aforesaid matters it can either inculcate natural and divine law, for example, by compelling parents to nourish minor children, and children to provide food for parents; or determine what that law leaves indeterminate, for example, by establishing conditions for succession in the goods of the dead or the mode of exercising justice; or impose what is more conformable to it, for example, prescription of goods, community or separation of goods in marriage, rescission of a contract begun by minors; or command or prohibit what that law permits, for example, concerning fishing, the manufacture of liquors, or hunting; or urge all these things by adding a penalty; or even impose conditions for the validity of acts established by it (for example, concerning contracts); nevertheless in no way can it contradict a superior law.

Article II: On the Obligation of Human Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 96, a. 4.

283. Principle I. Civil law, as such, not only coerces but obligates in conscience and before God, even under grave obligation. It is certain.

It is proved: a) Natural law and divine law obligate in conscience. But these laws dictate that superiors legitimately commanding are to be obeyed, and indeed even under grave obligation. Therefore. For legislative power is necessary for obtaining the end of society; but the legislative power of a superior imports for subjects an obligation in conscience of obeying just laws; otherwise

the power of the superior could be frustrated, and it would not be true power but a semblance of power. Therefore. Now those things which are necessary to human society obligate of themselves under grave obligation (cf. on natural law, n. 251, C).

b) From the Scriptures, according to which 1) civil law is borne by power granted by God (Rom. XIII, 1; Wis. VI, 4), imposed in the name of God by His ministers (Rom. XIII, 4, 6; Wis. VI, 5; I Pet. II, 13), and sanctioned by God (I Pet. II, 13); therefore 2) they are to be obeyed by necessity (Rom. XIII, 1, 5), not on account of wrath and contention but on account of God and conscience (I Pet. II, 13; Rom. XIII, 5). For he who resists the minister, in that in which he is minister, is judged to resist the king; whence 3) he who resists the power of the prince resists the ordinance of God itself and acquires for himself a just penalty (Rom. XIII, 2).

284. Corollary. - Civil law obligates in conscience, even if the legislator does not think of such obligation or does not care about it (even if he is an unbeliever, as is clear from the instruction of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith to the vicar apostolic of Siam), or should wish to abstract from it, provided he does not altogether exclude obligation and commands a true law. For he who commands implicitly wills to obligate in conscience, both because once the precept has been posited, obligation follows spontaneously and naturally from natural law and the will of God, which command obedience toward superiors, and because he often wills observance in a better and more efficacious mode, especially when there is question of things necessary for the common good.

Hence 1) in a case in which the legislator intends truly to use his legislative power but does not admit obligation in conscience or wills to exclude it, of two contrary wills the predominant will has force (p. 55), which must be presumed and ordinarily is the will of establishing a law and obligating, just as the nature of the thing demands;

2. even a legislator who does not care about God or obligation of conscience is not to be presumed to urge by coercion of penalty alone, unless the contrary is clear or a case is present in which the common good altogether demands obligation in conscience; but on the contrary, unless the contrary is clear, he must be presumed truly to obligate, at least in matters of greater moment.

285. Principle II. Human law, in order that it obligate, must be just, that is, must establish just acts:

1. on the part of the matter, because it must be concerned with just things; and therefore the prescribed acts must be just, both generally with justice broadly so called, or honorable (as all virtues require), that is, not contrary to a superior law (natural, divine, ecclesiastical), and with justice strictly so called, specifically just, that is, opposed to the right of no one;

2. also on the part of the one bearing it or of the mode, because it is prescribed justly:

a) by reason of the end, the prescribed acts must be useful not for one's own good but for the common good, as legal justice requires;

b) by reason of the author, they must be contained within the scope of his power, as commutative justice requires: for subjects are bound to obey superiors in those things in which they are superiors,

as a soldier obeys the commander in those things which pertain to war, and a servant obeys the master in works which regard service, etc.;

c) by reason of the form or prescription: they must be duly proportioned to the powers and faculties of all, so that in the distribution of honors and burdens the proportion of equality is preserved, as distributive justice requires.

But if one of these is lacking, according to this the law does not obligate.

286. An unjust law 1) on the part of matter obligates in no way, so that it cannot be fulfilled even to avoid death, because it is contrary to the divine good: for it is necessary to obey God rather than men (Acts V, 29. Cf. Exod. I, 17-21; enc. *Qui pluribus*, November 9, 1846; *Quanta Cura*, December 8, 1864); nevertheless per accidens it can be fulfilled if God or the Church yields its right and no longer urges its law, for example, concerning hearing Mass if soldiers were prohibited by civil law;

2. a law unjust on the part of the one bearing it, as being contrary only to a human good, can be fulfilled but of itself does not obligate, because it is not true law; nevertheless per accidens it must be observed by force of natural law on account of some grave motive, namely, to obtain a greater good or avoid a greater evil.

Hence a) a law which is not useful to the common good can obligate per accidens, for example, to avoid scandal, disturbance, etc.

b) A law which is borne against commutative justice by one who does not have power but usurps it, and invades the republic without right but holds it oppressed: if he does not yet possess the kingdom peacefully, it does not obligate by defect of power; but if he possesses the kingdom, laws which promote the common good obligate, because society cannot stand without a power of rule, which therefore it is judged to confer upon the usurper, nor without laws, to which therefore for the common good the people tacitly acquiesces; but laws directly borne against the legitimate prince do not obligate, because they injure a certain right.

1. Thus natural right: in practice positive human laws must also be considered, for example, the Hague Convention in the case of war. Thus, for example, it has been sanctioned that an invader of a territory can issue decrees which, while he precariously occupies the region, seem necessary for maintaining peace. But he cannot command beyond this necessity and the securing of his own safety. Vermeersch, *Theologia Moralis* I, n. 189.

c) A law injuring distributive justice (for example, in taxes) does not obligate for the unjust and excessive part, unless per accidens by reason of scandal, disturbance, etc.; nevertheless it obligates for the just part, unless the excess of proportion in distributing burdens were so great that the law itself yielded to common detriment.

Nevertheless it must be noted that it is necessary that the injustice be morally certain; otherwise presumption stands for the legislator, both because he has and possesses the faculty of commanding, which cannot be taken from him on account of doubt, and because he can have reasons hidden from subjects, and because otherwise subjects would take excessive license for transgressing laws, which scarcely can be so just that by apparent reasons of injustice they cannot easily be called into doubt by some.

287. Some laws are moral, others penal. - Certain civil laws are moral or preceptive, which strictly obligate in conscience to doing what is established by law, sometimes even under penalty, in which case they are also penal and are called mixed; certain laws are merely penal, which obligate in conscience not to doing what is established by law, but only to not resisting, in the case of transgression, the infliction of penalty and to undergoing the penalty inflicted.

Merely penal laws can certainly or probably be recognized: a) from the will of the legislator openly declaring this; b) from the tenor or form of the law, if it prescribes only the penalty: He who has done this shall pay such a fine; on the contrary, rather if it commands and at the same time imposes a penalty; c) from the matter of the law: if it is light and having no regard to good morals, or if the end can easily be sufficiently obtained by obligating under penalty alone; for then the legislator is presumed to obligate in that way unless he has declared otherwise. On the contrary, if the matter is of great moment, pertaining to good morals and to restraining vices, or if it is necessary for the peace or good of the republic or for avoiding a great inconvenience to it, especially if obligation in conscience is necessary or expedient for obtaining observance of the law; for then the legislator is presumed to obligate in a mode more efficacious and more suitable to the republic; d) somewhat from the nature or quantity of the established penalty, if it is not merely coercive but is able to compensate the defect of the act, as a fine, or if it is too great and not proportioned to the delict: for then the legislator is judged to increase the penalty because he obligates under penalty alone; on the contrary, if the penalty supposes fault or is merely coercive, as imprisonment; e) from common estimation, the interpretation of the wise, custom, etc.

According to the aforesaid rules, the following laws are to be judged moral: a) those which confirm natural or divine law, for example, those which prohibit vices; b) those which immediately contribute to the common good, for example, those which refer to contracts or prescribe offices pertaining to public functions, likewise the law of military service unless it is certainly unjust (cf. treatise on Justice); c) those which define rights, for example, laws which determine property concerning things found and lost, prescription of goods, rights of writers, the law which attributes to the father usufruct from the goods of children or from paternal goods attributes a legitimate part to children (at least ordinarily); d) also per se laws of taxes, because these are necessary for the governance of the republic, and moreover the Scriptures teach thus (Mt. XXII, 15-22; Rom. XIII, 1-7), whence, unless the contrary is clear, at least direct taxes obligate in conscience, which are imposed immediately and directly upon persons at established times on account of goods, income, faculties, the exercise of an art or commerce, and which also are usually exacted by coercive penalties; but according to present-day law they do not obligate before they are defined and exacted (cf. treatise on Justice).

On the contrary, the following are probably merely penal: a) laws and statutes which refer to the external order of the community (*lois et arretes de police*); b) laws concerning the cutting of wood or pasturing of animals in common forests or pastures; likewise laws concerning hunting and fishing, except insofar as they establish the right of a third party; c) laws which forbid certain goods to be exported or imported (unless it is altogether necessary for the public good, for example, in time of war); d) laws which impose certain indirect taxes, which primarily and immediately touch goods and are paid occasionally for the transmission and change of rights or the intervention of a tribunal (*droits d'enregistrement, de mutation, de timbre, d'hypotheque, de greffe*), whether for goods being transported (*droits de douane: d'entree, de sortie, de transit*), or for the manufacture of certain things (*droits d'accises*) or the

cultivation of certain fruits (for example, tobacco); e) laws which prohibit games of chance and games, except for the part by which they forbid establishing games of chance by design, since this is vicious and also harmful to others.

Nevertheless it is better not to teach these things publicly to the people, but to lead them to observance of the law, especially because violation of a merely penal law, chiefly if habitual, can be culpable per accidens, either because on the occasion of this the right of a third party is injured or scandal is given, or because charity toward oneself and one's own is injured, while one imprudently exposes oneself and one's family to graver penalties and great dangers, infamy and damages, or because one would exercise violent resistance against those who by office are bound to apply the law, or would be prepared for it.

288. There are also invalidating civil laws which render acts invalid, whether as a penalty for a delict, or for the protection of the agent or a third party, or for the common good, for example, on account of the danger of frauds, and to avoid lawsuits, and so that contracts may be made with greater protection.

And indeed: a) sometimes acts are invalidated by law alone without any sentence of the judge, if conditions are lacking which are altogether required for the nature, object, or existence of the act and therefore as quasi-essential for validity, so that without them it cannot even be conceived, for example, if there is radical incapacity or inability for placing acts, or if forms required for the solemnity of a donation inter vivos or of a testament are lacking; then in French law it is said: *nul par le fait meme, radicalement nul, inexistant, non avenu*; b) sometimes invalidation is decreed by law, yet in such a way that for the invalidation itself a declaratory sentence of the judge is necessary, if conditions simply required for validity are lacking; in which case the act before the sentence of the judge remains valid, after the sentence is invalid not only from the moment of the sentence but is judged never to have been placed: for the judge does not render it null but only declares it to be null by the law itself. Then in French law it is said: *nul de droit, nul de plein droit, simplement nul*; c) sometimes it is not annulled by the law, but it is decreed that it can be annulled by the judge, if it is valid in itself but certain conditions required for liceity are lacking; in which case before the sentence of the judge it remains valid, after the sentence it is judged null but only from that moment, because it is annulled not by the law but by the judge himself. Thus it happens in French law when the act is injurious to rights, whether of the agent or of a third party (*acte lesionnaire*): it is called rescindable (*rescindable par action en rescision*); or when it is fraudulent (*frauduleux*), and this is called revocable (*par action revocatoire*).

These laws render acts void in conscience (as determining rights), also more probably in the first case before the sentence of the judge.

But it should be noted that invalidating laws are not necessarily prohibiting laws (as a law invalidating a testament without the forms required for solemnity), but only if the act cannot be good unless it is valid, or if the motive which demands invalidation also demands prohibition (for example, donations of parents beyond the legitimate portion), or if it is expressly or implicitly prohibited, through the addition of a special penalty besides invalidation.

289. Corollary.

From what has been said it follows that civil law per se obligates gravely in grave matter, namely, whenever it greatly conduces to an end of great moment, unless, however, the legislator wills only to obligate lightly, or under penalty alone.

Article III: On the Subjects of Civil Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 96, a. 5 and 6.

290. Principle. To civil laws are obligated all and only the subjects of the power bearing the law, habitually endowed with the use of reason, for whom the law was borne. - Hence according to St. Thomas: a) the perfect also are subject to human law insofar as it is the rule of human acts, because thus natural and divine law also establishes, as the Church defined against the Beghards and Beguines, condemned in the Council of Vienne (a. 3); b) nevertheless, as to the coercive force of law, the just and virtuous whose will is consonant with law are not subject, but only the wicked whose will is discordant from the law.

291. Personal and territorial laws.

Some laws are personal, which immediately affect persons and are concerned principally with their state and capacity (*lois qui composent le statut personnel: nationalite, capacite, majorite, filiation, etat civil*), and accessorily with goods: to these probably pertain laws concerning movable goods, which are judged to adhere to persons. Others are territorial, which immediately affect the territory of society and mediately persons insofar as they pertain to the territory; among these are numbered real laws, which are concerned principally with immovable goods and accessorily with persons, laws which determine the forms and execution of acts, because acts are to be constituted and executed according to the laws of the place in which they are constituted or committed to execution, according to the principle: place rules the act; laws regarding the external order and public tranquility of the territory and the security of persons and dominions (*lois de police et de surete*), to which pertain laws which punish delicts.

292. Various persons are subject to laws in various ways.

In the territory there can be:

1. Citizens or nationals, who are members of society, whether by birth, by law, by adoption, or by annexation: a) those present in the territory are held by all laws; b) those absent are held by personal laws (Civil Code, a. 3, § 3), but are not held per se by territorial laws, for example, concerning public order or the form of contracts; c) nevertheless they are held per accidens, if they are morally present by reason of goods which they possess in the territory for real laws, or by reason of an action or omission which they exercise there, for example, for fulfilling offices toward society, or if by fiction of law they are present by reason of a delict exercised against a fellow citizen: for this is judged to be done in the territory of the community.

2. Strangers, who are not members of the community, but have domicile or residence in the territory or pass through it. Now, because they are not members of the community, a) they are not held by personal laws; b) nor per se by territorial laws; c) nevertheless per accidens they are held, either 1) by reason of the common good, to laws which regard order (Civil Code, a. 3, § 1) or which have been specially borne for them, or 2) by reason of goods which they possess

there for real laws (Civil Code, a. 3, § 2), or 3) by reason of an act which they exercise, do, or execute there, for laws which determine the form or execution of contracts (place rules the act), or 4) by reason of a delict which they commit there, for laws which establish penalty; d) if they are absent they are held only by laws which are concerned with goods possessed by them, or by reason of a crime perpetrated against society (at least if they are not sufficiently punished by their own superior).

3. Exempt persons, who by fiction of law are judged outside the territory and are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the place. They are a) by human right: princes of other nations dwelling in it for any cause whatsoever; likewise their ambassadors with their attendants and domestics; b) from divine and ecclesiastical right: the Roman Pontiff as to all; clerics and religious for those things which are opposed to their dignity and office (concerning which it pertains to the Church to judge); for other things today they are held even directly by force of the laws themselves.

4. Whether the legislator himself is subject to law is no longer a practical question, because there is not a singular legislator; whence all who have concurred in the making of the law are subject to it. Nevertheless, as to the coercive force, the person of the king himself is exempt, and for that reason is declared inviolable (Belgian Constitution, a. 63).

Article IV: On the Fulfillment and Interpretation of Human Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 96, a. 6; q. 97, a. 3, ad 2; II-II, q. 60, a. 5, ad 2; q. 120.

293. In what way law is to be fulfilled. - The human legislator does not directly prescribe the internal mode of virtue, but the conservation of social order; whence he prescribes only the substance of the act commanded and is content with physical or external fulfillment, although he can intend the good of virtue. For the end of a precept does not fall under the precept; nor therefore, per se, does the (extrinsic) mode of fulfilling the precept, unless the mode is of the substance of the precept (intrinsic).

These things will be declared more where there is discussion of ecclesiastical law.

294. In what way law is to be interpreted. - But in order that it be rightly fulfilled as it ought, law often needs interpretation. Namely, human law cannot be so perfectly set forth that it excludes every doubt about its meaning, and therefore it often needs interpretation, either on account of the weakness of human talent, or on account of change of circumstances and morals.

Interpretation is a clearer determination of the mind or words of the legislator. By reason of value or efficacy it is twofold: authoritative, which is imposed with authority, and merely directive, which can also be made by private persons. But by reason of cause or author it is fourfold:

1. Authentic or legal, which is made authoritatively by the ruler of the community himself as such, who is deservedly judged to know the sense of the law better and therefore enjoys authority of interpreting: it is made by the legislator himself, or by his successor or superior, or also by another specially designated for this (as happens in France, by the Council of State), and it has the same force as the law itself.

In our country, art. 28 of the Belgian Constitution has force: "L'interpretation des lois par voie d'autorite n'appartient qu'au pouvoir legislatif."

2. Usual, which is made by general observance of the community, or by the use and custom of the people, which is therefore called the best interpreter of laws. Moreover one custom is antecedent to the law, and this can have force for detecting the sense of a law which is usually borne according to custom; another concomitant is the mode of observing the law, and this has force as a sign and witness for recognizing the mind of the legislator, because it displays the common sense of subjects, which, although it is not authentic, nevertheless has more force than doctrinal interpretation because several agree in it; another subsequent custom, given the conditions, can define or extend a preexisting obligation, just as it can introduce or remove it (as we said in n. 273): then it is authoritative. Nevertheless in present-day civil law the force of custom for interpreting law authoritatively is not admitted, just as neither for introducing or abrogating it.

3. Judicial, which is made authoritatively by judicial power in order to a special cause, namely, by applying law to a particular fact: it is authoritative as to the litigants; as to others it has only the private authority of the judge, so much the greater as he excels in greater knowledge and the interpretation is more often repeated, yet, other things being equal, greater than if it is given by a private doctor.

4. Doctrinal, which is not authoritative and therefore of itself not obligatory, but is supported by science and directive, and is made by private doctors or jurists according to the rules of critical art. It is so much greater as their number, excellence, and arguments are greater; but if all agree in the interpretation, it would be rash to spurn it.

295. How many kinds interpretation is.

By reason of character or of the mode by which it is made, interpretation is simply declarative or comprehensive, which merely declares the words and sense of the law and adds or subtracts nothing, whether it declares more or less clear things, or even elucidates more obscure things: this can be made by all, even private persons; or supplementary, which adds what is lacking to the sense and words of the law, and is either extensive, which adds an obligation previously not expressed or intended, and therefore needs promulgation, or restrictive, which removes either one: this, like the law itself, can be made by the authority of the legislator, and by custom when the consent of the legislator can be presumed.

296. Interpretation by epikeia. - Even a subject of the law, in rare particular cases, can make a certain quasi-restrictive interpretation and licitly act beyond the words of the law, when these, namely, would be harmful to the common good. For law obligates insofar as it is ordered to the common good, and does not obligate if it departs from this. But it happens that something is useful generally and in the greater number of cases, and in certain cases is harmful; but because the legislator cannot foresee all cases (nor can law enumerate all cases, because it would become more obscure), law is proposed according to that which happens in the greater number of cases, for the sake of the common good.

Therefore, in a case in which observance of the law is harmful to the common good, it is not to be observed; for the legislator is rightly judged not to have willed to include that case in the law, just as a law concerning the gates of a town to be closed would not be applied to a citizen who would be very useful for defending the city, and a law which prohibits carrying arms does not obligate him who is sought by an enemy for death.

A right judgment concerning the circumstances in which law does not obligate, and a moral virtue inclining (under the direction of prudence) to acting rightly according to such a prudent judgment (which pertains to legal justice), is called epikeia, that is, equity, kindness, moderation, which interprets and judges and applies laws according to the equitable and good, that is, according as the reason of justice and the common utility demand. "In theological usage it designates a certain explanation of law which is made from equity, a benign interpretation and prudent moderation of law beyond the rigor of the words, by which it is judged that the law does not extend to some particular case on account of its special circumstances, although the legislator's words, as they sound, contain even that case." It can be defined: an equitable and benign interpretation of law, or a prudent moderation and restriction, by which against the words or sense of the law we follow the habitual mind of the legislator.

1. Thus Leroux in *Revue Ecclesiastique de Liege* VII, n. 4 (January 1901).

It is twofold: one broadly so called does not exceed the limits of simple interpretation drawn from circumstances, and has place not only in positive law but also in natural law (for example, deposits are to be returned); another strictly so called contains an emendation of law and has place in human law alone. And this differs: a) from simple interpretation, which explains obscure words and inquires whether in this or that sense those words are to be taken, so that they comprehend these or those cases: this follows the literal sense of the law and the mind which the legislator had; that departs from the words and the clear literal sense of the law and follows the mind which the legislator would have had, or reasonably ought to have had, if he had foreseen the case; b) from simple cessation of the end: for by this the law ceases universally and indeed negatively or contradictorily because its end is lacking; but by epikeia it does not obligate in a particular case and indeed contrarily because the law is rendered harmful or too burdensome; c) from dispensation: for this is an act of jurisdiction by which the legislator dissolves the bond of the law in a special case to which otherwise the law would be applicable; but epikeia pronounces that such a case was never comprehended in the law, although it is comprehended in the words.

297. Epikeia strictly so called has place whenever the law is 1) harmful or evil, for example, if it cannot be observed without sin; or 2) so impeditious of good or very burdensome and too difficult that it could scarcely be imposed by an equitable legislator; or 3) not so burdensome and difficult that it could not be imposed, but nevertheless, the circumstances being inspected and especially the ordinary mode of commanding with moderation, it is presumed that such was not the mind of the legislator. But ordinarily it is not given in invalidating laws on account of the common good.

The interpretation of epikeia can be made by any private person if the cause is evident; if it is doubtful, the superior is to be approached, because it pertains to him to interpret what is useful or useless to the community, whence on account of such cases he has the power of dispensing: for it is disordered to pass beyond the words of the law where the will of the legislator can certainly be

known, and in doubt concerning the liceity of an act, we must, insofar as we morally can, arrive at certitude (n. 213 and 214, 4). But if there is a cause which does not allow the delay of recourse to the superior and is sufficiently founded (so that there is positive doubt whether the law still obligates), necessity itself dispenses, which has no law: then, namely, it suffices that probably the law has ceased to obligate.

By present-day civil law, however, epikeia is admitted with difficulty, except in a case in which it would evidently harm the common good directly. Namely, the legislator restricts it to the least possible, and judges it better to observe the law, even if it is burdensome to one or another, on account of the example of others.

Third Question: On the Mutability of Human Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 97.

298. Human law is mutable. - Human law, although negatively it is perpetual because of itself it is stable and always endures like the community, nevertheless positively is not perpetual, because what it commands from its nature is not necessary: "in mutable things," says St. Thomas, "there cannot be anything remaining altogether immutably" (a. 1, ad 2).

Whence human law can be changed either a) on the part of the legislator, who gradually wishes to lead subjects to a greater good; or b) on the part of the matter, which on account of diverse circumstances of times and places becomes less useful to the end; or c) on the part of the subjects, for whom diverse laws are expedient according to their diverse conditions (cf. for ecclesiastical law, Lateran Council IV, c. 26; and Trent, sess. 14, c. 1 and 2; sess. 21, c. 2).

Nevertheless they are not easily to be changed (especially organic laws of political and administrative right), even when some improvement is possible. It is proved:

Human law is rightly changed insofar as, by its change, provision is made for common utility. But the very change of law of itself is harmful and brings detriment to the common good: "for the observance of laws," says St. Thomas (a. 2), "custom has very great force, to such an extent that those things which are done against common custom, even if they are lighter of themselves, seem graver; whence when law is changed, the constraining force of law is diminished, insofar as custom is removed." Therefore human law should never be changed unless so much is recompensed to common utility as is derogated from it by the change. This happens in two cases:

a) either from the fact that some very great and very evident utility comes from the new law;

b) or from the fact that there is very great necessity from this, that the accustomed law either contains manifest iniquity or its observance is very harmful.

299. Human law can be changed in two ways:

1. So that the law itself ceases and we are excused from it generally: either intrinsically by the total cessation of the end itself (when the reason of the law ceases, its disposition ceases, and when the end ceases, the precept ceases), or extrinsically, both by revocation, that is, abrogation and derogation, and also by contrary custom (with the consent of the legislator). Nevertheless, in present-day law neither custom nor cessation of the end is admitted unless it

is expressly indicated by the law, nor is it necessary in present-day society: for in these cases the abrogation itself of the law can be proposed by members of the legislative assembly.

2. So that in some way only the obligation of the law ceases (or at least is not applied) in a determined case, and we are excused from transgression of the law, whether formal and subjective only, which happens by ignorance, or also material and objective, which happens intrinsically by inability (which is judged by epikeia), and extrinsically by dispensation, to which privilege pertains.

Nevertheless in present-day law a) dispensation cannot validly be conceded except in rare cases determined by it, b) ordinarily ignorance of the law is not admitted in the external forum, because all are judged to use diligence for knowing the laws; hence although one who is ignorant is innocent before God, before a judge he can be held as guilty: then juridical fault is present, and if the law establishes a penalty, after the sentence of the judge there is an obligation to sustain it by reason of preserving external order and the common good, otherwise all would say that they were ignorant of the laws.

All these things will be more apparent from their application to ecclesiastical law. This will be discussed below.

Section C: On the Laws Which Rule Supernatural Acts

Fifth Part: On Divine Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, a. 4 and 5.

300. Divine law is an ordination of divine reason which was immediately borne and promulgated by the free and positive will of God for directing men to the supernatural end. - It is morally necessary:

1. even before the sin of Adam, on account of the supernatural end to which man must be directed by law: for if the end did not exceed the proportion of natural powers, natural law and human law, proportioned to natural powers, would suffice; but now it is necessary (by necessity of fittingness) that man be directed to that end by a law divinely given;

2. after sin, moreover a) on account of the uncertainty of human judgment (especially concerning contingent and particular things), so that man might know readily, without doubt and error, what is to be done and avoided;

b) for ordering by positive law the interior acts of men: for human law does not directly command except exterior acts; but for the perfection of virtue it is required that man exist right in both;

c) for prohibiting by positive law all sins: for human law cannot punish or prohibit all evils (Ps. CXVIII, 33).

"And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. XVIII, 8, where it is said: The law of the Lord is immaculate, that is, permitting no turpitude of sin; converting souls, because it directs not only exterior acts but also interior acts; the testimony of the Lord is faithful, on account of the certitude of

truth and rectitude; giving wisdom to little ones, insofar as it orders man to the supernatural and divine end" (a. 4).

301. How many kinds of divine law there are. - A certain divine law was given to Adam in paradise for the whole human race. But after sin it was twofold: the old or Mosaic law, manifested through Moses to the Israelites alone; the new or Christian law, borne by Christ for the whole human race (Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 19 and 20).

They are distinguished not as two species, but as imperfect and perfect in the same species; and they are as boy and man (Gal. IV), way and terminus, preparation and consummation, as is clear: 1) from the end to which they were directly ordered, which is the sensible and earthly common good in the Old Law (the temporal happiness of the Jewish people), the spiritual and heavenly good itself in the new (eternal happiness); 2) from the justice which they place in human acts, which the old law chiefly made as to exterior acts, which alone it could efficaciously restrain, but the new more as to interior acts, which it efficaciously directs; 3) from the mode by which it induces to its observance, namely, the old by fear of penalties, the new by love which is given from the grace of Christ.

1. Not the immediate end: this is rather subordination to God and is common to the old law and the new; but this subordination in the old law directly tended to temporal happiness, in the new directly to eternal happiness.

2. Chiefly, for interior acts were also regarded, such as love of God (Deut. VI, 5), penitence of heart (Lev. XVI, 18), and concupiscence of another's goods (Exod. XX, 17). Cf. q. 100, a. 2.

Before Moses, men were led to the supernatural end by the hypothetical natural law alone, or the natural-divine law: for, supposing the revelation made to Adam both of the supernatural end and of the future Redeemer, they were able to know by reason that one must tend to that end through Christ by faith, hope, and charity, and by acts of virtues.

3. Before Moses there was no positive divine law. The precepts concerning sacrifices were from human law determining natural law; the precept concerning circumcision was not a law borne for a people, but a private precept given by God for the family of Abraham (Gen. XVII). There were also certain other particular precepts given to Noah (Gen. VII and IX).

Chapter I: On the Old Law

First Question: On the Old Law According to Itself

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 98.

302. The old law is good, both because it has God as author, and because Christ, teaching by words and deeds and observing it, said that it is good (Mt. V, 17), and because it is consonant with reason while it represses concupiscence (Exod. XX, 17) and prohibits sins (ibid.). Whence it is called by the Apostle in Rom. VII, 12: a holy law, a holy commandment (cf. Ps. XVIII, 8-11; Mt. V, 17; I Tim. I, 8). Yet it is not simply perfect, because of itself it was not sufficient for leading to the end which is eternal life, toward which it only aided fallen man, but did not heal him completely nor render him fit: for this happens through grace, which was not given by the old law

(Gal. IV, 9; Heb. VII, 19; X, 1). But it was perfect according to the time for which it was given and according to the condition of those to whom it was given.

"But how far the Mosaic law excels foreign laws is clear to one who attends a little: a) for it clearly and explicitly inculcates monotheism, and strictly prohibits the worship of idols which flourished among other peoples: I am the Lord... (Exod. XX, 2-4). b) Moreover slavery, although tolerated, is much milder than among neighboring nations (Exod. XXI, 1-11). c) The sum of the law is love of God and neighbor: You shall love... (Deut. VI, 5; Lev. XIX, 18). d) It prohibits not only external sins, as most laws do, but also internal sins: You shall not covet (Exod. XX, 17; Deut. VI, 5; Lev. XVI, 18). e) Not only negative holiness is commanded, but also positive holiness, which consists in a certain imitation of divine holiness: Be holy because I am holy, the Lord your God (Lev. XIX, 2)."

1. Tanquerey, op. cit., n. 337.

303. The old law was given

1. by God the Father, because it disposed men to the future Christ, His Son, in two ways: both by giving testimony about Him (Luke XXIV, 44; John V, 46), and by withdrawing men from idolatry and placing them under the worship of the one God by whom the human race was to be saved (Gal. III, 23-24; Rom. X, 4);

2. by the ministry of angels, because it was imperfect, while the new and perfect law had to be given through Christ Himself (Gal. III, 19; Acts VII, 53);

3. to the Jewish people alone, whom God chose so that Christ might be born from it; whence it was fitting that it be eminent by a special sanctification (Deut. IV, 8; Ps. CXLVII, 8; Rom. III, 2). Hence although, as to the precepts of natural right which it contained and manifested, it obligated all, nevertheless as to its own precepts superadded to natural law, per se it obligated only the Jews, and per accidens gentiles who were enrolled into the Jewish people by circumcision (Exod. XII, 48).

304. Observations. - 1) Therefore the end of the old law is: a) immediate and proximate, to instruct the people in order to honesty, worship of God, and justice, and thus to procure temporal happiness; b) mediate and ultimate, supernatural beatitude (Luke X, 25); c) extrinsically joined to the aforesaid, Christ as to be honored and glorified (Rom. X, 4).

2. Concerning the time in which the old law was to be given, St. Thomas teaches, q. 98, a. 6: "The old law was most fittingly given in the time of Moses. The reason for this can be taken from two things, according as any law is imposed on two kinds of men: the hard and proud, who are restrained and tamed by law; and the good, who, instructed by law, are aided to fulfilling what they intend. 1) Therefore it was fitting that the old law be given at such a time for convicting the pride of men. For man was proud about two things, namely, about knowledge and about power. a) About knowledge indeed, as though natural reason could suffice him for salvation; and therefore, that his pride about this might be convicted, man was permitted to the rule of his own reason without the help of a written law; and by experience man could learn that he suffered a defect of reason, by the fact that men had fallen even into idolatry and most

shameful vices around the times of Abraham. And therefore after these times it was necessary that a written law be given as a remedy of human ignorance, because through law is the knowledge of sin... b) But after man had been instructed by the law, his pride about his infirmity was convicted, while he could not fulfill what he knew. 2) But on the part of the good, the law was given as a help; and this indeed was especially necessary to the people when natural law was beginning to be obscured on account of the overflowing of sins."

Second Question: On the Power of the Old Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 99 and 100; q. 101 and 104; q. 103, a. 2; II-II, q. 122.

305. The old law, although by reason of the matter about which it is concerned it contains many precepts, nevertheless in itself is one, because all were ordered to one end (q. 99, a. 1).

For since, by distinction from human law, which principally orders men to one another, divine law principally orders men to God and secondarily to one another, hence it contains precepts of a threefold kind:

1. some are moral precepts concerning acts of virtues, by which men were made good and like to God: for the law intended friendship with the best God, which cannot exist without likeness to Him (a. 2);

2. others are ceremonial, by which they were ordered to the worship of God, which must be done not only by interior acts, but also by exterior works by which man professes servitude (a. 3);

3. others are judicial, by which men were ordered to one another, the mode of justice among them being preserved (a. 4).

Now A. to the aforesaid precepts all other things are reduced which pertain to the directive force of law: for either they are dictated by reason itself and are due according to the rule of reason, and then they pertain to morals, which are conclusions of the law of nature (even if they are commands and counsels); or they are due from positive law determining natural law, and are either ceremonial, which are determinations of natural precepts in divine things, or judicial, or determinations in human things (Deut. V, 1; VI, 1, 17). Hence it is called by the Apostle (Rom. VII, 12) a just, holy, good commandment (a. 5).

B. As to coercive force: the law induced to their observance by temporal promises and threats, because it was not directed to the perfect, who, having despised temporal things, cling to spiritual things, but to the imperfect, who desire temporal goods, although in order to God. For means must be proposed to men according to their condition (a. 5 and 6).

Namely, eternal goods did not immediately pertain to the covenant entered between God and the Jewish people, but only through the promise of the Redeemer and the future covenant. Whence the law which regards the people contained only temporal promises; eternal goods could be obtained by individuals through faith and hope in the Redeemer, from His merits and the power of His grace, or by force of the new law, for according to this they pertained to the new law (q. 106, a. 1, ad 3, and q. 107, a. 1, ad 2 and 3).

306. Specifically, A. all moral precepts can in some way be reduced to the ten precepts of the Decalogue proposed to the people.

It is proved: for in the law of nature a) some precepts are primary in knowledge, self-evident, known to all, which it was not necessary to promulgate again; but other, secondary precepts are conclusions deduced from the first, of which b) many are more remote, which were not to be placed in the Decalogue, because their reason is manifest only to the wise alone, to whom it pertains to teach the people, and because a multiplicity of precepts would place confusion, whence they were not to be proposed to the people; c) certain are proximate and immediate, which by slight consideration are at once evidently deduced from the first precepts and whose reason appears to all, and these were placed in the Decalogue, because in fewer cases or among some it happens that human judgment concerning them is perverted.

Now the primary and common precepts (for example, love of God and neighbor) are contained in the precepts of the Decalogue as principles in conclusions (ad 1); but the more remote, conversely, are contained in them as conclusions in their principles.

Therefore all precepts of the Decalogue are moral, except the third, which is partly moral, as to the fact that man deputes some time to divine worship, and partly ceremonial, as to the determination of a special time, namely, the Sabbath (ad 2).

B. Ceremonial precepts determined the peculiar mode by which God was to be worshiped; these had to be many and solemn, for promoting the worship of God and turning away from idolatry. They were of four kinds: a) either concerning worship itself, which specially consists in sacrifices, or b) concerning sacred instruments, or c) concerning those worshiping, who are consecrated by sacraments, and d) are distinguished from others by various observances. All these prefigured the future Christ (q. 101).

C. Likewise judicial (or political) precepts regarded human affairs according to the fourfold order which can be found in a people: a) some were of princes to subjects, b) others of subjects to one another, c) certain of the people to foreigners, d) certain toward domestics (wife, children, servants). These prefigured the Church (q. 104).

Ceremonial and judicial precepts were subject to various changes, for God did not cease to accommodate His laws to the conditions of the Jews, whence He sent prophets who authentically interpreted and completed the law.

307. Moral precepts concern all acts of virtues.

For by difference from human law, which orders the community of men to one another (which is done through exterior operations), and commands only acts of justice and acts of other virtues insofar as they assume the notion of justice, divine law commands concerning all those things by which men are ordered to communication with God. But man is joined to God by reason (and will). Whence divine law commands concerning all those things by which human reason (and will) is duly ordered, which happens by acts of all virtues; yet in such a way that certain things, without which the order of reason cannot be observed, fall under the obligation of precept, but certain things which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue fall under admonition and counsel.

1. For intellectual virtues order well the acts of reason in themselves; moral virtues order well the acts of reason concerning interior passions and exterior operations.

Nevertheless all precepts of the Decalogue pertain to justice.

For the precepts of the Decalogue are principles of natural law to which reason adheres by slight consideration and which it at once recognizes as due. But the notion of debt appears most in justice, which is toward another (for in those things which concern oneself it seems at first sight that man is master of himself and that he can licitly do whatever he wishes). And therefore the precepts of the Decalogue pertain to justice: the first three concern acts of religion, which is the chief among the virtues annexed to justice; the fourth concerns acts of piety, which is second among these virtues; the other six concern acts of justice commonly and strictly so called, which is between equals.

1. This in a certain way is true, except for those things which cannot be taken away from oneself without injury to God or neighbor.

308. The precepts of the Decalogue are fittingly distinguished according to diverse objects and are enumerated in a fitting number (q. 100, a. 4 and 5). - It is proved:

Just as human laws order men to a certain human community, so divine law orders them to the community of men under God. But in order that someone be well ordered in society, two things are required: that he bear himself well both toward him who presides over the community and toward the other fellow citizens. Whence in divine law first are placed the precepts which order men to God, and then those which order them to other neighbors living together under God, whether by deed, or by mouth, or by heart.

A. But man owes three things to the prince of the community:

I. fidelity in deed, by which He alone is acknowledged, which is handed down in the first precept: You shall not have strange gods; by which we acknowledge the unity of God;

II. reverence especially in speech, by which nothing injurious is said against Him, which is handed down in the second precept: You shall not take the name of God in vain, that is, you shall not commit perjury; by which we revere the truth of God;

III. service even in heart, recompense for benefits received (first of all creation), which pertains to the third precept: Remember that you sanctify the Sabbath day; by which we worship the goodness of God.

B. But someone bears himself well toward neighbors:

a) either specially toward those to whom he is a debtor, if he renders to them what is due, which:

IV. must be done especially to parents, whence the fourth precept is placed: Honor father and mother;

b) or generally toward all, if he inflicts no harm, neither alpha) by deed, by committing injury, whether:

V. against one's own person as to individual life, which the fifth precept prohibits: You shall not kill;

VI. against a person joined to oneself as to the propagation of offspring, which the sixth precept prohibits: You shall not commit adultery;

VII. against external possessed goods, which are ordered to both, which the seventh precept prohibits: You shall not commit theft;

nor beta) is harm inflicted by speech:

VIII. as to reputation and honor, which the eighth precept prohibits: You shall not speak false testimony;

nor by heart, either:

IX. by concupiscence of the flesh, by desiring the wife of another, which the ninth precept prohibits: You shall not desire your neighbor's wife;

or X. by concupiscence of the eyes, by coveting his goods, which the tenth prohibits: You shall not covet your neighbor's house, etc.

1. A special precept concerning concupiscence of homicide and false testimony is not handed down as concerning delight in adultery and theft: delight of the flesh and the utility of riches are especially appetible and are loved as if naturally; homicide and falsity are not goods of themselves but rather bring horror than delight (a. 5, ad 5).

309. The precepts of the Decalogue are handed down in a fitting order (q. 100, a. 6 and 7). - It is proved:

The precepts of the Decalogue are given concerning those things which are immediately admitted readily by reason; but something is more easily admitted by reason in proportion as its contrary is graver or more repugnant to reason. Therefore the precepts had to be placed according to the order of gravity. Now disorder toward the end itself, God, is more repugnant to reason, and therefore the first precepts of the Decalogue order man to God; and indeed 1) infidelity toward a superior, which is prohibited by the first precept, is graver than 2) irreverence, which is prohibited by the second, and this is graver than 3) absence of due service, concerning which the third treats. In the precepts ordering toward neighbor, it is more repugnant to reason and a graver sin if man does not preserve the due order toward persons to whom he owes more; and therefore after the three precepts toward God is placed 4) the precept toward parents. Toward the remaining neighbors, it is graver to sin by deed than by mouth, and indeed 5) homicide, by which the life of an existing man is taken away, is graver than 6) adultery, by which the certainty of offspring to be born is impeded, and this is graver than 7) theft, which pertains to external goods; then 8) sins of the mouth, which are graver than sins of the heart, and among these 9) concupiscence of adultery is graver than 10) concupiscence of theft.

All these are negative precepts, except the third and fourth: for negative precepts extend to all persons and cases; not so affirmative precepts, because benefits and services are not to be furnished to all nor always, and therefore only two are placed, as to God and parents, on account of the greatest benefits which cannot be sufficiently recompensed (a. 7, ad 1).

310. All moral precepts are easily distinguished according to the precepts of the Decalogue.

It is proved:

A. Certain altogether universal and self-evident precepts are presupposed as principles to conclusions. Thus the precept of acknowledging the supernatural end and tending to it by faith, hope,

and divine charity is presupposed to the first three; and the precept of loving one's neighbor as oneself to the rest. Similarly the precept of loving oneself and preserving life for oneself, which man naturally fulfills and which moreover is included in the love of God and neighbor: for in this man truly loves himself, that he orders himself to God, and he truly loves his neighbor if he orders him to the end as himself.

B. Other particular determinate precepts, whose reason is not manifest to all but to the wiser, are joined as conclusions, either mediately, as all things which necessarily lead to those things which the Decalogue itself commands or prohibits, or indirectly, because there exists a similar reason of commanding or prohibiting them. Hence:

to the first precept are reduced all things which are ordered to idolatry or have likeness with it: sorcery, divination, vain observance, those things which are against fidelity, such as tempting God, or against works of worship by which we show fidelity, such as sacrilege and simony;

to the second precept: blasphemy and false doctrine, all illicit or violated oaths and vows, every vain taking up of divine things;

to the third precept: all ceremonial things which regard sacrifices and sacraments;

to the fourth precept: all precepts concerning honoring superiors and elders, and concerning benefits to be shown to equals, inferiors, and the poor;

to the fifth precept: all violations against the body of one's neighbor, hatred and anger which lead to them, and scandal which violates the soul;

to the sixth and ninth precepts: fornication, vices against nature, and those things which begin lust or lead to all these;

to the seventh and tenth precepts: usury, fraud, robbery, and every injustice toward external goods, and all things which lead to these;

to the eighth precept: false judgment, lying, detraction, and every injury done by word against reputation and honor.

Precepts toward oneself did not have to be stated in the Decalogue (cf. n. 307), and moreover they are easily reduced to it. For:

1. the precept of loving and preserving oneself is known to all and is naturally observed, and therefore it was not to be promulgated; moreover it is included in the love of God and neighbor (the first and fifth precepts): for in this man truly loves himself, that he orders himself to God, and he truly loves his neighbor if he loves him and orders him to the end as himself (q. 100, a. 5, ad 1);

2. but other precepts are remote conclusions whose reason is not manifest to all, and therefore they were not to be proposed directly to the people but to the wise, who can teach the people. Yet they are easily reduced to the precepts concerning neighbor according to the diverse goods about which they are concerned: thus precepts concerning one's own health and concerning food and drink, which are ordered to it, are reduced to the fifth; those which concern goods of fortune to the seventh and tenth; those which concern honor, reputation, and glory to the

eighth; the precept of fortitude according to various motives on account of which someone ought to despise death.

311. The old law does not justify (q. 100, a. 12) properly and perfectly, because it could not cause justice infused by God through moral or judicial precepts, which concern only human acts, which cannot cause grace; nor through ceremonial precepts, because the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer grace. Nevertheless it justified in a certain respect insofar as it prescribed acts of justice; also improperly insofar as it stirred up faith and hope and thus disposed to the grace of Christ justifying and signified it, and insofar as ceremonial precepts conferred "legal" justification and cleanness, by which men according to external justice, in the face of law and society, were held just before the law and fit for the worship of God.

Third Question: On the Mutability of the Old Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 100, a. 8; q. 103, a. 3 and 4; q. 104, a. 3.

312. Principle I. The old law, once the redemption of Christ had been accomplished, ceased, because its end ceased, which is to prepare for Christ and the new law (q. 103, a. 3; Heb. VIII, 13; Col. II, 16; Council of Florence). Nevertheless:

1. its moral precepts, although not on account of the old law, obligate because they are of natural right and because they were again imposed by Christ in the new law; this especially holds of the precepts of the Decalogue, which contain the very conservation of the common good, which is ordination to God (the first three precepts), and the order itself of justice and virtue to be preserved among men (the remaining seven);

1. Nevertheless the determination and application to individual acts can vary because of a change of matter and circumstances, as was said above concerning natural law, n. 258-259.

2. as to ceremonial precepts, the law had to cease when the Redeemer came, because exterior worship must be proportioned to the interior worship which it expresses; but in the Old Law there was faith and hope not only concerning beatitude and heavenly goods, but also concerning the means to it, which are the graces of redemption, as concerning certain future things. Whence, when the Redeemer came, it began to cease, and once redemption had been accomplished, worship lost obligation (as the Apostles decreed in the assembly at Jerusalem, Acts XV, 1-28), which happened in the very death of Christ (Council of Florence, decree for the Jacobites);

3. as to judicial precepts, because they were instituted for disposing the state of the people by which it was ordered to Christ, therefore, once the state of the people had been changed after Christ came, they lost obligation (cf. Acts XV).

313. Principle II. To observe the ceremonial precepts today is gravely evil, because they are false worship (q. 103, a. 4).

It is proved:

A false profession of faith is gravely evil. But all ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the interior worship of God consists, and the ceremonies of the Old Law signified Christ as to be born and to suffer. Therefore, just as he would sin gravely who now said that Christ is to be born, so does he who observes the ceremonies of the Old Law (Gal. V, 2, 4).

But the judicial precepts, because they were instituted not for figuring Christ as to come but only for disposing the state of the people, can be observed, unless per accidens someone from a false opinion wished to impose or observe them as obligatory from the institution of the old law.

314. Principle III. When Christ had died, the old law ceased to obligate (Heb. IX, 16, 17; Eph. II, 15), whence it is called dead (q. 100, a. 4, ad 1).

Nevertheless by the Jews it could be observed for a time without sin, as is clear from the example of the Apostles (Acts X, 14; XVI, 3; XVIII, 18; XXI, 24; I Cor. IX, 20), and from the necessity of observing it for a certain time so that the Jews might more easily be led to Christ: so that the law would cease not immediately and as if violently, but gradually, and worship and morals would be changed, and so that the Synagogue might be buried with honor. But it was not observed insofar as it signified Christ as to come, nor with the persuasion that it was still obligatory (as moreover the Apostles expressly said), but insofar as it prescribed the mode of worshiping God to be fittingly preserved according to the special circumstances of that time, as those circumstances sufficiently indicated. But after the time of the Gospel sufficiently promulgated, every reason for observing it ceased; whence from that moment worship no longer has anything but the false signification of a future redemption, and the law became death-bearing; which seems to have happened at the time of the fall of Jerusalem, at which time the Synagogue was definitively buried. Cf. Council of Florence, decree for the Jacobites, February 4, 1442.

Chapter II: On the New Law

First Question: On the Essence of the New Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 106 and 107.

315. The new law properly and principally is the internal law implanted in us (q. 106, a. 1): for just as the natural law is the very light of our reason habitually showing what good is to be done and what evil is to be avoided, and the very habitual inclination to the good of reason, so the new law is the very habitual grace of the Holy Spirit, written in the heart of the faithful, in which the whole power of the law consists, since from the abundance of the light of faith and of the gifts (of understanding and knowledge) and of the illuminations of the Holy Spirit it indicates what is to be done in order to eternal life, and from the abundance of love and of grace sweetly inclining it also aids one in fulfilling it.

This is clear from the doctrine of the Apostle, who a) in Heb. VIII, 8-10, says that the prophecy of Jeremiah (XXXI, 33) concerning the new pact or testament has been fulfilled: "I will give My law in their inward parts and I will write it in their heart"; whence II Cor. III, 3: "you are the letter of Christ (ministered by us), and written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on fleshly tablets of the heart"; b) in Rom. III, 27, 31, he calls the very grace of faith a law, and opposes it as internal to the old law of exterior works; and c) in VIII, 2, he calls it the law of the Spirit of life, that is, of the Holy Spirit internally vivifying (for the spirit of life is something internal),

which frees us from the law of sin and death, that is, from internal concupiscence, which the old law, as being external, could not conquer. Cf. Jn. VI, 44, 45 and Is. LIV, 13.

Secondarily, however, the new law is an external and written law, insofar as by words and writings it instructs the faithful concerning those things to be believed and done which dispose to grace or pertain to its use.

From this it follows that the new law justifies by its own power according as principally it is the very grace given interiorly, but not according to the precepts which secondarily pertain to it (a. 2).

316. The new law ought not to have been given from the beginning (a. 3).

1. because it is principally the grace of the Holy Spirit, which ought not to be given abundantly except after the redemption had been accomplished through Christ (Jn. VII, 39; Rom. VIII, 3); 2) because it is perfect: something ought not immediately be brought to perfection but successively, and therefore the imperfect law had to precede (Gal. IV, 24); 3) because it is the law of grace, and therefore it was necessary that man be left to his own powers in the Old Law, so that, by falling into sin and knowing his infirmity, he might recognize that he needed grace (Rom. V, 20).

317. The old and new law are one in species insofar as they tend to one thing, namely, that men be subject to God and have eternal life (q. 107, a. 1-4); nevertheless they are two in the degree of perfection, insofar as the Old is imperfect, but the New is perfect because it is the law of charity and of friendship with God.

Hence 1) the New fulfills the old (Mt. V, 17), because the perfect fulfills what is lacking to the imperfect: a) as to the end, which is the justification of men, which the old law could not effect but prefigured and promised would be effected by the new law; b) as to the precepts: for Christ not only confirmed the moral precepts of the law, but explained its true sense by showing that interior acts also are prohibited by it, indicated how it might be observed more safely, and superadded more perfect counsels (Mt. V-VII); 2) it is contained in the old as the tree in the seed; 3) it is less burdensome than the old (Mt. XI, 28), both in the number of precepts, because it adds few positive external precepts to natural law, and in the facility and delight of love with which it is fulfilled: for although it commands a more perfect mode of operating according to virtue and also prescribes justice in every interior affection, nevertheless these things are not burdensome to those who love God and have justice.

Whence the new law is altogether spiritual: a) it has a spiritual and eternal sanction (Mt. X, 28); therefore it calls blessed those who are poor, who mourn, who suffer persecution, because their reward is abundant in heaven (Mt. V, 3-12), and denounces temporal goods as impediments which delay us from the kingdom of heaven (Lk. VI, 24-25; Mt. XVI, 26);

b) it is a spiritual kingdom, for entering which faith in the Gospel, love of God and neighbor, imitation of Christ, and denial of self are required (Mt. V, 48);

c) the worship which it promotes, although it must be externally manifested, especially must be internal (Jn. IV, 23). Hence the ancient sacrifices, which chiefly consisted in external immolation, have been abolished, and there succeeds to them the sacrifice of Christ, who immolates not only His

body, but His soul by most perfect obedience (Heb. X, 5-7). For this reason He wills His disciples also to offer spiritual victims (I Pet. II, 5; Mt. VI, 1).

1. Tanquerey, *Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis*, n. 247.

318. The new law was solemnly promulgated on the day of Pentecost, Jews from every nation being present; on that day it began to obligate in Jerusalem, but in other regions successively according to the time necessary for the knowledge of the law morally to be able of itself to arrive at them. But that this had been sufficiently done for the world then known is commonly believed to have occurred about 40 years after the death of the Savior (at the time of the fall of Jerusalem): for then the sound of the Apostles had gone out into every land (Rom. X, 18). Nevertheless for this reason the law had not been divulged, since knowledge of it had not yet in fact come to all.

Second Question: On the Power of the New Law

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 108; q. 106, a. 1, ad 1; a. 4.

319. The new law must order exterior acts (q. 108, a. 1 and 2). - For although it is principally the grace of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless it fittingly hands down certain precepts not only concerning interior acts, but also concerning exterior acts, so that it is a true law (Mt. V, 17; XXVIII, 20; Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 19, 20 and 21). And indeed it contains:

1. certain ceremonial things concerning the sacraments, for the very reception of grace (e.g., Jn. III, 5): for we have grace through the Son of God visibly made man; whence grace flowing from the incarnate and visible Word must be led down to us through visible signs, which are the sacraments and the sacrifice;

2. also moral precepts concerning acts of virtues both internal and external, which dispose to grace or pertain to its use:

a) precepts concerning acts which are necessary as a disposition for the reception and conservation of grace, whether as to the intellect, such as knowledge of the principal truths of faith or of the preambles concerning the manifestation of the divinity and humanity of Christ; or as to affection, namely those things which pertain to contempt of the world, without which man is not capable of the Holy Spirit (Jn. XIV, 17);

b) precepts concerning acts which are necessary for the right use of grace, not only concerning internal acts, which are the very grace and charity ordering us internally to God and neighbor; but also concerning external acts, which are produced from the impulse of grace: for grace is operative through charity, and therefore it must also manifest itself through external works (Eph. V, 8; Jn. XII, 36; Mt. X, 13), some of which have a necessary fittingness or contrariety to grace, and these are prescribed or prohibited, e.g., confession and denial of faith (Mk. XVI, 16; Mt. X, 32; XXVIII, 19, 20 [the original misprints XXV, 19, 20]; Jn. XVI, 9), and many others handed down in Mt. V, 22 sq.

3. But other works which are not necessary for grace are not prescribed: if these look to each person individually, they have been left to his liberty; if they look to common utility, they have been left to temporal and spiritual superiors. And therefore besides moral and sacramental precepts, no other ceremonial or judicial things were given, but they were left to the Church.

Hence, by difference from the old law, which is called the law of servitude, the new law is called the law of liberty, not only a) because by it we are freed from the servitude of sin (Rom. VI, 18), but also b) because the new law obligates only to those things which are necessary to salvation to be done, or contrary to it to be avoided, and leaves other things to liberty, nor is it like the old law, which determined many ceremonial and judicial things and left few things to the choice of men (Acts XV, 1; Gal. V, 1); c) because it makes us fulfill these precepts freely, not by fear and a servile mind, but insofar as by the interior instinct of grace and love we willingly fulfill them.

320. The new law fittingly orders interior acts, so that men may be totally subject to God (q. 108, a. 3). - For Christ, in the sermon which He gave on the mount, 1) promised beatitude to various excellent works; 2) ordered the interior acts of man as to himself: a) concerning means, that we abstain not only from exterior evil works, but also from interior ones and from occasions of evils; b) concerning the end, that we not establish it in human glory, or riches, or pleasures; whence He proposes three contrary good works: prayer, almsgiving, and fasting; 3) ordered the interior acts of man as to neighbor, lest we judge rashly or unjustly or presumptuously, nor trust the unworthy too much; 4) teaches the mode of fulfilling the law, by imploring divine help, by applying effort toward virtue, and by caution against seducers (Mt. V-VII).

321. In the new law, which is the law of liberty and perfection, counsels are fittingly added concerning those things which are necessary, not for obtaining the end, but so that we may obtain it better and more expeditiously (q. 108, a. 4). For man is placed in the middle between worldly and spiritual goods, so that the more he clings to the one, the more he withdraws from the other; and although it is not necessary for beatitude that man totally relinquish earthly things, because he can use them according to reason, nevertheless he will arrive at it better and more expeditiously by totally renouncing those goods. Now:

1. The goods of this world are of three kinds: a) riches, to which the concupiscence of the eyes excites, and the counsel of poverty proposes that these be relinquished (Mt. XIX, 21); b) the pleasures of the flesh, about which the concupiscence of the flesh is concerned, and the counsel of virginity or continence teaches that these be relinquished (Mt. XIX, 11-12; I Cor. VII, 25-40); c) honors, which the pride of life pursues, and which we relinquish by perfect obedience (q. 108, a. 4).

2. Similarly, the disquiet of secular solicitude is cast upon man especially concerning three things (Lk. VI, 24; IX, 23; XII, 22): a) concerning the management of exterior things, and this solicitude is taken away from man by the counsel of poverty; b) concerning the governing of wife and children, which is cut off by the counsel of virginity; c) concerning the disposing of one's own acts, which is cut off by the counsel of obedience, by which someone commits himself to the disposal of another (cf. C. Gent. III, 130).

3. Finally, man has a threefold good: a) the good of exterior things, which someone offers totally to God by voluntary poverty; b) the good of his own body, which he offers by perfect chastity; c) the good of the soul, which he offers totally by obedience, by which someone gives to God his own will, through which man uses all the powers and habits of the soul (II-II, q. 186, a. 7).

322. The new law is universal (q. 106, a. 4). For:

a) it is imposed on all men (Mt. XXVIII, 18-20; Mk. XVI, 15-16; Rom. I, 16); but some precepts are immediately obligatory, e.g., of believing and receiving Baptism; others mediately, namely on the baptized, e.g., the precept of confession and communion;

b) it is imposed on all subsequent times, because none more perfect can exist, since 1) it immediately joins men to God and introduces them into the last end (Heb. X, 19-20), 2) it causes grace itself through the sacraments, which truly sanctify, and 3) it has a sacrifice of infinite dignity. And surely in this life a more perfect divine law or religion cannot be given, since a greater union of man with God cannot be devised: for here He was made man and by the Incarnation united Himself to us, so that He might make us gods and unite us to Himself through the life of grace; He nourishes and increases this life by uniting His flesh and blood to us in the Eucharist, so that we may be united to Him by perfect vision and intimate possession of Himself in heaven. Thus in the religious order the maximum toward God is attained, than which something greater cannot be devised. Whence

c) the new law can be changed by no one, nor can the Church properly dispense in it, but only interpret it authentically in the name of God; and it is to endure until the consummation of the age. Hence in the Scriptures it is called a stable kingdom (Mt. XVI, 18; XXVIII, 20), the last time (Acts II, 17; I Jn. II, 18), a covenant remaining forever (Jer. XXXI, 40; Mal. I, 10-11; Heb. XIII, 20; Mt. XXVIII, 20), a new and eternal testament (Mt. XXVI, 28; Lk. XXII, 20; Heb. XIII, 20; IX, 20).

Therefore the new law differs from the old law: 1) by reason of the efficient cause, because it is from Christ not only as He is God but also as man (Heb. I, 1); 2) by reason of the formal cause, because principally it is grace and charity, which it gives *ex opere operato*, while the old law gave knowledge of precept and of sin, but not help; 3) by reason of the material cause, because it was borne for all and in perpetuity, declares the precepts perfectly, adds counsels, imposes few external things, but many internal things which nevertheless are easy to fulfill from grace; 4) by reason of the final cause, because it immediately procures eternal happiness.

Sixth Part: On Ecclesiastical Law

323. Ecclesiastical law is an ordination of human reason by which the Church and the baptized faithful are directed by him who has care of them unto sanctity and eternal life. For just as civil law is necessary for determining the natural law and for ruling the people in order to temporal felicity, so ecclesiastical law is necessary for determining, inculcating, completing, and urging by an added special sanction of penalty the natural and divine law, and thus for ruling the Christian people in order to the last end. It is not surprising, therefore, if many things said about human law are applied in the present matter.

1. St. Thomas does not specially treat ecclesiastical law, because this used to be done in the science of law.

The law is also called canonical, from the eighth century, from canons which are opposed to civil laws already in the Council of Ancyra (314) and Nicaea I (324); likewise sacred human law, both by reason of the authority which was constituted by Christ (by divine law), and by reason of the matter, which excludes temporal things as such, and by reason of the end, because it is made for the sanctification of souls. Hence it is a derivation, imitation, and supplement of divine law.

First Question: On Ecclesiastical Law According to Itself

Article I: On the Author of Ecclesiastical Law

324. All those can make law who enjoy perfect public power of ruling, or political jurisdiction, over a perfect community or a part of it. In the Church, power, from the will of Christ, belongs by ordinary divine right to the Supreme Pontiff (Mt. XVI, 19; Jn. XXI, 15-18) and to bishops (Mt. XVIII, 18; XXVIII, 20); by ecclesiastical right it can be conceded also to others. But one kind is called ordinary, had by force of one's own office; another delegated, from a special commission of him who has ordinary power (c. 197, § 1). Hence they can make laws who enjoy:

2. This is always vicarious, or to be exercised in the name of another; but ordinary power can be proper or vicarious according as it is exercised in one's own name or in the name of another. But that difference does not regard legislative power.

a) ordinary perfect jurisdiction in the external forum:

1. the Supreme Pontiff for the whole world and any part of it (c. 218), whether alone, or with others, e.g., Roman Congregations, by whose aid he composes or issues decrees which he himself confirms;

2. a Council: an ecumenical council (c. 228) confirmed by the Roman Pontiff (c. 227) for the whole Church; a plenary council for its territory (c. 290), e.g., a national council for a nation, a provincial council for a province; but the decrees of particular councils cannot be promulgated before they have been reviewed by the Sacred Congregation of the Council (c. 291, § 1); likewise a diocesan synod for a diocese (c. 356);

3. bishops for their subjects, even outside a synod (c. 362); likewise, when the see is vacant, the chapter of the cathedral church (c. 429 and 431) or the college of consultors (c. 427) and the capitular vicar (c. 435), although this is not expedient unless for urging laws previously enacted or there is need during a very long vacancy, yet in such a way that "nothing be innovated" (c. 436); likewise those who exercise episcopal jurisdiction, such as prelates nullius and exempt prelates for the territory subject to them (c. 323); likewise apostolic vicars and prefects for their region (c. 294), and apostolic administrators permanently constituted (c. 315);

4. religious Orders and exempt clerical religions in general chapter (c. 501, § 1);

b) or jurisdiction delegated by the Pontiff: legates, nuncios, etc., for the region to which they are sent and according to the tenor of the concession and of their faculties; likewise vicars general by special delegation of the bishop;

c) but not those who lack such jurisdiction:

1. rectors of lower communities: parishes, monasteries, sodalities, universities, a non-exempt religion (c. 501, § 1), etc.; their statutes, however, can have the force of obligating from the pact or vow of subjects, or from dominative authority, or from the will of the legislator;

2. superiors general or general chapters of a lay religion even if exempt, because only clerics are able to obtain jurisdiction in the Church (c. 118);

3. abbesses or superioresses: for although by domestic authority they can command, nevertheless no power of jurisdiction in the Church belongs to women.

Article II: On the Matter and Quality of Ecclesiastical Law

325. The matter of ecclesiastical law in general. - The matter of human law is all acts whose performance or omission can contribute to the common good, even those which of themselves are indifferent, insofar as they can be ordered to virtue or vice. The common good which the Church intends is the worship of God and the supernatural sanctification of men; whence it can make laws concerning those things which pertain to spiritual life, such as faith, the Christian virtues, the remission of sins and indulgences; concerning those things which look to worship, such as sacrifice, sacraments, prayers, vows, oaths, processions, pilgrimages, ceremonies, feast days; concerning sacred persons set over spiritual life and worship; concerning temporal goods necessary for providing for all these things.

Moreover, in all these things law can either inculcate the natural and divine law (e.g., by prohibiting heresy, prescribing Baptism), or determine what they leave undetermined (e.g., annual confession, Paschal communion, Sunday, fasting), or impose what is more conformable to them (to celebrate the Nativity of the Lord), or prescribe and prohibit what they permit (to abstain from meats, from servile or forensic work), or urge all these things by an added special sanction of penalty (e.g., excommunication), and also add conditions for the validity of an act instituted by natural, divine, or ecclesiastical law (thus for religious profession, for marriage, e.g., that it be celebrated before the pastor).

326. Specifically, what acts can be prescribed. - On the part of the matter, ecclesiastical law, as being human law, must prescribe acts which are:

1. generally honorable, that is, not contrary to a higher law, e.g., natural or divine;

2. specifically just, that is, opposed to the right of no one;

3. contained within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the legislator: for subjects are bound to obey superiors according to the reason of superiority; whence besides jurisdiction in the superior, competence is required, that is, power over the particular matter about which the law is concerned;

4. useful for the common good. Such, per se and regularly, are only acts:

a) morally possible and accommodated to the powers of men; otherwise the law would not be conformable to reason, nor would it promote the common good, but more often would be an occasion of sins. Nevertheless, let it be noted that judgment concerning the difficulty of a law belongs to the legislator, not to the subjects; otherwise it would be the end of laws. Moreover, arduous and heroic acts can be imposed upon those who have freely chosen a state to which they pertain (such as perpetual continence upon priests and religious, perpetual enclosure upon nuns, missions in places

of barbarians upon missionaries), or even when the public good demands it (e.g., the administration of the sacraments by a pastor in time of plague);

b) future: for to command, prohibit, permit past acts, or, if they are irrevocable, to invalidate them, would be useless; likewise past acts cannot be punished unless they had already been prohibited by some law, nor can revocable acts be invalidated or persons rendered unfit or incapable for past acts, except on account of a great necessity of the common good: for the good of a part must always yield to the good of the whole. Hence canon 10: "Laws regard future things, not past things, unless provision is made in them by name concerning past things" (cf. can. 2226, § 2 and 3, and 2222). But a law not constitutive of new right, but merely declarative of an older right, is able to touch past acts;

c) external, which alone place us in relation to society and alone are directly referred to external governance.

327. Can internal acts be prescribed?

Many more recent authors, by distinction from the older ones, prefer to extend the legislative power of the Church to merely internal acts. Nevertheless they assert this without foundation. For:

1. Thus formerly Sylvius and Elbel, Schmier and Bockhn; but now Ballerini-Palmieri, Bouquillon, Van den Berghe, Lehmkuhl, Maroto, Leroux in *Revue Ecclesiastique de Liege*, VII, n. 3, November 1911; Noldin favors it. On the contrary, St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, a. 4; q. 95; q. 100, a. 9; II-II, q. 104, a. 5; Suarez, Benedict XIV, Reiffenstuel, St. Alphonsus, d'Annibale, Billot, Vermeersch, and almost all canonists.

1. Just as the power of the internal forum directly and immediately regards the internal sanctification of individuals, so the legislative power of the external forum per se first tends to external and common governance, for society, even ecclesiastical society, is a visible and external body. But merely internal acts are not apt matter for governance of this kind. Therefore. And surely human law, since it is enacted for the community, affects individuals insofar as they are part of visible society and communicate socially among themselves; whence social power is necessarily of the external forum. But merely internal acts do not pertain to social communication: for through them we do not communicate with others. Therefore internal acts directly and according to themselves cannot be the object of human law and of social power.

2. The legislator cannot make laws except concerning those things about which he can judge and to which he can compel; otherwise law would be useless and inefficacious for obtaining its effect. Hence legislative, judicial, and coercive power are of the same order, as parts of one integral power of jurisdiction, which therefore per se are contained by the same limits. But a human legislator cannot judge or punish except external acts. Therefore neither can he command except external acts.

1. They respond: 1) The Church could impose censure. But an unknown internal sanction is not naturally proportioned to an external law. 2) It can appeal to divine judgment. But kings also could do this; why, therefore, could they not also prescribe internal acts, for example, of love and devotion toward the republic?

3. Whence Innocent III says: the Church does not judge concerning hidden things.

Hence legislative power of the internal forum cannot be conceived except as vicarious of God and to be exercised in the name of God; but from revelation or from the usage of the Church no trace is given of such power conceded by God. For the words Mt. XVI, 19 and XVIII, 18 must be understood with restriction according to the nature of the thing, and are general only within the latitude which is always assigned to a human legislator; otherwise they would also prove that the Pontiff can dissolve natural or divine law, or make law in temporal and civil matter.

Therefore: a) it is not proved that ecclesiastical law can prescribe merely internal acts, and it is certain that it does not do so;

b) it is able directly to touch all external acts, even hidden ones; for external acts per se and by their nature are public and only per accidens are hidden; but law attends to those things which happen per se and commonly;

c) it is able indirectly to touch all internal acts which are the form of exterior acts and are conjoined with them, whether necessarily and per se, or even per accidens, provided that in some way they manifest themselves externally: for by this very fact they are touchable by law. Thus there is touched: 1) the internal cause of an external act, e.g., the will of fasting is also prescribed and the will of eating meats is prohibited; likewise 2) a necessary condition so that the external act may have species, validity, honesty, and even special morality, e.g., intention in an oath or in the sacraments or sacrifice, attention in prayer, sorrow in contrition, intention of obligating oneself in a contract, consent in marriage, dispositions so that acts (e.g., confession or communion) may be good (cf. prop. 14 condemned by Alexander VII and 55 condemned by Innocent XI, and can. 907 and 861); 3) likewise a special motive or accidental end on account of which the act is to be placed: Mass to be celebrated for the flock, prayer for rain, for the souls in purgatory, etc.; namely, it is a condition of the public act as it is intended by the Church.

1. Likewise censure punishes an act done from hatred, favor, avarice, or love of base gain. Yet in this way it does not touch the internal act, but does not touch the external act unless it is done from hatred, etc. It is, namely, only a restriction of punishment, as Suarez and the Salmanticenses say. Or, as Santi explains: insofar as that internal act goes out into the external forum and produces bad effects in society.

328. Observation.

Although by legislative power the Church does not touch merely internal acts, nevertheless it can touch them by another power; and indeed:

1. it can attach a favor, e.g., an indulgence, to an internal act, as it has done for meditation on the way of the cross;

2. it can in the name of God interpret natural and divine law even as to merely internal acts, to which then we are bound not by force of ecclesiastical law, but by force of the higher law: thus in the name of God it can remit vows or oaths even internal ones;

3. it can in the name of God in the internal forum of conscience absolve from sins, even internal ones, and prescribe merely internal things, e.g., pious meditation;

4. it can, through superiors, prescribe internal things to religious, by force of the vow of obedience, e.g., mental prayer, examination of conscience.

Article III: On the Formation of Ecclesiastical Law

329. Ecclesiastical laws can be formed just as other human laws can: either by an imperative act of the legislator requiring observance from the subjects, or by the observance or custom of subjects, to which the consent of the legislator is added.

In former times many ecclesiastical laws were introduced by custom, several of which have now been consigned to writing; but even today custom is able to introduce law, as we shall explain in q. 3, art. 7, but always with the consent of the legislator (can. 25); these laws are called customary right.

Now, however, laws are ordinarily constituted by an imperative act of the legislator; whence these laws are called constituted right, which ordinarily is written.

It belongs to the nature of constituted law: a) that the superior not make a law without the counsel of prudent persons; whence Pontiffs are accustomed to consult congregations, and bishops have the counsel of the chapter; indeed at least every ten years a diocesan synod is to be celebrated (can. 356, § 1), in which nevertheless the bishop alone is legislator, the others having a merely consultive vote (can. 362); b) that the intention of obligating be expressed in clear and brief words and in the language of the society to which it is directed, such as Latin in the Western Church; c) that it be proposed in writing, by which provision is better made for the perspicuity of the law. This can be done under various forms of decree, letter, code or collection, even response and sentence, although these two are more suited to interpreting a law already enacted than to introducing a new one; indeed under the form of an instruction, which nevertheless is rather a declarative norm and a directive rule to be observed, accessorily completing the law, in which nevertheless certain secondary points can be imposed by prescriptive ordination. Yet no determined form is to be observed by precept in the formation of laws.

330. Ecclesiastical laws take on various forms.

Today there are enumerated:

1. apostolic constitutions, which are issued in the name of the Roman Pontiff or proceed immediately from him, in the more solemn form of a Bull, and are concerned with graver business;

2. apostolic letters, which are issued under the form of a Bull or under the less solemn form of a Brief, for less grave business, especially of the order of governance or administration; letters are called encyclicals when they are directed to the bishops of the whole world, or to a notable part of them, e.g., at least of one or several nations;

3. decrees or general decrees, which the Roman Pontiff composes either in an ecumenical council or through the Roman congregations;

4. decretal letters or responses which take occasion from another's relation (to a consultation or petition), and rescripts by which another's petition is satisfied (can. 36 sq.);

5. consistorial allocutions, which are had by living voice in consistory: for the external forum they are authentic if they are reduced to writing and consigned by officials;

6. the Code of Law, or collection of the principal disciplinary laws of the Church, whose prescriptions are distinguished not by articles as in civil law, but by canons;

7. decrees of particular councils;

8. statutes, by which rather are designated laws enacted by an inferior power, e.g., episcopal or diocesan statutes, or ordinances of the internal governance of moral persons, e.g., capitular or religious statutes.

331. The mode of promulgating laws, just as of forming them, was variously used by the Pontiffs.

a) During the first twelve centuries, they promulgated their constitutions by sending them into the provinces, through clerics of most approved faith, either to individual bishops, or to metropolitans or patriarchs, who took care that they be transmitted to the bishops;

b) at the beginning of the thirteenth century, they began to promulgate authentic collections of canon law by sending them with a Bull to the more celebrated academies: thus Innocent III, in the year 1210, promulgated the collection of his decretals by letters directed to the University of Bologna;

c) in the course of the same century, they ordered certain Bulls to be promulgated by affixing them in the place of their residence, especially at Rome (e.g., at the doors of the Lateran Church; the basilica of St. Peter in the Vatican, and the Apostolic Chancery, or in the square of the Campo de' Fiori), with this clause, that such promulgation would suffice for the law to obtain its whole force: thus Martin IV in the year 1281 issued a Bull against Michael Palaeologus, and Boniface VIII used the same mode against Philip the Fair.

Such promulgation made in a central place such as Rome suffices for the law to have the force of obligating: for it is the chief city of the whole world, whose communication with the whole world is immense, to which almost all nations come together, in which not only kings have their legates but almost all prelates have their procurators, who can render them more certain concerning new laws; whence a new law promulgated there is very easily divulged.

This mode of promulgation thereafter was generally retained by the Supreme Pontiffs, although it was never the only one: for certain things were accustomed to be promulgated by transmission to nuncios, metropolitans, bishops, etc., such as encyclicals and decrees issued by congregations; or even by promulgation in individual dioceses or even parishes, as was done for the decree of Trent concerning clandestine marriages and was usually done for penal law, invalidating law, law removing jurisdiction, or for constitutions which regard a part of the Church.

d) But now Pius X decreed (constitution of September 29, 1908) that an official commentary be issued (Acta Apostolicae Sedis), in which he willed pontifical constitutions, laws, decrees, and other decisions of the Roman Pontiff and of the Sacred Congregations and Offices to be inserted and

published to the public, and in this way promulgated, whenever there is need of promulgation and no other provision has been made by the Holy See. The Code ratified this, can. 9: "Laws enacted by the Apostolic See are promulgated by publication (that is, not by insertion alone, but by publication or some making public) in the official commentary of the Acta Apostolicae Sedis, unless in particular cases another mode of promulgating has been prescribed."

332. When a promulgated law begins to obligate. - Once the promulgation of a general law has been made at Rome, the law obligates at the time designated by it; but if none is designated (as formerly often took place), some said that it obligates at once, that is, on the following day; others, better, gradually after a time sufficient for divulgation, more or less according to the distance of places; others finally, only after two months, and indeed everywhere, even in the place of promulgation: for the time in which the law can arrive in a human way at the ears of subjects is to be assessed by the judgment of the prudent, which formerly in Roman law was assessed at two months; therefore one must stand by it where the time is not determined. But this assessment is not demonstrated to be applicable to the laws of the Church; then the Roman Curia declared nearby persons guilty of transgressing the law before two months had elapsed; and on the other hand there are several regions to which, after two months, knowledge of the law could not always come; finally, that assessment does not seem capable of being made for all times, even those in which the means of divulgation become much easier. Whence the second opinion seems true, the last was held probable by many, and the first is altogether improbable.

Now, however, the time has already been designated universally, and canon 9 of the Code has force: "Laws enacted by the Apostolic See are promulgated... and exercise their force only after three months have been completed ('as they are computed in the calendar, with the first day counted,' can. 34, § 3) from the day which is appended to the issue of the Acta, unless from the nature of the matter they bind immediately, or in the law itself a shorter or longer vacatio has been specially and expressly established."

From the nature of the matter, laws immediately bind which are concerned with the matter of faith and morals, condemn books and place them in the Index, or declare those things which suffer no delay and must be applied immediately.

333. Concerning the promulgation of particular laws, such as episcopal laws, the common law has nothing; whence it is left to be determined by the judgment of the legislator. They can be promulgated by public reading in the cathedral church, by the voice of a crier in the city square, by affixing in a public place designated for this, by insertion in the diocesan paper, or even by public decision in a synod (can. 335, § 2 and 362). They obligate at once, unless otherwise declared. The same almost holds for the laws of particular councils (can. 291, § 1).

334. For the validity or obligatory force of ecclesiastical law, per se there is not required:

A. Acceptance of subjects properly so called approbative, or acceptance of right, that is, consent to the observance of the enacted law, or the will to submit oneself to it. For the ecclesiastical legislator has power conceded by Christ Himself, not by the community or subjects, to be exercised independently of their consent; and therefore he can, and generally wills to, command independently of such consent (Council of Florence; Trent, sess. 14, c. 7; Vatican, c. 3). Hence there is not required:

1. acceptance of the people; nor 2) for pontifical law, acceptance of the bishops, or for episcopal law, acceptance of priests of the second order: yet if bishops think a pontifical law harmful to their subjects, they can, indeed must, render the Pontiff more certain of this and beseech him that he derogate from it; during the time of supplication, the obligation is probably suspended by epikeia until the Pontiff has judged definitively; nor 3) a fortiori is the consent of secular power required (placet). Cf. Vatican Council, c. 3; encyclical Quanta cura, 1864; Syllabus, prop. 28, 41, 49; constitution Apostolicae Sedis, tit. I, n. 7 and 8.

B. A fortiori there is not required executive acceptance and improperly called acceptance of fact, in order to attribute validity to the law, or the very actual observance of the law and its deduction into use.

Nevertheless, it can be necessary for conserving the force of the law, not directly but indirectly. For if the superior cannot obtain the fulfillment of the law from the greater or sounder part of the community, it can be fitting that he not urge the observance of the law: for by urging it he can be an occasion of ruin to subjects without fruit. In this case the obligation does not fail directly from non-acceptance by the people, but indirectly from the tacit or presumed consent of the legislator, who is judged not to will the ruin of souls if he does not urge the law. But when such a law is judged revoked cannot be determined generally, but is left to the judgment of the prudent.

335. Observation.

Definitions of the Church regarding natural and divine right, and a simple interpretation of ecclesiastical right in force, immediately obligate once they are known, because they do not need promulgation since they are not new laws.

Article IV: On the Division of Ecclesiastical Law

336. Division of ecclesiastical right. - Ecclesiastical right is one thing when liturgical, which directly rules acts of divine worship; another when disciplinary, which directly regards the morals of the faithful: this latter, in the stricter sense, is called canonical.

Both were gradually elaborated, both from the prescriptions of Pontiffs and Councils, and from use and custom afterward confirmed in writing.

This was so especially for liturgical right, which already in ancient times was consigned to books. The things which regarded the Sacrifice were contained in the Roman and Gallican Sacramentaries, in the Antiphonaries or Graduals, in Lectionaries, Epistolaries, and Evangeliaries: from these three the Missal was afterward made. As to the Sacred Office, there existed the Psalter, Antiphonary, Hymnary, Codex of Sacred Scripture, Homiliary, Collectary, etc., from which diverse things were taken and united in the Breviary. For the administration of the Sacraments, Rituals are found, which were also called Manuals or Agendas.

Today liturgical laws are contained in five authentic books: the Missal, Breviary, Ritual, Pontifical, and Ceremonial; and in the decrees and declarations of the Sacred Congregation of Rites (can. 253). For certain matters, however, the Congregation of Ceremonial has competence (can. 254); and for the rites of the Oriental Churches, the Congregation for the Oriental Church (can. 257).

But disciplinary right existed at various times under various forms; recently the right of the Latin Church was codified. Concerning these things, certain more particular points are opportunely noted.

337. Division of older right. - Canon law was slowly formed in the course of the centuries. Before the most recent codification of right, it was distinguished into ancient right, which extends from the age of the Apostles up to the twelfth century, namely up to the Decree of Gratian (1140-1150); new right, which extends from the Decree of Gratian up to the sixteenth century, or to the Council of Trent (1545-1563); and newest or post-Tridentine right.

A. Ancient right. In the first centuries there existed collections and collections of canons, especially those issued by Councils, e.g., by Nicaea, and then also formed systematically. But about the middle of the twelfth century, the Benedictine monk Gratian undertook to collect all canons into one and to arrange a new and single collection of ecclesiastical laws, which afterward was called the Decree of Gratian, and by which, as it were, he laid the foundations of the studies of canon law.

The Decree is divided into three parts: a) the first consists of 101 Distinctions, and each distinction embraces several canons or chapters; b) the second part is divided into 36 Causes, the causes into questions, and the questions into canons; c) the third part, which treats On Consecration, that is, concerning rites and sacred things, is distributed, like the first, into Distinctions and canons.

B. New right is contained in the Corpus Iuris Canonici. It embraces:

1. The Decree of Gratian, which, although amended, nevertheless is not authentic, and therefore has no other authority than the sources themselves from which it was taken.

2. The Decretals of Gregory IX, which by order of this Pontiff were edited by St. Raymond of Pennafort, O.P. (1234). This collection is truly authentic and per se has the force of law; it embraces the letters of Gregory IX and of certain predecessors, and the Pontiff willed that it alone be used in judgments and in schools. It contains five books which are divided into titles, and the titles into chapters.

3. The Sixth Book of Decretals of Boniface VIII, which this Pontiff added (1298), authentically conferred with the same force and authority as the preceding ones. It consists of the same divisions as the collection of St. Raymond.

4. The Clementine Decretals, collected by Clement V and authentically promulgated by John XXII (1317), so that they have the force of law.

5. The Extravagantes of John XXII, so called because they wandered outside the previous collections, collected and edited by private zeal in the year 1325; they do not have the force of law as a collection, but only from the documents themselves which truly emanate from pontifical authority.

6. The Common Extravagantes, seventy in number, of other Pontiffs, collected by private authority around the end of the fifteenth century: they do not enjoy the authentic value of a collection, but only the value of the documents themselves.

C. Newest right is contained in the decrees and canons of general Councils, especially of Trent and Vatican, in the Constitutions of the Roman Pontiffs, in the Declarations of the Sacred Congregations and Tribunals of the Roman Curia, and in the Rules of the Apostolic Chancery.

To these almost innumerable laws there has now happily succeeded the Code of Canon Law, which, ordered by Pius X, was solemnly promulgated by Benedict XV on the feast day of Pentecost in the year 1917, so that it would have obligatory force from the day of Pentecost of the following year, that is, from May 19, 1918.

338. Division of the new codified right. - The Code of right is divided into five parts or books:

The first book hands down General Norms, especially concerning Laws, Rescripts and Privileges, and Dispensations.

The second book treats: concerning Persons, specifically concerning Clerics in general and in species, concerning Religious and concerning Laypersons.

The third book is: concerning Things, namely, concerning the Sacraments individually and in species, and sacramentals, concerning Sacred Places and Times, concerning Divine Worship, concerning the Ecclesiastical Magisterium, concerning Benefices and Ecclesiastical Institutes, and concerning the temporal Goods of the Church.

The fourth book treats concerning Processes, namely, concerning Trials in general and in species, concerning Causes of beatification and canonization, and concerning the Mode of proceeding in certain affairs to be examined.

The fifth book finally is concerning Delicts and Penalties.

339. The value of the Code is indicated by the Code itself.

Can. 1: "Although in the Code of Canon Law the discipline also of the Oriental Church is often referred to, nevertheless it regards the Latin Church alone, and does not obligate the Oriental Church, unless there is question of those things which from the nature of the matter itself also affect the Oriental Church."

Can. 2: "The Code, for the most part, determines nothing concerning the rites and ceremonies which the liturgical books, approved by the Latin Church, prescribe to be observed in the celebration of the sacrosanct sacrifice of the Mass, in the administration of the Sacraments and Sacramentals, and in performing other sacred things. Wherefore all liturgical laws retain their force, unless some one of them is expressly corrected in the Code."

Can. 3: "The canons of the Code in no way abrogate conventions entered upon by the Apostolic See with various Nations, nor do they derogate anything from them; these therefore will continue to be in force just as at present, the contrary prescriptions of this Code notwithstanding."

Can. 4: "Rights acquired by others, and likewise privileges and indults which, granted by the Apostolic See up to this time to persons whether physical or moral, are still in use and have not been revoked, remain intact, unless they are expressly revoked by the canons of this Code."

Can. 5: "Customs, whether universal or particular, now in force against the statutes of these canons, if indeed they are expressly reprobated by the canons themselves, are to be corrected as corruptions

of right, even if they are immemorial, and are not to be allowed to revive in the future; others, which indeed are centenary and immemorial, can be tolerated, if Ordinaries according to the circumstances of places and persons judge that they cannot prudently be removed; the rest are to be held suppressed, unless the Code expressly provides otherwise."

Can. 6: "The Code for the most part retains the discipline in force up to this time, although it brings suitable changes. Therefore:

1. All laws whatsoever, whether universal or particular, opposed to the prescriptions of this Code, are abrogated, unless concerning particular laws provision is expressly made otherwise;

2. Canons which report the old law in its entirety are to be assessed from the authority of the old law, and therefore from the interpretations received among approved authors;

3. Canons which only in part agree with the old law are to be assessed from the ancient law where they agree; where they differ, they are to be judged from their own meaning;

4. In doubt whether some prescription of the canons differs from the old law, one is not to depart from the old law;

5. As regards penalties, of which no mention is made in the Code, whether they are spiritual or temporal, medicinal or, as they call them, vindicative, of latae or ferendae sententiae, these are to be held as abrogated;

6. If any of the other disciplinary laws, which have been in force up to now, is contained neither explicitly nor implicitly in the Code, it must be said to have lost all force, unless it is found in approved liturgical books, or the law is of divine right, whether positive or natural."

Second Question: On the Power or Obligation of Ecclesiastical Law

340. Thesis. Ecclesiastical law as such is truly moral, that is, it does not import mere coercion, but obligates in conscience and before God, even under grave sin.

It is of faith from the Council of Constance, sess. 8, prop. 8, 11, 12 and 15 against Wyclif, and sess. 15, prop. 12 and 15 against Hus, and from the bull of Leo X against Luther, and from the Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 8 on Baptism; that the obligation is grave is clear from the universal preaching of the Church and from the practice of urging certain laws under grave sin.

It is proved: a) Ecclesiastical law is borne by power conceded by God, is imposed and sanctioned in the name of God by His minister; whence the things which are bound by it on earth are also bound in heaven, and those who spurn the ministers spurn Christ (Mt. XVI, 19; XVIII, 17-18; Lk. X, 16).

b) Human law obligates in conscience, so that those who resist natural human power acquire damnation for themselves (Rom. XIII, 2); a fortiori ecclesiastical law, which is made by power supernaturally constituted.

c) Whence in the Scriptures the faithful are often admonished concerning religious obedience to be furnished to pastors (Acts XV, 28-29; II Cor. X, 6; I Thess. IV, 2, 8; II Thess. III, 14; Heb. XIII, 17).

d) And thus holds the common sense of the faithful, e.g., as to hearing Mass, abstinence from meat.

It is said: 1) as such, that is, not only insofar as it contains and applies natural and divine law. For the cited texts are altogether general, obligation arises from the divine origin alone of the power, not from a similar divine precept presupposed, and many things are inculcated by the Apostles which are in no way comprehended by natural and divine law;

2. even under grave sin: for those things which are necessary to human society, such as obedience toward authority, of themselves obligate under grave sin, in grave matter.

Article I: On the Quantity or Gravity of Obligation

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 105, a. 2.

341. The gravity of obligation in ecclesiastical law depends on two things: on the gravity of the matter and on the will of the legislator, who at least must have an implicit intention of obligating under grave sin. Whence:

a) if the matter is light in every respect, even considering the end and circumstances, the law cannot obligate under grave sin: for such matter is not capable of grave obligation, nor can the legislator make it that light matter, which conducts little and lightly influences the end or common good, should conduct much and gravely influence it, or that small disobedience should be great; moreover such a law is not conformable to reason, nor would it tend to the common good, but rather would be an occasion of ruin;

b) if the matter is grave and the legislator intends to obligate under light sin, the obligation is only light: for by distinction from natural law, in which both obligation and its gravity necessarily and immediately arise from the very gravity and necessity of the matter, the proximate and immediate cause of obligation in positive law is the will of the legislator; therefore the obligation is as great as the legislator wills, and just as it depends upon him that the law exist and obligate, so also that it be grave or light. And although by acting thus the legislator sometimes can sin, nevertheless the obligation, because it is the effect of his own will, does not extend beyond that which he willed.

342. The gravity of matter is weighed by reason of the end and of aptitude for this end:

A. Matter is indeed grave when it is an efficacious means to a great good, namely, when the special or proximate end is of great moment as to the common good, very useful, morally necessary, and at the same time that which is prescribed by the law conduces much to obtaining the end. Such is the dignity of sacred worship, the service of God, penance, the sanctity of the clergy, etc., to which the use of sacred vestments, the observance of feasts, abstinence from meat, celibacy, contribute much. Whence a thing light in itself can be grave matter, as was the eating of the forbidden fruit in paradise by reason of the acknowledgment of God and the subjection of man to God: so, e.g., entering a house by reason of scandal or danger, the mingling of water and wine by reason of the representation of a great mystery in the sacrifice.

B. On the contrary, if the special end is not of great moment, or if it is of great moment and the action does not conduct much to the end, the matter is light; thus the order among the diverse hours of the breviary does not contribute much to the glorification of God.

343. Practical rules for discerning grave or light obligation.

A. Positive law obligates under grave sin when the matter is grave, that is, when it conduces much to an end of great moment, and at the same time the legislator wills to command under grave sin.

B. But the legislator wills to obligate under grave sin:

a) if he uses gravely threatening or more severe words, e.g., if he commands in virtue of holy Obedience, under the indignation of God, under threat of divine judgment, etc.;

b) if he imposes a grave penalty, e.g., of death, mutilation, perpetual prison, exile, deposition, privation of goods, censure, irregularity, reservation, privation of ecclesiastical burial (can. 2218, § 2): for a penalty, in order to be just, must be proportioned to the delict;

c) if in grave matter he uses ordinary words: we mandate, we command, we prohibit, etc., and does not express that he wills to obligate under light sin, nor is this gathered from the circumstances, especially, e.g., from the excessive burden which the law would impose, he is judged to obligate under grave sin: for he is presumed to act reasonably and ordinarily to obligate according to the capacity and exigency of the matter. Nor must he explicitly intend grave obligation: just as he must not explicitly intend obligation in conscience, but make a law, and thus he implicitly wills obligation, in the same way by commanding grave matter, he is judged implicitly to will to command under grave sin;

d) if the custom and usage of the faithful and the practice of the God-fearing interpret the law thus;

e) if the prudent, pious, and learned unanimously judge thus.

C. But if there is doubt about these things, the law is judged to obligate under light sin, unless the legislator urges it under grave sin, because then the presumption stands for him.

Article II: On the Quality and Extension of the Obligation of Preceptive Law

344. Preceptive or moral law is that which commands some good to be done or prohibits some evil to be avoided. The observance of this law is not always an act of that species and virtue to which the matter of itself pertains, but of that virtue from whose formal motive the law has been enacted: for virtues and good human acts are distinguished by the formal object or motive. Thus fasting of itself is an act of abstinence, and the Lenten fast is such when it is prescribed from such a motive; but fasting before communion is an act of religion, which is imposed from the formal motive of religion. Whence he who transgresses a precept sins against that virtue from whose motive the precept is borne.

From these things it follows that the transgression of a precept is a sin of formal disobedience only if it is borne from the special motive of obedience, but not in other cases, unless the transgression is made from contempt. No ecclesiastical law seems to have been enacted from the special motive of obedience.

345. Preceptive law founded on a presumption of right is that which rests on a reasonable conjecture or probability taken from circumstances often connected with truth. For presumption is a probable conjecture concerning an uncertain matter (can. 1825, § 1): thus, e.g., a law obligating one to the sentence of a judge, which is presumed just, to the execution of a contract

which is supposed to have been validly entered upon unless the contrary is proved; likewise a law by which a child is judged to have the use of reason from the seventh year (c. 88, § 3), and a pubescent person is judged to know what marriage is (c. 1082, § 2).

1. One is of right only if contrary and direct proof is admitted in the external forum, e.g., c. 1015, § 2; another is of right concerning right, when the judge is forbidden to attend to contrary and direct proof, e.g., for a thing adjudged (c. 1904, § 1). Nevertheless indirect proof is admitted against the very fact upon which the presumption is founded (c. 1826).

One is founded on a presumption of a particular fact when the superior presumes that a fact, e.g., damage, fraud, consent, negligence, exists not in common and for the most part, but in any particular case, and therefore makes a law for all similar cases: thus in the examples given. Another is founded on a presumption of common danger when he presumes that from such a work or mode of acting, for the most part, ordinarily and commonly there follows damage, fraud, scandal, etc., and therefore he prohibits it, e.g., to read depraved books: it does not suppose fraud or scandal or damage, but the danger of them.

The first per se does not obligate if the presumption in the particular case is false, because then the foundation of the law is lacking, which is the presumption of this particular fact; hence you are not bound to pay money for damage falsely presumed.

Whence the saying: the same judgment is made in the forum of conscience and in the forum of the court is true in cases in which the external forum does not rest on a false presumption of a particular fact. Per accidens, however, in the external forum we are bound to obey, by reason of public order and scandal; but then we can compensate ourselves secretly (even after the sentence of the judge). But we cannot obey if the matter is illicit, as if someone were to seek or render the debt in a marriage certainly invalid which is presumed valid in the external forum.

The second per se always obligates, even in particular cases in which damage or its danger does not intervene, because the foundation of the law remains.

a) For the superior did not make the law because he presumes damage in any given case, but because he presumes that for men commonly it is so; therefore, as long as the common danger remains, so long the law itself remains.

b) Moreover, the common good demands that no exception be admitted; otherwise the evils to be avoided would not be impeded efficaciously, because each person would easily persuade himself that there is no danger with regard to himself. The law intends to forestall this false persuasion, and also to render men more diligent for avoiding harms. Thus ecclesiastical law enacted to forestall a general danger of perversion or spiritual detriment, just as civil law is enacted to forestall a general danger of negligence.

c) In other words: a law does not cease unless the end ceases adequately, that is, totally and as to all. But in the case, even if danger does not exist for the individual, it perseveres for the community. Therefore the law does not cease. For its end is to avoid common danger; now common danger cannot efficaciously and certainly be avoided if the law did not urge absolutely and for all, since each person would easily persuade himself that the danger is not present for himself, from which the end of the law would be frustrated.

Hence, just as civil law, to forestall the general danger of negligence, obligates one guilty of merely juridic fault to repair damage, e.g., to pay for damage caused by a dog without moral fault, by which law the judgment of danger is withdrawn from subjects; so also ecclesiastical law obligates when it prohibits religious profession before sixteen years, invalidates clandestine marriage, prohibits mixed marriages or books entered in the Index, even if it is clear that no fraud, or defect of liberty, or damage is present. This doctrine is now confirmed by can. 21.

346. A law founded on a fiction of right is not to be confused with a law founded on presumption.

1. No law, properly speaking, is founded on fiction, since fiction is nothing. But the reason of the common good, e.g., equity, moves that the same thing be established as for a true case.

For presumption is a reasonable conjecture in an uncertain matter, but a fiction of right is a disposition by which the legislator, from a just cause, establishes the same thing for a fictive case as another law establishes in a true case, e.g., that canons absent from choir because of infirmity are held as present with regard to daily distributions (can. 420), or that a marriage by which antecedent offspring is legitimated is judged valid from the time of this conception or birth (can. 1117), or that offspring born in a marriage which afterward is proved null is judged legitimate (can. 1114), or that an invalid marriage, if it is sanated in the root, is judged valid from the beginning (can. 1138).

Therefore presumption rests on verisimilitude, fiction on equity; presumption is assumed in a doubtful case according to verisimilitude, fiction in a certain case against the truth.

Such a law, if it is just, obligates in conscience.

Nevertheless, note that 1) fiction has place only in cases expressed in law;

2. fiction ought not to operate more in the fictive case than truth operates in the true case;

3. it is not valid beyond that which is expressed in the law: thus for the deceased and the heir there is held to be unity of person with regard to inheritance, not with regard to other things;

4. finally, it is to be interpreted strictly.

347. Permitting law is not the absence of law, nor mere license or simple toleration, but a true law which positively acknowledges in man liberty, either internal or at least external, or juridic capacity, for doing something. Such a law obligates others not to impede the aforesaid acts, and judges not to punish them. Likewise a law concessive of rights obligates others not to deprive one of them or impede one from legitimate action. Nevertheless it is not a merely prohibitive law for others, but bestows a special right, grants a faculty or capacity.

Article III: On the Quality and Extension of the Obligation of Penal Law

348. Since the Church has public coercive power, it can also establish penal laws (can. 2214), which obligate one to undergo even a graver penalty (can. 2291), whether they are merely penal laws, or mixed laws, that is, moral and penal at the same time.

In fact, merely penal pontifical laws are not given, for penalties inflicted in Canon Law all suppose true fault (can. 2215); nevertheless they are usually given in Orders and religious institutes, and can be given in diocesan laws.

By reason of the mode by which the penalty is imposed, one is of latae sententiae, another of ferendae sententiae (can. 2217).

1. A penalty of ferendae sententiae is that which is not incurred by the fact itself, but must be inflicted by a judge or superior, or which is established as to be inflicted by a condemnatory sentence of a judge afterward to be borne.

Such are those which are designated: a) by words of the future: he will be excommunicated, he will be excommunicated, etc. (c. 2315, 2321, 2328); b) by threatening words or words demanding the ministry of a judge: under penalty, under threat of excommunication, we have judged that he is to be bound by sentence, let him know that he will incur excommunication, let him be interdicted from entering the church, he must be excommunicated; c) by ambiguous words which do not sufficiently indicate a penalty of latae sententiae, e.g., let him be subject to excommunication, let him fall into excommunication, let him lose his place: for laws which establish a penalty are subject to strict interpretation (can. 19), whence according to canon 2219: "in penalties the more benign interpretation is to be made," unless, however, the context indicates otherwise.

2. A penalty of latae sententiae is that which is incurred by the very fact of the delict committed, namely, by the fact that the transgression of the law or sin is committed.

Such are those which are borne: a) by words which exclude the ministry of another: by the fact itself, by the law itself (c. 2217), by that very fact (c. 2365), without another sentence; b) by words of past or present time: he is excommunicated, we will, let him know or let him be aware that he is excommunicated, we have excommunicated, by our authority or by virtue of the present letters let him be excommunicated, from now we have excommunicated; c) by imperative words of the penalty itself, which indicate that the guilty person here and now is affected by the penalty: let him remain suspended, let him be anathema, excommunication holds (c. 2388, § 2).

If this, in execution, requires an external executive action either of the delinquent himself or of another, and has a physical effect, ordinarily it requires a declaratory sentence of a judge; thus for positive penalties of exile, beating, prison, fine, or penalties privative of a good already possessed, namely, of a right acquired, e.g., in confiscation of goods, deposition, degradation, privation of a benefice or office obtained, or of a dignity acquired. On the contrary, if it requires no external action, consisting in a moral effect alone, it is incurred immediately: thus privative penalties from a right or from the exercise of right, e.g., spiritual privative penalties (censures), or negative penalties by which a good otherwise fully to be acquired is denied to the guilty person (e.g., irregularity from delict), or an inability is contracted for something, e.g., a canon culpably omitting the office loses the right of receiving fruits.

A condemnatory and a declaratory sentence differ: the first falls upon the penalty itself and therefore the penalty is owed from the day of the sentence; the second falls not upon the penalty itself but upon the crime committed, declaring that it has been committed, and therefore it is declared that the

penalty had been contracted and the penalty owed is drawn back to the time of the crime committed. Whence canon 2232, § 2: "a declaratory sentence draws back the penalty to the moment of the delict committed."

349. Penal law, after transgression, obligates in conscience judges to inflict the penalty, at least if the law uses words that are not facultative but preceptive (can. 2223, § 3); and it obligates subjects to undergo it.

Before the sentence of the judge:

1. if the penalty is of ferendae sententiae, they are not bound to undergo it until by the sentence of the judge they have been condemned to it: for the law does not inflict the penalty, but decrees that it is to be inflicted; whence it is also licit by honorable means to avert and elude the sentence to be borne;

2. if it is of latae sententiae and requires an external executive action, ordinarily they are not bound to undergo the penalty before a declaratory sentence. The reason is that law must be morally possible and accommodated to human nature; but it would be too hard and inhuman if it compelled the guilty person so that he would be bound to despoil himself of his own goods and rights.

Exception is made: a) if the penalties are lighter or such that judges cannot impose them, such as fasting, recitation of prayers, moderate chastisement of the body, not going out from an assigned place, abstinence from foods; b) if they are conventional.

3. if it requires no external executive action (e.g., censure, irregularity), it is incurred from the moment at which the crime to which it is annexed is committed, and from this moment (the danger of infamy being excluded) it obligates subjects to undergo it without the sentence of a judge.

In the external forum, however, it is not judged to have been contracted without a declaratory sentence of the judge, unless the delict is notorious. I said: the danger of infamy being excluded (which is usually absent in privation of active or passive voice), because if such a danger exists and the delinquent cannot observe the penalty without infamy, a privative penalty is equated to a positive penalty (can. 2232).

After the sentence of the judge:

1. the guilty person is obligated to execute the penalty by himself, if it is not too harsh nor much repugnant to nature, e.g., to pay money which is exacted, to go to prison when it is not long-lasting, for he is bound to obey a just and morally possible precept;

2. he is obligated only to undergo the penalty without positive resistance when it is very grave or repugnant to nature, although he can resist negatively by fleeing. This is a general principle in human law, even civil law; e.g., one condemned to death is bound to ascend the scaffold, to present his neck, etc., but he can flee. For no one is bound to do such a penalty, but to suffer it; whence no one is bound to furnish that from which death, wounding, public flogging,

perpetual prison, perpetual exile follows, and, e.g., to remain in a place from which he is to be led to death; but he is bound to suffer it, that is, not to resist the one inflicting it.

350. A conventional penalty is distinguished from the aforesaid penalties, by which, when something, e.g., a benefice, is given to someone under the tacit condition that he do something, if the condition is not fulfilled, he himself is deprived of the thing conceded. It obligates by the fact itself without the sentence of a judge; e.g., a curate, who formerly could be a deacon, if not initiated into the priesthood within a year, lost the benefice; a bishop not receiving consecration within three months does not make the fruits his own (Council of Trent, sess. 23, c. 2), and neglecting this within six months remains deprived of the episcopate by the law itself (can. 2398).

351. Observations.

1. Canon 2219, § 1: "In penalties the more benign interpretation is to be made."

2. Canon 2219, § 2: "But if it is doubted whether a penalty inflicted by a competent Superior is just or not, the penalty is to be observed in both forums, except in the case of an appeal in suspensive."

There is no appeal in suspensive from a censure judicially inflicted (can. 2243, § 1); there is one from vindicative penalties, unless something else is expressly provided in law (can. 2287).

3. Canon 2219, § 3: "It is not licit to extend a penalty from person to person or from case to case, although there may be an equal reason, indeed a graver one, saving, however, the prescription of can. 2231"; namely, in the case in which several have concurred in perpetrating one delict, whether physically, or by common counsel, or by commanding, or in another way, if the delict otherwise would not have been committed; these are held by the same penalty unless the law expressly provides otherwise.

4. A judge can diminish and increase a penalty from a just cause, if he himself is the legislator; but an inferior cannot unless this is permitted by law. Thus in the new law, according to the mode of canon 2223.

Article IV: On the Quality and Extension of the Obligation of Invalidating Law

352. An invalidating law is that which renders some act invalid or null. To it is reduced, as a species to a genus, an inhabilitating law, which decrees that some person is unfit for this or that act; whence invalidation directly regards the act, and inhabilitating directly regards the person; nevertheless in practice and morally speaking both return to the same thing, because the act is always rendered invalid either immediately or mediately.

Invalidating law differs: a) from prohibiting law, because this renders the prohibited act illicit, not invalid; whence there are distinguished a merely prohibiting law (e.g., an impeding impediment of marriage), a merely invalidating law which only invalidates the act and does not prohibit it (as can happen if a superior invalidates the vow of a religious), and a law at once prohibiting and invalidating (e.g., a diriment impediment of marriage);

b) from penal law strictly so called, because this establishes a penalty on account of fault; whence there are distinguished a penal invalidating law, which invalidates in penalty for a delict (e.g., formerly one ordained without a certain title, and still today a beneficed person omitting the office receives fruits invalidly), and a directive invalidating law, which invalidates on account of the common good (e.g., clandestine marriage) or on account of the protection of certain persons (e.g., religious profession before age sixteen, a promise extorted by fear, alienation of goods of the Church without the consent of the chapter): then invalidation is a penalty improperly so called;

c) from a permitting law, which does not acknowledge the act or allows it to be neglected by others, or from the simple absence of law by which an act is not protected in the external forum (invalidation improperly so called).

Moreover, just as penal law, so invalidating law has effects by the fact itself or by the sentence of a judge: for sometimes by the law itself or by right the act is most fully invalidated, as happens for impediments of marriage, and for simoniacal conferral of a benefice (can. 729); sometimes it is invalidated by law in such a way that for the full effect a declaratory sentence of a judge is required, e.g., an election made if more than a third part of the electors were not legitimately convoked (can. 162, § 3), a renunciation made from grave fear unjustly inflicted, from fraud or substantial error, or simoniacally (can. 185); cf. also can. 1679, 2238: in which case the force of the sentence is drawn back to the moment at which the act was done and it is null from the beginning (can. 1679-1682); sometimes it is not invalidated by law, but by a decretory or annulling sentence of a judge, because the law establishes that the act can be invalidated by competent authority, or rescinded, as acts proceeding from grave fear or fraud (can. 103, § 2; 104; 153; 162, § 2; 1317, § 2; 1684, § 1; 1689): then it is invalid from the moment of the sentence.

The sentence of the judge, and consequently annulment, can be impeded by licit means; indeed the act remains valid even if the sentence is impeded by illicit means. But if this is done by unjust means, there can arise an obligation of repairing damage.

353. Principles. I. An invalidating law obligates judges to hold the act as invalid or to invalidate it; others, not to omit the act, but to hold it as invalid or not to insist upon an invalid act.

II. A penal invalidating law enacted against fault does not obligate nor have effect if fault is lacking: for it is founded on a presumption of a particular fact; whence invincible ignorance excuses from it, because the penalty was established on account of fault and supposes it. Thus if a beneficed person, from inculpable forgetfulness, omits, e.g., vespers of the office and compline, he makes the fruits his own.

III. An invalidating law which is also directive always obligates and has effect even if fault is lacking or if the law is unknown: for it is founded on a presumption of common danger, and the cause of annulment subsists even in a case of ignorance, namely, the common good. Hence canon 16, § 1: "No ignorance of invalidating or inhabilitating laws excuses from them, unless something else is expressly said."

Per accidens, however, the obligation ceases:

a) on account of common necessity: thus the impediment of clandestinity ceases if the pastor or Ordinary or delegated priest who would assist at the marriage cannot be approached, and it is foreseen that this condition of affairs will last for a month (can. 1098);

b) also on account of private necessity in a more urgent case, if the Church is known (or can be presumed) to dispense, as happens for almost all impediments of ecclesiastical right, both when danger of death is urgent and if, with all things prepared for the nuptials, the marriage cannot be deferred without probable danger of grave evil (can. 1043-1045; 1098).

354. Observations.

1. Concerning invalidating laws, let canon 11 be noted: "Those laws only are to be held invalidating or inhabilitating by which it is expressly or equivalently established either that the act is null or that the person is inhabilis" (that is, by equivalent words, e.g., by prescribing the necessary form of an act or substantial conditions).

2. Hence invalidation is not per se presumed to be annexed to a prohibiting law, but is to be proved per se and certainly. Whence canon 15: "Laws, even invalidating and inhabilitating laws, do not urge in doubt of right" (founded and reasonable).

3. On the contrary, in order that an invalidating law also be prohibiting, an express declaration is required, unless the act is base in itself or illicit from elsewhere.

Article V: On the Subjects of Ecclesiastical Law

355. The subjects of the general laws of the Church are all and only the faithful or baptized persons, habitually endowed with the use of reason, to whom the law is suited (Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 8, and sess. 14, c. 2 and 5, can. 12 and 13); whence canon 13, § 1: "All throughout the whole earth for whom they have been made are bound by general laws." It is said:

1. the faithful, namely, in the external forum, that is, the baptized, even the perfect and spiritual.

Hence a) infidels, Jews, catechumens are not bound, because they have not entered the Church through Baptism nor are they its subjects (c. 12); b) per se heretics, apostates, schismatics, and the excommunicated are bound, because by Baptism they have been made subjects of the Church, and they do not cease to be such on account of the state of rebellion; nevertheless they are often excused from sins on account of ignorance, indeed sometimes the Church is judged or presumed not to will to obligate them to laws when the obligation would yield to destruction rather than to edification, as it expressly declared for the impediment of clandestinity (c. 1099, § 2). Thus, according to some, this is to be presumed for all laws which directly regard the sanctification of souls, such as laws of fasting, feast days, etc.; nevertheless this has no foundation in the law (cf. can. 87). But certainly they are obligated to laws which are directly enacted on account of the common good, for the decorum of religion or for removing abuses, e.g., to impediments of marriage, unless the Church expressly declares the contrary (can. 1070, § 2).

2. habitually endowed with the use of reason: for law is the rule of human acts, whence it is made for those alone who are capable of obedience and of direction to the common end, or who are capable regularly of positing human acts and of knowing the promulgation of the law.

Hence a) the perpetually or habitually insane are not bound, nor children before the use of reason (can. 12), indeed b) not even children who have the use of reason before the completion of the seventh year, because laws are made for things ordinarily occurring and children before the completed seventh year are not judged to have the use of reason (can. 12); whence they are not bound unless something else is expressly provided in law, as for the law of annual confession or Paschal communion (can. 906 and 859). c) But if after the seventh year there is doubt concerning the use of reason, in the external forum they are judged to have the use of reason because it judges from things ordinarily occurring; in the internal forum, if the doubt is not negative but positive, founded on grave reasons, the obligation becomes truly doubtful and therefore is not to be urged. On the contrary, d) those sleeping, drunk, or half-insane, who have lucid intervals, are bound, since in these the defect of reason is only accidental and transitory.

From these things it follows that those acting against an ecclesiastical law who, for example, are not themselves subject to it because they are not baptized or do not habitually have the use of reason, do not even materially transgress the law to which they are not subject, and those who induce such persons to this do not sin, e.g., by furnishing meats on Friday, by imposing servile work, unless by reason of scandal or contempt. On the contrary, the faithful who habitually have the use of reason but here and now are deprived of it, sin materially, indeed also formally if they culpably placed the cause of the transgression (e.g., by making themselves drunk), just as those also sin formally who induce such persons to transgression of the law.

3. to whom the law is suited: for sometimes certain conditions or age are required for certain acts or penalties, e.g., the twenty-first year for fasting (can. 1254), the years of puberty (14) for penalties (e.g., censures) of latae sententiae (can. 2230).

356. Is a superior bound by his own laws? - The rector of a community, who alone exercises legislative power, such as the Pope, or a bishop for a diocese, 1) is not bound by his own laws as to coercive force: for no one is properly compelled by himself, nor can he be compelled by others, because he alone has supreme power; 2) as to directive force: a) he is not bound directly, that is, by force of the ecclesiastical law itself: for no one obligates himself, nor can someone at the same time be superior and inferior to himself; b) nevertheless indirectly he is obligated by force of natural law, that is, from honesty, fittingness, and natural equity, which demands both that the head be conformed to the members, and that the legislator concur for the common good by enticing subjects by his example, and also lest his authority become cheap among subjects; yet this obligation, as being from fittingness alone, is light, unless there is danger of scandal, great harm for the community, notable injury of a third party as can happen in contracts, etc.; c) he is not obligated even indirectly if his laws do not suit his condition, such as a law concerning pontifical vestments not to be worn, or a law imposing taxes.

It is said: who alone is legislator, for those who exercise legislative power with others in an assembly, e.g., in a council or chapter, are obligated to the laws: distributively, considered singularly and individually, they are inferiors to the assembly itself or to the collection of all, which alone has supreme authority.

357. Particular laws are some territorial, others personal. - The Pontiff and inferior legislators, such as bishops and prelates, can make particular laws which obligate a part of the Church; of these,

some are territorial, which immediately affect the territory and mediately persons of the territory as such, that is, insofar as they pertain to the territory; others are personal, which immediately affect certain persons, and which, like particular precepts, cling to their bones and accompany them and obligate them wherever they go: thus a priest suspended in his own diocese cannot celebrate in another. But since a community is defined by territory, and subjects are not obligated except insofar as they are part of the community, hence canon 8, § 2: "A law is not presumed personal, but territorial, unless something else is clear."

358. Subjects of particular laws. - In a territory there can be:

1. Inhabitants, who have domicile there, and newcomers, who have acquired quasi-domicile (can. 13, § 2): domicile is acquired in some parish (or quasi-parish) or at least in a diocese (or quasi-diocese) by residence prolonged to a completed decade, indeed even from the beginning by residence alone with the intention of remaining there perpetually; quasi-domicile is acquired by habitation prolonged for the greater part of the year, that is, after six months, and also from the beginning by habitation with the intention of remaining for the greater part of the year (can. 92). Both are lost by departure from the place with the intention of not returning (can. 95). These are obligated to territorial laws: a) while they are physically present in the territory (can. 13, § 2); b) also while they are physically absent but morally or juridically present, if transgression of the law in their own territory causes harm (can. 14, § 1), e.g., by reason of a thing situated in their own territory, or of an action or omission which they exercise there, or of a delict committed there; c) when absent from the territory and not morally present, they are not bound, because only those who are in some way in the territory are obligated; even if they depart precisely so that they may be exempted from the law, although thus they can sin by intention: for no one transgresses the law who uses his own right.

1. Let it be noted, according to canon 93, that a wife not legitimately separated from her husband necessarily retains the domicile of her husband; an insane person, the domicile of his curator; a minor, the domicile of him to whose power he is subject. But a minor, having passed beyond infancy, can obtain his own quasi-domicile; likewise a wife not legitimately separated from her husband can obtain a quasi-domicile, and one legitimately separated can even obtain a domicile.

2. Travelers, who elsewhere have domicile or quasi-domicile, but accidentally for a short time are staying outside their own territory with the intention of returning, such as merchants and travelers making excursions:

a) generally they are not bound by the laws of their own territory, unless the transgression harms their own territory, as was said under 1), b) and c) (can. 14, § 1);

b) nor per se are they bound by the laws of the territory in which they are present, even if they are similar to the laws of their own territory, because law obligates only subjects or members of the community;

c) nevertheless per accidens they are bound, by force of the common law, by reason of the thing about which they are acting or of the action which they exercise there or of the delict which they

commit (because by this reason they are subjects), or from natural law, by reason of the order to be preserved and disturbance and scandal to be avoided; whence they are bound to laws of public security or those which are specially enacted for travelers. Hence canon 14, § 1, 2: "nor by the laws of the territory in which they are staying, except those which provide for public order (insofar as they provide for order), or determine the solemnities of acts";

d) nevertheless they are bound to the universal laws of the Church even if in their own territory they had been abrogated, e.g., to abrogated feasts (can. 14, § 1, 3);

e) but they are not bound to those universal laws if in the place in which they are present they have been abrogated, because local privileges are participated in by all who are staying in the place (can. 14, § 1, 3);

f) but if in one place they have already satisfied the common law, in another they are not bound, except by reason of scandal, because the Church is judged not to will to obligate twice to the same thing.

3. Vagabonds, who have domicile or quasi-domicile nowhere, but pass or wander from place to place, are now obligated by laws both general and particular which are in force in the place in which they are staying (can. 14, § 2); whence they become subjects of the Ordinary or pastor of the place where they are actually dwelling (can. 94, § 2).

4. Exempt persons, who by a fiction of right are judged to be outside the territory and are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the territory, such as religious strictly so called with regard to the laws of the Ordinary of the place (can. 615):

a) these are not bound to territorial laws per se and by force of the laws themselves;

b) per accidens they can be bound from fittingness or equity, namely, by reason of scandal to be avoided, or the common good to be obtained, with regard to those things which are not repugnant to their exemption and privilege;

c) they are bound with regard to certain causes expressed in law (e.g., with regard to the care of souls) according to the principles of can. 336, § 2 and 619.

Such causes are:

1. by reason of doctrine (the bishop is at the same time as it were an apostolic delegate in a matter of faith), e.g., with regard to the public preaching of the word of God (can. 1338, § 2; 1334 and 609, § 3; Council of Trent, sess. 5, c. 2; sess. 24, c. 4); with regard to schools, oratories, patronages, and other works in those things which regard religious and moral instruction (can. 1382), prior censorship of books to be published (can. 1385-86), prohibition of books (can. 1395, § 1), examination of those to be ordained (can. 996-997);

2. in protecting divine worship (can. 1261, 1265, 1274, 1279), e.g., with regard to prayers and solemnities (can. 612), processions (can. 1291-1292), pious associations (can. 686, § 3; 703), feasts and fasts (can. 1244); laws regarding celebration of Mass, stipend, collections (can. 831, § 3; 804, § 3), etc.;

3. in the care of souls, not only if they are pastors, but generally, not only with regard to instruction and morals, as was said, but also with regard to the administration of the sacraments toward seculars and religious women (can. 874, § 1; 876);

4. in certain matters of discipline, censures and interdicts upon the people, promulgating indulgences (can. 919);

5. by reason of a delict committed outside the convent, when the superior, having been warned, neglects to punish (can. 616, § 2).

1. Some deny this; but it is not demonstrated that the received discipline was changed by the new Code of right.

359. Cases.

A. One who passes from a place in which he is obligated to a place in which he is not obligated:

1. as to a prohibiting law (e.g., abstinence from meats or from servile works): a) per se he is bound to observe it as long as he is in the former place, because a negative precept obligates always and for always; b) nevertheless per accidens he is not bound if the precept is indivisible (e.g., fasting): for he has the right of not observing the law in the other place, and if he uses that right, now the precept becomes impossible to observe even in the first place;

2. as to a preceptive law (e.g., hearing sacred Mass): a) he is bound to observe it if during the whole time in which the possibility or opportunity of observing the law is given he remains in the former place, because while he is subject to the law he cannot, by beginning a journey, place an impediment to fulfilling the law; hence he must hear Mass if before the last Mass or, while only one is celebrated, before that one he will not be in the other place; b) if before the end of this time in which the law can be observed he arrives at the other place, he is probably not bound, because he has the right of waiting for the last opportune time for fulfilling the law, e.g., if before the time at which the only or last Mass is celebrated he will arrive at the other place. Nor does it stand in the way that one foreseeing an impediment is bound to forestall it, because that is true only when, the force of the precept remaining, someone is to be impeded; but here he is absolved from the obligation of the precept.

B. One who passes from a place in which there is no obligation to a place in which there is obligation:

1. as to a prohibiting law: a) per se he is bound to observe it from the moment at which he is in the second place, e.g., to abstain from meats or to fast, because at this moment he is subject to the law; b) nevertheless per accidens he is not bound if the precept has already become impossible to fulfill, e.g., if in the former place he had already used his right of eating several times so that fasting has become impossible; but if he has not used that right, and the fast can still be observed, he is bound to it unless there would be grave inconvenience;

2. as to a preceptive law, he is bound to observe it if he has returned before the end of the time in which it can still be observed, e.g., if before the last Mass, because from this moment he is subject to the law and obligated to it, unless, however, it cannot be fulfilled morally, that is, without grave inconvenience.

C. One who in traveling merely passes through a place where there is obligation, although he is not obligated in the place from which he set out or to which he is going, is not judged to be obligated unless he remains in the place of transit, because to interrupt a journey is a sufficiently great inconvenience and as it were an extraordinary means.

D. One who has satisfied the common law in one territory is not per se bound to satisfy again if he comes into a place where the same precept urges to be observed, because there does not exist an obligation of fulfilling the same precept twice.

Let it be noted that in the aforesaid cases an obligation is often given per accidens by reason of avoiding scandal.

Article VI: On the Fulfillment of Ecclesiastical Law

360. A prohibiting law is satisfied either knowingly and voluntarily, by a human act even meritorious, or unknowingly, e.g., by one sleeping, because it suffices to omit that which the law prohibits; but for omission there is not necessarily required a positive will of omitting or abstaining from the work. Hence one who fasts satisfies the law, whether he does it in order to spare money, or by reason of health, or because food is not given to him, or because he is asleep or does not think about food: for it is a negative precept. Yet one who omits unknowingly should rather be said not to transgress the law than to fulfill it.

Nevertheless, the one omitting cannot have a contrary will: for that which the law prohibits is evil, and therefore by that very fact the affection or will of this evil is prohibited; thus he from whom meats are violently taken away against his will, although effectively he does not transgress the law, nevertheless sins affectively against it and is guilty in will of violating it.

361. A preceptive law must be fulfilled by a human act, that is, knowingly and voluntarily: for law is given to men; whence if it prescribes a personal act, it requires that it be done in a human mode. Hence one drunk, or sleeping, or altogether compelled at the sacred rite does not satisfy; but if the law is real, imposing a thing to be furnished, it suffices that it be furnished by another, but by mandate of him who is obligated, or with his ratification.

In order that law be fulfilled in a human mode, intention is required, which the substance of the act demands so that it may be placed in its moral species; whence:

1. on the part of the subject, the intention should be at least virtual, that is, formerly had and here and now influencing the act (e.g., continuing to pray while distracted from the intention had at the beginning), and implicit, contained in another (e.g., the intention of praying in the act of taking up the breviary);

2. on the part of the object, there should be the intention of placing the act prescribed, because without that the act prescribed by law would not be placed.

Nevertheless, there is not required: a) the intention of the extrinsic end intended by the legislator (unless it is specially imposed): for the end intended by the legislator is one thing, the act which he prescribes as a means to this end is another. Hence the axiom: the (extrinsic) end of a precept does not fall under the precept, and the end of the one acting can be opposed to the end of the legislator; e.g., one who eats fish from gluttony observes the precept of abstinence; therefore the law is not deprived of common utility;

b) nor an explicit intention of satisfying or of fulfilling the law as such, because laws generally do not obligate to formal obedience, that is, to doing something because it is prescribed, but only to doing that which is prescribed; hence one who is ignorant that it is a feast day, or who intends to hear another Mass, nevertheless satisfies the precept;

c) indeed, probably one effectively satisfies the law with a contrary intention of not satisfying (provided the will of doing the prescribed work is predominant), because the legislator ordinarily prescribes only the substance of the work; hence one who wills to pray and not to satisfy the law, although he can sin affectively against the law, nevertheless effectively satisfies. For although it depends on the intention of the agent that an obligation be fulfilled which depends on his will, such as a vow, oath, sacramental penance, nevertheless it depends not on his will but on the will of the legislator that the law obligates to such a work and is fulfilled by such a work; for once the prescribed work is placed, the subject cannot impede that by this work the law is fulfilled. Therefore, once the substance of the work is placed, the law is necessarily fulfilled. Exception is made if someone is bound by several precepts, e.g., law, vow, sacramental penance, to several similar acts: for then it depends on his intention to which one he satisfies.

362. Can law be fulfilled with sin? - Law generally can be fulfilled: 1) without the state of grace or a good habit, joy, delight, etc., because it prescribes the substance of the act, not the mode (prop. 16 of Baius condemned); unless the mode or state of grace is positively and intrinsically required for the substance of the act, e.g., for confession (can. 907; prop. 14 of Alexander VII) or for communion (can. 861; prop. 55 of Innocent XI); indeed 2) law, not indeed universally taken or the law of charity, to which every sin is repugnant, but another law prescribing a particular act, can be fulfilled while sinning, provided that the act of fulfillment as to substance and according to object and species remains good, and its goodness is not totally corrupted (as in a null confession); namely: a) by an act which at the same time is done on account of an extrinsic evil end which is not the sole reason for acting, e.g., to hear Mass also in order to see a woman (n. 156, 4); b) by a good act which is merely accompanied by an evil extrinsic circumstance which does not pass into the object and does not influence the act, e.g., to hear Mass with depraved thoughts or with the intention of stealing (the law is not satisfied by sinning, but the sinner satisfies; n. 154): for law does not prescribe the (extrinsic) mode, but only the substance of the act; unless the mode is of the intrinsic reason of the act according to itself or as it falls under law. Hence the axiom: the (extrinsic) mode of a precept does not fall under the precept.

363. When law must be fulfilled. - A preceptive law, if it does not determine the time of fulfillment, must be fulfilled as soon as, morally speaking, it conveniently can be done (e.g., within three days, if it must be fulfilled at once), for otherwise someone could elude the law by always deferring. But if it determines the time, it must be fulfilled at that time; but if the time has elapsed, if it had been prefixed for ending the obligation, the obligation ceases, e.g., of Mass, of fasting; but if for urging the

obligation, it obligates as soon as possible, e.g., one who has not confessed within the year, or has not made the Paschal communion (can. 859, § 4), or who did not fulfill sacramental penance on a certain day.

Concerning the time of obligation, canons 31-35 are to be noted, especially canon 33, in which it is said: "In computing the hours of the day one must stand by common usage; but in private celebration of Mass, in private recitation of the canonical hours, in receiving holy communion, and in observing the law of fast or abstinence, although the usual computation of the place is different, one can follow the time of the place, whether local, true or mean, or legal, whether of the region or some other extraordinary time."

The canon is to be understood according to the Response of the C.I.C., May 29, 1947, in which it is declared that "once one mode of computing time has been chosen here, by force of can. 33, § 1, it can be changed in formally diverse actions."

Formally diverse actions are those which, even perhaps in one materially single action, regard diverse obligations or diverse precepts, which are not intrinsically connected or do not have intrinsic affinity.

Thus:

1. Someone can on the same Friday eat meat because according to the earlier hour it is already midnight and the law of abstinence no longer urges, and also satisfy the obligation of reciting the divine office of Friday, because according to the later hour it is not yet midnight and the term for ending the obligation has not yet expired.

2. Indeed someone can on Friday eat meat because according to the earlier hour the day of abstinence has already elapsed, and nevertheless on Saturday celebrate Mass or approach the Sacred [rite/Communion], because according to the later hour Saturday has not yet begun. For that action, materially one, is formally manifold, since it is the fulfillment of two obligations which do not have an intrinsic connection or affinity.

3. But he who on the night of the Nativity, in the first Mass, by mistake has taken the ablutions with wine so that he is now no longer fasting, cannot celebrate the second and third Masses by now choosing the later hour for determining the midnight from which he must be fasting. For here there is question of one action formally, corresponding to one and the same precept.

364. To what law obligates. - Law 1) directly and explicitly obligates to its own observance, which is the essential and chief obligation of law, in which the others are contained implicitly and virtually;

2. indirectly and implicitly it obligates to all ordinary means proximately necessary for observance: for he who is bound to the end, by that very fact is bound to the means which are proximately necessary for obtaining the end; namely:

a) to knowledge of the law, which is a prior and immediately necessary means without which it could not be observed, and consequently to applying ordinary means which conduce to knowledge of the law;

b) to other internal and external means without which the law will not be able to be fulfilled, provided they are ordinary and the law is proximately imminent, e.g., to acquiring a breviary for reciting the office;

c) and therefore to avoiding or removing or forestalling impediments which render its observance proximately impossible;

d) to avoiding proximate occasions which frequently expose one to the danger of transgression or are morally conjoined with it.

365. Can several precepts be fulfilled at the same time? - Response: 1) Several laws or precepts can be satisfied by one act if all prescribe a matter or act the same in species and number: thus a canonical or religious priest satisfies by one recitation of the breviary; nevertheless satisfaction is not made if diverse or distinct actions are required, e.g., fasting prescribed and imposed by a confessor or by a superior, unless the same one imposed it; by paying 100 francs once if someone owed it twice. When diverse laws are judged to fall upon the same or diverse actions, we have from the intention of the one commanding, the words, custom, and other circumstances.

2. Satisfaction is also made by several acts placed at the same time, provided they are compossible and diversity of times has not been prescribed, e.g., hearing Mass (or a pilgrimage) and recitation of the hours; satisfaction is not made if they are incompossible, e.g., to hear confession and to read the breviary.

366. Observation.

When several precepts occur at the same time which cannot be fulfilled together:

1. by right, if they are equally urgent, the greater must be observed before the lesser: hence, other things being equal, a negative precept is to be preferred to an affirmative one, a natural precept to a positive one, a divine precept to a human one, an ecclesiastical precept to a civil one, a precept of a primary superior or of a stricter virtue or looking to a common or spiritual good to a precept of a secondary superior, of a less strict virtue, looking to a particular or bodily good;

2. in fact, the agent satisfies that to which he intends to satisfy: for it depends on the intention of the agent to which one he satisfies. But if he has thought determinately of no obligation, he is judged to satisfy the more urgent; if they are equally urgent and the matter is divisible, he satisfies each in part; if indivisible, the greater obligation, as was said under 1).

Article VII: On the Interpretation of Ecclesiastical Law

367. Ecclesiastical law, as being human, often needs interpretation, which can be merely declaratory or comprehensive, or extensive and restrictive, and by reason of the author by whom it is made, it is denominated authentic or legal, usual, judicial, or doctrinal (cf. n. 294). Moreover in ecclesiastical right not only legal interpretation is authoritative, but also usual interpretation from the subsequent use of the law, once the conditions required for custom have been given, concerning which we shall speak below (can. 27-29); likewise judicial interpretation, but only as to the parties of the case; doctrinal interpretation, however, is merely private.

368. The Supreme Pontiff can delegate the Roman Congregations to interpret laws authentically, from a special mandate, or even from a general mandate, such as he gave to the Congregation of Rites for laws pertaining to rites, and to the Congregation of the Council for the decrees of Trent regarding morals and discipline; now, however, according to the constitution Sapienti of June 28, 1908, each exercises this right for the competence committed to it, the approval of the Roman Pontiff being saved (can. 244); moreover a special commission was instituted for declaring the canons of the Code (from the motu proprio of September 15, 1917). Their acts do not enjoy the same authority, but such and so much authority as they themselves attribute to individual acts.

For:

1. Either they issue a solemn and general decree, approved by the special authority of the Pontiff, by which they settle a controversy: it has the same force as law and can also extend it.

2. Or, under approval in common form, they hand down resolutions, declarations, and general decisions, by which they expressly explain the sense of the law: these are merely declarative but authentic interpretation, which is valid for all cases.

3. Or they give responses to doubts proposed for a particular case, without issuing a general decree: these are authoritative in relation to the case proposed and for the persons whom it regards, like judicial interpretation (can. 17, § 3). For others and with regard to similar cases they are not authoritative interpretation nor per se obligatory; nevertheless they exhibit a probable and prudent manner of acting and have a doctrinal value greater than if it were given by private doctors, and greater in proportion as it rests upon firmer arguments, has been repeated more often, and the cases occurring are more similar. Indeed, if there were a uniform, general, constant practice, it would be wrong to contradict it: then the contrary would not be probable; whence in responses there is sometimes added: "with attention to the constant practice of the Sacred Congregation."

369. Does interpretation need promulgation? - Authentic extensive (or also restrictive) interpretation requires a new promulgation, because in reality it is an extension (or change) of obligation which was not contained in the law, or a new law in relation to some point: such an interpretation made by him who is deputed simply to interpret laws does not have the force of law, unless it is given from a special mandate of the legislator and is legitimately promulgated by him, as usually happens for decrees of Congregations (can. 17, § 2).

Comprehensive interpretation, which declares a sense that is sufficiently clearly contained in the law or necessarily drawn out of it, does not require promulgation because it was sufficiently promulgated with the law; but that which declares a sense which is obscurely contained, so that before and of itself it was doubtful or only probable, requires a new promulgation. According to natural right this can be disputed: according to others it does not require promulgation because it does not establish a new law, but uncovers the sense which previously lay hidden; according to others it requires it because that which was doubtfully or probably contained in the law was not sufficiently promulgated, whence the law was not totally promulgated. But with regard to the new ecclesiastical right, it must be promulgated from can. 17, § 2.

370. Doctrinal interpretation must be made according to the rules established in law; namely:

1. "Ecclesiastical laws are to be understood according to the proper signification of the words considered in the text and context; but if this remains doubtful and obscure, recourse must be had to parallel places of the Code, if there are any, to the end and circumstances of the law, and to the mind of the legislator" (can. 18).

2. "Laws which establish a penalty, or restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception from the law, are subject to strict interpretation" (can. 19).

3. "If concerning a certain matter an express prescription of law, whether general or particular, is lacking, the norm is to be taken, unless there is question of penalties to be applied, from laws enacted in similar matters; from general principles of right observed with canonical equity; from the style and practice of the Roman Curia; from the common and constant opinion of doctors" (can. 20).

4. "Laws enacted to forestall a general danger urge, even if in a particular case the danger is not present" (can. 21).

5. "A later law, enacted by competent authority, derogates from a prior one, if it expressly says this, or is directly contrary to it, or orders anew the whole matter of the prior law; but a general law (of itself) in no way derogates from the statutes of special places and singular persons, unless something else is expressly provided in it" (can. 22).

6. "In doubt, the revocation of a pre-existing law is not presumed, but later laws are to be drawn to earlier ones and, insofar as it can be done, reconciled with them" (can. 23).

371. Ecclesiastical law admits the private interpretation of epikeia, and indeed in a threefold case: 1) if the law in a particular case becomes harmful or evil, e.g., if it cannot be observed without sin, as if you wished to leave a sick person wholly needing your help for the sake of Mass;

2. if it is impeditious of good, or very burdensome and too difficult to be urged by an equitable legislator, as if it exceeds human powers or causes grave disproportionate damage, e.g., if one gravely sick were bound to fast;

3. even if it is not so burdensome that it cannot strictly be imposed, if, after the circumstances of time, place, persons, and especially the ordinary mode of commanding with moderation have been inspected, it is presumed that such was not the mind of the legislator: thus you are not bound to hear Mass lest a great extraordinary profit have to be lost.

But ordinarily epikeia is not given in invalidating laws, on account of the common good, from which no ignorance excuses, unless it is expressly said (can. 16, § 1).

The interpretation of epikeia can be made by any private person if the cause is evident; if it is doubtful, it is full of dangers, since a man in his own cause is accustomed quickly to incline to the more benign part; whence the superior must be approached, who on account of such cases has the power of dispensing (can. 15). But if there is a cause which does not allow delay in recurring to the

superior and is sufficiently founded, so that there is positive doubt whether the law still obligates, necessity itself dispenses: then, namely, it suffices that probably the law has ceased to obligate.

Third Question: On the Mutability of Ecclesiastical Law

372. Ecclesiastical law, like every human law, can be changed, and indeed in two ways:

a) Some are causes excusing from law, which do not take away the obligation but impede it from being applied here and now to someone, and excuse from transgression of the law, namely: 1) ignorance, which impedes in the subject only formal and subjective obligation, and 2) inability, which also impedes material and objective obligation.

b) Other causes are exempting from law, which take away the obligation either in a particular case, with regard to certain persons only, so that the law itself does not cease, which happens by 3) dispensation, and 4) privilege; or in general so that the law ceases, either 5) intrinsically, by cessation of the end, or extrinsically, by 6) abrogation and derogation, and 7) custom. Concerning these things we must now speak in species.

Article I: On Ignorance

373. Does ignorance excuse from fault? - Ignorance on the part of the subject does not effect that the law does not touch him in first act, but it can effect that it does not obligate in second act and that the transgressor is excused from fault. For invincible ignorance (antecedent or concomitant), whether of right or law, or of a fact determining the application of law, excuses from fault because it takes away the voluntary: for nothing is willed unless foreknown. On the contrary, vincible ignorance does not take away the voluntary; nevertheless it diminishes fault, unless it is affected for sinning more freely or for having an excuse from sin (n. 82).

374. Does ignorance of law excuse from penalty? - Invincible ignorance, whether of right or of fact, in the internal forum excuses from penalty because it excuses from fault; on the contrary, vincible ignorance does not excuse from a proportionate penalty, yet it excuses from a disproportionate penalty; whence if the fault is light, a grave penalty is not incurred (can. 2199-2203). But in the external forum, "ignorance or error concerning the law or penalty or concerning one's own fact or concerning another's notorious fact is generally not presumed; concerning another's non-notorious fact it is presumed until the contrary is proved" (can. 16, § 2); and "once an external violation of the law is posited, malice (that is, a deliberate will of violating the law) is presumed in the external forum until the contrary is proved" (can. 2200, § 2). This often does not happen, and therefore (if sufficient proof is lacking) someone is sometimes bound to undergo a penalty on account of a just cause, the common good demanding it, at least when the sentence of a judge is added; but then it is not a penalty properly so called, but rather a burden to be undergone on account of the common good.

1. Indeed, according to present-day right, none is incurred if there is question of laws properly so called (not of mere precepts) and of penalties of latae or ferendae sententiae to be inflicted by a judge (not by a superior), even in the external forum, if the excuse is established for the external forum (can. 2218, § 2).

375. Does ignorance of the penalty excuse from the penalty? - Ignorance (even invincible) of the penalty alone does not excuse from a proportionate penalty, because reason dictates to each person that evil according to its nature is to be punished, e.g., homicide by death, theft by prison. Whence canon 2202, § 2: "Ignorance of the penalty alone does not take away the imputability of the delict, but diminishes it somewhat." Similarly it does not excuse from invalidation, for canon 16, § 1: "No ignorance of invalidating or inhabilitating laws excuses from them, unless something else is expressly said." Indeed, neither does ignorance of the law exempt from any vindicative penalty of latae sententiae in the external forum (can. 2229, § 3, 1); whence canon 988: "Ignorance of irregularities, whether from delict or from defect, and of impediments, does not excuse from them."

Nevertheless, ignorance of law or penalty excuses: a) if the penalty supposes contumacy and therefore knowledge of the threat, as for medicinal penalties and censures, unless the ignorance is crass or supine (can. 2229, § 3, 1); b) if the legislator requires knowledge or rashness, because he does not will to punish except him who has acted knowingly, rashly, deliberately, studiously, with presumption, or has dared (can. 2229, § 2), unless the ignorance is affected, because this in law is equated with knowledge and excuses from no penalty of latae sententiae (can. 2229, § 1).

Article II: On Inability

376. Inability is the incapacity of a subject for fulfilling the law: one kind is absolute, when the prescribed work cannot be placed, whether it is bodily or physical, when physical power for placing it is lacking, e.g., by defect of strength, means, liberty from violence, external coercion, as in one sick fixed in bed or imprisoned; or spiritual, when the work cannot be placed without sin on account of a higher law; another kind is moral, when the law cannot be fulfilled without great fear or danger of grave damage or inconvenience, bodily or spiritual, which per accidens is conjoined with fulfillment, e.g., if it requires extraordinary labor, or notably harms health or fortune, or furnishes an occasion of scandal or grave scruples, or is impeditious of a great good, e.g., of an eminent work of charity not prescribed.

377. Rules concerning excusal on account of inability.

I. Absolute physical inability always excuses from the observance of law, because no one is bound to the impossible. — II. Absolute spiritual inability excuses from the observance of law, because no one is obligated to evil.

III. Moral inability, on account of epikeia, regularly excuses from the observance of positive law, because law must prescribe acts morally possible; hence the axiom: positive law does not obligate with grave damage or inconvenience extrinsic to itself. How great a difficulty is required in order that it excuse must be morally estimated from the moment of the law, the quality of persons, the circumstances of places, times, etc.

1. Inconvenience joined per se with the law must be borne by the will of the legislator. Likewise that which has been tacitly accepted with an office.

Exceptionally, however, it does not excuse:

1. per se, by force of the positive law itself, when observance is necessary to the common good, which always excels private good; thus, e.g., even with danger of life the sacraments are to be administered to the dying by a pastor, war is to be waged by soldiers;

2. per accidens, by force of natural law, when violation would yield to contempt of God, religion, legislative power, or to grave scandal, e.g., the law of not celebrating without sacred vestments, the law concerning diriment impediments of marriage, or the law of not eating meats if this were demanded in hatred of religion.

378. He who cannot fulfill the whole law, is he bound to fulfill a part? - Response: 1) he is bound to the possible part if the law is morally divisible, the part is somewhat notable, and it conduces to the end of the law; e.g., he who cannot fast is bound to abstain from meats; lacking a breviary, he is bound to the parts which he knows by memory or which are preserved in a diurnal (prop. 34 condemned by Innocent XI);

2. he is not bound: a) if the law is at least morally indivisible, because it is impossible to observe even partially, e.g., fasting: thus he who cannot make a pilgrimage is not bound to begin the journey;

b) if the part is altogether slight, so that it is reputed as nothing, e.g., to supply the psalm Iudica at Mass: thus one who would know little of the office while lacking a breviary;

c) if the reason of the precept is not preserved in the possible part, because this contributes nothing to the end; e.g., he who cannot be present for the consecration is not bound to the remaining parts of the Mass, which are not prescribed except on account of the consecration.

One who seriously doubts whether he can observe the possible part is not bound, on account of the great inconvenience of scruple.

379. Is it licit to place an impediment to the observance of law? - Every precept in some way obligates both to avoiding impediments and to removing those which stand in the way of its fulfillment. Hence:

1. to place or not remove impediments, whether proximate or remote, is not licit if it is done directly, that is, for the end that the precept cannot be satisfied; e.g., to undertake a journey so that one cannot hear Mass: for this would be to will to violate the law;

2. indirectly, that is, for another end, with the foresight nevertheless that the law cannot be fulfilled, it is illicit to place or not remove proximate impediments, that is, at the very time of obligation or a little before, when morally and proximately it is already urgent; e.g., to begin a journey on the evening before a day of precept; unless, however, a proportionately grave cause is present, e.g., a grave inconvenience, or extraordinary means would have to be applied, e.g., for going to church: for then the principle concerning a cause with a double effect has force, one good, the other evil;

3. to place or not remove remote impediments is not prohibited, e.g., on Monday to begin a journey or to place the cause of sickness, on account of which someone cannot hear Mass on

Sunday or fast on Friday: for it would be a great and grave inconvenience also to be obligated to avoid remote impediments. For these are not causes to be avoided so that the precept can be fulfilled, in other words, remote and per accidens causes, and even if they are prohibited, they are not prohibited precisely lest this effect follow.

380. Observation [the original misprints 389].

Just as inability to fulfill the law can excuse from fault, so it can also excuse from a penalty, or diminish it (cf. can. 2199, 2203, § 2, 2205).

Article III: On Dispensation

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 97, a. 4; q. 96, a. 6; II-II, q. 63, a. 2, ad 2; q. 88, a. 10 and 11, ad 2; q. 89, a. 9; q. 147, a. 4 and ad 1.

381. Dispensation is the relaxation of a law in a particular case made by one having competent public power of jurisdiction (can. 80). It is said:

1. Relaxation, that is, exemption, remission, suspension, removal.

Thus it is distinguished: a) from interpretation and epikeia, which only declare that the law here and now does not obligate (e.g., on account of excusing causes), either according to the sense of the words or against their sense;

b) from permission, which only does not impede nor punish the violation of law;

c) from license, which is had from the fact that the law disposes that something is prohibited, not absolutely, but only, e.g., so that it not be done without the will of the superior at least presumed; once this condition is placed, the law is not suspended but never obligated, e.g., let no one export grain without license, or go out of the house; whence license is a faculty conceded according to law (e.g., can. 1398);

d) from absolution, which is not the remission of an obligation to be fulfilled in the future, but of fault or penalty contracted in the past, and pertains to judicial power, not to legislative power. All these do not take away the obligation itself of the law and are not against the law, but according to the law.

2. In a particular case; for it is given only to some persons, or if to all, not for all time, whence the law remains in the universal or for the community.

Thus it is distinguished: a) from abrogation and derogation, by which a law is extinguished totally or partially but with respect to the community, that is, for all and in perpetuity; b) from privilege, which positively constitutes a right, while dispensation operates merely negatively; moreover, privilege is permanent and stable and is not always against law, but many times beside the law, e.g., the privilege of absolving or dispensing.

3. Made by one having competent public power of jurisdiction.

Thus it is distinguished: a) from invalidation, for which dominative power of a superior over an inferior suffices, and which touches law only mediately; b) from interpretation, which can be made,

and from epikeia, which is always made by a private person; for these knowledge can suffice, and power is not necessarily required.

382. Dispensation is given in human law on account of the variation of cases and circumstances, which the legislator cannot foresee: for it happens that a precept which is for the common good as in most cases is not suitable to this person or in this case, because something better would be impeded or some evil would be induced. But it is twofold: simple dispensation, if the bond of the law is simply relaxed; and dispensation with compensation, if some burden is imposed in place of the law, and then it is called commutation. For legitimate dispensation three things are required: power of dispensing, the will of dispensing manifested, and a just cause of dispensing.

383. For dispensation there is required the power of dispensing. - The faculty of dispensing pertains to the public power of jurisdiction. Consequently some have it:

A. Either by ordinary power, that is, by force of office: namely, those who can make laws, in their own laws, and in the laws of predecessors and inferiors; for "every thing is dissolved by the same causes by which it arises." These are the Roman Pontiff with respect to all ecclesiastical laws, and bishops and other local Ordinaries with respect to diocesan laws, even synodal ones (can. 82), unless they have been confirmed in specific form so that the Roman Pontiff has made them his own.

B. Or by delegated power: for an inferior cannot dispense in the law of a superior unless this is conceded to him, because an inferior has no power over the will of a superior, upon which the whole force of the law depends. But inferiors have the faculty:

Either a) by quasi-ordinary power, or by law or custom: these are those who have an office to which law or custom attaches the power of dispensing in certain laws of superiors, namely:

a) Local Ordinaries (bishops and vicars general, while the see is vacant the capitular vicar, prelates nullius, administrators, vicars and prefects apostolic).

These "cannot dispense from the general laws of the Church, not even in a particular case, unless this power has been granted to them explicitly or implicitly" (can. 81); nevertheless it is granted to them implicitly if the law says indefinitely: that it can be dispensed, or until it is dispensed, or also explicitly, as happens for irregularities arising from an occult delict, except that which arises from voluntary homicide or abortion, or another brought before the judicial forum (can. 990), and for penalties *latae sententiae*, according to the norm of canon 2237. But they can do this generally:

1. in certain lighter causes more frequently occurring: thus, for example, in individual cases they can dispense individual faithful subjects of theirs or individual families, even outside the territory, and in the territory even travelers, from the common law concerning the observance of feasts, and likewise concerning the observance of abstinence and fast, or even both; indeed, from a particular cause of a great concourse of people or of public health, they can also dispense the whole diocese or place from fast and from abstinence, or even from both laws (can. 1245, §§ 1 and 2); likewise for prohibited books (can. 1402); likewise from centenary custom in the recitation of the hours;

2. in cases of urgent necessity, if recourse to the Holy See is difficult and at the same time there is danger of grave harm in delay, and if there is question of a dispensation which the Holy See is

accustomed to grant (can. 81), for example, in impediments of marriage (can. 1043 and 1045) and from irregularities, in a case of danger of grave infamy, for exercising orders (can. 990);

3. in doubt of fact, even for invalidating laws, provided there is question of laws in which the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to dispense (can. 15);

4. as regards the laws of a provincial or plenary council, but only in particular cases and for a just cause (can. 82 and 291, § 2).

b) Pastors, by custom now strengthened by law, in the laws concerning the observance of feasts and concerning abstinence and fast.

But only in this way, in individual cases and for a just cause, can they dispense individual faithful and individual families, but not the whole community (can. 1245, § 1).

c) Religious superiors, in an exempt clerical religion.

They are Ordinaries, namely, the general or provincial superior, in certain cases determined by law, yet less frequently than local Ordinaries; and the provincial can dispense from laws enacted in a provincial chapter, the general from laws enacted in a general chapter. Likewise these and the superiors of a house can dispense from laws concerning the observance of feasts, fast, and abstinence, with their inferiors, but only in the manner of a pastor (can. 1245, § 3).

1. Thus in doubt of fact (can. 15), in difficulty of recourse and danger in delay (can. 81-82), from an irregularity from an occult delict (can. 990), for penalties *latae sententiae* according to the norm of can. 2237, in an urgent case, from individual prohibited books (can. 1402).

d) Confessors, however, cannot do this.

They can only declare laws, but not of themselves dispense in them, unless sometimes this is expressly granted.

Thus by law they are delegated in more urgent occult cases in which the Ordinary cannot be approached: 1) in the case in which danger of grave harm or infamy is imminent, over all irregularities arising from an occult delict, but only for the exercise of the order received, except the irregularity arising from voluntary homicide or from procuring abortion, or another already brought before the judicial forum (can. 990);

2. likewise over the observance of a vindicative penalty *latae sententiae*, if otherwise the guilty person would betray himself with infamy and scandal; but with the burden of recurring within a month to the competent superior, if it can be done without grave inconvenience (can. 2290);

3. over all matrimonial impediments of ecclesiastical law, except the impediments of the presbyterate and of affinity in the direct line from consummated marriage (can. 1044-1045).

Or b) by purely delegated power, or from man: these are those to whom this has been expressly committed by those who have ordinary or quasi-ordinary power, or delegated power for a universality of causes or with the faculty of subdelegating.

Thus bishops, by force of quinquennial and triennial faculties, can by extraordinary faculty dispense in many things.

Concerning all these the following rules have force.

384. Rules concerning the power of dispensing.

1. He who has ordinary power of dispensing can also commute, just as he can impose one obligation in place of another.

2. He who has delegated power of dispensing can also commute in laws which impose a burden, for example, fast, recitation of the hours; but not in laws which were enacted for other ends pertaining to the common good, for example, for avoiding inconvenience, preserving order, such as impediments of marriage, because compensation can contribute nothing to their ends.

3. He who has the power of dispensing of himself has the power of commuting, unless he is explicitly restricted to dispensing in a certain case.

4. But he who has the power of commuting cannot therefore dispense, nor commute to something less; otherwise he would be dispensing in part.

5. But he who has the faculty "of commuting by dispensing" can commute to something less, but cannot simply dispense.

385. Whom they can dispense. - Of themselves they can dispense with subjects (can. 201, § 1), even with vagi (can. 14, § 2), with exempt persons at least with the presumed consent of their superior (because they are not of a worse condition, according to rule 61: What is granted for someone's favor is not to be turned to his detriment), and even with travelers who otherwise would be bound to approach their own superior, which often could not be done without great inconvenience (can. 1245; 2253, 3; 2237; 1043-1045), unless nevertheless the contrary is positively established, as for example in can. 990, § 1, and 1402, § 1; indeed with oneself, because they are not of a lower condition than subjects, and because acting in the name of the superior one dispenses himself as subject to him, though not in one's own laws, in which he does not need dispensation, since he is not directly subject to them.

386. For dispensation there is required a will of dispensing, present or antecedent; but a presumed future will is not sufficient, which is not an absolute will, for example: if the superior knew, he would dispense. And in this way dispensation is distinguished from license: for in this case the action is not prohibited simply, but only lest it be done without the consent of the superior, for which presumed consent suffices; but when the action is absolutely prohibited and therefore evil, there is necessary at present a will which takes away the prohibition and the malice. This can be manifested 1) expressly, by words, writings, signs; or 2) tacitly from facts: a) if the superior knows that action is being taken against the law and does not contradict, although he easily can and ought, so that from the circumstances his silence cannot be explained except on the supposition of dispensation; b) if with certain knowledge he commands or concedes what cannot be done without dispensation, for example, the Pontiff knowingly gives a benefice to an irregular person, or commands meats to be eaten on a forbidden day.

387. For dispensation there is required a just cause, known and examined by mature counsel. - For a) if the dispenser dispenses according to his own will, he will be either unfaithful or imprudent: unfaithful if he does not have a just cause, for he orders to a particular good a power given unto edification on account of the common good, and thus turns it into destruction, while he disturbs the right order of society and, by committing acceptance of persons, gives occasion for complaints, exempting one while others are pressed by the law; imprudent if he is ignorant of the reason for dispensing. Moreover b) because to exempt from law him who is not to be exempted from law is acceptance of persons; c) because it is disgraceful and against natural law that a part without cause should not be conformed to the whole. Hence:

1. If a just cause is lacking, a) and it is done in the law of a superior, the dispensation is illicit as an abuse of another's power, and indeed gravely or lightly according as the law obligates under grave or under light matter, and ordinarily invalid because the superior is not judged to commit the power of dispensing without cause, which he could not concede without sin (can. 84, § 1);

b) if it is done in one's own law, the dispensation is valid because positive law does not bind without the will of the superior, but it is illicit gravely or lightly according to the degree of disturbance that follows: although it is a sin of acceptance of persons, which is grave from its genus, against distributive and legal justice, and which is apt to generate scandal and harm the common good, nevertheless more often in a particular case it will in fact be light, because ordinarily it is not very harmful; yet it is grave if notable scandal arises, or harm to the one dispensed, or a burden upon others;

c) a subject knowingly asking for dispensation without legitimate cause sins gravely or lightly, according as he induces the dispenser to grave or light sin (even if the superior is in good faith); nevertheless, by using the dispensation, if it is valid and scandal is excluded, he does not sin.

2. If only knowledge of the cause is lacking: a) if it is done in the law of a superior, the dispensation is illicit, and also invalid if the delegating superior placed examination of the cause as a condition of dispensation, or also a just cause and the cause is lacking; otherwise validity is probable;

b) if it is done in one's own law, the dispensation is valid but illicit;

c) if, diligence having been applied, it is not certain but probable that the cause suffices, the dispensation is licitly and validly granted, because in morals evidence cannot always be had, but a prudent and probable reason suffices (can. 84, § 2).

In doubt concerning the validity of a dispensation it is judged valid: one must stand for the value of the act.

388. A just cause of dispensing can be: necessity, for example, grave pain of the head or weakness from fasting; piety, for example, the service of worship for dispensing from an irregularity; or utility at least mediately redounding to the common good, whether intrinsic or extrinsic.

Intrinsic utility is preservation, difficulty, or inconvenience of observing the law united to it per accidens, for example, preservation from scruples or temptations, the difficulty of a journey in winter.

Extrinsic utility is the good of the one dispensing, for example, that he show himself liberal or kind; the good of the one dispensed, for example, utility in view of good merit, the dignity of the petitioner; the common good, for example, for forestalling excessive transgressions, for increasing common gladness. Thus also the payment of money for the utility of the Church, the compensation of merits, the reconciling of peace.

1. Nevertheless the use of every cause, if the one dispensing is not the legislator, is not always permitted. Namely, one must see in what way the faculty has been delegated and within what limits it is contained.

How great a cause is required must be determined with attention to the moment of the law, the quality of the person, the circumstances of time, etc., so that, all the circumstances being considered, it appears fitting to reason. It is, namely, like a cause with a double effect: the good coming from the dispensation must compensate the evil caused by it. But the cause need not be so great that it certainly excuses of itself from the observance of the law, or probably if the superior cannot be approached, because then there is no need of dispensation, since the law has probably ceased; nor can it be minimal or just any small cause, but an intermediate cause suffices.

The cause of dispensation need not exist when the dispensation is asked for or when it is granted inchoatively (for example, mandatorily), but when it is granted definitively and effectively, or is executed (can. 41). Moreover it must remain until use is begun and during use, if it was given for an act morally divisible and revocable and the cause by its nature is temporary; whence the dispensation is given under the tacit condition that the cause continue, for example, dispensation from recitation of the hours or fasting on account of infirmity. But it need not remain if it was given for an act morally indivisible and irrevocable, and the cause by its nature is perpetual and therefore, if it ceases, it is per accidens; whence the dispensation is given absolutely, for example, dispensation from an irregularity on account of poverty is valid even if the poverty has ceased; dispensation from an impediment of marriage for legitimating offspring is valid even if, after the dispensation has been granted, the offspring dies.

389. Dispensation can be vitiated by violence, fear, and error.

A. Violence strictly so called, or perfect and absolute, invalidates it because it renders it involuntary (can. 103, § 1).

B. Fear of itself does not invalidate, because it does not take away the will of dispensing, unless it was so grave that it altogether disturbed reason; whence a dispensation is judged valid unless something else is provided by law (can. 103, § 2), as for remission of a penalty extorted by fear (can. 2238).

C. Error arising either from subreption, that is, suppression of the truth, or from obreption, that is, expression of the false:

1. invalidates if it bears

a) upon the substance of the object or thing, or upon a quality which enters the substance of the thing about which dispensation is made, for example, affinity instead of consanguinity (can. 40);

b) upon the subject or person to whom it is given, for example, Peter instead of Paul (can. 40);

c) upon those things which, according to the style of the curia, are required to be expressed for validity, even if the superior would dispense otherwise (can. 42, § 1), unless nevertheless the clause *motu proprio* is added to the dispensation (can. 45);

d) upon the final or motive cause which so moves to dispensing that, once it is removed, the dispensation would not have been given, if the sole cause or all the final causes alleged are false (can. 42, § 2), unless nevertheless an exception is established by law, as for lesser impediments of marriage (can. 1054).

2. Outside these cases it is valid, for example, if the error bears upon accidents of the thing, or upon the name of the person or place or thing, provided, in the judgment of the Ordinary, there is no doubt about the person or thing itself (can. 47), or upon a merely impulsive cause without which the dispensation nevertheless would have been given but which moves one to dispense more easily, or if it bears extrinsically and independently toward the thing requested, even if otherwise it would not have been dispensed: for here and now the one dispensing wills to loose the bond.

3. A defect of obreption or subreption in only one part does not weaken another, if several dispensations are granted at the same time (can. 42, § 3).

390. Observations. - 1. Canon 84, § 2: "A dispensation, in doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause, is licitly asked for and can be licitly and validly conferred."

2. Canon 85: "Not only a dispensation according to the norm of can. 50 (concerning a law in the advantage of private persons), but the faculty itself of dispensing granted for a certain case, is subject to strict interpretation"; but not a general faculty, whether ordinary or delegated for a universality of causes, since it is favorable and granted beside the law, and therefore admits a broad interpretation (can. 200, § 1).

3. Canon 86: "A dispensation which has successive duration (and not the whole effect at once, as an irregularity or the removal of an impediment of marriage) ceases in the same modes by which a privilege ceases, and also by certain and total cessation of the motive cause (whether negatively or contrarily)." Whence it also ceases: 1) by revocation of the granting superior signified to the subject (can. 71 and 60), which the legislator always validly effects, but an inferior delegate only for a just cause; 2) by renunciation made by him who can renounce, and accepted by the competent superior (can. 72); 3) by the resolution of the right (and death) of the one granting, if the dispensation was given at pleasure (can. 73) or with an equivalent clause: until I shall will, until it shall please, etc.; otherwise if it was given: until I shall revoke; 4) by the death of the person to whom it was granted, if the privilege was personal; if local, by the destruction of the place, unless it is restored within fifty years (can. 74-75); 5) when the time has elapsed or the number of cases for which it was granted has been completed (can. 77); 6) if the circumstances, in the judgment of the superior, are so changed that the dispensation has become harmful or its use illicit (can. 77); but not by non-use alone, unless it is onerous to others and legitimate prescription or tacit renunciation is also added (can. 76).

But a dispensation which has the whole effect at once, if it is granted absolutely, does not cease even by certain and total cessation of the motive cause.

4. Concerning the invalidity of dispensation the following have force:

Canon 43: "A favor denied by one Sacred Congregation or Office of the Roman Curia is invalidly granted by another Sacred Congregation or Office, or by the local Ordinary, even if he has power, without the assent of the Sacred Congregation or Office by which, or with which, action had begun, saving the right of the Sacred Penitentiary for the internal forum."

Canon 44, § 2: "A favor denied by a Vicar General and afterwards obtained from the Bishop, with no mention made of this denial, is invalid; but a favor denied by the Bishop cannot validly be obtained from the Vicar General, even with mention made of the denial, if the Bishop does not consent."

Canon 53: "The executor of a rescript invalidly performs his office before he has received the letters and recognized their authenticity and integrity, unless previous notice of them has been transmitted to him by authority of the one rescripting."

5. Concerning the cessation of the power of dispensing, one must speak according to the mind of canons 207 and 208.

6. To avoid simony, dispensation must be gratuitous, although modest payments can be exacted under the title of chancery expenses, as for example in can. 1056.

7. A real or territorial dispensation has force in the territory; a personal dispensation, as is that which removes an impediment or inability, everywhere; a mixed dispensation (real and personal) has force for all in the territory, and for subjects also outside the territory.

Article IV: On Privilege

391. Privilege etymologically is a private or particular law, and therefore it is a particular law enacted for the benefit of a determined person or category of persons. It is taken objectively for the particular law itself; subjectively for the special faculty of acting according to the particular law and of using the benefit or privilege taken objectively.

In the broad sense any particular law is thus called, in which sense the rights of bishops, pastors, minors, wives, etc., are called privileges; in the strict sense it is a favorable private law granting a special favor or benefit, not necessary, against or beside common right. Thus laws which regulate the life of religious are privileges only in the broad sense; those which further bestow on them a special benefit, such as exemption from the bishop or a special faculty for the sacrament of Penance, are privileges in the strict sense.

Since, however, it is a law, hence it must have the essential conditions of law; and therefore a privilege must be:

a) stable and permanent, and thus it is distinguished from dispensation or grace, which is not usually granted in a stable and permanent mode but transitorily;

b) useful to the community, otherwise it would be exorbitant and to be abolished, since the community must recognize the privilege and not impede the privileged person in its use. Thus

privileges granted to regulars or clerics favor not only them but the whole Christian religion;

c) and therefore granted by him who has care of the community: for to exempt from common right, or to obligate others not to impede the privileged person from the use of the privilege, cannot belong except to the legislator. Therefore a private person cannot grant privileges, but only give licenses, and not against law.

Therefore privilege differs:

1. from a rescript, which is like the instrument by which a privilege or dispensation or interpretation of right or another grace is obtained from a superior;

2. from grace, which is a genus of benefit, of which privilege is a certain species;

3. from dispensation: a) privilege is a true law which positively constitutes some right; dispensation negatively relaxes law and takes away its obligation; b) privilege can be not against law but only beside law; dispensation is against law; c) privilege of itself is stable and permanent; dispensation of itself is granted for a passing act; d) privilege is given to an individual person; dispensation also to a community.

392. Division of privileges. - Privilege is divided in many ways:

1. By reason of the object or matter about which it is concerned: a) it is against law if it derogates from some law, or beside law if by it no law is derogated from, as is the faculty of dispensing: thus any habitual faculties whatever which are granted in perpetuity or for a predefined time or a certain number of cases (can. 66, § 1). The first can be granted only to subjects, because it is an exemption from law by an act of jurisdiction; the other also to non-subjects, because it is done by way of donation or faculty, which a superior can grant even to outsiders to be exercised in his territory. b) It is favorable, which brings advantage to the privileged person and prejudice to no one, as an honorific privilege or that of saying Mass in a private oratory; or odious, which brings advantage to one and inconvenience to another (not to the common good), as exemption from taxes or from the jurisdiction of the Ordinary.

2. By reason of the subject to whom it is granted, it is personal, which primarily, directly, and immediately is granted to a person by reason of himself, on account of knowledge, dignity, etc., and follows the person himself and is extinguished with him, for example, the faculty of absolving from censures, or of saying the rosary in place of the breviary; and real, which primarily, directly, and immediately is conferred upon a thing, whether corporeal, as a church, monastery, altar, or incorporeal, as a dignity, office, state, and through the thing redounds to the person: thus the faculties which are customarily delegated habitually to an Ordinary, which consequently do not cease by his death or removal. But if a real privilege is attached to a place, it is called local.

3. By reason of the cause or motive on account of which it is granted, it is gracious, which is from the mere grace and liberality of the superior; remunerative, which is given as a reward on account of merit or service of the person himself, or of his parents, blood relatives, or kinsmen;

and onerous, if by an intervening contract on account of a burden imposed and service promised.

4. By reason of the mode by which it is granted, a) it is given or at instance, which is granted in view of a petition and is to be interpreted according to it; or *motu proprio*, which is granted from the mere kindness and inclination of the superior as a most special favor, even if a supplication preceded, and therefore it is of broad interpretation. b) It is granted first and of itself, without respect to a privilege otherwise given; or *ad instar*, if it is given in the mode by which it was granted to another: and then it is given either equally principally, if it is bestowed as if it had been granted first and of itself, and therefore is not revoked if in the other it has been abolished; or by accession, if it is communicated on account of the connection which the one to whom it is granted has with others previously privileged, so that it is increased, diminished, and lost together with their privilege.

5. By reason of the end, a privilege is common, which immediately regards and intends the common good, for example, the privileges of canon and forum given to clerics or of exemption given to religious orders; and private, which, although given to a community, immediately regards the good of a particular person.

393. Acquisition of privilege. - A privilege can be acquired in a threefold mode: by direct concession, indirectly by communication, and by prescription or custom (can. 63, § 1).

1. By direct concession, which only he who has legislative power can validly give, because he alone can obligate others not to impede the privileged person from the use of the privilege.

2. Indirectly, by communication, privileges are acquired which are granted to a moral person or state with which another moral person has communication of privileges.

Such communication of privileges in equally principal form existed among approved religious Orders, but for the future it has now been excluded by can. 613, § 1, privileges acquired before the Code not being revoked (Commission for Interpretation, December 30, 1937); but now it exists in accessory form between regulars and their familiars or tertiaries, between the first and second order (can. 613, § 2; 614).

Nevertheless communication of privileges, even in equally principal form, regards only those things which had been granted directly, perpetually, and without special relation to a certain place or thing or person to the one first privileged, account also being taken of the capacity of the subject to whom communication is made (can. 64).

3. By prescription and custom, in the same mode and with the same conditions by which a right is legitimately acquired or a law is abrogated (cf. n. 404); but since by prescription a norm of right is not constituted, but only a subjective right is bestowed, it can be called a privilege only analogically.

Centenary or immemorial possession induces the presumption of a privilege granted (can. 63, § 2).

394. Interpretation of privilege is to be made according to the following rules:

1. A privilege is to be estimated from its own tenor, nor is it licit to extend or restrict it (can. 67).

Therefore interpretation is to be taken from the clauses, from the words taken in their proper juridical sense, and from the context of speech. But in no way can a privilege be extended either from person to person, or from thing to thing, or from place to place, even if the same, indeed a stronger, reason occurs.

2. That interpretation is always to be applied, so that those increased by privilege may seem to have obtained some grace from the indulgence of the one granting (can. 68).

For privilege is essentially a concession of benefit and favor.

3. In doubt privileges are to be interpreted according to the norm of canon 50 (can. 68), namely, those which refer to lawsuits, or injure rights acquired by others, or are opposed to a law in the advantage of private persons, or finally were obtained for acquiring an ecclesiastical benefice, receive strict interpretation; all the rest, broad.

Thus odious privileges are generally to be interpreted strictly, especially those which are against right; on the contrary those which are beside right, favorable, remunerative, granted *motu proprio*, given to an Order or religious community.

4. A faculty granted carries with itself also the other powers which are necessary for its use (can. 66, § 3).

Wherefore in the faculty of dispensing there is included also the power of absolving from ecclesiastical penalties, if any perhaps stand in the way, but only for obtaining the effect of the dispensation.

5. A privilege, unless something else is clear, is to be judged perpetual (can. 70).

The contrary can be clear from the tenor, from clauses, as if it is given at our good pleasure, from the nature of the thing, as if it is strictly personal, or granted for a certain number of cases or a certain time.

6. A personal privilege follows the person and is extinguished with him.

395. Use of privilege. - 1. A common privilege, which principally has been granted for the common good, each one generally is bound to use, nor can he ever renounce it; because to act otherwise would be to the detriment of the common good.

2. A private and merely personal privilege, which has been granted to a private person only for his favor, each one can renounce; nor is he bound of itself to use it, unless an obligation arises from another head (can. 69).

Hence a sick priest detained at home who has the privilege of a private oratory is not bound to erect it, nor, once it has already been erected, to use it so that he can celebrate on Sundays. On the

contrary, a confessor enjoying the privilege of absolving from reserved cases is bound to use it toward a penitent rightly disposed.

3. A private privilege which has been granted to a community on account of the good of individuals, individuals cannot renounce (but only the community); but of itself they are not bound to use it. Per accidens they can be bound to this, by reason of a special precept imposed on individuals by a superior, or by reason of conformity with others.

396. Cessation of privilege. - Privileges can cease either directly and of themselves, or indirectly and per accidens, namely, by defect of a necessary condition:

A. Directly: 1) by renunciation legitimately made and accepted by the competent superior. Nevertheless a private person cannot renounce a real privilege or one made to a community; nor can the community itself, if it was given by way of law, or if the renunciation would yield to the prejudice of the Church or of others (can. 72);

2. by express or tacit revocation, that is, by an explicit special act, or by a contrary law enacted by the superior who granted the privilege. Concerning this, cf. can. 71 and 60; in practice various rather intricate cases can occur, concerning which it pertains to jurists to judge.

B. Indirectly: 3) by the resolution of the right of the one granting, if the privileges were given with the clause: at our good pleasure, or another equivalent, such as: until I shall will, during my pontificate, etc. (can. 73); but not: until I shall revoke;

4. by the time having elapsed or the number of cases for which they were granted having been completed; or by circumstances, in the judgment of the superior, so changed that they have become harmful or their use illicit (can. 77);

5. by extinction of the person (can. 74), or by the thing to which they cohere being absolutely suppressed, or by the place to which they are attached being destroyed, unless the place is restored within fifty years (can. 75);

6. by non-use of an onerous privilege with liberative prescription of him to whose burden the privilege yields (can. 76); but other privileges do not cease through non-use.

397. Observation. - A just cause is required for the licitness of a privilege: for without a just cause a privilege against right injures legal and distributive justice; a privilege beside right is illicit prodigality. Nevertheless it is not required for validity, because it depends on the mere will of the legislator that someone be exempt from his law.

Article V: On Cessation of the End

398. The intrinsic end of law is that good which the law immediately regards and intends, or the proximate formal motive on account of which it was enacted. It ceases when it has already been obtained or can no longer be obtained, for example, the health of the pontiff to be obtained, if it has been obtained or if the pontiff dies. But it can cease either negatively or contradictorily, when observance of the law is no longer useful for the end: this is simple cessation; or positively and

contrarily, when from being just, useful, and morally possible it has become, on account of circumstances, unjust, harmful, or very difficult: this is called change of matter.

399. The rules concerning cessation of the end are usually stated as follows:

I. When the total or adequate end of the law ceases (even negatively) in the universal, that is, with respect to the whole community or the greater part, and indeed permanently, the law ceases, because it becomes useless to the community, at least with respect to that which it intended, nor does the legislator will to obligate when the end intended by him is lacking; a fortiori if it ceases positively and the law becomes universally harmful. Hence the axiom: when the reason of the law ceases, its disposition ceases.

II. When a partial end ceases, the law does not cease, provided the end of the law is sufficient; for example, prayer for peace and fair weather does not cease when this has been obtained.

III. When the end ceases in the particular (with respect to one person or for a time), the law in no way ceases, because it intends the general good; but if it becomes harmful or too burdensome, the law itself does not cease, but as regards the particular case it can fail to obligate by epikeia, if it becomes too grave.

400. Corollary. - Hence for the cessation of law from within, three conditions are required. Namely, the final cause must cease totally as to all parts of the law, universally for the whole community, and constantly; otherwise the law is only suspended.

Article VI: On Abrogation and Derogation

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 97, a. 2.

401. Abrogation (*abroger, revoquer, rapporter*) is the abolition or revocation of the whole law; derogation (*deroger, modifier*) is the abolition or revocation of part of the law, the other part retaining vigor. They differ from invalidation of law: the latter is the abolition, by a superior, of a law enacted by an inferior so that it never obtains force; but the former revoke a law which has had force.

They can be made directly or expressly (formal cessation), or tacitly and indirectly (virtual cessation), by enacting an incompatible law (obrogation).

402. Those who can make laws can abrogate and derogate, namely, the legislator himself, his successor, and his superior. For "every thing is dissolved by the same causes by which it arises."

As regards ecclesiastical laws, these are: the Pontiff for all; Councils for the laws of their own jurisdiction; bishops for diocesan laws, even those enacted in synod, but not for laws enacted in a provincial council, or for diocesan laws if they have been confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff in specific form, that is, not simply in favor of the superior, but in favor of the community, so that the pontiff has made them his own.

They validly do this even without a reason, because positive law essentially depends on the will of the legislator; they do not licitly do it without a just cause, because to abrogate useful laws or frequently change them into others brings detriment to the common good: for thus the people are brought into contempt, and laws are less esteemed and observed, since custom avails much for observance of law.

403. Observations. - 1. Canon 22 is to be noted: "A later law, enacted by competent authority, obrogates a prior law if it expressly says so, or is directly contrary to it, or orders anew the whole matter of the prior law; but a general law in no way derogates from the statutes of special places and singular persons, unless something else is expressly provided in it." Nevertheless, from the express determination of the law, "any laws whatever, whether universal or even particular, opposed to the prescriptions of the Code, are abrogated, unless concerning particular laws the contrary is expressly established" (can. 6, 1°).

2. Concerning tacit abrogation, note: a) a later law is to be reconciled with an earlier one insofar as the propriety of the words permits (can. 23), for change of law is of itself harmful to the community and is to be interpreted strictly;

b) by a general law a prior general law is abrogated insofar as it is directly contrary; not particular customs or the statutes of special places or singular persons, which can be unknown to the legislator;

c) by a later general law a prior general law is abrogated, not only if contrary but also if diverse, if the later law orders anew the whole matter of the prior law (can. 22). Namely, it is opposed to the common good that the same subject matter be under a twofold ordering.

Article VII: On Custom

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 97, a. 3.

404. Custom, considered as a fact, properly is use or manner, that is, frequent repetition of the same acts, a frequent mode of acting, and the inclination arising from this to act similarly. But in the present matter, in juridical speech, it designates right introduced by the use or manners of the people. It is usually defined: legal right introduced by the long-standing manners of the community with some consent of the legislator.

Another custom is according to law (inhesive or declarative), which interprets a law previously enacted; another against law, which abrogates a law or derogates from it; another beside law, which introduces a new law, as is that which is now strengthened by can. 135.

1. Hence special promulgation is not required. Hence the nature of the thing is not changed when custom is reported in a written document, unless the writing itself is formally promulgated.

The conditions required for custom are:

a) On the part of the acts, that they be 1) frequent, that is, often repeated; 2) long-standing, that is, exercised for a long time; 3) uniform or constant and therefore not interrupted, whether on the part of the people or on the part of a superior contradicting; 4) public and notorious, otherwise it would not be the custom of society as such; 5) deliberate or freely placed, and not placed from force or fear or error, by which the consent of the community is impeded; 6) practiced not by a few particular persons, but by the greater part of the community, or of the part for which a law can be made (can. 26), for example, of a diocese, class of faithful, religious order, or its province, but not of a parish or religious house.

b) On the part of the matter, that the custom be reasonable (can. 27), at least negatively, and therefore that the conditions necessary for law be present.

c) On the part of the subjects, the intention of obligating themselves (or of de-obligating themselves, or of understanding and fulfilling the obligation in such a mode, or of extending or limiting the obligation to this), which can be manifested by word or deed of the superior or subjects, by practice, by the common judgment of experts, etc.: thus customs from gratitude or devotion, for example, of hearing three Masses on the Nativity of the Lord, of signing oneself with blessed water, of saying "The Angel of the Lord...," are not obligatory.

d) On the part of the legislator, consent (can. 25), whether special, express or tacit, which is gathered from action or omission, or general or presumed, given to every legitimate custom, or of approving any customs whatever adorned with certain conditions.

405. What the Law establishes concerning custom. - According to the new Law:

1. To introduce a custom beside law, there are now required forty continuous and complete years (can. 28); when the required time is present, the custom is called prescribed (can. 27).

Nevertheless custom differs from prescription:

a) the latter is the mode by which private persons acquire a right; the former induces an effect for the community;

b) for prescribing, good faith is required by which someone is ignorant that the thing is not his; for custom it is not always required that those introducing it be ignorant that the law exists;

c) for prescription the consent of him against whom prescription is made is not required; for custom the consent of the legislator is required;

d) for prescription and custom a different continuous time is required: for prescription thirty years ordinarily suffice, or another lesser time determined by law; for custom, a time of forty years.

2. Custom against law or beside law is revoked by contrary custom or law (can. 30).

3. Nevertheless, unless it makes express mention of them, a law does not revoke a centenary or immemorial custom, just as neither does a general law revoke particular customs (can. 30).

Hence, by promulgation of the new Code, centenary and immemorial customs were not removed, unless they are expressly reprobated there (can. 5).

406. In what way custom obtains the force of law. - Custom, furnished with the due conditions, just as it can make laws, so also can abrogate them and derogate from them. This happens in two ways:

a) By way of connivance or special personal consent, with the superior personally knowing and consenting either expressly or tacitly, that is, not contradicting when he conveniently can and ought to contradict: for he is not judged to consent if the custom is unreasonable, for example, one which is contrary to divine right, offers an occasion of sinning, is harmful to the common good, dangerous to faith, pernicious to ecclesiastical discipline, divine worship, the liberty of the Church, or is expressly reprobated in law as an abuse or corruption (can. 27, § 2), such as a custom contrary to the preceptive rubrics of the Mass (can. 818), unless it is so called because of circumstances now changed. This of itself does not require time but has force as soon as it is clear that consent is

present: thus a law which was never received by use ceases to obligate after a few acts tolerated by the superior.

b) By way of prescription, or by consent not special but general, not personal but legal or juridical (which is contained in a law which ratifies all legitimate customs), with the superior even ignorant of the custom and giving presumed consent: this requires that it be reasonable and that it have been continued for a long time, and not interrupted; otherwise it does not sufficiently appear that the law is not accommodated to the manners of the subjects, nor could the legislator be presumed to consent. How much time is required must be determined by the judgment of the prudent.

But now it is universally established in law that no custom can derogate from ecclesiastical law unless it has legitimately prescribed through forty continuous and complete years; but against a law which contains a clause prohibiting future customs, only a centenary or immemorial custom can prescribe (can. 27, § 1).

Wherefore it has seemed to some that a custom tacitly approved by way of connivance no longer has force unless it has also endured without interruption for forty years (or one hundred). But they do not demonstrate this efficaciously.

407. In what way custom against law can be introduced. - To understand how a custom against law can be introduced, even without sin, let St. Thomas be heard, q. 97, a. 3, ad 2: "Human laws fail in some cases. Hence it is possible sometimes to act beside the law, namely, in a case in which the law fails (epikeia), and nevertheless the act will not be evil; and when such cases are multiplied on account of some change of men, then it is manifested through custom that the law is no longer useful; just as it would also be manifested if a contrary law were promulgated by word. But if there still remains the same reason on account of which the first law was useful, custom does not conquer law, but law conquers custom; unless perhaps the law seems useless for this reason alone, that it is not possible according to the custom of the country, which was one of the conditions of law. For it is difficult to remove the custom of a multitude."

From this last point it is already understood that it is not necessary that every custom against law be introduced by acting legitimately and without sin; as moderns are accustomed to note with St. Alphonsus, *Theologia Moralis*, book I, n. 107: "Custom against law does not require good faith, but can also be introduced by sinning. For custom has a threefold state. In the beginning those introducing it against law all sin (unless they are excused by some reason). In progress, those using it, already introduced by their elders, do not sin (in good faith), but can be punished by the prince. But in the end they neither sin nor can they be punished when using it, already prescribed."

408. Custom can do everything which the legislator can do, for example, abrogate obligation in conscience as to fault and not as to penalty, or vice versa; likewise abrogate invalidating laws; indeed even laws which are borne with the clause: notwithstanding any custom whatever to the contrary, because this regards customs already existing, but does not impede future ones. But it cannot change the law against the legislator when he wills that it not be changed by custom, as if he contradicts this; whence if the law was enacted with the clause: notwithstanding any custom whatever, even future, the law does not presume consent unless the custom is centenary or immemorial (can. 27).

409. Custom ceases 1) from within, if it has become unreasonable;

2. from without, by contrary custom legitimately prescribed;

3. likewise by a law which suppresses it. Nevertheless:

a) Special laws of places, as particular customs, statutes, and privileges, because although they are reasonable, they can easily be unknown to the universal legislator, are not judged abrogated by a contrary universal law, even if it is borne with the clause: notwithstanding custom; unless the law indicates this specially and expressly, for example, by saying: notwithstanding nothing, or notwithstanding any contrary custom whatever (can. 30); nevertheless they are removed by a law enacted by the particular legislator of the place.

b) Likewise an immemorial or centenary custom is not judged abrogated even by a law which is borne notwithstanding any custom whatever, unless it expressly indicates this, for example, by adding "even centenary," or implicitly, by declaring it "unreasonable or a corruption" (can. 30).

Treatise: On Sins in General

Introduction

410. Object of the treatise. - Moral theology treats of human acts by which we come to the end, beatitude. They are those acts which are conformed to the dictate of right conscience and to the eternal law. But there are also human acts which are not conformed to the law of God or to the dictate of right conscience, by which we do not come to the end, and which are called sins. Hence, after the treatises on the end, on human acts, and on their rules, namely, on conscience and on law, the consideration of evil acts or sins rightly follows.

411. The treatise is divided into three parts:

The first part treats of sin according to itself:

1. of the essence of sin; 2) of the distinction of sins, a) specific, b) numerical; 3) of the comparison and gravity of sins; 4) of the subject of sin, where internal sins are treated.

The second part treats of the causes of sins:

1. of interior causes: a) of ignorance on the part of reason, b) of passion on the part of the sensitive appetite, c) of malice on the part of the will;

2. of exterior causes: a) of God permitting, b) of the devil tempting, c) of man cooperating;

3. of sin which is the cause of another sin, namely, of the mode by which one sin causes another, and of capital sins.

The third part treats of the effects of sin:

1. of the diminution of the good of nature; 2) of stain or guilt of fault; 3) of guilt of punishment; 4) of mortal and venial sin, which are distinguished according to diverse effects: a) of the distinction of mortal sin from venial, b) of its gravity, c) of the conditions required for it, d) of the division of mortal and venial sins, e) of their conversion, f) of venial sin according to itself.

412. Importance of the treatise. - The treatise is of the greatest importance, because it applies the abstract general principles concerning human acts more determinately and concretely to sins, which above all are to be avoided by each one, and are to be estimated and judged in others by the priest and confessor.

1. The following can usefully be consulted: St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo* 1, 2, 3, 7; and I-II, q. 71-89 with the commentaries of Cajetan and Billuart; St. Alphonsus, *Theologia Moralis*, book V; Reiffenstuel, *Theologia Moralis*; Ferraris, *Prompta Bibliotheca*; Ballerini-Palmieri, *Opus theologicum morale*, vol. I; Billot, *De peccato personali et originali*; *Theologia Mechliniensis*, *Tractatus de Peccatis*, edited by St. Carton de Wiart; Lumbreras, *De Vitiis et Peccatis*; Deman, article

"Peche," in *Dictionnaire de Theologie*; and manuals known to all, such as Van der Velden, Haine, Aertnijs, Marc, Lehmkuhl, Genicot, Noldin, Tanquerey, Prummer, and Vermeersch.

First Part: On Sin According to Itself

First Question: On the Essence of Sin

Article I: On the Notion and Conditions of Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 1 and 2; q. 71, a. 1-4; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 2.

413. Sin properly so called is taken philosophically and theologically:

a) Among philosophers an evil act is called a sin, which is a middle term between evil and fault: for not every evil is a sin, nor is every sin a fault. Evil, indeed, is the privation of a perfection which ought to be in something. But sin is the privation of a perfection due in order to an end, that is, in operation when this is not directed as its end requires; but since law is the rule according to which an act is to be directed so that it may come to its end, it is the same whether sin is called a disordering from the end, or a transgression of law. Moreover there are three laws: the law of physical nature, the rules of art, and the moral law; hence a monster is said to be a sin of nature, and a weak structure a sin of art. But transgression of the moral law has this special feature, that it arises from a free will, as mistress of its own acts; and consequently it is imputable and blameworthy: hence it has obtained the special name of fault.

b) But among theologians, who consider sin only in the moral matter and in order to the ultimate end, God, the custom has prevailed of taking sin and fault in the same sense. Therefore in the stricter signification sin is a morally evil act, or an evil human act. And in this sense, in the present treatise, there will be speech of sin.

414. Sin is distinguished from vice and from malice in strictness of speech, although in common speech these are often confused: vice is a habitual inclination to sin, or an evil habit; sin, an evil act; malice is the discordance with right reason and law, on account of which an act or habit is evil and therefore a sin or vice. Vice is directly opposed to virtue, sin to a good act, malice to goodness.

Sin has greater malice than vice, for 1) habit is midway between potency and act, and therefore just as it exceeds potency in good or evil because it inclines it to this, so it is exceeded by the act which determines the potency to this; whence it is worse to act badly than only to be able to do this or to be inclined to it; 2) vice is not evil except on account of the malice of the act, because it inclines to an evil act. Nevertheless under a certain respect vice is worse than sin, because it lasts longer and can be the efficient cause of many sins; but sin with respect to vice is the final cause according to which goodness or malice is considered, and therefore it is simply worse.

415. Sin differs from imperfection, which is either negative or physical, namely, the defect of a greater perfection which an act could have, and this is proper to every created act; or positive or moral. This again is distinguished as twofold: one, improperly so called, is a wholly indeliberate transgression of a law of lesser moment, for example, a wholly involuntary distraction in prayer: this is materially a true venial sin but without any fault; another, properly so called, is a voluntary action or omission against a counsel to which someone is stirred either by divine inspiration, or by the

judgment of reason, or by the directive will of a superior, for example, to omit morning prayers, to violate the statutes of a community, etc.; and in this sense they are now accustomed to speak of imperfection. This in itself is not sin because it is not against law; nevertheless, if it is done deliberately and especially habitually, it will not always be without fault, either by reason of the effect, such as scandal or damage, or more often by reason of the cause, namely, an inordinate affection or depraved motive on account of which it is placed: whether from negligence or levity, or from inordinate passion, for example, of sensuality, curiosity, concupiscence or anger, impatience, sloth, worldly fear, etc., or from contempt; for reason forbids man to act in his acts from an evil or irrational motive.

In this matter it is altogether necessary to preserve the essential difference between a precept, which of itself is obligatory because it concerns a good necessarily to be done or an evil to be avoided, and a counsel, which is not obligatory of itself, as concerning a better good; so that every theory which would remove this difference in practice, by that very fact would be shown to fall short of the truth. Therefore the doctrine of those more recent authors cannot be admitted, who hold the passing over of the better good as per se and necessarily and always culpable, unless from determined circumstances it were proved that this good in the case is less fitting or less good: these remove in practice the aforesaid difference between precept and counsel. Besides, they do not prove their affirmation validly, although it belongs to the one affirming to prove. Namely, by the very fact that there is question of a better good, which of itself pleases God more, there is also a lesser good, which also of itself pleases God, as being good, although it pleases less because it is less good.

Therefore the passing over of the better and the choice of a lesser good is not of itself, necessarily, and always irrational, nor consequently evil: for it can be done from a rational motive, especially if someone does not positively intend to abandon the greater good, but chooses the lesser good because it is fitting to him here and now, from which the omission of the greater good follows indirectly. Therefore imperfection is not always fault, but it is not always without fault. And therefore it would better be called a less perfect act than imperfection.

416. Conditions of sin. - Sin strictly so called is a voluntary act deprived of due order to the ultimate end, or of due rectitude; therefore two things concur for it: a) disorder, whence it has the notion of evil, namely, privation of due order to the ultimate end and therefore recession from right reason and the law of God: this comes to it on the part of the object; b) the notion of the voluntary, whence it has the notion of fault: this comes to it on the part of the act or subject. Hence a threefold condition is required for sin:

1. moral malice of the object, otherwise it would not be evil; but subjective malice in the object suffices, that is, in the thing or action insofar as it is known, nor is objective malice necessarily required in the thing or action as it is in itself: for he who thinks something is evil and does it, really wills evil; whence he who falsely believes that it is Friday and eats meat nevertheless sins;

2. in the subject there is required some advertence to the malice, at least confused: for nothing is willed unless foreknown; whence if evil is in no way adverted to, not even by suspecting it or doubting about it, man cannot will it; hence he does not sin who on Friday, thinking nothing about the precept, eats meat;

1. This is clear from the condemnation of proposition 35 of Luther by Leo X, June 15, 1520; and of proposition 68 of Baius by Pius V, October 1, 1567; and of proposition 2 by Alexander VIII, December 7, 1690.

3. consent of the will is required, direct or indirect, because sin is a human act; hence an act which neither is in the will nor from the will nor accepted by it is not sin, as is a temptation not accepted by the will; and indeed free consent is required, whence the most vehement movements of anger or of another passion by which the use of reason and freedom are taken away excuse from sin.

1. This is clear from the condemnation of proposition 46 of Baius, and proposition 1 by Alexander VIII.

2. Freedom is required not from coercion but from necessity, as is clear from the condemnation of propositions 39, 41, 66, and 67 of Baius; and of proposition 3 of Jansenius condemned by Innocent X, May 31, 1653.

When advertence to malice is lacking, the evil act which is placed is called material sin, which is an involuntary transgression of law: it is not sin because in the acting subject the voluntary is lacking, yet it is called sin because on the part of the object or matter about which it is concerned, all things required for sin are present. Formal sin, however, is a deliberate, voluntary, and culpable transgression of law, whether the law exists or is thought to exist.

417. The notion of sin is not univocal but analogical. - That is not univocal which belongs in the same mode to all things of some genus, but it is called analogical whose property is that according to the full and perfect notion it is predicated of one genus, namely, of actual mortal sin, but imperfectly, deficiently, and in a certain respect of others: for the very essential elements which are found in every sin, namely, the notion of a voluntary act and disorder, are diverse. For:

1. Sin primarily and originally is an act; secondarily, however, and consequently, the disorder which follows the act, or the state of sin, is also properly so called and is sin, which is an evil act only in a certain respect, insofar as the act perseveres morally or by guilt.

2. Mortal and venial sin differ in the notion of disorder: the former is perfectly against the law, from whose end it turns away, to which we are united through charity; the latter only imperfectly, and therefore only delays from the end.

3. Personal and original sin differ in the notion of the voluntary: the former is voluntary by one's own will; the latter is most imperfectly voluntary, namely, not by one's own will but only by the will of our head Adam.

1. Analogy of proportionality, according to being and intention. Cf. I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1; *De Malo* q. 7, a. 1, ad 1; II Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

418. Sin in the Scriptures is called: 1) in order to the end: αμαρτία and αμάρτημα, that is, aberration from the end (Rom. V, 12; VII, 7), in such a way, however, that the first word is said also of the state of sin, the other of the act alone; 2) in order to the law of God: άνομία and παρανομία (in

the Vulgate, iniquity), that is, violation or contempt of law (I John III, 4; II Peter II, 15); παράβάσις, that is, transgression or prevarication of law (Rom. V, 14; Gal. III, 19; I Tim. II, 14); παράκοή, that is, the will of not hearing the voice of God, or disobedience (Rom. V, 19; Heb. II, 2); 3) in order to the sinner: παράπτωμα, that is, fall (Mark XI, 25-26); ήττημα, that is, defeat, diminution (Rom. XI, 12); αγνόημα, that is, ignorance, because every sin imports culpable error (Heb. XI, 7; Acts XVII, 30).

Sin is also rather often taken in a metaphorical and improper sense, either for the sacrifice offered for sins (Hos. IV, 8; II Cor. V, 21), or for the cause, occasion, or object of sin (Deut. IX, 21), or even for its punishment or effect (Lev. XX, 20), or for cause and effect at once, as concupiscence is called sin by the Apostle (Rom. VII, 17), because it is from sin and inclines to sin (Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5).

Article II: On the Sin of Omission Negatively Voluntary

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 5; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 1.

419. What the sin of omission is. - A sin of commission is the placing of a prohibited act, and is opposed to a negative precept; a sin of omission is the non-placing of a prescribed act, and is opposed to an affirmative precept.

This sin of omission in itself, that is, considered in its essence, is not an act but a mere privation; nevertheless it supposes some positive act, at least interior, joined or preceding, which is its cause or occasion, by which, namely, someone directly wills to omit the prescribed thing, or directly wills, whether now or before, something else by which he is impeded from doing that which he ought. For omission, in order to be sin, must be directly voluntary, either according to itself, as if someone wills not to hear Mass, or at least in the cause, as if he directly wills to place an act incompossible with the prescribed thing, whether joined, for example, if he wills to play when he ought to hear Mass, or preceding, as if he wills to stay awake long in the evening, from which he foresees that he will not hear.

1. Nevertheless, it is better said that the sin of omission is without an act. Cf. above, p. 67, note 1.

420. When does a sin of omission occur? - A sin of omission is begun interiorly and contracted as to affection and fault when the cause of the omission is voluntarily placed: for then the one omitting either voluntarily intends not to fulfill, or voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of not fulfilling; it is consummated exteriorly and placed effectively when the time for fulfilling the precept is present and it is not fulfilled.

This exterior omission adds no malice per se to the interior act; nevertheless it is sin (and therefore to be declared in confession), as being voluntary disorder, in the same mode as an evil external work is rightly called sin. But if someone has sincerely and efficaciously retracted the will of omitting before the external omission follows, this will not be sin but only the materially evil effect of sin, for example, one who threw the breviary into the sea and afterward on the journey repents.

421. Is the work placed at the time of omission a sin? - The work which is placed at the time of omission, if it is its cause or occasion, is sin, yet not distinct from the omission (and consequently not to be declared in confession), but evil with the very malice of the omission: thus play which is

the cause of the omission of Mass. If it is not the cause of the omission but is related to the omission merely accidentally and concomitantly, unless it is evil from elsewhere, it will not be evil, nor from the omission: thus if someone has efficaciously resolved not to hear Mass, but lest meanwhile he remain idle, applies himself to study.

Article III: On the External Sin of Commission, Indirectly or in the Cause Voluntary

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 6; q. 74, a. 2; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 2 and 3.

422. What the external sin of commission is. - Sin of commission properly so called is not only the interior will of evil, but also an evil external work commanded by the will or not impeded, for example, homicide, theft, an external movement of anger: for the external act, although it does not have the notion of fault except from the will, nevertheless of itself has the notion of evil because it has deformity or discordance with right reason and the law of God, on account of undue matter or undue circumstances. Whence it also is prohibited by God: but everything which is prohibited by God is sin (and therefore to be declared in confession).

External sin is begun interiorly in affection when its cause is voluntarily placed, and is consummated exteriorly in effect when the external act is really present, in the same mode as was said concerning omission.

423. External sin can be voluntary in the cause or only indirectly. - For sin is an evil human act; whence, just as for a human act, so that an evil external work may be sin, it is required, but also suffices, that it be voluntary in some way. Therefore it is not required that it be voluntary in itself, but it suffices that it be voluntary in a positive cause (for example, anger from drunkenness), or indirectly in a preceding omission insofar as the will ought to prohibit it and does not do so (for example, damage from the fact that a father does not prohibit his son from stealing).

424. Question: Is actual advertence to malice required for sin? - The response is that from the aforesaid the question is easily solved: for sin some voluntary thing suffices, whether in the cause or indirect from omission; but for such a voluntary thing advertence at the moment at which such a cause or omission is placed suffices. Hence:

a) Actual advertence to malice is not always required here and now, that is, at the moment at which the external sin is consummated or the external act is effectively placed: for this is not required so that it may be voluntary, since evil effects or acts are rightly imputed to man which are placed with culpable inadvertence and proceed from a voluntary cause from which they are foreseen as going to follow, as from culpable ignorance on account of negligence (for example, damage to a sick person from a physician negligent in learning the things which he is bound to know), from a passion which someone deliberately wills to follow (for example, homicide from drunkenness or anger), from an evil habit (for example, blasphemy from custom), from voluntary inconsideration, as by acting precipitously (for example, a hunter negligent in considering whether a man or beast is present, and killing a man).

b) Nevertheless that inadvertence and the act placed with it will not be voluntary and culpable, unless at the moment at which the cause was placed there was actual advertence by which in some way the effect or evil act was foreseen at least confusedly, obscurely, and indistinctly, insofar as

someone at least doubted or suspected that evil would follow, or knew the obligation of attending to it or of applying greater caution; otherwise they would in no way be voluntary. At this moment sin is begun interiorly and committed as to affection and fault.

From the explanation given, the opposed opinions of theologians are easily reconciled, of whom some always require actual advertence, while others, on the contrary, affirm that sometimes virtual and interpretative advertence suffices (n. 60, II and 63).

Article IV: On the Constitutive Elements of Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 6; q. 72, a. 1 and 5; q. 73, a. 2; *Contra Gentiles* III, 9; *De Malo*, q. 1, a. 1; q. 2.

425. Sin consists of two constitutive elements, as it were metaphysical parts, which stand to one another as matter (undetermined) and form (determining) in beings of nature, and which therefore are called material and formal. For in sin itself there is had:

1. a positive and material element: the substance of the act considered, not in physical being insofar as it tends to some good whatever (for thus it is not a human or moral act, nor therefore morally evil and consequently not a constitutive element of sin but presupposed to it), but in moral being insofar as it unduly tends to some created good which cannot be referred to the ultimate end: this is undue conversion to a creature; and

2. a privative element which necessarily follows from the first, namely, the very privation of rectitude or of due ordination to the ultimate end: this is aversion or withdrawal from God. This is the formal element because it determines the material element to this, that it be sin: for conversion to a creature would not be theological sin unless through it man also had himself inordinately concerning the ultimate end. In other words: the material of sin is the voluntary act itself by which man tends to something contrary to the eternal law; the formal, however, is the very deformity of the act or recession from the eternal law.

426. Observation. - 1. The material of sin is not to be confused with material sin: for in the latter there is no formal malice; indeed it can be a formally good act. The material of sin is its constitutive element which inseparably has malice annexed. Thus the approach of Jacob to Leah is a material sin with respect to Jacob, but the material of sin with respect to Leah; to take money for him who is compelled to this by violence is a material sin, but the material of sin for him who inflicts the violence.

Similarly, the formal of sin and formal sin are not to be confused: the latter is the whole sin; the former is the element of formal sin.

427. Essence of sin. - Concerning the essence of sin there exists a celebrated controversy: St. Thomas says that both elements, material and formal, pertain to the essence of sin and consequently that this consists in something positive; Scotus, however, Suarez, and others, considering the material element as the mere subject of sin, say that the formal is the whole sin and that this consists in a privative thing or even, as a few have said, in a negative thing.

Concerning this it must be observed:

1. It is certain that sin does not consist in a negative thing: for sin is an evil act, but evil is not the simple absence of perfection, but the absence of a due perfection. Whence sin essentially is not something negative, but at least something privative.

2. It is certain that the formal element of sin is something privative. For the formal of sin is that by which an evil act is evil. But evil is the privation of good. Therefore the formal of sin is privation, and sin insofar as it is evil is something privative, namely, privation of conformity with the eternal law or of the rectitude due to the act.

3. It is certain that the sin of omission, considered in its essence separately from the act which is its cause, namely, insofar as it is mere omission, is something privative, as was said above, n. 419. In it the material is the privation of the due act; the formal, privation of order to the ultimate end.

4. It seems that one must say the essence of a sin of commission is not pure privation, but something positive, namely, that the voluntary act which is the material of sin pertains to the very essence of sin. It is proved:

1. Thus the great Thomists: Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, etc.; in recent times Billot and Vermeersch have acceded. Cf. Gillon, *La theorie des oppositions et la theologie du peche*.

a) Privation is twofold: one is pure, total, and complete, which corrupts the whole opposite good, as death, blindness, and therefore can be conceived without anything positive, but essentially is nothing but privation; another is not pure, but partial and incomplete, as sickness, which is the way to death, and ophthalmia or dim-sightedness to blindness: this does not corrupt the whole opposite good, but retains something of it so that it cannot be conceived without that, and therefore in its essence includes something positive. But in moral matters there is not given pure privation (or pure evil), because no will can tend to evil as evil, but always under the aspect of good: namely, the will in acting does not totally remove the good of reason, but always retains something of rectitude or of the order of reason to good. Therefore the privation of due order which is found in sin essentially includes the conservation of some rectitude or tendency to good, which is something positive. Whence just as sickness is not the pure and total privation of life, but includes the partial conservation of life, which nevertheless is not lived in a normal mode, so sin is not the pure and total privation of the order of reason, but positively includes a tendency or order of reason to an apparent good, which really is evil and prohibited because it cannot be referred to the ultimate end.

b) Moral good and evil are not opposed contradictorily, as quality and privation, thing and nothing, but contrarily, as two opposed qualities: for virtue and vice are contraries because they tend to contrary objects, good or evil; and if vice is contrary to virtue, so also sin from which vice is generated or which is elicited by it. But if moral evil or sin were mere privation, it would be opposed to good contradictorily, and would be the simple absence of good. Therefore moral evil or sin is not mere privation but something positive, namely, an act tending to an evil object.

Article V: On the Definition of Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 6.

428. Sin theologically taken is defined by Augustine, book 22, Against Faustus, chapter 27: A saying, deed, or desire against the eternal law.

a) That which is material in sin is indicated, namely, the act, which is distinguished as threefold to denote the threefold sin which can be committed by thought, word, and deed. But since affirmation and negation are reduced to the same genus, under the name of saying, deed, or desire (that is, willed or loved thing) there also comes the sin of omission: not-said, not-done, not-desired, when someone ought to say, do, or will. Besides, the sin of omission radically consists in a positive act, because it is not voluntary unless it is derived from deliberation by which man has decreed either to omit the precept or to do something incompossible with it.

b) It is said: against law, so that it may be implicitly signified that for sin it is required that it be voluntary and free: for no one properly and formally acts against law except through a voluntary and free act, or unless he freely wills to transgress it.

c) It is said: against the eternal law, because the eternal law is the first and essential rule of human acts, ordering them to the end, from which they have that they are good or evil; and although sins are also against reason, or also sometimes against human laws, nevertheless these are not sins except because they are at the same time against the eternal law of God, from which all laws are derived and which prescribes that they be obeyed. This is the formal of sin, that it is against the law of God.

429. Sin strictly so called is also rightly defined philosophically: An act against right reason, or a human act discordant with rational nature.

Thus according to what St. Thomas observes, ad 5, "by theologians sin is considered chiefly insofar as it is an offense against God, but by the moral philosopher insofar as it is contrary to reason." Nevertheless there is no philosophical sin, that is, one repugnant to right reason, which is not at the same time theological, or contrary to the eternal law, because on the one hand whatever is against right reason is against the eternal law, which is the reason of God, since right reason is nothing other than a participation of the eternal law in a created mind; on the other hand it is impossible that any man who has sufficient use of reason invincibly be ignorant of God and the eternal law. Although, therefore, the concept of philosophical sin is not metaphysically repugnant, for an act sufficiently appears evil and sin from the fact that it is repugnant to the rule of reason alone, abstracting (not excluding) from the eternal law, nevertheless in fact, in the real order, it does not exist, as is clear from proposition 2 condemned as scandalous, rash, and erroneous by Alexander VIII.

1. "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act discordant with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is grave sin, but it is not an offense of God, nor mortal sin dissolving friendship with God, nor worthy of eternal punishment." Lehu notes: "In the proposition the two indicated cases are condemned, not however copulatively but disjunctively: in him who either is ignorant of God, or does not actually think of God. Therefore in each case taken separately the proposition is equally condemned," op. cit., n. 217.

430. Sin is less well defined by some as: A free transgression of the law of God, or a voluntary recession from the divine rule.

This definition, although true, is nevertheless incomplete because it is made according to the formal element and does not indicate that the material element is of the essence of sin; it is also less proper than the definition of Augustine: for sin is more a voluntary act than a privation or recession, because the will does not directly tend into privation, but into a positive good which has privation annexed: for good is its proper object. Whence the positive element must be placed first and directly.

1. St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 35, q. 1, a. 2.

431. Observation. - Just as the notion of sin, so the definition does not belong perfectly except to actual mortal sin; imperfectly and in a certain respect, to others.

Second Question: On the Distinction of Sins

Article I: On Specific Distinction

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 6.

432. Principle I. Sins are distinguished in species immediately and proximately according to diverse formal objects, or objects distinct in moral species. For sin is not a simple privation but a voluntary act deprived of due rectitude; whence, just like other human acts, sins will have their species immediately from the object: thus idolatry, homicide, and gluttony are distinguished (a. 1). But since end or good is the proper object of the will, it follows that sins are distinguished in species according to diverse ends (ad 1), whether of the one acting (for example, to steal for revenge or for fornication), or especially those intrinsic to the work itself (for example, gluttony toward pleasure, theft toward money; gluttony from love of delicious food or from love of much food).

433. Principle II. Sins are not distinguished in species immediately and proximately insofar as they are opposed to diverse virtues from which they recede (as Scotus taught), **or to precepts** (as Vasquez says): for the privation which is had in sin, namely, recession from virtue or law, is not intended by the sinner but is outside his intention, whence it is not per se and directly the object of the will and of the human act, nor therefore does it give species to the evil act (a. 1).

Nevertheless St. Thomas observes that it comes to the same thing whether sins are distinguished in species according to objects or according to the virtues to which they are opposed, because the virtues themselves are distinguished in species from objects (ad 2); or even according to precepts, because these differ according to diverse object, motive, and end, and also according to diverse virtues, since they are made for this, that we may operate according to virtue. Therefore, although sins do not immediately take their species from the law which they transgress, or from the virtue from which they recede, nevertheless they can be said to receive species remotely and mediately from them.

1. From Laymann, Noldin took this, and Tanquerey follows him: that sins proximately receive specific distinction from the virtues or from the precepts to which they are opposed, remotely from the objects about which they are concerned. But precisely the contrary must be said.

434. The following practical rules are usually constructed, by which the specific distinction of objects and consequently of sins is easily discerned:

The first, altogether universal, to which all the others can be reduced: Those sins are diverse which are concerned with formally diverse objects; but objects are formally diverse not according to physical being but according to moral being, that is, according to special agreement or repugnance with right reason and the eternal law. Hence to steal a sheep, a horse, or money is the same sin in species, although the objects are materially diverse, because they agree in one moral reason, in taking another's good; on the contrary, homicide, adultery, and theft are diverse because they contain diverse repugnance to reason, since they injure a diverse right: to life, to a wife, to exterior goods (a. 1 and ad 3).

The second: Those sins are diverse which are opposed to diverse virtues; for individual virtues have their own proper goodness. Hence theft, fornication, and perjury are distinguished because they are opposed to justice, chastity, and religion (ad 2).

The third: Those sins are diverse which are opposed to the same virtue but in a contrary mode, that is, by excess and defect, as presumption and despair to hope, prodigality and avarice to the virtue of liberality: for they are placed from an opposite motive and recede from virtue by a diverse reason (a. 8).

The fourth: Those sins are diverse which are opposed to the same virtue, not in a contrary mode but in a diverse mode, on account of a special repugnance with right reason and law; in other words, those which are against diverse goods, rectitudes, honesties, or offices of the same virtue, for example, homicide and theft, theft and robbery, contumely and detraction, real, personal, and local sacrilege, violation of a vow and of an oath, idolatry and magic, perjury and blasphemy: for then diverse goodness is injured and in the objects there is deformity of a distinct reason.

The fifth: Those sins are diverse which are repugnant to formally diverse precepts, that is, precepts enacted from a diverse motive or intrinsic end; but not those which are repugnant to several precepts enacted from the same intrinsic motive, even if they are enacted by diverse legislators. Hence he who is bound by vow and by the precept of a confessor to fast on Friday of Ember week, if he does not fast, commits a threefold sin specifically distinct against temperance, religion, and the virtue of penance; on the contrary, one omitting Mass on a feast day falling on Sunday, or not fasting on an Ember Saturday falling on a vigil, because each precept is of the same reason on the part of the end or intrinsic motive; likewise there is only one sin which is prohibited by natural, divine, ecclesiastical, and civil law, such as homicide.

435. Circumstances of themselves only aggravate sin. - For many pertain to the same object and the same matter; for example, from the same motive the prodigal gives when, where, and to whom he ought not, and the illiberal man accepts when and where he ought not and more than he ought. Nevertheless they change the species if they include a special and distinct deformity with reason or proceed from a special motive; but then they do not remain circumstances, but become as it were a secondary object of the act and have the notion of a specific difference. Thus theft of a sacred thing is distinguished in species from simple theft, likewise various sins of gluttony, such as eating too much or food too delicious (a. 9).

436. Corollaries. - A. Therefore the following are distinguished in species: a) carnal and spiritual sins, because they tend to formally diverse objects: for carnal sins, namely, gluttony and lust and those which are reduced to them, have as their end carnal pleasure which is perfected in the touch of

the body; spiritual sins have spiritual pleasure which is consummated in the cognition of some thing, as the five other capital sins do (a. 2).

b) Likewise sins against God, against oneself, and against neighbor, for the objects and virtues by which man is ordered to God, to neighbor, and to himself are diverse in species. Let it be noted that every sin which is against neighbor and against oneself is also against God; but here under the name of sin against God there comes that which is proximately, immediately, and specially against Him, without being against neighbor and oneself (a. 4).

B. Sins are not distinguished in species: a) because they differ according to guilt of punishment, as mortal and venial sins do. For the will of the sinner does not intend the punishment of sin, but this is per accidens and outside his intention. Since, therefore, guilt of punishment is not the object of the sinful act but follows per accidens, it does not cause a specific difference.

Mortal and venial sin differ infinitely on the part of disorder or privation, but not on the part of conversion to created good, on the part of the act and object, from which nevertheless they have species. Therefore nothing prevents mortal and venial sin from being found in the same moral species, as the first movement in the genus of adultery, or theft of ten centimes, is venial (a. 5).

Likewise b) because they are sins of heart, mouth, and deed: for although per accidens they differ in completed species if they are consummated and perfect, whether by thought, word, or deed, as heresy, blasphemy, and idolatry, because then they have diverse ends or objects; nevertheless per se they indicate only degrees of one sin in species, whose first beginning is in the affection of the heart, second degree in the manifestation of the mouth, third in the consummation of deed; for example, the desire, proposal, and perpetration of adultery; to conceive anger in the heart toward another, to express it in harsh words, and to strike him (a. 7).

Hence 1) they are not distinguished when they are joined together at the same time;

2. but if one or another degree is found separately and the will does not proceed further and does not execute the sin, then they are distinguished in incomplete species, because then they stand as incomplete and complete species in the same mode as part of a movement and the whole movement, an imperfect work and a completed work, for example, the placing of a foundation and the building of a house. Thus internal lust, imperfect lust of the mouth, sight, or touch, and consummated or perfect lust of deed (ad 3).

Likewise c) because they are sins of commission and omission: for although according to physical being they are distinguished in species and even in genus, according to moral being they are not necessarily distinguished in species, because they can be concerned with the same object, tend to the same end, and proceed from the same motive, as to seize another's goods and not to restore, to stay awake and to sleep against the precept of a superior, to omit Mass or to steal for adultery, etc. (a. 6).

Article II: On Numerical Distinction

St. Thomas, II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 6, ad 12.

437. Principles. - Sins are multiplied in number, not indeed from many or diverse deformities or malices, and therefore that which is multiple in species is not necessarily multiple in number, because one and the same act can have several moral species, for example, theft of a sacred thing; but

1. from the moral multiplication of acts: for sin is not a simple privation but rather an act deprived of due order; also

2. from the moral multiplication of objects: for acts are distinguished according to objects, since an act is nothing but a tendency toward an object.

Whence a twofold practical rule is usually established.

438. The first rule is: There are as many sins as there are total moral objects, that is, objects not morally united but distinct, and not coalescing into one object. Hence:

a) External acts physically many are one sin when they are considered by reason and commanded by the will as coordinated parts, incomplete or integral, of one complete object, according as they are concerned with things of the same reason, as repeated acts for taking away several, even diverse, goods of the same person; several evil oaths or blasphemies or various contumelies or heresies uttered in one impulse; several immodest touches exercised upon the same person in the same impulse; several canonical hours of one day omitted; and probably diverse sacraments (for example, of the sick) administered sacrilegiously to one person, or several sacraments (for example, Eucharist or Penance) administered sacrilegiously to several without moral interruption, because they are one ministration. On the contrary, external acts complete in themselves are several sins, such as to steal Peter's horse and then Paul's money, to detract one person and immediately afterward another, three fornications had even one immediately after another, the office omitted on three days, three Masses celebrated sacrilegiously on the Nativity of the Lord, several sacrilegious ministrations of sacraments.

b) External acts physically many are one sin when they are intended as subordinated to one principal action as means to one end; for example, he who sacrilegiously consecrates and communicates in the same sacrifice; he who for fornication gives gifts, utters obscene words, exercises immodest touches, works the sin itself, and immediately afterward has complacency concerning it; he who, willing to kill an enemy, buys weapons, lays ambushes, and strikes. On the contrary, if they are not subordinated to a complete principal act: thus he who, without the intention of fornication, exercises immodest touches and finally comes to fornication commits two sins, just as he who, after fornication has been completed, after some interval again touches immodestly.

1. Just as things which are many in the genus of being are one house, so those acts distinct in the genus of being are one thing in the genus of morals, namely, one sin consummated by an external work, since all those acts are ordered to this as incomplete acts to the complete act.

c) Probably there is one sin when a physically one external act touches diverse persons or matters, as to kill or scandalize several by one action, to steal from several or detract from several before several by one act, to blaspheme several saints, to consecrate several hosts sacrilegiously in the same sacrifice, etc.: for the external act has unity in itself and therefore tends into several things by way of one; whence these are conceived and intended as one adequate object. On the contrary, if someone explicitly intended to touch them distinctly and singly, by way of several things, because then they are intended as several and distinct objects: namely, an act physically one will then be morally multiple.

2. Nor is it an obstacle that adultery of a married man with a married woman, or carnal sacrilege between two sacred persons, is a double sin. For there it is not double in number, but double in species: to injure the right of another and not to observe the contract with one's own spouse are diverse malices; or also unjustly or sacrilegiously to violate one's own promise and to cooperate in the injustice or sacrilege of another.

d) Probably an inefficacious will intending several objects of the same reason is one sin, for example, several external acts even complete, as morose delight concerning three women, hatred of three persons, the inefficacious desire of fornicating three times even with three women, of omitting the hours several times, fast, Mass through a week, month, or year, the inefficacious wish of diverse evils even to several persons: for then these are considered by way of one as one pleasing or displeasing object. On the contrary, if several complete acts are intended by an efficacious will or proposal, because then they are considered by way of several, as several effects to be obtained or caused.

Let it be noted that several acts, or several evil effects of one act, which constitute only one sin, are not therefore less evil than if they were several sins: for this one sin is graver in proportion as it contains more malices, and is as evil as several sins because in malice it is equivalent to several.

439. The second rule is: There are as many sins as there are morally interrupted and repeated acts, even concerning the same object. But acts are morally interrupted when they are not judged to remain virtually or in effect. This happens in three ways:

1. by retraction or a contrary will, whether explicit or equivalent, by placing an act incompossible with the prior act;

2. by voluntary and free cessation from the act, without the proposal of proceeding further, for example, by ceasing from an attempt which is not ordered to another attempt, by turning aside to other things because of weariness or fatigue;

1. It is said: "without the proposal of proceeding further," for if such a proposal of proceeding were present and those acts were otherwise able to be united among themselves for constituting one complete act, cessation from the act would not make a moral interruption, and thus neither would it multiply sin in number; for example, if someone had begun to exercise with a woman filthy things disposing to copulation, but meanwhile, because another person intervened, ceased for some time, yet in his soul did not revoke that sinful proposal, in that case, that is, after the other departed, he would again pursue the former most filthy acts; there would not be judged to intervene between these and the preceding acts a moral interruption, but one sin in number, morally continued by force of that evil proposal, would be committed, notwithstanding that voluntary cessation." Reiffenstuel, *Theologia Moralis*, treatise on Sins, q. 5, n. 53.

3. by involuntary or natural cessation, which is had from involuntary distraction, forgetfulness, occupation, etc., for example, by reading a letter, sleep, drunkenness, and the like, when the prior will does not remain virtually and cannot be judged the cause of the later act concerning the same object. But the sign on account of which the prior will is deservedly judged to remain virtually is that the will returns to the same object as if spontaneously and without new

deliberation; on the contrary, if new deliberation was necessary. Whence brief involuntary cessation ordinarily is not a moral interruption; but precisely how much delay is required for moral interruption cannot be defined by a general rule, but must be left to the determination of prudent judgment, with attention to the intensity of the act and the nature of the distraction. Hence:

a) Merely internal acts (morose delights, desires or inefficacious hatreds, envies, rash judgments, doubts concerning faith, desperations) do not persevere for a long time, so that a physical interruption, if it is notable, is judged moral: for the same affection cannot endure amid diverse occupations and distractions except for a short time, regularly certainly not beyond two or three hours; indeed this seems much.

b) Internal acts to be completed exteriorly, as being ordered to an external work, remain longer, especially if they have begun to be fulfilled; otherwise they are judged to persevere only for some days: for the same internal impulse, even vehement, does not last longer, at least generally; for certain acts, such as efficacious hatreds, desires for a base thing or for revenge, often persevere for a long time because of vehemence, also the will of not restoring, because it is ordered to an effect of itself perpetual.

c) External acts are interrupted if they are absolute and complete, that is, if they are not subordinated to a principal action nor occur by the same impulse, as was said in the first rule under a) and b).

440. Practical corollaries. - 1) He who has committed one sin which is concerned with several objects is not bound per se to declare the number of objects in confession; but he is bound to declare plurality, saying, for example: I scandalized several or many, I inefficaciously desired several women, I absolved several sacrilegiously, I detracted from a family, etc.; otherwise he would lead the confessor into error, who would rightly think that the act was concerned with only one object, and thus in fact another sin would be accused, as he who would say: I stole one gold coin, instead of twenty.

2. In acts subordinated to one principal action, this alone, but not the means, is to be declared, unless they contain mortal malice distinct in species, for example, theft for fornication. But if the principal action did not follow, the intention of committing it must be declared. The means employed are not to be declared if in themselves they are indifferent (for example, buying weapons, a walk), because they are not evil except by the malice of the intention; they are to be declared if in themselves they are evil, for example, if they manifest the internal intention, but in a general and confused mode, for example: I employed immodest means toward fornication, or I attempted to procure it; they are to be declared in a distinct mode if they contain mortal malice distinct in species, for example, sorcery or the cooperation of another for inflicting damage.

3. A penitent who cannot determine how many interrupted times he consented to an internal temptation should declare the time through which he persevered in the evil will, for example, through the day I had hatred, through the month I desired a girl, adding as far as possible whether the interruptions were rare or frequent. For from the time, with attention to the disposition of the person, the nature of the thing, and the circumstances, the confessor will be able in some way to conjecture the interruptions.

4. He who by one impulse places several acts of the same reason should declare one, saying, for example, I touched a woman, I blasphemed, I swore, I detracted, etc.: for it is one act morally.

5. Lest the sacrament of penance be rendered burdensome and odious, and lest the faithful and the confessor be tortured by scruples, questions concerning the species and number of sins are not to be made unless grave motives are present. But the penitent is bound to confess the species and number according to the knowledge which he had of these at least confusedly at the moment at which he committed the sin, but not according to theological science if he did not have it: for nothing is willed unless foreknown.

Third Question: On the Comparison and Gravity of Sins

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 7, 8, 9, 10.

441. Principle I. Not all sins are equal. - For sin is not a pure and simple privation, but retains something of the order of reason to good; whence, just as sickness is greater or lesser according as it deprives more or less of health, so sin is more or less grave according as it recedes more or less from the rectitude of reason.

It is of faith against the Stoics and Jovinian (cf. proposition 20 of Baius).

It is proved: 1) from the Scriptures: John XIX, 11; I John V, 16; Matt. V, 22; Ezech. XVI; Jerem. VII; Lam. IV;

2. from the unequal punishments of sins: When the punishments of sins are unequal, the sins themselves are also unequal, because inequality of punishment supposes inequality of fault. But punishments are unequal; therefore also sins (cf. Deut. XXV; Luke X, 12-14);

3. from the unequal species of sins: Species stand as numbers. But sins are distinct in species. Therefore they are unequal in the notion of sin, and therefore their gravity is not the same (a. 2).

442. Principle II. The fundamental or principal gravity of sins:

1. Is taken immediately from the objects from which sins have fundamental morality or their first species. For just as sickness is graver in proportion as it injures a nobler principle or organ of life, so sin is graver in proportion as action is against a nobler end or object (a. 3).

Hence sins directly against God are according to themselves or according to species (that is, other things being equal, circumstances not being considered) graver than sins against Christ as man; and these than those which are done against worship and sacred things; and these than those which are done against oneself and one's neighbor. Moreover suicide is greater than homicide, and this than adultery and fornication, which are against the propagation of life alone, and these than theft, which is against exterior goods.

2. It is taken mediately from opposition to virtues. Hence a) those sins are according to themselves graver which, concerning the principal object of the virtues, are directly repugnant to the more worthy virtues, so that the highest sin against a more worthy virtue is greater than

the greatest sin against an inferior virtue. Therefore the greatest sin is hatred of God, which is against charity; there follow sins directly against faith, against hope, against religion, against penance, and against the cardinal virtues in order (a. 4).

We said: which are directly repugnant to the principal object; for indirect opposition to a more worthy virtue, or direct opposition concerning a secondary object, can be less than direct opposition to the primary object of an inferior virtue, for example, omission of an act of charity, or scandal or envy is less than heresy; reading a heretical book, than despair.

b) Among sins which are repugnant to the same virtue, those are according to themselves graver which recede more from the principal inclination of the virtue; whence avarice is a greater sin than prodigality, timidity than audacity, intemperance than insensibility, and generally a sin of commission than one of omission, for example, perjury than violation of an oath.

c) Likewise those are according to themselves graver which are opposed to a greater rectitude, good, or office of the same virtue, for example, homicide than adultery, and this than detraction, and this than theft; similarly blasphemy is graver than perjury, and this than sacrilege.

3. It is also taken mediately from opposition to precepts: sins are according to themselves graver if they are opposed to more worthy precepts, that is, precepts enacted from a nobler motive or by a nobler legislator, or more necessary precepts; for example, other things being equal, a sin against divine law is greater than one against human law.

443. Principle III. The accidental and secondary gravity of sins, by which it can happen that a sin graver from its object is in fact less grave, and vice versa, is taken from circumstances (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7):

1. on the part of the agent or cause: sin is graver in proportion as the free will, which is the proper cause of sin, is greater; the sign of this is often the intensity and duration of the act (a. 6). Hence sins from malice, because they are more from the will, are graver than sins from infirmity or passion, and these than sins done from ignorance;

2. on the part of the act, whether the circumstances change the species (for example, theft of a sacred thing; various sins of lust according to nature), or multiply the reason of sin in the same species (as the prodigal who gives when and to whom he ought not, or he who says diverse contumelies), or increase or diminish the deformity of sin (as he who steals much, scandalizes several, or absolves several sacrilegiously, omits several hours of one day): for sin is from the defect of some due circumstance (a. 7).

Hence a) sin is aggravated according to the condition and dignity of the person against whom it is committed, because this person is as it were the object of sin; whence sins against persons more joined to God or to the sinner or to several are graver (III Kings XIX, 14; Mic. VII, 6). Examples are: the killing of a priest (Zach. II, 8), of a father (Ecclus. XIV, 5), or of a king or public person (Exod. XXII, 28), whose injury redounds upon several (a. 9).

b) Deliberate sins are graver in a person of greater knowledge or virtue, both because he resists sin more easily, and on account of ingratitude and scandal, and on account of the special repugnance of

sin to such a person, for example, injustice in a king, fornication in a priest, idolatry in a believer. But sins which are done by subreption on account of the infirmity of human nature are lesser, because such a person less neglects to repress sins of this kind (a. 10).

c) Sins against neighbor are graver in proportion as greater harm follows from them, especially if it was intended for its own sake; also if it was not intended in itself but nevertheless foreseen at least confusedly, and there was no just cause for permitting it (a. 8).

1. Thus summarily. St. Thomas more distinctly: 1) if greater harm is distinctly foreseen and intended, it directly increases the sin; 2) if the harm is distinctly foreseen but is not intended, and there was not a just cause of neglecting it, it indirectly increases, "namely, insofar as it proceeds from a will much inclined to sin that someone does not omit doing damage either to himself or to another, which simply he would not will"; 3) indeed, if it is neither distinctly foreseen nor intended, but follows per se from the act of sin, it directly increases the sin (provided, however, that in some way it was foreseen confusedly), "because those things which follow per se upon sin pertain in some way to the very species of sin"; but if it is related per accidens to sin, it does not increase directly.

444. Corollary. - Not every spiritual sin is of greater fault than every carnal sin; but, other things being equal, with only the difference of spirituality and carnality considered, spiritual sins are graver: 1) on the part of the subject, because carnal sins are consummated in the carnal appetite, to which it principally belongs to be converted to bodily good, and therefore they have more of conversion to created good; but spiritual sins are more in reason and will, to which it belongs to be converted to God and to be turned away from Him, whence they have more of aversion, from which fault proceeds; 2) on the part of him against whom one sins: one sinning by spiritual sin sins against God or neighbor, while one sinning by carnal sin sins per se against his own body, which he uses unduly; 3) on the part of motive: carnal sins are lesser because we are more impelled to them, which diminishes freedom. Nevertheless carnal sins are of greater infamy because they consist in a pleasure common to us and beasts, and they are of greater adherence and danger on account of the pleasure annexed (a. 5).

445. Observations. - 1. Sins are not all connected. Mortal sins indeed all contemn the same author of law, God, and agree in aversion, and therefore are contrary to charity (which is the end of the law) and deprive of grace and incur guilt of the same punishment, according to what James says, II, 10: "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all," that is, guilty of that fault and punishment which is found in all; whence one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. Nevertheless the sinner does not intend to be turned away from God and to recede from that which is according to reason, but rather to tend into certain appetible goods; but goods of this kind are diverse, and are not connected, indeed sometimes they are contrary, and consequently one can be sought without another, as James himself testifies, II, 11 (a. 1).

2. From the sixteenth century many speak of four sins which in the Scriptures are said to cry to heaven, because, as several think, they are committed directly against the highest goods necessary as a foundation to every society. Yet this is not sufficiently founded either in the Scriptures or in reason, as the distinguished professor Leroux shows in *Revue Ecclesiastique de Liege*, May 1914.

Fourth Question: On the Subject of Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 2 and 3; q. 7, a. 6.

446. The subject of sin is the power which is the principle of the evil act remaining in it. Moreover sin is in various subjects: a) properly and formally it is in the will, for sin is a voluntary act, but a voluntary act most properly is an immanent act of the will (a. 1); b) nevertheless not only acts of the will are voluntary, but also acts which are commanded by the will or are not repressed by it; whence sin also resides in reason and in the inferior faculties insofar as they are moved by the will; c) nevertheless it is not in the exterior members because their actions are transient. Therefore one sin in number can consist of several partial acts which are in diverse subjects: nevertheless these acts, because one says order to another, constitute one thing in the moral order: one sin (a. 2).

447. Sin is usually attributed to the more principal power when it is elicited by several powers. By the Scholastics it is attributed to the power principally operating, because action is attributed more to the principal and first agent than to the secondary or quasi-instrumental. But by moderns today it is usually attributed to the power in which it is consummated. Hence by reason of the subject three internal sins are distinguished:

1. in the sensitive appetite, insofar as it is moved by reason and will, movements of concupiscence or sins of sensuality, which are perfected by passions of the sensitive appetite;

2. in reason, morose delight, when deliberate reason does not repress the movement of imagination, of the sensitive appetite, or of the will, but remains about it for delight, by thinking and representing the evil to itself as present: for then the will does not tend into the act and the delight naturally following, but consents to delight alone as thought and represented, and the sin is perfected in reason;

3. in the will itself, desire or joy, when the will consents not only to the delight thought of but also to the evil work itself, whether to be placed or placed, which intention is perfected in the will itself.

Let it be noted, however, that several of these sins are rather often joined.

1. From this principle the mode of speaking of St. Thomas in this whole question is to be understood. Hence 1) sin is not usually attributed to the members and exterior senses because, since they obey despotically at the nod of the will and cannot resist it, and consequently do not have their own movements, they are only passive faculties and organs and instruments of the acts of the will (a. 2, ad 3). 2) Sin is attributed to the sensitive appetite (concupiscible and irascible) insofar as it is moved politically by reason and will, because it is not a pure instrument, but is an active faculty which has its own acts to which it can be moved by reason and will or be repressed by them, yet in such a way that it also resists them. Therefore it has a certain principality of operating comparatively to the exterior members; but it is not always principally operating comparatively to reason and will. For a) mortal sin, which requires perfect deliberation of reason and full consent of the will, is attributed only to reason and will, which principally operate and to which it belongs to be converted to the end or to be turned away from it (a. 4; *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate* 25, a. 5). But b) inordinate movements of

concupiscence which do not occur with full deliberation, but only with some advertence of reason, imperfectly or indirectly voluntary, are attributed to the sensitive appetite as principally operating, because reason and will do not principally but imperfectly operate in them (a. 3, ad 3). They are called sins of sensuality. 3) Every sin is from deliberating reason; moreover it can be in reason in two ways: a) insofar as reason errs in the cognition of something which it can and ought to know, b) insofar as it commands or does not restrain the inordinate movements of other powers (a. 5). When deliberate reason does not repress an inordinate movement of appetite, but remains about it for delight, the sin of morose delight or consent in delight is committed, which is attributed to reason as principally operating, namely, as first moving and directing (a. 6). 4) With reason deliberating, there can be consent not only in the delight of the work but also into the act or the work itself, future or past: then there is present the sin of desire or joy, which can be attributed either to reason as judging and bearing sentence and directing, or to the will which consents and thus completes the sin (a. 7, ad 1).

Article I: On Movements or Sins of Sensuality

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 3 and 4; *De Malo* q. 7, a. 6 and 8; *De Veritate* q. 25, a. 5.

448. Movements of sensuality or concupiscence are called inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite rising up against the order of reason, such as movements of sensible love or aversion, anger, gluttony, delight, sadness, hope, fear, despair, audacity, etc., and especially venereal movements.

They are distinguished by theologians as: 1) first-first movements, which precede every advertence of reason, and these are not formal sins, which is of faith for the baptized, from the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5; and it is certain concerning infidels from the condemnation of propositions 50 and 51 of Baius;

2. second-first movements (so called because they are second after the first-first, and first among moral and free movements), which occur with semiplene or some advertence, and these are venial sins;

3. deliberate movements, which occur with full advertence of the intellect and are deliberately admitted or excited by the will: these are voluntary

either a) directly and in themselves, when the will positively consents to them, and then they are mortal sins if they are gravely inordinate or prohibited under grave matter;

1. We use the received terminology, which it is neither possible nor opportune to change. The terminology of St. Thomas is different, although not of all of his age. According to him, first-first movements are merely natural movements, which depend solely on the disposition of the body, or which are so suddenly aroused at the apprehension of sense that reason could in no way foresee and impede them; second-first movements are those which depend on the sensitive apprehension of imagination or sense. But since the sensitive faculties are born to be moved by reason and to obey it, reason can impede those movements. Concerning these St. Thomas teaches that they are venial sins, and indeed generally and indefinitely, because if reason is watchful, it can foresee and impede individual movements. Nevertheless do not

conclude from this that they are always sins. St. Thomas enunciates a general principle: movements of themselves are apt to be foreseen by reason and therefore can and ought to be impeded, and thus they are indirectly voluntary; in fact, sometimes there are excusing causes on account of which they ought not or even cannot be impeded. In this matter more recent authors perhaps admit excuses too easily and more than is fitting, being less solicitous concerning the office of watchful reason; the ancients applied the principle very rigorously and attended less to causes of excuse.

or b) indirectly voluntary, when the will only omits to repress them while it can and ought;

or c) voluntary in a positive cause, when the will only places a cause from which they are foreseen as going to follow.

449. Indirectly voluntary movements are those to which the will neither positively consents nor resists, but to which it has itself negatively and which it only permits. Concerning them it must be said:

1. Man certainly sins in them, because reason and will fail in their office of directing and repressing the movements of the inferior powers, nor can man hold himself indifferently toward whether his movements and acts are inordinate or not. But the appetite of evil is deformity and consequently to be expelled. If reason adverts to this, it ought to deliberate concerning it and show displeasure and remove the deformity as far as it can, according to Gen. IV, 7: Its appetite shall be under you, and you shall rule over it. But he who has himself negatively is judged equivalently to consent. But:

a) per se he does not sin gravely, because positive and full consent of the will is lacking;

1. Let it be noted that a man cannot permit another to excite movements in himself, and indeed under grave matter, because this is cooperation in mortal sin and more easily includes danger of consent.

b) per accidens he would sin gravely, if from this there were a proximate danger of consenting to gravely prohibited movements, as often happens in more vehement venereal commotions, and in vehement hatred or appetite of revenge.

2. Many say: "if the movements are vehement, one must resist under mortal sin, because proximate danger of consent is present," but this is not always true; "if the movements are slight, one need not resist under mortal sin, because the danger of consent is small," but neither is it always small for all.

2. Man is bound to resist them positively, insofar as it is necessary and morally possible for not consenting and for repressing the movements:

a) Ordinarily, however, not directly, that is, by contrary or violent acts, because this is not necessary or is too difficult, or even excites the movements more.

3. Per accidens there can be an obligation of resisting directly, if another resistance does not sufficiently exclude the danger of consent, for example, in anger or hatred.

Direct resistance is made by suppressing imagination, by an act of love in place of hatred, of hope in place of despair, by compression of the members, by violent movement of the head, by chastisement of the body through afflictions, vigils, discipline, for example, by throwing oneself naked into thorns or into cold water, etc.

b) But generally he is bound to resist indirectly, by applying the mind to other incompossible things, especially those which more strongly affect the mind.

Thus, for example, by interrupting the work, pursuing business, by an external occupation requiring special attention, by praying, meditating, etc.

c) Sometimes, if there is a just cause for not resisting otherwise nor repressing the movement, positive resistance by a simple act of displeasure, at least implicit, suffices; this act is not to be repeated frequently, since, until it is retracted, it is judged morally to persevere.

1. Displeasure is present implicitly if someone voluntarily does something else, voluntarily does not attend to these things, or contemns them.

Thus if someone has experienced that another resistance is useless for coercing the movements, or excites and increases them more; or if the movements have their origin from a necessary cause or from a useful action, as will be indicated in the following number under c), and it is too troublesome to repel them, for example, because of duration; or if the movements are slight and transitory, both because causes exciting such movements are very frequent and therefore the obligation of repressing them would be too difficult, and because they are better and more efficaciously repressed by contempt: for solicitude to impede them is accustomed to excite the imagination and increase the movements. All these things are easily verified in a scrupulous person, who therefore shows sufficient displeasure by simply contemning the movements.

Nevertheless, in the aforesaid circumstances, man must bring safeguards and care lest he consent to the movements.

450. Movements voluntary in the cause, which are not intended and to which the will does not consent, but which are only willed in a positive cause from which they are foreseen as going to follow, are sin only as much as the cause insofar as it influences them. Hence:

a) It is grave sin without sufficient reason to place a cause per se gravely influencing movements prohibited under grave matter, such as venereal movements, movements of great unjust anger, of great hatred, even if they do not follow per accidens.

Thus, for example, reading long continued that is very impious and persuasive against religion, the priesthood, public order, etc., exciting hatred, anger, revenge; very base reading, conversation or reading inducing despair or suicide; frequenting companions who excite to this; duration of touch or sight of a dishonorable part; likewise protracted morose delight of revenge or lust. Hence St. Alphonsus says that even a movement of pollution is not mortal unless it comes from a cause per se mortal in the genus of lust: 1) it must be mortal, because since pollution is not willed in itself but only in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil (understand: in which

the cause is evil insofar as it is a cause; but every and only a cause which per se gravely influences movements prohibited under grave matter, unless there is an excusing reason of a good effect which compensates the evil, is mortal insofar as it is a cause); 2) it must be mortal in the genus of lust, because otherwise it would influence pollution not gravely but only lightly, for example, drunkenness.

b) It is a light sin without a just cause to place an action lightly influencing even vehement movements and movements prohibited under grave matter (indeed, even pollution itself), provided that they do not please and there is no proximate danger of consent. A slight influence into a grave thing, namely, is a light matter.

Such is a not-long conversation with an impious man or with a girl; sight or touch not very base; reading slightly impious or slightly base. A sufficient reason for permitting these things will be any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness.

c) It is no sin from a just cause to place an action from which inordinate movements are foreseen as going to follow (even pollution), provided that proximate danger of consent is always absent.

In the matter of lust, a just cause for a priest is to hear confessions and study base matters; for a surgeon, to see and touch dishonorable parts, likewise for one serving the sick or in baths; for all, to kiss women according to the custom of the country, to touch oneself from necessity, to ride on horseback for the sake of recreation or utility, to lie down in a more comfortable position, to take hot foods and drinks moderately.

451. Observation. - In the preceding things we have spoken according to natural law alone; for sometimes causes which for someone influence lightly or in no way are prohibited even under grave matter by positive law, for example, by the law of the index of books.

Article II: On Consent in Delight, or on Morose Delight

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 6, 7, 8; *De Veritate* q. 15, a. 4.

452. Morose delight, which is nothing other than consent in delight concerning an evil object, is defined: simple love or voluntary complacency concerning an illicit object or work, exhibited by cognition as present, without desire of execution.

It is not directly concerned with the external work but with the work exhibited to us through imagination. For he who delights feigns to himself an act of sin as present (for example, the killing of an enemy, theft, fornication) and is complacent in that act represented to him as if he were executing it (for example, actually killing, stealing, or fornicating), yet without the will of executing it.

It is called delight, because mere thought about an evil thing is not sin (unless per accidens insofar as it includes danger of sinning and inclines to sin), but delight concerning an evil thing thought of is sin (a. 8). It is called morose, not because it requires a delay of time, for it can be perfected in one moment, but because deliberating reason, rather than repelling the delight, lingers about it insofar as the evil thing is pleasing and pleasant to man (a. 6, ad 3).

453. Principles. I. Morose delight is sin: for no one delights except concerning that which seems good to him and conformed to his nature; therefore he who delights concerning an evil thing has it as good for himself, and consequently his affection tends into an evil thing.

II. Morose delight is grave or light sin according to the object: if it occurs concerning an object venially evil it is venial; if concerning an object gravely prohibited, it is always mortal: for that someone deliberately wills that his affection be conformed to a work which of itself is mortal is mortal sin (a. 8; Prov. XV, 26; Wis. I, 3; Matt. XXIII, 27).

III. Morose delight, although it is less evil than the evil work itself (from which it is distinguished as an incomplete species from a complete one) **or than the proposal of it, nevertheless, because it tends into the same object thought of, has malice of the same species as the work** (to be declared in confession), provided and insofar as the work is thought of as delectable, or moves to delight. Namely, merely internal delight is morally of the same reason as delight actually perceived which arises from the work.

Thus delight concerning homicide, concerning adultery as adultery, concerning sodomy as sodomy, or concerning false testimony differs in species from delight concerning wounding, fornication, pollution, or lying.

Nevertheless, probably morose delight does not contract the malice of circumstances which reason indeed adverts to but from which it abstracts in the delight and about which the delight is not concerned, or by whose delectability the appetite is not moved. For delight tends into the object not as really existing, but insofar as it exists in the intellect, and consequently it does not tend into circumstances which reason does not represent as delectable and which are not the motive of delight.

Hence if someone delights concerning the homicide of a priest, not because he is a priest, or concerning theft of a sacred thing, not because it is sacred but because it is precious, he does not contract the specific malice of sacrilege but only of homicide or theft; and if he delights concerning intercourse with a married woman, but not as married but as a beautiful woman, he does not contract the specific malice of adultery but only of fornication.

454. Corollaries. - Morose delight is only concerning an evil object or work. Hence:

a) Delight, not indeed concerning the evil thing thought of, but concerning the thought itself or concerning the mode in which the evil thing is done, is good, venially evil, or mortally evil, according as the thought itself or the mode itself is good, lightly evil, or gravely evil. Examples are: to delight concerning knowledge of the crimes of a penitent, concerning knowledge idly acquired or from curiosity, concerning knowledge of a secret or occult crime from detraction; or concerning a mode that is ingenious, skillful, subtle, wondrous, new, or laughable (as concerning the flexibility of a drunk man), concerning marital intercourse had outside the natural mode or position, concerning a mode against nature in sins of lust.

Thus licitly it occurs concerning obscene paintings and plays on account of the artistry; concerning the subtle or artful mode by which a thing was taken away; concerning the Attic salt with which a fictitious narration has been sprinkled; concerning singular or ingenious craftiness in fraud; concerning the eloquence of one detracting; concerning the dexterity of one fighting; concerning the fall of a man from a horse on account of laughable circumstances; concerning the mode in which little women quarrel among themselves or in which obscene deeds are narrated; concerning obscene statues because they are very artful; concerning lubricious spectacles because represented with great art; concerning a most beautiful or witty mode of narrating lubricious things.

b) Delight concerning an evil work, abstracting from the fact that it is evil, or concerning a materially evil work, is licit if the work is prohibited only by positive right, unless someone delights in it insofar as it is prohibited by law, for example, concerning the eating of meats on a forbidden day, concerning forgetfulness of matins, concerning omission of Mass: for this work in itself is not objectively intrinsically evil. On the contrary, it is illicit if the work is prohibited by right of nature, because then the work in itself is intrinsically evil, for example, concerning material fornication, involuntary homicide, pollution involuntarily procured, material perjury on account of liberation (cf. proposition 15 condemned by Innocent XI).

But since merely natural pollution, proceeding from nature alone relieving itself, is not materially evil, it is not sin on account of a good end to delight concerning it or even by a simple affection to desire it, yet not on account of pleasure.

c) Delight concerning an evil work on account of a good effect is evil, for example, concerning the killing of a father on account of inheritance, concerning omission of Mass on account of utility, concerning procured pollution on account of concupiscence quieted. But it is licit concerning only the good effect, or concerning the fact that the evil work had good effects, for example, concerning inheritance from homicide, concerning offspring from fornication, concerning the glory of martyrs, concerning the cessation of scandal from the killing of a seducer; or even concerning the evil of neighbor, not indeed as it is evil for him but insofar as it is a greater good for him or for others, with the order of charity observed, namely, so that the evil which is avoided outweighs or equals the evil of neighbor which pleases.

Thus, for example, concerning bodily evil on account of the good of the soul, concerning the infirmity of a neighbor so that he may be converted, concerning the evil of one on account of the common good, concerning the death of a persecutor of the Church or of an evildoer on account of the example of others. On the contrary, it is illicit to delight concerning the evil of neighbor on account of a lesser good, for example, concerning the death of a father on account of inheritance, as is clear from propositions 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI.

d) Delight concerning a work sometimes licit but illicit at the time of delight, if this is prohibited by positive right alone, ordinarily is not evil because positive law does not prohibit delight but only the work; for example, on a day of abstinence someone can delight concerning the eating of meats, yet not precisely as prohibited. But if the work is prohibited by right of nature, delight is evil if it occurs concerning the work absolutely and as present, for example, for the betrothed concerning intercourse now to be had; it will not be evil if it occurs under the condition of the time at which it will be licit, for example, concerning intercourse to be had in marriage.

But let it be noted that this last can occur if the delight is in the rational appetite, but not if it is in the sensitive appetite: for the rational appetite tends into the object proposed by reason, but reason can propose it under a condition concerning the future or the past, and thus abstracted from malice. On the contrary, the sensitive appetite tends into the object proposed by the internal senses, but sense proposes it without any condition or abstraction from malice, and therefore absolutely as present and as it is in itself; whence delight is borne into the object not as it is under a condition but as it is in itself, and consequently as it is absolutely evil in the present. Therefore sensible delight had here and now concerning hatred and revenge legitimate at another time would be evil; not so spiritual delight, or delight of the will, which can be under the condition of injury inflicted.

Hence for practice: 1) by the rational appetite, but not by the carnal, the betrothed can delight concerning future intercourse and desire it; likewise widowed persons can delight and rejoice concerning past intercourse; likewise a spouse who has made a vow of chastity while the other has not;

2. but for other unmarried persons, although the same is not illicit of itself, ordinarily it is illicit per accidens, because it will not occur without movements of concupiscence which they cannot excite and for permitting which they can have no reason;

3. on the contrary, spouses, even when the consort is absent, can delight carnally concerning intercourse had or to be had (provided it is not done principally on account of delight but on account of an honorable end and danger of pollution is not present), because here and now intercourse is licit for them, although per accidens it is impossible.

455. Observations. - A. Let it be noted that all the delights concerning which we have spoken in the preceding number are to be avoided in practice, both because they are often idle and therefore venial sins, and because they are very dangerous, especially when there is question of matters of lust or revenge, because a transition easily occurs to delight concerning the evil work itself.

B. The following conjectural criteria are listed for discerning whether delight was concerning the thought alone or mode, or concerning the evil thing itself:

a) The affection or good intention of the agent. For if someone from a good motive and sincere intention studies or speaks about evil things (for example, a confessor, physician, artist, etc.), delight can be presumed to be concerning the thought and not concerning the thing itself thought of; on the contrary, if delight arose from a vicious affection, from excessively curious and useless reading or consideration.

b) The occasion from which the delight arises. If it arises on account of study, confession, preaching, etc., it can be presumed that the delight is concerning the thought; on the contrary, if it proceeds from a base occasion, such as vengeance taken or sin perpetrated.

c) The habitual inclination of the agent. If someone habitually inclines and sins rather often, for example, in matters of lust, then his thoughts are presumed no longer merely theoretical, but concerning the depraved things themselves; on the contrary, in a God-fearing man.

d) The moderation or vehemence of the delight. If the thought (or mode) delights equally in licit and illicit things, it is a sign that the delight is not concerning the evil thing; on the contrary, if it is such as is perceived from the base thing itself when it is present, say with a similar commotion of appetite, it is an indication that the delight is not concerning cognition (or mode) alone, but also concerning the thing itself.

e) Sufficient cause. For if someone without any cause or from mere curiosity delights concerning the mode in which an evil thing was done or represented, it is sin (at least venial); but if he does this because he is bound to attend to such things, it is not sin.

1. Thus Ballerini-Palmieri, *Opus theologico-morale*, vol. I, n. 538 sq.; *Theologia Mechliniensis*, *Moralis generalis*, n. 148, q. 2; and Prummer, *Theologia Moralis* I, n. 398, who adds: "Already the old

authors, such as Castropalaus and the Salmanticenses, observed (and priests themselves should keep this before their eyes), that those are convicted of being latently carried by delight of the flesh who frequently and more willingly speak about hidden parts of the body, about illnesses, clothing, and other things pertaining to these, and easily break out into uncomposed laughter. Whence a priest who is a lover of chastity, when he either unwillingly hears these things or for a just cause utters them, ought to offer no sign of gladness, but preserve serenity and gravity of countenance in all things."

C. Just as delight concerning an evil thing is evil, so in the same mode sadness concerning a good thing: the latter truly hates good just as the former loves evil. Hence:

1. Sadness concerning a good which is prescribed under grave matter is grave sin.

2. Sadness concerning a good which is prescribed under light matter is light sin.

3. Sadness concerning a good which according to itself is not prescribed, e.g., concerning a vow emitted or to be emitted, concerning the priesthood received or to be received, does not exceed light matter, provided the will of fulfilling the obligation contracted is retained. Whether it is a light sin or no sin depends on the motive on account of which someone is saddened, namely, whether it is reasonable or not; ordinarily, however, once the work has been chosen, sadness of this kind lacks a reasonable motive.

4. Sadness not concerning the good work itself, but concerning only the circumstances of a good action, e.g., concerning inconvenience and labor, is not sin.

2. Noldin, *Theologia Moralis* I, n. 335.

Article III: On Consent in the Act, or on Desire and Joy

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 7, 9.

456. Morose delight, desire, and joy differ: the first regards present time because it is concerned with an object insofar as it is here and now present to us by cognition; desire regards the future because it is an act of the will wishing for an evil thing; finally joy regards the past and is complacency or approval of an evil work perpetrated by the one rejoicing or by others. In other words, morose delight is consent in the thought present delight alone and not in the act itself; desire is also consent in the future act and in the act to be placed; joy in the past act and in the act placed.

1. If the act were present so that the sin were committed here and now, delight concerning it as present would not be morally distinct from the sin.

2. "It is wrong to confuse consent in a past act with consent in the delight of a past act thought of as present, which is morose delight." Waffelaert, *De Virtutibus Cardinalibus*, p. 323.

By reason of the object, desire is twofold: efficacious or absolute, which is called proposal, when someone proposes to perform the work; inefficacious or conditioned, when he wills that the work be performed by himself or by another under a certain given condition, for example, if nothing stood in the way, if he could, if it were licit, etc. This is not conditioned on the part of the will but on the part

of the object: for it is not a merely interpretative will which someone does not have but would have if he knew something (this does not exist), but an actual will which he has here and now and by which he now establishes and intends that he would will the work to be performed if the condition were given.

457. Principle I. Absolute desire and joy have the same species and gravity of malice, mortal or venial, which the work has about which they are concerned, to be perpetrated or perpetrated, with all known circumstances (Matt. V, 28): for the interior act of the will has malice from the exterior act as from the object; for desire tends into the work really to be placed and consequently not as represented in the intellect as delectable but as it is on the part of the thing, and joy is concerning a past work as it was, and each tends into all the circumstances which are in the work and are not separable from it in the concrete. Whence, by difference from morose delight, desire contracts the malice of all circumstances, even those which are not held as delectable nor are the motive of the will.

Thus, for example, he who desires to sin with a married woman, not because she is married but because she is beautiful, is guilty of adultery; and he who wills to steal a sacred thing, not because it is sacred but because it is precious, is guilty of sacrilege. "In practice, however, it not rarely happens that desires are not referred to an object altogether determined, but rather to something generic. For example, someone desires to take revenge on his enemy, without determining the mode by which he wills that revenge; or someone desires to sin carnally with a person of the other sex, without being conscious to himself of the special act to be committed. In these cases it suffices to confess: I willed to take revenge on my enemy, or I willed to sin with a person of the other sex" (Prummer, *Theologia Moralis* I, n. 403).

458. Principle II. Conditioned desire, under a condition which takes away all malice from the object, per se is not sin, yet often it is idle and sometimes dangerous. Hence:

a) in all things prohibited only by positive right, desire under the condition "if it were not prohibited" is licit;

b) in things prohibited by natural right, naturally or ordinarily illicit or illicit outside a state, but licit in some case or state, desire is licit (although dangerous) under the condition of this state or case, for example: I would kill Peter if God commanded it; I would take a wife if I were not a religious; I would hang a thief if I were a judge; I would have intercourse with her if she were my wife;

c) things prohibited by the right of nature as essentially evil, which are never licit, are never licitly desired, because malice cannot be separated from them, for example: if it were not sin, I would will to blaspheme, to commit sodomy, to perjure myself, to avenge myself, etc.; for an impossible condition cannot take away malice.

Locutions of this kind, however, rather often only signify a natural propensity into such an object, without affection toward it, so that the sense is: I am inclined to blaspheme but I do not will it on account of the law of God; and then they are not sin. On the contrary, if it were a true desire or consent in the work, or if the sense were: I would will blasphemy not to be sin, which would still be worse than the simple desire of blasphemy.

459. Principle III. Conditioned desire, if the condition partially takes away the malice of the object, is sin, but less than absolute desire: namely, it puts on the malice which remains in the object, but does not contract that which was taken away. Thus if someone were to say: if I were not a priest I would fornicate, he would contract the malice of fornication, not of sacrilege, because the condition takes away the malice of this.

460. Principle IV. Conditioned desire, if the condition, as not pertaining to morality, in no way takes away the malice of the object, puts on its malice with all the circumstances. - The reason is that even conditioned desire consents and tends into the external work according to itself and as it is on the part of the thing. Thus if someone were to say: I would fornicate if there were no hell; if I could secretly, I would take revenge.

Second Part: On the Causes of Sins

First Question: On the Interior Causes of Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 1 and 2; *De Malo*, q. 1, a. 3.

461. In what way sin has a cause. - Sin 1) on the part of the act (the material element), has, like any act and any being, an efficient cause per se, namely, the power of man, especially the will insofar as it intends some created good; 2) on the part of disorder (the formal element), it has a cause in the mode in which negation can have a cause:

a) an efficient cause per accidens: for upon the placing of one effect there follows the absence of another; and thus a cause intending the placing is, per accidens, the cause of the consequent negation, as fire by causing heat consequently causes the privation of coldness. Thus the will intending a created good opposed to law at the same time produces the privation of conformity with law annexed to this good, which nevertheless it does not intend, but which it causes consequently, per accidens, and outside its intention. Whence the cause of sin per se on the part of the act is also per accidens the cause of disorder;

b) it has a deficient cause: for in sin there is not mere negation but privation; but that which ought to be in some effect would never be absent except on account of the defect of some cause. Therefore the will causes sin insofar as it defects from the direction of the rule of reason and the law of God, that is, insofar as it does not attend to it or does not use it. Nor is this defect or lack of the rule already sin (although it is a physical imperfection), but rather that the will proceeds with this lack to choosing and acting.

462. Sin has four interior causes on the part of the act: two proximate and immediate, reason and will, which are required in every sin; two remote and mediate, sensitive cognition and the appetite following, when sin is concerned with sensible good. In this case the imagination begins (at least ordinarily) and proposes a delectable good to the sensitive appetite, and immediately by that very fact the appetite is moved into it, preceding reason and enticing it to approve it and judge it good. Then reason adverts to the various advantages and disadvantages of this delectable good, even that it is or perhaps is against the law of God. Nevertheless reason, defecting from the rule, can approve it: then the will, by consenting to it, completes and perfects (through delight, through desire, or through the work) the notion of sin (James I, 14-15).

463. Division of the question. - Therefore sin is from reason directing badly, from appetite inclining under the guidance of imagination, and from will perfecting. Hence we shall speak:

1. of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the part of reason;

2. of infirmity or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite;

3. of malice (or contempt), which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.

Thus according to that saying of Isidore, *De Summo Bono*, book 2: "In three modes sin is carried on, that is, by ignorance, infirmity, and industry." Namely, sins are called sins of ignorance, infirmity, or malice, according as their principal cause or principle of sinning is ignorance, passion, or malice.

1. This distinction, however, is not essential and specific, but merely accidental of gravity, because it is not from the object. Therefore the same sin, for example, of homicide, can be from ignorance, passion, or malice.

Article I: On Ignorance as a Cause of Sin on the Part of Reason — On Sins of Ignorance

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 76; *De Malo* q. 3, a. 6, 7, 8.

464. On the part of reason, the cause of sin is ignorance and inconsideration of the intellect, not any whatever, but that which removes knowledge (whether universal knowledge of right, or particular knowledge of fact or circumstance) by which, if it were present or present more fully, sin would not occur. Whence it is not the cause of sin per se, but per accidens, insofar as it removes that which would impede sin. But if someone is so disposed that without ignorance he would nevertheless sin, ignorance would not be the cause of sin: such a one does not sin from ignorance or on account of ignorance, but sins with ignorance or while ignorant. Thus if ignorance is concomitant, or even if it is affected but precisely for sinning more freely.

For every sin, even one done from malice, ignorance or error is required in the ultimate practical judgment, by which reason erroneously judges such an illicit act to be good for itself here and now; but sins of ignorance are called those which proceed also from a culpably erroneous speculative judgment.

1. It is called ignorance of bad election. Cf. *Ethics* III, lect. 3; I-II, q. 6, a. 8; II Sent. d. 39, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.

2. "Ignorance sometimes excludes the knowledge by which someone simply knows that this which is done is evil, and then he is said to sin from ignorance; sometimes it excludes the knowledge by which man knows that this now is evil, as when one sins from passion; sometimes it excludes the knowledge by which someone knows that this evil is not to be sustained on account of the attainment of that good, although he simply knows that this is evil, and thus he who sins from malice is said to be ignorant." I-II, q. 78, a. 1, ad 1. Cf. *De Malo* q. 2, a. 3, ad 9.

465. Ignorance can be sin (the contrary was condemned in Coelestius and Abelard), not indeed according to itself, for it is an intellectual evil, not a moral one, but by reason of preceding negligence in learning or actual negligence in considering (Luke XII, 48; I Tim. I, 13). Nevertheless not every ignorance is sin: for invincible ignorance, which someone could not repel, is not sin, as is clear from propositions 68 of Baius and 2 of Alexander VIII, condemned; but vincible ignorance is only sin if it concerns those things which someone is bound to know, or which are necessary for directing his own acts and without which he cannot rightly exercise the due act.

1. "Negative infidelity is sin." "Invincible ignorance of the right of nature in the state of fallen nature does not excuse from formal sin."

Whence for sin it does not suffice that ignorance be voluntary, but in addition it must be culpable. For this three things are required: in order that it be voluntary, 1) that someone could have removed it, that is, had the means for that, and 2) that he adverted to it in some way; but in order that it be culpable, in addition 3) that someone was obligated to impede the ignorance, that is, to apply means lest ignorance follow. Thus ignorance of medical science is not culpable for a farmer and advocate, but for a physician.

Moreover all are bound to know a) the articles or fundamental truths of faith, b) the universal precepts of right, namely, of the Decalogue and of the Church; c) but individuals are bound to know those things which regard their state or office, at least those things which are common and occur often.

Indeed ignorance can be a special sin. Vincible ignorance 1) of a thing which we are bound to know habitually or by reason of itself (ignorance of right) is a special sin of omission, diverse from the sins which follow from it, because ignorance itself is morally evil in itself, and because one sinning thus violates two diverse precepts.

Thus, for example, if someone voluntarily were ignorant of the Incarnation or the malice of adultery or the five precepts of the Church, and therefore blasphemed Christ, or committed adultery, or ate meats, he would be guilty of a double sin.

On the contrary, 2) ignorance of a thing which someone is bound to know, not indeed permanently and by reason of itself, but transiently and on account of the work here and now to be placed (ignorance of a particular fact, for example, of a circumstance of the act), is not a sin distinct from the sin which follows from it or to which it exposes, because it is not evil except by reason of the evil effect, and therefore one sinning does not act except against one precept and one virtue.

Thus negligence of inquiring whether the present day is a day of fast (even if it were not a day of fast), because from the same precept one is bound to fast and to inquire.

466. Principles. I. Invincible and antecedent ignorance per se totally excuses from the whole sin the work which is done from it, because it renders it involuntary (Gen. IX, 21); per accidens it does not entirely excuse if it is not total but partial, because only the circumstance is unknown which, if known, would prevent the sin, and nevertheless the sin is done knowingly, for example, the killing of a man by one who does not know that he is his father (Gen. XXXVIII). Whence it excuses insofar as it is ignorance.

II. Invincible and concomitant ignorance does not entirely excuse: it excuses from sin the external work which is done with it, because it renders that work non-voluntary; but it does not totally excuse the one operating, because it does not take away every will of sinning or internal affection toward sin, since the work would nevertheless be done if ignorance were not given, for example, one who kills an enemy, thinking him to be a beast, when nevertheless he would kill if he knew. Such ignorance neither excuses entirely, nor accuses.

III. Vincible and consequent ignorance concerning these things which someone is bound to know, if it is the cause of sin which otherwise would not occur, does not totally excuse from sin the work which is done from it, because it remains voluntary (since the ignorance itself is voluntary), but it diminishes it because it renders it involuntary in a certain respect. Whence it accuses, as voluntary, and does not excuse from the whole but from so much, for example, wounding from drunkenness.

IV. Vincible but affected ignorance, and excited precisely for sinning more freely, in no way excuses from sin but rather increases it, because it proceeds from a greater will of sinning. Whence it simply accuses.

Article II: On Passion as a Cause of Sin on the Part of the Sensitive Appetite — On Sins of Infirmity

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77; q. 9, a. 2; *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 9, 10, 11.

467. On the part of the sensitive appetite the cause of sin is passion, by which man is moved toward a sensible good or is drawn back from a sensible evil, against the good or order of reason. But since passions are certain sicknesses of the soul, which weaken and impede the use of reason and of the will, the sins which proceed from them are commonly called sins of infirmity (Rom. VII, 23; James I, 14).

468. Passion cannot directly draw or move the will, but only indirectly. And indeed:

1. on the part of the subject, by a certain subtraction, by distracting power from the will: for since all the powers proceed from the soul as from one root, it follows a) that the intense exercise of one potency diminishes the force of acting in the others, and b) that man, while he attends vehemently to one thing, is less attentive to other things. Hence the more intensely the sensitive appetite acts, the more remiss the force of the will becomes, or the motion of the will is impeded;[1]

[1] The argument concludes for the present state, for powers which need organs, because these, in the present state, lose their powers by exercise; it is not valid for powers which exercise themselves without an organ.

2. by contrariety, on the part of the object or good which reason apprehends, by inclining toward a good contrary to reason: a) for to a man in passion that appears good which does not appear so to him when existing outside passion, just as to one loving or angry there appears a good which does not appear to one who is quiet, and thus passion often tends into an object contrary to reason; moreover b) passion imports a vehement apprehension of the imagination, which reason needs in its exercise, and by which in the case it is inclined especially to consider and approve the object of passion and to judge it good. Hence it happens that the judgment of

reason, and consequently the will, often follow passion and act otherwise than if passion were not present;[2]

[2] How passion can incline to sinning notwithstanding an opposed universal moral knowledge, St. Thomas indicates, a. 2, ad 4: "He who has knowledge in the universal, on account of passion is impeded lest he be able to take under that universal (proposition), and to arrive at the conclusion; but he takes under another universal, which the inclination of passion suggests, and under it concludes. Hence the Philosopher says, in VII *Ethics*, that the syllogism of the incontinent man has four propositions, two universal: of which one is of reason, for instance, that no fornication is to be committed, the other is of passion, for instance, that delight is to be pursued. Passion, therefore, binds reason lest it take and conclude under the first; hence while it lasts, it takes and concludes under the second." Cf. *De Malo* q. 3, a. 9, ad 7.

3. by bodily change, sometimes so transmuting the body that the imagination depends solely on the disposition of the body and is no longer ruled by reason; in this case it totally binds the cognition of reason and impedes its deliberation and use, and consequently sin: thus many, on account of the abundance of love and anger, have been turned into insanity.

469. Inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin. - For to love someone is to will good for him; but by sin someone inordinately wills good for himself; hence sin proceeds from this, that one inordinately loves himself.

But the good which man inordinately seeks for himself is threefold:

a) delectable goods according to touch or the sense of the flesh, which pertain to the conservation of the individual and of the species, and the inordinate appetite for these is the concupiscence of the flesh or natural concupiscence;

b) delectable goods according to the apprehension of the imagination, such as monies, external goods, splendor, pomp, adornment of garments, etc., and the inordinate appetite for these is the concupiscence of the eyes or the cupidity of those things which outwardly appear to the senses and, thus known, please;

c) finally, the inordinate appetite for a difficult or arduous good, and therefore an excellent one, is called pride of life, which is the appetite of excellence.

These three are the cause of all sins (I John II, 16); to these also can be reduced all passions which are the cause of sin: to the first two, all passions of the concupiscible appetite; to the third, all passions of the irascible appetite.

470. Principles. I. Passion which totally binds the use of reason impedes deliberation and liberty and therefore excuses from sin, unless it has been voluntarily contracted in its cause, for example, from drunkenness.

II. Antecedent passion and the cause of sin does not totally excuse from sin, but diminishes it, because it renders it less free.

III. Consequent passion, as being voluntary and free, in no way excuses nor diminishes, but either is a sign of the magnitude of the sin, if it proceeds from it by redundancy, or increases it, if it is directly chosen and excited in order to sin more intensely; as was said in the treatise *On Human Acts*, n. 180.[3]

[3] No concomitant passion is given, because no passion is related to an act of the will without influence.

Article III: On Malice as a Cause of Sin on the Part of the Will — On Sins of Malice

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 78; II-II, q. 14; *De Malo* q. 3, a. 12-15.

471. On the part of the will the cause of sin is malice or depravity and perversity (Ps. LI), by which the will, with no ignorance or passion influencing, from itself chooses evil knowingly and of set purpose (Job XXXIV, 27), not because it wills evil as evil, which is impossible, but insofar as it prefers the privation of a spiritual good to the absence of a temporal good, and loves the lesser good more. Then the will is said to do evil not only choosing, but from election, as happens a) in affected ignorance, which it chooses in order to sin more freely; or b) in passion, which it deliberately excites in order to sin more intensely; or c) in a bad custom voluntarily and freely admitted. These things can also occur in venial matters.

472. Sins from a bad habit are done from malice. - For since a vicious habit has been freely acquired, if it is also freely conserved in the present by the will not retracting it, the man who acts according to the habit, not from inadvertence or passion, but knowingly and freely uses his habit, sins from malice, because he acts from a will confirmed in evil, or from a bad inclination of the will by which it has been made firm in evil. Then the will is said to do evil, not according to habit, but from habit. - Yet not every sin from malice is from habit; but man can also, without habit, choose evil of set purpose (as the evil angels and the first man did), whether from an innate or acquired predisposition of the body, or from the removal of what restrains, namely faith, hope, fear, etc.

473. Principle. It is more grave, other things being equal, to sin from malice than from passion (or, a fortiori, from ignorance), because 1) it is done from a motion more proper to the will, since the will is moved in no way by an impulse extrinsic to it (such as passion is), but wholly from itself: "hence sin is aggravated so much the more as the malice has been more vehement, and is diminished so much the more as the passion has been more vehement"; - 2) one sinning from passion, since this quickly passes, easily returns to a good proposal, but one sinning from malice often sins from habit and therefore more lastingly; - 3) one sinning from passion has his will ordinarily ordered to the good: for he proposes and seeks the good, but sometimes recedes from the proposal on account of passion; but one sinning from malice is badly disposed as to the very end, because he has a firm proposal of sinning. But the end in morals is the first principle. Hence one sinning from malice sins more gravely, because the defect of the principle is worst, and more perilously, because he is not easily recalled from sin.

474. Of special malice are sins against the Holy Spirit. - They are those which are done directly against the good which is attributed to the Holy Spirit by appropriation, namely, the goodness and love of God, and indeed from malice or election of evil. This name, taken from the Scriptures (Matt. XII, 31; Mark III, 29; Luke XII, 10), there designates that sin of the Pharisees by which, from malice, they attributed to the devil the miraculous works of Christ, done by the power of the Holy Spirit so that men might be saved and drawn back from evil; which is to assail truth manifested and clearly proposed and acknowledged. By the Fathers and Scholastics, however, by analogy it was extended to designate all similar sins which maliciously contemn the means granted by the Holy Spirit for converting man and drawing him back from sin.

Therefore two things are required for those sins: a) that they be from malice, that is, not from a sudden motion of passion (as can also happen in the case of despair, hatred of God, etc.), but from the will alone deliberately moving itself to evil. Yet this does not suffice, otherwise all who sinned from habit would sin against the Holy Spirit; but b) special malice is required, from the fact that one contemns and casts away those things which could impede sin or procure its remission; these means are effects of the grace of the Holy Spirit in us, and therefore he who thus acts from malice properly sins against the Holy Spirit. They are, therefore, those sins by which man through contempt casts away the means granted from the goodness of the Holy Spirit by which he could have been drawn back from sin.

475. Six sins against the Holy Spirit are numbered by the Scholastics. - For man is drawn back from sin:

a) on the part of divine judgment, either 1. by consideration of mercy through hope, which despair casts away; or 2. by consideration of justice through fear, which is taken away by that presumption by which one wishes to obtain glory by the mercy of God alone and without merits or penance;

b) on the part of the gifts of God, either 3. by acknowledgment of truth through faith, against which is placed the assailing of acknowledged truth, so that one may sin with greater license; or 4. by the help of interior grace, against which is placed envy of fraternal grace, while someone is saddened not concerning the good of neighbor alone, but concerning the very increase of grace in souls;

c) on the part of sin, either 5. by the inordination and baseness of sin, which, actual grace moving, lead to penance, and to this is opposed impenitence, which is not mere death in sin but the proposal of not doing penance; or 6. by the smallness and brevity of the good which is found in sin, which, actual grace moving, induces man to this, that he not be made firm in sin, and to this is opposed obstinacy, that is, the firm proposal of adhering in sin.

Hatred of God, although in itself it is a sin of the greatest malice, is not placed among the sins against the Holy Spirit, because it is graver than they, and because in some way it is implicitly contained in all of them.

476. Sin against the Holy Spirit is called irremissible: not as though it could not be remitted by the grace of God, nor because in fact it is never remitted, but it is such according to its nature, because it directly excludes those things through which the remission of sins is made, and includes a disposition of pertinacity which of itself is permanent, and while it remains is an obstacle of positive resistance to the action of divine grace. Hence it is remitted with greatest difficulty, more rarely, and only as it were miraculously, because, by contemning the supernatural gifts necessary for remission, it directly assails every conversion to God.

477. Remark. - Sins of malice which are from the inclination of habit are never first sins, because they presuppose the acts from which the habit was caused. Sins against the Holy Spirit ordinarily presuppose other sins, because man is accustomed to proceed from a more imperfect and lesser sin to a perfect and greater one; yet on account of freedom of choice,[1] someone can, even in the first act, sin against the Holy Spirit from contempt.

[1] Thus according to St. Thomas this happens either on account of preceding bad dispositions (as from the complexion of the body and from preceding sins, but forgiven), or on account of a vehement motive to evil and a weak affection toward good.

Second Question: On the Exterior Causes of Sins

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 3; *De Malo* q. 3, a. 3.

478. The exterior cause of sin is that which moves its interior cause, whether the will or reason or the sensitive appetite. No one can move the will immediately except God, who is not the cause of sin but permits it; man and the devil can move reason, by persuading to sin; exterior objects, for example, apprehended in themselves or in the imagination, move the sensitive appetite. Yet nothing so moves the will that it necessarily sins.

Article I: On God Permitting

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 79; *De Malo* q. 3, a. 1 and 2.

479. Sin, according to the formal element, insofar as it is privation, aversion, and defect, is not from God, who is not the cause except of being, nor can he move to aversion from himself: for he is the ultimate end, which inclines all things to himself. This is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 6, and from the Second Council of Orange, and the Council of Valence, and the Fourth Lateran Council.

But according to the material element or conversion: a) insofar as it is being, it is from God as from the first being through essence, and insofar as it is act, it is from God as from the first moving cause and the one applying all other causes to acting; b) but insofar as defect is joined to the material element (or insofar as it is the foundation of privation), it is not from God but from the deficient cause, namely free choice: for the act of sin can be considered inadequately insofar as it retains something of the order of reason to good, and under this respect it is not evil but good and is from God; also adequately, insofar as it does not have enough of the order of reason but deviates from it, and thus it is evil and is not from God but from the will defecting from order. Just as whatever there is of motion in limping is from the motive power of the soul, but that the defect of limping is joined to the motion is not from the motive power but from the indisposition of the shin-bone: so whatever there is of perfection and act in sin is from God; but that that act is with defect is from free choice defecting from the order of reason: for God would move to a perfect act if free choice were not defectively disposed.[1]

[1] Even in the opinion of the Thomists, man begins sin in some genus of cause, namely the material and dispositive, insofar as he objectively moves God to furnish an influx by reason of the disposition of nature corrupted by original or actual sin: God moves each thing according to its condition. Cf. Billuart, *De voluntate Dei*, diss. 8, a. 5; *De peccatis*, diss. 8, a. 9.

480. God is not the cause of sin, as the Council of Trent defined, sess. 6, can. 6: a) not a cause directly and per se, as is clear from what precedes; nor b) a cause per accidens or indirectly, although he could impede sin, by bestowing motion or efficacious grace toward good, and sometimes does not impede it, by not granting that grace, or even by subtracting it from those who place an obstacle: for he is not bound to give such grace and to impede sin, which otherwise he permits according to wisdom and justice (cf. Ps. V, 5; Ecclus. XV, 21; Rom. IX, 14; James I, 13; Deut. XXXIII; Wis. XIV, 9 together with XI, 25).

Article II: On the Devil Tempting

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 80; *De Malo* q. 3, a. 3, 4, 5.

481. The devil is not the cause of sin except indirectly: a) by way of one persuading, not indeed by directly moving the intellect, which he does not intend to illuminate, because the more it were illuminated the more it would be drawn back from the deception which the devil desires; but by instigating interiorly, or by operating in the senses and imagination, by which he wishes to darken the intellect, and by moving the sensitive appetite; b) sometimes by outwardly proposing to the senses an object as sweet, pleasant, etc., or even by appearing visibly (I Thess. III, 5; I Pet. V, 8).

482. Are all sins from the temptation of the devil? - All sins, although they come indirectly from the devil (I John III, 8), insofar as he is the cause of original sin (from which we are prone to sin), nevertheless not all come directly from his instigation, but either from the solicitations of the world, that is, of sinners, or from the corrupted nature of man itself, or from the will alone.

483. Temptation is commonly called a solicitation or incitement to sin. This word originally and in a broad sense means the same as examination or trial: "for to tempt is to take an experiment concerning something" (I, q. 114, a. 2), for the end that something may be known, and this is the temptation of trial, which can also be attributed to God, who by afflictions and extraordinary commands proves the faithful and explores their virtue and constancy (Deut. XIII, 3), not that he himself may know what they are, but that man may show it (I Tim. VI, 9). But in the present matter the word is taken in the stricter sense and the question is only of the temptation of seduction, which is an incitement to sin whether internal or external: this is not from God (James I, 13), although he permits temptation (I Cor. X, 13), but it comes from our corrupted nature, also from the world, and especially from the demon. And it can be grave or light according as it vehemently incites the will or not; but its force depends on the nature of the thing, on the vividness of the representation, and on the intensity of the appetite.

But since from its nature it is only a solicitation to evil, according to itself it is not sin itself, but it can be a cause of sin when the consent of the will is added; hence the following principles can be established concerning it.

484. Principle I. To feel temptation is not sin, but to consent is: not sensation or pleasure, but consent and complacency. To feel, that is, to have an intellectual consciousness of the solicitation, indeed to be moved by delight in evil and thus to experience and feel (even in the lower faculties) that it is agreeable and pleasant: this is not yet sin; but voluntarily to adhere to the evil to which it solicits is sin: for only a free act from the consent of the will is morally evil. This is altogether certain from the common doctrine, which otherwise is found proved from the Council of Trent itself, sess. 5, can. 5, and from the condemnation of prop. 50 of Baius.

In order that this may be applied more easily in practice, it is useful in the process of temptation to distinguish three stages. Namely, there is:

a) suggestion, or the mere representation, or mere idea of evil: the simple proposal of evil through the imagination and intellect, and this, however depraved and long-lasting, is not sin, because in it the will has no part;

b) indeliberate delight, arising from suggestion in the sensitive or even rational appetite, by which the temptation pleases: for frequently and connaturally from suggestion, especially if it is vivid, intense, or long continued, delight arises, indeed a pleasant organic impression and sensible

commotion, by which one is affected toward a pleasing object: this also, until deliberation of reason intervenes, is no sin, because such a motion is not deliberate nor free;

c) free consent of the will: after reason perceives the depraved suggestion as well as the delight in the appetite arising from it, and its malice, if the will immediately rejects both, there is no sin: for this is not in the intellect alone, or in the sensitive appetite, or in the spontaneous inclination of the rational appetite, but in the free will which adheres to evil; but if this will freely consents to the delight, or has complacency for itself in it, or admits it, approves it, or retains it because it pleases or adheres to it, then sin will be present.

485. Principle II. Rashly and without just cause to provoke temptation or to expose oneself to it is illicit, more or less according to the gravity of the danger.

For temptation imports some danger of sinning, more or less grave. But to expose oneself to the danger of sinning without sufficient reason is not licit (n. 177). Therefore it is also illicit to expose oneself to temptation without just cause; and this ought to be proportioned to the gravity of the temptation, that is, to the incitement and danger of sinning, considered not only absolutely and in itself, but also relatively to different individuals. And indeed:

a) It is gravely illicit without sufficient reason freely to expose oneself to a grave temptation of graver sin, namely, one which imports proximate danger of sinning gravely.

b) It is licit from a just grave cause to expose oneself to grave temptation with proximate danger of sinning gravely, provided due cautions are employed to remove the danger and at the same time there is a founded hope of overcoming the temptation.

c) It is lightly illicit without a just light cause to expose oneself to a light temptation of sinning gravely or to a grave temptation of sinning lightly.

486. Remark. - For avoiding and conquering temptations, opportune remedies are to be employed:

A. Before temptation: 1. vigilance for forestalling many and graver temptations (I Pet. V, 8; Mark XIII, 37), for which it is necessary a) to flee occasions, b) to avoid idleness and useless wanderings of the mind, from which dangerous phantasms often arise, c) also positively to turn the faculties of the soul and the passions toward good, useful, and religious things;

2. prayer (Matt. XXVI, 41; VI, 13; Luke XI, 4), for which are required a) humility (James IV, 6), b) confidence (Phil. IV, 13), and c) fervor;

3. to these can usefully be added the practice of meditation, for example, on the passion of Christ, the last things, and the presence of God, by which we are moved to praying more fervently and to fleeing sin and its occasions.

B. In temptation one must resist: 1. immediately and from the beginning, when the enemy is still weak and victory easier;

2. strenuously and strongly: for if we waver hesitatingly, or resist only softly, the enemy becomes bolder and attacks more bitterly;

3. perseveringly, until it has been fully conquered.

Thus a) by praying, b) by laboring strenuously, c) by not disputing with the enemy, d) by turning the mind to the opposite virtue, e) and by turning it away from vice.

C. After temptation has ended or been overcome, it is expedient: 1. humbly to give thanks to God, to whom alone victory is to be attributed; nor ever to fall in spirit, but confidently to flee to the mercy of God;

2. not to examine oneself further concerning consent given or denied, lest a new temptation be provoked;

3. to open graver temptations to a prudent and pious spiritual director, and to seek counsel.

Article III: On Man Cooperating

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 62, a. 7; *De Malo* q. 13, a. 4, ad 19.

487. Man is a cause of sin: a) by transmitting original sin, concerning which Dogmatic Theology treats;

b) by suggesting and persuading actual sin to others, which is done by scandal, namely, both by the perverse and false principles of the world (that is, of evil men), and by its depraved works and examples by which it draws the weak, and by threats by which it terrifies the timid, and by the attractions of exterior goods which excite concupiscence (Matt. XVIII, 7; II Tim. III, 1-10; Rom. XII, 2; I John V, 19; II, 16). Scandal formally and principally is against charity, and therefore its malice is spoken of specifically in the treatise on charity;

c) by cooperating with others, which can happen in 9 modes (6 positive and 3 negative): by commanding, counseling, consenting, praising and reproaching, patronizing, participating, by not admonishing, by not opposing, by not manifesting. These are commonly called, metonymically, others' sins (I Tim. V, 22), because, namely, they are committed by others, yet are imputed to us, because in some way we are their cause insofar as we have cooperated toward them as authors, helpers, or those not impeding them. Hence they are others' and our own at the same time, because although committed by others, by reason of cooperation they become our own.

488. Cooperation toward the sin of another is every concurrence furnished to the evil action of another.[1]

[1] Waffelaert wrote excellently on cooperation in a special little work: *Etude sur la Cooperation et l'espece morale du scandale*.

A. By reason of the mode in which it is done: I. one cooperation is properly so called and directly voluntary, which is done by a positive act (the first 6 modes); II. another is improperly so called and indirectly voluntary, which is done by omission of an action impeding sin by one who can impede and is bound to this (the 3 negative modes): the latter is called negative, the former positive.

Positive cooperation is twofold: 1. broadly so called, which is done by a moral influence upon the will of another who executes the evil action (so that his will may be moved or in some way determined to sin): it is identified with direct scandal, which is not a mere occasion but a true moral cause of the sin of another, and is done by command, counsel and seduction, petition and consent, praise, moral patronage;

2. strictly so called, which is done by a real influence upon the evil effect itself, by helping another to produce it, or by partially causing with another principally acting the evil act or effect, which is done by participation or real patronage: it is called a) immediate when the cooperator executes with the principal agent the very act of sin, for example, by helping a thief in taking away another's thing, as if two steal one thing by carrying it together; b) mediate when the cooperator supplies something (matter, faculty, means) which serves the principal agent for executing the evil work, or for executing it more easily, for example, by handing over a ladder for stealing or by opening a window for a thief. This can be more or less proximate or remote, according as the means supplied, from its nature or from the circumstances, more or less influences and has a greater or lesser connection with the sin of the principal agent; for example, to hold a ladder for one ascending, or to furnish an idol to an unbeliever, is called proximate cooperation; to hand over a ladder, or to sell matter from which an idol is to be made, remote cooperation.

B. By reason of intention, it is divided into formal cooperation, when the cooperator consents to the evil will of the principal agent and intends his sin (as happens in direct scandal); and material cooperation, when he does not intend the sin but does something foreseeing that the principal agent will abuse it to perpetrate sin. Therefore the same action, according to a diverse intention, can be formal or material cooperation: thus an innkeeper, if he serves drink to someone for the end that he become drunk, is formal cooperation; but only material if for the sake of profit he furnishes drink to one who is foreseen to be about to make himself drunk.[2]

[2] Thus material and formal cooperation is better defined after St. Alphonsus. But in order that the doctrine of authors may be rightly understood, the reader must attend to the fact that they sometimes explain the terms otherwise.

489. Principles. Cooperation toward evil generally is illicit, because it is to place a cause of an evil effect; and this cannot be licit unless the action in itself is not evil, but at least indifferent, the intention is right, and there is produced equally immediately at the same time both a good effect and an evil one which is compensated (n. 173). Hence:

a) **Formal cooperation is always illicit,** because it does not proceed from a right intention but intends the sin of the principal agent, and therefore is always a sin of the same species as that sin, as consent in it and approval of it.

b) **Immediate cooperation, even merely material, is illicit,** because it is not an indifferent action but an evil one; indeed it is always a sin of the same species as the sin of the principal agent, because it is to execute with him and to do the prohibited work itself; - unless sometimes the question is of goods of fortune, in the taking away of which the owner can consent.

c) **Mediate merely material cooperation, although not always and necessarily, nevertheless per se and ordinarily is illicit,** because it is an act of evil appearance which is not licit except on account of an extrinsic reason rendering it honorable: for if the effect or end is evil and prohibited, even the means for obtaining it per se and ordinarily (unless there is an excusing reason) will be prohibited; for if the means are voluntarily employed, the effect also will be voluntary in its cause; if the means are culpably employed, the effect will be culpable in its cause. This is a sin against the virtue which is injured by the sin of the principal agent (although not of the same lowest species), and at the same time against charity when, by omitting cooperation, we could impede the sin of our neighbor.

d) **Mediate merely material cooperation per accidens is licit, if a proportionately grave reason is present.**[3]

[3] Hence St. Thomas: "For avoiding some inconvenience, a man can licitly use the matter of another, or not subtract the matter from him, but furnish it." Q. D. *De Malo* 13, a. 4, ad 19.

Thus according to the rule handed down above concerning an action from which a twofold effect arises: it is licit to place a cause good or indifferent in itself, which has a twofold equally immediate effect: one good, which alone is intended, and the other evil, provided that there is a proportionately grave reason for acting (n. 173). Of these four conditions, the two intermediate ones in this cooperation are always verified from the nature of the thing; hence it must be said that this cooperation is licit, if the action is not evil in itself (which is not always easy to determine), and if a proportionately grave reason or sufficient cause for cooperating is present.

490. A proportionately grave reason or sufficient cause for cooperating is present, if the good end or effect, that is, the utility and necessity of acting, compensates the evil effect, or rather the influence into the evil effect: thus, for example, if another means is lacking, it is licit to cooperate mediately toward the sin of another on account of avoiding his greater sin (as toward drunkenness lest he blaspheme), and toward harm to neighbor on account of avoiding either a greater harm to him or an equal harm to oneself; of two evils the lesser evil is to be preferred.

Hence a graver cause is required the graver the cooperation is, that is:

a) the graver the sin is toward which someone cooperates, both in itself and with respect to the harm which it brings to the honor of God, the common good, or a third party; for example, a graver cause is required for cooperating with a sin of injustice than with another, because the cooperation is done not only to the spiritual harm of the sinner but also to the temporal harm of a third party; likewise for cooperating with homicide than with theft;

b) the more proximate the cooperation is, that is, the more it influences the sin of another or is more closely connected with it; for example, a graver cause is required for arranging the type in printing a bad book than for preparing the papers, for extending the sword of killing than for the material from which it is made;

c) the more probable it is that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin; for example, a greater cause is required for selling weapons, wine, bad books, etc., if there is one shop than if there are many who sell those things; for furnishing meats in a paternal house than in a tavern.

491. Therefore the following special practical rules can be established:

1. Proximate cooperation toward an action which is gravely harmful to the public good, whether of religion or of the state, is excused from mortal sin on account of no harm whatever, because it is a perversion of order: to prefer a private good to the public and common good.

2. If the evil action does not gravely harm the public good, proximate cooperation toward it (especially if it is necessary for the execution of the sin) will not be excused except on account of a grave cause or inconvenience; indeed, if the cooperation is gravely harmful to an innocent third party, a very grave inconvenience is required, namely, fear of at least equal harm.

3. Remote cooperation, if the other is already equipped for sinning, is excused on account of a light cause; unless, by denying consent, the sin could be impeded: for then fear of notable detriment is required.

492. Applications to cases. - In order that the doctrine explained above, and in a moral matter of daily application, may be better understood, it is useful to illustrate it by certain examples from approved authors concerning the cooperation of merchants and servants, which regards many matters, and therefore belongs more fittingly to general theology than other applications which pertain to the special virtues.

A. Concerning the cooperation of merchants: 1. To sell indifferent things, not of themselves destined to evil (painted cards, wine, weapons, knives, meats on Friday, feminine adornment), is licit by reason of profit alone, even if it is foreseen in general that many will abuse them: for the cooperation is sufficiently remote and abuse cannot be altogether impeded.

2. But if this or that one is foreseen in particular as going to abuse them:

a) the sale is not licit except on account of a grave cause proportioned to the sin, because the cooperation is proximate; hence it will not be licit to sell adornment to a girl who is going to abuse it for lust (or drink to one going to become drunk), even if it would equally be bought from others; unless for avoiding notable harm or inconvenience, or on account of a moderately grave cause (the departure of a wealthy customer, diminution of buyers, a grave quarrel, real blasphemy).

b) When by not selling it is foreseen that the sin will be impeded, a far graver cause is required; wherefore it is not licit, except perhaps on account of a most grave cause, to sell a bad book to an innocent person who otherwise would not be corrupted.

c) Finally, if the other is going to abuse the thing to the harm of a third party, fear of equivalent harm is required; for example, it is not licit to sell weapons to one going to kill unless to avoid one's own death or an equivalent evil, and scarcely ever will it be licit to sell things to those who, after making a truly harmful adulteration, are going to resell them to others, because this is gravely harmful to the public good.

3. Things not indifferent, but destined to an evil use either of themselves or by institution, and scarcely having another use, such as poison, truly obscene images, an abortive means, it is not licit to sell unless it is clear that danger of abuse is absent, or unless a most grave cause proportionately excuses.

4. Things which of themselves from their own nature have no other use than evil, and which man cannot use without sin, it is never licit to sell, such as a manifestly base theatrical garment, or instruments destined to impede generation, a drug destined only for abortion, insignia of the Masonic sect; unless it were certain that someone was seeking them for another end and would not abuse them.

B. Concerning the cooperation of servants: 1. To present garments, prepare a horse or carriage for a master going off to sin, open the door to a concubine, bring a torch, prepare a bed, bring a bad book or newspaper, prepare meats on a forbidden day, set out wine for a master going to make himself

drunk, etc., is licit by reason of service alone, because these are indifferent services and cooperation toward sin is remote.

2. To accompany the master or carry him by carriage to the place of sin, for example, to a concubine, is not licit by reason of service or profit alone, but there must be added fear of some notable detriment (such as being treated badly, being expelled from the house, a grave quarrel), because the cooperation is more proximate.

But if by the company of the servant the master is rendered more bold for sinning, when otherwise he would not sin, according to St. Alphonsus, l. II, n. 64, he can never accompany him; according to others, however, he can on account of the greatest harm, as cases similar to this are: to keep watch while the master sins with a mistress and to warn him if someone intervenes - secretly to gather information concerning the place in which such a girl is accustomed to dwell - to paint an image of a person basely loved - to offer one's shoulder to one ascending to a woman not unwilling.

3. To carry gifts or love letters to a concubine, according to St. Alphonsus, l. II, n. 67, is illicit because, since they directly excite to sinning, it is intrinsically evil: for it is cooperation toward the sin of the master and direct scandal toward the concubine. Many authors, however, judge that this is an indifferent work which nevertheless will not be licit except for avoiding grave harm, because the cooperation is sufficiently proximate; but it would be intrinsically evil both to write and carry very base love letters, or to approve them before such a person.

4. To place one's shoulder under, to hold a ladder, to open a window by force so that the master can ascend to deflower a virgin will not be licit except on account of fear of death or equivalent evil, because the cooperation is altogether proximate and maximally injurious to an innocent third party (cf. Innocent XI, prop. 51 condemned).

C. Specifically as to the cooperation of a servant toward usuries: 1. He who helps a usurer only in counting monies, writing accounts, or carrying a pledge, can be excused by reason of service alone.

2. Not so the servant who in the name of the master exacts usuries, because exaction is more proximate cooperation toward the sin of the usurer, even if he exacts amicably.

3. But if he exacted by force or threats, he would not only sin but also be bound, in default of the master, to restitution.

Third Question: On Sin Which Is the Cause of Another Sin

Article I: On the Mode in Which One Sin Causes Another

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 4; q. 84; *De Malo*, q. 8.

493. One sin can be the cause of another, just as one human act can be the cause of another. But this happens in three ways: 1. it can be the material cause of another, insofar as it supplies and prepares matter for another, as gluttony prepares matter for lust, and avarice for litigation, because it multiplies temporal goods which are the matter of lawsuit; - 2. it can be the efficient cause of another: a) per accidens, insofar as it removes grace, or charity, or shame, or submission, or anything else which draws one back from sin and would impede it: thus from drunkenness or anger all sins

can arise, because they remove the judgment of reason by which man is restrained from sin;[1] b) per se, insofar as by some sin, for example, of lust, man is disposed by way of inclination or habit to similar acts, or sins of the same species; - 3. and especially it can be the final cause of another, insofar as on account of the end of one sin someone commits another sin, as if someone steals in order to fornicate. And because the end in morals gives the species or form, thus one sin is also the formal cause of another, because it gives form to the other: for if someone steals on account of fornication, theft is as the material, fornication as the formal (q. 75, a. 4).

[1] In this way pride, on the part of aversion, is the cause of every sin indirectly, insofar as it removes subjection to God, which draws one back from sin.

494. Capital sins are those which for the most part are the cause of many other sins, especially the final cause, because they have an object or end most appetible; hence on account of that end other sins are easily committed. They are called capital from the head, which is said metaphorically of that which is the principle and directive and in some way leading of others: for they are the principle or cause of other sins, as was said; they are directive because they are their final cause: for human acts are directed by the end. Hence the capital sins are as leaders, and the vices which arise from them as armies (q. 84, a. 3).

Therefore capital sins are not the greatest, since many others are graver than they, for example, those which are directly against God or are directly opposed to the theological virtues; nor are they necessarily mortal, even if done deliberately, as is clear concerning anger and gluttony, which often are venial.

495. The capital sins are seven,2 as is shown in the following way: Capital sins are those which have very appetible ends and therefore principal ends for moving the appetite.3 But something moves the appetite directly per se, and thus good moves it to pursuing; another thing moves indirectly through another, and thus good moves it to fleeing, insofar as someone flees a good on account of an evil joined to it.

Now the good which man most seeks can be:

1. excellence of praise and honor, which is a good of the soul, which vainglory inordinately seeks;
2. food and drink, which is the good of the body by which the individual is conserved, which gluttony inordinately seeks;
3. the use of venereal things, which is the good of the body by which the human species is conserved, which lust inordinately seeks;
4. external goods, which avarice inordinately seeks.

But the good which man flees on account of an adjoined evil which he most fears is:

5. his own spiritual good, which sloth inordinately flees on account of the bodily labor joined to it;
6. or another's good, which impedes his own excellence and thus is an evil, which envy inordinately flees;

7. or that against which anger rises up (q. 84, a. 4).

2. Ecclesiastical writers and the holy Fathers began to discuss these and to indicate more or fewer in number, until the authority of St. Gregory prevailed, so that seven capital sins were commonly numbered. Cf. Wrobl, *Die Hauptsundenlehre des Ioannes Cassianus und ihre historischen Quellen*, in *Divus Thomas*, 1923-1924.

3. Hence capital sins are not either those which are only the material cause of others, because it is not the cause of sin in act, but occasionally and in potency; or those which are only the efficient cause of others, which otherwise is verified of all sins, and thus every sin would be capital; or those which are the final cause but from the condition of the sinner, because this happens per accidens to the sin itself: "One sin is ordered to the end of another in two ways: in one way on the part of the sinner himself, whose will is more prone to the end of one sin than of another; but this is accidental to sins. Hence according to this they are not called capital sins. In another way, from the very relation of the ends, of which one has a certain agreement with another, so that in many cases it is ordered to it ... and according to this it is necessary to take the capital vices." Q. D. *De Malo* 8, a. 1; cf. I-II, q. 84, a. 4.

1. "Or otherwise. Good principally moves the appetite from this, that it participates in something of the property of happiness, which all naturally seek. Of its notion there is 1. a certain perfection; for happiness is a perfect good, to which pertains excellence or brightness, which pride or vainglory seeks; 2. ... sufficiency, which avarice seeks in riches that promise it; 3. ... delight, without which happiness cannot be ... and this gluttony and lust seek." a. 4.

496. Pride is the beginning of every sin, according to Ecclesiasticus X, 15 (the printed text has IX, 15), not only in the historical order, because the Angels and the first man were guilty of it, but also from the nature of the thing, because it is the final cause of all sins: for all sins can and are apt to arise from it, insofar as the temporal goods which man seeks in other sins he can will on account of his own excellence, which is the end of pride. And because the end is first in the order of intention, and intention precedes execution through means, it is rightly called the beginning of every sin. Therefore pride is the final cause of all sins, and consequently it is not a capital sin, from which only many vices arise, but rather the cause of all the capital sins, and the mother and queen of all vices.[2]

[2] Some have interpreted this concerning pride improperly so called, that is, a) concerning aversion or contempt of God, by which someone does not will to be subjected to his rule, which per se pertains to pride, but is found implicitly in all sins, consequent to conversion into a good opposed to the law; this general pride is the cause of sin or the beginning on the part of aversion: for from this sin has that it is evil, and therefore on the part of aversion the notion of evil begins; also b) concerning the inclination of fallen nature to such contempt, from which all sins proceed. - These things are true, but they do not hand down the sense of Scripture, which manifestly from the context speaks of pride properly so called, which is a special sin, namely, the appetite of one's own excellence (q. 84, a. 2).

497. Avarice is the root of all sins, according to the Apostle, I Tim. VI, 10, or a cause, not indeed final (as pride is), but disposing to all, because through riches man acquires the faculty and facility of perpetrating, and the occasion of desiring, any sin whatever, because for having any temporal goods whatever he can be aided by money, according to that saying of Ecclus. X, 19: All things obey money. Hence it is the root or first sin in the order of execution, because it offers the opportunity and gives

the means of perpetrating all things; and therefore, just as a root furnishes nourishment to a tree, so money nourishes the desire of every sin, and in this sense any sin whatever can arise from avarice.[3]

[3] Some have interpreted this concerning avarice improperly so called, namely, a) concerning inordinate conversion or tendency toward any temporal good whatever, which is found in every sin: this general cupidity is called the cause of sins on the part of conversion to created good, from which sin is nourished and fostered, whence it is called a root; also b) concerning the inclination of fallen nature toward inordinately seeking temporal goods, from which all sins proceed. - These things are true, but they do not hand down the sense of Scripture, which manifestly speaks of avarice properly so called, which is a special sin, namely, the inordinate appetite for riches (q. 84, a. 1).

Avarice, insofar as it is the root of all sins, is not a capital sin, but insofar as it is besides the final cause of many, it is rightly numbered among the capital sins.

498. Remark. - The capital sins are not those which are opposed to the fundamental or cardinal virtues, because "there is not the same account of origin in virtues and in vices. For virtues are caused through the order of the appetite to reason, or even to the incommutable good, which is God; but vices arise from the appetite for a commutable good. Hence it is not necessary that the principal vices be opposed to the principal virtues" (a. 4, ad 1).

Article II: On Pride and Vainglory

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, 130, 131, 132; *De Malo* q. 8 and 9.

499. Pride is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence.[1] It is called:

[1] Capital sins, if they are considered singly according to their proper species, pertain to special moral theology; but insofar as they are capital and thus exercise a general influence on other vices, they already pertain to the general part of moral science. Concerning them see the little work *De Variis Peccatis in sacramentali confessione medendis*, c. III.

1. an appetite, because pride resides in the appetite, namely principally in the will, if it seeks excellence in spiritual things; secondarily in the irascible appetite, which tends toward a sensible, arduous, and excellent good;

2. inordinate: to seek excellence according to itself is not evil, but it is against the order of reason that someone tend above that which he is, as the proud man does: "for right reason has this, that the will of each one be borne toward that which is proportioned to him" (II-II, q. 162, a. 1);

3. of excellence: both relative, by which someone wills to excel others, implicitly at least contemning them; and absolute, by which someone simply wills to excel above that which he is, even without thinking of others;

4. one's own: the special object from which pride receives its species is the loftiness of one's own person; for not in this or that matter, but commonly and in all things, the proud man bears himself as lofty. Therefore pride seeks a certain universal excellence, and by this it is distinguished from presumption, ambition, and vainglory, which inordinately seek some particular excellence, whether in works, or in honors and dignities, or in fame and glory.

500. Pride of itself is contrary to charity and therefore is mortal sin: for the proud man exalts himself above that which he is, that is, above that which has been fixed for him by God; hence implicitly at least contempt of God is included in pride, insofar as man does not will to be subjected

to God and his rule. But this is to be turned away from God, which is against charity, by which we are converted to God, and therefore according to itself it is mortal sin. - If that contempt is explicit, formal, and perfect, from an intention of contemning God because one disdains being subjected to God and his law and it seems injurious to one's own excellence, it is always mortal. But if it is only implicit, without an intention of contemning God, it can indeed be mortal, namely, in a grave matter; but often it is venial, not only from indeliberation but also from lightness of matter.

Now, according to Gregory (*Moralia*, l. 23, c. 4), pride is committed in four ways, diverse in species on the part of the object: 1. by judging that the goods which someone has are had from himself, not from God, or by acting as if he judged that he had them from himself; - 2. by judging that he has received them from God, but on account of his own merits, or by acting as if this were so;[2] - 3. by attributing to himself goods which he does not have; - 4. in the goods which he has, by willing, others being despised, to be preferred to them more than is fitting. The first two modes, since they include formal contempt of God, are mortal sin; the last two are often only venial, unless they are done with grave irreverence toward God, or render one prepared for sinning mortally, or there is grave contempt of neighbor or notable detriment.

[2] If the proud man truly believed, by a speculative judgment, that he had all these things from himself or on account of his own merits, he would be a heretic; for the most part he does not specially think this, but practically bears himself as if these gifts were not from God, or not without merit.

501. Daughters of pride. - "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters" (II-II, q. 132, a. 5). All vices indeed are apt to be ordered to the end of pride; yet certain ones, because they seek special excellence, have an object very close to the object of pride, and therefore immediately, proximately, and more frequently than other sins arise from it according to the account of the end, and immediately serve it; whence those alone are called its daughters. But they are three: 1. presumption, which is the inordinate appetite of excellence in works, namely, by undertaking something above one's powers; 2. ambition, which inordinately seeks the excellence of dignity and of honor not due, or greater than is due; 3. vainglory, which inordinately tends into fame and glory, that is, into a vain manifestation of excellence.

Presumption, ambition, and vainglory of themselves are venial sins, because they are not against charity, but are an excessive appetite for a thing good or indifferent according to itself. Per accidens they become mortal (more often vainglory), either because they proceed from a mortally evil cause, for example, from affection for mortal sin; or because they have mortal sin as their effect, as if they are done with notable harm or injury to neighbor, or if someone on account of them is prepared to commit mortal sin; or by reason of matter, as if someone seeks honor or glory from mortal sin (cf. treatise on Fortitude).

502. Vainglory is the inordinate appetite of glory and fame, that is, the appetite of vain glory, or of a vain manifestation and estimation among others concerning one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. This happens in three ways: a) by seeking glory concerning a thing which is not worthy of glory or of so much glory, as concerning an evil, false, fictitious, fragile thing, concerning riches, trifles, etc.; b) by seeking it from those who are not able to discern what is worthy of glory, for example, from one whose judgment is not certain; c) by seeking and not referring glory to the due end, namely, to the honor of God or the salvation of neighbor or one's own utility.

From vainglory seven vices more commonly arise, and therefore they are called its daughters. For by vainglory the manifestation of one's own excellence is sought, which can happen: a) directly: 1. either by words through boasting, by which someone glories concerning a work committed; or by deeds, 2. through presumption of novelties, by which someone devises novelties which excite the admiration of others; and 3. through hypocrisy, by which someone does good so that he may seem good, although he is not; - b) indirectly someone seeks the manifestation of his own excellence by showing himself not to be less than others, and this happens: 4. as to the intellect, through pertinacity, by which someone adheres too much to his own opinion; 5. as to the will, through discord, by which he does not will to recede from his own will so as to agree with others; 6. as to speech, through contention, by which he quarrels noisily; 7. as to deed, through disobedience, by which he does not will to execute the precept of a superior.

Article III: On Avarice

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118; *De Malo* q. 13.

503. Avarice is the inordinate appetite of riches: but under the name of riches come all exterior goods insofar as they are useful to man and can be valued by money.

Avarice is twofold: 1. the inordinate appetite of riches in taking and retaining unduly, which is opposed to justice and therefore often is gravely evil; 2. the inordinate affection for riches, by which they are too much loved or desired or please too much in delight, which is opposed to liberality, and of itself is lightly evil, unless on account of affection for riches someone does not fear to commit some mortal sin, or constitutes his ultimate end in riches.

504. From avarice seven vices more frequently arise, as from a final cause, which are called its daughters. Insofar as it is immoderate in retaining, there arises 1. hardening of heart, or inhumanity against mercy toward neighbor; insofar as it is immoderate in taking, there arises 2. in affection: unrest or superfluous solicitude about acquiring goods; in effect: 3. violence, when someone uses force for acquiring goods; 4. fallacy, and 5. perjury, when he uses deceit in words, either simple words or words confirmed by oath; 6. fraud, and 7. betrayal, when he uses deceit in deed, either as to things or as to persons, as is clear concerning Judas, who from avarice betrayed Christ.

Article IV: On Lust and Gluttony

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 153 and 148.

505. Lust is the inordinate appetite of venereal things, which of itself is mortal, as will be said in the treatise on Temperance. Since the appetite of lust is most vehement, it follows that it most greatly impedes the use of the higher powers, that is, of the intellect and will, because it distracts power from them and moves toward objects opposed to reason.

From lust many vices arise. - For:

a) In the intellect it produces 1. blindness of mind in the consideration of the end and its goodness, or alienation from thinking of heavenly things; 2. precipitation in counsel and deliberation concerning the choice of means; 3. inconsideration in judgment concerning things to be done which are unbecoming to one's state or person; 4. inconstancy in commanding the execution of judgment, or in good proposals. Hence it especially overturns prudence.

b) In the will it produces, concerning the end: 5. love of self as to the delight of the flesh, which it inordinately seeks; 6. hatred of God, insofar as he prohibits the desired delight; concerning means: 7. affection for the present age, that is, too great a love of the present life on account of its pleasures; and 8. horror and despair of the future age, that is, of spiritual goods, because while someone is too much detained by carnal delights, he does not care to arrive at spiritual ones, but is wearied by them and despises them.[1]

[1] Further there arise "certain inordinate exterior acts, and especially those pertaining to speech. In this there is something inordinate in four ways. In one way on account of the matter, and thus base speeches are placed: because from the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks ... the lustful, whose heart is full of base concupiscences, easily break forth into base words. Secondly, on the part of the cause: for since lust causes inconsideration and precipitation, the consequence is that it makes one break forth into words lightly and inconsiderately spoken, which are called scurrilous. Thirdly, as to the end: for since the lustful person seeks delight, he orders his words to delight; and thus he breaks forth into playful words. Fourthly, as to the meaning of the words, which lust perverts on account of the blindness of mind which it causes; and thus he breaks forth into foolish speeches, namely, when with his words he prefers the delights which he seeks to any other things whatever." II-II, q. 153, a. 5, ad 4.

506. Gluttony is the inordinate appetite of food and drink, which is only venial, unless, by reason of its effect, it brings grave harm to body or soul, for example, to health, or to the use of reason, or to virtue if it is the cause of grave sin (cf. treatise on Temperance).

From gluttony many vices arise. - Gluttony through the immoderate taking of food or drink produces a disturbance of the lower part and thus impedes reason, and consequently those things which ought to be directed by reason. Hence it produces 1. in the soul: a) as to reason, whose sharpness is dulled by immoderation of food and drink: dullness of mind or stupidity as to speculative things; - b) as to the appetite, which, with the helm of reason lulled to sleep, is inordinately affected: inept joy, or a wandering and uncomposed joy concerning those things which, according to the judgment of right reason, are not apt to cause any delight; - as to exterior acts: c) loquacity, by which man cannot restrain words; and d) scurrility, by which he cannot restrain or compose exterior gestures; - 2. in the body, however, it produces uncleanness, that is, the inordinate emission of any superfluities whatever (especially of seed): for although vomiting after superfluous eating is useful, nevertheless it is vicious that someone should subject himself to this necessity by immoderate food or drink.

Article V: On Envy and Anger

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36 and 158; *De Malo* q. 10 and 12.

507. Envy is inordinate sadness concerning another's good, esteemed as one's own evil, insofar as that good seems diminutive of one's own excellence. This of itself also can be mortal, as directly against charity, because just as charity rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, so envy is saddened concerning it (cf. treatise on Charity). It is especially concerning those goods in which there is glory and in which men love to be honored and to be in esteem, such as dignities, magistracies, insignia of titles, riches, beauty, adornment, celebrity of name, eloquence, erudition, friendships, piety, virtues, etc., especially wisdom and happiness; but that sin is especially accustomed to be found among the ambitious and women, and among those who are in some way equals, or at least approach in something, for example, in condition, knowledge, virtue, etc.: for such persons wish mutually to be equaled or preferred.

508. From envy five sins generally arise, from the fact that it attempts to do something against neighbor. For in that which it attempts to do, there is something as beginning and principle, something as means, and something as terminus. The principle is that someone intends to diminish the glory of another, which is done secretly by whispering, manifestly by detraction. The means is that one willing to diminish the glory of another either can do so, and then exultation in adversities arises, that is, joy in the evils of neighbor; or he cannot, and then there arises affliction in prosperities, which is not envy itself, but its daughter, when the prosperous things of neighbor happen against the attempt of the envious man who strives to impede them. Finally, the terminus is in hatred of neighbor itself, for just as delight causes love, so sadness causes hatred.

509. Anger is the inordinate appetite of vengeance. It is called inordinate because anger of itself is not evil but indifferent, as being a passion; hence to seek vengeance according to right reason, for example, so that another may be corrected, so that the order of justice may be preserved, so that reason may execute justice more strongly, so that others may be terrified, is good and praiseworthy (cf. treatise on Temperance).

Anger can be evil in two ways: 1. on the part of the object: a) by seeking unjust vengeance against him who has not deserved it, or beyond what he has deserved; b) by seeking vengeance not according to the legitimate order, but to be executed by one's own authority; c) by seeking it not for the due end, but, for example, from hatred, as satisfying one's own evil mind. This anger of itself is mortal, because it is contrary to charity and justice, although it admits lightness of matter, if the vengeance is slight. - 2. On the part of the mode, anger is evil if it is too ardent interiorly, or too much manifested exteriorly. This of itself is venial, because it is a mere excess of an indifferent thing; nevertheless it becomes mortal on account of an effect prohibited under grave matter, such as scandal, blasphemy, notable detriment to health, etc.

But let it be noted that anger is not necessarily inordinate because it is great, but because it is too great; hence a vehement motion is good provided it is proportioned to the quality of the fault, the condition of the sinner, and other circumstances, as is clear in Christ casting the merchants out of the temple.

510. From anger six sins more commonly arise. - Insofar as it is in the heart, from it are born 1. indignation against the man with whom one is angry, while he reckons it unworthy that such an injury has been done to him; and 2. swelling of mind, by which the angry man fills his mind, by meditating on and devising various means of vengeance; - insofar as it is in the mouth, from it arise 3. clamor, or inordinate and confused speech by which man shows anger in words; 4. blasphemy, by which he breaks forth into words injurious to God; and 5. contumely, or injurious speech against neighbor; - insofar as it proceeds even to deed, 6. quarrels arise from it, under which name are comprehended all harms, such as woundings, homicides, beatings, etc., which are brought upon neighbors in deed in anger.

Article VI: On Acedia

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 35; *De Malo* q. 11.

511. Acedia is sadness concerning spiritual good, especially divine good; it is torpor, coldness, languor, tepidity, weariness concerning spiritual things, because they impede bodily quiet and delight. Hence acedia prefers to do nothing, and from this is born flight, horror, detestation of

spiritual goods. This sadness is sin, both 1. by reason of the object: for to be saddened concerning evil is good, but to be saddened concerning that which apparently is evil but truly is good is sin, because good does not deserve that we be saddened concerning it; - and b) by reason of the effect: for it draws man back from due works (cf. treatise on Charity).

512. Acedia is twofold: 1. that by which we are saddened concerning the good of any virtue whatever; and this is not a special sin, even if it happens on account of the bodily labor attached, but is a circumstance of every sin, because every vice flees the opposite spiritual good even insofar as it impedes bodily quiet. Hence it is mortal or venial according as the sin of which it is a circumstance is grave or light; - 2. that by which we are saddened concerning spiritual good through excellence, to which all other things are ordered, namely, concerning divine good, not in itself, but insofar as it is internal to us and pertains to us and seems evil to us, for example, concerning beatitude or the friendship of God, and concerning the means to it, namely, concerning the sacraments, the grace of God, good works, divine precepts, etc., insofar as they require labor. This is a special sin, because it has a special object and is directly contrary to the special act of a special virtue: for it is opposed to joy concerning divine good, in which charity delights. Hence of itself it is mortal sin, because according to its proper account it is opposed to charity: for just as envy is mortal sin because it is saddened concerning the good of neighbor, concerning which charity rejoices, so a fortiori acedia, which is saddened concerning divine good. Yet it can be venial, if it is not perfectly deliberate, or also when it is concerned with goods not necessary for salvation.

513. From special acedia six sins arise. - For from sadness it happens that man flees those things concerning which he is saddened; indeed, that he assails them, and that he passes over to other things in which he delights. From acedia man flees divine goods: 1. the ultimate end, eternal salvation, or hoped-for divine good, which is done through despair; he also flees 2. spiritual good to be done, or the common and ordinary means to the end, which is torpor concerning precepts; 3. he flees arduous means, for example, those which fall under the counsels, through pusillanimity. - He assails 4. saddening spiritual goods, by detesting them, which is called malice; or also 5. he assails priests and God-fearing men who induce others to spiritual goods, and is indignant against them; and this is rancor. - Finally, 6. on account of sadness he passes over to exterior delectable things, in which the carnal mind delights, and this is wandering of the mind concerning illicit things.

514. Remark. - Many other sins arise from the capital vices; those which we have handed down are those which arise from them more frequently and more immediately, and which therefore are called their daughters. Others, by means of these, are born from them not so frequently, as envy from vainglory, anger from envy, acedia from anger, and from acedia avarice, gluttony, and lust. Thus Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, XXXI, c. 45 (P. L. LXXVI, 620-622).

Third Part: On the Effects of Sins

First Question: On the Diminution of the Good of Nature

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 85; 109, a. 7; *De Malo* q. 2, a. 11 and 12.

515. The first effect of sin is the diminution or corruption of the good of nature, not indeed of the principles by which human nature is constituted and of the properties which flow from it (for example, intellect and will), but of the natural inclination to virtue.[1] For:

[1] It is natural because according to its beginning it is from nature, insofar as the intellect and will tend to good (I-II, q. 63, a. 1), and because it perfects nature in its own order.

1. On the part of privation: by mortal sin (and therefore by original sin) man is turned away from the ultimate end, whence the powers of the soul are deprived of due subordination to one another and to God, and thus are deprived of due order to the good of virtue and negatively do not attain their end. This subordination in the state of pure nature would be had imperfectly from the fact that, reason ordering, the will would convert itself to the ultimate end, God, and thus by one act would habitually subject all the powers of man to itself and refer them to God; but in the state of innocence it was perfect through the supernatural gifts of original justice. Hence through original sin, which takes away original justice, man is also said to be wounded in his natural goods, because in him all the powers of the soul remain deprived of their proper order by which they were naturally ordered to virtue. Insofar as reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; insofar as the will is deprived of order to the good, there is the wound of malice; insofar as the irascible appetite is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of infirmity; insofar as the concupiscible appetite is deprived of its order to the delectable moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.

2. On the part of conversion: by actual sin, as by every human act, there comes about an inclination to similar acts; this disposition is an obstacle by which man is impeded from being easily borne toward the contrary good of virtue. Therefore the very inclination to virtue is diminished, not indeed in itself (and consequently it cannot be totally corrupted), but insofar as a positive impediment of attaining the end is set against it. Hence from actual sin the four wounds inflicted by original sin are increased and aggravated.

516. Remark. - From this is understood the doctrine of the Scholastics, according to whom sin has as its effect the privation of mode, species, and order:

"Mode, species, and order follow every created good, insofar as it is such, and also every being. For every being and good is considered through some form, according to which the species is taken. But the form of each thing ... is according to some measure ... and from this it has a certain mode, which regards measure. From its form, moreover, each thing is ordered to another. Thus, therefore, according to diverse grades of goods there are diverse grades of mode, species, and order.

a) Therefore there is a certain good pertaining to the very substance of nature, which has its mode, species, and order; and this is neither taken away nor diminished by sin.

b) There is also a certain good of natural inclination, and this also has its mode, species, and order; and this is diminished by sin ... but is not totally taken away.

c) There is also a certain good of virtue and grace, which also has its mode, species, and order; and this is totally taken away by mortal sin.

d) There is also a certain good which is the ordered act itself, which also has its mode, species, and order; and the privation of this is essentially sin itself (as to the formal element).

And thus it is clear how sin is the privation of mode, species, and order; and takes away or diminishes mode, species, and order" q. 85, a. 4.

Second Question: On the Debt of Guilt or the Stain of Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 86; q. 89, a. 1.

517. The second effect of sin is the debt of guilt, that is, the debt of repairing the offense brought upon God through sin. For after actual sin has been committed, man remains guilty of it; for when the voluntary act by which man recedes from the light of reason and the law of God ceases, man does not for this reason immediately return to it, but for this there is required a motion of the will contrary to the first motion, "just as if someone is distant from another by some motion, he does not immediately become near to him when the motion ceases, but it is necessary that he approach by returning through a contrary motion" (q. 86, a. 2). Hence guilt is imputed to man until he has retracted it and obtained its pardon.

518. In mortal sin, the debt of guilt imports a state of habitual aversion from the ultimate end, which is habitual sin: for it is impossible that man be guilty of aversion from the end and at the same time be converted to the end. Hence man remains turned away from God until by conversion he returns to God (Is. XVII; Matt. IX, 1-7; 12-13; Luke VIII, 37-50; I John III, 5; Ps. L, 4). Habitual sin, in the natural order, would be only the privation of the habitual ordering of reason (and will) to God; but in the supernatural order, since conversion and ordering to God is made through grace, the privation of habitual conversion to God is also the privation of habitual grace making one pleasing (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 15, can. 27; sess. 7, can. 6). It is not a mere punishment or effect, but true habitual sin, because it is a voluntary and culpable inordination: voluntary, as foreseen by him who sins mortally and therefore willed at least in its cause or indirectly; culpable, because he is bound to forestall and remove such inordination.

519. Mortal sin leaves a stain in the soul. - For our habitual ordering to God, whether through reason or through grace, is the beauty of the soul: "the soul of man," says St. Thomas, a. 1, "has a twofold brightness, one indeed from the shining of the light of natural reason through which it is directed in its acts, another from the shining of the divine light, namely, of wisdom and grace." Hence the privation of habitual ordering to God is at the same time the loss of due brightness and therefore a stain of the soul. Hence habitual sin and stain are not distinguished really but only by reason: insofar as it takes away order to God as ultimate end, it is considered as habitual guilt and separation from God; insofar, however, as it takes away the due beauty of the soul, it is considered as stain[1] (Jer. II, 22; Zach. XIII, 1; Ps. XIV; Ps. CXVIII; Ecclus. XXXI; Is. IV, 4; Ezek. XIV; XXXVI, 23; Josh. XXII, 17; John XIII, 10; Eph. V, 27; Tit. I, 15; I Cor. VI, 11; Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 2; prop. 56 of Baius).

[1] "Stain is properly said in corporeal things when some bright body loses its brightness from contact with another body ... But there is as it were a certain touch of the soul, when it adheres to certain things through love. But when it sins, it adheres to certain things against the light of reason and of divine law ... Hence the very detriment of brightness arising from such contact is metaphorically called a stain of the soul ... Therefore it must be said that the soul is not defiled by lower things by the power of those things, as though they acted upon the soul; but rather conversely the soul defiles itself by its own action, by adhering to them inordinately against the light of reason and of divine law" (q. 87, a. 1 and ad 1).

Nevertheless it does not follow that the stains of diverse sins do not differ among themselves, or that a second mortal sin does not cause a new stain, since habitual grace has already been removed by the first. For, as St. Thomas says, a. 1, ad 3, stain signifies the privation of the brightness of the soul in order to the cause, which is the act of sin, and therefore stains are many, diverse, and unequal according as the sins which induced them are many, diverse, and unequal, just as shadows are diverse

according to the diverse bodies impeding the light. Moreover a second sin of itself is privative of grace and would take it away if it found it; and therefore it is a new cause of privation and thus a new stain.

520. What venial sin leaves behind. - Venial sin, which is contrary to fervor, that is, the exercise of charity, is imputed unto guilt until man, charity influencing, through an act of contrition or another equivalent act which contains virtual displeasure for sin, retracts it and thus compensates its inordination. But since it does not take away nor diminish the habitual or permanent order to God and the habitual beauty of the soul (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 11; sess. 14, c. 5), it follows that it does not induce a stain properly so called and remaining; but insofar as here and now it impedes actual brightness arising from acts of the virtues, it is sometimes said improperly, for one moment, to stain the soul.[2]

[2] The greatest charity is compatible with venial sin; therefore the fervor which venial sin impedes is not habitual.

Third Question: On the Debt of Punishment

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 87; q. 72, a. 5; Suppl., q. 99, a. 1; *De Malo* q. 1, a. 4 and 5; q. 7, a. 1 and 8; *C. Gent.* III, 140-146; II Sent. d. 24, a. 2, ad 5.

521. The third effect of sin is the debt of punishment, that is, the debt of punishment to be paid on account of sin, or the obligation of undergoing punishment. For:

a) In order that law be observed by men, it must have coercive force through fear of punishment; in other words, it is required that law be sanctioned by a proportionate punishment (n. 237). But sin is against the eternal law of God. Therefore before God it induces the debt of a punishment proportionate to it.

b) Justice requires that the equality of order which has been injured be repaired. But the sinner violates the equality of order, while he prefers his own will to the divine will and satisfies it against the order of God. Therefore justice requires that equality be repaired, and that man be compelled to suffer something against his own will according to the ordination of the will of God, "namely, that he who has indulged his own will more than he ought, acting against the commandment of God, according to the order of divine justice should suffer something against that which he would will, whether spontaneously or unwillingly" (q. 87, a. 6); and this is punishment.

c) He who rises up against some order ought to be repressed by the prince of the order. But by sin man acts not only against the order of reason, and sometimes against the order of a human legislator, but also against the order of God. Therefore he incurs a threefold punishment: one from himself, which is remorse of conscience; another sometimes from man; but the third from God (q. 87, a. 1; - Exod. XVIII; Ps. XXXI; Matt. XII, 36; XXV; Rom. II, 9).

522. Punishment is an afflictive evil inflicted in vengeance of sin against the will of the one suffering, or the privation of a delectable good which the will unwillingly suffers against the natural appetite.[1]

[1] It is, namely, against the habitual tendency of nature, and not always against the actual and elicited appetite of the will, since someone can be ignorant of it, indeed can voluntarily undergo it, in which case nevertheless it remains involuntary in a certain respect.

One punishment is 1. concomitant, which guilt itself, as efficient cause, brings with itself intrinsically (Wis. V, 7; 2-13; Luke XV, 18), for example, privation of health, shame, remorse of conscience, privation of grace as a stain; - 2. another is inflicted, which is brought from without by God or man as efficient cause and of which guilt is the meritorious cause, for example, privation of grace as the physical destitution of a supernatural principle by God. This regards either only past sin, and then it is a) either punishment simply and strictly so called, or merely vindicative, if evil is inflicted from justice alone, solely in vengeance of the violated order, namely, in punishment of one's own sin (Ezek. XVIII, 20) and for restoring the injured order of justice, for example, the punishment of the future life; or b) satisfactoria, if the evil inflicted either by the judge or by the sinner upon himself is voluntarily sustained, for one's own sins or even for the sins of others, for compensating the injury brought upon God, for example, sacramental penance, fasting, an evil sent by God: this, involuntary in a certain respect, is voluntary simply, which diminishes the account of punishment; - or c) it also regards future sin, and then it is medicinal, if evil is inflicted or tolerated also from mercy, as a remedy of salvation, as censure is: namely, for correction and healing against future sins, whether of him who is punished or of others, for example, a punishment of the present life inflicted by God.

523. Thesis I. Mortal sin per se induces the debt or obligation of eternal punishment, as inducing an inordination of itself irreparable. It is of faith.

It is proved 1. from the Scriptures: Matt. XXV, 41, 46; Mark IX, 42; Is. LXVI, 24; Apoc. XIV, 11; XX-XXII; II Thess. I, 9;

2. from Tradition, namely, from the Athanasian Symbol, and from the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council (cap. *Firmiter*), and Trent, sess. 6, can. 24 and 25; sess. 14, can. 5;

3. by reason: Mortal sin induces an inordination of itself irreparable; therefore eternal punishment is owed to it. Proof: Mortal sin takes away the principle of moral life by which it could be repaired, namely, ordering to the ultimate end (in the present order: grace and charity), by which man adheres to God and by which he can obtain pardon from God by satisfying. But no one can recover the principle of life, in the case, ordering to the ultimate end (or charity), by his own powers. Therefore mortal sin of itself is irreparable, so that from its nature its disorder remains forever. But while the cause remains, the effect remains. Therefore, while the disorder of sin remains, the debt of punishment remains, and therefore mortal sin from its nature can be punished forever[2] (q. 87, a. 2).

[2] It is no objection that the inordination perpetually remaining after death is no longer voluntary, because the time of meriting and demeriting has passed; whence it ought not to be punished perpetually. For the perpetual disorder is voluntary in its cause, because one sinning voluntarily cast away ordering to the end, and indeed irreparably.

It is confirmed: a) The first principle of moral life is ordering to the ultimate end, just as the soul is the principle of animal life, and truths evident of themselves are the first principles of intellectual life. But sickness can be repaired because something of the vital principle remains, but death, which removes the principle of life, cannot be repaired by nature; similarly error in conclusions can be repaired from reduction to principles, but error in first principles is irreparable. Therefore similarly sin which turns away from the ultimate end, or inordination concerning the ultimate end, is irreparable for man; although it can be repaired by the power of God.

b) The sinner voluntarily places himself in a state from which, unless divinely aided, he cannot be rescued. Hence from the very fact that he wills to sin, as much as is in him, he binds himself to remain always in sin, and consequently implicitly wills to remain in sin perpetually. Just as he who would take away his own eyes would deserve to lack sight forever, so he who voluntarily turns himself away from God deserves to be deprived of God forever.

c) The sinner constitutes his ultimate end and perfect happiness in a creature against God, and consequently wills to order his whole life to it and always to adhere to it; he prefers the fruition of created good to the eternal fruition of the ultimate end, and consequently much more would have willed to enjoy that created good forever. And therefore he implicitly has the will of sinning forever, and deserves to be punished in his own eternal thing, since he has sinned against the eternal good.[3] - For he totally turns himself away from God, the ultimate end, and renounces him. But he who renounces the end because he adheres to another, deserves never to obtain it, because the ultimate end from its nature is perpetual. Hence he who renounces it, renounces it forever.

[3] It is no objection that the one sinning sometimes has a contrary will of not always adhering to the created good, or even of converting himself. For when there are several opposed wills, the predominant intention elides the others; but the will of sinning is efficacious and has effect, whence it is predominant; and therefore the opposed intention is only conditioned, or even a mere velleity. For knowing that these things cannot be composed, the sinner simply prefers and chooses created good as the ultimate end. "Just as if someone were to throw himself into a pit, from which he could not get out unless extraordinarily aided, it could be said that he would will to remain there forever, however much he might think otherwise" (St. Thomas, IV Sent. d. 46, q. 1, a. 3).

d) The sinner contemns eternal life and rejects charity, which is the bond by which he is united to the heavenly society; therefore he deserves to be excluded from that society in perpetuity.

We have proposed the argument for the present order, in which ordering to the ultimate end is made by grace and charity; but it is valid also in the natural order, because no creature can offer condign satisfaction for sin, nor therefore by itself recover the due ordering to the end, as is usually shown in the treatise on the Incarnate Word (n. 536).

524. Thesis II. The punishment of mortal sin is twofold: the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense. - For sin consists in aversion from God and undue conversion to created good. Insofar as it is aversion from God, the infinite good, it justly deserves to be deprived of the infinite good (punishment of loss: I Cor. VI, 9; Matt. XXV, 41; Apoc. XXI-XXII); insofar as it is undue conversion to a creature, a finite good, it justly deserves the punishment of affliction from creatures (punishment of sense; Is. LXVI; Mark IX, 42; Apoc. XIV, 11; Matt. XXV, 41). But since sin is not of infinite gravity on the part of conversion, punishment of infinite bitterness is not required (a. 4).

525. Thesis III. Venial sin of itself does not merit anything except temporal punishment. - For since it does not take away order to the ultimate end and charity from which it can be repaired, of itself it is reparable and therefore of itself does not merit eternal punishment, but temporal. Per accidens, however, according to St. Thomas, it is punished by eternal punishment, if it becomes irremissible because it is joined to mortal sin (a. 5).

526. Thesis IV. When guilt has been remitted, not always is every punishment remitted, as is proved in the treatise on Penance, and is clear from the definition of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 14, can. 30, and sess. 14, can. 22; but satisfactoria can remain, because the sinner cannot be converted to God unless his will accepts the order of divine justice, according to which "he who has

indulged his own will more than he ought, acting against the commandment of God, should suffer something against that which he would will, whether spontaneously or unwillingly" (a. 6). Hence it is required "that he himself spontaneously assume punishment for himself in recompense for past guilt, or also patiently sustain what is brought upon him by God" (Wis. X; Gen. III; II Kings XII, 13).

Hence, although "the stain being removed, the wound of sin has been healed as to the will, punishment is still required 1. for the healing of the other powers of the soul, which through preceding sin were disordered, namely, that by contraries they may be cured; 2. it is required for restoring the equality of justice; and 3. for removing the scandal of others, so that those who have been scandalized by guilt may be edified by punishment" (ad 3).

527. Remark. - Let it be noted that punishment does not correspond to guilt according to the dignity of him against whom one sins (because thus to any sin whatever there would be owed a punishment infinite in intensity), but according to the disposition and inordination of the sinner, - and indeed a) the quantity of punishment or bitterness corresponds to the quantity of guilt, which is not infinite simply but greater or lesser in various degree according to diverse gravity; b) the duration of punishment corresponds not to the quantity but to the duration of guilt, not on the part of the act which passes away, but on the part of perpetual inordination (a. 4, ad 3, coll. a. 3, ad 1; IV Sent. d. 46, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6).

528. The evil of guilt and the evil of punishment differ:[4] a) guilt is prior to punishment, because it induces punishment; b) guilt is according to the will (to operate evil), punishment against the will (to suffer evil); c) guilt is evil in action or a deficient act, punishment is evil in the agent according as he is deprived of permanent perfection; d) guilt is opposed to the honorable good, punishment to the delectable good. Hence:

[4] Cf. *De Malo*, q. 1, a. 4 and 5.

1. The evil of guilt is greater than the evil of punishment; whence it is never licit to commit sin, even venial sin, to avert any punishments whatever, even those of hell.

2. The same thing according to the same respect cannot at the same time be punishment and guilt, but under a diverse respect there is no repugnance. Thus the privation of habitual grace is at the same time sin and punishment: it is habitual sin insofar as it is the voluntary privation of ordering to God or habitual aversion from him; it is punishment insofar as it is the privation of an adornment granted by God, and indeed in two ways: as the privation of brightness and an adhering stain, it is concomitant punishment; as the physical taking away of supernatural life by God, it is inflicted punishment. In other words: morally, as a voluntary lack or habitual aversion of the sinner from God, which is passively in man, it is sin; actively and physically, as the aversion of God subtracting grace from man, it is punishment.

3. It is understood why sin, according to St. Thomas (a. 2), cannot be the punishment of sin per se or by reason of guilt, both because sin is voluntary, punishment against the will; and because punishment is intended by the judge, but God can in no way intend guilt.

Nevertheless per accidens and indirectly it can be the punishment of sin:

a) by reason of the antecedent, or on the part of the cause (which is the removal of what restrains), insofar as God, in vengeance of preceding sin, subtracts grace which would impede sin (Rom. I; II Thess. II);

b) by reason of the concomitant, namely, on the part of the substance of the act or material element, insofar as the act of sin brings difficulties and afflictions, whether it is an interior act, as happens in anger, envy, etc., or an exterior act, if man must sustain great labors or expenses and undergo dangers in order to perpetrate sin;

c) by reason of the consequent, or on the part of the effect, insofar as sin is called punishment on account of consequent effects, such as anxieties of conscience, infamy, poverty, diseases, etc.

In these last two ways sin is not only the punishment of preceding sin, but also of itself.

529. Every punishment is on account of guilt (a. 7 and 8). - And indeed:

1. Punishment strictly so called, that is, merely vindicative, is on account of the proper guilt of him who is punished: for no one is punished simply and properly for the sin of another (Ezek. XVIII, 20).

2. Satisfactory punishment can also be for the sin of another, since one can bear the punishment of another, insofar as one joined to another by the bond of charity assumes the punishment owed to the sins of others (Gal. VI, 2).

3. Likewise medicinal punishment, if it is corporeal and of the present life, can be inflicted for the sin of another upon those who are his: thus children are punished for parents, subjects for masters, citizens on account of the city or king (or vice versa), insofar as they are certain things of theirs; in which case the punishment is as to him for whom one is punished, not as to those who are punished; unless, however, they have been participants in his guilt (original or actual) or have imitated the sin, because then they are punished on account of their own sin and on account of the sin of another (Exod. XX, 5; Matt. XVIII, 32).

4. Indeed every penality is in some way on account of guilt, at least original guilt. Penality is not true punishment because it is not inflicted on account of sin, but on account of obtaining a greater good, namely, a spiritual good (cf. prop. 72 of Baius); but it has a likeness to punishment, because it is a temporal afflictive evil repugnant to the natural appetite, for example, the miseries of the Blessed Virgin or of the Saints (Heb. XII, 6; Ps. XXXIII, 20). Penality is inflicted by God a) for the exercise of virtue and greater merit (Tob. XII, 13); b) for turning away from sin (Luke XXIII, 31); c) as an example of virtue and patience for others (Tob. II, 12); d) in punishment of another's sin, as if parents are punished in their children; e) that God may show there is another life; f) that the glory of God or grace may shine out more (John IX, 3).

Fourth Question: On Mortal and Venial Sin

Article I: On the Difference Between Mortal and Venial Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1; q. 72, a. 5; *De Malo* q. 7, a. 1 and 2.

530. Thesis. There are in fact mortal sins distinct from venial sins. - This is of faith from universal preaching, confirmed in the Second Council of Lyons, profession of faith of Michael Palaeologus, by Benedict XII, const. *Benedictus Deus*, by the Council of Florence, in the decree of union, and by Trent, sess. 6, c. 5 and 15, can. 23, 25 and 27, and sess. 14, c. 1 and 5, can. 7.

Mortal and venial sin differ in several ways:

1. as to the debt of punishment: for mortal sin merits eternal punishment, but venial sin temporal punishment. Yet, says St. Thomas (*De Malo* q. 7, a. 1), "that difference follows upon the account of mortal and venial sin, but does not constitute it. For sin is not such because such a punishment is owed to it, but rather conversely, because the sin is such, therefore such a punishment is owed to it";

2. as to effect, for mortal sin deprives of grace, which is the supernatural life of the soul, and therefore of itself is irreparable and is called mortal (together with grace the connected gifts are taken away: charity, infused moral virtues, gifts of the Holy Spirit, sacramental graces; likewise the right to heaven and the merits of good works); but venial sin does not take away (nor diminish) grace, which is the principle of pardon and condonation, and therefore of itself is reparable and is called venial.[1] But neither is this the constitutive difference: for from the fact that some sin is grave, it has privation of grace as its effect and is irreparable, and not conversely. Hence:

[1] "Sin is as it were a sickness of the soul. Therefore just as there are certain curable diseases, and certain incurable ones which are called mortal, so there are certain curable sins which are called venial, and certain sins (as far as they are of themselves) incurable, although they can be cured by God, which are called mortal." *De Malo*, q. 7, a. 1.

3. in the very account of disorder the fundamental and intrinsically constitutive difference is to be sought. For disorder is twofold: "One by subtraction of the principle of order; another by which, the principle of order being preserved, inordination occurs concerning those things which are after the principle ... But the principle of the whole order in morals is the ultimate end ... Hence when the soul is disordered by sin concerning the ultimate end itself, even to aversion from God, to whom it is united by charity, it is mortal sin"; but when without aversion from the end disorder occurs only concerning those things which are toward the end, then it is venial sin (q. 72, a. 5). In other words: in mortal sin man constitutes for himself an ultimate end contrary to God, and therefore recedes from God and turns himself away (against the order of the end); in venial sin he inordinately adheres to those things which are toward the end, and by this act only does not tend to God (outside the order of the end). From this difference, as from a root, the first two follow.

531. Mortal and venial sin differ on the part of the formal element or privation. - For in each there is undue conversion to created good which cannot be referred to the ultimate end, and according to this they can pertain to the same species (for example, theft). But in mortal sin man is so converted to created good as if it were totally his ultimate end, whence to the conversion is joined the privation of every order to God as to the end, and this privation is aversion or recession from God; on the contrary, in venial sin man is converted to a creature, not as to the ultimate end, but places some act by which he cannot tend to God, and therefore to the conversion is joined only the

privation of actual tendency to God, although habitual order to him remains; and this privation is only retardation or distancing from the end. Hence on the part of privation mortal and venial sin differ from the whole genus and infinitely, for, as St. Thomas says (q. 87, a. 5, ad 1), "the ultimate end differs infinitely from those things which are toward the end."

In other words, in each there is an act tending to something prohibited by law, but the difformity with law is very diverse. For the law primarily commands the very essence of moral order, or the order itself of subjection to God the ultimate end; secondarily (as the complement of order) it commands the mode by which this is done, namely, that nothing be done except toward this end. Hence something can be against law in two ways: 1. simply and perfectly, because it turns one away from God, the highest good, and destroys the essence of moral order, the very subjection to the Ultimate End, and in this way mortal sin is against law; 2. imperfectly and in a certain respect, because although it does not contain aversion from the ultimate end, nevertheless it is not referable to the ultimate end, God, to whom we are bound to refer ourselves and all our things: in this second way venial sin is against law; but because it is not against the law of subjection to God but only against the mode which the law intends, it is better called beside the law. Therefore in mortal sin there is difformity with the essential and primary ordination of the law commanding what is altogether necessary to the end, and therefore it is called against the law, that is, against the end of the law, which is charity by which we are subjected and united to God; in venial sin there is only difformity with the accidental and secondary ordination of the law, which commands something useful to the end, and therefore it is called beside the law, that is, beside the end of the law, but against only the means to the end, without overturning subjection to the end. And therefore the notion of sin is analogical (ad 1).

532. From this is understood the revealed and theological doctrine concerning the nature of mortal sin:

A. In the Scriptures: 1. Christ himself teaches that there are absolutely grave sins, which are the cause of grave punishment, indeed of eternal damnation: "Whoever shall say to his brother: fool, shall be liable to the hell of fire" (Matt. V, 22); "Depart from me, accursed, into everlasting fire" (Matt. XXV, 41-42). Hence the Apostles also affirm that certain sins exclude from the kingdom of heaven (I Cor. VI, 9-10; Gal. V, 19-21; Rom. VI, 23; VIII, 13; James I, 15) and deprive the soul of supernatural light and the life of divine love (John III, 20; I John II, 9; III, 14).

2. Yet there are sins relatively graver than others: "He who handed me over to you has the greater sin" (John XIX, 11; cf. Jer. VII, 26); indeed certain ones are so grave that from their nature and as it were without a miracle of God they are called "irremissible" (Matt. XII, 31; Mark III, 29). Conversely, others of themselves are very light (Matt. XXIII, 24; Luke VI, 42), so that they are often committed even by the just (James III, 2; I John I, 8).

3. From these things are understood both the malice of mortal sin, which is in aversion from God (Jer. II, 13; Ezek. XVIII, 24), and its effect, because it deprives of the grace of God and charity and divine life, and brings death upon the soul and eternal damnation.

Namely, man, who through grace is a) an adoptive son of God (John I, 12; Eph. I, 5; I John III, 1-2; Rom. VIII, 14-16); b) a participant of the divine nature, that is, like to God, holy and a son of light (II

Pet. I, 4; I John III, 2; Eph. IV, 25; V, 8); c) a friend and temple of God (John XV, 14-15; I Cor. III, 16-17; VI, 19; John XIV, 23); d) worthy of eternal life and an heir (Col. I, 12-13; Rom. VIII, 17; Tit. III, 7); e) capable of meriting it (John XV, 1-5; Matt. X, 42; Rom. VIII, 17; II Cor. IV, 17; II Tim. IV, 8; Heb. X, 35; VI, 10); - through mortal sin becomes a) a son and servant of the devil (I John III, 8; John VIII, 44; II Pet. II, 19); b) a participant of his works, by which he walks in darkness and is unclean (I John I, 7-9; III, 8; Eph. V, 8; Col. I, 13; Heb. IX, 14); c) an enemy of God (Rom. V, 10); d) worthy of hell (Matt. XXV, 41, 46; Mark IX, 42; Apoc. XIV, 11, XX-XXII); e) incapable of meriting eternal life (John XV, 5-6).

B. Among the Fathers:[2] 1. In the first three centuries the distinction between mortal and venial sin was not explicitly but only confusedly established. They distinguished a) between the greatest sins and lesser sins; b) between the greatest and middle sins, which had to be expiated by public penance, and minute sins, which were remitted by contrition, almsgiving, prayer, and other means of this kind. But in the second and third century three sins were held as most grave: apostasy, adultery, and homicide, so that in at least certain Churches pardon was not conceded to them, at least before the article of death.

[2] Cf. Tanquerey, *Th. Mor. fund.*, n. 453-459.

These things are clear from the testimony of Tertullian and St. Cyprian.

2. From the fourth century the distinction is already had explicitly between grave sins, which are to be expiated by public penance, and light sins, for which it suffices to do penance privately. Witnesses of this are St. Ambrose and St. Augustine for the Latin Church; St. Gregory Thaumaturgus and St. Basil for the Greek Church.

3. Afterwards, around the sixth century especially, rules are handed down by which grave or capital sins and light or minute sins may be discerned, because the gravity of many up to this point had not been perceived. An enumeration can be found in Caesarius of Arles and in the Penitential books.

C. Among the Scholastics a scientific analysis and deeper investigation is established. They not only declare that those sins are distinguished by reason of effect and punishment, but by intrinsic nature, namely, in the very account of disorder by comparison, namely, to the ultimate end and to the eternal law, as was explained above.

533. Remarks. - 1. Aversion from God, which constitutes actual mortal sin, is not to be confused with privation of grace. This is habitual aversion and the effect of mortal sin; that is the inordination in the evil act itself by which we act against charity and exclude it, namely, actual difformity with charity and actual recession from the end, which is the cause of the privation of grace: the actual privation of habitual ordering. The former is the pure and total privation of charity; the latter is not pure privation but a tendency to good with privation. Hence St. Thomas, *De Malo* q. 2, a. 9, ad 2: "The death of the soul is the privation of grace through which the soul is united to God; but the privation of grace is not essentially guilt itself but the effect of guilt. Hence sin is called the death of the soul not essentially but effectively; but essentially it is a deformed or inordinate act."

2. He who sins mortally has as the end to which he orders himself, himself; as the end which he seeks, the created good itself, concerning which he unduly rejoices and toward which he tends as toward the ultimate end; namely, his own good loved even to contempt of God, or the suitability, convenience, excellence, abundance, wisdom of the sinner as disposed by himself, not as ordered by God, but connoting the privation of God.

3. He who sins venially cannot refer that act to God: for this would be most injurious to God, - nor does he refer it to some created good as to the ultimate end, because then he would sin mortally; - but simply refers it to happiness in common and abstractly willed. It is good in common under the aspect of complete good, or one's own good according to its whole breadth, abstracting from honorable or delectable good, a good universally comprehending every good of man.

4. Since on the part of privation mortal and venial sin are of diverse order and differ in whole genus and infinitely, it follows that all venial sins, even taken together, do not constitute one mortal sin, because they do not put on aversion from God properly so called. Hence he who proposed to commit all venial sins would not sin mortally per se; nor per accidens on account of the danger of thus falling into mortal sin, because that proposal only remotely leads into mortal sin.

5. That mortal sin is concerned with the ultimate end, but venial sin with those things which are toward the end, is not to be understood as though the proximate object of a gravely sinful act were always the ultimate end, the highest good (or that mortal sin is always directly against God); but the proximate object of a lightly sinful act were always some means to the ultimate end, namely, a created good, since there manifestly are mortal sins which are proximately concerned with means to the end, such as homicide, theft, etc., which has place when the means are necessary to the end. But understand that mortal sin is an inordination concerning the end because it destroys due order or conjunction with the ultimate end; venial sin is an inordination concerning only means which, namely, are not necessary to the end, because the will adheres too much to created goods, without nevertheless receding from the ultimate end. In other words: inordination concerning means necessary to the end is also concerning the end itself; but inordination concerning means not necessary is not inordination concerning the end.

Article II: On the Gravity of Mortal Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 2; q. 87, a. 4; II-II, q. 162, a. 6; q. 34, a. 2; q. 105, a. 1, ad 1; III, q. 1, a. 2 and ad 2; Suppl. q. 99, a. 1; III Sent. d. 20, q. 1, a. 2; II Sent. d. 42, q. 1, a. 5 and ad 2; *De Verit*. q. 28, a. 2 and ad 5; *De Malo* q. 2, a. 9, ad 5.

534. Mortal sin is the gravest evil, whether it is considered on the part of God, or on the part of man.

A. As to God:

1. It is the highest injury done to the Highest Good, by which man places the ultimate end and seeks beatitude in a creature and prefers it to God, contemns, dishonors, turns away from, and hates him, contemns his love and friendship, and thus violates the right of God, which requires

that we refer to him all actions and all creatures which we use; whence sin implicitly contains the malice of hatred of God,[1] of irreligion, of contumely toward God everywhere present (Ps. L, 6), and of idolatry (John XII, 43; Rom. II, 23; Is. LII, 5; XLIII, 24; Ezek. XXXVI, 20; Ps. CXXXVIII, 8; Ps. I, 6; I Kings II, 30; Lev. VI, 2; XXVI, 15; Phil. III, 19; Gal. V; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 5).

[1] Cf. II-II, q. 34, a. 2. There it can be noted, according to the mind of Cajetan, that sin includes the malice of hatred both of abomination and of enmity. In every mortal sin there is included the will that God not prohibit nor punish; whence God is implicitly hated as a thing contrary to the will of the sinner (hatred of abomination); indeed, there is the will that there not be a prohibiting God, and thus implicitly God is hated also as a person (hatred of enmity). In other words, in sin there is included the will that we ought not to prefer God to others and love him more than others, which pertains to abomination; indeed, the will that he not be the one whom we ought to prefer to others and who is to be loved above all things, which bespeaks enmity.

2. It is rashness, disobedience, and bold rebellion against infinite majesty, and an offense and contempt of the supreme legislator, almighty lord, judge and king, of his will and law itself, to which it contradicts and refuses obedience and subjection; whence it implicitly contains the malice of pride (Gen. II, 16; III, 1; Heb. II, 2; Jer. II, 20; Is. XXXIII, 14; Wis. V, 2-15; I John III, 4; Job XV, 25; Gal. VI, 7).

3. It is the greatest ingratitude against an outstanding benefactor, whose benefits we use for offending him: against the Father creating, conserving, providing, adopting us as sons, and calling us to eternal life; against the Son, brother and redeemer (Heb. VI, 5), whose cause of death it renews; against the Holy Spirit sanctifying, the friend and inhabitant of our soul. Hence it implicitly contains contempt of the friendship and presence of him whom we cast away from ourselves, and the malice of sacrilege, because it violates the soul consecrated to God, and of infidelity against the covenant entered into with God (Ezek. II, 3; Jer. XXXI, 32; Is. I, 2; Heb. X, 26-31; Eph. IV, 3) and the duties following from it (Is. V; Jer. II, 32; III, 1; II Kings XII, 7; Heb. VI, 6; I Cor. III, 17; VI, 19; II Cor. VI, 16).

B. As to man it is:

1. baseness, dishonesty, and foolishness (Ps. XLVIII, 13; LXVIII, 6; Wis. V, 2-13), as being an evil against our nature and reason (q. 71, a. 2);

2. spiritual suicide, as depriving one of supernatural light and life (I John III, 15, 20; II, 9; III, 14; Tob. XII, 10);

3. deformity depriving the soul of natural and supernatural beauty, whence it dishonors the one operating and renders him worthy of contempt (Ps. XLVIII, 13);

4. servitude of the devil (I John III, 8; Jer. II, 19; Rom. VI, 6; II Pet. II, 19), because man does the work of the devil and subjects himself to him by consenting to him, and thus renders himself more liable to temptations.

535. Remarks. - 1. The aforesaid malices are not found per se in mortal sin except implicitly, and consequently at most they are voluntary in the cause and virtually; hence they are not to be explained

in confession, as being a condition of every sin; unless someone explicitly and formally intended some one of them in itself, because then a sin of the intended species would be present.

2. Many malices of mortal sin are also found in venial sin, but only analogically, imperfectly, and in a certain respect (a. 1, ad 1). Hence, if it is a light evil in comparison with mortal sin, nevertheless in itself it is very grave.

536. In what sense mortal sin is infinite. - Mortal sin:

1. On the part of conversion is not infinite, because both the act of man and the created good toward which it tends are finite.

2. On the part of aversion from the Infinite Good:

a) it is not of infinite malice: for infinite evil is pure evil, without any mixture of good; hence in order that sin have infinite malice, man would have to tend toward evil insofar as it is evil; which is impossible;

b) nor, as it is an offense or injury against the infinite God, does it seem simply infinite: for the gravity of an offense seems to have to be measured not only from the dignity of God offended but also on the part of man offending. But the will tends into the object according as it is in the intellect, and therefore through sin it does not offend God as he is in himself simply infinite, but as he is known very imperfectly by the intellect. Therefore through sin an injury simply infinite is not brought upon God.

c) Nevertheless that offense is infinite in a certain respect, and especially relative to our reparation: for it is contempt of an infinite person; but injury is estimated also from the dignity of the person offended, whereas satisfaction is estimated only from the dignity of the person satisfying, and on the other side the distance between God and men is infinite; therefore the injury of sin is estimated infinitely more than every reparation of man (even one made from grace and charity). Therefore man cannot satisfy for sin de condigno. And therefore:

d) mortal sin of itself is of infinite duration, because from its nature it is irreparable, and its malice in us remains without end and lasts forever. Hence also there is owed to it a punishment of infinite duration.

537. The gravity of mortal sin is described in the Scriptures. - A. In the Old Testament: 1. From the beginnings sin is exhibited as disobedience or transgression of the divine precept, which is strictly punished (Gen. II, 16; III, 11, 14-19; IV, 9-16; VI, 5-7, 11-13).

2. After the election of the people of Israel and the promulgation of the divine law by Moses, sin is considered as rebellion against the supreme Legislator and King of the chosen people (Exod. XIX, 5-8; XXIV, 3, 7), and as contempt of the law of the Lord (Lev. XXVI, 15). Among sins idolatry is principal (Exod. XX, 3-5), and this also is severely punished (Exod. XXXII, 30-35); but other graver offenses also are punished by the penalty of death (Lev. XVIII, 29; XX, 6-27).

But in order that an unformed and uncultivated people might be turned away from sin: a) chiefly and before all things the law had the sanction of the promise of temporal goods for those observing it,

but of the threat of grave evils for those violating it (Deut. VII, 11-26; X, 12-22; XI, 13-28); - b) nevertheless the motive of gratitude and love toward God was also added (Deut. XI, 1; VIII, 2-20); - c) as also the motive of solidarity, because God would punish the offenses of individuals even in their posterity or in the nation (Exod. XX, 5).

3. From the time of the Prophets, sin is more expressly exhibited as an offense of God, of neighbor, or of one's own reason:

a) toward God it is ingratitude, contempt of benefactor and Father, and infidelity (Is. I, 2; Jer. II, 4-37; III, 1);

b) toward neighbor it is injustice (Amos II, 7);

c) toward ourselves, foolishness (Tob. XII, 10; Wis. V, 2-13; X, 8).

Wherefore the Prophets insist upon internal penance of heart, by which the mercy of the Lord will be obtained (Joel II, 12-13; Ps. L, 19).

B. In the New Testament: 1. Christ, who came that, as the Lamb of God, he might take away the sins of the world (John I, 29), supposes the nature of sin to be known, but denounces the gravity of certain sins, and the extension of sin to certain acts which were regarded as honorable; in particular the malice of hypocrisy, scandal, infidelity, and blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (Matt. XXIII, 5-32; XVIII, 16; XII, 31-32; Mark III, 29; XVI, 16; Luke XVII, 1-2). And he insistently proclaims the inordination of the internal sin of the heart (Matt. XV, 19-20).

2. St. Paul chiefly shows the effects of sin. It is, namely, slavery from which we are freed by grace (Rom. VI, 17-18); it is the cause of death (Rom. V, 12; VI, 23; VIII, 13), and of darkness (Col. I, 13; Eph. V, 8; II Cor. VI, 14); it is prevarication which will be punished by a terrible judgment (Heb. II, 2), because the sinner tramples upon the Son of God and saddens the Spirit (Heb. X, 26-31; Eph. IV, 30).

3. But St. John, the beloved disciple of him who appeared that he might take away our sins (I John III, 5), and whom we have as advocate with the Father, where he is the propitiation for our sins (II, 1-2), illustrates not only the effects but more the causes of sin: they are iniquity (V, 17; I, 9); the devil: for he who commits sin is of the devil (III, 8; cf. John VIII, 44); and the world, because the whole is placed in the evil one (V, 19), and everything that is in it is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life (II, 16). But the sinner walks in darkness and lacks light (I, 6; II, 9, 11), remains in death and does not have eternal life in himself (III, 14-15; V, 12), nor the charity of God (III, 17; IV, 8, 20). But he says that two sins especially are to be avoided: sin against the love of neighbor (II, 9-11; III, 15-17; IV, 8), and sin against Christ, by denying his divinity (II, 22; IV, 15; V, 10-12). This is sin unto death (V, 16-17), so grave that prayers are not poured forth for him who has perpetrated it (16).

Article III: On the Conditions Required for Mortal Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 2 and 6; *De Malo* q. 7, a. 1 and 3.

538. Conditions required for mortal sin. - In perfect or mortal sin there is a twofold element: a) objective, namely grave malice; b) subjective, or an act perfectly deliberate and voluntary. Hence for it a threefold condition is required:

1. gravity of malice in the object, otherwise it would not be gravely evil; moreover, gravity in the object suffices, that is, in the thing or action as apprehended, nor is grave malice necessarily required in the thing or action as it is in itself: for this suffices, that man really wills a grave evil. Therefore there must be grave transgression of law in itself, or at least from a false estimation;

2. advertence to the grave malice, for if the gravity is not adverted to, man cannot will it, and the offense will be light; and indeed full advertence or perfect deliberation, for otherwise the malice would not be perfectly willed and the condition would be lacking;

3. perfect consent of the will: for no one is judged to convert himself to something as to the ultimate end and to love it above all things and to separate himself altogether from God except by an act perfectly human and voluntary. Then something is sin insofar as it is voluntary; therefore if it is imperfectly voluntary, it is an imperfect sin. Finally, it is repugnant to divine goodness to punish a man with eternal punishments without full consideration and consent on his part.

539. The malice of the object, whose gravity we must advert to, is understood as either grave in itself, that is, from the object, or from circumstances, as from the end, scandal, an adjoined danger, etc., as will be said in article 5. In order to discern easily the gravity (or lightness) of malice, the following rules are usually handed down by theologians:

1. It is taken from Scripture: when Scripture marks some sin with grave appellations, it is to be judged mortal, for example, if it calls it a crime, wickedness, iniquity, abomination, or says that it is worthy of death, hateful to God, brings death, excludes from the kingdom of heaven, cries to heaven, or if a curse is attached to it, for example, woe (Lev. XXIV, 14, 16, 17, 23; Prov. VI, 16; Is. V, 20; Rom. I, 18 sq.; I Cor. VI, 8-VII; Gal. V, 19; Eph. V, 3); - on the contrary, sin is reckoned only venial when Scripture uses milder words, such as the name of mote, stubble, hay, etc. (I Cor. III, 12; Matt. XXIII, 24; Luke VI, 41), or strikes it with a lighter correction (Prov. X, 19; Matt. XII, 36).

2. It is taken from Tradition: mortal sins are those which are held as such in the decisions of Pontiffs and Councils, or from the morally unanimous consent of the holy Fathers or Doctors, or even from the practice of God-fearing men. Nevertheless, concerning the ancient Fathers one must carefully attend to what their mode of speaking was (for example, whether perhaps exaggerated in the manner of an orator), and what the discipline of those times was (for example, whether there was a grave punishment for a lesser fault or vice versa).

3. It is taken from reason: sins are mortal which take away order to the ultimate end, or dissolve charity toward God or oneself or neighbor; such are those by which the subjection and reverence of man toward God is taken away (for example, blasphemy, superstition of a false divinity); - or by which grave harm to one's own bodily or spiritual salvation is incurred, which

> is a necessary condition for the ultimate end, the love and glory of God; - or by which those things are taken away without which human society cannot be preserved, which is a means necessary for man in order that he may arrive at the ultimate end, such as rebellion, homicide, adultery, theft, disobedience in a matter of great moment: for men could not live together with one another where these things were perpetrated everywhere and indifferently, as we said when distinguishing the primary and secondary precepts of the natural law (n. 251, C).

Or also: mortal sins are those which are directly opposed to the primary precepts of the natural law, or which violate the moral order primarily intended by nature. For the observance of the primary order is a necessary condition for attaining the ultimate end. Therefore a substantial violation of the primary order is mortal sin. Hence mortal are: a) those which violate the order itself to God or take away subjection to him (blasphemy, perjury), but not those things which are only against the mode of subjection; - b) those which violate the order of man to himself, and are a direct disposition of himself or of his faculties against the very ordination of rational nature, or without due subordination to the human species and the common good (suicide, drunkenness, pollution), but not those things which are only against the mode of disposing; - c) those which violate the order to neighbor, while they bring notable harm or an offense to which he is gravely unwilling (homicide, adultery, theft), but not those things which only do not preserve the due mode or by which neighbor is not much unwilling (n. 251, A, b).

But disobedience in a grave matter is also had in positive law; hence mortal are those things which are done against a law commanding under grave obligation: for then by that very fact man acts against those things without which human society cannot be preserved, for the violation of a precept which is of great moment for the common good is apt notably to harm society. But law obliges under grave obligation when the matter is grave, that is, conduces much to an end of great moment, and at the same time the legislator wills to command under grave obligation; concerning which judgment must be made according to the rules handed down in the treatise on Laws, n. 343.

In practice, that whose grave malice does not appear certainly should not be called mortal.

540. Advertence of the intellect is present 1. to grave malice, if man understands that something is so evil or prohibited by God that it cannot stand together with his love, or friendship, or grace, or conjunction with him as end; or at least he understands this implicitly, for example, by knowing that something is very base, rigorously prohibited, notably disturbing the moral order, very opposed to the divine will, inducing enmity with God, worthy of grave punishment, etc., or perceives in some way whatever else is distinctive of grave sin.1

Hence St. Thomas, q. 88, a. 2, ad 1: "from the very fact that someone has chosen that which is repugnant to divine charity, he is convicted of preferring that to divine charity; and consequently of loving it more than God. And therefore some sins from their genus, which of themselves are repugnant to charity, have it that something is loved above God; and thus they are mortal from their genus."

But 2. full advertence or perfect deliberation is required, which nevertheless is not the greatest possible, but that by which man, fully master of himself, is accustomed to attend to a business of sufficiently great moment. And indeed:

a) Subjectively, obscure and imperfect advertence does not suffice, but full and perfect advertence is required, by which a man awake, with mind free, and not impeded by any notable distraction or carried away by disturbance, adverts to the gravity of malice, whether immediately, at the moment when the evil action is placed, or mediately, when the cause is placed from which an evil effect is foreseen to follow at least confusedly.

b) Objectively, however, distinct advertence is not required but confused advertence suffices: for it is not required that grave malice be apprehended distinctly, but it suffices that it appear confusedly, by doubting concerning it or suspecting it, or by adverting that there is danger of this, or that there is an obligation to attend to it or to attend more, and this whether at the moment in which the evil is done or at the moment in which the cause is placed from which it is foreseen that it will follow: for then, if someone nevertheless chooses it, he already fully wills it even if it is a grave evil (n. 214), and therefore he really wills a grave evil, and thus spurns the love of God and the ultimate end and loves it more, and implicitly and virtually chooses even aversion from God and leaves the ultimate end (a. 2, ad 1). Hence confused advertence is not for that reason obscure, but can be full and perfect.2

c) Reflex advertence by which man knows that he adverts is not required, but direct advertence to the malice itself suffices, such as is also drawn from habitual knowledge and can scarcely be absent in those things which are habitually known and are frequently recalled in memory: thus if a sacred person sins against chastity, even if he does not explicitly think about sacrilege, nevertheless he adverts to it implicitly or in act exercised, since he knows that it is he and not another who perpetrates such things; likewise one who willingly lingers in base thoughts which for the most part induce pollution, or one who is accustomed to act familiarly with women. Likewise, for full advertence a long duration of time is not required, nor is this a sign of it.

The conjectural signs of imperfect advertence handed down by theologians are the following: a) if, occupied and distracted by another thing, you have incidentally and slightly apprehended that the thing is evil; b) if half-asleep or half-delirious you were not yet perfectly master of yourself; c) if, forgetful after the fact, you scarcely remember what you did; d) if when you consider better, you judge, according to your habitual disposition, that you would not have done it if you had apprehended it thus; e) if you were so carried away by distraction or passion that you were occupied by cognition only of the utility, harm, convenience, or inconvenience to be perceived from the work, not of the malice; f) or if you labored or were disturbed by a most vehement passion (of anger, fear, sadness), apprehension, agitation of nerves or mania, or a pathological state, so that you scarcely knew what you were doing (which often happens in depraved thoughts, detractions, sins from which harms or dangers follow for others).

Imperfect advertence is ordinarily present and therefore is presumed in those half-asleep, first waking, suddenly consternated, half-mad, half-drunk, younger children (before the seventh year), old people becoming childish again, and the very scrupulous; - on the contrary, advertence at least confused but sufficient is supposed among habitual sinners and hardened sinners.

1. Therefore it is not required that this be done formally. Equivalently this happens when the sinner, although he does not will for the creature the notion of ultimate end, nevertheless in fact adheres to it just as if it were the highest good, perceiving, namely, that renunciation of

the creature is a necessary means to God as end and nevertheless choosing the creature, God thus being postponed and contumeliously treated.

2. Aertnijs notes, *Th. M.* I, n. 230, *De Peccatis*: "Advertence is called a) full, when one discerns with mind free; imperfect, when with mind not fully free, as being half-asleep, half-drunk, or half-distracted; b) confused, when one doubts or suspects concerning the gravity or species of the sin in the act to be done; distinct, when one discerns the quality or quantity of the sin. Hence it is clear that confused advertence can at the same time be full, since someone by an act of intellect fully conscious to himself can suspect grave malice of an action."

541. Consent of the will is full, when from full deliberation or advertence of mind, it chooses an act either directly and immediately, when the transgression is placed here and now, or mediately or indirectly, when a positive cause or omission is placed from which a transgression is foreseen to follow, at least confusedly. - On the contrary, consent is half-full if the will follows a half-full advertence of the intellect, or if it negligently, with some torpor, repels the suggestion of evil less than it ought, as if a passion of the sensitive appetite is moved but the will resists tepidly.

The conjectural signs of imperfect consent handed down by theologians are the following: a) if someone, fully adverting to a temptation, immediately repels it; b) if more fully adverting, he is immediately distressed or saddened; c) if, as soon as he is distressed, he still finds himself habitually so constituted that he would rather die than sin mortally; d) if he could easily have executed the sin and did not execute it; e) if a God-fearing man (or one who is accustomed to be so affected that he would rather die than expressly sin mortally) doubts whether he consented; f) if he remembers that he proceeded very timidly and hesitantly; g) if he was half-asleep, not fully master of himself, and judges that he would not have done it if he had been fully awake; h) if he doubts whether he was master of himself, awake, not drunk.

In doubt: imperfect consent is presumed among God-fearing men and those who are accustomed to be so disposed that they would rather die than sin mortally, because if they had consented perfectly, ordinarily they would not doubt; - on the contrary, perfect consent is presumed among those who are of a laxer conscience and easily fall into some sin: if these had resisted temptation better than they usually do, they would certainly know it.

542. Corollaries. - 1. He who knows that he is acting badly, but does not know whether the evil is grave or light: a) if he adverts to the danger of grave sin at least confusedly and doubts concerning this, sins gravely because he deliberately exposes himself to the danger of gravely offending God: for he knows that his action perhaps gravely offends God and nevertheless does not abstain from it (cf. treatise on Conscience, n. 214);

b) but if he thinks nothing at all concerning gravity or lightness, he does not sin gravely, because he in no way apprehends grave malice.

2. He who deliberates about committing a grave sin, namely, whether he ought to consent to the sin, yet in such a way that he does not consent: a) if the deliberation is true and full, so that with the gravity of malice proposed, he asks whether he wills a gravely evil thing or not, he sins gravely, because he compares God with a creature, wavering whether he should prefer God

or the creature, judging that it can happen that a created good be placed before divine friendship; which is injurious to God;

b) if the deliberation is imperfect, or only some hesitation or omission of resistance against temptation from negligence or torpor, it does not exceed venial sin.[1]

[1] Thus Haine, *Th. M.* I, *De Peccatis*, q. 7; and Noldin, *Th. M.* I, n. 318.

Article IV: On the Division of Mortal and Venial Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 2; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 8; q. 7, a. 3.

543. Mortal and venial sin are each either from the genus and per se, or per accidens. - Mortal sin is divided into mortal per se or from the genus, and mortal per accidens: the first, according to itself, by reason of itself, from its proper object or matter, from its specific account, can be mortal; the second is not mortal unless on the part of the agent or act a circumstance accedes to the species. Mortal per se is divided into mortal from the whole genus, which from its species is always mortal, and mortal from its own genus, which in its species admits lightness of matter.

Likewise venial sin is divided into venial per se and venial per accidens: the latter by reason of itself and from the object is mortal, and is not venial unless a circumstance accedes on the part of the agent, such as imperfect advertence; the former is venial by reason of itself and from the object, and is divided into venial from its own genus, which according to itself, from its proper object and from its specific account, cannot be mortal, and venial from lightness of matter, which, although from its specific account and proper matter it can be mortal, on account of the small quantity of the matter about which it is concerned, is venial.

Therefore, leaving aside sins which are grave and light per accidens, there remains the celebrated division into mortal sins from the whole genus, mortal sins from their own genus, and venial sins from their own genus.[1] This distinction is per se, according to the proper matter and species of sins, whence also the word genus here signifies species.

[1] St. Thomas speaks only of mortal and venial from the genus, and does not distinguish mortal sins into mortal from the whole genus and mortal from their own genus, because he regards the species of sin in the concrete. Hence mortal sin from its own genus, if the matter is grave, is mortal from the genus or from the proper species, and venial sin from lightness of matter is in fact not mortal in the concrete species, but venial.

544. Mortal sins from the whole genus are called those which do not have light matter, because in any part of the matter about which they are concerned, the integral account of disorder is preserved.[2] They are mortal from the quality of the matter, whence the whole genus is mortal. Such are:

[2] The things said in n. 251, C and 539 are to be applied.

a) sins which are directly against God, the infinite good, or some divine perfection, that is, by which imperfection or defect of perfection is directly imputed to God, whether they are directly opposed to the theological virtues, such as infidelity, heresy, despair, and hatred of God; or are against religion: explicit worship of a creature, that is, idolatry, or divination, or magic at least with an explicit pact with the devil, temptation of God strictly so called, blasphemy, and perjury; or any explicit and formal contempt of God;[3]

[3] Contempt pertains to any virtue: contempt of divine friendship is against charity, contempt of divine worship or of a vow against religion, contempt of life eternal against hope, contempt of a precept or of one commanding as such against obedience, contempt of parents against piety, contempt of a superior against observance, etc. In the present matter the question is of formal contempt of divine friendship, or of worshiping God, or of God commanding, or of God calling to eternal life.

b) sins which, if lightness of matter were given in them, would most greatly allure the human race to sinning, with immense harm to it, such as lust directly and in itself voluntary admitted outside marriage; and direct breaking of the sacramental seal, which would soon turn men away from the sacrament of Penance;

c) sins whose matter is a grave thing consisting in an indivisible, or whose malice in any matter whatever equally repugns to the grave end intended by the law, such as simony of natural right, homicide, duel, delight of lust sought for its own sake outside marriage, which always is directly opposed to the very order and primary end of nature, violation of the fast before communion, omission of Easter communion or of the mixing of water with wine in the Mass, simulation of a sacrament, etc.

545. Mortal sins from their own genus are those which can be mortal or venial according as the proper matter about which they are concerned is grave or light, contains grave or light disorder; whence they are mortal from the quantity of the matter,[4] and the genus contains mortal and venial sins. Such are those which are concerned with a finite and divisible good:

[4] Yet they are not grave by reason of quantity alone, but insofar as quantity influences and redounds into quality, and carries with itself notable harm or violation of the moral order.

a) sins against the virtue of religion or the precepts of the first table which are not directly against God, but only against worship, such as undue worship of God, temptation of God broadly so called, sacrilege, violation of a vow or promissory oath, an iniquitous oath, violation of the Lord's day, omission or defect in prayer, celebration or hearing of Mass, etc.;

b) sins which injure the rights of others concerning the goods of person, honor, riches; or bring grave detriment to the sinner in intrinsic goods, such as mutilation of the body, drunkenness, detriment to health; likewise sins which are directly against charity toward neighbor, such as hatred and envy; in one word, sins against the precepts of the second table, except homicide and lust voluntary in itself;

c) sins against grave precepts of the Church whose matter is divisible, such as violation of fast or abstinence, simony of ecclesiastical right, reading of a prohibited book, omission in the canonical hours, etc.

546. Venial sins from their own genus are those which, the same matter remaining, are never mortal, because whatever the quantity of the matter about which they are concerned, they do not contain grave disorder. They are venial from the quality of the matter, and the whole genus is venial. Hence they are not mortal unless the malice of another species accedes. Such generally are:

a) sins committed against one's own good, especially against virtues annexed to fortitude or temperance (for example, against magnanimity, magnificence, patience, perseverance, modesty, studiousness, etc.), which, grave harm excluded, consist in an immoderate appetite or excessive use of an honorable or indifferent thing, for example, of food, drink, sleep, laughter, the use of marriage,

goods, money, worship, clothing, praise, honor, delights, fear, sadness, etc.; likewise curiosity, idleness, trifles, loquacity, impatience, pertinacity, inconstancy in proposal, etc.

b) sins against certain virtues annexed to justice, which are not concerned with strict debt nor with a notable good of neighbor, namely, against truth and fidelity, affability, gratitude (by omission), liberality, etc.

Article V: On the Conversion of Mortal and Venial Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 4, 5, 6; *De Malo* q. 2, a. 8; q. 7, a. 3 and 4.

547. The conversion of mortal sin into venial, and vice versa, is not to be understood as if the same act in number of mortal sin which now exists in the concrete with all its circumstances could become venial; but that an act of sin which from the genus, by reason of itself, in the abstract is mortal, can be only venially evil according as in the concrete here and now it exists with its circumstances; and vice versa.

548. Mortal sin per se or from the genus can become venial, not indeed per accidens from a venially evil circumstance added to the act, because a light deformity added rather increases sin than diminishes it; but:

a) If it is mortal from the whole genus, it becomes venial only from a disposition of the agent which subtracts something from the act: 1. from an erroneous conscience which without grave negligence judges to be venial what is mortal; 2. from imperfect deliberation; and 3. from imperfect consent.

b) If it is mortal from its own genus, it becomes venial from the three aforesaid modes, and besides 4. from lightness of matter or on the part of the object, for example, theft.

Venial sins from imperfect deliberation or imperfect consent are called venial from imperfection of the act: for they are imperfect human acts. According to St. Thomas, imperfect deliberation and imperfect consent are possible in every matter.

549. Venial sin according to itself becomes mortal, whether a) on the part of the agent on account of a circumstance or disposition mortally evil, - or b) on the part of the act on account of a circumstance which changes the species and adds grave malice distinct in species; - or c) from coalescence, multiplication, or aggravation of matter. And indeed:

1. from an erroneous conscience which judges or doubts that what is only venial is mortal;

2. by reason of the ultimate end, when the sinner constitutes his ultimate end in venial sin, that is, when he is prepared to sin mortally on account of that sin which of itself is venial, for example, to omit Mass in order to play excessively or to steal a small thing;

3. by reason of an adjoined end, as if someone says a light lie or a lightly dishonest word in order to fornicate, or commits a light theft for homicide;

4. from formal and perfect contempt of the precept or the one commanding, by which man violates the precept precisely because it is a precept, whatever it may be, whether grave or light, - or because the superior insofar as he is superior commands, whatever he commands;[1]

[1] Not, however, because the superior commands only something light or something inept, or because he himself is imprudent or wicked.

5. by reason of grave scandal, as if you foresee that through a dishonest word you are an occasion to another of sinning gravely;

6. by reason of proximate danger of falling into mortal sin, to which the sinner would expose himself without sufficient caution or necessity, for example, conversation with a woman for a fragile man: furthermore, to danger of which mortal sin he exposes himself must be declared in confession;

7. by reason of notable harm which is foreseen to follow from the sin for neighbor, for example, if a light theft would place another in extreme necessity, or a quarrel would arise from excessive loquacity;

8. by reason of coalescing or multiplied matter, as must be explained specially.

The first seven modes are also valid for venial sin from its own genus; the last only concerning venial sin from lightness of matter.

550. The rule for discerning whether venial sin from lightness of matter becomes mortal from aggravation and multiplication of matter is the following: Several small matters can coalesce and are morally united into one grave matter when they pertain to the same precept in number and to one transgression of the precept.

Thus small thefts coalesce into one gravely unjust detention or damaging; likewise several small eatings, or omissions in the hours, had on the same day into one violation of the fast, or grave omission of the breviary; - on the contrary, several small eatings or omissions had on different days do not coalesce because they do not pertain to the same precept in number, nor do several light excesses in drink had on the same day coalesce: for since they do not consist in a permanent thing, they do not pertain to one and the same transgression; nevertheless they can coalesce into one harm to health or to the family, because in the account of harm they are something permanent.

He who by several light transgressions arrives at grave matter, if he intended this from the beginning, commits one mortal sin; but if he did not intend this, he commits as many venial sins as there were light transgressions, except the last, which is mortal, because through it grave matter is completed: for by this act he wills the small matter insofar as it is united with the others for composing grave matter.

Light transgressions following upon grave matter already completed, if they were intended from the beginning, constitute one mortal sin with the prior ones but aggravate it externally; - but if they were not intended, they do not constitute a new mortal sin unless they again attain a new grave quantity: but if nevertheless they were considered as one thing with the preceding grave matter, they include the mortal sin of joy or approval concerning it.

Article VI: On Venial Sin in Itself

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 89; q. 88, a. 3; *De Malo* q. 7, a. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9.

551. Thesis. There are venial sins distinct from mortal sins. - Thus the Church teaches against the Jovinians and Pelagius (cf. Council of Milevis, can. 7, and the African Council in ep. 95 of St. Augustine, and the book of 50 homilies, hom. 19), and it is of faith against the Protestants from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 11, can. 7, 23, and 25; and sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7. Cf. condemned proposition 20 of Baius.

It is established a) from the Scriptures, which teach that there is a genus of sins which are essentially small and distinct from the graver ones (Matt. XXIII, 24; Luke VI, 42), - that there is no just man on earth who does not sin (Eccles. VII, 21), - that all offend in many things (Jas. III, 2), - and that even the holiest have sin (I John I, 8), - indeed that upon the building of faith and charity there can be built wood, hay, and stubble (which therefore do not take away charity), which do not impede salvation, but nevertheless are to be burned, that is, punished (I Cor. III, 11-15).

b) The Fathers distinguish from capital sins (that is, greater sins) and middling sins, minute and light sins not to be submitted to public penance. Cf. Augustine against Pelagius, ep. 108.

c) From reason: 1. Not every disorder takes away the principle of order, nor every infirmity the principle of life; therefore not every sin takes away the order of subjection to the ultimate end, or charity, which is the principle of life. - 2. In every society there occur light offenses which do not dissolve friendship; therefore also in the society and friendship which man has toward God. For man understands that certain things are prohibited by God, yet not in such a way that they dissolve friendship, and he would be prepared to leave them if they did dissolve friendship.

Therefore, just as a man constituted in the state of mortal sin can, while he remains habitually turned away from God, perform some good works without referring them, however, to God loved above all things; so likewise a man existing in the state of grace can, while he remains habitually turned toward God, elicit acts venially evil, which, although they are not referred to God, are not on that account referred to a creature as to an ultimate end (q. 89, a. 1 and 2).

552. It is objected: He who by a deliberate act prefers his own will to the will of God, loves something above God. But to love something above God is to adhere to it as to the ultimate end, and therefore no longer to be subject to God the ultimate end. Therefore every sin from its nature is mortal and contains aversion from God. - Response. I distinguish: he who prefers his own will to the uncreated will of God loves something above God, I concede; he who prefers the thing willed to the thing willed and commanded by God, I subdistinguish: if the thing commanded is necessary for adhesion and subjection to God, I concede; if it is outside the order of subjection and adhesion to God, I deny. Venial sin is outside subjection to and friendship with God; it is not subjected to God nor does it love God, although it does not cast away subjection to and friendship with God.

553. Venial sin disposes to mortal sin. - All venial sins, because they impede fervor, that is, the exercise of charity, indirectly dispose per se to mortal sins: 1. insofar as they remove subjection to God, which was impeding the soul from tending toward an object contrary to God: "for from the fact that a man becomes accustomed not to subject his will in lesser things to due order, he is disposed to this, that he also not subject his will to the order of the ultimate end" (q. 88, a. 3 - Eccli. XIX, 1; Luke XVI, 10); 2. insofar as they impede the helps of God which would draw one back from mortal sin.

Venial sins directly dispose to mortal acts of the same species, namely:

1. venial sins from their own genus directly dispose to mortal sins per accidens, insofar as he who habitually commits a venial sin is disposed to loving it even as an ultimate end and to sinning mortally on account of it;

2. venial sins from lightness of matter and from imperfection of the voluntary act directly dispose to mortal sins of the same species: thus a small theft (or detraction) directly disposes to a great one, and half-full consent to lust disposes to fully voluntary lust (ibid.).

554. An angel cannot sin venially. - His intellect, since it is not discursive, does not know means except as connected with the end; whence his will cannot will means except in order to the end, and consequently there cannot be in him an inordination concerning the means without there being at the same time a disorder concerning the end itself. Whence good angels do good, evil angels evil, in all things, namely, from charity or from pride (q. 89, a. 4).

Likewise in the state of innocence venial sin was impossible; for then the lower part was perfectly subject to reason, whence venial sin from imperfection of act was impossible, that is, an act imperfectly subjected to deliberation; likewise reason was perfectly subject to God, whence venial sin per se and from the genus was impossible, that is, an act which is not subjected to the end, God, before man cast away perfect subordination to God, which is mortal (q. 89, a. 3).

555. Observation. - Venial sin cannot be committed before the use of reason is sufficient for mortal sin. Not indeed venial sin from its own genus or per se, because man more easily and earlier knows grave and perfect sin than light sin and sin in a qualified respect. - Nor venial sin from indeliberation, because for such a sin it is not sufficient that man deliberate imperfectly, but that he do this while he can deliberate perfectly; otherwise, the fact that the deliberation is not perfect but imperfect would not be voluntary and imputable to him. But perfect deliberation before the full use of reason is impossible. Thus Cajetan, on I-II, q. 89, a. 6, conformably to the doctrine of St. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 5, ad 7.

Treatise: On Habits and Virtues in General

Introduction

556. Object of the treatise. - Moral theology considers human acts by which man is moved toward God, the supernatural ultimate end: for it is the science concerning human acts in order to God the supernatural end, from revealed principles. Hence it treats of our ultimate end itself, and of the human acts by which we come to the end or beatitude, and of all things which pertain to those acts. Now acts need rules (an exemplar principle) to which they ought to be conformed, namely, both the proximate rule, or conscience, and the remote rule, or laws; and if they are not conformed to these, they are evil and are called sins. But acts also have (efficient) principles from which they are produced: the extrinsic principle is God through grace; the intrinsic principles are the powers and habits. Whence, after the treatises on the end, on human acts in themselves, on conscience, on laws, on sins, - with the doctrine on grace from dogmatic theology and the doctrine on the powers of the soul from psychology being supposed, - there rightly comes the consideration of habits, especially of good habits, the chief of which are virtues.

557. Division of the treatise. - Just as in a human act physical being, moral being, and supernatural being can be distinguished, so also in a habit. Hence the treatise is divided into three parts, and each into four questions.

The first part is on habits according to physical and psychological being, or on habits in general, that is, on their 1. essence, 2. subject, 3. cause, 4. distinction;

the second is on habits according to moral being, or on acquired virtues, that is, on their 1. essence, 2. subject, 3. distinction into intellectual, moral, and cardinal virtues, 4. properties: mean, connection, equality, duration;

the third is on habits according to supernatural being and on infused virtues, that is, on their 1. existence and essence, 2. distinction into theological virtues, moral virtues, and gifts of the Holy Spirit, 3. cause, 4. properties, as above.

558. The treatise is at once theological and philosophical. - The first part is merely philosophical, and provides the notions necessary for understanding the other parts. The third part is wholly theological, as treating of the supernatural element. The second part is at once philosophical, founded upon human reason; and theological, because it is partly confirmed by divine revelation or by the authority of the Church, and is employed as a means for explaining supernatural habits.[1]

[1] Cf. St. Thomas, in *Quaestiones disputatae de Virtutibus*; and I-II, q. 49-70, with the commentaries of Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Sylvius, and Pegues; also in part Billuart; - Goudin, *Philosophia*, in Logic and in Moral Philosophy; - Lehu, *Philosophia moralis et socialis*; - Satolli, *De Habitibus*; - de Roton, *Les Habitus, leur caractere spirituel*; - Waffelaert, *De Virtutibus Cardinalibus*; - Mazzella, Schiffini, and Billot, all of the Society of Jesus, each of whom wrote *De Virtutibus Infusis*; - Prummer, *Th. M.* I, n. 437 sq.; - Sertillanges, *La Philosophie morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin*; - Gardair, *Les vertus naturelles*; - Massoulie, *Meditations sur les Vertus*; - Janvier, *Conf. de N. D.: La Vertu*; - Masi, *De Virtute Fidei*, where an introduction on virtues in general is found.

On virtues, the modern authors of manuals are not accustomed to have many things; they are wholly occupied in distinguishing, numbering, and measuring sins, so that someone rightly said that their

moral theology is now nothing but a catalogue or code of sins. And if this is true of the special virtues, it is verified much more of virtues in general. On this argument, for example, St. Alphonsus, Gury, Ballerini, Genicot, Lehmkuhl, and Aertnijs have nothing; Vermeersch almost nothing; Haine few things. But many things are found in Marc, Tanquerey, and Noldin; nevertheless their doctrine is not complete nor always accurate. Better and more completely than all these, Prummer wrote. In the last editions of the work of Aertnijs, Fr. Damen added a good treatise on virtues.

First Part: On Habits in General According to Psychological Being

Question One: On the Essence of Habit

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49; Q. D. *de Virt*. 1, a. 1.

559. Habit (*hexis*, *hebbelijkheid*) is said from the verb *to have*; whence it signifies the quality or mode by which a thing has itself in this or that way, in itself or toward another. But something can have itself in many ways; whence the signification of the word is restricted to indicating only the first species of quality, that is, the mode by which a thing has itself in order to its nature and consequently to its end, and therefore well or badly; and indeed a perfect and permanent mode, which firmly inheres in the thing and therefore is lost with difficulty: thus it is distinguished from a simple disposition, which is a mode easily lost, by which a thing has itself in order to its nature. Therefore habit is a quality difficult to move, according to which a subject has itself well or badly according to itself or toward another; - or a stable disposition determining the subject to having itself well or badly according to itself or toward operation, in being or in operating.

"Habit," says St. Thomas, C. G. IV, 77, "differs from power in this, that through power we are able to do something, but through habit we are not rendered able to do something, but apt or inapt for doing well or badly that which we can do. Therefore through habit there is not given to us, nor taken away from us, any being able, but through habit we acquire this, that we do something well or badly."

560. Habit is divided a) into good and bad habit, according as it is a mode suitable to nature or not suitable;

b) into substantive or entitative habit, and operative habit, according as it is the mode by which nature has itself well or badly according to itself, as to being, - or by which it has itself well or badly toward another, as to its operation, or by which it is disposed to acting suitably or not suitably to its end.

The first immediately inheres in substance and is ordered principally to being, and not to operating, except mediately insofar as being itself is ordered to operating: such are beauty, health, sickness, and sanctifying grace; - the other immediately inheres in an operative power and therefore is immediately ordered to operation: such are aptitude and inaptitude, science and art, virtue and vice. "Something is disposed well or badly in two ways: namely, according to itself or by relation to something. Thus healthy is that which is well disposed according to itself, but robust is that which is well disposed for doing something." St. Thomas, in V *Metaph.*, lect. 20.

561. Necessity of habits. - That there are operative habits is known by experience: for operations which are very difficult afterward become very easy, as is clear from one who plays the lyre, or dances, or writes, or reads, or studies science, or exercises himself toward temperance or toward

drunkenness. - They are necessary in those things which are indifferent: for habit is good or bad; whence nothing has habit except that which can be disposed in several and diverse ways in order either to its nature in itself or to operation. Therefore habits are in those things which 1. are in potency, 2. to many, diverse, and contrary things, and therefore 3. can and ought to be disposed well or badly in several or diverse ways to their nature or operation. These three conditions are required in order that something need a habit. Hence:

1. Habit is not given in God, because in no way is He in potency, but He is His being and His operation, and consequently He can be disposed to nothing beyond Himself.

2. Nor is habit given in powers wholly determined to one thing, because they are sufficiently determined to act and cannot be determined in several ways, nor be more or better or less well disposed; whence the powers of nature do not acquire a habit by their exercise, but always act as much as they can.

3. But habits are in powers which are not wholly determined to one thing, and therefore do not have the whole propensity which they can have toward operation, but can be proportioned to this in diverse ways. Through habit such a power acquires a greater inclination, and thus constancy, facility, and sweetness in performing its acts. This mode becomes as it were connatural to it, and therefore habit is called a second nature.

Whence operative habit can be defined: A quality difficult to move by which man is disposed to operating easily, promptly, and delectably;[1] - or a permanent quality superadded to an operative power, facilitating it and inclining it to operating either well or badly, that is, suitably or not suitably to the end.

[1] It should be noted that infused habits give elevation to the power, but not so great a facility: they confer only the power of acting in higher things and a certain inclination toward them. See below n. 619.

562. Observations. - 1. From the aforesaid definition it follows:

a) that operative habit is the first (proximate) act of a power, and operation is the second act (q. 49, a. 3, ad 1);

b) that habit is a mean between pure operative power (remote first act) and perfect act (operation, second act);

c) that habit does not give to the power that it can operate, but that it operates perfectly, that is, constantly and uniformly, - promptly, easily, and expeditiously, - and delectably (Q. D. *de Virt*. 1, a. 1; C. G. IV, 77);

d) that operative habit is found truly and properly in an active power which properly operates; but in a merely passive power through which the active power operates, it is not found except improperly and secondarily, insofar as there is there a rather passive quality by which this power easily serves the active power (q. 50, a. 1).

2. Operative habit, while it inheres in an indifferent power, nevertheless does not completely take away its indifference, nor consequently necessitate it to act; whence St. Thomas says that someone uses a habit when he wills (q. 49, a. 3 sed contra; q. 50, a. 3, ad 2; a. 5).

Question Two: On the Subject of Habit

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 50.

563. A natural entitative habit is not found in the soul, because the soul is the form completing human nature, and therefore it cannot be disposed to something more perfect according to nature; but there can be found in it a supernatural habit by which it participates in a superior nature: thus through sanctifying grace it participates in the divine nature. - But in the body there is found a natural entitative habit by which it is more or less perfect in its being: such are health, sickness, beauty, deformity, leanness, etc.

564. Principle. Operative habit inheres in an indifferent operative power, that is, one not wholly determined to one thing. - It is proved:

1. It inheres in an operative power. For an operative habit is that which immediately determines to operation; but that must be determined to operation which is the principle of operation.

2. It inheres in an indifferent power. For that which can be disposed in several ways in itself can be ordered and determined in diverse ways to acting.

Hence it is in the powers of the soul which can operate in diverse ways:

1. in the will, which, as a rational power, can be ordered in diverse ways to acting and to a determined good of reason, and of itself is indifferent to acting well or badly;

2. in the intellect, which is in potency to all intelligible things, and undetermined to things not evident;

3. in the sensitive powers, not indeed when they operate from the instinct of nature (thus they are determined to one thing), but when they operate from the command of reason, according as they can be ordered to diverse things and disposed well or badly. But since:

a) the sensitive appetite operates more from the command of reason (and thus is more indifferent) than the internal senses, it follows that habit is found more in the sensitive appetite;

b) nevertheless habits are found in the interior senses, by which man becomes good in memory, or cogitative, or imaginative; but

c) they are not found in the external senses, because by nature they are wholly determined to one thing.

565. Operative habits properly so called are not in the powers of the body, which do not properly operate, but are mere instruments of the soul. For:

a) Operative habit per se does not inhere in the powers of the body, namely, the exterior members, or vegetative powers, or motive powers according to place, because by nature they are determined to one thing.

b) But insofar as they are moved by the soul, in them, and also in the external senses, properly operative habits cannot be, because they do not properly operate, but are mere instruments of the soul, which principally operates in them and which they obey at command.

c) Yet they are said to be in them secondarily, because in them there can be qualities and passive dispositions by which they are materially disposed to serving promptly the operations of the soul. Thus, for example, the motive powers according as the nerves are loosened or contracted; the vegetative powers according as they become accustomed to abstinence or to the use of a determined food.

Question Three: On the Cause of Habits

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 51, 52, 53; q. 63, a. 1 and 2; *De Virt.* q. 1, a. 8 and 9.

566. Principle I. One operative habit of the soul inheres in man from nature, not indeed totally (for then it would be innate), but partially and according to an inchoation, namely, the habit of first principles, insofar as, once the terms have been known through intelligible species (which do not inhere in us by nature), there immediately flows forth the facility of seeing that the terms agree with one another or do not.

567. Principle II. Other habits are caused in the soul from human acts proper to the agent, namely, from acts of the moving power in the moved power of the same agent;[1] thus, for example, the act of the appetitive power proceeds from apprehension representing the object, the intellective power as reasoning has as an active principle a proposition known through itself, and the possible intellect is moved by the agent intellect. For an agent in which there is at once the active and passive principle of its act, insofar as it is active can cause a habit, and insofar as it is passive can receive that habit and be perfected by it.

[1] Also the same power can be moving and moved under a diverse respect.

They are acquired habits.[2]

[2] Cf. I-II, q. 51, a. 3, and *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 9, ad 10 and 11.

Sometimes a habit is caused by one act, when the acting power by one act totally overcomes the passive power, as happens in the habit of science, because one act suffices for conviction;[3] - ordinarily, however, it is caused from repeated acts of the same species, as happens in an opinative habit, in habits of the internal senses, and especially in moral virtues and vices, because reason by one act cannot bring it about that the appetite be good or bad ordinarily, generally, and in all circumstances, as is nevertheless required for virtue or vice.

[3] Thus as to the intellect, for "as to the lower apprehensive powers, it is necessary that the same acts be reiterated several times, so that something be firmly impressed on the memory." q. 51, a. 3.

568. Principle III. Other habits are caused by God, namely, supernatural habits by which we are disposed to the supernatural end exceeding the faculty of human nature; likewise God can also cause habits which we can acquire by our acts, just as He gave to some knowledge of the Scriptures or of languages.

They are habits infused per se, or per accidens.

569. Principle IV. No habit is innate. - Supernatural habits in no way inhere in us from nature; - nor are acquired habits from nature according to essence, perfection, and consummation, but only according to a certain aptitude and inchoation, and indeed in two ways.

a) On the part of the soul, not according to the inchoation of the habit itself, but only according to aptitude or as to its principles, insofar as the intellect and will naturally state an order and inclination to knowledge of the true and love of the good, and thus the habit of first principles in the intellect and the natural inclination of the will to the good are principles or seeds from which intellectual and moral virtues are generated.[4] But "because the inclination to proper objects, which seems to be an inchoation of habit, does not pertain to habit but rather to the very account of the powers" (q. 51, a. 1), therefore it is not an inchoation of the habit itself according to itself, but only according to its principles or according to its aptitude in its causes.

[4] Cf. q. 51, a. 1 and q. 63, a. 1.

b) On the part of the body and of the internal senses, also according to the inchoation of the habit itself, insofar as on account of their disposition man is helped or impeded toward good, and thus is disposed better or less well to certain habits: thus from the disposition of the organs and the complexion of the body, one man is more disposed to understanding than another, or has a propensity to certain virtues (chastity, fortitude, meekness) or vices (anger, lust). Thus he has a greater aptitude for receiving such and such a habit and acquires it more easily.[5]

[5] Nevertheless they are not virtues or vices: for the soul can be unharmed, although the body is so disposed from natural complexion.

Moreover habits of the body can be caused by one act, if the producing cause was of great power, as health from one strong medicine, organic deformation from one passion, for example, from immense terror.

570. Principle V. Habits are increased, but not by the addition of a new grade: for addition supposes two or more things which are added, whence there would be several habits and thus several accidents of the same species in the same subject, which is repugnant (for example, two charities, two temperances, two arts); nor would the prior habit truly become greater and be increased, but rather it would be multiplied. But they are increased:

1. according to themselves: extensively, insofar as the same habit in number extends itself to new objects to which it was not previously ordered; as theological science is extended by the study of a new treatise;

2. on the part of the subject: intensively, insofar as the same habit is received more and inheres more firmly in the subject, and reduces it more into act; and consequently the power in which the habit resides participates more in the account of the habit, whence it tends to act more expeditiously and promptly; as the knowledge of the same treatise becomes clearer. And indeed:

a) Habits are increased intensively by the same cause by which they are produced: for similar acts cause habits similar not only in species but also in grade and intensity; whence an act more intense than, or equally intense as, the habit increases it or at least disposes it to increase; but when the will does not use the habit totally and produces a less intense act, that act disposes rather to diminution of the habit and does not increase it.

b) Habits are increased extensively through acts concerning another part of the object: one who already has knowledge of all the treatises of theology, except one, increases the habit by the study of

that part.

571. Principle VI. Habits are corrupted per se or per accidens: per accidens, when the subject in which they inhere is corrupted; per se, that is, through their contrary. It should be noted that every habit which is acquired by one act is corrupted by one act; but that which is acquired by several acts is not corrupted except by several, though it is diminished by only one.

Habits which do not have a contrary, such as the habit of principles, are not corrupted per se. But those which have a contrary can be corrupted per se, as science and opinion through an opposite principle or through a sophistical deduction; and acquired moral virtue through contrary judgments of practical reason from ignorance, passion, or malice; likewise habits of the body.

Habits of the intellect and will are not corrupted per accidens, because these faculties are incorruptible; but habits of the sensitive powers and of the body are corrupted, as temperance before the resurrection.

572. Principle VII. Habits are diminished intensively and extensively from the same cause by which they are corrupted per se, that is, through a contrary, because diminution is the way to corruption.

Moreover, certain habits are also diminished and corrupted by cessation from act alone, not indeed directly per se, but indirectly per accidens, namely, through the removal of that which prevents, insofar as this cessation takes away the acts which would impede things contrary to the habit from corrupting or diminishing it per se.

Question Four: On the Distinction of Habits

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 54 and 56, a. 2.

573. There are several rules according to which habits are distinguished in species (a. 2):

1. As forms are distinguished by reason of cause: habits whose proper and per se causes are diverse are distinguished in species, for every agent acts so as to produce something similar to itself according to species. Thus habits are distinguished which are acquired by diverse acts; likewise acquired habits, which we acquire by our acts, and infused habits per se, which God alone can give us.

2. As habits are distinguished by reason of nature: habits which state a diverse order to nature (and consequently to the end) are distinguished in species, as good and bad habits; or habits which state an order to a diverse nature, as ordinary human virtue and divine or heroic virtue, which is suitable to a superior nature.

3. As operative habits are distinguished by reason of the object: habits which have diverse formal objects are distinguished in species; for habits are dispositions to acts; therefore if acts are distinguished in species according to objects, habits also are. - This is the chief rule, because it indicates the ultimate species.

The three aforesaid rules are fundamental; but from the last there follows a derived rule, namely:

4. That habits consequently are distinguished by reason of the subject: habits which inhere in diverse powers operating principally are distinguished in species. For the powers themselves are distinguished from objects generically distinct. Whence where the powers are diverse, the objects also are diverse.[1]

[1] Hence the distinctive principle is the object, because powers are distinguished from the object. The disposition of the subject is not the principle of distinction by reason of itself but by reason of the object. Whence here, in truth, a new rule distinct from the third is not handed down.

574. Corollaries. - 1. From the third rule it follows that habits of diverse species can inhere in one and the same power, because a power can be ordered to diverse objects.

2. The fourth rule of specific distinction by reason of the subject or power is to be understood of powers which operate principally. For those which operate secondarily, by serving the principal act or by disposing to it, tend toward the object of the principal operation, and therefore the secondary habits which inhere in them have their species from this object: thus the operation of art in the hand takes its species from the object of the art which is in the intellect.

3. Hence one habit or one virtue cannot be equally and according to essence in several powers; nevertheless it can pertain to several powers in a certain order, so that it is in one principally and secondarily extends itself to others: either by way of diffusion, according as one power moves another which serves it, for example, justice commands frugality or temperance; or by way of disposition, according as one receives from another, for example, prudence rectifying the choice of means supposes rectitude of the appetite concerning the end (q. 66, a. 2).

Second Part: On Habits According to Moral Being, or On Acquired Virtues

According to moral being, that is, in order to the ultimate end and the rule of morals, operative habits are good and are virtues, or evil and are vices, according as they are suitable or not suitable to rational nature and its ultimate end.[1] Concerning vices enough has been said in the treatise on sins: for as many sins as there are diverse completed species, so many habits caused from them and inclining to them, or vices, can also be had. Therefore it remains that we speak specially of good habits and virtues.

[1] Moral theology treats of the motion of the rational creature toward God. We approach God by acts of virtues. Therefore virtues pertain per se to moral theology, not to dogmatic theology.

Question One: On the Essence of Virtue

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55; 56, a. 3; 57, a. 1; 65, a. 2; *De Virt*. q. 1, a. 1 and 2.

576. Virtue according to the name (*ischys*, *dynamis*, *deugd*) is derived from force, and therefore designates the perfection of an operative power or a completed power.[1] Hence:

[1] "Virtue according to the account of its name designates the complement of a power; whence also force is so called according as some thing, through the complete power which it has, can follow its impulse or motion; for virtue, according to its name, designates the perfection of power." Q. D. *de Virt*. q. 1, a. 1.

1. natural powers, since they are wholly determined to one thing, are from themselves perfectly disposed to operation, and therefore are called virtues of nature (a. 1). But

2. powers indifferent to many and diverse things, such as rational powers, can from themselves be disposed better through habit, and therefore in them the power is distinguished from its perfection; and virtue in them is a habit (a. 1). But since

3. true perfection does not consist except in good, it follows that virtue is a good operative habit (a. 3). Whence Aristotle: Virtue is that which makes the one having it good and renders his work good (II *Eth.*, c. 6; VII *Phys.*, c. 3);

4. we are treating of human virtue, which is proper to man, and which therefore is a good rational operative habit (a. 2).

577. Virtue is defined in words gathered from St. Augustine: A good quality of mind by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us.[2] There is indicated:

[2] Cf. *c. Iul.* IV, 3; *de Lib. Arb.* II, 19; ep. 105; and sermon XXVI on Ps. 118.

1. the genus: quality, because it is of the genus of habits; nevertheless it would be better to say habit, which is the proximate genus;

2. the specific difference: good, by which it is specifically distinguished from bad habits;

3. the subject: of mind, because human virtue resides in reason or in a power moved by reason;

4. the end of virtue, namely, operation: a) by which one lives rightly, that is, by which man operates conformably to reason, so that it may be indicated that it is a properly operative habit, and that it may be distinguished from habits which always have themselves toward evil; b) which no one uses badly, by which it is distinguished from habits which are sometimes toward good, sometimes toward evil, such as opinion or human faith. Hence virtue cannot be a principle productive of an evil act, and an act of virtue cannot be evil, for virtue does not flow into an evil act. Namely, no one can make virtue produce an evil act; no one can, by using virtue as a principle, produce an evil work; - nevertheless someone can use virtue badly as an object, as for example when he is proud of it or hates it, but that act does not proceed from virtue as from an operative principle;

5. the efficient cause is added: which God works in us without us, that is, without us as efficient causes, not however without us, as adults, consenting, or disposing ourselves through the help of grace; this is true of infused supernatural virtue, of which Augustine speaks. If these last words are omitted, there is had a definition common to all acquired and infused virtues (a. 4).

That this definition is real, that is, that such virtues are in fact given, will be shown throughout the whole treatise.

578. Virtue renders a power perfect. - Hence:

1. Not every good habit is a virtue, but only that which includes no imperfection; whence opinion, human faith or hope, continence, and constancy[3] are not virtues (q. 58, a. 3, ad 2).

[3] St. Thomas, using the terminology of Aristotle, says perseverance, but it is better called constancy, so that it may be distinguished from perseverance strictly so called, which is a virtue properly so called (II-II, q. 137, a. 1 and 3). On continence, cf. II-II, q. 155, a. 1.

2. Nor are those good habits virtues which serve the action of the principal power: for until the principal power, which consummates the work, is well disposed to operation, man will not yet be perfectly disposed to it, nor therefore will the operation be perfect. Therefore only the habit which inheres in the principal power, consummative of the good work, is called virtue. Hence it is said by Aristotle: the disposition of the perfect to the best,[4] that is, a stable disposition of a power perfectly instructed for exercising its operation in the best way.

[4] "Virtues are certain dispositions of that which is perfect in its nature toward the best, that is, toward the end, which is operation. For, as has been said, virtues of this kind are so called from this, that they make the one having them good and render his work good." St. Thomas, in VII *Phys.* c. 3, text. 17. Cf. II *Eth.* c. 6, and I-II, q. 55, a. 4; q. 56, a. 5; q. 58, a. 3, ad 2.

579. The notion of virtue is analogical, and therefore it does not belong equally perfectly to all, nor is it said of all in the same sense. For certain virtues render man perfect under some respect only, and therefore are called virtues in a qualified sense; - certain virtues render man good simply, insofar as he is man, and therefore are called simply and properly so called; to them belongs in the full sense the definition of Aristotle: virtue is that which makes the one having it good and renders his work good. Hence:

A. In the natural order and for philosophers: merely intellectual virtues (arts and sciences), which render man good under some respect only, namely, as to the good of one power, for example, which make a good architect, a good philosopher, etc., are called virtues in a qualified sense; but moral virtues render man simply perfect under the account of the good (namely, the honorable), that is, as to the good of the whole man, and make a good man, and therefore they are called virtues simply so called or simply human virtues. Their difference is twofold:

a) the former, although they give aptitude for operating well, nevertheless do not incline to using their aptitude; whence he who does not use his art is not on that account judged a more imperfect artisan; the latter incline man to use his aptitude rightly; whence he who does not posit just or temperate acts does not have justice or temperance;

b) the former do not render man morally good, nor incline him to living honorably; the latter, on the contrary, do; whence they reside in the will or in a power as moved by the will (q. 57, a. 1; 56, a. 3).

B. In the supernatural order and for theologians: virtues in a qualified sense are those which render man good as to a particular end (or an ultimate end in some genus), for example, temperate, just, believing, etc.; virtues simply and properly so called are those by which man is perfected as to the supernatural ultimate end. Whence natural and philosophical virtues, even those strictly so called, are not in the perfect state of virtue nor are they called by theologians virtues simply so called, unless in fact they are habitually ordered to the ultimate end, which is done through charity: then they are called perfect or formed; but if they inhere in a man turned away from the ultimate end, they are

called imperfect virtues or unformed, since there is lacking to them the ultimate or supreme perfection or form of morality. Formed virtues are virtues in the fullest sense (q. 65, a. 2).

580. Observation. - Just as in a good or evil human act (and in passion), so also in a moral habit, virtue and vice, a twofold element can be distinguished:

1. the material and physical, which is only the inclination or physical propensity to acting well or badly;

2. the formal or moral, which is the ordination of reason, namely, a permanent deliberate adhesion to the object as good or evil, which perfects the habit in the moral being of virtue or vice.

Hence when a sinner is converted, that which has the formal account of vice is taken away from the evil habit, but not the material propensity, although it is diminished and impeded; whence the vice remains only as to the material element, in a certain state of destruction. And likewise when a virtuous man sins gravely against the object of the virtue, he loses the formal element of virtue, but the good acquired habit remains as to its material element.[5]

[5] "Infused and acquired virtue are not of the same species. Whence since a habit generated from the frequency of works of sin is contrary to acquired virtue, it is not directly contrary to infused virtue, which has opposition to sin from that part by which it is an offense of God. Whence it is not necessary that, as soon as the infused virtues have been restored, the habits of vices be totally taken away, although they are impeded and also diminished." St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4. - "And although an acquired habit is not corrupted through a simple act, nevertheless an act of contrition has this, that it corrupts a habit of vice generated, from the power of grace. Whence in him who had a habit of intemperance, when he is contrite, there does not remain with the infused virtue of temperance a habit of intemperance in the account of habit, but on the way to corruption, as a certain disposition. But a disposition is not contrary to a perfect habit." Q. D. *de Virt.*, a. 10, ad 16.

581. Corollary. - The followers of Americanism contradict the proposed doctrine; their ideas are found latent among certain persons even in Germany, France, and England. They are said to have distinguished two genera of virtues, namely, active virtues and passive virtues, or: manly virtues, such as independence of self, cultivation of one's own personality, duties toward neighbor; and womanly virtues, such as humility, patience, meekness, abnegation of self, full confidence in God. Moreover, natural virtues seem rather to have the active virtues, which answer more aptly to the customs and necessities of the present age; but Christian and supernatural virtues seem rather to have passive virtues, which no longer agree with the present time as they did in the Middle Ages.

This doctrine was condemned by Leo XIII, in the letter of January 22, 1899 to Cardinal Gibbons. And deservedly; for it contradicts:

1. Scripture, where Prov. XVI, 32 says: "The patient man is better than the strong"; and Christ, our exemplar, is shown as meek and humble (Matt. XI, 29), and obedient (Phil. II, 5, 8), and crucified for the mortification of the flesh, on which account those who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with its vices and concupiscences (Gal. V, 24).

2. Reason. For a) a virtue cannot be passive, for as Leo XIII says, "virtue is the perfection of a power...; the end of a power is act, and the act of virtue is nothing other than the good use of free will";

b) furthermore, that natural virtues are to be preferred to supernatural ones and are of greater efficacy or fecundity cannot be understood, because nature, with grace acceding, is not made weaker, but is perfected. Whence also the saints, from humility, obedience, and abstinence, were made powerful in work and word.

3. Experience. It is established that to exercise passive virtues is of greater labor than to acquire active virtues; furthermore, it is known that from the exercise of those virtues great fruits have come both to individuals and to society, as Leo XIII shows.

4. Finally, it contradicts the very doctrine on the connection of virtues among themselves, with which it fits badly and can scarcely agree.[6]

[6] Cf. *Analecta S. O. P.*, vol. IV, p. 68; Weiss, *Die Kunst zum Leben*, XII, n. 2; Hugon, *Vertus actives et vertus passives*, in *Revue Thomiste*, 1908.

Question Two: On the Subject of Virtue

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56; *De Virt.* q. 1, a. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

582. Principle I. Virtues are in the powers of the soul. - Since virtue is 1. an operative habit, and 2. the perfection of an operative power, and 3. a disposition to the best end, but the end is operation or the thing operated, it follows that it is in an operative power of the soul as in a subject.

583. Principle II. In the intellect considered according to itself there are only virtues in a qualified sense, by which man is perfect under some respect: thus science and art; but insofar as it is moved by the will, there are also in it virtues simply and properly so called, by which man is perfected to the ultimate end: these are prudence and the virtues annexed to it, and in the supernatural order divine faith (q. 56, a. 3).

584. Principle III. In the will there are virtues simply so called, but not all. - For in the will:

a) There are not habits by which we are inclined to choosing our good of reason, proportioned to the will: for the will is appetite, whence from its nature, without a habit, it sufficiently tends toward its proper good; it is rational appetite, therefore it tends to the good of reason, that is, the honorable. Hence in the will there is no virtue for choosing the good of reason in the passions (q. 56, a. 6).

b) Nevertheless there are in the will habits for resisting the passions, namely, continence for resisting passions impelling toward delectable good against right reason, and constancy for resisting passions drawing one back from the good of reason on account of sadness and arduousness; these, however, are not called virtues, because they do not render man perfect: for they do not make the passions obey reason (q. 58, a. 3, ad 2).

c) Virtues simply so called inhere in the will, by which we are well ordered to an extrinsic good which exceeds the proportion of the one willing, whether as to the individual, such as the good of another, to which justice orders, or as to the species or human nature, such as the divine or supernatural good communicated to us, to which theological hope and charity order: for to these goods the will is not sufficiently inclined from its nature, and therefore virtues which order the affection of man toward God or neighbor are in the will (q. 56, a. 6).

585. Principle IV. In the sensitive appetite there are true virtues. - For in the sensitive appetite:

a) considered in itself there are not habits, nor therefore virtues;

b) but insofar as it is moved by reason and is the immediate principle of human acts, there are in it habits by which the passions obey and are conformed to reason, as fortitude, temperance, meekness, etc.;

c) moreover, those habits are virtues simply so called, because they include no imperfection, and because the good work is consummated in the sensitive appetite, namely, the regulated passion itself (q. 56, a. 4).

586. Principle V. In the other powers there are not virtues. - In the internal senses there are indeed good habits, but these are not virtues, because the good work is not consummated in the internal senses, and therefore those habits are subordinated to others: thus the habit of good memory serves the virtue of science, and a good cogitative power serves prudence. But in the other powers of man (the external senses, vegetative or locomotive powers) there are not properly operative habits, nor therefore virtues (a. 5).

Question Three: On the Distinction of Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57-63; *De Virt*. q. 1, a. 12.

587. Principles. Virtues are distinguished:

1. By reason of the subject or power in which they principally inhere, into intellectual virtues, which are in the intellect, and moral (or appetitive) virtues, which are in the appetite.

2. By reason of the nature to which they state an order, into natural virtues, which are suitable to human nature as such and to the natural end; and supernatural virtues, which are suitable to the divine nature participated in us, and to the supernatural end, the beatific vision; of these there will be treatment in the third part.

3. By reason of the cause, into acquired virtues, which are acquired by our natural acts, in the way explained in part I, q. 3, n. 567; and infused virtues per se, which God alone can give us.

4. By reason of the object and matter about which they are concerned, intellectual virtues are divided into speculative and practical virtues, and moral virtues according to their various objects; likewise supernatural virtues are distinguished into theological virtues, which are concerned with God Himself, and moral virtues, which order our life: these latter, just like natural virtues strictly so called, which render man morally good, are distinguished into cardinal virtues, which are concerned with principal matter, and annexed virtues, which are concerned with secondary matter.

It should be noted that virtues can be distinguished from several headings; in fact, however many there are, they are distinguished by reason of the object, which gives the lowest species.

In the present matter we shall speak in particular of intellectual, moral, and cardinal virtues.

Article I: On Intellectual Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57; *De Virt*. q. 1, a. 6 and 7.

588. Principle. Five distinct species of intellectual virtues are enumerated:

A. Three are in the speculative intellect, which rests in the contemplation of truth, by which namely it is perfected for knowing truth:

1. The habit of principles, by which it is disposed for knowing first principles, whether speculative, and then it is called simply understanding (*nous*), or practical, and then it is called synderesis.

2. Science (*episteme*), by which it is perfected for knowing evident conclusions in some genus of knowable things through their proper causes.

3. Wisdom (*sophia*), by which it is perfected for knowing conclusions of whatever genus through the highest causes, through which it also judges concerning principles.

B. In the practical intellect, which orders truth to work, there are two, by which it is perfected for directing and regulating human operations:

4. Art (*techne*), which rules transitive operations by which something is made in exterior matter, such as building, cutting, etc.

5. Prudence (*phronesis*), which rules operations remaining in the agent himself, such as willing, loving, becoming angry, etc.

Art is defined as right reason of things to be made, which directs the works themselves or effects to be made according to certain rules; prudence, as right reason of things to be done, which directs human acts.

589. In what sense they are virtues. - The first four are virtues in a qualified sense, because they do not incline to acting honorably: for they give only aptitude for operating well, not good use, because this pertains to the appetite, whence the work of art can be morally worst; - on the contrary, prudence, by which human reason is well disposed for ordering human acts in the appetite as means to an honorable end, is a virtue simply so called.

This virtue is most necessary to man. For in order to live honorably, it is not enough that man will some good end (*what* he is to do), but it is also especially required that he order suitable means to the end (*how* he is to act). Toward the due end man is disposed in the appetite through moral virtue; but for the means to be ordered suitably to the end, reason, moved by the will, also must be well disposed, which is done through prudence: for to deliberate, judge, and command concerning means precisely to be chosen are acts of reason; but prudence disposes us well to doing these rightly.

590. Corollary. - Hence, although prudence according to essence and by reason of the subject is an intellectual virtue, by reason of the matter, which is an honorable human act, it agrees with the moral virtues. Whence it is numbered among them when they are opposed to the theological virtues.

Article II: On Moral Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 58-60; *De Virt*. q. 1, a. 4, 5, 12.

591. Moral virtue is said from custom, that is, an inclination to acting, which properly belongs to the appetite; whence moral virtue is a habit by which the appetite is well disposed so that it may be conformed to reason. In fact, it is a habitual conformity to right reason. But since to choose is an act proper to the human appetite, hence moral virtue is a habit elective according to right reason, and it is defined by Aristotle, *Eth.* VI, c. 6: an elective habit consisting in a mean relative to us, determined by reason as the wise man will determine.[1] It is said:

[1] Cf. St. Thomas, in *Eth.* VI, c. 6, lect. 7.

1. an elective habit, because choice is the proper act of moral virtue, and because a moral habit is the principle of choice;

2. consisting in a mean relative to us: this is the object or term of this action. The moral good which is the object of virtue is a mean between excess and defect, which must be estimated not in itself, but with respect to the one choosing, so that he may choose what is fitting to himself according to right reason, neither more nor less;

3. determined by reason: this is the cause of goodness. For it is reason which determines the mean between excess and defect, so that it may be good. And because it happens that reason is not always right but also sometimes erroneous, there is added: as the wise man, that is, the prudent man, will determine; namely, reason through prudence will rightly estimate what is good or evil in acts of the appetite (q. 58, a. 1 and 59, a. 1).

592. Principle I. Moral virtues are necessary. - For both the rational and the sensitive appetite do not obey reason wholly at command, but can contradict it, because they are properly operative, that is, they have their own motions and actions. Whence for operating well it is required that not only the intellect be well disposed through prudence, but also the appetite be well disposed, for obeying reason, through the habits of moral virtues; otherwise it would be moved as if violently and with sadness (q. 58, a. 2).

593. Principle II. Moral virtue is not one in species but multiple, both by reason of the subject or diverse power in which it inheres, and by reason of the object (the formal principle), which can have itself in diverse ways toward reason, in which it can participate more or less, and thus states a diverse relation to reason directing (q. 59, a. 2 and 4; q. 60, a. 1).

For reason directs both the operations of the will by which man is disposed, even externally, toward another, and the passions of the sensitive appetite, whether of the concupiscible or of the irascible, so that they may be conformed to reason and thus man may be well disposed internally, in order to himself. Whence in a threefold way: both a) by reason of the matter about which they are principally[2] concerned (external operations, interior affections impelling or withdrawing), and b) by reason of the subject in which they inhere (will, concupiscible appetite, irascible appetite), and c) by reason of the formal object (good according to commensuration to another, or good according to commensuration only to the one operating, either as delectable or as arduous), there are distinguished in species virtues concerning operations of the will, - virtues concerning passions of the concupiscible, - and virtues concerning passions of the irascible (q. 60, a. 2).

[2] Principally, for virtues concerning operations can consequently be concerned with passions, insofar as these impede due operations, and conversely virtues concerning passions can also be concerned with operations, if the passions have exterior

effects and state a relation to another. Whence St. Thomas, q. 60, a. 2: "But it happens that in operations which are toward another the good of virtue is omitted on account of an inordinate passion of the soul, and then insofar as the commensuration of the exterior operation is corrupted, there is a corruption of justice; but insofar as the commensuration of the interior passions is corrupted, there is a corruption of some other virtue, as when on account of anger someone strikes another, in the undue striking itself justice is corrupted, but in the immoderation of anger meekness is corrupted. And the same is clear in other cases."

594. Principle III. The virtues concerning operations are diverse. - All the virtues which are concerned with operations agree in the general account of debt toward another. But the account of debt is not of one account in all: in one way something is owed strictly from pact; in another way, not strictly, from a promise or a benefit received; in another way something is owed to an equal, in another to a superior, in another to a lesser. Whence, according to the diverse accounts of debt, the virtues concerning operations are diverse, for example, justice, religion, piety, gratitude, truth, etc. (q. 60, a. 3).

595. Principle IV. There are also diverse virtues concerning passions of the concupiscible or the irascible, not indeed from the fact that the passions are diverse, but when they state a diverse relation to reason.

Hence a) the same virtue is concerned with contrary passions, between which it holds the mean, for example, fortitude between fear and daring (q. 60, a. 4);

b) furthermore diverse passions can be ordered to one another and to one thing in a certain order, and in the same way can be repugnant (or suitable) to reason, as happens for the passions of the concupiscible: love, desire, and delight of the same good (and consequently also for hatred, flight, and sadness concerning the opposed evil); whence all those passions pertain not to diverse virtues but to the same virtue, for example, to temperance (a. 4);

c) on the contrary, when passions are ordered to a diverse good of reason, and thus state a diverse relation to reason, as happens for the passions of the irascible, which "are not of one order but are ordered to diverse things. For daring and fear are ordered to some great danger; hope and despair to some arduous good; but anger to overcoming some contrary which has inflicted harm. And therefore concerning these passions there are diverse virtues, namely... fortitude concerning fears and darings, magnanimity concerning hope and despair, meekness concerning angers" (q. 60, a. 4);

d) a fortiori when they pertain to diverse powers, because then they are concerned with diverse objects; whence some virtues are concerned with passions of the concupiscible (good as such), others with passions of the irascible (good as arduous), for example, temperance and fortitude, philotimy and magnanimity, liberality and magnificence, temperance and meekness, etc.[3] (a. 5).

[3] Because reason rules the lower parts of man and also extends to exterior things, not at command but "in a certain order (and according to conditions determined by nature), therefore also according as one object of passion is apprehended by sense or imagination - or also by reason, and according as it pertains to the soul, the body, or exterior things, it has a diverse relation to reason, and consequently is apt to diversify virtues. Therefore the good of man, which is the subject of love, concupiscence, and delight, can be taken either as pertaining to the sense of the body (for example, food), or to the interior apprehension of the soul (for example, money, honor); and this either as it is ordered to the good of man in himself, either as to the body (money) or as to the soul (honor); or as it is ordered to the good of man in order to others (actions and speech, whether serious, by which he renders himself delightful or manifests himself to another, or playful). And every such diversity, on account of the diverse order to reason, diversifies virtue..." And because certain goods "can be considered either absolutely or with arduousness..., it is clear that according to Aristotle there are ten moral virtues

concerning passions, namely, fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, philotimy, meekness, friendship, truth, and eutrapely." q. 60, a. 5.

596. Corollaries. - From what has been said it follows:

1. "That the first principle of all human operations is reason,... whence just as appetite (rational or sensitive) is a principle of human act according as it participates in reason in some way, so moral habit has the account of human virtue insofar as it is conformed to reason" (q. 58, a. 2).

2. Hence, just as intellectual virtue is rational by essence, so moral virtue is rational by participation, insofar as the appetite, whether the superior appetite of the will or the lower appetite of the sensitive life, participates in reason (q. 60, a. 1; q. 56, a. 4 and ad 1; a. 6, ad 2; q. 58, a. 2; q. 59, a. 4, ad 2; q. 61, a. 2).

3. Moral virtues can exist without the intellectual virtues of wisdom, science, and art; not, however, without prudence, which is necessary for rightly taking the means to the end and which itself supposes understanding of practical principles (q. 58, a. 4).

4. Intellectual virtues can exist without moral virtues; however, prudence does not exist without these. For in order that a work be of the virtue of prudence, it must be done for a right end, or for the good; moral virtue provides the right end (a. 5).

Article III: On Cardinal Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 61; *De Virt.* q. 5, a. 1; q. 1, a. 12, ad 26.

597. Principle I. Certain virtues are called cardinal, as principal virtues on which the others are founded: thus metaphorically from the hinge on which a door is turned; whence those are so called on which, as on hinges, moral life turns and the whole right human life is founded.[1] Since they are principal in human life, they are not merely intellectual virtues and virtues in a qualified sense, but are virtues simply so called and moral virtues, which alone contain rectitude of appetite and which, with respect to good, surpass the intellectual virtues.

[1] Ambrose seems to have been the first who called them cardinal, *exp. in Luc.*, l. V, n. 49 and 62.

That there are four cardinal virtues is proved:

1. By reason of the object: the good of reason, which is the object of virtue, can be considered either in the very act of reason which considers it, or in the various matters in which it must be produced, namely, in operations and in passions. But some passions impel toward something contrary to reason; others draw one back from that which reason dictates. Thus, therefore, there will be one principal virtue which makes good in reason itself: prudence; and one which makes good in operations: justice; and one which moderates and represses passions impelling to what is contrary to reason: temperance; and one which strengthens us against passions drawing us back from the order of reason: fortitude.

2. By reason of the subject: there are four faculties of the soul in which virtues reside, and in each there must be a principal virtue: therefore in reason there is prudence; in the will, justice; in the concupiscible, temperance; in the irascible, fortitude.

598. Cardinal virtues are not always understood by all in the same sense. - For some take them in a generic sense, as general modes which are found in several, indeed in all virtues;[2] either:

[2] Thus Ambrose and Gregory.

a) as four genera or collections of virtues, under which all the others are contained as species, so that whatever virtue makes good in the consideration of reason is called prudence (for example, eubulia), and whatever virtue makes rectitude in operations is called justice (for example, religion, piety, gratitude), and whatever virtue restrains and represses passions is called temperance (for example, meekness, humility), and whatever virtue makes firmness of soul against whatever passions is called fortitude (for example, magnificence, magnanimity); - or also

b) as general conditions required for any virtue whatever, insofar as every virtue ought to be prudent, just, strong, and moderated.

But although these things are true, nevertheless they do not describe the proper nature of the cardinal virtues in the strict sense.

599. Principle II. Cardinal virtues are to be taken in a specific sense and are special virtues, which have determinate matter and are distinguished from all others. For:

a) In each genus of virtues (of which there has been treatment above) there is something greatest, chief, and more difficult, concerning which there is had a special virtue: thus in the act by which reason considers, the chief and more difficult thing is to command well rather than to counsel and judge well; in operations toward another, the chief thing is the rectitude due to strict equality, in which rectitude most shines forth, namely, in commutations and distributions; similarly it is more difficult to restrain the more vehement delights, namely, the delights of touch, and to strengthen man against the greatest dangers, namely, dangers of death. Whence there are four principal virtues, as being those which are concerned with principal matter: prudence strictly so called, which is preceptive of the good; justice properly so called, which is concerned with due actions between equals; temperance properly so called, which represses the concupiscences of the delights of touch; and fortitude strictly so called, which strengthens against dangers of death.

b) But because he who is well disposed to doing the chief and more difficult thing thereby has a certain inchoate disposition and facility for the less difficult, according to the saying: He who can do the greater can do the lesser (just as he who can restrain the concupiscences of the flesh, which is more difficult, thereby is more apt for restraining other passions, which is easier; and he who is just can already become liberal, grateful, pious, which otherwise he could not), hence he who has these four special virtues has, at least according to an inchoation, all the other moral virtues; and therefore they are the foundation of all the others, and are rightly called cardinal.[3]

[3] Cf. St. Thomas, in III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 4; and *De Virt*., q. 1, a. 12, ad 26.

But the others are called annexed virtues, which are concerned with secondary acts or matters, or potential parts, as not having the whole power of the principal virtue.

Question Four: On the Properties of Virtues

Article I: On the Mean of Virtue

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 64, a. 1, 2, 3; *De Virt*. q. 1, a. 13.

600. The saying: "Moral virtue is in the mean":

1. Is not to be understood of a mean according to essence and by reason of habit, as if it signified that virtue is essentially between two extreme vices, one of which is opposed to it by excess, the other by defect: for this is false concerning the virtue of justice, to which injustice alone is opposed. Besides, by the same sin one sins simultaneously by excess and by defect, for he who gives less than he ought to one gives more than he can to another or to himself; and if someone gives more than he ought to another, he is already not just but liberal.

2. But it is to be understood causally, of the mean according to effect and by reason of the object, and it signifies that virtue has for its object a mean between excess (more) and defect (less) in its proper matter: for it brings it about that our appetite chooses operations or passions neither more nor less, but precisely in that measure which right reason dictates. Thus for temperance, excess in the matter consists in using delights more than one ought, defect in not using them when one ought, and the mean which is the object of temperance is to use delights as, when, in what way... one ought.

It is proved: The good of moral virtue is in adequation or conformity to the rule, that is, to right reason, without discord from it. But adequation is a mean between excess, by which something surpasses the measure, and defect, by which it falls short of it or does not attain it. Therefore the good of moral virtue is in a mean.

But if virtue is called the ultimate of a power, which indicates the highest, not a mean; - this is to be understood according to the perfection of the act, for thus virtue is at the summit of perfection; but not according to the quantity of the matter, because thus virtue is in a mean.

3. But the sense is not of a mean by reason of the subject and according to the mere measure of our weak condition, namely, that virtue is to be exercised moderately in such a way that man cannot tend to something greatest; - for the greatest is sometimes conformable to reason, as is clear concerning fortitude, magnanimity, virginity, etc.; and yet in this case virtue is still in a mean, because excess is to tend toward that greatest thing when one ought not.

601. The mean of virtue is the mean of reason, because it is conformity to the measure of right reason, which measure it does not exceed and from which it does not depart: but between excess and defect, adequation to the measure holds the mean. Hence it is defined: the property of virtue by which it is so concerned with its matter that it guards against excess and defect. Reason establishes that mean, dictates it, and imposes it on the moral virtues through prudence; whence St. Thomas says that "that mean belongs to prudence as regulating and measuring, to moral virtue as measured and regulated" (a. 3); therefore prudence is in the mean because it itself is the measure of moral virtue.

602. The mean of reason is sometimes the mean of the thing, namely in justice, insofar as reason dictates to justice to pay what is owed according to equality, or to give a thing equal to the person of another or to the thing (whether arithmetically or proportionally), neither more nor less.

For reason determines the mean of a virtue in its proper matter. But justice is concerned with operations which consist in exterior things without respect to the diverse conditions of the one

operating. Therefore the mean of justice consists in a thing determined according to itself, without respect to the one operating, insofar namely as it gives to each what he is owed, neither more nor less. And thus the mean of reason is the mean of the thing.

But in the other moral virtues, which are concerned with interior passions, the mean of reason is taken by comparison to us, whence it varies according to persons, qualities, circumstances, and diverse relations to passions. Thus excess in drink for one man is not excess for another.

603. Observations. - 1. The intellectual virtues also are in the mean of the thing. The good of the intellect is truth, which depends on things, which are the measure of our intellect. "Therefore in this way the good of intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean through conformity to the thing itself, according as it says that what is, is, or that what is not, is not; in which the account of the true consists. Excess is according to a false affirmation by which it is said that what is not, is; but defect is taken according to a false negation by which it is said that what is, is not" (a. 3).

2. Furthermore, practical intellectual virtues have the account of a rule as to our works, and thus they are in the mean of reason like the rule itself which imposes the mean. Thus prudence imposes the mean on moral acts and virtues, and art on artifacts.

3. Certain theologians say that the virtues of Religion and Penance are not in the mean; but this is false: for although under one respect there cannot be excess in their matter, insofar as worship rendered to God and satisfaction for sins cannot be excessive in quantity, nevertheless under other respects - quality, mode, time, etc. - there is excess in their matter.

Article II: On the Connection of Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65, a. 1; *De Virt.* q. 5, a. 2.

604. Principle I. Imperfect moral virtues are not connected. - For inchoations of moral virtues, which dispose us to choosing this or that in certain circumstances, whether they inhere in us from nature on account of the disposition of the body, or come from custom, are not connected, as is clear from experience: for someone can be prompt toward liberality who is not prompt toward chastity. But those inclinations are sometimes called imperfect virtues; nevertheless they are not true and properly so called virtues, because they do not render one perfect.

605. Principle II. Perfect moral virtues are connected, which incline us to doing a good work constantly and in all circumstances, notwithstanding any difficulties whatever. Thus according to the mind of Saints Augustine1 and Thomas, against Scotus. For:

a) Moral virtue, which is a habit making choice good, cannot exist without prudence, because for choosing rightly the intention of the due end, to which moral virtue disposes, is not sufficient; but good counsel, judgment, and command concerning good means to the end are also required, to which prudence disposes: for to do evil on account of a good end is morally evil; whence perfect prudence is required for always acting rightly.

b) Prudence cannot exist without moral virtues; for:

1. For ordering means honorably there is required the intention of some good end, to which moral virtue disposes: for to order good means to an evil end is morally evil; and the ordering

of means will not always and in all circumstances be honorable unless in all circumstances there is had the intention of the due end, to which we are not disposed except through all the perfect moral virtues.

2. Each one ordinarily judges according as he is affected; therefore moral virtues are necessary so that man may always judge well and in every case.[1]

[1] To the matter Lessius, *de Prudentia*, c. 1, dub. 4, from Aristotle, VI *Eth.*, c. 5 and 13: "It belongs to prudence to apprehend what is honorable in individual actions, or to judge it as fitting here and now. But moral virtue existing in the will (or appetite) brings it about that what is honorable seems fitting to the intellect and to be accepted here and now. Each one ordinarily judges according as he is affected: for the angry man apprehends vengeance by the intellect as fitting, and the intemperate man pleasure, the avaricious man having an abundance of money; but they do not apprehend keeping the mode of reason in these things as fitting to themselves here and now, but at most as fitting in general, or for some time and state of things... Therefore moral virtues lying hidden in the will (or appetite) bring it about that the intellect judges the honorable good in actions to be fitting to be done here and now; and they furnish this partly because they compress the passions which disturb reason in the consideration of the honorable and display the delectable good, partly because they so dispose the subject that the honorable work is as congruous to him as drink to one thirsting, food to one hungry... For that agreement which is between object and affection is the cause on the part of the object that it be apprehended by way of something fitting; just as, on the contrary, dissonance is the cause why the intellect apprehends it as disagreeable."

c) This, moreover, is clear from experience, for a judge well affected toward justice but desirous of money, when money is offered, will judge unjustly; and a chaste but timid woman, through fear of some evil, will consent to fornication; and many strong, liberal, devout persons, through defect of prudence, badly choose means to the end of virtue.[2]

[2] He writes in the epistle to St. Jerome: "That point concerning the inseparability of virtues... pleased all the philosophers (for example, Aristotle, *Eth.*, l. VI, last chapter)... Certainly from this they persuade, that whoever has one virtue has all, and that all are lacking to him to whom one is lacking, because prudence can be neither cowardly, nor unjust, nor intemperate; for if it were any of these, it would not be prudence. Moreover if prudence will then exist, if it is also strong and just and temperate, certainly wherever it is, it has the others with it. So also fortitude cannot be imprudent, or intemperate, or unjust; so it is necessary that temperance be prudent, strong, and just; so justice is not, unless it is prudent, strong, temperate. Thus where any one of them is true, the others similarly are; but where the others are lacking, that one is not true, even if in some way it seems to be similar." P. L. XXXIII, 735.

Hence prudence and the moral virtues mutually include one another, and consequently all the virtues are connected through prudence. Prudence is of the essence of the definition of moral virtue, and moral virtue is of the definition of prudence insofar as prudence must be toward a good end.

1. Hence every man, in order to be perfectly virtuous, must be exercised concerning all the matters of the moral virtues which perfect man according to the common state and as to those things which commonly occur to be done in every human life; but the virtues which perfect man according to some eminent state (magnanimity, magnificence, liberality, virginity), not every virtuous man has in act, but he has them in proximate potency and in preparation of soul, so that they may be acquired by moderate exercise (a. 1, ad 1).

606. Observation. - Merely intellectual virtues are not all connected among themselves nor with the moral virtues, because they are concerned with diverse matters not ordered to one another, as is clear from the diverse sciences and arts; nevertheless all depend on the understanding of principles, but this, in turn, does not depend on the others.

Article III: On the Equality of Virtues

St. Thomas, q. 66, a. 1-5; *De Virt.* q. 5, a. 3.

607. Equality of virtues can be understood in three ways: 1. equality according to species; 2. equality in the same species of virtue according to itself, as to those things to which it extends itself or according to its extension to diverse objects; 3. equality in the same species according to grade and intensity, or according to participation of the virtue in the subject.

608. Principle I. According to species virtues are not equal, but some are more perfect than others according as they have nobler objects.

A. Comparing intellectual and moral virtues:

1. Speculative intellectual virtues, because their object is universal, therefore as habits (or entities) are simply nobler according to object or species than moral virtues, whose object is a particular good; moreover, among the intellectual virtues wisdom is eminent, whose object, the highest cause, is nobler than all. Whence wisdom judges concerning all the intellectual virtues and orders them, and therefore is called architectonic.

2. But moral virtues and prudence are nobler in a qualified sense (under one respect, namely, in order to act), insofar as they dispose more to operating: for they not only give aptitude for operating well, but also dispose to using their aptitude well. Whence as virtues they are more perfect.

B. Among the cardinal virtues: 1. prudence is more perfect, which is in reason, and therefore has as object the good of reason itself by essence, while the others are concerned with the good of reason participated in others; - 2. then justice: a) because it is in the will, which is a power nearer to reason and therefore participates in reason more; and b) because it not only orders man well in himself but also toward another; - 3. fortitude is preferred to temperance because the good of reason shines forth more in it, since its motive is not the delectable per se; furthermore fortitude subjects the sensitive appetite to reason concerning that which is greatest in man, namely, concerning life and death itself; - while 4. temperance is concerned with those things which immediately serve life.[1]

[1] Thus speaking simply; for in a qualified sense one can be greater. Humility, namely, in removing that which prevents, namely pride, which lies in wait for good works; obedience, not on the part of the object, but on the part of him for whom one renounces; fortitude, because it defends and fights for the common good whose equality justice makes: it is a support of justice; liberality, insofar as it intends the supplement and splendor of justice: thus it is the ornament of justice and in some sense greater, but simply it is lesser because it is ordered under the principal virtue of justice.

C. Comparing the special moral virtues, after prudence there are eminent religion and penance, which approach nearer to God.

609. Principle II. According to extension, prudence and perfect moral virtues, as being connected, are equal, because they cannot be increased extensively, since they dispose to doing good in all circumstances; therefore in all men, and in the same man even at diverse times, they are equal according to extension (a. 1). - The contrary must be said of the inchoations of virtues, and of intellectual virtues, because they are not connected.

610. Principle III. According to intensity, perfect moral virtues, because they are connected, are equal in the same man at the same time; whence if one is increased, all are proportionally increased, just as the fingers of the hand are unequal according to quantity, but are equal according to proportion when they are increased proportionally. This is to be understood a) on the part of prudence and according to the formal element of virtue, which is the ordination of reason to good: for through prudence they adhere equally to the good of reason or to the mean, which is constituted equally well for all by one and the same prudence. "With reason existing as equally perfect in one and the same man, it is necessary that the mean be constituted proportionally according to right reason in any matter of virtues"; whence they are conformed equally to reason. Nevertheless b) they are not always increased according to the material element, that is, according to the inclination and proneness of the subject to the acts proper to it, for man can be more prompt toward certain virtues, whether from the disposition of the body, or from custom, or from the gift of grace (a. 2).

But they can be unequal according to intensity in diverse men and in the same man at diverse times: for thus they are not connected. "But if virtue is considered on the part of the subject participating, thus it happens that virtue is greater or lesser, whether according to diverse times in the same man, or in diverse men; because for attaining the mean of virtue, which is according to right reason, one is better disposed than another, either on account of greater habituation, or on account of a better disposition of nature, or on account of a more perspicacious judgment of reason, or also on account of a greater gift of grace" (a. 1).

611. Observation. - Merely intellectual virtues, because they are not connected, are not equal according to extension or intensity.

Article IV: On the Duration of Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 67, art. 1-2; *De Virt.*, q. 5, a. 4.

612. Principle. In the blessed there remain those virtues which include no imperfection repugnant to their state. - Whence moral virtues remain, not indeed:

a) as to the material element or inclination to their acts, for in the future life there will not be exchanges and distributions of things, nor dangers of death, nor delights of foods and sexual matters, etc.; - but

b) as to the formal element, which is conformity to right reason, or as to their essence, insofar as the appetite, whether rational or sensitive, will be wholly and in all things conformable to reason; whence those virtues will exercise other acts, conformable to heavenly life. Say the same of prudence, which is concerned with the same matter as the moral virtues. Whence, according to Augustine, *De Trin.*, l. XIV, c. 9, "it will belong to prudence to place or equal no good before God, to fortitude to adhere firmly to Him, to temperance to delight in no harmful defect"; likewise it belongs to justice to be subject to God. - Nevertheless:

c) before the resurrection, temperance, fortitude, and other virtues concerning passions will not exist except in root, because they are in the sensitive appetite, concupiscible and irascible; and that appetite cannot exist without the body.

The same must be said of the souls of purgatory; but in the damned there can be no virtue properly so called or perfect.

613. Corollary. - Likewise the intellectual virtues remain according to the formal element, or essence, because their subject, the intellect, is incorruptible, and it always preserves the intelligible species on which intellectual virtues depend. But they do not remain according to the material element, that is, according to the images of imagination which we use in the sciences, nor according to the acts of this life, because for these are required images which cannot exist without the body. And in this sense the Apostle says, I Cor. XIII, 8: knowledge will be destroyed, namely, as to the mode of operating of this life, but it will have another act.

Third Part: On Habits According to Supernatural Being, or On Infused Virtues

614. Necessity of supernatural habits. - The end to which in fact we are destined consists in participation of the life proper to God, that is, in seeing and loving God in that mode by which He sees and loves Himself. Such an end is absolutely supernatural, and therefore no creature can arrive at it through the principles of its nature. Whence, in order that man may be ordered to it and tend to it by his acts, it is necessary that certain principles or habits be added to human nature, by which he may be elevated above himself, transported to the divine order, and made capable of eliciting divine operations proportioned to the supernatural end. This is done by the gift of habitual divine grace, which is formally sanctifying.

"Acts leading to the end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of the active principle; and therefore we see in natural things that no thing can perfect by its operation an effect which exceeds its active power, but only can produce by its operation an effect proportioned to its power. But eternal life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature,... and therefore man by his natural things cannot produce meritorious works proportioned to eternal life; but for this there is required a higher power, which is the power of grace." I-II, q. 109, a. 5.

615. What supernatural habits are given. - Grace, as Dogmatic Theology hands down, is as it were an entitative habit which perfects the very essence of the soul, which it elevates to the divine order, and renders deiform, that is, similar to the divine nature itself and participating in its life (II Pet. I, 4; I John III, 2); whence it is as it were a new supernatural and divine nature, or a new divine form inserted and communicated to us. Hence it is not a pure ornament of the soul, something merely static, but also a dynamic principle which founds and constitutes a new supernatural life, by which we live to God, live with Christ in God, and Christ lives in us (Rom. VI, 4-11; VIII, 2; John X, 10; II Cor. V, 15-17; Col. III, 3; Gal. II, 20), by which we are inserted into Christ as branches into the vine (John XV, 1-5), by which the seed of God and the beginning of divine life remain in us (I John III, 9), by which we are regenerated and born again from God unto new life (John I, 13; III, 5; Jas. I, 18; Tit. III, 5; I Pet. I, 23; I John III, 9), as sons of God (I John III, 1-3; V, 18; John I, 12; Eph. I, 5; Rom. VIII, 15; Gal. IV, 5-7).

But for life three things are required: a fundamental vital principle, vital operative faculties, and vital acts. Whence in the infusion of habitual grace there are given at the same time:

a) grace itself, which is a new vital principle elevating us to a new grade of intellectual life, which far exceeds rational life and is a participation of the very intellectual life of God; a new principle of new operation, namely, of the intuitive vision of God and of operation preparatory to it;

b) infused virtues which flow from grace: they are as it were new faculties by which the powers naturally implanted are perfected and elevated so that they are able to elicit supernatural acts, deiform acts. For "just as from the essence of the soul flow its powers, which are the principles of works, so also from grace itself virtues flow into the powers of the soul, through which the powers are moved to acts" (q. 110, a. 4, ad 1);

c) supernatural and meritorious vital acts which proceed from the virtues and by which we tend toward the supernatural end and merit to obtain it. But since, in our acts, we are not sufficiently directed toward that end which so surpasses our nature by our own reason, even illuminated by faith, but need the Holy Spirit Himself as guide, who moves us by the instinct and inspiration of actual grace so that, eliciting supernatural acts even in a superhuman mode, we may be conserved in supernatural life and progress in it; hence we also need principles or habits by which we are ordered to following the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the use of infused virtues, which are called the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

1. Concerning these may be consulted: Scheeben, *Die Herrlichkeiten der gottlicher Gnade*; Terrien, *La Grace et la Gloire*; Froget, *L'Habitation du Saint-Esprit dans les ames justes*; Waffelaert, *De Unione iustorum cum Deo*; Mercier, *La Vie interieure*; Marmion, *Le Christ, Vie de l'ame*; Janvier, *Conf. de N.D.: La grace; La vertu*; Sauve, *L'Homme intime*; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Perfection et Contemplation*; Gardeil, *La Structure de l'ame et l'experience mystique*; and the articles which we wrote in the periodical *Revue Eccl. de Liege*, years 10, 11, 12, and 13.

616. The root of the whole supernatural life. - Therefore the very essence of grace, and the fundamental account from which all its attributes are conceived to be derived, is a physical participation of the divine nature insofar as it is intellectual, and therefore a resplendence of divine light in us (Eph. V, 8), and a participation of the life proper to God, which renders us deiform (q. 110, a. 3). From this follow:

A. First and immediately, absolute perfections: for because grace renders the soul deiform, therefore it renders it:

1. lovable and worthy of the love and friendship of God (John XV, 14-15), and pleasing and acceptable to Him; hence

2. also worthy of eternal life and divine beatitude (Col. I, 12-13; Rom. VI, 23; II Cor. I, 22; Eph. I, 13-14); thence

3. remotely capable of supernatural operations meritorious of eternal life: for supernatural nature is ordered to operation, and he who is worthy of eternal life ought to do works worthy of eternal life; whence

4. grace is the root of the virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, which flow from it and by which we are proximately capable of supernatural works; but especially it is the root of charity, by which we are proximately capable of meriting.

By all these is constituted the state of holiness and justice (Eph. IV, 24) and of supernatural beauty (Eph. V, 8).

B. Then from these result relations which are founded in the absolute perfections: because grace renders one a participant of the divine nature, pleasing to God and worthy of eternal life, therefore it renders man:

1. the adoptive son of God, especially of the Father, and therefore heir of eternal life (I John III, 1; Rom. VIII, 15-17); thence

2. brother of the Son and coheir (Heb. II, 11; Rom. VIII, 17), and image of the Word (Rom. VIII, 29), indeed, in the hypothesis of the Incarnation, a member inserted into Christ the Head, and it renders the soul a spouse united to Him (Eph. V, 28);

3. by means of charity which flows from it, it renders him a friend and associate of God, and a temple of the Most Holy Trinity dwelling within (John XIV, 23), especially of the Holy Spirit (I Cor. III, 17), so that we may be directed by Him on the way of eternal salvation and enjoy His love and presence.

C. Finally, from all these are derived further permanent and transitory effects: because grace renders us participants of the divine nature, it also renders us participants of divine operations, whence from it are derived:

1. supernatural operative habits, namely, infused virtues, theological and moral, and gifts of the Holy Spirit (II Pet. I, 5-7);

2. supernatural and meritorious acts, namely, divine operations.

617. Matter to be treated. - Concerning the mode by which God elevates us to supernatural being through habitual grace, enough is said in the treatise on grace. Whence it remains to speak of the supernatural operative principles or habits, which are the proximate principles of human acts and thus pertain specially to moral theology.

Question One: On the Existence and Essence of Infused Habits and Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 51, a. 3 and 4; q. 110, a. 2; q. 62, a. 1 and 2; q. 63, a. 2, 3, 4; *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 9 and 10; q. 5, a. 4.

618. Thesis. Supernatural operative habits are infused into us by God.

It is proved:

1. No one tends and operates perfectly to an end except through a permanent principle of operation, by which he is intrinsically inclined to that operation; whence God not only moves natural things to their acts, but has given to them permanent principles of operating to their end,[1] by which their motions become connatural and easy. Therefore also to our supernatural end (for which God certainly provides no less) He gave us supernatural habitual and permanent principles, so that we might operate and tend perfectly to it;[2] otherwise we would be moved not connaturally but as if violently.

[1] Remote: form; and proximate: powers.

[2] He gave the remote principle: habitual grace; and proximate principles: habits and virtues. - The argument is especially valid when the sweet Providence which we know from revelation is considered.

"It is not fitting that God provide less for those whom He loves for having supernatural good than for creatures which He loves for having natural good. But He provides for natural creatures in such a way that He not only moves them to natural acts, but also bestows on them certain forms and powers, which are principles of acts, so that according to themselves they may be inclined to a motion of this kind; and thus the motions by which they are moved by God become connatural and easy to creatures. Much more, therefore, into those whom He moves toward obtaining eternal supernatural good, does He infuse certain forms, or supernatural qualities, according to which they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly toward obtaining eternal good" (q. 110, a. 2).

2. This is certain, because it is clearly deduced and is the obvious sense of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, although it is not expressly defined: for it says that grace and charity inhere in us (can. 11), and that man is justified through the reception of grace and gifts (c. 7), and receives infused faith, hope, and charity (c. 7); all of which indicate habitual principles, especially because it attributes the same justification to infants (sess. 5, can. 4; sess. 6, c. 2), who are not capable of acts and of motion to act.

3. Whence the Scriptures say that the seed of divine life remains in us (I John III, 9), and describe justification as regeneration; these indicate the concession of a permanent principle.

619. What the essence of infused habits is. - Supernatural beings are not properly in the categories of natural beings, in the same way as God Himself, of whom they are a participation; nevertheless they are reduced to the categories according to a certain analogy, more or less, and thus sanctifying grace, since it is a spiritual and permanent accident, is reduced to quality, as an entitative habit. Similarly supernatural operative principles are reduced to quality, and indeed as operative habits, although they do not have all things in common with them. For they are neither pure habits nor pure powers, but have something of power and something of habit. For:

1. In something they fall short of the account of habit, because they do not give facility for operating in every way: they indeed confer an intrinsic inclination, aptitude, and promptitude toward the good, indeed a greater one than acquired habits, but not an extrinsic one, because they do not remove from us all obstacles to good, as is clear from a converted sinner, who does not experience a facility toward good much greater than before; whence they are not habits properly so called.[3]

[3] "Facility of operating the works of virtues can be from two things, namely, from preceding custom, and infused virtue does not bestow this facility in its beginning; and again from strong inherence in the object of virtue, and this is found in infused virtue immediately in its beginning." St. Thomas, in IV Sent. d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5. Cf. q. 65, a. 3, ad 2 and *De Virt.*, a. 10, ad 15.

2. But they make man able to operate supernaturally, which habit does not do, and in this therefore they do not agree with habit but rather with operative power.

3. But in all other respects they agree with habits, for a) just like habits, they reside in natural operative powers, which they elevate and with which they operate: for they do not give simply

the power to act, but the power to act better and supernaturally; b) man, if they are active, uses them when he wills and in what grade he wills, intensely or remissly, and he can use them only for good; c) they can be increased and corrupted. All these things do not belong to power properly so called. Therefore they have more of the account of habit than of the account of power, and therefore they are customarily called supernatural habits.

620. Supernatural habits and virtues differ from natural ones in many ways:

a) On the part of essence: natural virtues are habits properly so called, whence they do not give power but facility of acting; supernatural virtues give the power of acting supernaturally, but not such facility in every way.

b) On the part of the efficient cause: natural virtues are acquired from the principles of nature and from our acts; supernatural virtues must be infused by God (q. 51, a. 4; q. 63, a. 1).

c) On the part of the nature and end to which they are ordered: by natural virtues man has himself well in order to human things and to natural acts suitable to human nature; by supernatural virtues man has himself well in order to this, that he be an adoptive son of God, destined to eternal life, and in order to this, that he exercise supernatural acts suitable to the divine nature (q. 54, a. 3; q. 63, a. 4).

d) On the part of the formal object: in natural virtues there is good according to the rule and light of human reason, or conformity to the natural end; in supernatural virtues there is good according to the supernatural rule and light of the law divinely revealed (which exceeds human reason), or conformity to the supernatural end. Therefore they are nobler than acquired virtues (q. 63, a. 4).

621. Observation. - By exercising supernatural virtues man will conquer and remove obstacles extrinsic to the habit, and thus will acquire facility in every way and perfect facility toward the good. For acts produced from a supernatural habit can be considered in two ways:

1. as supernatural, or as tending toward something precisely as supernatural, exceeding human nature, and thus they cannot produce habits of the same species, or supernatural habits, which are infused by God alone (n. 639); but

2. supernatural acts, while they tend to the supernatural end or good and object, at the same time tend under some respect to the natural end and to the natural good suitable to reason, both because natural faculties are exercised at the same time, and because supernatural act and good eminently contain and include natural act and natural goodness. But in this way they can produce natural habits of the same species as that object as it is natural and conformable to reason, and by this conquer and remove obstacles opposed to this act and object, in the same way as was said concerning acquired virtue (n. 567). And thus facility in every way is acquired, which nevertheless is not supernatural virtue, as not proportioned to the supernatural end, but is a natural habit: for example, while someone believes God, exercises chastity or justice with a view to eternal life, he also does something conformable to reason. Cf. *De Verit*. q. 10, a. 10, ad 1; *Quodl*. VIII, q. 2, a. 2.

Others say that habits are not produced, but only impediments are removed; whence now every difficulty in acting ceases.

Question Two: On the Distinction of Infused Habits and Virtues

622. Threefold species of infused habits. - For operating supernaturally, we need three principles:

1. principles by which we are ordered to the supernatural ultimate end itself: these are the theological virtues;

2. principles by which we are ordered concerning the means to the supernatural ultimate end, to be chosen reasonably under the guidance of reason: these are the moral virtues;

3. principles by which we are ordered to following the guidance itself of the Holy Spirit moving us to eternal life: these are the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Concerning each one there must be treatment.

Article I: On Theological Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62; *De Virt.*, q. 1, art. 10 and 12.

623. Theological virtues are operative principles by which we are immediately ordered to God as supernatural end, so that through their acts the soul immediately attains God the supernatural end and is joined to Him. They are rightly called theological:

1. because they have God Himself, the supernatural end, insofar namely as He exceeds the cognition of our reason, both as the material object which is attained by them and as the formal object or motive;

2. and therefore they are infused into us by God alone;

3. and they can be known by revelation alone (a. 1).

624. Thesis. Theological virtues are necessary, and indeed three. - It is proved:

1. By the reason of St. Thomas: In the natural order man would be habitually inclined to the natural end, radically through the soul, immediately through the intellect knowing the end and judging that one must tend to it, and through the will, which from its nature tends to the end or its proper good. But, since man, from the gratuitous goodness of God, is destined to the supernatural end, the beatific vision, it is necessary that supernatural principles be added to nature by which he is habitually inclined to the supernatural end.[1] There is one substantive principle: sanctifying grace, in the very essence of the soul, and three operative principles: faith, by which the intellect attains God, the supernatural end, as true, and is able to know Him and the other supernatural principles; hope, by which the will tends to God the supernatural end as its good but arduous; and charity, by which it is ordered to Him as good in Himself, and thus through love is supernaturally conformed to Him. Therefore there are three theological virtues (a. 3; II-II q. 17, a. 6).

[1] If nature, St. Thomas notes, does not fail in necessary things, much less grace.

2. By Scripture and Tradition, in which these three virtues are constantly enumerated, so that by a peculiar fittingness they must be connected with one another and distinguished from all the others; whence the Apostle, I Cor. XIII, 13: "But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three. But the greater of these is charity" (cf. I Thess. V, 8; Col. I, 4, 5).

3. By decrees of the Church. For this is supposed by Innocent III (*cap. Maiores*), saying that it is disputed among the learned whether faith, charity, and the other virtues are infused even into little children; and by Clement V in the Council of Vienne, establishing that this opinion should be preferred as more probable. But the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7, teaches it as certain for faith, hope, and charity, although it does not define it.

625. Among the theological virtues there is order:

A) The order of generation, not indeed 1. according to time, for all are infused at the same time, but 2. according to reason, faith precedes, hope follows, finally charity advances: a) according to acts: for no one hopes or loves what he does not know; but the things which he hopes and loves, he knows through faith; - and similarly, man, by hoping for good from God, also considers Him as his own good and proceeds to loving Him; - b) also according to habits, but in order to acts: for faith is presupposed to hope and hope to charity, just as intellect is presupposed to will, and imperfect love precedes perfect love.

B) But in the order of perfection charity precedes, which is the perfection of all virtues (a. 4).

Article II: On Moral Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 63, a. 3 and 4; *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 10.

626. Thesis. Besides theological virtues, supernatural moral virtues must be admitted, as Saints Augustine, Gregory, and Thomas teach, against Scotus and the Nominalists, and as the almost common opinion of theologians now admits. For:

In the natural order man would be habitually well disposed not only to the ultimate end, but also concerning the means to the end through acquired moral virtues. Therefore, also in the supernatural order, for which God certainly provides no less, it is not sufficient that man be habitually well disposed to the supernatural ultimate end, but he must also be habitually well disposed concerning supernatural means to be ordered to the ultimate end, which is done through infused moral virtues (q. 65, a. 3). - Otherwise a) proportion would be lacking between the soul elevated to divine being and its moral life, between the supernatural end and the moral virtues, between theological virtues concerning the end and moral virtues concerning the means: for they would not be of the same order, but theological virtues would have to operate divine effects through instruments not proportioned and defective. Whence b) supernatural moral acts would not be elicited connaturally by us, but the faculties would be moved to them as if violently (q. 63, a. 3).

Innocent III and the Council of Vienne suppose this (n. 624, 3), as does Leo XIII, ep. to Cardinal Gibbons (n. 581); and Scripture intimates it (Wis. VIII, 7): "She teaches sobriety and prudence (Eternal Wisdom), justice and virtue, than which nothing is more useful to men in life" (cf. II Pet. I, 5-7).

627. Infused moral virtues are operative principles by which we are ordered to choosing human acts rightly as means to the supernatural ultimate end, and therefore they are not concerned immediately with God the supernatural end, but with our acts and our whole life to be ordered, on which account they are called moral.

Whence 1. they also pertain to the divine life participated in us, insofar as they mediately pursue the supernatural end itself: for under the influence of the theological virtues they order in some way all works to God as end and to His glory, just as God orders all things to Himself.

2. Therefore they are many, just as human acts are many and diverse; generally theologians say that as many supernatural moral virtues are infused as natural virtues can be acquired.[1] Nevertheless all can be reduced to the four cardinal virtues, in the same way as was said concerning acquired virtues.

[1] Some, such as Pesch and Noldin, say that only the four cardinal virtues are infused.

628. Supernatural moral virtues are distinguished from natural ones, as was said above q. 1, n. 620, and indeed not only:

a) according to essence, as habits less properly so called are distinguished from properly so called habits;

b) and according to the efficient cause, which is God alone, not our acts;

c) and according to the end and nature, namely, so that man may have himself well toward the heavenly city and eternal life, but not only toward human things; but also:

d) according to the formal object: in natural virtues there is good according to the rule of human reason; in supernatural virtues there is good according to the rule of divine law, or of human reason elevated by faith. Thus, for example, natural prudence dictates that which is good according to reason; supernatural prudence, that which is good according to the supernatural law of faith; justice chooses the mean by a higher title, conserves peace and society, so that there may be peace and society as it were deific and heavenly; by natural abstinence man uses food moderately on account of human reason, for example, lest he harm health; by supernatural abstinence, on account of the reason of faith, for example, that he may chastise the body and reduce it to servitude and be himself more freely vacant for divine things; supernatural patience is to be exercised not from the reason of human wisdom, but so that one may be conformed to Christ, etc. Hence infused prudence does not always dictate the same mean as acquired prudence, and therefore infused moral virtues do not have the same act as acquired virtues (q. 63, art. 4). Whence they differ in species.

629. Corollary. - From these things one can understand how political, purgative, and purified-soul virtues are distinguished, as St. Thomas teaches, q. 61, a. 5:

"A. Because man according to his nature is a political animal,

1. virtues,... according as they exist in man according to the condition of his nature, are called political, namely, insofar as man according to these virtues has himself rightly in conducting human affairs...

B. But because it pertains to man also to draw himself toward divine things as much as he can... and this is commended to us in Scripture in many ways, as in that text Matt. V, 48: Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect, it is necessary to posit certain virtues midway between political virtues, which are human virtues, and exemplar virtues, which are divine virtues (in God Himself); ... namely, in such a way that:

2. certain virtues are virtues... of those tending toward divine likeness, and these are called purgative virtues: namely, in such a way that prudence despises all worldly things by contemplation of divine things and directs every thought of the soul to divine things alone; but temperance leaves behind, insofar as nature allows, those things which the use of the body requires; and it belongs to fortitude that the soul not be terrified on account of departure from the body and access to higher things; but it belongs to justice that the whole soul consent to the life of a proposal of this kind.

3. But certain virtues are virtues of those already attaining divine likeness, which are called virtues of a soul already purified, namely, in such a way that prudence looks upon divine things alone, temperance knows not earthly desires, fortitude ignores passions, justice is associated with the divine mind in a perpetual covenant, namely, by imitating it; and these virtues indeed we say belong to the blessed and to some who are most perfect in this life."

Whence virtues are distinguished as political, purgative, and of a soul already purified.

Article III: On the Gifts of the Holy Spirit

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 68, a. 1-4; q. 69 and 70; II-II, q. 8, a. 6.

630. Thesis I. The gifts of the Holy Spirit differ from infused moral virtues:[1] we need the latter so that we may be disposed to obeying right reason promptly; therefore a fortiori we need the former so that we may be disposed to obeying promptly the motion or inspiration of the Holy Spirit dwelling in us through charity (as proper mover). "For the higher the mover is, the more necessary it is that the movable thing be proportioned to him by a more perfect disposition, just as we see that a disciple must be more perfectly disposed in order that he may receive higher doctrine from a teacher." And therefore, just as for obeying reason the appetite needs habits, so a fortiori it seems that the gifts by which we obey the Holy Spirit must be called habits, not transitory dispositions, so that we may be moved connaturally, promptly, easily, and sweetly, and not as if violently, but as instruments adapted and proportioned to Him.

[1] Peter Lombard, William of Auxerre, William of Paris, and among recent authors De Bellevue held only a distinction of reason from the virtues; likewise Scotus, Gabriel Biel, Ockham, and the Nominalists, which we are not able to understand, since they do not even admit infused moral virtues; others are found uncertain, such as Durandus and Vasquez. Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas, Suarez, and Billot teach a real distinction. Other antiquated opinions are noted in St. Thomas, a. 1.

Therefore the gifts of the Holy Spirit are supernatural habits by which we are disposed to obeying promptly the motion or inspiration of the Holy Spirit Himself dwelling in us through charity as proper mover. They are called gifts not only because they are given by God, but because they dispose one to following the instinct of the giving (that is, infusing) Holy Spirit, and render man promptly

movable by divine inspiration, which is a special gift of actual grace; they can also simply be called spirits.[2]

[2] Concerning these, cf. John of St. Thomas, in the commentary on the *Summa*; Meschler, *Die Gabe des Pfingsfestes* (translated into French); Dr. Walter, *Der H. Geist in seinen Gnaden und Gaben*; Regler, *Die sieben Gaben des H. Geistes nach Lehre H. Thomas*; Weiss, *S. Thomae Aq. de septem donis Spiritus sancti doctrina*; Friaque, *Le Saint-Esprit, sa grace, ses figures, ses fruits, ses dons*; Msgr. Perriot, in the periodical *Ami du Clerge*, 1892 and 1898; Froget, *L'Habitation du Saint-Esprit dans les ames justes*; De Bellevue, *L'oeuvre du Saint-Esprit ou la sanctification de l'ame*; Touzard, in *Rev. Biblique*, VIII (1899); Raymond, in *Rev. Thomiste*, 1913-1914; Gardeil, in *Dict. de Th. cath.*, art. *Dons*; *Les dons du Saint-Esprit dans les Saints Dominicains*; Schrijvers, *Les Principes de la Vie Spirituelle*; Meynard, *Traite de la Vie interieure*; Billot, *De Virtutibus infusis*; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Perfection et Contemplation*; - *Oeuvres de Ruysbroeck*, trans. of the Benedictines of St. Paul de Wisques, vol. II.

631. Thesis II. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary for salvation. - For not only do those who exercise extraordinary and more excellent works (for which their powers are not sufficient) need the motion of the Holy Spirit,[3] or the special help of actual grace, but each person needs it in order to persevere and progress in the grace received, as is proved in the treatise on grace. The fundamental reason for this matter is assigned by St. Thomas: through grace and the theological virtues we possess divine nature, life, and powers only in an imperfect mode; but he who imperfectly has some nature or form or power cannot always and as to all things operate per se, unless, at least sometimes, he is moved by Him who perfectly possesses that nature: just as little children in life, who must be led lest they fall, and also so that they may progress. Therefore, imperfect in divine life, we need to be moved and led by God Himself, so that we may so live always that we arrive at eternal life.

[3] The motion of the Holy Spirit is special; otherwise it is simply called divine motion. The distinction between each motion occurs in St. Thomas, q. 109, a. 9. Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, in the work *Xenia Thomistica*, II, p. 212.

Whence the gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary for salvation for every just man, and although especially for extraordinary and more excellent works, nevertheless they dispose not only to these but also to common works, when and insofar as they are done by the just under the motion of the Spirit of God. Hence those gifts are granted to all the just (Rom. VIII, 14) and are connected with charity, by which we are united to the Holy Spirit as mover.

632. What those gifts are. - Those gifts are enumerated in Isaiah XI, 2, where they are attributed to Christ, the exemplar of the just and the firstborn among many brethren (Rom. VIII, 9-29; Gal. IV, 6): "The spirit of wisdom and understanding shall rest upon him, the spirit of counsel and fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and piety, and the spirit of the fear of the Lord shall fill him." But, according to the doctrine of the Fathers from the beginning of the Church, they are also granted to all the just.

Concerning the number of the gifts nothing certain can be established, for in the Greek and Latin text seven are numbered, but in the Hebrew text piety is lacking; moreover the prophet does not seem to intend a complete enumeration, but rather indicates the more outstanding gifts in order to teach that the fullness of the gifts of the Holy Spirit belongs to Christ. Nevertheless the Fathers, theologians, and mystical authors are accustomed to order all the sanctifying effects of the Holy Spirit according to the seven gifts which are enumerated in our text, to which the Liturgy alludes in the hymns.

Four are in the intellect, by which we are disposed so that under the guidance of the Holy Spirit and as if experimentally: 1. we may penetrate the truths of faith through the gift of understanding; and we may judge 2. concerning created things through the gift of knowledge, according as they lead to God or lead away from Him; 3. concerning divine things, and human things according to divine reasons, through the gift of wisdom, by which we taste them sweetly (Wis. VII, 8, 11); and 4.

concerning individual things to be done or avoided in the spiritual life, and in more difficult and unexpected cases, through the gift of counsel, by which we are directed to operate without hesitation. This is the practical gift; the three prior are principally speculative, secondarily practical.

Three are in the appetite: for, with the Holy Spirit impelling, 5. through piety we lovingly revere God, not as creator but as Father, and all men as His sons (Rom. VIII, 15); 6. through the gift of fortitude we confidently despise whatever dangers and adversities there are on the way of salvation; and 7. through filial reverence we fear to offend God, especially in the delights to which we are most inclined, and this is fear of the Lord.[4]

[4] Thus in the doctrine of St. Thomas. - St. Albert, St. Bonaventure, and Ruysbroeck hold counsel as the gift leading to perfection and contemplation, but knowledge, on the contrary, as the practical gift of the active life; - likewise St. Albert, St. Bonaventure, and Ruysbroeck place piety in the concupiscible; - St. Bonaventure and Ruysbroeck place wisdom in the will; - Ruysbroeck places fear in the irascible and fortitude in the will. This last fits with his doctrine on the cardinal virtues, according to which prudence directs and governs the irascible, temperance adorns the concupiscible, justice the power of natural reason, and fortitude the free nature of the will.

633. The gifts correspond to virtues. - And indeed 1. immediately[5] to the seven more principal infused virtues: understanding and knowledge correspond to faith; fear of God to hope, insofar as it makes us avoid offense of God; wisdom to charity; counsel to prudence; piety to justice; the gift of fortitude to fortitude; and fear of God to temperance, insofar as it makes us flee the delights which most allure us to sin. By these gifts respectively we are disposed to exercising both the common and ordinary acts, and the more excellent acts, of these virtues under the impulse of the Holy Spirit. Thus St. Thomas; nevertheless, according to others, while counsel corresponds to hope, knowledge corresponds to prudence; according to others to hope, to which fear then does not correspond; according to others, as Innocent V, to temperance.

[5] They also correspond mediately3 to the seven chief acquired virtues: to the understanding of principles, knowledge, and wisdom there correspond the three gifts of the same name; to prudence, counsel; to justice, piety; to fortitude, fortitude; to temperance, fear of God.

2. Immediately, because they are given for the exercise of those virtues; nevertheless not exclusively but principally, for mediately all the gifts have influence upon all virtues. Whence it is not absurd that one gift correspond to two virtues, as fear to hope and temperance, or knowledge to faith and hope; and two gifts to one virtue, as understanding and knowledge to faith.

3. Mediately, for the gifts do not move to the exercise of these virtues, but because the supernatural order perfects the natural order, supernatural life is built according to an analogy to natural life. - But no gift corresponds to art, because it has no influence on the interior life.

634. The beatitudes are not habits but certain perfect and excellent works of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which specially lead to beatitude, and specially merit both perfect beatitude in heaven and also the inchoation (firm hope) of beatitude in the present life. Whence on account of their singular perfection they are a pledge, merit, and inchoation of perfect beatitude.

Concerning their fitting enumeration and signification, cf. St. Thomas, q. 69, a. 3 and 4. - According to him, also one beatitude corresponds to each gift, considering in the beatitudes their motives, namely, in this way:

To the gift of fear, the first beatitude: Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven; - to the gift of piety, the second: Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the earth; - to the gift of knowledge, the third: Blessed are they who mourn, for they shall be comforted; - to the gift of fortitude, the fourth: Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice, for they shall be satisfied; - to the gift of counsel, the fifth: Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy; - to the gift of understanding, the sixth: Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God; - to the gift of wisdom, the seventh: Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God (III Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 4). But the eighth beatitude: Blessed are they who suffer persecution for justice, is a certain confirmation and manifestation of all the preceding, insofar as on account of them it comes about that one does not depart from these goods on account of any persecution (I-II, q. 69, a. 3, ad 5).

635. The fruits of the Holy Spirit are any works whatever of virtue when they have a special delight and sweetness annexed, whence they are called fruits; they are perfected under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, whence they are called fruits of the Holy Spirit. Since carnal and worldly delights allure us, the Holy Spirit Himself produces in us a much greater and as it were heavenly delight through the works of virtues; hence the fruits are opposed to the works of the flesh.

The chief ones are enumerated by the Apostle, Gal. V, 22, 23.

636. Corollaries. - From the fact that the gifts dispose man so that he is well movable by God, while virtues dispose him so that he is well movable by reason, which is the fundamental distinction, it follows:

1. that virtues are given so that man may actively act well, gifts so that he may be passively acted upon well; and although he also acts freely under the action of the gift, nevertheless he has himself more passively than actively, "because the mind of man does not have itself as moving but rather as moved";

2. that virtues perfect man for acting in a human mode, accommodated to human nature; gifts, for acting in a higher, superhuman, and divine mode according as it is suitable to the Holy Spirit: thus as to the object when someone exercises more excellent and heroic works, or as to the mode alone when he is moved spontaneously, as if instinctively, and acts without discourse and rather is led than leads himself;

3. that we can use virtues when we will, but gifts when the Holy Spirit wills.

637. Observation. - The gifts are not to be confused with graces gratuitously given, although the latter can be founded in a gift, for example, of knowledge or wisdom, which they manifest: for they remain distinct; and they are rather transitory, not habits. Cf. q. 68, a. 5, ad 1 and 2.

Question Three: On the Cause of Infused Habits and Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62, a. 3; q. 63, a. 2; q. 65, a. 3; q. 114, a. 4 and 8; II-II, q. 24, a. 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12; *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 11; q. 2, a. 12-13.

638. Thesis I. Infused virtues are infused by God together with sanctifying grace. - This is established from the documents of the Church adduced above (n. 624, 3), and is easily understood,

because they are powers derived from sanctifying grace. For he who is elevated to divine being and nature and life through grace must also acquire virtues for divine operations, for every nature tends to operation and life imports activity. Whence from grace supernatural virtues flow into the powers of the soul for divine operations.

Therefore those are not to be heard who say that faith and hope are infused into him who, from actual grace, exercises an act of faith or hope, although he does not receive grace and charity. For:

1. he who does not sufficiently dispose himself to receiving supernatural being, by which he participates in the divine nature, is not sufficiently disposed to supernatural virtue, by which he participates in divine operation;

2. furthermore, since the works of God are perfect, He never infuses faith and hope without charity.[1]

[1] This is the obvious sense of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 6: "They are disposed... while, conceiving faith..., believing..., they are raised up into hope..."; and c. 7: "Justification follows this disposition... and then at the same time he receives infused... faith, hope, and charity." Therefore an act of faith and hope can be had before justification and before the infusion of faith and hope.

639. Thesis II. Our acts do not produce infused virtues. - It is proved:

A. Our natural acts 1. do not cause a supernatural habit or virtue, because the effect cannot surpass the cause; 2. nor do they dispose to it, because they are not proportioned to it.

B. Acts done from supernatural grace:

1. Do not effect supernatural virtue, because a) an operative power toward several acts, such as supernatural virtue is, in its entity (as principle) is more perfect than one of its acts, whence it cannot be caused by that act; - nor b) by several acts, for they do not do this unless each one causes something; but the first act cannot produce a disposition to several acts. - Besides c) those acts, although they can be elicited by the help of actual grace, require that they be elicited by a faculty and habit; but nothing produces that which is its connatural cause.

2. Nor do they produce increase, because an operative power cannot produce a greater power.

3. Nevertheless those acts can a) dispose to the infusion of virtues, which an act of charity does proximately; and b) they can merit their increase, insofar as they are done from charity. But God alone effects their production and increase, though He can use others for this as instruments, such as Christ and the sacraments; whence these virtues are called infused per se (q. 63, a. 1; a. 2, ad 3; a. 3, ad 3; q. 51, a. 2, ad 3).

640. What about the increase of infused habits? - Habits infused per se and virtues are not increased extensively, because they give the power for all corresponding supernatural acts which can be done, or the power of acting supernaturally for all circumstances. But they are increased intensively, not by addition but by greater rootedness and participation in the subject, and indeed by the same causes by which they are produced. Therefore God alone is the efficient cause of this increase; but the sacraments produce it instrumentally (*ex opere operato*), and our supernatural acts done from charity, even the least (Mk. IX, 40), can be dispositions and merit for increase (*ex opere*

operantis), as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 6, c. 10 and 16, can. 24 and 32. Whence they are increased together with grace and charity; and therefore the Church prays: Give us, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and charity (cf. Prov. IV, 18).

Concerning the time at which the increase of charity and infused virtues is given on account of our good works, there are chiefly two opinions among theologians. Certain ones, considering an act done from charity only as the sole moral and meritorious cause of increase, say that it is conferred immediately when the act is posited, whether this act is intense or is not; whence they also say that a sinner, because all his works revive, always rises again in charity greater than that which he had before. They certainly admit this, although it seems incredible; but on the other hand, they deny that all the good acts of the just are done from the influence of charity and are meritorious. Thus, after the Nominalists, Vasquez, Suarez, De Lugo, Mazzella, and the greater part of more recent authors. - Others, holding our acts not only as moral and meritorious causes, but also as dispositive causes, say that every act done from charity merits increase, but not in a determinate grade, except under the condition that the due disposition for the said increase be present;[2] but this is only an act more intense than the charity had, or equally intense, because by such an act alone does man strive toward increasing charity: for God established that He would cause the increase of charity when our power would cause it, if it could. But less intense acts do not sufficiently and immediately dispose to increase, but only mediately, "insofar as from one act of charity man is rendered more prompt again to acting according to charity, and, as aptitude increases, he breaks forth into an act of more fervent love by which he strives toward the progress of charity, and then charity is increased,"[3] not only (from one title) on account of that act, but (from several titles) also on account of all the preceding acts. Whence all works revive in an equal grade of charity, provided that the disposition to that grade is present; but if the disposition is lesser, they revive in an inferior grade; if greater, in a superior grade.[4] Thus St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Cajetan, and almost all the older authors; and among more recent authors, the Thomists.

[2] St. Thomas, q. 114, a. 8, ad 3.

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 6. - Every remiss act per se disposes, although insufficiently, to increase, because it disposes to an intense act; per accidens it disposes to diminution, insofar as it easily gives place to contrary causes.

[4] III, q. 89, a. 2.

The chief argument of the former opinion is that the merit of good works cannot be understood unless to each work there is given a special reward, that is, a special grade of grace, charity, and glory; otherwise we would not merit more by many works than by one,[5] nor would all the merits of good works revive totally. - The chief argument of the second opinion is: Virtue is increased by the same causes by which it is generated; therefore, just as for the infusion of charity and of infused virtues there is required a disposition proportioned to the quantity of charity to be infused (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7), so also for increase there is required a disposition proportioned to the increase. And indeed:

[5] The argument is not compelling. For a reward is not a gift according to itself, but a gift formally as given on account of works. Therefore if it is given on account of two works, or on account of a greater one, the reward is greater. It is morally more: for it is a great perfection to have eternal life as a crown for works, and greater in proportion as it is conferred by more titles of works. Therefore the reward is greater if the same thing is given by more titles, and from this also accidental joy increases. Thus for Christ, for whom there was an innate right to the glory of the body, He willed to merit this same glory by many titles of sufferings and sorrows and of His death. - Besides, in the natural order it would certainly be so, since

acquired virtue would not be increased by one but only by several repeated good works; therefore what would be in the natural order is not repugnant in the supernatural order.

a) qualities which admit more and less exist in a greater or lesser grade according to the diverse disposition of the subject. But just as less intense acts of acquired virtue do not immediately dispose to its increase, but an act equally intense disposes to this and a more intense act produces this; so also a less intense act of infused virtue or charity does not immediately dispose to its increase, but only a more intense or equally intense act does this;

b) otherwise we would have more power for disposing ourselves as to the increase of infused virtue than of acquired virtue; - and

c) we would be converted to God our end, and would tend to Him and have friendship with Him, more than we would will or strive to do.

Therefore, in order that charity and infused virtue be increased, a more intense or equally intense act is required. - There is added that it is very probable that all works of the just are meritorious, and yet it is incredible that charity is increased in each almost without interruption, nor could anyone assert this with any probability.

641. Observation. - It can be added with probability (after Gonet, Billuart, and Masi), although it is not necessary, that the increase of charity and infused virtue which in this life was merited by less intense works, but on account of the absence of a proportioned disposition was not obtained, is conferred upon us in the first moment after death, when the soul with the whole intensity of its charity tends into an act of love of God. This act is not meritorious, because the separated soul is not in the state of wayfaring, but it would be a disposition for obtaining the increase which by the prior merit of this life is due.

642. Infused virtues can be lost and per se are lost by sins directly contrary to them. Hence divine faith is lost only by infidelity, hope by despair and presumption against hope, moral virtues by a grave sin contrary to them,[6] for example, justice by grave injustice, charity by every mortal sin.

[6] St. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 42, a. 2, ad 4.

Per accidens a virtue is lost when another virtue is lost which is presupposed to it and on which it depends as on a foundation. Thus hope is lost by infidelity, and infused moral virtues are lost when charity is lost, with which they are connected.

Faith and hope are not lost when charity has been lost, because they are presupposed to it; namely, God from goodness conserves them in those who cast away the supernatural life of grace, as relics by which they may be converted more easily.

643. Infused virtues cannot be diminished. - Charity and the other infused virtues cannot be diminished directly and in themselves, for mortal sin, which is contrary to them, totally takes them away; venial sin, because it is not contrary to charity and infused virtues but is outside them, cannot diminish them. Hence venial sins, or non-use of infused virtues, do not even per accidens effect their diminution, but only dispose to their corruption, and this disposition to corruption can be called indirect diminution and diminution improperly so called.

644. Corollary. - The gifts of the Holy Spirit, connected with charity, are infused together with it, are increased intensively, and are lost in the same way as infused moral virtues.

Question Four: On the Properties of Infused Habits and Virtues

Article I: On the Mean of Infused Virtues

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 64, a. 1, 2, 3; *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 13.

645. Theological virtues are not in the mean, properly and per se and according to the very account of virtue, that is, by reason of the object, because in their matter excess cannot be given: for the object and measure of the theological virtues is not the good of reason to be placed in acts (which is in the mean), but God Himself (infinite perfection, which exceeds every human faculty), toward whom we cannot tend too much; indeed, we cannot love Him or believe in Him or hope in Him as much as we ought. Namely, there is no excess in attaining the measure.

Nevertheless, on our part and by reason of the subject and the mode in which they are exercised, they are in the mean between two extreme vices, because we ought to tend toward God according to the measure of our nature and condition; whence we ought so to hope and believe that our hope may be midway between presumption and despair, and our faith between two opposed heresies, and therefore the presumptuous man sins, who hopes for a good which exceeds his condition, and the despairing man, who does not hope for what according to his condition he can hope; likewise he sins who would give himself to contemplation when detriment would follow for society or when he ought to be vacant for the affairs of the family. But this is per accidens as to the nature of theological virtue, because it does not come from its proper acts considered according to themselves, and from its proper matter, but from the extrinsic circumstances of the subject in which it inheres. Whence they are said improperly to be in the mean.

646. Therefore theological virtues are appretiatively supreme, that is, they adhere to God above all things:[1]

[1] Hence faith is said to be without measure, because it is concerned with the end. Cf. St. Thomas, on Rom. XII, lect. 3.

1. Faith adheres to divine authority before every other authority; hope adheres to omnipotence before every other power; charity adheres to divine goodness before every other goodness.

2. Faith believes God more firmly than all others; hope hopes more immovably in God than in any others whatever and loves Him above all concupiscible things; charity prefers God to all other things and loves Him above all lovable things.

3. Whence we are prepared to put aside all things which are contrary to faith, hope, or charity, rather than depart from them.

647. Infused moral virtues are in the mean, in the same way as was said concerning acquired virtues; but the mean can be diverse because it is not determined by relation to human reason but to divine law.

The gifts of the Holy Spirit are not in the mean because they are directed by the instinct of the Holy Spirit, who cannot fall short or exceed; furthermore, the Holy Spirit is not something regulable.

Article II: On the Connection of Infused Habits

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65 and 68, a. 5; *De Virt.*, q. 2, a. 3; q. 5, a. 2.

648. Principle I. Theological virtues according to essence are not connected, but they are connected as virtues. Among the theological virtues:

1. Faith and hope according to their proper essence do not depend on charity, for they are presupposed to charity; whence they can exist without charity, as is clear in a sinner who has not denied faith and hope. This has been defined for faith by the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 15 and can. 28; for hope it is certain from the unanimous opinion of theologians.

2. Nevertheless without charity they are not perfect or formed virtues because in fact they are not referred to the ultimate end. For it belongs to the account of perfect virtue not only that we operate good, but also that we operate well; but faith is a voluntary assent, which will not be perfect unless it is done in the due mode and the will is also well disposed through charity; hope is the expectation of beatitude from merits, which will not be perfect unless present merits are had, for which charity is required. Hence charity, by which we are ordered to the supernatural ultimate end, is called the perfection and (extrinsic) form of all supernatural virtues; and faith and hope without charity are unformed (q. 65, a. 4).

3. Faith can exist without hope because it is presupposed to hope according to reason.

4. But charity cannot exist without faith and hope, and hope cannot exist without faith. Hence St. Thomas, q. 65, a. 5: "Just as someone could not have friendship with another if he disbelieved or despaired that he could have some society or familiar conversation with him, so someone cannot have friendship toward God, which is charity, unless he has faith, through which he believes in a society and conversation of this kind with God, and hopes that he pertains to this society."

649. Principle II. Infused moral virtues are connected:

A. Among themselves through prudence: for they incline us to choosing supernatural means well for a good end, or to acting supernaturally well in all circumstances, which is impossible without perfect supernatural prudence; - and conversely perfect prudence cannot exist for ordering means well in all circumstances, unless one is disposed to a particular good end for all circumstances, for which all moral virtues are required. This is in the same way as was said concerning acquired virtues (q. 65, a. 1).

B. They are also connected with charity:

1. They cannot exist without charity. For they cannot exist without supernatural prudence; moreover, supernatural prudence cannot exist without charity, for if for perfect prudence it is required that man be well disposed relative to the due particular ends in such and such matter, which is done through the moral virtues, much more is it required that he be well disposed relative to the ultimate end, which is done through charity: for an act ordering means well to a good particular end but to an evil ultimate end becomes evil. Therefore infused moral virtues are connected with charity (a. 2).

2. Likewise charity cannot exist without infused moral virtues. For a) charity is connected with sanctifying grace, which elevates to supernatural being and is the remote principle of

supernatural operations. But infused moral virtues are properties of sanctifying grace, for he who has supernatural being as remote principle must be able to operate supernaturally and have proximate principles for supernatural operations. Therefore - b) grace and charity, insofar as it orders man to the ultimate end, is the principle of all good works which can be ordered to the ultimate end. But no being tends to an end unless it has the power of disposing means to the end, and the principle of certain works is not found in any thing unless those things are found which are necessary for perfecting works of this kind. But moral virtues give the power of choosing means necessary to the ultimate end and of perfecting the individual genera of supernatural good works. Therefore they are connected with grace and charity. Namely, God operates no less perfectly in the works of grace than in the works of nature.

Hence he who receives grace and charity receives supernatural moral virtues; and through any mortal sin whatever, charity and all supernatural moral virtues are lost (a. 3).

3. Likewise the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected with charity, by which we are united to the Holy Spirit as mover, and therefore they are granted with charity, are increased intensively, and are lost (q. 68, a. 5).

650. Principle III. Natural acquired moral virtues can exist without charity, and conversely, for a sinner who is converted does not on that account have acquired virtues; and he who sins mortally does not on that account lose them (q. 63, a. 2, ad 2).

651. Observation. - St. Thomas says: "Charity is the form of all virtues because it gives and impresses on the acts of the other virtues their form and ultimate perfection, according as it orders them to the ultimate end; it is their root because it nourishes and sustains them; their end because it orders all the other virtues to its end; and their mother because from appetite for the ultimate end it conceives the acts of the other virtues by commanding them" (II-II, q. 23, a. 8). Therefore prudence is the form of the moral virtues because it gives ordination to the particular end according to reason; charity is the form of the theological virtues and of prudence because it gives perfect ordination to the ultimate end; grace is the form of charity because it gives divine being and thus confers upon it dignity and a right to the ultimate end (*De Virt.*, q. 2, a. 3, ad 19).[1]

[1] Cf. II Sent., dist. 26, q. 1, a. 4, ad 5.

Article III: On the Equality of Infused Habits

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 66, a. 1, 2, 6; q. 68, a. 7 and 8; II-II, q. 23, a. 6; *De Virt.*, q. 5, a. 3.

652. Principle I. According to species, theological virtues are more perfect than the others. - For as object they have God Himself, the supernatural end, and immediately attain the very primary rule of human acts, namely, God; and thus they are more perfect according to species than the other virtues, which attain only human reason. But among them charity is eminent, for faith and hope include distance from God and imperfection, since faith is concerning God not seen and hope concerning God not possessed, but charity is concerning God who already in some way is possessed through the love of friendship and will be fully possessed.[1] Whence the Apostle, I Cor. XIII, 13: The greater of these is charity (q. 66, a. 6).

[1] Another reason is handed down in the treatise on Charity. Cf. II-II, q. 23, a. 6.

Faith, entitatively as a habit, is more perfect than hope because it is in the intellect, whose object is nobler; but hope, as a virtue, is more perfect because it approaches more to God.

Infused moral virtues are less perfect than theological virtues, because they are immediately concerned only with means to the end; but they have a diverse grade of perfection in the way in which it was said concerning acquired virtues.

The gifts of the Holy Spirit are less perfect than the theological virtues, which are their principles and roots, and which immediately join one to God as ultimate end; while the gifts only perfect man so that he is subjected to God moving him: but to be united to God is more perfect than to be subjected to Him as mover. But they are more perfect than other virtues, which perfect either reason itself or dispose us to following the motion of reason, while by the gifts we are submitted to the nobler mover, the Holy Spirit. "But it is manifest that for a higher mover the movable thing must be disposed by a greater perfection" (q. 68, a. 8). - Among the gifts, those which are intellectual are more excellent than those which are in the appetite, and indeed 1. wisdom is more worthy, 2. understanding, 3. knowledge, 4. counsel, 5. piety, 6. fortitude, 7. fear, according to the order of the natural virtues[2] (a. 7).

[2] Thus the dignity of the gifts is considered simply, "by comparison to their proper acts, according as they proceed from their principles"; for in a qualified sense, namely, "by comparison to matter," "fortitude and counsel, because they have place in arduous things, are preferred to knowledge and piety, which have place in common things." Whence they are enumerated by Isaiah before knowledge and piety. And the order of the beatitudes inversely agrees with this order.

653. Principle II. According to extension and intensity, infused habits are equal. - Infused virtues - likewise the gifts of the Holy Spirit - cannot be increased extensively, but dispose to all corresponding supernatural acts; and therefore in all men and in the same man even at diverse times they are equal according to extension. Likewise, because, according to the formal element, they are connected and are infused at the same time, they are also equal according to intensity in the same man at the same time: thus all infused habits are equally ordered through charity to the supernatural end, just as moral virtues through infused prudence equally adhere to the good of reason and are conformed to reason. Hence if charity is increased, all are proportionally increased at the same time; just as, when prudence has been increased, all moral virtues are proportionally increased.

Article IV: On the Duration of Infused Habits

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 67; q. 68, a. 6; *De Virt.*, q. 5, a. 4.

654. Principle. In the blessed there remain infused habits which include no imperfection repugnant to their state. - Hence:

1. Faith and hope do not remain, which include imperfection because they concern what is not seen and what is not possessed; whence, when vision and possession arrive, they are made void.

2. Charity remains because love from its nature includes no imperfection: it can concern what is possessed and what is not possessed, what is seen and what is not seen.

3. Supernatural moral virtues remain as to essence, but they will have other acts conformable to heavenly life, as was said concerning acquired virtues; nevertheless, before the resurrection,

the virtues which are concerned with passions will not exist except in root, because they are in the sensitive appetite, which cannot exist without the body.

4. The gifts of the Holy Spirit remain as to essence in the other life because the blessed perfectly follow the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and are most perfectly subjected to Him; but they will have other acts suitable to heavenly life.

655. Observation. - In the souls of purgatory, faith and hope also remain because they do not yet see nor possess God. But in the damned no supernatural habit or virtue can exist, because they are no longer destined to supernatural life.

Special Moral Theology

Introduction — On the Matter, Method, and Order of Special Moral Theology

656. Matter. - After general moral theology, which comprises the treatises on the ultimate end, on human acts in themselves, on their rules, namely, conscience and laws, on sins, and on habits and virtues considered in general, we begin special moral theology, which treats in particular:

1. of individual good acts, and of evil acts or opposed sins;

2. of individual habits, virtues or gifts of the Holy Spirit, and of opposed vices;

3. of individual precepts, whether affirmative, which pertain to good works and virtues, or negative, which pertain to sins and vices.

Moreover, among all these, certain things pertain to the state of all men, certain things to some determined state, namely, of clerics, religious, bishops, etc.

657. Method. - Now all the aforesaid things can be explained separately, or even several of them together, as many modern authors do, who with St. Alphonsus divide moral theology according to the precepts. But the scientific and more perfect method of St. Thomas, as more complete and at the same time more compendious, is to consider all these things together, so that in the same treatise we may consider both the virtue with its acts, and the opposed vices and sins, and the gift of the Holy Spirit corresponding to this virtue, and the affirmative or negative precepts pertaining to all these things.

"It must be considered," says St. Thomas,[1] "...that if we determined separately concerning virtues, gifts, vices, and precepts, it would be necessary to say the same thing many times... Therefore the way of considering will be more compendious and expeditious if, under the same treatise, the consideration proceeds at the same time concerning the virtue and the gift corresponding to it, and the opposed vices, and the affirmative or negative precepts. But this mode of consideration will be suitable to the vices themselves according to their proper species. For it has been shown above that vices and sins are diversified in species according to matter or object... But the matter concerning which both virtue operates rightly and the opposed vices depart from rectitude is the same."

[1] In the introduction to the Secunda Secundae.

In reality, the order of the precepts does not favor a scientific exposition, by which all things may be logically joined among themselves and reduced to principles. For:

a) there are many acts which are reduced to the precepts rather arbitrarily and very remotely, for example, imprecation, anger, indeed gluttony and drunkenness, which are apt to harm the body, to the fifth precept; all the sacraments to the third; the obligation of alms to the fourth or to the fifth; humility to the eighth;

b) there are acts or virtues which must be reduced to several precepts, for example, charity to the first for love of God, to the fifth for love of neighbor, to the fourth or fifth for the office of almsgiving; likewise restitution and justice, fortitude and temperance to diverse precepts according to various matters; - and thus many things are mixed together whose morality proceeds from very diverse reasons, or on the contrary those things are separated which regard the same virtues;

c) furthermore, the said method gives place to an incomplete treatment: treating professedly of commanded acts, they omit those things which are of counsel and which regard perfection, and they consider sins more, or even exclusively, not virtues.

Whence the division according to virtues is altogether to be preferred.

658. Order of division. - There are seven virtues to which all others are reduced: three theological and four cardinal. Therefore special moral theology comprises seven treatises: on faith, on hope, on charity, on prudence, on justice, on fortitude, on temperance, which regard all states; to these is added an eighth: on particular states.[2]

[2] Understand particular states relative to the ultimate end, but not lay states as moderns posit them: these, with St. Thomas, are to be considered with the virtue of justice.

We begin to speak of the theological virtues.

On Theological Virtues

Treatise: On Divine Faith

Introduction

659. Faith according to the name (*pistis* from *peitho*, *peithomai*, I trust, I have been persuaded) primarily and according to origin designates voluntary trust or confidence, given either to the authority (or truth) or testimony of another through our intellect,[1] or to his goodness or promise through the will itself.[2]

[1] Heb. XI; I Cor. XIII, 13; I Thess. I, 8; II Thess. II, 12; II Cor. V, 7.

[2] Jas. I, 6: "Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering"; John II, 23; Matt. VI, 30; VIII, 26; IX, 2; XIV, 31; Eccli. VII, 28; XXVII, 17; I Cor. IX, 17, and often in the Scriptures, though not always, as the Protestants falsely assert.

From the derivation of this latter signification, faith is also taken: a) for fidelity in promises;[3] b) for the promise itself and vow;[4] c) for the things promised.[5]

[3] Rom. III, 3; Matt. XXV, 21; Luke XIX, 17; I Cor. IV, 2.

[4] I Tim. V, 12: "they have made void faith (that is, the promise of chastity)."

[5] For example, to keep the faith of marriage.

From the derivation of the former signification, faith is also taken: a) for truth in testifying;[6] b) for the very things testified, for example, for the doctrine to be believed, as in Eph. IV, 5: "One Lord, one faith," and the Athanasian Symbol: "This is the Catholic faith...";[7] c) for trust given either to one's own opinion, when full evidence is not present, or to the dictate of one's own conscience, as in Rom. XIV, 23: "That which is not from faith (that is, from persuasion of conscience) is sin"; in which sense also someone is said to be of good or bad faith.

[6] Apoc. III, 14: "the faithful and true witness"; Jer. VII, 28.

[7] Acts VI, 7; Apoc. II, 13; Gal. III, 25.

660. Faith taken in the strict sense is said of the voluntary assent of the intellect (actual faith), or of the habit inclining to furnishing such assent (habitual faith), on account of the authority or testimony alone of another. If that authority is human, it is called human faith; if it is divine, it is called divine faith.

Divine faith could be given concerning merely natural things; nevertheless, in the present order in which we are destined to a supernatural end, it concerns supernatural and divine things (and other things in order to eternal life), and therefore it is more strictly divine, not only by reason of motive but also by reason of matter, whence it is called theological.

661. Theological faith is described by the Apostle, Heb. XI, 1: But faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing. It is said:

1. the substance of things to be hoped for, that is, the first inchoation of beatitude in us, and the first foundation (which stands under the others and therefore founds the others), as St. Thomas explains; or, more conformably to the Greek text: the firm and certain subsistence

(*hypostasis*) of beatitude in our mind, insofar as faith makes us so certain of the things to be hoped for as if they were already present and possessed by us;

2. argument (*elenchos*) metonymically for its effect itself, namely, the conviction which it causes;

3. of things not appearing (*ou blepomenon*); faith is an argument, that is, a full conviction, a certain persuasion of things which are seen neither by the senses nor by the mind, but are admitted on account of the authority of God.

St. Thomas shows that this description is a true definition, II-II, q. 4, a. 1 (cf. *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 2), whence from his time it is customarily explained in the schools as the classic definition. For by this definition faith is distinguished from all other things:

a) by the fact that it is said to be the substance of things to be hoped for, it is distinguished from faith commonly so called, for example, from human faith, which is not ordered to hoped-for beatitude;

b) by the fact that it is called an argument, it is distinguished from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, by which the intellect is not fully convinced nor firmly adheres to any truth;

c) finally, by the fact that it is said to be of things not appearing, it is distinguished from science and from the understanding of principles, by which things appear to the intellect. Whence if someone wished to place the doctrine of the Apostle in the form of a definition, he could say: "faith is a habit of mind by which eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to things not appearing."

662. The Vatican Council explains the definition of the Apostle, while it expounds the nature of faith (*Dei Filius*, c. 3): "This faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue by which, with the grace of God inspiring and helping, we believe the things revealed by Him to be true, not on account of the intrinsic truth of the things, seen by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. For faith is, as the Apostle testifies, the substance..." There is indicated:

1. the genus to which faith pertains: supernatural virtue;

2. the act proper to the virtue of faith, by which it is distinguished from other virtues: by which we believe things to be true;

3. the matter concerning which it is concerned: things revealed by God;

4. the motive of faith: on account of the authority of God revealing;

5. the cause of faith: with grace inspiring, that is, preventing, and helping.

That this definition is real and adequate will be shown throughout the whole treatise.[8]

[8] For doctrine on faith, the following can usefully be consulted: throughout, St. Thomas, Q. D. *de Veritate* 14; and II-II, q. 1-16, with the commentaries of Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Sylvius, the Salamancans, Gotti, and Billuart; likewise Billot, *De Virtutibus infusis*; - also sometimes, though less safely: Suarez, Lugo, Franzelin; - likewise Scheeben, Heinrich, Mannens, Tanquerey, Van Noort in their Dogmatic Theology; - Brouwer, *De Fide divina*; Bouquillon, *De Virtutibus theologicis*, with annotations by Waffelaert; Mazzella and Schiffini in their respective treatise *De Virtutibus infusis*; *Theologia Mechliniensis*, *De*

Virtutibus; Masi, *De Virtute Fidei*; Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Revelatione*; Lumbreras, *De Fide*; - likewise Goudin, *Philosophia*, p. 4, diss. 2, q. 4, a. 5; R. Martin, *De Necessitate credendi et credendorum*; Gardeil, *Credibilite et Apologetique*; Bainvel, *La Foi et l'acte de foi*; Lefebvre, *L'Acte de Foi d'apres S. Thomas*; Ansgar Stolz, *Glaubensgnade und Glaubenslicht*; Al. Janssens, *Het Geloof*; Janvier, *Conf. de N.-D.: La Foi*; Harent in *Dict. de Theol.*, art. *Foi*; - for the more practical part: St. Alphonsus and other more recent moralists: Lehmkuhl, Ballerini, Aertnijs, Marc, Haine, Genicot, Noldin, Prummer, and Vermeersch.

But the treatise on faith does not pertain, as it has seemed to some, to dogmatic theology, but to moral theology. For to believe is a human act by which one must tend to the supernatural end. And therefore, although the more principal objects of faith are merely speculative or dogmas only to be believed, which are explained in Dogmatic Theology, nevertheless faith itself is something practical, which is to be known to the extent that at the same time it is to be done and led into practice. Whence the whole treatise, as great as it is, pertains to moral theology.

663. Division of the treatise. - The treatise on faith comprises five parts:

The first part treats of the object of faith, which is more known than the act of faith, whence it must also be explained first: 1. concerning the formal object; 2. concerning the material object: a) concerning the material object in itself; b) concerning its conditions; c) concerning its evolution; d) concerning the Church proposing it.

The second part treats of the act of faith, which is more known than the habit of faith: A. concerning the interior act: 1. concerning its essence; 2. concerning its analysis, namely, both a) of the act of faith itself, and b) of the pious affection of credulity, and c) of the judgment of credibility, that is, concerning the preambles of faith; 3. concerning the necessity of the act of faith; B. concerning the exterior act or confession of faith.

The third part treats of the habit of faith: 1. concerning faith itself: a) relative to the subject, b) relative to the other supernatural virtues, c) relative to the other intellectual virtues; 2. concerning those who have faith; 3. concerning the cause and effects of faith; 4. concerning the gifts corresponding to faith.

The fourth part treats of opposed vices and sins: 1. concerning sins directly opposed to interior faith: a) concerning infidelity; b) concerning heresy and apostasy; 2. concerning sins indirectly opposed to faith: a) concerning communication with unbelievers and heretics; b) concerning cooperation in infidelity and heresy; c) concerning the reading or dissemination of prohibited books; d) concerning the admission or profession of doctrine which is dangerous for faith; 3. concerning blasphemy, which is directly opposed to the confession of faith.

The fifth part treats of the precept of faith.

First Part: On the Object of Faith

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 1.

664. The object of faith is first truth, God, as will be proved below. He Himself is first truth in a threefold way: a) in being, because His essence is the first being and therefore the first eternal truth; b) in knowing, because His wisdom from eternity knows all things as they are; c) in speaking, because by His veracity from eternity He has the highest propensity for speaking the truth, if He speaks.

665. The object of faith is twofold: material and formal. - For in every power and habit, just as in every act, a twofold object is distinguished:

1. The material object, or that which is actually attained, the matter about which the act is concerned, for example, for cognition, that which is known, such as a conclusion. Moreover the material object is twofold: for there is something which is first, through itself and by reason of itself, attained, which consequently is called the primary object, and by reason of which the other things are attained, which are called the secondary material object.

2. There is had the formal object, or that through which, by means of which, the material object is immediately attained, or the proximate motive on account of which it is attained; for example, for cognition, the medium through which something is immediately known, such as the syllogism by which the conclusion is known.

Let the example be in vision: the secondary material object is the things seen, the primary material object is the colored thing, the formal object is light.

666. Observations. - 1. Lest confusion arise, it should be noted that certain theologians call the primary material object the formal object *which*; but these call the formal object the formal object *by which*, or the formal motive or formal reason.[1]

[1] For the primary object is the formal reason under which, or that by means of which, the secondary object is attained, and thus it is as it were the formal object with respect to the secondary object. Nevertheless it is that which is attained, indeed first and per se; whence it is better called material than formal, so that the designation "formal object" may be reserved for that which is only formal, or that by which we attain. And St. Thomas speaks thus here in article 1.

2. In catechisms, the material object is designated by the particle *what*, for example, when it is asked what we ought to believe; and the formal object is expressed by the particle *why* or *wherefore*, for example, why we ought to believe.

Question One: On the Formal Object of Faith

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 1; *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 8.

667. Thesis. The formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing, or first truth in speaking. - The formal object of faith is that on account of which that which is believed is believed. But this, as the Vatican Council defines, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 3, is the authority of God revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive; indeed authority not in commanding but in affirming and testifying, or the truth of God in speaking, and indeed the truth of God as revealing. These words indicate two things:

1. That God, when He speaks, from infinite perfection says nothing except the true, and therefore has the right that we believe Him; whence the formal object of faith is said to be first truth in speaking.

2. But it is not sufficient that God, when He speaks, says the true; for faith it is also required that He in fact has spoken; whence the formal object of faith is said to be the authority of God as revealing, or first truth revealing. For if we ask someone why he believes, he will answer:

because God has said it (behold the second); and he believes that God has said it because God in speaking is true (behold the first). - But:

3. For the authority of God by which He is true in speaking, it is not sufficient that God be infinitely truthful, that is, that He cannot from malice deceive anyone, but it is also required that He be infinitely wise, that is, that He cannot be deceived in knowing from ignorance. Therefore theologians say that the formal object of faith is first truth in speaking, insofar as it supposes first truth in knowing. Nevertheless the immediate and ultimate motive of faith is only first truth revealing.

668. That the authority of God revealing is the formal object of faith is proved:

1. By reason: by divine faith we believe God in the same way as by human faith we believe man. But by human faith we believe on account of the authority of man in testifying: for if we ask someone, why do you believe this, he will answer: because Peter said it; and if we ask, why do you believe what Peter said, he will answer: because Peter is true in speaking.

2. From the mode of speaking of Sacred Scripture: a) faith is said to be from hearing the word of God (Rom. X, 14; Jer. VII, 28), and the faithful are said to receive faith as the word or testimony of God (I Thess. II, 13); - b) by faith we believe God (Gen. XV, 6): to believe is to receive the testimony of God, just as to believe men is to receive the testimony of men (I John V, 5-13); and indeed divine faith is compared with the faith which is given to witnesses in court (John V, 36; VIII, 17); - c) the prophets of the Old Testament, when they require faith, appeal to the authority of God ("Thus says the Lord"), indeed Christ Himself explicitly appeals to His truth and veracity (John VII, 16, 28; VIII, 26); whence by believing we signify that God is truthful (John III, 33). By all these things it is established that we believe God in the same way as we believe men, and that faith is founded on the testimony and authority of God speaking. - And therefore d) faith is called obedience and captivity of the intellect unto the obedience of Christ (II Cor. X, 5): for when man by faith admits, not what he himself sees, but what Christ sees, because he voluntarily trusts Christ, therefore through the will the intellect is held captive by the intellect of Christ, subjects itself to Him, and honors Him.

3. From Tradition: the Fathers from the beginning teach the same clearly and openly: Athenagoras, *Leg. pro christianis*, n. 7; St. Theophilus of Antioch, *ad Autolyc.* I, 8; Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* II, c. 2, n. 8; St. Chrysostom, on Matt. hom. I, n. 82; hom. 36 on Gen. 15, n. 6; Theodoret, *Graec. affect.*, serm. 1; St. Cyprian, *de Mortalitate*, n. 6; St. Ambrose, on Luke IV, 71; St. Augustine, ep. 47, n. 7; *de Spiritu et Littera*, XXXII, n. 5; St. Leo the Great, serm. 27, c. 1.

The arguments adduced prove that faith is equally founded on revelation or testimony and on the truth of God, and therefore that not only the truth of God in speaking is the formal object of faith, but also that revelation pertains to it, or is a motive positively influencing faith, and is not a pure condition without which it would not exist, which applies the motive, as Scotus taught. And indeed:

a) That which formally constitutes God as witness and which renders the authority of God formally moving pertains to the motive of faith. But active revelation formally constitutes God as witness and renders His authority formally moving, for authority not speaking is not moving the hearer. Therefore

the formal motive of faith is first truth as actually testifying; otherwise it would move in first act, not in second act.

b) For a partial motive is that by which reason sees the connection between the authority of God and the truth to be believed, just as the nexus of a conclusion with a principle moves to the assent of science; but this connection in the case is the fact of revelation. Therefore revelation is a partial motive.

c) The adequate formal object is that which infallibly shows the revealed truth. Neither the authority of God alone nor revelation alone shows this. Therefore the adequate formal object is each together. Namely, we do not believe only because God is truthful, nor only because God has revealed, but on account of each.[1]

[1] Thus St. Thomas I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2; II-II, q. 1, a. 1; q. 5, a. 5; *De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 8; Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, the Salamancans, and generally Thomists; also Billot and Pesch.

669. Faith is a theological or purely divine virtue, which consequently has God alone as formal object: for by habitual grace and the theological virtues we participate in the life and operations proper to God Himself, which have only God as object. Whence the single motive of faith is only the truth of God revealing, nor can anything created enter into its formal object, just as must also be said concerning the other theological virtues. Hence the following are not to be heard:

1. Those who with De Lugo think that the formal object of faith partially is the proposition of the Church, saying that we believe because God has revealed, and this because the Church says it. For the proposition made by the Church is not the cause or motive why we believe, but only the ordinary means by which we know what has been revealed by God;[2] and once this is known, we adhere to the revealed things on account of the authority of God alone. Thus when a teacher says: this is the sentence of Scripture or of St. Thomas, you believe the sentence not on account of the authority of the teacher, but on account of the authority of Scripture or of St. Thomas.

[2] The proposition of the Church does not formally influence the act of believing; but it furnishes the means of knowing which things have been revealed, both because it is connatural to man that he be taught by another, and because thus it is done more easily and expeditiously, and because the means is safe and efficacious, since it is not subject to failure.

Thus also the things contained in the letter of a king are not believed on account of the authority of the messenger.

2. Nor are those to be heard who, like Mazzella, teach that extrinsic revelation enters into the formal object of faith, because for faith it is required that in fact God has spoken, as was said in n. 667. For God's speech can be considered either actively, as in God Himself it is the conception of the truth which He orders and directs to us, and the will and command of revealing it, and thus it is nothing except God Himself and pertains to the motive of faith; or it can be considered passively, as the manifestation and sign of this conception and will in creatures (external voice, imaginary vision, or intelligible species infused into us), and this is not the formal object of faith but only a condition without which it would not exist: for because we are not able to inspect the speech of God, that is, His intellect and will, therefore

we need signs external to God for knowing it; nevertheless these signs are not the cause or motive why we believe, but a condition without which faith is not possible.

Thus a letter by which someone testifies is not the motive of believing, but the condition of knowing his judgment and internal testimony of his intellect.

670. Corollary. - From this it appears that the opinions of older theologians are false, according to whom:

1. Cajetan placed the formal object of faith in the divine essence or in the truth of God in being, and William of Paris in the supreme dominion of God: these are the ultimate ontological reason of the motive itself of faith, but not the proximate motive which moves to assent, or on which the assent of our intellect rests;

2. Banez and Sylvester Maurus placed it at least partially in the light of faith, whether habitual or actual: grace causes by way of efficient cause, but is not the motive of believing;

3. Ripalda, for revealed promises, placed it in the fidelity of God: but this pertains to the motive of hope.

Question Two: On the Material Object of Faith

Article I: On the Material Object in Itself

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 1 and 2; a. 6, ad 1; *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 8.

671. Thesis I. The material object of faith is all things revealed by God. - The material object of faith is that which is believed on account of the authority of God revealing. But this, as the Vatican Council teaches, sess. 3, c. 3, is all those things and only those things which have been revealed by God. - It is proved:

The material object of faith is everything which can be attained through the formal object, which is the authority of God revealing. Now the authority of God extends itself equally to all revealed things, and God is equally worthy of faith, whether He manifests truths of greater importance or things of lesser importance; on the other hand, the authority of God in speaking cannot extend itself to those things which He does not reveal. Therefore all those things and only those things which God has revealed are the material object of faith.

672. Thesis II. The primary or principal material object of faith is God Himself as supernatural end, or first truth in being. - The primary or principal material object is that which is believed per se and by reason of itself, and by reason of which the other things are believed. But this is God Himself as supernatural end; for all other things, such as the humanity of Christ, the sacraments, and other things contained in the Scriptures, "do not fall under faith except according as they have some order to God," so that we may know Him more fully as supernatural end and tend better to Him. Whence the primary material object is said to be God as He is first truth in being.

Although the object of faith is first truth, which is altogether simple, nevertheless because we do not see it in itself but conceive it in our mode according to a certain composition, it follows that the object of faith as to us is some proposition capable of being enunciated.

673. The secondary object of faith. - To this pertain:

1. those things which directly and per se conduce to the supernatural end, and which are called matters of faith and morals: these are the object of faith properly and per se;

2. those things which per se are indifferent to the supernatural end and without which Christian doctrine concerning faith and morals is complete, but which in fact together with that doctrine were attested in Sacred Letters for its manifestation, for example, the history of Abraham or of the captivity of the Jewish people, and other things of this kind which can be known by natural reason; these also must be believed, but they are not the object of faith except improperly and per accidens (q. 1, a. 6, ad 1).

674. Corollary concerning private revelations. - Since divine authority is equal in particular revelations directed to a private person and in public revelation, it follows that they are the object of divine faith, and can be believed provided that they are certainly established. In which case, at least the one to whom they were directed is obliged to believe; if he omits this, he commits the sin of infidelity, disbelieving the authority of God, which overturns faith in him; but for others it probably suffices that they do not contemn them.

For if private revelations are approved by the Church, they are not proposed to be believed by divine faith; but the Church only declares 1. that they contain nothing against faith and morals, 2. that there are sufficient indications so that they may be prudently, piously, and without superstition believed by human faith; from which it follows 3. that it is not lawful to contemn them.

675. The implicitly revealed object of faith. - Not only those things pertain to divine faith which are explicitly, that is, in themselves, in express and proper words, revealed, but also those things which are revealed implicitly and in another.

For certain things are said to be revealed:

1. Formally and immediately, although implicitly, that is, really and by their proper concept, although not in an expressed and distinct but in a confused mode, and not in proper but in equivalent terms: these are those things which are contained in things explicitly revealed as a part in the whole, for example, the definition and essentials of the defined thing in the defined thing (the metaphysical actual whole and metaphysical parts, for example, man = rational animal; sacrament = practical sign of grace); - or the particular in the universal (the potential whole and subjective parts, for example, every man, John); - or essential elements and properties in the whole (the physical or integral actual whole, and constitutive or integral parts, for example, man = body and soul; head, brain, heart; risible); - or essential powers and potencies in the essence (the potestative whole and potential parts, for example, soul, intellect and will); - or one correlative, contradictory, or contrary in the other (for example, John is the son of Zebedee; this man is the father of John). These are the object of faith because equivalently and as to the sense they are said by God, and therefore are truly, really, and properly contained in revelation: He who reveals the whole implicitly reveals the parts.

2. Those things are said to be revealed virtually and mediately implicitly which are contained in revelation as an effect in a cause, and as a consequence or conclusion in its principles. These

are not the object of divine faith, since they are not immediately and in themselves revealed,[1] but only mediately, namely, in the medium from which they can be deduced: for they are not admitted because God said them, but only on account of another thing which God said, namely, not uniquely on account of the word of God but also on account of the nexus with those things which He said. He who enunciates a principle or cause does not enunciate the consequence or effect. Nevertheless these are the object of the assent of theological science; and if they are infallibly defined by the Church, they must altogether be admitted as true and are the object, not of divine faith, but of theological assent or even of ecclesiastical faith.[2] - Hence:

[1] That these are revealed and to be believed was formerly taught by many, among whom M. Cano, A. Vega, Vasquez, and Ripalda are customarily named. Thus also today Tuyaerts, *L'Evolution du Dogme*. - On the contrary is the far greater part of more recent authors. Cf. Schultes, *Introductio in historiam dogmatum*.

[2] Thus it is generally taught; nevertheless several hold that in the case they are to be believed not by ecclesiastical but by divine faith, as Suarez, Ripalda, Lugo, Schiffini, de Grandmaison, Gardeil, Marin-Sola, who thus hold a certain intermediate opinion.

a) A conclusion from one revealed premise and another naturally known is revealed and an object of faith if the second only shows that the conclusion is formally implicitly contained in the first, for example, Christ is man, therefore He has a body or is a rational animal; every man generated from Adam contracts original sin, therefore Peter contracts it; and also, as it seems, a conclusion whose knowledge depends on a contingent fact, for example, every legitimately elected pontiff is the vicar of Christ, therefore Pius XI is the vicar of Christ; - this child duly baptized has grace; this consecrated host contains Christ. Nevertheless in these examples there is not a true syllogism, because the process does not have illative force; it is not a conclusion properly so called through true demonstration and deduction of a new truth, but is a merely explicative conclusion and a simple declaration of those things which were already actually contained in the premises.

b) A conclusion from one revealed premise and another naturally known, if it is equally contained in each and is equally and truly deduced from each, is not revealed nor an object of faith, because it is admitted not on account of the authority of God alone but on account of deduction, for example, Christ is God-man; but God-man can never lack grace or the beatific vision; therefore; - the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of Christ; but St. Anne is the mother of the Blessed Virgin; therefore she is the grandmother of Christ; - Christ died under Pontius Pilate, therefore under Tiberius. Then there is a true syllogism, true and properly so called deduction, and a true illative conclusion of those things which were contained in the premises only virtually and by force of connection; namely, a conclusion of a distinct truth, not revealed, but connected with revelation. The conclusion, logicians say, follows the weaker part.

c) A conclusion from two revealed premises, according to several authors,[3] is revealed and an object of faith, both because the conclusion is formally contained in the two premises, which in the case are revealed; and because God knows their connection and conclusion, but he who enunciates two premises while he sees the conclusion intends to enunciate this and manifests it in a sufficient mode. These arguments, however, do not seem probative: not the first, because a conclusion properly so called is contained in the premises not formally but only virtually, which are the true cause of arriving at the conclusion; otherwise the conclusion would not express a new truth, nor would reasoning be a

means of increasing knowledge;[4] - not the second, because for a conclusion to be properly and formally enunciated, it is not sufficient that someone know it in the premises and intend to say it, but it is also required that he manifest the connection with them in some way by human speech, namely, that he enunciate the premises not indeed separately but as premises, insofar as they are compared to one another and lead to the conclusion. Therefore in order that God, who uses human speech to men, reveal a conclusion, it is not sufficient that He know the connection with the principles and see the consequence, but it is also required that He express that connection or consequence, and place one premise immediately after the other.[5]

[3] Thus Lugo, the Salamancans, Franzelin, Mazzella, Brouwer, Bouquillon, Waffelaert, the Mechlinians, Mannens, Satolli, De Groot, Tanquerey, etc. The contrary is held by all who absolutely say that true and properly so called conclusions deduced from revelation are not revealed, speaking in the same way concerning all and in no way distinguishing among conclusions, whether they are deduced from one or from two revealed premises. Thus John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Billuart, Berthier, and generally Thomists; likewise Valentia, Molina, Turrianus, Lorca, Suarez, the Wurzburgenses, Dens, Schiffini.

[4] Thus Mercier, *Logique*, 3rd p., ch. I, a. 2, n. 95; and Goudin, *Philosophia Thom.*, t. I, *de demonstr.*, a. 1, single paragraph.

[5] Hence Berthier, *de Loc. theol.*, p. 1, l. 2, ap. 1, n. 478: "The certitude of a conclusion drawn from two premises certain by faith is per se less than the certitude of a proposition certain by faith. For although God is judged to have included that conclusion in the premises, nevertheless God Himself in no way asserted that this was included in them, but the ingenuity of man found and collected it; to which the infinite knowledge and veracity of God does not belong."

Therefore conclusions of this kind, from two revealed premises, do not seem necessarily and always revealed; but if they were, others could be deduced from them, and from these again others, and thus revelation would extend itself as it were to infinity. In fact, nevertheless, they are often revealed and an object of faith, either because they too are expressly revealed, or because one premise only shows what is formally implicitly contained in the other, in which case there is no truly demonstrative syllogism, but a merely explicative one, as was said under a); for example, God is one; but Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are God; therefore they are one God; - all the Apostles received the Holy Spirit; Peter is an apostle; therefore.

d) All the aforesaid conclusions, if they are considered as conclusions, that is, insofar as they have a nexus with premises even revealed and are deduced from them, are not the object of faith but of the assent of theological science, because then they are not admitted on account of the motive of faith, the authority of God revealing, but on account of the motive of science, namely, on account of the nexus with principles and rational deduction.

676. The object of faith as to itself and as to us; of divine and Catholic faith. - The object of faith can be distinguished:

1. The object of divine faith as to itself is that which in fact has been revealed and thus as to itself pertains to faith.

2. The object of faith as to us is that which in addition is sufficiently proposed as revealed and whose revelation is certainly known by us. Whence particular propositions whose knowledge depends on a contingent fact, for example, this host contains Christ, this child has grace, often will not be the object of faith as to us when the existence of the fact is not known by us with absolute certitude:1 for then the nexus with the revealed proposition does not appear.

3. The object of Catholic or universal faith as to all, and to be believed by all, is that which pertains to public revelation directed by God to all men and to the universal Church (contained in Scripture and Tradition), and in addition which the Church proposes as divinely revealed and commands all to believe. Hence private revelations cannot pertain to Catholic faith, and the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin before the definition was an object of divine faith, but not of Catholic faith (Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3; Code of Canon Law 1323, § 1).

Whence something can a) be of faith as to itself, and not as to us, if we are not certain that it is revealed: thus today the question is posed concerning the universal mediation of the Blessed Virgin;

b) be of faith as to one person and not as to another, for example, a private revelation;

c) be only probably of faith, if there is doubt concerning revelation; indeed probably of Catholic faith, if there is doubt concerning the proposition of the Church;

d) begin to be of Catholic faith after definition; indeed cease to be of Catholic faith as to us, if the definition or its sense is no longer established.

Therefore explicit faith can grow.

1. These particular propositions are not revealed except insofar as they are contained in a universal proposition. Whence they are not revealed unless they are necessarily connected with it: if no necessary nexus exists, they are not revealed. But only strict certitude establishes the objective nexus between a particular and universal proposition.

Article II: On the Conditions Required for the Material Object

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 3, 4, 5; I-II, q. 67, a. 3 and 5; *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 9.

677. Two conditions are required for the object of faith. - In order that something can be believed, it is required that it be at once true and obscure, or non-evident. Hence theologians say that there are two conditions of the material object of faith, namely, that it be true and obscure, and two properties of faith on the part of the object: infallibility and obscurity.

678. The infallibility of faith. - First, it is required that the material object of faith be true (Num. XXIII, 19; Heb. VI, 18): for what is false cannot underlie faith, neither on the part of God revealing, nor on the part of the man believing,

a) Not on the part of God revealing, because He cannot say what is false: for if God, by Himself or through another, could say what is false, this would happen either because He was deceived, or because He wished to deceive others; but each is impossible, for the former is repugnant to His omniscience, the latter to His infinite goodness and perfection.

b) Nor on the part of the man believing: for nothing is attained and believed by the habit of faith except on account of the authority and testimony of God, namely, through the mediation of the formal object; but the authority and testimony of God do not extend themselves to false things; therefore what is false cannot be believed.

Faith is an intellectual virtue which is not occupied with what is false, which is the evil of the intellect: for no one uses virtue badly. Hence if someone assents to something false which, through ignorance even invincible, he thinks to be revealed by God, such a one does not assent from the

supernatural habit of theological faith on account of the authority of God, because God has revealed it, but only by a natural act on account of error, because he falsely thinks that God has revealed it. Nor does God by grace concur with such an act, by which the intellect adheres to what is false. Hence faith is infallible.

679. The obscurity of faith. - Second, it is required that the material object of faith be obscure or non-evident: for faith is the argument of things not appearing. And indeed:

a) All theologians unanimously admit that the material object of faith is formally non-evident, by reason of the motive, that is, insofar as it is attained through the formal object, the authority of God revealing: for this does not render the thing evident to the intellect, as the Vatican Council says, sess. 3, c. 3, nor does it make the revealed truth appear in itself.

b) All likewise hold that something cannot at once be believed and be seen by the beatific vision, according to I Cor. XIII, 9-10.

c) Likewise they concede that those things concerning which faith principally is, are altogether obscure and non-evident: for they are the beatific vision and other mysteries hidden in God, for the knowledge of which revelation is absolutely necessary (Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 4, can. 1).

d) It is disputed whether other objects which can be known naturally, but which nevertheless are revealed, can be believed by those who concerning these objects also have evident rational knowledge, for example, whether one who has evidence in every way of the existence of God, or of creation, or of providence, etc., can still admit these things on account of the authority of God, who also revealed them.

680. How evidence impedes faith. - In this question:

1. It is certain that one who has evidence of some thing can believe this implicitly, insofar as he must believe in a general mode all things which God has revealed and can exclude none of them; and this is the sense of the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3.

2. Indeed, he can believe it explicitly, but at another moment than that at which he has evident knowledge: for one who, for example, now demonstrates the existence of God can afterwards admit it on account of revelation, namely, when the intellect does not consider the evidence or does not remember the demonstration.

3. Hence there can be at once in the same man, concerning the same truth, the habit of faith and an act of science, an act of faith and the habit of science, indeed even the habit of faith and the habit of science, by which he is disposed at the same time to believing and knowing, not simultaneously but at diverse times.

4. For it seems that it must be said with St. Thomas,[1] that at the same moment in which someone makes an evident demonstration of some truth, or most fully remembers an earlier demonstration, so that he has full evidence of the truth, he cannot at that moment accept the same truth on account of testimony, even divine testimony. - It is proved:

[1] St. Thomas follows the tradition of Chrysostom, Gregory, Augustine, and in the same way Scotus.

a) From internal experience it is established that what we see with our eyes, we never admit, nor can we admit, on account of the testimony of another even most worthy of faith; likewise it is established that no one believes or can believe the first principles, for example, the principle of contradiction, which are seen by the mind; hence in heaven faith is made void, when the vision of God comes; the same seems to be said of the moment in which someone, after a demonstration has been made, sees by the mind the evident conclusion of the existence of God or of another natural truth: for immediate and mediate evidence are of the same genus. Namely, it is a law of our intellect that it cannot believe the things which we see.

b) By reason: the intellect cannot at the same moment rest perfectly in the truth and at the same time not rest. But he who has knowledge altogether evident, rests perfectly in the truth and indeed necessarily; he who believes does not rest in it, for the possibility and liberty of doubting or of not assenting remain to him. Therefore at the same moment someone cannot hold the same truth by faith and by evidence.[2]

[2] Therefore the impossibility perhaps is not metaphysical, but psychological. - Some deny the force of this second argument, saying that the intellect rests in the truth as evident, but at the same time does not rest in it from the motive of faith. Yet to one considering well it appears to be nothing other than the same argument as the first, drawn from psychological experience, but whose reason at the same time is rendered. Rest, moreover, does not express a relation to the object, but absolutely a relation to the subject, which is at rest or is not.

c) From the answer to the principal argument of the adversaries: the same truth can be admitted at once on account of a twofold motive, namely, evidence and authority. For this is easily distinguished: if those motives do not require a contrary disposition of the intellect, I concede; if they require a contrary disposition, I deny. For otherwise, in the same way, the possibility of faith in heaven, or the compossibility of science and opinion, would be demonstrated.

681. Observation. - Therefore the merit of faith is not diminished from the fact that someone does not believe revealed rational truths of which he has evidence. For, as St. Thomas notes, q. 2, a. 10, ad 2: "Demonstrative reasons brought forward for those things which are preambles of faith (not however for the articles), although they diminish the account of faith, because they make that which is proposed to be apparent, nevertheless do not diminish the account of charity, through which the will is prompt to believe them, even if they did not appear, and therefore the account of merit is not diminished."

Article III: On the Evolution of the Material Object

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 6 and 7; *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 11.

682. Notions. - Theologians distinguish these three things: dogma, point, and article of faith.

A point of faith is a truth revealed by God.

A dogma of faith is a revealed truth proposed by the Church as to be believed.

An article of faith[1] is a revealed truth perfectly distinct from others, and therefore 1. principal or primary among the things to be believed, and 2. not seen by a special reason. It is called:

[1] Article, from the Greek *arthron*, signifies a certain fitting together of distinct parts, and therefore the little parts of the body fitted to one another are called joints of the members. Hence also the things credible by faith are said to be distinguished by articles, insofar as they are divided into certain parts having a certain fitting together with one another.

1. principal among the things to be believed, that is, either God Himself, the supernatural end to be possessed by beatitude, or something supernatural which directly and per se orders us to God and leads to God as end and beatitude, but not those things which are revealed only per accidens, in order to other things (as was said in n. 673); hence that Abraham had two sons or that Saul was the first king of Israel are not articles of faith, since per se they do not pertain to faith;

2. not seen or obscure by a special reason, and therefore having a particular difficulty in being believed; hence that Christ suffered, died, and was buried is only one article, because those three propositions have the same difficulty, but that on the third day He rose again is a distinct article, because the resurrection has a special difficulty in being believed.

683. Principles. On the increase of the object of faith and the progress of faith.

I. The material object of Catholic faith, that is, of the faith to be held by all, did not grow, through the succession of times, as to the substance of the articles. For the whole revealed doctrine is reduced to two highest heads, revealed from the beginning, in which all things are contained implicitly as in a brief introduction: objectively, namely, on the part of the thing, not however logically and as to us, nor formally nor virtually; namely, that God as supernatural end exists, and that He has providence concerning the salvation of man, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews XI, 6: "He who comes to God (that is, who tends to the supernatural end, for in the present order the end is not natural but supernatural, to be attained by the beatific vision) must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him."

II. Up to the times of Christ and the Apostles faith grew by an objective evolution which was made through new revelations. For the explanation or objective evolution of the two fundamental articles grew through new revelations, such as the Trinity, predestination, and all eternal things for the first; all things temporally disposed toward salvation, namely, Redemption, and in this the Incarnation, passion, resurrection, and sacraments of Christ, for the second. Thus it was up to Christ, who revealed all things to His Apostles, whether by Himself, or by the Holy Spirit whom He sent, according to John XVI, 13: "When that Spirit of truth shall come, He will teach you all truth." Hence in the Apostles public revelation was consummated and completed (Council of Trent, sess. 4; prop. 21 of the Modernists).

III. From the time of the Apostles faith did not grow in itself by objective evolution, but only by subjective evolution in the minds of men. New revelations were no longer made, and therefore the object of faith did not grow simply and in itself; nevertheless it can be said to have grown according to a certain respect and as to us, that is, according to explanation or subjective evolution, insofar as its knowledge grew in us, whether through a new proposition, more distinct or urgent, by which it grew in the mind of the Church, or through more perfect knowledge, deeper inspection and understanding, by which it grows in the mind of each one of the faithful. It is, says Albert the Great, III Sent. d. 25, a. 1, "rather the progress of the faithful one in faith than of faith in the faithful one." - Moreover, the subjective evolution of the Church as to the faithful is an objective evolution, not indeed of revelation itself or of revealed truth, but of its proposition and explanation.

A. Subjective explanation in the mind of the Church (and consequently of the faithful), under the assistance of the Spirit of truth, is made in three ways:

1. By the distinct and accurate declaration and scientific exposition of those things which are revealed explicitly but obscurely and confusedly, when obscure revelation, by the interpretation of the Church, is rendered clear.

Thus, for example, Christ is God and man, therefore He has two natures and one person; there is one God, Father, Son, Spirit, therefore there are three persons and one nature; likewise the words: transubstantiation, consubstantial, definition *ex cathedra*, God-bearer.

2. By the explicit proposition of those things which have been revealed formally implicitly, when revelation conceived in general terms is evolved and applied to particulars.

For example, grace is necessary for every salutary work, therefore also for the beginning of faith; the Mother of God is most holy, therefore she does not have original sin; Christ is perfect God and man, therefore He has a divine and human will (and works); the particular rights and offices of the Supreme Pontiff in the primacy.

3. By the express, urgent, and theoretical preaching of those things which were revealed incidentally or in practice and custom, when revelation is proposed in a new mode, especially in order to meet a new error.

Thus, for example, the validity of the Baptism of children or of Baptism conferred by heretics, from the practice of baptizing or not rebaptizing; the sacramental character from the use of not rebaptizing; the presence of Christ under either species from the use of adoration or communion; the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff from the use of defining or imposing an irreformable sentence; Christ and the Apostles, by venerating Mary, show her to be most worthy.

Thus also the dogma itself concerning the evolution of dogma becomes known from use: they explained dogmas, condemned errors, defined formulas, etc.; therefore revealed doctrine can legitimately be expounded and explained.

B. Subjective explanation in the mind of each one of the faithful grows by a twofold way:

1. according to the logical way, or the way of speculative explanation of concepts, by the help of science, in the same mode as was said for the faith of the Church;

2. according to the affective way and connaturality, under the influence of the gifts of the Holy Spirit teaching us the truths of faith as it were experimentally; by which we experience and as it were feel the truth and the true sense of revealed doctrine.[2]

[2] Which Marin-Sola shows well, *La evolucion homogenea del dogma catolico*.

684. Corollaries. - I. Since revelation was closed in the Apostles, it follows that nothing can pertain to Catholic faith which was not revealed to them either explicitly or at least formally implicitly. Hence those things which certain modern writers say concerning the evolution or increase of living faith or dogma as if from a seed, cannot be understood of the revealed truths themselves, but at most of subjective explanation and of theological science concerning them.

II. Likewise it follows that no other, diverse, or contrary sense of dogma can become possible than that which the Church proposes or by which the Church once understood it. "Hence that sense must perpetually be retained which holy mother Church has once declared" (Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 4, can. 3).

III. Although the number of revealed truths does not grow, nevertheless the number of dogmas grows, that is, of revealed truths proposed by the Church: when such proposition comes, some truth begins to be of Catholic faith; dogmas also grow, that is, the proposition of revealed truths made by the Church becomes more perfect.

IV. To the aforesaid doctrine is opposed 1. the error of Hermes and Frohschammer, who think that, by the help of scientific progress, we can at some time arrive at demonstrating and penetrating mysteries; which is against the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 4; - likewise 2. the doctrine of Gunther and Loisy, who maintain that, by the help of the progress of science, the sense of dogmas can be changed, and become other than that which the Church has defined; which was condemned in the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 4 and can. 3, and by the encyclical *Pascendi* of Pius X, September 7, 1907, and in the Modernist propositions 21, 22, 23, and 26 condemned July 3, 1907; - a fortiori 3. the opinion of those who said that revelation was not closed at the time of the Apostles (prop. 20 of the Modernists), or that a new and more perfect economy of the Holy Spirit must be expected: thus the Montanists, Manichaeans, Fraticelli, Swedenborg, Anabaptists, Irving.

V. Once the explicit and express proposition has been made by the Church, she guards this explanation; hence per se there cannot be regression or obscuration in the explanation proposed by the Church as to a defined truth (cf. condemned prop. 95 of Quesnel and 1 of the Synod of Pistoia). Yet regression can per se occur as to the understanding of the faithful: thus at the beginning of the nineteenth century there was less knowledge of theological science than in the thirteenth century at the time of St. Thomas; likewise, exceptionally and per accidens, as to the subjective explanation of the Church, if a definition or proposition of the Church falls into total oblivion or its sense becomes doubtful, which nevertheless will happen rarely and only as to secondary truths. Let this be said, saving a better judgment.

Article IV: On the Church Proposing the Object of Faith

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 8, 9, 10.

685. Principle I. The Church infallibly proposes the object of faith. - In order that those things which truly and really are in revealed doctrine might become known to all, Christ instituted the Church, which could be recognized by all as His own, and which would be the authentic organ of infallibly proposing all things which, as divinely revealed, are to be believed by divine and Catholic faith (Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3; Code of Canon Law, can. 1322, § 1).

Moreover, there is a twofold mode which the Church uses in infallibly proposing or defining truths of faith: one extraordinary and solemn, which she employs in the definitions of Ecumenical Councils and of the Supreme Pontiffs speaking *ex cathedra*; the other ordinary and daily, which the Church diffused throughout the world uses insofar as, by the ordinary and universal magisterium, that is, by the daily and universal preaching and doctrine of the Supreme Pontiff and the bishops, she proposes and defines certain truths as revealed and to be believed (cf. treatise on the Church; Vatican Council, l. c.; Code of Canon Law, can. 1323).

686. Principle II. The Church is infallible in defining not only the object itself of faith but also connected truths and facts, and she proposes sacred doctrine in varying degrees. - The Church is not only infallible in defining revealed doctrine itself; for more perfectly guarding it she also infallibly proposes truths (and facts) necessarily connected with it insofar as they are connected; yet without commanding that they be believed by divine faith; - besides, she does not always at once from the beginning define revealed truths themselves as revealed and to be believed, but sometimes as certain and true, or only as safe and to be held. Hence sacred doctrine can be proposed in various degrees:

1. Of defined and to-be-believed faith, or dogma of faith, when the infallible Church explicitly proposes it as revealed and to be believed; to this a heretical proposition is directly opposed.

2. Certain, when the Church only proposes or defines it as certain; to this erroneous doctrine is directly opposed. But doctrine is certain:

a) either certain by faith, if it is revealed; and to this is opposed error in faith or in revealed doctrine;

b) or theologically certain, if it is not revealed but has been deduced from another revealed truth; and to this is opposed theological error.

3. Common and safe, if it is admitted by all and is held as alone conformable to revelation, but is not proposed as certain; to this a temerarious proposition is directly opposed.

4. Probable or more probable, when it is verisimilar, that is, when a grave or graver reason for judging is present, that it is revealed or deduced from revelation; and to this is opposed an improbable or less probable opinion.

By some, certain doctrine is sometimes called proximate to faith (to which proximate to heresy is opposed), namely, when it is already so commonly and certainly proposed as revealed that it is proximately definable as a dogma of faith, for example, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin in the last state before the definition; - or also, according to others, when it has been declared by the Church at least as certain, but there is doubt whether it is of defined faith.

687. Principle III. The Church is also infallible in condemning and rejecting propositions opposed to the doctrine of faith. - The Church teaches not only positively by proposing or commending doctrine on account of its conformity with the doctrine of faith; but also negatively by condemning or censuring on account of some opposition with the doctrine of faith. But propositions are opposed to the doctrine of faith in diverse ways:

A. Some are opposed directly on account of the doctrine itself asserted:

1. A heretical proposition, which is directly opposed (contrarily or contradictorily) to defined revealed doctrine, for example, Christ is not God.

2. Erroneous, which is opposed directly and immediately to certain doctrine, whether it is revealed but proposed by the Church not as revealed but as certain, and then it is error in faith, for example, Christ does not have grace; or whether it has been deduced from revealed

doctrine, and then it is theological error, for example, Christ is not impeccable; the Son does not proceed from the Father by the intellect.

3. Temerarious, not only negatively because it affirms without any reason and authority, but positively and contrarily because it thus affirms directly against common and safe doctrine, which is admitted by all as alone conformable with revelation (not however by necessary connection), for example, the Church is not infallible in the canonization of saints; God does not will to save all children.

4. Improbable, which does not have grave reasons for itself, and is directly opposed to probable doctrine, for example, Blessed Joseph was immaculately conceived; a child can be saved without Baptism.

To these can be added a proposition proximate to heresy, in the manner explained in the preceding number.

B. Others are opposed to the very expression of Catholic doctrine, on account of the form of enunciating:

1. Savoring of heresy is a proposition, or one suspected of heresy, which can have a true sense, but nevertheless from the circumstances offers occasion for opining or suspecting that some heresy is in the mind of the one enunciating, for example, faith justifies; it is ridiculous to carry the Eucharist in procession; Christ is less than the Father; Christ is a most perfect man.

2. Savoring of error or suspected of error: for example, the Congregation of the Index is evil.

3. Ill-sounding, which has a true sense, but words not fitting, insofar as it expresses doctrine against the common and ordinary mode of speaking, for example, in God there are three relative essences; the Blessed Virgin is divine mother.

4. Offensive to pious ears, which, although it is neither false nor ill-sounding, nevertheless says something unbecoming and unworthy, which diminishes the piety and reverence of the faithful, for example, a proposition explaining the shameful members of Christ or speaking unbecomingly of the parturition of the Blessed Virgin, or this one: St. Mary Magdalene, prostitute, pray for us.

688. Principle IV. The Church employs the Symbol as the practical mode of proposing faith by the ordinary and universal magisterium. - This Greek word signifies both a contribution or collection of many things, and also an indication, a distinctive sign, a token. Therefore the brief collection or summary of the articles of faith, which is proposed to all to be believed as the sign of their profession, was rightly so called. Moreover, symbols were composed for three ends: principally a) that by the profession of the symbol the faithful might be distinguished from infidels and heretics; also b) for the easier instruction of the faithful; and c) that uniformity in faith might be preserved throughout the whole world.

There are three more celebrated symbols of faith in the Church, of which one declares another, and proposes the same doctrine explicitly, more distinctly, and more fully according to the necessities of

diverse times, and diverse errors, so that the faithful might be fortified against them:

The first, of the Apostles,[1] which by some is divided into 14 articles, by others into 12; this latter division became common among the faithful, and was preserved in the catechism of the Council of Trent.

[1] At least it already existed at the beginning of the second century, as having already been spread everywhere in that century; indeed probably in the first century, as seems to be established from the simplicity of the speech, which is in no way theological. It is the evolution of the baptismal form and of the primitive instruction to be handed down to catechumens, and in this sense it is rightly called apostolic doctrine. The evolution took place in various parts of the Church, both Western and Eastern, and under various forms, which exercised a mutual influence among themselves. The Roman form of the Symbol is the fruit of a progressive evolution, whose first stage is to be placed at least at the beginning of the second century.

The second, of the Fathers, which was composed in the First Council of Nicaea, but in the First Constantinopolitan Council and in the succession of times was increased.

The third is called of St. Athanasius, because it was once erroneously thought to have been composed by him;[2] it is not a symbol except insofar as it was received by the authority of the Roman Pontiff.

[2] It was composed in the fifth or sixth century.

Second Part: On the Act of Faith

Chapter I: On the Interior Act of Faith

Question One: On the Essence of the Act of Faith

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 1; *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 1.

689. What it is to believe. - To believe, says St. Augustine, *De Praed. SS.*, c. 2, is to think with assent. He is properly said to think who inquires by the intellect, not having full evidence of the truth; but assent is firm adherence of the intellect. Therefore he who believes assents, that is, he firmly adheres to a thing as true, not however having evidence of it. But since the intellect of itself is not determined except by evidence, it follows that when it believes, it is determined by the will. Therefore to believe is an act elicited by the intellect, commanded by the will. Hence:

1. In the broadest sense we are said to believe those things concerning which we have only practical certitude, which excludes not every doubt but only prudent doubt, that is, a conviction which suffices for acting prudently, although we do not have perfect evidence, just as many admit the existence of God on account of reasons not altogether evident to them.[1]

[1] We are improperly said to believe those things concerning which we have only probability: then properly we do not believe, but rather are inclined to believing.

2. More properly we believe those things which are not evident to us, but which we admit on account of the testimony of men, even when they are not worthy of faith; and therefore not on account of the testimony alone, for then we would admit everything which they say, but on account of the evidence of the testimony (evidence in the attester, the Scholastics say), because it is established for us that this testimony of theirs is in fact true. Such is historical certitude many times.

3. Most properly we believe those things which are not evident to us, but which we admit without doubting uniquely on account of the testimony or authority of another, that is, because he is worthy of faith and merits that we trust him (evidence of credibility), even if the testimony does not appear to be true. Thus a child believes his mother and the unlearned man the learned man. This is faith properly so called, because through it, in the proper sense, we trust another, and because for it it is especially required that the intellect be determined by the will; hence no one believes unless willing. Concerning this faith it is true to say that it honors the one testifying: for we could not believe unless we recognized the excellence of him whom we believe.

690. What it is to believe God. - According to the aforesaid explanation, to believe God is to admit the things which God has said, precisely because He has authority, that is, the dignity and right that we acquiesce in Him speaking. It is therefore a firm assent of the mind to truths revealed by God on account of the authority of God Himself revealing. We have already proved that this is the true notion of the act of faith, where we treated of the formal object; hence it is defined by St. Thomas, q. 2, a. 9: "The act of the intellect assenting to divine truth from the command of the will moved by God through grace."

691. Opposed errors. - To the aforesaid definition is opposed:

1. The error of the Rationalists, Semirationalists, and Modernists, who do not hold faith except:

a) as rational science or philosophical knowledge of God (Gunther); - or also

b) as a simple rational persuasion of religious truths or concerning divine things (Abaelard, Wegscheider, Hermes), or as any rational knowledge concerning God and divine things (Deists); - or

c) as an intimate blind religious instinct of the soul (that is, of suprasensible truths), for example, from the Holy Spirit, supported by imagination and the senses, not by a rational motive (Pietists, Jacobi and the Sentimentalists, Fideism, Pseudomystics and Methodists); - or

d) as a mere spiritual religious instinct of dependency, vividly perceived, which coheres with rational nature (Schleiermacher), or as a natural religious sense, whose motive is the conformity of religious truths with our aspirations and higher exigencies (Ritschl, Sabatier, liberal Protestants); - or

e) as the sole exigency and irrefragable postulate of practical reason, as the common inclination of human nature (Reid, the Scottish school), the approbation of religious truths on account of the practical truth of the moral life (Kant, Harnack) or on account of the inclination of the whole man (Renouvier); - or

f) as religious consciousness and a religious sense concerning divine things, arisen from the need of the divine (Modernists).

In one word, there is opposed: purely rational faith (a and b), affective faith (c and d), moral faith (e), affective-moral faith (f). Cf. Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 2 and 3; and prop. 23 condemned by Innocent XI: "Faith broadly so called, from the testimony of creatures or from a similar motive, suffices for justification."

2. Likewise the doctrine of the Protestants who are called orthodox. They distinguish a) the faith of miracles, or great confidence in God which obtains miracles (I Cor. XIII, 2), b) the faith of dogmas, or historical faith in the narratives of the Gospel, and c) the faith of promises: this they falsely contend to be a confidence of special mercy, and to be justifying faith (cf. treatise on grace), but that they maintain to be a simple notice and apprehension of revealed things, not truly an assent or firm judgment by which we hold them as true, contradicting the Apostle who says that faith is conviction of things not appearing. Hence Councils declare that by faith we are believers in true things: thus Trent, sess. 6, c. 6 and 9, or that by it we believe things to be true: thus Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3.

Question Two: On the Analysis of the Act of Faith

St. Thomas, in III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2.

692. Analysis or resolution of an act is its reduction to principles, both objective and subjective, that is, to the motive and efficient causes which concur for its production. Moreover divine faith, like human faith, includes several acts, for the act itself of faith presupposes two others: for it is an assent of the intellect commanded by the will, whence it supposes the motion and command of the will; but the will cannot move the intellect to assent and command the assent of the intellect, unless the intellect itself previously judge that such an assent is to be rendered, whence it presupposes a judgment of credibility on the part of the intellect. Hence:

1. a threefold act is required for believing: a) the judgment of credibility by which we judge this or that truth, for example, the Incarnation, to be worthy of belief; b) the pious affection of credulity by which we will to believe that truth; c) the act itself of faith by which we properly believe, that is, we adhere to that truth and judge it to be true;

2. consequently the question why we believe can be understood in a threefold sense, namely, a) dispositively: why do we judge some truth to be worthy of belief? - b) affectively: why do we command assent to that truth? - c) formally: why do we adhere to it? Therefore the analysis of this threefold act must be undertaken.

Article I: On the Act Itself of Faith

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 1; q. 2, a. 2; *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 1; III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2.

693. Thesis. The elicitive principle of faith is the intellect. - The last act required for faith, which is essentially and properly the act of faith by which we assent to revealed truth, is an act of the intellect; whence the intellect is the proximately elicitive principle of faith. - This is certain from the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3, establishing faith by which we believe true things, and from the profession of faith of Pius X; against many Protestants, who hold faith to be confidence, which is rather in the heart or will than in the intellect, and against Rationalists, Semirationalists, and Modernists, who place it especially in a tendency or inclination, or reduce it to a religious sense.

It is established from the Scriptures in which:

1. faith is called an argument, that is, a conviction of things not appearing (Heb. XI, 1);

2. by it we admit something as true, and indeed on account of testimony (Heb. XI, 3, 6, 8; Mk. XVI, 16; John VI, 70; XX, 31; Rom. X, 9; I John V, 1-10);

3. whence it is called the captivity of the intellect unto the obedience of Christ (II Cor. X, 5).

Hence a profession of faith was always required from catechumens, in which the Symbol was explained (cf. Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat. V, 7; Chrysostom, *in Hebr.*; Augustine, *De Praed. SS.*, n. 5).

694. The analysis of the act of faith simply is this: we admit some truth, for example, the Incarnation, that is, we judge it to be true, because God has authority in revealing it (which is supposed already to have been known beforehand); but in this act we do not believe nor in any way affirm the very authority of God revealing. For just as in human faith the authority of Peter testifying is in no way believed or affirmed, but is only the motive or that on account of which I believe what he says, so in divine faith the authority of God revealing is only the motive on account of which we believe, but in no way that which is believed or affirmed; otherwise it would be to confuse the material and formal object. In other words: the knowledge of the authority of God is previously supposed as a condition, but it is not the cause or motive of assent; this is not knowledge concerning the authority of God, but only the authority known from elsewhere.1

Hence 1. Suarez does not rightly teach,2 that the motive, that is, the authority of God revealing, is believed in the act itself of faith, saying that the analysis of this act is: I believe the Incarnation, because I believe the authority of God revealing it, and I believe the authority of God revealing it, because I believe the authority of God revealing itself, since it is impossible that God reveal something and not by that very fact speak His authority in revealing, or reveal Himself with authority. - For then it can again be asked: and why do you believe God saying that He reveals with authority, or revealing His authority? Either you will answer: because I believe a new revelation of the authority of God, and then you believe that because you believe another, and then there will be a process to infinity; or you will answer: I believe the authority of God revealing because I believe it, which is a blind affirmation without a reason given.

Nor say: the authority of God revealing is also revealed, therefore it also must be believed. - The answer is:

a) for this reason it is not believed in every act of faith: for the intellect can abstract from the fact that God, by revealing, also revealed His authority, and can consider uniquely that He revealed another truth, for example, the Incarnation; indeed ordinarily we act thus;

b) when we believe the authority of God revealing, it is at once that which is believed and the motive on account of which it is believed, but it is not believed insofar as it is the formal object or motive; in other words: the authority of God is believed on account of itself as motive, but not on account of itself as believed, otherwise we would arrive at this absurd analysis: I believe the authority of God revealing because I believe it!

Likewise 2. we do not admit what Lugo teaches,1 that in the act of faith the authority of God and the very fact of revelation are affirmed by reasoning, saying that the act of faith is a ratiocination or is equivalent to it: God in revealing is infallible; but God revealed the Incarnation; therefore the Incarnation was made. - For:

a) the conclusion of this syllogism is not: therefore the Incarnation was made, but: therefore God, in revealing the Incarnation, is infallible. This conclusion is not an act of faith, because it is not adherence given to the Incarnation; from it indeed follows the obligation of believing the Incarnation, but not necessarily that it is already believed;2

b) since that conclusion is admitted on account of the nexus with the premises, it is not an act of faith in the authority and testimony of another, but an act of science; especially

c) because it is not admitted by trusting in the dignity or authority of God revealing; whence such reasoning could also be made by an unbeliever, who at the same time by a perverse will would not wish to believe.

Nor say: it is irrational, indeed impossible, that we believe unless we know that God is infallible in revealing and that He Himself has spoken. - For the answer is that the assertion is true, but from this it does not follow that those truths are affirmed in the act itself of faith: for it suffices and is required that they be known prior to that act, as will be said in article 3. Just as in human faith it is prerequired that I know the authority and testimony of Peter in order that I may believe him, but while I believe him I do not affirm his authority and testimony.

695. Corollaries. - From the aforesaid doctrine it follows, and besides experience establishes:

1. that the act of faith is simple, because it indivisibly attains the revealed truth as believed and the authority of the one revealing as the reason for believing; consequently

2. that it is not complex and multiple, so that it is equivalent to two other acts (as Suarez says) or to three (as Lugo says); consequently

3. nor is it formally or virtually discursive. Moreover an assent which rests upon discourse has as motive the goodness of the consequence, for we assent to the conclusion because it coheres logically and follows well from the antecedent; but the assent of faith in no way rests upon the goodness of the consequence, but the adequate motive of faith is only the first truth of God revealing something.

1. This mode seems to us altogether conformable to the principles of St. Thomas. The Salamancans, John of St. Thomas, Gotti, Mazzella, Billot, Mannens, Van Noort, etc., hand it down; thus also perhaps Billuart judges.

2. Likewise Valentia, Coninck, Schaetzler, Brouwer, Waffelaert; also certain Thomists.

1. Likewise Franzelin, Bouquillon, the Mechlin Theology.

2. Perhaps someone will say that the argument can be proposed otherwise: What God reveals is true; but God revealed the Incarnation; therefore the Incarnation is true. But this conclusion is assent to the Incarnation. - Resp. 1. indirectly: either the assent is given on account of deduction, and then it is an assent of science, not of faith; or it is given on account of the authority of God alone, and then it is not discursive; - 2. directly: the sense of the Major, in which the whole formal object or motive of faith is placed, is: what God reveals is true as to us, that is, it is shown to be true, insofar as revealed and because God is truthful; for something is

not objectively in itself true because it is revealed; - but the minor is nothing but the application of the motive of faith to a determinate truth, namely, the Incarnation. The conclusion cannot be broader than the Major, and must be: the Incarnation is true as to us, namely, insofar as revealed and because God is truthful; but this is nothing other than to say: it is thus shown to be true on account of the authority of God revealing, so that this moves us to admitting it for that reason, and it merits being admitted on account of this motive by that other and special voluntary assent which is faith. But this is nothing but credibility; whence the conclusion itself is not an assent of faith.

Article II: On the Affection Itself of Credulity

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 2 and 9; q. 1, a. 1; *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 2, ad 10 and 13; a. 3, ad 10; a. 7, ad 3; III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 and 2.

696. Thesis. For the act of faith the command of the will is also required. - Namely, the second act required for faith is the motion of the will; this is certain because it is explicitly taught by the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3, calling faith the obedience of the will, indeed it follows immediately from those things which it defined concerning the liberty of faith (can. 5).

Its analysis is this: the will moves to assent to revealed things and commands it on account of a motive proper to itself; but the proper motive of the will is good; hence it moves the intellect to believing, for example, because it is good to believe, because to believe is useful, because to tend by faith to the ultimate end is good, because it is good not to act irrationally. "That will," says St. Thomas, *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 2, ad 10, "which determines the intellect to believing, is not an act of charity, nor an act of hope, but a certain appetite (or simple volition) of the good promised," for example, John VI, 69. This act of the will moving the intellect to believing is called by theologians after the Second Council of Orange the pious affection of credulity, that is, a pious inclination to believing.

697. Corollary: What it is to believe God, to believe God, and to believe in God. - From the aforesaid we understand what St. Thomas teaches after St. Augustine, *in Ioh.*, tr. 29 (a. 2), that by the act of faith we believe God (*credere Deum*), believe God (*credere Deo*), and believe in God (*credere in Deum*). For to believe is an act of the intellect commanded by the will. On the part of the intellect, God is the primary material object, and this we signify by saying: I believe God (*credo Deum*); He is also the formal object, and this we signify by saying: I believe God, namely, speaking with authority (*credo Deo*). But on the part of the will, this commands the act of faith by tending into God as into the end, and this we signify by saying: I believe in God (*credo in Deum*). We do not do this last perfectly except through charity, and therefore without this faith is called imperfect or unformed.

On the contrary, by divine faith we do not believe the Church, because the Church is not the formal object of this faith, although we can believe her by ecclesiastical faith (at least according to several); - nor do we believe in the Church because she is not our ultimate end; properly we believe the Church, as the Symbol speaks, because she is the material object which we believe.

698. The liberty of faith. - On the part of the motion of the will the act of faith has a property, namely, liberty, as the Second Council of Orange, can. 5, and Trent, sess. 6, c. 6, already taught, and the Vatican Council defined, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 5, against the Rationalists and Hermes, who confused faith with science.

It is a free act 1. not indeed radically, remotely, and per accidens, because we can fail to consider the motives of credibility, - or because the motives of credibility do not render us altogether certain concerning revelation, as Lugo falsely teaches (as will be said in the following article, n. 703), which besides would explain liberty in the preambles, but not in the act itself of faith; - but

2. formally, proximately, and per se, because, although the fact of revelation and the obligation of believing can be altogether certain and evident, nevertheless the truths to be believed are not evident by themselves for us; whence the intellect does not necessarily assent to them, but for this the motion of the free will is required, especially

3. because we admit those truths by trusting in divine authority. From which it follows:

a) that the act of faith is free not only as to exercise, or as to use (like science), because we can fail to consider the motive or turn attention away from the object to be believed, but also as to specification or as to assent, because while we consider the object, there remains the possibility of doubting, of not assenting, indeed of denying; whence St. Thomas, a. 10: "the act of faith... is subject to the will not only as to use, but also as to assent";

b) that the act of faith can be meritorious, with charity nevertheless acceding (a. 9 and 10).

The liberty of faith is handed down in Sacred Scripture:

a) once the preaching of the Gospel is set forth, some believe, some do not believe, which is a sign of liberty (Acts XVII, 32-34; Rom. X, 16; Is. LXV); they do not believe because they do not seek the light but love the darkness (John III, 18-21);

b) believers are praised, those not believing are reproved (Rom. IV, 3; Mk. XVI, 14; Apoc. II, 19; Luke XXIV, 25; Acts VII, 39);

c) faith falls under precept and reward is ascribed to it, but unbelief is held as a grave sin worthy of eternal punishment (I John III, 23; John III, 15; Rom. IV, 3; Mk. XVI, 16);

d) whence faith is called voluntary obedience (Rom. I, 5; X, 16; Acts VI, 7; II Cor. X, 5-6) by which it is believed from the heart, indeed from the whole heart (Rom. X, 9-10; Acts VIII, 37). Hence Augustine, *in Ioh.*, tr. 26, n. 2: "No one can believe unless willing"; and Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* IV, 37, 5: "Not only in works, but also in faith, the Lord preserved man free and in the power of his own judgment; and on account of this he who believes Him has eternal life, but he who does not believe the Son does not have eternal life, but the wrath of God will remain upon him."

Therefore the Church has never used force for converting infidels.

Article III: On the Judgment of Credibility or on the Preambles of Faith

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2; q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; a. 9, ad 3; a. 10.

699. Thesis. For the act of faith a judgment of credibility is required beforehand. - Namely, the first act required for faith, which precedes the others, is the previous judgment of credibility (Ps. XCII, 5 according to the Greek and Latin text; John X, 25, 37-38). This is altogether required before the act of faith as a condition. The reason is that the will cannot move the intellect to believing

something and command faith in something, unless this be proposed to it by the intellect as credible, and the intellect see that it is to be believed. And indeed:

a) That judgment must be evident, because the will cannot prudently command an altogether certain and firm assent, unless something appears to the intellect and is proposed by it as certainly and evidently credible.

b) That judgment is the conclusion of a ratiocination similar to that which Lugo said to be the act itself of faith: What God infallible in speaking says is credible and to be believed. But God infallible in speaking revealed the Incarnation. Therefore the Incarnation is credible and to be believed. - Or more reflexively: What, all things considered, after diligent examination sufficiently appears to me to have been infallibly attested by God, is to be believed. But, all things considered, it sufficiently seems to me that God revealed the Incarnation. Therefore it is to be believed.

c) Hence the premises of this ratiocination, namely, that God is infallible in speaking and credible, and that in fact He has spoken, must be known with certitude at least practical, not absolute, but respective, that is, which in relation to the capacity of each one's intellect excludes every prudent doubt; otherwise a certain judgment of credibility could not be founded upon them.

Hence proposition 21 was condemned by Innocent XI: "The assent of supernatural faith and useful for salvation stands with only probable notice of revelation, indeed with fear by which someone fears lest God has not spoken"; and proposition 25 of the Modernists by Pius X: "The assent of faith ultimately rests on a heap of probabilities."

700. The judgment of credibility rests upon the preambles of faith and the motives of credibility. - Those things whose knowledge is prerequired for faith, and upon which the judgment of credibility rests, are called the preambles of faith. Indeed divine authority or infallibility in speaking is known by reason: for, once it is supposed that God exists, it is easily deduced from the fact that He is the most perfect being. But the fact of revelation is known by diverse men through diverse arguments, according as they are adapted to their intellect; these arguments are called motives of credibility.

Therefore the motives of credibility and the formal object or motive of faith differ:

a) the former proximately demonstrate the motive of faith, namely, that God revealed something, and thus only remotely dispose, induce, impel to believing; the latter altogether proximately and immediately moves to believing;

b) the former precede the act of faith, and are a condition extrinsic to it; the latter enters the act of faith as an essential element and motive intrinsically constitutive of it;

c) the former show that faith is reasonable; and they are not the formal motive why we believe something, but only why we judge something to be credible and to be believed: the latter is the very motive why we believe something, that is, judge it to be true.

1. Evidence of credibility arises even from merely practical certitude without evidence concerning the existence of revelation, because evidence of credibility is occupied with the thing as prudently affirmable: it is evident to me that one must act prudently, that is, according to

practical certitude in the defect of certitude strictly so called. This is clear from the second form of the syllogism indicated, in which the three propositions are evident.

701. External motives of credibility are altogether certain. - Most certain signs are had, and external arguments adapted to the intelligences of all (Vatican Council), even of men of this time (profession of faith against the Modernists), and even for the wiser altogether apodictic, by which the existence of revelation is proved, as the Vatican Council defined, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 3 and 4, namely, certain facts which cannot be explained in a natural mode, and which appear as supernatural and divine. But, as the same Council teaches, c. 3, they are chiefly 1. miracles and 2. prophecies; - also 3. the Church, which, by herself, on account of her admirable propagation, eminent holiness and fecundity in good things (confirmed by the testimony of innumerable martyrs), Catholic unity and unconquered stability, appears as a divine work and institution and is an irrefragable testimony of her divine mission; and 4. the same Church, which, as marked by the notes and characters of her mission from Christ, evidently and easily appears to all as the legate of God, and thus as the guardian and teacher of revelation, proposing faith in the name of God.

Nor say: the Church is known by faith and revelation; therefore she cannot be the means of knowing revelation itself, and a motive of credibility; otherwise we would fall into a vicious circle. - For the answer is that the Church, insofar as she is the means of knowing revelation and the motive why we judge that one must believe, is known not by revelation and faith but by reason and history, insofar as we can inspect her, for example, insofar as she is described in the Gospels and in the testimonies of ecclesiastical writers, not insofar as these are the word of God or testimonies of divine tradition, but insofar as they are historical books having human authority. But afterwards the Church, as supernatural and divine, is known and believed by revelation and faith.

702. Internal motives of credibility are less certain. - Motives intrinsic to the Christian religion, such as the holiness of Christ and the sublimity of Christian doctrine, if they alone are considered, even as external divine facts naturally inexplicable, do not seem to prove the existence of divine revelation with certitude strictly so called and demonstrative, but only with the highest probability and practical certitude; besides, they are arguments requiring much study and liable to great difficulties, nor are they adapted to all intelligences. Hence they are not efficacious for convincing all, nor do they deserve to occupy the more principal part in Apologetics.

Still more vehemently do those err who, with the external motives of credibility rejected or at least set after others, for founding supernatural faith uniquely or chiefly appeal to merely internal motives, such as internal experience, the need of the religious soul, religious sense; or also hold faith as something instinctive. For these motives:

a) are not evident, nor are they capable of founding practical certitude in all, indeed they are subjective, so that others say that they need another faith or even none;

b) are repugnant to the supernaturality of faith, if what they say is taken to the word: that faith is something pleasing to nature, or that it alone satisfies the aspirations of nature or the necessities of society, since natural religion also satisfies sufficiently;

c) are repugnant to the motive of faith, which would no longer be the testimony of God but congruence with nature or society: for that God has spoken cannot be proved by all the aforesaid or

by other internal criteria, but only by external divine facts. Hence those motives can prepare for receiving faith, remove obstacles of faith, dispose the will to receiving revelation, and confirm it; they cannot truly demonstrate it.

703. Motives of credibility suffice if broadly certain; yet certain ones can found absolute certitude. - Motives of credibility, although among many they are not certain except by practical certitude and certitude improperly so called, nevertheless can be absolutely certain. Hence it is false, what Lugo is compelled to say, that the act of faith - which he thinks to be the conclusion of a ratiocination - is obscure and free, because the premises, namely, the authority of God and at least the fact of revelation, are obscure and are not known with evidence or certain demonstration, but only with great probability and practical certitude. For 1. the infallibility or authority of God revealing in speaking can be clearly perceived, as happens by philosophers; - 2. concerning the fact of revelation, it seems that we can acquire true historical certitude a) from prophecies, or from the miracles of Christ, concerning whose life and deeds we have historical certitude, but as it were physical certitude concerning the supernaturality of His acts, - and especially b) if all the motives of credibility are considered together, because if so many and all indications concur in showing the truth of our one religion, Providence itself would deceive if that religion were not true: it is not only improbable, but impossible to explain the Catholic Church and the miracles of Christ and the Apostles, if the religion of Christ is not true; - indeed 3. that God has spoken can be evident, as it was to Angels, Apostles, and others who are immediately instructed by God in faith; which does not impede faith, because the more evident the authority of God and the fact of revelation appear, the more evident the obligation of believing appears.

Hence the act of faith is obscure and free only because revelation does not make the revealed things appear, and especially because only those things are believed which are not fully evident, as was said above.

704. How can children and the unlearned form for themselves a judgment of credibility? - By children and the more unlearned the fact of revelation is often not known except by the human authority of parents, wise men, the pastor, etc., whom they believe: for right and prudent reason dictates to them that in necessary things which they cannot see through themselves, they subject themselves to the authority of those who naturally can and must instruct them. Therefore they believe by human faith those things which they have received from parents or the parish priest concerning the history of revelation made by God, for example, that God taught such or such things; once this is posited, they believe those things by divine faith on account of the authority of God revealing alone.

Generally they have the judgment of credibility. This is formed rather easily by the following or equivalent ratiocination, at least implicit: In necessary things which cannot be investigated by me, it is prudent or obligatory to admit the testimony of those who are naturally leaders or instructors. But through myself I cannot be made certain that God has spoken these things. Therefore it is prudent and obligatory to admit this because it is said by those who are naturally leaders and instructors; and therefore to believe on account of the testimony of God.

Therefore let parents and priests, to whom it belongs to instruct such persons, attend: 1. that doctrine be proposed to them at least as the word or revelation of God, for otherwise they would believe only by human faith on account of their authority, and not by divine faith on account of the

authority of God revealing. Indeed 2. if they are instructed a little more, they will easily recognize that parents teach the same as their priests, and that these cohere with the bishops, and that the bishops are united with the Roman Pontiff, for example, because all teach a similar catechism; whence they will know that the doctrine proposed is not of private persons, but of the universal religious society which is very strong in authority, and that it is not taught by pastors in their own name, but as by ministers of the Church, who have been sent by her and by Christ to preach; - indeed 3. they will easily recognize this doctrine to be the word of God, on account of the miracles by which revelation was confirmed, and on account of the Church, which by her notes (great authority and truth, Catholic unity of doctrine, holiness and fecundity in good things, unconquered stability) easily appears to all as the legate of God and guardian of the revealed word.

705. Observations. - 1. On the part of the judgment of credibility, faith is called reasonable, and a special property belongs to it, namely, reasonableness (Vatican Council, c. 3), to which rational credibility responds on the part of the revealed object.

2. Although the Holy Spirit can teach directly and immediately, and sometimes does teach even the more unlearned, nevertheless Protestants err in saying that revelation is credible on account of the immediate and internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, which would be granted to all (cf. treatise on Theological Places).

3. De Lugo and those who hold that the act of faith is the conclusion of a ratiocination which is admitted on account of the premises, in order to explain in their opinion how the proximate, immediate, and ultimate motive of faith is the authority and revelation of God, are compelled to say that the premises, and by name the fact of revelation which is asserted in the minor, are known by all immediately and without a new ratiocination, because miracles, fulfillments of prophecies, the proposition of the Church, etc., by which revelation is proved or shown and on account of which revelation is affirmed in the minor, are the completing part of the divine locution. - But:

a) at most all these things are nothing but the external locution of God, which is not the motive of faith, as was said above, n. 669;

b) more probably they are not even the external locution itself of God except improperly; properly they are only signs of divine locution, as the seal is the sign of the king's letter;

c) at least the first time, we did not know divine revelation immediately, but only by several arguments.

Question Three: On the Necessity of Faith

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 3 and 5-8; *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 10-12.

706. A twofold necessity: one of means, the other of precept. - It must be noted beforehand that something is said to be necessary for the end either by necessity of means, or by necessity of precept. Necessary by necessity of means is a means which positively flows into obtaining the end, and indeed in such a way that without it, even if omitted involuntarily, the end cannot be obtained. Necessary by necessity of precept is not a means to the end, but that which is imposed by precept in such a way that, when the precept is known, its observance is a condition, just as voluntary transgression is an

obstacle to attaining the end; whence it flows in not positively but negatively, by not placing an obstacle. From this definition it follows that invincible ignorance excuses from necessity of precept, because it excuses from sin, which would be an obstacle to attaining the end; but no ignorance or impossibility whatever liberates from necessity of means, for this does not supply the necessary influx of the means for attaining the end.

Necessity of means is one thing from the nature of the thing, another from positive institution; likewise one is necessity of means in reality, when the means itself is always necessary, another is necessity of means in desire, when the defect of the means can be supplied by another thing together with the desire of it. Examples for salvation are sanctifying grace and Baptism.

707. Faith is necessary by necessity of means.

I. By necessity of means for salvation, both for little children and for adults, from the nature of the thing, the habit of faith is necessary, because without it charity cannot be had. Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7.

II. By necessity of means for justification and in this way for salvation,1 for adults, that is, those having the use of reason, from the nature of the thing, in all times altogether, the act of faith properly so called is necessary, by which they explicitly believe, on account of divine revelation, that God, the institutor and end of the supernatural order, exists, and is a rewarder.

It is proved: 1. From Scripture, which rather often declares the absolute necessity of the voluntary reception of faith properly so called (for it recognizes no other as necessary) for attaining justification (Heb. X, 38 sq.; Rom. I, 17; III, 26; IV, 5; Gal. II, 16; Mk. XVI, 16), and professedly teaches at Heb. XI, 6, that "without faith it is impossible to please God. For he who comes to God must believe (the act of faith) that He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him."

2. From the perpetual doctrine of the Church, which is established from Trent, sess. 6, c. 6, 7, 8; from the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 2; and from the condemnation of propositions 22 and 23 by Innocent XI.1

3. From reason: a) No one can order himself and tend to the supernatural end, which nevertheless is required for justification, unless he know that end. But we cannot know the supernatural end by reason, but only by revelation, to which faith responds. Therefore.

b) Likewise no one can hope for salvation and have supernatural contrition concerning sin, unless he know the supernatural end and reward. But hope and supernatural contrition are required for justification (Council of Trent, sess. 6 and 14). Therefore for justification it is required that we believe the supernatural end.

From what has been said it follows a) that some true concept of one God is required, by which namely He is distinguished from creatures, and is known at least as creator, or omnipotent, or a necessary or most perfect being; otherwise we would not tend to the true God;

b) that knowledge of God as natural end and rewarder does not suffice: for although it is not required that we know distinctly and formally as supernatural the end or reward, nevertheless we must believe the reward which in fact is supernatural;

c) that practically there is no difficulty in this: whoever by faith on account of the authority of God revealing believes that God is and rewards, by that very fact believes God revealing Himself in a supernatural mode, that is, communicating with us beyond the exigencies of nature, and believes that God will reward with the reward which He promised by His revelation.

III. Before the Gospel was promulgated, explicit faith in the Incarnation (and at the same time in the passion, death, redemption, resurrection, and glorious reign of Christ in heaven) and in the Most Holy Trinity was not necessary by necessity of means for justification, but implicit faith sufficed; but whether after the Gospel has been promulgated it is required from the positive institution of God is disputed. Although the affirmative opinion of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus is more probable and more conformable to the mode of speaking of Sacred Scripture and the Holy Fathers,[1] nevertheless it is not altogether certain, because the texts which are brought forward to prove it, and which, according to them, proclaim the necessity of faith in Christ, perhaps can also be understood either of the efficacy alone of faith in Christ; - or of the necessity of precept alone; - or of necessity of means, but of the merits and grace of Christ, or of faith by which we are united to Christ, or at least of implicit faith in Christ. Yet because in things necessary for the end, in the case for salvation, it is illicit to choose a merely probable opinion, but the safer course must be taken (cf. n. 215, 3), therefore in practice these two mysteries must be considered as to be believed by necessity of means.

[1] Cf. Martin, *De Necessitate credendi et credendorum*.

1. It is said thus and not simply for salvation, because if someone was baptized in infancy, and afterwards arrived at the use of reason, and it should happen that faith is not sufficiently proposed to him, and at the same time that he does not sin mortally, he will be saved without an act of faith. Here, nevertheless, for adults it will regularly be a necessary means for preserving justice, namely, for fulfilling Christian duties, so that they may persevere in justice.

1. "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in a Rewarder." - "Faith broadly so called, from the testimony of creatures or from a similar motive, suffices for justification."

708. Practical corollaries. - 1. Since he who is ignorant of the existence of God as supernatural end and rewarder is incapable of justification and certainly indisposed, the sacraments, even of Baptism or Penance, can never be given to him. Indeed confessions made with ignorance even invincible of these truths are null (from defect of contrition) and therefore must be repeated.

2. Nor can these sacraments be administered to one who is ignorant of the mystery of the Incarnation or of the Trinity; but he must first be instructed concerning these, because it is illicit to expose a sacrament to danger of fruitlessness, or even Penance to danger of nullity (Holy Office, January 25 and May 10, 1703, renewed March 30, 1898; Innocent XI, prop. 64 and 65).[2] The case of extreme necessity is excepted, when the means or time of instruction is lacking; in which case the sacrament of Penance is administered under condition: if you are capable, provided that the other requisites are present, but with these given, the other sacraments absolutely.

[2] "A man is capable of absolution, however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith and even if through negligence, even culpable, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus

Christ." - "It suffices to have believed those mysteries once."

3. Especially let canon 752, § 2 be noted: an adult "in danger of death, if he cannot be instructed more diligently in the chief mysteries of faith, it is sufficient, for conferring Baptism, that he show in some way that he assents to the same and seriously promise that he will observe the commands of the Christian religion."

4. Since confessions made with ignorance not gravely culpable of the Incarnation or of the Most Holy Trinity by one who in good faith thought that he was rightly disposed, are not certainly invalid, although more safely they are repeated, nevertheless the faithful cannot be strictly obliged to this.

5. When it is a question of the half-witted or the very ignorant, an act of faith in God one and three, and in Christ the redeemer, is to be suggested to them before they are absolved; by which the validity of absolution becomes safer.

6. Hence St. Alphonsus notes, *Theologia Moralis*, l. 2, c. 1, n. 2: if someone were so unlearned that he could in no way perceive the aforesaid mysteries, and therefore did not explicitly believe, as to this he would be assimilated to infants and the insane; but if he cannot retain them, it will suffice that he explicitly believe the individual articles while they are proposed to him. The case, besides, is rare even in barbarous regions.

7. For justification implicit faith on the part of the act does not suffice, or faith in desire or broadly so called, but faith in reality is required, by which we explicitly believe God revealing; yet implicit faith on the part of the object suffices insofar as revealed truths are apprehended confusedly, but explicit faith is required as to truths necessary by necessity of means.

709. Faith is necessary by necessity of precept.

A. By necessity of precept under grave obligation all must explicitly know as to substance, that is, so that they have a common understanding of these things, and, if questioned concerning them, can answer the substance, although they hold in memory neither the precise words nor the order of the words:

1. Those things which are required for believing and thinking rightly, namely, the Apostles' Symbol, as is established from the perpetual use of the Church, requiring this knowledge before Baptism; besides, a Christian must summarily know the doctrine of Christ as to the principal truths, namely, the articles of faith, and be able to distinguish it from others.

Those things, however, of lesser importance which are contained in the symbol are obligatory only under light obligation, such as the perpetual virginity of the Blessed Virgin Mary; circumstances of time: under Pontius Pilate, the third day; the burial of Christ, and descent into hell, and sitting at the right hand of the Father; the judgment of the living and the dead; the communion of saints, etc.

2. Those things which are required for living rightly, namely:

a) the universal precepts of law, namely, the precepts of the decalogue and the five precepts of the Church, which all must observe;

b) the proper duties of state or condition.

3. Those things which are required for rightly using the special helps of salvation, namely:

a) the Lord's prayer, concerning which they ought at least to know that God is to be prayed to for the individual good things to be acquired and evils to be avoided which are enumerated there;

b) the sacraments, as much as is necessary that they be received well, namely, Baptism, Penance, and Eucharist always, because they pertain to all, but the rest when someone wishes to receive them.

The Symbol, the Lord's prayer, and the sacraments are to be explicitly believed; the rest can also be sufficiently known explicitly by reason alone; the decalogue, as revealed, can be explicitly believed, and at least implicitly must be believed.

B. By necessity of precept under light obligation all must explicitly know from custom and the common use of the faithful:

1. the sign of the cross, which is the distinctive sign of a Christian;

2. the angelic salutation, at least as to substance, because the Blessed Virgin is mediatrix of grace;

3. the symbol, the precepts of the decalogue and of the Church, the Lord's prayer, as to the words.

710. Practical corollaries. - 1. Parents and superiors, to whom it belongs to instruct others in faith, are gravely obliged, as soon as they arrive at the use of reason, gradually to teach them those things which must be known by necessity of means and of precept. This office in parish priests is of justice.

2. Hence greater explicit faith is required in certain persons by reason of office, condition, and state, for example, in those who must instruct others, as in the bishop, parish priest, preacher, confessor, a man of greater knowledge, a judge, a magistrate, etc.

3. If the confessor, on account of probable reasons, doubts whether the penitent is ignorant of things necessary to be known by necessity of means or precept, he is bound to question him concerning these. This today often happens.

4. "The confessor will conjecture that ignorance from the weakness of a younger or older age, from dullness of mind, from defect of education and letters, and from the mode of confessing, from the confession itself, for example, from long neglect of prayer, of frequenting the church, sermons, sacraments, and, while doubt remains, from prudent and discreet questioning" (Waffelaert, o. c., n. 191).

5. Yet St. Alphonsus notes, *Praxis Confessarii*, n. 22: "St. Leonard of Port Maurice, speaking of urban persons negligent of their own salvation, who hold it to be a great labor and insult to themselves to be questioned concerning these things, says that it befits the confessor to say to

them: Come, let us elicit the Christian acts together at once; say with me...," namely, adding the act of faith with the principal mysteries.

6. Those ignorant of things necessary by necessity of precept only are to be admonished that they learn them, and if they seriously propose this, they can be absolved. But if they have already proposed it rather often, it must be investigated whether the preceding confessions were not invalid from defect of purpose; and sometimes absolution must be deferred for them. - But if they do not have the opportunity of learning those things, let the confessor propose to them the substance to be believed, with the burden of learning it more perfectly, or of returning to learn it.

7. St. Alphonsus notes, *Theologia Moralis*, l. 2, n. 3, 3: In practice, those who are ignorant word for word of the symbol, prayers, etc., especially if they are more unlearned, are to be admonished that they learn them; otherwise they will expose themselves to the great danger also of not retaining the substance, and scarcely otherwise will they satisfy the precept of prayer.

Chapter II: On the External Act of Faith or on Its Confession

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3.

711. Confession of faith is its external manifestation through some sign suitable for this. It is an external act of the virtue of faith, because it is produced immediately by faith, with no other habit mediating; whence confession of faith according to object and species is directly ordered to faith as to an end.

From natural-divine law there is given a precept, obliging under grave obligation, of confessing faith outwardly; this precept is at once affirmative and negative (can. 1325, § 1).

712. Insofar as it is negative, the precept of confessing faith prohibits, in any case or danger whatever, even of death, expressly or tacitly, by word or sign or deed (by silence, for example), outwardly to deny the faith or to profess or simulate a false faith. For he who acted thus would at least implicitly say either that God reveals false things or that He did not reveal the dogmas of the Christian faith, each of which is most injurious to God. Hence Christ: "But he who shall deny me before men, I also will deny him before my Father who is in heaven" (Matt. X, 32, 33; cf. Luke IX, 26; XII, 8-9; II Tim. II, 12).

This can happen in two ways: a) directly and explicitly, when someone knowingly denies the faith or professes a false one; b) indirectly and implicitly, if without the intention of denying he places an action which is held by others as a denial of faith, such as assisting at or participating in heretical rites can be (for example, receiving the Calvinist supper).

Therefore they sin against faith:

1. by words, who openly, seriously or fictitiously, deny even one article of faith, or deny that they are Christians or Catholics, or say that they are disciples of another sect (Old Catholics, rationalists, positivists, Mohammedans), or deny that they are papists, ultramontanes, clericals, ... in regions in which those words signify nothing except a Catholic by religion;

2. by deeds: those who for concealing faith employ the rites or ceremonies of false worship, such as burning incense, genuflecting or sacrificing before an idol (S. C. de Prop. F., September 12, 1645), receiving the Calvinist supper, using circumcision as a religious rite, etc.;

3. likewise those who with money buy a certificate that they have professed a false religion (*libellatici*);

4. likewise those who place an action which from itself or from circumstances signifies the profession of a false religion, for example, to drink to the death of Papists or to the health of the enemies of the Church, to pray, sing, etc., together with them, to give one's name to a heretical, schismatic, Masonic sect, to an anti-Catholic or biblical society, for whatever cause;

5. generally those who use garments, gestures of the hands, or signs specially professive of a false religion, such as sacred garments which display honor to the Prophet, to an idol, etc. (S. C. P. F., March 23, 1844), and insignia or signs professive of Freemasons;

6. generally those who, when questioned concerning the faith by name and personally by public power, are silent or use ambiguous words (which, for example, are taken by the questioner as a denial): for this, on account of the circumstances, according to common estimation, is considered as denial or shame of faith, or fear of imminent punishment (prop. 18 condemned by Innocent XI).

I said generally, because, if on account of certain altogether peculiar circumstances it were manifest to all that those things are not a denial of religion or shame concerning it, for example, if silence were held by those present rather as a confession of faith, or if the law openly established that no public power is permitted to insert itself into the conscience of citizens, it would not be illicit. But when this happens is left to be determined by prudent estimation.

713. Insofar as it is affirmative, the precept of confessing faith commands, even sometimes with danger of life, the external confession of faith, and indeed in a twofold case: 1. when by the omission of this confession, privatively a great honor due to God would be subtracted, or positively or contrarily God would be affected by a great injury; hence not only one questioned concerning faith, who by silence is held as an infidel, must confess and procure great honor for God, but also he who sees sacred things trampled upon by infidels or heretics is bound to prevent it if he can, and he who hears the faith attacked must contradict if he can or impose silence on those attacking, or profess the faith, if these are judged useful or likely to profit; 2. when, by not confessing faith, grave spiritual harm would arise for one's neighbor, such as contempt of religion, the perversion of the faithful, scandal, for example, if, with someone being silent, others would believe that the faith was not true and would be turned away from the faith, or would be delayed for a long time, or would not be converted to the faith. Hence Rom. X, 9, 10: "If you confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus and believe in your heart..., you will be saved: for with the heart one believes unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."

For faith itself obliges us to confess it when, by omitting confession, injury is done to God in faith or one's neighbor suffers detriment.

714. Applications. - Since an affirmative precept does not oblige for always, hence per se and generally they do not sin, at least against faith, by words, signs, or acts:

1. who conceal or dissemble faith but for a grave cause;

2. who, when questioned by a private man, out of contempt either are silent or use equivocal words;

3. who deny or are silent that they are priests, religious, etc.;

4. a fortiori who, lest they be recognized as Catholics, eat meats, or do not assist at Mass, do not pray before or after lunch, unless this were expressly demanded in hatred of religion, disobedience to the Church, profession of a false sect;

5. indeed who for a graver cause use garments or signs distinctive of a nation, and also probably of a false religion only;

6. likewise those who flee in time of persecution (Matt. X, 23); pastors of souls are excepted, who would flee with the spiritual harm of these souls (John X, 11);

7. who pay money so that others may not harm them or inquire concerning their faith;

8. who, when the prince commands that Catholics betray themselves or appear, are unwilling to appear or betray themselves.

I say generally, for if the aforesaid actions from special circumstances were held by others as denial or shame of faith, or if great honor would be subtracted from God, or grave scandal would arise, they would be sinful against faith and must be abandoned. But when this happens is left to be determined by prudent estimation.

715. Observations. - 1. From other precepts or virtues we are also sometimes obliged to external confession of faith, for example, in the reception of Baptism (cf. ritual) or of another sacrament, by reason of external worship and adherence to the Church, from the precept of the Church (Holy Office, July 20, 1859; can. 1406-1408), etc. But in those cases it is not the precept itself of faith which obliges us.

2. Sometimes it is necessary to conceal faith, whenever, the precept of confessing faith not urging, from its confession religion would be more blasphemed, or disturbances would arise, or danger of death would have to be undergone, or other grave harms would follow (St. Thomas, a. 2, ad 3).

3. Concerning communication with infidels and heretics, it will be said in the fourth part.

4. Noldin notes: "If somewhere political power prohibits conversion to the true faith before a certain year of age (16 or 18), the law is impious, nor is it lawful for him who is persuaded concerning the truth of the Catholic religion to defer the profession of faith longer on account of civil law. Pastors of souls are bound to admit to the profession of faith those who ask to be enrolled in the bosom of the Church, notwithstanding whatever temporal evil, proper or alien.

But to avoid the evils which from civil law would threaten both the parish priest and the one to be converted, it can be permitted that by mutual consent conversion be deferred to lawful age, or that a conversion already made be concealed until that age, if it is already close at hand," *Theologia Moralis*, II, n. 14. But internal adherence must immediately be given to faith, nor can it be deferred.

5. Yet union with the Church and profession of faith per se must be made publicly, nor must they be concealed at least perpetually, as the constant praxis of the Church bears. Whence:

a) "Outside the case of necessity it is not lawful to baptize an adult or admit him to conversion secretly, with only the priest knowing, but this must be done publicly before others, at least two witnesses. Therefore the Church prescribes that the abjuration of heresy, which is required from neoconverts, be made before two witnesses and that the conversion made be inserted into the parish books, both so that satisfaction may be made to the obligation of professing faith, and so that the convert may be subject to the jurisdiction of the Church in the external forum...

b) Therefore it was established that a Mohammedan cannot be admitted to Baptism who, on account of danger of life, wishes to be and remain a hidden Christian, but that he must transfer himself to places where he can publicly profess the Christian religion (S. C. de Prop. F., May 28, 1635).

c) In the case of necessity, where namely a dying person from a reasonable grave cause refuses public conversion to the faith, he can be received into the Church altogether secretly by any priest, so that his salvation may be provided for, unless the reason of preventing scandal or promoting the salvation of one's neighbor demands otherwise, as in a man of great dignity and authority. But even in this case conversion can be made before two witnesses only, who can afterwards divulge the matter, if there is need" (ibid., n. 16, 2; cf. Holy Office, July 25, 1630).

d) Likewise "some heretic or pagan, who wishes to embrace the true faith but cannot accomplish this without great temporal inconveniences, can secretly before two discreet witnesses be received into the bosom of the Church (and conceal this for a time). But after conversion he can no longer perform acts which are a profession of heresy or paganism, for example, receive the Protestant supper, contract marriage before a non-Catholic minister, wear signs signifying idolatry, etc. But he could perform other things which are not a direct profession of heterodox faith, as, for example, visit the temples of heretics, assist (merely) at a non-Catholic funeral, indeed once or twice assist at a non-Catholic sermon, provided nevertheless that danger of perversion or scandal is absent," Prummer, *Theologia Moralis* I, n. 507, resol. 1.

6. Prummer notes, ibid., n. 507, 5: "In practice it cannot always easily be distinguished whether concealment of faith is lawful or not. Generally speaking, it is much better to profess faith candidly, because the harms arising from profession are not wont to be so great as they appear at first sight. On the contrary, from an honest profession of faith the greatest goods are wont to be produced both for the one professing himself, and for others admiring his good example."

Third Part: On the Habit of Faith

Question One: On Faith Itself

Article I: On Faith Considered in Order to the Subject

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 1-5; q. 6, a. 2; *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 4-7.

716. The habit of faith 1. is in the intellect as in its subject, because its act, which is to believe or to adhere to revealed truths, is an act of the intellect, whose object is the true (n. 693).

2. But that act is commanded by the will (n. 692 and 696): but since several powers concur for producing an act, the act will not be perfect unless all those powers are perfectly disposed through some habit. Hence faith will not be perfect unless the will also is well disposed by a certain habit for commanding faith (a. 2).

3. Nevertheless from this principle it cannot be concluded that there exists in the will a certain special habit which disposes us to nothing else except to commanding faith.

4. But it must be said, conformably to the principles of St. Thomas, that the habit by which man is perfectly disposed for commanding faith, and indeed on account of the ultimate end, is charity, which orders man to the ultimate end and therefore is naturally apt to command the acts of all virtues.

717. Corollaries concerning formed and unformed faith. - From the aforesaid doctrine the following conclusions are easily deduced:

1. Charity gives faith its ultimate perfection, namely, tendency to the ultimate end.

2. Hence charity is called the form (extrinsic, directive, and accidental) of faith (a. 3), and faith which is united to charity is formed or perfect and living faith, while that which is without charity is called unformed and imperfect or dead.

3. Unformed faith does not differ according to essence from formed faith, but, remaining the same in number, with charity acceding, it becomes formed; whence they do not differ according to species, but as perfect and imperfect in the same species (a. 5, ad 3).

4. Although faith is not a merely intellectual virtue but is in the intellect insofar as it is moved by the will, and therefore also inclines to living honorably; nevertheless in the supernatural order it is not a virtue simply so called and according to the perfect account or in the perfect state, which can produce an altogether perfect act, unless it is united to charity, by which the will is perfectly disposed so that it may tend to the good. Because thus it happens, as St. Thomas says, q. 4, a. 5, "that the intellect is always borne into the true,... and that the will is infallibly ordered to a good end." For when two powers concur for one operation, this operation will not be perfect unless each power is perfectly disposed.

5. Unformed faith, because it is a supernatural habit, is caused by God according to its essence, whence it is rightly called the gift of God (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7 and 15, can. 28;

Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 5); nevertheless God is not the cause that it is unformed, or that it is without charity (q. 6, a. 2).

718. Faith is in the speculative intellect, because it is directly occupied with the true and not with operable things. But since the object of faith, first truth, is also the ultimate end on account of which we act, hence faith also extends itself to operations insofar as in them we are directed by revealed truths or eternal and divine reasons. Hence faith is secondarily practical (a. 2, ad 3).

Article II: On Faith Considered Relatively to the Supernatural Virtues

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 5-7; *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 3 and 7.

719. Faith is a virtue because it is a good habit, not including imperfection: it is good because it always tends to the true; - it does not include imperfection, because for man in the state of the way it is not an imperfection but a perfection to admit on account of the authority of God those things which he cannot know by proper reason (a. 5).

It is one virtue because it has one formal object, for by the same divine authority we admit all revealed things (a. 6).

It is the first supernatural virtue: for the theological virtues, which order us to the supernatural end, precede the infused moral virtues, which order us concerning the means; moreover, relatively to the end, to know it is prior to willing it; but we know the supernatural end through faith, and therefore faith is the first virtue. Nevertheless per accidens the act of some virtue can precede the act of faith, insofar as it removes impediments to believing, as humility removes pride, and fortitude removes worldly fear (a. 7).

Article III: On Faith Considered Relatively to the Intellectual Habits

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 8; *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 12, ad 6; q. 14, a. 1, ad 7.

720. Notions concerning certitude. - Faith is compared with the intellectual habits under the respect of certitude. To understand this, it is fitting to recall that certitude properly so called or speculative is the determination of the intellect to one thing, or firm adherence of the mind to the object without fear of erring. Hence it includes a twofold element: one negative, namely, exclusion of actual doubt; the other positive, namely, firm adherence of the mind; and therefore certitude can be considered under a twofold respect: 1. negatively, insofar as it excludes all doubt or fear, and thus it does not admit degrees but consists in an indivisible; 2. positively, insofar as it adheres firmly to something, and thus it admits degrees and is greater or lesser. This happens in a twofold mode:

a) Simply and as to itself, on the part of the cause and motive, that is more certain which has a more certain cause or motive, to which error is more repugnant; whence the intellect adheres to it more firmly estimatively.

According to the diverse motive, natural certitude is metaphysical, physical, or moral. The first rests upon the essential or metaphysical necessity of things known from their very essences. The second rests upon their natural necessity known from induction, by which, when the same cause (antecedent) is posited even in various circumstances, always or almost always and for the most part the same effect (consequent) recurs, which could not be unless there were a natural property and law according to which that cause constantly tends to this effect and also, unless impeded from

elsewhere, will certainly produce it, for example, the sun rises in the morning, from hydrogen and oxygen water is made, mothers love sons. The third rests upon the testimony of other men, which from a quasi-moral induction is demonstrated true, because so many and such great concordant testimonies, diverse from one another and independent, have been given in such various circumstances, that the concord could not be explained except by the truth of the thing asserted, for example, the existence of Julius Caesar, Napoleon, William II, of Rome.

Moreover metaphysical certitude is greater than physical, and this greater than moral, because error is more repugnant to the essence of things than to their natural inclination, and to this than to human testimony.

b) Also according to a certain respect and as to us, that is, on the part of the subject, that is more certain which the intellect attains more fully because it is manifested more clearly to it, and consequently that which more satisfies and quiets the intellect and to which it adheres more firmly intensively without any possibility of doubting. In this mode evident or intrinsic certitude, which necessitates the intellect, is greater than non-evident and extrinsic certitude, which does not necessitate but is sought from the authority of others.

Besides, there is had certitude improperly so called, prudential or practical, which excludes not every speculative doubt, but every reasonable and prudent fear of erring. This is not strict certitude because it does not exclude every fear, but is the greatest probability which is equivalent to certitude, because it suffices for acting rightly and prudently; whence it renders us rather morally, that is, almost and equivalently certain, than being true moral certitude. Such among many is the knowledge of metaphysical and essential moral truths which they admit without full evidence of them; likewise often experimental certitude; especially human faith, which does not seem easily able to rise to strict certitude.

721. Faith is truly certain, as is established from the fact that it rests upon the infallible truth of God revealing (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 9, can. 16, and Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3); it is also supremely certain, as the unanimous opinion of the Holy Fathers and Theologians holds.

a) But it is more certain simply and as to itself, that is, on the part of the cause and motive: for in this mode faith is even more certain than metaphysical certitude, because it is more repugnant to admit the false on account of the truth of God by the light of divine grace than on account of any other motive whatever, even on account of the evidence in every way of the natural light of our reason. Wherefore we adhere more and more firmly to the truths of faith than to others, because the will in faith moves the intellect to an adherence estimatively firmer, before every other natural knowledge; whence man is prepared to deny, so far as is possible for him, all those things which would contradict revealed truths (I John V, 9; Pius IX, encyclical, November 9, 1846: nothing more certain).

b) Nevertheless it is not more certain according to a certain respect, namely, as to us, that is, on the part of the subject, of the man believing: for in this mode faith, because it does not exclude involuntary doubt, is less certain than fully evident assent, which excludes every possible doubt. Yet this is per accidens as to the motive of faith, which in itself has sufficient power of altogether confirming the intellect, and it comes from our imperfect mode of conceiving it, and therefore faith is more certain simply.

Certitude on the part of the motive is called by theologians certitude of infallibility; certitude on our part, certitude of indubitability.

The certitude of faith is proclaimed in the Scriptures:

a) firm adherence is required (Acts II, 36; VIII, 37; Rom. IV, 3-10, 21-25; Heb. X, 22; Gal. I, 8);

b) all doubt is reproved (Mk. XVI, 14; Luke XXIV, 25);

c) the reason is indicated why adherence must be firm (Acts I, 16 sq.; Heb. X, 19 to the end of the epistle; Gal. I, 8, 11; I John V, 9);

d) whence those things to which human reason seems repugnant are said to be humbly admitted (Heb. XI, 1; II Tim. I, 12), and in the Athanasian symbol it is read: This is the Catholic faith, which unless each one shall have believed firmly...

722. Observations. - 1. The certitude of faith is greater on the part of the motive than the certitude of the judgment and motives of credibility; in this sense proposition 19 was condemned by Innocent XI: "The will cannot effect that the assent of faith in itself be firmer than the weight of reasons impelling to the assent of faith deserves," that is, of the preambles on account of which we judge that one must believe, or of the motives thus remotely disposing to faith.

2. Since the conclusion is not more certain than the premises, it follows in the opinion of Lugo, who says that the act of faith is a ratiocination, that it cannot be explained that faith is more certain than rational knowledge; indeed, since he says (in the minor of the syllogism) that revelation is only practically certain, it would follow that faith has only practical and improperly so called certitude.

3. Certain theologians falsely contend that divine grace partially supplies the defect of certitude on the part of the motive, and causes an adherence firmer than the proximate motive of adherence on account of which we adhere and believe demands: for the will cannot reasonably command an adherence firmer than the motive of adherence deserves. Yet grace can illuminate the intellect so that it may more clearly and better perceive the motives of faith and credibility, even those which otherwise it would not perceive; indeed exceptionally it can internally manifest to someone a new and special motive of credibility.[1]

[1] Concerning this De Poulpiquet, *Le Miracle et ses suppleances*, deserves to be inspected.

Question Two: On Those Having Faith

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 5.

723. Angels and the first man were created in faith. - The reason is that on the one hand they did not enjoy the vision of God in Himself, and on the other hand they were destined for this vision; whence they had to know it by faith, so that they could tend to it as to the supernatural end (n. 707).

724. In the other life faith does not remain. - In the blessed faith does not remain, because they see (I Cor. XIII, 9-10); nevertheless it remains in the souls of purgatory. - But in the damned it is made void, because there remains in them no aptitude nor tendency to the supernatural end; for they are definitively turned away from the ultimate end and confirmed in evil.

Nor say according to Jas. II, 19: "The demons believe and tremble." For they do not properly believe or adhere to revealed truths by supernatural grace from a pious affection of credulity, on account of the authority alone of God revealing, because God is worthy of faith and because they will to trust Him speaking; - but they admit them only by rational knowledge and quasi-historical certitude, because from the perspicacity of their intellect they have such manifest indications that they are revealed by God not lying, and therefore that His testimony concerning them is in fact true, that they are convinced concerning them and cannot doubt, namely, on account of the evidence of the testimony (cf. n. 689, 2). Namely, they do not doubt but adhere, yet on account of signs and reasons inducing them, not on account of the very authority of God revealing.

725. Faith is lost not through any mortal sin whatever, as the Council of Trent defined, sess. 6, can. 28, and as is supposed in the Scriptures, I Cor. XIII, 2; Jas. II, 14; but only through a sin directly contrary to it (I Tim. I, 19), namely, through infidelity (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 15), even if it is occupied only with one point. For he who denies the authority of God revealing in one thing cannot receive it in another, because always and in all things it is of equal weight and value. Hence if a heretic adheres to other articles, this now happens not by divine faith on account of the authority of God, but either by human faith or by his own opinion.

Question Three: On the Cause and Effects of Faith

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 6 and 7; *De Verit.*, q. 8 and q. 18, a. 3.

726. God is the cause of faith: a) because exteriorly He proposes both the things to be believed which without divine revelation we cannot know, and the manifest signs by which we know this revelation to be divine. But b) this does not suffice, for many who know these things do not believe; whence there is also required an interior cause which interiorly moves man to assenting to those things which are of faith: not however free will alone, which is insufficient for a supernatural act; therefore God also interiorly through grace (habitual or only actual) moves us to assenting to revealed truths. "Since man, by assenting to those things which are of faith, is elevated above his nature, it is necessary that this be in him from a higher principle moving interiorly, which is God. And therefore faith as to the assent which is the principal act of faith, is from God interiorly moving through grace" (q. 6, a. 1). Therefore faith, since it is grace, is per se infused.

727. Faith is supernatural, not only objectively because as object it has the very truth of God revealing supernatural things; but also subjectively because it is produced by a supernatural principle, the grace of God not only medicinal or healing but also elevating. For it is impossible that by the powers of nature we attain any object supernatural in itself as such;[1] besides, faith, because namely it is the beginning of salvation and the root of justification, is the means by which we tend to the end supernatural in itself, but the means must be proportioned to the end. Thus the Second Council of Orange defined, can. 5, 6, 7; and Trent, sess. 6, c. 6, can. 3; and the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 5, against Hermes. - Cf. John VI, 44, 45, 64; Eph. II, 5, 8; I Cor. III, 7; II Cor. III, 5; Phil. I, 29.

[1] A supernatural object as conformable to reason, or as reasonably credible, or as representable or conceivable by created symbols, is something natural; but as a thing and as truth in itself it is supernatural.

Moreover, not only the act itself of faith, but also the very affection of credulity or motion of the will, as the beginning of faith, is elicited by the powers of grace, as the Second Council of Orange defined,

can. 5 and 7, against the Semipelagians. For it is to tend to a supernatural object, namely, to the act of faith.

But the judgment itself of credibility perhaps can be made by the powers of nature, because as object it has the reasonableness of faith; but when that judgment is immediately and ultimately practical (here and now it must be believed by me, here and now you should believe), so that it is made in order to supernatural faith and is the cause that we will to believe and do believe, or that the will of believing follows it, then it is occupied with a supernatural object as such, namely, the act of faith to be exercised, and pertains to the beginning of faith, and therefore cannot be made except by the powers of grace, as is certainly drawn from the same Council (can. 5) and from the Council of Milevis (can. 4). Cf. St. Augustine, l. 2, *Contra duas ep. Pel.*, c. 8.

The act of faith and the judgment of credibility are elicited by the habit of theological faith in him who possesses it;[2] otherwise this happens only by the powers of actual grace. The pious affection itself of credulity, according to St. Thomas, is elicited by charity in the just man; but in the sinner it happens only with the help of actual grace.

[2] St. Thomas admits that other acts, besides the act itself of faith, proceed from the habit of faith, q. 6, a. 1.

728. Observations. - 1. The powers of grace which are granted to our intellect, whether by way of habit or by way of actual grace, so that it can believe, are called by the Holy Fathers and Theologians the light of faith: for just as by the light of reason we are able to know natural things, so by these powers, which elevate our intellect, we are able to know supernaturally supernatural things.

2. Faith elevates us to the supernatural and divine order; whence the act of faith is supernatural not as to mode alone but according to itself and as to substance: for it is divine because as material and formal object it has God in Himself, such as He can naturally be known only by Himself. Hence we believe the same mysterious truths which we shall see in heaven, and indeed on account of the same motive: first truth revealing them. The only difference is on the part of the condition of the object, which in heaven is clear, here remains obscure. Hence just as the beatific vision is an act of divine life, so also is faith.

3. The habit of faith not only causes the act itself of faith, but as in other habits, its causality extends itself to other acts subordinated to the principal act (I-II, q. 54, a. 4), whether they are preparatory acts of the principal act, or preservative of it. Hence by the habit of faith there are also effected both acts pertaining to the previous judgment of credibility, as was said in the preceding number,[3] and acts by which (on account of the authority of the Church) we admit truths not indeed revealed in themselves but connected with these, which are defined by the Church, or at least proposed with authority, for preserving faith securely.

[3] Cf. St. Thomas, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3; a. 5, ad 1, q. 2, a. 9, ad 3; *Quodl.* II, 6.

4. From the things said before, the various properties of faith are already known: on the part of the material object are infallibility and obscurity; on the part of the will, liberty; on the part of the judgment of credibility: reasonableness (and rational credibility of the object); on the part of the intellect adhering to the formal object, supreme certitude; on the part of the exterior

cause, God moving through grace: supernaturality; finally on the part of the subject, irrevocability belongs to faith, as will be said below, n. 736, 3.

729. Effects of faith. - Faith has as effect: 1. fear: for insofar as by unformed faith we apprehend evils to be inflicted by divine judgment, it is the cause of servile fear, by which someone fears to be punished by God; but insofar as by formed faith we esteem God as the Supreme Good, from whom to be separated is the worst thing and to whom to will to be equal is evil, it is the cause of filial fear, by which someone is subject to God and fears to be separated from God; - 2. it has as effect the purification of the heart: for that is called impure which is mixed with baser things; and that is purified which is mixed with nobler things. From this it is clear that a man becomes impure if he subjects himself by love to temporal things, which are baser than himself; but through faith he tends to things higher than himself, namely, supernatural and divine things, and therefore faith is the principle of the purification of the heart: indeed unformed faith purifies from error, which happens from this, that the intellect adheres inordinately to lower things; formed faith purifies also from impurity of affection. Hence Acts XV, 9: purifying their hearts by faith.

Question Four: On the Gifts Corresponding to Faith

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 8 and 9.

730. The gift of understanding, under the interior instinct of the Holy Spirit, serves for penetrating by supernatural light those things which we cannot penetrate by natural light, and which stand in faith as principles from which other things are deduced (q. 8, a. 1).

Moreover, during the state of the way we are not able to penetrate those things in themselves; but we penetrate that other evident truths are not contrary to them (a. 2).

But this happens according to a threefold grade.

"The first grade of the gift of understanding is that through it man knows that one must adhere to the truths of faith as much as is necessary for salvation, by considering some reason of the Christian faith, on account of which he knows himself to believe. For the Holy Spirit shows to everyone having grace at least some reason of faith through the clarity of the gift of understanding, on account of which he knows that one must adhere to faith. For some are moved on account of the testimonies of the prophets concerning Christ and the new law. Some from consideration of the holiness and faith of preceding fathers... Some from consideration of miracles... Some from special inspiration or divine visitation or something similar, which they experience in themselves or which happens to them.

The second grade of the gift of understanding is subtly to contemplate all or certainly the chief truths of faith: and thus to be solidified in the truths of faith so much more robustly, the more diligently one weighs the foundations of faith, to such an extent that one greatly marvels that God has deigned to approve the Catholic faith so abundantly and most evidently. Therefore to this grade of the gift of understanding it pertains clearly and promptly to advert to the origin of faith, how Christ up to the passion and death had few believers... To know sincerely these and infinitely many similar things, I think, belongs to the second grade of the gift of understanding.

To the third grade it belongs that someone by a most purified keenness be able to consider the proper reasons and foundations of the individual articles of faith, and thus be able delightfully to

contemplate the individual truths of faith separately with a most subtle and most certain eye of the mind, namely, contemplating that the faith of the most blessed Trinity is reasonable... both on account of evangelical testimonies and apostolic documents, and on account of most beautiful persuasions received from the natures of things. Furthermore, by contemplating the reasons of faith concerning the incarnation of the Son of God, the oracles of the prophets, the testimonies of the apostles, reasonable considerations by which it is proved that this was fitting, and thus concerning the individual articles or particles of faith by considering their proper foundations, and how they assert almost nothing concerning Christ, without its being proved to have been foretold by the holy seers..."[1]

[1] Dionysius the Carthusian, *De donis*, tr. II, a. 34.

To this gift corresponds the sixth beatitude: Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God. For the gift of understanding cleanses the mind from phantasms and errors by which we would badly receive or understand those things which are proposed concerning God: but the more we are purified from them, the better we see God, as is possible in this life.

"For there is a twofold cleanness: one indeed preamble and dispositive to the vision of God, which is the cleansing of the affection from disordered affections; and this cleanness of heart is made through virtues and gifts which pertain to the appetitive power. But another cleanness of heart is that which is as it were completive with respect to the divine vision, and this indeed is the cleanness of the mind cleansed from phantasms and errors, so that namely those things which are proposed concerning God are not received by way of bodily phantasms, nor according to heretical perversities; and the gift of understanding makes this cleanness. Likewise there is a twofold vision of God: one indeed perfect, by which the essence of God is seen; but another imperfect, by which, although we do not see of God what He is, nevertheless we see what He is not; and so much the more perfectly in this life do we know God, the more we understand Him to exceed whatever is comprehended by the intellect. And each vision of God pertains to the gift of understanding: the first indeed to the consummated gift of understanding, according as it will be in the homeland; but the second to the begun gift of understanding, according as it is had in the way" (a. 7).

To the gift of understanding responds the fruit of the Holy Spirit, faith, that is, the certitude of faith which produces delight in the mind; but in the will there responds the fruit of joy (a. 8).

731. The gift of knowledge, under the interior instinct of the Holy Spirit, serves for judging rightly and certainly according to the truth of faith concerning human and created things, by discerning what concerning these things is to be believed from what is not to be believed (q. 9, a. 1 and 2).

"The gift of knowledge obtains a threefold grade.

The first consists in this, that man know all created things with respect to the divine nature to be passing and vain, and understand that they are neither to be loved on account of themselves, nor to be sought as ultimate end, and that he adhere to them less than to God; and this grade of the gift of knowledge is required for salvation, and is judged common to all having charity.

We ought to advance to the second grade of this knowledge, namely, that concerning individual created things, one by one and through their proper reasons, we know that affection is not to be fixed

in them, nor as in final goods is it to be bound in them, but that one intend or use them neither more nor less than is required for interior salvation.

Finally, the third grade of the gift of knowledge is to be so exercised, experienced, and perfect in those things which concern the active life, that in every... doubtful event and perplexed case he knows how to judge most truly, most promptly, and most salubriously, to elicit the causes of sins, to abandon the reasons of a more negligent and sluggish life, to induce contempt of temporal things, to attend to a most serious and indefatigable conversation of spiritual progresses."[2]

[2] Dionysius the Carthusian, *De donis*, tr. III, a. 25.

To the gift of knowledge corresponds the third beatitude: Blessed are they who mourn, for they shall be consoled. For he who judges rightly concerning creatures does not find perfect good in them, but rather mourns concerning them, and orders them to the divine good; from which consolation follows (a. 4).

732. Observations. - 1. By faith we adhere simply to revealed truths; by the gift of understanding we penetrate them.

2. The gift of knowledge differs from the gift of understanding: the latter proceeds by way of simple apprehension, "so that those things which are of faith may be penetrated or grasped by understanding"; the former by way of judgment, "so that man may have right judgment concerning them and esteem that one must adhere to these and withdraw from their opposites" (q. 8, a. 6).

3. Those gifts, like faith, are per se primarily speculative, yet secondarily practical (a. 3). Thus St. Thomas, in the present place, retracts what he had written to the contrary in I-II, q. 68, a. 4 (a. 6).

4. Two vices are opposed to the gift of understanding: blindness of mind, and dullness of sense. The latter "concerning understanding imports a certain weakness (or obtuseness) of the mind concerning the consideration of spiritual goods; but blindness of mind imports an omnimodal privation of the knowledge of them" (q. 15, a. 1). Dullness arises from gluttony; blindness from lust.

Ignorance is directly opposed to the gift of knowledge.

Fourth Part: On the Vices and Sins Opposed to Faith

733. Questions to be treated. - Under the name of an opposed sin there does not come a mere omission of the act of a precept, whether interior or of faith, or exterior or of confession of faith; but a contrary act, a sin of commission. But several vices and sins are opposed to faith:

1. To interior faith itself there is directly opposed a) infidelity, which from certain circumstances is called b) heresy and apostasy;

2. To faith there are indirectly opposed those things which for oneself or for others include occasion and danger of losing faith, such as a) communication with infidels and heretics; b)

cooperation in infidelity and heresy; c) writings against doctrine of faith and morals; d) internal admission or external proposition of doctrines which are dangerous for faith.

3. To exterior faith or confession of faith there is directly opposed blasphemy.

Question One: On Sins Directly Opposed to Faith

Article I: On Infidelity

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10.

734. Infidelity in general. - Infidelity (*ongelovigheid*), insofar as it is a state, is a defective lack of faith, namely, in one in whom faith ought to be; hence the blessed and man in the state of pure nature, although they do not have faith, are not infidels, because faith ought not to be in them; on the contrary, little children not baptized are infidels because they lack faith which they would have had, if they had not sinned in Adam.

The state of infidelity is threefold: a) negative infidelity or lack of faith in one who has never heard anything of faith; b) privative infidelity or lack of faith in one who has neglected to acquire for himself sufficient notice of faith; c) contrary and positive infidelity or lack of faith in one to whom it has been sufficiently proposed and who positively contemns it (by the will) and rejects it (by the intellect). This is infidelity properly so called, because it alone comes from the sin of infidelity.

735. The sin of infidelity. - Infidelity, insofar as it is a sin, is an act by which someone deliberately disbelieves some truth which is sufficiently proposed to him as revealed by God. This act on the part of the object is directly opposed to the act of faith, for to will to believe and not to will to believe, voluntarily to believe or to judge that this is true, and voluntarily to disbelieve or to judge that this is not true, are directly opposed by their object. Hence this act by its nature excludes faith, and therefore, so long as it is not retracted, man cannot believe; and the loss of the habit of faith necessarily follows from it. It is said in the definition:

a) an act, so that the sin of infidelity may be distinguished from the state of infidelity;

b) by which someone deliberately disbelieves, that is, refuses assent or adherence; for just as the act of faith is voluntarily to assent to revealed things, so the act of infidelity is voluntarily to dissent from them. Hence St. Thomas says that the sin of infidelity is in the intellect: it is not a mere omission or ignorance of faith, but a sin of commission by which someone positively resists faith and rejects it, which nevertheless has ignorance joined to it (a. 3, ad 2);

c) some truth revealed by God, for the denial or doubt of one article or point suffices for someone to lose faith. For he who rejects the authority of God revealing in one thing cannot receive it in another, because always and in all things it is of equal weight and value. Hence if a heretic adheres to other articles, he does this now not from divine faith on account of the authority of God, but either by human faith, or by his own opinion (n. 678);

d) which is sufficiently proposed: if some truth is invincibly unknown, indeed even if from negligence and altogether culpable ignorance it is insufficiently known, for this reason faith in it is not denied, nor is the sin of infidelity had, nor is faith excluded or lost:[1] for the will not to inquire concerning faith is not the will not to believe; indeed together with it there can stand the will of believing the

truth if it is sufficiently proposed, because by their object they are not directly opposed, as is clear in him who does not will to inquire concerning faith, and who, compelled to hear the faith, believes.

[1] If affected ignorance is present, there is present the will not to believe, yet not formal infidelity, because dissent of the intellect is lacking, since the truth has not been proposed. Yet there is present a sin of the will of the same malice.

Therefore the sin of infidelity arises from contempt of the will and pertinacity of the intellect, and therefore it can also be defined: a voluntary error resisting faith with pertinacity.

736. Corollaries. [The printed heading omits the number.] - From the aforesaid doctrine it follows:

1. That positive infidelity alone includes the sin of infidelity: for negative infidelity, since it is invincible, is no sin (John XV; Rom. X; condemned prop. 68 of Baius), whence, says St. Thomas: "those who are infidels in this way are indeed damned on account of other sins, which cannot be remitted without faith, but they are not damned on account of the sin of infidelity"; but privative infidelity does not include the sin of infidelity (which is of commission), but the sin of ignorance in faith (which is of omission), by which someone voluntarily lacks sufficient knowledge of faith. This sin, if it comes from grave negligence, will be mortal.

2. The merely external denial of faith is not properly infidelity, and therefore does not exclude the virtue of faith, because together with it there can stand the will of believing internally, since they are not directly opposed by their object.

3. Since the sin of infidelity supposes a sufficient proposition of faith, it follows that no one loses the habit of faith without fault[2] (Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3 and can. 6). Whence a special property belongs to faith on the part of the subject, namely, irrevocability.

[2] Yet we do not say: that without fault one cannot leave the body of the Catholic Church, or the profession of faith. For although this cannot happen from an objectively just cause and grace helps lest it happen, and therefore per se and ordinarily it is not without the graver fault of infidelity; nevertheless in exceptional circumstances some think that per accidens it can happen without fault or at least without grave fault of infidelity, though not many. Nor was this explicitly condemned by the Vatican Council, as is established from the history of the Council. Cf. Granderath, *Constitutiones Conc. Vat. explicatae*.

737. The sin of infidelity is mortal from its whole genus (Mk. XVI, 16), because it always contains contempt of the authority of God revealing, and therefore is a sin against the Holy Spirit, as rejecting from contempt a means necessary for salvation. And it is per se most grave, with hatred of God alone excepted. For since through the theological virtues we are directly and principally turned to God, hence sins directly opposed to them directly and principally import aversion from God, and therefore they are graver than sins directly opposed to the moral virtues: thus by infidelity man is more separated and removed from God, because he does not even have true knowledge of God.

Moreover, infidelity is graver than despair, because it is opposed to the truth of God as it is in itself; but despair is against God according as His good is participated by us. But hatred of God is graver, because that by which all other sins are sins, that is, voluntary aversion from God, is directly and per se intended in this sin, and is its very essence.

Yet often infidelity is a less grave sin on account of circumstances, for example, ignorance.

738. Diverse modes of infidelity. - Infidelity can be considered 1. on the part of the act and the mode in which it is committed; 2. on the part of the object as to species; 3. on the part of the conditions of the one sinning.

The mode in which it is committed is manifold: 1. as to the formal object: a) by denying God's truth in speaking or by doubting concerning it; b) by denying the fact of revelation or by doubting concerning it; c) by admitting revealed truth, not on account of God's authority, but exclusively on account of one's own reason; - 2. as to the material object: a) by denying proposed revealed truth, or by assenting to an opinion incompossible with revealed doctrine; b) by assenting to revealed truth not firmly, but with fear of the opposite; c) by deliberately and positively doubting concerning it, that is, by suspending assent, not indeed because someone wills either now to attend to other things, or not to fatigue the mind, or to inquire into motives for assenting more suitably, or something similar, but precisely because he positively thinks or fears that the proposed truth can be false. For all these things manifestly exclude the will of believing firmly and firm voluntary adherence on account of God revealing, and thus at least implicitly are a denial of faith.

739. Species of infidelity. - On the part of the object infidelity can be regarded:

1. According to the corruption of the truths of faith, and thus its species are indefinite, because errors can be multiplied indefinitely: these species are diverse but only according to physical being, and not according to moral being, because they do not include diverse repugnance to reason.

2. According to diverse relation to faith, and thus at present three principal species are distinguished: paganism (to which Mohammedanism, deism, atheism, etc., are referred), Judaism, and heresy. A pagan is one who acknowledges no faith or redemption; a Jew acknowledges the redeemer but thinks Him still to be coming; a heretic acknowledges Christ the redeemer, but corrupts His dogmas. These are three morally distinct species, because errors are opposed to faith under a diverse reason, either to faith which is not received, or to faith which is received[3] either in figure, or in manifestation of truth; besides, they often include diverse superstitions or are punished with diverse penalties. Hence those species are to be declared in confession.

[3] Objectively as to the account of evil; now:

They can be considered in two ways:

a) if they are considered according to the corruption of the truths of faith and the number of errors, paganism is graver than Judaism and Judaism than heresy;

b) but if they are considered according to diverse relation to faith, heresy is graver than Judaism and this than paganism, because it is graver to resist faith which is received in manifestation of truth than faith which is received in figure, and this than to resist faith which is not received, just as it is graver not to fulfill what someone has promised than what he has not promised.

2. Hence also subjectively on the part of the one sinning, as to the account of fault, ordinarily heresy is graver, because heretics ordinarily have greater knowledge of faith than Jews, and

therefore are more voluntarily opposed to it and with greater pertinacity; - similarly Jews than pagans. Yet in an extraordinary case they could have equal knowledge of faith.

1. Faith is received objectively, not always subjectively.

740. Are infidels to be compelled to faith? - Unbaptized infidels cannot be compelled by external force to receiving faith, because to believe is of the will; for neither can they be compelled by the Church, to whose power they are not subject, nor by civil society, which does not enjoy spiritual jurisdiction. Yet they can be compelled not to impede the preaching or exercise of faith by blasphemies, persuasions, persecutions in their places, because the Church received from Christ the right of preaching everywhere. Indeed, by their own princes they can be compelled both to observing the law of nature (and natural religion), in whose observance the right civil order is founded, and also sometimes to hearing faith.

But baptized infidels can be compelled by spiritual and corporal penalties, so that they may return to faith and the Church, because through Baptism they have been made subjects of the Church (Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 14).

741. Are the rites of infidels to be tolerated? - The rites of infidels cannot be approved or fostered by Christian princes (Syllabus, prop. 77-79); but they can sometimes be tolerated, if greater evils would be feared from their prohibition, or greater goods would be impeded: thus God tolerates evils in the world lest worse things be incurred, or better things impeded. Hence the rites of Jews are moderately tolerated, from whose preservation we have a great testimony of our faith (Const. *Imm. Dei*; encyclical *Libertas* of Leo XIII).

742. Observation. - The children of infidels regularly cannot be baptized against the will of their parents; concerning which see the treatise on Baptism, and can. 750 and 751.

Article II: On Heresy and Apostasy

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 11 and 12.

743. Various conditions of infidelity. - On the part of the one sinning, infidelity is called either apostasy, or heresy, or simple infidelity. An apostate is one who totally casts off the faith of Christ previously received; a heretic is one who professes the faith of Christ at some time (at least now) received, but corrupts the dogmas which it belongs to the Church to propose; simply an infidel is one who has never received the faith of Christ. But in order that someone be held fully, that is, also in the external forum and before the Church, as an apostate or heretic, it is required that by solemn profession in Baptism he received the faith (at least externally), and that he totally or partially denied this faith explicitly proposed by the Church as to be believed (can. 1325, § 2).

744. Heresy (*ketterij*) etymologically signifies election, whence in the whole Catholic tradition it designates the error of him who, with faith received especially in Baptism, adheres to Christ and does not wish to receive from the Church the rule of faith, but chooses for himself, that is, from perfect deliberation firmly establishes a rule of believing.1

It is customarily defined: a voluntary and pertinacious error in Catholic faith, in one who professes the faith of Christ. There is indicated:

1. the material element:

a) error, that is, an erroneous judgment, not ignorance alone, of the intellect, whence he is not a heretic who only externally denies faith from levity or fear, by speech or work;

b) in faith, that is, in revealed truth, whence he is not a heretic who only denies a truth connected with a revealed truth, even one infallibly defined by the Church, such as a theological conclusion or dogmatic fact. Thus heresy is distinguished from simple error, against ecclesiastical faith or the obedience due to the teaching Church;

c) Catholic, that is, in some revealed truth directed to all which the Church proposes as to be believed; so that in the one denying there is at once contempt of the authority of God and of the Church: thus heresy is distinguished from infidelity, which can also be opposed to divine faith alone;

d) voluntary, otherwise it would not be an act of infidelity by which someone would not wish to believe God and the Church and would disbelieve; whence he who, while adhering to the Church, from ignorance even culpable did not know that something was proposed by the Church as to be believed, and denied it, would not be a heretic even materially: thus heresy is distinguished from ignorance alone of faith;

2. the formal element: pertinacious, so that someone is opposed to the authority of God and of the Church, not indeed from ignorance even culpable, but knowingly and willingly, that is, with an evil will, while the truth and this authority are sufficiently proposed to him, whether it happens from pride or vainglory, or from the cupidity of contradicting, or from levity, or from any other cause; whence he who through ignorance even culpable did not know that the Church must be obeyed in faith, could sin, but would not be a formal heretic but only a material one: thus heresy properly so called and formal is distinguished from merely material heresy;

3. the subject: in one who professes the faith of Christ, that is, in one who received it, especially by Baptism, and did not totally cast it off: thus heresy is distinguished from apostasy and from the simple infidelity of Jews and pagans.

1. St. Thomas says that election signifies that which someone firmly wills after perfect consideration.

745. Heresy differs from infidelity as a species from a genus: for it adds something to infidelity.

1. Infidelity can be in every man using reason; heresy is only in a Christian, especially a baptized one.

2. Infidelity says only denial of faith in those things which God has revealed; but heresy says denial of faith in those things which are proposed by the Church as revealed and to be believed; whence he who denies a private revelation made to him would commit not heresy but the sin of infidelity, and he who denies a truth which he certainly knows to pertain to public revelation but which the Church does not explicitly propose as to be believed, would be a heretic, but not in the full sense and before the Church.

3. Infidelity is opposed to divine faith; heresy to Catholic faith.

746. Heresy is divided in various ways. - Heresy is one kind material,[1] another formal. Material heresy denies the authority of the Church in proposing faith without pertinacity, because it was not sufficiently proposed; formal heresy sufficiently knows the authority of the Church, but refuses to embrace the faith of the true Church and denies it at least in one point. - One kind is internal, which so lies hidden in the mind that it is manifested by no external sign; another is external, which manifests itself by external signs (words, signs, deeds, omission of a deed), even if no one sees it; this is either occult, which is manifested either to no one or to one or another only, or public, which is externally manifested openly and before several.

[1] Material heresy is without sin, if the ignorance is invincible; if it is vincible, it is venial provided that grave negligence was not present; otherwise it will be a grave sin of ignorance in faith, but not the sin of heresy.

The signs on account of which someone is to be judged materially a heretic are customarily indicated: 1. if he is prepared to submit himself to the judgment of the Church, when he recognizes the error, although in the meantime he holds his opinion tooth and nail; 2. if he has known nothing concerning Catholic faith, and has never doubted concerning his own; 3. if, while doubting, he has studied to recognize the truth, as much as he could. - But he who through human fear, or through neglect, procrastinates his conversion to faith, is not for that reason a heretic; nevertheless he sins against the affirmative precept of faith, if he defers it for a long time.

On the contrary, one is to be judged pertinacious and therefore a formal heretic: 1. who doubts, and from pertinacity or from contempt of the Church refuses to inquire further; - 2. who deliberately turns the intellect away from truth sufficiently proposed, so that he may adhere to his own sect or opinion; - 3. who, once the truth is recognized, perseveres in contradicting the Church, as heresiarchs are wont to do from hatred of the Pope or of the Church. - These are the three principal grades of pertinacity, the first of which is founded upon truth studiously neglected; the second upon truth sufficiently proposed, but contemned; the third upon recognized truth maliciously attacked.

747. The sin of heresy is most grave (n. 737 and 739), which per se merits corporal and spiritual penalties at the same time.

Concerning corporal penalties St. Thomas teaches: "It is much graver to corrupt faith, through which there is the life of the soul, than to falsify money, through which temporal life is aided. Whence if falsifiers of money or other malefactors are at once justly handed over to death by secular princes, much more can heretics, at once from the fact that they are convicted of heresy, not only be excommunicated, but also justly killed" (a. 3). Death, however, although it can be decreed by the Church, is not to be inflicted by her herself.

Spiritual penalties are inflicted by Canon Law; according to which heretics:

1. incur by the fact itself excommunication specially reserved to the Roman Pontiff (can. 2314, § 1),

2. unless, after being warned, they recover their senses, they are to be deprived of benefice, dignity, pension, office, or other function, if they have any in the Church, are to be declared infamous, and clerics, after repeated warning, are to be deposed (ibid.),

3. indeed, if they have given their name to a non-Catholic sect or publicly adhered to it, they are by the fact itself infamous, and clerics, after warning has been premised, are to be degraded (ibid.),

4. they are irregular (can. 985),

5. they are deprived of ecclesiastical burial (can. 1240, § 1).

For incurring these penalties formal and at the same time external heresy is required, and for the third and fifth penalties public heresy in addition.[2]

[2] Those suspected of heresy incur the same penalties, who after being warned do not remove the cause of suspicion and, once punished, within six full months from the penalty contracted, have not amended themselves (can. 2315). Such persons are held as heretics. Those to be held as suspected of heresy by law are: a) those who in any way spontaneously aid the defense of heresy (can. 2316); - b) those who communicate in sacred things with heretics (can. 2316 and 1258); - c) those who are united in marriage with an explicit or implicit pact concerning the non-Catholic education of offspring (can. 2319, § 2); - d) or procure the baptism or education of this offspring outside the Catholic Church (can. 2319, §§ 3-4); - e) those who sacrilegiously treat the consecrated species according to the norm of can. 2320; - f) those who appeal from the decrees of the Roman Pontiff to an ecumenical council (can. 2332); - g) those who, with hardened mind, for a year have persisted under excommunication... (can. 2340, § 1); - h) those who are ordained simoniacally, or ordain or administer other sacraments (can. 2371).

748. Corollaries. - 1. He is not a heretic who only externally denies faith, from levity or fear, by speech or work, because he does not have an erroneous judgment.

2. Pertinacity required for heresy does not signify duration of time in denying truth; but it is pertinacity of reason, which consists in denying truth sufficiently proposed, for which one instant suffices.

3. Since he who truly doubts positively concerning the truth proposed by the Church judges erroneously (at least equivalently or implicitly) that it is not certain, it follows that he is a heretic (can. 1325, § 2).

4. He who errs from culpable ignorance, even if it is affected and sought in order to sin, yet by another sin than heresy, provided he is prepared to submit himself to the judgment of the Church, is not a heretic, because pertinacity is lacking; but if the ignorance is affected, because he has decreed not to believe the Church so that he may err more freely in faith, that is, from a will by which he has decreed not to believe even if he knew that it was proposed by the Church, he is a heretic: for he has the will not to believe everything which is proposed by the Church, and internally he already dissents from one sufficiently proposed revealed truth, namely, from the authority of the Church, to which there must be total obedience in faith.

5. He who denies that which he falsely thinks to have been defined by the Church truly denies the authority of the Church, and is a formal heretic; nevertheless not in the external forum, unless he sufficiently brought forth his mind and sin.

749. Apostasy (*afvalligheid*), according to etymology, is defection; whence it signifies a retrocession from God. Moreover, in several modes we can be united to God: by faith, obedience in

precepts, or by a special bond not commanded (but pertaining to counsel), namely, religion and Order. Hence there is given a fourfold apostasy:

1. from Order, when a cleric constituted in major orders transfers himself to the lay state;

2. from religion, when someone withdraws from the religious institute or order which he has professed;

3. from obedience, when someone altogether withdraws himself from the law of God and from obedience to the divine mandates;

4. from faith, when someone totally withdraws from the faith which he previously professed. This alone is a sin against faith and is apostasy strictly so called: for while the other apostasies exist, man can still remain joined to God through faith; but if he withdraws from faith, then he seems altogether to retrocede from God.

Apostasy from faith is defined: a total withdrawal from the Christian faith (can. 1325, § 2). Apostasy of itself indicates only the term from which: the faith which is abandoned; but not the term to which the apostate approaches, whether it is idolatry, or deism, or Judaism, etc., or even whether he passes over to no religion and remains indifferent. Hence it is not a species of infidelity, but adds to its various species an aggravating circumstance, namely, that faith is abandoned (a. 1, ad 3).

750. Observations. - 1. Apostates per se are punished with the same penalties as heretics (can. 2314, § 1); sometimes, however, special and graver penalties can be enacted against them: thus in certain places it is a sin specially reserved to the Ordinary.

2. Those are rightly to be held as apostates who from conviction adhere to the Masonic sect, which under the veil of philanthropy, solidarity, and mutual aid, craftily opposes true religion. Indeed all who (even without internal adherence) give their name to that sect, as to other associations of the same kind which plot against the Church or legitimate civil powers, contract by the fact itself excommunication simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff (can. 2335); but clerics and religious are in addition punished with special penalties and are to be denounced to the Congregation of the Holy Office (can. 2336).

3. Formerly there existed a positive precept of denouncing to the Ordinary heretics or those suspected of heresy, but this has fallen into desuetude. But by force of natural law one must denounce whenever it is a question of avoiding grave harm of souls, to which a superior can bring a remedy; this also holds for regions where heretics are mixed with Catholics, for example, if it is a question of an unusual danger which would threaten the Catholic religion, the superior being ignorant of it. Clerics, however, seem to be denounced in every case, so that the bishop may meet the harm both of the people and of the clergy committed to him.

4. Concerning the reconciliation of heretics and reception into the bosom of the Church, we spoke in the little work *De Variis Peccatis in sacramentali confessione medendis*, c. 2, q. 1, XI-XV.

751. Warning. - He who has embraced faith, if a serious doubt[3] arises against it, is bound under grave obligation to inquire concerning faith and to ask light from God; but if he neglects this, he sins

by a sin of ignorance in faith, which is grave if the negligence is grave. But he cannot practically admit the doubt and dismiss faith, even if, after inquiry has been made, the contrary of faith appears probable, but he is bound to inquire until he arrives at certitude proportioned to his capacity. The reason is because in matters of salvation the safer course must be taken. Similarly the law of nature demands that we always have religion toward God. Whence, once admitted from authority, we must retain it until by proper reason we can sufficiently form a conviction, such as mere probability is not.

[3] He who believes and does not have serious doubt, cannot, in order to arrive at truth, inquire as one doubting; but empty doubt is to be neglected.

The same must be said of a heretic and infidel who doubt concerning their own religion.

Question Two: On Sins Indirectly Opposed to Faith

Article I: On Communication with Infidels and Heretics

S. Th. II-II, q. 10, aa. 7 and 9.

752. Communication with infidels and heretics is distinguished as twofold:

1. civil, in profane and civil matters pertaining to social commerce, such as purchases, sales, banquets, cohabitation, conversation, familiarity, service, etc.: this is lawful, provided scandal and danger of perversion are absent;[1] and provided the heretics are not excommunicates to be avoided, in which last case can. 2267 would apply.

[1] "If some have been firm in faith, such that from their communication with infidels the conversion of the infidels can be hoped for more than the turning away of the faithful from faith, they are not to be prohibited from communicating with infidels.... But if they are simple and weak in faith..., they are to be prohibited from communion with infidels" (St. Thomas, q. 10, a. 9).

2. religious, in sacred things pertaining to religion, such as rites, dogmas, sacrifices, prayers, etc., and in mixed things insofar as they regard religion, for example, in the religious rite of marriage or of funerals. This can be considered either on the part of infidels and heretics, or on the part of the faithful, and on each side it can be active or passive.

753. Concerning the communication of infidels and heretics with Catholics it must be said: Infidels and heretics can passively assist not only at the preaching of the word of God, but also at other offices of public worship; yet they cannot actively participate in them, because that would rightly be considered as a sign of religious unity. Hence they are excluded from the sacraments (can. 731, § 2), from sacramentals which are publicly administered to individuals in church,[2] from ecclesiastical burial (can. 1240), from enrollment in pious associations (can. 693), and things of this kind; consequently it is also generally prohibited that they use the same church simultaneously with Catholics, or vice versa. But if they are apostates or heretics, and therefore excommunicated, can. 2259 also applies.

[2] Private prayers, however, can be made for all and for individuals, even the Mass, but only privately and with scandal removed (can. 809 and 2262, § 2); likewise blessings, not indeed consecratory, but merely invocative, for obtaining the light of faith, or, together with it, health of body (can. 1149). Yet public prayers cannot be made for them individually, that is, with the name of a singular person expressed, unless for a public person as such, for example, for a king, that is, for the prosperity of society: thus it was tolerated to pray nominally for the king of England after Mass, in the formula "O Lord,

save the king" (February 23, 1820). Catholics can also pray privately together with heretics, provided the prayers are good and there is no scandal, for example, if the heretic is about to die.

There are many decisions of the Holy Office concerning this matter, which does not establish a positive ecclesiastical law, but interprets or applies in this matter and in similar questions the natural and divine law itself:

a) It is unlawful, in sacred functions, to invite heretics into the choir, to sing psalms alternately with them, to give them the peace, sacred ashes, candles and blessed palms, and other things of this kind of external worship, which are rightly considered indications of an interior bond and agreement (June 8, 1759).

b) It is not lawful to admit heretics, schismatics, or Jews, even if they are boys or girls, so that in Catholic churches they may sing in the musical choir at liturgical functions (May 1, 1889); nevertheless, considering special circumstances, this can be tolerated for schismatics (January 24, 1906). But it is lawful to permit non-Catholics to play the organ at liturgical functions in a Catholic church, if scandal is not to be feared from this (February 23, 1820).

c) It is not lawful to permit non-Catholics to carry torches or lights at the liturgical functions of Catholics (November 20, 1850); likewise to serve Mass (ibid.; June 30 and July 7, 1864); or to act as sponsor (May 3, 1893; June 27, 1900; can. 765); likewise to be used as witnesses in the marriage of Catholics, although sometimes it can be tolerated with scandal removed (August 19, 1891).

d) It is not lawful to permit heretics or schismatics to celebrate their rites in Catholic churches (May 10, 1753), nor for Catholics to perform sacred rites in their temples (can. 823, §§ 1 and 2): for this is equivalent to consenting to their rites, or at least to offering Catholics the occasion of communicating with non-Catholics in sacred things (May 10, 1753; August 13, 1627; June 5, 1889). Nevertheless this can sometimes be tolerated if it is impossible to do otherwise and the conditions render confusion of religions impossible, and scandal is absent (June 5, 1889). Thus, for a graver cause, in order more easily to promote the conversion of schismatics and infidels, with a view to sacred ceremonies, missionaries are sometimes permitted the faculty of celebrating Mass in the Catholic rite upon altars in the temples of heretics or schismatics, "so that the same altars serve only as bare tables, and are arranged according to the manner of Catholics with a sacred stone, linens, an image of the Most Holy Crucified One, candlesticks, and other necessary furnishings for the use of the sacrifice of the Most Holy Mass in the aforesaid rite" (April 12, 1704).

754. Concerning the religious communication of the faithful with infidels or non-Catholics it must be said:

Active communication, or participation in sacred things themselves, namely, of public worship, is unlawful, because it is an implicit approval of the exercise of worship and an acknowledgment of the sect; but passive communication is generally unlawful, yet sometimes can be lawful on account of a grave reason. Hence:

a) If it is done with heretics (or schismatics), by natural and ecclesiastical law it is per se and regularly gravely unlawful for the faithful, "either on account of the danger of perversion in Catholic faith, or on account of the danger of participation in a heretical rite, or on account of the danger and occasion of scandal or seduction,"[3] or on account of the appearance of adherence to the false sect which it of itself signifies (Rom. XVI, 17; Tit. III, 10).

[3] Thus according to the rule given to missionaries by the S. C. de Prop. F., 1729.

b) Nevertheless, per accidens and extraordinarily, it can be lawful, provided the action is not intrinsically evil and there is a proportionate cause, which is required to be the graver the more important the sacred thing is in which communication occurs, and the nearer the action approaches to worship.

c) With infidels, a fortiori, it is unlawful, especially because their worship is wont to be false and superstitious.

Hence canon 1258: "§ 1. It is not lawful for the faithful in any way actively to assist or to have part in the sacred rites of non-Catholics.

§ 2. Passive or merely material presence, for the sake of civil duty or honor, can be tolerated, for a grave reason to be approved by the Bishop in a doubtful case, at the funerals, weddings, and similar solemnities of non-Catholics, provided the danger of perversion and scandal is absent" (cf. can. 2316).

755. Specifically as regards the Sacraments, the general principle is that they are unlawfully sought from a heretical minister (schismatic or juring), because such a petition is an implicit acknowledgment of the authority of the minister and of the sect itself. Hence:

1. It is never lawful to ask them from one who is going to administer them in a manner alien from the Catholic rite and by which such persons are distinguished from the Church, because it would be an immediate participation in unlawful worship and an implicit profession of a false sect.

2. Nor is it lawful, if he administers in the Catholic rite, except in extreme necessity for Baptism (that is, if a layman is lacking) and Penance only (Holy Office, July 7, 1864), and, when this is lacking, for Extreme Unction, provided nevertheless that the circumstance of necessity brings it about (as ordinarily happens) that the petition is no longer considered as an acknowledgment of the sect; otherwise it would still be unlawful.[4]

[4] Likewise it is not lawful to give an alms to a heretical (or schismatic) priest to celebrate Mass (S. C. P. F., March 12, 1789); or formally and freely to go into a temple to hear his Mass, even if on a feast day one would be deprived of Mass (Holy Office, December 5, 1668; August 7, 1704).

3. It is never lawful in the Baptism of heretics, personally or through a procurator, to act as sponsor, because in the name of the one to be baptized he asks Baptism from the minister (May 10, 1770; July 7, 1864; January 3, 1871).

4. Indeed, regularly it is not lawful to assist at such a Baptism or materially to hold the infant in it, except for a grave motive and with scandal removed (May 10, 1770).

756. As regards sacramentals and the nuptial blessing, the same principle holds; they are unlawfully sought from a non-Catholic minister as such, because such a petition is an implicit acknowledgment of the authority of the minister. Hence:

1. It is never lawful to seek sacred things, such as blessings, prayers, etc., from a heretical (or schismatic) minister, nor the nuptial blessing, nor to give or renew matrimonial consent before him, even if the marriage had already been contracted before the parish priest (January 29, 1817), and this under penalty of excommunication reserved to the Ordinary (can. 2319; 1063, § 1).

2. To enter a civil contract before a heretical minister acting only as a civil minister is lawful (November 29, 1762; can. 1063, § 3).

3. It is never lawful, in a marriage celebrated before a heretical minister, to fulfill the office of witness, whether of the paranymph leading the bride, not to the bridegroom, but to the altar or to the minister, because by participating in the ceremony itself, and by lending the authority of a witness to the contract, he implicitly acknowledges the authority of the minister.

4. It is regularly not lawful to assist at such a marriage except for a grave motive, with scandal and contempt of ecclesiastical authority removed, and only for the sake of civil honor and duty[5] (May 10, 1770; January 14, 1874; can. 1258, § 2).

[5] Those things which regard marriage also hold for marriage between a Catholic party and a non-Catholic party against the prohibition of the Church.

757. As regards disputations with infidels and heretics:

1. To dispute as one doubting concerning faith and intending to test the truth of faith by arguments, for a member of the faithful, is a sin, and indeed a sin of infidelity.

2. To dispute privately for exercise is per se lawful, unless it is dangerous for the one disputing or for the hearers.

3. To dispute in order to refute errors is per se lawful, provided the disputant is firm in faith, sufficiently learned, and the disputation is judged likely to profit at least the hearers; yet in practice this will rarely happen.

4. Nevertheless, by positive law a public disputation[6] is prohibited to all, unless with the consent of ecclesiastical authority (can. 1325, § 3). Cf. S. C. de Prop. Fide, March 8, 1625; February 7, 1645; December 18, 1662; Holy Office, January 19, 1664; S. C. Conc., March 6, 1625; and March 8, 1658.

[6] A disputation is public when it is held on a fixed day and hour, before a multitude and judges of the controversy. - The prohibition also holds concerning disputation with socialists (Cong. de Neg. extr., January 27, 1902).

758. As regards entrance into the temples of heretics and assistance at their offices, the general principle is that it is not lawful to participate in the offices, yet sometimes it is lawful to assist materially (can. 1258). Hence:

1. Simple entrance into a temple is per se an indifferent thing; hence it is lawful if it is done (with scandal removed) to visit the temple, to avoid rain or assault, etc. (Holy Office, January 13, 1818).

2. Participation in the offices, psalmody, prayers, rites, by which someone conducts himself as heretics do and joins himself to them, is never lawful, even if it is required by public authority (S. C. P. F., August 6, 1764; Holy Office, January 13, 1818; April 26, 1894). Yet it is lawful privately to pray before the Most Holy Sacrament or the statues of the Saints, or to show reverence to the Most Holy, provided it sufficiently appears that the one who acts thus does not formally unite himself with those standing by; likewise, to pray privately together with heretics, if the prayers are good.1

3. Cooperation in the offices themselves of heretics, whether by singing, or by directing the chant, or by musical instruments, even done spontaneously or only from greed for gain, is never lawful, because it pertains to the very exercise of worship, or is even a simulation of false faith2 (Holy Office, June 19, and S. C. P. F., July 8, 1889).

4. Merely material assistance at offices or sermons, had from mere curiosity and without any cause, because it has the appearance of evil, is a sin (Holy Office, August 7, 1704; May 10, 1770; instruction of the Cardinal Vicar of Rome, July 12, 1878), yet probably only light, unless peculiar circumstances are added, or a special prohibition, as was made in Rome (Cardinal Vicar of Rome, July 12, 1878). Hence, with scandal removed, if it is done for a good end it will be lawful, for example, in order to refute heretics.

Hence a) in places in which Catholics have for a long time lived mixed with non-Catholics, such assistance is commonly not judged a grave fault, provided scandal is absent, as well as participation in rites or prayers, and danger of perversion.

b) In places altogether Catholic, in which heretics, almost unknown a little before, have now established seats, erect temples, and seek disciples, such assistance easily causes scandal and is taken as favor toward the sect or a sign of communion with it; hence it will easily be gravely evil and must be more strictly prohibited.

c) If it is required by a private person or by public power in hatred of religion or in favor of heresy, it is never lawful: for thus the very thing which is required by the superior would be judged to be fulfilled. - But if it is required for another reason (for example, for servants, sailors, soldiers, those incarcerated), it is lawful for avoiding grave inconvenience (Paul V, 1606).

d) In every case, however, assiduous attendance will rarely be excused from mortal sin, on account of danger or scandal.

1. Nor is it unlawful to swear by touching or kissing the Bibles of heretics, as is the custom in England (Holy Office, February 20, 1820), because the Bibles are not considered as improperly published or perhaps falsified, but as a sacred book.

2. Therefore it is more easily admitted that a non-Catholic may play the organ among us, than that a Catholic may do so in the worship of a heretical sect. - It would be another matter to do this in the temple of heretics for the king, even during an office, provided it is not part of the office.

759. Corollary. - Concerning assistance at funerals or burial:

1. If they are heretical (pagan, Mohammedan, Jewish...), materially to assist at them, for the sake of civil duty, is lawful for Catholics on account of grave harm, provided they do not communicate in the rites or sacred ceremonies of the sect whatsoever (prayers, lights, hearing the sermon), and the danger of scandal is absent[7] (Holy Office, January 13, 1818; July 5, 1871).

[7] In this matter, for parish priests and priests, the declaration of the Holy Office, March 3, 1859 and May 8, 1889, is to be noted: "a parish priest, as parish priest, cannot be present at the funerals of non-Catholics; but if he assists only civilly, without sacred vestments and without any communication in a sacred rite with heretics, it can be tolerated, provided it is notoriously clear concerning the bond of kinship or friendship between the parish priest and the deceased non-Catholic."

2. If they are strictly civil and in no way anti-Catholic, assistance or cooperation does not seem unlawful, if it is done for the sake of exhibiting civil duty, or for some other reason, even of friendship alone: thus it sometimes happens for one deceased who was not baptized, or for a suicide to whom the Church denies burial.

3. If they are (as more often happens) civil and at the same time anti-religious, for example, if they are a manifestation against burial denied by the Church, or against religion, as happens if great solemnity, a convocation of enemies of the Church, signs of Freemasons, spiritists, free-thinkers are employed; or even if the deceased, being baptized, wished to die as an apostate, or by some contract had bound himself to this, even if he died piously: formal cooperation or participation in the ceremonies, if it occurs, is never lawful; and material cooperation or assistance will not be lawful unless a) it does not signify approval and every danger of scandal is absent, b) it does not become greater or more lasting than necessity demands, and c) there is a very grave reason, such as ordinarily is not simple gratitude, ordinary friendship, invitation, gain, an artistic society, human fear. Yet near kinship, total subjection or coercion, loss of office with great temporal harm suffice, especially where such a reason could easily be recognized by all (letter of Pius IX to the archbishop of Paris, October 26, 1865).

4. To go to the mortuary house in order to exhibit civil respect and for the sake of courtesy is lawful.

760. Observations. - 1. The gravity of sin in assistance at offices, Baptism, marriage, and funerals of non-Catholics depends upon the circumstances: it is to be weighed from the gravity or species of the evil, from scandal, from the approval given, and from the insufficiency of the motive. To this end there must also be considered the quality of the person assisting, the necessity or fittingness of assisting, the significance of the solemnity, and the hostile intention.

2. Danger for faith can also arise from attendance at non-Catholic schools, and from mixed marriages; concerning these things it will be said in the respective treatises which regard these questions.

Article II: On Cooperation with Infidelity and Heresy

761. Cooperation with infidelity or heresy is concurrence furnished to them. It is twofold: one immediate, which is participation in their very establishment, propagation, or worship; this is intrinsically evil and always unlawful. The other is mediate, which is the supplying of matter, faculty, or means for their conservation, propagation, or worship. This is per se unlawful, because it gives

another the means or occasion of sinning, from which we are rather bound to turn him away, and in this it is evil; per accidens it can be lawful, if the action of the cooperator is not intrinsically evil and there is a proportionately grave cause, namely, a good which compensates the evil, that is, the occasion of sinning given. Hence a cause is required which is the graver the graver the evil is to which cooperation is made, and the nearer the cooperation is and the more it influences that evil (nn. 489-490).

762. As regards the Sacraments: 1. It is never lawful for parents positively to cooperate or to permit (for example, by asking, willing, or consenting) that their children be baptized by a heretical (schismatic, juring) minister, because to ask or to will the Baptism of heretics is an implicit acknowledgment of the sect, which is intrinsically evil (Holy Office, September 26, 1668; November 29, 1672; can. 2319). But negatively to permit this and to behave passively will not be lawful except on account of very grave inconvenience, because cooperation is made to a very grave evil.

2. Similarly for Catholics, even those serving in a hospital, it is unlawful, when a sick heretic asks, directly to call the minister of his sect so that he may receive the helps of religion (likewise so that the minister may perform funeral rites): thus the Holy Office, May 14, 1848 and December 26, 1898. Yet for this they can use a person belonging to the same sect (January 31, 1872).

But if such a person is lacking, according to some it is lawful to call the minister, saying: such a person wishes to speak with you, or something similar, but only on account of the common good, in a non-ordinary case, namely, so that great public hatred against the Catholic religion may be avoided, or the cessation of many goods to be furnished by those serving the hospital; otherwise not, because it is a question of the greatest evil of a private person, namely, of the eternal harm of the dying man.[1]

[1] Indeed Lehmkuhl (likewise Prummer, Marc, Vermeersch) thinks that in such circumstances it is also lawful for the attendant to prepare a table for the non-Catholic minister on which he wishes to perform his rites, and to offer utensils, bread, and wine. But this certainly cannot be done during the rite itself, because it is communication in worship. - Catholics can, however, stir up the dying man to faith in the truths to be confessed by necessity of means, and to contrition and love of God.

763. As regards the offices of worship and sermons of heretics:

1. It is never lawful to cooperate in the offices of heretics by singing or by musical instruments, as was said in the preceding article (n. 758, 3), because the cooperation is immediate, or participation in the very exercise of worship.

2. Nor is it lawful to invite others to the offices or sermons of heretics, whether by persuasion, or by authority or counsel, or by any other inducements whatsoever, because it is directly to induce to sinning, which is intrinsically evil.

3. Indeed, to ring bells as a sign that a heretical office or sermon begins (on the contrary, in honor of the king), because ordinarily it is taken for an invitation or is altogether closely connected with invitation; unless perhaps someone shows that he acts thus from a very grave cause, for example, in grave or quasi-extreme necessity.

764. As regards the building of temples and altars:

1. It will never be lawful to adorn idols and their altars or temples, because it is intrinsically evil.

2. To build their temples or altars is generally unlawful, because it is wont to be held as a sign of profession of a false faith and to stir up scandal (Holy Office, December 7, 1626; September 5, 1736; January 8, 1851); otherwise it will not be lawful except from a most grave cause, because it is a question of a thing altogether depraved (July 2, 1827).

3. To build temples of Mohammedans, scandal excluded, is lawful from fear of grave evil (Prop. F., November 21, 1837).

4. To build temples of heretics, Jews, or schismatics:

a) for masons and subordinate workmen, it is lawful from a lighter cause, provided it is not held as profession or approval of heresy, scandal is absent, and it is not required in contempt of religion, because the cooperation is remote and secondary (Holy Office, January 13, 1818; July 7, 1864);

b) but for architects, contractors, and overseers of works, in places in which Catholics have already for a long time lived mixed with non-Catholics, it is not lawful except from a grave cause, such as gain alone is not, because the cooperation is more principal;

c) for the same, in places altogether Catholic, it is generally gravely unlawful (instruction of the Cardinal Vicar of Rome, July 12, 1878).

5. The same seems to be said concerning the buildings of Freemasons or of another impious society.

6. But for leasing a house so that it may serve the worship of heretics or the congregation of Freemasons or of another impious sect, a graver cause is required, because the cooperation is nearer.

765. As regards the making and sale of things destined for false worship:

1. If they cannot have another good or indifferent use, it is never lawful, because it is intrinsically evil.

2. If they can have another use but must serve false worship, it can be lawful on account of a motive the graver according as the cooperation is greater.

In particular: a) generally it is lawful, from a lighter cause, to make organs, a pulpit, altars, vestments for heretics, because the cooperation is remote;

b) but if they are expressly and formally sought on account of an evil use, it will not be lawful except for a grave cause, because the cooperation is nearer; indeed sometimes a most grave cause is required, if the matter is most grave, for example, to make or sell hosts which enemies of the Church are going to abuse;

c) finally, it is unlawful to fabricate idols, sacred vestments destined for superstitious use, superstitious signs, signs and emblems of Freemasons, since the things almost never have a good use;

d) if those things are made for an indifferent or good use, it is lawful, as to make an idol for adorning a garden or for stage plays.

766. As regards non-Catholic religious works, or works which are ordered to a false religion:

1. To contribute money to them either spontaneously or because they regard religion is never lawful, because it is formally to protect, which is intrinsically evil.

2. To do this under coercion and without an evil intention, if the works are religious (for example, a temple, festivities, ceremonies), is regularly unlawful, unless a) on account of a very grave cause, because to foster a false religion is a fairly proximate cooperation and more proximate than the construction of a temple, and b) provided it is clear that there is no consent to false superstitions or ceremonies (S. C. P. F., July 2, 1827; Holy Office, April 21, 1847): as, for example, Catholics can do so that they may free themselves from simultaneity of worship (S. Penit., 1822), and deputies who, on account of the good of public peace, confer subsidies from the public treasury upon heretical works just as upon Catholic works.

3. If they are not ordered only to religion, but have another good end, for example, education, care of the sick, the poor..., a grave cause would suffice, provided it is not considered as favor of heresy, scandal is lacking, and the money is not used for perverting Catholics. This will more easily be lawful in places long mixed, than in places altogether Catholic.

4. The same seems to be said concerning the works of other enemies of the Church, for example, liberals, socialists, in regions where these words indicate opposition to the Church.

5. Nevertheless it is unlawful to give one's name to such societies which directly have an evil end; but if they are only indirectly ordered to an evil end, and have a direct good end, for example, an economic one, it will be lawful from a grave cause and with scandal removed.

Thus it is unlawful to give one's name to theosophical societies (July 4, 1919), likewise to the London society "for promoting the unity of Christianity" (July 18, 1919), or even to the association Y. M. C. A. (November 5, 1920), which spreads religious indifferentism.

767. As regards evil or prohibited writings: books, journals, dictionaries, encyclopedias, periodicals, newspapers, or others of this kind.1

A. **To be written:** 1. For editors to defend false principles and to compose writings according to those principles is never lawful, because it is immediate cooperation and always a grave sin.

2. To cooperate with articles indifferent of themselves (for example, concerning a literary, scientific, or artistic matter), and indeed frequently or ordinarily, is a cooperation more or less proximate according as in that way the depraved writing is more or less commended and defended, and therefore it is not lawful except, scandal excluded, and on account of a cause more or less grave, such as greater gain is not, but only gain necessary for sustenance.

3. Sometimes and extraordinarily to insert indifferent articles is a more remote cooperation, which nevertheless is not lawful without a cause, but for which a moderately grave cause suffices, such as certainly is to set forth or defend good principles occasionally, or to impede an

evil article, provided the reputation of the evil writing is not increased thereby, nor a very bad writing promoted with great scandal of the faithful (can. 1386, § 2).

B. **To be printed:** 1. For the publisher himself or the owner of a printing house, it is never lawful to undertake the printing, because this is not only to cooperate proximately but also to induce others to cooperate (can. 2318, § 1).

2. To cooperate altogether proximately with the printing, by directing the printing house, setting the characters or type, correcting printed sheets, is not lawful except in a very rare case, for a brief time and on account of grave necessity (such as dismissal from service is not), except in the case in which the book is so evil that it cannot have a good end (July 12, 1878).

3. To cooperate more remotely, although still fairly proximately, by placing the paper under the type, turning the press, preparing paper or ink, arranging and joining the printed sheets, or carrying them to purchasers, moving the machine and caring for it, is lawful from a lesser cause, nevertheless always a grave one.

4. To act most remotely, for example, by selling ink, paper, machines, and other things necessary for printing, is lawful for the sake of gain alone.

From this it follows that there is an obligation of leaving a printing house in which almost only depraved books and depraved journals are printed: absolutely for those who cooperate altogether proximately; indeed for those who cooperate more remotely, as also for those who work in printing houses in which good and evil books are printed indiscriminately, if they can depart without notable detriment.

C. **To be sold** (a fortiori, to be leased, distributed, conceded): 1. To sell a prohibited writing which is wholly evil, so that it has no good use, is in no way lawful, except to one who is certainly known to be about to read it by office, for example, an inquisitor.

2. To expose publicly and to sell in shops or on the streets those things which are not evil in every part but contain useful things, either to one who is going to abuse them, or indiscriminately to all, is not lawful except on account of very grave inconvenience, and until another means of acquiring a livelihood is present.1

3. A fortiori, to invite or positively induce another to buy evil writings is unlawful, because it is to induce to sinning, and therefore intrinsically evil.

4. To sell a separate copy can be lawful from a lesser cause, namely, one moderately grave (not on account of gain alone or competition alone); indeed it will in no way be unlawful if it can be presumed that the purchaser has a just cause for reading.

But it should be noted that booksellers are not bound to inquire for what end books are bought, but they can sell them to all whom, considering their quality, they prudently judge to seek them lawfully; otherwise too grave a burden would be imposed (cf. can. 1404).

D. **To be exposed:** 1. For innkeepers, tavern-keepers, owners of hotels, and barbers to expose for all to read writings altogether evil (which are scarcely not opposed to faith or morals) is a grave sin, even if they are sought by many who would on that account leave the tavern: grave damage does not sufficiently compensate the spiritual ruin of many.

2. To hand over to be read by those who ask writings which more rarely contain something evil is lawful for avoiding grave damage.

3. For those to whom it is clear by experience that almost all ask for such writings and otherwise would leave the tavern, it will not be unlawful to expose them publicly; it is preferable to expose good ones at the same time.

E. **To be promoted and sustained:** 1. To give one's name and buy shares for the sake of establishing a society for publishing or propagating depraved writings,[2] likewise to subscribe to their publication and to sustain it with money, is unlawful, because no necessity seems to make the cooperation honorable; this is most certain if the writings are professedly impious or depraved, or if without the cooperation the society would not be established.

[2] The dissertation of Ill. Waffelaert deserves to be consulted: *Etude sur la Cooperation et l'espece morale du scandale*.

2. To subscribe to a society already effected or to a writing already being published, since it is proximate cooperation, will not be lawful unless there is a grave cause proportioned to the influence of the cooperation and to the evil to be feared, the danger of scandal and perversion is absent, and the writing is not published manifestly in hatred of religion.

3. To buy a separate number or special copy is a more remote cooperation, for which, scandal excluded, a reasonable cause, even a light one, suffices, for example, the utility of reading; and a somewhat greater cause if it is done more frequently. It should nevertheless be noted that the reading itself is unlawful, if it is positively prohibited.

4. To furnish indifferent notices concerning things to be sold, leased, bought, etc., is not lawful except with scandal excluded and from a just cause, the greater according as the advertisements bring it about that the writings are propagated more widely and sustained more easily. When it contributes little, a less grave reason suffices.

1. A lesser reason is required, but nevertheless a grave one, for him who, excluding obscene and very impious writings and with scandal removed, would sell journals of whatever kind, good and evil, if a custom of acting thus exists somewhere; a fortiori he could do this if from the public administration he had bought the right or monopoly of selling journals in public places, for example, in squares or stations of railways, under the law that journals of every political faction are equally sold.

1. To retain purchased shares is not lawful if otherwise the evil can be impeded, but it is lawful for avoiding a greater evil.

768. As regards the elections of deputies in the assemblies of the kingdom, province, or municipality:

1. Spontaneously, that is, from conviction and approval, to elect a candidate hostile to the Church is gravely unlawful, because it is formal cooperation and therefore intrinsically evil.

2. Merely materially and under coercion, from fear of evil, to elect such a one is not intrinsically evil, because the mandate which the elector confers is not determined to evil, but is ordered to evil by the malice or abuse of the one elected; hence the elector is not a true cause but only an occasion of the evil to be brought in. But since it is a question of a most grave evil of religion and society, no cause of utility can excuse such cooperation, but only grave necessity (such as loss of office can be), especially if the outcome of the election appears truly doubtful and perhaps depends upon a few votes; in which case at least it will be a mortal sin, because then the vote can exercise a great influence upon a great evil. Therefore the friendship of the candidate or his greater skill does not suffice, nor the advantage to be hoped from his election: for these things do not compensate the assistance furnished to the grave harm of the Church or of the republic.

3. To abstain from casting a vote is unlawful for the same reasons, namely, if the election of the unworthy candidate can probably be impeded: for it is the negative cooperation of one who does not do what he is bound to do by office, namely, of legal justice. Indeed it is a grave sin when from this it can probably be feared that a sufficient number of good candidates will not be elected and thus a great evil will be perpetrated by the perverse; or if the one abstaining is of such authority that by his example he would draw many and effectively influence the success of the election (which rarely happens).

4. To elect a neutral candidate is unlawful if from this the election of a good candidate is probably impeded, or the election of an unworthy candidate is not impeded; indeed it can be a grave sin in the same way as was said in the preceding solution.

5. To promise a vote to a candidate seeking and compelling it, but with an internal restriction (as far as I can, and as you have a right), or to answer him equivocally, is lawful for avoiding grave inconvenience, because then the circumstances sufficiently indicate the sense of the response, namely, that the one responding intends only to free himself from troublesome coercion. Such a promise evidently does not oblige.

6. To elect a depraved or unworthy candidate, a fortiori a neutral one, can per accidens be lawful, for example, if there is no hope that a list of good candidates will be elected unless evil candidates who are contained in the same list are also elected; likewise if the candidates to be elected are only evil: for then the less evil candidate can be elected, especially if thus a greater evil to be feared from others would have to be averted.

Article III: On the Reading and Dissemination of Prohibited Writings

769. By natural and positive law, writings dangerous to faith or Christian life are prohibited in diverse ways. - By natural law we are obliged to avoid every danger of great moment for faith and morals; hence, apart from all human and ecclesiastical laws, it is regularly unlawful to disseminate or to read writings dangerous to faith or good morals. Hence:

1. Bishops, parish priests, fathers of families, legislators, magistrates, teachers, etc., must use the greatest vigilance that pernicious books be kept far from the eyes and hands of those for whom they are to render an account to God (can. 1405, § 2; 1397, § 4).

2. Even if books are not prohibited by human and ecclesiastical law, nevertheless they can be dangerous and prohibited for a determined person by reason of special danger, for example, for a youth.

3. Hence if books are not entered in the Index, they can be prohibited by the natural law, either generally, or for a determined person.

4. And if some have been furnished with the faculty of reading prohibited books, or if the laws of the Index did not flourish somewhere, nevertheless they could not read all things, namely, if by their nature they are dangerous for all, or if they know or experience that reading of this kind is harmful to them, or proximately dangerous, for example, if they do not know how to discern truth from error (can. 1405, § 1).

5. In this matter it is ordinarily expedient to follow the stricter opinions, says St. Alphonsus, namely, when it is a question of avoiding the proximate danger of formal sin.

6. But in addition, by ecclesiastical law, for example, of the Index, or by the Supreme Pontiff or by a bishop by name, writings can be interdicted[1] (can. 1395); and then, even if they were read without danger, nevertheless they remain prohibited: by natural law indeed they are prohibited on account of the very danger of perversion in the particular case, but by positive law on account of the presumption of common danger (n. 345, and can. 21).

[1] Cf. the treatise *De Ecclesia*, where concerning the power of the Church; likewise the Council of Trent, sessions 4, 18, and 25. Concerning the law of the Index one can consult: Vermeersch, *De Prohibitione et Censura librorum*; Salsmans, *Het Index*; Kiselstein, *L'Index*; Marc-Gestermann, in *Th. M.* I, appendix.

Concerning this positive law of the Index and its general and special rules we must now speak specifically; it prohibits three kinds of writings, namely, those regarding Sacred Scripture, or faith and morals, or worship, devotion, and liturgy.

770. As regards Sacred Scripture, by a general rule, by the law itself there are prohibited:

1. "Editions of the original text and of ancient Catholic versions of Sacred Scripture, even of the Eastern Church, published by any non-Catholics whatsoever" (can. 1399, § 1).

2. "Versions of the same into any language whatsoever, made or published by the same" (can. 1399, § 1).

3. "Books of the Sacred Scriptures or annotations and commentaries on the same, if they have been published without the prescriptions of the canons being observed" (can. 1385, § 1, and 1399, § 5), that is, without previous censorship, even by laymen.

4. "Versions of the Sacred Scriptures into the vernacular tongue... unless they have been approved by the Apostolic See, or unless they are published under the vigilance of the Bishops and with

annotations principally excerpted from the holy Fathers of the Church and from learned and Catholic writers"[2] (can. 1391 and 1399, § 5). This holds for editions after the year 1897: for the law does not have retroactive effect; but before the year 1897 the approval of the bishop was not required, but for Catholic editions a version with annotations sufficed.

[2] "Books of any writers whatsoever (even Catholics) which defend heresy or schism"1 (that is, not merely stating it in passing, with few words and as if doing something else, but attempting to persuade by adding reasons, proving or defending it); - "or which strive in any way to overthrow the very foundations of religion" (whether directly, by reasons, or indirectly, by insults; whether by serious attack, or even by jokes and derision) (can. 1399, § 2).

But it should be noted: a) the exception of can. 1400: "The use of the aforesaid books... is permitted only to those who in any way devote themselves to theological or biblical studies, provided the same books have been faithfully and integrally published and the dogmas of Catholic faith are not attacked in their prolegomena or annotations." They are permitted, namely, to professors, students, and those who, after their studies have been completed, continue to study Scripture; that is, whoever habitually, not by a merely passing act, cultivate these studies, whether in schools or privately;

b) there is no longer any prohibition of reading Scripture in the vernacular tongue, nor an obligation of asking permission from the parish priest or confessor, provided the edition is approved.

1. This must be taken copulatively (com. int. May 20, 1923). - Paraphrastic versions seem to be assimilated to versions with annotations.

2. Annotations which set forth profane science, geography, archaeology, etc., can be drawn from profane authors.

771. As regards faith and morals, by a general rule, by the law itself there are prohibited:

Heresy is error in Catholic faith. Schism is understood as perfect and complete, by which someone refuses obedience to the Supreme Pontiff; but not simple disobedience, nor contempt of a particular law, nor rebellion against a bishop. The foundations of religion are preliminary truths of the natural order which found the Catholic religion (for example, the possibility of a miracle, prophecy, revelation, or motives of credibility in general, etc.) or every religion (for example, the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul). Hence books defending atheism, pantheism, skepticism, agnosticism, positivism, theosophy (June 16, 1919), and many modern philosophical works are prohibited.

2. "Books which deliberately attack religion" (Catholic, or at least natural religion) "or good morals" (can. 1399, § 3), that is, they do not touch upon them in passing, but professedly attack them, or from intention and by design; this can be manifested either explicitly or by multiplied attacks from the fact that it is done in a notable part, for example, several times, or through several pages or an entire chapter.

Hence sectarian writings are prohibited, and many socialist writings, and those which habitually narrate or describe immoral things.

3. "Books of any non-Catholics whatsoever" (namely, apostates, heretics, schismatics, or the non-baptized) "which professedly treat of religion" (that is, with the intention of teaching,

principally, in a notable part, for example, one chapter), "unless it is clear that nothing" (of any moment) "is contained in them against Catholic faith" (can. 1399, § 4).

Books of non-Catholics treating of sacred doctrine, of dogmatic or moral matters, of canon law or ecclesiastical history, of philosophical truths which are the foundation of religion and theology, are presumed erroneous and dangerous in faith, unless the contrary is clear, as for example, in the case of Leibniz, *Systema theologiae*, or Hugo Grotius, *De Religione*. Therefore they are not to be read without previous information. - On the contrary, works of Catholics who afterward became heretics.

4. "Books which attack" (by arguments) "or deride any one whatsoever of the Catholic dogmas" (not only deny them), - "which support errors proscribed by the Apostolic See" (either immediately by the Supreme Pontiff or mediately by a Sacred Congregation with pontifical approval, for example, the errors of the Syllabus: thus S. C. Ind., May 23, 1898), "who defend them" (that is, professedly), - "which detract from divine worship" (not in passing but notably, so that its reputation is harmed or it is held in less esteem), - "which contend to overthrow ecclesiastical discipline" (for example, celibacy, the Index), that is, they professedly intend to change it and make it waver, - "and which deliberately" (studiously, advisedly, by design) "affect with insults the ecclesiastical hierarchy" (whether of order or of jurisdiction), "or the clerical or religious state" (not as private persons, but because they pertain to the hierarchy or the state) (can. 1399, § 6).

5. "Books which teach" (so that others may learn and do) "or commend superstition of any kind, sorceries, divination, magic, evocation of spirits, and other things of this kind" (can. 1399, § 7).

Such are those which teach effects of the devil, modes which are known to be insufficient without the intervention of the devil, or true spiritism by which the evocation of spirits or intercourse with them is intended; but not books which hand down merely natural occultism.

6. "Books which state that dueling, or suicide, or divorce" (not only of the civil contract but of the bond itself of marriage) "is lawful" (in conscience), that is, they do not affirm it in passing but attempt to demonstrate it by reasons, - "which, treating of Masonic sects or other societies of the same kind, contend that they are useful and not pernicious to the Church and to civil society," not incidentally but in a notable part (can. 1399, § 8).

Societies of that kind are clandestine sects, such as the Carbonari, Nihilists, Anarchists, etc., also the Fenians (Holy Office, January 12, 1870); but not socialists, who form a political sect, unless nevertheless they were secretly united to overthrow the State.

7. "Books which professedly" (not in passing, but principally, or directly and notably) "treat, narrate" (vividly so that they entice, for example, pornographic books), "or teach lascivious or obscene things," that is, theoretically approve them, for example, free love, Malthusianism, contraceptive means (can. 1399, § 9). - But not theological, scientific, or surgical works, unless under a scientific pretext they appear to have been written to nourish wicked curiosity or to excite venereal appetite.

It should be noted that formerly there existed an exception in favor of teachers for obscene classical works, but this has been removed. Hence if a professor, or judge, or newspaper writer, or official must read an obscene book by office, he should ask permission; but if he had to read it altogether immediately, he could suppose, for this case alone, that the law does not oblige and that its obligation here and now ceases.

1. Custom has excepted the writings of more ancient heretics, such as Tertullian, Origen, Pelagius, etc., whose errors have long since become obsolete.

772. As regards worship, devotion, and liturgy, by a general rule, by the law itself there are prohibited:

1. "Books and booklets which narrate new apparitions, revelations, visions, prophecies, miracles" (as supernatural), that is, they do not report them in passing by the way, but professedly or in a notable part; "or which introduce new devotions" (notably different from ancient and approved ones), "even under the pretext that they are private, if they have been published without the prescriptions of the canons being observed" (can. 1399, § 5).

This holds for books published after 1897, for the law does not have retroactive effect. Books of prayers, devotion, or theological doctrine and religious, moral, ascetical, or mystical instruction are no longer prohibited: they can also be read and retained without approval. Likewise the canon does not hold for apparitions approved by the Church, such as those of the Immaculate Blessed Virgin Mary of Lourdes, the revelations of St. Bridget, St. Margaret Mary, etc.

But several novelties were reproved: the cult concerning the blood of Mary (January 13, 1875), the title of friend of the Sacred Heart of Jesus (May 4, 1892), the title of the Blessed Virgin Mary as Lady of the Sacred Heart because she exercises dominion over the Son (February 23, 1875), the special cult to be attributed to the Face of the Redeemer in the manner in which it was proposed by the priests of the Holy Face (May 4, 1892), the title of the penitent Sacred Heart of Jesus (July 9, 1893), the prayer for the dominion of Christ and Mary Immaculate over all creatures (June 19, 1895), the private cult of the divine hands of Christ (April 17, 1896, Index), the image of the Eucharistic Heart of Jesus (May 27, 1891), the image of the Blessed Virgin Mary clothed in priestly vestments (April 8, 1916).

2. "Editions of liturgical books" (for example, the missal, breviary, ritual, pontifical, and ceremonial of bishops) "approved by the Apostolic See, in which anything has been changed, so that they do not agree with the authentic editions approved by the Holy See" (can. 1399, § 10).

3. "Books in which apocryphal indulgences, or those proscribed or revoked by the Holy See, are published" (can. 1399, § 11). Hence also small sheets with apocryphal indulgences are prohibited (can. 1388, § 1).

4. "Images printed in any way whatsoever" (by printing properly so called, engraving, photography, lithography, phototype, etc.) "of Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Blessed Virgin Mary,

the Angels and Saints or other Servants of God, alien from the sense and decrees of the Church" (can. 1399, § 12).

Statues or painted images are not prohibited.[3] Nor artistic images which have as their principal end to reproduce art; but pious images, destined for public or private worship. Nor simply images not approved, but new ones. Whether medals are comprehended is uncertain, because they are rather struck than printed.

[3] These, for their admission in churches or use in worship, can fall under can. 1279.

773. What is prohibited under the name of books? - Under the name of books manuscripts do not come (even lithographic or polygraphic ones), unless they have been published and made public, handed on or sold to all; but "those things which are prescribed concerning books are to be applied to publications, newspapers, periodicals, and any other published writings whatsoever, unless something else is clear" (can. 1384). Hence:

1. Periodicals, encyclopedias, etc., if by the way, in one or another article, they are touched by the general rules of the Index, are not judged prohibited; - on the contrary, if ordinarily or in a notable or greater part they have such things as their object, then not only the fascicles collected into a volume, but each one is proscribed. Yet excerpts from periodicals (*tires a part*), which contain good or indifferent things, are not prohibited.

2. If a prohibited work consists of several tomes, all are prohibited if they treat of the same argument and one indivisible; only the tome which contains the error or dangerous part is prohibited if the different tomes treat of a different argument, or indeed of the same one but divisible, as is, for example, universal history, because in this case they are judged different books.

3. A book prohibited only on account of certain places, provided this is certain, is no longer prohibited if this part is removed so that it cannot be read.

4. Mere citations from a depraved book, especially in order to refute them, are not prohibited, unless they are longer such that they would be a reproduction.

774. Special prohibition of writings. - Apart from books prohibited by the general rules, some are also specially and by name entered in the Index, or prohibited in another way by the Apostolic See. This prohibition brings about:

1. that all editions already made are prohibited, unless the prohibition is limited to a determined edition;[4] likewise all future editions "unless, corrections having been made, he who had prohibited the book, or his superior or successor, gives permission" (can. 1398, § 2);

[4] Prohibitions which forbid books on account of matter are judged to regard all editions; prohibitions which forbid books on account of defect of approval are not extended to books previously published.

2. that all versions are prohibited, for "the prohibition of books brings it about that without due permission a book cannot... be translated into another language" (can. 1398, § 1), unless nevertheless only the version had been entered in the Index;

3. that if all the works of some author are prohibited, they are to be understood not as later works, but as the earlier ones which exist at the moment of condemnation. From the preface of the Catalogue of the Index published in the year 1940 we have in addition that "when all the works of some writer are condemned, all and each of the same writer's works are judged condemned," and not only those which are prohibited by the general rules. Since this norm is modifying, it does not have retroactive value, so that for condemnations issued before January 2, 1940, all works are only those which are prohibited by the general rules. Nevertheless, a presumption and suspicion is present against the others, whence in practice they are to be submitted to examination.

4. that if all the love-stories of someone are prohibited, all and each are also understood if the condemnation was issued after the year 1940; otherwise only those which are prohibited by the general rules.

5. that chrestomathies are also prohibited if they reproduce one or more condemned writings for the greater part.

775. To what precisely does the law of prohibition oblige? - The aforesaid laws oblige the faithful (not Cardinals, Bishops, Ordinaries according to can. 1401), and indeed under grave obligation, because the end of warding off from the faithful the danger which threatens from reading is more grave, and the law contributes much to this end; this is also clear from the penalties. Moreover, it obliges the faithful so that:

a) they are bound everywhere on earth (can. 1396), unless nevertheless in some place a special indult has been obtained;

b) even those for whom danger is not present are bound (can. 21);

c) and so that "without due permission a book can neither be published, nor read, nor retained, nor sold, nor translated into another language, nor communicated in any way with others" (can. 1398, § 1).

It cannot:

1. be published, that is, be made public, which is done by: the author if he handed over the book for the end that it be published; the publisher who cares for its dissemination; and the owner of the printing house who undertakes its printing; - yet probably not proofreaders or the printers themselves;

2. nor be read in the proper sense, which is done by those who, scanning a book with their own eyes, understand the things written; - but not by those who hear another reading, nor by those who recite from memory, nor by those who scan with their own eyes but do not understand because of ignorance of the language, nor probably by those who hear a reader whom they have induced to read by requests or by command.

Grave matter and mortal sin are present: a) by reason of quality, when a very depraved passage is read, or an article in newspapers, even if it comprises only one or another page; b) by reason of quantity, if someone reads indiscriminately all things, or a notable part of a writing of unknown

nature, because he commonly exposes himself to great danger: what a notable part is is difficult to determine, whether 6, 10, or perhaps even 20 pages, according to the depravity or bulk of the writing and the gravity of the danger; but for newspapers it is the custom of reading; c) to read things which certainly are harmless, not only to the reader but by their nature and commonly to all, is venial, unless there is danger of contracting a habit and reading the rest; d) it is venial to read that which is prohibited only because it was published without approval;

3. nor be preserved, which is done by: the owner who keeps his own book with himself, even if he did so not for reading but for mere ornament, even if he does not understand the language; - by the depositary who keeps another's book with himself; - by the depositor who keeps his own book with another, provided he does not deposit it with an agreement not to reclaim it except after permission has been obtained; - yet not by the bookbinder (at least if it is not done for a long time), nor by the custodian or librarian, provided he does not remove the books and transfer them into his own house.

It is a grave sin to preserve one for a notable time, for example, for some weeks or for a month; but if someone is waiting for a suitable occasion of asking permission, the books can be retained somewhat longer;

4. nor be sold. Hence can. 1404: "Sellers of books are not to sell, lend, or retain books treating professedly of obscene matters; other prohibited books they are not to have for sale unless they have obtained due permission from the Apostolic See, nor are they to sell them to anyone unless they can prudently judge that they are lawfully sought by the purchaser." But those also sell who procure the book;

5. nor be translated into another language;

6. nor be communicated with others, for example, by propagating, lending, leasing, etc. (can. 1403, § 2).

776. Penalties against transgressors. - Penalties are also inflicted against some transgressors, namely, according to can. 2318:

1. "They incur excommunication reserved in a special manner to the Apostolic See by the fact itself, once the work has been made public: publishers" (that is, those who make the book public and care for its dissemination, as ordinarily are the author and the owner of the printing house) "of books of apostates, heretics, and schismatics" (but not of Catholics) "which defend apostasy, heresy, or schism" (by added arguments); - "and likewise those defending the same books or others" (of any writer whatsoever, even a Catholic) "prohibited by name through Apostolic letters" (in the form of a bull, brief, encyclical, etc., not through a decree of the Index alone, but by the Supreme Pontiff himself), by name (so that the proper title is expressed and not only the name of the author), "or knowingly" (so that ignorance excuses, even crass ignorance, yet not affected ignorance) "reading or retaining them without due permission."

2. "Authors and publishers who, without due permission, see to it that books of the Sacred Scriptures or annotations or commentaries on them are printed, incur by the fact itself

excommunication reserved to no one."

In these, unlike title XXIII, can. 1384, § 2 (n. 773), books are to be understood in the stricter sense, namely, writings published by type which consist in some volume and are not so slight in bulk and weight that they are usually called by another name rather than books. Therefore newspapers are not comprehended, - nor periodicals or small fascicles, unless these are bound into one (Holy Office, January 3, 1892).

777. Those who can prohibit books are: the Supreme Pontiff; the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, to which the Index of books now pertains, per se; per accidens, other Congregations, books concerning matter competent to them; - particular Councils; - Ordinaries of places1 (can. 1395). Hence can. 1403, § 1:

"Those who have obtained an apostolic faculty of reading and retaining prohibited books cannot for that reason read any books whatsoever proscribed by their own Ordinaries, unless in the apostolic indult there has been made for them an express power of reading and retaining books condemned by any persons whatsoever."

Likewise, those who have obtained this general permission of reading books entered in the Index, or the faculty of granting it, cannot for that reason read, or grant a general permission of reading, writings prohibited by the motu proprio of the Supreme Pontiff, as is clear from a recent declaration for the very well-known prohibited newspaper: *L'Action francaise*, years 1927-39; but those must obtain an altogether special permission.

Those who have prohibited books can give permission for reading, as can their superiors and those who are delegated by them to this. Hence Ordinaries per se do not have power to grant a general permission of reading books condemned by the Apostolic See, but only if they receive a special faculty; nevertheless in this matter can. 1402 must be observed:

"§ 1. Ordinaries can grant to their subjects, as regards books prohibited by the law itself or by decree of the Apostolic See, permission for individual books only and in urgent cases only.

§ 2. But if they have obtained from the Apostolic See a general faculty of permitting their subjects to retain and read proscribed books, they are to grant it only with selection and for a just and reasonable cause."

This faculty of reading, since it is a personal privilege, has force everywhere.

1. "Also the Abbot of a monastery sui iuris and the supreme Moderator of an exempt clerical religion, with his Chapter or Council, can prohibit books to his subjects for a just cause, and the same, if there is danger in delay, can be done by other major Superiors with their own Council, yet under this law, that they refer the matter as quickly as possible to the supreme Moderator" (can. 1395, § 3).

778. Dissemination and censorship of books. - Also for publishing or disseminating certain writings, previous censorship or permission is required:

A. For all, even laymen, according to can. 1385:

"§ 1. Unless ecclesiastical censorship has preceded, let there not be published, even by laymen:

1. Books of the Sacred Scriptures or annotations and commentaries on the same;

2. Books which regard the divine Scriptures, sacred theology, ecclesiastical history, canon law, natural theology, ethics, or other religious and moral disciplines of this kind; books and booklets of prayers, devotion, or religious, moral, ascetical, or mystical doctrine and instruction, and other things of this kind, although they may seem conducive to fostering piety; and generally writings in which there is something which peculiarly concerns religion and the honesty of morals;

3. Sacred images to be printed in any way whatsoever, whether they have prayers attached or are published without them.

§ 2. Permission to publish books and images concerning which in § 1 can be given either by the local Ordinary proper to the author, or the Ordinary of the place in which the books or images are made public, or the Ordinary of the place in which they are printed, yet so that if any one of these Ordinaries has denied permission, the author cannot seek it from another Ordinary unless he has informed the same of the permission denied by another."

B. Specifically for religious and clerics:

"Religious, however, must also previously obtain the permission of their major Superior" (can. 1385, § 3).

"Secular clerics are forbidden, without the consent of their Ordinaries, and religious, without the permission of their major Superior and of the local Ordinary, also to publish books which treat of profane matters, and to write in newspapers, sheets, or periodical booklets, or to direct the same" (can. 1386, § 1).

And indeed:

1. sometimes permission of the Holy See is required, namely:

a) for those things which pertain to causes of beatification and canonization (can. 1387);

b) for an authentic collection of prayers and pious works to which the Apostolic See has attached indulgences, for a list of apostolic indulgences, and for a summary of indulgences either now first collected or not yet approved (can. 1388, § 2);

c) for collections of decrees of the Roman Congregations (can. 1389);

d) for versions of the Sacred Scriptures without annotations to be printed in the vernacular tongue (can. 1391), for approving liturgical books (can. 1257), and new litanies to be publicly recited (can. 1259, § 2).

2. sometimes permission of the one who prohibited, namely, for prohibited writings (can. 1398, § 2).

3. sometimes permission of the local Ordinary:

a) for books of the Scriptures or their annotations and commentaries, books treating of a religious or moral matter, and sacred images (can. 1385, § 2);

b) for books, summaries, or sheets of indulgences already granted to be published (can. 1388, § 1);

c) for publishing liturgical books or litanies approved by the Holy See in order to agree with the approved edition (can. 1390);

d) for versions of the Sacred Scriptures with annotations into the vernacular tongue to be published (can. 1391).

779. Observations. - 1. "The approval of the original text of some work does not avail for translations of the same into another language, nor for other editions; wherefore both translations and new editions of an approved work must be fortified with a new approval" (can. 1392, § 1).

2. "Chapters excerpted from periodicals and published separately are not judged new editions and therefore do not need a new approval" (can. 1392, § 2).

3. "The permission by which the Ordinary makes the power of publishing is to be granted in writing, to be printed at the beginning or end of the book, sheet, or image, with the name of the one granting it expressed, and likewise the place and time of the grant" (can. 1394, § 1).

In this, nevertheless, a dispensation can sometimes be given for a just cause, or a great inconvenience can excuse; indeed, says Vermeersch, *Th. M.* III, n. 896, for many writings, especially of lesser bulk or moment, in practice it is admitted that merely this be placed: "with ecclesiastical approval."

Article IV: On the Admission or Profession of Doctrine Which Is Dangerous to Faith

780. Doctrines dangerous to faith. - Besides the sin of infidelity, which is directly opposed to faith and brings with it the loss of faith itself, there are other things indirectly opposed to it. For virtue prohibits not only that by which it is destroyed, but also that anyone expose himself or others to the danger of losing it or of not obtaining it. Hence occasional causes which lead to its loss are prohibited. Therefore the virtue of faith itself prohibits under grave obligation not only the external occasions of which we have already spoken, namely, the reading of writings against faith, communication and friendship with infidels, heretics, apostates, impious persons, indifferentists, etc., attendance at their societies or schools, participation in their rites, cooperation with infidelity and heresy, if they constitute a notable danger for faith, but also:

1. internal adherence to propositions censured by the infallible authority of the Church as erroneous and false or rash, because such propositions are logically connected with the denial of faith, or at least dispose and lead to this denial; likewise the denial of facts infallibly defined by the Church which are connected with revealed truths, because this denial leads to the denial of the dogma itself. These contain a grave injury against the authority of the Church, and are a sin directly opposed to the virtue of studiousness, indirectly against faith (Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 4; prop. 7 Mod.; can. 1324; letter of Pius IX to the bishop of Munich, December 11, 1862);

2. doctrinal assertion before others or defense of the preceding things (can. 1399, § 6), or even of propositions which are infallibly censured as savoring of heresy or error, evil-sounding, offensive to pious ears, scandalous (in doctrine): these are directly a sin against modesty in speaking, indirectly against confession of faith when they dispose others to sinning against faith (can. 1399, § 6). Hence the Church urges this under penalties (can. 2317);

3. indeed, per se, the denial of those things which, although not with infallible authority, nevertheless with the authority of the Roman Pontiff as head of all the Churches, or by the Roman Congregations, or by the consensus of all theologians in matters of faith and morals, are taught as certain or to be held: for per se it involves rashness because it spurns a doctrine, not infallible, but practically certain (Pius IX to the bishop of Munich, December 21, 1863; prop. 8 Mod.).

It is said: per se, because while the Church does not teach with infallible authority, the doctrine proposed is not of itself irreformable; hence, if per accidens, nevertheless in a very rare case, after an altogether diligent examination, most grave reasons against the doctrine thus proposed seemed present to someone, it would be lawful without rashness internally to suspend assent; yet externally, on account of reverence toward the Church, an obsequious silence would be required.

Question Three: On Blasphemy, Which Is Opposed to the Confession of Faith

S. Th. II-II, q. 13.

781. Blasphemy (*blapto*, I injure; *pheme*, fame), etymologically signifies malediction and insult against someone (I Cor. IV, 13), and therefore is used to signify derogation from some excellent goodness; but in the sense of the holy Fathers and Theologians, only speech insulting to God is so called. It is said:

1. Speech or signification, and thus it is distinguished from infidelity, which is a judgment, and from sacrilege (and simony), which is an unworthy treatment of a sacred thing. Moreover, utterance happens in various modes, and therefore on the part of the act, blasphemy is internal, of the heart (by a nod, as among demons), and external, which is either of the mouth, when it is done by spoken or written words, or of work, when it is done by sign, deed, or gesture, as if someone gnashes his teeth against God, spits toward heaven, tramples Christ, sacred images, crucifixes, casts blood toward heaven, etc. Hence sacrilege is also blasphemy, if in the deed of violation of the sacred thing there is at the same time signification, or a certain real speech against God.

2. Against God, and thus it is distinguished from insult and malediction against one's neighbor and against other creatures. Blasphemy, namely, is an act against faith, religion, and God, either in himself, or through creatures, insofar as they express an order to God: "for just as God is praised in his saints insofar as the works which God effects in the saints are praised, so also blasphemy which is done against the saints consequently redounds against God" (a. 1, ad 2). Hence on the part of the object or term, blasphemy is immediate or mediate.

3. Insulting, by which, namely, something is detracted from the excellence or honor of the divine majesty, and thus it is distinguished from perjury, which is speech invocative of divine testimony. But since God is present everywhere, every speech against him is an insult; hence blasphemy can also be diverse according to the diverse mode by which insult is inflicted, as we are now to explain.

782. Diverse modes of blaspheming. - Therefore, on the part of the mode by which insult is inflicted, blasphemy can be enunciative, dishonoring, or imprecative.

1. Enunciative blasphemy happens:

a) by affirming of God what does not belong to him, for example, that he is unjust, the author of evils, cruel, that he punishes unjustly, has forgotten me, is a tyrant, etc.;

b) by denying to God what belongs to him, such as omnipotence, providence, justice, knowledge, for example, by saying that not all things are well ordered but could have been done better in creation, that God does not will or cannot help us, does not care for our affairs, that one will do something against God's will ("whether God wills or does not will, I will do this"), by denying God or the sacraments, etc.;

c) by ascribing to creatures what is proper to God alone: for since everything proper to God is God, by this very fact God is said to be a creature and that which is proper to him is denied, for example, by saying: I can do this as well as God; by seriously calling a mistress a goddess, one's whole and only good, one's beatitude; by swearing by false gods; by calling the devil holy, omnipotent, more faithful, more powerful (a. 1, ad 3).

But if something contrary to faith is affirmed, or something pertaining to faith is denied, the blasphemy is heretical.

2. Dishonoring blasphemy happens:

a) by affirming or denying something of God with truth, but in an insulting mode through contempt or mockery, for example, by reproaching Christ because he suffered and died, by naming his shameful members, "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean," "Hail, king of the Jews," "Vah, thou who destroyest the temple of God"; or by cursing through all these things, for example, "may the blood, wounds, death, head, passion, sacraments, chrism of Christ destroy thee"; or by bringing Scripture to foul things: for all those things were instituted not for destroying but for saving;

b) not by affirming, but by naming holy things shamefully and contemptuously, that is, from anger, not indeed against creatures, but against God or religion, after the mode of one being indignant at them or contemning them, for example, "God!"; the name of God, the members, blood of Christ; the sacraments, the saints; "vah! the power of God"; to swear mockingly by the members of Christ; "I despise God with my whole heart," etc.

3. Imprecative blasphemy is when evil is wished or cursed upon God, or even commanded, for example, that he perish, not exist, die, be damned, not punish sins, not be omnipotent; "to the contempt of God!"; "may it displease God!" If such a thing is done from the soul, it proceeds from hatred of God and is the blasphemy of the damned and of the worst men.

All the aforesaid modes are reduced to the two former: falsely to affirm or deny concerning God. For dishonoring blasphemy implicitly says that there is in God something blameworthy which is not blameworthy, or denies that something is worthy which is worthy. Imprecative blasphemy implicitly affirms of God that something is possible which cannot be, or that something is fitting which is not fitting.

783. The diverse intention of the blasphemer. - On the part of intention, blasphemy is direct or perfect, which is done with affective detestation or the express intention of dishonoring God, and proceeds from hatred of God, from anger and indignation against God (and religion), from contempt, etc.; and indirect, which is done without an express but with an implicit intention of dishonoring God, when someone voluntarily utters words which, according to the judgment of his intellect, he knows, either from their proper signification, or from the mode of uttering them or other circumstances, to imply dishonor of God (a. 1). Hence if someone from custom, from anger against creatures, from jest, after the manner of an interjection, pronounces blasphemous words, he commits the sin of blasphemy; except if it happens from jest that the words are not held by others as blasphemous, or if they are uttered merely narratively.

784. Blasphemy is a sin at the same time against faith and religion. - For:

a) It is opposed to the confession of faith: for either it is heretical and explicitly says something against faith; or at least it says implicitly that God or a sacred thing is blameworthy, or that in God there is something worthy of insult. Namely, someone can sin against confession of faith even by stating nothing against faith, namely, by signifying by his mode of speaking that he does not believe, or by speaking as if he did not believe.[1]

[1] Cf. Lumbreras, in *Angelicum*, 1937.

b) It is also directly opposed to the honor and praise which are owed to God, and thus contains dishonor and irreverence against the virtue of religion.

Hence all blasphemies, even heretical ones, do not differ in species under the aspect of blasphemy; but sometimes other species are added, such as heresy, hatred of God, despair, which then must be declared in confession.

But if the speech is insulting against creatures, if they are considered formally with relation to God, insofar as they are his creatures, as easily happens for wind, rain, thunder, heaven, the whole world (for example, "cursed be the rain of God"...), and almost always for those things which per se express relation to God, such as Christian faith, the sacraments, the saints, our soul, etc., the insult necessarily redounds against God, their author. Indeed, since blasphemers generally do not intend to affect those things with injury on account of their own excellence, but only mediately insofar as they are referred to God, there is not a sin against dulia, but against religion and faith alone. - But if the saints were considered not as saints, but in themselves, formally abstracting from relation to God, insofar as they are men, it would be a sin against dulia alone owed to the saints, light if it is done from jest (for example, by calling St. Crispin a vile shoemaker, St. Peter bald, Saints John and Paul eunuchs), grave if it proceeded from anger, indignation, contempt, or hatred against them.

To curse other creatures considered in themselves, if they are rational, is injurious to them; if irrational, it is vain and idle. To curse the devil is not evil, except sometimes per accidens by reason of scandal.

785. Blasphemy is a mortal sin from its whole genus: for no insult against God can be small (Lev. XXIV, 15-16; Is. XXXVI; IV Kings XVIII, XIX; Tob. I, 21; II Mach. XV; I Tim. I, 20; Col. III, 8).

Indeed it is called most grave, in an absolute sense, that is, very grave; taken abstractly insofar as it is opposed to religion alone and implies only the dishonor of God, it is less grave than hatred of God, infidelity, despair, and idolatry; but graver than perjury (which affirms nothing false against God, but only makes him a witness of falsity) and than homicide (which is only against one's neighbor). But if it is considered in the concrete, it supposes and includes the malice of infidelity or hatred of God and adds something to them, and thus it is graver than they, so that the greatest blasphemy is graver than the greatest infidelity or the greatest hatred of God.

Therefore, on the part of the object, only idolatry surpasses it, which otherwise contains great blasphemy.

On the part of the sinner, however, it is often graver than idolatry.

On the part of the effect, it is less than homicide: for homicide harms man more than blasphemy harms God.

786. A voluntary custom or habit of blaspheming is evil because it proximately inclines to sin; hence there is an obligation of removing it, and he sins gravely who voluntarily acquires such a habit or neglects to eliminate it. He sins internally and as to affection as often as, noticing the obligation of retracting the habit, he does not retract it; externally and as to effect as often as, from habit, he utters sufficiently foreseen blasphemies by morally distinct acts.

He who blasphemes from custom:

a) either utters blasphemous words advertently, and then the blasphemy is voluntary and culpable in itself;

b) or he does not attend to the words uttered, and then the speech which externally sounds like blasphemy is voluntary and culpable in its cause, namely, the custom, as was said;

c) but if he has efficaciously retracted the custom, it is neither voluntary in the cause, nor a sin.

The custom is retracted by a will by which someone grieves over it and proposes to himself to employ means for removing it (which, on account of usefulness, should be renewed several times); but if after the resolution he has not employed the means, the custom again becomes indirectly voluntary for him, because he shows that he does not will to remove it.

787. Practical rules. - 1. Formulas are not blasphemous which by their proper signification can be insulting against God, but are either greatly changed or corrupted, or halved or defective, or at least are not held by men as blasphemous. Such are the expressions: *merdie, mordie, lardie, jarnidie, sernidie, ventredie, sacredjen, non de domme, verdomd, podverdomme, sacre non, sakristi, sapristi, sangbleu, morbleu, non di hu, non de djouw, godvernondedomme, godvernondedju, saterment*.

2. On the contrary, formulas are blasphemous which of themselves, by proper signification, do not contain insult against God, but either from the mode of uttering the name of God ironically or with contempt or in anger against God; or even from common acceptance are held as such. Such formerly was the Flemish expression *G. v. D.*, which signifies according to some: "God damn," according to others: "God damn me" (which is a mortal imprecation if said seriously,

venial if said with levity, as ordinarily happens), whose true signification it is necessary to teach the non-blaspheming people by mandate of the Bishops of Belgium (October 1903).

3. Equivocal formulas which can have a blasphemous and a non-blasphemous sense are blasphemous or not according to the intention of the speaker or at least of the hearers, for example, *mort-Dieu, ventre-Dieu, hoc est a fato destinatum, c'est fatalite, het is alzoo dat het moest zijn*. Hence they are not blasphemous if they are generally not held as such by men, for example, in Belgium: *tausend sakrament, tausend Herr Gott, mille Dieu, mille nom de Dieu, milliard de nom de Dieu, sacre mille Dieu*.

4. In doubt whether a formula is blasphemous, one must attend to the intention and conscience of the one uttering it, and to the circumstances.

5. The French formula *S. N. de D. (S. D.)* of itself is equivocal, because the word *sacre* has a double sense: in its primary and obvious sense it indeed signifies "blessed"; but in a secondary signification by antiphrasis it can signify "cursed" or "execrable," as happens in interjections and formulas: *sacree bete, sacre coquin, menteur, bougre, matin, sacre cure, sacre fils, sacree pluie*. Hence the formula *S. N. de D.* can have a pious sense, and a blasphemous sense, which sense it in fact has if it is pronounced from anger or indignation, not indeed against creatures, but against God. Originally it seems to have been promissory: "I swear by the sacred name of God." But that sense is no longer perceived by all; indeed by some the formula is taken in a blasphemous sense, whether they hold it as signifying: "execrable be the name of God," or themselves attribute to it no determined sense but in a confused way conceive it as a great blasphemy; which also often happens concerning the formula *S. D.*, although for this one the persuasion is less firm. Yet this estimation does not exist by right and is not correct, since these formulas can have a good sense.

Wherefore in practice preachers and confessors should teach: a) that the blasphemous sense is not the only and sole necessary sense, and especially that it is not: "God is cursed"; b) that the formula is not blasphemous if it is not uttered from an evil intention, or from anger and indignation against God, but only after the manner of a simple interjection or from anger against creatures; c) that nevertheless one must abstain from it, both because it includes venial irreverence toward God, and lest there be scandal to others.

788. Practical observations. - 1. Confessors should instruct penitents who from an erroneous conscience believe certain formulas to be true blasphemies and mortal sins, for example, *nom de Dieu, begod, par Dieu*, etc.; - yet they should ask about scandal given, which easily follows; - they should set forth to habitual sinners who utter true blasphemies (which in our country is rare) the magnitude of blasphemy and its horrendous malice and rashness and its uselessness; - upon them, so that they may be corrected, they should impose the renewal of a firm resolution to be repeated often, and at each blasphemy a little prayer to be made at once or a penance to be performed; and they should suggest other expressions which sound well but are not sinful.

2. Penitents are to be asked: a) what words they uttered, for they sometimes confuse maledictions, imprecations, oaths, and blasphemy; and with what intention: whether from infidelity, despair, hatred against God or the Saints, anger, etc.; - b) how often and on what

occasion: in a game, a tavern, for how much time, etc.; - c) whether before others, children of the family, etc., in order to know whether scandal was present.

Fifth Part: On the Precept of Faith

Single Question: On the Precept of Faith Itself

S. Th. II-II, q. 16.

789. By the natural-divine law there is given a precept of faith obliging under grave obligation, as is clear:

1. from reason: for supposing that God reveals, reverence toward him demands that we believe him;

2. from Scripture, which imposes the act of faith as a means of justification and establishes the command: *He who has not believed will be condemned* (Mk. XVI, 16; Jn. III, 16 and at the same time I Jn. III, 23; cf. prop. 16 condemned by Innocent XI1; Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 1).

This precept is both negative, by which we are prohibited from denying faith or doubting concerning it, and this obliges always; and affirmative, by which we are obliged to elicit an act of faith, and this does not oblige always.

1. "Faith is not judged to fall under a special precept and according to itself."

790. The virtue and precept of faith itself oblige us to elicit an act of faith, and indeed under grave obligation:

A. per se, that is, in circumstances common to the condition of all men. For it is altogether necessary, indeed also the greatest precept, to tend to the ultimate supernatural end; which nevertheless we do only by acts of faith, hope, and charity. Moreover this is especially necessary:

1. at the beginning of the use of reason, when man is bound to turn himself to God and to choose for himself the ultimate end;

2. in the article of death (that is, toward the end of life), when he is at the point of attaining the end;

3. several times in life. For it does not suffice that we tend to God once or twice, but during the whole of life we must acknowledge our dependence upon God; hence those acts are to be elicited several times.[1] Some determine this by saying: at least once a year; others each month (St. Alphonsus) or even each week (Scotus); others finally, and more probably, three or four times a year.

[1] Hence prop. 17 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in life."

If at the beginning of the use of reason the supernatural end is unknown because of defect of the proposal of faith, man will be bound to an act of faith as soon as it is sufficiently proposed.

B. per accidens, that is, on the occasion of some special circumstance:

1. when a temptation against faith arises which is hoped to be overcome only by an act of faith; yet this is not fitting for the scrupulous, who torture themselves by repeating that act; hence they should contemn these temptations by turning to other things;

2. when faith has been lost, which happens by a sin directly contrary, namely, of infidelity, because the tendency to the ultimate end thus removed must be renewed and restored;

3. when we manifest faith outwardly, for example, in a profession of faith; otherwise that manifestation would be simulation.

791. Other virtues and precepts sometimes oblige us to elicit an act of faith at least implicitly:

1. when temptations against other virtues arise, which are hoped to be overcome only by an act of faith;

2. when someone must or intends to receive the sacraments;

3. when he must or intends to exercise an act of another virtue which cannot be exercised without faith, for example, prayer, hearing Mass, contrition for sins, etc.; and thus we are obliged to faith when we are obliged to hope or charity.

But in these cases the obligation does not arise from the precept of faith itself; hence if this act is omitted, we do not sin against this virtue, but only against another precept by force of which it was required.

792. In the positive divine law there is not given an explicit precept of believing in God. - For, as St. Thomas has it, a. 1: "Law is not imposed by some lord except upon his subjects; and therefore the precepts of law presuppose the subjection of each one receiving the law to him who gives the law. But the first subjection of man to God is through faith, according to Heb. XI, 6: *One coming to God must believe that he is*; and therefore faith is presupposed to the precepts of the law; and on this account in Exod. XX, 2, that which is of faith is put before the precepts of the law, when it is said: *I am the Lord thy God*..., and afterward it immediately begins to treat of the precepts.

"But because in faith many things are contained ordered to the faith by which we believe that God is, which is first and principal among all believable things..., therefore, presupposing faith concerning God, by which the human mind is subjected to God, precepts can be given concerning other things to be believed." Nevertheless:

a) "in the old law the secrets of faith were not to be set forth to the people; and therefore, presupposing faith in one God, no other precepts were given in the old law concerning faith";

b) but, supposing subjection to God through faith in one God, in the new law precepts concerning other believable things were added, as concerning the incarnation, by which one is God and man. Hence Christ says, Jn. XIV, 1: *You believe in God, believe also in me* (ad 2);

c) in addition, presupposing faith in one God, even in the old law prohibitive precepts had to be given, by which men would be prohibited from particular defects and sins through which faith could be corrupted (ad 3);

d) indeed, presupposing the subjection of man to God through faith, already in the old law precepts had to be given pertaining to the confession of faith or to the doctrine of faith, yet not to faith itself (ad 4).

Precepts which regard the doctrine of faith pertain to understanding and knowledge, which are read to have been commanded more abundantly in the New Testament both in evangelical and in apostolic doctrine (a. 2).

793. Practical counsels. - 1. The precept of faith is satisfied even if the act of faith is not elicited professedly and explicitly, but only implicitly, by fulfilling another precept, for example, by receiving a sacrament, which cannot be fulfilled without faith (cf. n. 791).

2. Penitents should not examine themselves nor be questioned about the fulfillment of this precept: for those who live as Christians often have occasion to exercise it; but for others, from those things which they confess, it is fairly easily clear whether they have fulfilled it or not.

3. Especially priests should exhort the faithful to exercise faith more often; and in danger of death they should recite an act of faith with the sick person.

Treatise: On Divine Hope

INTRODUCTION

S. Th. I-II, q. 40, aa. 1 and 2; q. 25, a. 1; *Q. D. de Virt.* 4, a. 1.

794. Hope according to the name (*elpis*), in the proper sense, primarily signifies a certain passion of the sensitive irascible appetite; whence the word was used to designate also both an act of the will similar to the passion of hope, and the habit inclining to this act (I Cor. XIII, 13).

But in a derived and improper sense it is also taken: a) for the thing hoped for (Tit. II, 13; Rom. VIII, 24-25); - b) for him from whom we hope (Ps. XIII, 6; XXI, 10), in which sense we invoke the Blessed Virgin, saying: Hail, our hope; - c) for the means of acquiring the thing hoped for (merits, prayers of the saints, sacraments); - d) for the certitude of hope, which is its perfection (Rom. V, 4-5).

795. Hope, taken in the proper sense, is rightly defined: A movement of the appetitive power tending toward a future good, arduous, possible of attainment. It is said:

1. a movement of the appetitive power, that is, either of the sensitive appetite, or of the rational appetite or will, as was said in the preceding number;

2. tending toward a good, and thus it differs from fear, which concerns evil; moreover this good is sensible if it is a question of the passion of hope, but it is spiritual or even divine when it is a question of hope pertaining to the will;

3. future: for no one hopes for what he already has; and thus hope is distinguished from joy or delight, which concern a good already possessed;

4. arduous, that is, difficult of attainment: for no one hopes for what is immediately and easily in his power; and thus hope is distinguished from desire, which concerns any good whatever, without consideration of its difficulty or possibility;

5. possible of attainment, at least according to estimation, and therefore probably to be obtained; and thus it is distinguished from despair.

Therefore to hope is vividly to desire some good for oneself, and to trust that one will obtain it.

796. Hope necessarily supposes the love of concupiscence and desire; indeed it virtually includes them: for although someone can love, indeed even desire, what he does not hope for, nevertheless no one can hope for what he does not covet and desire. That love is the simple complacency of good, that is, the coaptation of the appetite to some good, by which the appetite becomes conformable and proportioned to the beloved, and this becomes connatural and fitting to it; desire is a movement, a tendency toward attaining that good. But beyond these, hope adds a firmer effort toward the attainment of the good, notwithstanding its difficulty. For when difficulties appear which allure man not to pursue the good, and at the same time the possibility of obtaining the good appears, hope brings it about that man does not abandon the pursuit of the good, but firmly perseveres in it; indeed, that on account of the difficulties he tends more toward the good. Therefore

hope strengthens the appetite, makes it firm, rises up by fighting against difficulties, and lifts us above difficulties.

When someone hopes for the attainment of a good from the help of another, the act of hope is properly called expectation.

797. Divine or theological hope is defined: a divinely infused virtue by which, with certain confidence, we expect eternal beatitude and the means to it, to be obtained by divine help. There is indicated:

1. the genus to which hope pertains: a divinely infused or supernatural virtue;
2. the proper act of hope by which it is distinguished from other virtues: by which we expect;
3. the material object, or the matter about which it is concerned, both principal: eternal beatitude; and secondary: the means to obtaining it;
4. the formal object, or motive, of hope: by divine help;
5. the essential property of hope: with certain confidence.

798. Division of the treatise. - The treatise on hope comprises four parts:

1. the first treats of the object of hope and of the act of hope, which is known through the object: 1. concerning the formal object, 2. concerning the material object, 3. concerning the necessity of hope;
2. the second treats of the habit of hope, which is known through the act, and of the subject in which it inheres: 1. concerning hope as it is a virtue, 2. concerning the subject of hope and those having hope; 3. concerning the gift of fear of God;
3. the third treats of opposed sins: 1. concerning despair, 2. concerning presumption;
4. the fourth treats of the precept of hope.[1]

[1] Concerning hope one can usefully consult: St. Thomas, in *Q. D. de Virt.* 4; and II-II, qq. 17-22, with the commentaries of Cajetan and Billuart; Bouquillon, *De Virtutibus theologicis*, with the annotations of Waffelaert; Billot and Schiffini in their respective work *De Virtutibus infusis*; Harent, in *Dictionnaire de Theologie*, article *Esperance*; Janvier, *Conf. de N.-D.: L'esperance*; in addition the moral manuals which are in everyone's hands.

First Part: On the Object and Act of Hope

Question One: On the Formal Object of Hope

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, aa. 1 and 4; *de Virt.*, q. 4, a. 1.

799. Thesis. The formal object of hope is the omnipotence of God giving aid. - The formal object of hope is that on account of which we hope for that which we hope. Moreover we hope for something because it seems to us possible of attainment; but something is possible to us in two

ways, either through our own power or through the power or help of another. Hence by divine hope we hope on account of divine power or help. Now:

1. The divine power or help, that is, the attribute by which God assists us, is the aiding virtue of God, or God's very omnipotence insofar as it in fact gives aid to us. For if we ask someone: why do you hope for beatitude? he will rightly answer: because God is ready to assist us; and if we ask: by what does he assist us? he will answer: by his power. Hence the Scriptures constantly indicate as the motive of hope the help and strength of God (Gen. XV, 1; Ps. XVII, 3; LVI, 2; LXI, 7; CXVIII often; Is. XXVI, 4; II Kings XXII, 3; Prov. XVIII, 10; II Cor. IX, 8; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 13).

2. Nevertheless, the omnipotence of God would not help us unless God were benign and merciful (good toward us). Hence the Scriptures sometimes found hope upon divine mercy (Ps. XII, 6; LI, 10; CXVIII).

3. Similarly we would not be certain, nor would we hope firmly that the power of God helps us, unless he had promised this and were faithful in his promises. Hence the Scriptures found the certitude of hope upon fidelity (Heb. X, 23; Tit. I, 2).

Hence it is said by theologians that the formal object of hope is aiding omnipotence, insofar as it supposes the benignity of God by which it is moved and commanded, and insofar as it supposes the fidelity by which he is bound to helping us. Nevertheless the ultimate and immediate motive of hope is only aiding omnipotence.

St. Thomas aptly says, *Q. D. de Virt.* 4, a. 1:

"It is possible for something to be had by someone in two ways: in one way through his own power; in another way through the help of another.... Thus therefore sometimes a man hopes to obtain something through his own power, sometimes through another's help.... And then it is necessary that the movement of hope be borne toward two objects, namely, toward the good to be obtained, and toward him on whose help he relies" ("The good which someone hopes to obtain," he says in II-II, q. 17, a. 4, "has the aspect of a final cause; but the help through which someone hopes to obtain that good has the aspect of an efficient cause"). "But man cannot obtain the supreme good, which is eternal beatitude, except through divine help... and therefore the hope of obtaining eternal life has two objects, namely, eternal life itself, which someone hopes for, and the divine help from which he hopes. Just as also faith has two objects, namely, the thing which it believes, and the first truth" (in speaking) "to which it corresponds. But faith does not have the nature of virtue except insofar as it adheres to the testimony of first truth.... Whence also hope has the nature of virtue from this very fact, that man adheres to the help of the divine power for attaining eternal life...."

800. Corollaries concerning various opinions not to be approved. - From what has been said, it is easily understood what must be judged concerning various opinions of theologians, who labor much in designating the divine attribute which performs the office of the formal object in hope.

a) Some simply say it is the omnipotence of God.[1] - But in order that we expect something from God, it is not enough that God can bear help to us for obtaining it; rather it is also required that he in fact

bear it and help us. Hence the complete formal object is not omnipotence considered in itself and almost abstractly, but only insofar as it is in fact aiding.

[1] Thus several Thomists. The more eminent, however, indicate aiding omnipotence: thus Capreolus, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Gotti, Contenson, Billuart, the Salmanticenses; also recently Waffelaert and Billot.

b) Others hold that it is divine mercy.[2] - But although mercy moves God to bearing help, nevertheless it is not that by which he immediately helps us and assists us; rather this is his power. But if a merciful one wished to bear help, yet did not have the power for it, every hope would become impossible; on the contrary, if he could help without benignity and in fact did help, whether he helped from mercy or not, provided nevertheless he helped, hope would subsist equally.

[2] Thus preachers are accustomed to speak. Very many theologians place mercy and omnipotence in the same line, because by each God gives aid. Thus Vasquez, Turrianus, Meratius, Malderus, Schiffini. St. Bonaventure seems to speak in the same way, III Sent., d. 26, a. 1, q. 2. - But St. Thomas constantly assigns divine help, virtue, the power of another, and by name of God, as the motive of hope. Cf. for example, I-II, q. 40, a. 2, ad 1, and a. 7; II-II, q. 17, aa. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 ad 3, and 7; q. 18, a. 2; *Q. D. de Virt.* 4, aa. 1 and 4.

c) Others say that it is God's fidelity in promises.[3] - But again fidelity is not that by which he immediately bears help to us, although it gives certitude and firmness to hope. But if the faithful God wished to execute his promises, yet did not have the power, hope would be impossible; on the contrary, even if God had promised nothing or were not faithful in promises, provided that with some probability it appeared likely that he would help by his power, there would be a sufficient foundation for hoping, although this hope would not be certain.

[3] For this opinion Juanin is alleged by St. Alphonsus, *Th. M.* l. II, n. 21.

d) Others, especially the very recent with St. Alphonsus, hold that those three together constitute the formal object.[4] - But these do not solve the knot of the question, nor do they touch it. For 1. of each habit, just as of each act, there is only one formal object and proximate motive; hence it is impossible that these three concur equally principally for the motive of hope. Moreover 2. if one formal object is constituted from these three, it must still be shown how they concur into one, which the aforesaid authors do not sufficiently, or even in any way, indicate; moreover this cannot happen otherwise than in the mode indicated above, insofar as the mercy of God moves omnipotence to aid, and this is altogether certain from his fidelity.

[4] St. Alphonsus, ibid. Lorea seems first to have defended this, whom Ripalda, Kilber, and many moderns followed: *Theologia Mechliniensis*, Haine, Bouquillon, Lehmkuhl, Genicot, Noldin, Aertnijs, Tanquerey, Vermeersch.

It remains, therefore, that aiding omnipotence alone, which is commanded by the mercy of God and executes his fidelity, is the formal object and immediate motive of hope: namely, mercy and fidelity are rather the reason why omnipotence helps than why we hope. - Or these two are also necessary to hope as a preamble, just as motives of credibility are a preamble of faith; but they are not the motive of hope itself.

e) Finally, others do not indicate a divine attribute as the formal object of hope, but speak too soberly by assigning only divine help.[5] - Yet this is not to be understood as the created help of grace: for that is something which we hope for, and pertains to the material object; - and otherwise nothing created can be the motive of a theological or divine virtue (cf. n. 669). It remains, therefore, that the help is understood as uncreated, and this again is nothing other than aiding omnipotence (q. 18, a. 4, ad 2; q. 17, a. 6, ad 3).

[5] Thus several of the ancients.

But if he also makes mention of divine piety or mercy, this is rather rare and accessory to power (II-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 2 and 3; *de Virt.*, q. 4, a. 1), nor can it be opposed to his general theory concerning the motive of hope, namely, that the motive of hope is that by which something becomes possible, whether by one's own or another's virtue. Therefore do not conclude from these that according to St. Thomas mercy as well as power pertains to the motive of hope; rather understand that he sometimes also adds piety, because in some way, although remotely, it concurs for founding hope.

801. The proper motive of hope is not God as our supreme good. - Scotus teaches, whom Suarez follows, that the motive of hope is God insofar as he is our supreme good,[6] or the goodness of God relative to us,[7] that is, the infinite perfection of God insofar as, possessed by us, it perfectly quiets our appetite and completes all our desires. - This indeed is the motive of the love of concupiscence and of desire, which are necessarily presupposed to hope (as a preamble) and are virtually included in it; for we covet and desire God because to possess him is good and delightful to us. But this is not the motive of the act which is proper to hope, and which adds, beyond desire, the expectation of beatitude which is had with difficulty. For what is obtained with difficulty, nevertheless we hope for on account of the power of him from whom we are able to obtain it.

[6] Thus Scotus, in III Sent., d. 26; Suarez, *de Spe*, disp. 1, sect. 3; Granados, Arriaga, Coninck, Wiggers, Harent. Cf. Ballerini, *Opus theol. mor.* II, *de Spe*, nn. 4 and 5; Schiffini, o. c., d. 5, sect. 3; Billot, o. c., th. 26.

[7] The goodness of God toward us and his goodness relative to us should not be confused: the latter is the aptitude or capacity of quieting our appetite, insofar as God is our supreme good, possessed by whom nothing to be desired remains; but the former is the infinite propensity and inclination of God to diffuse his perfection and to communicate it to us.

802. Secondary motives of hope. - The power of God alone is the principal efficient cause which leads us to beatitude; hence from him alone as from the principal cause or the first moving cause can we hope. But God uses creatures as instruments by which he helps us in some way toward beatitude. Therefore from creatures, as from secondary and instrumental causes acting under God, we can hope for some aid for obtaining goods ordered to beatitude.

In this way: 1. we hope on account of the merits of Christ, our head, in view of which God promised eternal life and helps toward it (Council of Trent, sess. 6, cc. 3 and 7); in addition, by their virtue all things must be asked from God;

2. we hope on account of the prayers and merits of the Saints, especially of the Blessed Virgin Mary, mediatrix; indeed, on account of the prayers and helps of men dwelling on earth, and therefore we ask something from them;

3. we hope for our own merits, insofar as they are made from grace and are gifts of God; not indeed because in this way they are the motive of hoping, but because they are dispositions required so that we may arrive at eternal life (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16, can. 26).

Nevertheless the power of God alone is the formal object of hope: for the merits of Christ, of the Saints, or of the one hoping himself do not help us, nor therefore move us to hoping, except dependently upon the very omnipotence of God, which uses them and from which they have efficacy, and which remains the foundation upon which our hope rests.

Question Two: On the Material Object of Hope

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 2.

803. The material object of hope is that which we hope for; but this object is twofold: one principal or primary, which we hope for on account of itself and by reason of which we hope for the rest, and this is God himself as the supernatural end to be possessed by us, for we do not hope for all other things, such as remission of sins, grace, etc., except insofar as they have an order to God, so that we may be able to arrive at him as our supernatural end, or arrive better. The other is the secondary object, and this is all the means which conduce to beatitude.

804. Thesis. The primary material object of hope is God to be possessed. - It is proved:

a) In Sacred Scripture hope is constantly described in relation to eternal life: it is called hope of eternal life (Tit. I, 2; III, 7), - and hope of the glory of the sons of God (Rom. V, 2); - it is the hope by which we expect that life which God is going to give to those who never change their faith from it (Tob. II, 18), and by which we know that we shall be like God because we shall see God as he is (I Jn. III, 2); - it is the hope which enters, that is, penetrates, even unto the inner parts of the veil, that is, unto hidden things, where Jesus has entered for us as forerunner (Heb. VI, 18). From all these things it appears that eternal life is the principal object of hope, whence Mt. VI, 33: "Seek first the kingdom of God, and all things shall be added to you." - This having been posited, we reason thus:[1] The object which we hope to obtain, and that in which we rest when we have obtained it, are the same. But the principal object in which we rest in eternal life is God himself. Therefore God himself is the principal object of hope. Whence Ps. LXXII, 25: "What is there for me in heaven, and apart from thee what have I wished upon earth?... The God of my heart and God my portion forever."

[1] Therefore the thesis is not proved directly from the Scriptures, where it is not stated, but the theological argument is present, deduced from the Scriptures.

b) The material object of hope is everything which can be attained through the formal object; but the primary material object is that which is proportioned to the formal object. Now the formal object, the omnipotence of God giving aid, is infinite. Therefore the material object which is proportioned to it cannot be anything except the infinite good; and consequently it is God himself.

805. Opinion not to be approved. - Certain theologians judge that the principal object of hope is not God to be possessed by us, but the very vision or possession of God, or the act by which we possess God.[2] Against this opinion not only do the two reasons brought forth in the preceding number militate, but also the fact that the primary object of a theological virtue is nothing except God, and in no way something created (cf. n. 800, e); and that one hoping does not seek God on account of possession, otherwise he would place the ultimate end in a creature, but he seeks possession of God on account of God. It remains, therefore, that the vision and possession of God is only the condition required so that God may be attained and possessed, and the application of God to be possessed and beatifying made to us.[3]

[2] Durandus judges that it is subjective beatitude; but that God is the mediate object (in III Sent., d. 26, q. 2). Others say that the object is composed from objective and subjective beatitude: thus Coninck, Ripalda, Pesch.

[3] Thus the Thomists; Cajetan, in q. 17, a. 2, and Billuart can be consulted.

806. The secondary material object of hope is all things which conduce to beatitude. And indeed the secondary object per se is the supernatural means which from their nature lead to

beatitude, namely, sanctifying grace together with the supernatural virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, remission of sins, sacramental graces and actual graces. But the object per accidens is all created goods, even natural and temporal ones (which per se are indifferent to beatitude and from their nature do not tend to it), insofar as sometimes in certain circumstances they can in some way conduce us to beatitude; hence also in the Lord's prayer we ask for them.

807. Observations. - 1. In order that something can be hoped for, it is required that it be at the same time future and arduous. These indeed are not the motive of hope, but are conditions required for the material object, just as obscurity is a condition of the material object of faith.

2. "Movement is toward the proper term proportioned to the movable thing. And therefore hope directly regards one's proper good, and not what pertains to another. But presupposing the union of love toward another" (by which someone has another as one with himself and another self), "then someone can hope and desire something for another as for himself; and according to this someone can hope eternal life for another, insofar as he is united to him through love" (a. 3).

Question Three: On the Necessity of Hope

808. Principle I. Hope is necessary by necessity of means. - By necessity of means for salvation, both for little children and for adults, from the nature of the thing the habit of hope is necessary, because without it charity cannot be had (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7).

By necessity of means for justification, and in this way for salvation, for adults having the use of reason, from the nature of the thing the act of hope is necessary. For no one can have supernatural contrition for sin unless he hopes for pardon; no one will be justified unless he hopes to be justified by God (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4; sess. 6, c. 6).

809. Principle II. Hope is necessary by necessity of precept. - The act of hope is also necessary by necessity of precept, not only for sinners so that they may arrive at justice, but also for the just; not only ordinarily and regularly, but always and for all, even the perfect.

The Quietists1 denied the necessity of hope for the perfect, so called from quiet or indifference concerning one's own salvation, who said that perfection consists in an act passively received and continuous, of contemplation and love, and in a passivity excluding every desire of beatitude, every activity in good works, indeed every resistance to temptations. Likewise the Semiquietists, saying that there is given a habitual state of pure love and consummate perfection, which excludes fear of punishments, desire of beatitude, and consequently the exercise of hope.

Now these opinions were condemned as erroneous, respectively by Innocent XI (November 20, 1687; cf. propositions 7 and 12 of Molinos) and by Innocent XII (March 12, 1699; propositions 1, 2 and 11 of Fenelon); and deservedly.

It is clear:

1. From the Scriptures, in which faith is said to be the substance of things to be hoped for, to which therefore hope connaturally follows; but faith is necessary for all. Hence also in many places, whether in the manner of a promise or in the manner of an admonition, hope is commended, and indeed to all (Ps. IV; LXI, 9; Wis. II, 22; Eccli. II, 6; Hos. XII; I Cor. IX, 24, 25;

Rom. XII, 12; VIII, 23-25; Col. I, 4, 5; I Thess. V, 8; Tit. II, 13; Heb. III, 6; VI, 18, 19; I Tim. VI, 17; I Jn. III, 3). These suppose that the act of hope must be elicited at least sometimes.

2. From the necessity of good works: eternal salvation is given to all adults as a reward and not as a pure inheritance; but no one works on account of reward unless he has confidence and hope of obtaining it. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 26: "If anyone shall say that the just ought not, for the good works which have been done in God, to expect and hope for eternal recompense from God through his mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if by acting well and keeping the divine commandments they have persevered unto the end: let him be anathema." Cf. Phil. III, 14; II Tim. IV, 8.

3. From the necessity of prayer for perseverance; but prayer to God supposes and includes hope (Jas. I, 6); hence also in the Lord's prayer we are commanded to express the desire of beatitude and to ask for it: *Thy kingdom come*.

4. From the nature of pure love or perfect charity, which does not exclude the desire and hope of beatitude. Namely, the perfection of charity consists: a) on the part of the act of love, in this, that one's proper good is not the motive of the act of charity itself, and b) on the part of the state of the one loving, that all acts are ordered to charity and thus stand under the end of charity, which is God to be loved and glorified for his own sake; - but not that other acts are excluded, for example, that we do not desire beatitude, since this is a condition required so that we can perfectly love God for his own sake, and thus it can be ordered to God to be glorified for his own sake. Hence indifference to beatitude and salvation is utterly impossible, speaking of beatitude in the abstract; it is sinful, speaking of beatitude insofar as in the concrete it consists in God; indeed it renders charity impossible.[1]

[1] Ekkard seems to have preluded these (prop. 8).

But if the adversaries hold that hope is imperfect, they err. The whole imperfection lies in this, that we do not possess God, which is the imperfection of the state of the way, not of hope itself. And although it is less perfect than charity, nevertheless it is in itself perfect, as being a true virtue uniting to God, as is now to be seen.

1. The vocation to supernatural beatitude is the foundation and condition of charity or friendship toward God, as will be clear from the treatise on charity.

Second Part: On the Habit and Subject of Hope

Question One: On Hope as It Is a Virtue

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, aa. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8; *de Virt.*, q. 4, aa. 1 and 3.

810. Theological hope is a morally good and honorable habit, because it has a good object: God, our supreme good, to be attained by divine help. Indeed it is a virtue because it is a habit rendering man perfect: for it makes him adhere to divine help and thus attain God, the supreme rule of human acts; but the perfection of man consists in this, that he adhere to God and attain his proper rule.

Hence in the Scriptures the praise of hope is derived from this, that through it man is joined to God (Ps. XVII, 3; LXI, 8; XC, 1; Jer. XVII, 5, 7).

Nor say: hope includes imperfection, because it concerns a future and absent good. - The response is: although this in itself is imperfect, nevertheless for man in the state of the way it is not imperfection but perfection to expect, on account of divine help, those things which we cannot acquire by human power (q. 17, a. 1, ad 3; *de Virt.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 4).

811. Opposed errors. - Lutherans, Calvinists, Baius, Jansenists, and several modern philosophers, especially Kantians and evolutionists, said that hope is disordered; the Quietists and Semiquietists said that it is imperfect: because it includes the love of concupiscence by which we will God as a good to us and expect a reward; which love is disordered because it refers God to the creature, or at least is an imperfect, interested, and mercenary love. - The response is:

a) In two ways we refer something to ourselves: as a means to an end, and as perfect to perfectible, that is, as the end which we desire for ourselves. Now by the love of concupiscence we refer God to ourselves as the fount of supreme perfection by which we must be perfected; this certainly is not disordered: for thus God himself willed his Son to be incarnate for us. But hope does not refer God to us as a means to an end; rather, on the contrary, it refers us to God as to the end, because it desires God as our supreme good or supreme end. And indeed, our end is not on account of us, but we are on account of the end. Hence to desire the end is not to order it as a means to us, but to order us as a means to it. - In other words, we are only the end for whom we desire, in no way the end which.

That this is lawful the Scriptures teach, constantly exhorting the faithful that they act on account of heavenly beatitude (Mt. VI, 33; XIX, 29; I Cor. IX, 25; Eph. I, 16; Col. III, 23-24; Heb. XI, 25-26; Apoc. II, 10; Ps. CXVIII, 112; Prov. XI, 18; Eccli. XII, 2; I Jn. III, 3); likewise the Church by the voice of Councils, for example, Trent, sess. 6, cc. 11 and 16, can. 31, and of Pontiffs, for example, Alexander VIII (props. 10 and 13 condemned).

b) Then that love, although it is less perfect than the love of dilection and charity, nevertheless is not disordered and positively imperfect, because it does not positively exclude the motive and love of charity, but only abstracts from them: for because we love God as our supreme good, we do not thereby deny that he is in himself supremely good and supremely lovable.

812. They object that a work done with a view to reward, in the case of eternal life, is mercenary. But it is disordered and vile to act on account of reward. - The response is:

a) A mercenary is properly one who orders the more noble as a means to the vile, for example, to money; or who acts only on account of reward, or even only on account of a temporal good. Hence by St. Thomas, q. 19, a. 4, ad 3, mercenary love is rather said to be that by which one loves God on account of temporal goods. But of hope it cannot be said: 1. that it acts on account of temporal reward; or 2. that it acts only on account of reward, because it does not exclude another honorable motive, although the hope of a merely spiritual and future reward powerfully incites to good. Hence reward is not the exclusive motive of acting, but an adjunct as a help. - Nor 3. does hope order God to beatitude, but it demands beatitude and further orders it to God, as was said in the preceding number, a, and n. 805.

b) But those who boast that they act on account of duty, as they say, and not on account of reward, deceive themselves or others: for experience shows that men begin to act with a view to reward, and only gradually are allured to a good of a higher order and to pure love, elicited without a view to reward. Indeed a necessary condition that we will and love something is that it also be our good; otherwise we could not desire it. But for that reason our good will not always and necessarily be the motive of acting, namely, in every act, nor a fortiori the principal or exclusive motive.

813. Hope is a theological virtue, because it attains the very supreme rule of human acts, God; for 1. it has God as its formal object: for it attains the omnipotence of God as efficient cause, insofar as it relies upon his help; 2. it also has God as its primary material object: it attains God as final cause, insofar as it expects beatitude in his possession.

Moreover it is a virtue distinct from the other theological virtues: for we can adhere to God either on account of himself, and this we do through charity; or as to the principle from which something comes to us. But from God there comes to us both the knowledge of truth, and faith is concerned with this, and the possession of divine goodness, concerning which hope is concerned.

Faith precedes hope, because it proposes the object of hope as possible; but hope precedes charity and introduces to it: insofar as someone hoping to be rewarded by God is enkindled to loving God on account of himself; as was said in the treatise *De Virtutibus*, n. 625.

814. Hope without charity is called imperfect or unformed, because the ultimate perfection is lacking to it, namely, the perfect tendency to the ultimate end; and because it hopes for beatitude only from future merits which someone thinks he will acquire, but not from present merits already had.

815. Hope is a supernatural virtue, both objectively, because as its object it has the very omnipotence of God supernaturally helping us to supernatural things; and subjectively, because it is produced by a supernatural principle: for since the act of hope is a means to a supernatural end, it too must be supernatural; moreover it will not be supernatural unless it is produced by a supernatural principle, the grace of God. Hence:

1. hope is a virtue infused per se;

2. the act of hope is produced by the habit of hope as by a principle, among those who possess it; in others it will exist only from actual grace;

3. the act of hope is supernatural not only as to mode but according to itself and as to substance; for it is divine because as material and formal object it has God to be possessed in himself, whom we expect with divine omnipotence aiding. Hence, just as God in his works relies upon his own power alone, so through hope in our acts toward divine things, even toward the possession of God similar to that which he himself has in heaven, we tend by relying on divine power alone;

4. whence hope elevates us to the supernatural and divine order.

Question Two: On the Subject of Hope

S. Th. II-II, q. 18; *de Virt.*, q. 4, aa. 2 and 4.

816. The proximate subject of theological hope is the will. - It is proved: a habit resides where the act is; but the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive power; since, however, theological hope as object has not indeed a sensible good, but a divine good, it is not in the irascible appetite but in the will. Therefore also the habit of theological hope is in the will.

From this it follows that the act of hope is free, because it is an act of the will. Nor say: man necessarily wills his beatitude; therefore he necessarily hopes. For although man necessarily wills his beatitude considered in the abstract, nevertheless he freely chooses this or that, in this case God, as the object in which he constitutes his beatitude in the concrete.

817. The remote subject of hope can be known from the fact that the object of hope is a good, future, arduous, possible of attainment. Hence:

1. hope does not remain in the blessed, because beatitude is not future for them. Nor can they hope for the future glory of the body, because it does not have the aspect of the arduous;

2. in Christ there was not the virtue of hope, because beatitude was never future to him; nevertheless he could hope for the glory of the body, which was arduous for him, as to be merited by the Passion. But he did not hope for that by theological hope, whose object, future beatitude, was lacking; but when the primary object has been removed, the habit does not remain; - on the contrary, hope was in the Blessed Virgin;

3. in the souls of purgatory hope remains because beatitude is future and arduous for them, as to be obtained through punishments as means. Nor does it stand in the way that beatitude is certain for them, for certitude is not against the nature of hope;

4. in the damned hope does not remain, because beatitude is impossible for them.

818. Hope is infused together with grace making one pleasing, faith, and charity; it is lost: a) directly through sins directly contrary, namely, through despair and through that presumption which removes the motive of hope; b) indirectly it is lost when its foundation, faith, has been destroyed, which happens through the sin of infidelity.

819. The hope of wayfarers is certain. - For although certitude essentially belongs only to an act of the intellect, nevertheless acts of other powers can participate in it insofar as they are infallibly moved by the intellect toward something. Therefore the act of hope is certain with a certitude derived from the certitude of faith. Hence:

a) Hope is absolutely certain and infallible as to itself, that is, on the part of the motive, for by faith it is certain that the omnipotence of God does not fail in aiding; whence faith moves the will so that it be without any fear, diffidence, or hesitation that something necessary to us for salvation should fail on God's part, but that it firmly adhere to God giving aid.

b) Nevertheless as to us, that is, on the part of the subject hoping, hope is not certain, because although God will not be lacking to us, nevertheless our free will can fail, place the obstacle of sin, and thus be lacking to God.

Therefore on our part hope has only a conditioned certitude, by which we are certain that we will obtain eternal life if we employ the means of salvation and persevere unto the end. Hence hope

stands together with fear that something will fail on our part, on account of our fragility and instability. Wherefore the Apostle says, I Cor. X, 12: "He who thinks himself to stand, let him see lest he fall," and Phil. II, 12: "With fear and trembling work out your salvation."

Yet this is per accidens in relation to the nature of hope, for it does not come from its object or motive, but from the conditions of the subject in whom hope inheres. Hence simply speaking hope is certain. This the Scriptures teach: Ps. XXX, 2; Eccli. II, 6, 12-13; Rom. V, 2; Heb. VI, 18, 19; II Tim. I, 12.

The whole doctrine is set forth by the Council of Trent, sess. 6, cc. 9 and 13, can. 18 and 16.

Question Three: On the Fear of God

S. Th. II-II, q. 19.

820. Notions. - Fear is a movement of the appetite by which it flees an impending evil which, although difficult to avoid, nevertheless can be avoided. It arises from love and hope: for man fears to lose or not attain that which he loves or hopes for. - Then fear and hope mutually help one another so that they may preserve man from presumption and despair: for fear mediates between hope and despair. Hence after we have treated of hope, and before we treat of despair, rightly there is treatment of fear.

821. What the fear of God is. - We cannot fear God insofar as he is an evil which we flee, for he is the supreme good; but we can fear some evil on account of God, insofar as from God or by comparison with God some evil can befall us: 1. from God indeed, the evil of eternal or temporal punishment, which he can inflict upon us; 2. by comparison with God, the evil of fault can befall us, by which we offend him and are separated from him.

822. How many kinds of fear of God there are. - Fear by which we are turned toward God and adhere to him is threefold: 1. if we are turned toward him and avoid sins only on account of the evil of punishment, it is servile fear, by which man fears fault (that is, offense against God) on account of punishment: for in this way servants are accustomed to fear punishments to be inflicted by a master; - 2. if we are turned and avoid sins only on account of the evil of fault, it is filial fear, by which man fears fault as fault, or insofar as it is an offense against God: for it belongs to sons to fear the offense of the father; - 3. but if we avoid sins and adhere to God on account of both, it is initial fear, intermediate between servile and filial, and as it were the beginning of filial fear.

To these there is opposed worldly or human fear, by which man withdraws from God, and on account of the evil which he fears, is prepared to offend God. This fear is always a grave or light sin, according as it induces us to sin mortally or venially.

823. Principle I. Servile fear in itself, considered according to its essence, is good: for it is nothing other than fear of punishment to be inflicted by God, which is deservedly feared. Hence Mt. X, 28: "Fear him who can destroy both soul and body in Gehenna" (cf. Lk. XII, 5; Mt. III, 7-10). This can be honorable, because it does not positively exclude fear of fault (just as neither does it include it), but abstracts from comparison with fault. Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 6, can. 8; sess. 14, c. 4; condemned props. 14 and 15 by Alexander VIII; and 60-64 of Quesnel, by Clement XI.

Nor does it stand in the way that to fear only punishment is disordered. For from its essence and proper object, servile fear only fears punishment simply, abstracting from this, whether fault also as fault must be feared or not, for it does not exclude another fear: so that it is not affirmed that only punishment is feared, nor is it affirmed that fault also is feared. - But that someone fears punishment only and does not fear fault on account of itself does not come from the essence or object of this fear, but because in fact it is found in a sinner who does not fear God's fault: therefore it becomes servile by reason of something extrinsic, namely, the state of the one fearing, from the absence alone of charity and filial fear. Hence:

1. the absence of charity is evil, whence it is said by St. Thomas that the servility of fear is evil;

2. since the absence of charity is extrinsic to fear, servility is extrinsic to it;

3. whence, when charity and fear of fault arrive, fear of punishment remains according to its essence but is no longer servile.

824. Corollary. - Several modern theologians distinguish servile fear as a genus into two species, namely, into simply servile and servilely servile; yet not rightly, for servilely servile fear has nothing in common with servile fear except the name. Fear simply servile, namely, is the fear described above; but servilely servile fear is the fear by which man fears punishment more than fault, and indeed in such a way that here and now he is so disposed that he would sin if there were no punishment. It is a fear which positively excludes fear of fault, by which namely a man says: I fear nothing except punishment, so that servility is intrinsic to it and belongs to it from its proper object and is of its essence. But such fear is not true fear of God, by which we are turned toward God from reverence and avoid sins, but is a sin; hence rather than being numbered among the fears of God, it seems to be reduced to worldly fear.

825. Principle II. Servile and filial fear differ in species, since they are concerned with a diverse evil object; initial fear, by which we tend toward God, fearing primarily the evil of fault and secondarily the evil of punishment, is not a new species of fear, but is filial fear, with which it has the same primary object, though it is found in an imperfect state.

For those who do not yet have the perfection of charity, but begin to love God, do not yet adhere to God and avoid sins on account of fear of fault alone, but also on account of fear of punishment. Hence in them there is fear of fault which necessarily supposes fear of punishment, and this is initial fear. But as charity grows, fear of punishment diminishes, while filial fear grows.

Filial fear does not exclude fear of punishment, but brings it about that fear of punishment is not the reason why we adhere to God: for this, in those who have filial fear, is only the fear of offending God.

826. Whether fear of God remains after this life? - In heaven fear of punishment does not remain; but filial fear has two acts, namely: 1. to fear separation from God, and as to this act it does not remain in heaven, where no fault is to be feared; 2. to revere God, and as to this act it remains, for the blessed, considering the loftiness of God and their own littleness, venerate God with the highest submission of soul and are perfectly subject to him: this is reverential fear.

827. The fear of the Lord is called the beginning of wisdom, not according to its essence, but as to the effect whence wisdom begins to operate (Ps. CX, 10; Eccli. I, 16):

1. servile fear, insofar as it is the first thing which disposes externally to wisdom (Eccli. I, 27);

2. filial fear, because the first effect of wisdom is reverence and subjection toward God (ibid. 20-22).

828. Observation. - Servile fear, although it is from the Holy Spirit, nevertheless is not numbered among his seven special gifts, because it is found in a sinner who does not possess the gifts of the Holy Spirit. But filial fear is numbered among those gifts: for the gifts dispose us to obey promptly the motion of the Holy Spirit; but for this it is required, and indeed first, that we not be resistant to the motion; but this is brought about by filial fear, by which we revere God and subject ourselves to him. And therefore filial fear holds the first place among the gifts of the Holy Spirit, ascending from the less perfect to the more perfect.

To this gift corresponds the first beatitude: *Blessed are the poor in spirit*...: for filial fear makes us revere God and be subject to him; hence we seek to be magnified in God alone, and not in ourselves through pride, or in honors, or in riches.

Third Part: On Sins Opposed to Hope

Question One: On Despair

S. Th. II-II, q. 20.

829. Despair is a sin which is opposed to hope by defect. It is not the simple absence of hope, but is an act contrary to hope, by which someone positively withdraws from beatitude and flees it, and thus casts away hope concerning beatitude.

Despair is twofold:

1. Despair improperly so called, by which someone contemns and loathes beatitude, because he judges it not good and not desirable. Thus does he who contemns the supernatural end; or who wishes to leave heaven to God, if God leaves earth to him; or who seriously desires to live perpetually in the world, precisely because he prefers this life to eternal life; - but not he who, by speaking thus, would simply show a great natural inclination toward earthly things, or fear of undergoing damnation.

2. Despair properly so called is that by which someone flees beatitude because he judges it impossible for himself, or too difficult of attainment, or not future, for example, because God is thought to deny pardon to the sinner, or not to give grace for conversion. But just as the act of hope is an act of the will which supposes a judgment of the intellect by which beatitude is judged possible, so despair supposes a previous judgment of the intellect by which someone thinks he will not attain beatitude; but that judgment inducing to despair is not despair itself: for this is an act of the will which follows, by which we positively withdraw from beatitude.

830. Despair differs from infidelity. - Despair, although it is easily joined to infidelity, can nevertheless be had without it, insofar as someone believing (by speculative judgment) in the abstract and universal that beatitude or remission of sins is possible, nevertheless despairs of this or that, because he falsely judges (by practical judgment) that in this particular case or state there is no

hope for him of pardon or beatitude, for example, because he judges that he is not predestined, or that beatitude is too difficult of attainment, or that God will not give him pardon. In the same way: he who fornicates judges that fornication here and now is good for himself, although in the universal he judges according to faith that it is evil.

831. Despair is a mortal sin from its whole genus: for it is always most injurious to God to regard beatitude as not good, or as not possible; - indeed it is a sin against the Holy Spirit, because through contempt of divine omnipotence mercifully giving aid it casts away hope, which is a special remedy granted to us by the Holy Spirit against sin. - Yet often despair is venial on account of indeliberation, if it comes from impatience, sadness, melancholic temperament, or scruples. - Hence:

1. It is a sin graver than those which are opposed to the moral virtues. For since by the theological virtues we are directly and principally turned toward God, hence sins directly opposed to them directly and principally imply aversion from God; and therefore they are graver than sins opposed to the moral virtues, which directly imply conversion to some created good, and only by a certain consequence aversion from God.

2. But infidelity and hatred of God are graver than despair, because they are opposed to the truth and goodness of God as they are in themselves; but despair is against God according as goodness is participated by us.

3. Nevertheless despair is more dangerous than these, because by hope we are recalled from evils and led to good; and therefore, when hope has been removed, men fall unrestrainedly into vices.

832. Causes of despair and remedies. - Despair improperly so called arises from lust: for from a great love of bodily delights, among which venereal delights are chief, it happens that man loathes spiritual goods and does not hope for them as certain great goods. - But despair properly so called arises from acedia or spiritual sadness, by which someone reckons that it is too difficult to live well, and flees the labors of good works.

Some remedies are against the causes of despair, concerning which St. Thomas says, II-II, q. 35, a. 1, ad 4: "The assault of sin sometimes must be conquered by fleeing, sometimes by resisting: by fleeing, indeed, when continued thought increases the incentive of sin, as in lust...; but by resisting, when persevering thought removes the incentive of sin, which comes from some slight apprehension. And this happens in acedia, because the more we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they are rendered to us; from which acedia ceases" (I Pet. I, 10; Rom. XII, 11, 12). - But other remedies are those which directly foster hope: firm faith concerning the mercy of God toward sinners (which shines forth greatly in the Gospel parables), consideration of the love and Passion of Christ, meditation on the divine promises, the examples of great sinners who became saints, prayer and devotion toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, and the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is called the salvation of the despairing.

Question Two: On Presumption

S. Th. II-II, q. 21.

833. Presumption is any immoderate or excessive hope;[1] nevertheless not every presumption is opposed to divine hope. For the object of every hope is a good, arduous, possible. But something is possible to man in two ways: through his own virtue, and through divine virtue. Hence presumption is twofold: one by which someone tends to a good as possible to himself, which nevertheless exceeds his faculty; and such presumption is per se opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which is concerned with hope of this kind, and is not opposed to the theological virtue of hope except per accidens, insofar as by his own powers someone would presume to obtain that which is not possible except by divine virtue. - The other is that which tends to some good as possible through divine virtue, which is not possible, as when someone hopes that he will obtain pardon without penance; this per se concerns the theological virtue of hope, through which someone adheres to divine power.

[1] The word presumption (from *praesumere*) is taken in diverse modes: for it can be referred either to the intellect or to the will. Presumption of the intellect is a judgment drawn from conjectures, by which the intellect takes more than can strictly be proved, and thus they speak of vehement, probable, light, false presumption, according to the foundation of the conjecture, and of a law founded on presumption. Presumption of the will: 1. one acts beyond the ordinary mode of sinning, by which without fear and force, knowingly and willingly, from contempt and singular audacity, someone transgresses the law; in which sense in law it is said: "if someone shall have presumed," "if someone by rash daring," "if someone knowingly"; 2. another acts beyond physical powers, whether a) he undertakes a work beyond his own powers, corporal or intellectual, and this is evil and directly against magnanimity; or b) he undertakes by divine virtue more than the ordinary, and thus it can be good, as if someone hopes from God something great which is fitting with excellent confidence (Judith VI, 15; IX, 17), or c) more than is fitting, and then it is evil against divine hope.

Therefore presumption opposed to divine hope can be defined: the rash and disordered expectation of beatitude or of the means to it. It is apt to follow from heresy or infidelity, and is easily joined to it; nevertheless it can exist without this, in the same way as despair: for it is not required for presumption that someone affirm something against faith by speculative judgment, for example, that pardon can be obtained without penance; but it suffices that practically someone act as if he believed thus, or even thought that God would use with him some singular privilege.

834. The presumption which is opposed to divine hope is manifold. - Presumption is one kind directly against hope, another kind beside hope.

The first is directly opposed to the motive of hope, the virtue of God giving aid, and therefore destroys hope. It is committed in two ways: a) by relying too much on one's own powers, as if someone positively refuses to hope for beatitude or remission of sin from divine virtue, but intends to obtain this or that by his own powers alone; and this presumption is called Pelagian; - b) by relying inordinately on God's virtue, as if someone attributes to him what does not belong to him, and thus detracts from him and diminishes him, by hoping, for example, for remission of sin without penance or glory without merits; and this presumption is called Lutheran.[2]

[2] Suarez adds a third presumption: to hope from God for help for sinning. But although this is great blasphemy, nevertheless it is not a disordered expectation of beatitude, whence it is not presumption opposed to the theological virtue of hope.

The other is beside hope: this does not remove the motive of hoping, nor destroy hope, but hopes in a disordered and rash mode for what belongs to God. It is committed in various ways: a) by hoping from God for extraordinary supernatural goods outside the common order of divine providence, as if someone hopes that he will have as much glory as the Blessed Virgin Mary; - b) by hoping from God for ordinary supernatural goods, but which have not been promised, such as time for penance

precisely at the end of life, while caring nothing about salvation; - c) by taking confidence in God as a motive for sinning more freely, or for increasing or multiplying sins, or for persevering long in sin, as if someone commits more sins precisely because their remission is easily obtained, or because several are remitted as easily as one. Yet he who sins several times solely because several sins are accused in confession as easily as one, although he has a depraved disposition, does not seem to commit the sin of presumption.

835. The gravity of presumption. - I. Presumption which is against hope is a mortal sin from its whole genus; because it removes the motive of hope and therefore hope itself. Yet Lutheran presumption is graver than Pelagian: for it is graver to diminish divine virtue than to extol one's own. Indeed it is a sin against the Holy Spirit: for it is maximally injurious to God to think that he gives pardon of sin without penance, or glory without merits; but by contemning divine omnipotence aiding under the aspect of justice, fear of God is cast away, which is the special remedy granted by the Holy Spirit that we may be drawn back from sin.

Nevertheless presumption is less grave than despair, because it is more proper to God to have mercy and to spare than to punish: for the former belongs to God according to himself, but the latter according to our sins.

The sin of presumption is rarely fully deliberate; but if it is not, it is not a sin against the Holy Spirit, nor does it remove hope.

II. Presumption which is only beside hope is a mortal sin from its genus, which admits lightness of matter. It is light: a) if someone hopes for an extraordinary supernatural good, but with full subjection toward divine providence; - b) if someone in some danger, without prayer and preparation, hopes for ordinary but small help, which God has not promised; - c) if the hope of pardon is the motive of committing only venial sins.

836. Causes of presumption and remedies. - Presumption indirectly arises from the errors in faith described above; in addition, that which relies upon one's own virtue directly proceeds from vainglory: for from this, that someone greatly desires glory, it follows that he attempts something above his powers. - But presumption which relies inordinately upon divine virtue directly arises from pride, from which it happens that someone esteems himself so much that he does not think he should be punished for sins or excluded from beatitude.

The remedies against presumption are: a) humility, which is directly opposed to the causes of presumption, namely, pride and empty glory; - b) meditation on the inscrutable judgments of God, which directly fosters the fear of God, by which presumption is excluded: "For God indeed is not mocked, and he punishes with just judgment those presuming too much concerning themselves."

837. Practical corollaries. - 1. Hope of pardon can be the motive of sinning, in which case the sin is aggravated by the malice of presumption; but if it is not the motive of sinning, but only holds itself concomitantly to the sin, it is not presumption; indeed it diminishes the sin: "To sin with a resolution of persevering in sin under hope of pardon pertains to presumption, and this does not diminish but increases the sin. But to sin under hope of pardon... with a resolution... of repenting (afterward) concerning the sin (if hope is not the motive of sinning but only holds itself concomitantly to the sin), this is not of presumption, but this diminishes the sin, because through this he seems to have a will less firmed toward sin," q. 21, a. 2, ad 3.

2. Since presumption mortally evil is a special sin, hence it must be declared in confession if someone committed some sin from this motive, because it is a circumstance changing the species.

Fourth Part: On the Precept of Hope

Single Question: On the Precept of Hope Itself

S. Th. II-II, q. 22.

838. By natural-divine right there is given a precept of hope, obliging under grave obligation, as is clear both from reason: for supposing that God has destined and promised supernatural beatitude to us, reverence toward him demands that we hope for it from him and adhere to him with firm confidence; and from Scripture, which requires the act of hope as a means of justification or perseverance or as a condition of merit, as was said above, nn. 808 and 809. Cf. Rom. VIII, 24; Heb. III, 6; I Jn. III, 3.

This precept is both negative, by which we are prohibited from casting away hope by despair or presumption, and this obliges always; and affirmative, by which we are obliged sometimes to elicit an act of hope, and this does not oblige always.

839. The obligation of eliciting an act of hope is present from a multiple head:

A. The very virtue and precept of hope obliges per se, that is, in circumstances common to the condition of all men, when the precept of converting oneself to God urges (n. 790):

1. at the beginning of the use of reason, or when eternal beatitude has been sufficiently proposed as the end toward which each one must tend, which he could not do unless he hoped for beatitude and the means to it from God;

2. in the article of death (that is, toward the end of life), when he is at the point of attaining the end;

3. several times in life (cf. prop. 1 condemned by Alexander VII1), which some determine by saying: under grave obligation, at least once a year; others each month or week; others more probably: several times, at least three or four times a year.

B. The very virtue and precept of hope obliges per accidens, that is, on the occasion of some special circumstance:

1. when a temptation against hope arises which is hoped to be overcome only by an act of this virtue; yet this is not fitting for the scrupulous, who torture themselves by repeating this act; hence they should contemn such temptations by turning to other things;

2. when hope has been lost, which happens by a directly contrary sin, and by infidelity;

3. when we manifest hope outwardly; otherwise the manifestation would be simulation.

C. Other virtues and precepts also sometimes oblige us to elicit an act of hope at least implicitly:

1. when temptations arise against other virtues, for example, religion or chastity, which are hoped to be overcome only by an act of hope;

2. when someone must or intends to receive the sacraments;

3. when someone must or intends to exercise an act of another virtue which cannot be exercised without an act of hope, for example, prayer, hearing Mass, contrition for sins, etc.

But in these cases the obligation does not arise from the precept of hope itself; hence if that act is omitted, we do not sin against hope itself, but only against another precept by force of which it was required.

1. "A man at no time whatever of his life is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues."

840. In the positive divine law itself an explicit precept of hope did not have to be placed. - St. Thomas shows this, a. 1:

"Some precepts... are of the substance of the law, but some are preambles to the law. Those things are preambles to the law without which the law cannot have place. Of this kind are the precepts concerning the act of faith and the act of hope; because through the act of faith the mind of man is inclined to recognize the author of the law as such, to whom he ought to subject himself; but through hope of reward man is induced to the observance of the precepts. But precepts of the substance of the law are those which are imposed upon man already subject and prepared to obey, pertaining to rectitude of life. And therefore precepts of this kind are proposed at once in the very legislation after the manner of precepts. But the precepts of hope and faith were not to be proposed after the manner of precepts, because unless man already believed and hoped, the law would be proposed to him in vain. But:

a) Just as the precept of faith had to be proposed by way of announcement or commemoration,... so also the precept of hope had to be proposed in the first legislation by way of promise. For he who promises rewards to those obeying, by this very fact incites to hope. Hence all promises which are contained in the law are things exciting hope.

b) But because, once the law has already been imposed, it pertains to wise men not only to induce men to the observance of the precepts, but also much more to conserving the foundation of the law; therefore after the first legislation in Sacred Scripture men are induced to hoping in many ways, even by way of admonition or precept, and not only by way of promise, as in the law; as is clear in Ps. LXI, 9: *Hope in him, all the congregation of the people*, and in many other places of Scripture (Ps. IV, Eccli. II, Hos. XII, etc.)."

The same holds concerning servile fear; but concerning filial fear there is given a precept in the law, as concerning love, as concerning the principle of the whole law (a. 2).

841. Practical counsel. - The faithful should be exhorted as much as possible to exercising hope; nevertheless penitents should not be questioned about the fulfillment of this precept, because it is necessarily fulfilled through the observance of the precepts or acts of Christian life: for it is not

required that, once hope has been received, it be exercised explicitly, but everywhere it suffices that this be done implicitly, by placing a work which cannot be fulfilled without it.

Treatise: On Divine Charity

INTRODUCTION

S. Th. I-II, qq. 26-28; I, q. 60; III Sent., d. 27, q. 1; *C. G.* IV, 19; *Quodl.* I, a. 8.

842. Charity according to the name. - The Latin word *charitas* is derived either from the Greek word *charis*, that is, grace, benevolence; or from the Latin word *carum*, that is, what is of great price. Each sense nearly falls back into the same thing, for one who is loved benevolently is generally esteemed of great price, and he who is held to be of great price is easily loved benevolently. Hence:

1. Charity originally and primarily signifies a gratuitous, liberal, honorable, benevolent, excellent love toward someone who is highly esteemed.

For although love, dilection, charity, and friendship in a certain sense pertain to the same thing, because they are the appetite of good, nevertheless in the proper and strict sense they are diverse: love and dilection properly signify an act; friendship is as it were a habit[1] or state; charity is said of both. Moreover, love is the most general term: for it signifies either a passion of the sensitive concupiscible appetite, or an act of the will; dilection adds, beyond love, a preceding election by which it happens that one thing is loved before another, whence it is an act of the will alone; charity adds, beyond dilection, some perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved by charity is esteemed of great price and is loved from benevolence. Finally friendship adds, beyond benevolence, mutual dilection or love in return: for it is mutual benevolence, founded upon a certain communication (Eth. VIII, 2; I-II, q. 26, a. 3). Hence St. Thomas says: "friendship is the most perfect among those things which pertain to love" (III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1).

[1] For human friendship is not a virtue but something consequent upon virtue. *Q. D. de Virt.* 2, a. 2, ad 8.

2. From the use of speech, however, charity is taken in a stricter sense, and is an eminent love of special friendship, whether natural or supernatural.

3. But in theological speech and in the strictest sense, only supernatural and divine friendship is called charity, as being more precious than all the others, esteeming God above all other things. Hence St. Thomas says: "friendship toward God is more precious and dear than all" (ibid., ad 7).

The aforesaid senses are handed down in Sacred Scripture: 1. charity is said of the uncreated love of God himself, a) by which he loves us (I Jn. IV, 8), indeed also b) the love of benevolence toward sinners who do not love him (Jer. XXXI, 3; Eph. II, 4); 2. natural friendship among men (II Mach. XIV, 26); 3. the love of supernatural friendship, namely, both a) the act by which we love God on account of himself and therefore our neighbor on account of God (Col. III, 14; Rom. XII, 10); and b) the habit of supernatural friendship toward God (I Cor. XIII, 13).

843. Charity is love. - Love is the coaptation of affection to the beloved good; under this respect knowledge and love differ: for a thing, through knowledge, is in a certain way drawn to the knower, because the agent intellect (by active virtue) acts upon the thing and takes and transforms the thing

into itself; on the contrary, through love the lover is drawn to the beloved itself, because the thing acts upon the appetite and transforms the appetite (a passive virtue) into itself (I-II, q. 22, a. 2). Namely, affection or appetite is in some way informed and changed by the apprehended good, - is adapted, conformed, and assimilated to it, - is transformed into it, - and is united to it, one with it; and therefore it adheres to it as fixed in it, and rests in it and is complacent in it because it is fitting to itself; and as a weight it is inclined and tends toward it. Namely, it is the principle and beginning of tendency toward the good, and thus love differs from desire and joy: from desire, which is the movement or perfect tendency toward attaining the good, proceeding from the inclination of love; also from joy, which is rest in a good already possessed, because the complacency of love is completed by possession of the beloved.1 - Love is as it were a weight tending toward the beloved; desire is the weight already falling; joy is the rest of the weight in its proper place, namely, in the real possession and presence of the term.

But a threefold love is found in man. For, as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 26, a. 1: Love is something pertaining to appetite, since the object of each is good; whence according to the difference of appetite there is a difference of love. For there is:

1. A certain appetite not following the apprehension of the one appetizing himself, but of another; and this kind is called natural appetite: for natural things desire what is fitting to them according to their nature, not through their own apprehension, but through the apprehension of the one instituting nature.

2. But another is an appetite following the apprehension of the one appetizing himself, yet from necessity, not from free judgment; and such is the sensitive appetite in brute animals, which nevertheless in men participates in some freedom, insofar as it obeys reason.

3. But another is an appetite following the apprehension of the one appetizing according to free judgment; and such is the rational or intellective appetite, which is called the will.

Moreover, in each of these appetites, love is called that which is the principle of the movement tending toward the beloved end:

a) But in the natural appetite the principle of this kind of movement is the connaturality of the one appetizing to that toward which it tends, which can be called natural love: just as the very connaturality of a heavy body to the middle place is through gravity and can be called natural love. Such natural love is in all the powers of the soul, and even in all parts of the body, and universally in all things, since each thing has connaturality to that which is fitting to it according to its nature.

b) Similarly, the coaptation of the sensitive appetite to some sensible good and the complacency of the sensitive appetite in a good apprehended sensibly is called sensible or sensitive love, which is concerned with qualities which please the senses and which are trifling and mutable, whence the love which arises from this is vain and inconstant.

c) Finally, the coaptation of the will to some intelligible good and the complacency of the will in a good apprehended by the intellect is called rational love, which arises from intellectual and moral endowments, such as perspicacity or promptness of mind, rectitude of judgment, wisdom, knowledge, prudence, benignity, fortitude and other virtues, nobility of soul, etc. This love is worthy

of man, as being founded upon truly human qualities; and it is more constant, as relying on endowments which are less mutable and more stable.

1. All these things are taken from St. Thomas. Thus, for example, in I-II, q. 26, a. 2: "Passion is the effect of the agent in the patient. But the natural agent induces a double effect in the patient, for first indeed it gives form, secondly it gives motion consequent upon the form.... Thus also the appetible itself first gives to the appetite a certain coaptation to itself, which is a certain complacency of the appetible, from which follows movement toward the appetible.... For the appetible moves the appetite, making in it in some way its intention, and the appetite tends toward the appetible to be really attained, so that the end may be where the principle was. Therefore the first change of the appetite by the appetible is called love, which is nothing other than the complacency of the appetible; and from this complacency follows movement toward the appetible, which is desire; and finally rest, which is joy. Thus therefore, since love consists in a certain change of the appetite by the appetible, it is manifest that love is a passion, properly indeed according as it is in the concupiscible power, but commonly and by an extended name according as it is in the will." And in III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1: "Love pertains to appetite; but appetite is a passive power.... But every passive thing is perfected according as it is informed by the form of its active thing, and in this its movement is terminated and rests.... When affection or appetite is altogether imbued with the form of the good which is its object, it is complacent to itself in it and adheres to it as fixed in it; and then it is said to love it. Whence love is nothing other than a certain transformation of the affection into the thing loved. And because everything which is made the form of something is made one with it, therefore through love the lover becomes one with the beloved, which has been made the form of the lover, and therefore the Philosopher says that a friend is another self; and I Cor. VI, 17: *He who adheres to God is one spirit*. But each thing acts according to the exigency of its form, which is the principle of acting and the rule of the work. But the good is the end; the end, however, is the principle in operable things.... Whence... the lover, whose affection is informed by the good itself which has the aspect of end... is inclined through love to operating according to the exigency of the beloved." Summarily, in a. 3, ad 2: "Love makes the beloved fitting and connatural to the lover, insofar as it unites the affection of the lover to the beloved...," and a. 1, ad 2: "it is the union itself or bond or transformation by which the lover is transformed into the beloved and in some way converted into it." Cf. I-II, q. 28, aa. 1 and 2; q. 26, a. 2, ad 2.

844. Charity is benevolent love. - For there is a twofold rational love or love of election, namely, of concupiscence or desire, and of benevolence or friendship.1

In the former mode we love something (a thing or person) for our own advantage and utility, namely, on account of ourselves as a good to us or so that good may come to us from it. In the latter we love someone on account of himself, and therefore we will good to him as a good to him or so that good may come to him. To love a horse on account of utility, or food on account of delight, is of concupiscence: for no one has proper benevolence toward a horse or food; and similarly to love a man on account of utility or delight, for example, a master on account of wages. On the contrary, the love of a friend toward a friend or of a mother toward a son is of benevolence.

These differ in many ways:

1. By reason of the end for whom: for by love of concupiscence we love something on account of ourselves, so that it may be well for us; by love of benevolence we love someone on account of himself, so that it may be well for him.

2. By reason of the end which (the material object): love of concupiscence intends one's own advantage, namely, the proper good of the lover; love of benevolence, the good of another, namely, the good of the beloved himself.

3. By reason of the proximate motive (the formal object): by love of concupiscence we love something because it is good to us, insofar as good comes to us from it, so that the love does not rest in the beloved but returns to the lover; by love of benevolence we love someone because he is good in himself, so that the love rests in the person of the beloved because he has in himself the perfection by which he is lovable in himself.

That twofold love: a) relates as perfect and imperfect: the love of benevolence by which we love someone according to himself (as a good in himself), so that it may be well for him, is love in the full and proper sense; but the love of concupiscence by which we love something only on account of ourselves so that it may be a good to us, is love in an imperfect and analogical sense:[2] for we do not love it on account of itself but only as a good to us, insofar as we love ourselves so that that good may come to us. Hence:

[2] Benevolence is the principle of friendship, Eth. IX, c. 5.

b) they are always joined in some sense and subordinated to one another: for it is impossible that we covet something unless we will it to someone benevolently and loved on account of himself, and thus in the love of concupiscence by which we wish something for ourselves we also love ourselves benevolently - and vice versa, it is impossible that we love someone benevolently unless we covet some good for him;

c) nevertheless, love of concupiscence and benevolence differ morally: in the love of concupiscence by which we wish some good for ourselves, we also love ourselves benevolently; but because this benevolence is necessary and natural, it is not attended to in moral science, which judges moral and free human acts, and therefore this love is simply called of concupiscence; - on the contrary, in the love of benevolence by which we love someone on account of himself, we also covet and desire goods for him as for ourselves, but because this proceeds from the same benevolent motive, this love is simply called of benevolence.

And thus considered, love of concupiscence and benevolence are distinguished in moral species, according as they principally tend toward this or that proper good of the lover, or toward the good of another loved in himself. For our acts have their species from diverse objects or motives distinct from us.

1. "Just as a good... simply is that which has goodness itself, but what is a good of another is a good in a qualified sense; and consequently the love by which something is loved so that it may have good is love simply, but the love by which something is loved so that it may be the good of another is love in a qualified sense" (I-II, q. 26, a. 4). Hence Aristotle says, Eth. VIII, c. 3, that useful and delightful friendship are friendship per accidens, according to similitude and

analogy, but not properly so called; and St. Thomas, q. 26, a. 4, ad 3: "because the good" (which someone wills to a friend) "is referred further to his own delight and utility, thence it is that useful and delightful friendship, insofar as it is drawn to love of concupiscence, falls short of the nature of friendship." Cf. q. 27, a. 3; *Q. D. de Virt.* 4, a. 3; in Jn. XV, lect. 4.

845. Charity is love of friendship. - Moreover friendship is: a) mutual benevolence or love in return, whence it is said: a friend is a friend to a friend (Eth. VIII); b) mutually known or manifested, for otherwise dilection would be mutual per accidens and would not be true love in return or dilection of another insofar as he too loves; whence it is said: friendship is love in return not hidden (Eth. IV); c) stable and therefore founded upon communication, that is, community of the same goods, in the fellowship of the same life and of one intimate society, so that among friends there is a certain equality, from which by parity they can use familiar commerce, live together amicably in the same life, and enjoy the same happiness. Hence it is said: friendship either finds equals or makes them.

Scripture speaks excellently about friendship, Eccli. VI, 14-16: "A faithful friend is a strong protection; but he who finds him finds a treasure; for a faithful friend there is no comparison, and the weighing of gold and silver is not worthy against the goodness of his fidelity; a faithful friend is a medicine of life and immortality."

846. The remote foundation of every love and the condition on the part of the subject is the necessary and natural love of oneself: because we love ourselves benevolently and will supreme perfection or happiness for ourselves, therefore by love of concupiscence we will for ourselves this or that good as something which pertains to our happiness; and by love of benevolence we love others as ourselves and will good to them as to ourselves (q. 27, a. 3).

The proximate foundation of benevolence is some community of goods: for the similitude of the lover with the beloved makes the lover love the beloved as another self, and love good for him as for himself.[3] - The proximate foundation of friendship is similitude even to equality, at least of proportion, arisen from communion in the same goods, namely, communication of one's own goodness, association in the same life, or at least destination or aptitude for the same life.[4]

[3] In love of another, man imitates love of himself: just as unity in substance with ourselves is the foundation of love toward ourselves, so union in form or similitude with others is the foundation of love toward them. Cf. I-II, q. 26, a. 2, ad 2; q. 27, a. 3; q. 28, a. 1, ad 2.

[4] Thus conformably to St. Thomas, in III Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 3; and d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4; and II-II, q. 25, a. 3.

For experience shows: a) friendship naturally arises among those who lead the same life, but does not arise among those who are greatly distant; b) according to diverse communion of life, friendship is diverse: thus natural friendship is founded upon the communication of natural life through generation; domestic, civil, or military friendship is founded upon communion in the same domestic, civil, or military life, etc.; and the more excellent the goods of some life are, the more excellent the friendship is; c) where the union in the same life is greatest, friendship is greatest, as is clear from the union of husband and wife.[5]

[5] Communication of goods is not to be taken in the active sense for benefits mutually conferred: this is an effect of friendship, not the foundation. This can be necessary so that community of life may be present, but that is per accidens; it

can also preserve and foster friendship. Thus according to the mind of Aristotle, and in this sense the definition is to be understood, as borrowed from him.

847. The remote foundation of every love and the condition on the part of the object is its goodness known as such, that is, insofar as it is proposed as proportioned to us: for it is impossible that someone love that which does not seem good or fitting to him; hence also naturally we love someone first by love of concupiscence insofar as he is our good, than by love of benevolence or friendship (q. 27, aa. 1 and 2).

The foundation or proximate motive, that is, the formal object according to which concupiscence, benevolence, and friendship differ, is that goodness considered in a diverse mode: for the motive of the love of concupiscence is the relative goodness of the thing, precisely as it is good to someone, because apt for perfecting and beatifying him; the motive of the love of benevolence is the absolute goodness of the person in himself, or his perfection, by which he is not only good to the one loving, but also good and lovable in himself; finally, the motive of friendship is the same goodness of the person in himself, but which we have in common with him, and on account of which we are also loved by him.

848. The chief effects of love, according to St. Thomas, are union or mutual inherence, ecstasy, zeal, universal influence upon the activity of the agent and subordination of actions to the beloved object, and wounding (q. 28).

1. Union, for any love tends to join lovers and from two or more to make one morally, according to that: *And of the multitude of believers there was one heart and one soul* (Acts IV, 32). It effects a double union: a) one affective, by force of which friends endeavor to will the same things and not will the same things, and the lover is in the beloved as reckoning the goods and will of the friend as his own, and conversely the beloved is in the lover because he loves him as himself. Thus it is read in Scripture (I Kings XVIII, 1): "The soul of Jonathan was glued to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul." Love causes this union formally; - b) another real, which consists in the presence and possession of the beloved; this union love makes effectively. This, however, although desired by lovers, is sometimes impeded or delayed by obstacles.

2. Ecstasy (*ek-stasis*, departure), by which the lover is as it were placed outside himself; this happens by a double act of intellect and will: a) according to the intellect, the lover, forgetful of himself, frequently thinks of the beloved, and love makes this ecstasy dispositively, insofar namely as it makes one meditate upon the beloved; but intense meditation on one thing abstracts from others; - b) according to affection he is carried outside himself: through the love of concupiscence, not content concerning the good which he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself; through the love of friendship, he does not act for himself alone, but wills and works good for the friend, as if carrying care and providence for him on account of the friend himself, not as to his own good but toward the good of the beloved, and love makes this ecstasy directly. Wherefore it is of the greatest moment to love only honorable and holy things, since the lover as it were goes out from himself and is made similar to the beloved.[6]

[6] Mystical ecstasy is nothing other than the connatural redundancy of the state of the soul and of the higher faculties into the lower faculties and the body, by which namely the higher faculties so altogether inhere in God that the internal senses,

or even the external, indeed also the corporeal faculties, are impeded, suspended, or totally bound, and the body preserves the state. Yet God also preternaturally can produce such an external state in those who have not yet arrived at the aforesaid grades of mystical life. - Rapture is nothing other than ecstasy which snatches by a sudden impulse.

3. Zeal, which comes from the intensity of love: for the more vehemently we tend toward something, the more strongly we repel whatever is opposed to this propensity. Thus, in the love of concupiscence, he who intensely covets something is by that very fact borne against everything which stands in the way of its attainment or quiet enjoyment; and in this way husbands are said to be zealous for their wives. In the love of friendship, he who sincerely wills the good of a friend is by that very fact vehemently moved against everything which is repugnant to his good; and according to this someone is said to be zealous for a friend, or also for God, when he tries according to his power to repel those things which are against the good of a friend, or against the honor or will of God. Whence Ps. LXVIII, 10: "Zeal for thy house has eaten me." (Cf. III Kings XIX, 14).

4. Universal influence upon the activity of the agent. Since love of the good (or end) is the cause of all things which the lover does, hence if one love is predominant, all things are done on account of it. And therefore he who vehemently loves someone orders all his actions to him, namely, toward pleasing him and attaining his friendship. From this it follows that nothing is of greater interest than rightly ordering one's affections, so that life itself may be rightly instituted; for, as Augustine says, *De Civ. Dei*, l. XIV, c. 28: "therefore two loves made two cities: namely, the earthly, love of self even to contempt of God; but the heavenly, love of God even to contempt of self."

5. Wounding. To the aforesaid effects are also reduced liquefaction, fruition, languor, and fervor, which by one name can be called wounding (Cant. IV, 9). Liquefaction is a softening of the heart which makes the lover not contained within himself, and by which the heart is made fit so that the beloved may enter, and may easily be penetrated by the beloved. If therefore the beloved has been present and possessed, fruition from the presence is caused; but if he has been absent, there will be languor or sadness from absence, and fervor or intense desire of presence by which the lover is carried outside himself into the beloved. - It is called wounding because the lover is divided from himself so that the beloved may enter, and is carried outside himself so that he may seek the beloved. Concerning this St. Thomas notes, III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4: "In love there is a union of the lover to the beloved, but there is also a threefold division. For from this, that love transforms the lover into the beloved, it makes the lover enter into the interior things of the beloved, and conversely, so that nothing of the beloved remains to the lover not united" (just as form reaches the inner parts of the thing formed, and conversely); "and therefore a) the lover in some way penetrates into the beloved, and according to this love is said to be acute: for it belongs to the acute by dividing to arrive at the inner parts of a thing; and similarly the beloved penetrates the lover, arriving at his inner parts, and on account of this it is said that love wounds, and that it pierces the liver. But because nothing can be transformed into another except according as it in some way withdraws from its own form" (because of one thing there is one form), "therefore b) this division of penetration is preceded by another division, by which the lover is separated from himself in tending toward the beloved, and according to this love is said to make ecstasy" (and languish), "and to burn,

because what boils bubbles outside itself and exhales. But because nothing withdraws from itself unless that by which it was contained within itself has been dissolved" (just as a natural thing does not lose form except when the dispositions by which the form was retained in matter have been dissolved), "therefore c) it is necessary that from the lover that termination by which he was contained only within his own boundaries be removed; and on account of this love is said to liquefy the heart, because the liquid is not contained by its own boundaries, and the contrary disposition is hardness of heart."

But if love is vehement, it can also cause injury of the body or organic injury.

849. There is a threefold union in friendship. - One is the cause of friendship, and this is community of goods, or union of similitude. Another is essentially the very love of friendship, and this is affective or moral union, in affection, by which man considers a friend as one with himself and another self, whence it is said: a friend is another self (Eth. IX). The third is the effect of friendship, and this is effective and physical union of real presence which the lover seeks to have with the beloved person: this is not of the essence but of the fittingness of love (q. 28, a. 1, ad 2).

Union according to affection is mutual inherence (mutual penetration), not only a) because friends love one another mutually; but b) because the beloved is in the lover, for he remains impressed in his memory through continued knowledge, and in affection through complacency, whence the lover reckons the beloved as the same as himself, and wills and acts on account of the friend as for himself; and conversely the lover is in the beloved, because he tends to knowing him intimately, and because by affection he is transformed into him, whence he reckons the goods or evils of the friend as his own and the will of the friend as his own, and therefore wills and does the same things as the friend, and is saddened and rejoices with him, as if made the same as the beloved. Hence friendship is called the bond of lovers, a union between the lover and the beloved: for it is the union and agreement of two wills (q. 28, a. 2).

850. Divine or theological charity is defined: a virtue divinely infused by which we love God, the supernatural end, with our whole heart on account of himself, and ourselves and our neighbor as ourselves on account of God. In this definition:

1. there is indicated the genus to which charity pertains: a divinely infused or supernatural virtue;
2. the proper act of charity by which it is distinguished from other virtues: by which we love;
3. the material object of charity, both principal: God, the supernatural end, and secondary: ourselves and our neighbor;
4. the motive of charity: on account of God;
5. properties essential to charity: with the whole heart (above all things) is toward God, and toward neighbor it is as toward ourselves.

That this definition is real and adequate will be shown throughout the whole treatise.[7]

[7] Concerning charity one can usefully consult: St. Thomas, in Eth. VIII-IX; in III Sent., dd. 27-31; *Q. D. de Virt.*, 2 and 3; II-II, qq. 23-45; with the commentaries of Cajetan, Bannez, John of St. Thomas, Billuart, and the Salmanticenses; likewise Gregory of Valentia, Suarez, and Ripalda; - Goudin, *Philosophia thomistica*, 3 p., q. 3, a. 2, and Mercier, *Psychologie*; - St.

Francois de Sales, *Traite de l'Amour de Dieu*, and Bossuet, in the writings on Quietism; - *Theologia Mechliniensis, De Virtutibus*; Bouquillon, *De Virtutibus theologicis*, with the annotations of Waffelaert; Billot, *De Virtutibus infusis*; Em. Card. Van Roey, *De Virtute Charitatis*; - Coconnier, *La Charite d'apres S. Thomas d'Aquin*, in *Revue Thomiste* 1906 and 1907; Janvier, *Conf. de N.-D.: La Charite*; Sertillanges, *L'amour chretien*; Noble, *L'amitie avec Dieu*; - *Xenia Thomistica* II: Keller, *De Virtute charitatis tamquam amicitia quaedam divina*; - and for the practical part: Ferraris, St. Alphonsus, Marc, Aertnijs, Ballerini, Lehmkuhl, Haine, Genicot, Noldin, Tanquerey, Prummer, Vermeersch.

851. Division of the treatise. - The treatise on charity comprises five parts: concerning charity itself, that is, concerning the habit of charity, - concerning the object of charity, - concerning its acts and effects, - concerning vices and sins opposed to it, - concerning the precepts of charity.

Ordinarily for the other virtues, from the object known the act is known, and then from the act the habit; on the contrary, for charity the habit is better known than the object and act: for since several and diverse loves can be referred to the same object under a diverse aspect, it must first be determined what kind of love charity is before it is determined under what formal aspect the object is considered and by what acts it is attained. Hence this treatise begins from the habit.

The first part treats of charity itself: 1. concerning the essence of charity; 2. concerning the excellence of charity, a) in itself, b) relative to the other virtues; 3. concerning the comparison of charity to the subject: a) concerning the subject and generation of charity, b) concerning its increase, c) concerning its diminution and loss.

The second part treats of the object of charity: 1. concerning the formal object; 2. concerning the material object, that is, concerning those to be loved: a) concerning those to be loved generally; then specifically, b) concerning God to be loved, c) concerning love of oneself, d) concerning sinners to be loved, e) concerning enemies to be loved; 3. concerning the order of charity: a) between ourselves and God, b) between ourselves and neighbor, c) between various neighbors.

The third part is concerning the acts and effects of charity: 1. concerning the proper act, dilection; 2. concerning the internal effects of charity: joy, peace, mercy, and the gift of wisdom; 3. concerning the external act, or beneficence: a) material, or almsgiving, b) spiritual, or fraternal correction.

The fourth part is concerning sins opposed to charity: 1. concerning hatred, which is opposed to dilection; 2. concerning sins opposed to joy, namely, concerning acedia and envy; 3. concerning sins opposed to peace; 4. concerning scandal, which is opposed to beneficence, namely, a) concerning active scandal, b) concerning passive scandal, c) concerning certain scandals in species.

The fifth part is concerning the precepts of charity.

First Part: On Charity Itself

Question One: On the Essence of Charity

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, aa. 1 and 2; *de Virt.*, q. 2, aa. 1-2; III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, aa. 2 and 4.

852. Thesis. Charity is true and properly so-called friendship between God and man. - It is certain.

It is proved:

1. From Scripture: a) in open words it indicates that such friendship exists (Wis. VII, 14; Ps. CXXXVIII, 17), wherefore the just are called friends of God, for example Abraham (Is. XLI, 8; Judith VIII, 22; Jas. II, 23); - b) the soul is united to God as bride to bridegroom (Cant. Cant.), and man as son to father (Rom. VIII, 14-17; I Jn. III, 1), and becomes a citizen and member of the household in the society and house of God (Eph. II, 19). But from communication of domestic and civil life, especially between son and father, between bridegroom and bride, friendship naturally arises; whence in Cant. II, 13, the bridegroom says: "arise, my friend...," and in V, 16, the bride says: "he is my friend"; - c) in the New Testament the Son of God himself explicitly calls those who keep the commandments friends (Jn. XIV, 15, 21; XV, 10, 14), and describes that friendship, Jn. XIV, 21: "But he who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him... and we will come to him and will make our dwelling with him," and XV, 14-15: "You are my friends; I will no longer call you servants, because the servant does not know what his lord does. But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard from my Father I have made known to you." This friendship we call charity.

2. From Tradition: the thesis is explicitly stated among the Fathers: Hilary, in Ps. 138, n. 38; Chrysostom (P. G. LV, 417); Athanasius (P. G. XXVII, 534); Ambrose, ep. 37, n. 13; Augustine, in Jn., tr. 85 (p. 1848 sq.); Cyril of Alexandria, in Jn. XV, 4; Bernard, serm. in Cant. 1, n. 8; 68, nn. 1, 3; and it is the common doctrine of theologians after St. Thomas, and of commentators on the Canticle of Canticles.

3. From reason: Charity is friendship between God and man if all the conditions required for this are present. But a) there is communication of goods, and indeed of those which are proper to the divine nature and life: for God communicates himself and his own intellectual life and beatitude in the beatific vision (I Cor. I, 9; I Jn. III, 2), and through grace we are consorts and participants of the divinity itself, and sons similar to God in nature and operations (II Pet. I, 4; I Jn. III, 1-2). In one word: God communicates to us his own goodness, inchoately through grace, perfectly and consummately through glory, so that we are truly sons of God and he our Father (Rom. VIII, 15). From this communication there naturally arises b) mutual benevolence, namely, the benevolent love by which we love God our Father, as the altogether ultimate supernatural end, above all things, and therefore on account of himself, because he is infinitely lovable; and the benevolent love by which God gratuitously loves us as sons, not for his own utility and happiness but for ours: for on the one side God cannot fail to be complacent to himself in the likeness of his own nature communicated to us, and on the other side he expects no utility or happiness to come to himself from this love, since he is in himself the supreme Good and supreme Happiness. c) It is also mutually known, for God declared that he loves those who love him (Prov. VIII, 17; Jn. XIV, 21, 23), and by probable conjectures and sufficiently certain signs we are able to discern whether we truly love God. Therefore.

853. A threefold union is found in charity. - One is the communication of goods or union of similitude which is the foundation of friendship and charity, and this in the present case is grace making one pleasing, by which we are similar to God in nature and worthy of eternal beatitude. The second is charity itself, and this is mutual union according to affection, by which God wills his own beatitude to us as to himself, and we will to God the beatitude which we will to ourselves, more than

to ourselves. The third is real union, which is the effect of charity, by which God and we seek mutual real presence, and God substantially inhabits us on earth through grace and charity, and will be present to our minds in glory.

Concerning the second union, or mutual inherence according to affection, John says (I ep., IV, 16): *He who remains in charity remains in God and God in him*. Namely, God remains in us because he remains so impressed in our affection that we will beatitude and all our goods to God as to ourselves, indeed more than to ourselves: thus he has been made one with us. On the contrary, we remain in God because we follow the will of God as our own, and have his desires and goods as ours, whence we will, act, and live as God does: thus we are transformed into God. Hence I Cor. VI, 17: *But he who adheres to the Lord is one spirit*.

854. Corollary. - Since in the state of pure nature no communication of the goodness and life proper to God would have been made to us, there would have been no equality nor friendship between God and us, although nevertheless on each side there would have been love of benevolence. For in that state we would have been only servants relative to God; but now we are his friends, not indeed insofar as we are servants, but insofar as we are his adopted sons.

855. Charity is not the Holy Spirit himself. - Peter Lombard taught that charity is not a habit created in the soul, but the Holy Spirit himself granted to us, who, with no created habit mediating, immediately by himself produces in us the act of divine love. This opinion is erroneous:

a) because it cannot be composed with the Council of Trent teaching (sess. 6, cc. 7 and 16, can. 11) that the charity which is given by the Holy Spirit inheres in us, and that in justification we receive faith, hope, and charity infused, through the Holy Spirit who pours forth charity; where charity is manifestly described as a habit, and is distinguished from the Holy Spirit as an effect from its cause;

b) it also contradicts reason, which 1. proves that charity is a created principle of operation: for the act of charity is voluntary and meritorious, whence it is not produced by the Holy Spirit alone, nor by the will acting as moved by him as his mere instrument, but by a principle of activity intrinsic to the will, by which the will itself freely moves itself by its own powers to loving God. But the act of charity, because supernatural, exceeds the intrinsic natural powers of the will; therefore it is necessary that the Holy Spirit add to the will a principle of operating, or supernatural powers intrinsic to it, by which it becomes capable of producing the act of charity.

2. Reason proves that that principle is not momentary and transient, but habitual and permanent: for no one perfectly tends and operates toward an end except through a permanent principle of operation; whence God gave such principles to natural things for operating toward their end. Therefore also for our supernatural end (concerning which God certainly provided no less) he gave us a supernatural habitual and permanent principle, so that we might perfectly operate and tend toward it. Otherwise the act of charity would not be easy nor delightful, but we would be moved to it as if violently and with sadness, which nevertheless is against experience.

Whence that charity is a habit created in the soul is theologically certain.

856. Observations. - 1. Grace is not friendship itself with God, but its principle, root, and foundation, namely, the participated divine good on account of which friendship between God and us can exist, which happens through charity: through grace we are rendered lovable to God, that is,

worthy of the love of divine friendship; through friendship, loved and loving. Grace is in the essence of the soul, to which it gives supernatural being; charity is in the will of the one loving, to which it gives the power of operating supernaturally.

2. God, in order to love us benevolently, does not await the presence of grace in us: for this is the effect, not the cause, of gratuitous divine love toward us, since the love of God is the cause of all goodness of things and all goods come from the love of God.[1] - But after we have been adorned with grace from the gratuitous love of God, we are now worthy to be loved by him and capable of loving him in return as Father. And thus grace, which is the effect of the divine love of special benevolence, is also the foundation of divine friendship or of stable and mutual love. Namely, God first by benevolent love confers upon man the perfection on account of which he becomes lovable, and then loves him as a friend.

[1] We love things because they are lovable in themselves; on the contrary, they are lovable because God loves them. Our love supposes the goodness of things, but divine love causes the whole goodness of things. Cf. I-II, q. 110, a. 1.

3. Between us and God there is friendship of excellence, because there is no equality of quantity, but only of proportion to the superexcellent goodness of God, which we participate.

Question Two: On the Excellence of Charity

Article I: On the Excellence of Charity in Itself

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, aa. 3, 4, 5, 6; I-II, q. 66, a. 6; *De Virt.*, q. 2, aa. 4 and 5; III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2.

857. Charity is a virtue because it is a habit rendering man perfect, for it joins him to God, who is the supreme rule of human acts. It is a special virtue because it has a special object, namely, the goodness of God in himself, insofar as it is the object of supernatural beatitude. It is one virtue because there is one end of charity and one principal reason for loving God, ourselves, and neighbor, namely, the divine goodness which he wills to communicate to us all; - and because there is one communication of eternal beatitude upon which the friendship of charity is founded.

Nor should it be said that friendship is not a virtue. For St. Thomas responds, *Q. D. de Virt.*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 8: "Friendship (human) is not posited as a virtue, but as consequent upon virtue, because from this very fact that someone has virtue and loves the good of reason, there follows from the very inclination of virtue that he loves those like himself, namely, the virtuous in whom the good of reason flourishes. But friendship which is toward God, insofar as he is blessed and the author of (supernatural) beatitude, must be set before the virtues which ordain to that beatitude. And therefore, since it is not consequent upon other virtues but a preamble..., it must itself be a virtue in itself." Likewise II-II, q. 23, a. 3, ad 1: "Friendship... is not a virtue by itself distinct from others. For it does not have the character of the laudable and honorable except from the object, namely, insofar as it is founded upon the honorable character of the virtues; which is clear from the fact that not every friendship has the character of the laudable and honorable, as is clear in friendship of the pleasurable and the useful. Hence virtuous friendship is rather something consequent upon virtue than a virtue. Nor is there a likeness concerning charity, which is not founded principally upon human virtue but upon divine goodness."

1. Sometimes human friendship is called a virtue, but then the question is not of friendship properly so called and internal, but of external friendship, by which men live together with one another and conduct themselves toward one another as if they were friends: it is, namely, affability. Cf. II-II, q. 114, a. 1, ad 1.

858. Charity is the most excellent virtue. - For

1. it is more excellent than the moral virtues, because it attains God himself;

2. it is also more excellent than the theological virtues

a) on the part of the formal object, because it attains God more and more perfectly: for faith and hope attain him insofar as from him there comes to us either knowledge of the true or possession of the good, but charity attains him in himself, so that it rests in him, and not so that some good may come to us from him; in other words, faith and hope rely upon God revealing and helping, charity relies upon God in himself;

b) on the part of the condition of the material object, because charity is more closely related to God: for faith and hope include distance from God and imperfection, since faith is concerning God not seen, and hope concerning God not possessed; but charity is concerning God who already in some way through the love of friendship is united to us and possessed by us, and will be possessed fully: "for the beloved is in the lover, and the lover is drawn by affection to union with the beloved" (cf. Col. III, 14; I Cor. XIII, 13).

In one word: faith and hope of themselves include imperfection, namely, either obscurity or the absence of the arduous good; but charity of itself introduces no imperfection. Hence those are made void in the fatherland, but not charity, which there is perfected by reason of the object present and intuitively seen.

859. They object to the aforesaid doctrine that faith resides in the nobler power, the intellect, but charity only in the will. - It is answered: knowledge is naturally perfected according as the object understood is in the intellect, and therefore the perfection of knowledge is measured by the dignity of the intellect; but volition is perfected according as the will is inclined to the thing as to a term, and especially dilection according as the one loving is drawn to the thing loved, and therefore the perfection of volition and dilection is measured by the perfection of the thing toward which it tends. But those things which are below us are in the intellect in a nobler mode than in themselves (because each thing is in another according to the mode of that in which it is); but those things which are above us are in themselves in a nobler mode than in our intellect. And therefore knowledge is more perfect than dilection of those things which are below us; but of those things which are above us, as God, dilection is more perfect than knowledge. Hence charity is more excellent than faith, according to Eph. III, 19: the charity of Christ surpassing knowledge. Hence God can be loved in himself without being known in himself. - Thus it is in the state of the way; otherwise in the fatherland: for in the beatific vision (by which we see God in himself), God is not represented in our intellect by a species received in us, but is immediately seen in himself without a created and received species, whence the intellect is united to the thing according as it is in itself, to God as he is in himself. And therefore vision is more perfect than dilection.

Article II: On the Excellence of Charity Relative to the Other Virtues

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, aa. 7 and 8; I-II, q. 65, aa. 2 and 4; *De Virt.*, q. 2, a. 3.

860. Without charity there is no perfect virtue. - Since virtue renders man perfect and the highest perfection of man consists in ordination to the ultimate end, which is not had without charity, it follows that without charity no virtue is had in the full sense and in the perfect state. Nevertheless, without it there can be true virtues which render man honorable and perfect under a certain respect, as regards some particular end; yet because these lack ordination to the ultimate end, which is the supreme perfection or form of morality, they are called imperfect or unformed virtues, such as faith, hope, or natural virtue in a sinner (I Cor. XIII, 1-3). But they are formed when they receive order to the ultimate end from charity, which accordingly is called the form of all the virtues.

861. Charity is the form, queen, and end of all the virtues. - Relative to all the virtues, charity is:

1. The end, because it orders the acts of all the virtues to the ultimate end, which is precisely its object and its own proper end; and since precepts concern acts of virtues, it is also called the end of the law (I Tim. I, 5; Rom. XIII, 10).

2. The form, not indeed intrinsic and essential, but extrinsic and accidental, because it gives and impresses upon the acts of the other virtues their form and ultimate perfection, namely, order or tendency to the ultimate end, and thus it bestows upon them the merit of eternal life (I Cor. XIII, 1-3).[1]

[1] For a fuller understanding of this doctrine, it must be observed:

1. St. Thomas, q. 23, a. 8, demonstrates it by this argument: That which gives to a human act order to the end gives to it form or perfection. But through charity the acts of the other virtues are ordered to the ultimate end. Therefore charity gives form to the acts of the other virtues. The major is proved: That which gives to an act order to the object gives form to it. But human acts have as object the good or end. Therefore that which gives to a human act order to the end gives form.

2. Therefore the principle of the demonstration is: In moral matters the form of the act is from the side of the end. This supposes the doctrine explained in I-II: When an act is from two principles, the higher mover gives form, the lower is as it were material. Therefore q. 13, a. 5, concerning choice, says that it is essentially an act of the will, but formally of the intellect; and q. 16, a. 1, concerning use, that it is an act of the will but with reason preordaining. And conversely q. 17, aa. 1 and 4, concerning command, that it is essentially an act of reason, but formally of the will as moving; and q. 18, a. 6 and q. 20, a. 3, concerning the case of a double act, says that the will of the end is the formal element, but the exterior commanded act, toward the end, the material element. Therefore if the act of charity moves the other virtues to its end, which is the ultimate end, it gives form to them.

Concerning the habit, however, one must speak as concerning the act: for the virtue itself is spoken of in order to formed acts. Therefore the virtue of charity is the form of the other virtues.

3. But what kind of form is it? Not intrinsic or constitutive of the essence, nor essential; but extrinsic, effective or motive, and accidental, as giving the ultimate complement of perfection. And yet it gives something intrinsic to the other virtues, thus constituting them in an accidental respect: namely, it imposes and impresses order in the acts of the other virtues by moving the habit to act.

What does it impress? Cajetan answers: The passive participation of its command and ordination is, as it were, the form constituting those acts in virtuous being simply. From this participation the acts of the other virtues are called and are formed.

Hence it adds something intrinsic, which constitutes them under some respect, namely, in the notion of perfect virtue, whence their merit and dignity. And yet they are not the same virtue: they have this by participation at the moment when they are moved by charity; just as an instrument participates in the power of the principal agent but does not become principally agent.

4. Is it an exemplary form? St. Thomas seems here to deny it, ad 1; but in the *Q. D. de Charitate* he affirms it. But it is a question of words. Under one aspect it is not exemplary; under another aspect it is exemplary. And he does not altogether deny this in the *Summa*, for he says: it is called form not exemplarily, but rather effectively. Hence it is not merely exemplary.

For an exemplary cause, properly, is that to whose likeness the others are; more broadly, that to whose likeness the others operate, insofar as inclination to the good is similar to the inclination of charity to the highest good.

Hence charity properly is not an exemplary form, because virtues are not generated according to the likeness of charity, but more broadly, insofar as they operate according to the likeness of charity (*Q. D. de Char.*, a. 3, ad 6 and 8). Therefore it is exemplary only as regards order to the ultimate end.

5. Hence charity is placed in the definition of every virtue as meritorious (*ibid.*, ad 1 and 3). It does not give to them their proper species, otherwise it would be an essential and constitutive form (ad 1); but it gives to them the common species of perfect virtue, and is the common form (ad 5 and 9). Hence there is one common species in all virtues (ad 1 and 5); not one proper species, which is called most special.

Nor is it an obstacle that thus there would be several forms in one thing. For it is not repugnant that there be several accidental forms, provided this is according to a certain order (ad 2).

3. The root, because it nourishes and sustains them, bestowing upon them strength so that they may be exercised more easily and more frequently.

4. The mover and queen, because it can move and command all of them so that they produce their acts when and how its end, the love and glory of God, requires it.

5. The mother, because from the appetite of the ultimate end it conceives and generates the acts of the other virtues by commanding them (I Cor. XIII, 4-7).

862. Observation. - Prudence is the form of the moral virtues because it gives order to a particular end according to right reason; charity is the form of the theological virtues, of prudence, and of the moral virtues because it gives perfect order to the ultimate end; grace is the form of charity and of the virtues, as regards divine being, because it gives dignity and a right to the ultimate end.

Question Three: On Charity Considered as Regards the Subject

Article I: On the Subject and Generation of Charity

S. Th. II-II, q. 24, aa. 1, 2, 3, 4; I-II, q. 112, a. 4; *De Virt.*, q. 2, aa. 10 and 11.

863. Charity is in the will. - Since charity has as its object not a sensible good indeed, but the divine good, hence it is not in the sensitive appetite but resides in the will.

864. Thesis. Charity is a virtue infused in itself: for it is not in us naturally, nor is it caused from our acts; therefore it is from divine infusion alone. - It is proved:

Charity exceeds the faculty of our nature: for it is founded upon the communication of eternal beatitude and of grace, which are supernatural gifts exceeding nature. But that which exceeds the faculty of nature is not in us naturally; nor is it acquired through natural powers, because an effect cannot surpass the cause. Therefore charity cannot be had except through divine infusion. It is confirmed: charity

a) is a property consequent upon grace making one pleasing, therefore it is supernatural as that is;

b) is the principle of a salutary and supernatural act, therefore it too is supernatural;

c) has a supernatural material and formal object; therefore it must be supernatural so that it may be able to tend toward that object.

865. Corollary. - From this St. Thomas deduces that charity is not given to us according to natural capacity (or disposition), as if natural perfection or works done by the powers of nature had a disposition toward charity or toward a certain quantity (or grade) of charity; or as if God had decreed to give greater or lesser charity according as natural perfection is greater or lesser. But God gives charity in such proportion as he wills (Eph. IV, 7); nevertheless, when he infuses it, through grace he prepares the man (adult) and gives him the actual disposition by which he strives to receive it voluntarily and freely, and indeed he gives a disposition or striving proportioned to the quantity of charity which he wills to infuse; otherwise man would have the love of God without willing it, or more than he willed or strove for. In this sense the Council of Trent is to be understood, sess. 6, c. 7: "each one receives his own justice, according to the measure which the Holy Spirit distributes to each as he wills, and according to each one's proper disposition and cooperation." Cf. cc. 5 and 6 and can. 4.

866. Observation. - The supernatural act of charity proximately disposes toward grace and the habit of charity after the manner of a material cause, and therefore with the desire alone of the sacrament it justifies (cf. treatise on Justification and on Penance).

Article II: On the Increase of Charity

S. Th. II-II, q. 24, aa. 4-9; q. 184, a. 2; I-II, q. 114, a. 8; III, q. 89, aa. 2 and 5; *Q. D. de Virt.*, q. 1, a. 11.

867. Charity in the way can be increased intensively. - Charity of the fatherland cannot be increased because it is at the term. - Charity of the way cannot be increased extensively, namely, by extending itself to new objects, because the least charity extends itself to all things which are to be loved from charity. But it can be increased intensively, insofar as it becomes more intense, stronger, and more prompt for acting.

This happens not indeed by addition of charity to charity, but only by this, that the same charity is received more and inheres more firmly, and man participates charity more, and is more reduced into act according to it, as was explained in the treatise on Virtue in general, n. 570.

It is proved: For he who is on the way can always approach the term more; but the term of the way is God; therefore on earth we can always approach God more. But through charity we tend and approach to God, to whom one does not approach by steps of the body but by affections of the mind by which we are united to him; therefore charity of the way can always be increased. Cf. Eph. IV, 15-16; Phil. I, 9; Prov. IV, 18; and the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 24 and 32, c. 10: "Moreover holy Church asks for this increase of justice when she prays: Give us an increase of faith, hope, and charity."

868. Charity can be increased without end, as was defined in the Council of Vienne, can. 1 against the Beguards. For no reason is present why its increase would be limited: 1. from its essence it is a participation of the infinite charity of God, which can always be participated more; 2. the infinite power of God, which is the cause of charity, can always produce greater charity; 3. man can always receive greater charity, for as charity grows, the aptitude for an increase of charity grows. Therefore from no side is there given a reason for limiting this increase. - Nevertheless, from divine preordination no one in fact will arrive at the charity of Christ or of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

869. God is the principal efficient cause of the increase of charity, as of its production; but charity is increased instrumentally through the sacraments, dispositively and meritoriously through good works. From the treatise on grace and on human acts we know that any act, whether of charity, or placed from the influence of charity, even the least, merits *de condigno* eternal life, and an increase of grace and charity. Hence Christ says, Mk. IX, 40: "For whoever shall give you a cup of water to drink in my name... shall not lose his reward." Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, cc. 10 and 16, can. 32.

870. When charity is increased. - Although every good act done from charity disposes toward an increase of charity, indeed merits it, nevertheless it seems that one must say with St. Thomas, not that every act of charity in fact increases it, but that this is done only through an intense act by which the agent strives as much as he can toward an increase of charity, namely, with all the powers of the charity which he has. For just as God does not infuse a determinate grade of charity except proportionately to the disposition and striving of the will, so he does not seem to increase it unless one strives toward this through an intense act. And then the increase is given not only on account of the last act but also on account of all the preceding acts. "The spiritual increase of charity is in some way similar to bodily increase; but bodily increase in animals and plants is not a continuous motion...; rather for some time nature operates disposing toward increase, and increasing nothing in act; and afterward it produces in effect that to which it had disposed, by increasing the animal itself, or the plant, in act. So also charity is not increased in act by every act of charity; but every act disposes toward an increase of charity, insofar as from one act of charity man is rendered more prompt for acting again according to charity, and with aptitude growing, man breaks forth into a

more fervent act of dilection, by which he strives toward the progress of charity; and then charity is increased in act" (q. 24, a. 6). Cf. *de Virt.*, n. 640.

871. In what sense charity can be perfect. - Charity:

1. On the part of the object, God lovable, cannot be perfect, because God can never be loved as much as he is lovable: thus therefore only that charity by which God loves himself is perfect.

2. On the part of the subject, the man loving, charity of the fatherland is perfect because it is in a connatural state (while here we are pilgrims from the Lord): a) for in it the conditions of friendship are verified perfectly: there is had eminent communication, highest union, perfect presence of the friend, conversation with him and possession of him; whence b) it is always actually borne toward God and indeed with its whole power; and therefore c) it is incapable of being lost. Therefore, although the habit of charity according to its essence is the same as in heaven, and can be equal in degree, indeed even greater in one wayfarer than in another blessed one, nevertheless according to the aforesaid conditions charity of the fatherland is always more perfect and more intense.

3. Charity of the way, although it cannot have the perfection of the fatherland by which the whole heart of man is actually borne always toward God - for it is impossible on account of the infirmity of human life always actually to think of God and to be moved by dilection toward him - nevertheless can be perfect insofar as it excludes all things which are repugnant to the motion of charity. And this in two ways:

a) so that habitually someone places his whole heart in God, so that he thinks or wills nothing which is contrary to divine dilection (or any mortal sin), and this perfection is essential to charity, which cannot exist without it, and common to all having charity, and of the necessity of salvation;

b) so that he studies to be free for God and divine things in such a way that he is also actually borne toward God insofar as the necessities of the present life allow this, and leaves other things except insofar as the necessity of the present life requires; and such perfection also is possible to some in the way, and is of counsel, and belongs only to the perfect.

Hence charity of the way on the part of man is in a threefold state:

for when someone has acquired charity, his principal care is that he avoid (mortal) sin and preserve charity, and then charity is called beginning (the purgative way);

then the principal care is toward progressing in good, and venial sins, especially deliberate ones, are to be avoided, and then charity is progressing (the illuminative way);

finally, third, the principal care is toward adhering to God, and those things are to be avoided which impede even more perfect union with God, and then charity is perfect (the unitive way), not as in heaven, but as it can be perfect on earth, namely, not so that it is actually borne always toward God, but so that man does this insofar as the necessity of the present life permits it.

The first is prescribed under mortal sin, the second under venial sin, the third is not of precept; nevertheless it would be a sin to contemn it, or to set the mind firmly against spiritual progress.

Article III: On the Diminution and Loss of Charity

S. Th. II-II, q. 24, aa. 10, 11, 12; *de Virt.*, q. 2, aa. 6, 11, 12, 13.

872. Charity cannot be diminished. - Charity is not diminished properly, directly, and in itself:

1. For this is not effected by the mere cessation from act (as with acquired virtues), because charity is not caused by our acts.

2. Nor by a sinful act:

a) it does not happen through mortal sin, because mortal sin takes charity away;

b) nor does venial sin effect a diminution of charity: for a habit is diminished through its contrary, but venial sin is not opposed to charity, because it is only a disorder concerning the means to the end, whereas charity is concerning the ultimate end itself.

3. Nor does God diminish charity in us, because he does not withdraw a good from us unless we merit it; but venial sin does not merit a diminution of charity: for when someone fails in a lesser thing, he does not merit suffering detriment in a greater thing, whence he who has himself inordinately concerning the means to the end does not merit suffering detriment in charity through which he is ordered to the ultimate end itself. Namely, God does not turn himself away from man more than man turns himself away from him.

Nevertheless the cooling of charity (Mt. XXIV, 12), which consists in the diminution or cessation of fervor, that is, of the frequency of acts or of the exercise of charity, disposes indirectly to its corruption; and venial sins also dispose directly to that cooling: this disposition to corruption can be called diminution indirectly and improperly so called.

873. Charity of the way on our part can be lost. - Charity according to itself cannot fail, neither 1. on the part of God moving, who through it can infallibly move to an act of charity (Rom. VIII, 38), nor 2. according to the proper nature and power of charity, which excludes every sin (I Jn. III, 9); but only 3. on the part of the subject, our will, which is mutable according to freedom of choice, and so can cast off charity.

Nevertheless charity of the fatherland cannot be lost because it is always borne actually toward God; but charity of the way can be lost because of the change of our will: for when charity is not actually borne toward God, something can occur through which it is lost, namely, a motive of sinning to which consent is given. Thus the Council of Vienne defines against the Beguards, and Trent against the Calvinists, sess. 6, cc. 12, 14, 15, can. 23 and 27 (cf. Ezech. XVIII, 26; XXXIII, 12-13; Rom. XI, 20-22; Gal. V, 4; I Cor. IX, 27; Apoc. II, 4, 5).

Charity is lost through any mortal sin whatever (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 15). For:

1. "He who has my commandments and keeps them, he is the one who loves me" (Jn. XIV, 21); but he who sins mortally does not keep the commandments of God; therefore he does not love God.

2. Mortal sin renders one worthy of eternal death (Rom. VI, 23); but he who has charity is worthy of eternal life (Rom. VIII, 15-17 together with II Tim. I, 7 and IV, 8). But it is impossible that someone be worthy of eternal death and eternal life at the same time. Therefore mortal sin takes away charity.

3. Charity demands that we love God appreciatively above all things and that we will to be subject to him in all things. But through mortal sin man in something refuses and does not will to be subject to God, but prefers sin to the friendship of God and a creature to God. Hence mortal sin is contrary to charity, and therefore takes it away not only meritoriously, but also physically and efficiently expels it.[1]

[1] One sinning venially does not refuse to be subject to God nor overthrow his subjection to God, but is subject and tends to the end in an undue mode.

Second Part: On the Object of Charity

Question One: On the Formal Object

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, aa. 4 and 5; q. 25, a. 1; I, q. 60, a. 5; I-II, q. 65, a. 5; *de Virt.*, q. 2, aa. 2 and 4.

874. Thesis. The formal or proximate motive object of charity toward God is the absolute goodness of God in himself, lovable on account of himself, insofar as it is the object of supernatural beatitude.

It is the goodness of God in himself. For:

1. Right love toward God has as motive the goodness of God considered either in himself, or relatively to us. But the love of charity does not have as motive the goodness of God relative to us. Therefore. - The minor is proved: It is true friendship with God. But the dilection of friendship loves the friend on account of the goodness of the friend himself, not so that from him a good may come to us; whence Jn. XV, 13 says: dilection lays down its life for a friend. Therefore.

2. Just as in the state of pure nature we would habitually tend to the natural ultimate end as a good in itself, to be loved above all things,[1] so in the supernatural order it is necessary that through a supernatural virtue we habitually tend to the supernatural ultimate end as a good in itself to be loved above all things. But we do not do this through faith, which tends into God under the aspect of the true; nor through hope, by which we tend to God according as he is our supreme good: for this does not tend to him as the supreme good in himself, nor does it make us love God above ourselves. Therefore through charity we tend to God the supernatural end as a good in himself.

[1] Cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 60, a. 5; and III Sent., d. 29, a. 3.

875. The formal object of charity is called the goodness of God in himself, as the object of beatitude, that is, as the supernatural end. This does not signify the goodness of God insofar as he renders us blessed, for this is no longer the goodness of God in himself but the goodness of God relative to us; but the sense is that the goodness of God which, and insofar as, communicates itself in

the beatific vision and is the ultimate supernatural end of all, and can be known only by the light of supernatural faith, is in itself and above all things lovable, and thus is the motive of charity.

For the goodness of God in himself can be considered in three ways: either by abstracting from the fact that it communicates itself, - or insofar as it communicates itself improperly through a certain shadowing of itself in the production of natural things, and according to the exigency of nature could be the end and object of natural beatitude, - or insofar as it communicates itself most properly through the beatific vision and grace making one pleasing. In the first two modes it is only the motive of natural love and benevolence, which would also exist in the state of pure nature; considered in the third mode, it is the motive of supernatural love and friendship. For a) if the goodness of God did not communicate itself according to a mode exceeding all exigencies of nature, it would never be the motive of supernatural love; and b) if the goodness and life proper to God did not become common to us, they would never be the foundation of friendship (cf. condemned propositions of Baius 34, 36, 38).

876. Opinions not to be approved. - 1. A few moderns understood the goodness of God to be the formal motive of charity in such a way that God is our highest good and the one beatifying us, also saying that love of concupiscence is the love of charity. This assertion was made not only without any foundation, but also falsely, for it is against the nature and perfection of true friendship; nor does it seem possible to reconcile it with the doctrine concerning the preeminence of charity above hope. And not only does it directly contradict St. Thomas, as is manifest from the exposition of the doctrine made,[2] but also before the end of the eighteenth century it seems to have been unknown.

[2] Especially there can be seen *Q. D. de Virt.* 4, a. 3, ad 9; II-II, q. 17, aa. 6 and 8; q. 23, a. 5, ad 2; q. 26, a. 3, ad 3; q. 28, a. 1, ad 3; III Sent., d. 29, a. 3, ad 2.

2. Several others undeservedly contend that the motive of charity is nature alone, or some divine perfection abstracted from the rest, insofar as it is lovable in itself.

For although God can thus be loved with a certain love of benevolence, the motive of charity is goodness in itself insofar as it communicates itself; but God in himself is infinitely good with all perfections and communicates himself just as he is in himself, and therefore communicates to us all his perfections to be seen and possessed.

Moreover, the motive of charity is the ultimate end, namely, the highest goodness in itself, supremely lovable, than which a greater cannot be thought, and, when it is possessed, nothing remains to be desired, because it perfectly beatifies and fully satisfies the whole appetite of man. But these things are not verified concerning one or another perfection which virtually contains the others, but only concerning the good which is also formally conceived as the sum of all perfections, at least confusedly. Therefore the adequate motive of charity is the highest infinite goodness of God insofar as it contains all perfections.

877. The formal object of charity toward neighbor is the same goodness of God in himself, as the object of supernatural beatitude, insofar, namely, as it is communicated or communicable to us.

For we can love neighbor on account of the goodness of God in himself, to which he has relation:

a) insofar as he is a thing of God and is destined for his glory: a means on account of the end;

b) insofar as divine goodness is supernaturally participated by him, shines forth in him, and renders him lovable, or at least neighbor is destined to this: the participant to the participated; the image to the truth, exemplar, prototype;

c) insofar as he is loved by God, and at least by destination is a friend of God: the loved to the lover.

To love neighbor with the love of charity is to will supernatural good to him, especially that he may adhere to God as to the ultimate end, and thus in eternity love and praise God; but the motive why we will this is because God in himself, infinitely good and perfect, deserves to be loved, praised, and glorified eternally by all who can do that (cf. I Jn. III, 14 sq.; IV, 12, 21; V, 1, 2).

Thus the ultimate and formal reason for loving neighbor is the uncreated goodness itself of God, lovable on account of itself.

878. How by divine charity we love ourselves. - In the same way it is explained how we love ourselves on account of God. This nevertheless can seem difficult or even impossible, namely, that we love God because he is good in himself: for we do not love except that which is good to us; but to love someone because he is good to us is not to love ourselves on account of him, but on the contrary to love him on account of ourselves. This is clear from the fact that in all acts we naturally and necessarily pursue our happiness.

Resp.: It is true that the condition required in order that we love something is that it be our good, whence also first we naturally love God with the love of concupiscence because he is good to us; nevertheless the principal and proximate motive of love is not always that something is our good, but can be that it is good in itself; and therefore after we have loved God on account of ourselves, as our good, we also consider him as good in himself and love him principally on account of himself, and we refer ourselves to God and will ourselves to God, as God's good.

In other words: the pre-required condition *sine qua non* is that the act of love of such an object, and therefore the object itself, be our good and befit us (thus it is within the sphere of the will); but this universal reason of love is not the special reason of perfect love: it is not its proximate motive, nor is it that which the will desires. For thus someone does not love the good because it is his own, but because it is good.

This certainly does not signify that in that act we do not seek happiness: for in every act we naturally seek it; but it signifies that we will ourselves to God and refer our happiness to God's happiness, and voluntarily constitute it in that. Therefore charity does not tend so much into God as the good of the lover, but rather as the good of the beloved.

879. Corollaries. - From the aforesaid it follows:

1. Although benefits received or to be received from God are remote motives which induce and impel us to charity, insofar as a) they show that God in himself is perfect and lovable of himself (Eph. V, 2), and insofar as b) they move us to loving the benefactor himself in himself, in which case gratitude disposes to the love of charity; nevertheless to will good to God solely and precisely on account of benefits is not an act of charity, but of gratitude, which pertains to the virtue of religion. Therefore if benefits are considered as goods conferred upon us and we rest there, it is an act of gratitude; if they are considered as communications of divine goodness, it can be an act of charity, if in them we do not love our utility, because we have

received them, but the goodness of God which communicates itself, insofar as it is lovable on account of itself.

2. Charity, and the love of concupiscence by which we love God as our good, do not exclude one another; indeed this love is necessarily presupposed to charity, and remotely disposes and moves to it as an impulsive cause (as was said in the preceding corollary) and strengthens it, insofar as goods received or to be received from God show that he is good in himself.[3] - Hence love of concupiscence can be elicited by charity itself provided it is subordinated to it, and God is loved principally, while our good is desired secondarily, insofar as we desire to possess God and to be blessed so that through possession we may better love and praise the goodness of God.

[3] Concerning these things Sylvius teaches wisely, in II-II, q. 27, a. 3: "Several things must be observed. First. It is not permitted to love God or to do other good works with regard to reward as the end, if the reward is understood as the end of the thing loved, that is, of God; because God cannot be ordered to anything else as to an end. For since the end is loved more than those things which are for the end, it would follow that it is permitted to love something more than God.

3. To love neighbor solely because God commanded it is not an act of charity but of obedience.

4. To love neighbor on account of benefits received from him, or on account of excellent natural qualities, or on account of the natural image of God impressed in him, is not charity but natural love. The same must be said if he is loved on account of his supernatural perfections of grace and charity, not indeed precisely as they are a participation of divine goodness (for thus they are loved by charity, as was said in n. 877), but insofar as they are proper to neighbor, without considering the relation which they have to God.

5. No one from charity can love neighbor without virtually and implicitly loving God, because to love neighbor is to will that he love God eternally; and conversely he cannot love God without virtually and implicitly loving neighbor, because to love God is also to will that he be eternally loved and praised by neighbor. Cf. I Jn. IV, 12, 21; V, 1, 2.

6. The act of charity is an act supernatural as to substance, and truly divine, because as material and formal object it has God himself in himself: for it loves God himself on account of his own proper goodness, by which he surpasses all creatures and the whole of nature, namely, in the same mode by which we will love God in heaven where we will be perfectly participants in his life, and in a mode similar to that by which God loves himself.

"Second. It is altogether permitted to love God on account of the reward of eternal life as the end of our dilection; because eternal life is the reward and end of good works constituted by God, according to that saying Mt. XIX: if you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments; and I Pet. I: receiving the end of your faith, the salvation of souls...

"Third. It is not permitted so to love God on account of reward that eternal life either be constituted the altogether ultimate end of our dilection, or that on account of it we love God in such a way that otherwise we would not love him,... because since God is supremely good, and supremely lovable on account of himself, we ought to love him on account of himself, even supposing that no advantage would come to us from his dilection. Therefore God is to be loved on account of eternal reward in

such a way that we indeed exercise both dilection and other good works on account of beatitude as the end of those works, but further order that beatitude of ours into God, as into the simply ultimate end... In this manner we will have regard to God principally and on account of himself, but to eternal reward secondarily, and on account of God and the glory of God.

"Fourth. If by the name of reward some temporal thing is understood, it is not permitted to love or worship God with regard to reward as an end properly so called; nevertheless it is permitted with regard to it as some good either accompanying the principal end or conducing to it, which therefore moves the one acting as some secondary or accessory end..."

After these things have been noted beforehand, he responds to the question itself: "charity is principally a love of benevolence; nevertheless nothing prevents it from secondarily including some love of concupiscence: for true friendship does not exclude regard to some good to be obtained from a friend, provided the friend is loved first and principally on account of himself, and that good is expected secondarily...

"If it is asked whether this is of imperfection? it must be said that indeed it is of imperfection to need such incitement, just as it is of perfection not to need it... Nevertheless to the perfection of dilection (or justice) it simply detracts nothing, in loving (or worshiping) God, to have regard to eternal reward and to love with regard to it...

"But although the principal act of some virtue is worthier than the secondary, nevertheless it is not necessary that the principal alone be worthier than the principal and secondary together."

Cf. St. Thomas entirely, in III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 4.

Question Two: On the Material Object of Charity

Article I: On Those to Be Loved from Charity Generally

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, aa. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12; *de Virt.*, q. 2, a. 7.

880. The object of love is twofold. - Since to love is to will good to someone, in every love there is a twofold object: the person to whom we will good, who is the immediate object, loved in itself and simply; - and the good which we will to him, which is loved only mediately and under a certain respect, insofar as we love the person to whom this good belongs. Hence loved persons alone are properly called the material object of love.

881. Thesis. The principal material object of charity is God himself, the supernatural end, who is loved in himself on account of his proper goodness, and by reason of whom other persons are loved, so that thus we may love him better and more perfectly. The secondary material object is all rational creatures which can communicate in the beatitude of God: we ourselves, all wayfaring men, the saints in heaven, the good angels, souls dwelling in purgatory; but not irrational creatures, the damned, and evil angels. These are loved not in themselves on account of their proper goodness, but on account of God and his goodness: just as if someone has friendship toward some man, by reason of him he loves all who pertain to that man, whether sons, or friends, or servants, etc., insofar as they pertain to him, so the friendship of charity extends itself to all the members of God's household, whom he calls to his society and beatitude.

882. What good do we will by the love of charity? - The principal good which we will to God is his infinite perfections, which indeed we do not desire for him, but in which we are complacent; the secondary good is the external manifestation and glorification of these perfections, which we wish and procure for God and concerning which, when procured, we rejoice.

The principal good which we will to ourselves and to neighbor is charity itself together with its foundation, grace making one pleasing, and beatitude; the secondary good is both all supernatural goods which of themselves conduce to beatitude, and also, accidentally, natural goods insofar as they can sometimes conduce to beatitude.

Charity can also be concerned with irrational creatures or demons, insofar as it wills them to be preserved for the glory of God or the utility of men.

883. Four diverse things are to be loved from charity, according to Augustine, *de doctr. chr.*, l. 1, cc. 23 and 26:

1. something as the cause and root of beatitude: God;

2. something which directly participates beatitude: the one loving himself, or we ourselves;

3. those whom we can have associated with us in this participation: neighbors;

4. finally, something to which beatitude is derived only through a certain redundancy: our body.

Article II: On Loving God

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 4; q. 25, a. 1; q. 27, aa. 2, 5, 6; q. 28, a. 1; q. 44, aa. 4, 5, 6.

884. How charity is to be exercised toward God. - Charity or divine friendship is an efficacious love of benevolence, whence it embraces both complacency concerning divine goods, - and desire or benevolence properly so called, that is, the will of increasing divine goods, - and zeal for promoting the glory of God.

1. Complacency is concerning the goods which God possesses: for when we truly love someone, we hold his goods as ours, and therefore we are complacent in his goods, as if they were ours; which Christ indicated in these words: "If you loved me, you would indeed rejoice, because I go to the Father" Jn. XIV, 28. Hence:

a) The just rejoice concerning the infinite perfections of God considered in himself, such as wisdom, power, benignity, beauty, etc.; indeed they are more complacent in the perfection and glory of God than concerning their own beatitude. Thus Augustine is reported to have said: "Lord God, I love you thus, that if I were God and you Augustine, I would wish to be Augustine, so that you might be God." And St. Francis de Sales, who reports this, himself prayed: "O most beloved of my heart, I do not indeed desire that I could wish any good to your majesty, but with my whole heart I am complacent in that supreme grade of goodness which you have, to which neither by desire nor even by thought can anything be added; but if such a desire were possible, O infinite Deity and divine Infinity, my soul would wish to be this very desire and nothing else."[1]

[1] *Traite de l'Amour de Dieu*, l. V, ch. 6.

b) They rejoice likewise concerning the external manifestation of the attributes of God, concerning divine providence, concerning the extension of the kingdom of God, concerning the external glory which he receives from the Angels, the elect in heaven, and the just on earth.

c) This complacency spontaneously bursts forth into praise of God (which is an act of religion), by which they congratulate him concerning all things which pertain to his perfection and glory: "Glory to God in the highest... We praise you, we bless you, we glorify you... We praise you, O God; we confess you, O Lord."

2. Desire is concerning divine goods to be increased insofar as this is possible; which is benevolence strictly so called, by which we will and wish good to God: for when we truly love someone, we wish good to him as to ourselves.

a) That desire is not absolute as regards perfections intrinsic to God, the increase of which we do not wish, since no good can accrue to the Infinite; nevertheless we can in some way wish them under a condition. For St. Thomas says (III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4): "If it were possible that from our works something would accrue to him, one having charity would do many more things for preserving beatitude to him than for obtaining it for himself." Whence St. Francis de Sales (*l. c.*): "I said to the Lord: You are my God, filled with immense goodness, who need neither my goods nor anyone else's; nevertheless, if it were possible for you to need some good, I would never cease to wish it for you, and, to procure it for you, I would freely spend my life and all things dearest to me."

b) But the desire is absolute as regards the extrinsic glory of God, which by love we are led to procure, both in ourselves insofar as we are prepared to do and suffer all things for progressing in divine love, and in others insofar as we sincerely desire that sinners and unbelievers be enlightened and know, love, and glorify God, or also that the just glorify him more: "Let the peoples confess you, O God; let all the peoples confess you... Praise the Lord from the heavens... praise the Lord from the earth... praise him, all nations... Bless the Lord, all works of the Lord... Hallowed be your name, your kingdom come."

c) From this desire arises sadness concerning sins and offenses committed against God, the highest Good, and filial fear lest by offending God we be separated from him loved above all things.

3. Zeal for promoting the glory of God arises when love does not rest in affection alone, but also works exteriorly. For affection is not sufficient, but charity must be effective: "Let us not love in word nor with the tongue, but in deed and truth" (I Jn. III, 18; cf. Mt. XXV, 41 sq.). "He who has the commandments and keeps them, he is the one who loves me" (Jn. XIV, 21). Whence St. Gregory: "The proof of dilection is the exhibition of work" (*hom. in Ev.*, l. 8, hom. 30).

This happens in two ways: a) by vehemently repelling, as far as possible, those things which are against the honor and will of God, and b) by positively carrying out those things which procure the honor of God: in oneself by perfectly observing the commandments, indeed also the counsels, and by effecting all works for pleasing God in such a way that he truly reigns over us; in others by promoting the exercise of religion and of the virtues.

885. Suitable means for progressing in the love of God are to be employed. It is necessary:

1. To diminish the obstacle and gradually eradicate disordered love of self, which is directly contrary to divine love and is the cause of every sin (I-II, q. 77, a. 4). Whence Christ (Mt. XVI, 24): "If anyone wishes to come after me, let him deny himself." Therefore the nourishment of charity is the diminution of cupidity, and we progress in charity so much as we depress love of ourselves.

2. To consider the reasons for loving God, namely, a) God is the lover of us, who first loved us and from eternity freely chose us for existence and for innumerable natural and supernatural benefits, not for his advantage or happiness, but for our good.

b) God wills and ardently desires to be loved by us, as is clear from the precept which he imposed upon us as the first and greatest of the whole law (Mt. XXII, 37-38), - from the promises, threats, benefits, and punishments by which he allures us to love of himself, and is shown as most lavish benefactor, best father, most loving spouse, urgently demanding to be loved, - especially from the fact that he sent the Son who came to communicate the divine life to us, to send the fire of divine love so that it might be kindled, and to promise the Holy Spirit and God dwelling in us.

c) God in himself is infinitely lovable, as is clear from the fact that all perfections, goodnesses, and beauties of all creatures and all supernatural benefits he contains in himself eminently and infinitely; whence he is worthy of all love, and if love ought to be proportioned to the dignity of the object, the supreme and infinite goodness will have to be loved without measure.

3. To employ means by which charity may be frequently exercised and increased, whether:

a) directly, by eliciting an act of love toward God, an illustrious benefactor lovable in himself, complacency in the divine attributes worthy of all praise, benevolence by which we wish that the name of God be sanctified, that his kingdom come, and that his will be done as in heaven and on earth, zeal by which with all our powers we promote the glory of God, perfect contrition by which we detest sins because they offend God infinitely good; - or:

b) indirectly, by eliciting acts of the moral virtues which are informed by charity, especially observance of the commandments, which is a sign of dilection (Jn. XIV, 15, 21; I Jn. II, 4; V, 3), perfect submission to the will of God, especially in fulfilling the duties of one's state; indeed by any action of piety, work, mortification, etc., performed from the love of God (I Cor. X, 31). And thus even more difficult works become easy, for, as Augustine says, nothing is difficult to those who love.

Article III: On Loving Oneself

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, aa. 4, 5, 7.

886. Man must love himself, both with natural love, which he also fulfills naturally, since each one naturally loves his own conservation and happiness (and thus to love is common to the good and the evil); - and with the supernatural love of charity, as is manifestly supposed in the precept of the Lord, namely, of loving neighbor as oneself. For although friendship properly so called cannot be had directly toward oneself, but something greater than friendship, nevertheless friendship can be had toward God, and consequently toward others (and ourselves) who are God's. Hence St. Thomas, q. 25, a. 4:

"Since charity is a certain friendship... we can speak of charity in two ways. In one way under the common aspect of friendship, and according to this it must be said that friendship is not had properly toward oneself, but something greater than friendship, because friendship imports a certain union... But to each one toward himself there is unity, which is greater than union toward another. Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love by which someone loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For in this we have friendship toward others, because we have ourselves toward them as toward ourselves... In another way we can speak of charity according to its proper nature, insofar, namely, as it is principally the friendship of man toward God, and consequently toward those things which are God's: among which is also the very man who has charity; and thus among the other things which he loves from charity as pertaining to God, he also loves himself from charity."

887. How man must love himself. - By force of the divine precept man is bound, from charity toward himself, to love himself supernaturally, on account of God, not according to sensitive and corporeal nature considered in itself, and according to the corruption of the exterior man in those things which are repugnant to reason, but according to rational nature or the interior man, insofar as he can participate in divine beatitude according to soul and according to body. This is the most perfect reason and at the same time the sole norm and rule in love of ourselves: we ought to love ourselves, that is, soul and body, insofar as we pertain to God. And indeed:

1. Primarily the soul, which, created by God, through grace has been made a consort of the divine nature, redeemed by the blood of Christ, the temple of divinity, and capable of eternal beatitude.

Hence we are bound a) to prefer the salvation of the soul and sanctification before all things (Mt. VI, 33), and to employ the means necessary for salvation, b) to cultivate Christian virtues, c) to do good and meritorious works according to the example of Christ (Mt. VI, 19-20), d) to esteem grace and the means for preserving and increasing it more than all temporal helps, e) and to hate and fear the one thing, sin, which turns one away from God. But all goods of the soul, whether natural, such as erudition, knowledge, honor, reputation, glory, etc., or even supernatural, are not to be loved on account of themselves but on account of God.

2. Secondarily and subordinately we must also love the body, not on account of itself but on account of God, insofar as it is the instrument of the soul for offering honor to God and doing good (Rom. VI, 13, 19), and a temple of God sanctified by grace and in some way capable of beatitude, which redounds from the glory of the soul into the body (I Cor. VI, 19-20; XV, 42-43 [the original prints II Cor.]).

Hence a) we are bound to employ the ordinary means for conserving our own life, integrity of members, and health, by procuring for ourselves food, clothing, habitation, so that the body can be a suitable instrument for serving the soul and serving God; nevertheless b) in desiring the good of the body, for example health, pleasure, life, etc., we must seek all these things on account of God, unto the glory of God; c) we must restrain the concupiscence of the flesh and disordered desires out of hatred of sin, and inflict reasonable mortification upon the body, which weighs down the soul and is prone to rebellion, namely, so that it may be subjected to the mind and to the service of God (Col. III, 5; I Cor. IX, 27); d) nevertheless, we must not afflict the body out of hatred of the body considered

according to its nature (thus it is good), nor seek mortification on account of mortification itself (just as neither pleasure on account of pleasure), nor flee all delights and pleasures, but we can rejoice and enjoy even earthly delights, yet according to right reason.

888. They sin against charity toward themselves: a) More by excess, those who indulge disordered egoism and chiefly pursue private advantages, more than the good of God, or exclusively, with the glory of God or the salvation and utility of others set after them (Phil. II, 21; I Cor. X, 24 [the original prints II Cor.]; II Tim. III, 1-2). Hence it is understood 1. that this happens in every mortal sin (Ps. X, 6; Tob. XII, 10); 2. that for the sake of no good is it permitted to sin even venially.

b) More by defect: 1. those who so love exterior or bodily goods that spiritual goods are contemned, namely, by preferring the good of the body to the good of the soul (Mt. X, 28), or even by placing goods of fortune before the salvation and life of the body;

2. those who neglect the means necessary for salvation or the ordinary means of conserving their own life, integrity of the body, or health; or expose themselves without sufficient reason to danger of soul (for example, by long deferring penance) or of body (for example, of death or grave illness);

3. those who wish evil to themselves and, a fortiori, inflict it on themselves, for example, by directly harming the health of the body, by injuring themselves in the integrity of members, or by taking bodily life from themselves.

Nevertheless, one need not attend specially in confession to that malice by which these sins are opposed to charity toward oneself, because it is included in every sin; besides, these sins always injure another precept or virtue, and therefore they must be declared according to another species.

Article IV: On Sinners to Be Loved

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, aa. 6 and 7.

889. Sinners are to be loved. - "Every sinner," says Augustine, l. 1 *de Doctr. chr.*, c. 27, "insofar as he is a sinner, is not to be loved, and every man, insofar as he is man, is to be loved on account of God." Therefore sinners according as fault is in them are not to be loved, but rather to be held in hatred, that is, fault in sinners is to be held in hatred; but according to nature, insofar as they are men capable of eternal beatitude, they are to be loved from charity.

To desire evil for a sinner insofar as it is evil is always illicit. But sometimes it is permitted to desire a temporal evil for him under the aspect of a greater good, either for the amendment of fault (for example, illness or adversity so that he may be converted), or for the conservation of justice (for example, that he be punished for a crime committed), or for the common good (for example, the death of a heresiarch lest he lead others away from the faith). But it is illicit to desire for any wayfarer that he be damned or that he sin, because this is simply evil.

890. Sinners do not love themselves from charity. - "Sinners," say the Mechlin theologians, n. 60, q. 2, "do not truly love themselves; because they do not love themselves according to that which is principal in them, that is, according to the soul and spiritual goods; but according to that which they ought to hate and deny, namely, according to the corruption of the exterior man. Whence, says St.

Thomas (*Q. D. de Virt.* 2, a. 12, ad 6), the sinner 'hates himself more than he loves himself according to Ps. X, 6: He who loves iniquity hates his own soul.' Nevertheless natural love from love of his own being remains."

St. Thomas illustrates the matter, q. 25, a. 7: "To love oneself in one way is common to all, in another way is proper to the good, in a third way is proper to the evil... Man is said to be something: In one way according to his substance and nature; and according to this... all men, good and evil, love themselves, insofar as they love the conservation of themselves. In another way man is said to be something according to principality...: for what is principal in man is the rational mind, but what is secondary is sensitive and corporeal nature, the first of which the Apostle names the interior man, the second the exterior (II Cor. IV, 16). But the good esteem rational nature, or the interior man, as principal in themselves, whence according to this they esteem themselves to be what they are. But the evil esteem sensitive and corporeal nature, namely, the exterior man, as principal in themselves. Hence, not rightly knowing themselves, they do not truly love themselves, but love that which they reckon themselves to be. But the good, truly knowing themselves, truly love themselves.

"And the Philosopher proves this by five things which are proper to friendship. For each friend 1. wills his friend to be and to live; 2. wills goods to him; 3. works goods for him; 4. lives together with him delightfully; 5. agrees with him, as if delighted and saddened in the same things. And according to this the good love themselves, as regards the interior man, because 1) they will him to be preserved in his integrity; and 2) they wish goods for him, which are spiritual goods; and 3) they also devote effort to attaining them; and 4) they return delightfully to their own heart, because there they find both good thoughts in the present, and the memory of past goods, and the hope of future goods, from which delight is caused. Likewise also 5) they do not suffer dissension of will in themselves, because their whole soul tends to one thing. - On the contrary, the evil 1) do not will to be preserved in the integrity of the interior man; 2) nor do they desire spiritual goods for him; 3) nor do they work for this; 4) nor is it delightful for them to live with themselves by returning to the heart, because there they find evils, present, past, and future, which they abhor; 5) nor do they agree with themselves on account of a remorseful conscience.

"And by the same things it can be proved that the evil love themselves according to the corruption of the exterior man; but the good do not thus love themselves."

Article V: On Enemies to Be Loved

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, aa. 8 and 9; *de Virt.*, q. 2, a. 8.

891. Enemies are to be loved. - Enemies are those who hate us or ours, or have offended us, or have affected us with injury, or at least are apprehended as such.[1]

[1] Offense is only a wounding of another's will, by which we bring annoyance to another and provide a sufficient motive of displeasure and indignation without violation of right properly so called, and it is against charity alone and human peace, or affability, etc.; as if, when a friend asks from you a service which he greatly needs and which you can provide, you deny it: this requires reconciliation. Injury is also a wounding of right properly so called, and is against justice; this is either damaging when in fact it harms neighbor in goods, and this requires restitution, or simple if it does not harm, for example, if you inflict an insult upon someone alone, and this requires simple satisfaction.

Enemies are not to be loved as enemies, that is, their enmity must not be loved, because that is an evil. But enemies according to nature, insofar as they are men capable of eternal beatitude, are to be

loved from charity. - It is proved:

a) From the words of Christ, Mt. V, 44: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you... pray for those persecuting and calumniating you, that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven"; and VI, 12: "Forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors," where dilection of enemies is indicated as a condition required for the remission of sins, for v. 15: "But if you do not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins."

b) From the Old Testament: Lev. XIX, 17-18; Exod. XXIII, 4, 5; Prov. XXV, 21, compared with Rom. XII, 20-21.

c) Reason dictates the principle: What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; but no one wills to be held in hatred, but everyone desires to be loved. - Besides, it is against reason, on account of fault, to hate someone not only according to fault, but also according to nature, insofar as there is good in him.

892. Enemies by precept are to be loved in common, that is, as other men even unknown are loved, insofar as we cannot exclude them from dilection of neighbor; whence we are bound in itself and generally to offer them, from internal affection, the common signs and benefits of dilection: for to deny these generally is held as a sign of hatred, and easily causes scandal, both with respect to the enemy who is thereby confirmed in enmity, and also with respect to those seeing.

But in particular, by exercising a special act of dilection toward the person of an enemy, it is not of precept but of perfection and counsel; and therefore generally to exhibit special signs of dilection is not of precept. Nevertheless this is in the precept according to preparation of soul, namely, that man be prepared to love an enemy in particular, and to do good to him, and to exhibit to him special signs of dilection, if necessity should require it (Prov. XXV, 21).

893. Common signs and benefits of dilection are those which, by reason of general charity, either are exhibited to all men or to all of some condition (for example, when someone prays for all, or gives alms to all the poor of the same city), or are customarily exhibited mutually by all men of such a state or condition (for example, by a neighbor to neighbors, by a relative to relatives, by a father to sons, by a student to fellow students, etc.). But what these are must be judged from the estimation of the prudent and from received custom: for there is great diversity according to region, state, and time. Hence, says St. Alphonsus, n. 28: "It is not permitted to exclude an enemy from common prayers, for example, the Lord's prayer, which is instituted for the community, nor from common alms, returning a greeting, response (even by letters), sale of displayed merchandise; because these are common signs of dilection, and therefore to act against these, for example, to invite all relatives, to greet all those met from the neighborhood or college according to custom, with the enemy alone excluded" is in itself and regularly evil.

894. Special signs and benefits of dilection are those which are owed to no one, nor are required by the condition of the person and the custom of the region, but from mere liberality are specially exhibited to some persons, by reason of special friendship which is not toward all of the same condition: these, just as they are freely assumed, are freely omitted. Hence in itself and generally we are not bound to visit sick enemies, to console the sorrowful, to receive them with hospitality or at a banquet, to pray specially for them, to have frequent intercourse with them, for example, by letters, indeed not even to speak to or greet them first, unless there were question of a superior or of those

very closely joined, or unless greeting or speaking were a common sign of charity toward those met (for example, in small places, at a banquet, in communities, etc.), from which to abstain longer would be held as a sign of hatred.

895. To omit common signs and benefits of dilection sometimes is permitted, but accidentally and extraordinarily, for a time, on account of a just cause:

a) from justice, namely, 1) if a superior offended by an inferior thus hopes to amend him (provided the hope is founded), or intends to correct him, or to give an example to others: for a superior has the right of punishing;[2]

[2] Parents can cast out children for a time, on account of a crime committed, or on account of an unworthy marriage, namely, for amendment or chastisement; but they cannot deny reconciliation perpetually.

b) from charity: 2) if it is done without hatred, even by a non-superior, so that the boldness and insolence of the offender may be restrained, or so that he may be amended;[3] 3) if someone, from the exhibited signs, prudently fears greater obstinacy of the enemy, remembrance of injuries, new disturbance or quarrel;

[3] Some, such as Ballerini and Genicot, say that this is permitted for taking vengeance concerning a lighter injury: for what can be sought from judges in graver injuries seems able to be assumed by each one on account of the same ends in lighter offenses, for avenging which one is not accustomed to have recourse to judges. - Nevertheless this does not seem to be approved, because in all Catholic theology the principle has always been solemn that private vengeance is illicit, both because it is permitted to no one to render right to himself and to vindicate his own rights for himself, but this belongs to judges, and because in practice it will be difficult to seek vengeance solely from love of justice without any malevolent mind; but the principle of Ballerini is new and unheard of. Hence this mode of acting is to be admitted only not as vengeance for a past injury, but as a restraint upon a further injury. Nevertheless Prummer notes, *Th. M.* II, n. 119, that this is permitted practically, if the superior is judged to delegate a private person; for example, by the presumed permission of parents a small correction can be administered to children, such as a light beating.

c) from another reasonable cause: 4) if it is done as a sign of just sorrow from an actual or recent injury, especially if this was atrocious; 5) if it is done on account of an injury gravely defaming, lest that injury seem to be little esteemed; 6) if, without scandal, it is done because someone knows certainly that the enemy will not respond to the signs exhibited, for example, because he has experienced this; but if he doubts, he is bound to try at least once.

896. We must exhibit special signs of dilection accidentally and extraordinarily; which then are already common signs owed to all:

a) in grave spiritual or temporal necessity (of life, reputation, fortune) of neighbor, for then to deny them would rightly be held as a sign of hatred;

b) when an enemy asks pardon, or exhibits special signs for obtaining it, in which case to deny special signs ordinarily is a sign of hatred; yet sometimes someone will licitly deny them (for a time), for example, a superior for amendment, punishment, or example, and anyone for expressing just sorrow if pardon is sought immediately after the offense;

c) for resisting hatred to which you feel yourself prone;

d) for avoiding scandal, which nevertheless generally can be avoided otherwise, for example, by a declaration or admonition of those seeing;

e) if there is founded hope that the enemy will then put aside grave hatred, from which obligation nevertheless a grave inconvenience excuses (cf. below, p. 3, q. 3, a. 2).

897. To deny to an enemy owed signs of charity is a mortal sin from its genus. - It is mortal because it is against charity;[4] this happens 1) from internal intention, when it proceeds from hatred or an appetite of vengeance mortally evil, 2) on account of external signification, when it is considered by the enemy as a grave offense, or when it causes grave scandal, or when it would be held by others as a sign of grave hatred or of an appetite of vengeance mortally evil. To judge this last, one must attend to the cause on account of which the signs are omitted; for example, if it is done on account of a preceding grave quarrel, it will more easily be held as a sign of grave hatred than if it is done on account of trifles. Hence it seems too general, what some say without restriction, that a religious who after ten days does not wish to speak to a confrere is not to be absolved: for it is not always held as a sign of grave hatred.

[4] St. Thomas proves the matter, *Q. D. de Virt.*, q. 2, a. 8: "In him who exercises enmity against us, there are two things to be found: one which is the reason of dilection, namely, that he pertains to God, and another which is the reason of hatred, namely, that he is opposed to us. But in whomever the reason of dilection and the reason of hatred are found, if, with dilection passed over, we are turned into hatred, it is manifest that that which is the reason of hatred preponderates in our heart over that which is the reason of dilection. Therefore if someone hates his enemy, that one's enmity preponderates in his heart over divine love. Therefore he hates that one's enmity more than he loves God. But we hate something as much as we love the good which is taken away from us by the enemy. It remains therefore that whoever hates an enemy loves some created good more than God, which is against the precept of charity. Therefore to have an enemy in hatred is contrary to charity."

It is mortal from its genus; therefore it admits lightness of matter: thus if a person much greater does not return the greeting of an inferior, for example, a nobleman of a rustic, a father of a son, it does not seem mortal; and otherwise in our regions the omission of greeting or of returning a greeting once or twice is often a venial sin: for in itself it is opposed only to affability, nor among us is it always a sign or effect of grave hatred, or cause of grave scandal.

898. We are bound interiorly to remit the offense to an enemy (Mt. VI, 15; XVIII, 35), yet not to renew with him the former special friendship, if this was freely assumed. Nor are we bound in itself, even if he asks pardon, to remit restitution for damage caused, or satisfaction for injury inflicted (for no one is bound in itself to remit a good owed to him), indeed not even to accept them if he offers them; but we can seek them by juridical action, provided that we do not principally intend the evil of the enemy, but the good which such an action procures, namely, the amendment of the enemy, or restraint, the quiet of others, or the conservation of justice.

In practice, however: 1) Generally we must accept sufficient satisfaction spontaneously offered, nor can we pursue it juridically, especially if there is question of seeking a grave penalty against the enemy without advantage for us, or of urging a greater satisfaction than he can provide. The reason is that in seeking such things, a spirit of vengeance is with difficulty absent: for it is difficult that someone seek public vengeance from a judge from pure love of justice, without a disordered love of private vengeance which is illicit, and to which man is very prone; whence also common estimation holds this as a sign of vengeance.

2. Sometimes we must remit reparation for a merely personal injury, when the burden which the enemy would undergo in repairing it would be too great with respect to the good which would

come to us from it.

3. It is never permitted to remit it, if a superior needed his reputation not so much for himself, but more for the good and salvation of others, or if it is an injury which would create infamy for the whole family or community, unless it were repaired by juridical satisfaction.

899. On the order and mode of reconciliation. - The offender must begin reconciliation (Mt. V, 23-24) as soon as he morally can: for from charity he is bound, just as not to place an offense, so also to remove it; but if the offense is mutual, he who offended more gravely; if it is nearly equal, he who offended first. An exception is if it is certainly foreseen that pardon will be denied by the other, or if the offender greatly surpasses him in dignity or state, unless perhaps the injury is enormous.

Reconciliation generally is sought sufficiently in an indirect mode through a special sign of dilection: by sending a gift [the original prints *dotium*], by providing deference, a service or benefit, by anticipating in honor, by friendly conversation, etc., or by the intercession of others. Nevertheless, when the offense was grave, and no other means of reconciliation is present (or if a superior or judge imposes it), the offender also must directly ask pardon, because just as from charity he was bound not to place the offense, so from charity he is bound to remove it. But in practice, a formal petition of pardon admits many excuses, for example, if it is not in use among persons of such a condition, if the offended person demands an unaccustomed humiliation, or does not care about the petition, or if satisfaction can be made fully otherwise, for example, by money or by an indirect means, through a sign of special dilection or honor, as was said above.

900. Practical warning. - Since each one easily persuades himself that he has suffered the graver injury, let the confessor exhort each one to seek reconciliation. Nevertheless, let him not easily impose the obligation of directly asking pardon, because this is almost never present; indeed even if it is certainly present, prudence often advises that he leave the penitent in good faith, if the admonition is not hoped to be profitable.

Question Three: On the Order of Charity

901. In charity order must be observed insofar as one thing ought to be loved more than another, according to comparison to the principle of the dilection of charity; which is twofold: the objective and final principle of beatitude and dilection, which is God, and the efficient principle of dilection, or the one loving himself. For the object of charity is the good loved, and this according to diverse grades insofar as one thing is better, or more proximate.

This order exists not only a) principally between diverse persons; but also secondarily, b) between diverse goods, some of which are more excellent or more necessary than others; indeed c) between diverse dilections or friendships, which, according to the diverse goods in which they are founded, are more excellent than others: for human goods, in which other conjunctions and friendships are founded, are ordered as to an ultimate end to the good upon which charity is founded, namely, to eternal beatitude; and therefore the conjunction and dilection of charity subordinates to itself all other honorable dilections, and commands the acts of every other honorable friendship (q. 26, a. 7).

902. The order to be observed is described by St. Augustine, *de doctr. chr.*, l. I, cc. 27-28:

"But he lives justly and holily who is an uncorrupted judge of things: and he is one who has ordered dilection, lest he either love what is not to be loved, or not love what is to be loved, or love more what is to be loved less, or love equally what is to be loved either less or more, or love less or more what is to be loved equally. Every sinner insofar as he is a sinner is not to be loved; and every man, insofar as he is man, is to be loved on account of God, but God on account of himself. And if God is to be loved more than every man, each one ought to love God more than himself. Likewise another man is to be loved more than our body: because all these things are to be loved on account of God, and another man can enjoy God with us, which the body cannot; because the body lives through the soul by which we enjoy God. But all are to be loved equally; but since you cannot profit all, one must chiefly consult those who, by opportunities of places and times or of any things whatever, are more closely joined to you by a certain lot."

Therefore between persons there is a threefold order: 1. between God and us, 2. between us and neighbor, 3. between various neighbors.

Article I: On the Order Between God and Us

S. Th. II-II, q. 26, aa. 1, 2, 3; *De Virt.*, q. 2, a. 7.

903. Notions. - It must be noted beforehand that someone is loved more than another in a threefold way: a) objectively, we love more him to whom we will a greater good; b) appreciatively or estimatively, we love more him whom simply we prefer and esteem more highly than another, so that we fear more to lose his friendship than that of another; c) intensively, we love more him whom we love with a more fervent affection, that is, with greater intensity and vehemence of act, for example, with greater striving of the will.[1]

[1] Billuart notes that St. Thomas under the same word of intension speaks of intension and appreciation: both are on the part of the agent.

904. Principle. In the order of charity God is to be loved simply above all things. - It is of the essence of charity that we love God above all things, as is said in Deut. VI, 5 and Mt. XXII, 37:

1. Objectively, because we ought to will to God divine goods which are infinite, namely, the infinity of his perfections which can belong to no creature; and because we ought to refer all other things to God and desire greater glory for him than for ourselves or neighbor.

2. Also appreciatively, so that we would prefer to lose and suffer all things rather than desert him;[2] for a) the infinite demands to be loved more than a finite creature, and the common good of all more than one's own particular good; b) God is the principle and cause of beatitude, whence we ought to love God more than ourselves or neighbor, who are only participants in this beatitude; c) the reason for loving ourselves and neighbor is God, as was said in nn. 877-878; whence God is to be loved more. Hence d) it is said in Lk. XIV, 26: "If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother..., and also his own soul (life), he cannot be my disciple" (cf. Mt. X, 37).

[2] Appreciatively, that is, also by election of the will or by estimative affection, not only judicatively through an act of the intellect; for thus even the demons themselves know and judge that God on account of himself is most worthy to be preferred to all created goods, but they do not thus esteem him by will.

3. Nevertheless we are not bound to love God more intensively;[3] for sensible and present or proximate goods are accustomed to move us more vehemently than remote, absent, and divine goods.

[3] Appreciation is from election of the will; intensity is not always so. For the intensity of the will and sensation of love does not arise so much from the dignity of the object as from the subjective disposition of the one loving, namely, from the vivid perception of the object and its proximity. Those things which seem more proximate to us are accustomed to be perceived more vividly and thus to excite more and to be loved more intensely. Hence many created objects, as visible, are perceived by us as more proximate and are felt by us more vividly than God, and therefore they excite intense love more than the contemplation of the invisible perfections of God.

But a creature cannot be loved more intensively than God, if from charity it is loved by the same act, because thus the reason for loving the creature is God loved, who consequently is loved more.

Article II: On the Order Between Us and Neighbor

S. Th. II-II, q. 26, aa. 4 and 5.

905. Notions. - It must be noted beforehand: a) that there is a threefold genus of goods, distinct in the order of charity: 1. spiritual and eternal goods, whether supernatural or natural, which of themselves and directly regard the soul and salvation, that is, the moral perfection of man, "honorableness," are to be esteemed more; - 2. then come natural temporal goods (whether of soul or of body) intrinsic to man, which of themselves and directly constitute the physical perfection of man, such as life, integrity and health of the body, doctrine, natural dispositions of soul, liberty, etc.; - 3. finally, natural goods extrinsic to man, among which nevertheless reputation and honor, as being something moral, excel riches. But note that the common good is greater than a private good, because the good of the whole, as more universal, excels the good of the part.

It must be noted beforehand: b) that in goods both spiritual and eternal and temporal, a threefold necessity is distinguished in the order of charity: 1. extreme, when danger of damnation, or of death, or of another equivalent evil, morally certainly threatens, and cannot morally be avoided without the help of another;[1] but an evil equivalent to death is perpetual privation of a great good which is equated with life and which nature willed to be common to all, such as health, reason, liberty, integrity of members, for example, an incurable disease, perpetual loss of the use of reason, and perhaps loss of a principal member, or servitude or perpetual imprisonment, especially if it is harsh; - 2. grave, when the aforesaid evils threaten only probably and man cannot avoid them without great difficulty, or when the evil certainly threatening is only grave, such as unjust captivity, notable infamy, grave illness, grave loss of goods by which it happens that someone supports himself with difficulty, loss of state, etc.; - 3. common, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty: in the spiritual order ordinary sinners are in this, and in the temporal order the poor begging at the door, whether publicly or secretly.

[1] Danger is estimated not strictly but morally, so that also a proximate danger of shortly falling into extreme necessity is understood, which by some is called quasi-extreme necessity. Hence the definition has been made so that it includes quasi-extreme necessity.

906. General principle. In the order of charity, other things being equal, man ought to love himself more than neighbor. - The order between us and neighbor is that, in equal goods and equal necessity and condition, each one simply loves himself more than neighbor. It is proved:

a) From Mt. XXII, 39: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Lev. XIX, 18), in which words dilection of oneself is handed down as the rule and exemplar of dilection of neighbor; but a rule is more powerful than the thing ruled; therefore we ought to love ourselves more than neighbor. Hence the word "as" does not signify that man loves neighbor equally to himself, but only similarly to himself (q. 44, a. 7).

b) Man through charity loves himself as a participant of beatitude, but neighbor only as an associate in this participation. But, says St. Thomas, participation is more powerful than association, as unity is more powerful than union. Therefore man ought to love himself more than neighbor.

c) Man naturally is more inclined to love of himself than to love of neighbor. This natural inclination, as instilled by the author of nature, cannot be disordered.

907. Comparing only spiritual and eternal goods, the principle is this: each one is bound to love himself more as regards the soul or salvation than neighbor. Whence:

a) It is never permitted, for the salvation of neighbor, to sin even most lightly.

b) Nor is it permitted to expose oneself to proximate danger of sinning, because this is to sin (props. 62 and 63, condemned by Innocent XI); but it is permitted to expose oneself to danger if it is remote, - and even, for a grave cause, if, suitable remedies having been employed, so that there is founded hope of not falling, the proximate danger can be rendered remote, - indeed sometimes it is necessary so to act that help may be given to neighbor in extreme spiritual necessity.

c) Charity always inclines to desiring grace and glory more for ourselves, and indeed greater grace and glory, than for neighbor, nor is it ever permitted to desire a lesser grace and glory for oneself.

d) Charity of itself always inclines us to more perfect things; nevertheless, if these are not strictly necessary, we can and sometimes must leave them on account of the spiritual or even temporal good of neighbor, for example, a priest leaving prayer in order to hear confessions, a son leaving entrance into religion in order to support parents. Yet in this case the good, if it is left from charity because thus it pleases God more, is compensated through charity.

908. Comparing the spiritual and eternal goods of neighbor with our temporal goods, the general principle is that each one is bound to love neighbor as regards the soul and salvation more than his own body. The reason is because we ought to love the soul of neighbor as associated in the full participation of beatitude, but our body as participant of beatitude by redundancy; but association in full beatitude is a greater reason for loving than participation by redundancy. Therefore.

Specifically: a) In the extreme spiritual necessity of neighbor, each one is bound, under grave sin, to aid him with certain danger of life (for example, an infant dying without Baptism, or a sinner about to undergo death who is not thinking of it or cannot elicit perfect contrition), provided that the necessity is not from his own malice (as it is in duellists and in unjust attackers of life), there is probable hope of helping him, there is no other who may bring help, nor is a graver evil feared, as if thereby the salvation of several others would be endangered (Jn. XV, 12; I Jn. III, 16).

b) In grave spiritual necessity,[2] neighbor must be aided, under grave sin, with some detriment in temporal goods of reputation, honor, fortune, to be morally estimated by the judgment of the prudent. Yet not with danger of life, although charity advises this; unless 1) someone is bound from justice by reason of office, as a physician, or a pastor who is bound with danger of life or of temporal

goods to minister the sacrament of Penance to parishioners infected with plague (Jn. X, 11); or 2) unless there is public necessity: for this is always joined with the extreme necessity of many, and otherwise the common good excels the private; whence if someone spreads depraved doctrine among the people and there is no one who may impede him, there is an obligation to impede him with danger of life; and in a time of plague (or persecution) a priest not having care of souls is bound to assist the dying, if there is no other.

[2] Grave necessity of soul is that from which, although neighbor can liberate himself absolutely, nevertheless he cannot do so except with difficulty, either on account of the vehemence of passion, or on account of inveterate custom and obstinacy in evil, or on account of ignorance or another cause.

c) In common spiritual necessity, neighbor must be aided without bodily detriment, but not with even light detriment (cf. p. 3, q. 3, a. 2).

909. Comparing only temporal goods, the general principle is that each one in itself is bound to love his own life and temporal goods more than the life and temporal goods of neighbor, - but neighbor more as regards bodily goods than himself as regards external goods.

Specifically: a) In extreme temporal necessity, neighbor must be aided, under grave sin, with notable proper temporal detriment; but not by extraordinary means (for to this not even man himself is bound as regards his own life), nor with loss of life or of a good almost equivalent, unless there is question of the extreme necessity of the commonwealth. Nevertheless, if someone does not distrust his state of grace, nor is there a necessity of family or of others, charity often permits and advises him to expose his life (a fortiori temporal goods) on account of a motive of virtue, for example, on account of friendship, gratitude, the honor of God, the common good, not by loving the life of neighbor equivalently to his own, but by loving the good of virtue more than his own life, because the good of virtue, which is spiritual, excels bodily life. Thus with danger of life they laudably serve those infected with plague, cast themselves into waters to rescue others, die for a person very necessary to the commonwealth or family.[3]

[3] "To hand oneself over to death on account of a friend is the most perfect act of virtue; whence the virtuous man desires this act more than his own bodily life. Hence that someone lays down his own bodily life on account of a friend does not happen from this, that someone loves the friend more than himself, but because in himself he loves the good of virtue more than bodily good." III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3.

b) In grave temporal necessity a private person must be aided, under grave sin, with only moderate inconvenience, and a community even with grave inconvenience.

c) In common temporal necessity, neighbor must be aided if this can be done without inconvenience (cf. p. 3, q. 3, a. 1).

910. Corollaries. - 1. From the aforesaid it follows that the principle, "Charity does not oblige with great inconvenience," holds in common and grave necessity, and indeed only generally, but it does not hold in extreme necessity, in which charity obliges even with the greatest inconvenience.

2. In all the aforesaid rules this is understood: if there is hope of fruit, and if another more bound has not provided it.

Article III: On the Order Among Various Neighbors

S. Th. II-II, q. 26, aa. 6-13; q. 31, a. 3; *de Virt.*, q. 2, a. 9.

911. Notions. - Order is attended according to greater proximity to the principle. But the principle of dilection is twofold, one objective: God; the other efficient: the one loving. Therefore a twofold order must be attended in charity: a) according to proximity to God; b) according to proximity or conjunction to the one loving.

Now a threefold conjunction is chiefly distinguished:

1. carnal, arising from the bond of blood, and founded in the goods of life and family: this is diverse in species according as it is between parents and children, - or between spouses, - or between blood-relatives, - or between relatives by affinity;

2. spiritual, arising from the bond of religion and founded in spiritual and eternal goods; which also contains several species: between members of the Church, - between members of a community, - between pastor and sheep, - between preacher or confessor and convert or penitent, etc.;

3. civil, arising from a political bond and founded in social goods, of which again there are multiple species: between citizens, cohabitants, fellow soldiers, benefactor and one receiving benefits, etc.

912. General principle. In the order of charity the better are to be loved more objectively, the more proximate more intensively and appreciatively. - Order is attended according to greater proximity to the principle. But the principle of dilection is twofold, one objective: God; the other efficient: the one loving. Therefore those who are more proximate and more conjoined to God or to us are to be loved more. And indeed:

1. The better or holier are to be loved more in one way, namely, objectively but directly, that is, by dilection which rests upon goods already possessed: for by dilection of complacency we ought to rejoice concerning the greater good possessed by them, and by dilection of benevolence we ought to will to them the greater beatitude to which they possess a right. For they are more proximate to God and therefore more worthy, and according to this we also owe them greater reverence, worship, and honor.

2. Those more conjoined to us, other things being equal, are to be loved more in all other ways:

a) Intensively: for love is the motion of the lover into the beloved; but the principle of motion flows more vehemently into those things which are more proximate to it than into more remote things; therefore, the more proximate some are to the one loving, the more vehemently they are to be loved, "and therefore man loves them with a more intense affection as regards that good toward which he loves them than the better as regards a greater good."

b) Also appreciatively: for thus those are to be loved more who are loved by more titles, and modes of dilection or friendships, all of which are commanded by charity (to which they are ordered as to an end, as was said in n. 901). But those more conjoined to us are united to us by more titles and dilections; others, however, only by the common conjunction of charity, because they can arrive at beatitude. Therefore from charity we ought to esteem more and prefer those more conjoined to us.

c) Hence also objectively they are to be loved more, at least indirectly: for the good of virtue in man can be increased and diminished, and therefore from charity we can will that those more proximate to us be better than others, and thus arrive at greater beatitude. - Therefore they are to be loved more by the dilection of benevolence and desire, by which we wish for others a good not yet possessed, and by the dilection of mercy and beneficence, by which we procure good for them (I Tim. V, 8; Gal. VI, 10; Is. LVIII).

Whence simply and absolutely those more conjoined are to be loved more.

913. Special principles. I. In goods proper to some conjunction, he is to be preferred to the others who according to this conjunction is more proximate to us, and therefore in those things which pertain to nature we ought to love blood-relatives more, in those things which pertain to civil intercourse fellow citizens are to be preferred, and in military matters fellow soldiers.

II. In goods common to any conjunction whatever, whether eternal or temporal, those must be preferred who are absolutely more proximate, that is, who are united to us by a stronger conjunction.

But in itself spiritual conjunction prevails over civil; but carnal conjunction prevails over both, as resting upon nature, and therefore prior and more immovable, and founded upon greater benefits: for charity does not change the order of nature but perfects it. Hence a son is bound to leave military service or religious life, if necessary, for converting or supporting his parents.

914. Order among blood-relatives. - Generally, ordinarily, and in itself, among various blood-relatives aid must be given 1. to the wife, who is so intimately united with the husband that they are one flesh; 2. to children, for whom according to nature parents ought to provide; 3. to the father, who is the nobler principle of generation; 4. to the mother; 5. to brothers and sisters; 6. to other blood-relatives and relatives by affinity. After them come friends, benefactors, superiors, and persons more useful to the commonwealth.

It is said: generally, ordinarily, and in itself, for a) in extreme necessity parents seem to be preferred to all others, because since they have given life, their life, if necessary, is especially to be preserved; b) from particular circumstances it is permitted to invert this order: thus a good and diligent mother is to be loved more than an evil and dissipating father, likewise a singular friend or notable benefactor more than more remote blood-relatives; c) it is permitted to change the order by reason of office or a special obligation: thus a pastor generally is bound more to the instruction of parishioners than of blood-relatives, yet not in extreme necessity.

915. Observations. - 1. Parents, because more similar to God, are to be loved more objectively and with reverence than wife and children; but these latter more estimatively and intensively and with beneficence, because they are more conjoined. For the same reason benefactors are loved more objectively than those to whom we do good; conversely, those to whom we do good are loved more intensively than benefactors.

2. A father as father is in itself to be loved more than a mother as such, because he is the nobler principle of generation; but under another respect (and by another dilection) the mother can be loved more, for example, if she loves more, as naturally easily happens, because often she has done more for the son (at least in the beginning) and knows more that he is her son than the father does, and immediately holds and nourishes the newborn with herself. Whence St.

Thomas, III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 7, ad 4: "the mother places more of her own in the son than the father, but more of that by which he is son is placed by the father than by the mother."

3. In these and in all the rules stated above, equal necessity in all in the same order of goods is always supposed; in unequal necessity one must first aid him who suffers the greater need, for example, an infant is to be baptized rather than confessions heard.

4. An inversion of the order of charity is not mortally evil unless there is question of extreme necessity; - or unless it is very notable and is done without any reason. An inversion between son, wife, and parents is not notable; but it is notable between wholly strange persons and those very conjoined.

5. In heaven a) the order of charity between God and us remains, where God will be loved simply above all things; - b) as regards the order between us and neighbor, objectively we will love the better more, and the less good less, in perfect conformity to the divine will; but appreciatively and intensively, ourselves more; - c) as regards various neighbors, simply we will love more those more conjoined to God (as more conjoined to us), because every other conjunction to neighbor ceases in heaven and the whole blessed life consists in the immutable ordination of the mind to God; whence those are loved more there and are held by us as more proximate who are more proximate to God. And although some are also loved by more titles and modes (because grace does not destroy natural dilection), nevertheless to all these reasons the reason of dilection which is taken from proximity to God is incomparably preferred. The contrary holds on earth, where we need the help of others (*Q. D. de Virt.* 2, a. 9, ad 12; II-II, q. 26, a. 13).

Third Part: On the Acts of Charity

First Question: On the Proper Act, or Dilection

S. Th. II-II, q. 27.

916. The virtue of charity, like every friendship, tends toward love, not toward that by which we are loved by others, but that by which we love others. For it is a love of benevolence; and benevolence wishes more to love than to be loved. Whence:

1. the proper act of charity is to love, which "befits charity insofar as it is charity";

2. "to love befits it more than to be loved": to love befits it according to itself, insofar as a virtue is inclined to its proper act; to be loved befits it through another, insofar as it itself also is a certain lovable good, and has the common character of good toward the loving of which others are moved by an act of charity; whence mothers, because they love most, seek more to love than to be loved;

3. to love is more praiseworthy and better than to be loved, whence friends are praised more from this, that they love, than from this, that they are loved; indeed, if they do not love, they are blamed. And although the better, insofar as they are better, are more lovable, from the fact that in them there is more perfect charity they are more loving.

917. The proper and principal act of charity is dilection. - This is not simple benevolence, by which we merely will good, but is a love of benevolence and friendship, and therefore also includes union according to affection between the one loving and the one loved, insofar as we esteem those whom we love in some way as one with us, and thus are moved toward them and also will good to them (nn. 844 and 846).

Therefore dilection includes benevolence and adds union of affection and complacency. Whence benevolence is the principle of friendship.

Therefore it is not sufficient to will a greater good to those who are to be loved more, or even effectively to do them good more, but it is also necessary according to affection to love one more than another, so that from the greater affection charity may proceed into a greater effect according as it shall be necessary.

918. How God is to be loved. - A. God is to be loved on account of himself: 1. as final cause, because he is not ordered to another, but he himself is the ultimate end of all; 2. as formal cause, because he himself is his goodness by essence; 3. as efficient cause, for his goodness proceeds from no other, but, on the contrary, the goodness of others proceeds from him. - But 4. not as dispositive or material cause, for on account of other things we are disposed to loving God in himself, for example, through benefits received from him, or through rewards hoped for, or through punishments which we intend to avoid through him. And thus hope and fear lead to charity.

B. God is to be loved immediately, and by means of him whatever other things there are are loved. For although here on earth he cannot be known immediately and in himself, yet he can thus be loved, because love tends into the thing loved not according as it is in the knower, but according as it exists in itself;[1] and therefore in heaven charity is not emptied out but remains.

[1] Cajetan notes: God in himself is the immediate term of love, although he does not immediately move to loving, because through other things we know God and so are moved to loving him.

C. God is to be loved totally: a) on the part of the thing loved, because the whole that pertains to God ought to be loved; b) also on the part of the one loving, because man ought to love God according to his whole power, that is, to order his whole self and all that is his to the love of God. - c) Nevertheless he cannot be loved totally according to the comparison of the one loving to the thing loved, so that he would be loved as much as he is lovable, because no creature can love infinitely him who is infinitely lovable.

D. God is to be loved supremely and without mode, and no mode is to be imposed on the dilection of him, because in the dilection of God there cannot be excess. For God is the ultimate end and the measure and supreme rule of all actions. But no one can adhere too much to the ultimate end, nor to the supreme rule; otherwise there would be another end of the ultimate end and another measure of the measure, and thus one would proceed to infinity. But the more the ultimate end and rule is attained, so much the better it is. Therefore the more God is loved, so much the better is the dilection.[2]

[2] Therefore it is not in the mean, but supreme: "The end," says St. Thomas, a. 6, "of all human actions and affections is the dilection of God, by which we especially attain the ultimate end, and therefore in the dilection of God a mode cannot be taken as in a measured thing, so that there would be in it taking more and less; but as mode is found in the measure, in which there cannot be excess, but the more the rule is attained, so much the better it is: and thus the more God is loved, so much the better is the dilection."

919. Observations. - As regards the merit of dilection, St. Thomas teaches: 1. the dilection of a friend, on the part of the object, is more meritorious than the dilection of an enemy, because it is better to love the better; but the dilection of an enemy, as being more difficult, is a sign of greater dilection of God, which is shown to be stronger in proportion as from it we do more difficult things; nevertheless charity loves friends more fervently than enemies because they are more proximate to us (a. 7).

2. If they are considered separately, the dilection of God is more meritorious than the dilection of neighbor, for this latter is not meritorious except through the former; but if the dilection of God alone and the dilection of neighbor on account of God loved are compared, so that it includes the dilection of God, thus the dilection of neighbor is preeminent (a. 8).

Second Question: On the Internal Effects of Charity

S. Th. II-II, q. 28, 29, 30, 45.

920. There are three internal effects of charity:

The first is joy, which is caused from dilection, either a) on account of this, that good is in the one loved and is preserved in him, and thus we rejoice concerning the immutable goodness of God (the joy of friendship completing the love of complacency), or b) on account of the presence of the one loved, and thus we rejoice fully concerning God in heaven, or even on earth concerning his indwelling in the soul (the joy of concupiscence filling the desire of the one loving). The first joy can have no sadness mixed with it; - likewise the other joy in heaven, where it will be altogether full, because nothing remains to be desired, indeed super-full, because more is given than is desired; but not now on earth, where from it there can also follow sadness concerning those things which are opposed to the perfection of participation of the divine good and which are contrary to the effects of charity in us or in neighbor.

In a similar mode we can rejoice concerning our own goods, and rejoice together concerning the goods of neighbor.

The second is peace, which includes two things: a) concord or union of our will with the will of others: charity makes this insofar as we love neighbors as ourselves; from which it happens that a man wills to fulfill the will of neighbor as of himself, and thus two wills tend into one; b) the union of all our appetites: charity makes this insofar as we love God from the whole heart and refer all things to him; and thus all our appetites tend into one.

The third is mercy, which is defined by St. Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, l. 9: "compassion or sadness in our heart over another's misery, by which, indeed, if we are able, we are compelled to give relief." For because one loving regards a friend as himself, he regards his evil as his own, and therefore he grieves over this as over his own, and wills to relieve his misery, as his own.

Joy and peace are secondary acts of charity, naturally and necessarily consequent upon dilection; they have the same object and motive as dilection, whence they are not distinct habits. But mercy is a special virtue because it has a special object, namely, another's misery to be relieved by our aid from compassion, and a special appetite, namely, grief over another's misery, to be moderated by reason. Now misery consists in this, that a man suffers what he does not will, that is, an evil which is in

some way involuntary to him; and thus the sin of another is also an object of mercy, insofar as it has certain evils annexed which are contrary to the will of the one sinning, such as the obligation of punishment, infirmity, separation from God, etc.

921. Observation. - Mercy is the greatest of all virtues, if it is considered in itself, because to give to others and to relieve defects belongs most of all to a superior, and therefore it is proper to God, in whom it is not distinguished from gratuitous love or charity, which it includes and extends to others. But if it is considered as regards the man having it, it is not the greatest, because it is greater to be joined to the superior, God, which is done immediately by the theological virtues and mediately by certain others. But among all virtues which pertain to neighbor it is the greatest, because to supply for a defect as such belongs to one better (q. 30, a. 4). Thus it is annexed not only to charity but also to justice, and pertains to liberality, of which it is a species (III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 4, qc. 4).

922. The gift of Wisdom corresponds to charity, as the most perfect among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Wisdom is taken: a) for a natural and acquired intellectual virtue by which man promptly judges concerning all things through the highest causes known by reason; b) for a supernatural and infused gift by which man, through the highest supernatural cause, God, and through divine rules, can judge and order all things from connaturality. Man obtains this judgment through the Holy Spirit (I Cor. II, 15 and 10), and therefore this wisdom is a gift of the Holy Spirit.

Wisdom resides in the intellect because its act is to judge; but it has its cause in the will, namely, charity by which we are connatural to divine things, since it unites us to God. Hence it belongs to wisdom to judge with savor, taste, sweetness, and delight. Therefore wisdom is not in sinners. Moreover, it not only contemplates divine things but also through divine reasons judges concerning human things; whence it is at once speculative and practical.

From the aforesaid its definition is clear: A divinely infused habit by which the mind is rendered easily movable by the Holy Spirit for contemplating divine things, and for judging concerning them, and concerning human things according to divine reasons.

As charity, according to the threefold state of men, is divided into the charity of beginners, of those progressing, and of the perfect, which is not a specific but a gradual distinction, conformably there is a threefold grade of wisdom.

"All who have charity and grace making one pleasing have the gift of wisdom at least according to this first grade of it. Now this grade of wisdom consists in two things. First, in this, that through it the intellect judges that one must adhere to divine things rather than to created and perishable things, saying that word of the Psalmist: It is good for me to adhere to God. Second, that through it he rightly disposes and regulates his human and external operations according to divine laws, according to divine precepts or counsels...

"The second grade of wisdom belongs to those progressing, consisting in this, that for the sake of perceiving and experiencing the spiritual and most pure sweetness or delight of wisdom, a man should despise and forsake all enticements of the flesh and delights of the world, and should strive with all his powers to stabilize the intellect in clear and savory speculation of divine things, endeavoring to ascend to the brightness of angelic conversation...

"The third grade of wisdom is fitting only to the perfect, and consists in this, that the knowledge of no created thing should be savory, delightful, or pleasing to the intellect except insofar as it contributes to the knowledge of divine things, and thus the mind itself should be totally fixed upon the contemplation of divine things, so that it may be able promptly, sincerely, subtly, and sweetly to behold them, the passions having been so quieted, and the exterior man entirely reformed, ordered, and subjected at the nod of the judgment of reason, as much as the frailty of the present life takes in or sustains..."[1]

[1] Dionysius Carthusianus, *De donis*, tr. II, a. 15.

To the gift of wisdom is attributed the seventh beatitude: Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God: 1. as regards merit, for peacemakers are those who make peace either in themselves or in others, which is done by reducing them to due order; but to order belongs to wisdom; therefore to be a peacemaker is fittingly attributed to wisdom; 2. as regards reward, for they will be sons of God by participating the likeness of the only-begotten Son of God, who is uncreated Wisdom itself begotten.

923. Observation. - Let the words of St. Thomas, q. 45, a. 5, be noted: "Some obtain so much of right judgment both in contemplation of divine things and also in the ordering of human things according to divine rules as is necessary for salvation; and this is lacking to no one existing without mortal sin through grace making pleasing... But some perceive the gift of wisdom in a higher grade, both as regards contemplation of divine things, insofar, namely, as they know certain higher mysteries and can manifest them to others; and also as regards direction of human things according to divine rules, insofar as according to them they can order not only themselves but also others; and this grade of wisdom is not common to all having grace making pleasing, but rather pertains to graces freely given, which the Holy Spirit distributes according as he wills, according to that word I Cor. XII, 8: To one..."

Third Question: On the External Act of Charity, or Beneficence

S. Th. II-II, q. 31.

924. Beneficence is nothing other than to do good to someone. But this is an external act or effect of charity: for dilection includes benevolence, since he who loves a friend as himself wills good to him as to himself; but the will effects those things which it wills when it can; therefore beneficence follows from the act of dilection and benevolence as an effect.

To do good, which is an act of charity, is to do good considered under the common character of good, insofar as it is good. But if the good which someone does for another is considered under a special character of good, for example, insofar as it is due, or gratuitous, or relieving misery, thus beneficence pertains to a special virtue, for example, of justice, or of liberality, or of mercy.

Beneficence is not a special virtue, for it has the same object (and motive) as dilection and benevolence (good under the character of good), of which it is the external executive act. Namely, beneficence and benevolence do not differ except as an interior act and an exterior act, because beneficence is the execution of benevolence. An interior and exterior act do not require diverse virtues.

925. Good must be done to all. - Since the dilection of charity extends itself to all, good also must be done to all, without exception, yet according to place and time. For it is not possible to do good to all in particular; nevertheless man ought always, in preparation of soul, to be ready to do good to whomsoever if the time should be present. Yet among them order is to be preserved, so that good is to be done more to those who are more proximate to us or are placed in greater necessity.

When beneficence is concerned with the necessity or misery of another, it is called corporal or spiritual almsgiving. Hence:

Article I: On Corporal Almsgiving

S. Th. II-II, q. 32.

926. Almsgiving (from the Greek: pity) **is a work by which something is given to one in need, from compassion, on account of God,** that is, a work rendered to one in need from commiseration for relieving his want. In this definition it is not taken, as often is customary, for the thing given, but for the action of giving.

It is an act of mercy commanded by charity. It is proved:

An exterior act pertains to that virtue to which pertains the proximate motive on account of which the act is placed; but the proximate motive for giving alms is that assistance be given to one suffering necessity, which pertains to mercy; but mercy is an effect of charity; therefore almsgiving is an act of charity through the mediation of mercy, or an act of mercy commanded by charity; which is said in the definition: on account of God.

But if it is ordered to another end, and is done from another motive, for example, for satisfying for sins, or unto the worship of God, it will be an act commanded by penance or religion, etc.

927. There are seven spiritual alms, which are ordered to defects of the soul, and seven corporal alms, which are ordered to defects of the body. But spiritual alms simply excel corporal alms: a) by reason of the thing offered, namely, a spiritual gift, which is nobler than a corporal one; b) by reason of him to whom help is given, namely, the spirit, which is nobler than the body; c) as regards the very acts by which help is given to neighbor, because spiritual acts are nobler than corporal ones. Nevertheless, accidentally, in a particular case, corporal almsgiving is to be preferred, for example, one dying of hunger is to be fed rather than taught.

Among the corporal alms six are exercised toward the living (Mt. XXV, 35-36, 42-43): to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to receive the guest, to visit the sick, to redeem the captive; and one toward the dead (Tob. II, 3-10; XII, 12-13): to bury the dead.

928. From natural and divine law there is given a precept of doing corporal alms, which is grave from its genus. - It is proved:

1. Christ, in Mt. XXV, 41, says: "Go, accursed ones, into eternal fire...: for I was hungry and you did not give me to eat"; but no one is damned on account of the omission of something which is not commanded, and indeed under grave obligation; therefore to give alms is in precept, and indeed a grave one.

2. Since dilection of neighbor is in precept, all those things are precepts without which this dilection is not had. But dilection of neighbor demands not only that we will good to him but also that we procure it for him; for this it is required that we assist his necessity through almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is in precept. The minor is proved: The law of nature demands that we assist neighbor in necessity, just as we will that he should assist us in our necessity; whence I Jn. III, 18: "Let us not love in word and tongue, but in deed and truth" (Deut. XV, 11; Prov. XXV, 21; Is. LVIII, 7; Ezek. XVIII, 7; Lk. III, 9 sq.; I Tim. VI, 17 sq.; Jas. II, 15 sq.; I Jn. III, 17).

929. The precept of almsgiving arises from a twofold head: a) if there is present a moral faculty, or superfluity, on the part of the one giving; b) if there is present true necessity on the part of the one in need. For a fuller understanding of these things, in the order of charity, not only must the threefold temporal necessity be distinguished with respect to the one in need, concerning which it was said above, n. 905; but also the threefold genus of temporal goods with respect to him who is about to give alms:

The first genus is of goods which are necessary for sustaining the life of oneself and one's own, of whom one has care (parents, wife, children, etc.): food, clothing, and dwelling; and these are called necessary (absolutely) to nature or life.

The second genus is of goods which are necessary (conditionally) to one's state, namely, for preserving the decent state of oneself and one's own, regard being had not indeed to all things which can happen, but to those which can prudently be feared and expected. Whence theologians in this genus include those things which are required for feeding servants, or for the necessities probably occurring from the increase of a family, the dowries of children, illnesses, old age, wars, etc.; indeed, banquets and honorable gifts and moderate liberalities, according to one's state, but not those exaggerated by ostentation and pomp. "The terminus of the necessary of this kind," says St. Thomas, q. 32, a. 6, "is not constituted in an indivisible point, but, many things being added, it cannot be judged to be beyond such necessity; and, many things being subtracted, there still remains that whereby someone can conveniently pass his life according to his own state." Therefore this admits a latitude from things strictly necessary to one's state, without which the state is lost, up to becoming things without which one would not act so fittingly. Things necessary to one's state are superfluous to life.

The third genus is of goods which are superfluous to one's state.

930. Principles. From which goods alms must be given. - In this matter the following rules hold:1

A. In extreme necessity: 1. Alms are not to be given from things necessary to life, because our life and that of our own is to be preferred to the life of another, unless there were question of a person necessary to the commonwealth, because the common good is to be preferred to one's own.

2. There is a grave obligation of giving from things superfluous to life and from things necessary to one's state, even with great inconvenience, as much as is necessary for removing the necessity: the order of charity demands that we love the life of neighbor more than the decency of our own state, which is a far inferior good.2

3. Nevertheless no one is bound to do this with the greatest inconvenience, or to use extraordinary and choice means which men commonly are not accustomed to use, for example, with the greatest expenses for buying a very precious medicine, procuring an extraordinary surgical operation, sending to a distant region, redeeming from a proximate danger of death; because we are not bound to use those means for preserving our own life. Nor therefore is someone bound to fall from his state or to suffer great diminution in it, which otherwise is regarded as a most grave evil.

B. In grave necessity: There is a grave obligation of giving from things superfluous to one's state, insofar as is necessary for removing the necessity (prop. 12 condemned by Innocent XI), indeed even from things necessary to one's state, when this can be done without grave inconvenience; because the order of charity demands that with slight inconvenience we relieve the great inconvenience of neighbor; indeed with great inconvenience, if there is question of a great necessity of the commonwealth.

C. In common necessity: 1. There is an obligation, from things superfluous to one's state, of sometimes during life giving something (Eccli. XIV, 13) to some poor persons, because we ought to love the decency of the state of neighbor more than our superfluity.

2. Nevertheless there is not an obligation of giving to all, nor precisely to this one or that one, nor of removing the necessity totally, because all the rich are obliged; and if all give something from their superfluity, enough assistance is given to necessities.3

3. Nor is there an obligation of seeking out the poor, unless there is a wholly grave doubt concerning extreme necessity, or unless someone is bound to this from office, as a parish priest: for this would be a grave burden, and otherwise it pertains to him who suffers necessity to expose the necessity.

1. The fundamental principles are stated by St. Thomas; but they are enunciated quite generally, so that among more recent scholastics they are found more determinately applied.

2. Goods are primarily ordered to the necessity of men, whence the private right of dominion cannot impede this primary end. - In the case all are bound in solidum; whence 1. someone can indicate extreme necessity, and then others also are bound; 2. if one gives assistance, the others are exempted; otherwise all not giving sin; 3. but if others do not give, each one alone is bound.

3. In the case not all are bound in solidum.

931. The obligation of almsgiving is grave from its genus; whence certainly it obliges under mortal sin in grave matter, namely, in grave necessity, of which at least Scripture speaks (Mt. XXV), and a fortiori in extreme necessity. Indeed also probably in common necessity, both because the expressions of Scripture and of the Fathers, indiscriminately and without restriction, inculcate a grave obligation of assisting the poor, which they suppose is often violated, although grave necessity is rather rare; - and because, if they were not helped, some would fall into grave necessity, and

otherwise the slight necessities of the poor, aggregated, constitute a grave evil for society, to which a remedy must be furnished.

But how much is to be given depends on various circumstances, for necessities are not always the same. In ordinary circumstances, according to St. Alphonsus, it suffices to give the fiftieth part, or 2%, of income, if that part is superfluous, and a proportionally smaller part if the income is enormous; although that estimation can be regarded as rather benign. Therefore he who would determine to give no alms in common necessity, or would be notably negligent in them, seems to sin mortally; but if he did not give a small quantity owed, he would sin only venially from lightness of matter.

But although someone has strictly satisfied the precept of almsgiving toward the poor, there nevertheless always remains to him the obligation of using the remaining superfluous goods well and usefully; which pertains to the virtues of liberality and magnificence, or even to legal justice in view of the common good.

932. Corollaries. - Since by almsgiving there is a transfer of dominion:

A. Those alone can give alms who can dispose of things, namely, all who have dominion and free administration of goods, - and also those who, without dominion, possess administration: thus a husband from goods whose dominion or usufruct pertains to the community, indeed from the wife's own goods if he has administration of them; a superior as regards the goods of the monastery; likewise tutors and curators from the goods of the ward for moderate alms such as he himself would have to give; all others who are placed under power, for example, religious or servants, only in the extreme necessity of neighbor, or if there is present the explicit or tacit or reasonably presumed consent of the superior or master, which consent they do not have if he contradicts. Hence:

1. A wife can give alms from her own goods, if she has any of which she herself can dispose; - likewise from the goods of the husband or of the community, but with the consent of the husband; - indeed also, in our regions, without consent, she can give moderate, not extraordinary, alms from domestic things according to her condition, because this pertains to the honorable sustenance to which a wife among us has a right; unless, however, in a particular case the husband should prohibit giving to such or such a one. But if he should prohibit it altogether, sometimes perhaps it would be better to abstain, to avoid the indignation of the husband.

2. Children of a family can give moderate alms from goods which are handed over to them by their parents absolutely and not for a determined use, unless, however, the father should expressly prohibit it.

3. Servants cannot give without certain permission; and this, because masters are not accustomed to grant it, cannot easily be presumed, unless perhaps as regards foods which are left over and otherwise would be thrown outside, or as regards bread for a true poor person. But if they nevertheless do it, in itself they are bound to restitution.

B. Almsgiving a) from goods unjustly acquired is illicit, unless they cannot be returned to the owner, or the poor person is in extreme necessity and assistance cannot otherwise be given to him;

b) likewise from goods acquired simoniacally, because every simoniacal contract is invalid from the beginning (can. 729); whence those goods must be restored;

c) but it can be done from goods lawfully acquired, but through sin or from something illicit, for example, on account of a homicide perpetrated or prostitution practiced; yet it is not commanded.

C. Fictitious poor persons sin in a threefold way: 1. against truth; 2. against charity, because they subtract alms from true poor persons; 3. against justice, because they deceive by deceit and fraud; whence the donation is invalid, and therefore they are bound to restore either to the owner or to the poor with the presumed consent of the owner, unless there is question of purest gifts whose primary motive is not poverty but love of God and neighbor.

933. Observations. - 1. The precept of assisting neighbor in necessity is sufficiently satisfied by giving a loan, by lending, for example, a horse until he returns home, by selling with deferred payment, etc., if by such modes the necessity is removed, for example, if neighbor only needs the use of a thing, or if he is not so absolutely poor that he has nothing either in fact or in hope. Nevertheless, the precept of giving alms from superfluity is not thus satisfied; but that precept can also be fulfilled in other circumstances, by giving to others.

2. Physicians, advocates, and others performing a public office are bound to spend their work gratis for the poor, if it does not appear how otherwise help can be given to them.

3. To the poor publicly exposed, who seem to show signs of extreme necessity (for example, from nakedness, illness, etc.) or who assert it (for example, by saying that they have fasted for three days), one is rarely bound from precept to give assistance even from superfluities, both because perhaps that necessity is exaggerated to move the spectators, and because they are presumed to be helped by others.

4. No one is obliged (indeed sometimes it is illicit) to give alms to poor persons unwilling to work; nevertheless, let not those be numbered with these who, on account of lack of work, have fallen into misery. For these it would be more advisable to procure or supply work from which they might live.

5. In alms, those more proximate are to be preferred; nevertheless no one can be systematically excluded (neither unbelievers, nor pilgrims, nor enemies), whether they are poor from misfortune, or from virtue on account of Christ, or even from previous fault (if almsgiving is the only means of giving assistance), but not if from actual fault (Mt. V, 45; Prov. XXV, 21; Rom. XII, 20).

6. From superfluities it is licit to reserve certain things for acquiring a somewhat higher state, provided that not all are reserved: decency indeed can demand that we ascend moderately and gradually to a higher state, but not that we reserve all things for this; indeed it demands that we give certain things from magnificence in alms (prop. 12 condemned by Innocent XI).

7. A prohibition of begging made by the civil magistrate does not free from the obligation of giving alms, because other means are not lacking for satisfying the precept, for example, by

distributing money to those who have care of the needy, or to good institutes or works of beneficence.

8. Similarly, payment of a tax from which the poor are helped diminishes the obligation of giving alms, but does not wholly extinguish it, if the tax does not suffice to extinguish the necessities of the poor.

9. Damage also must be averted from neighbor, if it can be averted without grave inconvenience, for example, by warning him to whom it is imminent, or by removing the cause.

934. Practical counsels. - 1. Let almsgiving be a) prudent, to true poor persons, not to the idle (II Thess. III, 10; Eccli. XII, 4); b) willing, that is, cheerful and kindly (II Cor. IX, 7); c) abundant, so that poor persons, even many, are truly relieved (Tob. IV, 9); d) prompt, so that it may be opportune, lest otherwise the poor fall into abject misery and into desperation (Prov. III, 28); e) secret and humble (Mt. VI, 1-4); f) just; g) in right order; h) helping all.

2. Let the confessor not easily deny absolution on account of omission of almsgiving, because penitents easily think themselves excused, and because there are few who give absolutely nothing to the poor or to good works, and because a grave obligation in common necessity is not certainly present.

Article II: On Spiritual Almsgiving, or Fraternal Correction

S. Th. II-II, q. 33; *De Virt.*, q. 3.

935. There are seven spiritual alms: 1. to pray for all, concerning which it is spoken in the treatise on Religion; 2. to forgive the one offending, concerning which it was said above, n. 898; 3. to console the sorrowful; and 4. to bear the burdensome and troublesome, which pertain rather to those who are constituted in office; 5. to teach the ignorant; 6. to counsel the doubtful; 7. to correct the sinner. Concerning these things something must be said here, especially concerning the last, which is the chief one and presents a special difficulty.

936. Correction of one sinning is one thing judicial, another fraternal:

1. The former is applied a) against sin insofar as it is an evil for others, especially for the common good; b) and is done for repairing order; c) through punishment of the delinquent. The latter is a) a remedy of sin insofar as it is an evil of the sinner himself; b) and is done by simple admonition of him; and c) is ordered to his amendment.

2. The former is an act of justice; the latter is the chief spiritual alms, whence it is an act of mercy commanded by charity.

3. The former is done by juridic action by a superior as judge; the latter is done by neighbor as by a brother for the good of a brother, and if it is done by a superior, it is not done by him as by a superior, but as by a private person. Hence it is defined: an admonition of a neighbor who is a sinner, made by a private or quasi-private person so that the neighbor may be amended; or, with St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 1: an admonition of a brother concerning the amendment of faults, proceeding from fraternal charity.

Between each is paternal correction, which is done by a superior with authority, but without the form of judgment, for amendment and for removing scandal.

937. From natural and divine law there is given a precept of fraternal correction, grave from its genus. - It is proved:

a) From St. Matthew XVIII, 15: "If your brother shall have sinned against you, go and correct him between you and him alone; if he shall hear you, you shall have gained your brother" (cf. Lev. XIX, 17; Eccli. XVII, 12; XIX, 13 sq.; Lk. XVII, 3; Gal. VI, 1; I Thess. V, 14; II Thess. III, 15).

b) From reason: By the law of nature and charity we are bound to assist neighbor bodily in need; therefore much more one spiritually in need. - Moreover, we ought to love neighbor; but dilection of neighbor includes willing and furnishing good to him; therefore much more averting from him a grave evil, such as certainly is mortal sin.

That precept, like charity, in itself obliges all toward all, that is, not only superiors, who are bound to correct both from office or justice, and also from the order of charity because they are more fit for it and more conjoined to subjects; but it also obliges equals, indeed subjects and sinners, although these are excused by many circumstances, as not always fit for correction.

Superiors are parents, the husband, tutors, teachers and preceptors, masters with respect to servants, bishops, prelates and parish priests, confessors with respect to penitents, preachers with respect to hearers.

938. Conditions required for fraternal correction. - Five conditions are simultaneously required so that this precept obliges here and now:

1. Certain matter, that is, a grave sin certainly committed, in which it is foreseen that neighbor will relapse, or in which it is feared that he will die, or will not do penance at the due time.

It is said: grave sin, because since every correction is burdensome to the one correcting and includes at least slight inconvenience, in itself and ordinarily it does not oblige for removing a slight evil from neighbor. Then morally certain knowledge of grave sin is required on account of the danger of one's own rashness and of another's offense; but if it is doubtful, a private person ought not and cannot inquire into the life of neighbor, because it would be very burdensome and hateful to others (Prov. XXIV, 15); otherwise sometimes a superior, who has the care and providence of others.1

2. Necessity, that is, probability that neighbor is not going to amend himself spontaneously and that another equally fit is not going to correct him.

3. Utility, that is, founded hope of amendment, or probability that the correction is not going to harm (for example, by impelling to new or graver sins), but is going to profit, either immediately or at least after some time. For when the end ceases, the precept ceases.

Hence a) if correction is doubtfully going to profit but certainly not going to harm, it must be done;

b) if the utility is not probable but doubtful, so that amendment is equally hoped for and harm feared, in itself and generally it is to be omitted, because the negative precept of not harming obliges more than the affirmative precept of doing good;

c) nevertheless in such doubt, accidentally and exceptionally, it must be done if it is foreseen that neighbor is going to die in sin, or if a greater evil is feared which ought to be prevented, for example, dishonor of God, irreverence toward religion, scandal or damage of many or of the commonwealth, indeed the damage of one if it is greater or is feared more than the damage of the one sinning; likewise if from office the correction must be made by a superior, who is bound to warn even with modest hope, lest discipline be weakened or scandal harm others.

4. Possibility, that is, that it can be done without too great inconvenience of the one correcting, such as is not the danger of some indignation, which is almost always present.

But the greater the necessity of neighbor is (in extreme necessity even with danger of life), or the gravity of the sin, or the probability of fruit, or the obligation of correcting, so much the greater inconvenience must be undergone. And indeed superiors are bound even with great inconvenience in grave necessity, indeed with danger of life if they are bound from justice, as bishops, parish priests, magistrates; or with some great detriment, as parents, masters, a husband, teachers; - on the contrary, servants and subjects are rarely bound, since the matter is easily doubtful in a particular case.

5. Opportunity, that is, that the time, place, and other circumstances suited to amendment are present here and now: for an affirmative precept does not oblige for always, but only in given circumstances.

Therefore it is not always to be applied immediately, but often is to be deferred to an opportune time, when fruit is hoped for more. Indeed sometimes the repetition of sin can be permitted so that the sinner may come to his senses more fervently, if immediate fruit is not hoped for. But if immediate fruit is hoped for, let it be done at once, if scandal harmful to others is to be removed, or if the honor of God or of neighbor is to be defended.

1. Some add: also a private person, if there were question of averting a most grave evil, for example, of homicide, or of common damage. But then there is not present an obligation to the amendment of a brother, but to averting the evil of another.

939. The mode and order to be observed in correction. - Fraternal correction can be done either by suitable speech, or by equivalent deeds or signs: by showing a sorrowful face, by diverting the conversation to other things, by withdrawing temporal help, or by other modes by which neighbor is warned openly or implicitly.

Nevertheless, let it always be done with great prudence and affection of charity, and indeed toward inferiors and equals with kindness and love (Gal. VI, 1), toward superiors with humility and reverence (I Tim. V, 1).

Lest one sin against justice by wounding the reputation of neighbor without necessity (Mt. XVIII, 15), the order to be observed in correction is prescribed: first let it be done secretly, and this several times, so long as fruit is hoped for; but if it does not profit, let one or two witnesses be brought in; and if it still does not profit, let denunciation be made to the superior, who first corrects paternally, then, if it shall have been necessary, also judicially. But that order can be changed so that

denunciation is made immediately: a) if the fault is public, known to the greater part of the community or shortly to be made known; b) if it is foreseen that private warning is not going to profit, especially if the necessity of correction urges, as if the sin is to the harm of the community or religion, or to grave damage of a third party (for example, of infamy, of the corruption of others); c) if amendment through the superior is foreseen to be much more secure and fruitful, provided the superior is prudent and discreet; d) if some law imposes denunciation, as for confessors soliciting.

940. To omit fraternal correction is a mortal sin from its genus. According to St. Thomas, if someone presumes concerning another that he could draw him back from sin, and nevertheless, on account of fear or cupidity or shame, absolutely refuses to make correction, he sins mortally, because he places fear, etc., before fraternal charity. But if someone from these is only made slower to correct, yet in such a way that, if it were clear to him that he could draw his brother back from sin, he would not omit it, he sins only venially, because the character of the end is not taken away; for example, if he were negligent in considering the circumstances and opportunity in which he is bound to correct, or culpably estimating himself not fit for it.

941. The matter of correction is only grave sins committed, and therefore the following are not:

1. Sins to be committed: for these are matter of warning (to counsel the doubtful), which obliges in the same circumstances as correction.

2. Material sins done from invincible ignorance or at least from ignorance not gravely culpable: these are matter of instruction (to teach the ignorant), which also is of precept in the same circumstances as correction, not only from reverence toward the law but also from charity, because depraved ignorance of those things which someone is bound to know is an evil to be removed from neighbor just as sin is; yet less strictly and often under venial sin only, because it is a lesser evil. Hence according to many it is probable that private persons are not bound to instruct others as regards material sins committed only against positive law (divine or human), because these are not intrinsically evil and therefore of lesser moment; it would be otherwise if someone were bound from office to teach others, or if from ignorance there arose damage of the ignorant person, or of a third party, or scandal, or irreverence toward God or religion, etc.

3. Venial sins. Nevertheless these accidentally can be matter of correction, instruction, or warning, to be done even under grave obligation sometimes, both by reason of the effect, for example, if from them there follows proximate danger of sinning mortally, or great scandal, or some other grave evil for religion or the common good, such as disturbance of tranquility in a community, or relaxation of regular discipline in a monastery; and by reason of office, for superiors, because they have care of others.

942. Instruction of the ignorant is useful, and therefore, the other conditions being supposed, generally it must be done:

1. If ignorance is vincible and gravely culpable, for example, if someone is not in good faith but doubts, as if he asks.

2. If ignorance will shortly become vincible, as if someone is ignorant of laws which cannot long be unknown, for example, the first principles and first conclusions of the law of nature, or the obvious duties of one's state (of priest, father, judge).

3. If ignorance is not gravely culpable, but harmful to the ignorant person, for example, if it concerns things necessary for salvation, or induces an occasion or proximate danger of sinning or of persevering in sin, or is a cause of estimating that to be sin which is not, or that to be mortal which is venial.

4. Even if ignorance is invincible and favorable, but warning will probably be profitable, at least after a time, and graver inconveniences are not feared, such as infamy for others, scandal, hatreds, quarrels, for example, from the dissolution of an invalid marriage.

On the contrary, generally it is to be omitted on account of a greater evil, namely, if ignorance is not gravely culpable and:

a) the warning is doubtfully going to profit the ignorant person and equally doubtfully going to harm (with a positive doubt), because formal sin is more to be guarded against than material sin;[1]

[1] Nevertheless in a negative doubt, or one improperly so called, whether the warning is going to profit or harm, it must be done, because no one is presumed evil unless it is proved.

b) more so if it probably is not going to profit, unless, however, greater damage is feared, whether public (great scandal), or of a third party (omission of restitution), or of the ignorant person himself (a depraved custom, for example, of pollution, difficult to conquer);

c) most of all if it certainly is not going to profit; unless, however, silence is equivalent to approval (for example, if a priest or preceptor, when asked or seeing fornication, pollution, theft, is silent), or unless from not warning there follows great damage of many or public damage, because the common good or the good of many is to be preferred to the private good of one (thus, in itself, a priest invalidly consecrating or teaching errors, spouses who exercise the marital act so that they impede generation), but not if there follows the damage of one, because the spiritual good of the ignorant person can be preferred.

943. Practical observations. - 1. Since the conditions required for the obligation of fraternal correction rarely are present for private persons (unless they are familiarly conjoined), these are rarely bound to correction, especially toward unknown persons whose disposition is unknown, and therefore amendment is very doubtful. A fortiori the scrupulous, who on account of lack of discretion would always think themselves bound to correct others, or would always doubt concerning this, and very often would commit imprudences, are rarely bound to it.

2. A sinner is bound to amend himself for correction: a) if he is a superior, because he is bound to procure those things which are necessary for rightly undertaking his office, among which is his own amendment; b) if he is a scandal to others, because he is bound to abstain from scandal; c) if neighbor is going to die in mortal sin unless he himself, having been amended, corrects him, because there then seems to be a grave necessity to which he ought to give assistance with some inconvenience.

3. In communities, colleges, etc., generally it is expedient that correction be done by way of denunciation to the superior: for he who denounced would easily be known, if he first warned privately; indeed, where there is question of grave damage of the community (not of one or another person), fellow residents unwilling to denounce could not be absolved.

4. As regards denunciation before a superior, St. Alphonsus notes:

a) If it is certainly clear that a brother has perfectly amended a hidden sin, and from it there is no danger of relapse or of damage to himself or to another, it is not licit to denounce him to a father or prelate, unless the brother expressly consents to that denunciation.

b) It is not licit to bring a fault to mediate superiors, if the immediate superior can correct by himself and there is no probable suspicion that this latter will fail in his office; for the reputation of neighbor, insofar as can be done, must be cared for.

c) A superior, by force of knowledge obtained through private denunciation made to him as father, cannot publicly warn or judicially proceed, because the fault was not manifested to him as judge.

Fourth Part: On Sins Opposed to Charity

First Question: On Hatred, Which Is Opposed to Dilection

S. Th. I-II, q. 29; II-II, q. 34.

944. Hatred is a motion of the appetite by which we are ill-affected toward something. For just as love is a consonance of the appetite with that which is fitting to it, so hatred is a dissonance toward that which is repugnant, or evil. Now hatred is twofold:

1. hatred of abomination or aversion, by which we turn away from something (a thing or a person) as evil or harmful to us; when there is question of a person it is called hatred of a quality;

2. hatred of enmity or malevolence, or hatred of the person himself according to himself, by which, from displeasure at some person, we will evil to him, because it is evil to him, that is, stopping in his evil, so that, namely, it may go ill with him.

Hatred of abomination is opposed to love of concupiscence; hatred of enmity is opposed to love of benevolence. But as love of concupiscence disposes to love of benevolence, so the former hatred disposes to this latter hatred: for from the fact that we turn away from someone as displeasing and troublesome to us, it often happens that we will evil to him, and regard his evil as our good.

945. Hatred of God. - According to his essence, God cannot be had in hatred, because by essence he is goodness itself; and therefore he who sees this essence does not have God in hatred. But insofar as from him there comes to us an effect which we regard as evil, he can be had in hatred by us (cf. Num. X, 35; Deut. XXXII, 41; Ps. LXXIII, 23; Jn. XV, 24), for example, insofar as he prohibits sins or punishes sinners.

This is a sin, and always mortal, unless it is done from indeliberation: for it is always a grave disorder to turn away from the highest Good, in whom there is nothing to be turned away from; or to will evil

to him who is supremely lovable. Indeed it is the greatest of all sins: 1. because it is directly opposed to the dilection of God, which is the principal act of the more worthy virtue, charity, and therefore it is also directly opposed to the infinite goodness of God; 2. because precisely that by which something is mortal sin is the aversion of the will from God; but this is had in itself, essentially, and explicitly in hatred of God, while in other sins it is found only implicitly, participatively, and according to another; therefore hatred of God is the gravest sin of all. - But hatred of enmity toward God is graver than hatred of abomination: the former is opposed to the infinite intrinsic goodness of God, the latter to his external manifestation and glory.

He sins by hatred of enmity a) who wills God not to be, or not to be omnipotent, omniscient, just, etc.; - b) who is saddened concerning his perfections or rejoices concerning offense against him, concerning the violation of God's precepts; - c) who persecutes the works of God and intends to lessen his external glory, because it is displeasing to God. Thus the devil desires and procures evil to God because it is God's evil.

946. Hatred of neighbor. - Hatred of abomination of neighbor is good, if he is had in hatred according to that which is evil in him (Wis. XIV, 9; Ps. CXVIII, 113; CXXXVIII, 21), for example, insofar as he is a sinner, enemy, persecutor, harmful to us, etc., unless the hatred is greater than the cause deserves. On the contrary, it is a sin if he is had in hatred according to something which is good in him, for example, insofar as he is pious, just, prudent, etc.[1] - Hatred of enmity toward neighbor, by which we will evil to him as evil, so that it may go ill with him, is always a sin. Thus he sins who 1. desires the inconvenience of neighbor as such and taken absolutely; 2. rejoices concerning his evil as it is evil to him; or 3. is saddened concerning good as it is good to him.

[1] Some say that hatred of abomination, not of a quality but of a person, insofar as this person is held as unworthy of all dilection, is always a sin and most grave, because it is to exclude from beatitude. But this is already hatred of enmity, as being hatred of the person according to himself: already to will that he have no good.

The sin of hatred toward neighbor is mortal from its genus because it is against charity (I Jn. II, 9; III, 14-15; IV, 20). Nevertheless it can be venial, not only from indeliberation, as if it is done from a sudden motion of anger, but also from lightness of matter, for example, if we wish a slight evil to neighbor, or if the aversion is slight, as ordinarily simple displeasure is without imprecation of evil. Nevertheless this is dangerous, especially if it lasts long, because it will easily happen that the evils which here and there befall neighbor are pleasing.

Hatred of neighbor, if it is considered on the part of the disorder of the one sinning, is the gravest of sins against neighbor, because thus our will is most greatly disordered toward him.[2] Nevertheless it is not the greatest on the part of the effect, namely, of the harm inflicted on neighbor: thus theft, homicide, detraction, etc., are greater.

[2] Namely, other sins against neighbor participate in the character of hatred, Cajetan notes.

947. Hatred of neighbor is multiple in species. - Hatreds of a quality of neighbor differ in species according to specifically diverse motives, for example, to hate neighbor because he is pious or because he has brought about a just damage.

Hatreds of neighbor by which we wish (with inefficacious desire) that diverse evils befall him are probably of the same species, because these evils are sought for him only under the general character of evil; whence the evils are not to be specified in confession. On the contrary, hatreds by which we

desire (with true efficacious desire) to inflict diverse evils on neighbor are certainly of diverse species, because the desire of committing a sin has the malice of the work with all the circumstances; whence the evils desired are to be declared in confession. Thus the will of taking away reputation and the will of killing differ.

948. Observations. - 1. Formal hatred of oneself is not given, as being repugnant to nature.

2. To will evil to someone insofar as it is a good for him or for others is not hatred; indeed, it is licit, if the order of charity is preserved (cf. n. 889). Nevertheless it would be a sin to will the evil of another against the order of charity, that is, on account of a good which does not equal it: thus a son cannot will the death of his father on account of the inheritance (cf. props. 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI).

3. Hatred of abomination concerning only the evil of neighbor is not simply hatred, but hatred in a certain respect and mixed with love: "This very thing, that in a brother we hate fault and defect of good, pertains to love of the brother: for it is of the same character that we will the good of someone and that we hate his evil. Whence, taking hatred of a brother simply (by not willing good), it is always with sin" (a. 3).

4. True hatred is cured with difficulty; nevertheless penitents often confess as hatreds things which are not such, or at least are not grave. Thus when they affirm that they cannot forget an injury, or cannot look at, speak to, or salute someone, or cannot do so without vehement emotion, it must be investigated whether these things are not mere natural aversion from a true or apparent offense, - or a pure affection of the sensitive appetite from diversity of disposition without sufficient deliberation, - or a desire of evil from an honorable end. But if they do not wish a grave evil to neighbor, nor refuse the ordinary signs of dilection, nor is another grave inconvenience feared from that affection (for example, contempt, scandal, and desire for revenge), they are to be absolved.

5. St. Alphonsus observes, *Th. M.*, l. II, n. 30, ad 3: "A private person who, being averse from another, flees him, if he does this so that he may deprive him of his conversation and consolation, and thus sadden him, and it may go ill with him, it is hatred of enmity and a sin. - But if, wishing no evil, you only flee because he is contrary to your nature, or is accustomed to be troublesome to you, it is hatred of aversion and a sin, if it is without reason: such it will not be if he is a very harsh person, provided contempt, scandal, and desire for revenge are absent."

6. Hatred of neighbor formally, according to the character of the object, and therefore more directly, arises from envy, through which the very good of neighbor is rendered saddening and consequently hateful. But dispositively it arises from anger: for first, through anger, man apprehends the evil of neighbor according to a certain measure, as it has the character of revenge; but, anger persevering, man comes to considering and seeking the evil of neighbor absolutely and according to itself, which pertains to the character of hatred (a. 6, ad 3).

Second Question: On Sins Opposed to Joy

To the joy of charity itself concerning the divine good, acedia is opposed; to joy concerning the good of neighbor, envy is opposed.

Article I: On Acedia

S. Th. II-II, q. 35; *de Malo,* q. 11.

949. Acedia is sadness concerning spiritual good, especially divine good. For acid things are cold; whence acedia imports weariness or tepidity of acting, which so depresses the soul of man that he is pleased to do nothing. Hence spiritual acedia denotes torpor, languor, tepidity, weariness concerning spiritual things, which are therefore troublesome because they require bodily labor. Whence it is sadness concerning spiritual things because they impede bodily rest and delight: for acedia prefers doing nothing rather than impeding the rest of the body, and thence is born flight from, horror of, and detestation of spiritual things. This sadness is always a sin: a) by reason of the object: for to be saddened concerning evil is good, but to be saddened concerning that which is apparently evil but truly is good, is a sin, because good does not deserve that we be saddened concerning it; b) by reason of the effect: for it withdraws man from due works.

Acedia is twofold: 1. that by which we are saddened concerning the good of any virtue whatever; this is not a special sin, even if it is done on account of bodily labor annexed, but is a circumstance of every sin, because every vice flees the opposite spiritual good also insofar as it impedes bodily rest; 2. that by which we are saddened concerning the spiritual good to which all other things are ordered, namely, concerning divine good, not in itself, but insofar as it is internal to us or pertains to us and seems evil to us: namely, if someone is saddened concerning beatitude or concerning the friendship of God, because they must be preserved through laborious exercises of virtues and so he does not care for that friendship; or if, on account of labor, he is saddened concerning the means to it, for example, concerning the sacraments, the grace of God, good works, divine precepts, etc., insofar as they are necessary or useful for the friendship of God. This is a special sin because it has a special object and directly opposes the special act of a special virtue: for it is opposed to joy concerning the divine good, in which charity delights.

950. The gravity of acedia. - 1. Acedia, as it is a general sin, is mortal or venial according as the sin of which it is a circumstance is grave or light.

2. Special acedia is a mortal sin from its genus, because according to its proper character it is opposed to charity. For the proper effect of charity is joy concerning God; whence acedia, by which we are saddened concerning the divine good, is directly opposed to charity. Nevertheless it can be venial if it is not perfectly deliberate, or even, as it seems, when it is concerned with goods not necessary for salvation.

This acedia is also a capital sin, as was declared above, in the treatise on Sins, n. 513.

Article II: On Envy

S. Th. II-II, q. 36; *Q. D. de Malo*, q. 10.

951. Envy is inordinate sadness concerning the good of another, esteemed as one's own evil, insofar as that good seems diminutive of one's own excellence. It is said:

1. sadness: this is concerning evil considered as joined to us; and thus envy differs from hatred, which is concerning the good of neighbor, in neighbor considered as absolutely evil;

2. concerning the good of another esteemed as one's own evil: "The object of sadness is one's own evil; but it happens that what is another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and thus there can be sadness concerning another's good";

3. insofar as it is diminutive of one's own excellence: sadness concerning the good of another which is considered as evil can happen in four ways: a) when someone grieves concerning the good of another, because from it he fears harm will come either to himself or to other goods, and such sadness is an effect of fear; b) when someone is saddened concerning the good of another, not because the other has the good, but because we lack that good which he has, and this is zeal or emulation, which, if it is concerning honorable goods, is praiseworthy; c) when someone is saddened concerning the good of another, because he to whom the good happens is unworthy of it, and this sadness is called nemesis or indignation, which is good if it is done for a right end and with due subjection to the ordering of divine Providence; d) when someone grieves concerning the good of another, insofar as the other exceeds him in goods and this is esteemed as one's own evil, because it is diminutive of one's own glory or excellence, and this properly is envy;

4. inordinate: envy is always evil because it grieves concerning that about which one should rejoice, namely, concerning the good of neighbor.

952. The gravity of envy. - Envy is a mortal sin from its genus. For the genus of sin is taken on the part of the object. But envy according to its object is opposed to charity, because as charity rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, so envy is saddened concerning it. Nevertheless it can be venial not only from indeliberation or imperfection of the act, but also from lightness of matter, if someone envies concerning a small good of neighbor, for example, because he wins in a game, perhaps by running with him, or by doing something of this kind.

953. Observation. - The sin of envy is accustomed to be found especially among those who are in some way equals, for example, of the same family, or at least approximate in something, for example, in condition, knowledge, virtue, etc.: for such persons wish mutually to be equaled or preferred. It is chiefly concerning those goods in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be held in esteem, especially concerning wisdom and happiness. Whence it arises from vainglory, although it itself is also a capital sin, as was said in the treatise on Sins, n. 508.

Third Question: On Sins Opposed to Peace

S. Th. II-II, q. 37-42.

954. Sins against private peace. - To peace, which is an effect of charity, several sins are opposed. To private peace there is opposed:

1. In the heart, discord, which is directly contrary to concord or union of wills, and is a dissension of wills (not only of intellects) concerning the good of God or neighbor which from charity we ought to will, namely, concerning a necessary good about which we are bound to consent.

Discord happens in two ways: a) in itself, when someone knowingly and from intention dissents from the good of God or neighbor in which he ought to consent, and thus it is a mortal sin from its genus

because it is contrary to charity; b) accidentally, when the intention of some persons is toward a good which pertains to the honor of God or the utility of neighbor, but one judges this to be good, while another has a contrary opinion, and such discord, which is rather of opinions and intellects than of wills, is not against charity nor a sin, unless it is with error concerning those things which are of the necessity of salvation, or exceeds the limits of moderation so that pertinacity is unduly applied. - Discord arises from vainglory, because we love our own will and our own judgment more than is right.

2. From discord often is born contention, which is an altercation of words by which one contradicts another inordinately, either by attacking the truth, or by defending it in an undue mode, for example, with too much acrimony. In the first case it is a mortal sin from its genus, namely, in matter of great moment: of faith, morals, justice, etc.; in the second case it is only venial, unless it generates grave scandal. It likewise arises from vainglory, by which each of those contending strives to carry off victory over the other.

3. From discord and contention sometimes is born strife, which is a fight of hands among private persons, by which, with souls inflamed by anger, one strives to strike or injure another. It is a mortal sin from its genus in the aggressor; yet if it does not exceed measure, as also a very light fight, it is venial. In one defending himself there is no sin, if he does not exceed the limits of moderation; if he exceeds a little, it is venial; if much, mortal, for example, if without necessity someone rises up to injure another gravely. - It arises from anger.

955. Sins against public peace. - To public peace, or peace of a multitude, there are opposed:

1. To the peace of the Church, schism, which is the voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church, the profession of faith being retained, or the voluntary separation of a baptized person from the Catholic Church. It is committed in two ways, for "the unity of the Church is attended in two things, namely, a) in the connection of the members of the Church with one another..., and b) again in the order of all the members to one head... And therefore they are called schismatics 1. (perfectly) who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff (with rebellion, so that they pertinaciously refuse to obey precepts), and 2. who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him" (in doctrine, worship, sacraments). From this it is clear that it is a most grave and mortal sin from its whole genus. Nevertheless it is less grave than infidelity, which is against God himself according as he is in himself the first truth upon which faith rests, while schism is against the unity of the Church, which is a participated good and less than God himself. And although charity is nobler than faith, the sin which is opposed against the secondary good of charity, namely, the good of neighbor, is less than infidelity, because the good of neighbor is less than the object of faith, which is God himself.

2. To the peace of a civil multitude, both a) illicit war; and b) sedition, which is a tumult or aggressive war by which one part of the commonwealth unjustly rises up against another, or against the legitimate prince, in which latter case it is called rebellion. It is a sin so much graver as the common good (namely, the peace and unity of society) excels a private good; whence it is mortal from its whole genus.

These sins are also against justice, and are better considered in the treatise on Justice.

956. Observation. - External heretics are also schismatics, but not conversely, although nevertheless schism leads to heresy. Schismatics also are punished by the same ecclesiastical penalties as heretics. Moreover, concerning communication with schismatics and concerning cooperation with schism, one must speak similarly as for heresy (cf. treatise on Faith).

Fourth Question: On Sins Opposed to Beneficence

957. Scandal is opposed to beneficence. - There are many sins which are opposed to beneficence, of which most inflict injury or cooperate with it, and therefore wound justice. Against charity there is especially scandal. This word etymologically signifies a stumbling-block, and is taken actively for the placing of a stumbling-block in the way, against which one striking with the foot is disposed to a fall or ruin; and passively for the very striking against the stumbling-block, or offense of the foot. Hence in the theological sense, actively, it is the placing of an action which disposes someone to spiritual ruin; passively, it is the very fall or spiritual ruin on account of the action of another.

Therefore in the theological sense scandal is not that which in common speech is so called, namely, rumor, or wonder, or horror and indignation concerning the sin of another; but grave suspicions, and rash judgments, detractions, calumnies arisen among the people, - indeed also delight or approval or consent in sin, although these latter things in common speech are not scandal.

Article I: On Active Scandal

S. Th. II-II, q. 43, a. 1-6.

958. Active scandal is defined: A less right word or deed furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin. It is said:

1. word or deed, but not something desired, because a merely internal sin cannot furnish to another an occasion of sinning. But since affirmation and negation are reduced to the same genus, therefore under the name of word or deed there also comes omission: not said, not done;

2. less right, that is, what according to itself is evil or at least has the appearance of evil; as if someone speaks of shameful things before an adolescent, or for a just cause eats meat on Friday before others who are ignorant, or works on Sunday: for nothing disposes to spiritual ruin except according as it has a defect of rectitude, because that which is properly right rather fortifies man against a fall than induces him to ruin;

3. furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin, both a) because scandal is not the efficient cause of another's sin, but this cause is his will alone, and b) because for scandal it is not enough that someone sin before others (for scandal does not fall upon the perfect man nor upon the altogether impious),[1] nor is it required that the ruin of neighbor in fact follow, but that an occasion be furnished to him, that is, that the action, either always or in these circumstances, of itself be naturally apt to move him to sin. But if the action does not move in itself, but by accident someone is moved to sin on account of it from his own disposition, the scandal will not be active, but only passive (a. 1, ad 4).

[1] Cf. St. Thomas, q. 43, a. 5; and St. Alphonsus, *Th. M.*, l. 2, n. 47, ad 5: "He is not judged to give scandal who, although he sins publicly, nevertheless does this before those who either are so vile, or infamous or wicked, or who are so upright that no one is moved to sin, for example, if someone fornicates before others who are prepared to do the same and are not moved by his example; or if before the meek someone contends, quarrels, or strikes another."

959. Active scandal is a mortal sin. - It is proved:

a) From the words of Christ, Mt. XVIII, 6-7: "Woe to that man through whom scandal comes" (Rom. XIV, 13, 20; I Cor. VIII, 13).

b) From reason: Charity obliges under grave obligation (by an affirmative precept) to correct neighbor and to impede him from rushing into sin; therefore much more (by a negative precept) it obliges us not to impel him to sin by counsel or example.

It is mortal from its genus; because it can be venial not only on account of imperfection of the act, but also on account of smallness of matter, if the other is induced only to venial sin, even if this is formally intended.

Moreover the sin of scandal is so much graver as the ruin of neighbor is greater, and as it is more intended, and as it follows more from our action (for example, given before an adolescent or by a priest), and as the persons who are moved to sin are more numerous.

960. Active scandal is divided by reason of efficacy: into direct, when someone is the true moral cause of the sin of neighbor, which is done by command, counsel, seduction, praise, request to commit sin, etc.; - and indirect, when someone places a less right action which is only a probable occasion of sinning for neighbor, as an evil example is.

Direct scandal is a sin not only against charity but also against the virtue to the violating of which it induces neighbor; indirect scandal is a sin, but probably against charity alone. Hence if someone by command, counsel, etc., has led someone to sin mortally, for example, to commit adultery, the species of sin to which he led him, in the case adultery, must be declared in confession; on the contrary, if someone has scandalized by evil example alone, it suffices to confess: I gave grave scandal. The reason is because any virtue obliges not only that we not violate it, but also that we not be a cause and positively procure that it be violated by others; but it is not proved also to oblige that we not furnish to another the mere occasion of violating it, nor that we impede its violation. And indeed the sin of another cannot be imputed to us (directly and in itself) unless we are its cause. Whence he who only gave to another the occasion of stealing (by example or intemperance) is not bound solidarily to restitution, and this is a sign that he did not sin against justice. And similarly concerning other virtues.[2]

[2] Do not say that it is indirectly imputed to us, insofar as we are bound to impede it, while direct and indirect voluntary are of the same species; - for we are bound to impede the sin of another insofar as it is his evil and is against charity, not insofar as it is such an evil and of such a species, and is against such a virtue.

961. Active scandal is divided by reason of intention: into directly or explicitly intended, whether it is formally and in itself intended (as an end), if someone explicitly intends the sin of neighbor insofar as it is sin (which is called diabolical scandal), or is simply intended (as a means), if someone explicitly intends the sin of neighbor on account of his own utility or pleasure; - and implicit or interpretative, if someone does not intend the sin of another but only places a less right action from which it can probably be feared that another will be drawn to sin.[3]

[3] That scandal which is formally intended is called by St. Thomas active in itself, that is, from the intention of the agent or on the part of the one operating, "when someone by his inordinate word or deed intends to draw another to sinning," and it is called a special sin, because "the end gives species in morals"; - any other active scandal whatever, even direct, is only scandal by accident, or "besides the intention of the agent, as when someone by his inordinate deed or word does not intend to give another an occasion of ruin, but only to satisfy his own will, and thus even active scandal is not a special sin, because what is by accident does not constitute a species." Thus in article 3; elsewhere St. Thomas uses similar terminology but in an entirely diverse sense, which must be carefully noted. For example, in article 1, ad 4, every active scandal is called a cause of sinning in itself, on the part of the work, "when someone by his evil word or deed intends to induce another to sinning, or even if he does not intend this, the very deed is such that by its character it has that it is inductive to sinning"; - but in merely passive scandal, the deed of one is a cause of sinning for another by accident, "when both besides the intention of the one operating and besides the condition of the work someone badly disposed takes occasion" of sin.

But just as someone can sin by a merely internal act, not indeed by the sin of scandal, but by a desire or affection for scandal, so also by an internal act someone can desire the sin of another more than he procures it externally by scandal. Hence if someone directly and explicitly intends to procure the sin of another by merely indirect scandal, as if by evil example alone he explicitly intends to lead another to lust, he indeed sins by desire or affection against the virtue (for example, of chastity) which he intends to be violated, which must be declared in confession; but the external sin of scandal, as being indirect, is against charity alone.

But if someone formally, with a diabolical intention, intends the sin of neighbor, he commits a special (that is, a distinct species) and most grave sin against charity toward neighbor, directly opposed to fraternal correction, by which he explicitly intends as an end the special and most grave harm of neighbor, which is spiritual ruin. But the end gives species to human acts. Otherwise the character of scandal is as it were a circumstance changing the species of another sin.

962. There is an obligation of repairing active scandal, as much as can be done: for if anyone from charity is bound to forestall the fall of another and to procure the amendment of one sinning (or erring), a fortiori he who through scandal was the occasion why another sinned is bound. The obligation arises from charity alone, because no injury is done to one knowing and willing; not, however, from justice or office, unless someone used unjust means, for example, deceit, force, fear, or unless a superior gave scandal to subjects for whose spiritual good, by force of his office, he ought to provide.

As regards the mode of reparation: 1. It suffices to repair implicitly indirect scandal given by example alone, namely, by cessation from scandal, good example, public reception of the sacraments, prayer for the one scandalized, etc.

2. Direct scandal, given by depraved counsel, false doctrine, depraved books, machination against the Church, etc., must be repaired explicitly, so that first its further influence is removed, and then the evil caused is compensated, so that he who suffered scandal may be recalled to good. Thus wicked counsel and false doctrine are to be recalled, machination against the Church is to be publicly detested, the diffusion of depraved books is to be impeded as much as can be done, and good books are to be written or spread.

3. Hence public scandal must also be repaired publicly, both so that its further influence may be removed, and so that the reparation, by which they are warned concerning the evil, may become known to all and profit them.

The mode of public reparation can be diverse: either a retraction drawn up in writing is published through public newspapers, or it is done before witnesses (two) who will afterwards publish the matter, or before the parish priest who will afterwards publish that the sinner has satisfied his obligations, provided it suffices for removing the scandal. But since the sacraments cannot be ministered to the unworthy, it is clear that he who has not removed public scandal cannot be publicly admitted to the sacraments; indeed, the minister would commit scandal, because he would furnish an occasion of judging that the sacraments are ministered to the unworthy and that scandalous actions are tacitly approved. Thus a public concubinary is bound first to leave the shameful commerce and its occasion before he publicly receives the sacraments. - In practice it belongs to confessors, parish priests, and bishops to determine the congruent mode of reparation.

963. Observations. - 1. It can happen that a sin grave according to itself is venial scandal, for example, if your grave theft is an occasion for another to commit light theft. Conversely, a sin light according to itself can be grave scandal of disobedience or irreverence or injury or immodesty, for example, if a religious utters a less honorable word before women or those who from it can take occasion of sinning mortally, or a priest keeps a suspect person at home.

2. Scandal can contain several other malices acceding to it, either on account of the quality of the person scandalizing, for example, if a father scandalizes children, a superior subjects, a teacher disciples: for these are bound not only from charity but also from office to forestall the ruin of subjects; or on account of the quality of the person scandalized, as if someone directly induces a married person, or one bound by a vow of chastity, to shameful things; or on account of the mode in which it is committed, if unjust means such as force or threats are employed.

3. "Some deed is not therefore scandal because another begins to suspect or think evil concerning such a man, because this latter does not sin if he suspects on account of sufficient indications. Nevertheless it is otherwise if he begins to think evil concerning the Catholic faith, the clergy, a religious order, or to be less disposed toward piety" (St. Alphonsus, l. II, n. 44, 6). For it makes no difference whether the sin by which scandal is given furnishes an occasion for sins of the same species or for sins of a diverse species. Hence those give scandal more easily who are of greater authority, or piety, or esteem.

Article II: On Passive Scandal

S. Th. II-II, q. 43, a. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8.

964. Passive or occasioned scandal is a sin, because it is the very spiritual ruin of neighbor on the occasion of the word or deed of another; but it is not a special sin, because taking an occasion from another's word or deed happens according to any genus of sin whatever and does not have a special deformity.

Passive scandal is 1. accepted because given, if the sin of neighbor truly arises from the word or deed of another, or from active scandal; or 2. only accepted, when the sin of neighbor does not truly arise from the word or deed of another, but either a) from the malice alone of the one sinning (for example, concerning exercises of piety or virtue), and then it is Pharisaic, or b) from his ignorance or infirmity alone, and then it is scandal of the little ones or of the weak (for example, concerning a woman honorably adorned). Hence St. Thomas notes that sometimes there is passive scandal

without active, as Pharisaic scandal; sometimes active without passive, as when someone induces another to sinning and the latter does not consent; sometimes there is active with passive, if from the induction or evil example of one another sins.

965. The obligation of avoiding passive scandal. - From the law of charity by which we are bound to do good to neighbor, there is also given an obligation, grave from its genus, of avoiding passive scandal, that is, of omitting those things from which neighbor is going to take an occasion of sin, whenever there is not present a sufficient reason for placing the act and permitting the spiritual ruin of neighbor.

But a cause is required so much greater as the sin feared is graver, and as it is foreseen more easily and certainly that it will follow, and as more persons are going to suffer scandal. Hence:

1. generally it is illicit to ask, counsel, command, etc., a work which, although it can indeed be done by another without sin, nevertheless this person certainly or probably will not do without sin, for example, an oath from one who is going to perjure himself; - unless it is done for a just cause of necessity or utility, for example, in the case, by a judge;

2. a greater cause is required that a cleric be the occasion of sin and permit it, than that a layman permit the same; a greater cause is required for permitting scandal of the little ones than Pharisaic scandal;

3. only from most grave necessity is it licit to do a work, however otherwise good, which of itself is very inductive to sinning, for example, to wash oneself or swim naked in public, to exercise the marital act publicly; - and if a great multitude of men is feared to be induced to grave sins, sometimes it would even have to be omitted with the loss of life: namely, to avoid the grave necessity of many.

966. Principles and practical rules. - Therefore, for avoiding passive scandal, certain things are to be omitted. And indeed:

I. For avoiding scandal accepted because given:

a) Every work which actively scandalizes, if it is evil, must always be omitted.

b) Also, generally, a work which has only the appearance of evil must be omitted, unless an urgent and grave reason is present.

This reason ordinarily sufficiently removes scandal; but if it should not suffice for this, then the occasion of ruin must be removed, insofar as it is in the power of the agent, for example, by warning made to neighbor concerning the rectitude of the action on account of a dispensation, an excusing cause, etc.: thus a dispensed priest eating meat on a forbidden day, - or frequenting a suspect person for counsel or administration of a sacrament. And if active scandal, that is, the appearance of evil, cannot be sufficiently removed, one must abstain from the work, whatever some moderns may seem to assert, for St. Thomas says, a. 2: "Active scandal is always a sin in him who scandalizes: because either the very work which he does is a sin; or even if it has the appearance of sin, it must always be left aside on account of charity toward neighbor, from which each one is bound to provide for the salvation of neighbor: and thus he who does not leave it aside acts against charity."

II. For avoiding scandal of the little ones:

a) Things necessary for salvation (the reception of Baptism or of the true faith) must never and cannot be omitted, nor the precepts of the natural law, whether negative (not to lie), or also affirmative if the law urges here and now (the precept of confession of faith or of penance), because it is not licit to do things intrinsically evil that good things may come about.

b) The precepts of positive law certainly are not to be omitted more often, because this would be a grave inconvenience to which charity does not oblige; but more probably they are to be omitted once or another time, grave inconvenience being excluded, because the precept of avoiding scandal, which is of the natural law, of itself urges more than positive precepts.

Examples are found in St. Alphonsus, l. II, n. 52: "A sin by which you know that a confessor in confession, yet from infirmity, will be gravely scandalized, you ought to conceal... A wife once or twice ought to omit a fast from which her husband would be gravely offended and discord would arise... If, when you are going to Mass, grave strife or bloodshed is to be excited, you are not bound to go... A superior can dissemble the sins of a subject in order to avoid disturbances and greater evils which otherwise he would be bound to punish." Thus also a woman knowing that she will be shamefully desired by a certain man, if she goes to Mass on Sunday, could once or twice abstain from Mass.1 This is to be advised in practice, although it cannot strictly be imposed.

c) Works of counsel or indifferent works, provided it can be done without great inconvenience, are to be omitted once or another time, or hidden, or deferred for some time until the reason for the work has been given to neighbor; but if after warning the scandal remains, it is judged Pharisaic.

Hence entrance into religion ought to be deferred on account of the scandal of relatives, if their consent is shortly hoped for; nevertheless someone can rightly enter, if, good motives having been proposed, they continue to resist. - Likewise a woman knowing that she will be shamefully desired by a certain man, for several times ought either to abstain from hearing a non-precepted Mass, or to put aside honorable adornment, or not to present herself at the window, or to abstain from walking about or to take another way so that she may flee his sight; - a fortiori she could not be excused from mortal sin if, led by vanity, although she does not intend the scandal of that man, she deliberately presents herself to his sight, or if she seeks some place which she would not approach unless she knew her lover was there.

III. For avoiding Pharisaic scandal:

a) Ordinarily good works are not to be omitted, because thus an occasion would be given to the evil maliciously to impede good, unless nevertheless fruit were hoped for from delay, or there were no cause for doing the work immediately, or the evil which is feared were far greater than the good which would be obtained by the work, as if a very grave sin at the point of death were feared, or several were going to sin: thus punishment of a sinner is sometimes to be left aside, if schism is feared.

b) Indifferent works are to be omitted, unless a just cause is present, which is not required to be very grave; for example, a priest can for a slight cause pass along a way where malicious haters of religion are found who will blaspheme.

c) Commanded works cannot be omitted; for example, a parish priest cannot omit those things which are necessary for preserving the goods of the church, on account of lawsuits; nevertheless he is bound to warn.

1. She is not bound to abstain from public walking about on account of the scandal of others in general: it would be too grave an inconvenience.

967. Observation. - Temporal goods 1. on account of Pharisaic scandal are not to be given up, because thus an occasion of seizing them would be given to the evil, which would harm the common good, and also those seizing them, who by retaining another's things would remain in sin. Hence no one is bound to pay more to a worker because he foresees that he will blaspheme, nor is a parish priest bound to give up stole fees to forestall the detractions of parishioners, because it is a grave inconvenience to himself and to his successors.

2. But on account of scandal of the little ones one's own temporal goods must either be given up, by handing them over or not reclaiming them, provided the sin which is impeded is grave and the loss is slight, because the spiritual good of neighbor is to be preferred to one's own temporal good; - or the scandal must be removed by charitable warning or instruction. Once this warning has been made, if it persists, it is judged Pharisaic. But another's goods are not to be given up except with the consent of the owner, at least reasonably presumed.

Article III: On Certain Scandals in Particular

S. Th. II-II, q. 78, a. 4; q. 98, a. 4; q. 169, a. 2.

That the doctrine stated above concerning scandal may be better understood and easily brought into practice, it is useful to apply it to certain special cases and determined examples more frequently occurring, so that it may thus be expressed by rules more concrete, whether general or special.

968. General rules concerning guilt of scandal.

I. He will be guilty of active scandal, and indeed always, who asks, counsels, commands, etc., a work which cannot be done by another without sin, even if that person is prepared to sin, because this is intrinsically evil, as directly inducing to sin, or at least to the exercise and continuation of sin.

Thus he who asks sacraments from an excommunicated priest to be avoided, or absolution from a priest lacking jurisdiction, from an unbeliever that he swear by false gods, from a usurer that he lend at unjust usury, from a notary or guardian what is against his office, from a prostitute fornication, from a man onanistic intercourse, etc. Nevertheless:

a) he who asks, counsels, commands, etc., a work which indeed can be done by another without sin, but which certainly or probably will not be done without sin, for example, a loan from a usurer, is not guilty of active scandal, although he can sin against charity by reason of passive scandal, as will be said below under II, and is clear from n. 965;

b) if someone is already prepared to commit a grave evil, and cannot be drawn away from the proposal (for otherwise the persuasion would not be good), it is licit to furnish to him the occasion of a lesser evil and to permit this, indeed probably also to persuade him, but precisely as lesser, unless nevertheless an unjust damage of a third party would follow. For it is not to seek evil but

good, namely, the election of a lesser evil; to draw back from a greater evil and conditionally to propose a lesser;

c) he who sins with an accomplice probably is not bound explicitly to confess the sin of scandal of which he has become guilty by seduction, because the other party, by consenting, is guilty of scandal of the same species; whence he sufficiently accuses the scandal by confessing the sin committed with the accomplice.

II. He is generally guilty of passive scandal who asks, counsels, commands, etc., a work which indeed can be done by another without sin, but which the other certainly or probably will not do without sin. He is excepted if it is done from a sufficiently grave cause.

Hence on account of necessity or sufficiently great utility it is licit to ask sacraments from a sacrilegious priest, especially if he is the parish priest; a loan from a usurer; an oath from one who is going to swear by false gods; and a wife, on account of danger of incontinence, can ask the conjugal debt from an onanistic husband (not completing intercourse).

III. Likewise he is also generally guilty of passive scandal who deliberately places something which will be an occasion of sin for another. He is excepted if it is done from a just and proportionate cause, provided the action is not actively inducing to sinning and is indifferent.

Hence it is licit for the father of a family deliberately not to remove, or even to furnish, to children or servants inclined or prepared for theft a mere occasion of sinning (for example, by exposing money or keys, or by leaving open the chest in which money is kept), not intending but permitting one theft so that several may be avoided; likewise for guards of fields, vineyards, and woods to hide themselves so that they may catch those doing damage and, once punished, turn them away from inflicting further damage, but not for this sole end, that they may catch someone from whom they may receive a fine or exact a penalty; likewise for a husband to furnish to a suspect wife a mere occasion of adultery for correcting her, or catching her, or proving infidelity.

969. Examples of active scandal. - The following are to be held guilty of very pernicious active scandal:

1. Those who retain the custom of blaspheming, especially before the younger, most of all before children.

2. Those who, after hearing grave detraction, report the matter to others: for from this arise hatreds and quarrels.

3. Those who, without the end of marriage, are messengers of love to some woman, whether married or unmarried; thus servants and domestics sin who furnish help to children of a family for fostering shameful loves.

4. Those who compose, publish, spread, indiscriminately sell to all, or hand over to others to be read, books or other writings of harmful reading.

5. Those who make, spread, or publicly sing shameful songs or poems.

6. Those who introduce into schools a pernicious method of teaching, or dangerous books. Without scandal there cannot be handed into the hands of boys anatomical or surgical books, or also books of pagan authors not sufficiently expurgated.

7. Those who establish and prolong, whether with clear words or equivocal words (sufficiently understood by the hearers), truly lascivious conversations (for example, concerning the marital act, concerning shameful ways of impeding generation, concerning those things which they have seen and done in brothels), especially before persons of diverse sex or before young persons or innocent children; - otherwise if they are said jokingly by common people, harvesters, plowmen, and other workers among themselves, because from them they are not much moved.

8. Clerics who, by retaining a person suspect to the people, furnish occasion for sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt for the clerical state.

9. Likewise wives who, by admitting handsome lovers to familiar conversations, are an offense to their husbands and others; likewise a husband who retains a maidservant suspect to the wife not without reason.

10. Likewise, in itself, parents and masters who permit to daughters or maidservants conversations in hidden places with betrothed men and lovers; they are guilty on account of their cooperation in scandal.

970. Especially in the matter of lust, they are guilty of active scandal:

A. As regards obscene images and statues, and indeed the following sin gravely:

1. Painters, sculptors, photographers, etc., who fashion images or statues truly obscene and commonly incentives to lust; unless it is done from a just cause, for example, for the study of anatomical science. Now those are obscene which intend to exhibit the altogether immodest parts of an adult person naked or covered only with a thin veil, or represent gravely impure acts, or altogether lascivious forms.

2. Those who expose images or statues of this kind publicly to the eyes of all in shops or in houses or gardens; likewise those who sell them, unless it is done to those who devote themselves to anatomical science.

3. Those who spread them, carry them around, or furnish an occasion of seeing them.

But images of eminent art, in viewing which those looking are moved especially by the artistic mode of representing or by the idea represented rather than by nudity, it is licit to keep in collections and museums; nevertheless it would be necessary that they not be handed over indiscriminately to all to be viewed, but to experts in art and persons of mature age. Therefore it also seems licit to make and reproduce the aforesaid images, and to sell them to experts in art or serious persons.

B. As regards spectacles and dances, which in themselves are not illicit, although they often are an occasion of sin; whence one must dissuade from these and take care lest they be introduced:

1. Authors and actors of plays in which virtue or good morals or religion is not spared sin gravely; or of very shameful theatrical dances in which, on account of immodest clothing, obscene modes of dancing, or lascivious gestures or touchings, great turpitude appears.

2. Likewise those who hold at their houses dances or very shameful and lascivious dances, such as generally are meetings which are called masked balls.

3. Likewise those who promote or approve them with much money or applause.

4. Likewise musicians who cooperate by their music, or owners and inhabitants by renting the place, unless it is done from a graver cause, for example, by reason of grave damage.

5. Indeed those who assist at or participate in such things, unless they are not moved from them to sin and are not a scandal to others by evil example.

C. As regards the concession or procuring of a place for sinning:

1. Innkeepers sin most gravely who furnish secret rooms for lust; likewise a private person who grants a place to those requesting it for sinning, unless perhaps, says Lehmkuhl, a wholly grave necessity is present, in which case he ought still to manifest displeasure.

2. To rent a house to prostitutes (likewise to usurers) in villages and small cities is illicit; but in great cities, in which, for avoiding a greater evil, prostitutes are permitted, it is not illicit (especially if other tenants are lacking), unless this would gravely harm the neighbors, or by reason of the location there would be a special convenience for sinning so that seductions and sins would be multiplied, or it would be grave scandal to others, as also easily happens.

3. Drivers conveying others to a brothel are not excused by reason of wages, but only on account of grave damage to be avoided, for example, if they fear lest they be dismissed and not easily find another master, or if by civil precept they are bound to convey travelers wherever they wish. They can never exhibit service for leading someone more securely or more secretly, or indicate to one ignorant where the brothel is; unless perhaps on account of the greatest damage (cf. n. 492, B).

D. As regards concubinage and merely civil marriage, see our little work *De Variis Peccatis in sacramentali confessione medendis*, c. II, § B, q. 2, n. V-VIII.

E. As regards the adornment of women, it will be said in the treatise on Temperance, where modesty is treated.

Fifth Part: On the Precepts of Charity

Single Question: On the Precepts Themselves of Dilection Toward God and Neighbor

S. Th. II-II, q. 44.

971. From natural-divine law there is given a precept of charity, obliging under grave sin, as is clear both from reason: for, supposing that God destines us to a supernatural end, to participation in

His own life and to intimate friendship with Him, reverence toward Him demands that we love Him above all things as the supernatural end infinitely lovable for His own sake; and from Scripture, which establishes the commandment of this love, Deut. VI, 5 and Mt. XXII, 37. This precept is both negative, by which we are forbidden to cast away charity, and this obliges always; and affirmative, by which we are obliged to elicit an act of charity, and this does not oblige always.

Hence an act of charity is necessary; nevertheless in the present economy of the New Law it is not necessary by necessity of means. The habit of charity indeed is necessary for all by necessity of means for salvation, not only for adults but also for infants, because without it no one is pleasing to God, no one is in the state of grace or of divine friendship (I Cor. XIII; I John III, 14; IV, 16; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7); but the act itself, in the New Testament, strictly is not of necessity of means for justification or salvation, because imperfect contrition with the sacrament really received now suffices. Nevertheless it is necessary by necessity of precept; and those do not satisfy this precept who remain for a long time in the state of mortal sin, or are justified only with imperfect contrition.

972. The obligation of eliciting an act of charity arises from various heads:

A. The virtue itself and the precept of charity obliges under grave sin *per se*, that is, in circumstances common to the condition of all men. For it is altogether necessary, indeed it is the greatest precept, to tend toward the ultimate supernatural end; yet we do not do this as is due except by an act of charity. Now this is especially necessary 1. at the beginning of the use of reason, when a man is bound to turn himself to God and to choose for himself an end; 2. in the article of death (or toward the end of life), when he is at the point of attaining the end; 3. often in life: for it does not suffice that we tend to God once or twice, but it is necessary to direct the whole life to the ultimate end, and therefore the act of charity must be repeated often (prop. condemned 1 by Alexander VII; 5, 6, and 7 by Innocent XI).1 Some determine this by saying: at least once a year; others, every month (St. Alphonsus), or even every week (Scotus); others finally, more probably: several times, at least three or four times a year. Yet this is easily fulfilled by leading a good Christian life; whence those who live as Christians abundantly satisfy the precept.

B. The virtue itself and the precept of charity obliges *per accidens*, that is, on the occasion of some special circumstance: 1. when a temptation rises up against charity, which is hoped to be overcome only by an act of this virtue; yet this does not befit the scrupulous who torture themselves in this matter, for whom nothing remains except to despise the temptation; 2. when charity has been lost, namely by an act contrary to it; 3. when we externally manifest it, otherwise the manifestation would be simulation.

C. Other virtues and precepts sometimes oblige one to elicit an act of charity, at least implicitly: 1. when temptations arise against other virtues, which are hoped to be overcome only by that act; 2. when someone, in the state of mortal sin, must celebrate and lacks the availability of a confessor; likewise if he must or intends either to administer a sacrament, or to receive a sacrament of the living, without being able or willing first to confess; 3. when he must or intends to posit an act of another virtue which cannot be exercised without an act of charity, for example, the Lord's Prayer (attentively recited in its full sense), perfect contrition for sins, a resolution of avoiding sin because it displeases God, a desire that all may serve God, etc. But in these cases the obligation does not arise from the precept of charity itself; whence, if its act is omitted, we do not sin against this virtue, but against another precept by force of which it was required.

Since charity is most excellent, most especially commanded, and the cause of supernatural merit, the faithful are to be urged very greatly to exercise it more often, and especially in the article of death, yet without speaking to the dying about the strict precept, lest they be cast into scruples.

1. "A man at no time whatever of his life is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues."

2. "Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of love of God only once in life, we do not dare to condemn." - "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not oblige per se, strictly speaking, even every five years." - "It obliges only then, when we are bound to be justified and we do not have another way by which we can be justified."

973. In positive divine law, in the first place concerning charity, a special, distinct, and explicit precept had to be given. For every due thing is commanded: namely, something is commanded insofar as it is due. Now something is due *per se*, namely the end, because it has the character of good *per se* (for example, health); and something is due on account of another, namely that which is ordered to the end (for example, medicine to health). But the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, which is done through charity, and to this, as to the end, all other things which pertain to the spiritual life are ordered[1] (a. 1). Therefore the greatest precept concerning charity had to be given, and it is so much greater insofar as that which is *per se* is preferable to that which is on account of another (ibid.). Hence it is called the greatest and first commandment in the law (Mt. XXII, 38; cf. prop. 1 condemned by Alexander VIII).[2]

[1] St. Thomas proves the minor thus (a. 1): "For all the virtues, concerning whose acts precepts are given, are ordered either to purifying the heart from the disturbances of the passions, as are the virtues which are concerned with the passions; or at least to having a good conscience, as are the virtues which are concerned with operations; or to having right faith, as are those which pertain to divine worship; and these three are required for loving God. For an impure heart is drawn away from the love of God on account of passion inclining to earthly things; but an evil conscience makes one dread divine justice on account of fear of punishment; and fictitious faith draws affection to that which is fashioned concerning God, separating it from the truth of God."

[2] "It suffices that a moral act tend to the ultimate end interpretatively: hence man is not bound to love either at the beginning or in the course of moral life." See the other condemned propositions, above p. 742.

Moreover concerning charity a twofold precept had to be given in positive law, explicit and distinct: the love of God and of neighbor.

For although in the first the other is included, as the conclusion is contained in the principle, and therefore he who would perfectly know the principle (the love of God) according to its whole force would also perceive the conclusion (the love of neighbor), nevertheless this does not clearly appear to all, and "therefore it is necessary that precepts be given not only concerning the love of God but also concerning the love of neighbor, on account of the less capable, who do not easily consider that one of these precepts is contained under the other" (a. 2). But these two suffice; for charity is friendship, and therefore love toward another whose good we will. Now the good is either the end, or that which is for the end, and therefore concerning charity two precepts suffice: one by which we are induced to love God as the end; the other by which we are induced to love the neighbor on account of God, as on account of the end (a. 3). Concerning love of self no explicit precept had to be given, because man naturally loves himself and his own body; but the mode of loving himself, namely that he love

himself in an ordered (and supernatural) way, is sufficiently indicated in the love of God and neighbor, insofar as he ought to love God above all things and his neighbor as himself (ad 1).

Nevertheless the two aforesaid precepts were not to be enumerated in the decalogue, because they are concerning the end, while all the precepts of the decalogue are ordered to the love of God and of neighbor, which therefore are presupposed in all and included in all (a. 1, ad 3). Whence Christ says, Mt. XXII, 40: "On these two commandments depend the whole law and the prophets."

974. The intrinsic mode and mode of precept by which God is to be loved is that He be loved from the whole heart, as is said in Deut. VI, 5 and Mt. XXII, 37. For it is required for an act of virtue not only that it fall upon due matter: God to be loved; but also that it be clothed with the due circumstances by which it is made proportionate to such matter: the mode of love. But God is to be loved as the ultimate end, to whom all things are to be referred. And therefore He is to be loved totally, so that man receive nothing contrary to the love of God (a. 4). Whence it is said (Deut. VI, 5): You shall love the Lord your God from your whole heart.

Accordingly God is not only to be loved effectively by observance of the commandments, but also affectively by explicit affection; and not only affectively, or by the will, but also effectively by all the other powers moved by the will, which thus become principles of spiritual movements, namely, by the intellect, the lower appetite, and the external executive powers. And thus it can be understood that God is said to be loved from the whole heart, and from the whole mind, and from the whole soul, and from the whole strength or with all one's powers (Deut. VI, 5; Mt. XXII, 37; Mk. XII, 30; Lk. X, 27), although perhaps by all these one and the same thing is signified under different words.

"Therefore it is commanded to us that our whole intention (of the will) be borne toward God, which is from the whole heart; and that our intellect be subjected to God, which is from the whole mind; and that our appetite be regulated according to God, which is from the whole soul; and that our exterior act obey God, which is to love God from the whole strength, or virtue, or with all powers" (a. 5).

That precept will be fulfilled fully and perfectly in the fatherland, where charity is always in act according to the whole power; on the way it can be fulfilled imperfectly, insofar as man does nothing against the love of God; and thus one fulfills it more perfectly than another, insofar as he abstracts more from temporal things and thinks about God, and thus approaches more, by a certain likeness, to the perfection of the fatherland (a. 6).

975. The precept concerning love of neighbor is thus fittingly proposed: You shall love your neighbor as yourself (Lev. XIX, 17-18; Mt. XXII, 39). "For in it both the reason for loving and the mode of love are touched upon. The reason for loving is touched upon from the fact that he is named neighbor; for because of this we ought from charity to love others, because they are neighbors to us, both according to the natural image of God and according to capacity for glory... But the mode of love is touched upon when it is said: as yourself; which is not to be understood as to this, that someone should love his neighbor equally with himself, but similarly to himself, and this in three ways: 1. indeed on the part of the end, namely, that someone love his neighbor on account of God, just as he ought to love himself on account of God, so that thus the love of neighbor may be holy (and not merely natural); 2. on the part of the rule of love, namely, that someone not condescend to his neighbor in anything evil, but only in good things, just as a man ought to satisfy his own will only in

good things, so that thus the love may be just (that is, honorable); 3. on the part of the reason of love, namely, that someone not love his neighbor on account of his own utility or delight, but for this reason, that he wills good to his neighbor, just as he wills good to himself, so that thus love of neighbor may be true; for when someone loves his neighbor on account of his own utility or delight, he does not truly love the neighbor, but himself" (a. 7). "But from the very fact that it is said: You shall love your neighbor, it is consequently given to be understood that those who are nearer are to be loved more" (a. 8, ad 3): "for the order of charity pertains to the very account (or essence) of the virtue" and falls under the precept (a. 8).

That precept was proposed more perfectly and declared more evidently by Christ in the New Testament, to be exercised in a more perfect manner than in the Old, and by this reason it is called new: "A new commandment I give to you, that you love one another; as I have loved you, that you also love one another" (John XIII, 34-35; cf. XV, 12-13; I John III, 16). Namely, it is new 1. by reason of a new exemplar (John XIII, 34 and XV, 12); 2. by reason of the motive, because Christ is in our neighbors: for supernatural love is founded in the communication of the divine life of Christ, who joins all in one mystical body of which He is the head, and in one participation of the Eucharist (John XV-XVII); whence Christ says: "Amen I say to you, as long as you did it to one of these my brethren, you did it to me" (Mt. XXV, 40); 3. by reason of the measure and mode, because it is necessary to love even to the giving of one's life (John XV, 12-13; I John III, 16; Eph. V, 2); 4. by reason of extension, because it is toward all, even strangers and enemies, which was not explicitly handed down in the Old Testament (Mt. V, 43-45; Lk. VI, 27-28; Rom. X, 12). The Apostle excellently describes the distinguished qualities of this eminent charity in I Cor. XIII, 4-7.

The precept obliges not only to doing good to the neighbor effectively and externally, but before all things to truly loving him with internal affection (cf. I Pet. I, 22; props. 10 and 11 condemned by Innocent XI);[3] which generally is sufficiently fulfilled by the very love of God in which it is implicitly contained; nevertheless it is to be exercised explicitly when it is necessary for an external work and benefit to be furnished to the neighbor, or for avoiding hatred and offense of the neighbor. But since occasions of this kind frequently occur, hence the faithful living as Christians by that very fact abundantly satisfy this precept.

[3] "We are not bound to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act." - "We can satisfy the precept of loving the neighbor by external acts alone."

Fulfilling the great commandment of love according to the exemplar of Christ toward all, toward enemies also and evildoers, looking in all things to the image of the Savior and the dignity of the children of God, ready to lay down our life for our brethren, loving not in word and tongue but in deed and truth, we have the pledge of divine love and of the charity which joins us to God. As, by the inspiration of the Spirit of eternal Love, the apostle of charity himself testified (I John IV, 12 and 16): "If we love one another, God abides in us, and His charity is perfected in us... God is charity, and he who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him."

Appendix. Excursus: On the Systems of Philosophers concerning the Foundation and Norm of Morality

Since Christian ethics, in our times indeed, is much attacked, and since modern prejudices against it, on account of the wider diffusion of culture and literature, are now carried about everywhere, it seems not useless to set forth succinctly the principal systems of adversaries. Yet we in no way intend to hand down a complete history of ethics, but to note certain things useful for the use of priests.

I. Hedonism practically exists among many in all times; but theoretically and scientifically it does not have many defenders. Protagoras (c. 480-410) and Gorgias (c. 480-375) taught moral positivism and relativism. From the fact that there is no objective difference and norm discriminating good and evil, their disciples concluded that a norm must be established relative to the subject. Whence the principle of discrimination is sensible pleasure; to procure this by all means is good. Thus the sophist Callicles first taught, and after him Thrasymachus and Polus. Aristippus the Cyrenaic (435-354) perfected the system, whose disciples led it to its ultimate evil consequences.

In modern times the Encyclopedists adhered to it, such as Helvetius (1715-1771), de La Mettrie (1709-1751), D'Holbach (1723-1789), author of the work *Le Systeme de la Nature*, and in Italy Melchior Gioia (1767-1829).

To these the pessimists are partially reduced, such as Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and von Hartmann (1842-1906), who say that only negative happiness is possible: the absence of misery and pain (negative eudaemonism); finally Nietzsche (1844-1900) in antipessimism, who proposes full happiness, but for eminent men alone, or supermen (*Uebermensch*).

Hedonism was set forth and refuted in n. 130.

II. Individual or egoistic utilitarianism. In antiquity Leucippus, Democritus (c. 460-370), Epicurus (341-270), and Lucretius taught it; among the moderns, Gassendi (1592-1655), Spinoza (1632-1677), Hobbes (1588-1679), La Rochefoucauld (1613-1680), and many followers of moral positivism, such as Bentham (1748-1832), Mackintosh (1766-1832), Stuart Mill (1806-1873); likewise (explicitly or implicitly) the materialists of the eighteenth century: de Condillac (1715-1780), Diderot (1713-1784), Feuerbach (1804-1872), economists such as Malthus, Bastiat, etc., anarchists such as Bruno Will and Kropotkine.

Among these the following deserve attention:

1. Epicurus (341-270), who does not attend to sensual pleasure alone, but also to spiritual pleasure; nor to immediate and present pleasure alone, but also to mediate and future pleasure; nor to every pleasure indiscriminately: not every pleasure is good, because sometimes it brings with itself greater pains, just as, on the contrary, from the tolerance of pains a greater delight often follows. Whence the true wise man rightly discerns among pleasures and pains; and the principal virtue is the right discernment of pleasures, but from

love of pleasure! And in this he is distinguished from Aristippus, who admitted only present pleasure as the norm of morality. Epicurus judged, namely, that greater pleasure would come to man from the absence of pain and tranquility of soul than from pleasant affections and positive satiety of the senses.

2. Hobbes (1588-1679) followed Epicurus: the one good is pleasure; but it is necessary to distinguish present and future pleasure, and sometimes it is expedient to lack the present lest we be deprived of the future: thus justice is utility sanely understood, and altruism is egoism sanely understood.

3. Jeremiah Bentham (1748-1832) perfected the system spread by Hobbes; he contended that the method of experimental observation recommended by Bacon must be applied in moral matters, and he comparatively estimates things delightful and painful according to intensity, duration, nearness, certainty, extension, purity and fecundity, etc., by arithmetical computation. It is a certain moral arithmetic, for knowing that which produces the greater happiness.

4. Stuart Mill (1806-1873) perfected moral arithmetic by weighing quality rather than quantity, so that those things which are of a higher order, for example, the exercise of virtue, are more excellent and to be esteemed more than those which are of the lowest order, such as sensual pleasures: "it is better to be Socrates suffering than a satiated pig!"

We spoke of individual utilitarianism in n. 131.

III. Social or altruistic utilitarianism. F. Bacon (1561-1626) proposed this system: the common good, or public utility, is the rule of morals. It prevailed under the influence of Lockean philosophy (Locke 1632-1704). Cumberland (1632-1719) taught: the law of mutual benevolence is the foundation of all morality; Shaftesbury (1671-1713): the true account of morality is in preserving perfect harmony between egoistic and altruistic inclinations, but egoistic propensities are to be subjected to social ones; Hutcheson (1694-1747); Reid (1710-1796); Hume (1711-1776); Smith (1723-1790); Hartley (1705-1757) and Paley, etc.; and in Germany Pufendorf (1632-1694): the Creator by His free decree implanted into human nature the law of sociality, so that all actions agreeing with the law of sociality are good, and those repugnant to it are evil. Likewise the positive school, namely, the modern positivists: Aug. Comte (1798-1857): you ought to live for others; Littre[1] (1801-1811), Sidgwick (1838-1900), Lotze (1817-1881), Laas (1837-1885), Paulsen (1846-1908), v. Ihering (1818-1892), Jodl (1849-1914), Ziegler (1846-1918), and several socialists. Finally the defenders of the system of solidarity, such as Bourgeois and Payot: since we are debtors to society for every good which we have, every good which we do is owed to society.

[1] Littre attempted to confirm this from the faculties of vegetative life. There are two functions in man: nutrition for preserving individual life, and generation for the propagation of the human species. Nutrition produces egotism; generation promotes altruism. But falsely: altruism arising from generation would be limited to a few, and often excites egotism, indeed also hatred, against strangers.

Social utilitarianism exists under a threefold form:

a) such that the social aspect is an effect of individual utilitarianism, insofar as it is necessary to the utility of the individual. Thus already Epicurus, Bentham, Stuart Mill, and Nietzsche *pro parvis*. But thus altruism does not constitute a special system;

b) such that the utility of others is principally regarded, secondarily the utility of the individual, insofar as it favors the good of the whole. Thus A. Comte, Hoffding, and the assertors of solidarity. Every good, they say, is from society; therefore we owe to it everything which we do. For man, in the concrete case, is a production of society; although generation is not a social but an individual act, and the man produced is a distinct, separate individual, and spiritual functions are individual;

c) such that only social utility is regarded (absolute altruism), and personality is absorbed by the State. Thus the pantheists of metaphysical monism: Fichte (1761-1814), Schelling (1775-1854), Hegel (1770-1831). Likewise Schopenhauer; and also v. Hartmann as to intermediate ends.

On altruistic utilitarianism see n. 131, B.[2]

[2] See below VI, B.

IV. A special form of altruism is affective ethics, which affirms that human nature of itself is generous and inclined to virtue, and that we spontaneously discern good and evil by a certain special sense, which is distinct from the intellect and is called the moral sense. Shaftesbury (1671-1733) first taught this, and Cumberland (1632-1723) had in some measure preceded him; Hutcheson (1694-1747), however, determined it more, positing in us egoistic and altruistic tendencies; but holding that these latter are moral as benevolences toward others. According to Hume (1711-1776), however, even egoistic tendencies can be moral, as those which can generate certain virtues, such as prudence and ability; yet they are to be subordinated to generous and altruistic affections, which are reduced to a certain affection of humanity. The system flourished in the Scottish school, which, just as it said that the fundamental criterion of truth was the instinct of truth, which is called common sense, so in moral matters it established good sense, which is called conscience. Thus Reid (1710-1796), Hamilton (1788-1856), Mansel (1820-1871), and others. Finally Smith (1723-1790) perfected the system and placed the criterion of morality, or the moral sense, in the spontaneous sympathy or antipathy which we experience toward certain actions and their authors.

The theory passed into France, where J. J. Rousseau (1712-1778), against the pure rationalists, posited that there is a voice of nature which speaks in conscience and directly reveals itself, so that there is no uncertainty of reason; but Th. Jouffroy places it in blind faith in the veracity of our faculties.

Likewise in Germany Jacobi (1743-1819) was the parent of the sentimental school. But the sentimentalists say that the moral sense consists in an internal affection or affective faith, which begets in us a firm and invincible persuasion and induces us to pursue some things and avoid others, or experiences satisfaction in good deeds and remorse in evil deeds.

Herbart (1776-1841), however, establishes a moral taste, so that the good is the object of right taste, and morals, which judges concerning the value of actions, is a subdivision of aesthetics, insofar as good and evil arouse pleasure or displeasure. Thus he confuses the aesthetic order with the moral.

The system of moral sense, which many moderns adopt, such as Schuppe, Hoffding, Martineau, was sufficiently refuted in n. 137, B.

Especially as to the theory of Herbart, it should be noted:

a) that the systematization of ideas is artificial; in particular

b) that it establishes a superficial identification of the aesthetic and ethical order. Although a moral action can procure aesthetic delight, nevertheless it is not moral because it procures this; nor is the aesthetic sense the criterion or norm of morality. In us there is a sense, or rather a judgment concerning the moral goodness and malice of acts, but it is altogether foreign to any delight whatever arising from admiration;

c) that it contradicts the facts, for sometimes we approve actions as moral without any kind of aesthetic delight;

d) that thus morality is exclusively reduced to the affective life; and the ideal or rational element is excluded, although it is primary. For all, in his system, say that this is the norm of morality which they have as rational;

e) finally, that the system is illogical. Pleasure arising from a noted comparison or conformity of the will and the judgment of reason is the first form of moral estimation; and yet in the moral judgment itself that estimation is already fully present. Therefore it does not arise from a comparison of the inclination of the will and the judgment of reason. And therefore the pleasure arising thence is other than the estimation approving the goodness or disapproving the evil of the action.

V. A special form succeeded primitive social utilitarianism: evolutionary utilitarianism, or utilitarian evolutionism; this is accommodated to the theory of evolution of Ch. Darwin (1809-1882), and applies it to the moral problem concerning the origin of moral conscience, and intends harmonically to compose individual and social utility. They explain this by a twofold process:

1. by the psychological process alone, or the association of moral experiences once had, even those which pertain to past generations; whereby it comes about that customs are slowly generated, and, the experiences, causes, and motives of them having been forgotten, actions conforming or not conforming to them are now held as good or evil in themselves. Thus Stuart Mill, Comte, Littre, Bain (1818-1903), Huxley (1825-1895), Tyndall (1820-1893), Clifford (1843-1879), Loue, Paulsen, Gizycki (1851-1895), etc.

2. by the biological process of adaptation of individuals to external circumstances and to the medium in which we are found and to the conditions of social life; which also appeals to the laws of the universe (for example, the persistence of force, continuous evolution, and final equilibrium), so that moral science is, as it were, a part of the mechanical science concerning the material universe. Thus especially H. Spencer (1820-1904).

In the beginning men, scarcely distinct from brute animals, imitated the morals of brutes, and sought nothing except their own advantage. Then, living in herds, little by little they understood that they must help and protect one another, and that they cannot seek their own pleasure with harm to others: for those upon whom harm is inflicted do not hesitate to seek penalties; to avoid this it is better to suffer something or to abstain from some pleasure. Thus under the influence of the society in which men are united, from egotism altruism is born, that is, an inclination to promoting the happiness of others; indeed, to procuring the general good into which man is impelled by social instinct.

By these things the origin of ideas of good or evil can now be explained. Men first notice that certain actions are useful to society and to the preservation and increase of life, while others are truly harmful; the former are praised and sometimes repaid with a reward, but the latter are reproved and punished. Hence is born the idea that certain actions are truly praiseworthy and worthy of reward, but others to be blamed and punished as worthy of punishment: namely, the idea of merit and demerit. From this finally follows the idea of good and evil: namely, an action praiseworthy and useful to society is declared good, an action demeritorious and harmful to society, evil. Once arisen, those ideas are rooted and fixed by heredity and education.

But how and why certain actions are useful, while others are pernicious, they attempt to set forth scientifically by help of evolution. For since all nature tends toward the evolution of life, those actions are truly useful and good which promote the expansion and delight of life in any order whatever, physical, biological, psychological, and social, or which are rightly ordered to the end: the evolution of present life; but those are pernicious and evil which more or less obstruct this end.

From another side, it is historically clear that the human race constantly progresses in every order, and especially that altruism, or the sense of solidarity, prevails more from day to day. Today private good and common good still often fight against each other, and therefore only a certain relative morality is possible, from a certain compromise between egotism and altruism; but as evolution proceeds, men will so adapt themselves to social conditions that egoistic inclinations will perfectly serve the common good. Once this evolution and adaptation is completed, anyone by following egoistic inclinations will by that very fact promote the common good, and thus there will be perfect harmony between egotism and altruism. This will happen through sympathy, from which we feel the happiness or punishment of others as our own; and thus altruistic actions will become delightful. And then morality will be absolute, and by force of perfect solidarity men will become very good and happy.

Several things can especially be opposed to this system:

1. It is founded upon a false mechanical concept of the universe, in which no place is left for liberty, and therefore there is not given moral good and evil in the true and proper sense; but all things are physically good insofar as they necessarily concur toward the evolution of life. In physico-mechanical evolution all inclinations are of the same value; nothing is of greater or lesser estimation, but all things are nothing but phenomena of nature.

2. But the moral is opposed to the physico-mechanical and spontaneous-instinctive. Namely, the moral is that which is justified before reason. Therefore the moral as moral is not that which excites or satisfies the instinct or appetite of happiness, or the expansion of life. The expansion of life is not always good, but sometimes full of injustices and cruelties. Therefore there must be another norm of morality.

3. In order that the system of evolution could avail to be applied in practice, it would be necessary that each one know the necessary laws of the evolution of life which would be the criterion of morality; in particular a) that he know the definitive state, or final equilibrium, to which humanity is going to arrive, which surely is complex enough; b) that there be only one means of acting for the realization of that state, or at least that what is better among diverse

means always be known; c) that he so will to act and attain that state from delight or utility. We could hope for these three things in vain.

4. For to anyone there belongs the right of subjecting that conclusion to examination, and of rejecting (or admitting) it on account of a motive, say of delight or utility. And thus we now return to another criterion, either of pleasure and egoism, or of rational good.

5. Hence the system does not hand down a rule for the institution of morals and actions, because it cannot be legitimated by experience. Whence it does not have an empirical basis but rather an agnostic one, which is against the very principles of the system. Namely, perhaps it is a utopia to reconcile egotism and altruism; in fact egoism appears as strong now as before.

6. Nor can it sufficiently explain how from utility we arrive at the idea of good, since between the useful and the good there is the greatest distinction; nor how self-denial (for undergoing harmful effects) is extolled so highly, if useful effects and a happy outcome are the cause of the idea and consciousness of morality; nor why obedience extorted by force is of lesser morality, when nevertheless the same effect is obtained.

VI. To Utilitarianism and Evolutionism can be reduced:

A. The ethics of fuller life, arisen from Darwinism and natural monism, which sets before all things the intensity and expansion of life, or natural life fully possessed. Against it:

1. it introduces the principle of the "struggle for life" into moral life, and institutes a dangerous and unlimited apology of sexual love. This contradicts every more delicate and exquisite culture; whence it comes about that purity, benignity, and charity are esteemed less;

2. it overturns the very foundations of ethics: in place of free will it posits a blind tendency, in place of conscience an instinct, in place of moral debt a physical necessity;

3. the end which it proposes, namely, fullness, vigor, and beauty of physical life, cannot be attained by many who are infirm or weaker, and can be attained by others only in a very limited way. And the ever fuller life of the human race and the advent of a superior man is uncertain and fantastic;

4. it neglects the duality of human life, which consists in the opposition of spirit and sense. For it considers only the fullness of vegetative and sensitive life, which necessarily leads to the domination of sense, nor does it truly understand spiritual life in its proper character and superiority, which obtains nobility from the higher ends which it pursues.

B. The ethics of progressive culture, or progressivism, which places the ultimate end and the good not precisely in earthly happiness and private or common utility, but in culture, or the objective abundance of all human goods, and especially in intellectual perfection; or in the continual progress of humanity toward ideal culture. Progressivism is proposed in two ways:

a) one is private, which came forth in the Leibniz-Wolffian school from a reaction against mere eudaemonism, among Wolff (1679-1754), Fergusson (1724-1816), Ulrici (1806-1884), etc. Actions

are morally good or evil insofar as they either promote or diminish man's perfection, both in himself and in others;

b) the other is social: good is whatever promotes the progress of general culture, they say, or the continual progress of humanity. Thus many pantheists: Hegel, Schelling, Krause (1781-1832), Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Ahrens (1808-1874); especially Wundt (1832-1920), Carus, Tiberghien (1819-1901), Windelband (1848-1915), Bergemann. Thus also in some sense von Hartmann, according to whom the ultimate end is absolute liberation from the miseries of existence through a certain annihilation of self (IX, 2); but the intermediate end is the progress of culture by which this is known.

Against it: 1. man, or humanity, would be an end in itself;

2. the rule is vague and indeterminate: for what is it that in fact contributes to one's own perfection? Namely, what perfection is must be determined, and the culture of man is something indeterminate. Whence it is a subjective and variable norm, and not the supreme rule;

3. it does not avail for all: for the concept of culture on the one side is too difficult; on the other side the progress of earthly culture for many and in many circumstances is impossible, for example, for the infirm, the weaker, criminals, who nevertheless must rule life according to moral principles; indeed, certain nations could omit all culture, and therefore morality among them would have no sense!

4. but if culture were the end, virtue would necessarily grow with culture.

C. Sociological ethics is also in some way reduced to evolutionism, and regards moral dictates as products under the influence of the "social milieu," as Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim said. They will to rest upon the one scientific experience of sociological facts, by which it is clear not only that man wills to live in society, but also at the same time that an ideal social exemplar appears, which is the rule according to which man becomes fit to live in society, according to the varied social milieu and the diverse circumstances of places and times. And this is the whole moral life.

Against it: fundamental judgments are the same in all times and places; therefore they are not subjected to the fluctuations of diverse societies. On the contrary, very diverse causes, such as fear of evils, hope of goods, public opinion, laws, heredity, education, etc., cannot explain the origin of the same fundamental ideas.1

Especially: 1. the sociological fact as such does not exist in the concrete, but is a mere mental construction, obtained by abstraction from several individual facts gathered into a synthesis according to a certain convention. Whence sociological ethics does not rest immediately upon experience, but must have recourse to reason.

2. It does not render an account of the speculative or theoretical value of morality. For it does not appear how from experiences of contingent facts or from merely experimental associations of ideas, absolute moral obligation can arise.

3. Nor can it found the practical value of morality, because to will to live in society is not the supreme or only rule or reason of morals: the ideal exemplar of society, just as society itself, does not have the reason for itself in itself, nor is it the reason for being of individuals. And indeed:

a) This rule has a merely relative value, because it obliges individuals as to social offices alone. But society is not the whole individual, and the individual does not have his whole reason for being in society.

b) For to will to live is more fundamental: for the individual does not will to live in society except because he wills to live, and indeed to live toward his ultimate end, or toward his perfect and complete good.

c) Society ultimately is for individuals, and therefore it is not understood that individual conscience in morality, whether exclusively or ultimately, is obliged to society.

D. Finally, pragmatism, which teaches that the ideal of morality is known by internal experience in the collective conscience, and is nothing but a function of the utility which it procures. Thus William James (1842-1910), Schiller, and others.

To this system those things can be opposed which are opposed to utilitarianism. Whence, just as utilitarianism is variable, so in pragmatism morality would be variable and mutable.

1. Concerning the system of sociological ethics cf. Deploige, *Le conflit de la morale et de la sociologie*, and M. St. Gillet, *La morale et les morales*.

VII. Rational eudaemonism was founded by Socrates (470-399), who posited its essential principles from a certain reaction both against the subjectivist sophists and against the physical empiricists. Ethics is founded upon universal rational knowledge, which nevertheless itself rests upon knowledge of the nature of things, especially of human nature and psychology. Thus reason can and ought to rule man and so render him happy.

Plato (427-347) perfected this, by showing that happiness is in assimilation with God, the Supreme Good, through contemplation of the eternal Ideas. We can arrive at this through the virtues, of which the principal are wisdom, fortitude, temperance, justice, and religion.

Aristotle (384-322) completed it. He says that acts, in order that they be good, must be conformable to reason, and besides must be means by which we tend toward the highest good, beatitude. It is acquired principally by the mean virtues, by which all parts of man are subjected to reason; also, in some measure, by temporal goods possessed in a certain measure, because they are a condition or suitable disposition so that happiness can be full. Thus man is prepared for the contemplation of wisdom by which he is assimilated to God. This is happiness such as can be attained by man. It is an intelligible good, which by common effort in society must be pursued for all and thus attained.

This system Albert the Great and St. Thomas, joining Plato and Aristotle, perfected under the influence of the light of the Christian faith and led to its ultimate consequences. In particular:

1. they establish more firmly the foundation of morality and obligation, by binding ethics to metaphysics, and they show that the order of things and human reason are nothing but the

realization of the very eternal reason of divine wisdom, or of the eternal law;

2. they do not limit happiness, as Aristotle does, to the present life, in which, as experience testifies, full happiness is not always possible even for men acting from a right intention and according to the rule of reason; indeed, without interruption it does not belong even to the wise and perfect themselves. Whence happiness will be full in the future life;

3. they manifest the eminence of contemplation, and that it is the perfection of human nature, from this, that it joins us to our principle, as being contemplation of the divine essence itself and infinite truth, by which we cannot fail to be satisfied;

4. finally, they notice that the highest good, or happiness, must be sought not on account of delight and pleasure, but on account of the perfection of human nature; and that the very possession of infinite truth is not principally to be intended, but rather the infinite truth itself possessed.

VIII. Formalism, or pure rationalism, first came forth in Greece from a certain reaction to the intellectualism of Socrates: namely, in the Cynic school, whose author is Antisthenes the Athenian (444-369), and to which Diogenes (414-324), Crates, and Menippus pertain. It flourished especially in the Stoic school of Zeno (342-270), who was a disciple of Crates, and many from Greece adhered to it: Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, Panaetius, Dardanus, Posidonius; and Romans: Persius Flaccus, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius.

Good and virtue are to be conceived without any relation to delight and happiness; they consist in the sole effort of the will. Whence one must abstract from conventions and culture, and live according to nature, namely rational nature, that is, according to reason.

But by the name of nature the Stoics understood not only individual human nature but also the universal nature of the whole world, which man participates. The individual nature of man is only a part of the well-ordered universal nature; therefore, by living congruently with our nature, we consent to universal nature, or to the universal reason and spirit which orders the whole world so that all things happen by fatal necessity. But lest, on hearing reason and spirit, you think of an immaterial principle: for all things are bodies, even spirit, indeed also God; and the intelligent matter of which they consist is not inert but dynamic, because a force is intrinsic to them which is called the intelligent soul of the world.

To this materialistic conception it can be opposed: a) that in such a system no place is left for free will, but all things are carried out by ineluctable fate, and consequently there is no place for morality; b) if there is one intelligent reason of the universe, morality will be impersonal, which contradicts experience: thus the moral law, right, and the civil state ought to be the same for all.

Stoicism, with materialism excluded, was followed in some way by Reid (1710-1796), and especially by Kant (1724-1804), whose system was set forth at greater length above, n. 132. Several followed him as to the substance, among whom Renouvier (1815-1903) can be noted.

He too admits the categorical imperative and synthetic judgments *a priori*, which express better ideal norms and thence obligatory ones, whose obligatory force he derives from abstract and universal human reason. He departs from Kant in two things:

a) he says that facts also must be considered, and especially the history of the human race, which is a fallen race, to which therefore principles are to be adapted, and the ideal law cannot be imposed in all its purity, although one must tend toward that purity by slow progress;

b) consequently he does not reprove those who act honorably not from the motive of duty alone, but also with a view to happiness.

Formalism, especially under the Stoic or Kantian form, was sufficiently set forth and refuted above, n. 132-133.

IX. Kant exercised an immense influence, and several of his principles exerted force upon the whole of modern philosophy. Now from the influence of Kantian philosophy several systems arose.

1. On the one side, transcendental or absolute idealism was logically born from Kantian principles, and it arrived at Pantheism. Fichte (1762-1814) professes pantheistic monism and ethical idealism: the absolute ego, which is not a being but an action which thinks and realizes itself, the pure ego. Hence the principle: act according to your destination. But the destination is not individual but impersonal: subject yourself to the Whole, to the end of the community, so that in the experimental ego you may return more to the pure ego.

Schelling (1785-1854) has almost similar things: he proceeds from Fichte as to doctrine, proposing the system or principle of identity between object and subject, reality and ideality, matter and spirit, in the unity of the absolute, or of absolute reason. Hence moral virtue is a constant tendency toward the absolute, or progressive union with absolute reason.

But Hegel (1770-1831), developing the principle of dialectical identity, holds panlogism, and says that morality consists in the subjection of the individual, or subjective spirit, to the objective spirit, or supra-individual reason of the race, of which the State is the expression and form, so that the individual is absorbed in the State.

Concerning these systems it was said above, n. 137, C.

2. On the other side certain of the Kantian disciples fell into pessimism. According to them the noumenon is of a volitive and free nature;1 because all things in themselves are tendency, effort, or will to live. There is one absolute and unconscious will, which manifests itself in fatal phenomena and is limited in individual wills.

But the will is evil, because every desire, every effort, imports pain. For it tends toward happiness and delight as the end, and yet possession of the desired object does not procure it. Positive happiness cannot be obtained. Therefore, because the will is evil itself, one must act against it in its effects and in itself:

a) in its effects. The miseries of this life are to be mitigated through a certain affection of compassion toward others. Hence the only good actions are those which, from an affection of compassion and without any egoistic motive, serve the common good and diminish the misery of others;

b) in itself. Since the cessation of misery cannot be obtained, one remedy remains: annihilation of oneself and of one's will. Not through suicide, which only suppresses life, but does not suppress the will of life; but through renunciation of any desire whatever and abdication of every will. This is done

through perfect chastity, by which the propagation of evil is impeded, and through asceticism, or flight from delight and tendency toward self-annihilation, even to the renunciation and extinction of the very will to live and entrance into the nirvana of the Buddhists. Thus Schopenhauer (1788-1860), but his disciple von Hartmann (1842-1906) judges renunciation of the will to live impossible, and therefore says that there will be a future collective cosmic suicide, by which, with the powers of all wills united, the universe would return into the night of unconsciousness.

The system a) supposes the false principles of Kantian philosophy, materialistic evolution, and pantheism;

b) posits mere hypotheses or contradictions, for example, that every effort is a manifestation of the absolute will, that this is at once unconscious and free, that it is unconscious and tends to an end, that effort is from a free will and is fatal, that the end of every effort is nothing but delight and happiness, and that happiness cannot be attained;

c) concludes without necessity to altruism, since it could equally lead to Epicureanism and egoistic utilitarianism.2

Nietzsche (1844-1900) saw this, who professed sensualistic antipessimism, and at the same time pessimism. There are two kinds of men, he says: the former, eminent, learned, superior, who are called super-human (*Uebermensch*), are bound by no law and can freely follow their propensities, whatever they may be. Good for them is everything which leads to the perfect evolution of their activity. For they are a manifestation of the absolute will, which is not evil, but the essential cosmic force which must be amply evolved in the super-human. The latter, or uncultivated, must restrain inclinations and passions, so that they may humbly serve the former; they need rules of morality, namely altruistic ones, as pessimism hands down. This holds of nations as of individuals. Whence there is given a twofold diverse ethics: one of "masters" and of the stronger, the other of "slaves" and of the weak.

3. From a certain reaction against Kant and his aprioristic system, there was born the historical school, to which Stahl (1802-1861), v. Savigny (1779-1861), v. Ihering (1818-1892), etc., pertain, and the sociological school in Durkheim. Against immutable and universal principles established *a priori* they object the very notable variations and modifications of ethics. Purely rational and *a priori* doctrine cannot be applied to contingents except by adapting principles; and for this, psychological and historical inductions and the experience of life must also be consulted. But they reject all rational principles and have recourse to experience alone. And thus we return to moral positivism, concerning which n. 122.

1. Thus from a certain reaction against Hegel, according to whom it is essentially idea.

2. Concerning this see Fouillee, *Critique des systemes de morale contemporaine*.

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