SYNOPSIS OF MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY

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The seventh edition, carefully revised
according to the Code of Canon Law

VOLUME II

Fundamental Moral Theology

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Fundamental Moral Theology (Volume II)

Prolegomena to Moral Theology

Prolegomena to Moral Theology

We have already spoken of Theology in general in the first volume of Dogmatic Theology. Here, therefore, it will be enough to premise a few things concerning the notion, sources, and history of Moral Theology.

§ I. The Notion of Moral Theology

1. 1° Definition. (A) Theology in general is defined: the supernatural science concerning God and creatures insofar as they are referred to God.

[1] St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 4-5; Zacharia, *Dissertatio de Casuisticae Theologiae originibus, locis atque praestantia*, in Heilig, *Theol. Moralis S. Alphonsi*, Mechlin, 1845, p. XXVII-CXLVIII; Patuzzi, *Prodromus ad universam morum theologiam*, in Migne, *Theol. Curs. Compl.* XI, col. 9-64; Muller, *Theol. Moralis*, Introduction, § 1-14; T. Bouquillon, *Theologia Moralis Fundam.*, 3rd ed., Introduction, p. 1-167; Hogan, *Clerical Studies*, Boston, 1898, ch. V; which work was rendered into French under the care of Boudinhon, Paris, 1902: *Les Etudes du Clerge*.

It is divided into dogmatic and moral theology: the former, which is more speculative, sets forth and demonstrates the truths to be believed, and deservedly is called the rule of things to be believed; the latter, which is more practical, is concerned with morals or things to be done, and therefore is called the rule of things to be done. Yet from this it is not lawful to infer that dogmatic theology is merely speculative, and moral theology merely practical: for the dogmas which are proposed to our faith, although primarily they present to the mind an objective concept, are finally ordered to our sanctification and glorification; on the other hand, the rule of morals flows logically from Christian dogmas, and nothing more efficaciously allures to the practice of virtues than the attentive and pious contemplation of the divine mysteries, for example, Creation, Providence, and the Incarnation. Hence dogmatic theology is indeed primarily, but not exclusively, the rule of things to be believed; and moral theology, although it is primarily the rule of things to be done, must also embrace speculative questions.

2. (B) Moral theology can be defined: a science, relying at once upon reason and faith, treating of human acts insofar as they are means for attaining the supernatural end.[1] - It is called:

[1] Today not a few defenders of independent ethics ambitiously define this science as the breviary of humanity, namely the compendium of all sciences which render man happier; others, with Payot, *Cours de Morale*, p. 6, assert that it is the science by which human life is made more perfect, more intense, and happier. There is no one who does not see that these definitions are too comprehensive and confused.

(a) A science, that is, a series of conclusions deduced from certain principles and connected in logical order. It differs therefore from that theology which is merely casuistic, and which is situated in the solution of practical difficulties; for Moral Theology ascends higher: it investigates, sets forth, and demonstrates the principles of morals, known both by reason and by faith; afterward from these it deduces in logical order conclusions which approach more nearly to practice; and it hands down rules by which human acts can tend toward our supernatural end.[2]

[2] Recently there has arisen, especially in Germany, a controversy among Protestants and Catholics, and indeed among Catholics themselves, concerning the method to be followed in Moral Theology: for many have contended that the casuistic discipline rests upon no solid foundation, and gives occasion to many abuses. This indeed is true when the rules of morals are set forth independently of dogmatic truths; but it is by no means verified in the works of theologians who, adhering to the footsteps of St. Thomas, diligently investigate principles, with the help of analysis and synthesis, and from them logically deduce conclusions. Cf. Mausbach, *Die katholische Moral, ihre Methoden, Grundsaetze und Aufgaben*, Cologne, 1901; Adloff, *Katholische Moral und Sittlichkeit*, Strasbourg, 1901; E. Van Roey, *Recentes controverses de Morale*, in *Revue Neo-Scolastique*, May-Nov. 1902, pp. 213, 464.

(b) Relying upon reason and faith, that is, obtained not by natural light alone, but also with the help of revelation; and thus it is distinguished from Ethics, or moral Philosophy, which treats of the principles of morals known by reason alone, and insofar as they tend toward the ultimate natural end.

3. (c) Treating of human acts insofar as... by these words the object of this science is declared, namely all human acts, whether internal or external, pertaining to private, domestic, or social life, not indeed under every respect, but insofar as they tend toward the ultimate supernatural end; therefore it treats of human acts both in themselves and in their principles; of the laws by which acts of this kind are regulated; and also of the internal or external means, for example, the sacraments, by whose help we may be able to direct our actions to our supernatural end. And thus it is distinguished from those human sciences which treat of laws pertaining to some particular end, for example, from economic science, which hands down norms by which riches ought to be acquired and distributed; from politics, which hands down norms of prudent governing, etc. - It is likewise distinguished from those ecclesiastical sciences, such as canonical and liturgical science, which are proximately ordered to promoting the external governance of the Church or public worship, although remotely they also tend toward the ultimate end. Nevertheless moral theology uses these various sciences, and even in some respect presides over them, insofar as the proximate end ought to serve the ultimate end.

4. Moral theology taken in the broad sense embraces ascetical and mystical theology; but in the strict sense it is distinguished from them: for it is concerned with the laws of the Christian life; ascetical theology, however, with the rules and counsels of Christian perfection; and mystical theology with the higher ways of contemplation and of intimate union with God.

5. 2° Division. Commonly moral theology is divided into two parts: (a) General, or Fundamental, which treats both of the last end of man and of the norm of morality, which is nothing other than the ordering of acts to the last end, and of the general means by which we tend toward the end; (b) and special, which discusses the particular means by which we tend toward the end; namely, the virtues common to every Christian, and the duties proper to each state; and also the sacraments, by which grace is conferred for rightly fulfilling the duties of the Christian life.

6. But since in the *Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology* the doctrine, not only speculative but also practical, concerning the four sacraments has already been set forth, we first completed the sacramental matter, by setting forth the moral and canonical doctrine concerning the three

other sacraments, namely Penance, Matrimony, and Order; afterward, however, in the following order we shall discuss the various parts of Fundamental and Special Theology:

Fundamental or General Theology:

On the Last End and the norm of morality.
On Human Acts.
On Laws.
On Conscience.
On Sins and Vices.
On Virtues in general.

Special Theology:

On Theological Virtues.
On Moral Virtues, or on the Decalogue.
Appendix concerning the precepts of the Church.
On Justice and Contracts.
On the Various Obligations of States.

7. The reason for the division will be clear to one who attends a little. First, in the Fundamental part, there is treatment of the Last End toward which we tend, according to that saying: in all things look to the end; afterward, of Human Acts, insofar as they are means to the end; of Laws, by which our acts are directed to the end; of Conscience, by whose help general laws are applied to individual persons; of Sins and Vices, by which the human will turns aside from the law; of Virtues, by whose help we are inclined to live according to the law.

Special theology, which treats of particular duties, first treats of theological virtues, and secondly of moral virtues, because under these two genera are comprehended all the common duties of the Christian life; thus the precepts of the Decalogue, which are referred to the virtues, are set forth. By way of Appendix, however, there is joined the Treatise on the Precepts of the Church, as a complement of Decalogal Theology. - But because among the moral virtues justice demands a longer exposition, there is special discussion of it in the Treatise on Justice and Contracts. - Finally, since besides the duties common to all, there are certain duties proper to various states, these are discussed in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States.[1]

[1] In the special edition for the use of seminaries, where Moral Theology is set forth separately from Dogmatic Theology, we follow this division: T. I. Fundamental moral theology; on virtues and precepts. T. II. On Justice and contracts; on the various obligations of States. T. III. On the Sacraments in general and in particular.

§ II. Sources of Moral Theology

The sources from which moral truths are drawn are the same as the theological sources, concerning which there has been treatment in the *Synopsis of Fundamental Theology*. It may be permitted to add only a few things which more directly concern moral discipline.

8. 1° Concerning the use of Scripture in moral matters. All who admit the inspiration of the Scriptures confess that the Scriptures both of the Old and of the New Testament are useful, indeed necessary, for the right institution of morals: "All Scripture, inspired by God, is

profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice; that the man of God may be perfect, furnished to every good work."[1] In truth, in them are found both precepts and examples by which morals are instructed.

[1] II Tim. 3:16-17.

(A) But when we use the books of the Old Testament, three things especially must be kept before our eyes: (a) that there was a constant and progressive increase of revelation from the Patriarchs even to Christ; and that God, in those things which He prescribed, permitted, or tolerated, accommodated Himself to human weakness, so that not all things which were lawful for the Jews are permitted to Christians; for example, polygamy and divorce, which at least were tolerated in ancient times, are wholly prohibited under the new dispensation; and the law of charity toward neighbor was not understood in the same manner by Jews and Christians. Hence texts taken from the Old Testament ought not to be alleged or understood without choice and discrimination, but with account taken of this evolution.

(b) In the legal books there are found precepts of three kinds: moral precepts, which retain their force, provided they are taken not precisely in the manner in which they lie there, but as approved, explained, and perfected by Christ; ceremonial precepts, which regarded worship; and judicial precepts, which constituted the law proper to the Israelite nation. These two latter kinds have now been abrogated, and we cannot use them except for determining more fully what is lawful or expedient in certain circumstances, what pertains to natural or positive law, or also for illustrating by analogy certain Christian truths or practices.

(c) As to the examples which are reported there, many indeed are worthy of imitation; but since even the holiest men are not free from human frailty, not all things which they did are for that very reason commendable, although they are not expressly reprehended by Scripture. Therefore it must be carefully weighed, from the context and parallel places, whether these are approved or not; and if they are approved, whether in themselves, under the moral respect, or under another respect; and if any actions either are evil, or at least bear before themselves the appearance of evil, they are not to be drawn into imitation. - The same must likewise be noted as to certain parables and some examples related in the New Testament.

9. (B) In reading the books of the New Testament, attention must chiefly be given to these three things: (a) Christian revelation was not completed in one moment, but grew successively until the death of the last of the Apostles; even after the Apostles had died, the Spirit of God teaches through the infallible magisterium of the Church, and those things which are contained only obscurely, implicitly, and virtually in the Gospels, Epistles, and divine Tradition, are in the course of time proposed more lucidly, explicitly, and formally by the Church herself. Hence, in order to set forth Christian ethics fully, one must wisely use the various books of the New Testament, the divine Traditions, and the infallible magisterium of the Church, whether extraordinary or ordinary.

(b) Since certain things are handed down under precept, but others under counsel, these must not be mixed indiscriminately, but must be distinguished with great circumspection. The foundation of this distinction is found in the Gospel itself:[1] for when the very rich young man had come to Christ,

asking, "What good shall I do that I may have life everlasting?", the Master answered: "But if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." The young man said that he had kept these from his youth; then Jesus said to him: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven." From this it is inferred that, for attaining eternal life, the observance of the commandments strictly suffices; but for perfection something further is required, namely poverty and the other evangelical counsels. Hence from the text, the context, parallel places, the subject matter, and especially the interpretation of the Church, it must be discerned what is established by way of precept and what by way of counsel.

[1] Matt. 19:16-21; cf. Maldonatus, on this place; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 118, a. 4.

(c) Likewise among precepts, some are universal, some particular, others perpetual, others temporary; for example, the Apostles in the Council of Jerusalem established these things:[1] "For it hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things; that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." Now from elsewhere it is clear that the prohibition of fornication is perpetual, absolute, and universal, but that the other things are prohibited only for a time. Hence likewise the context, parallel places, and the interpretation of the Fathers and of the Church must be diligently inspected.

[1] Acts 15:28-29.

10. 2° Concerning the use of Tradition in Moral Theology. It has already been set forth elsewhere (*On the Sources of Revelation*, n. 961 sq.) by what means Tradition is transmitted and known; what is the authority of the solemn or ordinary magisterium of the Church, of the Fathers, theologians, Congregations, etc. It may be permitted to add only a few things which more nearly regard practice.

(A) In reading the decrees of Councils and Supreme Pontiffs, these things especially must be attended to: (a) Definitions concerning moral matters indeed contain principles of morals which in themselves are immutable; but their application can be diverse according to the diverse circumstances of times and places. Thus definitions concerning usury, established in those times when economic laws differed much from those which now prevail, cannot today be applied in the same way as in the Middle Ages. (b) Disciplinary laws vary according to various times and nations, and therefore can be changed or abrogated; hence more recent decrees sometimes correct and reform older ones. Yet the theologian ought to use these so that he may better understand and explain the new dispositions of laws. (c) As to condemned propositions, in order to uncover their sense, it must be carefully inquired by whom and in what circumstances they were uttered, why and how they were reprobated.[2]

[2] For accomplishing this, cf. D. Viva, *Damnatae Theses*; Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de Theologie*, I, 740, 748, etc.

11. (B) The Roman Congregations, in the name of the Pontiff, often promulgate decisions very useful concerning moral matters. For they not only have the power of authentically interpreting the Tridentine decrees and other ecclesiastical laws, each according to its proper competence, with the approval of the Roman Pontiff preserved; but in addition they settle controversies which are to be solved in a disciplinary or administrative manner:[1] decisions of

this kind, however, which make law only between the parties, bear very great authority for similar cases. But among these one must speak a little more fully concerning the Holy Office, whose duty it is "to guard the doctrine of faith and morals,"[2] and also concerning the Tribunal of the Sacred Penitentiary, whose office it is "to examine and settle questions of conscience."[3]

[1] The examination of questions which are to be treated in judicial order is reserved to the Tribunal of the Sacred Rota; its sentences, which contain the reasons both in fact and in law, are of the greatest importance.

[2] Pius X, Bull *Sapienti Consilio*, June 29, 1908.

[3] Ibid.

(a) The Congregation of the Holy Universal Inquisition, which is commonly called the Holy Office, has the right of proceeding and defining in all causes concerning heresy, schism, apostasy from the faith, magic, and abuse of the sacraments; for which reason it has issued not a few decrees for explaining the Bull *Apostolicae Sedis*, where these crimes are punished by various censures. Its doctrinal responses enjoy great authority, especially because they are not issued except after mature discussion of the matter, and are always approved by the Supreme Pontiff; nevertheless this approval, ordinarily in common form, in no way renders them infallible.

(b) The Sacred Penitentiary solves practical difficulties for the internal forum,[4] but it does not settle speculative controversies; hence its decisions must be received with the greatest reverence, and can be very useful even in similar cases; but they do not have the force of law, since they are issued only for a particular case.

[4] In truth Benedict XIV, Constitution *Pastor Bonus*, granted to the Major Penitentiary that "he may be able, with the counsel of his Doctors and Theologians, to declare all doubts in the matter of sins, or otherwise concerning the penitential forum in any way." - More briefly, Pius X, Bull *Sapienti Consilio*: "It examines questions of conscience, and settles them."

12. 3° Concerning the use of reason in Moral Theology. (A) Although the theologian treats especially of those things which God has revealed and which the Church proposes to us to be believed and done, he cannot pass over the principles of morals which are known by natural reason: for God is the author of reason as well as of faith, and revealed truths

are better understood and set forth when they are compared with truths of the natural order. On the other hand, revealed truths themselves ought to be understood reasonably; from these same truths conclusions and practical conclusions are to be inferred. Therefore Moral Theology can and ought to use reason in order rightly to set forth the principles of morals, to prove and illustrate them, and to unfold them for practical uses.

Yet human reason in moral matters is not independent, but subordinated to faith, and it ought to acknowledge the infallible magisterium of the Church in moral questions as much as in dogmatic ones.

(B) Among the natural sciences which can be useful to moralists are numbered: (a) natural Ethics, which treats of the various duties of men, and therefore the works of philosophers, even pagans, which deal with virtues and duties; (b) Psychology, not only speculative, where there is question of human faculties, habits, passions, etc., but also practical, which is acquired from discreet commerce with men; nor should experimental psychology be passed over, especially that part in which the

various diseases are described which can affect the internal faculties; (c) Pastoral Medicine, where physiological and pathological notions are handed down which, on account of the intimate relations between body and soul, are very useful for judging concerning the morality of certain actions; (d) Sociology, which treats of the rights and duties of citizens, insofar as they are members of the social organism; (e) Political Economy, which hands down principles concerning the production and equitable distribution of temporal goods; (f) Civil Jurisprudence, insofar as it sets forth by law those things which among various nations complete and perfect the natural law; (g) History, especially that part which describes the morals, worship, and moral precepts of various peoples: for in this way the progress or regression of moral science is better understood; and besides, from the experience of past times it is more wisely inferred by what means morals can be restored.

§ III. Brief Survey of the History of Moral Theology

13. In order that the aforesaid sources, especially the works of the Fathers and theologians, may be inspected more deeply, and that the method to be followed in Moral Theology may be better understood, it will not be beside the matter briefly to delineate the history of this science. In it a twofold age can be distinguished: the former, of the Fathers; the latter, of the theologians. In each age, several epochs may be distinguished, which have their own proper character: the difference among these does not proceed from their mutual opposition, but from successive evolution; and, since one epoch is a preparation for another, it can often scarcely be defined where this one begins and the other ends.

[1] Zacharia, *Dissertatio de Casuisticae Theologiae originibus*; Patuzzi, op. cit.; C. F. Standlin, *Geschichte der christlichen Moral*; Luthardt, *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik*; Ziegler, *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik*; E. Muller, *Theologia Moralis*, Introduction, § 11-13; Pruner, *Theologie Morale*, translated by Belet, t. I, p. 19-47; Bouquillon, *Theologia Moralis Fund.*, Introduction, n. 124-195.

I. Moral Science in the Age of the Fathers

14. In the age of the Fathers, Moral Theology is more positive, apologetic, and polemical than speculative and scientific; more paraenetic or exhortatory than casuistic; it does not embrace an integral and systematic exposition of all ethics, but only particular treatises, or a brief and incomplete synopsis of duties. - In this age, three epochs are usually distinguished: the first, from the beginning to the Council of Nicaea; the second, from the Council of Nicaea to St. Gregory the Great (+ 604); the third, from St. Gregory to St. Bernard (1120).

[2] Cf. Le Nain de Tillemont, *Memoires pour servir a l'Hist. ecclesiastique*, Paris, 1701; Dom Ceillier, *Hist. des auteurs ecclesiastiques*, 1758; Fessler, *Institut. Patrologicae*, Innsbruck, 1850; O. Bardenhewer, *Les Peres de l'Eglise*, French translation by Godet and Verschaffel, Paris, 1898.

15. 1° In the first epoch, the principles of morals are not unfolded in a systematic manner, but, as occasion is given, are set forth compendiously in epistles, homilies, commentaries, or particular treatises.

(A) Among the Apostolic Fathers who wrote especially concerning moral matters: - (a) the author of the work *Didache*, or *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles* (around the end of the first century), hands down a compendium of Christian ethics: there are three principal commandments, namely love of God and

neighbor, and also the golden rule that one should not do to another what he would not wish to be done to himself; the graver sins are murder, fornication and adultery, idolatry, theft, blasphemy; finally particular duties toward oneself, the Church, the poor, and the family are described.[1] (b) St. Clement, Pope, in the *Epistle to the Corinthians* (around the year 97), especially commends concord and fraternal charity; envy and jealousy stand in the way of this; these vices must be eradicated through penance, obedience, and humility; just as in the body some members minister to others and all to the head, so the faithful of the Church ought to minister one to another, and all to legitimate superiors; therefore those who dissent should confess their sin, subject themselves to the presbyters, and return to peace and unity.[2] (c) Hermas, in the work entitled *Pastor* (around the year 140), sets forth the chief commandments in the second part of his book: for the Shepherd, or angel of penance, commands that Christ's disciple believe in God, flee detraction, and bestow alms; that he cultivate truth and chastity, and also justice, patience, and penance; that he flee sadness, avoid pseudo-prophets, and remove from himself every evil desire; the devil is not to be feared, but God, who can save and destroy. Other things are handed down here and there concerning divorce in the case of adultery, concerning the use of riches, concerning fasting, and finally concerning the way of salvation.[3]

[1] Funk, *Patres Apostolici*, 2nd ed., Tubingen, 1901, t. I, p. VI-XIX and p. 2-37.

[2] Funk, op. cit., p. XXXII and 98-184.

[3] Funk, op. cit., p. CXXII and 414-639.

16. (B) In the second and third century, besides many Fathers who incidentally, in apologetic books against pagans or polemical books against heretics, vindicated the principles of Christian ethics, certain men wrote entire treatises concerning the chief virtues.

(a) Thus, in the Greek Church, Clement of Alexandria elegantly set forth a brief summary of moral doctrine in the *Paedagogus*, and a more profound exposition in the books of the *Stromata*.[4] The Pedagogue is Christ Himself, always like His eternal Father, who teaches us with meekness what a Christian ought to be like: how we ought to use foods not for pleasure, but for the conservation of our life; how carefully obscene speech and acts, and also luxury and ostentation, are to be avoided; afterward he treats of Christian marriage, which ought to be ordered not to pleasure, but to the procreation of children; of the true beauty of man, which consists not in comeliness or external adornment, but in charity; of riches, which we ought to communicate to others not arrogantly and sparingly, but kindly and liberally;[1] of baths and bodily exercise. In the books of the *Stromata*, among other things, he sets forth that the Christian gnostic or philosopher ought to be adorned especially with two virtues, Stoic insensibility and Christian charity.

[4] Migne, P.G., t. VIII and IX; in t. IX, p. 798 sq., there is to be found the excellent dissertation of Nicolas Le Nourry concerning the works and doctrine of Clement; cf. E. de Faye, *Clement d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1898; W. Capitaine, *Die Moral des Clemens von Alexandrien*, Paderborn, 1903; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. III, p. 137.

[1] Concerning this argument he treats more fully in the little work whose title is *Quis dives salvetur*, P.G., IX, 603-652.

17. Origen wrote many things about ethics, not indeed in an ordered and systematic manner, but incidentally in homilies, commentaries, and various treatises, from which a summary of moral science has been excerpted.[2] For there he sets forth the origin of sin, which had already been committed by spirits and human souls before these were joined to bodies; Christ indeed

satisfied for our sins, but the free will of man must cooperate with grace in order that he may obtain sanctification. Actual sins must be expiated in various ways, but especially by penance, which supposes the confession of sins. Moreover there are two classes of Christians: the perfect and the imperfect. The former, or gnostics, ought to cultivate continence and virginity, and to withdraw from the world. But Origen erred concerning the eternity of punishments.

[2] The works of Origen which survive you will find in Migne, P.G., t. XI-XVII; concerning his moral doctrine Capitaine wrote *De Origenis ethica*, Munster in Westphalia, 1898; cf. Huet's *Origeniana*, P.G., XVII, p. 697-1114.

St. Methodius, about + 311, carefully avoided these errors. Moreover he taught that faith, as well as good works and the observance of the commandments, is necessary for salvation; if we sin, recourse must confidently be had to penance, since God is merciful and ready to pardon. He established the distinction between precepts and counsels, and especially commends virginity, yet without in any way reprobating marriage.[3]

[3] The chief work of St. Methodius, *Convivium decem virginum*, you will find in Migne, P.G., XVIII, 27-228; as to his other works, cf. G. N. Bonwetsch, *Methodius von Olympus*, I, *Schriften*, Erlangen and Leipzig, 1891.

18. (b) In the Latin Church, Tertullian and St. Cyprian especially wrote concerning moral matters. The former favors excessive rigorism, even before he embraced the errors of the Montanists;[4] nevertheless he describes certain duties clearly and eloquently. He treats of civil and public life especially in his little works *De spectaculis*, *De idololatria*, *De corona*, and there he urges the principles of cooperation too strictly, not distinguishing sufficiently between precepts and counsels. He excellently sets forth the virtue of fortitude in the books *Ad martyres*, *De patientia*, and *De fuga*; he treats of temperance in the *Exhortatio castitatis*, *De virginibus velandis*, *Ad uxorem*, *De monogamia*, *De cultu feminarum*, *De jejuniis*, but there he censures second marriages too bitterly.

[4] The works of Tertullian you will find in Migne, P.L., t. I-II; Oehler made the best edition public, Leipzig, 1853-1854; cf. P. Monceaux, *Histoire litteraire de l'Afrique chret.*, t. I, 1901; A. d'Ales, *La Theologie de Tertullien*, Paris, 1905; Turmel, *Tertullien*, 1905.

St. Cyprian, although a disciple of Tertullian, tempered his severity.[1] He carefully distinguishes between precepts and counsels. One of the chief virtues is faith, which is truly free, and makes us capable of good works. By good works we truly merit, while by evil works we are made debtors of God; nevertheless we can satisfy God by just works, and do penance for sins. He treats especially *De habitu virginum*, *De dominica oratione*, *De opere et eleemosynis*, *De bono patientiae*, *De zelo et livore*, *De lapsis*, and, in his letters, of penance, where he asserts the necessity of confession. - He erred concerning the necessity of rebaptizing heretics.

[1] Read the works of St. Cyprian in Migne, P.L., t. IV; nevertheless the best edition is that which G. Hartel edited, Vienna, 1868-1871; cf. E. W. Benson, *Cyprian, his life, his times, his work*, London, 1897; P. Monceaux, *Hist. lit. de l'Afrique chret.*, t. II, 1902.

19. (c) In the same age, certain particular Councils issued decrees concerning practical questions pertaining to the Christian life; thus the First Council of Carthage, about the year 215, established laws concerning heretics to be rebaptized; the Council of Elvira, about the year 300, concerning idolatry, sorceries, adultery, divorce, usury, times of fasts, the excommunicated and energumens, and many other matters; the Council of Arles, in the year

314, concerning the faithful who wish to administer public affairs, concerning the baptism of heretics, divorce, marriage with Gentiles, clerics who take interest, those who hand over the sacred Scriptures or the vessels of the Lord to pagans, etc.[2] Likewise the *Canonical Epistle* of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus[3] (253-258), which hands down the penitential discipline of this age, ought to be read attentively.

[2] Hefele treats learnedly of these councils, *Histoire des Conciles*, t. I, § I-XVII. Cf. Mansi, *Concilia*, t. I; Th. Bruns, *Canones Apostolorum et Conciliorum*, Berlin, 1839, t. I.

[3] Migne, P.G., t. X, p. 1019-1047.

20. 2° The second epoch, from the fourth to the sixth century, is deservedly called the golden age of the Fathers. Moral works were then published not only more numerous in number, but also more profound in doctrine and erudition. On the occasion of rising heresies, the foundations of Christian ethics are more firmly established; from the progress of monastic life there arises a more perfect exposition of ascetical and mystical theology; on the other hand, moral principles are more specifically adapted to the various changes which occur in civil life; thus there is more often treatment of the acquisition, use, and abuse of riches, of usury, of alms, etc. Questions of this kind

questions are weighed not only in epistles, in homilies and sermons, but also in commentaries on Scripture, or in various treatises concerning the chief virtues. At the same time, the letters of the Roman Pontiffs and collections of canons exhibit ecclesiastical discipline and authentic rules of morals.

21. (A) Among the Greeks, there flourished especially:

(a) St. Cyril of Jerusalem, who in the *Catecheses* (347) lucidly treats of the dignity, necessity, and illustrious effects of baptism; of sacred chrism or confirmation; of the Eucharist, of the Mass and its utility not only for the living, but also for the dead; of confession and penance for obtaining the remission of sins.[1]

[1] Migne, P.G., t. XXXIII; cf. J. Marquardt, *S. Cyrillus baptismi, chrismatis, eucharistiae mysteriorum interpres*, Leipzig, 1882.

(b) St. Basil the Great, who flourished in the year 365: he wrote concerning moral and ascetical matters. In the *Moralia* he treats of virtues and vices, whether common or proper to each state; in the homilies, of certain capital vices, avarice, anger, drunkenness, and also of the contrary virtues, alms, humility, fasting. He was also a legislator of the monastic life, both in the Ascetical Treatises and in the Longer or Shorter Rules.[2]

[2] Migne, P.G., t. XXXI; cf. Vasson, *S. Basile le Grand, ses oeuvres oratoires et ascetiques*, Paris, 1894.

(c) St. Gregory Nazianzen (330-390) wrote moral poems in which, after setting forth the nature of virtue, he inculcates the individual virtues, especially patience and equanimity in adversities, chastity, poverty, liberality, and humanity toward the poor; but especially he instructs adolescents devoted to the study of letters with salutary admonitions, and afterward the unmarried and monks, excellently commending virginity.[3]

[3] Migne, P.G., t. XXXVII; cf. Benoit, *S. Gregoire de Nazianze*, Paris, 1876; C. Cavalier, *S. Greg. de Naz.*, Montpellier, 1886.

(d) St. Gregory of Nyssa, who flourished in the year 371, wrote three Treatises concerning Christian and religious perfection, where he shows that Christian profession properly consists in the imitation of Christ, in purification from sins, abnegation of one's own will, assiduous prayer, charity, humility, and modesty. Besides, in a special book, he treats of virginity; in the Orations, he especially commends love of the poor and beneficence.[4]

[4] Migne, P.G., t. XLVI; cf. Diekamp, *La Theologie de S. Greg. de Nysse*, 1896.

22. (e) St. Ephrem, the Syrian (+ 362), after demonstrating free will, declares how man's true beatitude consists in virtue; afterward he treats of the individual virtues, especially of the fear of God joined with confidence, of charity and humility, of obedience and abnegation of oneself, of patience, meekness, and chastity. For cultivating these virtues, spiritual combat is necessary, so that the devil and one's own concupiscence may be overcome. He likewise wrote a little book on the priesthood and very many sermons concerning the perfection of the monastic life.[1]

[1] *S. Ephraem Opera*, Rome, 1732-46, t. II and III; cf. A. Haase, *S. Ephraemi Syri theologia*, Halle, 1869.

23. (f) St. Chrysostom (+ 398), in his homilies, eloquently sets forth almost all the duties of the Christian life. Among virtues, he most greatly commends charity, the love of enemies, and alms; among vices, he strictly reprehends drunkenness and avarice, the luxury of the rich, impurity, and the custom of frequenting theaters and circus games. Afterward he urges penance, to be manifested by confession, tears, humility, and alms. He also wrote many moral little works, especially six books *On the Priesthood*, a book *On Virginity*, two books *To the Younger Widow*, and the book *That No One Is Harmed Except by Himself*.[2]

[2] Migne, P.G., t. XLVII-LXIV; cf. A. Puech, *S. Jean Chrysostome et les Moeurs de son temps*, Paris, Hachette, 1891; Ph. Schaff, *Saint Chrysostom and Saint Augustin*, London, 1891.

(g) St. John Climacus, born at the beginning of the sixth century, excellently described the perfection proper to monks in the *Ladder of Paradise*, which embraces thirty steps. There he ingeniously proposes the means for obtaining virtues and eradicating vices. First indeed he commends abnegation of the world, so that we may be able to adhere wholly to God; afterward obedience, penance, meekness, silence, fasting, chastity, humility, and he describes the vices contrary to the aforesaid virtues. By the practice of virtues and by prayer we can attain full perfection, or apathy, that is, a state free from vices and passions.[3]

[3] Migne, P.G., t. LXXXVIII, 631-1164.

24. (B) At the same time, in the Latin Church, there flourished:

(a) St. Ambrose (+ 397), who wrote three books *On the Duties of Ministers*, in which he proposed to himself to follow Cicero's treatise *On Duties*, yet correcting errors and at the same time completing Stoic ethics by the precepts and counsels of Christ. First of all, he demonstrates that divine retribution is one of the chief motives for fulfilling duties. Afterward he describes various virtues, especially the four cardinal virtues; he declares how it is useful for clerics to win for themselves the love, confidence, and good estimation of others; likewise why one should seek not what profits individuals, but what profits many or all; finally he establishes that nothing is to be sought except what is honorable: therefore let not only utility, but life and friendship, yield to honesty. Elsewhere

he treats of virginity, widowhood, flight from the world, the good of death, and the holy Patriarchs, whom he exhibits as models of the virtues.[4]

[4] Migne, P.L., t. XIV-XVI; nevertheless the Vienna edition is better; cf. Pruner, *Die Theologie des H. Ambrosius*, Eichstaedt, 1862; Duc de Broglie, *L'Eglise et l'Empire romain*, t. 5-6; Thamin, *S. Ambroise et la morale chretienne au IVe s.*, Paris, 1895.

(b) St. Jerome (+ about 385), in his Commentaries and especially in his Letters, hands down many things concerning contempt of the world and Christian perfection, concerning the virtues which are necessary for bishops, clerics, and virgins, concerning monastic life and perfection, etc.

25. (c) St. Augustine (+ 429), easily the chief of the Fathers of the Western Church, wrote many excellent things concerning almost all questions of ethics, although he did not arrange his doctrine into one body. Before all things, he establishes the foundations of ethics: God is the supreme good, the good of all goods, the good from which all goods are, and therefore the ultimate end toward which we ought to tend; wherefore the ultimate norm of morality is the eternal law, or divine reason and will; therefore the source of moral obligation is the supreme dominion of God.[1] We tend toward the end through free and meritorious acts: therefore it does not suffice to believe, but it is necessary to perform good works.[2] Among these the works of charity stand forth, to which the rest are referred: the love of God even to contempt of self builds the heavenly city; the love of self even to contempt of God builds the earthly city.[3] In various works he describes the duties of individual, familial, and social life. Nor does he pass over the various degrees of perfection: "Charity begun, therefore," he says, "is justice begun; charity advanced is justice advanced; great charity is great justice; perfect charity is perfect justice."[4] Augustine did not cease to enjoy very great authority among the later Fathers and the Scholastics, so that he deserved to be called the father of Western theology.[5]

[1] *De Beata vita, De Moribus Ecclesiae, Confessiones*, P.L., t. XXXII; *De doctrina christiana*, P.L., t. XXXIV.

[2] *De libero arbitrio*, P.L., t. XXXII; *De fide et operibus*, P.L., t. XL; *De spiritu et littera*, P.L., t. XLIV.

[3] *De Civ. Dei*, P.L., t. XLI, 439; *Enchiridion*, P.L., t. XL.

[4] *De nat. et gratia*, P.L., t. XLIV, 290.

[5] Grou, *Morale de S. Augustin*, Paris, 1786; Nourrisson, *La Philosophie de S. Augustin*, Paris, 1869; Dorner, *Augustinus*, Berlin, 1873; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, I, 2432.

26. (d) Cassian (+ about 416), in the *Institutes of the Coenobia* and the *Conferences*, gathered the marrow of spiritual doctrine which had been handed down by the monks of Egypt. The end of the monastic life is to promote the kingdom of God, but its aim is to attain purity of heart, or charity. To accomplish this, it is necessary to renounce the threefold concupiscence and to eradicate the eight capital vices. God indeed permits the just to be troubled by diverse calamities and temptations, but all these things can be overcome by prayer. For perfection there are desired perfect chastity, which cannot be cultivated without the grace of God, spiritual knowledge of the Scriptures, fraternal charity toward all, and the right use of the tongue. - Yet it is to be regretted that the author fell into semi-Pelagianism.[6]

[6] The works of Cassian you will find in Migne, P.L., t. XLIX-L; nevertheless the Vienna edition is better, edited by Petschenig, 1886-1888; cf. Lombard, *Jean Cassien, sa vie, ses ecrits, sa doctrine*, Strasbourg, 1863.

(e) Caesarius of Arles (+ 543), in Sermons and Letters, amplified the moral doctrine of the earlier Fathers, especially of Origen, Ambrose, and Augustine, and accommodated it to the morals of the sixth century. Worthy of note are the sermons concerning faith and the necessity of good works, concerning divine judgment and penance, concerning charity toward God and neighbor, where he treats brilliantly of the love of enemies, against impurity and drunkenness. He establishes the distinction between capital and minute sins; but at the same time he shows that the habit of often sinning lightly easily draws one to grave sins; thence he infers that it is a grave evil if progress in good works is neglected.[1]

[1] His chief sermons are found among the works of St. Augustine, to whom they had long been ascribed, P.L., t. XXXV; other works were edited by Migne, P.L., LXVII; cf. A. Malnory, *Saint Cesaire, ev. d'Arles*, Paris, 1894; C. F. Arnold, *Caesarius von Arelate*, Leipzig, 1894; P. Lejay, *Le role theologique de Cesaire d'Arles*, in *Rev. d'Hist. et de Litt. relig.*, t. X, 1905, p. 145 sq.; and Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. Theol.*, t. II, p. 2168.

27. (f) St. Gregory the Great (+ 604) wrote many things concerning morals, for the instruction of pastors and the faithful, but especially the *Moralia in Job*, where he explains allegorically this book of Scripture: Job is a type of Christ and the Church, who form one mystical body; the patriarch's wife designates carnal men; the three friends signify heretics; Leviathan is a figure of the devil. This allegorical exposition, however, provides him the occasion to declare at length almost all the rules of Christian ethics concerning vices and virtues. He also completes these in moral letters, so that a summa of moral theology could be excerpted from his works. Besides, in the excellent book *Regula pastoralis*, he excellently describes the duties of pastors of souls, by setting forth who can and ought to come to this office, how he should live, how he should teach, and how, while teaching, he should acknowledge his own infirmity.[2]

[2] Migne, P.L., t. LXXV-LXXIX; cf. Ed. Clausier, *Saint Gregoire le Grand, sa vie, son pontificat, ses oeuvres, son temps*, Paris, 1886-1891; V. Fevre, *Etude des Morales de S. Gregoire* (thesis), Paris, 1858; A. Snow, *Saint Gregory the Great: his work and his spirit*, London, 1892; Grisar, *S. Gregorio Magno*, in *Civilta*, 1890-1893.

28. (g) In the same age there are already found collections of canons, such as the *Canons of the Apostles* and the *Constitutions of the Apostles*, around the beginning of the fifth century; likewise there are many decrees of general and particular Councils concerning moral matters and penitential discipline;[3] not a few decretal letters of the Roman Pontiffs, especially of St. Siricius, St. Innocent I, Zosimus, Boniface, St. Celestine, Hilary, St. Gelasius, Symmachus, St. Leo, and Gregory the Great.[4]

[3] Concerning these, see Mansi, t. II-X; Hefele, t. I-IV; Bruns, op. cit., t. I-II.

[4] Concerning these letters, see P. Coustant, *Epistolae Rom. Pontificum*, Paris, 1721; A. Thiel, *Epist. Rom. Pontif.*, from St. Hilary to Hormisdas, Braunsberg, 1867; Ph. Jaffe, *Regesta Pontificum Roman.* from St. Peter to the year 1143, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1885.

29. 3° In the third epoch of the Fathers, from St. Gregory to St. Bernard, on account of the bitterness of the times, there is scarcely any progress of theology; most authors are only collectors and compilers. For the most part theological science is cultivated in abbatial and episcopal schools, and gradually becomes scholastic. Hence there already begins a systematic exposition of ethics, and the way is prepared for the Summas of theology.

30. (A) Among the Greeks, John Damascene (+ 740) stands out. In the book *De Orthodoxa fide*, and in the little works *De jejuniis*, *De Virtutibus et vitiis*, he arranged the chief principles of ethics.[1] He attempted to accommodate Aristotelian philosophy to the Christian faith, and thus opened the way for the Scholastics. He establishes that there is a twofold law: the law of God manifested by the testimony of conscience, to which obedience must be given, and the law of sin, which we must resist. By fulfilling the law of God, we are made like Him. To God is owed adoration, or the worship of latria. We likewise glorify Him by exercising the virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Toward neighbor we ought to cultivate justice, charity, and beneficence. But for accomplishing this, two things are necessary: abnegation of oneself and prayer. - Elsewhere he treats brilliantly of the sacraments and the worship of images.

[1] His works were edited by Migne, P.G., t. XCIV and XCV; cf. Grundiener, *Johannes Damascenus* (thesis), Utrecht, 1876; Lupton, *S. John of Damascus*, London, 1884; V. Ermoni, *S. Jean Damascene*, Paris, 1904.

31. (B) Among the Latins, there flourished: (a) St. Isidore of Seville (+ 601), who, in the three books of the *Sentences* and in the two books *De ecclesiasticis officiis*, arranged the moral and ascetical doctrine of his predecessors; he was held by his contemporaries and by the Scholastics as an ornament of the Catholic Church.[2]

[2] See his works in Migne, P.L., t. LXXXI-LXXXIV; Fr. Menendez Pelayo, *S. Isidore et l'importance de son role dans l'histoire intellectuelle de l'Espagne*, in *Annales de Philos. chret.*, new series, t. VII, 1882, p. 258-269.

(b) The Venerable Bede (+ 691), both in commentaries and in homilies, set forth moral doctrine in an exhortatory manner and in a fuller style;[3] most studious and very learned in the Scriptures, he was called Venerable on account of the merits of his doctrine and virtues.

[3] Migne, P.L., t. XC-XCV; cf. Gehle, *De Bedae venerabilis vita et scriptis*, Leyden, 1838; Dom Plaine, *Le Venerable Bede*, in *Revue anglo-romaine*, 1896, t. III, p. 49-96.

(c) Alcuin (+ 755), besides moral commentaries on Scripture, wrote books concerning the use of the Psalms, concerning the ceremonies of baptism, concerning confession, where he proves its necessity, concerning virtues and vices, concerning the reason of the soul, in which he gathered many useful and pious things.[4]

[4] Migne, P.L., t. C-CI; cf. Monier, *Alcuin et Charlemagne*, 1864; Werner, *Alcuin und sein Jahrhundert*, Paderborn, 1876; Hamelin, *Essai sur la vie et les oeuvres d'Alcuin* (thesis), Paris, 1877.

(d) Hincmar, Archbishop of Reims (+ 845), wrote various little works concerning vices to be avoided and virtues to be exercised, concerning the restraining of the plunders of soldiers, concerning the restraining of the abduction of widows, girls, and nuns, etc.[1]

[1] Migne, P.L., t. CXXV-CXXVI; cf. Vidieu, *Histoire de Reims, etude sur le IXe s.*, Paris, 1875.

(e) Rabanus Maurus[2] (+ 847) wrote books concerning the praises of the Holy Cross, the instruction of clerics, marriages of blood relatives, the deceits of magicians and false divinations, sacred orders, ecclesiastical discipline, seeing God, purity of heart and the manner of penance, questions of penitential Canons, etc.

[2] Migne, P.L., t. CVII-CXII; cf. Dahl, *Leben und Schriften des Erzbischofs R. Maurus von Mainz*, Fulda, 1828.

32. (f) St. Peter Damian (+ 1057) published many little works concerning the duties of the faithful, clerics, and monks, concerning the sacraments administered by the impious, concerning the degrees of kinship and relationship, concerning the time of celebrating marriages, concerning Lent, concerning the fast of Saturday, concerning the celebration of vigils, concerning the canonical hours, concerning the celibacy of priests, concerning the common life of clerics, concerning the perfection of monks, etc. He likewise wrote histories of certain saints, so that he might confirm precepts by their examples.[3]

[3] Migne, P.L., t. CXLIV-CXLV; cf. Vogel, *Peter Damiani*, Jena, 1856; Capecelatro, *Storia di S. P. Damiano e del suo tempo*, Florence, 1862.

(g) St. Bernard (+ 1120), "last among the Fathers, certainly not unequal to the first," says Mabillon, wrote concerning moral, ascetical, and mystical matters in such a way that he deserved to be called the Mellifluous Doctor. Besides sermons *De tempore*, *De diversis*, and *De Cantico Canticorum*, he wrote very many little works, especially *De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae*, *De diligendo Deo*, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, *De baptismo*, *De praecepto et dispensatione*, and the five books *De consideratione* to Eugene III. Most devoted toward the Blessed Virgin, he salutes her as mediatrix to the Mediator and as aqueduct of grace; yet he does not acknowledge her immaculate conception. He lays the foundations of mystical theology, and treats brilliantly of the ecstatic love of God.[4]

[4] Migne, P.L., t. CLXXXII-CLXXXV; cf. Neander, *Der heilige Bernhard*, Berlin, 1813; S. Huffer, *Der heilige Bernhard von Clairvaux*, Munster, 1886; Vacandard, *Histoire de S. Bernard*, Paris, 1895; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. II, p. 746-785.

33. (C) To the same epoch must be referred: (a) The penitential books, in which a catalogue is composed of grave sins and of the canonical punishments annexed to these. These books were edited: among the Greeks, by John the Faster, Theodore the Studite, Nicephorus of Constantinople;[5] but among the Latins, by almost innumerable authors, such as St. Columbanus, Cummian, Egbert, Theodore of Canterbury, Rabanus.[1]

[5] You will find these in Migne, P.L., t. LXXXVIII, p. 1889-1918; t. XCIX, p. 1721-1734; t. C, p. 855-864.

[1] See them in Migne, P.L., t. LXXX, p. 228-230; t. LXXXVII, p. 979-998; t. LXXXIX, p. 401-436; t. XCIX, p. 927-938; t. CXII, p. 1397-1424. - Cf. J. Schmitz, *Die Bussbucher und die Bussdisciplin der Kirche*.

(b) Collections of canons and decrees, in which ecclesiastical laws are reported or arranged under various titles. Thus to St. Isidore of Seville is ascribed a very ancient collection, which is distributed into ten books: concerning the institutions of monasteries and monks and the orders of penitents; concerning the institutions of judgments; concerning the institutions of offices and the order of baptizing; concerning the diversities of marriages; concerning the general rules of clerics and of other Christians; concerning the honesty and affairs of princes; concerning God and those things which are to be believed about Him; concerning the abdication of heretics; concerning idolatry and its worshipers.[2] - There are many other collections, which were edited, among others, by Egbert of York, Isaac of Langres, Burchard of Worms, Anselm of Lucca, Ivo of Chartres, and especially by Gratian, whose *Decretum* was inserted into the Body of Canon Law.[3]

[2] In Migne, P.L., t. LXXXIV, p. 25-92; ibid., p. 849-914, there is found a historical-critical preface by C. de la Serna Santander.

[3] The collections of Egbert and Isaac are to be found in Migne, P.L., t. LXXXIX, p. 379; t. CXXIV, p. 1075; cf. Ballerini, *De antiquis collectionibus et collectoribus canonum*.

II. Moral Theology in the Age of the Theologians

34. Moral science, already from the twelfth century, is set forth by theologians in a systematic, didactic, and philosophical manner. The elements elaborated by the Fathers and Councils are united into one organic body and distributed in logical order; nor are they set forth by way of exhortation or under the form of homilies, but didactically, as is usually done in the schools; and at the same time they are accommodated especially to Aristotelian philosophy, which was then handed down in the Universities. There is a twofold epoch: the former, scholastic, which extends from the twelfth century to the sixteenth century; the latter, modern, from the sixteenth century to our own times.

[4] Simler, *Des Sommes de theologie*, Paris, 1871; Haureau, *Hist. de la philos. scolastique*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1880; De Wulf, *Hist. de la philosophie medievale*, Louvain, 1900; Picavet, *Esquisse d'une histoire generale et comparee des philosophies medievales*, Paris, 1905; Hurter, S.J., *Nomenclator litterarius*, t. IV, Innsbruck, 1899. For French authors: *Histoire litteraire de la France*; P. Feret, *La Faculte de Theologie de Paris*, Paris, 1894-1897; for German authors, Michael, S.J., *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes*, Freiburg im Breisgau, t. III, 1903.

1° Scholastic Moral Theology

Three periods can be distinguished in scholastic theology: the first, which is preparatory, in the twelfth century; the second, truly golden, in the thirteenth century; the third, which falls somewhat into subtleties, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

35. (A) In the first period, the way was already being prepared for the evolution of theology by the foundation of certain schools. Thus the school of Bec, founded by Lanfranc[1] and illustrated by St. Anselm,[2] introduced a new method, namely the scholastic method, by whose help many conclusions are deduced from revealed principles, and are arranged into one body of doctrine. Yet these men wrote concerning moral matters only incidentally. Nor can the school of Abelard be passed over, although he erred in several matters; the *Introduction to Theology*, which Abelard wrote, is as it were a summa of theology, which authors not only contemporary but also later used much; another work, *Scito teipsum*, exhibits a compendium of natural Ethics.[3] Likewise the school of St. Victor, in Paris, although less didactic and more mystical, contributed not a little to the progress of theology; among the doctors of this school Hugh of St. Victor stands out, who, in the books *De Sacramentis*, hands down a compendium of all dogmatic and moral theology.[4]

[1] His works were edited by Migne, P.L., t. CL; worthy of note is the little book *De Celanda confessione*, ibid., p. 625-632, where he says that the penitent can, when a priest is lacking, confess to clerics, and even to the faithful; cf. Lecomte, *Ecole de l'Abbaye du Bec*, thesis, Rouen, 1878.

[2] Migne, P.L., t. CLVIII-CLIX; you will find his moral doctrine especially in the homilies, sermons, and meditations; cf. Card. d'Aguirre, *S. Anselmi Theologia*, Salamanca, 1678-1681; Ragey, *Hist. de S. Anselme*, Paris, 1890; J. M. Rigg, *S. Anselm of Canterbury*, London, 1896; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 1327-1350.

[3] Ch. de Remusat, *Abelard, sa vie, sa philosophie et sa theologie*, Paris, 1855; Vacandard, *Abelard, sa lutte avec S. Bernard, sa doctrine, sa methode*, Paris, 1881; Denifle, *Abaelards Sentenzen und die Bearbeitung seiner Theologia*, in *Archiv fur Literatur... des Mittelalters*, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1885, t. I; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 36-55.

[4] Migne, P.L., t. CLXXV-CLXXVIII; cf. Mignon, *Les origines de la Scolastique et Hugues de S. Victor*, Paris, 1895, t. II, p. 77-395; Simler, *Des Sommes de theologie*, thesis, p. 78-96; Engelhardt, *Hugo von S. Victor...*, Erlangen, 1838. - The *Summa*

sententiarum, formerly ascribed to Hugh, was written by one of his disciples, and does not sufficiently recede from the errors of Abelard; cf. Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict.*, t. I, p. 53.

But the most celebrated doctor of this time was Peter Lombard, professor of theology and afterward Bishop of Paris, who in the four books of *Sentences* gathered a summa of Dogmatic and Moral Theology from the Fathers and arranged it by the scholastic method. In the third and fourth book, after setting forth the mystery of the Incarnation, he treats of the

Christian life, which is principally situated in the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, and secondarily in the moral virtues; but besides, in order to attain our end, it is necessary to observe the ten precepts of the Decalogue and the evangelical law. Afterward he treats of the sacraments in general and in particular, and of the consummation of the Christian life in heaven. He was called the Master of the Sentences, and his work was expounded in the schools for many centuries by the most illustrious theologians.[1]

[1] Migne, P.L., t. CXCI-CXCII; cf. Simler, op. cit., p. 89 sq.; Protois, *Pierre Lombard, son epoque, sa vie, ses ecrits, son influence*, Paris, 1881; Baltzer, *Die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus*, Leipzig, 1902.

36. (B) In the second period, Universities had now succeeded the schools, and the little works or books of sentences are succeeded by *Theological Summas* of immense bulk and very great erudition, in which truths not only dogmatic but moral are set forth and demonstrated at length under various respects, and against whatsoever errors. The principal doctors were:

(a) Alexander of Hales (+ 1245), born in England, disciple and afterward Master in the University of Paris, having already advanced in age entered the Order of St. Francis, called the Irrefragable Doctor, wrote a theological Summa in which, after setting forth the mystery of the Incarnation, he treats of Christian ethics: of the eternal and natural law, of the Mosaic and evangelical law, by which man is directed to eternal life; of grace, by whose help we are able to observe the law; of virtues, which incline us to live conformably to the law; of the sacraments, by which we receive the grace necessary for salvation. But, prevented by death, he could not complete his work concerning virtues and sacraments.[2]

[2] *Summa Alexandri Alensis*, Venice, 1475; other editions, of which the best is the Venetian, 1575-1576, under this title: *Universae theologiae Summa*. Cf. Wadding, *Scriptores Ordinis Minorum*; Simler, op. cit., p. 97-133; Vacant, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 772-785.

37. (b) In this age theological schools began to flourish among the regulars. Two lights illustrated the Dominican Order:[3] Albert and Thomas.

[3] Concerning Dominican theologians read Jac. Quetif-Echard, *Scriptores ordinis Praedicatorum*, Paris, 1719.

Blessed Albert the Great[4] (1206-1280), professor at Paris and Cologne, "great in natural magic, that is, in the natural sciences, greater in philosophy, greatest in theology," treats learnedly in the *Summa theologiae*, especially in the second part, of man and his primeval state, of grace and sins; in the *Summa de creaturis* he hands down useful things concerning the psychological propensities of man. But, in theological matters, he formed a disciple superior to himself, Thomas Aquinas.

[4] His works were edited at Lyons, under the care of P. Jammy, 1651. Cf. Sighart, *Albertus Magnus*, Regensburg, 1857, rendered into French, Paris, 1862; Weddingen, *Albert le Grand*, Paris and Brussels, 1881; W. Feiler, *Die Moral des Albertus Magnus*, Leipzig, 1891; Vacant, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 666.

38. St. Thomas (+ 1274), the Angelic Doctor, taught sacred theology learnedly and accurately in the University of Paris and in some academies of Italy. He gathered and joined into one the doctrines of his predecessors, like scattered members of a certain body, arranged them in wondrous order, and increased them by great additions. His ethics is found in the commentaries on the four books of the *Sentences*, the *Summa theologica*, the Disputed Questions, and the Quodlibets. He exhibits an admirable synthesis of all Christian ethics.

In the first part of the *Summa theologica*, he treats of God, insofar as He is the first principle of all creatures; in the second, of the movement of the rational creature toward God. This is the moral part, which was held to be truly golden even by those who rejected his philosophical principles; in the third, he treats of Christ, insofar as He is the way of tending toward God, and of the sacraments.

In the moral part, no less than in the dogmatic part, there shines forth a truly scientific order. First he treats of the ultimate end of man, which is God; afterward of human acts by which we tend toward this end. Human acts are considered both in themselves and in their principles, whether internal or external. With the general notions thus set forth, the Holy Doctor treats of duties which are common to all: these are reduced to the theological and moral virtues, the chief of which are called cardinal; finally, of the duties of each state. There he establishes a comparison between the active and contemplative life, and excellently declares what things are required for the state of perfection. The sacraments, concerning which he treats in the third part, are the means by which grace is conferred for rightly fulfilling Christian duties. When he has discussion of the virtues, he sets forth not only those things which are necessary for avoiding sin, but also those which are desired for perfection: thus he does not tear moral theology away from ascetical theology, but embraces both together.[1]

[1] Touron, *La vie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, avec un expose de sa doctrine et de ses ouvrages*, Paris, 1737; Barelte, *Histoire de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, 4th ed., 1862; Werner, *Der heilige Thomas von Aquino*, Regensburg, 1858-1859; Feret, op. cit., t. II, p. 443-486.

39. (c) In the Franciscan school[2] there flourished especially Bonaventure and Scotus.

[2] Concerning theologians of this school see Wadding, *Scriptores Ord. Minorum*, Rome, 1650.

St. Bonaventure (1221-1274), the Seraphic Doctor, born at Bagnoregio in Etruria, handed down sacred Theology in the University of Paris, and afterward was elected Minister General of the Order, Bishop of Albano, and Cardinal. His moral doctrine is to be found: in the Commentaries on the four books of the *Sentences*; the Disputed Questions, where, among other things, he treats of evangelical perfection, namely humility, poverty, continence, and obedience; the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, where he shows that God can be reached especially through the traces which He has left in the sensible world, through the images implanted in man's faculties, and through speculation or contemplation; the *Collationes* concerning the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, and concerning the ten precepts. Nor should his ascetical works be passed over: *De triplici via*, which is also entitled *Incendium amoris*, where he declares that the soul reaches God by a threefold way, meditation, prayer, and contemplation; *Soliloquium*; *Lignum vitae*, or contemplation concerning the Passion of the Lord, etc. - In speculative matters he cannot be equated with St. Thomas, but in mystical matters he is easily held to be chief; and since between the Angelic and the Seraphic Doctor there is a great likeness of virtue, sanctity, and doctrine, it is worth the effort to read the works of both.[1]

[1] The best edition of the works of St. Bonaventure, under the care especially of Fidelis de Fanna and Jeiler, was printed at Quaracchi, 1882-1902. Cf. Prosper de Martigne, *La scolastique et les traditions franciscaines*, Paris, 1888, p. 79-116; L. de

Cherance, *S. Bonaventure*, Paris, 1899; A. de Margerie, *Essai sur la philosophie de S. Bonaventure*, Paris, 1855; Werner, *Die Psychologie und Erkentnisslehre des Joh. Bonaventura*, Vienna, 1876; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. II, p. 962-986.

John Duns Scotus[2] (+ 1308), the Subtle Doctor, taught theology at Oxford, Paris, and Cologne; he adhered neither to Thomas nor to Bonaventure, but weighing their doctrines critically and subtly, he frequently proposes and defends new opinions, yet without himself falling into heresy. His principal work was the Commentary on the four books of the *Sentences*, which he wrote at Oxford and perfected at Paris. His moral doctrine differs in many respects from Thomistic doctrine: the norm of morality, according to him, depends more on the free will of God than on the very nature of things as perceived by divine wisdom; hence natural law is not so immutable, especially as to duties toward neighbor. Other differences will be set forth in the course of the work.

[2] His works were edited by Wadding, Lyons, 1639. Cf. Werner, *J. Duns Scotus*, Vienna, 1881; Seeberg, *Die Theologie des Duns Scotus*; Pluzanski, *Essai sur la Philosophie de D. Scot*, Paris, 1887; Vacant, *Etudes comparees sur la Philosophie de S. Thom. d'Aquin et celle de D. Scot*, Paris, 1891.

40. (d) Outside the aforesaid schools of the regulars there flourished William, called of Auvergne because of the region in which he was born, and of Paris because he taught theology at Paris and was bishop of this city (+ 1249). He wrote various treatises concerning moral matters, especially the *Summa virtutum et vitiorum*, and little works *De Fide et Legibus*, *De remediis tentationum*, *De claustro animae*, *De paenitentia*, *De pluralitate beneficiorum*, etc.

(e) In the same age St. Raymond of Pennafort[1] collected the Decretals of Gregory IX and made them public law, setting forth in five books the whole canonical doctrine of this time. He also published a summa concerning penitential cases, where he treated of sins against God and neighbor, of the ministers of the sacraments, and also of marriage.

[1] Cf. *Raymundiana*, or documents which pertain to the life or writings of St. Raymond of Pennafort, by Balme, Baran, Colomb, Rome and Stuttgart, 1901.

41. (C) In the third period, moral theology becomes less clear and synthetic, and is deformed by an intolerable abuse of distinctions. The principal causes of this were the propagation of nominalism, dissensions among the various schools of theologians, the Great Schism, and corruption of morals. Therefore only a few works are worthy of note.

Among the chief authors who wrote concerning moral matters are numbered:

(a) Peter of Ailly[2] (1350-1420), who, besides questions on the books of the *Sentences*, arranged little works concerning erroneous conscience, concerning the sacraments, etc. He writes learnedly, but holds that no action is evil in itself, but only because it is prohibited by law.

[2] Tschackert, *Peter von Ailly*, Gotha, 1877; Salembier, *Petrus de Alliaco*, thesis, Lille, 1886; Vacant, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 642.

(b) John Gerson[3] (1363-1429), whose chief moral works shine with wisdom and piety: *Compendium theologiae*; concerning the precepts of the Decalogue; concerning confession and the art of dying; concerning little children to be drawn to Christ; concerning celibacy; concerning prayer; concerning contracts, etc.

[3] Jourdain, *Doctrina Gersonii de theologia mystica*, Paris, 1838; J. B. Schwab, *Johannes Gerson*, Wurzburg, 1859; Masson, *Jean Gerson, sa vie, son temps, ses oeuvres*, Lyon, 1894.

42. (c) In this same age certain works were arranged for the use of confessors, summas of cases of conscience or confessional summas, in which rules were handed down for solving practical questions which occur in the sacred tribunal; the chief authors of these works were: Monaldus, O. Min. (+ 1285), St. Astesanus, an anonymous author from the town of Asti, O. Min. (+ 1330); Bartholomew of San Concordio, O. Praed. (+ 1347); but especially St. Antoninus, O. Praed. (1389-1459), Archbishop of Florence, who wrote a theological Summa, deservedly praised even today in moral matters; Sylvester Prieras (1502), who wrote a *Summa casuum conscientiae*.

(d) Mystical works were published by Meister Eckhart (+ 1327), who nevertheless unknowingly fell into a certain pantheism; John Tauler, O.P. (1290-1361), who wrote concerning true virtues and the degrees of Christian perfection; Henry Suso, O.P., whose works, very pious and pleasant, were recently committed to print under the care of Denifle.[4]

[4] Cf. Delacroix, *Essai sur le mysticisme speculatif en Allemagne au XIVe siecle*, Paris, 1900.

2° Modern Moral Theology

43. Moral theology, which in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had slept, awakened from sleep by the attacks of the Humanists and Protestants, received new strength, and for nearly two centuries made progress; but, as the seventeenth century waned and thereafter, it again declined, especially because the minute, and sometimes too benign, investigation of particular cases, which is called casuistry, had been cultivated too much.

[1] Cf. Hurter, *Nomenclator litterarius recentioris theologiae catholicae*, Innsbruck, 1892-1895, with the various authorities cited there.

44. (A) First progressive period. The principal causes of this progress were: the true reform completed by the Council of Trent; the necessity of defending faith and morals against Protestants and Rationalists; the institution of various orders of clerks regular and Congregations, especially of the Society of Jesus, from which came forth an army of theologians; the institution of new Universities or the renewal of old ones; the invention of the art of printing, by whose help the ancient works of the Fathers and theologians became much more easily available to all. - Therefore theology was called back to its sources, Scripture and the Fathers; the method was not exclusively dialectical, but partly historical; not a few subtleties vanished, and new questions, accommodated to the needs of the times, were carefully weighed. - The book of Sentences of P. Lombard is gradually removed from the schools, while the theological summa of St. Thomas is excellently expounded by commentaries. - It will suffice to enumerate the principal theologians in each school, and the best works which they wrote concerning moral matters.

45. (a) In the Dominican school or Order of Preachers, there flourished: Thomas Cardinal Cajetan (1510): Commentaries on the *Summa* of St. Thomas, *Summa casuum conscientiae*, where he shows himself to be a probabiliorist; Francisco de Vitoria (+ 1546): theological relections, where, among other things, he treats brilliantly of the right of war, marriage, the increase of charity, temperance, homicide, magical art, and simony; Bartholomew Medina (+ 1581): commentary

on the first and third part of the summa of St. Thomas; he is deservedly held to be the prince of the moderate probabilists; Dominic Soto (+ 1560), a serious probabilist author: *De justitia et jure*; concerning caution in the use of oaths; concerning the manner of keeping and revealing a secret; commentary on the four books of the Sentences; Peter Soto (+ 1563): a classic work concerning the institution of priests; Bartholomew of Ledesma: summa of cases of conscience; John of St. Thomas (+ 1644), excellent expositor of St. Thomas; J. B. Gonet (+ 1681), distinguished by keenness of mind, rejected the more benign opinions of probabilism as intolerable laxities and an evasion of the divine precepts, in the moral part of the *Clypeus thomisticus* against its new opponents.

John Martinez de Prado (+ 1668): *Theologiae moralis quaestiones praecipuae*; *De Sacramentis in genere et in specie*.

46. (b) Among the Franciscans: Anthony of Cordoba (+ 1578), *Commentary on the four books of the Sentences*, and a theological questionnaire, or forest of cases of conscience; Emmanuel Rodriguez (+ 1613), *Regular and Canonical Questions*; John of the Trinity, *Against Confessors Who Solicit*; Martin of St. Joseph (+ 1649), *Summa of Moral Theology*; John Mary of Castilento (+ 1653) arranged alphabetically the Seraphic polyanthea of moral theology; Gesuald of Bologna, O. Cap., published an entire course of moral theology; Peter Marchant (+ 1661), a notable probabilist: *The Sacramental and Visible Tribunal of Souls*; *Notable Resolutions of Various Cases and Practical Questions*; Eligius Bassaeus (+ 1670), O. Cap., gathered the flowers of all practical theology.

47. (c) From the nascent Society of Jesus there came forth many theologians of great name:[1] Blessed Canisius (+ 1597), whose *Summa of Christian Doctrine*, translated into many languages, counts almost innumerable editions; Toletus (+ 1596), whom St. Francis de Sales greatly esteemed: *Instruction of Priests*, concerning the seven sins, and a most complete *Summa of Cases of Conscience*; Emmanuel Sa (+ 1596), whose *Aphorisms of Confessors* are most useful; Louis Molina (+ 1600): *De justitia et jure*, a work of great authority among jurists; Gregory de Valentia (+ 1603): *Theological Commentaries*, in which he excellently expounds all the questions contained in the *Summa* of St. Thomas; John Azor (+ 1608), a moderate probabiliorist: *Moral Institutions*; Francis Suarez (+ 1617), among modern theologians most learned, wrote clearly and at the same time profoundly, and indeed with a fuller pen, concerning the principal moral questions; Gabriel Vasquez (+ 1604), celebrated for keenness of mind and profundity, wrote a commentary on the First of the Second of St. Thomas, and also little works concerning almsgiving, scandal, restitution, etc.; Thomas Sanchez (+ 1610), who discusses marriage at length; Vincent Filliuccius (+ 1622), wrote concerning Christian duties and cases of conscience, from which he himself made a synopsis of universal moral theology; he leans toward the more benign opinions; Lessius (+ 1623), whose most praised work treats of right and justice and the other cardinal virtues; Aegidius Coninck, not an unworthy disciple of Lessius (+ 1633): *De sacramentis et censuris*; concerning the morality, nature, and effects of supernatural acts, where he treats of faith, hope, and charity; P. Laymann, a moderate probabilist (+ 1635): *Moral Theology*; Ripalda (+ 1648), wrote excellently concerning the theological virtues; John Cardinal de Lugo (+ 1660), most renowned for keenness of mind and

perspicuity, subjects the opinions of others to accurate criticism and solidly defends his own: concerning the virtue of divine faith; concerning justice and right; concerning the sacrament and sacrifice of the Eucharist; concerning the virtue and sacrament of penance; concerning suffrages and indulgences; moral responses; Theophilus Raynaud (+ 1663), elegantly and eloquently, though not always critically, wrote concerning virtues and vices, and also concerning equivocation and mental restriction; H. Busembaum (+ 1668), a benign probabilist, very celebrated for his clear method, whose *Medulla theologiae moralis* reached more than 200 editions, and was explained by commentaries by Lacroix, St. Alphonsus, and Ballerini; Anthony de Escobar (+ 1669), a more benign probabilist: *Liber theologiae moralis 24 S. J. doctoribus reseratus*; *The More Received Opinions of Universal Moral Theology without Dispute*; Thomas Tamburini (+ 1675): *Explanation of the Decalogue*; *An Expeditious Method of Confession*.

[1] Cf. A. De Backer, *Bibliotheque des Ecrivains de la Compagnie de Jesus*, Liege, 1869-1876; new edition under the care of Ch. Sommervogel, Brussels, 1890.

48. (d) From other orders likewise certain moralists came forth: among the Benedictines:[1] Louis Blosius (+ 1566), who in the *Mirror of Religious* and other ascetical little works discusses the religious virtues with genuine piety; J. Graffius (+ 1620), *Golden Decisions of Cases of Conscience*; L. Engel, who in the year 1661 published a *Manual of Parish Priests*; J. Saenz de Aguirre (+ 1699): *Concerning the Virtues and Vices of Morals*. - From the Order of St. Augustine:[2] Peter Aragon published commentaries on the Second of the Second of St. Thomas concerning faith, hope, and charity, concerning justice and right; Bartholomew Salon likewise wrote learnedly concerning justice. - Alexander Pellegrino (+ 1634), O. Theat., composed a treatise concerning the duel. - Thomas Hurtado, O. Cler. reg., a more benign probabilist: *Various Treatises of Moral Resolutions* (1651). - Seraphinus a Conceptione,[3] O. Carm. (+ 1663): *Treatise concerning the Virtue and Sacrament of Penance*.

[1] Concerning Benedictine writers, go to Ziegelbauer, *Historia rei literariae ordinis S. Benedicti*, Vienna, 1754; Dom Francois, *Biblioth. generale des ecrivains de l'Ordre de S. Benoit*, Bouillon, 1777-1778; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. II, p. 602-628.

[2] Cf. Gandolfus, *Dissertatio historica de ducentis augustinianis scriptoribus*, Rome, 1740.

[3] Concerning him and other Carmelites, cf. *Bibl. Carmelitana*, Orleans, 1752.

49. (e) From the secular clergy: St. Charles Borromeo[4] (+ 1584), restorer of Christian life and discipline, whose moral doctrine is found in the *Acts of the Church of Milan*; worthy of special praise are the instructions for confessors; St. Francis de Sales[5] (+ 1622), easily the chief among ascetical authors; whose principal works are: *Introduction a la vie devote* (*Philothea*); *Traite de l'amour de Dieu* (*Theotimus*); *Spiritual Conferences*, *Letters*, *Sermons*; Martin Azpilcueta, called Navarrus (+ 1587), whose *Manual*, or *Enchiridion of Confessors*, is a classic work; Martin Bonacina (+ 1631), celebrated for abundance of matters and perspicuity of doctrine: *Moral Theology*; three treatises concerning laws, sins, and the precepts of the Decalogue; Francis Sylvius (+ 1648), whose principal work is a very neat commentary on the *Summa* of St. Thomas.

[4] Vac.-Mangenot, *Diction. de Theol.*, t. II, p. 2267.

[5] Hamon, *Vie de S. Francois de Sales*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1858.

50. (B) Second period gradually declining. In this second period, moral theology gradually becomes less scientific, and more casuistic. After a distinction had been made between ascetical and strictly moral theology, the summas or manuals of moral theology often wholly omit, or only touch in passing, the principles of Christian life and the means for cultivating virtues; they set forth especially what is strictly required for avoiding sin. From this, there is sharp dispute between probabiliorists and probabilists as to what is prohibited under grave obligation, what under light obligation, and what can be tolerated; concerning the excellence of virtues, concerning the motives and means of cultivating them, scarcely anything is indicated, under the pretext that these things pertain to ascetical theology. Hence moral theology is turned into a certain spiritual pathology. Moreover, not rarely antiquated or idle questions are treated at length, while new problems, which arise from changed circumstances, are scarcely touched in passing. Wherefore gradually the name of casuist becomes odious.

51. Nevertheless, even in this age, not a few theologians are found who excellently clarified moral matters. Among them:

(a) From the Society of Jesus: Claudius Lacroix (+ 1714), a learned and moderate probabilist:[1] *Moral Theology*; John Reuter (+ 1762), a weighty and wise author: *Theology Morally Divided into Four Parts*; *The New Confessor Practically Instructed*; Dominic Viva (fl. 1710), besides a theological-moral course, wrote a very useful and classic work: *Theses Condemned by Alexander VII, Innocent XI, and Alexander VIII*; P. Gabriel Antoine, a probabiliorist, whose *Universal Moral Theology* (published in the year 1726) was explained by order of Benedict XIV in the College of Propaganda Fide; Edmund Voit (+ 1780), whose moral theology is very practical; P. Gury (+ 1866), whose *Compendium of Moral Theology* and *Cases of Conscience* often appeared: a brief, neat, and clear work, but merely casuistic; various editions illustrated or corrected with notes were published by Cercia, Dumas, Sabetti, especially Ballerini, who in addition wrote a very learned *Moral Work*, which Palmieri made public (3rd ed., 1898); Genicot, who arranged Ballerini's *Moral Work* in better order and briefly (3rd ed., 1900); Lehmkuhl, whose *Moral Theology* (10th ed., 1902) is more scientific and exhibits moderate opinions; Noldin, whose *Moral Summa* (3rd ed., 1902) is notable for perspicuity and solidity of doctrine.

[1] Theologians of the Society of Jesus, with few exceptions, defend probabilism.

52. (b) From the Order of Preachers: Natalis Alexander (+ 1724), outstanding in knowledge and erudition, who, besides historical works, arranged theology

dogmatic and moral neatly; J. Mayol, in the year 1704, published a *Summa of Thomistic Moral Doctrine*, where he defends moderate opinions; Charles R. Billuart (1757), a moderate probabiliorist, wrote a course of universal theology according to the mind of St. Thomas; Benatus Drouin (+ 1742) polished a learned treatise concerning sacramental matters; Vincent Louis Gotti (+ 1742), who likewise lucidly set forth the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor; Daniel Concina (+ 1756), a rigid probabiliorist, attacked the probabilists especially in the work *Della storia del probabilismo e del rigorismo*, and also in *Theologia christiana dogmatico-morali*; John Vincent Patuzzi (+ 1769), a most vehement opponent of probabilism: *Christian Ethics*; *Trattato della regola prossima delle azioni umane*, etc.; M. A. Potton, in a little work concerning the theory of probability, set forth the system of compensation, in the year 1874.

Nor can H. D. Lacordaire (+ 1861) be passed over, who spoke eloquently concerning several Christian virtues in his *Conferences*.

(c) From the Order of Carmelites came forth the celebrated *Cursus theologiae moralis Salmanticensis*, which Francis a Jesu Maria, Andrew a Matre Dei, Sebastian a St. Joachim, and Alphonsus ab Angelis arranged (years 1717-1724): notable for abundance of matters and perspicuity of doctrine, but sometimes more benign.

(d) From the Order of St. Francis: Reiffenstuel (+ 1703), who wrote not only *Canon Law*, but also a clear and solid *Moral Theology*; Fr. Henno elaborated a dogmatic and scholastic theology, in which he sets forth the principal questions (1706-1713); Patrick Sporer (+ 1683) and Benjamin Elbel (+ 1756) wrote a moral theology, in which the scholastic and the casuistic method are happily joined together; both works were recently edited with new care by Irenaeus Bierbaum (1894 and 1901); Pius Van der Velden (+ 1857), *Principles of Moral Theology*, a clear and moderate work.

53. (e) From the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer: St. Alphonsus de Liguori (1696-1787), who deservedly is held to be the prince among modern authors of moral theology. That he might hold a middle way between the excesses of the rigid and of the laxists, he tempered probabilism by refining the system which is called equiprobabilism, as we shall set forth in its place. His principal works are: *Moral Theology*;[1] *The Apostolic Man*; *The Practice of the Confessor*; *Examination of Ordinands*. He wrote besides many ascetical little works, in which the way of perfection is safely shown. Among recent interpreters of St. Liguori are numbered: A. Konings, *Moral Theology*, seventh edition, New York; C. Marc, *Alphonsian Moral Institutions*, 4th ed., Paris, 1888; Jos. Aertnys, *Moral Theology*, 4th ed., 1896: these explain equiprobabilism clearly and moderately.

[1] L. Gaude began to publish a critical edition of the *Moral Theology*, diligently compared with the old editions, reviewed in the individual allegations of the authors, and illustrated with critical notes and commentaries; t. I appeared at Rome, 1905.

54. (f) Outside the aforesaid schools, certain theologians likewise flourished: first, Prosper Lambertini, afterward Supreme Pontiff Benedict XIV (+ 1758), who wrote most wisely concerning canon law, and touched not a few moral questions no less solidly than learnedly in the books concerning the diocesan synod, the ecclesiastical institutions, and in the treatise concerning the Sacrifice of the Mass; L. Habert, a doctor of the Sorbonne: *Dogmatic and Moral Theology*, 1707; P. Collet, Cong. Miss.: *Institutions of Moral Theology*, 1758; Eusebius Amort, canon regular (+ 1795), a moderate and eclectic probabilist, very learned: *Eclectic Moral and Scholastic Theology*; *Christian Ethics*; *Rule of Moral Actions*; *Idea of Divine Love, or Distinct Exposition of the First and Greatest Commandment*; Gaspar Saettler (+ 1779), a moderate probabiliorist, wrote a universal moral theology and admonitions to parish priests; Sailer (+ 1832) wrote many wise things concerning moral, pastoral, and ascetical theology, especially *Handbuch der christlichen Moral*; *Vorlesungen aus der Pastoraltheologie*; J. B. de Hirscher (+ 1865) published, among other works, *Die christliche Moral*, where, indeed learnedly, but not accurately enough, he discusses the Christian life; C. Werner, very versed in theological history and literature, published not only historical works concerning Aquinas, Suarez, Bede, Alcuin, etc., but also an *Enchiridion of Moral Theology* and *System der christliche Ethik*; Pruner, a moderate equiprobabilist, published

Lehrbuch der Kath. Moralth., 1875-77, of which a new edition has recently been reprinted; Bouvier (+ 1854), Bishop of Le Mans, a weighty author and moderate probabilist, elaborated theological institutions, which were explained as a manual in many seminaries of France; Martinet (+ 1874) wrote a *Moral Theology*, in which all things, even the sacraments, are referred to the Decalogue; A. Carriere, Cong. S. Sulpice (+ 1864), wrote learnedly, solidly, and moderately concerning justice and right, concerning contracts, and concerning marriage;[1] Vincent and Bonaly, of the same Congregation, arranged classic compendia of dogmatic and moral theology; Ernest Mary Muller (+ 1888) published a moral theology, which is notable for solidity of doctrine and perspicuity of style: he defends equiprobabilism; Joseph d'Annibale (+ 1892) wrote an elegant and learned little summa of moral theology; Thomas Joseph Bouquillon (+ 1902), a moderate probabilist, very learned, had sketched out a great work of moral theology which he was not able to complete; there exist the following treatises: *Fundamental Moral Theology*, 3rd ed., 1903; *Concerning the Theological Virtues*, 1890; *Concerning the Virtue of Religion*, first part, 1880; Emile Berardi, a probabilist, wisely sets forth practical questions especially in these works: *De recidivis et occasionariis*, 5th ed., Faenza, 1897; *Praxis Confessariorum*, 4th ed., 1903; likewise John Morino, Cong. Miss., arranged a useful compendium, 5th ed., Turin, 1899.

[1] Concerning him and other members of St. Sulpice, see L. Bertrand, *Bibliotheque sulpicienne*, Paris, 1900.

55. Conclusion. From this brief historical survey it is permitted to infer that moral theology, at the time when it flourished, namely that of the Fathers of the fourth and fifth century, of the Scholastics of the thirteenth century, and of the Theologians of the sixteenth century, was not merely speculative nor merely casuistic, but at the same time scientific and practical: the principles of morals were solidly proved both by natural reason and by the authority of Scripture and the Fathers, and from them practical rules were inferred for the Christian ordering of life. Moreover, it was not occupied only with those things which are strictly prohibited, but also with the virtues which are desired for a truly Christian life. And deservedly: indeed, what is forbidden under grave obligation and what under light obligation must be accurately defined; but it is of no less moment to propose motives and means for extirpating vices and cultivating virtues: for unless Christians have before their mind the ideal perfection which Christ Himself exhibited by words and examples, they gradually grow cold and soon fall into sin. Certain recent theologians rightly understood this, such as Muller, Lehmkuhl, Bouquillon.

Therefore in this work, adhering to the footsteps of these men, after the general principles of morals have been set forth, we shall treat of virtues and duties in such a way that to directors of souls it may become clearly known not only what Christ strictly commanded, but also what He commended, and what are the means for making progress in the practice of virtues: "He who is just, let him be justified still; and he who is holy, let him be sanctified still."[1] But because we strive for brevity, we frequently refer readers to authors who have treated more fully of Christian perfection, especially to the Gospel itself.

[1] Apoc. XXII, 11.

Fundamental Moral Theology discusses human acts, insofar as they tend toward the ultimate end, namely:

I. Concerning the Ultimate End toward which we tend through human acts, and consequently concerning the norm of morality, which consists in the ordering of our acts to this ultimate end.

II. Concerning Human Acts considered psychologically and morally, insofar as they are general means to the end.

III. Concerning divine and human Laws, or concerning the external norm by which acts are ordered to the end.

IV. Concerning Conscience, or concerning the internal norm, by whose aid laws are applied to individual persons for the right ordering of life.

V. Concerning Sins, or acts by which the will turns aside from the law and from the ultimate end, and also concerning Vices, or evil propensities and habits by which it is inclined to sin.

VI. Concerning Virtues in general, or concerning good habits, by whose aid we are inclined to living rightly, and therefore to pursuing the ultimate end.

On the Ultimate End of Human Acts, or the Foundation of Morality

Concerning the Ultimate End of Human Acts,

1. Declaration of the title. Deservedly St. Thomas begins the moral part of the *Summa theologica* from the consideration of the ultimate end: for thus the connection between moral and dogmatic theology appears; since the morality of human acts ultimately depends on the ultimate end, both natural and supernatural, this morality cannot be understood unless the ultimate end of man is first set forth. Thus also the question concerning the foundation or norm of morality, which today is agitated with great heat, can be solved: for below it will be demonstrated that the ultimate norm of morality is God, the ultimate end. Wherefore in one and the same treatise we treat concerning the ultimate end and concerning the norm of morality, because these are only two respects of one and the same question.

Division. There will therefore be two articles: the former concerning the ultimate end of man; the latter concerning the norm or foundation of morality.

I. Concerning the ultimate end of man:

- Preliminary matters: concerning end, good, perfection, beatitude.
- God as ultimate end, insofar as:
- He is to be formally glorified by us.
- He beatifies us.
- He is reached through Christ.
- Corollary: concerning the cooperation of God and man.

II. Concerning the norm of morality:

- Catholic norm:
- The intrinsic distinction between good and evil.
- God as the ultimate norm discriminating good and evil, and conscience as the proximate norm.
- God as the ultimate norm commanding.
- Corollary concerning sanction.
- Conclusion concerning the excellence of the Catholic norm.
- Non-Catholic systems:
- Utilitarianism: it is set forth; it is refuted.
- Kantism: it is set forth; it is refuted.
- Independent ethics: it is set forth; it is refuted.
- Comparison between the Catholic norm and the others.

Art. I. Concerning the Ultimate End of Man.

Since in Theology we use a twofold light, reason and faith together, here the end of man is treated, both natural and supernatural. Therefore we presuppose those things which in Philosophy were said

concerning end, and which in the *Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology* we established concerning the elevation of man to the supernatural state.

Preliminary Matters.

Nevertheless, that the matters may be understood more clearly, we recall to memory the things more necessary to know: 1. concerning end, especially concerning the ultimate end; 2. concerning moral good, by which we tend toward the end; 3. concerning perfection, which is the complete evolution of this good; 4. concerning beatitude, which arises from perfection.

2. 1. Concerning end. (A) Notion. End in general is that toward which some being tends. Namely, every being, when it acts, tends toward something certain, determinate, and defined, which therefore is aptly called end, because it completes and, as it were, terminates the being itself; wherefore it is also called appetible, good, perfection.[1] And indeed every nature by its action spontaneously seeks its own perfection and completion. But man has this above other creatures, that he is master of his own operations, and thus not only is moved, but further moves himself toward his own end and good.[2]

[1] Properly speaking, "good either is an end, or is said in order to an end." *Sum. Theol.*, Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 1, ad 2. But "the end principally has the nature of good." Ibid., q. 72, a. 1, ad 1.

[2] St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. XXII, a. 1.

(B) Species. End is twofold: the end of the work and the end of the worker.

(a) The end of the work is that to which the work is destined by its own nature, independently of the intention of the agent: thus the relieving of a poor man is the end of almsgiving. This is called: 1. proximate, or intermediate, when it itself is ordered to another further end; 2. ultimate, however, when it is not ordered to another: ultimate in a certain respect, when it is such only in some series of things (for example, health with respect to medicine), ultimate absolutely and simply, when it is such in relation to all beings.

This ultimate end is more expressly called by St. Augustine "the end of our good,"[1] as it were the full completion of our good.

[1] *De Civit. Dei*, XIX, 1, P.L. XLI, 621.

Hence: a) the ultimate end, from its notion, is necessarily one; b) other goods cannot be desired except as beginnings or means relative to the ultimate end, and thus from the desiring of the ultimate end; c) our ultimate end and our perfect beatitude coincide: "For beatitude is the perfect good, which totally quiets the appetite."[2]

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 2, a. 8.

(b) The end of the worker is the motive on account of which the agent works: thus the end of the worker in almsgiving can be love of neighbor on account of God, or vain glory. This likewise is called proximate when it is so intended that something else is sought through it; ultimate, when one rests in it, and indeed either absolutely or in some series of operations.

3. 2. Concerning good. (A) Notion. Good in general is that which is fitting to some being, or that which terminates and quiets the appetite, or that which perfects a being. These notions complete one another: (a) indeed, that which is fitting to some nature is deservedly called good; (b) but a being deservedly quiets the appetite[3] in the apprehension of some object fitting to itself; (c) on the other hand, it is perfected in the attainment of this good.[4]

[3] Deservedly, therefore, St. Thomas writes (I, q. 5, a. 1): "Good consists in this, that something is appetible"; and *C. Gent.*, III, 3: "This belongs to the nature of good, that it terminates the appetite."

[4] "Each thing is called good insofar as it is perfect" (I, q. 5, a. 5).

(B) Species. Good is distinguished as threefold: honorable, delightful, and useful: honorable, that which perfects a rational being and therefore is consonant with right reason; delightful, that which brings some sense of delight; useful, that which is apt as a means for attaining some other good. - But since the useful good is not desired for its own sake, but insofar as it is a means for obtaining something else, there are only two genera of goods: honorable, which perfects rational nature, and delightful, which delights the appetite. It must likewise be noted that these two genera of goods are indeed diverse, but not necessarily opposed; for some delight can be honorable, namely when it is conformable to right reason.

The honorable good is also called moral, and is a certain reality perfecting and completing man in order to his end: for every being is called good insofar as it pursues its end and comes nearer to it. - Moral evil, on the contrary, is a certain defect of entity, in some way diminishing man, and turning him away from his end, or at least delaying him.

4. 3. Concerning perfection. (A) Notion. The perfection of some being is its complete evolution; for, as St. Thomas says, "that is called perfect to which nothing is lacking":[1] therefore it consists ultimately in the attainment of the end: "Each thing is said to be perfect insofar as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection of the thing."[2]

[1] *In 4 Sentent.*, q. 1, a. 4.

[2] St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 184, a. 1.

Whence "the perfection of anything is its good";[3] for perfection arises from the attainment of the end, which itself also is some good.

[3] *Cont. Gent.*, III, 16.

(B) Species. Perfection is twofold: absolute, in which a being totally attains its end; relative, by which a being tends toward the end because it will have attained it. Deservedly, therefore, St. Thomas says: "But each thing, if it lacks its proper perfection, is moved toward it, so far as it is in itself; but if it has it, it rests in it."[4]

[4] *C. Gent.*, III, 16.

5. 4. Concerning beatitude. (A) Beatitude, which belongs only to intellectual nature, when man is being treated is called "the perfect good of man,"[5] or the stable possession of the perfect good; for it can be nothing other than that which perfectly befits him.

[5] *Sum. theol.*, Ia, q. 26, a. 1.

(B) It can be twofold: a) begun, which sufficiently, but not perfectly, quiets man; b) perfect, which totally quiets him, as it will be in the other life. Perfect beatitude, after Boethius, is described as a state perfected by the gathering together of all goods, or more accurately, the stable possession of the perfect good which totally quiets the soul.

Division. With these things noted beforehand, we shall demonstrate that God is the ultimate end of man, and indeed in a twofold sense: 1. insofar as we are bound to tend toward Him by a free movement and to glorify Him; 2. insofar as in Him we find supreme beatitude; 3. we shall show that Christ is the mediator for glorifying God and attaining beatitude. Whence there will be a threefold thesis.

6. Thesis I: God is the ultimate end of man, in both the natural and supernatural order, insofar as we are bound to glorify Him formally, or by a free movement. It is certain.

It is declared. Irrational creatures tend toward God by necessity of nature and promote His glory only objectively, insofar as they are a trace of His perfections; rational creatures, such as man, are moved freely toward God and formally, or with full consciousness, glorify the Creator by praise, worship, love. - Here it is a question of external glory, which is defined as "clear knowledge with praise,"[1] or the rendering of honor to some person because of his excellence; but it is not a question of the internal glory of God, which consists in the knowledge and love of Himself, and cannot be increased.

[1] *Sum. theol.*, Ia IIae, q. 2, a. 3.

Since man, from the things said in the treatise concerning God the Creator, nn. 152-176, was destined to a supernatural end, he ought to tend toward God not only in the natural order, but also in the supernatural order. Now the natural end of man consists in the knowledge and love of God proportioned to the powers of human nature; but man naturally does not see God intuitively, but knows Him deductively, understanding in some way His existence and attributes from those things which have been made. But there is another mode of knowing God, namely the mode by which God Himself knows Himself, by contemplating His own essence directly, immediately, intuitively. This mode, as altogether exceeding the proper powers of man and of the other creatures, is deservedly called supernatural.

7. It is proved. 1. God is the ultimate end of man in the natural order.

(A) God, in creating man, as a supremely intelligent being, had some end: for every intelligent being acts on account of an end. But God, supremely and infinitely perfect, cannot create on account of any other end than Himself; for every other end, as lower, is wholly unbecoming to Him. Therefore God created man on account of Himself.

(B) Every being is master of those things which it has produced, especially when it is the author of their whole being. But God created man from nothing, giving to him his whole being, and continuously conserving the same; therefore He is master of the whole man. But He would not truly be his master unless man ordered his life to God, by knowing, loving, and worshiping Him. Therefore man is bound to glorify God. - In other words: man, all that he is, is from God; therefore man, all that he is, depends on Him, and ought to tend toward Him by glorifying Him.

8. 2. That God is the ultimate end of man in the supernatural order is established from the things said in the treatise concerning God the Creator and concerning God the Consummator, where it is proved that man is destined to the beatific vision. Here let it suffice to relate the principal texts, from which it is evinced that men in heaven enjoy the immediate vision of God, are already adoptive sons of God, and that all things are to be referred to God.

(a) Men in heaven see God immediately and clearly: "We see now through a mirror in an enigma; but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know, even as I am known";[1] - "Beloved, now we are sons of God; and it has not yet appeared what we shall be; we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is."[2] Therefore in heaven we shall see God face to face, that is, directly, immediately, intuitively; we shall see Him as He is, in the same mode (but not in the same degree) in which He sees Himself. But from Philosophy it is established that this is above all the powers and exigencies of man.

[1] I Cor., XIII, 12.

[2] I John, III, 2.

(b) By such an elevation we do not remain simply servants of God, but we are made partakers of the divine nature, and adoptive sons of God, heirs indeed of God, and coheirs of Christ.[3] For God sent His Son that we might receive the adoption of sons,[4] and as many as received Him, He gave them power to become sons of God.[5] And indeed, since we are sons, God sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying: Abba, Father;[6] for the Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God: but if sons, also heirs, heirs indeed of God, and coheirs of Christ.[1] Whence John deservedly exclaims:[2] "See what manner of charity the Father has given us, that we should be called sons of God and be so." Now divine adoption and also inheritance are in no way owed to man.

[3] Which we set forth in the treatise concerning Grace, 139-145.

[4] Galat., IV, 5.

[5] John, I, 12.

[6] Galat., IV, 6.

[1] Rom., VIII, 16-17.

[2] I John, III, 1.

But to this beatific vision, and to the perfect love which follows it, we are disposed in the present life through the practice of supernatural virtues, and especially of faith, hope, and charity; and thus already we begin to glorify God.

9. (c) From this Scripture infers: 1. that all things were created on account of God, and therefore that all things are subject to His dominion, and conspire unto His glory: "For from Him, and through Him, and in Him (in Greek, *eis auton*, that is, on account of Him) are all things: to Him be glory forever."[3] Therefore we are as things of God, and ought to act on account of Him: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself; for whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord; therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."[4] 2. Especially the works of the Incarnation, Redemption, and Sanctification tend unto

the glory of God: thus, when Christ was born, the angels sing: Glory to God in the highest;[5] but Christ, when about to die, says to the Father: "I have glorified Thee upon earth";[6] the Blessed in heaven say:[7] "Thou art worthy, O Lord our God, to receive glory, and honor, and power"; finally Christ Himself will be subject to Him who subjected all things to Himself, that God may be all in all.[8] - From these things it is deservedly inferred that God is the ultimate end, toward which we ought to tend, by promoting His glory: "All things are yours, but you are Christ's; and Christ is God's."[9]

[3] Rom., XI, 36; cf. Hebr., II, 10; Apoc., XXI, 6; Ps. XVIII, 2.

[4] Rom., XIV, 7-8.

[5] Luke, II, 14.

[6] John, XVII, 14.

[7] Apoc., IV, 11.

[8] I Cor., XV, 28.

[9] I Cor., IV, 22-23.

10. Thesis II: God is the ultimate end of man in the natural and supernatural order, insofar as in Him alone we find supreme beatitude. It is certain.

It is declared. The Vatican Council[10] deservedly declares that God created the world "not to increase His own beatitude, nor to acquire it, but to manifest His perfection through the goods which He imparts to creatures." For God, since He is the fullness of being, is altogether sufficient to Himself, and in the possession of Himself is perfectly blessed; for beatitude consists in the possession of the good which totally satisfies and quiets the appetite; but God, by possessing Himself, infinitely perfect, possesses such a good, since there is nothing outside God which is not already eminently contained in Him; therefore God did not create man in order to obtain something for Himself. - On the other hand, He proposed to Himself some end; therefore He willed to impart His perfection to others in some way, namely by communicating to them some participation of His being and of His beatitude.

[10] Sess. III, cap. I.

11. It is proved: 1. By reason. For true beatitude two things are required and suffice: the possession of the perfect good, which totally quiets every legitimate desire, and the stable or interminable possession of this good. For (a) if we investigate the matter metaphysically, an imperfect good is not appetible for its own sake, but only on account of another, and therefore does not confer true and integral beatitude; on the other hand, if the good possessed is lost or can be lost, beatitude already fails: for that which passes cannot quiet the immortal desires of man. (b) Psychologically the same is established: when we look into our inward aspirations, we are conscious that we wish to attain perfect beatitude by fully developing our faculties, and that we wish to live not only for a long time, but perpetually.

But this possession of the perfect and perennial good is not found in created goods, but in God alone.

12. (A) Man cannot attain beatitude in created goods.[1] For these are of three kinds: external goods of fortune, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But goods of this kind, although in manifold respect they are desirable, lack the two aforesaid conditions.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 11, a. 1-8; *Cont. Gent.*, lib. III, cap. 26-36; Suarez, *De ultimo fine hominis*, disp. V; Meyer, t. I, n. 59-60; P. Lescoeur, *La Science du Bonheur*, Paris, 1873, pp. 9-44; 110-144; 321-341.

(a) External goods, such as riches, dignities, honors, fame, etc.: 1. are not appetible of themselves, but only on account of another, insofar as they help toward procuring goods of soul or body; thus riches are sought to sustain life or to enjoy pleasures, honors suppose that some excellence is present in a man, but they do not confer it. - Nor do they fulfill all the legitimate aspirations of man; for often the more riches and honors abound, the more they inflame desire; not rarely also, after some time, they bring on nausea and weariness of life; furthermore, many other things necessary for felicity can be lacking to those who have all these things, such as bodily health, wisdom, tranquility of soul, etc.

2. Nor are they stable; for they are easily lost by some misfortune; hence they are possessed with solicitude, and at length sometime they pass away at the time of death.

13. (b) Goods of the body, which consist in health, strength, beauty, and the delight of the senses, do not confer true felicity: 1. by their nature they are subordinated to goods of the soul, nor are they truly useful except insofar as they serve the operations and perfection of the soul; for what does strength of body profit, if the mind is weak and the will depraved? Nor do they fulfill all the legitimate desires of man; for they are common to beasts and men, and therefore do not satisfy the nobler faculties of the soul; indeed, when someone indulges immoderately in bodily delights, the powers of the soul are depressed, morals are corrupted, and man, since he delights in the same pleasures and rests in them contrary to the right order of reason, becomes like a beast.

2. Moreover, how uncertain and unstable they are, there is no one who has not experienced it.

14. (c) Goods of the soul, namely those which are acquired through the exercise of the faculties, such as wisdom and virtue, indeed contribute more to man's felicity, especially when they are found joined together with the moderate and legitimate use of the other goods, but they do not perfectly satisfy our desires. For the adequate object of the intellect and will is not any truth or good whatsoever, but universal truth and good, which is found only in God. 1. And indeed our intellect is so constituted that from the knowledge of finite beings it rises to the knowledge of the infinite, and from the notion of particular truths it in some way reaches to universal truth itself. Hence, however great may be the breadth of things which it knows, it wishes to learn many more things, and curiously to search out things unknown. 2. The same must be said of the will, which is able to rest only in the absolute good; wherefore friendship, even the most perfect, which brings friends so many and such great consolations, at least for a time, does not fulfill the desires of the heart; hence the noblest men exclaim with Augustine: "Thou hast made us for Thee, O God, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee."[1]

[1] St. Augustine, *Confess.*, lib. I, n. 1, apud Migne, P.L., XXXII, 661.

15. (B) Man finds his beatitude in the attainment of the ultimate end, or in the perfect knowledge and love of God.

Here it is a question of knowledge and love of God relatively perfect, that is, with respect to the capacity of each man: for absolute perfection belongs to the infinite alone. But man is truly blessed when his capacity, whatever it may be, is sufficiently fulfilled.

It is proved. The supreme good of each being is known from its nature, faculties, and legitimate tendencies: for the most wise Creator placed these in it, as a manifest sign of its destination. But since man's proper faculties are intellect and will, he is perfectly blessed when faculties of this kind rest in the attainment of their object. Now the intellect and will of man, from what has been said, are capable of all truth and good, or of universal good and truth. Therefore they are perfectly satisfied when, according to their capacity, they know and love God, who alone is the highest truth and the highest good.

16. It is declared. 1. Man attains knowledge and love of God only imperfectly in the present life, whether naturally through reason or supernaturally through faith: for he is on the way in relation to perfection, and daily ought to reach a higher degree; and consequently he attains greater felicity the more perfectly he orders his whole life to God.

2. It must likewise be noted that for perfect beatitude the legitimate satiety of man's sensitive faculties is desired. This indeed does not belong to the essence of beatitude, but to its natural complement. For the sensitive faculties are truly a part of man, although subordinated to the intellectual powers; therefore they ought to be subjected to the spiritual part, and to aid it in attaining beatitude; and since the tendencies of these faculties are diverse among themselves, and also often contrary to the higher tendencies of the soul, in the present life they ought to be mortified, so that the spiritual man may be able more easily to attain his end. Nevertheless, when they are subjected to the will, they can attain a certain proper felicity even in the present life;[1] but in the future life, when the struggle between body and soul has ended, the sensitive faculties will enjoy legitimate joys more fully.

[1] The matter can be demonstrated historically, by showing that those who turn themselves to God are much happier than those who turn themselves away from Him. Cf. Baunard, op. cit., and *La Foi et ses victoires*, 7th ed., Paris, 1901-1902.

17. 2. By authority. (A) In the Old Testament, again and again Moses and the Prophets, the Sapiential books and the Psalms call him blessed who loves God from his whole mind, from his whole heart, and with all his powers, but unhappy him who departs from the way of God.

Ecclesiastes declares this clearly: "I have seen all things that are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity and affliction of spirit."[2] For indeed he had rejoiced in riches and pleasures, but in all these he had found nothing except vanity and affliction of spirit: "I enlarged my works, I built houses for myself and planted vineyards... And all

[2] Eccles., I, 14.

which my eyes desired, I did not deny them, nor did I forbid my heart from enjoying every pleasure... And when I had turned myself to all the works which my hands had made, and to the labors in which I had sweat in vain, I saw in all things vanity and affliction of soul, and nothing remaining under the sun."[1] Wherefore he passed over to contemplating wisdom, and proposed to investigate all things which are done under the sun, but soon recognized that in these also there is labor and affliction of spirit, and that there is one and the same end of the wise man and the fool; whence again he exclaims: "If the end of me and the fool shall be one, what does it profit me that I have given greater labor to wisdom?... And therefore my life wearied me, seeing all evils under the sun, and all things vanity and affliction of spirit."[2]

[1] Eccles., II, 4-11.

[2] Eccles., II, 15-18.

(B) In the New Testament, Christ defines the conditions of perfect and eternal beatitude throughout the whole Gospel, but especially in the sermon on the mount, where He proclaims blessed those who, willingly renouncing earthly things, serve God alone, love Him perfectly, and their neighbor on account of God, and thus pursue the kingdom of God. Wherefore the Apostle, writing concerning piety, which embraces love of God and neighbor, exhibits it as most efficacious for earthly and eternal beatitude: "But piety is profitable for all things, having promise of the life which now is and of that which is to come."[3]

[3] I Tim., IV, 8.

Therefore man's beatitude is found in God alone; therefore God is our end insofar as He is the author of our beatitude.

18. Conclusion. From this it is inferred that the glory of God and the beatitude of man are connected intimately, not only extrinsically from the will of God, but also intrinsically, from the very nature of the matter, and in fact fall back into the same thing: for man is blessed by glorifying God, and by pursuing true beatitude he glorifies God: for by the same acts of knowledge and love of God each end is acquired, and deservedly St. Thomas[4] says: "God does not seek His glory on account of Himself, but on account of us."

[4] *Sum. theol.*, IIa IIae, q. 131, a. 1 ad 1.

If, however, we compare one end with the other, the glory of God is the primary ultimate end, man's beatitude the secondary end, since this beatitude by its nature is referred to glorifying God and is subordinated to Him. Therefore let us do all things for the greater glory of God, and by that very fact we shall be blessed.

For attaining each end, we need Christ as mediator.

19. Thesis III: For glorifying God and attaining eternal beatitude, man, in the present state, needs the grace of Christ the Redeemer. It is certain.

It is declared. In the treatise concerning God the Creator we proved that man, raised to the supernatural state, fell, and in the treatise concerning the Incarnate Word that the same man was redeemed by the infinite satisfactions and merits of Christ, so that the Lord is the necessary mediator to God. Therefore it will be enough to touch briefly on a matter proved elsewhere.

It is proved. 1. Christ is the perfect mediator of religion, by whom we are able to glorify God: "One mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave Himself as a redemption for all."[1] Hence St. Peter exhorts all that they honor God through Christ: "That in all things God may be honored through Jesus Christ."[2]

[1] I Tim., II, 5.

[2] I Peter, IV, 11.

In reality the Lord instituted the sacrifice of the Mass, in which anew He offers Himself to the Father as a victim of praise, not only in His own name but in our name, since He is truly the head of the mystical body of which we are members. Moreover, through holy communion, He communicates Himself to us with the spirit of religion, so that through Him and with Him and in Him, not only at the very moment of communion, but throughout the whole day, we may be able to glorify God, by offering our actions to the Father with Christ as so many spiritual victims.

2. Christ is also the perfect mediator of sanctification, insofar as He merited for us all graces by which we may be able to attain perfection and beatitude. For He Himself not only revealed to us the truth which we ought to believe, nor only showed by His virtues the way which we ought to follow, but also merited all graces by which we are able not only to be freed from sin but also to cultivate all virtues, and we tend toward eternal beatitude: "I am the way, and the truth, and the life[3]... And for them I sanctify Myself, that they also may be sanctified in truth[4]... Blessed be God... who has blessed us with every blessing in the heavens in Christ[5]..." - Therefore Jesus is not only the exemplary cause, but also the meritorious cause of our justification: "The causes of this sanctification," says Trent,[1] "are indeed the final cause: the glory of God and of Christ and eternal life; but the efficient cause: the merciful God... and the meritorious cause: His most beloved Only-begotten, our Lord Jesus Christ, who, when we were enemies, on account of the exceeding charity with which He loved us, by His most holy Passion on the wood of the cross merited justification for us and satisfied God the Father for us."

[3] John, XIV, 6.

[4] John, XVII, 19.

[5] Ephes., I, 3.

[1] Sess. VI, cap. VII (Denzing., 799).

There is, therefore, an obligation of tending toward God the ultimate end, of glorifying Him, and thus of attaining salvation through Christ.

20. Corollary. From this it follows that the means for attaining our end are the cooperation of God and of ourselves.

A) Namely, God, out of superabundant goodness, makes deiform the essence and faculties of the soul which He created, through habitual grace, infused virtues, and gifts of the Holy Spirit; moreover He not only assists the exercise of human faculties through natural concurrence, but also fittingly elevates it through actual graces. But God provides these internal supernatural means, in order that

He may accommodate Himself to human nature, constituted of soul and body, through external means, especially through the Sacraments.

B) Thus elevated and made a partaker of the divine nature, man moves himself freely to the end, by acting under God and with Him cooperating, according to the norm of the precepts imposed by God both naturally and supernaturally, with Christ as leader and helper, the perfect exemplar and meritorious cause of all virtues.

This indeed will be clearer from what is to be said concerning the norm of morality.

Art. II. Concerning the Norm of Morality.

That man may attain his end, he needs a rule or norm to which he may render his deliberate acts conformable. This norm can be twofold: general or fundamental, by which a distinction is established between good and evil, obligatory acts and non-obligatory acts; special, by which it is determined in species which actions are licit or not, commanded or not. Here it is a question only of the general norm.

We shall set forth: 1. the Christian norm of morality; 2. various systems of non-Catholics.

§ I. The Catholic Norm of Morality.

21. State of the question. From the things said concerning the ultimate end it is permitted to infer what is the true norm of morality, or that rule by which the distinction is constituted between good and evil acts, between acts obligatory or not. For since the perfection of man consists in the attainment of the ultimate end, actions which tend toward God are good, but those which turn us away from Him are evil; those which are necessary to the end are obligatory, those which are only useful are non-obligatory. We shall weigh three things: 1. whether there is an intrinsic distinction between good and evil; 2. what is the norm discriminating between good and evil; 3. what is the commanding norm, or that which imposes obligation.

As to the first question, certain things are to be noted beforehand.

That there is some distinction between good and evil all philosophers of sound mind admit, but they by no means agree concerning its nature.

(A) For not a few contend that the reason of this distinction arose from man himself: (a) namely from civil laws, according to Hobbes (1588-1679), who teaches that the rules of good and evil, of the just and the unjust, are civil laws, and therefore that is to be held as good which the legislator has commanded, that as evil which he himself has forbidden;[1] this theory J. J. Rousseau renewed and many modern politicians embrace; (b) from education, according to Montaigne (1533-1592); or from public opinion and the tradition of peoples, as Saint-Lambert[2] held (1717-1803); or from the evolution of social sense, as the evolutionists hold.

[1] Hobbes, *Elementa philosophica de Cive*, c. XII, § 1.

[2] St-Lambert, *Principes des moeurs chez toutes les nations*, Paris, 1798. - To this also pertains the opinion of those who, with Levy-Bruhl (*La Science des moeurs*, Paris, Alcan, 1904), hold that ethics is occupied with morals as they exist, not with duties to be fulfilled: for these duties, they say, arise only from social influence (*pression sociale*); these A. Fouillee refuted in the periodical *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, Oct. 1, 1905, p. 519-550.

(B) Some teach that the distinction between honorable and dishonorable acts must be placed in the free will of God, so that, before every law and apart from God's good pleasure, what is good and what is evil cannot be defined; thus Scotus, Descartes, and Samuel Pufendorf[3] (1632-1694).

[3] Pufendorf, *De jure naturae et Gentium*, l. I, c. 2, § 6.

Against these we shall establish that at least certain actions, from their own nature, independently of every will, are good or evil, and that this distinction is ultimately to be placed in the divine reason or nature, which is the supreme norm of good and evil.

22. Thesis I: There are certain actions intrinsically good or evil, even if they had been commanded or prohibited by no law, even divine law. - We indeed confess that there are many actions which are morally good for this reason, that they have been commanded by some divine or human law, and others similarly evil, because they have been prohibited; but there are certain actions which are commanded or prohibited for this reason, that in themselves they are honorable or dishonorable. - This indeed is declared rather than demonstrated.

23. 1. Historically and psychologically it is established that there are certain actions which, by the common and perpetual persuasion of men, have always been held as essentially honorable or dishonorable; thus, for example, to love parents, to do good to one's neighbor, to speak the truth, and other things of this kind, are deservedly reputed good; on the contrary, to pursue parents with hatred,[1] to kill the innocent without legitimate reason, to betray friends unjustly, to utter a lie harmful to one's neighbor, and other things of the same kind, are deservedly judged as something base and dishonorable.[2] This persuasion indeed flourishes among all nations, even barbarous ones, nor is it diminished or lost except when the moral sense is diminished or destroyed.

[1] There are indeed barbarians who cultivate piety toward parents in a singular way, for example by killing the aged, lest they suffer bitter pains longer or be reduced to captivity by enemies; thus they indeed err concerning the manner of cultivating piety, but not concerning the obligation itself of loving parents.

[2] J. L. de Lanessan confesses (*La Morale des Religions*, Paris, Alcan, 1905, p. 557) that in all religions, whether ancient or modern, these duties are found prescribed. - It is evident, on the other hand, from the things to be said below, n. 213, concerning the existence of natural law.

But so constant and universal a persuasion, deeply inhering in minds so diverse and disagreeing about almost all other things, does not arise from civil law, which is diverse among various nations, nor from education or public opinion, which likewise is not the same among diverse peoples, but is derived from nature itself. For public opinion is nothing else than the manifestation of ideas which flourish among individual citizens; education transmits only notions which appeared rational to ancestors; if therefore the distinction between good and evil is recognized by all today, that surely cannot arise except from the common persuasion that such a distinction is so consonant with reason that it draws its origin from nature itself.

Nor can it be said that the morality of these acts depends on a free institution of God; for just as there are certain speculative truths which are true independently of the divine will (for example, that which is, is; two and two make four, etc.), so likewise there are certain moral actions which of themselves are so honorable or dishonorable that not even the divine will can change their morality;

for example, God cannot make blasphemy a praiseworthy act, nor piety a sin: this will be clear from the following argument.

24. 2. Philosophically it is established that an essential distinction must be admitted between good and evil. (a) For from what has been said, every action which tends toward God, the supreme good and ultimate end, cannot fail to be good. But certain actions, considered through themselves, independently of every law, tend toward God in this way; for example, love of God and of neighbor rightly ordered is so disposed in relation to the ultimate end and the common good, that no one of sound mind can say that acts of this kind are depraved; on the contrary, contempt of God, His existence being posited, the unjust killing of the innocent, and other things of this kind are so opposed to right reason that they can never be honorable. Therefore, by the judgment of right reason, these actions can only be good, while the contrary acts are necessarily evil.

(b) This indeed is also clear from the consequences of the contrary opinion; for if there is no essential and objective distinction between good and evil, a broad way is opened to moral skepticism; for that which today is held as evil, tomorrow, with laws or tradition or education changed, can be held as licit; and therefore the true notion of moral obligation perishes. For obligation is conceived as something permanent and universal, prescribing certain actions not hypothetically but categorically, while civil laws or traditions of peoples are something unstable and particular, and can create only hypothetical obligation. Therefore, with this distinction removed, by that very fact the moral order falls, as will be still more clear from the things to be said below concerning other systems of ethics.

25. Thesis II: The ultimate discriminating norm of morality is God Himself, insofar as He is the supreme good and the ultimate end of all things; but the proximate norm, for man, is his rational nature considered integrally, whether in itself or in its relations with others.

It is declared rather than proved. Although all Catholics agree concerning the substance of the norm of morality, nevertheless they differ as to the mode of explaining the same. For all admit that God is the ultimate norm of morality; but, according to some, this norm is the divine essence itself; according to others, it is the divine reason or eternal law,[1] or conformity with divine reason or with the natural order of things. Again, as to the proximate norm for man, some assert that it is man's rational nature, others that it is right reason or conscience.[2] But these are various modes which, when rightly explained, fall back into the same thing.[3]

[1] Thus, for example, St. Thomas (Ia IIae, q. 21, a. 1): "But in those things which are done through the will, the proximate rule is human reason, but the supreme rule is the eternal law. Therefore whenever a man's act proceeds toward the end according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, then the act is right; but when it is turned aside from this rectitude, then it is called sin."

[2] Concerning these various systems, cf. Meyer, op. cit., n. 181-185; Costa Rossetti, op. cit., th. 22-23; Cathrein, *Philosophia Moralis*, 3rd ed., 1900, Freiburg, n. 84-95.

[3] For some hand down the principally objective norm (*the nature of God, the rational nature of man*), others the directly subjective and indirectly objective norm (*divine reason, right reason*); but since divine reason infallibly perceives the divine nature itself, and right human reason judges of things according to man's rational nature, the difference is rather in the mode of speaking than in the thing itself.

1. We have said that the ultimate norm of morality is God, insofar as He is the supreme good and ultimate end. (a) That is the ultimate norm of morality from which, as from a fundamental principle, acts derive their goodness. But God, supreme goodness and the source of all perfection, by that very fact is the fundamental principle of every goodness. Therefore God is the ultimate norm of morality, and therefore our actions are morally good or evil according as they are conformable or deformed in relation to the divine goodness. (b) That is the supreme norm of morality according to which acts attain their ultimate end: for, from what has been said, every being is good insofar as it attains its ultimate end. But God is the ultimate end of all things, and especially of the rational creature, and therefore of human acts. Therefore God is the supreme norm of morality. Therefore human acts are good when they tend explicitly or implicitly toward God, evil when they decline from the ultimate end.

Thus moral goodness depends neither exclusively nor primarily on the divine good pleasure, but ultimately on His wisdom and goodness: for God wills nothing except what is consonant with His infinite wisdom, and wisdom approves nothing except what is consonant with the divine nature itself, or infinite good. Therefore they err who say that the Christian norm of morality is arbitrary, as resting on the free and blind will of God. Even when God promulgates positive laws, He prescribes nothing except what He sees to be good, since His will is not really separated from His wisdom and goodness.

26. 2. We have said besides that the proximate norm of morality, for man, is his rational nature considered integrally, in itself and in its relations with others.

(A) The proximate norm of morality is rational nature. It is proved: (a) in a deductive manner. Every being is good insofar as it attains its end, from what was said above. But it does not attain its end except by perfecting acts conformable to its nature; therefore man acts well by following his rational nature. This is valid especially for man, who, created to the image of God, participates in His goodness in some way. Therefore, by following our rational nature, by that very fact we live conformably with the divine nature and tend toward our ultimate end.

(b) In an inductive manner. Good is called that which perfects us, but evil that which depresses us; but it is established by experience that we are perfected by the harmonious and hierarchical exercise of our faculties, so that the sensitive faculties, as lower, are subjected to the higher reason.[1] Therefore we are perfected by acting according to our rational nature.

[1] A. Eymieu, *La Loi de la Vie*, demonstrates this by many facts, and concludes, p. 157: "... Life, every life composed of diverse elements, exists, lasts, and develops only on the condition that the superior element coordinate and therefore subordinate, dominate, the elements which compose it, and subject them to itself in order to use them."

(B) The proximate norm of morality is nature considered integrally, that is, according to all its parts, both rational and sensitive or vegetative, insofar as these parts also are truly human and ought to be subjected to reason; indeed, even according to the individuating notes proper to each one, namely his temperament, character, propensities, special duties and offices, etc. For human nature ought to be considered not in the abstract, but in the concrete: for it can happen that what is licit to one becomes illicit to another, because, with attention given to his character or condition, it is evil, or at least proximately inducing to evil.

(C) Again, the nature of each man must be considered not only in itself, but in its relations with other men, and also with beings inferior to him, or superior, and especially with God, to whom it is subordinated as to its end.

(D) Since in the present state man is destined to a supernatural end through Christ the Redeemer, man's nature must be considered as Christian, aided by grace and subject to supernatural laws.

27. Conclusion. (a) These things being posited, an action is deservedly called good which is truly consonant with the integral nature of man, and is exhibited to right reason as honorable.[1] For when we pursue the good proportioned to our rational nature, toward which we are naturally inclined, we cannot act badly in the moral order; otherwise the defect would be poured back upon the author of nature Himself. Deservedly therefore St. Thomas[2] says: "For each one, that is good which is connatural and proportioned to him." - From this it follows that the ancient precept "live according to nature" is legitimate, provided it is rightly understood, in the sense explained.

[1] I say honorable, because the delightful or useful is not always consonant with reason, and therefore is not morally good.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 27, a. 1; cf. q. 29, a. 1. - That the matter may be declared by examples, temperance is something good, but intemperance something evil, because it is consonant with rational nature that we use food and drink only moderately for perfecting the whole man; so also acts of justice are good, because it is consonant with rational nature considered in its relations with others that to each one his own right be rendered.

28. (b) Since we have been raised to the supernatural order, God has manifested His will to us not only by the light of reason, but also by the light of faith, by which we know the divine ordering of things in a more perfect and more certain manner. Indeed, the Son of God, made man, led a human life, and by cultivating natural and supernatural virtues, showed the way to attaining the end not only by precepts but by examples, and thus handed down to us a living rule of morals. This rule is briefly contracted in these words: "Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect."[1] For since our perfection consists in the attainment of the ultimate end, namely God the supreme good, we ought, as far as possible, to imitate the divine morals, adhering to the footsteps of Christ.

[1] Matt., V, 48.

29. Thesis III: The ultimate commanding norm of morality (that is, imposing moral obligation) is God the supreme legislator, or the divine command moderated by wisdom; the proximate norm is the necessary connection with the ultimate end perceived by reason.

The first part is proved. (A) Among the goods which lead us to the ultimate end, some are truly necessary for attaining the end, either of themselves or from the wise will of God, but others are only useful. But God, infinitely good and perfect, cannot fail to command those things which are necessary to the end; otherwise He would not truly will the end itself. Therefore He wills certain goods to be truly obligatory. - Other goods, however, which are only useful, He does not command; and these are matters of counsel.

(B) On the other hand, God alone, by reason of the supreme dominion by which He alone has power over all wills, has the right of imposing those things which He wisely judges to be necessary for the end. But He manifests His will both by natural law, manifested through conscience, and by positive law: concerning which things the treatise concerning Laws treats.

30. The second part is proved, or the proximate norm is the necessary connection of actions with the ultimate end. For the will is invincibly borne toward that which is supremely appetible, namely toward beatitude, which is found in the ultimate end. But there are objects which appear to reason as necessarily connected with beatitude or the ultimate end. Therefore there are objects which appear to reason as necessarily to be desired, or as morally obligatory. On the other hand, there are other goods whose connection with beatitude is not established, and these are only matters of counsel.

Therefore the proximate norm of obligation is the necessary connection of acts with the ultimate end or beatitude, perceived by reason.

31. Corollary. Besides the norm of morality and of obligation, there must be admitted a certain sanction, by force of which those acting honorably receive some reward and those acting badly undergo punishments.

(A) From the things said above, n. 10, God willed that men acting honorably should find their beatitude in the attainment of the ultimate end, and that those acting perversely should find, in the loss of the end, the lack of beatitude, and therefore supreme unhappiness. This is the primary and best sanction, flowing from the very nature of things and the divine ordering, or from a certain immanent justice, by force of which virtue ultimately obtains beatitude and vice is punished by the privation of the same.

(B) On the other hand, right reason shows that some sanction is necessary; for, (a) God, as infinitely wise, good, and just, must establish order in the moral order as equally as in the physical order. But the moral order requires that beatitude not be separated from good, at least at the end, since beatitude is nothing other than the quiet possession of good.

(b) God can be considered as ruler and guardian of the moral society, whose members are individual rational beings, and therefore He ought to provide for the common good of that society; but He would not wisely do this unless He rewarded the good and punished the evil; for, given human nature as it exists, many, enticed by passions, will violate the moral order and disturb the peace of society, unless they are deterred from evil by fear of punishments; on the other hand, unless reward is granted to the good, not a few of those who wish to cultivate virtue, broken in spirit because of the innumerable difficulties by which they are beset, and not strengthened by hope of some recompense, will abandon the arduous path of perfection, and soon will increase the number of violators of the law. Therefore, as wise provider and ruler of society, God ought to reward the good and punish the evil.

Conclusion Concerning the Excellence of the Catholic Norm.

32. From the things thus far set forth it is clear that the Catholic norm of morality, such as it has been explained, is at once consonant with reason and most excellently accommodated to

human nature.

For this it is required and sufficient that this norm be: 1. lucid, complete, and accommodated to all; 2. that it provide motives apt for doing good; 3. that it supply efficacious means for fulfilling duty. But these three things are found in the Catholic norm:

1. A neat, complete rule, accommodated to all; since: (a) it clearly sets forth the distinction between good and evil, between duties and counsels, by showing that good is that which is consonant with divine wisdom and will, insofar as it is manifested by right conscience, but evil that which is contrary to this will; duty is that which is wisely commanded by God as a necessary means to the ultimate end; counsel is that which is useful but not necessary to the end.

(b) It commands all duties: 1. toward God, whom, as Creator, Lord, and Father, we ought to reverence, love, and worship; 2. toward neighbor, whom we ought to love as an adoptive son of God and brother in Christ, and whose rights we ought to protect; 3. toward family and society, by revering the very authority of God in parents and rulers; 4. toward ourselves, by polishing through the practice of virtues the image and likeness of God impressed upon our minds.

(c) It is accommodated to all: by its perspicuity it can be understood by the simple, since it sets forth duties not abstractly but concretely; by its profundity it pleases philosophers, since it places the reasons of good and evil, of duty and counsel, in the highest cause.

2. It provides motives most apt for acting well: to deter from evil, it excites fear of God and of punishments; for cultivating virtues, it raises hope by the consideration of rewards; for acting perfectly, it fosters love of God and neighbor; and thus progressively it snatches men from vices and lifts them to the summit of virtues.
3. It supplies most efficacious means, namely:

1. The examples of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and of the Saints, which more efficaciously than words draw even the weak to the perfection of Christian life;
2. Innumerable graces, which, whether through visible signs or sacraments, or in a merely internal manner, perfect our faculties, increase spiritual powers, and render the observance of the commandments not only possible but also easy for all those who, conscious of their own weakness, trustingly invoke the help of God.

This will also be clearer from a simple exposition of the systems of non-Catholics.

§ II. Systems Alien to the Christian Faith Concerning the Norm of Morality Are Critically Weighed.

33. Innumerable are the systems devised by various philosophers concerning the foundation or norm of morality. Yet the principal ones can be reduced to two genera, which we shall weigh historically and critically. These are: 1. utilitarianism, to which modern evolutionism has succeeded, according to which the norm of morality is utility or pleasure, whether individual or social; 2. rationalism, which seeks the norm of morality from human reason alone; of which

there is especially a twofold form: stoicism, whether ancient or modern (Kantism), which contends that the norm of morality is moral obligation itself, or duty, independently of any utility or pleasure, and independently of God; and the system of independent ethics, which is explained in diverse ways by diverse authors, as will be declared below.

I. Concerning Utilitarianism. — 1. Utilitarianism Is Set Forth.

34. Utilitarianism, which is also called hedonism (*hedone*, pleasure), or eudaemonism (*eudaimonia*, beatitude), places the ultimate good of man and his ultimate end in felicity, or pleasure, so that actions are to be called good which, after a prudent estimation of things has been made, bring more pleasure than pain. Therefore the supreme rule is: "Pleasure is to be sought, pain is to be fled." - A twofold utilitarianism is distinguished: individual utilitarianism, which regards only the pleasure of the individual; social utilitarianism, which regards also the felicity of others and of the whole human race.

[1] L. Carrau, with great erudition, described utilitarianism historically and critically, *La morale utilitaire*, Paris, 1874; cf. M. de Baets, *Les Bases de la Morale*, Paris and Ghent, 1892, p. 37-79.

35. (A) Among the ancients, the principal favorers of individual utilitarianism were Aristippus of Cyrene, Epicurus (hence the name Epicureanism), Democritus, Lucretius; among the moderns, La Mettrie, Condillac, Helvetius, Diderot, Feuerbach, and others. The summary of Epicurus's doctrine is this:[2] experience establishes that the supreme rule of life, common to men and beasts, is flight from pain and pursuit of pleasure: for to this nature impels us. Nevertheless we do not embrace every pleasure; for we observe that sometimes greater pains follow from pleasure, and that from the toleration of pains greater delight often follows; wherefore the wise man uses things moderately, and chooses those actions which, all things considered, throughout the whole course of life finally bring more pleasure than pain. - And in this he is distinguished from Aristippus, who admitted only present pleasure as the norm of morality.

[2] Guyau, *La morale d'Epicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines*, 4th ed., Paris, Alcan; cf. L. Carrau, op. cit., p. 10-36.

A nobler form of eudaemonism Aristotle had proposed, the Stagirite, born in Thrace, disciple of Socrates and Plato, according to whom the norm of morality is situated in the highest good of man, such as can be obtained in the present life; but that good consists not in the pleasure of the senses, nor in some state or potentiality of the soul, but in the activity proper to rational man, whose completion is had in the contemplation of honorable and divine things.[1]

[1] L. Olle-Laprune, *Essai sur la Morale d'Aristote*, Paris, 1881.

36. (B) Social utilitarianism was advocated, among others, by Francis Bacon[2] (1561-1626), who held that the common good, or public utility, is the rule of morals; Hartley (1705-1757) and Paley, who likewise taught that one's own advantage does not suffice for morality, but that benevolence toward others, or sympathy, is also required;[3] but especially J. Bentham (1747-1832) and Stuart Mill (1806-1873) perfected and completed that system. As a general principle they defend that the norm of morality must be placed not only in private good, but also in social good, or in the felicity of all men.

[2] Apud Carrau, p. 40-56; Guyau lucidly sets forth the various systems of the English concerning moral matters, *La Morale anglaise contemporaine*, Paris, Alcan.

[3] Apud Carrau, p. 143-165.

37. Bentham[4] contends that the method of experimental observation alone, commended by Bacon, is to be employed in moral matters: "What experience is for the physicist," he says, "that observation is for the moralist."

[4] Bentham, *Introduction to the principles of Moral and Legislation*, 1789; *Traites de Legislation civile et penale*, a work extracted from the manuscripts of Bentham by E. Dumont, Paris, 1820; cf. Carrau, p. 167-217.

(a) Now by observation he finds that all men seek delight and flee pain; therefore, he says, every delight is some good and ought to be sought, while every pain is some evil which ought to be avoided.

(b) Therefore man ought to tend toward the greatest possible sum of delightful good in the whole course of life, with a calculation of things employed, which he calls deontological, namely by comparatively estimating delightful and painful things according to intensity, duration, proximity, extension, purity, and fecundity, which he computes in an arithmetical manner.[1]

[1] Thus he compares drunkenness and sobriety, or temperance:

Drunkenness: intensity + 30; duration + 10; certainty + 10; proximity + 20; purity - 20; extension - 20; fecundity - 10 = 20.

Sobriety: intensity + 20; duration + 10; certainty + 10; proximity + 20; purity + 30; extension + 20; fecundity + 20 = 130.

Therefore sobriety is worth more than drunkenness. - But what is to be understood by characters of this kind, he himself declares: "The value of pains and pleasures can be estimated by their intensity, their duration, their proximity, their certainty, and their extent. Their intensity, their duration, their proximity, and their certainty regard individuals. Their extent concerns the number of persons placed under their influence... A fecund pleasure is one which has the chance of being followed by pleasures of the same kind. A fecund pain is one which has the chance of being followed by pains of the same kind. A pure pleasure is one which does not have the chance of producing pains. A pure pain is one which does not have the chance of producing pleasures." (*Deontologie*, t. I, p. 77; *Traites de legislation*, t. I, p. 58.)

(c) Although man acts on account of a principle that is in itself egoistic, he contributes something to the felicity of others; for, given that men are constituted in society, an intimate and necessary relation exists between general and individual felicity, so that the felicity of one redounds to others and vice versa. Therefore the supreme principle of morality is reduced to this: Direct your activity in such a way that it produces the greatest sum of felicity and the least of pain, not only for yourself, but also for others, or at least for the greatest number of other men. But in a case of collision, place your own felicity before the felicity of others.

38. Stuart Mill[2] polished that system and propagated it widely; for he taught that delightful goods are to be measured not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively, and that those which are of a higher order are much more excellent and to be esteemed far more than those which are of the lowest order; from this he infers that the felicity which is found in the exercise of virtue is to be preferred to the pleasure which arises from the senses. Moreover, according to him, at first indeed we do good to others in order that we may procure our own felicity; but afterward, abstracting from our own advantage, we directly intend the felicity of others; this disposition

indeed can and ought to be increased in the young by education. Thus explained, utilitarianism does not differ much from the eclectic system, in which the norm of morals is situated in right reason.

[2] S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, rendered into French, *L'Utilitarisme*, Paris, Alcan; cf. Carrau, p. 227-268. - Recently Sidgwick adhered to the same system, *Methods of Ethics*; cf. Fouillee, *Critique des syst. de Morale contemporains*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1893, p. 36-38.

39. (C) To social utilitarianism succeeded another form of utilitarianism, which is accommodated to the theories of evolution; whose principal favorers were in England: Herbert Spencer[1] (1820-1904), and C. Darwin[2] (1809-1882); but in France, A. Comte,[3] Littre and Taine[4] defended almost the same system under the name of positivism; to these can be added M. Guyau, who has as the rule of morals the intensity and expansion of life;[5] Bourgeois, Payot, and many others who today advocate solidarity.[6]

[1] H. Spencer, *The Principles of Ethics*, London and New York, 1900; idem, *Les Bases de la Morale evolutioniste*, Paris, Alcan; cf. F. H. Collins, *Resume de la Philosophie de H. Spencer*, translated by H. de Varigny, Paris, 1891, p. 513-542; J. Halleux, *L'Evolutionisme en Morale*, Louvain, 1901.

[2] Darwin, *The Origin of Species*; *The Descent of Man*; in French: *L'origine des especes*; *La Descendance de l'homme*, translated by E. Barbier, Paris, Schleicher.

[3] A. Comte, *Cours de Philosophie positive*; *Politique positive*; L. Levy-Bruhl, *La Philosophie d'A. Comte*, Paris, 1900, p. 349-394.

[4] Littre, *La Science au point de vue philosophique*; Taine, *Les Philosophes francais au XIXe siecle*; cf. Fouillee, *Critique des systemes de Morale*, p. 39-56.

[5] Guyau, *Esquisse d'une Morale*; idem, *Education et heredite*, Paris, Alcan. - Man, he says in the cited work, pursues good from the fact that he naturally desires to expand his life: for when he becomes conscious of his powers, he wishes to exercise them; by instinct and education he understands the necessity of living not only for himself but for others; but he overcomes difficulties by a certain natural desire of going to meet dangers and arduous things; and thus he progresses daily.

[6] L. Bourgeois, *Solidarite*, Paris (Colin); idem, *Essai d'une Philosophie de la solidarite*, Alcan; Payot, *Cours de Morale*, Paris, 1904.

The foundation of this system is the theory of evolution, by force of which higher beings proceed from lower beings by a long process: thus living things drew their origin from non-living things, animals from plants, men from beasts; men themselves first lived for a long time in a state of barbarism, but afterward were gradually made more cultivated. Now morals followed almost the same evolution. In the beginning indeed men, scarcely distinct from beasts, imitated the morals of beasts, and sought nothing except their own advantage; but afterward, living in groups, they gradually understood that they could not seek their own pleasure with the detriment of others: for those to whom injury is done do not hesitate to seek punishments; to avoid these, it is better to suffer something, or to abstain from some pleasure; and thus under the influence of society in which men are united, from egoism is born altruism, or the inclination toward promoting the felicity of others, so that one's own advantage may be better procured.[6]

[6] Littre tries to explain the origin of altruism in another way: there are, he says, two essential functions in man, nutrition, by which the life of the individual is preserved, and generation, by which the human species is propagated. Now nutrition indeed produces egoism, but generation promotes altruism by fostering love. (Apud Fouillee, op. cit., p. 41.) This Fouillee deservedly rejects; for altruism which arises from generation extends only to a few, and often excites

egoism, indeed hatred, against strangers. But he himself thinks that love toward others arises from a purely intellectual idea, which, as universal, impels us to love of humanity; thus especially in the work *La Psychologie des Idees-forces*, Paris, 1893.

40. These things being posited, the origin of the ideas of good and evil can be explained in this way. Men first observe that certain acts are useful to society, but others harmful; the former are praised and sometimes receive some reward, but the latter are disapproved and punished with penalties. From this it is inferred that certain actions are truly praiseworthy and worthy of reward, but others are to be blamed and punished: this indeed is nothing other than the idea of merit and demerit. From it follows the idea of good and evil: namely, an action is declared good if it is praiseworthy, or useful to society, but an action is declared evil if it is demeritorious, or harmful to society. - These ideas, once arisen, are much rooted by heredity and education.

Moreover primitive men devised that there are certain invisible beings which they called gods; and, since virtue often does not receive reward on earth, nor vice sufficient punishment, it belongs to the gods to reward good acts in the other life, and to punish vicious ones. All these things, they say, are nothing other than dreams, as modern science has demonstrated.

41. Nevertheless the evolutionists reject utilitarianism as incomplete: for it does not set forth how and why certain actions are useful, but others pernicious. They themselves explain the matter scientifically by the aid of evolution. For since all nature tends toward a certain evolution of life, those actions are truly useful and good which promote the expansion of life in any order, physical, biological, psychological, and sociological, or when they are rightly ordered to their end, namely the evolution of present life; but those are pernicious and evil which more or less stand in the way of this end. - On the other hand, it is historically established that the human race constantly progresses in every order, and especially that altruism, or the sense of solidarity, prevails more day by day; wherefore the time will come when, by force of perfect solidarity, men will become exceedingly good and happy.

42. Here it is worth the labor to note how Darwin explains remorse of conscience. In a general way the altruistic sense prevails in man; nevertheless, under the influence of violent passion, egoism sometimes conquers. For when the movement of passion is urgent, the will so vehemently desires the object pleasing to itself that it no longer attends to the altruistic sense. If someone in this case yields to pleasure, the appetite is now quieted and the movement of violent passion ceases; wherefore man, now calmed, perceives that he has done something which is repugnant to altruism, and from this perception he experiences a certain sadness which is called remorse of conscience.

2. Utilitarianism Is Critically Weighed.

43. We do not deny that there is something true in the more recent forms of utilitarianism; it is indeed true that there is some connection between virtue and felicity, especially when this is placed not in the pleasure of the senses, but in the fulfillment of the nobler desires of the mind, and in the good of the whole society. Nevertheless that system, even as it is explained by Stuart Mill and H. Spencer, is deficient and imperfect, nor does it hand down the true norm of morality.

(A) First, the method which it uses, namely experimental observation, is incomplete; for determining the rule of morals, historical and psychological observation of facts and actions is indeed useful, but by no means sufficient; for the question is not only what men have done or do, but also and chiefly what they ought to do. Now for this experience is not sufficient, but the exercise of reason itself is required: for we must search out what is the origin and cause of this moral obligation of which we are conscious.

Moreover most utilitarians use the method of observation only imperfectly; when they assert that there is no man who does not ultimately act on account of his own advantage, and who seeks anything other than his own felicity, they do not attend sufficiently to the fact that there are certain men who, on account of God and fellow citizens, spend themselves and all that is theirs. - Likewise, if most men act on account of felicity, they nevertheless have the idea of the right and the just, wholly distinct from the idea of felicity, and they conceive that certain acts are good, indeed best and heroic, which, far from bringing pleasure, cause sadness and detriment: they do not render an explanation of this fact;[1] and therefore they do not explain the norm of morality.

[1] Kant declares this excellently as follows (*Critique de la Raison prat.*, ed. Picavet, p. 63): "He who has lost at play may indeed be angry with himself and his imprudence, but if he is conscious of having cheated (although he gained by this means), he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself with the moral law. Therefore this must be something quite other than the principle of personal happiness. For in order to be obliged to say to oneself: I am infamous, although I have filled my purse, one must have another rule of judgment than in order to approve oneself and say: I am a prudent man, for I have enriched my cashbox."

44. (B) Utilitarianism is not the true and supreme norm of morality, since it can be called neither universal, nor immutable, nor efficacious.

(a) Not universal. For it is not easily accommodated to all; since, according to Bentham, each one ought to weigh and measure the advantages and disadvantages which follow from this or that action, before he can judge whether this is good or evil; but who will be able to do this quickly and wisely at the same time? The difficulty is increased if, according to Stuart Mill and the positivists, he ought to consider not only his own advantage, but also that of the whole society, indeed the good of the human race. And, since he himself is the ultimate judge, is it not to be feared that he will favor himself, to the detriment of others? Will not altruism more often yield to egoism, and private good be placed before public good?

Nor likewise does it explain all honorable acts, especially those which imply self-renunciation. For all men of heart deservedly approve the manner of acting of those who spend themselves and their own things for the utility of others; thus a physician who, when a plague is raging, often offers his life into danger in order to aid others, is judged to act rightly. Now if felicity alone is the norm of morality, why must such a manner of acting be called good? If one's own felicity is sought, surely it is better and safer to flee a city infected by plague. The utilitarians answer that the physician in this case finds his felicity in devoting himself for others. This indeed I understand if virtue is praiseworthy for its own sake, or on account of a higher end; but by no means if only on account of the felicity which it brings; for many physicians will think themselves happier if it is permitted them to abandon a city infected by plague. They indeed remain there, not on account of felicity, but on account of fulfilling duty, because the voice of conscience dictates that this is good.

45. (b) Nor immutable; for since felicity is something subjective and relative, it is not conceived in the same way by all, but according to various times, regions, and men it is understood in diverse ways, so that nothing is more mutable than a rule of this kind. In reality some call felicity whatever pleases the senses; but others contend that the pleasure of the senses must be despised, and that a nobler felicity of the mind must be sought; not a few think that it is enough to obtain one's own advantage, while others hold that attention must be given to the good of others. Now, unless recourse is had to a higher principle, who will be able to define which of these systems is to be preferred? One indeed will say that greater felicity is obtained in promoting public good rather than private good; but another will deny this, and will choose to lead a quiet life rather than undergo the danger of death in order to aid others. In reality, how few there are who care more solicitously for the public good than for their own good? Therefore unless recourse is had to a superior and objective principle, all things will be uncertain and unstable.

46. (c) Nor efficacious for imposing moral obligation. The supreme norm of morality ought to be imperative, or apt for producing moral obligation. But temporal felicity alone, which utilitarians advocate, is able to impose no obligation. For if it is a question of one's own felicity, who can ever bind me to pursue it? We indeed tend naturally toward beatitude, and perhaps we can be called foolish if we do not pursue it; but by what argument can it be proved that we are morally obliged to obtain temporal felicity? The idea of duty by no means follows from the idea of beatitude; we indeed wish in a general way to be blessed, but this volition or inclination by no means demonstrates that we are bound to do this or that, but only that we shall be happier if we in fact elicit such an action. - But if it is a question of the felicity of others, the matter becomes still more difficult. For why does an obligation lie upon us of promoting the good of others, with our own detriment? Why, for example, is a poor man bound to abstain from theft? Why ought he to care for the felicity of a rich man rather than his own? You say to me that greater beatitude is found in doing good to others and especially to society. But, if felicity alone is the norm of morals, I shall say that nothing pleases me more than to pursue my own beatitude, even with the detriment of others, or at least by abstracting from the good of the community: let others devote themselves to the good of the fatherland, if they wish! I pursue a quiet life and find felicity in it.

47. From this it follows that the explanation of remorse which Darwin hands down, above, n. 42, is deficient; indeed he rather happily explains how the sensible emotion is diverse at the instant when passion urges and at the time when, pleasure having been completed, the soul is quieted. But remorse of conscience implies something nobler, namely sadness concerning a violated moral obligation, which Darwin by no means explains: for when passion is urgent, man did not perceive the moral obligation of rejecting pleasure for the utility of others, and therefore was not conscious of violated duty; consequently he ought not to experience moral sadness.

We say nothing of the theory of evolution itself, which is weighed elsewhere;[1] but it is permitted to note that the evolutionists err when they assert that the idea of good and evil arose from the fact that there are actions which are useful and others harmful to society; for between the useful and the good

there is often the greatest contrariety: perjury, for example, can sometimes be useful even to some society, but no one will say that it is good.

[1] *Synopsis Th. Dogm., De Deo Creante,* n. 35-51.

Spencer indeed comes nearer to the truth by saying that the goodness of acts is taken from the fact that they are ordered to an end, namely to the evolution of life; but an end of this kind, namely the evolution of temporal life, is only a subordinated end, and no one can prove that the duty of pursuing such an end lies upon us: it surely is useful, but why it is obligatory Spencer does not explain.

Nor can it be said, with Guyau, that good necessarily follows from the intensity and expansion of life; for life, even the most intense, is not always good, but is sometimes full of injustice, indeed of cruelty; therefore it is necessary that another norm be found, by which life may be ordered to honorable good.

II. Concerning Rationalism. — 1. Stoicism and Especially Kantism Are Set Forth.

48. (A) Among the ancients,[1] stoicism first flourished at Athens, afterward at Rome. The founder was Zeno (336-264), born from the island of Cyprus, and his school was called Stoic from the porch (*stoa*) in which his disciples were accustomed to assemble. To this school adhered, among the Greeks, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, Posidonius, and others; among the Romans, Persius Flaccus, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, etc. The foundation of morality, according to the Stoics, is to live according to reason and nature; but by the name of nature they understand not only the individual nature of man, but also the universal nature of the whole world, which man participates. Virtue consists in this, that the will with all its powers and constantly strives to live conformably to nature; it is more perfect the more intense and constant the striving is; hence the highest good is life agreeing with itself. The good, which does not differ from the beautiful, is to be loved and sought for its own sake, not on account of another; therefore it is an end in itself; but the other things, such as health and riches, are indifferent; nevertheless health and riches are useful things, or advantages which are preferable to sickness and poverty. - But the true wise man follows this rule: endure, abstain; he patiently endures all disadvantages; he abstains from vain joys; he subjects all affections of soul and passions to reason, and, through a certain impassibility, is so elevated above all things that he cannot be disturbed by any influence of pain or pleasure.[2]

[1] Ritter, *Hist. de la Philos. ancienne,* Paris, 1836, t. III, p. 516-583; Card. Gonzalez, *Hist. de la Philosophie,* translated by P. de Pascal, Paris, 1890, t. I, p. 355-367; J. C. Meyer, *Commentatio in qua doctrina Stoicorum ethica cum christiana comparatur,* Gottingen, 1823; A. Chollet, *La Morale stoicienne en face de la Morale chretienne,* Paris, Lethielleux.

[2] The description of the just man outlined by Horace (*Od.*, III, 3, 8) can therefore be accommodated to the Stoic:

The just man, tenacious of his purpose, is not shaken from his solid mind by the ardor of citizens commanding wicked things, nor by the face of a threatening tyrant, nor by the South Wind, stormy leader of restless Hadria, nor by the great hand of thundering Jove; if the shattered world should fall upon him, the ruins will strike him fearless.

49. (B) To ancient stoicism succeeded modern Kantism,[3] although it differs from it not a little. In each system, duty must be fulfilled for its own sake; but, according to the Stoics, we ought to

live conformably to nature, while, if we listen to Kant, we ought always to fight against nature.[1]

[3] Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, 1785; *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, 1788; works rendered into French: *Fondements de la metaphysique des moeurs*, translated by Barni, Paris, 1848; *Critique de la Raison pratique*, translated by Picavet, Paris, 1902. Cf. Theod. Ruyssen, *Kant*, Paris, 1900, p. 191-285; A. Cresson, *La Morale de Kant*, Paris, 1904; A. Fouillee, *Le moralisme de Kant et l'amoralisme contemporain*, Paris, Alcan, 1905; Delbos, *La Philosophie pratique de Kant*, Paris, 1905; H. Sidgwick, *Lectures on the philosophy of Kant*, London, MacMillan.

[1] You will find a comparison between stoicism and Kantism apud Cresson, op. cit., p. 171-179.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), author of critical philosophy, after he had tried to demonstrate that by pure speculative reason the existence of God and the immortality of the soul cannot be proved with certainty, resolved to establish the foundation of ethics by another way, with the help of practical reason.

Now the foundation of ethics is duty; which he declares thus: among worldly things, there is one which is truly and in itself good, namely the good will. But this will is good not from the object which it intends, but from the motive by which it is moved to acting; but that motive can be nothing other than duty to be fulfilled. Duty is nothing other than conformity with the universal moral law, which is engraved in practical reason. Therefore the will, in order to be morally good, ought to do what is commanded, and because it is commanded; for if it fulfills the law on account of obtaining some felicity or utility, now it pursues the useful, not the good, and therefore it is not morally good.

50. The moral law is truly commanding, not conditionally and hypothetically (if you wish to be blessed, do this), but absolutely and categorically: do the good; hence it is called the categorical imperative; and we ought to obey this simply, without any respect to the consequences of the act or the reward to be obtained, and without further inquiry into its authority. For the moral law proceeds from rational nature, which is an end in itself, so that man cannot be ordered as a means to another end. Therefore we ought to act from reverence for the law alone, abstracting even from the divine will, because our will remains autonomous.

That the will may be able to obey this categorical law, it ought to be free: for if it were compelled to act, it could not be morally good.[1]

[1] From this the philosopher rises to God and the immortal soul: the supreme good, he says, consists in the intimate and permanent conjunction between beatitude and virtue; but, in the present life, such a connection by no means exists, since very often we must act against natural tendencies in order to cultivate virtue; therefore it is necessary that there be another life, in which God will grant supreme felicity to those who have cultivated virtue.

51. These things being posited, the fundamental rule established by Kant is this: "Act in such a way that the rule of your will can become a universal rule," that is, before you act, carefully weigh whether something absurd would follow from your action, on the supposition that all were commanded to act in the same way, and thus in fact acted. He explains this rule elsewhere thus: "Act in such a way that you regard yourself and others as an end, but not as a means which you use"; for if you use yourself and others as a means, by that very fact you act on account of utility or pleasure, not on account of duty. From these principles he infers many conclusions, which this is not the place to relate.

52. Renouvier[2] taught and propagated Kantism in France, with a few changes however: indeed he admits that there is some categorical imperative, but he derives its obligatory force from abstract and universal human reason, nor does he disapprove those who act honorably not only on account of duty, but also on account of reward. - Yet Fouillee deservedly observes that this abstract and universal reason does not really exist except in God.[3]

[2] Renouvier, *La science de la Morale*, Paris, 1869; G. Seailles, *La Philosophie de Ch. Renouvier*, Paris, Alcan, 1905.

[3] Fouillee, *Critique des systemes de Morale*, p. 222.

Among the disciples of Kant, some, such as Schopenhauer and Hartmann, fell into pessimism; for, thinking that felicity cannot be obtained, and that the practice of duty is impossible, they held that the miseries of this life must be mitigated by a certain affection of compassion toward others, but that their cessation cannot be obtained except through the annihilation of oneself, or entrance into nirvana.[4]

[4] Schopenhauer, *Fondement de la Morale*, 1841; French translation by Burdeau, 1888. - F. Nietzsche taught pessimism together with sensualism (*Par dela le bien et le mal*; *La Genealogie de la Morale*, translated by H. Albert, Paris, 1900); there are two kinds of men, he says: the former, learned and noble, who are called super-human, need no law, and can freely follow their propensities, whatever they may be; the latter, or the uncultivated, ought to restrain their passions, so that they may humbly serve the former. How much such a system is opposed to right reason, there is no one who does not see. Cf. Fouillee, *Nietzsche et l'immoralisme*, Paris, 1903.

2. Kantism Is Critically Weighed.

53. We say nothing concerning the stoicism of the ancients, which is now antiquated; on the other hand, the principal arguments which we shall bring against Kant are valid also against Zeno.

Kantism surely comes nearer to truth than utilitarianism: for it deservedly asserts that the moral law is absolute, universal, and truly obligatory; likewise it excellently describes duty, and assigns to the human will a motive which is much more perfect than utility or pleasure. Nevertheless a system of this kind is deficient and teems with very many errors.

54. (A) The method which it uses, namely the sole method *a priori*, is incomplete; reason surely is necessary for defining what we ought to do, as we said above, n. 43; but historical and psychological observation of human nature cannot be rejected; otherwise, the rule of morals will not be proportioned to human powers. Thus Kant declares that an act honorable in itself, which is elicited with hope of reward or fear of punishment, is not morally good: now it is established historically and psychologically at the same time that very few men do good without any respect to beatitude, or are deterred from vice without fear of some punishment; therefore a norm of this kind is not accommodated to human weakness. - Moreover, by defending the incapacity of speculative reason for attaining truth, by that very fact he greatly depresses the force of practical reason for knowing good: for why are we more certain concerning the existence of moral obligation than concerning merely speculative truths?

55. (B) Kant affirms that the moral law is universal, absolute, and obligatory, but he does not render the reason of this obligation. He does not derive it from God, but only from human reason:[1] but this is not universal, but individual, nor absolute, but relative and finite,

borrowing its perfections from uncreated Reason, nor can it be conceived by what authority it is able to command so categorically. For this cannot be explained unless our reason is nothing other than a manifestation of uncreated Reason, which, as infinitely wise and supreme mistress of all things, can establish a universal and categorical law. But Kant denies this, when he asserts that reason is autonomous. - He falls into another error, by saying that human nature is an end in itself: for since it is finite and created, it must necessarily be referred to its Creator. - He likewise falsely supposes that those actions alone are good which the moral law absolutely commands, and because it commands them. For often actions are deservedly held as honorable which are in no way commanded, for example, if someone freely devotes himself wholly to works of mercy. Moreover, why would actions not be good which are done, not because they are commanded, but from the motive of charity, because they are useful to the neighbor?

[1] Afterward indeed he recognizes, once the existence of God has been admitted, that the command of reason can be considered as a divine command (*Raison pratique*, pp. 235, 238); but he establishes the foundation of obligation before he has demonstrated the existence of God. - Certain Christians, while they reject the errors of Kant, nevertheless borrow certain principles from him in order to lead to the Christian faith those who favor subjectivism and criticism; cf. Fonsegrive, *Le Kantisme et la pensee contemporaine*, in the periodical *La Quinzaine*, March 1, 1904, p. 86-107.

56. (C) Kant contradicts himself, by asserting on the one hand that an act elicited on account of hope of beatitude is not morally good, and on the other hand that the supreme good is situated in the conjunction of virtue and beatitude. For, if the supreme good implies true beatitude, why are we prohibited from desiring and seeking it? Surely it cannot be evil to pursue what is more perfect; but, with Kant as witness, it is more perfect to cultivate virtue and at the same time to enjoy beatitude; and nevertheless, if we think of beatitude and desire it, our action ceases to be morally good!

3. Various Systems of Independent Ethics Are Set Forth.

All systems of this kind agree in this, that they wish to be independent; nevertheless in a diverse degree and in a diverse manner, as will be clear from the following.

57. (a) Namely, some hold that ethics is indeed independent from revealed religion, but not from God.[1] Concerning these we do not now treat; we by no means deny that some code of moral laws can be established by reason alone; but, as was proved in the treatise concerning True Religion, n. 50, in the present state, the human race cannot morally, without some revelation, know a complete and perfect code of moral truths expeditiously, with firm certitude and with no admixture of error.

[1] Thus Ravaisson; Franck; P. Janet, *La Morale*; J. Simon, *Le Devoir*, Paris, 1854; E. Caro, *Problemes de Morale sociale*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1887, p. 15-95, where he expressly rejects and refutes the system of ethics independent from God.

58. (b) Others say that it is independent even from God, insofar as the essential principles of morals can be safely and certainly defined, without the existence of God being demonstrated, from the sole consideration of the moral order, such as can be detected by reason, once the liberty of man alone is admitted.[1] For we can recognize the existence of liberty by conscience alone, without any metaphysical investigations; but since liberty is an inviolable power, it

supposes some right to which duty responds: and from the twofold idea of right and duty the whole of ethics can be deduced.

[1] Thus C. Coignet, *La Morale independante*, Paris, 1869; M. Ferraz, *Philosophie du Devoir*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1869; Beaussire, *Les principes de la Morale*, Paris, 1888.

On the other hand, it is of the greatest importance that ethics by no means depend on theodicy and metaphysics: for there are so many dissensions concerning metaphysical matters that unless the foundation of ethics is placed outside these controversies, it now becomes impossible to find a commonly received rule of morals.

59. (c) Others contend that the rule of morals is wholly independent from speculative reason itself, and is to be placed in the moral sense: namely, that must be called honorable or dishonorable which excites the sympathy or antipathy of the majority; or, as it pleases others, that which is conformable or deformed in relation to the moral sense. For, whatever may be said concerning merely speculative truths, men commonly agree concerning certain moral rules which by moral sense they recognize as true. But that sense is sometimes called common sense, moral instinct, sometimes moral sympathy and antipathy, or simply conscience. It indeed exists in all, but can and ought to be cultivated, especially by exciting sympathy toward others: then good is easily known and is perfected by a certain natural instinct.[2] This school flourished especially in England, although it gained not a few disciples in other regions.

[2] Thus, among others, Shaftesbury, *An inquiry concerning virtue and merit*, 1699; Adam Smith, *Theory of moral sentiments*; T. Reid, *Inquiry into the Human mind, or the principle of common sense*, Edinburgh, 1765; F. Hutcheson, *System of Moral Philosophy*, Glasgow, 1755; Hoffding, *Morale, Essai sur les principes theoriques et leur application*, translated from the German by L. Poitevin, Paris, 1903.

4. The System of Independent Ethics Is Critically Weighed.

60. We do not deny that something true is found in these systems: indeed right reason can find certain rules of morals from the very contemplation of things and of the end to which they are destined; it is likewise true that some duties are manifested to us, without any discourse, by a certain moral sense, which is called the voice of conscience. But how incomplete and imperfect the norm of morality is when constituted independently from God will be clear from the following.

61. (A) The supreme norm of morals ought to be absolute and universal; but human reason and moral sense, if they are considered independently from God, bear before themselves nothing absolute and immutable: reason, as created and finite, perceives truth only in a finite and imperfect manner, and, unless it rests on divine reason, often errs; hence it is historically established that there have been no fewer dissensions of philosophers concerning the principles of morals than concerning metaphysical truths, as is established from the various systems already set forth above. Therefore human reason, if it is considered separately from divine reason, will often be uncertain, and will propose diverse rules according to diverse times or various nations; and consequently it will be essentially mutable and subjective.

62. (B) Moreover it lacks authority for imposing moral obligation; for this cannot be understood without a superior being. If right reason is a certain participation of divine reason, and the natural order is apprehended as a manifestation of the divine will wisely disposing all things, then there arises the obligation of living and acting according to this order constituted by the supreme Lord of all things; but if reason is considered in itself, without any respect to God, it can indeed perceive that some act is honorable, but it cannot impose the obligation of doing it, since reason is not superior to man, but only a part of man. The same must be said *a fortiori* concerning the moral sense: if it is the same as practical reason, it has no greater force; but if it is held as a special sense, distinct from reason, it will possess still less authority, since sense is or ought to be subordinated to reason. - We indeed confess that moral sense rightly informed is a sign of some obligation, but it cannot create or induce this obligation.

63. (C) In that system likewise sanction is lacking for inciting man to good. God indeed, as just and supreme remunerator, is able to bestow reward upon the good and punishments upon the evil, so that He may draw them to virtue and deter them from vice. But, if one abstracts from God, what will the sanction be? Not human felicity: for not rarely the just are oppressed and the evil abound in riches and pleasures. Nor remorse of conscience; for unless this is held as the voice of God, it terrifies the evil little: indeed the more wicked they are, the less they feel remorse, and by long custom of vice the voice of conscience is finally rendered mute. Therefore there will be no truly efficacious sanction; now although a few men, among the noblest, do not hesitate to fulfill the law without sanction, nevertheless most are accustomed to despise it.

Conclusion of This Treatise.

64. By the critical exposition of these systems the Catholic norm of morality is confirmed not a little. For whatever true and honorable thing they contain is found in Catholic doctrine. Thus with utilitarianism we admit that beatitude is the end, not indeed the primary but the secondary end of man, and indeed true and perfect beatitude which perfectly quiets all his legitimate aspirations; that it is not indeed the norm of morality, but one of the motives by which we are helped toward acting well. With Kantism we confess that the moral law is absolute, universal, and categorically obligatory; but we exhibit the reason why the matter is so, namely because the moral law is nothing other than the manifestation of divine reason and will. We concede to rationalists that right reason is to be followed as the proximate norm of morality; but at the same time we show that this cannot be done except because our reason is a certain participation of divine reason, which is the ultimate and infallible rule of morals. Nor do we deny the existence of some moral sense, and its influence upon human morals; but we show that this sense is nothing other than the judgment of right reason, and a sign of a higher norm, namely of divine reason itself, which cannot be deceived.

With evolutionism we hold that some progress must be admitted, whether in individuals,[1] or in society; thus the new law is more perfect than the old law, and Christian society itself can make progress daily, by better understanding and cultivating Christian virtues; but this progress is directed not by blind necessity, but by wise Providence. We agree with those who, with Guyau, promote life most intense;[1] but we order life to God, the supreme and infinite good.

[1] "And he who is just, let him be justified still; and he who is holy, let him be sanctified still." (Apoc., XXII, 11.)

[1] "I came that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly." (John, X, 10.)

On the other hand, the Catholic rule carefully avoids the errors and rocks of the other systems, as we have shown above; therefore it is to be admitted. Therefore in the whole course of Moral Theology nothing further remains except to weigh how, according to the light of reason and faith, our acts can be ordered to God, the ultimate end.

65. We tend toward the ultimate end through free, moral, and meritorious acts, which therefore are called seeds of eternal life. (a) They ought indeed to be free, because the ultimate end is obtained by way of prize and reward, and therefore through a free act, which alone is apt for reward; (b) moral and honorable, because God cannot reward evil acts; (c) meritorious, or clothed with those conditions which are required for supernatural merit, because in fact we are destined to a supernatural end. Therefore we shall speak:

I. Concerning free acts, or concerning the liberty of the human act.

II. Concerning moral acts, or concerning the morality of the human act.

III. Concerning meritorious acts, or concerning merit.

Concerning free acts:

- Notion and species.
- Principles which produce them.
- Causes influencing them.

Concerning moral acts:

- Elements from which morality is derived.
- Extension of morality to:
- the indirect voluntary;
- cooperation.

Concerning meritorious acts:

- Conditions on the part of:
- the one operating;
- the work;
- God.

On Human Acts — Chapter I: On Free Acts

Concerning Free Acts.

66. State of the question. Among the acts which are performed by man, some are voluntary, others involuntary. The former are performed by the will with a previous cognition of the intellect. But the latter are done without previous cognition or will. Of this kind are the acts of one fully dreaming, drunk, or delirious, who are incapable of conscious cognition;[1] likewise the acts of vegetative life, such as the digestion of foods or the circulation of the blood, which are not subject to the will; and also the acts of a fully distracted man who, although he is capable of attention, in fact does not notice those things which he does, because his attention is turned aside to other things. - The former acts, namely voluntary acts, can be called human acts, because they proceed from man insofar as he is rational man; but the latter are called acts of man, because they indeed proceed from man, but not insofar as he is rational, since they are done without advertence and will.[2]

[1] Thus voluntary acts are distinguished from spontaneous acts, which are done with merely sensitive cognition, such as the acts of infants or the mentally unsound.

[2] Sometimes, however, only those acts are called human which are truly free, and therefore proceed from the deliberate will, according to those things which are set forth below. To the point St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 1: "Of the actions which are done by man, those alone are called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man. But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his own acts. Whence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master. But man is master of his own acts through reason and will... therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will."

Here we treat concerning voluntary acts; nor will there be discussion of the others, except that they may be distinguished from the former. Among voluntary acts, some are necessary, but others free or deliberate. The former indeed proceed from the will with previous cognition, but in such a way that the will cannot abstain from them; thus we necessarily will good in common;[1] for we do not embrace evil except under the species of good, or insofar as in some way it appears to us to be good. On the contrary, free acts so proceed from the will that the will according to its own pleasure can posit the act or not posit it. Thus the voluntary is, as it were, a genus which contains under itself two species: the necessary voluntary and the free or deliberate voluntary; but, since the former is occupied only with good in common, often voluntary and free are taken promiscuously. - We shall declare this more fully by setting forth: 1. the notion and species of a free act; 2. the principles which concur toward its production; 3. the causes which influence a free act.

[1] Certain ones, however, think that man is free even concerning good in common, because, they say, he tends toward it naturally indeed, but not from necessity; thus Piat, *La Liberte*, t. II, *Le Probleme*, p. 262-269. - Nevertheless it is established psychologically that there is some distinction between the desiring of beatitude, which all elicit at least implicitly, and the willing of the means which lead to it: for since these are diverse, and consequently limited goods, they do not solicit our assent necessarily. - For the rest, in practice, it matters little, provided it is admitted that we are truly free concerning the choice of means for obtaining beatitude.

Art. I. Notion and Species of Free Acts. — I. Notion of Free Acts.

67. 1. Definition. An act is called free which is immune from coercion and necessity.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 8-17; Suarez, *Tr. de voluntario et involuntario*, disp. I, II, VI-X; Salmanticenses, *De principiis moralitatis*, cap. I, n. 9-21; Billuart, *De actibus humanis*, diss. I-III; Bouquillon, n. 318-330; Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, n. 1-34.

(a) Liberty or immunity from necessity, which is also called liberty of exercise, or free will, is the faculty of choosing one thing before another, so that the agent is not intrinsically determined to one thing. For liberty it is by no means required that the will be in a state of indifference; but it suffices that, notwithstanding various causes, whether external or internal, which influence it, it ultimately be able to choose either part. - It is threefold: liberty of contradiction, which is exercised concerning contradictories, for example, when we can choose between loving and not loving; liberty of contrariety, which chooses between contraries, for example, between loving and hating, good and evil; liberty of specification, to which belongs choosing between objects diverse in species, such as eating and walking. Now for the essence of liberty the sole faculty of choosing between contradictories suffices, or between acting and not acting.

(b) Liberty from coercion, or liberty of execution, is the unimpeded faculty of acting according to one's pleasure, so that the agent is not forced to act by external violence, nor impeded from acting. Necessity therefore affects the very internal faculty of choosing, while coercion only binds the external power of executing.

68. 2. Existence. (A) The existence of liberty today is denied by determinists,[1] who contend that all actions of man depend on antecedent or concomitant circumstances in such a way that they are truly determined by them, but are not freely chosen by the will. It is not our purpose to vindicate against them the existence of free will; Philosophers do this.

[1] Thus, among others, A. Fouillée, *La liberté et le déterminisme*, 4th ed., Paris, Alcan, 1895. Yet he himself confesses that we become free little by little: for we have the concept of liberty; but every concept tends to burst forth at some time into act and to become real. For the rest, most determinists confess that there is in us some power of changing circumstances, and so of indirectly attaining what we will.

69. Let it suffice to recall their principal arguments to memory:

(a) Psychological.[2] From the inward testimony of conscience it is established that we, at least in many acts, are truly free. For notwithstanding the various motives which impel us to acting in this or that way, we can, according to our own judgment, consider these motives attentively or not, and make a practical judgment about them; we are conscious that we can choose between delightful good and honorable good; at the very instant in which we choose good, pleasure often allures us to evil, and therefore the fulfillment of duty requires an effort, that is, an act of the will contrary to pleasure; if we do good, we impute the action to ourselves as to true authors, as worthy of praise; if we have acted badly, conscience reproves us as worthy of blame. At length sometimes we perceive the distinction between acts arisen from an invincible propensity and those which are performed freely. Therefore unless conscience manifestly deceives us, we are truly free at least in many things.

[2] Piat, *Le problème de la liberté*, p. 37-127; Mercier, *Psychologie*, t. II, n. 203-206; Meyer, op. cit., n. 109-114; Fonsegrive, *Essai sur le libre arbitre*, 2nd ed., Paris, Alcan, 1896, p. 434-452, where he joins the psychological and the metaphysical argument together.

This is confirmed from the concept of duty to be fulfilled, which is present in all, as was shown above. For by duty we are not forced nor determined, but solicited to acting; hence sometimes we resist the command of duty, while conscience resists; sometimes we give consent to it, while concupiscence resists; in the former case, we repent that we have violated the order of nature; in the latter, we rejoice concerning good freely chosen.

(b) Metaphysical. The proper and adequate object of the will is universal good; wherefore, if some object is proposed to the will which is, and evidently appears to be, universally good, according to every consideration, of necessity the will will tend toward it, if it wills anything; for it will not be able to will the opposite. But if some object is proposed which is not, and does not appear, good according to every consideration, the will is not of necessity borne toward it. Now any particular goods, insofar as they are not the universal good, but are deficient from some good, can be taken as not good; and according to this consideration, they can be rejected or approved by the will.[1]

[1] Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 2.

Therefore the subject of liberty is properly the will, to which belongs choosing between acting and not acting, doing this or that. But the root of liberty is reason, which can have diverse conceptions of good:[2] it conceives the highest good and proposes it to the will as something necessary; but particular goods it conceives and proposes as desirable insofar as they are more or less connected with beatitude.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 2 ad 2; I, q. 83, a. 1.

70. (B) Theologians likewise, against Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jansenists, prove that the human will, even in the state of fallen nature and under the influence of grace, remains free from necessity.[3] (a) This surely is established from the general manner of speaking of Scripture; for precepts are given to man; rewards are promised to those doing good, but punishments are inflicted on the evil; sinners are called to penance, the just are warned lest, trusting too much in themselves, they fall into sin; there are in us two kinds of propensities mutually opposed to one another, by which we are allured to good and to evil;[4] but, if without God's help we can do nothing from ourselves, we can do all things in Him who strengthens us.[5]

[3] Which we proved in the treatise concerning Grace, n. 94-98.

[4] Rom., VII, 15-25.

[5] Philip., IV, 13. - Fonsegrive sets forth the doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers concerning liberty, op. cit., p. 79-124.

(b) Therefore the Council of Trent deservedly declares that by Adam's prevarication the free will of man, although weakened and inclined in its powers, was by no means extinguished, and that it can dissent from the grace of God, if it wills.[1] Likewise, as heretical, the third proposition of Jansenius was reproved: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices."

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 1 and can. 4-5 (Denzing., nn. 675, 696, 697).

II. Species of Free Acts.

71. The primary distinction of free acts is taken from the principle from which they proceed: some indeed are elicited and others commanded. Elicited or immanent acts proceed immediately

from the will and are perfected and consummated in it,[2] such as volition, intention, election, etc.; commanded acts are those which do not proceed immediately from the will, but, from its command, from another power, whether internal or external, such as thinking, walking, etc. A few things must be said concerning these, so that the nature of the free act may be better understood.

[2] In a general way those acts are called elicited which are performed by that faculty which is the proper subject of those acts; thus an act of faith is elicited by the intellect and commanded by the will. But in moral matters, an elicited act is so called in relation to the will, to which it belongs to act morally.

72. 1. Concerning elicited acts. Six elicited acts of the will are generally distinguished, when we act not precipitately, but prudently and maturely: simple volition, intention, consent, election, use, fruition.

(a) When the intellect apprehends something as good, the will is borne toward it as lovable in itself, and that inclination is called simple volition, or complacency, or love.

(b) But this volition moves the intellect to weighing whether that good is fitting and possible for the subject; and if the intellect truly judges that the matter is so, intention is born, by which the will tends toward the end as attainable.

(c) By force of this intention, the intellect inquires concerning means suited to obtaining the end, and the will gives consent, or desires the means useful for attaining the thing.

(d) By force of this consent, the intellect is applied to discerning what are the more apt means for attaining the object, and on the part of the will there is election, by which it approves one means before others.

(e) When the means has now been chosen, the will, with the intellect directing, commands the execution of this means, and consequently applies the executive powers to the act; this indeed is called active use, or the command of the will for acting.

(f) Finally, when the will has attained the good, it rests in it and enjoys it, and from this is born fruition, or joyful rest in the possessed end.

73. 2. Concerning commanded acts. For judging rightly concerning the liberty, and consequently concerning the morality, of these acts, it is of the greatest importance that it be defined over which faculties the will can command, and by what kind of command. For a twofold command is distinguished: one absolute, or despotic, which cannot be resisted; and another non-absolute (which was called political by the Scholastics), which we can resist.

(a) Now the will exercises no command over those apprehensions of the intellect which precede every volition; for example, it cannot prevent reason from perceiving the truth proposed to it; directly it does not influence the judgment which is made concerning a thing evidently true or false, but indirectly, insofar as affections of soul incline the judgment in some way toward that part which is more pleasing. - The intellect is subject to the free will as to application, insofar as it can be applied to this or that object, but not absolutely, as is clear from the wanderings of mind to which we are

subject; and in some way as to adherence, when the truth is not evidently clear, for example, in the mysteries of faith; for then the will is able to command an assent firmer than the weight of the reasons which are brought forward deserves.[1]

[1] It is clear from the condemnation by Innocent XI of this proposition: "The will cannot effect that the assent of faith in itself be firmer than the weight of the reasons impelling to assent deserves." (Denzing., n. 1036.)

74. (b) The will cannot exercise command over the first representations of imagination or recollections of memory, which moreover were not willed, nor over the first movements of the sensitive appetite (or of the passions); for all these things anticipate its act. But as to the other acts of these faculties, it is able to exercise some command; for it can excite phantasms, recollections, or passions, and on the contrary in some way restrain the movements of concupiscence, by commanding these faculties that they turn themselves aside to other objects. Often, however, phantasms, recollections, or movements of the passions return even against the command of the will: "But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, which is in my members."[1]

[1] Rom., VII, 23.

(c) Almost the same must be said concerning the external senses: they depend on the will as to application, or turning away from objects, but not as to sensation, or impression: for the senses are so disposed that sensation is produced whenever a sensible object strikes the organs; but from that sensation there necessarily follows some pleasure or sadness. Nevertheless, often the will, when there is place for deliberation, can indirectly prevent sensations and the movements following from them, by commanding the senses to turn themselves away from certain objects. But when pleasure or sadness has arisen, the will can freely consent or dissent.

75. (d) But the motive power of the external members of the body is subject to the command of the will almost absolutely, provided only that it is not impeded by some defect, such as paralysis, or by some extraordinary state, such as hypnotic sleep or diabolical obsession.

(e) Certain functions of vegetative life, such as nutrition, depend on the will only indirectly, insofar as, for example, it can command that this or that food be eaten; certain functions, however, such as respiration, are directed by the will; all are remotely subject to some command of the will, insofar as dispositions of soul, such as joy or sadness and other passions, influence not a little the exercise of these faculties.

All these things indeed must be kept before the eyes for judging rightly concerning the liberty and morality of acts which are more or less commanded by the will.

76. By reason of manifestation, human acts are merely internal, when they are performed by the powers of the soul without any exterior sign, such as thought, imagination, volition; external, when they are exercised through the external organs of the body, such as walking, inclination of the head, etc.; mixed, which are exercised by external and internal powers together, such as pious recitation of the rosary, devout genuflection, etc. - There are other divisions, concerning which we shall speak below in their own place.

Art. II. Concerning the Principles Which Concur Toward the Production of a Free Act.

77. When it is a question of a merely natural act, the internal principles which concur toward its production are the various faculties which are described in Psychology; if it is a question of a supernatural and meritorious act, there are required besides certain supernatural gifts, by which the faculties are completed and elevated; these are declared more fully in the treatise concerning Grace. Here it is sufficient to recall to memory those things which are more useful for the understanding of a free and meritorious act.

§ I. Concerning the Natural Principles Concurring Toward a Free Act.

Although all the faculties of man concur in some way toward the production of a free act, nevertheless there are two which proximately produce it, namely the intellect and the will: the former knows the object, judges concerning its moral goodness or malice, and proposes it to the will: nothing is willed unless previously known; the latter pursues the good proposed by the intellect. - The other faculties indeed concur toward a free act, but only insofar as they are directed by the will, from what was said above, n. 73-75.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 9-15; Suarez, op. cit., disp. VI, VIII; Billuart, diss. III. Confer the Philosophers, where they discuss Psychology.

I. Concerning the Cognition Required for a Free Act.

78. That an act may be truly and in all respects free, cognition or advertence of mind ought to precede the election of the will; and the agent ought to advert to two things: the act itself as moral, and the various elements which can affect its morality: and the more perfect the cognition, the freer the act is, because the will elicits the act more freely the more lucidly the motives of acting are proposed to it.

1. The agent ought to be conscious of the action itself which he elicits, that this may be free; for since a free act is in the power of the one operating, the agent ought to be so disposed that he can posit or not posit the act, continue or interrupt it; but he cannot do this unless he is conscious that he is acting and performing such an act. Nor does it suffice that he advert to the material act itself, but it is required that he perceive its morality.

79. (a) By reason of the subject itself, advertence is full or semi-full: full, when nothing on the part of the intellect impedes the eliciting of the act of adverting, with that perfection which prudent persons are accustomed to employ in matters of some moment, for example, when someone, awake, in possession of himself, neither disturbed nor distracted, attends to a matter; - semi-full, or rather non-full, when something impedes the mind so that the act of adverting is not perfect, for example, when someone thinks about some matter while not yet fully aroused from sleep, or not fully in possession of himself, or distracted by other matters.

According to diverse advertence of mind, three kinds of acts are usually distinguished: first-first movements, or indeliberate ones, which precede all advertence, for example, the natural movement of aversion, anger, revenge when they are excited before they are adverted to; second-first movements, or semi-deliberate ones, of which we are conscious only imperfectly, because we are not

fully awake, or are distracted in some way; second movements, or deliberate ones, which are elicited with full advertence, namely by one who is altogether in possession of himself and fully attends to the matter.

80. (b) By reason of the object, advertence is distinct, when the morality of the object is clearly perceived; confused, when it is apprehended only obscurely. Thus one who throws a stone from a window, foreseeing that from it a passing enemy will be wounded, distinctly adverts to the malice of this action; but if he does this, indeed suspecting that perhaps someone passing by can be wounded, but not knowing whether someone in fact is passing, he adverts only confusedly to the wounding of the neighbor. - This distinction indeed is of the greatest moment, since an effect only confusedly foreseen is much less imputable to the agent than one which is clearly perceived.[1]

[1] Which Vieux Moraliste lucidly sets forth, apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XX, 1898, p. 1025-30.

81. 2. That the agent may freely will all the circumstances of the act, he ought to advert to them; for since nothing is willed unless previously known, if in some object there are several moral elements which the agent does not perceive, he does not freely will the same. Thus if someone kills his father, thinking him to be a man hostile to himself, he is indeed guilty of homicide, but not of parricide, because, on account of darkness or another cause, he did not advert that this man was his father; if he kills him while hunting, thinking that what he saw was a wild animal, he is guilty neither of parricide nor of homicide.

II. Concerning the Volition Required for a Free Act.

Since a free act is directly elicited by the will, it remains to speak concerning volition itself, so that it may be better discerned when it is truly free.

82. 1. By reason of deliberation and adherence, volition, like cognition itself, is called perfect or imperfect, according as it is done with full or semi-full advertence, and at the same time with full or semi-full consent. Therefore in the voluntary, or free, there can be several degrees, according as cognition or volition is more or less perfect. Certain ones think that the perfection of volition depends on cognition alone; but others, whom we follow, judge that there are degrees in consent itself. For sometimes no consent is given, although advertence is full, as in the case of abulia, below, n. 128. Sometimes consent is semi-full, although advertence is full, as in the case of a habit already retracted, n. 125. At other times the will consents only reluctantly, under the influence of fear: thus a Christian who, from fear of death, externally denies the faith; or an official who, in order to preserve an office, reluctantly acts against conscience. In this case, if advertence is full, volition does not cease to be free, and indeed sufficiently full for committing mortal sin: for then the agent deliberately prefers a temporal and transitory good to a spiritual and eternal good, which is commanded under grave obligation. This is illustrated by a comparison: a merchant who, when a storm has arisen, throws his merchandise into the sea to save his life, does this indeed reluctantly, but nevertheless freely and efficaciously, because he places life before riches; thus one who consents to sin from fear acts freely,

although reluctantly. - But at other times consent is given with the whole soul, with the whole heart. Therefore there are various degrees in consent itself.

83. 2. By reason of manifestation, volition is express, when it is distinctly declared externally by words or other signs; tacit, when consent is indeed elicited, but is not distinctly manifested, and is gathered to be present only from some fact or omission of fact: thus, if a superior, knowing that something is being done against the law, does not prohibit it when he easily can, he seems to consent. - From this was born the axiom: he who is silent seems to consent; it must be noted, however, that silence alone of itself does not signify consent, but that its sense is to be defined from the adjuncts, according to the rules which will be handed down in the whole course of the work.

From the voluntary or tacit consent there must carefully be distinguished the presumed voluntary, which someone in fact did not elicit, but would have elicited, if the matter had been proposed to him; for example, if in a particular case a positive law cannot be observed without grave inconvenience, the dispensation of the legislator can be presumed.

84. 3. By reason of the mode in which it is expressed, volition is positive, when it is terminated to some act; negative, when it consists in some omission; for example, a father who adverts that his son is stealing another's good, and does not impede it, negatively wills to cooperate in this theft. But this omission is truly free and imputable when someone can and is bound to act.

Here it can be noted that a voluntary omission can happen in manifold ways. If it is a question, for example, of hearing Mass: (a) someone can expressly say: I do not wish to hear Mass; (b) or choose an action incompatible with hearing Mass, for example, hunting; (c) or positively determine himself to elicit no act, whether of volition or nolition; (d) or behave altogether passively, as happens to those who are found in a state of indifference or abulia, as they say. In the first three ways, the omission is free; in the fourth, it is controverted: for abulia is a psychological disease, which often was voluntary in the cause, but greatly diminishes and sometimes removes liberty.

Other divisions of the voluntary or free, direct and indirect; actual, virtual, and habitual, will more opportunely be declared below.

§ II. Concerning the Supernatural Principles Concurring Toward a Meritorious Act.

85. Natural faculties, aided by divine concurrence, indeed suffice for eliciting an act naturally good, provided it is not too arduous;[1] but, since in fact we have been ordered to a supernatural end, it is useful to say certain things in passing concerning those principles which are superadded to our nature for making a meritorious act.

[1] What fallen man can and cannot do, without grace, as to ethically good works, was declared in the treatise concerning Grace, n. 33-48. - In the same treatise all those things which concur toward a meritorious act are set forth more fully.

1. The Christian, by receiving baptism, is constituted an adoptive son of God and heir of the heavenly kingdom, and receives a certain participation of the divine nature, namely habitual

grace, by force of which human nature is elevated to the supernatural state, and radically becomes capable of acting meritoriously; at the same time virtues are infused into the powers of the soul, which perfect them and render them proximately apt for eliciting supernatural acts; to these are added the gifts of the Holy Spirit, for performing more perfect and more arduous works by a certain divine instinct. Finally, that our faculties, already adorned with supernatural virtues and gifts, may break forth into act and in fact elicit supernatural works, undeserved helps are provided to them, which are called actual graces. Thus in Christians nature is perfected by grace; faculties are completed by infused virtues and gifts; the concurrence by which God cooperates with our acts is supernatural; thus we are able to act not only honorably, but also supernaturally and meritoriously.

But when habitual grace and charity are lost by mortal sin, faith and hope remain in the soul, provided someone has not sinned gravely against these virtues; nor are actual graces denied to him, by whose aid he is able to elicit supernatural acts[1] of fear of God, hope, penance, and love, and to recover sanctifying grace.

[1] These acts of the sinner are indeed supernatural, but not meritorious *de condigno*, as is declared in the treatise concerning Grace.

86. 2. But infidels, who have not been justified by baptismal regeneration, receive at the opportune time undeserved helps, by whose aid they can fulfill the natural law. When for some time they have observed this law, God, according to the common opinion, kindly bestows on them, not from justice, but from mercy, certain actual graces of illumination; if they consent to these, they will be led step by step to faith, hope, charity, and justification; but once justified, they are equated with Christians, and can truly merit. - All these things indeed are set forth at length in the treatise concerning Grace.[2]

[2] Since in the present Treatise we are able to touch these things only in passing, the professor, according to various circumstances, will explain the same things more or less to his students.

Art. III. Concerning the Causes Which Influence a Free Act, for Diminishing or Increasing Liberty.

87. After those things which we have set forth concerning the principles which produce a free act, it remains to inquire concerning the causes which influence the same, for increasing its liberty, or diminishing it, or wholly taking it away. Generally theologians treat only concerning the impediments of a free act, four of which are enumerated by St. Thomas: ignorance, concupiscence, violence, and fear. Yet elsewhere others are listed, concerning which it is useful to say a few things here, so that the confessor may be more equitable in judging the works of penitents. But we consider it more opportune here to treat not only concerning the impediments of liberty, but concerning the principal causes which influence it for diminishing or increasing it. Now certain causes influence the voluntary more proximately: 1. indeed directly in the intellect, and indirectly in the will, such as error and ignorance; 2. directly and principally in the will, such as the passions; 3. directly in the execution of volition, and indirectly in the intellect and will, such as violence. - But other causes influence the intellect

and will more remotely, such as heredity and temperament, education, habit, and also certain morbid states affecting body or soul. Concerning these we must speak separately.

§ I. Concerning the Causes More Proximately Influencing a Free Act.

Since a free act depends on intellect and will, everything which affects either faculty by that very fact can benefit or harm liberty.

I. Concerning the Causes Directly Influencing the Intellect, and Especially Concerning Error and Ignorance.

88. There are certain dispositions of mind and body in which man is not in possession of himself, and concerning which nothing special occurs to be said here, namely: the defect of reason in infants; but in adults, insanity whether total or partial (monomania), sleep whether full or semi-full, drunkenness, hallucination, diabolical obsession. In all these, if the use of reason is wholly lacking, liberty will be lacking; if some advertence remains, the act will be more or less free according to the very degree of cognition. - But since ignorance and error much more frequently influence human acts, these must be treated especially.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 76; Suarez, disp. IV; Salmanticenses, op. cit., cap. XIV; St. Alphonsus, *De act. hum.*, n. 26-29; Billuart, diss. I, art. 9; Bouquillon, n. 332-334; Ballerini P., n. 35-58; Vieux Moraliste, apud *Ami du clerge*, XX, 1898, p. 1153-1161; Didiot, *Morale surnaturelle Fondamentale*, n. 383-432.

1. Notion and Species of Ignorance.

89. (A) Notion. Ignorance in general is the lack of some knowledge in a subject otherwise capable; it is called negative, or simple nescience, when it is the lack of knowledge which we are not bound to acquire, for example, ignorance of medicine in a rustic; it is called privative if it is the lack of due knowledge, as is ignorance of theology in a priest; concerning the latter we treat here.

Ignorance differs from error, which, beyond the lack of knowledge, involves a judgment contrary to truth, as if someone thinks hatred of enemies to be something honorable. It differs also from inadvertence, which consists in this, that the mind does not actually attend to a matter, although it habitually knows it, as occurs in distractions: consequently inadvertence is the lack of actual attention, while ignorance denotes a habitual state. - But, in moral matters, the principles which we shall hand down concerning ignorance can be applied to error, forgetfulness, and inadvertence, with this distinction however, that inadvertence is more easily excused because of the weakness of the human mind.

90. (B) Division. (a) By reason of the object, ignorance is twofold: ignorance of law, when the law itself is unknown, for example if someone does not know that on the vigil of the Assumption fasting must be observed; and ignorance of fact, when someone does not know that the law, otherwise known, must be applied in the case, because, for example, he does not advert that this day is the vigil of the Assumption.[1]

[1] Certain ones besides admit ignorance of the penalty attached to the delict, for example, if someone does not know that the reading of a book defending heresy is punished by excommunication: but this can be referred to ignorance of

law.

91. (b) By reason of the subject, ignorance is: 1) vincible, and therefore culpable, when with moral diligence applied it can and ought to be driven away. The moral diligence of which there is question is not the highest diligence, but that which prudent persons are accustomed to apply in matters of this kind: for this ought to be diverse according to the various circumstances of person, thing, place, etc., nor can it be defined mathematically, but morally from the manner of acting of prudent persons in the same adjuncts. - Moreover, ignorance is not morally called vincible unless when the agent notices or at least suspects the obligation of putting it away, and voluntarily lets go the occasion of inquiring: for of what is unknown there is no desire.

Therefore there can be degrees in vincible ignorance; if someone deliberately wills ignorance, so that he may more freely violate the law, if perhaps it exists, this is called affected ignorance; for example, if someone doubting whether today one must fast does not wish to ask, although he easily can, lest perhaps he become conscious of the obligation of fasting. - But when someone omits due inquiry, not because he wishes to be ignorant of the matter, but from negligence, shame, lightness of soul, or another similar cause, the ignorance is called simply vincible; if no diligence or almost none has been applied, it is called crass or supine.

92. 2. Ignorance is called invincible, and therefore inculpable, when, with moral diligence applied, it cannot be expelled, and *a fortiori* that which is so rooted that not even a suspicion of inquiring arises. If knowledge could in no way have been acquired, the ignorance is absolutely invincible (concerning which, however, there is scarcely question in moral matters); if it could be put away only with difficulty and with extraordinary diligence, it is morally invincible. - Now that today there are many who labor under this ignorance in religious and moral matters, not only among rustics, but also among men otherwise learned in profane matters, those who have given labor to the sacred ministry for some time know very well. And this ignorance indeed is occupied not only with merely positive laws, ecclesiastical or divine, but also with the secondary principles of natural right.

93. (C) Another division, although of lesser moment, is found among theologians, namely into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent ignorance; this, however, is not opposed in its members, but is taken in a diverse way.

1. By reason of the work concerning which it is occupied, ignorance is antecedent when it is truly the cause of the work, so that the agent would not posit the action if he knew the truth; thus the hunter who kills a friend whom he thinks to be a wild animal, and certainly would not have killed him if he had known him to be a friend; - concomitant, when it is not the cause of the work, because the one operating is so disposed that he would posit the action even if he knew the matter: such is the hunter who kills an enemy whom he thinks to be a wild animal, but otherwise would have killed him if he had known.
2. By reason of the will, ignorance is antecedent when it precedes every act of the will, and therefore is altogether invincible, as is ignorance of fasting in him who by no means thinks of

fasting; consequent, which is in some way willed, and consequently vincible, as it exists in him who, thinking about fasting, neglects to inquire concerning it, when he easily can.

2. Principles Concerning the Influence of Ignorance on Free Acts.

94. (A) Ignorance morally invincible, whether actually or in the cause, removes the free, and therefore imputability, concerning that which is unknown. For, by force of the principle that nothing is willed unless previously known, we do not freely will that which we do not know; but that which is invincibly unknown is not known in itself, as is clear, nor even in the cause, since the ignorance is supposed to be invincible, and consequently cannot morally be dispelled.[1]

[1] What is voluntary in itself and in the cause, and also imputability (*responsabilite*), will be set forth more fully where the morality of human acts is treated.

It is said concerning that which is unknown; for it can happen that the one operating perceives some morality of the act, although not the whole: thus one who kills an innocent person whom he does not know to be a priest is not indeed guilty of sacrilege, but of homicide, because he knowingly killed a man unjustly.

On this head, often children and the rude, who do dishonorable things, whose malice they do not well understand, are excused more or less from grave sin according to the degree of ignorance.

95. (B) Ignorance actually vincible does not remove the free, but diminishes it, at least if it is not affected. - It is said actually vincible, that it may be distinguished from ignorance which formerly was vincible, although here and now it is invincible.

(a) The reason for the former is that vincible ignorance, as is clear from the notion itself, supposes at least some cognition or thought concerning the obligation of inquiring; now he who neglects to inquire, when he is bound to do so, by that very fact freely intends, at least confusedly, the effects which are foreseen to follow from his action. Thus, if a hunter discharges a gun at some object, not knowing whether it is a wild animal or a man, he rather freely consents to homicide; if he thinks it is a wild animal, while suspecting it to be a man, he consents less freely, but nevertheless in some degree.

96. (b) The reason for the latter is that something is less free the less knowledge there is of it; but, in our case, there is only confused or probable knowledge, or even mere suspicion; therefore the free and the fault are diminished, and indeed the more so the less the cognition is.

It has been said at least if it is not affected; for more commonly theologians, after St. Thomas,[1] hold that affected ignorance does not diminish, but increases sin, since the agent intends to sin more freely. Yet some deny this with Lugo,[2] because, they say, it is worse to violate a known precept than not to wish to know it in order that it may be violated without remorse: for something of reverence and fear is shown in the second case. - In practice, the matter depends on the intention of the agent at that instant when he does not wish to inquire: if in reality he intends nothing except to sin more freely and boldly, his culpability is not diminished; but if he neglects to inquire from a certain reverence toward the law, which he fears to violate, the fault is diminished.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 76, a. 4.

[2] Lugo, *De Paenitentia*, disp. XVI, n. 183.

97. (C) Ignorance here and now invincible, which nevertheless formerly was vincible, indeed removes the actual free and the free in itself, but leaves the voluntary in the cause.

For it can happen that ignorance was formerly vincible and culpable, without nevertheless being adverted to here and now; suppose, if a confessor has not sufficiently cultivated theology, or has for a long time and culpably interrupted the study of it, he can hand down an erroneous decision to a penitent, without being conscious of this error. In this case he is not free, nor does he incur sin at that instant in which he inadvertently deceives the penitent; but if, while he was studying theology, he was conscious of omitted diligence and foresaw, at least in a confused way, the evil effects that would follow from negligence, by that very fact he willed those effects, more or less freely and culpably according to the degree of cognition; and thus those effects are not actually and in themselves free, but only in the cause.

Hence, if someone has retracted the fault of ignorance formerly committed, by suitable penance and due diligence, he can be equated with one who labors under invincible ignorance.[1] Nevertheless, if even after penance he is ignorant of those things which are necessary for undertaking his office,[2] he ought to abstain from exercising it until he has acquired the necessary knowledge; for by freely exercising an office without competent knowledge, he would commit a new sin.

[1] Gury-Ballerini, t. I, note to n. 37; Bouquillon, nn. 277, 333.

[2] Here it is a question of competent knowledge, not of eminent knowledge, which is found in the most learned; the confessor, judge, physician, etc., who possess the former and use proportionate diligence, can exercise the office without fault, even if sometimes they err.

98. Corollary. Since the will is freer the more perfect cognition is, it is of the greatest interest to acquire true knowledge, especially of those things which are useful for living honorably and religiously. But because knowledge influences the will the more as it occurs more vividly to the agent, frequent reconsideration or meditation of noble things serves not a little for living rightly; for since the will is blind and is illuminated only by the intellect, he who thinks rightly is inclined to acting rightly; and by frequent meditation of honorable things the custom of living honorably is gradually formed.[3] It is likewise very expedient to think seriously concerning the morality of the act in itself and in its effects before we act, so that, with all things carefully weighed, we may choose what is better.

[3] Not only mystics, but also rationalists and positivists have recognized this utility of meditation, such as J. Payot, *Education de la volonte*, Paris, 1904, p. 92-134, and Fouillee, in the cited work, *Les idees-forces*.

II. Concerning the Passions Directly Influencing the Will.

The internal causes which principally move the will are the passions: they indeed influence the intellect, by disturbing the judgment more or less, but besides and especially they add to or diminish the powers of the will, by vehemently impelling it toward good or evil.

[4] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 22-48; q. 6, a. 6-8; Suarez, disp. III; Senault, *De l'usage des Passions*, Paris, 1664; Billuart, *Tr. de Passionibus*, diss. I; idem, *De Actibus hum.*, diss. I, art. 7-8; Meyer, I, n. 119-129; Bouquillon, n. 335-343; Alibert,

Physiologie des Passions, Paris, 1827; Letourneau, *Physiologie des Passions*, Paris, 1868; Belouino, *Des Passions*, Paris, 1883; A. Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*, rendered into French by P. Le Monnier, *Les Emotions et la volonte*, Paris, 1885; Mercier, *Psychologie*, 6th ed., Louvain, 1904, n. 134-137; Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments*, Paris, Alcan.

99. 1. Notion and division of the passions. (A) In a broad sense, passions are called any affections whatsoever of the soul, even merely internal ones. Among the common people, passion denotes any inordinate or excessive propensity of the will: in which sense avarice is called a passion.[1] Philosophically, passions commonly are called affections of the soul which arise from the sensitive appetite with some organic commotion of the body; thus love, hatred, anger, etc., move not only the sensitive appetite, but also the body; for example, the heart is dilated by joy, contracted by sadness.

[1] Certain modern philosophers make this notion their own, such as Rabier, *Psychologie*, 6th ed., Paris, 1898, p. 516.

100. Concerning the division of the passions, which by many moderns are also called emotions, philosophers do not agree.

The more common division is that which St. Thomas hands down, after Aristotle. Eleven are distinguished, six of which look to the concupiscible appetite and pursue delight: love and hatred, desire (or concupiscence) and horror or flight, joy and sadness; but five are referred to the irascible appetite, which tend toward arduous good and toward battle against obstacles: hope and despair, daring and fear (or dread), and also anger, to which there is no contrary.

The reason of the division is this: in man, as in animals, there are two kinds of inclinations, by which we are moved toward sensible good, according as it is simply delightful or arduous. By the concupiscible appetite we tend toward good insofar as it is delightful; namely by love we are inclined toward good, abstracting from whether it is present or absent; by desire we pursue good insofar as absent, and by joy we are delighted in present good; on the contrary, by hatred we absolutely turn away from evil, by horror we flee absent evil, and by sadness we grieve over present evil. But when it is a question of sensible arduous good, which we are able to attain only with strenuous effort, by the irascible appetite we pursue it: if the good, although arduous, is possible to obtain, hope arises; if it appears impossible, despair is born; if it is a question of future evil easily to be fled, daring arises; but if it appears difficult to repel, fear creeps in; finally if a present evil pressing for vengeance is present, anger blazes forth.

Bossuet shows brilliantly how all passions proceed from love and are caused from love;[1] St. Thomas and St. Augustine had already gone before him; for the latter says:[2] "Love longing to have what is loved is cupidity; but having this and enjoying it is gladness; fleeing what is adverse to it is fear; and feeling it if it should happen is sadness."

[1] Bossuet, *Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-meme*, ch. I, n. 6.

[2] St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, lib. XIV, c. 7, apud Migne, P.L. XLI, 410.

101. Other divisions have been proposed by moderns, without nevertheless explaining the matter more clearly. Thus Descartes[3] lists six original passions: admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy, and gladness. According to Hume,[4] there are two species of passions: some direct: desire,

aversion, sadness, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security; others indirect: pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, commiseration, malice, generosity. According to Ribot,[5] there are five original ones, namely fear, anger, sensitive love (*tendresse*), love of oneself, sexual love: from which others are derived by a certain evolution.[6]

[3] Descartes, *Les passions de l'ame*, 2nd part.

[4] Hume, *Tr. on human nature*, B. II, p. I, sect. I.

[5] Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments*, Introduction.

[6] Other divisions are set forth apud A. Bain, op. cit., pp. 68-75 and 568-581.

102. (B) In moral matters, a careful distinction must be made between voluntary and non-voluntary passions. (a) They can be voluntary in a diverse degree: directly and in themselves, 1) when they are deliberately excited, 2) when, having arisen spontaneously, they are freely admitted, 3) when they redound from a vehement voluntary affection; - sometimes they are indeed actually voluntary, but only indirectly, as if someone reads a book from mere curiosity, foreseeing that evil thoughts will arise from it; sometimes they are previously voluntary, but not actually, namely because the cause formerly freely posited has been retracted. (b) They are called involuntary when neither formerly nor actually, neither in themselves nor in the cause, were they willed, but they arise spontaneously either from a fortuitous occasion or from a disposition of the body, without deliberation and consent.

According to the manner of speaking of theologians, passions are called antecedent when they precede the will and allure it to the act; consequent, when they are excited by the will itself, and therefore follow the consent of the will.

103. 2. The influence of the passions on a free act.[7] (A) Antecedent passion indeed increases the intensity of the act, but diminishes the free, and sometimes takes it away.

[7] Concerning this theologians discuss where they treat of concupiscence; for often by this name they designate all the passions of the concupiscible appetite.

(a) The reason for the first assertion is that, under the influence of passion, we apprehend sensible good more vividly, so that it appears greater than before, and our will is borne toward it with a more vehement propensity, as each one can gather from an attentive consideration of himself.

(b) But from this the free is diminished; for liberty is less the more reason is impeded from deliberating quietly and wisely, and the more the will is inclined toward one part; but the antecedent movement of passion more or less disturbs reason and impedes it from considering opposed motives attentively and perseveringly; it also vehemently solicits the will to consenting, and while it increases the powers for pursuing the proposed good, it diminishes not a little the force of resisting.[1] This indeed is established psychologically from the fact that, when the movement of passion has been calmed, the matter is now perceived by reason in a diverse way, and often the will vehemently grieves concerning the consent given.

[1] Which St. James (I, 14) indicates: "But everyone is tempted by his own concupiscence, drawn away and allured."

(c) Indeed sometimes, although rarely, passion is so vehement that it wholly disturbs the mind and impedes the judgment of reason concerning the morality of the act: then the agent is not properly in possession of himself, but for some time is, as it were, insane. Now where no deliberation is present, the action is not truly free.[2] Thus especially in those who suffer from hysteria, as will be said below, or who are inflamed by anger vehemently.

[2] "If concupiscence totally took away cognition, as happens in those who become mad because of concupiscence, it would follow that concupiscence would take away the voluntary." (St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 7, ad 3.)

Usually, however, passion does not wholly take away the use of reason; and then liberty is only diminished. Wherefore, in practice, if penitents say that they could not resist a vehement passion, they must be asked whether they employed means or not for conquering it, and from all the adjuncts it will be judged whether and to what extent they were free and culpable.

104. (B) Consequent passion, which arises from the command of the will, does not diminish the free, but is a sign of intense volition.

(a) The reason for the former is that the passion was freely willed; for example, if someone deliberately recalls an injury done to him so that from this he may conceive anger, he now freely wills to consent to anger.

(b) Indeed such a manner of acting is a sign of intense volition; for someone excites passion in himself for this reason, that he may attain the intended object more efficaciously and vehemently.

Nevertheless it can happen that, once a vehement passion has been excited, the agent is less in possession of himself and proceeds further than he had previously foreseen, for example, that he kills one whom he wished to wound; in which case the aforesaid passion, insofar as it moves to acts not foreseen nor intended, can be called, as it were, antecedent in relation to those acts.

105. Especially concerning fear. (A) Among the passions which disturb the mind and lessen the powers of the will, fear is deservedly numbered; but in moral matters fear is not only a passion, but also a certain spiritual affection, which is customarily defined as trepidation of mind, by reason of an impending or future danger. It arises indeed from the apprehension of an evil perceived by the intellect, but it affects the will, and indeed in a twofold way: it depresses its powers, and at the same time moves it to flee strenuously the imminent evil;[1] wherefore the will, under the influence of fear, often chooses what otherwise it would not have willed; thus a sailor, from fear of shipwreck, casts into the sea those things which otherwise he would have wished to preserve; a sick man, on account of fear of death, chooses the amputation of an arm, although reluctantly.

[1] A. Bain describes the psychological notion, nature, and effects of fear, *Les emotions et la volonte*, p. 147-167.

By reason of intensity, fear is grave or light, according as it disturbs the mind much or not. Generally for grave fear two things are required: apprehension of a grave evil, with a truly probable danger of incurring it; for we do not greatly fear evils which are possible, but not probable. Nevertheless, for judging concerning the gravity of fear, attention must also be given to the character of the person; for evils which move one person only lightly can gravely disturb another; whence in moral matters fear absolutely grave is distinguished, which can seriously disturb even a strong and constant man, such

as fear of death or exile; and fear relatively grave, which, all circumstances of sex, age, character, etc. being considered,

can gravely disturb the person concerning whom there is question. Hence also reverential fear, by which the indignation of parents or superiors is feared, can sometimes be judged grave from the adjuncts. - By reason of influence on the act, fear is called antecedent when it truly is the cause of the act, which consequently is elicited from fear; or concomitant, which is not the cause of the action but nevertheless coexists with it, so that this is done with fear. Thus a traveler who gives his purse to a robber acts from fear of death; but a robber who despoils a traveler sometimes acts with fear lest he be seized by guards.

106. (B) Concerning the influence of fear on a free act. (a) Fear which is so vehement that it altogether disturbs the use of reason takes away the free. For where there is no deliberation on the part of the intellect, there is no liberty; but he who is so vehemently disturbed acts not deliberately but under the influence of a vivid impression. - Yet this rarely happens; for generally fear does not take away every faculty of deliberating, but only impedes it somewhat.

(b) An act posited from fear, even grave fear, does not take away the free, but ordinarily diminishes it. For one operating from fear deliberately chooses the action as a means for avoiding a greater evil and therefore truly wills what he does, although he retains affection toward the opposite; thus the merchant who, from fear of death, throws goods overboard does this freely, although reluctantly, because he deliberately places life before riches.[1]

[1] But when fear excuses from the obligation of observing the law and from sin will be declared below, where we treat concerning Sins, concerning Faith, concerning Contracts, concerning Marriage, etc.

Nevertheless fear diminishes liberty, and indeed the more so the graver it is; for it diminishes the indifference of the will, and moves it toward eliciting what otherwise it would not have chosen. - It is said ordinarily, because sometimes an act begun from grave fear is completed without any repugnance; for example, someone can, from fear of hell, withdraw from an occasion of sin, and afterward altogether freely detest sin.

(c) Light fear, whether in itself or relatively, indeed diminishes the free, but much less than grave fear, since it by no means impedes the use of reason and deliberation; wherefore in the external forum it is not attended to, because a little is reputed as nothing.

107. Concerning the right use of the passions.[1] The passions, considered in themselves, bear nothing dishonorable before them, since they arise from man's sensitive-rational nature, namely from the intimate union of the organic body with the spiritual soul, and moreover were placed in us by the author of nature Himself; in reality they add powers and constancy to human activity, so that a man wholly deprived of these appears, as it were, unarmed, and given over to apathy. Often, however, when they are not rightly ordered, they allure us to sin, against the dictate of reason. Wherefore no less faith than reason commands us to conquer them and subject them to the command of the will: "But they who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with its vices and concupiscences; if we live by the spirit, let us also walk by the spirit."[2] For since reason excels the body and the sensible appetite, the passions ought to obey reason.

[1] Mystics discuss this matter, such as Schram, *Instit. Theologiae mysticae*, Paris, 1868, t. I, § 90; and also philosophers, such as Payot, *L'education de la volonte*, p. 66-108, where he, although a positivist, borrows not a few things from Catholic ascetics; also physicians, such as Descuret, *La medecine des passions*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1860; and Surbled, *La Morale dans ses rapports avec la Medecine*, t. III, p. 16-56.

[2] Galat., V, 24-25.

But the means by which we can rightly order the passions are: (a) immediately and strenuously to turn the mind away from the delightful object which sense or imagination proposes to us, and indeed not only negatively, but also positively, by thinking attentively about an honorable thing and by revolving in the soul those motives of a superior order which dissuade us from dishonorable delights.[3] (b) Carefully to abstain from external acts to which passion provokes, and to exercise contrary acts: for since internal acts of the same kind are excited through external acts, he who externally behaves lasciviously indulges lust much more easily than he who cultivates modesty.[4] (c) To flee external occasions which, from what commonly happens, are accustomed to move the passions;[1] thus the irascible ought to be silent concerning those matters by which they are more easily and vehemently provoked to anger. (d) Finally, the best means is to order the passions to better goods: for since they add powers to the will, the will will profit much if it uses them for pursuing good strenuously. Thus those who are more easily captured by sensible love should turn themselves to Christ, hiding under the Eucharistic species, and sweetly recline in His bosom; let the ambitious promote the glory of God and the salvation of souls with flaming zeal; let the fearful fear not men and their vain judgments, but "Him who can destroy both soul and body in hell";[2] and thus let them prudently flee occasions of sin; let the daring cultivate fortitude; let envy be turned into noble emulation; sadness into penance, and so concerning the rest.

[3] To the point even the agnostic Payot, op. cit., p. 87: "One must even often renounce direct struggle, and for example calm sensual disturbance by getting up, by going out to walk, by going to pay a visit, etc.; in a word, by trying to eliminate the fixed idea, to wear it out, to disturb it, or at least to oblige it to share consciousness with other states introduced thus artificially."

[4] Payot illustrates this thus, op. cit., p. 80: "A desire, a tendency, are absolutely separated from the external world; they can be satisfied only by muscular acts: anger satisfies itself by insults or blows; love by embraces, kisses, caresses; but our muscles depend in large measure on our will: and since we all can momentarily refuse the ministry of our members to a passion, it is clear that we will be able to develop our power and succeed in burying the emotion within ourselves."

[1] More fully concerning these in the moral part of the treatise concerning Penance, n. 451-469.

[2] Matt., X, 28. - Cf. Feuchtersleben, *Hygiene de l'ame*, Paris, 1904, p. 188-247; Senault, op. cit., p. 132-140.

III. Concerning Violence Insofar as It Impedes the Execution of Free Volition.

108. 1. Notion. Besides the causes which act upon the intellect and will, there are those which directly impede the execution of volition and indirectly influence the will itself: such is violence, which is defined as a certain motion impressed from without against the inclination of the will.[4] This is physical violence, and is distinguished from moral violence, which consists in threats, reproaches, and other things of this kind, and falls back into fear: for from these threats arises trepidation of mind. From this it is clear that violence does not properly coerce the will, but falls only upon those acts which can be commanded by the will. Nevertheless it can indirectly influence consent, insofar as the

external act which the agent is forced to effect solicits the consent of the will. Thus, if someone is forced to drink sweet and generous wine, he experiences sensible delight, to which the will is in some way inclined to consent; thus a woman, oppressed by force, falls into the danger of consenting interiorly to pleasure.

[3] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 4-5; Suarez, *De voluntario*, disp. II; Salmanticenses, *De volunt. et involunt.*, disp. V; Billuart, diss. 1, art. 5-6; Frins, *De actibus hum.*, n. 247-280; Bouquillon, n. 344-346; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 67-72.

[4] A few indeed say that violence is present whenever imagination experiences base phantasms, or the appetite suffers movements of inordinate concupiscence, against the inclination of the will; but all these things are better called first-first acts, concerning which above, n. 79.

109. 2. Concerning the influence of violence on free acts. When violence is done to someone, his will can have itself in a diverse way.

(A) If he resists internally and externally, as much as he morally can, the violence is called absolute, and the act so perpetrated is in no way free, nor consequently imputable: such is he whose knees by external force are bent before an idol, and whose hands are moved to offering incense to false gods, against his inclination; or he who is violently forced to sign a contract or testament, against his assent.

110. (B) But if the agent indeed resists externally the force brought upon him, but inwardly consents, the free indeed is diminished, but of itself is not removed.

(a) The free is diminished, for in such a case the mind cannot deliberate quietly, nor is the will left to its own indifference, but is allured to giving consent, and indeed the more vehemently the more vividly the delight is felt which, as it were necessarily, accompanies the external act; whence liberty and imputability are much diminished; such is the case of a woman to whom force is brought.

(b) Yet it is not removed of itself; for, even if the will is powerfully allured, and the mind cannot deliberate so easily, nevertheless, provided the exercise of reason is not wholly impeded, the will can dissent, as St. Anselm[1] excellently notes: "A man can be bound unwillingly, because he can be bound when he is unwilling; he can be tortured... but he cannot will unwillingly, because he cannot will when he is unwilling to will; for everyone willing wills his own willing."

[1] St. Anselm, *De lib. arb.*, c. 5.

111. (C) If the agent outwardly behaves altogether passively, neither consenting nor resisting, although inwardly dissenting, he freely permits the external act, which consequently is imputed to him whenever there is an obligation of resisting.

It can indeed happen that there is an obligation also of resisting externally, whether on account of scandal to be prevented, for example in the cause of faith, or in order to remove an interior danger of consenting, as in the matter of chastity; in which case it is not lawful to behave permissively, as is clear. But if no obligation of this kind is present, external resistance can be judged useless, and therefore not imputable. Wherefore from all the circumstances it must be judged whether the agent has sinned or not.

In practice, when the delight which accompanies the external act is vehement, the obligation falls upon one of resisting externally, insofar as it can be done, lest the will, allured by pleasure, consent interiorly.

§ II. Concerning the Causes Which More Remotely Influence the Internal Act.

The principal ones are: 1. heredity and temperament; 2. education; 3. habit; 4. certain pathological states, in which the exercise of liberty is diminished or removed.

I. Concerning Hereditary Propensions and Temperament.

We comprehend these two together, because what is called temperament is often handed down from the parents themselves, by force of heredity.

1. Concerning Hereditary Propensions.

112. (A) The facts are set forth. All admit that certain propensions are transmitted by heredity, and there is controversy only concerning the extension of this law.

[1] Theologians have few things concerning this matter, especially where they treat concerning the transmission of original sin; thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 1; among moderns, cf. Ribot, *L'hérédité psychologique*, 4th ed., Paris, 1890; M. Guyau, *Education et hérédité*, 4th ed., Paris, 1895; P. Vallet, *La vie et l'hérédité*, Paris, 1891.

Now, although many things concerning this matter are uncertain, generally propensions are handed down more easily and more efficaciously the more nearly they depend upon the organism; thus physical diseases or defects and also bodily qualities are frequently transmitted to descendants, so that certain families are marked for several centuries by certain anatomical and physiological characters;[2] in almost the same way, although not so efficaciously, certain sensitive faculties are handed down, such as keenness in sight, a ready memory, etc.[1] - Mental aptitudes also not rarely pass by heredity from parents to children, although less frequently, such as a special ability for musical art, or for solving mathematical problems.[2] - As regards moral propensions, it seems certain that certain ones likewise are transfused into children, especially those which depend more upon the organism, such as inclinations to anger, drunkenness, vices of the flesh, etc.; in reality, in most regions, examples are alleged of families in which certain virtues or vices were transmitted through many generations.[3]

[2] You have examples in Ribot, p. 3-14; P. Lucas, *Traité philosophique et physiologique de l'hérédité naturelle*, Paris, 1847-1850.

[1] Cf. Ribot, p. 38-64; Darwin, *The descent of man*; in French: *La descendance de l'homme*; H. Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, § 82; in French: *Principes de Biologie*, Paris, Alcan.

[2] Ribot, p. 65-85; Galton, *Hereditary genius*, London, 1869.

[3] Ribot, p. 86-102; Aubry, *La contagion du meurtre*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1894, p. 17-51; R. L. Dugdale, *The Jukes*, New York, where through five generations the history is described of an American family, almost all of whose members publicly indulged in vice.

113. Both parents concur in this transmission of qualities or defects, though not in the same degree: not rarely sons receive the endowments of the mother by heredity, while daughters receive the propensions of the father; nevertheless, for the most part the inclinations of the offspring are

tempered by a certain, as it were, mixture of the qualities of each parent. Sometimes also hereditary transmission is not immediate, but mediate, namely from grandparents to grandchildren; in which case it is called atavism.[4]

[4] Ribot expounds the laws of hereditary transmission known hitherto, p. 157-262.

It is indeed easily understood how physical endowments are handed down together with bodily substance and blood; but others pass into offspring mediately, on account of the intimate and substantial union of body and soul, from which it happens that the physical organism, and especially the nerves and brain, have the greatest influence upon the senses both external and internal, and, through the mediation of the senses, upon the intellect and will.[5]

[5] St. Thomas declares this, Ia, q. 118, a. 1-2 and q. 119, a. 1-2, ad 2, where among other things he has these words: "The assimilation of the generator to the generated does not take place on account of matter, but on account of the form of the agent, which generates something like itself. Whence it is not necessary, in order that someone be assimilated to his grandfather, that the bodily matter of the seed have been in the grandfather, but that there be in the seed some power derived from the grandfather through the mediation of the father." And elsewhere, *Quaest. disp., De Pot.*, q. III, a. 9, ad 7: "It must be said that the very disposition of the body is followed by the disposition of the rational soul, both because the rational soul receives from the body, and because according to the diversity of matter forms also are diversified." Cf. P. Vallet, op. cit., p. 315-334. - Ribot lists and weighs various hypotheses for explaining hereditary transmission, p. 385-409.

114. (B) Concerning the influence of heredity on liberty. (a) Not a few modern determinists contend that by the law of heredity liberty is destroyed: for, on the one hand, propensions are handed down into children without their consent, and on the other hand, it is morally impossible to resist these; to prove this, they bring forward certain examples of families in which vice seems to have been hereditary through several generations.

Yet this is opposed no less to historical facts than to the testimony of conscience. We indeed admit that free will is diminished by hereditary propensions, insofar as reason is darkened by them and the power of the will is in some way weakened, according as we have said concerning the passions to which hereditary inclinations can be assimilated. Nor do we deny that sometimes from vicious parents a certain species of madness is handed down, which wholly takes away liberty. But as often as the use of reason remains, by that very fact there remains the power of deliberating and choosing. This is evident historically; for, even in those families which seem given over to vice, children are found who live rightly,[1] especially when they have obtained a good education; while conversely among very honorable families there are found children who act basely. - Besides, even when propensions of this kind press urgently, some consent to them, while others resist them; indeed one and the same man sometimes allows himself to be overcome, but at other times strenuously resists; therefore even psychologically it is evident that liberty is not wholly extinguished.[2]

[1] You have examples in Aubry, op. cit., pp. 42, 48, 50.

[2] Ribot admits this (op. cit., p. 324), at least for many cases: "The first case is that in which inherited tendencies do not have an irresistible character. Man, inheriting modes of feeling and thinking from his fathers, is solicited to will and consequently to act as they did. This heredity of impulses and tendencies constitutes for him an order of internal influences in the midst of which he lives, but which he has the faculty of judging and conquering. They no more entail than other internal or external circumstances the suppression, the annihilation of the personal factor (whatever its nature may be), the irresistible necessity of acts." - Afterward, however, he adds that in certain cases those propensions

are irresistible; yet this does not occur except when the exercise of reason is suspended. - Cf. Guyau, op. cit., pp. 16-32 and 70-80, where he shows that hereditary propensions can be reformed through education.

115. (b) Nevertheless, since liberty is attenuated by these things and is inclined toward evil, those who have received depraved inclinations from their parents are to be received with great kindness, and gently exhorted that by diligent and constant effort they strive to conquer them, using the means described above, where we treated concerning the passions. - Moreover, where it is a question of the choice of a state of life which requires special virtues, directors of souls ought to attend to these propensions; thus the Church does not readily enroll illegitimate sons in the priesthood, lest they imitate paternal incontinence; the same can be said of the sons of drunkards, who not rarely are vehemently inclined to drunkenness.

2. Concerning Temperament and Moral Character.

116. (A) Notion. The complex of those propensions which, whether from heredity or from the organism proper to each one, belong to some individual and constitute his special disposition is called temperament. But native dispositions of this kind are in some way changed by education, external circumstances, and one's own efforts. From this arises character, or the complex of native propensions insofar as they have been changed by education or by one's own will, and have acquired some stability. - Sometimes, however, temperament and character are taken promiscuously.[2]

[1] As regards ancient systems, cf. Debreyne-Ferrand, *La Théologie morale et les sciences médicales*, Paris, 1884, p. 9-46; as regards new systems, cf. Fouillée, *Tempérament et Caractères*, Paris, 1895; Paulhan, *Les Caractères*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1902; Malapert, *Les éléments du caractère et leurs lois de combinaison*, Paris, 1897; E. Ledos, *Traité de la Physionomie humaine*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1904, t. I, p. 85-161.

[2] Not rarely also temperament designates something physiological, and character something psychological.

Physiologists and moralists by no means agree concerning the species of temperaments. Formerly four were distinguished, according to the four principal elements of the human body, namely: the sanguine, in which the sanguine system prevailed; the nervous, where the nerves dominated; the bilious, in which bile had more force; the lymphatic, or phlegmatic, where the watery part of the blood principally existed. But modern physiology has rejected this division, as lacking a foundation; hitherto, however, no other scientific foundation could be found.

117. Yet commonly enough four principal temperaments are distinguished, which, as regards psychological marks, very nearly approach the division given above. For among men, some are more sensitive, because they feel more vividly, and others more active, because they react more vehemently to sensations. Again, among the former, some excel by abundance of blood, others by organization of the nerves; among the latter, some act more promptly and intensely, as the choleric, others only slowly and weakly, as the phlegmatic. Therefore four temperaments are distinguished:[1]

[1] Thus Fouillée, op. cit., p. 3-80; Paulhan proposes another division, op. cit.

(a) Those who are sensitive and sanguine feel promptly and vividly, but not intensely and perseveringly; wherefore they are very unstable; they easily sin and conceive contrition, but, forgetful

of promises, soon fall into sin. Among these are numbered Mark Antony, Louis XIV, Mirabeau, etc.

(b) Those who are sensitive and nervous feel much more intensely and lastingly; therefore in them the passions, whether they are ordered to good or to evil, are much more vehement; and thus their moral character depends especially upon the object toward which they turn themselves; they likewise have some instability, arising from the various emotions to which they are given: such were Voltaire and Frederick, king of Prussia. Sometimes they become melancholic, when they cannot attain the ideal perfection which they pursue: thus Pascal.

(c) The choleric act not only intensely but perseveringly and with the greatest force; they are ambitious, they wish to dominate others and to obtain glory in whatever way: such were Caesar, Cromwell, Napoleon.

(d) The phlegmatic act more coldly and slowly, but with great strength and unconquered constancy; thus many Dutchmen, but especially, among them, William, duke of Holland, who became king of England.

These four kinds, however, are often found mixed in one and the same individual, and indeed in various degrees.

118. (B) The influence of temperament on liberty. Concerning this Aquinas had already said:[2] "The soul rules the body and resists the passions which follow temperament; for from temperament some are more apt than others for concupiscences or angers; yet they abstain from them more, on account of something restraining them, as is clear in the continent." - In reality it is historically evident that there were not a few who, by temperament prone to anger, became most gentle, as St. Francis de Sales; others, inclined to ambition, became humble and full of zeal for souls, as is clear in the example of St. Francis Xavier. - This is proved no less evidently by experience; for one and the same man often acts according to his character, but sometimes against the same;[3] moreover, temperament is not rarely changed by education, so that some of those who at first excelled in sensibility afterward rejoice in the greatest activity.

[2] *Sum. Cont. Gentil.*, lib. II, cap. 63.

[3] Whence not rarely it is said concerning some action: "it is contrary to his character."

Therefore, if by temperament the exercise of free will is often diminished, it is not wholly removed. But educators and confessors should strive with all their strength to help the younger, so that whatever is good in their character they may assiduously cultivate, and whatever is evil they may correct by contrary acts, as was said where we treated concerning the passions.[1] - Moreover, some psychological notion of the various kinds of character is especially useful to confessors, so that they may more safely direct their penitents to the practice of virtues: the sanguine are to be persuaded to accomplish all things more deliberately and constantly, lest, moved by a passing ardor, they undertake something above their strength, and afterward, cast down in spirit, fall into despair; the nervous and the choleric are to be moderated, lest, through excessive ardor, they indulge excesses, but especially are to be admonished to turn their passions to a good end; the melancholic need consolation, lest they be oppressed by sadness and despair; the phlegmatic are to be stirred up, lest, made sleepy, they become sluggish and lax.

[1] Concerning this see also A. Martin, *L'Education du caractère*, Paris, 1889.

II. Concerning Education Insofar as It Influences Liberty.

119. Hereditary propensions and natural inclinations, which arise from temperament and are strengthened from character, are greatly increased or diminished by education. For the soul of the young is like soft wax, which easily receives external impressions and retains them in itself.

[2] Dupanloup, *De l'Education*, 7th ed., Paris, 1866, t. I, p. 89-402; t. II, p. 108-484 and p. 547-599; Martin, *Educ. du caractère*, p. 126-365; cf. Marion, *Leçons de Psychologie appliquée à l'éducation*, 8th ed., Paris, 1895; H. Spencer, *Education*, New York, 1885; in French, *De l'Education*, 7th ed., Paris, 1888.

Now the young are instructed not only by parents and teachers, but also by all with whom they converse, and by society itself: for civil laws bend minds toward that which they prescribe; if they favor drunkenness, divorce, and other vices, by that very fact they induce many to those sins; but conversely, if vices are punished by proportionate penalties, not a few are deterred from them through fear of just chastisement.

120. Education influences free will especially in a threefold way: by inculcating principles, by presenting example, and by exciting passions.

1. By inculcating principles. For since, from what has been said, the will does not act unless illuminated and moved by the intellect, he who can inspire ideas and emotions by that very fact bends the will. It is evident by experience how much prejudices vividly impressed on the minds of the young avail, especially in religious and moral matters; thus certain persons, among Protestants and socialists, have been so imbued from childhood with prejudices against Catholics that they judge them guilty of any crime whatsoever, and therefore pursue them with contempt and hatred; likewise not a few, among anarchists, are persuaded that nothing is more useful to social order than to plunder the goods of the rich. But others, on account of a defect of moral education, labor under ignorance even concerning certain precepts of the natural law, and acts evil in themselves are perpetrated in good faith.

Now, in these or similar cases, in order to judge whether acts evil in themselves can be called free and imputable or not, the principles set forth above concerning ignorance and error, n. 94-98, must be applied. In other respects one must deal more mildly with these persons, so that, by a kind and sincere exposition of the truth, prejudices may be dispelled and the will turned toward better things.

121. 2. By presenting example. Examples influence liberty in a twofold way: indirectly, by gradually inducing the intellect to approve that which is done by many, especially by those who shine with some authority; directly, by drawing the consent of the will, because, as the adage has it, words move, examples draw: for men, especially the young, by a certain natural propension desire to imitate what they see done by others. Thus not a few boys, otherwise of a good disposition, are often induced by the examples of older persons to blaspheme, steal, or act immodestly; likewise, in prisons where young men and adults are enclosed promiscuously, most come out worse than they were before, because by the words and examples of others they have been enticed to many vices.

By all these things, certainly, the power of maturely deliberating or of freely acting is diminished, but it is not extinguished. Wherefore those who, deceived and seduced by depraved examples, have

indulged in vice are partly to be excused; and one must strive with all one's strength that, having left evil companions, they frequent others stable in good, by whose conversation and example they may return to better things.

122. 3. By exciting or moderating the passions. For just as by the best education the passions are moderated and directed toward good, so likewise by evil education they are excited and carried toward evil. Thus, for example, those who receive and read books in which whatever is true, beautiful, and good is extolled much more easily turn their passions to the practice of virtue; on the contrary, if books of love-affairs are given them to read, in which vices are vividly described, their curiosity is excited, desires are inflamed, and the way is prepared for lust.

Here, therefore, the principles given above concerning the passions, n. 103-104, must be applied; these for the most part do not remove liberty, but diminish it.

III. Concerning Habits Insofar as They Influence a Free Act.

123. 1. Notion. Besides temperament and education, natural habits influence liberty; for since they are acquired by repeated acts, they increase the inclination to performing similar acts. - Here we treat only of natural habits, which are acquired by repeated acts, and not of supernatural habits, which are divinely infused; and indeed insofar as they affect a free act.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 49-54; Suarez, *Disput. metaphysicae*, disp. XLIV; Meyer, t. I, n. 130-139; Bouquillon, n. 338; *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clergé*, XXI, 1899, p. 529-593, 673 sq.; Rabier, *Psychologie*, p. 571-587; F. Ravaisson, *De l'habitude* (thesis), Paris, 1838.

In this sense, habit is defined as a constant inclination acquired by repeated acts for producing similar acts. Already by the first act a certain initial facility is acquired for repeating the same; but when the same acts are often repeated, at a short interval, with attention and with a propension of the will, especially if it is a question of a delightful thing, soon a vehement inclination is formed and rooted; and this not rarely is acquired and strengthened much more easily by the law of ancestral heredity, concerning which above. This inclination is added to various faculties, and therefore can affect not only the sensitive appetite, but also the intellect and the will.

In moral matters one must carefully distinguish between voluntary and involuntary habit. (a) When a habit has been knowingly and freely acquired and has not been efficaciously retracted,[1] it can be called actually voluntary; indeed, if it had been acquired inadvertently, it becomes actually voluntary when it has not been retracted after the agent became conscious of this habit. (b) When an inclination was acquired inadvertently and retracted as soon as the operator was conscious of it, it must be called altogether involuntary. (c) If it was acquired or retained advertently, but afterward efficaciously retracted, it is called antecedently voluntary and actually involuntary, nor is it morally imputed to the agent.

[1] It is efficaciously retracted when means apt for overcoming the custom are applied, even if it is not immediately conquered.

124. 2. Concerning the influence of habits on liberty. (A) What is done from a voluntary habit, not yet retracted, is free and imputable: in itself indeed, if the habit is actually voluntary; in the cause, if it is antecedently voluntary.

(a) For he who actually wills to retain a habit of which he is conscious by that very fact freely wills frequently to elicit the acts which he foresees will naturally follow from that habit; otherwise he would retract the habit.

(b) But if he does not actually will positively to retain the habit, but formerly freely acquired it, without ever having retracted it, the acts which proceed from the habit can be called voluntary in the cause, insofar as the agent, by freely acquiring the inclination, by that very fact freely willed the effects which he foresaw would follow from it. But, as we noted above, n. 97, the free in the cause is less imputable than the free in act.

(c) Indeed, a habit actually willed increases the voluntary, and consequently merit or demerit; for he who is conscious of some habit, good or evil, and positively wills to retain it, by that very fact shows how vehemently he intends the acts proceeding from the habit; for knowing that they arise from the habit frequently and intensively, he nevertheless wills to retain the habit, and therefore intends this frequency and intensity.

125. (B) What is done from an involuntary or efficaciously retracted habit is less free and imputable.

For, on the one hand, the habit itself is not voluntary, and on the other hand, it so impedes the deliberation of reason and allures the will that it weakens its powers and greatly diminishes liberty. - Indeed, sometimes the habit is so vehement that, when it bursts forth into act, it anticipates the judgment of reason and free consent, especially if it affects the executive powers, as is evident in the example of those who utter blasphemous formulas without any deliberation. Not rarely also custom has sent down the deepest roots, so that, even if it does not wholly remove the use of reason, nevertheless it takes away that degree of liberty which is required for grave sin, as can be seen among certain drunkards who, even after the habit has been retracted, are impelled to drinking by a propension almost invincible.

Wherefore, where habit prevails, it must be morally judged from all the adjuncts how great a degree of liberty remains in the agent.

126. 3. Concerning the manner of acting with regard to habits. From this it is given to understand of how great importance it is to acquire good habits and to eradicate evil ones. For by custom the powers of the will are increased a hundredfold, and acts are performed more promptly, more easily, more perfectly, and more delightfully, and thus the way is prepared for true and constant progress: for with less effort a greater effect is produced.[1] Those, therefore, who have obtained the custom of piety and virtue walk expeditiously in the ways of the Lord and ascend the arduous paths of perfection with a great heart; but those who have formed depraved habits fall easily into sins, undergo the tyranny of the passions, and can return to the practice of virtue only with difficulty and by heroic efforts.

[1] Concerning the utility of habit A. Lemoine says, apud Rabier, *Psychol.*, p. 587: "If it were necessary for the will always to make the same efforts to direct the movements of the members, if no trace remained today of yesterday's exercise, man would not walk; he would scarcely drag himself along like a child of tender age. He would not speak, he would stammer. He would see without looking, he would learn without ever knowing. If it were necessary for him always to conquer the same resistance of instincts and passions without passion losing its force, without that of the will increasing, the most valiant man would soon be at the end of moral energy; he would succumb in this struggle ceaselessly renewed, and virtue would be only a word. It is thanks to habit that man can run instead of crawl, that the sciences are constituted and enriched; that virtue is acquired, that in all things progress is accomplished. In proportion as the act no longer requires, in order to be repeated, anything but a simple effort, the surplus of power, which the cause does not expend in order to reproduce it, becomes in some way available for new and superior efforts."

Happy, therefore, are those who, already from childhood, learn to cultivate, by repeated acts, honesty, piety, abnegation of oneself, charity toward others, and the other virtues!

But if depraved habits have already sent down deep roots, nevertheless one must not despair: custom is conquered by custom. In order that a depraved custom may be conquered more efficaciously, (a) there ought to go before it attentive consideration or meditation on all the motives which ought to move us to eradicate it completely; (b) when the evil inclination urges, we ought to divert the mind to other things, and, if an external occasion is present, immediately flee it and direct our whole attention to something honorable; (c) we ought to apply the means described above, n. 107, for overcoming the passions.[1]

[1] Payot, op. cit., p. 200-222, after ascetics, explains how especially sensuality and pleasure can be conquered by the young.

IV. Concerning Pathological States Which Influence Liberty.

127. On account of the intimate connection between body and soul, there are certain pathological states in which liberty is diminished or removed. All states of this kind directly affect the nervous system, and indirectly the will. Among these we shall treat: 1. concerning abulia and invincible propension, which in the state of wakefulness especially harm liberty; 2. concerning neurasthenia, hysteria, and epilepsy, which in the same state harm liberty less; 3. concerning hypnotic sleep and suggestion.

[2] Ribot, *Les maladies de la volonté*, 18th ed., Paris, 1904; translated into English by Fitzgerald, *The diseases of the will*; more briefly Rauh and Revault, *Psychologie appliquée à la Morale*, Paris, 1900, p. 282-286.

1. Concerning Abulia and Invincible Propension.

128. (A) Abulia (lack of will) consists in a certain incapacity of efficaciously willing what is desired. Positivists infer that this is a disease of the will itself from the fact that it is found in men otherwise apparently sound and robust, who by their own initiative cannot or will not will what otherwise they desire and are able to accomplish. But from these facts this conclusion cannot be drawn; for even in those who seem sound, a disease of the nerves or brain can lie hidden. Wherefore all those who admit the spirituality of the soul teach that abulia arises from a certain pathological state of the body, by force of which the organs are not in that condition in which the will can expeditiously exercise its operations.

Sometimes this impotence is universal; sometimes it is limited to certain acts or certain times.[1]

[1] Ribot reports many examples of abulia, op. cit., p. 38-59.

Nothing certain is known concerning the cause of this disease;[2] but those incur the danger of falling into it who more promptly and easily, without sufficient reason, abdicate their own will and show themselves sluggish; or who abuse soporific medicines, for example opium.[3]

[2] Ribot gives a physiological explanation, p. 50-56.

[3] In this way the very well-known T. de Quincey had fallen into abulia; cf. Ribot, p. 40-43; T. Quincey, *Confessions of an opium-eater*.

Whatever the case, when the disease has prevailed, liberty is much diminished, and sometimes it seems to be removed at least as regards certain acts; and therefore the omission of acts which are prescribed is, in itself, either little free or in no way free; but it is free in the cause when someone knowingly and freely has induced this state by his own fault. - Nor is such a disposition altogether incurable; for, with relatives and friends helping, those who labor under abulia begin to will and execute easier things, and step by step more difficult things also, provided they are persuaded that this is not arduous.[4]

[4] Ollé-Laprune, *Le prix de la vie*, Paris, 1896, ch. 24, p. 304-317.

129. (B) Vehement and invincible propension.[5] Here there is question of those propensions which, by an almost unavoidable motion, impel someone to doing that which otherwise he abhors. Sometimes certain persons are so suddenly and vehemently pressed by these impulses that they are not conscious of the things which are perpetrated; but others are conscious of this violent propension and flee to friends so that, being imprisoned or bound by them, they may be able to avoid the evil action to which they are impelled.[6] Thus certain persons are carried unwillingly to suicide, homicide, theft, drunkenness, during the whole time in which the crisis endures, and afterward, when the crisis has been overcome, they detest all these things and become masters of themselves.

[5] Ribot, op. cit., p. 73-95.

[6] "These irresistible impulses are, some unconscious, sudden, followed by immediate execution, without the subject having even had time to take knowledge of them, without his being informed of his action either before or after; the others are fully conscious: the sick person feels that he is no longer master of himself, that he is dominated by an interior force, invincibly pushed to commit acts which he reproves and of which he has horror. A young man adores his mother and is haunted by the idea of killing her; to prevent himself from executing his atrocious desire, he is obliged to beg that he be tied in the barn like a wolf." (Rauh and Revault, op. cit., p. 283).

Whence from all the adjuncts it must be judged whether, in these cases, liberty is only diminished or is removed. In practice, however, as soon as someone is conscious that a crisis is occurring, he ought to ask friends to take care that the invincible propension not pass into act. - Moreover all those things by which propensions of this kind can be induced ought carefully to be avoided.

2. Concerning Neurasthenia, Hysteria, and Epilepsy.

130. (A) Neurasthenia is a certain pathological state in which the nerves appear weakened and exhausted, so that the agent, although master of himself, labors under the greatest inconstancy and is much depressed physically and mentally. Generally a state of this kind is caused by various excesses, whether by working too much, or by indulging pleasures, or by abusing

certain narcotic medicines;[1] sometimes, however, it is transmitted by heredity. It affects the whole body, and therefore can be called not so much a disease as a cohort of diseases.

[1] "All the passions, or even excessive sentiments, are capable of bringing on neurasthenia; whether it is love or ambition or filial affection, or again cupidity, which comes into play, it will suffice that their development be hindered for a consequent neurasthenic state to declare itself. In the intellectual sphere, all excesses of work can be incriminated, and, if moral preoccupations are joined to it, which is not rare, the combination of the two orders of causes will bring on neurasthenia still more easily." (Dr. Block, cited by H. Vigouroux, *Traité de Médecine*, t. III, p. 125.)

From this weakness of the nerves the will becomes very infirm and unstable, unfit for strongly resisting evil propensions; wherefore liberty is diminished, though not removed. - Besides physical medicines, which physicians prescribe, spiritual remedies are of much profit, such as confidence in God,[1] a firm will and hope of repelling this disease, moderation in acting, a quiet life far from the tumult of cities, the society of friends who are able gently to console the sick person and often strongly to exhort him to acting well and quietly.

[1] This is candidly acknowledged by a man otherwise unbelieving, who wrote concerning nervous diseases: "Religious faith could be the best preservative against these maladies of the soul and the most powerful means for curing it, if it were living enough to create in its adherents a true Christian stoicism. In this state of soul, alas! so rare in right-thinking circles, man becomes invulnerable. Feeling himself supported by his God, he fears neither sickness nor death. He can succumb under the blows of a physical disease, but morally he remains standing in the midst of suffering; he is inaccessible to the pusillanimous emotions of neuroses." Dubois, *Les Psychonévroses et leur traitement moral*, Paris (Masson), 1904, p. 245-246; in the same place various therapeutic and moral means for curing those diseases are described; cf. Feuchtersleben, *Hygiène de l'âme*, Paris (Baillière), 1904, p. 147.

131. (B) Hysteria (from the Greek word *hystera*, uterus, because formerly this was thought to be a disease of the uterus) is also a disordering of the nervous system, but much graver than neurasthenia; it consists especially in this, that the sensibility of the nerves is diminished or for a time extinguished in certain parts of the body (anesthesia), while in others it is rendered much more intense (hyperesthesia). This irritability of the nerves changes the whole nature of hysterical persons, disturbs the mind, weakens the will, and opens the way to hallucinations: they vividly represent to themselves phantasms, which induce a state akin to ecstasy or somnambulism. Prone to diverse and contrary affections, and laboring under the greatest inconstancy, they pass immediately from laughter to tears, from love to hatred. Often they have recourse to lying: they simulate sentiments of soul which they do not have, piety, and imaginary visions; sometimes they falsely affirm that force has been brought upon them by a person whose name they reveal, describing the minute circumstances of the crime, and on that account they excite discords and scandals. Not rarely they are prone to theft, and they easily steal whatever pleases them. - Therefore let priests beware lest they be deceived by these persons.

Not only women, but also men can incur hysteria: a soft life, abstinence from physical exercises, the reading of romantic books which excite the imagination and disturb the heart, premature and excessive study, lustful excesses, in one word whatever induces physical debilitation and agitates the nervous system, disposes one toward it. - There are various degrees of hysteria and various stages, which are described by physiologists; sometimes the disease grows stronger and reaches a paroxysm,[1] which by physicians is commonly called great hysteria (*la grande hystérie*).

[1] P. Richer, *Etudes cliniques sur l'hystéro-épilepsie*; Axenfeld and Huchard, *Traité des névroses*, p. 967-1012; Ribot, op. cit., p. 115-125; Surbled, op. cit., t. IV, p. 72-78; Antonelli, *Medicina Pastoralis*, Rome, 1905, t. I, n. 436-449. - Physiologically hysteria is described thus: "Hysteria is a neurosis with numerous and varied manifestations. The three principal ones are: the sensation of a ball which starts from the belly and rises back to the throat, where it determines a feeling of constriction; nervous attacks accompanied by cries, by loss of consciousness; anesthesias or partial paralyses." (Vigouroux, op. cit., p. 95). - Psychologically it is described thus by Huchard, apud Ribot, p. 117: "Their character changes like the views of a kaleidoscope, which could make Sydenham say with reason that what is most constant among them is their inconstancy. Yesterday they were playful, amiable, and gracious; today they are in a bad humor, susceptible and irascible, growing angry at anything and nothing, gloomy and sulky by caprice, discontented with their lot; nothing interests them, they are bored with everything. They experience a very great antipathy against a person whom yesterday they loved and esteemed, or on the contrary manifest an incomprehensible sympathy for another... Sometimes their sensibility is exalted by the most futile motives, while it is scarcely touched by the greatest emotions... By turns gentle and violent, beneficent and cruel, impressionable to excess, rarely mistresses of their first movement, incapable of resisting impulses of the most opposed nature, presenting a defect of equilibrium between the superior moral faculties, the will, the conscience, and the inferior faculties, instincts, passions, and desires."

It is very difficult to define whether and in what degree hysterical persons remain free. Whence, in practice, only from all the circumstances, and from the declaration of the hysterical persons themselves (to which, however, one must not entirely give trust), can it probably be known what liberty remains in them. - Remedies are of two kinds: physical, which a wise[2] physician will prescribe, for example physical exercises, assiduous labor, although moderate; and spiritual, especially a sufficiently constant effort for at once restraining vain phantasms and bridling the passions, while hysterical persons are masters of themselves.

[2] I say wise; for, since hysterical persons fall into hypnotic sleep more easily than others, certain physicians, for the sake of experiment, hypnotize them and often render their condition worse.

132. (C) The epileptic disease is likewise a certain disordering of the nerves which, with longer intervals interposed, induces a crisis of greater or lesser duration, in which the sick person is not master of himself. Now, among epileptics, there are some who do nothing morally evil; but there are others who are vehemently impelled toward something dishonorable, for example toward inflicting injuries on others, toward stealing, toward blaspheming, or toward speaking or acting basely, without retaining any memory of all these things. In which case they are not free;[1] nor can the offenses thus perpetrated be imputed to them, provided they are not voluntary in the cause.

[1] "Some sick persons suddenly begin to utter incoherent words, coarse words, insults against the persons who surround them. Others commit acts of brutality, strike persons, break objects. Under the influence of the impulse, the epileptic is capable of wounding, of killing the persons who approach him; and he is all the more terrible because his vigor, in those moments, is prodigious, and because he strikes with remarkable sureness... After a few moments the sick person comes back to himself, retaining no memory of what happened." (Féré, *L'épilepsie*, p. 51-52). Cf. Surbled, op. cit., p. 78-82.

3. Concerning Hypnotic Sleep and Suggestion.

133. To these pathological states must be added hypnotic sleep, while which endures commands are suggested to be fulfilled either at once or after some interval.

[2] Charcot, *Leçons sur les maladies du système nerveux*, Paris, 1887; and *Oeuvres complètes*, t. V; P. Richer, *Etudes cliniques sur la grande hystérie*, Paris, 1885; Bernheim, *De la suggestion et de ses applications à la thérapeutique*, Paris, 1886; A. Moll, *Der*

hypnotismus, a work rendered into English as *Hypnotism*, 1893; E. Morselli, *Il magnetismo animale, la fascinazione e gli stati ipnotici*; Coconnier, *L'hypnotisme franc*, Paris, 1897; Grasset, *L'hypnotisme et la suggestion*, Paris (Doin), 1903. - You will find a brief synopsis in Lelong, *La vérité sur l'hypnotisme*, and Guibert, *Etude sur l'hypnotisme*, Paris, Retaux, s. d.; Tanquerey, *Synop. Theol. Dogmat., De Deo Creante*, n. 108-115.

(A) The facts are described. Hypnotic sleep is induced by various means, by command of the voice, by the gaze of the eyes, by the handling of the hands, especially by pressing zones which are called hypnogenic, or even by simple mental suggestion. Generally it is asserted that no one, in the state of wakefulness, can be hypnotized unless he has first given consent at least implicitly; but natural sleep can be changed into hypnotic sleep without the consent of the sleeper. Not all can be hypnotized, but many can, and not only women but also men, especially those who are weak in will or labor under a nervous disease.

The phenomena of hypnotism are distinguished into three kinds: somatic, intellectual, or mixed. (a) The first are so called because they especially affect the body (*soma*): catalepsy, lethargy, and somnambulism. In the cataleptic state, the body remains immobile, like a statue, and preserves that manner of bearing itself which is impressed upon it; it appears altogether inert and insensible. In the lethargic state, the eyes previously closed are opened and turn themselves almost necessarily toward the hypnotizer; the members acquire, as it were, waxen flexibility. If some motion is impressed upon the members, the hypnotized person performs or completes the same; thus if the hands are joined, as generally happens at the time of prayer, the whole body behaves just as if the mind were vacant for contemplation. Finally, in the state of somnambulism, the hypnotized person seems to be, as it were, awakened from sleep: he hears, sees, speaks, and acts; but he is not master of himself, for he obeys almost absolutely the command of the hypnotizer.

(b) In the intellectual order, the principal phenomenon is mental suggestion, which can happen especially in the state of somnambulism. Namely, the hypnotized person hears and executes all those things which are suggested and commanded by the hypnotizer; for example, he sees or does not see an object truly present in the room, at the nod of the hypnotizer; if the latter has ordered that a theft be committed, at first indeed he resists, but for the most part, conquered by the stronger will, the theft is perpetrated. Indeed, suggestions to be executed after a week or a month he faithfully fulfills at the appointed time.

(c) Mixed phenomena are called those which are produced in the body through the mediation of the imagination; for example, a bloody sweat, which someone suffers at the suggestion of the hypnotizer.

134. The cause of these facts is assigned diversely by diverse authors.[1] Many explain them through a certain analogy with natural sleep. For very often it happens to those sleeping that they take imaginary likenesses of things, which are represented in their phantasy, as real, and perform various acts under their influence; and this indeed proceeds from the fact that reason, in order to judge rightly concerning the truth of things, lacks the perception of the senses which is necessary to it. Now he who permits himself to be hypnotized by another submits himself to his command; in his phantasy he vividly perceives likenesses of things which are suggested by him, and, judging them to be real, acts in the same way as if he truly perceived the things themselves.[2]

[1] Cf. Wundt, *Hypnotisme et suggestion*, translated from the German by Keller, Paris, 1902.

[2] Coconnier explains this happily, op. cit., p. 347-380.

135. (B) Concerning the liberty of the hypnotized person.[1] (a) It is certain and admitted by all that the exercise of liberty is much diminished by hypnotic sleep and suggestion; indeed, according to all, it is almost entirely removed as long as the sleep endures; for if an honorable person first resists the suggestion of stealing something, this happens by force of a habit previously acquired; but if the hypnotizer orders the same thing again and again, soon the theft is carried out; therefore that liberty which suffices for moral imputability does not remain.

[1] Concerning this see J. Liégeois, *De la suggestion et du somnambulisme*, Paris (Doin), 1889, n. 507-575; Gilles de la Tourette, *L'Hypnotisme*, Paris (Plon), 1889; Mercier, *Psychologie*, 1904, n. 203.

(b) But if it is a question of a suggestion to be fulfilled afterward, in the state of wakefulness, the Parisian school contends that liberty is not wholly removed but only diminished; while, according to the school of Nancy, even in this case the hypnotized person cannot morally resist the suggestion. Wherefore, in practice, he must be interrogated carefully and cautiously, so that, from his own testimony, it can be discerned whether and to what extent he was free in performing the action.

(c) From this it is clear that the evil actions which the hypnotized person perpetrates are sometimes free in the cause, namely when he freely abdicated his own will and gave consent to hypnotic sleep, foreseeing that actions of this kind were to be suggested. - For this reason the use of hypnotism cannot be permitted indiscriminately, but only for most grave reasons, and with precautions applied lest anything morally evil be able to occur, as will be explained below, n. 916.

Conclusion of the Whole Chapter: Concerning the Education of the Will.

136. Since liberty is a necessary condition for acting morally and meritoriously, and otherwise one of the noblest faculties, it is of the greatest importance to fortify and strengthen it against various impediments. The principal means for attaining this are these:

(a) To cultivate reason rightly; for since this especially influences the free act, whatever perfects the intellect by that very fact strengthens the will. For ideas have the greatest force for exciting desires; and these tend toward action.[2] Wherefore, if we conceive honorable, noble, and Christian ideas, and do not dwell upon them perfunctorily, but assiduously and attentively, by that very fact we vehemently desire and strenuously strive to accomplish good. But conversely error and ignorance, together with prejudices imbibed from whatever source, are to be carefully dispelled by the study and meditation of truths which greatly help toward rightly informing morals. Inadvertence and lightness of soul are to be corrected by the custom of doing nothing except on account of an honorable, indeed also supernatural, motive seriously considered: therefore one must think before acting, so that all things may be done not from blind impulse, but deliberately.

[2] Cf. Dr. P. E. Lévy, *L'éducation rationnelle de la volonté*, 4th ed., Paris, Alcan, 1904, p. 22-57; Payot, *Education de la volonté*, p. 35-45 and 66-127.

(b) To moderate the passions and direct them toward good; for since they add powers to the will, they are indeed not to be extinguished, but, with reason going before, ought to obey the will as handmaids. - But if depraved habits have already been formed, let them be conquered by contrary

custom, and by repeated acts let the habit of doing good promptly and expeditiously gradually be acquired.

(c) But because bodily weakness, and especially disturbance of the nervous system, can induce pathological states which greatly retard or impede the free exercise of the will, excesses of every kind are to be avoided, so that there may truly be a sound mind in a sound body.

(d) Finally, since the will is diminished unless you exercise it, it is expedient to choose more often deliberate and free acts of the will; and therefore, in order to act strenuously, the greatest opportunities, which rarely occur, are not to be awaited, but in the smallest matters, which occur daily, the power of the will is to be exercised; for thus hesitation and fluctuation of soul are avoided, from which abulia can be induced; besides, as Christ Himself observed: "He who is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in that which is greater; and he who is unjust in that which is little is unjust also in that which is greater."[1]

[1] Luke XVI, 10. - Cf. Guibert, *La formation de la volonté*, Paris, 1903.

(e) Nor are supernatural means to be passed over, especially prayer and frequent reception of the sacraments, by which grace is obtained and the will is strengthened, according to that saying: "I can do all things in Him who strengthens me."[2]

[2] Philip., IV, 13.

On Human Acts — Chapter II: On the Morality of the Human Act

Concerning the Morality of the Human Act.

137. State of the question. (A) Hitherto we have treated of the free act considered psychologically; but the same act is called moral when it is considered in its relation with the rule of morals. Now, as was proved above, n. 25-26, the proximate norm of morals is the rational nature of man, and the ultimate norm is God, insofar as He is the supreme good and the ultimate end. For this reason morality is defined as the conformity or difformity of a human act with rational nature and divine goodness.[1]

[1] Some define morality as conformity or difformity with the eternal law manifested through reason; for the eternal law is nothing other than divine wisdom insofar as it is directive of all acts, and therefore it is not really distinguished from divine goodness.

Therefore, by reason of morality, human acts are good or evil according as they tend toward God, the highest good and ultimate end, or are turned away from Him. - But those are called indifferent which are neither good nor evil, because they have no relation with the norm of morality. Whether, however, such acts exist not only objectively, but also in the individual case, will be weighed below. Meanwhile it can be noted that indifference is not properly a species of morality, but a negation of morality.

138. (B) Here we treat of an act naturally or ethically good, not of a supernatural and meritorious act. Man indeed has been elevated to the supernatural state, and sometimes ought to elicit supernatural acts; but he is not bound, under penalty of sin, to act supernaturally in all things. Besides, since an act morally, or ethically, good is presupposed as one of the conditions for merit, this must first be discussed, so that it may be defined when an act is morally good.

(C) Intrinsic and extrinsic morality are distinguished: the former arises from the relation of the act to the natural order of things; the latter from the relation to the positive rule alone. Whence an action is called intrinsically evil which of itself is opposed to the natural order of things, which exists necessarily independently of any law whatever, as for example to hate God, to kill the innocent unjustly; an action is called extrinsically evil which is opposed only to the order freely constituted through positive law, such as the violation of the sabbath day, of the precept of communion, or of the law of fast.

These things posited, we shall speak: I. concerning the elements of the human act from which morality is derived; II. concerning the extension of morality, namely to which acts it extends, adding a few things concerning the indifferent act.

Article I. Concerning the Elements Contributing to the Morality of the Act.

139. When the will elicits a human act, it tends toward an object, on account of some end, in certain determinate circumstances, and often under its command an external act is effected.

Therefore there are four elements which can influence morality: the object, the end, the circumstances, the external act; concerning these we must speak separately.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18-20; Suarez, *De bonitate et malit. human. act.*, disp. IV-X; Billuart, diss. IV; St. Alphonsus, n. 34-40; Ball. B., n. 81-102; Bouquillon, n. 351-374; Lehmk., n. 27-36; Noldin, n. 56-65.

§ I. Concerning the Object of the Human Act.

140. 1. Notion. (A) When the will acts deliberately, it tends toward some object; consequently the object of the human act is that toward which the action tends primarily and of itself; thus it is distinguished from the circumstances, which are touched only secondarily and per accidens, and also from the end, which is the motive on account of which the agent operates. If, for example, I bestow a copious alms upon a wounded poor man, on account of the love of Christ, the alms is the moral object toward which my action primarily tends; the abundance of the alms and the condition of poverty of the wounded neighbor are the circumstances of the act; and the love of Christ is the end, or motive, on account of which I relieve the poor man.

141. (B) But the object, by reason of morality, can be threefold: (a) good, if in itself it is consonant with the rule of morals, for example to love God, to love one's neighbor; (b) evil, if, on the contrary, in itself it is opposed to this rule, such as hatred of God, the unjust killing of an innocent person; (c) indifferent, if of itself it has no relation with the rule of morals, as to walk, to write, to read, to eat. Yet Bouquillon, n. 356, rightly observes that an object of this kind does not remain indifferent except when it is considered indeterminately, namely by abstracting from the circumstances and especially from the end; for to walk for the sake of health is a naturally good act; to write in order to instruct others in truth is something very honorable, while conversely to read depraved books is something dishonorable.

142. Here, moreover, it is permitted to observe that some things are evil absolutely, so that they can never become good or indifferent, for example hatred of God or of neighbor; but some things are evil relatively, and indeed in a twofold way: on account of a defect of right in the agent, as if someone takes another's good while the owner is reasonably unwilling; or on account of a danger of sinning which is incurred, for example if someone reads books harmful to faith or to good morals.

143. (C) But the object, whether good or evil, can be considered in two ways: (a) objectively, or materially, insofar as it is considered in itself, relative to the remote rule of morals, but independently of conscience; (b) formally, insofar as its goodness or malice is perceived by the conscience of the agent, and freely intended by the will. Thus another's property can be taken without the injustice of such an action being known, and in this case such an action is materially evil, but not formally; but if it is adverted to and intended insofar as unjust, it is formally evil. From this it is given to understand what material and formal sin are: the former is committed without knowledge or consent; the latter with knowledge and consent.[1]

[1] Concerning this see *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clergé*, XXI, 1899, p. 1105-1109; concerning material sin it will be said below, n. 507.

144. 2. Concerning the morality derived from the object. Human acts receive their primary and essential morality from the object formally taken.

The material object of itself constitutes the objective morality of the act; for certain acts are good of themselves, by reason of the object, as to love God and neighbor; certain acts are of themselves better than others; thus the love of God, by reason of the object, is more perfect than the love of neighbor. - Nevertheless, when the act is considered in the concrete, as it is performed by the agent, the primary and essential morality is taken from the object formally taken; for since morality properly so called is conformity or difformity with the rule of morals insofar as it is perceived by reason, the act is not truly moral unless that relation is adverted to.

But the morality which is derived from the formal object is called primary, because it is conceived before every other morality which comes from the end and circumstances, and, if it is a question of malice, perseveres even when the end and circumstances are changed. Thus the deliberate taking away of another's property, while the owner is reasonably unwilling, is conceived as unjust before the end and circumstances are considered, nor can it be rendered honorable even when the end and circumstances are changed, even if, for example, someone stole in order to give alms.

It is also called essential, because it is intrinsically present in the action itself; thus the love of God deliberately elicited is good by a goodness inhering in the object itself, while conversely hatred of God freely willed is evil by force of the object itself formally considered.

145. Corollaries. (a) In order that a human act receive goodness from a good object, the will must tend toward that object, at least confusedly, on account of its honorable character; for, if good of this kind is not intended, at least confusedly, as honorable, it will be intended as something delightful or useful; consequently the act will not be morally good, because it will have no formal relation with the rule of morals, which is by no means situated in delight or utility: thus to be present at Mass solely for the sake of curiosity. But it suffices to intend this goodness confusedly; this happens as often as an object honorable of itself is not sought ultimately as delightful or useful; thus he acts rightly who gives alms, not indeed formally thinking about its honorable character, but neither exclusively seeking his own delight or utility: this will be better understood from what is to be said where we treat concerning the end.

146. (b) In order that a human act contract the malice of the object, it is not required that this malice be sought in itself, even confusedly, but it suffices that it be known and interpretatively willed, or logically willed by way of consequence. For malice so adheres to the object itself that it cannot be torn away from it even through a good intention. Thus he who knows that it is prohibited to eat meat on Friday, and nevertheless, without sufficient reason, eats it, sins, even if he does not will the malice of the act: for then he truly wills to break the law, although he would not wish to sin; the same must be said concerning him who becomes drunk, intending only the delight from drink, and not the malice of drunkenness: for while he foresees that he will be drunk from the drink, by that very fact he wills, at least interpretatively, the malice of drunkenness.

§ II. Concerning the End of the Human Act.

147. Notion. (A) The end concerning which we are treating is not the end of the work, which is not distinguished from the object formally taken, but the end of the one operating, or the intention, the motive on account of which the agent operates (above n. 4). Thus, if someone gives alms, the end of the work is the relief of the poor man, but the end of the one operating can be love of neighbor for his own sake, love of God or of Christ, the intention of redeeming sins, or vainglory, etc. Indeed one and the same act by the same agent, and at the same instant, can be performed on account of a manifold intention; thus someone can bestow alms in order to relieve the poor man, because he is loved on account of Christ and God, and at the same time in order to obtain remission of sins, etc. - Hence the end of the work is sometimes the same as the end of the one operating, namely when the agent intends the very goodness intrinsically inhering in the act, for example the relief of the poor man in the case of alms. - The intention itself is necessarily good or evil: for since it is deliberate, if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason and is good; otherwise, it is evil.[1]

[1] Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9: "For since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, from this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the nature of evil; but if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason, whence it has the nature of good. But it is necessary that it either be ordered or not be ordered to the due end." Cf. Didiot, op. cit., n. 440-454.

(B) With the end is connected the means, or that through which the agent wills to attain the end. A means, insofar as it is a means,[2] is not desirable or good of itself, because the will does not rest in it; but it is perceived as something useful for attaining the end, and therefore it is intended not on account of itself, but on account of the end. From this arose the axiom: he who wills the end, by that very fact wills the means; and he who wills the means, as it is a means, by that very fact wills the end. For the end cannot be obtained without the means, and consequently no one sincerely wills the end without by that very fact willing the means necessary for attaining the end. Likewise the means, as it is a means, is not intended except insofar as it conduces to the end; therefore no one sincerely wills the means as such unless at the same time he wills to attain the end. Thus he who wills to kill Peter, by that very fact wills the means necessary for perpetrating this homicide; likewise he who knowingly wills to apply, or in reality applies, means of themselves apt for killing Peter, by that very fact wills to kill Peter.

[2] It is said insofar as it is a means; for if it is considered not in order to the end, but in itself, insofar as it is an independent act, it has its own morality from the object, its proper end, and the circumstances.

Therefore the end and the means, by reason of morality, are indivisibly connected and are subjected to the same rules.

I. Concerning the Morality Derived from the End.

148. 1. Principle: A human act receives some principal morality from the end, or intention on account of which it is done. For from this intention it can happen that an action is conformable or difform to right reason: for by force of the intention, an act indifferent of itself can become good or evil, a good act can become better or evil, an evil act can become worse. Thus a walk, indifferent of itself, is good if it is done so that afterward one may be more free for work or prayer, but evil if it is done in order to seek occasions of sinning; alms, good in itself, is rendered better if it is done from love of Christ, but

evil if it is done in order to turn the poor man away from the true faith; theft, evil in itself, becomes worse if it is committed for the sake of drunkenness or lust.

But St. Thomas[1] declares thus that this morality, derived from the end, although not primary or fundamental nor essential, is principal: "To the second it must be said that the end, although it is not of the substance of the act, is nevertheless the most principal cause of the act, insofar as it moves the agent to acting; whence also a moral act most especially has species from the end."

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 7, a. 4, ad 2.

149. 2. Corollaries. (A) An act good from the object, and referred to a good end, besides the objective goodness which it retains or can retain, acquires a new goodness, and sometimes a manifold one, from the intention or end.

Thus alms given to a poor man, for relieving him, on account of the love of God, and at the same time in satisfaction for sins, has a threefold goodness: that of mercy from the object, that of charity from the intention of loving God, and also that of penance, on account of the motive of making satisfaction for sins; for the agent truly seeks this threefold goodness, and his action is virtually and morally threefold.

We said: an act can retain its objective goodness. Indeed it in fact retains it if this is at least implicitly intended; but if it is in no way intended, and only the final goodness is sought, the act derives its morality solely from the end; thus if someone abstains from wine, not on account of the moral goodness of abstinence, about which he cares nothing, but in order more easily to preserve the health of the body.

From this it follows that those who wish to progress in the spiritual life and to acquire greater merits ought especially to take care concerning the purity and perfection of their intention, and to embrace several good ends; for the purer, more perfect, and more manifold the intention is (provided excessive anxiety about this matter is avoided), the more perfect is the manner of acting.

150. (B) An act good from the object, but referred to an evil end, (a) becomes totally evil if the depraved intention is the total and adequate cause for positing it; for example if someone bestows alms solely in order to turn the poor away from the true religion. For then the agent wills the good, not as it is good, but as a means to an evil end, and therefore as something evil.

(b) But if an act good of itself is posited partly on account of a good end and partly on account of an end lightly culpable, it is more probable that the whole is not vitiated, but that it is partly good and partly evil; for example if someone gives alms both in order to relieve the poor man and in order to catch praise. For then the will is truly borne toward the good object, and that tendency is not destroyed by the intention lightly culpable, which by no means turns us away from God.[1]

[1] Thus Billuart, diss. IV, art. 4, § 2; Collet, *De act. hum.*, cap. IV, art. 2, sect. 1, conclus. 1; Gury, n. 30; Ball. P., I, n. 98; Noldin, n. 65. - But Suarez, op. cit., disp. 8, sect. I; Vasquez, in Ia IIae, disp. 70, cap. 2; Walsh, n. 546-561, defend the contrary opinion.

But if the evil intention, although not the adequate cause of the act, is nevertheless gravely culpable - as is alms given partly in order to relieve the poor, but partly and especially in order to turn them

away from the faith - the act is totally evil, at least much more probably; for that intention turns us away from God, and consequently prevents the act itself from pleasing God.

151. (C) An act evil from the object, and known as such, even referred to a good end, remains evil, though less so than if it were elicited on account of an evil end.

(a) It remains evil; for if the object is evil and is known as such, the good end does not prevent the will from seeking evil; for example, if someone steals in order to relieve a friend who is by no means placed in extreme necessity, by that very fact he wills the malice of theft, although the relief of the poor man is good. In this sense the Apostle says:[1] "And not (as we are slandered, and as some claim that we say) let us do evil that good may come." - Therefore it is not lawful to apply a means evil of itself in order to attain a good end.[2]

[1] Rom. III, 8.

[2] Therefore they slander Catholics who ascribe to them this saying: *The end justifies the means*. For theologians reprove it; while certain non-Catholics approve the same, among whom Matthew Prior, who wrote that from a good end even evil means become legitimate, and that only he sins who has a depraved intention:

"The end must justify the means, He only sins who ill intends."

Cf. *The works of the english poets*, London, 1810, t. X, p. 155; *Etudes des PP. Jésuites*, 5 August 1904, p. 357.

(b) Nevertheless a good end diminishes the malice of the act, because it shows that the affection toward evil is lesser, since the evil is not sought except from love of some good, or as a means for attaining an honorable end; thus, in the case brought forward, the malice of theft committed for doing good is less than that committed for harming one's neighbor. - Conversely, however, an evil end adds new malice to an act objectively evil, because it is difform from the rule of morals in a twofold way, as if someone steals in order to become drunk.

152. (D) An act indifferent from the object, but referred to a good end, receives from the end a certain goodness; but if it is ordered to an evil end, it receives moral malice from it. Thus to sing in order to praise God is an act of religion, while to sing in order to excite lust is a sin of scandal: for in the former case the will truly intends something good, in the latter something evil.

From this it is given to understand of how great importance it is to set before oneself an honorable end in all actions, even indifferent ones, so that all may become morally good.

II. Concerning the Obligation of Intending the Ultimate End and an Honorable End.

Having set forth the influence of the end or intention upon morality, another question now arises, namely whether for the morality of an act there is required the ordination of the intention to the ultimate end, or at least to an end morally honorable.

153. 1. Concerning the relation of the act to God. Baius, the Jansenists, and certain Louvain doctors, thinking that human nature had been wholly vitiated by original sin, taught that for the moral goodness of an act it is required that it be referred to God as ultimate end, and indeed not only implicitly, but also explicitly.[1] Now the relation of an act to the

ultimate end is explicit when the agent thinks about it and intends it; implicit, when the ultimate end is not intended in itself, but in another, for example in the objective goodness of the act.

[1] According to Baius and Jansenius, he sins who acts without charity or heavenly delight, because no middle is given between charity and vicious cupidity; the Louvain doctors embraced the doctrine of Baius, although they tried to soften it somewhat. Cf. Vacant-Mangenot, *Dict. de théol.*, t. II, under the word Baius.

154. Thesis: For the moral goodness of an act an explicit relation to God is not required, but an implicit relation suffices. Thus the common and true opinion.

(A) For here there is question of a work good in itself and performed on account of an honorable motive. But he who does good from an honorable end by that very fact acts in a manner consonant with right reason, and consequently with divine reason itself. Therefore such a work of itself, by its own weight, tends to the glory of God, and consequently is truly done on account of God, although implicitly.

155. (B) Nor does the argument taken by the adversaries from the words of St. Paul[2] avail to the contrary: "Whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all things unto the glory of God." Whether those words are to be understood of a precept or of a counsel is controverted among theologians. But even those who, with St. Thomas, hear them as concerning a precept, require nothing else than that all works be referred implicitly and objectively to God, as has already been explained. - Augustine[3] declares this excellently thus: "I suggest a remedy, whence all day long you praise God, if you wish: whatever you do, do it well, and you have praised God... Have you ceased from singing a hymn, do you depart so that you may refresh yourself? Do not become drunk, and you have praised God... Do you carry on business? do not commit fraud, and you have praised God."

[2] I Cor., X, 31.

[3] St. Augustine, on Psalm 34, serm. II, n. 16, Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 341.

And indeed, if the aforesaid words signified a universal precept of referring all acts explicitly to God, it would follow that all the works of unbelievers are sins, since these do not explicitly refer them to the true God; yet this has deservedly been reprobated by the Church.[4] - But if it is said that here there is question of a particular precept binding only the faithful, an intolerable yoke is imposed on them: for most very often act without thinking about the ordination of their works to God; indeed they are persuaded that they act well when, for example, they give alms to relieve a poor man, without thinking about the ultimate end. Therefore such an interpretation is opposed to the common sense and practice of the faithful.

[4] Indeed by Pius V, 1 October 1567, this proposition 25 of Baius was condemned at least as scandalous: "All works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices." (Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, n. 905).

N. B. Although we are not bound to refer all our acts to God, nevertheless there is given a precept of turning oneself to Him several times in the course of life, as will be explained below, where we treat concerning the virtue of charity. - Besides, it is certainly expedient not only in the morning, but also more often during the day, to offer all one's acts to God, that they may become more perfect.

156. 2. Concerning the relation of the act to an end positively honorable. As we noted above, n. 5, honorable good is distinguished from delightful or useful good. Wherefore the question arises whether we ought to act on account of an honorable end, or whether it is lawful to act on account of delightful or useful good. Among theologians themselves the matter is controverted.

(A) For some teach that it is by no means required that the will positively intend an honorable end, but that it suffices that it not exclude it, or apprehend that it is doing nothing contrary to an honorable end; for, they say, for an honorable action it is not required that an honorable end always be intended, but it suffices that it be good from the circumstances, provided the end is not evil; thus he acts well who plays in order to recreate himself, without thinking about the honorable character of this action.[1]

[1] Thus Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, n. 112-129; Genicot, I, n. 39; Noldin, n. 69.

157. (B) But others, more commonly and more truly, teach that delightful or useful good ought not to be sought except on account of an honorable end, positively willed at least implicitly. For delight is ordered by God, the author of nature, primarily to alluring men to necessary or useful operations to which it is annexed; thus a certain delight is annexed to the use of foods, so that man may thereby be allured to eating and may preserve his life; therefore he acts inordinately who, at least implicitly, does not refer this delight to self-preservation, but eats solely on account of pleasure.[2] The same must be said concerning useful good, which from its own nature ought to be referred to a further end. - But he implicitly intends on account of an honorable end who acts moderately; for moderation proceeds from right reason.

[2] To this belongs proposition 8, condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "To eat and drink even to satiety, for pleasure alone, is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its own acts." For, according to Viva (on this proposition, n. 7), the proposition was condemned not only because here there is question of immoderate pleasure, but also because it supposes that it is lawful to enjoy pleasure by intending it uniquely and ultimately. Cf. Denzing., n. 1025.

Nevertheless we can intend useful or delightful good not only insofar as it is honorable, but also insofar as it is useful or delightful, provided the reason of the honorable is not neglected, nor the due order inverted. For the delightful and the useful are something good, although subordinated to honorable good; therefore it is lawful to intend each, not indeed primarily, but secondarily, as an intermediate end to honorable good.

Hence the intention of one's own good, even delightful good, does not render an action evil, provided the will does not rest in it as in the ultimate end; nevertheless he acts more perfectly who, affectively renouncing delights, intends nothing except the properly universal good and that which is consonant with right reason, namely honorable good.

§ III. Concerning the Circumstances of the Human Act. — I. Notion and Species.

158. (A) A circumstance is something accidental, coming upon a human act already constituted in its substance, and affecting it in some way.[1] This, if it regards the act morally, is called moral. Thus in theft, a threefold element morally constitutes the substance of the act: another's

property, the appropriation of it while the owner is unwilling, by one who does not have the right of taking the thing away; now many conditions can come upon this threefold element and influence its morality, for example whether the property of another is sacred or profane, precious or vile; whether the owner is altogether unwilling or has yielded something of his right; whether the thief is poor or rich, layman or priest, etc.

[1] The origin of this name St. Thomas declares, Ia IIae, q. 7, a. 1: "The name circumstance is derived from those things which are in place, and is applied to human acts. But in local matters something is said to stand around, which is indeed extrinsic to a thing, yet touches it or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances."

(B) Seven circumstances are usually recounted, contained in this verse:

Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when.

Aristotle, however, had added an eighth, namely concerning what. St. Thomas[1] expounds the matter thus: "A circumstance is so called as existing outside the substance of the act, yet in such a way that it touches the act itself in some way. Now this can happen in three ways: in one way, insofar as it touches the act itself; in another way, insofar as it touches the cause of the act; in a third way, insofar as it touches the effect. But it touches the act itself either by way of measure, as time and place (when, where); or by way of the quality of the act, as the mode of acting (how). But on the part of the effect, as when one considers what someone has done. But on the part of the cause of the act, as regards the final cause, why is taken; but on the part of the material cause, or of the object, concerning what is taken; and on the part of the principal efficient cause, who acted is taken; but on the part of the instrumental efficient cause, by what aids is taken." - One of these circumstances is the final cause (why), concerning which we have already spoken.

[1] Ibid., a. 3.

II. Concerning the Morality Derived from Circumstances.

159. 1. Principle: A human act receives some morality, although less principal, from circumstances. For (a) Christ Himself declared that the poor widow, who put two mites into the treasury, gave more than the rich who cast in many things; and this indeed is not explained otherwise than by reason of circumstances, namely because "of her want she cast in all that she had, her whole living."[2] (b) Trent defined that it is necessary to confess the circumstances of sins which change the species of sin;[3] certainly because they increase moral malice. (c) For circumstances, when considered in their relation to such a determinate act, can be conformable to the rule of morals or not; for not rarely law determines in what place, time, mode, etc., this act is to be performed. Now, if they are conformable to right reason, they have some goodness which they confer upon the act; but if they are difform, they add a certain malice to the act.

[2] Mark, XII, 41-44.

[3] Trent, sess. XIV, can. 7.

160. 2. Applications. Circumstances can attribute morality to a human act in a fourfold way:

(a) An act indifferent from the object can become good or evil from circumstances; thus to eat temperately, for refreshing one's strength, is good; to do this with excess is evil.

(b) An act good from the object is sometimes rendered evil from circumstances, gravely or lightly, according to the degree of malice which is present in them; thus, for example, the exercise of trade in a sacred place, servile labor on Sunday, marriage entered into with a person bound by a vow of chastity, etc., by reason of circumstances, bear something evil before them.

(c) An act good or evil from the object can receive a new species of goodness or malice from circumstances; for example, he who from a vow preserves continence attains not only the goodness of chastity, but also that of religion; conversely he who unjustly carries off a sacred thing from a place contracts not only the malice of theft, but also of sacrilege. Circumstances of this kind are called those changing the species.

(d) An act good or evil from the object can acquire some degree of goodness or malice from circumstances, or, conversely, lose it. For there are circumstances which, although they do not change the species of the act, nevertheless increase or diminish its goodness or malice. Thus a poor man giving alms performs, other things being equal, a more excellent act of mercy than a rich man; a priest committing the same act of intemperance as a layman sins more gravely; he who steals because he is placed in a certain grave necessity sins less gravely than he who already abounds in wealth.

161. 3. Required conditions. In order that an act derive morality from circumstances, two things are required: (a) the circumstances must bear some goodness or malice before them; for if they are indifferent, they do not morally influence the act; thus generally it matters little whether a theft was committed on Monday or Tuesday; (b) they must be apprehended as moral and intended at least implicitly and in the confused; otherwise, although good or evil in themselves, they are not sought under this respect.

N. B. A gravely evil circumstance takes away the whole goodness of an act; otherwise, if it is lightly evil, as was said above concerning intention, n. 150. - From circumstances differ actions, internal or external, which sometimes are done during the principal action: for example, an idle word during prayer, an act of impatience while working; these are truly distinct acts, which can be evil, but do not take away the goodness of the principal action.

§ IV. Concerning the Morality of the External Act.

162. 1. State of the question. The things which thus far we have said concerning morality regard the human act, whether internal or external. But here the question arises whether the external act, or the execution of the interior act, adds to it a special goodness or malice. (a) We suppose here that there is question of an efficacious internal act, to which full consent has been given, and of an external act which is nothing else than the mere execution of this interior act; for according to all, between a desire more or less ineffectual and its execution there is a great difference; likewise, if the external act adds something to a merely internal desire, as not rarely happens, by that very fact it introduces new morality. (b) All concede that the external act increases per accidens the goodness or malice of the internal act, and indeed especially in a threefold way: by reason of intensity, insofar as the will, in the very execution of the act, is borne toward

the object with greater vehemence, on account of the delight or difficulty which is found in it; by reason of duration, insofar as the one executing, by continuing the act of the will until he has completed the work, perseveres in it longer; by reason of multiplication, because often, on the occasion of the external act, the internal act is renewed several times, and from this becomes better or worse.

163. 2. Opinion of the Scotists. These things posited, the Scotists say that the external act of itself increases the morality of the internal act. For (a) internal and external acts are prohibited by diverse precepts of the Decalogue; thus by the seventh precept the external act of theft is prohibited: you shall not steal; but by the tenth the very desire of theft: you shall not covet; therefore theft outwardly perpetrated has a special malice of itself.

(b) From the common sense of the faithful, the external act of sin must be accused, nor does it suffice for the thief to say: I efficaciously willed to steal; but if the external act adds no malice to the internal act, why are we bound to confess it?

(c) If the opposite opinion is true, something false follows; for example, if someone has an efficacious desire of killing a thousand men, he sins as gravely as if in reality he had killed them; if, conversely, he has an efficacious will of feeding a thousand poor persons, he merits equally as if in fact he had fed them; yet no one admits this.

164. 3. The common opinion of the Thomists and others. The Thomists, with whom in this matter most theologians agree, teach that the exterior act, as it is precisely the execution of a truly efficacious interior act, does not of itself add to this a new goodness or malice.

(a) For here belong the words of Christ:[1] "Everyone who looks at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart"; for there the merely internal act is equated with the external act. Many Fathers, explaining the aforesaid words, in reality declare this explicitly.

[1] Matt., V, 28.

(b) There is no morality without liberty; but the whole liberty of the external act proceeds from the internal one, so that, if that act happens without the free consent of the will, it is neither free nor imputable; therefore the external act of itself has no morality, and consequently cannot increase the goodness or malice of the interior consent.

Hence if desire and its execution are prohibited by diverse precepts, it does not follow from this that these two have distinct malice, but that God willed that a rude people, such as the Israelite people was, should better understand that not only the external act, but also the internal desire, although separated from its execution, is evil.

165. (c) If the opinion of the Scotists were true, someone could deprive another unwilling person of moral goodness by impeding the external act; for example, a thief, by taking away money destined by someone for alms, could deprive this person of the special goodness annexed to the external act of almsgiving; which indeed is altogether repugnant.

Nor is it absurd to say that he who efficaciously wills to feed a thousand poor persons, although he is prevented from accomplishing this by theft or another cause, attains the goodness annexed to such an action; for God looks upon the heart, and rewards the very volition as well as its execution. Thus He said to Abraham, who had immolated his son only intentionally: "Because you have done this thing, and have not spared your only-begotten son for My sake, I will bless you."[2] - Nevertheless the external act must be declared in confession, not because it has per se a distinct malice, but because for the most part it becomes graver per accidens, and besides the confessor can scarcely fulfill his office concerning avoiding occasions, imposing restitution, or suggesting remedies, unless together with the internal consent, the external action is candidly set forth.

[2] Gen., XXII, 16.

166. Conclusion. Speculatively speaking this latter opinion seems more probable. But in practice, for the most part the execution of the interior act supposes a more intense volition and a greater goodness or malice, as was explained above, n. 162. Whence one would be much deceived who cared little about external acts. (a) If it is a question of good acts, these things are to be kept before the eyes: the volition is not truly efficacious which, where it can, does not pass to the external act; besides, by acting externally, we strengthen the will itself by forming good habits; finally many external acts are prescribed by positive laws, and deservedly, since the exterior act often suggests the interior.

(b) If the question is about evil acts, from their execution there not rarely follow scandals, the obligation of restitution, depraved habits, and greater facility for sinning.

Therefore, although care must chiefly be taken about rightly ordering internal acts, the right ordination of external acts cannot be passed over.

167. Corollary concerning the sense of the axiom: Good from the whole cause, evil from any defect. That axiom, which is found in the works ascribed to St. Dionysius the Areopagite,[1] has been commonly received by theologians in this sense: that moral goodness does not belong to an act which, whether from the object, or from the end or circumstances, is evil. Yet this must be understood with the restrictions set forth above.

[1] *Lib. de divinis nominibus*, cap. 4, apud Migne, P. G., t. III, 730.

(A) As regards the object, an act evil from the object and known as such cannot become good from the end or circumstances, n. 151. But an act indifferent of itself can become good from the end or circumstances, nn. 152, 160. Therefore for the goodness of an act, it is not required that the object be good of itself, but it suffices that it receive some goodness from the end or circumstances.

(B) If it is a question of the end, an intention totally and adequately evil suffices for vitiating an act otherwise good from the object and circumstances, n. 150; likewise an intention gravely culpable, although it is not the adequate cause of the act, vitiates it; but an intention lightly culpable accompanying a good intention more probably does not vitiate the whole act, n. 150.

(C) When speech is about circumstances, a gravely evil circumstance vitiates the whole act, but not a lightly evil one, nn. 150, 161.

From this it is likewise understood that the conditions required for moral honorableness are: 1. that the act be free; 2. that the object not be evil at least formally or in knowledge; 3. that the act be good at least on the part of the end, whether of the work or of the one operating; 4. nor otherwise be vitiated by some gravely evil circumstance.

Article II. Concerning the Extension of Morality.

168. State of the question. The things which we have said concerning morality regard the act in itself, or directly willed; but, since there are effects which are voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, it remains to be inquired whether these also are moral and imputable to the agent. For understanding this, a few things must be noted beforehand.

(A) That is voluntary in itself, or directly, which the will immediately and expressly intends either as the end or as the means; thus certainly the death of an enemy which the murderer intends as the end is voluntary in itself, or the killing of a traveler which a thief intends as a means for taking money. - But that is voluntary in the cause, or indirectly, which is intended neither as the end nor as the means, but is foreseen as going to follow from the act directly willed, and consequently is imputed to it in some way; thus he who from curiosity reads a depraved book, foreseeing that doubts concerning the faith are going to arise from reading of this kind, by that very fact indirectly, or in the cause, wills to experience these doubts. - Again an effect can be voluntary in the cause in two ways: positively, if an action is posited from which the effect is foreseen as going to follow; and negatively, if an action is omitted while foreseeing the effect as going to follow from this omission; thus he who sees a house blazing in fire, and does nothing to extinguish the fire, when he could do something, indirectly and negatively wills the conflagration.

169. (B) These things posited, it is asked whether an effect voluntary in the cause is truly voluntary and ought to be imputed to the agent. Namely, an act is imputable when its goodness or malice can and ought to be attributed to the agent as to its proper author; moreover one can be held as the proper author of this action when he freely posited it, with prior knowledge of its morality.

Nevertheless in this matter one must carefully distinguish between a good effect and an evil effect. A good effect, willed only in the cause, is not imputed to the agent; thus he who writes a book for the sake of making profit, foreseeing at the same time good effects going to follow from its reading, but not intending them in themselves, even confusedly, does not perform a morally good act, because he intends his own utility, not honorableness; this is clear from what was said above, n. 145. - But an evil effect, willed only in the cause, can be imputed to the agent; for from what was said in n. 146, an act contracts the malice of the object as often as this is known and interpretatively willed; but when it truly ought to be imputed will be clear from what is to be said below.

(C) The indirect voluntary can occur in two ways: (a) sometimes an evil effect, willed in the cause, follows from an act directly willed without the concurrence of another free agent: then it is called the indirect voluntary simply. (b) Sometimes, however, an evil effect is produced with the concurrence of another free agent: then it is called a case of cooperation, because namely two (or more) concur toward the production of this effect. - Concerning each one, we must speak separately.

§ I. Concerning the Morality of the Effect Indirectly Willed.

170. Preliminary notes. In order that one may judge concerning the morality of an effect, it must first be inquired how it is connected with the cause.

[1] St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 7; Suarez, *De volunt.*, disp. I, sect. 5; Billuart, diss. I, a. 4; Elbel-Bierbaum, t. I, n. 23; Walsh, n. 88-192; Laloux, *De Act. humanis*, diss. 8; Ball. P., I, n. 26-32; Bouquillon, nn. 328, 371-374; Noldin, n. 33-38.

(a) Sometimes a cause is so determined to producing one effect that this effect follows necessarily: then the effect is directly intended and is deservedly imputed to the agent; thus he who knowingly applies fire to wood directly wills to burn it, because fire of itself is determined to burning.

(b) Sometimes, however, the cause produces a double effect, yet in such a way that one is subordinated to the other and follows necessarily from it; thus if someone knowingly and willingly discharges a gun at the father of a family, certainly foreseeing that from his death his children will be deprived of support, the double effect (the death of the father and the miserable condition of the children) is deservedly imputed to the agent, because the former is directly intended as a means to the end, namely vengeance, but the latter indirectly as an effect which necessarily follows from the means directly willed.

(c) Effects produced by a cause can be so coordinated that they proceed equally immediately, because the cause of itself is determined to producing each; thus if a physician gives to a pregnant woman a medicine which can heal her and at the same time cause abortion; in which case each effect is said to follow per se. But if one effect does not proceed equally immediately from the cause, because this is not of itself determined to producing such an effect, this follows per accidens: thus if someone writes a good or indifferent book for the sake of making profit, by whose reading, however, another, on account of his own fragility, is scandalized. - Now the question is whether and when effects of this kind, which proceed either per se or per accidens from the cause, and were willed in the cause, are imputable to the agent.

There will be a double principle: the former declares when an evil effect is imputable; the latter when it can be permitted.

171. First principle: An evil effect, willed only in the cause, is morally imputable when these three things concur at the same time, namely: 1. the agent foresaw the effect at least in the confused; 2. he was able not to posit the cause; 3. he ought to have impeded the effect. It is explained and proved by parts.

1. It is required that the agent have foreseen the effect at least in the confused; for if he did not foresee it in any way, the effect is not voluntary, and therefore not imputable: nothing is willed unless foreknown. - But he foresees the effect in the confused who knows, even obscurely or indistinctly, or at least suspected that the effect was going to follow; thus he who undertakes the office of physician, judge, confessor, etc., adverting that he is wholly lacking the knowledge required for such an office, truly, although indistinctly, foresees the evil effects going to follow from this; likewise the hunter who suspects that what he sees is a man, and nevertheless fires upon it, confusedly foresees the homicide going to follow from this.

Conversely, he who becomes drunk from a small draught of liquor whose force he did not suspect does not incur the malice of drunkenness.

From this it is given to understand when sins committed in drunkenness ought to be imputed: if someone has known by experience that, in the state of drunkenness, he is liable to anger, fights, blasphemies, etc., and nevertheless freely becomes drunk, he is guilty of sins of this kind, because he foresaw them; but if he is not accustomed to commit these things, the same cannot be imputed to him, if perhaps they occur, because they were not foreseen.[1]

[1] Certain theologians assert that for imputability it suffices that the agent could and ought to have foreseen the effect; which falls back into the same thing, for he neither could nor ought to have foreseen it if he in no way actually foresaw it.

172. 2. It is required that the agent could not have posited the cause: for if he is morally bound to posit the cause, he cannot abstain from that act, and therefore the effect is not morally imputable to him; since no one is bound to the impossible. - Thus the priest is not guilty of sacrilege who gives communion to a sinner whose unworthiness he knows only from confession, because he is bound faithfully to keep the sacramental seal.

173. 3. It is required that the agent be bound to impede the evil effect; for if he is by no means bound to this, he permits rather than effects the effect; and besides, if he has a just and proportionate reason for permitting it, such an effect is not to be imputed to him.

Now he is bound to impede the effect if this flows of itself from the cause: for then he who wills the antecedent wills also the consequent. But if the effect follows per accidens, namely from other causes independent of the will of the agent, so that the act posited is rather the occasion than the cause of the evil effect, the agent is not bound to impede this effect by abstaining from an act otherwise good, which is only the occasion of the evil effect. Thus a physician who, in the exercise of his art, is liable to not a few movements of concupiscence, is not guilty of these, even if he foresaw them, because the exercise of medicine produces those movements not of itself, but per accidens.

174. But when the three aforesaid conditions concur, the evil effect, although indirectly willed, is truly free and consequently imputable. Then, however, sin is committed not at that instant in which the evil effect follows, but at that instant in which it was foreseen and intended; and therefore, even if the effect does not follow, the sin has already been committed, because it has been willed.

Thus he who gives poison to another, foreseeing that death will follow from it, at this very instant commits homicide in his heart, even if, on account of the intervention of a physician or some other cause, death does not in fact follow. Thus he who adverts that he will be made drunk by further drink, and by experience knows that in drunkenness he commits many sins, implicitly intends all these sins at that instant in which he intends to drink the further drink.

Whence, in order to judge concerning the gravity of an indirectly willed sin, attention must be paid to the very malice of the internal act: the more distinct and certain the foresight of the evil effect was, the graver is the fault; the less distinct and certain, the lighter is the fault. Whence many are excused

from grave sin because, on account of lightness of soul, they apprehend only confusedly the depraved effects of their actions.[1]

[1] *Vieux Moraliste* rightly explains this, apud *Ami du Clergé*, XX, 1898, p. 1121-1129.

175. Second principle: It is lawful to posit an act good in itself or indifferent, from which a double effect follows, one good and the other evil, provided the good effect is not produced except not by means of the evil, a proportionately grave reason is present, and the end of the agent is honorable.

Therefore four conditions are required:

1. That the act be in itself good or indifferent; for if it is evil in itself, it can never become lawful, even if a good effect follows from it, and a fortiori if an evil effect follows. - But in order to judge whether the act is evil in itself or not, attention must be paid to whether the malice arises from the circumstances, or is found in the act itself according to the common estimation of the prudent: if the former, the act is judged good or indifferent in itself; if the latter, it must be judged evil in itself. - Thus, since hypnotic sleep is evil not in itself, but from circumstances, sometimes, though rarely, it can be permitted on account of a grave reason, provided due precautions are applied for warding off depraved effects.

176. 2. That the good effect not be produced except by means of the evil effect; for if the evil effect immediately follows from the cause, and the good arises only through the mediation of that evil effect, it is not lawful to posit the cause: for then the evil effect is assumed as a means to good, and therefore is directly intended.[2] Thus he acts illicitly who gives an intoxicating drink to a servant so that thereby he may cast horror of drunkenness into others.

[2] Certain persons, however, deny the necessity of this second condition; for, they say, it is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor in order to protect one's own life; now in this case the good effect, namely the preservation of one's own life, is not obtained except through the mediation of the evil effect, that is, the death of the aggressor. Thus Walsh, n. 143-144. - The matter is not without difficulty; nevertheless it can be said that in this case the death of the unjust aggressor is not an effect morally evil in itself: by natural and divine right, the killing of the innocent is indeed prohibited, but not that of the guilty. - Besides, he who, in order to protect himself, kills the aggressor, does not intend his death as a means to the preservation of life, but strikes or fires for the end of rendering him unarmed and incapable of harming, foreseeing nevertheless that perhaps the death of the aggressor will follow from this.

177. 3. That there be present a proportionately grave reason for positing the cause and permitting the evil effect, so that the good effect compensates for the evil. For right reason dictates that it is better to lack a lesser good than to obtain it through an act from which a greater evil follows; but conversely, if the good effect surpasses or at least compensates for the evil, the law which prohibited the evil effect now seems to cease.

The whole difficulty is in defining what reason is proportionately grave. But this, in individual cases, can be discerned only from the judgment of the prudent, all the circumstances being attended to. The principal adjuncts to be carefully weighed are reduced to these:

(A) One must inspect not only the advantage or disadvantage going to arise in the particular case, but also that which would threaten the whole society, if such an action were generally permitted or prohibited. For there are actions for which there does not seem to be a sufficient reason, if attention is paid to the particular case; but it will be recognized as present if regard is had to the universality of cases, with attention to the public good, or the good of the whole society.[1] Thus the social good requires that an unjust aggressor can be killed when other means of preserving one's own life are lacking, even if the aggressor perhaps loses not only temporal life, but eternal life; for otherwise assassins, robbers, and impious men, knowing that good men, for guarding life, would never kill, would become more audacious and would disturb families and society itself with homicides and robberies, as is explained in *De Justitia*, n. 325.

[1] Cf. Laloux, diss. 8, p. 217; Walsh, n. 136-137.

178. (B) Attention must be paid to the gravity of the evil effect: the graver the evil foreseen is, the greater the excusing reason must be. Thus if someone repels an unjust aggressor by bringing death upon him, a greater reason is required than if he inflicts a non-lethal wound: in the former case, it is required that the goods to be defended be of the greatest importance, while in the latter they can be of lesser importance (*De Justitia*, n. 329-331).

179. (C) The influence of the action upon the effect, whether good or evil, must also be inspected. For the evil effect must be compensated by the agent because his action influences that effect; therefore it must be compensated in that proportion in which it influences the effect. - But the measure of the influence depends on several things, namely on proximity, probability, and the positive or negative mode of acting. Generally, the more proximately, the more probably, the more positively the action influences the evil effect, the greater reason is required for lawfully positing it.

(a) A cause is called the more proximate the fewer intermediates there are between it and the effect; for example, if someone learns to read, foreseeing that perhaps he will incur the danger of reading depraved books, and from this of experiencing temptations, this last effect follows quite remotely from the act; but if someone in reality reads a depraved book, movements of concupiscence follow more proximately from this reading; therefore a greater reason is required.

(b) A cause influences the effect the more probably the more likely this effect is foreseen as going to follow from the cause; for example, if someone throws a stone from a window in a city and on a street where many pass by, the wounding of one's neighbor is going to follow much more probably than if he does this in a village where very few make the journey; therefore a much greater reason is required.

(c) The agent influences the effect the more positively the more actively he behaves; thus a greater reason is required for doing something than for omitting something from which an evil effect is going to follow.

180. (D) Attention must also be paid to the connection, more or less necessary, between the cause and the effect; thus, for leasing to heretics some building in which they will spread their errors, a greater reason is required if they cannot find any other building in the place than if they can easily lease others.

(E) Likewise one must keep before the mind the right or office which belongs to the agent of positing the act: certainly a lesser reason is desired if there is question of those who have a special right, or a fortiori an office, of doing the act; for example, if a physician or priest foresees that he will experience some temptation by reading books which he has the right and office of reading, in order rightly to fulfill his duty, a much lesser reason suffices than if there is question of another who wants to read the same books only from curiosity.

181. 4. It is required that the end of the agent be honorable, that is, that the agent not intend the evil effect which he foresees, nor afterward approve it, but behave permissively only with regard to it; wherefore he cannot take complacency in the depraved effect, but ought to be so disposed that he would wish it not to be produced, if he could otherwise obtain the good effect which he intends. This is clear from what was said where we treated concerning the end, n. 150; for he who intends a depraved end, or takes complacency in it, by that very fact wills some evil.

182. When the four aforesaid conditions concur at the same time, the evil effect only indirectly willed is not imputed to the agent; for that effect, insofar as it is evil, must be judged morally involuntary, since the will neither intends it nor takes complacency in it.[1] The agent indeed foresees and permits, or tolerates, the evil effect, but on account of a just and proportionate cause, just as God Himself tolerates evil on account of grave reasons. Now the public good demands that an act, otherwise good or indifferent, not be prohibited on account of an evil effect, if there is present a grave reason for positing it, as is clear from the examples already brought forward and from others to be brought forward in the whole course of the work.

[1] "Nothing prevents there being two effects of one act, one of which alone is in the intention, while the other is outside the intention. But moral acts receive species according to that which is intended, not from that which is outside the intention." (St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 7).

§ II. Concerning Cooperation Toward an Evil Act.

183. State of the question. (A) To cooperate in general is to operate with another; and therefore, if there is question of an evil matter, cooperation is the concurrence furnished to the depraved action of another. But someone can cooperate with the sin of another in two ways: by influencing the will itself through counsels, examples, flatteries, etc.; this kind of cooperation is properly called scandal, concerning which we shall treat where we treat concerning charity; by helping another, already determined to sin, in the perpetration of the sin: and this is cooperation properly so called, about which we must say something.

[2] Most theologians treat this matter where they treat concerning charity; thus St. Alphonsus, lib. III, n. 59-80; Elbel-Bierbaum, t. I, p. 11, n. 361-464; Bouquillon, *De virt. theologicis*, n. 545-555; cf. Waffelaert, *La coopération au mal*, 2nd ed., Bruges, 1892; *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clergé*, XXIII, 1901, pp. 721, 785, 961, 1025, 1073 sq.

(B) But this cooperation can be intentional or formal, or only material: the former is present when the one cooperating knowingly and willingly concurs in the action insofar as it is evil, and therefore truly intends its malice, whether explicitly, or implicitly by exercising a work which is directly ordered to a depraved action; for example, by writing and selling a book which of itself is ordered to corrupting morals. For then he proposes to himself an evil end, and consequently sins,[1] according to

the principles given above, n. 150. - It is material when he concurs in the action of another insofar as it is physical, without the intention of cooperating in the sin. Thus he who hands over the keys of a house to a thief, so that the thief can more easily steal, cooperates formally and culpably; but materially, if he does this only for the end of avoiding his own harm, for example death, in no way intending to cooperate in the theft. Here we do not treat of formal cooperation, which is evidently directly evil; but only of material cooperation, which, as is clear from the notion given, falls back into the case of the indirect voluntary. For the one cooperating directly wills his own utility, for example to preserve life, and only indirectly wills the evil action, for example the theft which he foresees as going to follow from the handing over of the key.

[1] That sin has a double malice: one against charity, by inducing one's neighbor to sin; the other against the special virtue which is harmed by the cooperation.

184. (C) This material cooperation can be immediate, if someone has a part in the depraved action itself, for example by helping a thief to carry off a chest in which another's money is contained; or mediate, if the one cooperating concurs only in those acts which precede or follow the sin itself, for example by opening the door of the house to the thief, so that he may be able to enter or leave. - Again mediate cooperation can be more or less proximate, according as by its own nature or from circumstances it is more or less connected with the sin of another; for example, a servant who on Friday cooks meat cooperates less proximately toward the violation of the law of abstinence than an innkeeper who provides the same meats to be eaten by guests.

185. Principles. (A) He who cooperates only materially and mediately, even proximately, in an evil action does not sin, provided the act which he performs is not intrinsically evil and, besides, there is had a proportionate reason for cooperating.

For he who cooperates in this way does not will the evil effect except indirectly and permissively; but, from what was said above, n. 175, this is lawful when a proportionately grave reason is present. - Besides, when a sufficient reason is lacking, it is not lawful to cooperate with sin, even materially; for something inordinate is found in the act by which one concurs toward sin.[1]

[1] Wherefore the following proposition (51) was condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "A servant who, with shoulders submitted, knowingly helps his master to ascend through windows to violate a virgin, and many times serves him in this by carrying a ladder, opening the door, or cooperating in something similar, does not sin mortally if he does this from fear of notable harm, for example lest he be badly treated by his master, lest he be looked upon with stern eyes, lest he be expelled from the house." (*Denzing.*, n. 1068; Viva, on this proposition.) For since in this case the cooperation is proximate, a very grave reason is required, which is lacking; for the servant here is supposed to have been able to find another master; he ought at least to have sought another, lest he be forced many times to cooperate in a depraved action.

186. (B) Immediate cooperation is not always and necessarily illicit, but sometimes it is permitted, provided there is present a proportionately grave reason. Thus more probably.

Certain theologians deny this, with Billuart,[2] because immediate cooperation is intrinsically evil; for does not he who helps a thief to carry off another's money himself steal? - Yet that argument does not hold in all cases. (a) Let the case of theft, concerning which Billuart treats, be taken; if someone cannot avoid death except by helping thieves in carrying off another's money, the taking away of another's thing in these adjuncts is not morally theft. For no one is bound, apart from a special pact,

to lose his own life for protecting the goods of fortune of another; for the owner of the thing taken away would be unreasonably unwilling if he demanded this, at least when the one cooperating is not bound by a special pact to guard the thing. (b) Again, when someone asks for the sacraments, on account of a grave reason, from an unworthy minister, he by no means sins, according to the common opinion of theologians, although he is truly and immediately a participant in the action by which the minister sins; the reason is that the whole malice of the act holds itself on the part of the minister, who can, if he wishes, recover the state of grace by an act of contrition; and therefore the cooperation of the one asking in those adjuncts is not illicit.

[2] Billuart, *De Justitia*, diss. VIII, art. 13, § 6.

Therefore it cannot be said that in every case immediate cooperation is illicit. - Yet there are many cases in which immediate cooperation is sin; thus it is never lawful to participate immediately in the unjust killing of an innocent person, since such an action taken concretely is intrinsically evil.

The matter, therefore, is to be judged from the very nature of the evil act toward which one concurs, or from the circumstances; namely, if such an act, considered in the concrete, is so intrinsically evil that someone cannot cooperate in its physical perpetration without at least implicitly intending its malice, the cooperation is illicit.

187. (C) To judge whether the reason is proportionately grave, attention must be paid to the gravity of the sin with which one cooperates, to the propinquity and influence of the cooperation, and also to the obligation of impeding the sin.

(a) To the gravity of the sin: the graver the sin toward which someone cooperates is, the greater the excusing reason must be; thus a greater cause is required for someone to cooperate toward homicide than toward theft.

(b) To the propinquity of the cooperation: the more proximate the cooperation is, the greater reason is required; thus remote cooperation is excused on account of a light inconvenience; nearby cooperation, on account of a grave inconvenience; proximate cooperation, from a very grave cause; immediate cooperation, from a most grave cause. Thus he who sells paper to a publisher printing depraved books cooperates only remotely, and is excused from the mere motive of earning money; the worker who moves the machines cooperates nearby, and is excused only on account of a grave inconvenience, for example the loss of notable profit; but he who sets the type cooperates proximately, and is not excused except on account of a very grave cause, for example the greatest difficulty of finding another employer.

188. (c) To the influence of the cooperation; namely if the cooperation so influences the evil effect that, without it, the sin would not happen, a greater cause is required than if the sin would be committed without that cooperation; for example, a lesser reason is required for selling arms to him who is foreseen as going to abuse them, if there are present many other merchants who sell arms in this place.

(d) To the obligation of impeding sin; thus if someone by office of piety, as a father, or of justice, as a magistrate, is bound to impede some sin, a much greater cause is required for him to permit it.

Concerning special cases of cooperation as regards religion, charity, justice, temperance, etc., we shall treat in the course of the work.

Scholion: Concerning an Indifferent Act in the Individual Case.

189. 1. State of the question. After the things said concerning the morality of an act directly or indirectly voluntary, it remains to be inquired whether there is given an act which is neither good nor evil, but indifferent with respect to morals. Concerning this there was keen dispute in the schools. - In order that we may separate certain things from uncertain ones, a few things must be noted beforehand:

(A) A human act can be considered in species, or in the abstract, or in the individual case, or in the concrete: it is considered in the former way when it is inspected in its object, the circumstances and the end of the one operating being set aside: thus to walk, to eat, to play, etc.; it is considered in the individual case when not only the object, but at the same time the circumstances and the end of the one operating are inspected: thus to eat moderately, in order to renew strength and to work better. Now all concede that there are given some acts indifferent in species, at least when the object is inspected in the abstract, without those marks which introduce objective morality, for example to walk, to play, without any other determination; hence St. Thomas says:[1] "But it happens that the object of the act does not include anything pertaining to the order of reason, such as to lift a straw from the ground, to go to the field, and things of this kind; and such acts according to their species are indifferent."

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 8.

190. (B) Here there is question of mere natural honorableness; for, in the supernatural order, acts are given which are neither meritorious nor demeritorious or sinful: thus the works of unbelievers, or of those who are placed in mortal sin, are not truly meritorious, or do not merit an eternal reward, although they can be morally good (for example, alms given from a natural affection of mercy).

(C) Moreover there is question of deliberate acts, that is, acts done with knowledge and advertence; for all confess that there can be indeliberate acts indifferent even in the individual case: for these are not truly human, nor moral.

191. 2. The doctrine of St. Thomas. These things posited, St. Thomas (a) explicitly teaches that there are not given deliberate acts in the individual case which are naturally indifferent; for it is necessary that any individual act have some circumstance through which it is drawn to good or to evil, at least on the part of the intention. For an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason, to which it belongs to order rightly, and has the nature of evil; but if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason, whence it has the nature of good. But it is necessary that it either be ordered or not ordered to the due end.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9; cf. *Quaest. disp., De malo*, q. 2, a. 5.

(b) Yet he does not require, for the honorableness of the act, that this be explicitly referred to God, but only that the natural goodness which is conformable to right reason be intended. Now works indifferent of themselves are consonant with reason when they are done moderately, without any excess; for virtue stands in the mean;[2] wherefore he acts well who eats and drinks, the mode of temperance being observed, or who plays for recreation, the mode of eutrapelia being observed, which keeps the mean in games, or rests in order to repair the powers of the body.[3] Wherefore idle words are reprehended only because they lack the reason of just necessity or pious utility: "For what is done on account of just necessity or on account of pious utility is done laudably and is a good act."[4] Thus, for example, if there is question of play or conversation, the act will be morally good if these three things are observed: if delight is not sought in shameful or harmful operations or words; nor is the gravity of the soul totally relaxed, or, in other words, if one plays or converses moderately; if recreation agrees with the person, time, and place, and is duly ordered according to the other circumstances.[1]

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 64, a. 1.

[3] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9, ad 3; IIa IIae, q. 168, a. 2-4; in 2 *Sentent.*, dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5†.

[4] St. Thomas, *Quaest. disp.*, *De malo*, q. 2, a. 5.

[1] St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 168, a. 2.

(c) Works indifferent of themselves, when they are done deliberately by a just man (i.e. one who is in the state of grace), are not only morally good, but also meritorious of supernatural reward: "It sometimes happens that a man does not order some act to God, while nevertheless that act of itself does not contain any disordering by reason of which it is not referable to God, and because the mind of man is habitually related to God, that act is not only not a sin, but is also a meritorious act." For he who enjoys habitual grace, in a general mode orders his whole life to God, and therefore the act of a just man, which bears before itself nothing inordinate, by that very fact tends to God.[2]

[2] St. Thomas, *Quaest. disp.*, *De malo*, q. 9, a. 2.

192. 3. Opinion of many Thomists. Yet many Thomists progress further, or perhaps declare the matter in a more explicit way, saying that an act is not good unless it is referred to God at least virtually and implicitly: virtually, that is, by force of an actual intention, at least general, previously had and still persevering; and implicitly, namely one which is contained in the general intention of living rightly and always acting according to reason.[3] This they prove from a double text of Scripture: (a) from the words of the Apostle:[4] "Therefore whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all things unto the glory of God"; for there, they say, is included the precept of referring all acts to God, at least virtually and implicitly. (b) Besides, Christ Himself declared that an account must be rendered for every idle word;[5] but a word is called idle, not because it has an evil end, but because it does not have a good and honorable end. (c) In reality, man acting deliberately cannot act except on account of delight or on account of an honorable end: if he acts on account of delight and rests in it, he acts inordinately, since the delightful ought to be subordinated as a means to some end; if on account of an honorable end, the action is good, as implicitly ordered to God.

[3] Thus Billuart, diss. IV, art. 6.

[4] I Cor., X, 31.

[5] Matt., XII, 36.

193. 4. Opinion of the Scotists. But the Scotists, after St. Bonaventure,[6] hold that indifferent acts in the individual case can be given, and therefore they try to blunt the force of the aforesaid arguments.

[6] Scotus, in II lib. *Sentent.*, dist. 40-41; St. Bonaventure, in l. II *Sentent.*, dist. 41, a. 1, q. 3; Vasquez, in Ia IIae, disp. 52; Arriaga, *De act. hum.*, disp. 21; Henno, *Theologia*, Cologne Agrippina, 1718, *De Act. hum.*, disp. III, q. 6.

(a) They understand the words of St. Paul brought above as concerning counsel, not however concerning precept; besides, they say, St. Paul here speaks of supernatural charity and of the supernatural relation of acts to God, not however of their natural honorableness.

(b) What Christ says concerning an idle word is to be understood not of a merely idle word, but of a lying and calumnious word, both from the context and according to the opinion of many Fathers;[1] therefore from this it is by no means inferred that there falls upon man the obligation of referring all acts and all words positively to God.

[1] Cornelius a Lapide reports these on this place.

(c) Nor is this obligation proved by reason. It is indeed true that man is rational, and therefore ought to do nothing against reason; but from this it by no means follows that the office falls upon him always of directing his actions to an honorable end; for since man is composed of soul and body, and his nature is spiritual and bodily, sometimes he can act on account of bodily good, or on account of delight, provided he does not seek an evil end.

194. 5. Conclusion. (A) With the Angelic Doctor we think that per se there are not given deliberate acts morally indifferent in the individual case; for the end which a man deliberately operating intends is either in some way subordinated to the ultimate end, or it is not; if it is subordinated in some way, mediately or immediately, implicitly or explicitly, the act is good; but if in no way, namely if someone rests ultimately in delight, the act is disordered, and consequently evil.[2]

[2] In this sense the doctrine of St. Thomas is embraced not only by Thomists, but by most other theologians, such as Suarez, *De bonit. et malit.*, disp. IX, sect. 3; Costa Rossetti, op. cit., th. 26, p. 84-90; Meyer, op. cit., t. I, n. 193; Bouquillon, n. 377; Walsh, n. 674-688; Noldin, n. 74.

(B) Nevertheless we do not assent to those Thomists who hold that for a good act a positive relation of the act to God is required, even virtual and implicit; for we judge that acts indifferent of themselves, which do not lack the reason of just necessity or true utility, which otherwise do not recede from the mean through excess or defect, are morally good, according to the principles of the Angelic Doctor himself set forth above, even if they are not positively referred to a further honorable end; for acts of this kind, considered in the concrete, are conformable to reason, and consequently tend toward God as by their own weight.

But per accidens indifferent acts in the individual case can be given, namely if they are indeliberate, or are done without advertence to their morality.

To Be Noted for Practice.

195. In practice, however, although it is not certain concerning a precept of referring all acts to God, nothing is more expedient for spiritual progress than often and explicitly to refer oneself and all one's thoughts, affections, words, and works to God, loved on account of Himself. This is the nobler, more useful, safer, and more compendious way to perfection: "If it is kept seriously and perseveringly, it will easily and most sweetly lead a man to the summit of Christian perfection within the proper state of each one, and thence to a sublime and most excellent degree of glory; but if it is not kept, although other things are applied, scarcely can mediocre progress in the spiritual life be obtained."[1]

[1] Card. De Aguirre, *S. Anselmi Theologia*, t. III, tr. VII, disp. 130, n. 149 sq.

On Human Acts — Chapter III: On the Merit of the Human Act

Concerning the Merit of the Human Act.

196. Preliminary notes. As was said above, n. 8, the end toward which we tend is supernatural, and is attained by us by way of remuneration, n. 29. Therefore it does not suffice to act honorably, but supernatural and meritorious acts must be elicited.

[1] Dogmatic theologians treat concerning this matter in the Treatise *De Gratia*, namely St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 114; Suarez, lib. XII, c. 2 sq.; Salmanticenses, disp. I-II, and others whom we list in *Synopsi Th. Dogmat., De Gratia*, n. 184-204.

When someone, by a free and honorable action, brings to another an emolument not owed, he is said to merit with him, or he acquires a right to some retribution; but conversely, if someone freely and unjustly inflicts some detriment on another, he demerits, or incurs the obligation of undergoing some punishment. Yet in order that a reward can be demanded by strict right, it is necessary that some pact, at least implicitly, be entered into, by force of which one of the contracting parties promises some determinate work in favor of the other, and the other promises a determinate reward in retribution for the work. For although a good and free action, performed in favor of another, is of itself apt for obtaining some reward, the strict obligation of conferring it, and also the nature, quantity, and quality of this reward, are by no means determined of themselves; therefore it is necessary that a pact be entered into for determining these things.

From this it is asked whether man can merit with God. The reason for doubting is that, since he has received his whole being from God, he can do nothing which is not owed to God. Nevertheless, since man is of his own right and is endowed with liberty, he can furnish something of his own to God, namely a free act of the will (above, n. 30); and, although this free submission is essentially owed, God, nevertheless, most good, deigns to accept it as worthy of reward, and promises the unfading crown of glory to all those who freely operate good. This promise posited, we acquire a right to retribution, not indeed from an explicit pact, but from the fidelity by which God always fulfills His promises. - But because we have been elevated to the supernatural state, here we shall treat not of natural retribution, but of supernatural merit, setting forth its nature, and also the conditions required for merit on the part of the one operating, of the work, and of God.

I. The Nature of Supernatural Merit.

197. 1. Notion. Meritorious acts are distinguished from supernatural acts in this, that more conditions are required for merit properly so called than for the supernatural.

All honorable acts are called supernatural which proceed from a supernatural principle (i.e. from a faculty elevated by grace, whether habitual or actual), and at the same time are elicited from a motive known through revelation;[1] hence certain acts of unbelievers, by which they prepare themselves for justification, are supernatural, although they are not properly meritorious, from what is to be said.

[1] Certain theologians, with Noldin (n. 79-80), assert that the former condition suffices, and that it is not required that the motive be supernatural; for, when the root and principle of the act is something supernatural, the fruit or effect

must also be supernatural. Yet others more commonly reject that opinion; for since acts are specified by the formal object, supernatural works differ from natural works by reason of the formal object, or motive. - To compose the dispute, perhaps it could be said that an act elicited under the influence of actual grace is already supernatural inchoatively, but does not become totally supernatural unless there is added a motive known by faith.

But a meritorious act is a good and supernatural work done on account of God, from which, divine ordination being posited, there arises a right to supernatural retribution.

It is called (a) a good and supernatural work, so that thus it may be distinguished from natural merit by which someone can obtain a merely natural reward; thus an unbeliever, by acting honorably, can obtain some natural recompense. But a meritorious work ought to be supernatural both by reason of the principle, insofar as it is done under the influence of grace, and more probably by reason of the end, insofar as it is done at least implicitly on account of a supernatural end, as will be declared below. (b) On account of God; for if some work is not done on account of God, there is no reason why retribution should be expected from Him. (c) From which there arises a right...; in this consists the essence of merit, and it is distinguished from impetration; for merit gives a certain right to retribution, while impetration gives no right, but obtains favor from mere mercy. (d) Yet there is added, divine ordination being posited; for unless God had willed to give us supernatural retribution on account of our good works, we would have no right to it: all that we have or do is from God and is owed to God, and therefore we can have no strict right relative to God, unless He Himself confers such a right upon us. (e) To supernatural retribution; in this merit is distinguished from satisfaction; for satisfaction compensates for the injury brought against God, while merit is ordered to obtaining reward.[1]

[1] Therefore a threefold value can be present in our works: impetratory, which arises from petition clothed with due conditions, and is founded partly on the mercy of God, partly on His promises; meritorious, which arises from the supernatural work itself done on account of God, and is founded partly on justice, partly on the divine promise; satisfactory, insofar as it is a penal work which is accepted by God as compensation for the injury brought against Him. In the prayer of the just this threefold value can be found: insofar as it fittingly asks from God, it can impetrate; insofar as it performs a supernatural work acceptable to God, it can merit grace; but insofar as it performs a difficult and laborious work, it makes satisfaction for its sins.

198. 2. Species. A twofold merit is usually distinguished:

(a) Merit de condigno is that to which a reward is owed from justice, or at least from fidelity: from justice, when the work of itself equals the reward; from fidelity, when a promise is present, by force of which the reward, although exceeding the work, is nevertheless infallibly granted. Merit de condigno is true merit, or merit simply and properly so called, and therefore theologians intend to speak of it as often as they do not expressly signify otherwise.

(b) Merit de congruo is that to which reward is owed not from justice or fidelity, but from mere fittingness. - To explain the difference between each, certain theologians use this comparison: a soldier who conducted himself very strenuously in war has a twofold merit: he merits de condigno the stipend promised to soldiers; but he merits de congruo, besides the ordinary stipend, to be promoted to some dignity.

In the Treatise *De Gratia* (n. 193-204), it is proved that a justified man, that is, one placed in the state of grace, can truly merit an increase of grace and eternal life; here therefore it will suffice to set forth the conditions required for merit, especially the conditions required for merit de condigno; for the

conditions for merit de congruo are the same, with two exceptions, namely the state of grace and the promise of God, which are not required for merit de congruo. - Conditions of this kind are taken: 1. on the part of the one operating; 2. on the part of the work; 3. on the part of God.

II. Conditions for Merit on the Part of the One Operating.

199. For merit de condigno, two things are required: the state of wayfarer and the state of grace.

1. The state of wayfarer. (A) For God willed that man merit eternal life while he was dwelling on earth, or in the state of probation. (a) This is certainly proved by those texts of Scripture in which the Prophets, Christ, and the Apostles exhort the faithful that, while they live, they operate good, and thus prepare themselves for judgment, or for the coming of Christ; since, as St. Paul says,[1] "we must all be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may receive the proper things of the body," that is, those things which were done in the body, or during mortal life. For these suppose that after death there is not given a place for penance or merit. (b) This indeed is confirmed not only from the unanimous consent of the Fathers and theologians of all schools, who taught and teach this as one of the primary Christian truths; but also from the intimate persuasion of all the faithful, who therefore wish to act well in the present life or to be reconciled with God before death, because they believe that after death there is no redemption. Wherefore it can be said that this truth was implicitly defined by the ordinary and infallible magisterium of the Church.

[1] II Cor., V, 10.

(B) Reason shows that this is fitting. For it is necessary that the time of probation, through which man can merit or demerit, receive an end; but it altogether befits that this time receive its end at the point of death: for as long as the soul is joined to the corruptible body, on the one hand it is not capable of the beatific vision, and on the other it is in a state most apt for meriting, because it can use the body for acquiring perfection, and in the miseries of this life can find ampler opportunities for meriting. Therefore. Yet we admit that that argument is only an argument of fittingness, because the time of probation depends on the will of God alone.

200. Moreover, the state of sanctifying grace is required. It is certain: (a) From Scripture. For Christ says: "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it remain in the vine; so neither can you, unless you remain in Me";[1] but no one remains in Christ except through habitual grace; therefore. Likewise St. Paul:[2] "And if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor... but have not charity" (and consequently habitual grace), "it profits me nothing."

[1] John, XV, 4.

[2] I Cor., XIII, 3.

(b) From Tradition. From the decree of Trent, in which it is declared that the works of a justified man truly merit;[3] for a justified man is said to be one who is adorned with habitual grace; and from the condemnation of the proposition of Baius denying that sanctifying grace is necessary for merit.[4]

[3] "If anyone shall say that the good works of a justified man... do not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself... and also increase of glory; A. S." (Trent, sess. VI, can. 32).

[4] Apud Denzinger, n. 895; cf. nn. 882, 892.

(c) From theological reason. It is certainly repugnant that someone merit de condigno with God, when otherwise he is an enemy of God and worthy of eternal punishment; but a sinner, not yet justified, is hateful to God and worthy of eternal punishment; therefore he cannot at the same time merit eternal life. - Moreover, there ought to be some proportion between work and reward; but the reward concerning which we are treating is within the order of supernatural filiation; therefore we can be heirs of eternal life insofar as we are adoptive sons of God: "if sons, also heirs";[5] but only through habitual grace are we made adoptive sons of God; therefore only through this grace do we merit.[6]

[5] Rom., VIII, 17.

[6] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 3.

III. Conditions on the Part of the Work.

201. There are three: namely, the work must be free, honorable, and supernatural. 1. A meritorious work must be free, both from coercion and from necessity. It is of faith against the Jansenists.

For the following proposition was condemned as heretical: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices."[1] And in reality no one is rewarded or punished unless he is master of his acts; but man is not master of his acts unless he is truly and intrinsically free. - This, however, does not prevent prescribed works from being meritorious; for God, by His goodness, has promised recompense even to prescribed works; thus, for example, love of enemies is prescribed, and yet it is a very meritorious work, according to that saying: "Love your enemies... and your reward shall be great";[2] indeed, a precept, other things being equal, increases merit, by adding to the work the merit of obedience.

[1] Apud Denzinger, n. 968. - The state of fallen nature is that in which man is placed after original sin; cf. *De Deo Creante*, n. 197-200.

[2] Luke, VI, 35.

202. 2. Moreover it must be honorable, or naturally good, on the part of the object, end, and circumstances; for an evil work evidently cannot be rewarded, but on the contrary is worthy of punishment; but an indifferent work, if there is any in the individual case, of itself neither merits nor demerits; therefore only a good work can be rewarded. Yet a work indifferent of itself can be made good through a supernatural intention; indeed a work materially evil can, according to the common opinion, become good and meritorious, if it is honorable in the mind of the agent: for God looks upon the heart.

203. 3. Supernatural (a) by reason of the principle, in the sense that it must be done under the influence of grace; this is admitted by all. But what grace is required? Certain theologians, ancient and modern,[3] said that habitual grace suffices, without actual grace, because an act elicited under the influence of habitual grace and the infused virtues is already sufficiently supernatural by reason of the principle. - Yet the common opinion is that actual grace is required; for Christ said to the Apostles, already adorned with sanctifying grace: "Without Me you can do nothing";[4] these words indeed are interpreted

by the Fathers not only of habitual grace, but also of actual grace. Here also come all the texts brought forward in the Treatise *De Gratia* (n. 50-60), from which it is evident that even a just man can do nothing in the supernatural order without actual grace. Likewise Trent declares that the works of the just are not meritorious without the virtue of Christ which precedes, accompanies, and follows them; but grace preceding, accompanying, etc., is actual grace.[1] - Besides, that grace is never lacking to men of good will.

[3] Thus D. Soto, *De nat. et grat.*, l. III, c. 4; Terrien, *La Grâce et la Gloire*, Paris, 1897, t. II, p. 56-62.

[4] John, XV, 5.

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16.

(b) By reason of the end or motive, according to the common opinion, in the sense that it must be done not from a human motive, but with at least implicit relation to God or to eternal life, according to that saying: "Whatever you do, do from the heart, as to the Lord and not to men, knowing that from the Lord you shall receive the retribution";[2] all the places where it is said that we ought to act on account of God prove the same.

[2] Coloss., III, 23.

Indeed, according to Thomists, it is required that that work be done under the influence of charity; yet the virtual influence suffices, which remains as long as the act of charity toward God, once elicited, has not been retracted. For they argue thus:[3] in order that an act of some virtue be meritorious of eternal life, it ought to proceed from habitual grace; but from grace no act proceeds except through the mediation of charity: for every movement and influence of grace tends toward God, the supernatural ultimate end; therefore no act can be meritorious of eternal life unless it is referred to God, the supernatural ultimate end, at least virtually by charity. - Yet this is denied by not a few theologians, especially Suarez and Vasquez;[4] for, Scripture being witness, eternal life is promised not only to acts of charity, but also to other supernatural works, namely obedience, poverty, meekness, and the rest of good works in general.[5] Besides, any supernatural work performed in the state of grace has sufficient proportion with eternal life. And this seems to be the mind of St. Thomas, who often teaches that every honorable act performed by him who is placed in the state of grace and elicits an act of charity as often as this is prescribed, is meritorious, because it is habitually and implicitly referred to God (above, n. 191).[6] - The controversy is more in the mode of conceiving than in the matter itself; for Thomists hold that all acts elicited by him who has charity, or is in the state of grace, are done virtually under the influence of charity and are meritorious, unless this is impeded by some disordering of the act. Besides, according to all, it is better often to offer our actions to God from the motive of charity: for thus merit is greatly increased.

[3] Salmanticenses, disp. IV, n. 7.

[4] Suarez, lib. XII, c. 9-10; Vasquez, Ia IIae, disp. 127.

[5] Mark, III, 35; Matt., V, 3-6; Rom., II, 6; I Tim., VI, 17.

[6] St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 5; *De Carit.*, q. un., a. 11, ad 2.

IV. Conditions on the Part of God.

204. In order that our works be truly meritorious, a positive ordination of God is required. For through merit de condigno we acquire a true right to reward; but a creature cannot acquire any strict right toward God unless some positive ordination of God is supposed: for all our acts are already owed to God by the manifold title of dependence, gratitude, etc.; hence, according to Trent, eternal life is "as a reward, from the promise of God Himself, to be rendered to the good works of the just."[1] Besides, our works, even supernatural ones, do not of themselves equal the reward granted to us, namely the beatific vision; and therefore our merit is not from mere justice, but partly from justice and partly from fidelity.

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16.

This can indeed be illustrated by a comparison: if some worker should labor of his own accord in the field of another person, without having been hired by him, he will not have a strict right to payment; but if he has done this from a pact, he will have a strict right to reward. Thus also we, while we labor in the vineyard of the Lord, cannot have a right to supernatural reward, unless God first has sent us into His vineyard and has declared a recompense to be annexed to such labor. Nevertheless it befits God so to act, because the worker is worthy of his pay, and it is fitting that happiness follow virtue.

205. Corollary. From this it is given to understand what circumstances can increase merit: 1. the greater excellence of the act itself, which is taken both from the object formally taken; for example, an act of charity is objectively better than an act of humility; and from the quantity of the work, for example in the case of alms; and from its difficulty: thus it is more meritorious to resist a grave temptation than a light one; 2. the end, or intention of the one operating; thus he merits more who acts from the motive of charity than he who acts from the motive of hope or fear; 3. greater intensity, or fervor, consisting in this, that we act with all our powers, with a great heart and a willing soul; likewise constancy in operating, which supposes a greater and more assiduous effort; 4. more intimate conjunction with Christ; for he who keeps himself more intimately united with Him derives from Him a greater power of meriting; for He Himself is the fountain and origin of all merits; and those who are joined to Him bring forth much fruit, according to the words of Christ Himself:[1] "He who remains in Me, and I in him, he bears much fruit."

[1] John, XV, 5.

Therefore let us act freely, honorably, and meritoriously, through Christ, and with Christ, and in Christ; and our works will truly be seeds of eternal life.

On Laws

Concerning Laws.

206. Human acts cannot tend toward the ultimate end unless they are conformable to the norm of morality, which, from what was said above, n. 25, is twofold, namely God, the supreme good and ultimate end, and the rational nature of man. The former is now to be treated. God is the ultimate norm of morality; for He infallibly sees what is good and how human actions can be ordered to the ultimate end; moreover, by force of His supreme dominion, He commands whatever He judges necessary for the attainment of our end. But this ordination is manifested to us through laws, by which the divine mind and will are signified. Now, among laws, some are divine, because they emanate directly and immediately from the divine will, but others are human, because they emanate directly from human authority, whether ecclesiastical or civil. Nevertheless even human laws, when they are just, proceed mediately from God, since God Himself has handed over to legitimate superiors the power of making laws: "For there is no power except from God."[1] - From this it follows that human acts ought to be conformable to laws, that they may lead us to the ultimate end. - Therefore we shall speak:

[1] Rom., XIII, 1.

I. Concerning the concept of law in general;

II. Concerning divine law;

III. Concerning human ecclesiastical law;

IV. Concerning human civil law.

Article I. Concerning the Concept of Law in General. — I. Notion.

207. 1. Law is defined by St. Thomas as "a certain ordination of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has care of the community."

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 90-93; Suarez, *De Legibus*, lib. I and lib. II, c. 1-4; Salmanticenses, Tr. XI, *De Legibus*, c. 1; Billuart, *De Legibus*, diss. I-II; Bouquillon, n. 53-64; Haine, t. I, *De Legibus*, q. 1-4; Ball. P., I, n. 236-239; Bautain, *Philosophie des Lois*, Paris, 1860, ch. I-II; Didiot, n. 588-607; Farges, op. cit., p. 252-265.

It is said: (a) ordination, or norm or rule, by force of which the acts of subjects are ordered to the due end; (b) of reason, because it pertains to reason to know the end and the means proportioned for attaining this end; yet the will accedes to reason, for commanding what reason has judged equitable; from this it is clear that a norm which is not just cannot truly be called a law, because it is not an ordination of reason. (c) For the common good, and consequently not for evil: for then it would not be an ordination nor law, but tyrannical oppression; for the common good, not however for the particular good of some private person or of some members of society: otherwise it would be a precept, not a law. This good can indeed be spiritual, or temporal, or both, and it tends at least mediately and implicitly to the ultimate end. (d) By him who has care of the community: for not just anyone can command such an ordination authentically, but only he who presides over the

community, that is, God Himself, and those to whom God has entrusted the power of ruling society. (e) Promulgated, or authentically published and imposed by the Prince, or in his name and authority; for in order that a rule can be useful, it must be applied to the subject; but it cannot be applied unless it is known, and knowledge occurs through promulgation.

2. This definition is deservedly held as masterly. Yet in it the obligation which law imposes is not explicitly declared, because the holy Doctor had already established earlier (a. 1) that law is a rule which obliges to acting. Therefore the definition can easily be completed with these words: "and obliging subjects to doing or omitting something." And thus law is distinguished from counsel.

208. According to St. Thomas,[2] law imposes obligation in a fourfold way, namely by commanding, forbidding, permitting, punishing: for it commands certain acts of virtues; prohibits evil acts; permits those which are indifferent, and from this permission there follows the obligation of not impeding others from performing those acts; punishes transgressors of the law, and therefore imposes on judges the obligation of inflicting punishment, and on subjects the obligation of undergoing punishment; sometimes it also irritates an act, rendering it invalid, in order more efficaciously to prohibit the same.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 92, a. 2.

II. Difference of Law from Precept.

209. A particular precept differs from law: (a) by reason of the subject upon whom the obligation is imposed: for a precept is imposed on one or more private persons, on account of a particular good; law on the whole society or community, and indeed for the common good. (b) By reason of the author: for making a law public authority and jurisdiction over some community are required; for a precept private authority suffices, for example the authority of parents over children, of a husband over a wife, of a master over servants. (c) By reason of duration: a precept, since it is enjoined for the good of private persons, perishes with the death of those upon whom it has been imposed, and therefore is not of itself perpetual; while law, which is made for the good of society, by its nature is born to endure; it can indeed be abrogated, but of itself it does not perish by the death of the legislator or of the first subjects: it endures as long as it has not been explicitly or implicitly revoked. Therefore if the legislator restricts the effect of the law to a determinate time, it is not properly a law, but a precept. (d) By reason of place: since law is given to a community, it directly affects the territory, and consequently does not oblige subjects who are legitimately outside the territory; but a precept, since it is directed to subjects, directly affects them and obliges them, even if they go out from the limits of the Prince's territory: it is something personal, and adheres to persons wherever they go.

It must be noted, however, that sometimes, among authors, the names law, precept, or statute are taken indiscriminately, so that the sense can be determined only from the context and various adjuncts.

III. Difference Between Eternal Law and Law Properly So Called.

210. 1. Eternal law, according to St. Thomas,[1] is "the reason of divine wisdom, according as it is directive of all acts and motions." Namely, God from eternity decreed to create creatures from nothing, and to order and direct them, according to His infinite wisdom, to the end. But He willed to direct them according to the proper nature of each: inanimate things, through the powers and properties impressed upon them; sentient things, through the instincts and tendencies placed in them; intellectual things, through the illumination of the intellect, and the motion by which He directs the will without harming its liberty. Now that ordination of all things to the ultimate end, insofar as it is considered as existing from eternity in the divine mind, is called the eternal law. Its existence is logically inferred from the dogmas of creation and providence.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 93, a. 1. - Eternal law, concerning which the pagans spoke only obscurely, is described by the Scriptures especially under the name of the wisdom or word of God: Job, XXXVIII-XXXIX; Prov., VIII-IX; Wisd., VI-XII; Ps. CXVIII. Cf. Corluy, *La sagesse dans l'Anc. Testament*, *Congrès scient. catholique*, 1888, t. I, p. 61-91.

It can indeed be called law in a broad sense, insofar as it is an ordination of reason, for the common good, willed by him who has care of the community; but it is not law in the strict sense set forth above; for from eternity the community upon which that ordination is imposed is lacking, and likewise promulgation is lacking.[1] From this head the eternal law already differs from the other laws: for it is not properly law, but the fountain of all laws.

[1] For that cannot be called a true promulgation which, according to Billuart, is made through the eternal Word and the book of life written from eternity; for this, unless we are mistaken, is a metaphorical manner of speaking.

211. 2. Laws properly so called are derived from the eternal law, insofar as they manifest to us this ordination which from the beginning exists in the divine mind. This is indeed clear as regards divine laws, which signify to us the will of God. But human laws are derived from the eternal law by a threefold reason: (a) as from an exemplary cause, because laws, that they may be just, ought to be conformable to the eternal law; (b) as from an efficient cause, insofar as every legislative power comes forth from God; (c) as from a directing cause, in the sense that divine reason, through the mediation of the light of reason or faith, directs legislators so that they may see what laws are to be established and when, according to the diversity of persons, times, places, and circumstances. Wherefore divine Wisdom deservedly says: "By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things; by me princes command, and the powerful decree justice."[2]

[2] Prov., VIII, 15-16.

Article II. Concerning Divine Law.

212. Divine law is twofold: natural, which is founded in the very nature of things, is necessarily enacted by God, and is promulgated in human conscience; positive, which is freely enacted by God and is promulgated in various external modes. Each must be discussed separately.

§ I. Concerning Natural Divine Law.

Here we hand down only the more general matters, since the various precepts of the natural law must be explained in the course of the work. Therefore we shall speak: 1. concerning the concept and

existence of the natural law; 2. concerning its object and character; 3. concerning its promulgation and knowledge.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 94; Suarez, *De Legibus*, lib. II, c. 5-17; Gonet, *Clypeus Theol. thomisticae*, tr. VI, disp. 3; Billuart, diss. II, art. 2-4; Muller, t. I, § 30-35; Meyer, t. I, n. 242-286; Bouquillon, n. 65-81; Noldin, n. 91-95; Bautain, op. cit., ch. 3-6, p. 46-129; Didiot, op. cit., n. 736-760.

I. Concerning the Concept and Existence of the Natural Law. — 1. Concerning the Concept of the Natural Law.

213. (A) Notion. (a) Natural law, according to St. Thomas,[2] "is nothing other than the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature." For God from eternity knows and ordains whatever is consonant with the nature of each being, and that ordination, from what was said above, n. 210, is called the eternal law. But in time He created rational creatures, and manifested this eternal law to them. Now natural law is nothing other than the manifestation or promulgation of the eternal law in the conscience of the rational creature. Therefore it can be defined: the divine ordination of the rational creature to the ultimate end, founded in nature itself, and perceived by the natural light.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 91, a. 2.

It is called natural for a twofold reason: namely because it embraces only precepts which are founded in the very nature of things, and moreover because it is known by the natural light. Thus it is distinguished from the positive law of God, which concerns things necessary for attaining the ultimate end, not of themselves, but from the will of God, and becomes known only by revelation.

Therefore natural law commands all those things which by their nature are honorable and necessary for the ultimate end; but it prohibits all those things which by their nature are evil. Hence it is thus described by Augustine:[1] "The eternal law is the divine reason or the will of God, commanding that the natural order be preserved, forbidding that it be disturbed."

[1] St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, l. XXII, c. 27, P. L., XLII, 418.

214. (b) Consequently natural law is not the free will of God alone, as the Nominalists used to say: for actions are not good or evil because they are commanded or prohibited by God, but rather are commanded or prohibited because divine reason, which cannot be deceived, sees that they are good or evil (above, n. 22).

Nor is it the dictate of practical human reason, or the categorical imperative of the autonomous will; for human reason is not the rule obliging, but only exhibiting and manifesting obligation (above, n. 26); and the human will is not autonomous, but essentially depends upon God.

2. Concerning the Existence of the Natural Law.

215. All those who acknowledge the existence and providence of God admit that some natural law exists in the sense explained above; but atheists, positivists, and evolutionists reject it, whose systems we have already explained, n. 34-42. - Traditionalists indeed admit the existence of the natural law, but they assert that, in the present state of fallen man, it becomes known to us only by the supernatural light of faith or tradition.

Thesis: A moral law must be acknowledged which deservedly is called natural, because it is inserted into nature by God, and can be known by the natural light of reason, at least as to its primary principles. - It is of faith that the natural law exists, since the ordinary magisterium of the Church clearly teaches this; it is certain that this law can be known naturally.

216. (A) It is proved by authority. St. Paul, after he had reproved the Jews who, notwithstanding the positive law of God, had sinned gravely, writes concerning the Gentiles, who had not received revelation: "For when the Gentiles, who have not the law [the Mosaic law], do naturally those things which are of the law, these, not having the law, are a law to themselves: who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one another, in the day when God shall judge the hidden things of men, according to my gospel, by Jesus Christ."[1] Now (a) there it is declared that the Gentiles, who lacked the Mosaic law, nevertheless observed certain precepts of the natural law, because, namely, this kind of law was written in their hearts, and conscience, reproving evil and approving good, urged its observance; and this law was not merely human, but divine, since according to it God will judge the Gentiles. (b) Moreover, the Apostle in no way teaches that this law was known by tradition, but by natural reason, since it is written in the heart and is confirmed by the testimony of conscience.

[1] Rom., II, 14-16. - That this text is to be understood of pagans we proved in *De Gratia*, n. 35, note 10.

217. The Fathers confirmed this doctrine of Paul; thus Tertullian says:[2] "Therefore do you seek the law of God? You have that common one in the public place of the world, in the natural tablets, to which also the Apostle is wont to appeal... when, in saying to the Romans that the nations by nature do those things which are of the law, he suggests both natural law and legal nature." - The same Fathers likewise teach that this law is inscribed in hearts by the finger of God, innate, inserted, implanted, and therefore known naturally by human understanding; thus St. Ambrose:[3] "Therefore that law is not written, but is born within; nor is it received by any reading, but is expressed in each one by a certain flowing fountain of nature." Nor otherwise Chrysostom:[4] "From the beginning, forming man, God placed the natural law within him. And what, finally, is the natural law? He impressed conscience upon us, and willed the knowledge of good things and of contrary things to have been implanted by nature." - Leo XIII briefly sums this up: "Such is the chief of all, the natural law, which is written and engraved in the souls of individual men, because it is human reason itself commanding right action and forbidding sin."[5]

[2] Tertullian, *De corona*, VI, apud Migne, P. L., II, 83.

[3] St. Ambrose, *Epist*. 73, n. 3, Migne, P. L., XVI, 1251.

[4] St. Chrysostom, homil. XII, *de statuis*, Migne, P. G., XLIX, 131.

[5] Encycl. *Praestantissimum*, 20 Jun. 1888.

218. (B) The same is established psychologically and historically. (a) By the intimate testimony of conscience we know that certain actions are good of themselves, and others depraved (above, n. 22), - that the latter are to be avoided, but the former to be done, at least those which are apprehended as necessary and as commanded by supreme authority, - so that he who obeys

this command obtains peace of soul, while he who transgresses the same is disturbed by the goads of conscience. Now all these things suppose that some natural law exists, promulgated in each one's conscience, which we are bound to obey, and indeed a universal and absolute law: for this authoritatively commands the fulfillment of certain duties for all and unconditionally, independently of any civil law.[1]

[1] J. Simon, *Le Devoir*, 3e p., ch. 1, p. 233-262.

(b) The intimate experience of each person is confirmed in no small degree by the unanimous consent of peoples, who, although they think differently concerning some moral precepts, nevertheless agree in admitting a moral distinction between good and evil; - they hold that there is some law which arises not from kings, nor from the decrees of the people or senate, but from nature itself or from the divine power; - that violators of it are vexed by anxieties, even when they can avoid human punishments; - and that from it other laws draw their force, so that they ought to be conformable to it.

219. Thus, among the Greeks, Sophocles commends the natural law in this way:[2] "Would that fortune be present to me for attaining the holy integrity of all words and works, concerning which sublime laws have been set forth, born in the heavenly ether, of which Olympus alone is father, and the mortal race did not beget them, nor indeed will oblivion ever lull them to sleep: in these there is a great God, and He does not wither with age." Among the Latins, let Cicero be heard:[3] "I see that this was the judgment of the wisest men, that law was neither devised by the talents of men, nor is it some decree of peoples, but something eternal, which rules the whole world by the wisdom of commanding and forbidding... But it arose together with the divine mind. Wherefore true and chief law, apt for commanding and forbidding, is the right reason of supreme Jove." Among the Chinese likewise a universal rule of morals is admitted, which rules heaven and earth, and is read as inscribed in the heart of all.[4] Similar things are found among various nations, even barbarous ones.[5]

[2] Sophocles, *Oedip.*, v. 863-871; cf. *Antigon.*, v. 446-460. Similar things may be seen apud Plato, *Respub.*, l. IV, p. 427, ed. Stephan.

[3] Cicero, *De Legibus*, II, 4. Cf. *Pro Milone*, IV, 10; *Philipp.*, XI, c. 12, n. 28; likewise the fragment preserved apud Lactantius should be read, *Instit*. VI, 8, Migne, P. L., VI, 660-661.

[4] "The rule of moral conduct of man is the law of all intelligences; it illumines the universe in the highest heavens, as in the deepest abysses. The rule of moral conduct of the wise man has its principle in the heart of all men, whence it rises to its highest manifestation, to enlighten heaven and earth with its brilliant rays." (Apud J. L. De Lanessan, *La Morale des Philosophes Chinois*, Paris, Alcan, 1896, p. 44-45.)

[5] Cf. Quatrefages, *L'unité de l'espèce humaine*; *L'espèce humaine*, Paris, Alcan; Carbonnelle, *L'aveuglement scientifique*, in period. *Revue des Quest. scientif.*, VII, 193.

220. (C) Reason supports this. For once the creation of man is posited, natural law already becomes necessary. For God, the most wise creator and orderer of all things, must direct all beings to the end for which they were destined by Him. But no directive principle is suitable for beings endowed with liberty except a moral rule. Beings which lack liberty tend to their end by a certain necessary instinct divinely impressed; but man, since he is free, tends to his end only freely; and therefore he must not be led by a blind and necessary impulse, but by a moral rule

which shows him the way to be followed, without taking away his free will. But this rule, common to all, can be nothing other than a certain participation or manifestation of the eternal law, or, in other words, the natural law.

II. Concerning the Object and Character of the Natural Law.

Once the existence of the natural law has been proved, it is useful to describe its object and character.

1. Concerning the Object or Matter of the Natural Law.

221. In a general way the natural law embraces those things which are so fitting or repugnant to rational nature that they ought to be commanded or prohibited by the Author of nature.

(A) Now, with respect to the logical nexus by which they are connected with one another, the precepts of the natural law are of three kinds: -

(a) Some indeed are most universal, so that the rest flow from them; such are these and similar ones: good is to be pursued and evil avoided; the supreme good is to be loved; what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; live conformably to right reason.

222. Among philosophers and theologians it is asked what is the supreme principle from which the rest flow logically. St. Thomas asserts that it is this: good is to be done and evil avoided.[1] According to others: Live conformably to human nature, considered according to all its essential relations.[2] Berti proposes this, according to the mind of St. Augustine: Love God as the end and the rest on account of Him.[3] Others prefer this formula: Exhibit also by free actions the image of God, absolutely holy, impressed upon you by way of rational nature.[4] Meyer proposes this: Preserve the right order of rational nature as divinely holy.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.

[2] Thus not a few Scholastics.

[3] Berti, *Theolog. discipl.*, lib. XX, c. 4, prop. 3.

[4] Carl Aeger, *Moralphilosophie*, 1873, S. c. 63 ff.

[1] Meyer, op. cit., n. 284.

Of these, the formula of St. Thomas is the simplest and most clearly intelligible; the last, although not so clearly intelligible, seems more complete and scientific; the Augustinian one is in itself most perfect, but in the order of knowledge it is not first, nor explicitly known to all. In any case all agree substantially as to the sense.

223. (b) In the second place come those precepts which are deduced from universal principles by an immediate and easy discourse; for example, honor your father and mother, you shall not steal, you shall not kill, and the rest contained in the Decalogue, if one excepts the sanctification of the Sabbath day, which is a positive law.

(c) In the third place proceed those precepts which are deduced from the first principles remotely and only by diligent study and more difficult discourse; for example, an injury inflicted on someone, in a

well-ordered society, is not to be avenged by one's own authority. Since precepts of this kind are not easily known by all, they are often proposed more clearly and certainly by positive law.

224. (B) With respect to necessity, the precepts of the natural law are some primary and others secondary: the former are so necessary for the particular or social good that, without them, the moral order is impossible; thus blasphemy, the unjust killing of an innocent man, false testimony, etc., are opposed to primary natural right. - But secondary precepts are those which are very useful for the particular or social good, but not necessary, so that the moral order can subsist without them, although less perfectly; thus polygamy and divorce are opposed to secondary natural right.

225. (C) By reason of the object about which they are concerned, natural precepts regard: (a) God, who is to be worshiped and loved; (b) our neighbor, to whom reverence, justice, and charity are owed; (c) ourselves, insofar as we ought to subject the sensitive faculties to reason, and reason to God.

2. Concerning the Character of the Natural Law.

226. The natural law is universal, immutable, and non-dispensable; the reason is because it flows not from the positive will of God, but from the very nature of things. This, however, needs declaration.

(A) The natural law is universal, insofar as it binds all those who enjoy the use of reason; for, on the one hand, it is promulgated in the conscience of each rational being, and on the other it is enacted for every rational creature.

It is asked, however, whether it also reaches infants and the insane. The controversy had concerning this matter can be reconciled in this way: the natural law of itself affects them, insofar as they are radically and potentially rational; but it does not oblige them morally, under penalty of sin:[1] for only those are capable of moral obligation and imputability who enjoy the use of reason.

[1] Adults, however, using reason, sin when they impel them to act against the natural law.

227. (B) The natural law is immutable, in the sense that it cannot be changed in itself, although it admits some changes in its application.

(a) Indeed, it cannot be changed in itself: for it is founded in the very nature of the rational being, considered in its relations with the ultimate end; but the nature of things and their relations to the ultimate end always remain the same. - Yet in order rightly to understand immutability of this kind, we must consider the natural law not in some abstract and insufficiently determined principle, but with all the adjuncts which constitute morality. Thus homicide is prohibited by natural right, and nevertheless there are many cases in which it is licit to kill others. But to one attending even a little, it is clear that not every homicide is prohibited, but only unjust killing, or the killing of an innocent man by private authority, without necessity; consequently, when an unjust aggressor is killed, or a criminal is condemned to death, the natural law is not changed, since it in no way prohibits the legitimate defense of oneself or of society: the circumstances, the adjuncts, are changed; the law itself remains the same.

This is true also of secondary precepts; take, for example, polygamy, which is opposed to secondary natural right, and yet flourished among some Patriarchs; the law itself suffered no change in itself; for at every time it was contrary to the secondary ends of marriage, especially to the peace of families; but, since it did not hinder the primary end of marriage, namely the procreation and education of offspring, it could be permitted or tolerated, with means employed by which abuses would be prevented.[1]

[1] Some older scholastics wrote that the natural law can be changed as to the more remote conclusions; they bring the example of a deposit, which by natural right ought to be returned, and nevertheless sometimes cannot be returned, because, for example, it is foreseen that the owner will use the deposited sword to kill an enemy. - But in a case of this kind there is no change of the natural law; for the law does not establish that a deposit is to be returned in every case, but forbids it to be returned at that time when the owner is going to abuse his own thing.

(b) But in its application it suffers some changes, when secondary precepts are in question. Thus God tolerated, under certain conditions, polygamy and divorce; for in those things which are not absolutely necessary, but only very useful, it can happen that, circumstances having changed, the application of the law, even if very useful, is not urged; for example, among the Jews divorce was tolerated, in order to avoid worse abuses, namely adultery or the killing of a spouse; but divorce of itself remained contrary to the perfect equality of the contract, to the best education of offspring, to the peace of families, etc.

228. (C) The natural law is not properly dispensable; and indeed, if God Himself does not change the natural law, no one on earth, not even the vicar of Christ himself, can dispense in this law.[2] The Church, however, can declare and interpret it, and that infallibly; for she received from Christ the power of teaching, and consequently of explaining and interpreting divine laws, by defining whether in these or those adjuncts they truly oblige. Thus the indissolubility of marriage pertains to secondary natural right; but the Church, by long-standing practice, has implicitly declared that this indissolubility does not belong to a marriage simply ratified.

[2] Likewise some older theologians said that some dispensation can be admitted in secondary natural law; they bring the example of the permission given to the Hebrews to carry off the goods of the Egyptians; but from this nothing can be inferred as to the thesis set forth: for since God is the supreme lord of all goods, He could transfer the ownership of certain goods from the Egyptians to the Hebrews, on account of the reason of the public good, or by way of compensation for the labors furnished.

III. Concerning the Promulgation and Knowledge of the Natural Law. — 1. Concerning the Promulgation of the Natural Law.

229. The natural law certainly obliges all rational creatures as soon as it has been sufficiently promulgated in their conscience: for it is nothing other than the manifestation of divine reason and will, which all must obey.

(A) Now, on God's part, for sufficient promulgation two things are required and suffice: (a) that the most universal principles of the law can easily be known by him who enjoys the use of reason; (b) that from these, through natural means, internal and external, individual and social, those practical conclusions can be deduced which are necessary for the right institution of life. It is in no way required that all men be able to acquire these notions for themselves with equal facility, or know individual conclusions without admixture of error; for this would contradict the natural inequality

and infirmity of men. Therefore it suffices that those who enjoy lesser ability can learn from those who are endowed with a more powerful mind the truths necessary for living rightly.

As to the fact, man is indeed physically capable, by his own powers, of knowing the natural law; but, as the Vatican says,[1] "it is to be attributed to divine revelation that those things which in divine matters are not of themselves inaccessible to human reason, in the present condition also of the human race, can be known by all expeditiously, with firm certitude, and with no admixture of error." - If man had remained in the state of pure nature, God would have furnished men, by a special natural concurrence, the means for knowing the natural law more expeditiously.

[1] Vatican, sess. III, cap. 2, *de Revelatione*; we explained this decree in Tr. *de Vera Relig.*, n. 50.

230. (B) But on man's part, certain things are necessary for attaining knowledge of natural right: (a) positive means, namely one's own study of the truth, recourse to wiser men in more difficult matters, prayer to God, who is the Father of lights; for right reason suggests all these things; (b) negative means, or the removal of impediments, the chief of which are levity of mind and want of reflection, prejudices, depraved customs which cloud the mind, and evil counsels received from others.

If, notwithstanding those means seriously employed, knowledge of some natural precept could not be acquired morally, the ignorance is invincible; otherwise it is called vincible, according to what was explained above, n. 91-92.

2. Concerning the Knowledge of the Natural Law.

231. From this it can be understood what sort of ignorance can be admitted concerning the precepts of natural right.

(A) The first and most universal principles of the natural law cannot be invincibly unknown by an adult who is fully in possession of reason. For these principles stand to practical reason as the first principles of demonstrations stand to speculative reason: both are per se known; thus no one in possession of himself can be ignorant that good is to be done and evil avoided.

232. (B) Particular precepts, which are deduced immediately and clearly from the first principles, cannot be invincibly unknown for a long time by one who uses suitably developed reason. Such are: honor your father, do not kill an innocent man, do not steal, etc. For these, since they flow from known principles by an obvious and easy inference, cannot be unknown for long by one whose reason has been sufficiently cultivated. It can indeed happen that, by prejudices imbued from infancy, by depraved persuasions and examples, and also by evil habits, the mind is clouded for some time; but, when someone in good faith pursues the truth, and thinks seriously about the rule of morals, at least a doubt arises concerning the liceity of acts contrary to these natural precepts; but doubt produces the obligation of inquiring further about the truth, and God does not deny the help of illumination to those who inquire. But if the search for truth is omitted, the ignorance is not without fault: and the gravity of this is judged from what was said, n. 95-97.

233. (C) Remote conclusions of the natural law can be invincibly unknown even by one who uses suitably developed reason. For conclusions of this kind can be known only after diligent study has been premised, and with great difficulty; wherefore they are not rarely unknown by those who cannot diligently devote themselves to the study of truth, whether because of weakness of mind, or because of lack of time, or the necessity of attending to other matters. Moreover, in the more remote conclusions of the natural law, there is often some obscurity and uncertainty: for the more we recede from first principles, the more frequent is the danger of erring or at least of doubting. Hence among theologians themselves it is often disputed whether this or that precept pertains to natural right; thus, for example, Scotus taught that the precepts of the second table are not of natural right,[1] while most others hold otherwise; it is disputed whether there is a natural obligation of referring all acts to God, whether every lie is evil per se, etc.; what wonder, therefore, if the unlearned are ignorant of many other things?

[1] Scotus, in III *Sentent.*, dist. 37.

In fact confessors, who have frequented the sacred tribunal, know very well that certain penitents labor under the greatest ignorance concerning the more remote conclusions of the natural law, for example concerning the malice of internal acts,[2] or even of an officious lie, of perjury for preserving life,[3] of certain acts against chastity,[4] etc. - Therefore penitents are to be questioned prudently, treated benignly when they are in ignorance, - and instructed discreetly.

[2] Cf. Lacroix, lib. I, n. 135; St. Alphonsus, *De conscientia*, n. 9.

[3] Sanchez, *De praeceptis Decal.*, lib. I, c. 16, n. 33.

[4] St. Thomas, *Quaest. disp., de malo*, q. 3, a. 8, thinks it can happen that someone invincibly does not know the prohibition of fornication. Cf. Ball. P., I, n. 48.

§ II. Concerning Positive Divine Law.

234. Since perfect knowledge of the natural law, without admixture of error, is very difficult for the human race, some clear and positive declaration of this law through revelation becomes useful. Indeed, granted that man was elevated to the supernatural state, it is necessary that he be directed to the supernatural end through positive divine law: for means ought to be proportioned to the end. - In fact God, through revelation made to men, promulgated certain precepts of natural right, and also precepts imposed by His positive will. In that revelation a threefold stage is usually distinguished: the primeval law, manifested to the first parents and patriarchs, and therefore destined for the whole human race; the old law, or Mosaic law, manifested through Moses to the Israelite people; the new law, or Christian law, promulgated by the Incarnate Word, or Christ, for the whole human race. - Nothing special occurs here to be said concerning the primeval law, since very few things are known concerning it; wherefore the old and the new law must be briefly discussed.

I. Concerning the Old Law, or Mosaic Law.

235. It is not our purpose to examine the historical questions concerning the Mosaic law which today are agitated with great heat not only among rationalists, but even among Catholics: for this pertains to the history of revelation.[1] Yet it is fitting to outline a few things: 1. concerning

the character and end of this law; 2. concerning its object; 3. concerning its obligation and abrogation, so that the perfection of the new law may be better understood.

[1] Concerning this matter, cf. Vigouroux, *Les Livres Saints et la Critique rationaliste*, 3rd ed., 1891, t. III, p. 3-226; Hummelauer, *Comment. in Exodum*, 1891, p. 16-25; in *Deut.*, 1901, p. 23-110; Pelt, *Histoire de l'Anc. Testament*, 4th ed., Paris, 1904, t. I, ch. XXVII, p. 295-331; Prat, S. J., *Le Code du Sinaï, sa genèse et son évolution*, Paris, Bloud, 1904; Lagrange, O. P., *La Méthode historique*, 3rd ed., 1904, p. 147-182.

1. Concerning the Character and End of the Mosaic Law.

236. Since the natural law, impressed upon minds, and the primeval law given to the first parents and patriarchs, had gradually been obscured, whether because of sin, or because of the long stay of the Israelites in Egypt, it was opportune that the chief precepts of each should again be solemnly promulgated and completed by others, by which the chosen people would be more efficaciously removed from idolatry and corruption of morals. For this reason, in the third month after Israel's departure from the land of Egypt, on Mount Sinai, the ten precepts of the Decalogue were promulgated,[2] which contain the sum of the moral precepts of the ancient law; for the rest, not expressed in the Decalogue, are either presupposed, as the precept of faith and love,[3] or follow from others, as the prohibition of lying,[4] which is inferred from the eighth precept, - and the prohibition of unjust hatred,[5] which is deduced from the fifth. - Yet to these moral precepts were added ceremonial and judicial precepts, which were accommodated to the special condition of the Hebrews, and were ordered to the more perfect observation of the moral precepts.

[2] Exod., XIX-XX; cf. Hummelauer, in hunc loc.

[3] Deut., VI, 5; Levit., XIX, 18.

[4] Exod., XXIII, 1.

[5] Levit., XIX, 17-18.

237. (A) That law is truly divine, insofar as it proceeds from God through revelation or inspiration. For this is declared many times not only in the Old Testament (loc. cit.), but also in the New; thus St. Stephen, the interpreter of Jewish tradition, says:[1] "You received the law in the disposition of angels"; and Paul declares that the law was ordained through angels in the hand of a mediator;[2] for the ministry of angels denotes the intervention of God.

[1] Acts, VII, 53.

[2] Galat., III, 19.

From this, however, it is in no way permitted to infer that the Hebrew legislator borrowed nothing from the primeval law, from the customs of the patriarchs, or from foreign laws: for God, by inspiring the sacred authors, can move them to use all those things which they already know naturally. Thus, for example, abstinence from things strangled and from blood, and circumcision, had already been prescribed before Moses;[3] likewise divorce, polygamy, slavery, and the law of retaliation had been in use, and the Mosaic law limited all these things rather than established them; moreover, certain moral or ritual precepts are almost the same as those which flourished among the Chaldeans and Egyptians.[4]

[3] Gen., IX, 4-6; Gen., XVII, 10-14.

[4] Cf. Prat, op. cit., p. 16-20; Lagrange, op. cit., p. 156-182, where he sets up a comparison between the Mosaic law and the code of Hammourabi recently discovered by V. Scheil, O. P.

But how much the Mosaic law excels foreign laws is clear to one who attends a little: (a) for it clearly and explicitly inculcates monotheism, and strictly prohibits the worship of idols, which flourished among other peoples: "I am the Lord your God... You shall not have strange gods before me. You shall not make for yourself a graven thing..."[5] (b) Moreover slavery, although tolerated, is much milder than among neighboring nations.[6] (c) The sum of the law is the love of God and of neighbor: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole strength;[7]... You shall love your friend as yourself."[8] (d) Not only external sins are prohibited, but also internal ones:[9] "You shall not covet your neighbor's house; nor shall you desire his wife." (e) Nor is only negative holiness commanded, but also positive holiness, which consists in a certain imitation of divine holiness: "Be holy, because I am holy, the Lord your God."[10]

[5] Exod., XX, 2-4.

[6] Exod., XXI, 1-11.

[7] Deut., VI, 5.

[8] Levit., XIX, 18.

[9] Exod., XX, 17.

[10] Levit., XIX, 2.

238. (B) To urge the observance of the precepts, the Mosaic law chiefly, although not exclusively, uses temporal promises and threats. St. Thomas explains the reason for this:[1] just as in speculative matters means are proposed to the hearer according to his condition, so in moral matters men must be led to the observance of laws by means proportioned to their character, namely by punishments and rewards. Now the Israelites, since they were stiff-necked and especially inclined toward temporal things, were more easily led by the hand to execute the commandments through temporal promises and threats. Wherefore God, accommodating Himself to them, leads them to divine worship by the promise of temporal things, which are symbols of eternal goods: "Whence it was fitting for the old law that through temporal things which were in the affection of imperfect men, it should lead men by the hand to God."

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 99, a. 6.

239. (C) The Mosaic law, although divine, received various additions at various times:[2] for God did not cease to accommodate His laws to the condition of the Jews; hence He sent Prophets, who not only recalled the people to the observance of the law, but also authentically interpreted and completed the law.[3] Likewise He inspired other writers, who in the sapiential books and in the psalms explained the ancient precepts of ethics and handed down new and more perfect ones. The historical books also, besides the examples of virtue which they report, contain not a few precepts or counsels which are especially useful for the spiritual life. Hence, in order to know the old law accurately, it is not enough to read the Mosaic books, but it is necessary to run attentively through the other sacred writers.

[2] In the Mosaic books a threefold series of laws can already be distinguished: (a) the Code or volume of the covenant (Exod., XX-XXIII); (b) the priestly Code (Exod., XXV-XXX and XXXV-XL; Levit. in its entirety; Num., I-IX, XV, XVII-XIX, XXVIII-XXX, XXXIV-XXXV); (c) Deuteronomy, which either contracts or more fully explains each code.

[3] You will find certain examples apud Prat, op. cit., p. 48-67.

240. (D) But the end of the law is Christ;[4] for, as St. Peter says,[5] "all the prophets, from Samuel and afterward, who have spoken, announced these days" (messianic days). The law itself was our pedagogue in Christ, that is, leading us to Christ; for its various precepts, not only moral, but also ceremonial, especially those which regard sacrifices and sacraments, were divinely ordered to preparing the way of the Messiah; for by the observation of the law they disposed the Jews to understand and receive more easily the more perfect law of Christ. This indeed is true also of many historical facts, according to that saying of the Apostle:[1] "All these things happened to them in figures"; for many things tended to this, that they might draw minds away from temporal things, and dispose them to awaiting the spiritual kingdom of the Messiah. Therefore the law cannot be rightly understood unless it is kept before the mind that this is a preparation for the evangelical law.

[4] Rom., X, 4.

[5] Acts, III, 24-25. We proved this elsewhere, *De Vera Relig.*, n. 229-265.

[1] 1 Cor., X, 11; cf. Fillon, *La Ste Bible*, t. I, Introduction, p. 2-10.

2. Concerning the Object of the Mosaic Law.

In the old law are contained moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts. -

241. (A) Moral precepts, which are briefly summed up in the Decalogue. For there the chief duties toward God and neighbor are handed down.

St. Thomas declares this as follows:[2] To God, as the principle of the community, three things are owed: fidelity, reverence, service. Fidelity consists in this, that He alone be adored; hence the first precept: "You shall not have strange gods." Reverence demands that nothing injurious be committed against Him; whence the second precept is as follows: "You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain." Service is owed in recompense for benefits received from the Lord: and to this pertains the third precept concerning the sanctification of the Sabbath, in memory of the benefit of creation. - But toward neighbor, the duties to be fulfilled are special or general: special with regard to parents, to whom children ought to show honor, according to the fourth precept. General duties consist in this, that harm be inflicted on no one by deed, mouth, or heart. By deed let no injury be committed against the person himself: You shall not kill, according to the fifth precept; nor against the person joined in marriage: You shall not commit adultery, as the sixth precept bears; nor in external goods: You shall not steal, as the seventh precept declares. Harm of the mouth is prohibited by the eighth precept: You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor. But harm of the heart is prohibited by the ninth and tenth precepts: You shall not desire the wife... You shall not covet your neighbor's house.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 5.

Yet these precepts presuppose another one handed down elsewhere, namely the love of God and of neighbor, as we explained above, n. 236.

242. (B) Ceremonial precepts, which determined the peculiar mode by which God was to be worshiped at that time, and at the same time prefigured the mysteries and sacraments of Christ. From this it can be understood why precepts of this kind were so numerous:[3] (a) to promote the worship of God;

[3] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 101, a. 3.

for since the Jews were prone to idolatry and the neighboring nations worshiped idols in manifold ways, it was necessary likewise to institute many and solemn ceremonial precepts, by which the chosen people might be more efficaciously deterred from the worship of idols; if the worship offered to the true God had been too simple, the Israelites would easily have been led away to the more solemn worship of the gods; and indeed, when Christian rites, much simpler than Jewish rites, succeeded them, not a few Hebrews converted to the faith grieved greatly over the abrogation of the ancient rites, as is evident from the Epistle to the Hebrews. (b) Moreover, the ceremonial precepts prefigured Christ who was to come, as the *Decree for the Jacobites* declares:[1] "All the sacred rites, sacrifices, sacraments, and ceremonies of the Old Testament pre-signified Him [Christ] as one day to come." But the mysteries of Christ, on account of their perfection and multiplicity, could be prefigured only by many rites: for the individual Mosaic rites, as imperfect, signified only one or another aspect of the mysteries of Christ; thus, in order to represent the one sacrifice of the New Law, there were many and diverse old sacrifices, each of which in its own way prefigured the immolation of Christ.[2]

[1] Apud Denzing., n. 602.

[2] Concerning the reason and sense of the ceremonies of the old law, cf. Bähr, *Symbolik des mosaischen cultus*, Heidelberg, 1874, t. I; Broglie, *Confér. sur l'idée de Dieu dans l'Ancien Testament*, Paris, 1892, 6th Conf., p. 197-223; Lesêtre, apud Vigouroux, *Dict. de la Bible*, t. II, 437-441.

243. (C) Judicial precepts, or civil or political ones, which ordered the Israelites toward one another, under the rule of God, the supreme king. For God was held not only as spiritual Lord, but also as temporal king of the Jewish people. Wherefore He determined their political and social state by judicial laws, and ordered it especially to a twofold end: (a) that the Israelites, by living according to justice and equity, might be prepared step by step for the messianic kingdom, which is a kingdom of justice and equity; (b) that by the social rule of the chosen people the constitution of the Church of Christ might in some way be prefigured.[3] - According to St. Thomas,[4] judicial precepts are divided into four species: (a) those which regard the institution of princes and magistrates, their offices, and the reverence to be shown to them; (b) those which pertain to fellow-citizens in their mutual relations, for example purchases, sales, judgments, punishments, etc.; (c) those which regard foreigners, for example wars against enemies, the manner of acting toward pilgrims and strangers; (d) those which refer to domestic life, namely wives, children, servants.[5]

[3] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 104, a. 1-2.

[4] Ibid., a. 4.

[5] Pelt hands down a brief synopsis of these civil laws, op. cit., t. II, p. 40-59.

3. Concerning the Obligation and Abrogation of the Mosaic Law.

244. (A) Concerning obligation. (a) The old law, insofar as it promulgates moral precepts of natural right, obliges all men who have attained knowledge of these, not because it is the Mosaic law, but because it is the natural law impressed upon hearts; and therefore the precepts of the Decalogue, if you except the sanctification of the Sabbath day, which does not pertain to the natural law, bound the Gentiles per se and also bind them today, and likewise Christians themselves; for, according to the common and true opinion, these precepts, with the third excepted, are nothing other than an exposition of the natural law. Wherefore Trent strikes with anathema those who hold that "the ten precepts pertain in no way to Christians."[1]

[1] Trent, sess. VI, can. 19.

(b) But the ceremonial and judicial precepts obliged only the Jews, and the proselytes of justice,[2] who by circumcision were inserted into the Jewish nation: for these were positive precepts, which had been enacted not for the Gentiles, but for the chosen people alone. Just as today clerics and religious are held by certain laws which in no way bind laymen, so the Israelites were bound to observe certain special commandments to which other peoples were not bound.[3] But because legal observances were of no little profit for attaining holiness and salvation more securely, certain Gentiles, who converted themselves to the true God, freely took up the obligation of observing the Mosaic laws.

[2] Proselytes of justice were Gentiles converted to the faith, who by circumcision were inserted into the Jewish people; proselytes of the gate, although truly converted, were not circumcised, but only had to fulfill the precepts which were called Noachic (Gen., IX, 4).

[3] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 98, a. 5.

245. (B) Concerning the abrogation of the old law. From what has already been said, the moral precepts were in no way abrogated by the new law. But the ceremonial and judicial precepts were abrogated through Christ, as is evident from the Council of Jerusalem, which, against the Pharisees, declared that circumcision and the other Mosaic prescriptions were no longer in force,[4] - and from the Epistle to the Galatians, where the Apostle severely reproves the converts who had wished to bind themselves to this law. - And deservedly; for, since they had been instituted to prefigure and prepare the advent of Christ, once Christ had come, they could no longer persist.

[4] Acts, XV, 5-29.

Yet, during the life of Christ, the law was in force together with the Gospel, and He Himself willed to fulfill the law, because the mystery of Redemption had to be consummated only through the passion and death of the Savior. Christ having died, the legal observances were dead in law, because our redemption was then completed; yet in fact they were abrogated only at that time when the Gospel had been promulgated.

II. Concerning the New Law, or Christian Law.

God, who in many portions and in many ways had formerly spoken to the fathers in the prophets, in the fullness of time spoke in the Son, who instituted the new law, preached it by words and

examples, and sealed it by His blood. We shall explain concerning this law: 1. its character and end; 2. its object; 3. its perfection and duration.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 106-108; Suarez, lib. X; Bellarmine, *Controversiae*, *De justificatione*, lib. IV; Muller, § 42-46; Bouquillon, n. 85-103; Bautain, op. cit., ch. 7, p. 142-152; Stevens, *The Theology of the New Testament*, New York, 1899, pp. 17-26, 65-75, 92-149.

1. Concerning the Character and End of the New Law.

246. (A) The Christian law is deservedly said to have been promulgated not through Angels, but through Christ Himself, written not on tablets of stone, but in the hearts of the faithful. For the Prophets had already announced this: "I will give my law in their inward parts, and I will write it in their heart."[2] And St. Paul sees the fulfillment of this prophecy in the new dispensation; for, addressing the faithful, he says:[3] "You are the epistle of Christ, ministered by us, and written not with ink, but with the spirit of the living God, not in tables of stone, but in the fleshy tables of the heart."

[2] Jerem., XXXI, 33; this prophecy is declared to have been fulfilled through the new law, Hebr., VIII, 10, X, 16. - There note that the new law is not presented as something imposed from without, but as an internal rule, which the Christian, under the influence of grace, makes his own.

[3] 2 Cor., III, 3.

This metaphor signifies that the new law has been put into the mind through the abundance of faith, which proposes to us the rules of acting more explicitly and clearly, - and has been inscribed upon the heart through the abundance of love, which sweetly inclines us to do those things which are commanded.[4] Indeed, to the old law there had been joined a certain grace of illumination and love, but much less abundant: for since the price of redemption had not yet been paid, it was not fitting that such copious grace be granted to the Jews; but, once the price was paid by the death of Christ, much more copious grace was poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit.

[4] Thus it is distinguished from the natural law, which indeed is said to be engraved on the heart, but naturally, while the new law is said to be inscribed by the supernatural light of faith.

Paul indeed inculcates this many times, especially in the Epistle to the Romans and to the Galatians: for there he shows that justification is not from the Mosaic law and from the works of the law, but from faith which works through charity; for often the law of itself excites concupiscence and is the occasion of sin, not because it is evil, but because, on account of our infirmity, we act against its prescriptions: "For the law works wrath; for where there is no law, neither is there transgression.[1]... What then shall we say? Is the law sin? God forbid. But I did not know sin except through the law."[2] Grace alone can help us to fulfill the law; this indeed was given to the Hebrews, but sparingly, while it is granted abundantly to Christians: "For the law [the new law] of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has freed me from the law of sin and death."[3]

[1] Rom., IV, 15.

[2] Rom., VII, 7; cf. VII, 11-25.

[3] Rom., VIII, 2.

247. (B) The new law is wholly spiritual; (a) for its sanction does not consist in temporal threats or promises, but in spiritual and eternal ones: "And fear not those who kill the body, and cannot kill the soul; but rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell."[4] - Wherefore it calls blessed those who are poor in spirit, who mourn, who suffer persecution for justice, because their reward is great in heaven.[5] On the other hand, it denounces riches and honors as impediments which retard us from the kingdom of heaven: "Woe to you that are rich, for you have your consolation. Woe to you that are filled, for you shall hunger[6]... For what does it profit a man if he gain the whole world, but suffer the loss of his own soul?"[7]

[4] Matt., X, 28.

[5] Matt., V, 3-12.

[6] Luke, VI, 24-25.

[7] Matt., XVI, 26.

(b) The kingdom which Christ preaches is not a temporal kingdom, such as had been conceived by many Jews, but a spiritual kingdom, for entering which there are required faith in the Gospel, love of God and neighbor, imitation of Christ, and denial of self, as will be more fully explained in the Treatise on the Virtues.

(c) The worship which He promotes, although it ought to be manifested externally, ought especially to be internal: "But the hour comes, and now is, when the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth."[1] Hence the ancient sacrifices, which consisted chiefly in external immolation, have been abolished, and there succeeds to them the sacrifice of Christ Himself, who immolates not only His body, but His soul by most perfect obedience: "Therefore coming into the world he says: Sacrifice and oblation you did not will, but a body you have fitted to me; holocausts for sin did not please you. Then I said: Behold I come; in the head of the book it is written of me that I should do your will, O God."[2] Wherefore He wills His disciples to offer to God spiritual victims, namely good works done for the sake of God, and not from ostentation: "Take heed that you do not your justice before men, to be seen by them; otherwise you shall not have a reward with your Father who is in heaven."[3]

[1] John, IV, 23.

[2] Hebr., X, 5-7.

[3] Matt., VI, 1.

248. (C) The end of the evangelical law is to promote the glory of God and of Christ, - and indeed in the most perfect mode, namely by attaining true and internal sanctification, by which we are made partakers of the divine nature, adopted sons of God, and His heirs, and co-heirs with Christ, - by which consequently we merit eternal beatitude, or the clear vision of God and perfect love. Christ proposed this end to Himself: "I have glorified you on the earth; I have finished the work which you gave me to do. And now glorify me, you, Father, with yourself, with the glory which I had with you before the world was."[4] His disciples ought to set the same end before themselves: "That in all things God may be honored through Jesus Christ[5]... Do all things for the glory of God."[6] To glorify God, they ought to imitate His holiness, insofar as it can be done:[7] "Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect." When we have accomplished this according to our powers, we await glory as the crown of justice;[8] but this is

our glory, that we may see God face to face: then we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is.[9]

[4] John, XVII, 5.

[5] 1 Peter, IV, 11.

[6] 1 Cor., X, 31.

[7] Matt., V, 48.

[8] 2 Tim., IV, 7.

[9] 1 John, III, 2.

2. Concerning the Object of the Evangelical Law.

249. The evangelical law embraces not only precepts, which it is necessary to observe in order that we may attain eternal life, but also counsels, by fulfilling which we attain greater perfection on earth and a more copious reward in heaven.

(A) The foundation of the whole of Christian ethics is situated in this, that God is manifested not only as Creator and Lord, but as Father, who, from His infinite goodness, adopted us as sons, - and redeemed us from the slavery of sin through His only-begotten Son, who washed us from our sins in His blood, - whose infinite merits are applied to each of us through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us. "For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba [Father][1]... For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that everyone who believes in him may not perish, but may have eternal life[2]... The charity of God has been poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us."[3]

[1] Rom., VIII, 15.

[2] John, III, 16.

[3] Rom., V, 5.

Hence the whole law is summed up in two precepts: we ought to love God as Father, and men as brothers and co-heirs: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and in your whole soul, and in your whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like to this: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments depend the whole law and the prophets."[4] Each commandment was already contained in the old law; but in the new law it is declared much more perfectly; formerly God was held and feared especially as Lord, now He is loved as Father; formerly the Jews loved their friends and fellow-citizens, but cared little for strangers, and not rarely hated enemies; today there is no distinction of Jew and Greek, but all are to be held as brothers in Christ, and we are commanded to love enemies: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you."[5] Wherefore Christ could deservedly say that the commandment of fraternal charity was new, not indeed in itself, but as to the perfect mode in which it must be understood and fulfilled: "A new commandment I give to you, that you love one another, as I have loved you."[1]

[4] Matt., XXII, 37-40.

[5] Matt., V, 44.

[1] John, XIII, 34.

From this twofold precept flow all duties toward God and toward neighbor.

250. (B) But because, in the state of fallen nature, we cannot love God and neighbor as we ought, Christ by words and by His own examples preached self-denial as a necessary means for attaining this end: "If anyone wills to come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me."[2] We deny ourselves through mortification of the senses, chastity, temperance, obedience, humility; we take up the cross through patience in adversities, and faithful fulfillment of the duties proper to our state, as will be explained more fully in the course of the work. - But that denial, which is the more arduous the more it must be renewed continually, becomes easier by the examples of Christ, who went before us bearing His cross, so that we also might be able to carry our cross, according to that saying:[3] "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you may follow his footsteps." For thus patience is, as it were, deified, and greatly increases our merits: "If yet we suffer with him, that we may also be glorified with him."[4] How much strength of soul and how much consolation this doctrine brings, the rationalists themselves are compelled to acknowledge.[5]

[2] Matt., XVI, 24.

[3] 1 Peter, II, 21.

[4] Rom., VIII, 17.

[5] Thus, among others, P. Janet, *Histoire de la Philosophie morale*, Paris, 1860, t. I, p. 211: "The Passion, which is the supreme mystery in Christianity, sufficiently indicates that the life of man is nothing but a passion, that is, a sorrow. While all antiquity made the good consist in not suffering, and invited man, either by virtue or by pleasure, to flee sorrow, the Gospel presents sorrow as a good. Sorrow is in some way deified, since God Himself willed to suffer, to groan, to die." - Nor otherwise G. Seailles, *Les affirmations de la Conscience moderne*, Paris, Colin, 1903, p. 51: "Christianity deifies suffering: Jesus, Son of God and God Himself, descended upon the earth; He took with our body all our infirmities; from the point of view of this world, He was one conquered, He was despised, insulted, struck; He willed to suffer, to die; He carried His Cross, He attached Himself to that wood of sorrow, He groaned, He shed tears... The Christian, he who looks at things with the eyes of faith and not with the eyes of flesh, no longer knows one disinherited, one conquered by life. Suffering is a good; it has its price in itself. God gathers up the most unknown, the most obscure, the most humble miseries, to make of them beatitude and glory."

251. (C) The duties of domestic and social life flow both from the love of God and neighbor and from self-denial. Thus children ought to honor parents and obey them, because they hold the place of God.[1] Servants and domestics ought to show honor and obedience to masters, as to Christ;[2] but masters ought to hold their servants as brothers in Christ.[3] - Subjects are bound to obey legitimate superiors, as God Himself: "For there is no power except from God... Therefore he who resists the power, resists the ordinance of God."[4] Superiors, on the other hand, ought to exercise only a paternal rule, and to imitate God, whose power over men is joined with paternal goodness.

[1] Ephes., VI, 1; Coloss., III, 20.

[2] Ephes., VI, 5-6; 1 Peter, II, 18-19.

[3] Ephes., VI, 9; Coloss., IV, 1; Ep. to Philemon.

[4] Rom., XIII, 1-2.

252. (D) Those things which regard worship are concerned with the sacraments and the sacrifice of the Mass; but these derive their virtue and efficacy from the passion of Christ, and therefore tend to this, that they may more perfectly dispose us to receiving the supernatural life of grace, which itself is as it were a foretaste of eternal life. For this reason the ceremonial matters of the new law are fewer in number, easier in act, and far greater in usefulness than the rites of the ancient law, as befits the state of sons, which is proper to the Christian people.[5]

[5] St. Augustine, *Cont. Faustum*, lib. XIX, c. 13, Migne, P. L., XLII, 355.

253. (E) To these precepts, however, evangelical counsels have been added, by which we are able to tend more securely to the perfection of the Christian life. Precepts are given concerning those things which are necessary for attaining the end,[6] and therefore imply a true moral obligation; - but counsels are given concerning those things which lead us to the end more expeditiously and perfectly, and therefore do not oblige per se.

[6] This is easily understood concerning precepts under grave obligation: for the violation of them turns us away from the ultimate end. As to precepts under light obligation, the violation of them retards us from the kingdom of heaven, as long as it is not fully remitted.

Christ indeed did not hand down this distinction explicitly, but implicitly, when He addressed the rich young man thus: "But if you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments... If you wish to be perfect, go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you shall have treasure in heaven, and come, follow me."[1] Paul confirms this concerning virginity, saying: "But concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel... He who gives his virgin in marriage does well, and he who does not give her does better."[2] Yet we do not deny that it is often difficult to define from Scripture what ought to be referred to precepts and what to counsels; for the most part this can be determined only from the traditional sense of the Church.

[1] Matt., XIX, 17-21.

[2] 1 Cor., VII, 25-40.

254. Among the counsels, three are principal, which usually are specially called evangelical, namely poverty and virginity, concerning which there is question in the texts cited above, and also perfect obedience, which is nothing other than the abdication of one's own will, and is commended many times in Scripture. - St. Thomas declares why these three are of the greatest importance:[3] The goods of this world consist in three things: in riches, which pertain to the concupiscence of the eyes; in delights of the flesh, which pertain to the concupiscence of the flesh; and in honors, which regard the pride of life. But these three things are totally abandoned through the aforesaid counsels: for riches are abdicated through poverty, delights of the flesh through perpetual chastity, pride of life through the service of obedience. - And thus he who strives to observe these and other counsels renounces the goods of the world more perfectly, and loves God more fully from the whole heart. Yet the practice of the counsels is not fitting for all, because perfection belongs to few.[4]

[3] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 108, a. 4.

[4] On the counsels see J. Schwane, *De operibus supererogatoriis et consiliis evangelicis in genere*, Monasterii, 1868.

3. Concerning the Perfection and Duration of the New Law.

255. (A) From all these things it is manifest that the new law is much more perfect than the old:[5] (a) by reason of the object, which embraces more moral precepts, and those more luminously explained and better reduced to unity, - but fewer ceremonial precepts, and those conducing more closely to true holiness; (b) by reason of the more abundant grace which accompanies it; (c) by reason of universality, since it was enacted not for one people, but for all, according to that saying:[6] "Going therefore, teach all nations... teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you"; (d) by reason of perpetuity, since it will endure until the consummation of the age, according to that which remains to be explained.

[5] Bourdaloue eloquently discusses the perfection of the Christian law, *Sermon pour le 6e Dim. après l'Epiphanie, sur la sainteté et la force de la loi chrétienne*.

[6] Matt., XXVIII, 19.

256. (B) The Prophets had already announced that the ancient law, in its ceremonial part, was to be abrogated: "Behold the days shall come, says the Lord, and I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah, not according to the covenant which I made with their fathers."[1] Not so concerning the new law, which is called the new and eternal testament, to last until the consummation of the age.[2] In fact, after Christ's advent in the flesh, nothing else is to be expected except His same advent in the clouds of heaven to judge the living and the dead.[3]

[1] Jerem., XXXI, 31-32; cf. Malach., I, 10-11.

[2] Hebr., XIII, 20; cf. Canon of the Mass; Matt., XXVIII, 20.

[3] Matt., XXV, 31-46; XXVI, 64.

Although the new law is perfect, and embraces all essentials, nothing prevents it from being accommodated to various places and times, under the authority of the Church, to whom Christ handed over the power of making laws which help the faithful to observe the divine precepts more safely.

Article III. Concerning Ecclesiastical Law.

257. In the Treatise on the Church (n. 49-100 and n. 199-216), it was proved that Christ conferred on the Church the power of making laws, and that this authority does not indeed reside in the body of the faithful or of simple priests, but with the supreme Pastors, primarily indeed with the Supreme Pontiff, and secondarily with Bishops. In fact, already from the Council of Jerusalem, the Church has not ceased to establish laws, by recalling to memory those things which had already been commanded by divine law, by determining more explicitly those things which divine law had left indeterminate, and by imposing certain things which until then had been free, for promoting the more perfect fulfillment of the evangelical law. Wherefore here certain principles must be handed down concerning ecclesiastical law considered in general; but particular laws are explained in the course of this work, and especially in the *Praelectiones juris canonici*.

[4] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 95-96; Suarez, lib. IV-VI; Billuart, diss. III-IV; Muller, § 48-69; Bouquillon, n. 108-213. - Besides theologians, see the Canonists, especially Reiffenstuel, Schmalzgrueber, De Angelis, Santi, in book I of the Decretals, tit. II, *De Constitutionibus*, tit. III, *De Rescriptis*, tit. IV, *De Consuetudine*. - Concerning ecclesiastical law the manuscripts were of the greatest use which S. Many, professor of canon law in the Catholic University of Paris, kindly handed over to me, and which he will make public at an opportune time.

Division:

- Concerning the author
- Concerning the object
- Concerning the promulgation
- Concerning the obligation of ecclesiastical law
- Concerning interpretation
- Concerning cessation
- Concerning custom

§ I. Concerning the Author of Ecclesiastical Law.

258. From what was said in the Treatise on the Church (loc. cit.), by divine right, the Supreme Pontiff can make laws for the whole Church, but Bishops for the part of the territory assigned to them by the Roman Pontiff,[1] and indeed by ordinary power. Moreover the Pope, who is endowed with supreme legislative power, sometimes grants part of his power to others, either by simple delegation, or by deputation to some office, to which ordinary jurisdiction is annexed.

[1] Whether the jurisdiction of Bishops proceeds immediately from God, or immediately from the Supreme Pontiff and mediately from God, is disputed, from what was said in the Treatise on the Church, n. 208.

259. 1. The Roman Pontiff can establish laws for the universal Church, and for any part of it; and indeed either alone, insofar as he is the vicar of Christ, - or with the sacred Council approving, in which case the Bishops are legislators together with him.[2] And indeed, although he is able by his own authority to make laws, sometimes it is expedient that a Council, whether provincial or ecumenical, be convoked, for knowing better what abuses have crept into various parts of the Church, and by what means he may be able to remedy them; moreover, those things which have been decreed by common counsel are more efficaciously put into execution with concordant mind. - An Ecumenical Council enjoys the same universal authority as the Pontiff himself (On the Church, n. 211-216).

[2] *De Ecclesia*, n. 199-216.

260. 2. A Bishop can make laws for his own diocese, either in synod (that is, with the pastors of his diocese and others to be called by law convoked), or outside synod, - yet under the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, who can set certain limits to their power, and can invalidate their laws if he judges them to be contrary to the common good.

Patriarchs, Primates, Metropolitans can indeed make laws for their own diocese; but not for the whole province over which they preside, except in a provincial or plenary Council, namely with the suffragan Bishops concurring, who possess true lawmaking power. In the western Church, before the

decrees of a plenary or provincial council are promulgated, they must be reviewed by the Sacred Congregation of the Council, or of Propaganda Fide (where missions are in question), so that they can be amended, if there is need;[1] nevertheless that review in common form[2] does not give greater force to these decrees, but only shows that nothing stands in the way of their promulgation.

[1] Sixtus V, Const. *Immensa*, 22 Jan. 1588; cf. Benedict XIV, *De synodo*, l. XIII, c. 3, n. 3; Pius X, Bull *Sapienti consilio*, 29 Jun. 1908.

[2] Decrees are confirmed in solemn form when the Pontiff makes them his own and promulgates them in his own name; this is not customarily done today.

261. By common ecclesiastical right, Vicars and Prefects Apostolic can make laws for their territory (c. 294, § 1), Abbots and Prelates nullius (c. 323), major Superiors and, according to the norm of the Constitutions, Chapters in exempt clerical religions (cc. 198, § 1, 501, § 1). - By particular ecclesiastical right, legates, nuncios, and others can make laws according to the tenor of their faculties.

Abbesses or superioresses, and rectors of lower communities, namely parishes, monasteries, sodalities, universities, etc., do not enjoy legislative power.

§ II. Concerning the Object of Ecclesiastical Law.

262. 1. The general principle is that the Church can make laws concerning all those things which regard the worship of God and the sanctification of man: "Whatever therefore in human affairs is in any way sacred, whatever pertains to the salvation of souls or the worship of God, whether it is such by its own nature, or again is understood to be such because of the cause to which it is referred, all that is in the power and judgment of the Church."[3] For the power of any society is measured by its end; but the end of the Church is the attainment of eternal life through the worship of God and the sanctification of its members. - From this it follows that nothing dishonorable, nothing contrary to natural or divine right, can be prescribed.

[3] Leo XIII, Encycl. *Immortale Dei*, 1 Nov. 1885.

263. 2. Ecclesiastical law cannot command what is too arduous and difficult. For since it is enacted for the good of the community, it ought to be proportioned to the fragility of human nature; otherwise it would not promote the public good, but rather would be a very frequent occasion of sins. Concerning this, however, three things must be noted: (a) it is not repugnant that an arduous law be imposed upon some society or state which not all, but few, freely choose, as is, for example, the law of celibacy or poverty annexed to the clerical or religious state; (b) when the reason of the public good requires it, the Church can command even heroic acts, for example the administration of the sacraments in time of contagious disease; (c) judgment concerning the difficulty of the law belongs to the legislators themselves, not to the subjects: otherwise laws would be done away with.

264. 3. But it is asked whether the Church can command internal acts. Here there is question not of the penitential forum, where the confessor, as minister of Christ, judges

concerning internal things, and can enjoin merely internal works by way of satisfaction; but of the external forum, to which legislative power pertains.

(A) According to all, the Church can prescribe internal acts which are necessarily joined with external acts; for law directs only truly human acts, and therefore can be concerned with the internal dispositions necessary for a human act; thus, by commanding an oath, confession, communion, or the hearing of Mass, by that very fact it commands the internal acts necessarily joined with those external acts, namely the mind of swearing, attrition, the state of grace, attention.

(B) According to the common opinion, which we embrace, the Church cannot prescribe merely internal acts.[1] For (a) the judicial and coercive power of the Church cannot be exercised concerning internal acts, as Innocent III openly declared: "If their excess [of simoniacs] were manifest to the Church, which does not judge hidden things, they would have to be struck with canonical penalty";[2] and elsewhere he adds: "It has been given to us to judge only concerning manifest things."[1] But legislative power cannot proceed without judicial and coercive power: for it is required that the legislator be able to urge the observance of his laws by judgment and penalties; otherwise, his power would be contemned.

[1] Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 4; q. 100, a. 9; Suarez, *De Legibus*, l. IV, c. 12; Schmalzgrueber, in tit. *de Const.*, n. 21; St. Alphonsus, lib. I, n. 100. Bouquillon, n. 114, with certain others, defends the contrary.

[2] Cap. *Sicut*, 33, *de Simonia* (lib. V, tit. 3).

[1] Cap. *Tua nos*, 34, *de Simonia* (lib. V, tit. 3).

(b) Just as the power of the internal forum directly and immediately regards the internal sanctification of individuals, so the power of the external forum directly regards the external governance of the Church, and therefore reaches internal acts only indirectly, namely those which are necessarily joined with external acts.

265. 4. It is asked moreover whether ecclesiastical law can reach past acts. (A) Per se it generally does not extend to them; for since law is primarily a rule, it cannot reach past acts which can no longer be ruled. Hence in canon law it is expressly said:[2] "Since it is certain that laws and constitutions give form to future affairs, they are not to be drawn to past facts, unless provision is made in them by name concerning past things." From this was born the axiom: "The law does not have eyes backward."

[2] Cap. *Quoniam*, 13, *de Constit.* (lib. I, t. 2).

(B) Sometimes, however, the law reaches past acts, not indeed as to the force of commanding or forbidding, as has already been said, but as to other effects: -

(a) As to a penal effect; namely, it cannot reach an act previously prohibited in no way, but it can punish an act which was already previously prohibited, although without sanction or without determinate sanction.

(b) As to an irritant effect; if an act, previously posited, is irrevocable by natural or divine right (for example, a matrimonial contract between Christians), a subsequent law cannot reach it; but if from some part, although valid, it is infirm or capable of being made void (for example, a contract entered

into from fear), the law can irritate it, for a grave cause, provided that it expressly makes provision for this.

(c) A law establishing inabilities, incapacities, and irregularities, which are not properly penalties, can reach past acts for a most grave cause: for since here there is question not of a penalty, but of a condition for obtaining some office, the matter depends upon the will of the legislator.

It must be noted, however, that the things which we have said regard law properly so called, or law constitutive of new right; for if there is question of a law declarative of ancient right, it much more easily reaches past acts, although the agent ought to be excused from fault and from penalty, on account of ignorance and uncertainty of the newly declared right.

§ III. Concerning the Promulgation of Ecclesiastical Law.

266. I. Necessity and mode. Law does not obtain the force of obliging unless it has been intimated, or promulgated, to the subjects. For promulgation is the act by which the legislator authentically intimates his law to the community, or makes it known, with the will of obliging clearly manifested; and this he can accomplish either by himself or through another. The necessity of this promulgation is acknowledged in Canon Law:[1] "This alone suffices, that he be held to the observance of it [the law], who has known that it has been solemnly issued or publicly promulgated." And deservedly, for law cannot direct or bind the will unless it is first known.

[1] *Decretal.*, l. I, tit. 5, *De postulat.*, c. 1, *Ad haec*.

From the nature of the thing, that promulgation is required and suffices by which the law, considering all the adjuncts of times, places, and persons, can morally and in a human manner reach the knowledge of the subjects; once this is posited, the mode of promulgating the law is left to the judgment of the legislator.

267. II. Specifically concerning Pontifical laws. 1. The mode of promulgating laws used by the Pontiffs was not always the same.[2] (a) During the first twelve centuries, they promulgated their constitutions by sending them into the provinces, through clerics of most approved fidelity, either to individual bishops, or to metropolitans or patriarchs, who would take care that the same were transmitted to the bishops. (b) At the beginning of the thirteenth century, they began to promulgate authentic collections of canon law, sending them with a Bull to the more celebrated academies; thus Innocent III, in the year 1210, promulgated the collection of his decretals by letters directed to the University of Bologna. (c) In the course of the same century, they ordered certain Bulls to be promulgated by affixing them in the place of their residence, especially at Rome, with this clause, that such promulgation would suffice for the law to obtain its whole force: thus Martin IV, in the year 1281, issued a Bull against Michael Palaeologus.[3]

[2] Zaccaria, *De varia Ecclesiae, praesertim Latinae, in promulg. sacrar. constitut. disciplina*; Bouix, *De princ. juris can.*, Parisiis, 2nd ed., 1852, p. 248 sq.

[3] *Bull. Rom.*, ed. Cocquelines, t. III, P. 2, p. 30.

268. 2. But afterward they promulgated their decrees in various ways: (a) Constitutions or Apostolic Letters, when they contained a law for the whole world, were promulgated by affixing them at Rome, in one or more of these places: at the doors of the Lateran church, of the basilica of St. Peter in the Vatican, of the Apostolic Chancery, - or in the area of Campo de' Fiori. (b) They promulgated Encyclicals by sending them, according to the ancient custom, to individual bishops, or to metropolitans or apostolic nuncios. (c) Indeed, it had almost come into custom that the acts of the Holy See and its decrees, when published by legitimate authority in the secretarial Office by which they had been issued, were held by that very fact to have been promulgated.

3. But Pius X decreed[1] that an official Commentary should be published (*Acta Apostolicae Sedis*), in which he willed that pontifical constitutions, laws, decrees, and other decisions both of the Roman Pontiffs and of the sacred Congregations and Offices be inserted, and thus promulgated, whenever there is need of promulgation, and no provision has otherwise been made by the Holy See.

[1] Const. *Promulgandi*, 29 Sept. 1908, A. A. S., I, p. 5.

Therefore the opinion of those who formerly thought that promulgation in provinces and dioceses was required for the force of pontifical laws is to be rejected; for this is in no way required from the very nature of the thing, and moreover the legislator has several times declared that the promulgation which is made at Rome suffices.

269. But today, according to the Code, can. 9, "laws are promulgated by the Apostolic See through publication in the official commentary of the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, unless in particular cases another mode of promulgating has been prescribed; and they exercise their force only after three months have been completed from the day which is affixed to the number of the *Acta*, unless from the nature of the thing they bind at once, or in the law itself a shorter or longer vacancy has been specially and expressly established."

Thus an end is imposed upon the controversy formerly agitated concerning the time at which a law begins to oblige. Some said that it obliges at once, namely on the day after promulgation;[2] but others gradually, namely from the time at which each person has known it;[3] and others, finally, only after two months from the day of promulgation.

[2] D'Annibale, *Summula*, t. I, n. 202, note 21, 23.

[3] Suarez, lib. III, c. 17, n. 6, and lib. IV, c. 15, n. 9 sq.

270. III. Concerning the promulgation of episcopal laws. According to the recent Code, can. 335, § 2, the matter is left to the reasonable judgment of the bishop. Thus they are sufficiently promulgated if they are publicly read in the cathedral church, or signified by the voice of a herald in the square of the city, - or, having been written, are affixed in a public place designated for this, for example at the doors of the cathedral church, - or are committed to type in the diocesan sheet. - Indeed, if the law regards only the clergy, it needs no other publication except that which is made in the synod itself, at which the principal part of the clergy is present.[4]

[4] Benedict XIV, *De synodo*, lib. XIII, c. 4, n. 1.

An episcopal law obliges at once once it has been promulgated, unless otherwise declared; for common law establishes no delay for the obligation of particular laws.

IV. Concerning the Acceptance of Ecclesiastical Law.

271. In order that ecclesiastical law may oblige, it in no way needs the acceptance of the community or of secular authority.

1. It does not need the acceptance of the community; for ecclesiastical power does not come from the community, but from Christ Himself, as was proved in the Treatise on the Church. Hence the force of pontifical laws per se does not depend upon the acceptance of the bishops, since they are bound to obey the Roman Pontiff even in those things which regard the discipline and government of the Church; nor does the force of episcopal laws depend of itself upon the acceptance of priests, since they ought to obey their bishops.

Yet if some bishop understands that some pontifical constitution, concerning some head of discipline, can induce some harmful effect in his diocese, he not only can, but even ought, to represent his reasons to the Roman Pontiff.[1] "Nor," says Benedict XIV (loc. cit.), "have the Roman Pontiffs ever refused to lend an ear to the reasons of inferiors; and, as often as they recognized these to be sufficiently valid, they in no way refused to exempt some provinces or dioceses from the law of their general constitutions, as to that kind of discipline of which we are now treating." - Now, during the whole time of supplication, the obligation of the law is more probably suspended;[2] but when the Apostolic See has pronounced judgment, one must stand wholly by this.

[1] Thus Benedict XIV, op. cit., lib. IX, c. 8, n. 3.

[2] Reiffenstuel, in tit. *De Constitut.*, n. 145.

272. 2. It does not need the acceptance of the civil authority, or the royal placet. Sometimes princes have opposed the promulgation of ecclesiastical laws in their kingdom, or prohibited pontifical bulls from entering the kingdom without the royal placet.[3] This abuse, reproved many times by the Supreme Pontiffs, Vatican thus condemned:[4] "Wherefore we condemn and reprobate the opinions of those who say that this communication of the supreme head with pastors and flocks can licitly be impeded, or who make the same subject to secular power, so that they contend that those things which are established by the Apostolic See or by its authority for the government of the Church have no force and value unless they are confirmed by the placet of the secular power." In fact the Church is a complete society, independent from the State (*De Ecclesia*, n. 109-110), and in spiritual matters she is endowed with supreme authority.

[3] The royal placet, among others, was advocated by Van Essen, *De promulg. legis et de placito regio*; whom these refuted: Zaccaria, *Antifebronius vindicatus*, t. IV, diss. 12; Bouix, op. cit., p. 11, sect. 2, c. 4; Tarquini, diss. *de placito regio*; Cavagnis, *Instit. juris publici*, ed. 3a, t. II, lib. III, n. 2-23.

[4] Vatican, sess. IV, c. 3 (Denzing., n. 1675).

Yet sometimes the Church, for the good of peace and to avoid greater evils, tolerates that the royal placet be obtained by bishops; sometimes also, in concordats, some use of the placet is conceded.

§ IV. Concerning the Obligation of Ecclesiastical Law.

273. Ecclesiastical law, duly promulgated, has the force of obliging in conscience, as is clear from the Treatise on the Church (n. 49-67), where it was proved that Christ conferred on the Church the power of making laws. Hence those who despise the pastors are said to despise Christ Himself;[2] and filial obedience is to be shown to spiritual rulers.[3]

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 96; Suarez, lib. IV, c. 17-20; Billuart, diss. IV, art. 3-7; St. Alphonsus, lib. I, n. 140-152; Bouquillon, n. 133-163; Noldin, n. 118-127 and 136-148.

[2] Luke, X, 16.

[3] Hebr., XIII, 17.

But if there is question of a doubtful law, according to the Code, can. 15, "laws, even irritant and inhabilitating laws, do not urge in a doubt of law; but in a doubt of fact, the Ordinary can dispense in them, provided there is question of laws in which the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to dispense."

We shall speak: 1. concerning the gravity; 2. concerning the extension; 3. concerning the subject of this obligation; 4. concerning the manner of fulfilling it.

I. Concerning the Gravity of the Obligation Induced by Ecclesiastical Law.

The gravity of this obligation depends both on the matter of the law and on the will of the legislator.

274. 1. It depends on the gravity of the matter, insofar as the legislator cannot impose under grave obligation except grave matter. For it is not consonant with reason that matter, light under every respect, be commanded under penalty of mortal sin; otherwise sins would be multiplied, and the law would turn to the detriment, rather than to the good, of subjects.

But for judging concerning the gravity of the matter, attention must be given not only to the nature of the thing, but also to the end and other adjuncts. (a) When the end to be attained is of great importance and morally necessary, and moreover the action commanded greatly conduces to obtaining this end, the matter is judged grave; thus the public service of God, the dignity of worship, the holiness of the clergy, etc., are certainly something of great importance, and moreover the observance of feasts, abstinence, fasting, observance of celibacy, and recitation of the breviary greatly conduce to pursuing those ends; therefore all these things can be commanded under grave obligation. (b) When the intended end is not of great importance, or when the action does not greatly conduce to the end, otherwise of great importance, the matter is judged light; thus a law commanding that the various parts of the breviary be recited at certain times of the day, although ordered to the glorification of God and the sanctification of priests, does not conduce greatly to obtaining that end, since God is glorified and priests are sanctified even if the breviary is recited at other times of the same day; therefore this matter is light.

275. 2. It depends also on the will of the legislator: for he, sometimes at least, can command under light obligation a thing grave of itself, for example fasting; for, even when there is question of an end of great importance and of a means very useful for attaining such an end, the legislator can foresee that a precept imposed under grave obligation will be the occasion of manifold spiritual ruin, and therefore prescribe the thing only under light obligation.

But for discerning what the intention of the legislator was, these things especially are to be weighed: (a) the very words of the law, which imply grave obligation when it is said: we command severely, strictly, in virtue of obedience, under threat of divine judgment, etc.; (b) the penalties inflicted or to be inflicted upon transgressors; for a grave penalty, such as excommunication, suspension, interdict, etc., implies grave obligation; (c) the interpretation of doctors and the sense of pious faithful.

276. Corollary. Since law is obligatory, by that very fact the means truly necessary for observing the law are obligatory: for he who sincerely wills to attain the end, logically and consequently wills the means necessary to the end.

Hence (a) subjects ought to apply ordinary diligence to knowing the law: for the law cannot be observed unless it is known.

(b) Likewise they ought to furnish those things which are proximately necessary for the observation of the law; thus he who is bound to recite the divine office ought to obtain and keep a breviary; he who is bound by the law of fasting ought to buy fasting foods at a suitable time.

(c) Moreover they ought to remove or forestall impediments which render observance of the law impossible, provided that this can be done without grave inconvenience; thus he who knows that he cannot fast when he hunts ought to abstain from hunting on a fast day.

II. Concerning the Extension of This Obligation.

There are certain laws which, from their special character, induce a special obligation; thus especially laws including a presumption, or founded on a presumption, and irritant laws.

1. Concerning the Obligation of a Law Including a Presumption or Founded on a Presumption.

A twofold presumption is distinguished: presumption of fact and presumption of danger.

277. (A) A law including a presumption of fact is one which, supposing that some fact always exists in certain adjuncts (because in similar adjuncts it is truly accustomed to exist), establishes rights and obligations for a case of this kind. Thus if someone has been born and educated among Catholics, he is presumed by law to have been baptized: therefore the law by which he is subjected to all the statutes of the Church, although his baptism is not certainly established, is a law including a presumption of fact.

A presumption of fact can be simply of law, or of law and by law: the former is one which is simply expressed or supposed in law, and against which any proof is admitted; thus in the case brought above; - the latter is one which is held by law as so firm that it is considered as truth, and against it

not any proof is admitted, but only proof either indirect, or direct but wholly manifest: thus "a res judicata is held true and just by a presumption of law and by law, and cannot be impugned directly," as the Code, c. 1904, decrees; thus also from c. 1972, "a marriage which, while both spouses were living, was not accused, after the death of either or both spouses, is presumed to have been valid in such a way that no proof is admitted against this presumption, unless the question arises incidentally."

(a) In the external forum, a law founded on a presumption of law simply obliges until the falsity of the presumed fact is proved: and for demonstrating this, any proof suffices. - If there is question of a presumption of law and by law, it likewise obliges until the falsity of the presumed fact is demonstrated; but regularly direct demonstration is not admitted, unless it is wholly manifest. But indirect proof is admitted; for example, a res judicata can be impugned indirectly if the falsity of the documents on which the sentence exclusively rests is proved. - Indeed direct proof is permitted, if it is wholly evident, as judicial confession, a public document, witnesses of extraordinary authority: for the axiom is universally received: presumption yields to truth.

278. (b) In the internal forum, a law founded on a presumption of fact does not oblige in conscience, if the fact truly does not exist: for, in the forum of conscience, presumption always yields to truth. Thus if two spouses contracted marriage invalidly, because of a diriment impediment which cannot be proved in the external forum, they cannot engage in marital intercourse, even if the validity of the marriage is confirmed by the sentence of the judge.[1] - Yet if a law of this kind can be observed without sin, it often ought to be observed in order to avoid scandal.

[1] *Decretal.*, cap. *Inquisitioni*, 44, *de Sentent. excommunicationis*.

279. (B) A law founded on a presumption of danger is one which forbids or commands something, to forestall a danger which is frequently found connected with some action or omission; thus the law which prohibits the reading of depraved books, or forbids mixed marriages; for in these cases the danger of perversion regarding faith or morals is frequently present. Now a law of this kind always obliges, even if in a particular case the danger is not present. For law does not cease unless the end of the law has ceased adequately, that is, totally and as to all, morally speaking: since it is directed to the whole community. But in our case, even if danger does not exist for such an individual, nevertheless it perseveres for the community. Therefore the law retains its force. - Moreover according to the Code,[2] "laws enacted to forestall a general danger urge, even if in a particular case the danger is not present." Otherwise many will rashly judge that no danger threatens them.

[2] Code, can. 21.

2. Concerning the Obligation of an Irritant Law.

280. (A) Notion and species. (a) An irritant law is called one which establishes that some act or contract, on account of some defect, is by that very fact invalid or rescindable; and thus it is distinguished from a prohibiting law, which of itself indeed makes an act illicit, but not invalid. - A law closely related to an irritant law is an inhabilitating law, which decrees that such a

person is incapable for this or that act; whence irritation directly regards the act, and inability directly regards the person; but in practice and morally speaking, both produce the same effects.

(b) From the very notion handed down, a law can irritate in two ways: by the law itself, when the act is rendered null from the beginning, even before the sentence of the judge; - by the sentence of the judge, when the act is valid until it is rescinded by the judge: wherefore, before the sentence of the judge, it is indeed rescindable, but not invalid. - From another head, irritation is called penal, when it is enacted on account of some delict; non-penal, when, on account of the public good, it irritates acts lacking a certain condition.

281. (B) Effects of an irritant law in the external forum. (a) If the act is only rescindable, it is deservedly held as valid until it is rescinded by the judge; for to this pertains what is said in canon law:[1] "Since many things are tolerated through patience, which, if they had been brought into judgment, with justice requiring it, ought not to be tolerated." (b) If the act is null by the law itself, it is held as invalid from the beginning, and the sentence of the judge, if it supervenes, does not properly irritate it, but declares that it was invalid from the beginning.

[1] *Decretal.*, cap. *Cum jamdudum*, 18, *de Praebendis* (lib. III, tit. 5).

282. (C) Effects of an irritant law in the internal forum. When there is question of a rescindable act, there is no difficulty: for it is valid in the forum of conscience until it is rescinded. But very grave difficulties and controversies are present when there is question of an act null by the law itself. We explain those things which seem to us more probable: -

(a) If the question is concerning those acts or contracts which have being and receive force from canon law alone (as, for example, religious profession), they must be held as invalid, even in the internal forum, before any declaratory sentence of a judge; since they do not have being and force from natural law, but only from canon law, - and moreover canon law in the case irritates them, they have no existence or force.

(b) If the question is concerning those acts or contracts which receive being and force from natural law, the difficulty increases: 1) if the canonical legislator clearly manifests his will of irritating the act even in the internal forum, this must be wholly stood by: for he is endowed with the power of doing this; 2) if there is question of a matrimonial contract, the same must be said; the reason is because if that contract is once admitted as valid, thereafter it can be rescinded by no human power, even ecclesiastical, on account of the indissolubility of the matrimonial bond established by divine right; 3) but if there is question of other acts or contracts (for example, alienation of ecclesiastical goods), and nothing else is lacking for their validity except a certain solemnity prescribed by canon law, certain canonists of great name probably hold that the contract can be held as valid in the forum of conscience, until it is declared null by a judge; for it seems too hard that someone ought to despoil himself of a good justly acquired (considered according to natural right), before the declaratory sentence of a judge, on account of the defect of some solemnity; whence, in this case, it can be said that the act is not valid canonically, but retains its natural force until the contrary is authentically declared.

III. Concerning the Subject of Ecclesiastical Law.

Laws do not oblige except subjects; but for defining who are subject to ecclesiastical law, we shall set forth 1. the general principle; 2. conclusions to be deduced therefrom concerning certain laws or certain persons.

[1] Suarez, lib. III, c. 31-35 and lib. IV, c. 19; Billuart, diss. IV, art. 8; Bouquillon, n. 151-163.

283. 1. General principle: All and only baptized persons, habitually in possession of reason, are subject to ecclesiastical laws.[2]

[2] "Those who have not received baptism are not held by merely ecclesiastical laws, nor baptized persons who do not enjoy sufficient use of reason, nor those who, although they have attained the use of reason, have not yet completed the seventh year of age, unless something else is expressly provided by law." (Code, c. 12).

(A) All baptized persons, as Trent openly defined:[3] "If anyone shall say that the baptized are free from all the precepts of holy Church, which are either written or handed down, so that they are not held to observe them, unless they shall have wished to submit themselves to them of their own accord, let him be anathema." - For by receiving baptism, they become members of Christ and citizens of the Church (*De Baptismo*, n. 27).

[3] Trent, sess. VII, *de Baptismo*, can. 8, apud Denzing., n. 745.

Heretics and schismatics also are bound per se by these laws. For if there is question of those who freely and culpably separated from the Church, they cannot by unjust rebellion exempt themselves from the obedience owed to legitimate superiors; in fact in the *Corpus juris* many laws are found concerning heretics, schismatics, and apostates, and it has several times been declared that they are held by impediments diriment of marriage. - But if the question is concerning those who are born in heresy, and remain in it in good faith, some have thought that the Church, for her benignity, does not wish to bind them by at least certain laws; but, as to the fact, the Church has never declared that they are immune from these laws. Therefore it can only be said that those who are in good faith are excused from every formal and culpable transgression of ecclesiastical laws, because they are wholly ignorant of them.

284. (B) Only baptized persons; for those who have not yet been regenerated by baptism are outside the Church. Now the Apostle teaches that the Church does not judge those who are outside;[1] the Pontiffs acknowledge that pagans are not bound by canonical constitutions;[2] and Trent declares that the Church exercises judgment over no one who has not first entered into her through the gate of baptism.[3] Consequently infidels, Jews, and others not baptized are in no way held by ecclesiastical laws.

[1] 1 Cor., V, 12-13.

[2] *Decretal.*, lib. IV, tit. 19, cap. *Gaudemus*, 8, *De divortiis*.

[3] Trent, sess. XIV, cap. 2, apud Denzing., n. 775.

285. (C) Habitually in possession of reason, that is, those who have attained the use of reason and at least habitually retain it, such as not only those who actually enjoy reason, but also the insane who have lucid intervals, the drunk, and the delirious; but not infants and the perpetually insane. - For ecclesiastical law tends to this, that it direct the actions of subjects to

a spiritual end; but the actions of those who enjoy reason neither actually nor habitually cannot be directed to the end; on the contrary, the actions of those who habitually enjoy reason can be directed, even if actually they lack the use of it. - Therefore it is licit (although it is not fitting) to furnish meat to infants and the insane on a forbidden day.

286. Yet certain exceptions are given: (a) laws granting rights, or irritating some act, can affect even those who do not habitually have the use of reason, - because they are not directive laws; (b) the impubescent are not subject to penal laws of the Church, unless the contrary is expressed in law: for, on account of defect of more mature judgment, they are worthy of mercy; (c) but the faithful are subject to the other laws suited to their age; hence they are not held by the precept of fasting unless they have reached the twenty-first year; but those who have completed the seventh year ought to hear Mass and abstain from meat, and those who have attained the use of reason ought to communicate at Easter time.

[4] Who are adults, impubescent persons, infants, the Code, c. 8, thus declares: "§ 1. A person who has completed the twenty-first year of age is an adult; below this age, a minor. § 2. A minor, if male, is judged pubescent from the completed fourteenth year, if female, from the completed twelfth year. § 3. An impubescent before the full seventh year is called an infant or child or little one and is judged not in possession of himself; but when the seventh year has been completed, he is presumed to have the use of reason. To an infant are assimilated all who are habitually destitute of reason."

287. (D) It is asked whether the legislator himself is bound to obey his laws? (a) The legislator properly and directly is not held by his laws, at least more probably; for no one can command himself and exercise jurisdiction over himself. But he is held indirectly and consequently, insofar as he ought to observe the law established for the good of the whole community, in order to furnish subjects good example, and lest they be scandalized. But the gravity of this obligation depends on the gravity of the scandal caused by violation of the law.

(b) But those who compose a college endowed with legislative power are subject to the laws enacted by the college or council; thus bishops and the metropolitan ought to obey the laws which they themselves enacted in a provincial Council; for, taken singly, they cannot enact these laws, and therefore the provincial council is truly above the individual bishops, not excepting the metropolitan, and can impose precepts upon them. - But the Roman Pontiff, who, while he presides over an ecumenical council, remains above the council, is not directly obliged by the disciplinary laws of the Council.

2. Conclusions Concerning the Obligation of Laws in Certain Cases.

288. State of the question. General laws, enacted by the Roman Pontiff or by ecumenical Councils, indeed oblige all the baptized, as we have said; but particular laws enacted by bishops and provincial councils are presumed territorial; therefore the question arises who are held by these laws. Now in relation to territory, there are distinguished inhabitants, newcomers, pilgrims, travelers, vagi, and exempt persons.[1]

[1] Code, c. 91: "A person is called: an inhabitant, in the place where he has domicile; a newcomer, in the place where he has quasi-domicile; a pilgrim, if he is staying outside the domicile and quasi-domicile which he still retains; a vagus if he has domicile or quasi-domicile nowhere."

(a) Inhabitants of some place are called those who have their domicile there. Now from the Code, c. 92, § 1, "Domicile is acquired by residence in some parish or quasi-parish, or at least in a diocese, vicariate apostolic, prefecture apostolic; which residence is either joined with the intention of remaining there perpetually, if nothing calls one away from it, or has been protracted to a completed decade." It is lost as soon as these two things concur at the same time: actual departure from the place, and the intention of not returning.

(b) Newcomers are those who have a quasi-domicile somewhere. Now quasi-domicile is acquired "by residence as above, which is either joined with the intention of remaining there at least for the greater part of a year, if nothing calls one away from it, or is in fact protracted to the greater part of a year."[2] But it is lost if these two things concur at the same time: actual departure and the intention of not returning.

[2] According to the Canonists, six months are judged to be the greater part of a year.

(c) Pilgrims are called those who reside in some place for a short time, while retaining their domicile or quasi-domicile elsewhere.

(d) Vagi are those who nowhere have a domicile or quasi-domicile, either because the intention of remaining in a certain place is lacking to them, or because, having left their domicile, they are seeking where they may establish a seat.

(e) Finally, exempt persons are those who, by a fiction of law, are placed outside the territory of any diocese, are exempted from the jurisdiction of bishops, and are immediately subject to the Roman Pontiff.

289. (A) Concerning inhabitants and newcomers. Inhabitants and newcomers are bound by the laws of the territory when they actually live in it. The matter was formerly doubtful concerning newcomers; but today, from the practice of the Holy See, it has become certain: for those who have quasi-domicile in some place are subject to the pastor of this place, and therefore to the bishop of the diocese.

290. (B) Concerning pilgrims. Pilgrims, according to the Code, c. 14, "are not bound by the particular laws of their own territory as long as they are absent from it,[1] unless either the transgression of them harms in their own territory, or the laws are personal; nor by the laws of the territory in which they are staying, excepting those which provide for public order, or determine the solemnities of acts; but they are held by general laws, even if these are not in force in their own territory, but not at all if they do not oblige in the place in which they are staying." Whence: -

[1] This holds even when they leave their own diocese *in fraud of the law*, that is, with the very purpose of evading the law; for in so acting they *use their own right*, namely the right of departing from the place where a special law is in force. Yet the two cases set forth in the Treatise on Penance, n. 353, and on Marriage, n. 410, are excepted.

(a) Pilgrims are not held by common laws which are in force in their own diocese - from which they are absent - but are not in force in the place where they are sojourning. For, by entering another diocese, they enjoy the privileges of the place in which they are staying; thus those who, during Lent, are sojourning in the United States of America, enjoy the privilege granted there of eating meat on all days, except Wednesday and Friday, even if that privilege is not had in their own diocese.

(b) But pilgrims are held by common laws which are in force in the place where they are staying, even if they do not oblige in their own diocese. Thus French and Americans, staying at Rome during Holy Week, ought to fast according to the Roman or strict manner, even if in their own regions the common law has been mitigated by custom or indult; for the common law is in force where they live, and moreover they cannot enjoy the local privilege of the diocese from which they are absent, from what has already been said.

(c) Pilgrims are certainly held to observe certain special laws of the places where they are staying, namely those which regard the validity of contracts, - or have been enacted for the common security of the place and public order, - or specially regard pilgrims.[1] - As to other laws, today, from the Code, pilgrims are not strictly held to observe them, outside the case of scandal; for laws oblige only subjects; but pilgrims, who have neither domicile nor quasi-domicile in the place where they are sojourning, are not truly subjects of that diocese. Thus those who pass through a place where a special fast has been prescribed are not held to fast. Indeed, if a special law is in force in the diocese of the pilgrim and in the place where he is living, he is not strictly held to observe it: not by reason of the precept of his own diocese, because he is outside it, nor by reason of the precept of the diocese in which he is living, because he is not a subject of the legislator. - But, from a certain equity and decency, it is altogether expedient that he observe it.

[1] Thus pilgrims are held by the reservations of places (A. A. S., 1 Dec. 1920).

291. (C) Concerning vagi, it was formerly controverted; not a few said that they are held to the laws of the place in which they are staying; but others held that they probably are not held except to the universal laws of the Church, and to those local laws which bind pilgrims. But today, from the Code, c. 14, "vagi are obliged by both general and particular laws which are in force in the place in which they are staying."

292. (D) Exempt persons per se are not held by the laws of the diocese within whose boundaries they have their houses: for they are called exempt for this reason, that they are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of bishops. - It is said per se, because they can be held per accidens, as often as this is necessary to avoid scandal or to procure the public good; or if they have received pastoral care: for then they are held by certain laws, not as Regulars, but as pastors.[2]

[2] Cf. Leo XIII, Constit. *Romanos Pontifices*; C. Plen. Baltimorense III, n. 85-99.

IV. Concerning the Manner of Fulfilling Law.

293. 1. General principle: Law must be fulfilled in the mode determined by the legislator, whether explicitly or implicitly; for that mode, like the act itself, falls under the precept. Hence it must be fulfilled: -

(a) In a human mode, that is, with advertence and liberty.

(b) In an honorable mode, so that the act is not substantially vitiated under that respect under which it is commanded; thus one does not satisfy the obligation of annual confession through a sacrilegious confession, but he satisfies the precept of hearing Mass who is duly present at the sacred rite, even if

because of vain glory. Nor is it required that the law be fulfilled in the state of grace, unless the prescribed act by its nature supposes that state.

(c) At the time prefixed, and if no time has been assigned, as soon as morally possible. If the time has elapsed, and at the same time it was determined for urging the obligation, this obligation does not cease (for example, the law of annual confession); but if it was determined for defining the obligation, the obligation is extinguished (for example, the law of fasting affixed to such a day).

294. 2. Concerning a prohibiting law. This commands nothing other than the negation of the act, without any intention of fulfilling the law. Wherefore he does not transgress the law of fasting who, sleeping the whole day, does not eat, nor the law of abstinence who on a forbidden day abstains from meat because he lacks it.

295. 3. Concerning a commanding law: (a) There is required at least the implicit will of placing the prescribed work; otherwise the law is not fulfilled in a human mode. But there is not required the intention of satisfying the precept, nor a fortiori of attaining the end intended by the legislator; for the end of the precept does not fall under the precept. - Yet it is better to propose this intention to oneself, so that the merit of obedience may be had.

Thus he who, for the sake of devotion, hears Mass, not knowing that it is a feast day, satisfies the precept, because he implicitly wills the prescribed work; but he who, sleeping or coerced, assists at the sacred rite, does not satisfy the precept. He fulfills the law of fasting who observes the form of the fast, even if he eats sumptuously and does not intend mortification of the body.

(b) He who cannot fulfill the whole law is held to nothing if the thing commanded is indivisible, as a pious pilgrimage; but if it is divisible, he is held to the part which he can fulfill; thus he who cannot recite the entire office, but only vespers and compline, is held to that.

(c) It is licit by the same act to satisfy several precepts, unless it is established that the legislator's mind was otherwise; and this is known from the circumstances and the judgment of prudent men. - Thus he who receives viaticum at Easter time satisfies the twofold precept of communicating at Easter time and in danger of death. But if alms are prescribed for the jubilee, and another alms is owed from a vow, one does not suffice for fulfilling both obligations.

(d) It is licit at the same time to satisfy several precepts, provided that the various works commanded do not exclude one another, or unless it is established that the mind of the legislator was otherwise. Thus someone can hear a prescribed Mass and at the same time recite the hours.

§ V. Concerning the Interpretation of the Law of the Church.

296. Written law, however clearly expressed, often needs interpretation, whether because of the weakness of human understanding, or because of the change of circumstances and customs.

Interpretation is nothing other than an explanation of the will of the legislator. (a) By reason of the author, it can be authentic, if it is given by the superior himself; - judicial, when it is made by a judge sitting for a tribunal; - usual, if it proceeds from the community through observance; doctrinal, whenever it is proposed by private doctors. (b) By reason of its character, it is called declarative, or

comprehensive, if it elucidates obscure things and adds or takes away nothing from the law; - suppletive, when it adds what is lacking in the words of the law, especially with attention to the reason of the law, and therefore either extends the law to a case not comprehended in it, or restricts it, by excluding a case contained in the law.

I. Concerning Authentic Interpretation.

297. 1. The authentic interpreter is the legislator himself, or his successor, and "he to whom the power of interpreting has been granted by the same." Authentic interpretation, exhibited by way of law, has the same force as the law itself; and if it only declares words of the law which are certain in themselves, it does not need promulgation and has retroactive force; if it narrows or extends the law or explains a doubtful one, it is not drawn back and must be promulgated. (Code, can. 17).

Now the Supreme Pontiff can interpret general laws not only through himself, but also through the Congregations, to which he delegates his authority.[1] Yet it must be noted that the Sacred Congregations do not proceed in one manner in explaining laws: (a) for sometimes, by a solemn and general decree, approved by the special authority of the Pontiff, they settle a controversy, and therefore in this case their decrees have the force of law;[2] (b) sometimes they explain the sense of the law, by authority granted to them by the Holy See, and with approval in common form: then also merely declarative interpretation obtains the force of law;[3] (c) but often they respond to proposed doubts for a particular case, without issuing a general decree; decisions of this kind indeed hand down a prudent and very probable norm of acting for similar cases, but not, according to the Code, c. 17, an authentic interpretation to be held: "But one given by way of judicial sentence or rescript in a particular matter does not have the force of law, and binds only the persons and affects the things for which it was given."

[1] For interpreting the canons of the Code authentically, a special Commission was instituted by the Supreme Pontiff Benedict XV by the Motu proprio of 15 September 1918.

[2] Thus the decree of 7 Apr. 1879, declaring that civil marriage, where the law of clandestinity was promulgated, does not produce the impediment of public honesty (*De Matrim.*, n. 363). Then the Pontiff makes the decree his own, and promulgates it by his own authority.

[3] Thus the decisions of the Sacred Congregation of the Council in moral and disciplinary matters, when they are not extensive, which are promulgated in this way: The report having been made, the Most Holy One approved and confirmed.

298. 2. In order that decrees of the Sacred Congregations may have the force of obliging, they must be authentic, that is, with the conditions and formalities prescribed by the Pontiff having been observed; and moreover they must be certainly established, whether through insertion in an authentic collection, or from the relation of trustworthy writers. - If the interpretation is merely comprehensive, it does not need new promulgation. But when it is extensive or restrictive, it more probably needs new promulgation, because it is deservedly judged a new law.

II. Concerning Judicial and Usual Interpretation.

299. 1. Judicial interpretation is made through ecclesiastical judges, who apply the law to a particular fact. From this it follows that that interpretation has obligatory force as to the parties who subjected the matter to the judges, unless they have appealed to a superior judge at an opportune time; but as to others, it has only doctrinal authority, yet greater than that which is given by private doctors. - Therefore judgments issued by the Sacred Tribunals, even for a particular case, help greatly for rightly understanding the law itself; yet they can be adduced only cautiously and prudently, because not rarely the sentence depends on special circumstances which are found in such a case, but not in another.

300. 2. Usual interpretation is that which is had from the general observance of the community. For since laws are ordered to the good of the community, account must be taken of the commonly received sense; thence was born the axiom: custom is the best interpreter of law.

But custom can contribute in three ways to understanding the law: (a) antecedent custom discloses the mind of the legislator, because he is judged to have accommodated himself to the customs of the community; (b) concomitant custom furnishes the same, because, by exhibiting the common sense of subjects at the time when the law was enacted, it greatly helps for understanding the words used by the superior; (c) subsequent custom can determine the extension of the law; for since, from what is to be said, it can introduce a new obligation and abolish an old one, a fortiori it can define the extension of the obligation: in this last case it can be truly authentic, namely when it enjoys all the qualities required for establishing law.

III. Concerning Doctrinal Interpretation.

This is made by private doctors, canonists and moralists; it is indeed very useful, provided that they seek to explain the sense of the law, and not to pervert it. Hence certain rules are handed down, by which they may be helped in a matter of such importance, both as to laws in general and as to certain laws in particular.

1. Rules Concerning Laws in General.

301. (A) The words of the law are to be taken in their proper sense, unless from the adjuncts it is manifestly established that the legislator thought otherwise.

(a) The reason for the former is because the legislator ought to have used words apt for manifesting his will to the community. Whence, from the Code, c. 18: "Ecclesiastical laws are to be understood according to the proper signification of the words considered in text and context; and if this remains doubtful and obscure, one must have recourse to the parallel places of the Code, if there are any, to the end and circumstances of the law, and to the mind of the legislator."

(b) The reason for the latter is because, since law is an ordination of reason, nothing unjust, absurd, or useless ought to be imputed to the legislator; therefore if the proper sense contained something of this kind, one would have to depart from the letter, in order better to attain the mind of the superior. - Wherefore rule 88 of law, in the Sixth, is as follows: "It is certain that he acts against the law who, embracing the words of the law, strives against the will of the law."

302. (B) General words are to be understood generally; for example, if it is said all, no one, nothing, the whole, etc., nothing ought to be excepted from the law, unless from the context, parallel places, or other adjuncts, the contrary mind of the legislator is established. For canon law made its own this axiom of civil law: Where the law does not distinguish, neither shall we distinguish.[1]

[1] *Decretal.*, cap. *Quia circa*, 22, *de privilegiis* (lib. V, tit. 33): "Since he excepted nothing and could have excepted."

303. (C) Law is contained in the dispositive part, but not in the reason assigned. For the motives which the legislator adduces are not the law itself, and, although they often help for understanding his mind, nevertheless sometimes they lack a solid foundation; while the dispositive part manifests the will of the legislator.

Thus, when the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) restricts the impediment of consanguinity to the fourth degree, it hands down this reason, which certainly lacks foundation: "Because there are four humors in the body, which consist from the four elements."[1] - Whence the intrinsic end of the law must be inferred not only from the reason assigned, but from the monuments of history, or from other adjuncts; and that saying is to be applied only cautiously: the reason of the law is the soul of the law.

[1] *Decretal.*, cap. *Non debet*, 8, *de Consanguinitate* (lib. IV, tit. 14).

2. Rules Concerning Certain Laws in Particular.

304. (A) It is fitting that odious things be restricted and favors enlarged.[2] To understand this rule, these things must be noted: (a) From the Code, c. 19, "laws which establish a penalty, or restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception from the law, are subject to strict interpretation." (b) Favors, or favorable things, are understood as graces granted to someone, provided that they are not against common right or against the acquired right of a third party.

[2] Rule 15 of law, in the Sixth.

Having posited these things, an odious law is restricted, that is, it extends no more widely than the words themselves; thus, if an interdict is brought against the people, the clergy is not subject to the same.[3] - If the law is favorable, it is enlarged, or is understood in the whole amplitude which the property of the words permits; thus, in favorable matters, the word people embraces the clergy, the word sons embraces bishops, etc.

[3] *Decretal.*, cap. *Si sententia*, 16, *de sentent. excomm.* in the Sixth.

Yet there are exceptions, concerning which in the course of the work.

305. (B) In obscure matters the minimum is to be followed.[4] By obscure things here are understood laws or statutes whose sense, whether in whole or as to part, is so obscure that neither from the text of the law, nor from the context or subject matter, or from custom or other adjuncts, does the true mind of the legislator appear. In this case, it is licit to follow the minimum, that is, to embrace the sense which burdens subjects less. For laws are more inclined to freeing than to obliging, and interpretation is to be made against him who could have spoken clearly.

[4] Rule 30 of law in the Sixth.

306. (C) A special law derogates from a general law, even one enacted afterward,[5] that is, when two dispositions are contrary to one another, that which is special prevails, and thus derogates from the general law, but only in that in which it is contrary to the general law.

[5] Rule 34 of law in the Sixth signifies the same: "The genus is derogated from by the species."

Now a special law is one which establishes something concerning a thing contained under some genus; thus a law concerning testaments for pious causes is special relative to a law concerning testaments in general; a law concerning donations between spouses is held as special relative to a law concerning donations in general, and this is special relative to a law concerning gratuitous contracts.

Scholion Concerning Epikeia.

307. Epikeia (epieikeia, equity) obtains place when it is judged that some particular case, although certainly comprehended in the general words of the law, is nevertheless exempt from the obligation of the law on account of special circumstances.

The legitimacy of epikeia, admitted by Roman law, is thus explained by St. Thomas:[1] "Because human acts, concerning which laws are given, consist in singular contingents, which can be varied in infinite ways, it was not possible for any rule of law to be instituted which would fail in no case; but legislators attend to that which happens in the greater number of cases, enacting the law according to this; yet to observe this law in some cases is against the equality of justice, and against the common good which the law intends... Therefore in these and similar cases it is evil to follow the law posited; but it is good, the words of the law being put aside, to follow that which the reason of justice and the common utility demand."

[1] St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 120, a. 1.

308. Yet rules must be observed in epikeia: (a) if someone, on account of special adjuncts, certainly or probably judges that the legislator did not will to comprehend such a case in the law, and moreover cannot easily approach the superior, he can with safe conscience omit the law; but, since no one ought to be judge in his own cause, this judgment is not to be left to the agent himself, but, insofar as it can be done, to a prudent and learned man.

(b) If, when there is only a probable judgment, he can easily approach the superior, he is generally held to have recourse to him; for it is disordered for a subject to put aside the words of the law, on account of some doubt, where the will of the legislator can be certainly established. - I said generally; for it is not necessary to have recourse to the legislator if the special case of which there is question has already been solved in this way by doctors and ecclesiastical judges.

§ VI. Concerning the Cessation of Ecclesiastical Law.

The obligation of law can cease in two ways: 1. by the cessation of the obligation itself, while the law itself nevertheless remains; 2. by the cessation of the law.

I. Concerning the Cessation of the Obligation Induced by Law.

309. Sometimes a law, even if it remains in itself, ceases to oblige certain subjects, on account of a special reason. Now there are three principal causes exempting from the obligation of law: ignorance, concerning which we have already spoken (above, n. 89-97), moral impotence, and dispensation, concerning which we must discuss separately.

1. Concerning Moral Impotence.

310. Impotence is nothing other than the incapacity of the subject for fulfilling the law; it is called absolute when the work prescribed by the law can in no way be effected, because, for example, powers, instruments, or the required conditions are lacking; moral impotence is present when the work cannot be accomplished except with extraordinary labor, or with the imminent danger of grave evil or deprivation of a notable good. - It is involuntary when it exists without the free consent of the agent; voluntary, when it has been freely contracted.

(A) Involuntary impotence generally exempts from the obligation of law, not only absolute impotence, but also moral impotence. For from what was said, n. 263, the legislator cannot command something too burdensome; otherwise he would command unto destruction, not unto edification; therefore, if in a particular case observance of the law becomes too difficult, or impossible, the legislator does not intend to urge it.

Sometimes that impossibility arises from the concurrence of a superior law; then the natural law is to be preferred to the positive law, divine law to human law, ecclesiastical law to civil law, negative law to affirmative law, at least commonly. - But sometimes it proceeds from grave inconvenience, and in the course of the work it will be explained how great a difficulty excuses from the law; for this depends on the character of the law itself and many other adjuncts.

It was said that moral impotence generally excuses; for it can happen that the law is of such importance that it must be observed, notwithstanding any inconvenience whatever.

311. (B) Even impotence voluntarily contracted generally exempts from the obligation of the law, provided that it is not contracted directly so that the law cannot be fulfilled, and moreover that there is a proportionately grave reason. For here recurs the principle explained above concerning an indirectly willed effect (n. 170-182).

Thus someone can make a journey, even if he foresees that he cannot hear Mass on a feast day, provided that he has a sufficient reason for traveling; but it is not licit on a fast day to go hunting, for the sole cause of recreation, with foresight that in this way impotence for fasting is induced. - But for judging what reason suffices, these things must be kept before the mind: the graver the law is, and the rarer the return of its obligation, and the more proximately it urges, the greater the reason required; likewise a much graver cause is required if someone frequently or continually renders himself impotent for fulfilling the law than if he does so once or rarely.

2. Concerning Dispensation from Law.

312. (A) Notion. (a) Dispensation in general is prudent administration; but since it pertains to prudent administration to use moderation, and to remit certain things from benignity, the word dispensation signifies a certain lenity and condescension in the application of laws. - It is

usually defined as the relaxation of law made by the superior in some particular case in which the law would otherwise oblige. Therefore it differs from epikeia, which judges that some case is not comprehended in the law; and from abrogation or derogation of law, by which a law is taken away in whole or in part for the whole community.

(b) St. Thomas thus declares the reason why it is sometimes expedient to grant a dispensation:[1] it happens sometimes that some precept, which is for the advantage of the multitude, is not suitable to this person or in this case, because through this something better would be impeded, or even some evil would be induced: therefore it is expedient that in this particular case the law be relaxed; but because it would be dangerous to commit this to the judgment of anyone whatever, except because of evident and sudden danger, it is fitting that he who has the power of ruling the multitude have the power of dispensing in human law, which rests on his authority.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 97, a. 4.

313. (B) Concerning the author of dispensation. He who has the authority of making law can dispense by ordinary power, - but he who is deputed to this by the legislator himself can dispense by delegated power.

(a) By ordinary or native right, both the legislator and his superior as to this, that is, as to dispensation, can dispense. Concerning the legislator himself and his successor there is no difficulty, since the law, in its whole extent, depends on their will. Wherefore the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in all ecclesiastical laws, even those enacted by an ecumenical council; but a bishop can dispense in the statutes of his own diocese, even those enacted in synod.

The same must be said concerning the superior as to this; for he, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, has the whole power of inferiors; thus the Pope can dispense in episcopal laws. But a metropolitan cannot dispense in the laws of a suffragan bishop, because he is not his superior as to all things, nor as to this, namely as to the granting of dispensations.

314. (b) By delegated, or borrowed, right, an inferior can sometimes dispense in the law of a superior, namely whenever he has received this power from the superior; by quasi-ordinary right, when this power is permanently annexed to some office; by merely delegated right, when it has been transiently granted by the superior.

Thus Ordinaries, by power delegated from common law, dispense in irregularities arising from occult delict, except the one which arises from voluntary homicide and except others brought to the contentious forum;[1] likewise they dispense in abstinence and fasting with particular persons, indeed sometimes with the whole community;[2] they dispense in certain impediments of marriage, in a case of urgent necessity.[3]

[1] Code, c. 990, § 1.

[2] Code, c. 1245.

[3] What bishops can do as to impediments of marriage we explained in the Treatise on Marriage, n. 1046 sq.

Thus also pastors, who by proper right cannot grant any dispensation, by delegated common law, in particular cases, dispense in fasting and abstinence and also in servile works prohibited on a feast

day; thus also confessors.[4]

[4] Code, cc. 1044-1045.

The Roman Congregations likewise have received the power of dispensing in pontifical laws, according to predefined limits.

315. (C) Concerning the subject of dispensation. Since dispensation is an act of jurisdiction, only subjects can be dispensed by a superior. As to the Supreme Pontiff, there is no difficulty: for all the baptized are his subjects.

But as to bishops, and others whose jurisdiction is exercised within the limits of some territory, these things are to be noted: (a) they can dispense with inhabitants and newcomers who, by reason of domicile or quasi-domicile, are subject to them; indeed with vagi, who, since they are subject to the laws of the place in which they are staying, are judged subjects as to the means necessary or useful for salvation, and therefore as to dispensation in the common laws of the Church; more probably also with pilgrims, who in a case of necessity cannot have recourse to their own bishop, and this indeed from the presumed consent of the bishop proper to the pilgrims: for otherwise pilgrims would be deprived of a means very useful for salvation.

(b) Since dispensation is an act of voluntary jurisdiction, and this can be exercised outside the territory, a bishop, pastor, or delegates can dispense with inhabitants and newcomers, even those dwelling outside the territory, provided nevertheless that these remain subjects, that is, retain domicile or quasi-domicile in the territory of the one dispensing.

(c) He who possesses the faculty of dispensing can dispense with himself, unless something else is established from the nature of things or from law, as is clear from the Code, c. 201, § 3: for voluntary jurisdiction, such as the power of dispensing, of itself does not require a distinction of persons, and moreover no law requires it in the present matter. - Hence he who has ordinary or delegated general power of dispensing in laws, or in vows and oaths, can use this with regard to himself.[1]

[1] Suarez, liber VI, caput 12, n. 8-12; Sanchez, *de Matrimonio*, liber VIII, disp. 3; Schmalzgr., in titulo *de Constit.*, n. 65; St. Alphonsus, liber I, n. 183; liber III, n. 249, 256.

316. (D) Concerning the conditions required for dispensation. For validity, there are required:

(a) In the one granting, a just and reasonable cause, if he dispenses in the law of a Superior; but none if he dispenses in his own law or in the law of an inferior; in doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause, a dispensation can be granted validly.[2]

[2] Code, c. 84: "§ 1. Let there be no dispensation from an ecclesiastical law without a just and reasonable cause, with account taken of the gravity of the law from which dispensation is made; otherwise a dispensation given by an inferior is illicit and invalid. - § 2. A dispensation in doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause is licitly sought, and can be licitly and validly granted."

(b) In the petitioner, there is required the allegation of a thing necessarily to be declared, unless the rescript has been granted motu proprio (Code, c. 45); the truth of at least one final or motive cause at the time when the rescript was given or at the time of execution; and recourse to the competent Superior, especially when a dispensation has already been denied (cf. cc. 43-44).

317. For the liceity of dispensation, there is required a cause at least probably sufficient, under light obligation if the legislator dispenses, under grave obligation in a grave matter if a delegate dispenses.

As to other things, cf. in the Code the titles concerning rescripts and concerning dispensations.

II. Concerning the Cessation of the Law Itself.

The law itself can cease especially in a threefold way: 1. through abrogation and derogation; 2. through cessation of the end; 3. through contrary custom; we treat here of the first two, since there must be discussion of custom in the following paragraph.

318. 1. Concerning abrogation and derogation. Abrogation is the total abolition of a law made by the legislator himself; derogation is the partial abolition of a law.

(A) Since the existence of a law depends on the will of the legislator, he himself, or his successor or superior, can take it away totally or partially.

But for this to be done licitly, a reasonable cause is required, namely nothing other than the good of the community itself. And this, according to St. Thomas,[1] can happen in two ways: (a) indeed it is consonant with human reason that it pass from the imperfect to the perfect; wherefore the first institutors of laws, not being able to consider and foresee all things, established certain imperfect things and things deficient in many respects, which they themselves or their successors wisely changed; (b) moreover what, in ancient times, was useful to society can, circumstances having changed, become useless or harmful.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 97, a. 1.

(B) But change can be made in two ways: (a) by expressly revoking the old law; therefore in practice, as soon as the will of the legislator to abrogate the law is certainly known, subjects are no longer held to observe it;[2] (b) by enacting a new law contrary to the pre-existing law: then the later law "obrogates the former, if it expressly says this, or is directly contrary to it, or orders the whole matter of the former law anew from the beginning." (Code, c. 22).

[2] Suarez, l. VI, c. 27, n. 14-18.

319. 2. Concerning cessation of the end. Since law is an ordination of reason, if the reason which moved the superior to enact the law totally ceases, by that very fact the law itself ceases. But, to avoid the dangers which easily occur from private judgment in a matter of this kind, certain conditions are required:

(a) That the end of the law cease totally: for if one of the motives subsists, the law does not become useless, and therefore does not cease; thus if a bishop has commanded prayers for attaining peace with enemies and the cessation of internal sedition, the law does not cease when peace has been obtained, if sedition still rages; (b) that the end cease adequately, that is, for all the articles of the law: for if it ceases only for one or another, the obligation of those articles is indeed taken away, but not of the others which remain useful, lest, namely, the useful be vitiated by the useless;[1] (c) that it cease generally and permanently, that is, for the whole community and for a very long time: for if it

ceases for one or another private person, there is no place for abrogation, but for dispensation or epikeia; if for a short time, suspension of the law suffices.

[1] Rule of law 37, in the Sixth.

§ VII. Concerning Custom, or Unwritten Law.

Thus far concerning written law; but since law is sometimes introduced or taken away through custom, we must treat of this, which is often called unwritten law.

[2] Reiffenstuel, Pirhing, Schmalzgrueber, De Angelis, Santi, and other canonists in tit. *de Consuetudine*; Suarez, lib. VII; Billuart, diss. V, art. 2; St. Alphonsus, n. 107-109; Ball. P., n. 257-286; Bouquillon, n. 209-213; Noldin, n. 175-180; Kreutzwald, *De canonica juris consuetudinarii praescriptione*, Friburgi Brisg., 1873.

I. Concerning the Notion, Division, and Reason of Custom.

320. 1. Notion. Custom, or rather customary right, is right induced by the customs of the community, with some consent of the superior.

It is explained: (a) In democratic government, where the people enjoy lawmaking power, the consent of a superior is not required for custom, or rather, since the people itself is the superior, its consent is contained implicitly in the customs themselves. But, in the Church of Christ, in which the people does not enjoy legislative power, custom has the force of law uniquely from the consent of the competent Superior (Code, c. 25). - (b) Yet customary right, although ultimately it obtains its force from the will of the superior, is not originally induced by him, but by the community itself, which frequently and universally manifests its mind by such or such a mode of acting.

Custom is distinguished from prescription: for this is the mode by which private citizens or private communities acquire some right, or free themselves from some obligation; while custom is law induced for the whole society.[3]

[3] We treat of prescription in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 243-263.

321. 2. Division. (a) By reason of extension, custom is general or particular, according as it has been received in the whole Church or in some part of the Church.

(b) By reason of relation to law, one is according to law, when by use it confirms or interprets an existing law; another is beside law, which induces a new obligation; another is against law, which derogates from written law in whole or in part.

322. 3. Reason of customary right. (a) That a new law can be induced by custom is easily understood. For laws attain their end, namely the public good, more efficaciously the more they are accommodated to the customs of the community: for then they are observed more easily and sweetly; but nothing is certainly more accommodated to these customs than a custom induced by the community itself and strengthened through a long time; therefore it was altogether fitting that the legislator should confirm by his authority customs apt for promoting the good of society. Thus certain impediments were introduced, such as disparity of cult, and also certain fasts. - The same can be said concerning a custom which interprets law.

(b) A custom which abrogates an existing law must likewise be said to be consonant with reason. For, that a law may promote the good of society, it ought not to be too arduous nor inaccessible to human infirmity; now if a law is opposed to a long-standing custom, which moreover we suppose to be reasonable, from this it is deservedly inferred that that law is too arduous and therefore to be abolished. - And this indeed appears more evident for the Church than for any other society: for the Church is perpetual and universal; but a law which is accommodated to one age, or to some region, often, with the passing of ages or with changed adjuncts, loses its usefulness, indeed sometimes has several inconveniences, especially in such or such a region. Therefore it was altogether fitting that antiquated laws could be abolished by contrary custom.

II. Concerning the Conditions Required That Custom Be Legitimate.

They arise from a fivefold source: on the part of the legislator, - of the community, - of the matter, - of the acts by which it is induced, and of time.

323. 1. On the part of the legislator consent is required, as is clear from what has already been said, n. 320. - (a) Yet consent which is called personal, by which namely the legislator, knowing some individual custom existing somewhere, assents to it either expressly or tacitly, namely when he does not protest though he easily can, is not strictly required, but plainly suffices. (b) Consequently legal consent suffices, which is given by way of general law, namely when the legislator, in the law itself, declares that any customs whatever will be valid, provided that they are clothed with the designated conditions; for thus he clearly expresses his consent, although in a general mode. Now that the matter is thus in canon law is clear from the celebrated declaration of Gregory IX: "For although the authority of long-standing custom is not worthless, nevertheless it is not going to prevail to such a degree that it ought to generate prejudice even to positive right, unless it has been reasonable and legitimately prescribed."[1]

[1] *Decretal.*, c. *Cum tanto*, 11, *De consuetud.*, lib. I, tit. 4.

324. 2. On the part of the community, two things are necessary: (a) that custom be induced by a community upon which law can be imposed; for if it is not capable of receiving law, neither is it capable of inducing law. Now the communities which, from canon law, enjoy that capacity are: the universal Church, a province, diocese, city, town, and more probably a parish, - and also a religious order, a religious community, a chapter, seminary, and confraternity: for upon all these a law can be imposed by the Pontiff or bishop; - but a family or a private man cannot induce a custom.

(b) That the greater part of the community elicit acts inductive of custom; indeed the lesser part does not suffice, since this cannot command the greater; nor is universality required, since even in a legislative assembly universality of votes is not necessary; therefore the greater part suffices, which morally represents the community.

325. 3. On the part of the matter, or object, it is required that it be reasonable, at least negatively; and therefore that it not be contrary to natural or divine right of the new law, since, from what was said above, n. 227 and 256, each is immutable; nor expressly or

equivalently reprobated by canon law itself; nor furnish an occasion of sin or be pernicious to society. But the judgment concerning the reasonableness of custom pertains to prudent men, doctors, confessors, honorable men, - or to a judge, if the matter is brought to the external forum. - But it is not required that it begin without sin; not rarely the first who prescribe against the law sin; but custom, even begun in bad faith, is valid, provided that it is negatively reasonable in the sense explained.

326. 4. On the part of the acts by which custom is induced. These ought to be: (a) free, that is, proceeding neither from ignorance or error, nor from force or fear, but from free will with previous knowledge; otherwise, they are not truly human acts, and therefore cannot induce or take away an obligation; (b) frequent and continuous, or uninterrupted: for if they occur very rarely, or are interrupted either on the part of the people, or on the part of the Prince punishing transgressors, they can no longer be said to constitute the customs of the community, which suppose a certain frequency and continuity; (c) with at least interpretative intention of inducing right or derogating from right: for acts morally do not operate beyond the intention of the agent; and therefore those who act from mere devotion (for example, in daily hearing of Mass) do not impose a new obligation on themselves, nor do they prescribe against the law, if from want of consideration they do not observe its prescriptions. - A custom prevails prescriptively, even if the law against which prescription is made is not explicitly known, provided that there is had an interpretative intention of abolishing the law; thus a diocese which prescribes against the law of fasting in general, and does not observe a new fast unknown to it, has sufficiently the intention of abolishing that fast.

327. 5. On the part of time. According to the Code, can. 27, 28, custom against the law is not valid unless it has been "legitimately prescribed through forty continuous and complete years; but against an ecclesiastical law which contains a clause prohibiting future customs, only reasonable centenary or immemorial custom can prescribe. A custom which is expressly reprobated in law is not reasonable. A custom beside the law, which has knowingly been observed by the community with the mind of obliging itself, induces law, if likewise it has been reasonable and legitimately prescribed through forty continuous and complete years."

328. Corollary. From this it can be inferred how certain clauses, added to pontifical laws for reprobating customs, can be understood.

(a) A universal law indeed takes away a universal custom contrary to itself, but per se does not take away particular customs which the legislator can be ignorant of.

(b) The clause "notwithstanding any custom whatever" indeed takes away every ordinary custom, but not an immemorial one, namely that of whose beginning no memory exists.

(c) The clause "notwithstanding any custom whatever, even immemorial" indeed takes away all previous universal customs, but does not prevent a new custom contrary to the law from being formed.

(d) The clause "any custom in the future being excluded" renders impossible an ordinary custom contrary to the new law, but in no way renders impossible a contrary centenary or immemorial custom, as is clear from the Code, c. 27, § 1. Hence against disciplinary Tridentine laws, centenary or immemorial custom is admitted.

See the rest concerning custom and ecclesiastical law apud the Canonists.

Scholion: Concerning the Code of Canon Law.

329. Ecclesiastical legislation, which formerly was contained in the *Corpus juris canonici*[1] and in many other documents of the subsequent age, today is found in the *Code of Canon Law*, arranged by order of Pontiff Pius X, and promulgated by the authority of Pope Benedict XV, which had the force of obliging in its entirety from the day of Pentecost 1918, the 19th day of May.

[1] The best critical edition of the *Corpus juris canonici* was published by Richter, which afterward Friedberg polished and furnished with notes, Leipzig, 1879-1881: there you will find learned Prolegomena concerning the character and authority of the parts of which the *Corpus juris* consists. - The *Corpus juris canonici* consisted of six parts: 1. the *Decretum* of Gratian; 2. the Decretals of Gregory IX; 3. the Sixth of Decretals of Boniface VIII; 4. the Clementines of Clement V; 5. the Extravagants of John XXII; 6. the Common Extravagants.

(A) The scope of the Code was "to gather into one, arranged in a clear order, all the laws of the Church published up to these times; removing from it those which had already been abrogated or had become obsolete; adapting others, where there was need, more suitably to our present customs; and also establishing others anew, whenever it seemed necessary or expedient."

(a) It regards the Latin Church alone, and does not oblige the Oriental Church, unless there is question of those things which, from the very nature of the thing, also affect the Oriental Church (Can. 1).

(b) For the most part it decrees nothing concerning rites and ceremonies; wherefore all liturgical laws retain their force, unless some one of them is expressly corrected in the Code (c. 2).

(c) By the Code there are in no way abrogated conventions entered into by the Apostolic See with various Nations, nor privileges and indults granted to persons, whether physical or moral, unless they are expressly revoked by the canons of the Code.

(B) As to laws previously enacted, the Code decrees these things (c. 6):

"1. Any laws whatever, whether universal or particular, opposed to the prescriptions of this Code, are abrogated, unless concerning particular laws something else is expressly provided;

2. Canons which refer the old right in its entirety are to be judged from the authority of the old right, and therefore from the interpretations received among approved authors;

3. Canons which agree only in part with the old right, insofar as they agree, are to be judged from the ancient right; insofar as they differ, they are to be judged from their own meaning;

4. In doubt whether some prescription of the canons differs from the old right, one must not depart from the old right;

5. As to penalties of which no mention is made in the Code, whether they are spiritual or temporal, medicinal or, as they call them, vindictive, latae or ferendae sententiae, let them be

held as abrogated;

6. If any of the other disciplinary laws which have flourished up to now is contained neither explicitly nor implicitly in the Code, it must be said to have lost all force, unless it is found in approved liturgical books, or the law is of divine right, whether positive or natural."

(C) Division of the Code. At the very threshold three things are found: (a) the Preface in which Cardinal Gasparri learnedly sets forth the history of collections of Canon Law, and clearly declares the reason and method of the Code; (b) the Constitution of Benedict XV promulgating the Code and decreeing that it has the force of law for the universal Church; (c) the Profession of Catholic faith to be emitted in certain circumstances.

The Code itself embraces 2414 canons distributed in five books.

In the first book are proposed the General Norms.

Book II treats of persons, namely clerics, religious, laymen.

Book III treats of things, namely concerning the sacraments in general and in particular; concerning sacred places and times, concerning divine worship, concerning the ecclesiastical magisterium, concerning benefices and other non-collegial institutes, concerning the temporal goods of the Church.

Book IV treats of processes, namely concerning trials, concerning causes of beatification and canonization, concerning the manner of proceeding in certain business or penal sanctions.

Book V treats of delicts and penalties.

There follow the Code eight documents, among which especially should be noted the Constitution of Pius X, *Vacante Sede Apostolica*, 25 Dec. 1904, where all those things are prescribed which are to be done while the Apostolic See is vacant.

Article IV. Concerning Civil Law.

332. Just as ecclesiastical society can make laws for the spiritual good of the faithful, so likewise civil authority can establish laws for directly promoting the temporal happiness of citizens, and mediately their spiritual good; for even temporal happiness itself is reduced to a higher end, namely the practice of virtues, which ultimately conducts to eternal beatitude. Therefore civil law itself, provided that it is an ordination of reason, is truly a norm of human acts, since it ultimately tends to perfecting citizens and leading them to their end.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 95-96; Suarez, lib. III, V, VI; Billuart, diss. III-IV; Muller, § 50-60; Bouquillon, n. 214-252; Van Gestel, *De Justitia et lege civili*, Groningae, 1896; Bautain, op. cit., ch. 11-12, 16-17; Waffelaert, *Etude de Théol. Morale sur l'obligation en conscience des lois civiles*, Tournai, 1884.

Here, from what was said in Philosophy, we presuppose that man is by nature a social being, and therefore that civil society is from nature, or, in other words, from God the author of nature, and does not arise from a mere social pact. But in every society there ought to be some authority which presides over the commonwealth; and this authority, in whatever way it is designated, whether by the vote of the nobles or of the people, or by received right of birth, proceeds from God, according to that saying of the Apostle:[2] "For there is no power except from God; but those things which are, are

ordained by God... For he is God's minister to you for good." In fact, as Leo XIII argues, society can neither exist nor be understood in which there is not some superior who moderates wills and impels them rightly to the common good; therefore God willed that in civil society there be those who command the multitude. By force of this authority, those who preside over society, whether Princes or legislative Assemblies, can, as ministers of God, establish laws which oblige in conscience. Wherefore we shall speak: 1. concerning the conditions required for civil law; 2. concerning its moral obligation.

[2] Rom., XIII, 1, 4. Cf. Leo XIII, Encyc. *Diuturnum*, 29 Jun. 1881, and *Immortale Dei*, 1 Nov. 1885.

§ I. Concerning the Conditions Required for Civil Law.

In order that civil law may be just, and therefore have the force of obliging, certain conditions are required on the part of the author, promulgation, and object.

I. Concerning the Author of Civil Law.

333. 1. The faculty of making laws, as to temporal matters, resides in legitimate superiors, who are different according to the different constitution of society. Under a regime of absolute monarchy, this authority is exercised by the king, or supreme prince. Where aristocracy, or the power of the nobles, prevails, laws are established by the Assembly of nobles. Under a democratic regime, power resides in the assembly elected by the community. In most modern societies, laws are proposed by ministers of the State, or members of the legislative Assembly, and, after public discussion before the same Assembly, are accepted by vote and sanctioned by the supreme power.

Therefore it is necessary that all those upon whom the care of establishing laws lies act equitably and honorably, and intend the public good, not that of a few. Therefore they sin gravely who accept money for casting a vote for a law which is foreseen to be harmful to the public good.

334. 2. A usurper, who obtains public power, of himself indeed does not have the right of making laws; but as soon as he enjoys quiet possession of the government, with the people at least tacitly acquiescing, it is necessary, on account of the public good, to obey his precepts and laws, otherwise just, until his authority is shaken off by legitimate means. Leo XIII clearly taught this: "But that in matters not unjust those who preside are to be obeyed, for the sake of preserving order, in which the foundation of public safety is found, no one doubts: yet it does not follow that, by obeying, whatever is unjust either in the Constitution or in the administration of the state is approved."[1]

[1] Leo XIII, Epist. 22 Oct. 1880, to the Archbishop of Paris.

II. Concerning the Promulgation of Civil Law.

335. 1. Civil law must be promulgated and made public right, but the mode of doing each is diverse among various nations. In many modern States, promulgation is made by an act of the supreme authority, which holds the law as ratified, and commands that it be published, generally in the official journal, and committed to execution. For the most

part it does not begin to oblige until one or another day, or several days, after promulgation.[1]

[1] Thus, in France, from the decree of 5 Nov. 1870 still in force, "a new law is executable in each arrondissement one full day after the number of the *Journal officiel* which contains it has arrived at the chief town of that arrondissement" (Planiol, *Tr. élém. de Droit Civil*, Paris, 1901, t. I, n. 170). - In Belgium: "Laws, after their promulgation, are inserted into the *Moniteur*, the French text and Flemish text facing one another. They are obligatory in the whole kingdom on the tenth day after their publication, unless the law has fixed another delay" (De Le Court, *Codes Belges, Complément*, p. 300). - In Italy: "The law does not become obligatory on the very day of its publication, but on the fifteenth day afterward (that is, the dies a quo excluded, and the dies ad quem included), unless something else has been provided in the law itself" (E. Gianturco, *Istituzioni di Diritto civile*, Firenze, 1901, p. 13). - As to the United States of America, general laws issued by Congress oblige at once once they have been promulgated, unless otherwise established in the law itself; thus apud A. Carlier, *La République américaine*, Paris, Guillaumin, 1890, t. 3, p. 257; cf. Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, New York, 1896, t. I, ch. 16 and 40.

336. 2. For the force of civil law the acceptance of the people is not per se necessary; for, even under a democratic regime, legislative power can be exercised without recourse to the people: for once the delegation of authority has been legitimately made, the legislative Assembly or other superiors are restricted in the exercise of their power only by a superior authority. But, in certain regions,[2] provision has been made that certain laws of greater importance would not oblige except after the acceptance of the people: then indeed they must be referred to the people. And this often favors good government, provided that citizens have care for the public good, and freely give their votes: for thus laws are better accommodated to the customs of the people and are observed more willingly.[3]

[2] Thus in Switzerland, and in certain American States, concerning which see Bryce, op. cit., ch. 39.

[3] Hence, even in the Middle Ages, many kings, especially Charlemagne, did not hesitate to seek the consent and acceptance of the people as to new laws, as G. Kurth reports, *Les origines de la civilisation moderne*, Paris, 1903, t. II, ch. 13, p. 225-229.

III. Concerning the Object of Civil Law.

337. 1. Civil law in a general way can regulate all those things which regard the temporal good of citizens, and consequently: (a) goods of fortune, namely their legitimate acquisition and transmission, whatever favors agriculture, industry, commerce, or the various human arts; (b) goods of the body, by taking care that by apt means the number of citizens be preserved and increased, that nothing be done contrary to public health, that orphanages, hospitals, and other charitable institutes be erected for assisting those who are in necessity; (c) goods of the intellect, by providing for the right instruction of youth in letters, sciences, and human arts, which contribute greatly to the good of private persons and of society; (d) goods of the will, by promoting moral virtues, restraining and punishing vices; (e) goods properly social, namely the very constitution of society, the form of government, the administration of public affairs, relations between the various orders of citizens, and also the defense of the rights of the whole community against the unjust aggression of foreign nations.

338. 2. In matters which are merely temporal, the State can establish laws independently from the Church, but not independently from God.

Hence, (a) it can sanction the natural law by positive prescriptions, for example by compelling parents to nourish minor children, and children to provide sustenance to parents; (b) it can more specifically determine prescriptions of the natural law which are too vague and general, for example by establishing conditions for the validity of contracts, for the succession of children in the goods of parents; (c) it can complete the natural law by additions, by prescribing certain things which of themselves are indifferent, but, by reason of circumstances, can promote the common good, for example in relation to roads or streets, to fishing or hunting, etc. - But in no way can it enact statutes against the natural law; for since law is an ordination of reason, human law has so much of the power of law insofar as it is consonant with right reason: "but if in something it disagrees from the natural law, it will no longer be law, but a corruption of law."[1]

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 95, a. 2.

339. 3. But in those things which are mixed, that is, which are referred to a spiritual and temporal end at the same time, the State cannot make laws while prescinding from ecclesiastical society, but concerning these it can make agreement with the Church, as often happens in Concordats. For since each power can prescribe something concerning these matters, conflict will easily arise unless the matter is defined equitably and peacefully by common counsel. Thus, for example, in scholastic legislation, provision must be made for sciences and arts in such a way that nothing is attempted against faith or good morals; in the matrimonial contract, concerning civil effects, concerning the mutual rights and duties of spouses, concerning the legitimacy of children, things must be established in such a way that no detriment is brought to the unity and sanctity of the matrimonial bond.[1]

[1] We discuss these things more explicitly in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 6-11, and in the dogmatic part of the Treatise on Marriage, n. 32-39.

340. 4. In merely spiritual matters, the State can establish nothing by its own authority; but indirectly and ministerially it can, and, with the due conditions posited, must help the Church in defending the true religion, as we explained in the Treatise on the Church, n. 233-238.

§ II. Concerning the Obligation of Law.

341. State of the question. 1. Civil law obliges only subjects; but subjects can be either citizens or foreigners dwelling in the territory. Citizens, who dwell in their own territory, per se are subjected to all laws suited to their condition;[2] if they live outside their homeland, they remain subject to certain laws, especially those which regard personal status and personal duties, but not all, specifically those which are held as territorial. - Foreigners, when they dwell in the territory of some society, are subject to some laws, chiefly those which regard public order and tranquility, or goods possessed there. - As to particular matters, the various Codes must be consulted.

[2] For certain citizens can be immune from some laws. - The immunity of clerics is treated in canon law.

2. But here we especially inquire concerning the moral obligation of civil law, whether 1. a law commanding and prohibiting, 2. an irritant law, 3. a merely penal law, obliges in conscience.

I. Concerning the Obligation of a Law Commanding and Prohibiting.

342. Thesis. A just civil law, commanding or prohibiting something, truly obliges in conscience, and indeed per se under grave obligation.

(A) For the Scriptures declare this many times: (a) Since every power is from God, "he who resists the power, resists the ordinance of God; and those who resist acquire damnation for themselves... therefore be subject of necessity, not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience";[1] from which it follows that civil laws at least sometimes oblige in conscience, and indeed under penalty of damnation. (b) The reason assigned shows the same: for princes and other superiors in the civil order are to be obeyed because they are ministers of God, sent by Him, and therefore in some way participate in His authority: "For he is God's minister to you for good... For he is God's minister, an avenger unto wrath against him who does evil";[2] - "Be subject therefore to every human creature for God's sake: whether to the king as excelling; or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, but for the praise of the good."[3] Consequently, just as God can oblige in conscience, and indeed under grave obligation, so likewise can those who hold His place on earth.

[1] Rom., XIII, 1-5.

[2] Rom., XIII, 4.

[3] 1 Peter, II, 13-14.

(B) The reason is taken from the very concept of civil law handed down above, n. 332. For since civil law, although immediately ordered to the temporal good, is mediately and ultimately referred to the eternal good, namely to the practice of virtues which lead to God, it can truly be said that by the observation of civil law citizens are directed to the ultimate end, and by violation of it are turned away from the ultimate end; but aversion from the ultimate end is sin, and indeed grave sin.

343. Yet it was said: per se it obliges under grave obligation. For, that sin be grave, two things are required: gravity of matter, which must be judged not only from the thing commanded itself, but from the intended end (above, n. 274-275); and the intention of the legislator, which is discerned from various adjuncts, but especially from the sense of the people and the interpretation of prudent men. But here it must be noted that from a grave penalty the gravity of the transgression is not always inferred; for sometimes a grave penalty is inflicted for a light delict (for example, in the case of hunting and fishing), by which citizens may be more efficaciously deterred from violation of the law. - Nor are those to be heard who contend that modern legislators do not intend to impose a moral obligation upon citizens, because they themselves reject the existence of God and every foundation of morality; for, even if some of these defend those wicked errors, nevertheless they will to promote the observance of their laws in the best way they can, and therefore implicitly to bind subjects by a moral bond, since this is the most efficacious means.

344. Corollary. Generally laws of this kind oblige in conscience before the sentence of the judge, even in the matter of justice. For understanding this, it must be known that in this matter laws can be made in two ways: laws determinative of property, and laws irritating certain acts translative of property. Here we treat of the former; of the latter below, n. 345.

Laws determinative of property are those which more explicitly and distinctly define the rights of citizens as to ownership. For the right of nature not rarely remains obscure and indeterminate in this matter; and therefore it pertains to the civil power to declare the natural law more accurately concerning this matter, so that disputes and lawsuits may be forestalled; thus as to things found or lost, as to the prescription of goods, as to the rights of writers over the offspring of their own mind, etc., civil authority has accurately defined the more or less uncertain right of nature. Now laws of this kind oblige in conscience, even before the sentence of the judge, according to the common opinion. The arguments adduced in the thesis prove this; for here there is question of a temporal matter, insufficiently determined by the right of nature, concerning which therefore the State, as minister of God, can make laws immediately obliging in conscience.

II. Concerning the Obligation of an Irritant Law.

345. To civil authority belongs the power of irritating certain acts of subjects, which otherwise by the right of nature are valid. Theologians commonly admit this against a few; and deservedly. For supreme and independent authority, such as civil society is, can establish, in its own forum, whatever is required for promoting the public good; but the public good sometimes demands that certain acts and contracts, although valid by the right of nature, be held as null; such are, for example, certain contracts entered into by minors, or from fear, or without legal forms. - Moreover sometimes the public good requires that those contracts be held invalid not only in the external forum and after the sentence of the judge, but also in the forum of conscience and before the declaratory sentence: for otherwise lawsuits would be multiplied, and the poor, who cannot pay the expenses of lawsuits, would easily be oppressed by the more powerful. Therefore civil law can, for grave reasons, irritate certain acts in conscience, even before the sentence of the judge.

Yet, since we are dealing with odious matter, a law wholly irritating is not easily presumed, but must be certainly proved; therefore if it can reasonably be understood of mere prohibition, the more benign interpretation is to be followed; likewise, if in a particular case it is doubted whether the legislator willed to irritate some act before the intervention of the judge, and moreover the public good does not evidently require the rescission of the act, the sentence of the judge can be awaited.[1]

[1] We explain this more fully in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 617-619.

The reason for the distinction between this case and the other (n. 344) is because a law determinative of property is favorable matter, while a law irritating an act valid of itself is something odious.

III. Concerning the Obligation of Penal Law.

346. 1. All concede that by civil law penalties can be decreed against delinquents; for otherwise laws would be violated by many with impunity; wherefore those who are not inclined to

good by persuasion must be turned away from evil by penalties. - Yet penalty supposes fault, and ought to be proportioned to it: otherwise it would not be equitable. - Yet, in the external forum, fault which is called juridical is admitted, namely omission of that diligence which is required by law, whatever may be the case concerning internal guilt. Whence it can happen that someone is held guilty juridically, even if before God he is innocent, because of inadvertence: in which case civil law, imposing the burden of repairing damage, does not oblige except after the sentence of the judge.[2] - Moreover a penal law indeed obliges ministers of justice to prosecute the guilty, and judges to inflict penalties on those who have been juridically proved guilty; but it does not oblige the guilty themselves to undergo the penalty before the sentence of the judge: for this would be too odious.

[2] We declare the matter in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 474-476.

347. 2. But here it is asked whether there are merely penal laws, that is, laws which obligate disjunctively either to placing or omitting the act, or to undergoing the penalty inflicted upon violators of the law. It is commonly answered affirmatively; for, when there is question of things useful to the common good, but not necessary, some coercion is very expedient, and moreover it seems less opportune to command or prohibit the thing under penalty of sin; wherefore the legislator sometimes sanctions his law by a fine or another penalty, without nevertheless intending that violators incur some guilt of fault; thus many think that the law which prohibits hunting without a special license (*permis de chasse*) is merely penal. - Yet the general principle is that civil laws are not merely penal, but generally oblige in conscience, unless the contrary is proved. Whence, in particular cases, for judging whether a law is merely penal or not, attention must be given to the will of the legislator, insofar as it can be discerned from his declaration, from the nature of the law and penalty, and from other adjuncts. - We treat specifically of the law of taxes in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 590-598.

348. Corollary. From what has been said it follows that those err who think little of equitable civil laws, and, without grave reason, violate them: for thus they contradict Christ, who said:[1] "Render therefore the things that are Caesar's to Caesar, and the things that are God's to God"; they contradict the Apostles, who command obedience to superiors even difficult ones; they contradict the earliest Fathers and Christians, who did not hesitate to submit themselves to the just laws of the empire. And indeed Catholics ought to furnish example in all things, even in the observance of civil laws.

[1] Matt., XXII, 21.

But if some civil law is unjust (which is not presumed, but must be proved by valid arguments), it does not oblige in conscience, because it is not an ordination of reason, and therefore is not law. Indeed, in a democratic society, in which citizens in some way participate in legislative power, the duty lies upon honorable men of striving with all their powers to procure the abrogation of an unjust law. For this those associations of citizens are especially useful which, taking care for public matters, carefully see to it that those who favor unjust laws are not elected to the legislative Assembly.

"Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord."[2] All indeed desire beatitude, but very many do not know how one comes to it. The Psalmist shows them the way: the undefiled or perfect, and therefore blessed, are those who faithfully keep the law of the Lord: for by fulfilling the law, whether inscribed in hearts, or divinely revealed, or promulgated by legitimate authority, they tend with unoffending foot toward God Himself, the fountain of perfection and beatitude.

[2] Ps. 118 (Hebr. 119), 1; the entire psalm embraces praises of the divine law; cf. St. Augustine, Commentary on this psalm.

On Conscience

Concerning Conscience.

349. In order that we may be able to tend to the ultimate end, laws are not sufficient, by which the way to be followed is shown in a general mode; but it is required that laws of this kind be applied to each action in particular. Now that application of the rule of morals, in individual cases, is made through the practical reason of each man, which bears judgment concerning the morality of this or that act, all circumstances having been considered, and is, as it were, the proximate and subjective rule of morals. But this practical reason is called conscience. - In the present Treatise, we shall discuss:

I. Concerning the concept and species of conscience.

II. Concerning certain conscience, insofar as it is the proximate rule of morals.

III. Concerning doubtful conscience, and the means of removing doubt.

Article I. Concerning the Concept and Species of Conscience. — § I. Concerning the Concept of Conscience.

350. The word conscience, which is derived from knowledge,[2] designates several things, but especially: (a) the intimate sense, by which we perceive and discern internal sensations; (b) psychological conscience, by which we apprehend our spiritual operations, namely acts of cognition and volition; (c) moral conscience, by which we judge concerning the morality of our acts. Now the intimate sense, which is concerned with sensible things, is something altogether distinct from conscience properly so called, which perceives spiritual things. But psychological and moral conscience are not two distinct faculties, but one and the same faculty, namely reason (or intellect), which, insofar as it is conscious of spiritual operations, is called psychological conscience, - and insofar as it judges concerning their morality, is called moral conscience.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia, q. 79, a. 13; Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 5; *Qq. disputatae, de Veritate*, q. 17; *Quodlibet.*, III, a. 26-27; Suarez, in Ia IIae, tr. III, disp. XII, n. 1-4; Salmanticenses, Tr. XX, cap. 7; Sayrus, *Clavis regia sacerdotum casuum conscientiae*, Venetiis, 1618, lib. I, c. 2-5; Billuart, *De Act. hum.*, diss. V; St. Alphonsus, lib. I, n. 2-19; Brocardus, Tr. *de Conscientia* (Migne, *Theol. Curs.*, t. XI), q. II, art. 1-5; Sporer-Bierbaum, Tr. I, n. 1-30; Elbel-Bierbaum, P. I, n. 113-141; Ball. P., t. I, n. 130-159; Lehmkuhl, n. 41-66; Muller, § 71-74; Bouquillon, n. 253-282; Bautain, *La Conscience*, Paris, 1869, ch. 13-14; Didiot, n. 233-253; F. Bouillier, *De la Conscience en psychologie et en morale*, Paris, 1872.

[2] Cf. Bréal and Bailly, *Dict. etymol. latin*, Paris, 1898, p. 327-328, where he also notes that the word *scire* (from which *scientia* is derived) primarily signifies the same as to discern, or to judge.

Moral conscience is sometimes considered as a habit, insofar as it inclines us to pronounce concerning the liceity of actions; more often, however, as an act, insofar as it brings forth a judgment. But it is an act of the intellect, not of the will; and in this it agrees with psychological conscience; but it differs from it because it is not a mere apprehension of the intellect, but a true judgment or dictate concerning the liceity of an act, or concerning its relation to the rule of morals: whether it is licit or

prohibited, whether there is an obligation of placing it or merely a counsel, whether under grave or under light obligation. Nor is it a speculative judgment, but practical, because it does not regard the liceity of an action in general and in the abstract, but in particular and in the concrete; indeed it is a proximately practical judgment, because it is borne concerning an action to be placed here and now, and therefore expresses an order to acting.

351. Moral conscience is therefore distinguished: (a) from synderesis, which is usually defined as the habit of the first moral principles, or a certain innate promptitude of reason for easily knowing the first moral principles, such as these: good is to be done, - what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another, etc. (above, n. 221); (b) from science, which is knowledge of general conclusions deduced from first principles; (c) from prudence, which is the right estimation of all the circumstances regarding the morality of some action. - Yet it depends on these three: for it uses the knowledge of principles and conclusions, and also the prudent consideration of all circumstances, for judging whether this action in particular, all things considered, is licit or not.

Many say that the judgment of conscience is, as it were, the conclusion of some prosyllogism. Namely the major is some general principle, proposed by synderesis, for example, every evil is to be avoided; the first minor declares that such a genus of action is comprehended under the general law, for example, theft is evil; from this moral science infers that theft is to be avoided. Then prudence adds: but the action which is here and now proposed as to be done, all things considered, falls under the concept of theft; and the last conclusion is the practical judgment of conscience: therefore here and now one must abstain from that theft. - For the most part, however, conscience does not explicitly syllogize, but, with all adjuncts considered, by a simple judgment, without any reasoning, decrees that this or that action is to be done, or omitted.

352. Therefore conscience can be defined as a practical judgment concerning the morality of an action to be placed here and now.

This is conscience properly so called, insofar as it is the rule of morals. Yet under the name conscience also comes the judgment which our reason bears concerning the morality of a past act: when it approves this, it is called the testimony of a good conscience; but if it reproves it, it is called remorse or the worm of conscience. Here we treat of conscience properly so called.

1. Many moderns do not distinguish the intimate sense from conscience; Rabier reports their various theories concerning the nature of conscience, *Psychologie*, ch. 6, p. 52-79. - Some think that conscience is a special faculty distinct from the intimate sense and the intellect: thus Reid, Garnier, Fabre, apud Bouillier, op. cit., p. 54-59.

§ II. Concerning the Species of Conscience.

353. State of the question. Conscience is divided from a manifold head.

(a) By reason of the obligation which it manifests, conscience, like the law itself, is called commanding, forbidding, permitting, according as it commands, prohibits, or permits certain acts (above, n. 208).

(b) By reason of the mode in which it enunciates the judgment, it is certain, when, without prudent fear of erring, it judges that some act is good or evil, and therefore to be done or avoided; doubtful when it hangs suspended concerning the liceity of an action,[1] or at least pronounces not without prudent fear. We shall speak below concerning each.

[1] That suspension of soul is not properly a judgment, but it implicitly supposes the prior conscience that one must abstain from pronouncing concerning the liceity of the action.

(c) By reason of conformity with the objective rule of morals, conscience is true,[1] if it agrees with truth, that is, with divine goodness and reason, or law; erroneous, if it differs from the same. But erroneous conscience is lax or scrupulous: lax, when someone, from a lighter cause, judges something to be licit which truly is not licit, or something light which is grave; scrupulous, if someone, from a futile cause, judges something to be illicit which in fact is licit, or something grave which is light.

[1] Often true conscience is called right; yet there is some distinction between each: right conscience is that which is formed according to the rules of prudence; but sometimes conscience is true, although imprudently formed. But for the most part these two words are taken interchangeably.

From this it is clear that certain conscience differs from true conscience: the former regards the subjective judgment which is borne concerning the morality of an action; the latter the objective conformity of this interior judgment with truth. Wherefore conscience can be certain without being true, such as invincibly erroneous conscience; likewise true conscience can remain doubtful, namely when truly probable arguments are present for the liceity and against the liceity of some action.

Whether and in what sense erroneous conscience is a rule of acting, we shall explain below; but a few things must be pre-noted concerning lax and scrupulous conscience, so that it may be better understood how a right conscience is formed.

I. Concerning Lax Conscience.

354. 1. Notion. Here we treat of lax conscience, especially insofar as it denotes a habit, or a disposition of soul which inclines reason to diminishing or denying moral obligations, and therefore to extending liberty too much. By force of this habit, in a particular case, conscience judges, without sufficient reason, that something which is truly prohibited is licit, or that what is grave is a light sin. - Sometimes, from a long-standing habit of sinning, the moral sense is so clouded that conscience thinks little or nothing of even very grave sins, calling evil good, and drinking iniquity like water:[1] then it is called seared.[2]

[2] Bourdaloue excellently explains its causes and dangers, *Sermon pour le 3e Dim. de l'Avent, sur la fausse conscience*; cf. *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clergé*, t. XXIV, 1902, p. 737-743.

[1] Isa., V, 20; Job, XV, 16.

[2] 1 Tim., IV, 2.

355. 2. Causes. Among the causes which form a lax conscience, these can be numbered: (a) depraved education: for those who from infancy have been instructed not in the law of the Lord, but in worldly corruptions and false opinions, and have had before their eyes

examples of all vices, easily are ignorant of not a few precepts of the natural law, and judge as indifferent certain acts shameful and dishonorable in themselves; (b) defect of consideration and counsel: those who do not think before acting, and in more difficult matters do not seek the counsels of the wise, are often deceived, and hold as good or at least indifferent what is truly evil; (c) the impulse of desires: namely, when various passions urge, reason is not rarely clouded: what we vehemently desire appears licit; whatever we will is good, and whatever pleases is holy; movements of anger seem to be nothing other than pious indignation, - unbridled ambition nothing other than noble emulation, - avarice is held as legitimate foresight, - commercial frauds are judged an exhibition of industry, etc.; (d) the habit of doing evil: for, sins having been multiplied, the moral sense is dulled, fear of God and reverence for law gradually vanish; hence those things which at the beginning were judged very grave crimes are soon considered as light or no delicts; (e) presumptuous trust in God: God, they say, good and merciful, will forgive us; for He has known our frame and the infirmity of human flesh; wherefore He is much more inclined to benignity than theologians and preachers, nor does He so strictly reprove what moreover is done by most.

356. 3. Harms. Lax conscience, like the ignorance upon which it rests, can be vincibly or invincibly erroneous, according as it can be corrected by moral diligence having been applied or not, according to what was said above, n. 90-98: yet each is full of dangers.

(A) Even when conscience is invincibly erroneous, it induces many evils;[1] for it is the cause why many acts sinful in themselves and objectively are perpetrated. Now an objectively evil act: (a) is a disorder, since it is opposed to the law which is an ordination of reason, and therefore of itself, without the formal malice of the agent, gradually depresses the moral sense, and, when it is often repeated, generates habits evil of themselves and very harmful; thus he who, even from ignorance, often acts against truth or chastity, even if he does not formally sin, commits something shameful and dishonorable in itself, which gradually dulls his moral sense; (b) it gives scandal: for many, seeing evil acts often committed by others, from this take occasion of sinning, and easily persuade themselves that those acts are not very depraved, indeed perhaps even licit, since they are done daily by so many men; from this, gradually and imperceptibly, morals are corrupted, with great detriment to private persons and to the whole of society; (c) it induces the danger of sinning formally: for by acts against the law often repeated, even ignorantly, habits of themselves vicious are soon acquired; and, when afterward conscience awakens, and their malice clearly appears, they are not easily eradicated; thus one incurs the danger of formally consenting to acts which are now apprehended as evil.

[1] This is clearly explained by *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clergé*, t. XXI, 1899, p. 1169-1175.

357. (B) But often lax conscience is vincibly erroneous, and therefore culpable, because it was voluntarily formed, insofar as the agent, entangled in the snares of the passions and burning with pleasure, desired and suggested to himself, while conscience resisted, that this or that action was not prohibited, and afterward suffocated the remorse of conscience; or because, doubting or at least suspecting that the matter was evil, nevertheless he was unwilling to take counsel, lest perchance he discover the truth and no longer be able to enjoy the intended

pleasure.[2] Then indeed he sinned formally, and indirectly or in the cause willed the depraved effects which he foresaw would follow therefrom (above, n. 97 and 171-174).

[2] If it is actually vincibly erroneous, by that very fact it is not certain, and therefore not to be followed, as is declared below.

Moreover if, at the very time at which he acts, someone doubts or suspects that the matter is evil, and moreover knows that his conscience is lax, he cannot follow it, because he is conscious that it is not a right rule of morals, but is held to reform it by the means soon to be set forth. Wherefore by following it he voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of sinning, and therefore actually sins.

By these grave sins often committed the way is prepared for blindness of mind and hardness of heart: for the intellect is clouded insofar as it has become accustomed to approving false things as true, evil things as good; and the will is hardened in evil, insofar as, by indulging pleasure, it acquires a vehement propensity toward depraved acts, so that it obeys conscience only with difficulty.

358. 4. Remedies. As soon as someone becomes conscious that he has entered the way of laxity, he ought seriously to strive, under the guidance of a prudent confessor, to reform his conscience.

(a) First of all he will have recourse to prayer, so that, helped by divine light, he may attain practical knowledge of the rule of morals, - and, relying on divine help, may be able not only to hear, but also to follow the voice of right conscience, notwithstanding human infirmity: "Give me understanding, and I will search your law, and I will keep it with my whole heart."[1] (b) Afterward there is required the agent's own consideration before acting, with a sincere will of knowing and doing what is honorable, and not what pleases; but to discover the truth more easily, let the counsels of skilled and honorable men be sought, and not those of men who are easily deceived by the fallacies of the age; (c) finally let the impediments be removed, namely disordered passions and vicious habits, by which conscience is frequently clouded.

[1] Ps. 118, 34.

But the confessor should receive with paternal affection those who seriously wish to be amended, even if for a long time they have walked in broad ways; and he should instruct them rather than rebuke them, - he should add courage to them, and persuade them that the reformation of conscience, although difficult, is in no way impossible, provided that prayer is joined to good will and assiduous efforts.

II. Concerning Scrupulous Conscience.

359. 1. Notion. Here likewise we treat of scrupulous conscience, insofar as it is a habitual disposition,[3] by force of which the agent, from a futile foundation which he thinks solid, believes or doubts that something is illicit which in fact is not, and therefore with anxiety fears lest he frequently sin, and indeed mortally. For the most part this vain trepidation is accompanied by a certain sensible impression or commotion, arising from vivid imagination, which more or less disturbs judgment and vexes the mind with anguish.[1]

[2] Besides the authors alleged, see Scaramelli, *Director. asceticum*, Augustae Vindelicorum, 1770, tr. II, n. 421-467; Reuter, *Neo-Confessarius*, Ratisbonae, 1870, n. 255-274; Schram, *Instit. theol. myst.*, Parisiis, 1868, t. I, § 73-83; Lombez, *Paix intérieure*, 2e p., ch. 7; Dubois, *l'Ange conducteur des âmes scrupuleuses*, Lille et Paris, 1901; *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clergé*, t. XXIV, 1902, p. 673-678.

[3] A judgment brought by scrupulous conscience is sometimes certain and sometimes doubtful: in the former case, conscience is said to be informed by scruples, and its dictate must be followed, from what will be said below concerning certain conscience; in the latter case, conscience is agitated by scruples, and concerning it we treat here; this is not to be followed, but the doubt is to be put aside by force of a reflex principle handed down by the confessor (n. 364).

[1] The word scruple (*scrupulus* or *scrupus*) literally signifies a little stone (*pierre pointue*); for just as this, inserted between the foot and the shoe, torments the one walking, so scruple vexes the soul.

(A) The principal signs by which scrupulous persons are recognized are these: (a) fear of sinning in all things, even indifferent and honorable things, or the vain apprehension that fault otherwise light is grave; (b) excessive anxiety concerning past confessions, and consequently the desire of making general confessions again and again, especially when from these doubts and anxieties increase; (c) lengthy accusations of circumstances which do not pertain to the matter, even if the confessor has several times said that all these things are useless; (d) pertinacity of judgment, which does not wish to acquiesce in the decisions of the confessor, but to seize upon the counsels of others: from which greater anguishes of soul are born; (e) frequent change of opinion on account of light reasons, and the greatest disturbance of soul in acting, which is sometimes exhibited by ridiculous gestures.

360. (B) Scruples are sometimes concerned with all things and sometimes with one or another object, especially (a) concerning past confessions: whether due examination was premised, and all circumstances rightly declared; whether contrition was had, and indeed at the very time of absolution; whether a good purpose was efficaciously elicited, etc.; (b) concerning depraved thoughts against chastity, or doubts against faith, to which they assert that they have given full consent, or intentions which they suppose to have been evil; (c) concerning scandal which perhaps they gave to others; (d) concerning a habit of acting with serious doubt whether the action is licit, from which it happens that most of their actions are sins, etc.

Scrupulous conscience differs from tender, or delicate, conscience, which perceives the smallest defects, and, on account of love of God, wills to amend them, well knowing that they are not grave, but harm perfection; this disposition indeed is laudable.

361. 2. Causes. Some are natural, others supernatural.

(A) Natural causes are physical or moral. (a) Among physical causes are especially numbered: a melancholic disposition, which often arises from temperament, and injects vain fears; and a certain morbid inclination to despair, arising from character, sickness, or various misfortunes; - excess in labors, abstinence, fasts, vigils, and other austerities, which, by diminishing the strength of the body, depress the strength of the soul; and also long-standing flight from all human conversation and honorable recreation, from which arises an assiduous and morose investigation of one's own conscience. (b) Among moral causes are numbered: weakness and inconstancy of soul, which follows the impressions of a vivid imagination rather than mature judgment; and from this head, more women than men are prone to scruple; - defect of science, whether speculative or psychological, by

force of which the extent of duties is exaggerated, or impression is confused with consent; this defect is sometimes increased by the ignorance or imprudence of certain confessors; - excessive fear of divine justice, proceeding from this, that God is held not as a merciful Father, but rather as a severe Judge, scrutinizing and punishing all things strictly; - hidden pride, by which the scrupulous person tenaciously adheres to his own judgment, and does not consent to obey a spiritual director.[1]

[1] To these causes, which hold themselves on the part of the subject, external ones are sometimes added: conversation with scrupulous persons, - reading of books favoring rigid opinions, - counsels of a director who is ignorant, or lacking discretion.

(B) To these sometimes supernatural causes are added: (a) namely God indeed does not send false concepts into conscience, but sometimes withdraws His light for a time even from the just, and permits them to be vexed by scruples, so that, by patient tolerance of this trial, they may satisfy more perfectly for past sins, and, by detesting them more efficaciously, may withdraw more vigilantly from dangerous occasions; - and also that, conscious of their own infirmity, they may have recourse to God with greater confidence and obey a spiritual director with more sincere humility.

(b) The devil can also act upon our sensitive faculties, especially upon the imagination, for exciting or increasing vain fears; or, when the soul is already held by sadness, he strives to suggest despair by various persuasions; or, if the conscience is delicate, "he strives to make it much more delicate also, and to drive it into a certain extreme degree of anxiety, so that thus, being miserably disturbed, it may finally fall away from spiritual progress."[2]

[2] St. Ignatius of Loyola, *Exercitia spiritualia*, ed. Roothaan, Romae, 1854, Rules concerning scruples, p. 160; P. Jennesseaux, S. J., rendered it in French, Paris, Poussielgue, 13th edition, 1891, p. 323.

362. 3. Harms. Scruples to which consent is given, from whatever cause they arise, can induce the greatest harms, temporal and spiritual at the same time: -

(A) Temporal indeed; for, when they last for a long time, (a) they weaken or disturb the brain and nervous system: for by force of the intimate union between body and soul, vain fears, sadness, anguishes, and other things of this kind, to which scrupulous persons are liable, lessen physical strength and greatly harm health. (b) The powers having been weakened, the way is prepared for neurasthenia, hysteria, and other illnesses described above, n. 130-133. (c) Indeed, as anxieties increase, sometimes reason itself is dulled, and falls into dementia, if the scruples are universal, or into monomania, if they are concerned with one object.

(B) Spiritual harms: they break the powers of the soul, and gradually turn virtues once acquired into vices: (a) they weaken hope: scrupulous persons, thinking themselves to be in the state of mortal sin, regard God as a most severe exactor and flee from Him. (b) Wherefore they cannot pray: too solicitous concerning the state of their own conscience, and fearing God too much, they do not dare to remain in His presence and be united to Him. (c) From this they lack fortitude: for since they retain only slight confidence in God, and moreover exaggerate their own infirmity, and do not trust their spiritual director, they undertake nothing great, but waste time uselessly in vain anxieties. Hence they are rendered unfit for acting fruitfully for the usefulness of others, and for diligently fulfilling the duties of their state; indeed they are usually burdensome to themselves and to others. (d) They also easily incur the danger of sinning gravely: for, their powers weakened, and exhausted by assiduous efforts against natural inclinations, they sometimes slip into despair, and, for the sake of

consolation, loosen the reins to their desires; whence not rarely they fall into extremes, today indulging excessive mortifications, but tomorrow pleasure: for human nature cannot long resist such cruel torture.

363. 4. Remedies. (A) The primary and most efficacious remedy, to which the others are subordinated, is perfect obedience to be shown to a prudent confessor. For a scrupulous person, since he is destitute of the right dictate of conscience, cannot form a right judgment concerning things to be done; and therefore there is no other mode of rightly operating available to him than to submit himself to the judgment of a prudent man, by whose aid he will gradually put aside vain doubts and erroneous judgments. But the prudent man in question can scarcely be anyone other than the spiritual director, to whom the secrets of the heart are trustingly opened.

(a) But the confessor, as soon as he knows that some penitent is agitated by scruples, will strive to win his confidence by paternal benignity, and afterward will address him in these or similar words: I can and will, with God's help, restore peace of soul to you, provided, however, that you will open all things sincerely to me, and obey in all things, having set aside your own judgment for a time; if you promise this, you will certainly be freed from all doubts and anxieties at the opportune time; otherwise, you will be vexed perpetually. For a scrupulous person cannot act rightly by his own counsel,[1] but ought to follow without hesitation the counsel of a prudent man; practically, he never errs who obeys a wise director.

[1] Often he will not acknowledge that he is scrupulous; but the confessor will affirm that the matter is clear from the doubts, fluctuations, and anxieties set forth by the penitent.

(b) The first time, let him allow the scrupulous person to set forth his doubts fully; if he wishes to make a general confession, this can be permitted once, provided that he has not made such a confession to another a little before: let him kindly help him in the examination of conscience and in eliciting the act of contrition; but once this confession has been duly completed, let him no longer be permitted to repeat confessions. If nevertheless afterward he says that he did not confess all things, let the confessor order him to swear that he certainly remembers some sin certainly mortal and certainly never declared in a valid confession: if he fears to swear, let him not be heard; if he swears without hesitation, let it be permitted to him to declare this sin.

364. (c) The confessor will strive to know the cause and object of the scruples, so that he may be able better to hand down practical rules of acting to the penitent. If the cause is physiological, proceeding from weakness of the brain or disturbance of the nerves, he will send him to a wise physician, yet without omitting spiritual remedies. - If the cause is doubt concerning the liceity of such or such an action, he will inculcate in him the rule which is valid at least for the scrupulous: a doubtful law is no law; if, after the action has been performed, he doubts whether he sinned gravely, in practice he ought to act as if he had not sinned gravely, and therefore not abstain from Holy Communion: for he ought not to hold as mortal sin except that which he can swear to be certainly mortal. - He ought to take care that the scrupulous person absolutely obey the rules handed down; whence even if with tears he asks to repeat confessions, or wishes to be absolved from doubtful sins before communion, let him be sweetly but firmly repelled: this severity is the highest clemency. - Nor let him permit him to

spend a long time in examination of conscience (which increases scruples), but let him set a brief time, which he should never exceed; the same must be said concerning the act of contrition, about which scrupulous persons are greatly tormented.[1]

[1] For theologians deservedly teach that one of the privileges of scrupulous persons is situated in this, that they are not held to examine their conscience with the same diligence as others, nor to accuse all sins, but only those which, after a brief examination, they evidently know to be grave (*De Paenitent.*, n. 204 and 192).

The scrupulous person sometimes objects: the confessor does not know my intimate dispositions well; I myself know them better, and I would not wish to die in this uncertain state. - The director will respond: Unless your conscience had been sufficiently known to me, I would not have prescribed a manner of acting; since you are agitated by scruples, you cannot form a right judgment concerning your own dispositions, but you ought to obey the judgment of the wise, even in the article of death; nor can God damn him who has trustingly submitted himself to a superior.

In all these things let the confessor not speak as one opining and hesitating, but as one certainly knowing and having authority: let him adduce either no reasons, or only very brief ones; otherwise, the discussions will be interminable. - Yet firmness of soul should be tempered by charity, so that the scrupulous person may understand that the confessor is a most devoted friend.

365. (B) Other remedies, besides obedience, to be employed are: (a) fervent prayer to God, as a kind and merciful Father, by which light may be trustingly obtained for seeing the way clearly, and strength for following it assiduously; (b) contempt of scruples, by acting strenuously against them, according to the prescriptions of the confessor; (c) Christian mortification, especially that which consists in immediately expelling vain phantasms, impressions, thoughts, and anxieties: hence assiduous and strenuous labor, and the faithful observance of the duties of one's state are especially useful; for thus the mind is efficaciously turned away from torturing doubts; but the scrupulous person should be warned never to hesitate long, but, after brief consideration, to act deliberately according to the counsels given or presumed of the confessor; (d) right formation of conscience, by which gradually, according to the general rules handed down by the director, he will prudently bear judgment concerning his own actions, as if they were the actions of another.

366. Corollaries. (A) Concerning perplexed conscience. Sometimes a scrupulous person, placed between two precepts, believes that he will sin, whichever part he chooses: then his conscience is called perplexed;[1] such is, for example, one who, assisting a sick person on Sunday, thinks that he sins if he leaves him, and likewise sins if he omits Mass.

[1] Sometimes, however, someone can be perplexed from mere ignorance, because namely he does not know how to form his conscience in the conflict of two obligations: then it suffices to instruct him.

In this case, (a) if the matter admits delay, and is of grave moment, he is bound to defer the action until he can obtain the counsel of a prudent man: for each one ought to avoid what he thinks is sin.

(b) But if the matter does not admit delay (which for the most part happens) or is of slight moment, he ought to choose that which seems to him to be the lesser evil, and therefore rather to transgress a positive law than a natural law. But if he cannot discern the lesser evil, and remains perplexed, whichever part he chooses, he does not sin: for he lacks that moral liberty which is required for sin.

Therefore penitents of this kind are rightly to be instructed so that, laying aside vain anxieties, they may learn that in no case does there exist a necessity of sinning.

(B) Concerning pharisaical conscience. Sometimes also, on account of ignorance or prejudices, conscience is lax in matters of great moment, pertaining to natural or divine right, while it is too narrow and scrupulous in matters of lesser moment, especially those pertaining to merely positive right: then it is called pharisaical, because it imitates the morals of the Pharisees, of whom Christ said:[2] "Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, who tithe mint, and anise, and cumin, and have left the weightier things of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith... straining out a gnat, but swallowing a camel." - From this vice today they do not sufficiently depart who are too anxious about many devotions, and, on the other side, neglect fraternal charity or the duties of their state. These are to be diligently instructed so that, putting aside superfluous devotions, they may assiduously cultivate the Christian virtues congruent with their condition.

[2] Matt. 23:23-24; the whole chapter should be read.

Art. II. Concerning Certain Conscience as the Proximate Rule of Morals.

We shall set forth two things: 1. what certain conscience is; 2. whether and in what sense it is the rule of morals.

I. The Genuine Notion of Certain Conscience.

367. 1. Preliminary remarks concerning certitude. Certitude in general is the firm adherence of the mind to some notion or fact, without fear of erring. By reason of the foundation on which it rests, certitude is distinguished as threefold: (a) metaphysical, which is founded in the very essence of things and ideas; thus we are metaphysically certain that the whole is greater than its part, because the truth of this proposition clearly shines forth from the very comparison of the ideas; (b) physical, which is founded in the constancy of natural laws; thus we are physically certain that fire burns, because from constant experience it is established for us that there is in fire the power of burning; (c) moral, which rests on the constancy of the laws of the moral order, or on the common manner of acting of free beings. This is: speculative, if it concerns abstract truths or the liceity of an action in general; and practical, if it concerns the liceity of an action to be placed here and now.

368. 2. Concerning the certitude which belongs to conscience. (A) Now the certitude which belongs to the practical judgment of conscience is moral and practical certitude: for since it pronounces concerning the liceity of such or such an action, not in general and in the abstract, but in the individual and in the concrete, with attention given to all the circumstances, the judgment brought forth is not infallible, but rests on human prudence,[1] which can be mistaken.

[1] Not a few theologians say that conscience sometimes enjoys absolute certitude, because it is founded on a motive altogether infallible; such, they say, is the certitude which is had concerning the precepts of the Decalogue and their proximate conclusions. - But in speaking thus they confuse synderesis or moral science with conscience: for this latter does not judge concerning the precepts of the Decalogue, but concerning the practical question whether such or such an action, in these or those circumstances, is prohibited by the Decalogue or not.

(B) Practical certitude itself admits several degrees: (a) sometimes it excludes every doubt and every fear of erring, and is called strict moral certitude; this can be had with regard to practical judgments altogether evident, for example, here and now I ought to abstain from such a theft; (b) sometimes, however, there is had only practical certitude broadly so called, or prudential certitude, which does not exclude every doubt, but only prudent doubt; thus, for example, we are not absolutely, but only prudently, certain concerning the validity of baptism or of orders received: for it can happen that the minister lacked the required intention; wherefore we have some fear of erring, but that fear, as being slight, does not destroy prudential certitude. This suffices in the moral matter, since often we cannot have another; now reason itself dictates to us that that certitude suffices which is accommodated to the infirmity of human nature; otherwise man would frequently remain perplexed, not knowing what was to be done.

369. (C) But this practical certitude, taken strictly or broadly, can be acquired in two ways, directly or indirectly: (a) directly, when, from the very comparison of the action with the law, we come to a morally certain conclusion; thus, given the law of hearing Mass on a feast day, unless a grave inconvenience is present, I judge morally certainly that I am held by that precept, because I see here and now that in my case there is not a grave inconvenience; (b) indirectly, that is, either from authority, or from an external, or reflex, principle, as they say, when we cannot come to a certain conclusion unless a certain principle extrinsic to the thing itself is called into the middle; thus a judge, after attentive consideration of the proofs brought forward in a criminal case, sometimes doubts whether the accused is truly culpable; then he has recourse to an external, or reflex, principle: in doubt, favor is to be shown to the accused; and therefore practically and morally certainly he concludes: this accused man, all things considered, is to be absolved. - That external principle can be the judgment of a prudent man, and especially of a confessor.

370. (D) Certain conscience is not always true, as we have already noted, but can be erroneous, since one can err even when he prudently judges concerning the liceity of some action: then it is called invincibly erroneous, according to the things said above, where we treated ignorance, n. 92. If conscience is actually vincibly erroneous, by that very fact it is not morally certain; for in this case the agent can expel the error, or at least prudently doubts concerning the liceity of the action here and now to be performed. But it must be said otherwise of conscience previously vincibly erroneous, but which at present is actually invincibly erroneous, because namely the agent does not think about the necessity of inquiring: for this is now morally certain, because, although previously he had thought about the necessity of investigating the truth, now he prudently thinks the action to be licit, without suspecting that the matter must be further investigated. Thus a seminary student, while he was studying theology, foresaw that from his negligence he would give certain erroneous decisions: then his conscience was vincibly erroneous; afterward, however, having forgotten this negligence, he brings forth a false judgment concerning a matrimonial case, without at that instant suspecting that he errs: his conscience is invincibly erroneous, and subjectively morally certain.

II. In What Sense Is Certain Conscience the Rule of Morals?

371. 1. Principle: Conscience morally and practically certain, and indeed it alone, is the proximate rule of morals.

(A) Conscience morally and practically certain is the proximate rule of human actions. For conscience morally and practically certain, in whatever way this certitude has been acquired, is that which, without prudent fear of erring, judges that some action is licit or illicit, obligatory or permitted; but it cannot happen that he sins who is prudently certain that the action which he does is honorable, or that the one which he omits is illicit. For no action or omission is imputable to anyone unless it is voluntary; but the malice of an action is not voluntary unless it is apprehended as such by the intellect; therefore he does not sin, but acts rightly, who follows a morally certain conscience; therefore this is deservedly called the proximate rule of morals.

372. (a) Concerning this there is assuredly no difficulty when certain conscience is at the same time true: for then it is altogether consonant with the ultimate rule of morals, namely divine reason. - But the same thing must be said even when certain conscience is invincibly erroneous, because, although it disagrees with the law, the defect of conformity is not imputed to the agent, because it is invincibly unknown by him; and therefore an act elicited according to an invincibly erroneous conscience is objectively and materially evil, as often as namely it is opposed to a law commanding or forbidding, - but subjectively and formally good, because it is apprehended and intended as such. - The same thing must be said of conscience here and now invincibly erroneous, which antecedently was vincibly erroneous. For an act placed according to such a conscience not only is materially evil, but can also be called formally evil in its cause (above, n. 97). Nevertheless it is not in itself actually evil: for it is elicited in good faith, and is not apprehended nor intended as evil: "Every human act has the character of sin or merit insofar as it is voluntary; but the object of the will according to its proper character is the apprehended good: and therefore a human act is judged virtuous according to the apprehended good toward which the will is borne of itself, and not according to the material object of the act."[1]

[1] St. Thomas, *Quodlibet.*, III, a. 27; cf. I-II, q. 19, a. 7; q. 76, a. 3.

This can be confirmed from proposition 28, condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 December 1690, at least as rash:[2] "Although invincible ignorance of natural right be given, this, in the state of fallen nature, does not excuse the one acting from formal sin itself"; therefore invincible ignorance, and consequently invincibly erroneous conscience, excuses from formal sin.

[2] Denzing., n. 1159.

373. (b) This holds even when moral certitude is only prudential, and was had by the aid of a reflex principle. For since the question is concerning things to be done, that certitude suffices which can be obtained in practice; now, when the question concerns performing or omitting such or such an action, not rarely only prudential certitude can be acquired. Sometimes speculative doubts arise which it is impossible to solve directly; from another side the necessity of acting presses; therefore nothing remains except to solve the speculative doubt practically by the aid of some reflex principle (above, n. 369). Thus he who, after all things have been diligently weighed, follows the prudent dictate of conscience, acts rightly before God.

374. (B) Certain conscience alone, morally and practically certain, is the right norm of actions. For he who acts with conscience which is not practically certain, by that very fact voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of transgressing the law, since he prudently and practically doubts whether the action, here and now to be placed, is licit; moreover, he who voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of sinning, while he can easily avoid it, by that very fact implicitly wills to sin. Therefore he who practically doubts concerning the liceity of an action here and now to be performed cannot, while the doubt stands, proceed further, but ought to form for himself a practically certain conscience, by the aid of a reflex principle, according to the manner to be explained below.

375. Corollaries. (A) Conscience here and now vincibly erroneous is not a legitimate rule of acting. For, from one side, that conscience is not consonant with the objective rule of morals; and from the other, that defect, as being actually voluntary, is imputable to the agent; since, in this case, the agent prudently doubts concerning the liceity of the action, and therefore ought to inquire further, if he can, and put away the error. - But if he cannot, and from another side the necessity of acting presses, he ought to choose that part in which evil, or the greater evil, is more safely guarded against; for by acting thus, he puts aside the practical doubt, and the error is not imputed to him unto fault. But if he chooses that of whose liceity he practically doubts, by that very fact he sins, by rashly exposing himself to perpetrating evil.

376. (B) To discern whether the conscience of the penitent was vincibly or invincibly erroneous, the confessor will ask: (a) whether the penitent perceived some indecency in the act, or at least doubted concerning its liceity; (b) whether conscience dictated to him that the confessor or another prudent man was to be asked, and he voluntarily neglected the occasion of inquiring. If he sincerely denies both, the error was invincible; if he affirms either, the error must be called vincible. - But the nature and gravity of the sin committed from vincibly erroneous conscience depends on the very disposition of the agent at the time when he acts: if he apprehends the matter rather clearly as of great moment, and as contrary to this or that virtue, he sins gravely against that same virtue; but if the matter seems to him of slight moment, or its malice appears only confusedly, the sin will be venial. - From this it is clear how necessary it is for confessors kindly and prudently to explore the conscience and character of each penitent, so that they may form a true judgment concerning the sins committed by him.

377. Hence penitents are deceived who, after they have acted in doubt, seek in books or from a prudent man whether the action is licit, and lay aside every anxiety if they learn that the matter is not objectively evil: the morality of an action depends on the dictate of conscience brought forth at the very instant at which the action is completed, but not on the judgment which is afterward brought, when the matter has been better investigated. Whence that investigation will indeed be greatly useful for the future, but by no means for the past time.

Art. III. Concerning Doubtful Conscience.

To certain conscience is opposed doubtful conscience, concerning which we shall set forth two things: 1. what it is and how it can be rendered practically certain; 2. what are the various systems devised for solving practical doubt.

[1] Suarez, *Tr. de Actibus hum.*, disp. XII, sect. 5-6; St. Alphonsus, n. 20-54; Billuart, *De Act. hum.*, diss. V, art. 6; Lehmk., n. 48-51; Ball. P., n. 160-168; Muller, § 73; Bouquillon, n. 267-291; Noldin, n. 196-201; *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XXII, 1900, p. 369-374.

§ I. Concerning the Genuine Concept of Doubtful Conscience and the Practical Means of Shaking Off Doubt.

378. 1. Preliminary remarks concerning doubt and probability. (A) When the mind cannot judge morally certainly concerning the liceity of some action, it can comport itself in a twofold way: either it adheres to neither part and suspends assent, or it assents to one part more than to another, yet with a prudent fear of erring; in the former case, doubt is called strict; in the latter, it is called broad, or opinion.[2] But opinion is distinguished from suspicion, which is a certain initial adherence, or propensity toward judging, but not a true assent.

[2] Here opinion is treated insofar as it is a subjective judgment of the mind; the same word often signifies the proposition itself to which the mind adheres with fear of erring, or opinion objectively taken.

379. (B) Sometimes opinion is taken objectively; then it can be more or less probable. Probable, according to the force of the name, is said of that which can be proved; but, from common usage, it signifies that which, although not manifestly true, bears before itself certain signs of truth which can move a prudent man to assent to it. But the degrees of probability depend on the greater or lesser verisimilitude which the opinion seems to have; thus that opinion is called more probable which rests on graver motives than the contrary opinion; on the contrary, the one which is supported by lighter arguments is called simply probable, or less probable; again, an opinion is notably more probable, or most probable, if the excess of probability is very notable: then the opposed opinion is slenderly or doubtfully probable.

(C) This probability indeed is called intrinsic or extrinsic: the former rests on reasons drawn from the very nature of the thing, the latter on the authority of learned or wise men. Often, however, each is joined, and the authority of doctors is worth the more, the greater is the weight of the reasons which they bring forward.

380. (D) Again probability is absolute or relative: absolute, which is supported by those reasons by which the mind of a prudent man is accustomed to be moved; relative, which does not bend all minds, but a certain one in particular, because of his special character, or the special circumstances in which he is placed. For in matters which are not evident of themselves, the will can command the assent of the intellect, because of extrinsic motives, whether legitimate or more or less dishonorable; thus in doubts, those who are right of heart adhere to the part which more favors the divine honor, the good of neighbor, or the peace of the community; on the contrary, those who are prone to laxity not rarely adhere to the part which favors pride or pleasure.

(E) Finally, doubt is speculative or practical: speculative, or remote, which concerns the law considered in itself, or its application in general - namely, whether such a law has been sufficiently promulgated, or has been abrogated by custom, - whether to paint on a feast day is a prohibited

servile work, etc.; practical, or proximate, which concerns the liceity of such or such an action in particular, for example, whether it is licit for me to paint on this feast day.

381. 2. Concerning doubtful conscience itself. Merely speculative doubt does not directly affect conscience itself, but pertains to moral science, which weighs those questions; nevertheless often it indirectly affects conscience, by rendering it uncertain concerning the liceity of such or such an action in particular to be placed here and now by the agent; thus, for example, if it is doubted whether painting is a servile work, by that very fact a practical doubt will frequently arise whether Peter can here and now paint on this Sunday.

But here we treat only of practical doubt,[1] and therefore doubtful conscience is called that which either remains suspended concerning the honesty of some action in particular, or pronounces concerning the same not without a prudent fear of erring. - But this state of mind can be induced from the fact that on both sides reasons are present which are equally probable; or because on one side there is a more probable reason, which nevertheless does not remove the probability of the adverse opinion, or a reason only merely but solidly probable. - But for conscience of this kind merely negative doubt does not suffice, which rests on reasons so slight that they would not move a prudent man; for notwithstanding merely negative doubt, we judge concerning the liceity of the action without prudent fear of erring; - hence positive doubt is required, resting on grave arguments, which are accustomed to move a prudent man.

[1] For concerning speculative doubt we have already said something in the Treatise on Laws, and it is treated in the whole course of Moral Theology, by setting forth what opinions are more or less probable.

382. 3. Concerning the manner of solving practical doubt. (A) From what has been said above, n. 374, it is not licit to act with a practically doubtful conscience, but doubt must be shaken off by diligently investigating the matter.

For man ought to try, insofar as he can, to attain truth, and therefore, in a moral matter, to investigate the law and its genuine sense, and also attentively to consider all the circumstances, so that, in the best way that can be done, he may conform his actions to the law, which is nothing other than the manifestation of divine reason and will. Therefore he who, laboring under practical doubt, does not wish seriously to weigh the matter, acts rashly, and voluntarily and culpably exposes himself to the danger of sinning against the law. But, on the contrary, he who uses moral diligence to shake off doubt acts prudently, and the error into which perhaps he involuntarily falls is not imputed to him.

But that examination ought to be more or less diligent according to the gravity of the matter, and the quality or duties of the person; thus, if the question concerns a matter of slight moment, a prolonged investigation is by no means necessary. But this is required if the matter concerns a grave precept, especially concerning the strict rights of another person, or if from office an obligation lies upon some person to solve a doubt which concerns not only his own good, but also the common good.

383. (B) To perform rightly an examination of this kind, that natural prudence which is called right judgment (*bon sens, common sense*) is indeed required, but it does not suffice; rather, in those

who are able to devote themselves to study, there is desired competent knowledge of the principles of moral theology, and in others recourse to prudent men, by whose counsels they may be able rightly to form their conscience. For when the question concerns not only positive right, but also many conclusions of natural right, some aspect often escapes the mind which, if it had been known, would have greatly helped conscience to form a right judgment. For although knowledge of principles pertains directly to synderesis, nevertheless it is especially useful for rightly forming the dictate of conscience: the better the sense of the law becomes known, the easier its application to a particular case becomes.

384. Confessors especially are held to devote themselves to study of this kind, as we have proved elsewhere.[1] Wherefore Benedict XIV admonishes them,[2] "that in a doubtful matter they should not rely on their own opinion, but, before they decide the cause, should consult very many books, especially those whose doctrine is more solid, and then should descend into that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms." (a) Namely, they should not rely on their own opinion, which is often fallacious: for more wisdom is found in the judgment of many than in the judgment of one. (b) They should consult very many books, in order more easily to guard against the same inconvenience; for what could have escaped one author will not so easily escape many, especially if they do not belong to the same school, but to diverse schools: for experience shows how easily authors of the same school, without further examination, confidently repeat the opinions and arguments of their predecessors! (c) But they should choose those books whose doctrine is more solid, those namely which, by knowledge, prudence, and piety, have acquired a greater reputation for themselves, and have weighed the matter expressly, not incidentally: nor are the authors whose works are read to be so much counted as weighed. (d) Let them descend into that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Hence, insofar as can be done, attention must be given both to intrinsic reasons and to extrinsic authorities: the arguments brought forward should be critically weighed, with attention given to the circumstances of times and places, and, generally speaking, the authority of theologians should not be estimated at more than the weight of the reasons which they bring forward. Nevertheless, if some conclusion is confirmed by the common doctrine of all schools, by that very fact it has great probability, even independently of the arguments brought forward; nor should one depart from it unless a new reason which up to this time was unknown is brought into the middle.

[1] *Syn. Theol. Mor., De Paenit.,* n. 370-374.

[2] Benedict XIV, Apostolic Constitution *Constit.* concerning preparation for the Jubilee, year 1750, § 21.

385. (C) After all these things have been weighed, if conscience cannot bring a morally certain judgment, it remains that we have recourse to a reflex principle, by whose aid the practical doubt may be converted into moral certitude. Now, among reflex principles, some are universal, because they can be applied in any doubt concerning the liceity of an action for forming a practically certain conscience; such are: a doubtful law does not oblige, - in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and others which we shall soon explain in the critical exposition of the systems; others, however, are particular, which can be applied only in certain matters, for example, in doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be proved, - in doubt one must

stand for the validity of the act, - in doubt the presumption stands for the superior, etc.; these indeed are explained in the various Treatises. By their aid doubt is shaken off, and a morally and practically certain conscience is formed. If someone, for example, after mature investigation of the matter, has judged that the law of fasting in such a case is truly doubtful, because of grave reasons, and at the same time admits the truth of the principle "a doubtful law does not oblige," he can immediately conclude: a law of this kind does not oblige me in this case; and this judgment indeed is morally and practically certain. For, from one side, probabilists hold as morally certain the principle "a doubtful law does not oblige"; from another side, it is morally certain that in this case the law of fasting is doubtful; therefore it is morally certain that this law does not oblige me.

386. But the uneducated, who have not explicitly learned the use of a reflex principle, nevertheless form for themselves a practically certain conscience, because, rightly using moral sense, they judge that they act prudently, since such or such an action does not seem, all things considered, clearly and certainly prohibited;[1] but if doubt tortures them too much, they approach a prudent man, especially the pastor or confessor, and ask from him what must be done.

[1] *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XXII, 1900, p. 753-758.

§ II. Concerning the Various Systems Devised for Solving Practical Doubt.

387. State of the question. While practical doubt remains concerning the liceity of an action to be performed, some reflex principle is necessary for forming a practically certain conscience, as we said above. But what is the universal and morally certain principle by whose aid practical doubt can be solved has been keenly disputed among Catholic doctors for many centuries, and is still much disputed today. For understanding this controversy, a few things must be noted beforehand.

1. When moral certitude, even broad certitude, cannot be obtained, the mind practically doubts whether the law obliges in such a case or not; now the law, or obligation, appears as most probable, or much more probable, equally probable, solidly probable, or slenderly probable, according to the weight of the reasons which are brought forward to prove the obligatory force of the law; and from this it is already given to understand how there can be diverse principles for solving doubt, according to the diverse degrees of probability.

Moreover, from the commonly received manner of speaking, the safe or safer part is called that which favors the law or obligation; but the part which favors liberty is called less safe. Wherefore, if it is asserted that the safer part is to be followed, by that very fact it is signified that the law is to be observed as truly obligatory.

388. 2. The reflex principles proposed by the various systems are not valid, according to all prudent men, except where the matter concerns only the licit or illicit; for if it does not concern only the licit, but the valid, or an effect necessarily to be obtained, generally the safer part is to be followed; which occurs especially in three cases: -

(A) When the matter concerns a means necessary for salvation; for since, eternal salvation having been lost, all goods are lost together, whatever may be the intimate persuasion of the soul, surely nothing is to be done from which eternity is endangered. Thus, where the matter concerns truths to be believed by necessity of means, for example, concerning faith in God incarnate, it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, as is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (4) by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679: "An unbeliever who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief."[1]

[1] Denzing., n. 1021; which proposition was reproved at minimum as scandalous and pernicious in practice; cf. Viva, on this proposition.

389. (B) When the matter concerns the validity of a sacrament, as is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (1) by the same Pontiff:[2] "It is not illicit, in conferring sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of a sacrament, the safer opinion being left aside." Namely, in doubt whether such matter is sufficient for the validity of a sacrament, the minister is bound, on account of reverence for the sacrament and the good of the faithful, to apply the safer matter, if he has it at hand; but if this is lacking, and it is necessary to administer the sacrament, it is right to apply the doubtful matter, in order to provide, insofar as can be done, for the salvation of the faithful. - Yet an exception is given in a case in which the Church can and is reasonably presumed to supply the defect, as sometimes happens for jurisdiction required for the validity of absolution, or for merely ecclesiastical impediments of marriage, as we explain in its own place.

[2] Ibid., n. 1018.

390. (C) When the matter concerns the danger of temporal or spiritual harm, either one's own or another's, which we are bound to guard against or prevent from justice or from charity. Thus it is not licit, without necessity, to take food probably poisoned; nor to apply doubtful remedies to a sick person when other remedies certainly efficacious are at hand; nor probably to expose oneself or others, without sufficient reason, to the proximate danger of formally sinning; because in all these things probability does not remove some danger of inflicting an evil which, moreover, we are certainly bound to avert.

Outside these cases, when the matter concerns only the licit, there are various systems.

I. Historical View of the Various Systems.

391. No system before the sixteenth century. For very many centuries, no system properly so called was devised and arranged for solving practical doubts; but the Fathers and Theologians, as opportunity was given, solved occurring doubts with a certain benignity, by diverse reflex principles, but especially by teaching that the obligation of a doubtful law was not to be urged.

(A) Among the Fathers, St. Augustine, treating the question agitated in the first centuries whether it was licit for Christians to contract marriage with unbelievers, declares that in the Gospel or apostolic letters the matter had not been defined without ambiguity, and therefore that this was not reputed a sin, "because truly in the New Testament nothing has been prescribed concerning it, and therefore it has either been believed to be licit, or left as doubtful."[1] - Elsewhere, being asked whether, in a case

of necessity, it was licit to eat food offered to idols, he responded: "Either it is certain that it is idolothyte, or it is certain that it is not, or it is unknown: therefore if it is certain that it is, it is better rejected by Christian virtue; but if it is either known not to be, or is unknown, it is taken for use of necessity without any scruple of conscience."[2]

[1] St. Augustine, *De fide et operibus*, c. 19, n. 35, apud Migne, P. L., XL, 221; cf. *De conjug. adult.*, lib. I, c. 25, n. 31, Migne, P. L., XL, 468-469.

[2] St. Augustine, Epist. 47, to Publicola, n. 6, Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 187.

Thus also St. Gregory Nazianzen replies to a certain Novatian, asserting that second marriages are illicit: "By what argument do you confirm this? Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot do this, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and facility prevail."[3]

[3] St. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 39, *In sancta lumina*, n. 19, Migne, P. G., XXXVI, 358.

392. (B) But the Scholastics, down to the sixteenth century, did not propose an entire moral system, but taught that an uncertain law either does not bind, or at least does not bind in the same way as a certain law, and they began to distinguish between more or less probable opinions; according to many, the more probable part was to be followed; according to others, a doubtful obligation was not to be urged. But since in those times it was not yet customary to institute an accurate distinction between speculative and practical doubt, and between direct or indirect certitude, it is often difficult to know their mind with certainty.

(a) Thus St. Thomas asserts that no one is bound by a precept except through knowledge or notice of the precept:[4] "Whence no one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept; and therefore he who is not capable of notice is not bound by the precept; nor is anyone ignorant of the precept of God bound to fulfill the precept, except insofar as he is held to know the precept." But what degree of certitude he requires for knowledge or notice is not clearly explained there; this assuredly excludes merely conjectural opinion, or slenderly probable opinion; but whether more probable knowledge suffices or moral certitude is required is not sufficiently clear from this place. - Elsewhere he declares that he sins who doubts whether he can have several benefices, and nevertheless, while such doubt remains, retains them, because he exposes himself to the danger of sinning;[1] and thus he seems to favor probabiliorism; but since he says "while such doubt remains," some understand this place concerning him who, practically doubting, retains these benefices without having formed a conscience for himself. Wherefore probabiliorists, equiprobabilists, and probabilists try to draw the Angelic Doctor into their own sense; to us his mind seems doubtful, because he arranged no system concerning this matter. - The same can be said of St. Bonaventure, of Scotus, St. Antoninus, and many other Doctors.

[4] St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 17, a. 3.

[1] *Quodlib.*, 8, a. 13. - Concerning the mind of St. Thomas, Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., wrote at length in the famous work whose title is: *Fundamentum Theologiae moralis*, that is, Theological Treatise concerning the right use of probable opinions, diss. IX; you will find a compendium of this work apud Migne, *Curs. Theol.*, t. XI, p. 1397-1476.

393. (b) Nevertheless, as Medina, the first favorer of probabilism, admits, not a few theologians before the sixteenth century held that the more probable opinion was to be followed, the probable one being left aside. Behold his very words:[2] "The most learned Soto explains this

question, difficult enough, in book 3 *De Justitia*, q. 6, a. 5, ad 4, in this manner: for he says that, although in speculative matters and in the school it is sometimes licit to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one being left aside, nevertheless in morals and in matters which pertain to the right of a third party, it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one being left aside. Sylvester feels the same, at the word opinion, § 2, Conradus, in the book *De Contract.*, the last question, and, what moves more, Lord Cajetan in his *Summa*, at the word opinion." Afterward he sets forth the arguments by which the aforesaid authors supported their opinion: 1. He who follows a probable opinion, the more probable one being left aside, exposes himself to the danger of sinning, and chooses that which is less certain, by leaving behind that which is more certain: therefore he sins. 2. In doubts the safer part is to be chosen; but the more probable opinion is safer; therefore it is to be followed. 3. When there is danger on each side, one must incline to that part which is confirmed by greater reasons. 4. A judge who would pronounce sentence against him who adduces more probable testimonies would certainly sin mortally, and would commit injustice; therefore he who follows a probable opinion, the more probable one being left aside, without doubt sins. - Therefore, when Medina was writing (in the year 1577), probabiliorism was already flourishing, supported by arguments not to be despised.

[2] Bartholom. a Medina, *Expositio in I-II*, q. 19, a. 6, concl. 3, p. 178-179 of the Venetian edition, 1580.

394. 1. System of the old probabilists.[3] (A) The first who expressly defended that system is the aforesaid Medina, who, in the cited place, thus declares his mind: "But it seems to me that if an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite one is more probable."

[3] Concerning the mind of the old probabilists, Fr. Ter Haar has written learnedly, *De systemate morali antiq. probab.*, Paderborn, 1894.

But he adduces these arguments: (a) in speculative matters, a probable opinion is that which we can follow without danger of error and deception; therefore in practical matters a probable opinion is that which we can follow without danger of sinning. (b) An opinion is called probable from this, that we can follow it without reprehension: for it is that which wise men assert and excellent arguments confirm; therefore it implies a contradiction that it should be probable and that we cannot licitly follow it. (c) A probable opinion is conformable to right reason and to the estimation of prudent men; and although the more probable opinion is more conformable and safer, we are not held to follow it, because no one is obliged to that which is better and more perfect. (d) The opposite opinion tortures fearful souls, by obliging them to inquire which opinion is the more probable. - From another side, whatever adversaries say, he who follows a probable opinion does not expose himself to the danger of sinning, because, although the more probable is safer, the probable is secure and safe. - These arguments can be contracted into one: he who acts probably acts prudently, and therefore does not sin.

395. (B) Medina's system was first spread abroad in Spain, but afterward in the other regions, and soon became common enough down to the seventeenth century. Yet it was defended in a threefold way: (a) some indeed, whom they call moderate, say that a probable opinion is not to be followed when it is doubtfully or much less probable; but that the opinion on behalf of the

law is to be chosen when this is certainly or notably more probable; (b) but according to others, who are called simple or pure probabilists, it is licit to follow a probable opinion, even if the contrary opinion is certainly or notably more probable; (c) finally, a few laxists contended that it is licit to follow an opinion even slenderly probable.

396. (a) Among the moderates are numbered not a few distinguished theologians of the Society of Jesus: Suarez (1548-1617), who indeed teaches that it is licit to follow a probable opinion concerning the honesty of an act,[1] but elsewhere added:[2] "Greater probability is a certain moral certitude, if the excess of probability is certain"; - Rebellus (+ 1608), who writes:[3] "But it is certain, as will be shown elsewhere, that no one can with a safe conscience follow an opinion which is known by him to be less probable"; from the context, the question concerns an opinion certainly less probable, and in other places he favors equiprobabilism; - Gregory of Valentia (+ 1603), asserting that it is licit to follow a probable opinion when it is truly doubted which one is true, but not when the other opinion is truly more probable;[1] - Theophilus Raynaudus, who holds the same when the reasons are equally or almost equally valid; - Esparza, writing in the year 1667 that it is right to follow a probable opinion, provided however that the other is not altogether indubitably more probable;[2] - Terillus (+ 1676) teaches the same, provided the opposite opinion is only a little more probable;[3] - Mamianus de Ruvere, who says:[4] "When the probability of the less safe opinion, speculatively conceived with regard only to material honesty, is equal with the probability of the safer opinion... or when the excess of probability is not very notable... then it is licit to follow such a less safe opinion, the safer one being left aside"; - Rassler (+ 1713), Antonius Mayr, Gabr. Daniel (+ 1728), Joa. Reuter (+ 1762), J. Biner (+ 1766), F. Manhart, etc., taught almost the same.[5] - With these agree some Dominicans, such as Martinez Prado, Fr. de Arauxo, Passerini de Sextula, and also Benedictines, such as Ant. Perez (1559-1637), Bened. Schmier, - and others, whether regulars, such as Joan. Bossius, O. Barnab., Ant. Cotonius, O.S.F., G. Herincx, O.M., Ant. Schiara, O. Theat., Roncaglia, C.M.D., Eusebius Amort, canon regular, Fr. Sylvius.

[1] *De Religione*, Tr. IX, I, IV, c. 15, n. 21.

[2] *De Legibus*, I, VIII, c. 3, n. 19.

[3] *De obligat. Justitiae, Religionis et Caritatis*, 1608, P. I, l. 3, q. 5, n. 5.

[1] *In II-II*, disp. V, q. 7, punct. 4, dub. 3.

[2] *De actibus hum.*, Appendix to q. 23.

[3] *Tract. de Conscientia probabili*, q. 2, n. 15.

[4] *Concordia doctrinae Probabilistarum cum doctrina Probabilioristarum*, P. III, 100, ed. 1707.

[5] F. Ter Haar reviews the opinions of these and of others whom we allege below, op. cit., p. 52-65.

397. (b) Among pure or simple probabilists are numbered many theologians of diverse schools; thus, from the Society of Jesus: Fr. Toletus (+ 1596), Emmanuel Sa (+ 1596), Joa. Azor (+ 1607), G. Vasquez (+ 1604), Lessius (+ 1623), Laymann (+ 1625), Castropalaus (+ 1633), J. Lugo (+ 1660), Cardenas (+ 1684), Dechamps (+ 1701), Lacroix (+ 1714), Mazzotta (+ 1748), Gury Ballerini, Sabetti, Genicot, Noldin, etc. - With these can be joined: Bonacina, bishop of Utica (+ 1631), C. Lupus, O.S.A. (+ 1681), Sporer, O.S.F. (+ 1714), the

Salmanticenses, Order of Carmelites (+ 1717-1734), and many others especially of the nineteenth century.

398. (c) Yet certain probabilists did not hesitate to favor laxism more than was fair; sometimes they held that opinions only slenderly or doubtfully probable were truly probable, and therefore licit; sometimes they said that it was licit to follow probable opinions even when the matter concerns those things to which they ought not to be extended (above, n. 388). Thus, for example, Joa. Sanchez, or Sancius (+ 1624), Bauny, S.J. (+ 1649), Leander, O. SS. Trin. (+ 1663), Diana, Theatine (+ 1663), Tamburini, S.J. (+ 1675), Moya, S.J. (+ 1684), J. Caramuel, Cistercian and bishop of Vigevano, in Italy (+ 1682), whom St. Alphonsus calls the prince of the laxists. The Supreme Pontiffs Alexander VII (1665-1666) and Innocent XI (1679) condemned various excessively lax propositions, and the very principle of laxism contained in this proposition: "Generally, when relying on probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not go outside the limits of probability, we do something, we always act prudently."[1]

[1] Apud Denzing., n. 1020.

399. 2. Tutiorism. To avoid the excesses of the probabilists, some theologians defended tutiorism, contending that in doubt the safer part is to be chosen, even when the matter concerns only the licit. A twofold tutiorism is distinguished: absolute, according to which it is not licit to follow an opinion favoring liberty, even if it is most probable; mitigated, which holds that the opinion on behalf of liberty cannot be chosen unless it is most probable.

(A) Absolute tutiorism was advocated by Sinnichius, doctor of Louvain (+ 1666), and the Jansenists. For they taught that certain precepts are truly impossible for men, and, in order more easily to maintain this proposition, indulged rigorism, and did not hesitate to impose unbearable burdens on the faithful. It is not licit, they said, voluntarily to expose oneself to the danger of sinning; but by following an opinion even most probable, we incur the danger of sinning, since this can be false.[2]

[2] To the point Sinnichius, in the work *Saul ex-rex*, lib. I, c. 95, n. 357: "No one is ignorant that any human opinion, by this very fact, is liable to the danger of error, because it does not transcend the limits of probability... For if an opinion, whether less probable, or even less than probable, can be true; so on the contrary an opinion more probable, or even most probable, can be false."

Alexander VIII condemned this error, 7 December 1690, by reproving this proposition 3: "It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among the probable."[3] And deservedly; for, if certitude strictly so called were required in order to act licitly, and it were not licit in doubts to form for oneself a practically certain conscience from a reflex principle, in many circumstances either one would have to abstain from acting, or one would have to sin; for from one side doubts often occur, and from the other, the human will is so infirm that it cannot always choose the safer way. - Wherefore tutiorism is not truly safe: for by imposing an intolerable yoke, contrary to the mind of the Gospel,[4] it increases sins, generates despair, and bars many from the practice of religion; with regard to many, therefore, it is a most safe way of damnation.

[3] Denzing., n. 1160.

[4] For Christ says: "For my yoke is sweet, and my burden light" (Matt. 11:30). Cannot that be preached concerning tutiorism which Peter was saying about the Mosaic law: "Now therefore why do you tempt God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" (Acts 15:10.)

400. (B) Mitigated tutiorism was defended by certain doctors of Louvain, who tried to soften Jansenist errors by saying that it is right to follow a most probable opinion; among them were Opstraet (+ 1720), Steyart (+ 1701), Henry of St. Ignatius (+ 1719), Dens (+ 1775), to whom Cardinal Gerdil (+ 1802) adhered. It rested on almost the same argument as above: namely, by following an opinion which is not most probable, we are exposed to the danger of sinning. - This indeed is false; for even when such an excess of probability is not present, a practically certain conscience can be formed from a reflex principle, and thus every danger, at least of formally sinning, is avoided. - Tutiorists indeed reject the reflex principle, but undeservedly; for the most probable opinion, which they permit to be followed, either produces a certain conscience, or it does not; if the former, we fall into absolute and condemned tutiorism; if the latter, conscience remains practically doubtful, and it is not safe to follow it. Wherefore today tutiorism is a thing done with.

401. 3. Probabiliorism. (A) To avoid the rocks of laxism and tutiorism, in the middle of the seventeenth century, probabiliorism, which had already flourished before Medina, was renewed. Certain pontiffs, especially Alexander VII and Innocent XI, contributed not a little to this revival.

The former condemned forty-five propositions "relaxing Christian discipline and bringing ruin upon souls"; and to his exhortation it is especially to be ascribed that the Dominicans, gathered in a general Chapter in the year 1656, decreed to fight against the laxer doctrines. From that time namely almost all defended probabiliorism; among them: Julius Mercorus (+ 1669), J. Gonet (+ 1681), Contenson (+ 1674), Fagnanus (+ 1678), Natalis Alexander (+ 1724), Concina (+ 1756), Billuart (+ 1757), Patuzzi (+ 1769). With these are to be numbered a few Jesuits, such as Antoine (+ 1743), Elizalde; but especially Thyrsus Gonzalez (+ 1681), who, seeing the excesses of probabilism, wrote a Treatise concerning the right use of probable opinions, in which he defended probabiliorism;[1] after many difficulties had been overcome, by the counsel of Innocent XII, he made the same public, and within the space of one year committed it to the press twelve times. From that time, not a few Jesuits advocated the same system, for example, Estrix, D. Nunnez, Blanchet, Bonnet, Malatra, Ehrentreich, Muniessa, Taberna, Gisbert, Gabriel Antoine; many, however, continued to adhere to probabilism. - The Franciscans, very many of whom had defended probabilism, gathered at Mantua in a general Chapter, in the year 1762, decreed to follow the more probable opinion.[1] The General Assembly of the Gallican clergy had already declared the same before, in the year 1700, at the suggestion of Bossuet.[2] Many other authors, in the same eighteenth century, taught probabiliorism, among whom were F. Genet (+ 1702), L. Habert (+ 1718), J. Pontas (+ 1728), the brothers Ballerini, Peter and Jerome (+ 1764). Indeed Benedict XIV ordered that the moral theology of Father Antoine, S.J., a probabiliorist, be expounded in the Seminary of the Propagation of the Faith.

[1] Gonzalez, *Fundam. Theologiae moralis*. - Here we subjoin the text of the famous decree of Innocent XI, concerning which there has been sharp dispute between Father Brucker, S.J. (*Etudes*, t. 86, p. 779 sq., t. 91, p. 831 sq.) and Father Mandonnet, O.P. (*Revue Thomiste*, Sept. 1901 - Jan. 1903, separately edited as *Le decret d'Innocent XI, contre le Probabilisme*,

Paris, 1903); the genuine text of that decree, long unknown, was made public by the authority of J. B. Lugari, assessor of the Holy Office, on 21 April 1902.

[1] Apud Ter Haar, op. cit., p. 85.

[2] Bossuet, *Oeuvres completes*, ed. Vives, t. XXII, p. 768; you will find the doctrine of Bossuet in the same place, p. 712, and t. XXXI, p. 1-20.

402. (B) But Billuart sets forth the doctrine of probabiliorism clearly and moderately thus:[3] (a) In the concurrence of two opinions concerning the objective honesty of an action, it is not licit to follow the less probable and less safe one, the more probable and safer one being left aside. (b) In the conflict of two equally probable opinions concerning the objective honesty of an act, we are held to follow the safer one. (c) When the matter concerns only the objective honesty of an act, it is licit to follow the manifestly and solidly more probable less safe opinion, or the one favoring liberty, in the concurrence of the less probable safer one, or the one favoring the law. (d) In order that it be licit to follow the more probable opinion, it is not required that it be most probable, nor does just any slight excess in probability suffice, but a notable and morally grave excess is required, which moves a grave and prudent man to assent to it rather than to the other.

[3] Billuart, *De Act. hum.*, diss. VI.

403. But the arguments which he brings forward are reduced to almost these: (a) It is not licit to follow a less safe opinion if it is not properly, solidly, and readily probable; but the less probable opinion in conflict with the more probable is not properly, solidly, and readily probable; for the motives on which it rests do not suffice for obtaining the assent of a prudent man, but only for introducing some fear concerning the opposite: for the force of those motives is broken by the stronger motives, and a prudent man cannot assent to an opinion which he judges more probably false. From another side he cannot form for himself a morally certain conscience by force of the reflex principle: he who operates probably operates prudently, or a doubtful law does not oblige; for that principle is not morally certain, since all anti-probabilists deny it and attack it with reasons at least probable; and therefore the practical conclusion deduced from this principle is not morally certain. (b) Just as in speculative doubts we are held to embrace that opinion which approaches nearer to truth and more excludes the danger of erring, so in doubts concerning the honesty of an action, we are held to follow that opinion which is more verisimilar and more efficaciously turns away from the danger of sinning; but assuredly the more probable opinion is more verisimilar and more removes the danger of sinning.

404. Nevertheless the probabilists try to solve these arguments thus. (a) In this system the order of knowledge is confused with the order of operation: in doubt concerning the truth of some opinion, generally we ought to assent to that which appears more probable, but in doubt concerning the liceity of an action, we do not adhere to either opinion, but, by force of a reflex principle, a practically certain conscience is formed. The probabiliorists themselves ought to use a reflex principle, namely, in doubt it is licit to follow the more probable opinion; now they cannot prove the truth of this principle except through an argument taken from invincible ignorance of the law: but this argument equally proves the truth of the other principle: a

doubtful law does not oblige. (b) A moral system cannot be true which in its application seems morally impossible; but such is probabiliorism; for most cannot judge whether such an opinion is more probable or only probable; besides, what appears certainly more probable to one appears only probable to another; thus men of fearful conscience are cast into scruples and perpetual anxieties.

Today there are very few probabiliorists, but three systems flourish: equiprobabilism, probabilism, and compensationism, concerning which we must now speak.

II. Present-Day Systems Are Weighed Critically. — 1. Concerning Equiprobabilism.

405. (A) Its origin. Equiprobabilism, which does not differ substantially from moderate probabilism as set forth above, had as its principal defender St. Alphonsus de Liguori, who was numbered among the Doctors of the Church on 23 March 1871. He at first had adhered to the Probabiliorists, but, in hearing confessions, understanding well that their system could be applied only with difficulty, he embraced moderate probabilism, and defended it against the probabiliorists in a dissertation, published in the years 1749 and 1755, whose title was: *Dissertatio scholastico-moralis pro usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris*; but already at that time he reproved the opinion of the laxists no less severely. In the first edition (1749), he had made the system of the probabilists his own in these words: "It is licit to follow a probable opinion in the concurrence of a more probable one, provided that it rests on a grave motive, whether intrinsic, namely from reason, or extrinsic, from the authority of doctors"; but in the second edition he added this restriction: "unless the excess of probability is notable." Afterward, however, fearing lest by this formula certain persons might abuse it for favoring too benign opinions, in the year 1762 he published a new dissertation, in which he established these two things: "When the less safe opinion is equally probable, one can licitly follow it"; - "It is not licit to follow a less probable opinion when the opinion which stands for the law is notably and certainly more probable"; in these words the sum of equiprobabilism is contained. He polished this system more and more, and in the year 1767, in the sixth edition of *Theologia Moralis*, he explained it thus: "Therefore I say that it is not licit to follow the less probable opinion when the opinion which stands for the law is notably[1] or certainly more probable; I say or certainly, because when the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything but notably more probable"; - from another side: "When the less safe opinion is equally, or almost equally, probable, one can licitly follow it."[2] Toward the end of his life, attacked by tutiorists with accusations of laxism, and fearing lest his system be confused with simple probabilism, he openly declared that he was not a probabilist: "I again declare in this brief little Work that I am not a probabilist, nor do I follow probabilism; indeed I reprove it."[1] - It is helpful to observe that the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus was specially praised by the Roman Pontiffs, because "amid the tangled opinions of theologians, whether laxer or stricter, he paved a safe way, by which the directors of the souls of the Christian faithful could walk with unoffending foot."[2]

[1] This word is omitted in the seventh edition, because it adds nothing to the word certainly; cf. *Theologia moralis*, cura Gaude, 1905, t. I, p. xx.

[2] These and other texts of the Holy Doctor you will find in the work *Vindiciae Alphonsianae*, Rome, 1873, P. I, p. 1-125, - more briefly apud Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 911-915. Moreover, concerning the mind of St. Alphonsus there has been much dispute, and there is still dispute today, between equiprobabilists and probabilists; besides the works cited, cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, Appendix I, *Diss. de genuina S. Alphonsi sententia circa usum opinionis probabilis*, p. 632-706; Bouquillon, n. 315-317; Wittmann, *S. Alphonse et le pur probabilisme*, Gien, s.d.; Ter Haar, op. cit. p. 99-107; Gaude, *De Morali systemate S. Alphonsi*; De Caigny, *Apologetica de aequiprobabilismo alphonsiano*, 1894.

[1] Apud Bouquillon, n. 317; cf. *Vindiciae*, p. 70-72.

[2] Decree of 22 March 1871, concerning the concession of the title Doctor; this testimony and very many others are reported by *Vindiciae*, preliminary dissertation, and more briefly by Marc, *Instit. Mor. Alphonsianae*, t. I, at the beginning.

The system of St. Alphonsus is defended by Redemptorists, among whom are Konings, Marc, Aertnys, Ter Haar, Wouters, etc.; and by not a few others, Gousset, Del Vecchio, Savini, Pruner, Muller, Simar, C. Martin, and also many Dominicans, who, setting aside probabiliorism, adhere to equiprobabilism.

"Wednesday, 26 June 1680. After a report had been made by Father Laurea concerning the contents of the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzales, S.J., directed to Our Most Holy Lord, the Most Eminent Lords said that it should be written through the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of the Spains, so that he might signify to the said Father Thyrsus, that His Holiness, having kindly received and not without praise read through his letters, commanded that he freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; and that he should make him certain that whatever he shall have done and written in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

"Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness, that he not only permit Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those asserting that in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; but also that he write to all Universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that each one, as it pleases him, freely write for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary opinion; and command them that they wholly submit themselves to the mandate of His Holiness." F. Ter Haar, C.SS.R., gives the history and commentary of this decree in the little work *Ven. Innocentii PP. XI de Probabilismo Decreti historia et vindiciae*, Tournai and Paris, 1904; Arendt, S.J., explains the same decree in a plainly different sense apud *Analecta ecclesiastica*, 1902, p. 306 sq. and p. 353 sq. Cf. *Revue thomiste*, Jan. 1903, May-Oct. 1903, May-June and Sept.-Oct. 1904, where you will find diverse disputations concerning the same decree; *Etudes*, t. 86, p. 778 and t. 91, p. 831.

406. (B) Equiprobabilism is set forth.[3] It can be contracted into these three propositions, according to C. Marc (n. 91-103):

[3] Besides St. Alphonsus, *Systema morale*, cf. Marc, op. cit., n. 88-108; Konings, n. 63-96; Aertnys, n. 80-121; Gousset, *Theol. Morale*, n. 79-88; Wouters, *De minusprobabilismo*, 1905.

(a) When opinions equally or almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the existence of a law, it is licit to follow the opinion favoring liberty; thus against the Probabiliorists. For 1. a law truly and strictly doubtful does not oblige; for it is insufficiently promulgated, and can be called invincibly

unknown: since on each side there are reasons equally or almost equally probable, morally speaking there is no greater reason for affirming than for denying, and therefore in this case the existence of the law, or obligation, is invincibly unknown. 2. From another side, in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; a principle of this kind, which in the matter of justice is admitted by all, can be extended to the other virtues: for when someone, after diligence has been applied, could not find the truth, he perseveres in possession of his liberty, and therefore cannot be deprived of his right by a strictly doubtful law.

(b) When arguments equally or almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, the opinion which favors the law is to be followed; thus against the Probabilists. It is gathered from the principle: in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; for, just as liberty possesses when the law is not certain, so the law possesses when this is certain and it is doubted whether it has been revoked; therefore the law is to be observed until its revocation is established. - This is confirmed from received principles of law, such as, for example: in doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated; now the revocation of a law, or desuetude, or dispensation is a fact which is not sufficiently demonstrated by equiprobable reasons. - Yet these authors note that liberty possesses much more frequently than the law.

(c) In the concurrence of an opinion certainly more probable on behalf of the law, it is not licit to follow the less probable on behalf of liberty; against the probabilists. - For, in this case, the law is not strictly doubtful: for only then does the intellect fluctuate between two opposed parts, when the motives on each side are either none or appear nearly equal; but in the case, the motives on behalf of the law appear certainly stronger than those on behalf of liberty, and thus the force and efficacy of the reasons on which the less probable opinion rests is certainly overcome and broken by the stronger arguments of the contrary opinion; for that reason man does not act prudently by following the less probable opinion, since by his own will he forces the intellect to leave behind what seems more verisimilar, and to adhere to an opinion which appears less verisimilar. - Nor is it licit to have recourse to the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; for this is valid only when the law is strictly doubtful, namely when the mind fluctuates because of arguments nearly equal on each side, but not when it certainly sees stronger arguments favoring the law.

407. (C) The arguments brought against equiprobabilism are set forth. Against the equiprobabilists the probabilists, especially Noldin, n. 219-222, argue thus: (a) Equiprobabilists, in order to establish their system, use these principles: a doubtful law does not oblige, and an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; but from these not equiprobabilism, but probabilism follows by necessary inference; for even a law which more probably exists remains truly doubtful and uncertain, provided that against its existence or force a probable argument is brought forward. Nor can it be said that the lesser probability is broken by the greater probability of the other opinion; for often the lesser probability rests on an entirely independent foundation, and therefore subsists, even if the contrary opinion is truly more probable. - Nevertheless the equiprobabilists respond that, even in this case, the less probable opinion, which considered apart appears probable, when compared with the opposed notably more probable one, is no longer solidly probable.

(b) A moral system which for its use necessarily requires that the moments of reasons be weighed on each side, and that it be established whether adverse opinions are equally or almost equally probable, is less apt for solving difficulties practically: for often it is impossible to determine when probability is equal or almost equal, and those who think that they can furnish this without difficulty deceive themselves and others. - This impossibility by no means exists, say the adversaries, for with ordinary diligence it can be recognized whether such or such an opinion is notably more probable or not, all the more because St. Alphonsus and modern theologians determine this accurately enough.

(c) From another side, the principle: in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, is falsely applied: for it is false that in doubt concerning the cessation of a law, the law previously certainly existing possesses. And indeed in doubt concerning the cessation of a law, liberty is certain and the law is doubtful, since it is truly probable that the law has ceased. - Besides, the right of liberty is in itself prior to the right of law, because liberty, if not in time, at least in nature and reason, precedes law, and therefore in doubt the presumption stands for liberty. - Yet equiprobabilists say that liberty is no longer in possession when it is certainly established that some law has been promulgated; for liberty was morally bound by the very promulgation of the law, and therefore cannot be called immune from obligation until the revocation is sufficiently established.

(D) Conclusion. Equiprobabilism assuredly is supported by solid arguments, and, although it does not perfectly solve some difficulties, it lays down a safe way between the laxer and stricter opinions.[1] Wherefore the Sacred Penitentiary, being asked "whether a professor of sacred theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which Blessed Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology," on 5 July 1831 judged that it should be answered: "Affirmatively, without, however, those being judged reprehensible who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors." - Yet let these last words be noted, from which it is clear that other systems, not reproved by the Church, can freely be defended.

[1] Yet to us it seems that the principle "in doubt, the condition of the possessor is better" is not rightly applied in the case in which the law, as they say, possesses; for whether the matter concerns the existence or the cessation of the law, we do not think that it obliges when the reasons brought forward on each side are equally or almost equally probable: for then there is truly and strictly a doubt, and the Liguorian principle is deservedly applied: a law truly and strictly doubtful does not oblige.

2. Present-Day Probabilism Is Weighed Critically.

408. (A) The system is set forth:[1] In every doubt, where the matter concerns only the licit, it is licit to follow an opinion certainly and solidly probable, even if the contrary opinion is truly more probable. It is said:

[1] We chiefly borrow the exposition and arguments of probabilism from Lehmkuhl, n. 79-118, and from Noldin, n. 209-216; cf. Ball. P., n. 175-198.

(a) In every doubt, namely whether of law or of fact, - whether the matter concerns human law or divine or natural law, - and indeed concerning the existence of the law or the cessation of the law.

(b) Where the matter concerns only the licit, for even probabilists admit the restrictions enumerated above where the matter concerns the valid, etc., n. 388-390.

(c) It is licit to follow an opinion certainly and solidly probable, but not one doubtfully or slenderly probable. Now, for an opinion truly and solidly probable three things are required: that it rest on a truly grave motive of reason or authority; - that neither a definition of the Church nor a certain reason be opposed to it; - that its motives, compared with the motives of the opposed opinion, retain their probability. These things being posited, the more probable opinion on behalf of the law can be neglected, as long as it itself remains within the terms of probability, and is not morally certain. - But it is required that the opinion be certainly and solidly probable to the very one who follows it; otherwise the law is not truly doubtful and uncertain to him.

This certain and solid probability can be constituted by arguments not only internal, but also external, or taken from the authority of theologians: "For if several authors, and grave ones, call an opinion probable, ordinarily it cannot happen that it is not supported by probable internal reasons... Not only an opinion which is called probable by most theologians, but also an opinion which five or six theologians distinguished for probity, knowledge, and prudence hold as true or probable, ought to be considered truly and certainly probable, unless their authority is weakened either by a declaration of the Church or by manifest reason."[2]

[2] Noldin, n. 212.

409. (B) Arguments favoring probabilism are proposed. Two especially are brought forward: (a) A doubtful law does not oblige; but a law against which there is certain and solid probability is truly doubtful; therefore. - The major is declared: a law cannot oblige unless it is sufficiently known: "No one," says St. Thomas,[1] "is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept"; but only certain cognition is true cognition: for he who doubts concerning some law indeed knows the doubt concerning it and the obligation of inquiring, but he does not know the law itself; therefore a doubtful law cannot oblige. - The minor is proved: certitude and opposite probability concerning the same truth mutually exclude one another; therefore as long as the opinion on behalf of liberty is probable, the opposite on behalf of the law cannot be certain, even if it certainly appears truly more probable; therefore the law against which there is certain probability is truly doubtful, and therefore does not oblige.

[1] St. Thomas, *De verit.*, q. 17, a. 3.

(b) An uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; for the right of liberty precedes the right of law, even if not in time, at least in nature and reason, since obligation supposes a free will which is bound; and therefore the certain and prior right of liberty cannot be restricted except by a certain law; but a law against which an opinion certainly and solidly probable fights is truly uncertain, as is clear from the things already said; therefore an uncertain law cannot beget a certain obligation.

Yet Noldin adds, n. 213, with moderate probabilists: "If, however, the opinion on behalf of the law is most probable or notably more probable than the opposite one, we are held to observe the law. For although an opinion of this kind does not attain true certitude, nevertheless practically it is equivalent to a certain opinion, because its opposite is not truly and certainly probable and therefore cannot furnish a norm of acting, since it does not suffice for informing a practically certain conscience." From this head, moderate probabilists come near to equiprobabilists.[2]

[2] This St. Alphonsus repeats again and again in all works published from the year 1762; cf. Gaude, n. 38-62.

410. (C) The arguments against Probabilism are set forth. Besides those which have already been proposed by the probabiliorists, above, n. 403, the equiprobabilists and compensationists urge others. (a) The principle "a doubtful law does not oblige" is not valid where the law is certainly more probable than liberty; for a law certainly more probably existing is sufficiently known so that it obliges indirectly, by force of the general principle that we ought sincerely to tend toward truth, and therefore to follow the opinion which approaches truth more closely.[3] - Nor can it be said that a certainly more probable law is invincibly unknown: in strict doubt alone, because of the equality of reasons, is the law inculpably unknown; but where the objective obligation is certainly more probable, it is no longer licit to suspend judgment, but the mind ought to adhere to the opinion which is held as more verisimilar. - Nor can it be added that a certain right of liberty cannot be taken away by an uncertain law; for the right of liberty does not remain certain when there is opposed to it an office certainly more probable, but becomes truly doubtful, and indeed less probable than the duty itself.

[3] D. N. de Caigny recently tried a conciliation between each system, *De Gemino probabilismo licito*.

411. (b) Probabilism easily opens the way to laxism; for once the right of following opinions even certainly and notably less probable has been granted to all, easily to each one the opinion which pleases more will appear probable; likewise, once it has been granted that the authority of five or six grave authors suffices for recognizing the probability of some opinion, who is there who, in the long series of probabilist theologians, would not find five or six, otherwise grave, approving an opinion more or less lax? Already in his own time St. Alphonsus wrote:[1] "And truly in the past century very many abuses occurred in opining in order to prove many lax opinions as probable; and therefore the Church proscribed several opinions, because they were undeservedly called probable, such as propositions 27 and 40 proscribed by Alexander VII, and 1, 3, 6, 35, 44 and 57 proscribed by Innocent XI. All these were condemned because in them it was said: it is probable, etc." A little afterward he adds that he too was deceived by the authority of many:[2] "It is true, in the first printings of my moral theology, led by the authority of several authors, I admitted as probable many opinions not sufficiently firm; but when the matter had been better weighed, I revoked or reformed them."

[1] St. Alphonsus, *Homo apost.*, Tr. I, n. 73.

[2] Ibid., n. 78.

412. (D) The responses of the probabilists are handed down. Nevertheless the probabilists try to solve these difficulties.[3] (a) They observe indeed that an opinion solidly, although less, probable, even when compared with the more probable, retains its probability, nor is its force entirely broken: otherwise the contrary opinion would no longer be more probable, but morally certain. Now, while an opinion certainly and solidly probable stands, the law remains truly and strictly doubtful, and therefore the principle can legitimately be applied: a doubtful law does not oblige. Nor is there present an obligation practically to follow the more verisimilar opinion; for otherwise this would have to be done even when the opinion favoring the law is slenderly more probable, and thus we would fall into probabiliorism. - Wherefore an obligation, even certainly more probable, remains uncertain, as long as the opinion favoring liberty is certainly and solidly probable; nor therefore is it to be strictly imposed under penalty

of sin, lest perchance a yoke too burdensome be imposed upon human infirmity and men still weak in virtue be kept away from religion.

[3] Lehmk., n. 94-106; Ball. P., n. 198; Noldin, n. 216.

(b) Nor is laxism seriously to be feared, provided that probabilism is prudently applied, that is, only when the opinion favoring liberty, even when compared with the contrary opinion, remains solidly probable, - and from another side with this caution, that a probable opinion is not held as something perfect, but as something strictly speaking licit. Therefore let these words of the probabilist Noldin (n. 216) be attended to: "If a Christian man in the service of God were to do nothing other than what the law strictly demands from the principles of probabilism, he would certainly lead a life little worthy of a Christian; but the practice of probabilists is this: where the question concerns imposing an obligation and judging sins, they are benign in order to avoid the dangers of formally sinning; but where the matter concerns pursuing perfection and the exercise of virtues, they strive toward the highest things, measuring the service owed to God not from the obligation of law, but from love and gratitude toward the divine majesty."

413. Conclusion. These things being posited, we admit probabilism, not indeed as a norm of perfection or of Christian life, but as a system from which there can be discerned the minimum which is required for avoiding sin. For when the matter concerns canonical laws, the Church herself, whose office it is to interpret her laws authentically, equivalently declares that it is licit to follow an opinion certainly probable and favoring liberty; thus, among the Rules of Law in the Sixth, one reads: "It is fitting that odious things be restricted, and favors enlarged" (reg. 15); "In obscure matters the minimum is to be followed" (reg. 30); "In penalties the more benign interpretation is to be made" (reg. 49); "Interpretation is to be made against him who could have stated the law more openly" (reg. 57). - Now what is said of ecclesiastical laws can be said of all others by equal reason; for if God had willed to bind us strictly, under penalty of sin and eternal damnation, He would have manifested His mind clearly to us; therefore where the divine law, whether positive or natural, is uncertain because of a grave doubt concerning its existence, who will dare to say that man is strictly held to observe it, under penalty of damnation?

414. Nevertheless, in order that an opinion be certainly and solidly probable, we do not admit that the authority of five or six grave theologians suffices of itself, when namely a most grave reason, which they have not solved, fights against them.[1] For it can happen that these men, although grave, were deceived, and held as probable an opinion which, all things diligently weighed, is not truly probable; hence their arguments must be seriously weighed, as we warned above, n. 384, and, if they appear weak either in themselves or because of changed circumstances, their opinion must be rejected. - Besides, we make more of the universal sense of the faithful, resting on solid reason, than of the authority of five or six grave theologians, which in a particular case is opposed to the same; wherefore, if an opinion which the common sense of the faithful reproves is called probable by some theologians,[1] we reject it as improbable. - With regard to intrinsic reasons, in a moral matter those are of greater weight which appeal to moral sense than those which are too subtle and deduced from metaphysical principles; for any science has its own genus of proofs: now moral science rests not so much on

metaphysical arguments as on moral principles which the practical reason of prudent and honorable men perceives. But those who wish not only to abstain from sin, but to cultivate Christian virtues, will seek rules of perfection not among casuists, but among ascetics, and especially among the sacred authors and the Fathers, who have discussed the virtues.

[1] That this is the mind of St. Alphonsus is clear from the things which he says, l. I, Tr. I, n. 82: "The confessor, before he embraces some opinion, is certainly held to weigh the intrinsic reasons; and when some convincing reason for the safer opinion occurs to him, to which he does not see that an adequate response is available, then he cannot embrace the opposite less safe opinion, although the authority of very many doctors favors it: provided the authority is not of such weight that it seems to him that he must defer to it rather than to the apparent reason."

[1] You have an example in the Treatise concerning the Virtue of Justice, n. 483, where the question concerns error about the person injured, when someone, for example intending to kill Caius, kills Titius.

3. Concerning the System of Compensation.

415. (A) Exposition. Since not a few difficulties are found in the aforesaid systems, certain authors devised a new system for solving doubt from the principle of sufficient reason, or compensation: thus, among others, Manier, Laloux, Potton.[2] (a) According to them indeed, a doubtful law is not lacking every obligatory force, nor does it have all its force of obliging, but it obliges more or less, according as it is more or less known: as often as the law is wholly known, it has its whole force of obliging in relation to us; as often, on the contrary, as it is altogether unknown to us, it in no way obliges; therefore, if the law is imperfectly known, it binds us imperfectly. Now, so that we can act licitly against a law even imperfectly obliging, some excusing cause, or sufficient reason, or compensation, is required. Or, in other words, a doubtful law is not worth as much as a certain law, but is worth more than no law, and therefore, for relaxing its obligation, some sufficient reason is required, although less grave than for a certain law.

[2] Manier, *Compendium Philosophiae*, 10th ed., t. III, Appendix I, p. 539-553; Laloux, *De Actibus humanis*, diss. IV, p. 42-148 (which work, not yet completed, was published not by the author himself, but by a disciple); Potton, O.P., *De Theoria probabilitatis*, Paris, 1874.

(b) This is declared in another way: in even a material transgression of a just law, some evil is always found; for, from what has been said, law is an ordination of reason, and he who violates it even ignorantly inflicts some detriment on himself or on others: thus dueling, infanticide, and other things of this kind, although committed ignorantly, truly harm individuals and society; and therefore knowingly to expose oneself to the danger of material evil, without sufficient reason, is a sin, but it is licit if there is a sufficient reason proportionately grave. For here the principles handed down above, n. 175-182, concerning the indirectly voluntary, can be applied: it is licit to place an act in itself good or indifferent, from which an evil effect is foreseen as probably going to follow, provided that there is a proportionately grave reason. Namely, he who violates a doubtful law indeed foresees the evil effect probably going to follow from it, - the material transgression of the law; - but his action is not intrinsically evil, and therefore he is excused from sin, provided that he has a sufficient reason for acting thus; but if there is no reason of this kind, the agent in some way sins, because freely, without cause, he exposes himself to the danger of at least materially transgressing the law. - Wherefore, in order to know whether it is licit to act against some doubtful law, attention must be given: (a) to the

gravity of the law and to its probability: the more holy and grave the law is, and the more probable its existence, the greater the reason ought to be so that it may be sufficient; (b) to the goods which are obtained from the transgression of the doubtful law: the greater they are and the higher their order, the more easily the material transgression of the law can be permitted.

416. (B) The system of compensation is weighed critically. The probabilists attack the aforesaid system thus:[1] (a) Compensationism leads to tutiorism: for if a doubtful law always obliges in some degree, unless an excusing reason occurs, the safer part must always be followed, even when the opinion favoring liberty is most probable: which nevertheless was reproved by Alexander VIII, above n. 399. - Yet it can be said that this system does not lead to tutiorism any more than probabilism draws toward laxism: for just as probabilists avoid laxism by rejecting the sufficiency of an opinion slenderly probable, so likewise compensationists escape tutiorism by asserting that a doubtful and uncertain law does not oblige except when a sufficient reason for transgressing it is wholly lacking, and that an altogether slight cause excuses from a very doubtful law.

[1] Gury, *Casus consc.* 7, concerning Conscience; Montrouzier, in the periodical *Revue des Sciences eccles.*, t. XXI, 1870, p. 220 sq.; two anonymous authors in the same periodical, t. XXV, 1872, p. 383 sq.; whom Potton tries to refute, op. cit., p. 169-240.

(b) It is by no means proved, say the probabilists, that an imperfect obligation is induced from imperfect cognition of the law: what does this half and partial obligation mean? What degree is required for sinning gravely or lightly? Is it not better deduced from an uncertain law that it gives no obligation? - The compensationists respond that there are certain degrees in obligation, since an obligation light is distinguished by all from a grave one, and that those degrees can be discerned from all the circumstances from which grave sin is distinguished from venial.

Nevertheless, in our judgment, a response of this kind does not completely remove the difficulty. For, in a moral matter, a little is reckoned as nothing, and therefore we think that a law whose existence is only slenderly probable imposes no obligation, even under light sin. It can indeed be said that it is better to obey this law if there is no reason for receding from it; but with the common opinion of theologians we judge that no one is held to this.

(c) The probabilists add that there is nothing evil in the material violation of a law; - which assuredly we do not admit, from what was said above, n. 356. They also say that in the aforesaid system the danger of private judgment or private inspiration is incurred, since each one must judge whether in each case a sufficient reason is present or not; - which argument is easily retorted, since in any system someone must judge whether such an opinion is truly probable, equiprobable, or not.

417. Conclusion. Nevertheless we do not admit compensationism as a general system by which practical doubt can be solved; but we think that prudent confessors, in the use of equiprobabilism or probabilism, ought to use a certain prudent compensation: namely, to attend not only to what is licit, but also to what is expedient, and therefore diligently to weigh whether or not there is had a sufficient reason for counseling the use of such or such a probable opinion, in such a determinate case, with attention given not only to external circumstances, but also to the psychological dispositions of the penitent.

Practical Conclusions.

418. In so great a conflict of opinions, let it be licit for each one speculatively to assent to one of the systems which are permitted by the Church to free discussion; but in practice, let these things especially be attended to.

1. Let it always be kept before the mind that even probabilists today extend their system only to cases where the matter concerns only the licit or illicit, according to the things set forth above, n. 388-390.

419. 2. It is not licit for the confessor to impose his own system upon a penitent who has formed his conscience according to one of the permitted systems; for the proximate rule of morals is each one's conscience.

Hence if a probabilist penitent wishes to follow an opinion certainly and solidly probable, and from another side is rightly disposed, a probabiliorist confessor cannot deny him absolution; otherwise he would violate the right which the Church leaves to each of the faithful, of following a truly probable opinion. - But if the penitent has not formed a conscience for himself, and asks the confessor what is licit or illicit, the latter, after the dispositions of the penitent have first been investigated, will respond according to the system which he will judge in the Lord to be more expedient for his spiritual good. Thus, if the penitent tends toward better things, to him he will generally advise that which, all things considered, seems better. But if, given the infirmity of the penitent, he foresees that this man will not follow the more probable opinion favoring the law, and from another side knows that the more benign opinion is truly probable, he can suggest this, so that the penitent may continue to frequent the sacraments, and, fortified by divine grace, may gradually tend toward better things; indeed, in many cases, he ought to furnish this from charity: for even if he himself adheres to equiprobabilism, he can permit others to follow probabilism.

But when the doubt concerns the very dispositions of the penitent, it pertains to the confessor himself to judge concerning them, according to his own system: for here the question concerns an action to be placed by the confessor himself; nevertheless let him temper judgment by charity and prudence, according to what was said in the Treatise on Penance, n. 407-409.

420. 3. In any system whatsoever, the confessor ought to weigh not only what is licit, but also what is expedient, all circumstances of times, places, and persons having been attended to: "All things are lawful to me, but all things are not expedient."[1]

[1] 1 Cor. 6:12.

Therefore the probabilist who would always recommend to penitents to follow less probable opinions would act altogether imprudently: from the fact that it is not strictly prohibited under sin to follow such opinions, it is rashly inferred that this is good and opportune. An upright Christian, who wishes to cling to the footsteps of Christ, ought not only to avoid mortal sin, but also, according to his condition and powers, to tend toward moral perfection; otherwise he will lead a life little worthy of a Christian, and soon will fall into sin. For he who so indulges himself that he wishes to enjoy all delights which are not strictly prohibited, quickly also desires prohibited pleasures, and, accustomed to delights, is exposed to the danger of sinning. Therefore even if a probabilist knows very well that it

is licit to follow all truly probable opinions, very often he will advise well-disposed penitents that, not indeed from fear of hell, but from love of God and of Christ, they turn themselves toward better things. - In this sense temperate probabilism by no means tends toward laxism.

421. 4. When two opposed opinions are truly probable, it is licit for each one to follow either, indeed to use each in various circumstances, yet in such a way that he is practically consistent with himself and violates the rights of no one.

The matter is made clear by an example: let a testament be supposed destitute of legal forms, concerning whose validity there is a twofold truly probable opinion. Titius, as heir, can indeed today use the probable opinion favoring him and enter upon the inheritance, as long as he is not disturbed in his possession by the sentence of a judge; at another time, he can impugn the validity of another testament destitute of legal forms, and enjoy the benefit of the law. But after, relying on a probable opinion, he has accepted the inheritance, he cannot decline the burdens annexed to the inheritance under the pretext that the testament is probably invalid; for he ought to be consistent with himself, and if he receives the inheritance, he ought to pay the legacies: he who feels the advantage ought likewise to feel the burden; otherwise the rights of the legatees would be violated.

Conclusion of the Whole Treatise: Concerning the Education of Conscience.

Since conscience is the proximate norm of actions, and the right ordering of our life to God depends especially on it, it is of the greatest moment to form it rightly and prudently by means both natural and supernatural.

[1] Bouquillon, n. 280; H. Marion, *Lecons de Morale*, 2nd ed., Paris, Colin, 1901, p. 387-406; B. Perez, *L'Education morale des le berceau*, 3rd ed., Paris, Alcan, 1896, p. 29-110; P. Vignot, *La Vie meilleure*, Paris, 1898, p. 41-142; Thamin, *De puerorum indole*, Paris, 1895, p. 46.

422. Concerning natural means. (A) Already from infancy the younger are to be diligently and gradually taught by parents and teachers, but especially by those who explain the catechism, that there is a difference between good and evil, that certain actions are conformable to divine reason and will, but others altogether deformed from them. When they do some good thing, let them receive not only praises and rewards, but let them be persuaded that they have fulfilled a duty, and that the principal reward is situated in the testimony of conscience and the approbation of God.[1] On the contrary, if they perform something evil or less right, let them be rebuked sweetly indeed but strongly, as violators of moral obligation; and at the same time let it be explained to them that the greatest punishment is remorse of conscience, and also divine reprobation. Wherefore let the necessity be inculcated upon them of lending attentive ears to conscience, as to the voice of God Himself, and in actions of seeking not pleasure or one's own advantage as the end, but whatever is honorable, whatever is holy, whatever is pleasing to God; but if they doubt concerning the liceity of some action, let them approach skilled and honorable persons, not depraved or imprudent persons. In order that they may know their duties better, and more diligently fulfill the same, it is necessary to explain to them not only what they ought to do, but why, namely by declaring the reasons on account of which they ought to do this and avoid that: for thus they will learn to do good not from blind instinct, but from the intimate persuasion of the soul. - But while horror of sin is instilled into them, let

nothing false or less true be said: thus small thefts or lies should not be exhibited as mortal sin, but as something unbecoming and dishonorable and base, although, because of lightness of matter, it is a venial sin.

[1] This, in Virgil (*Aeneid*, IX, 252-254), wise Aletes excellently promises, before all other rewards, to the most noble youths Nisus and Euryalus:

"What, O men, what worthy rewards for praises so great
can I think can be paid to you? First the fairest rewards
the gods, and your own morals, will give...."

423. (B) Let their conscience be rightly instructed not only by words, but by the examples of those who educate them: for since the younger are accustomed to imitate what they have before their eyes, if they see splendid actions performed by parents, teachers, and other educators, by that very fact they will be moved to acting splendidly, and by acting well they will form for themselves a right conscience; on the contrary, by depraved examples they are easily drawn toward evil, and by acting badly they deprave conscience. But since it can scarcely happen that they are not at some time witnesses of some depraved action, educators will seize this very opportunity to manifest the turpitude of that action, and to inspire horror and hatred of sin into their souls.

They will likewise take care that the young read books in which examples of virtue are praised, but vices are severely condemned: for from the things which they read, their mind and reason are vehemently borne toward good or evil. - Let them likewise frequent those companions who conduct themselves honorably and in a Christian manner: gradually and without sensing it we for the most part embrace the judgments and manner of acting of those with whom we often associate. Nevertheless, because it is almost impossible to avoid altogether those who act perversely, let adolescents learn as soon as possible to despise the judgments of the depraved; and, notwithstanding contrary opinions and examples, let them manfully arrange their life according to the dictate of conscience and the law of God.

424. (C) Let them cultivate perfect sincerity not only with others, but also with themselves, candidly scrutinizing their own conscience, and judging their own actions equitably, as if they had been performed by another.

This pagan philosophers had already commended to their disciples; thus, among others, Seneca:[1] "Knowledge of sin is the beginning of salvation. Epicurus seems to me to have said this excellently; for he who does not know that he sins does not wish to be corrected: you must detect yourself before you amend yourself. Some glory in vices. Do you think that he considers anything concerning a remedy, who counts his evils in the place of virtues? Therefore, as much as you can, convict yourself! Inquire into yourself; first perform the parts of accuser, then of judge, finally of intercessor." - The Fathers advise the same; thus St. Chrysostom:[2] "Do you not have a book at home in which you write daily accounts? Have likewise a book in conscience, and write daily sins; for example, when you lie in your bed, and there is no one who causes you business, before sleep steals in bring the little book into the middle, and reckon your sins with yourself, saying within yourself: Have I today sinned either in word or in deed?... But when you compute these things, suspend your soul, rend it, open it

with fear of gehenna... so that on the next day you may approach more slowly to perpetrating sins." In truth, he who seriously and sincerely recalls and discusses his actions, and investigates the causes of his sins and foresees their consequences, more easily and efficaciously grieves for past offenses, guards against future ones, and in this way rightly forms his conscience; on the contrary, one often offending without penance easily slips into laxism.

[1] Seneca, Epist. 28, to Lucilius, p. 214 ed. Lemaire.

[2] St. Chrysostom, Appendix on Ps. 50, hom. II, n. 5-6, apud Migne, P.G., LV, p. 581-582.

425. 2. Concerning supernatural means. Among these can be numbered: (A) frequent and fervent prayer to God, who is deservedly called the Father of lights: for in order that conscience be rightly instructed, it ought to be consonant with divine reason and will, which is the supreme rule of morals; now, for detecting the mind of God, nothing surely helps more than prayer, by whose aid we ask the grace of illumination. Therefore let these or similar words often be repeated: "Give me understanding, and I will search thy law, and I will keep it with my whole heart.... Incline my heart unto thy testimonies, and not to covetousness."[1] Let divine strength likewise be urgently asked, by which the law may be more easily fulfilled, and the manner of acting become conformable to the dictate of conscience.

[1] Ps. 118:34-36.

426. (B) The practice of Christian virtues; for just as conscience is easily obscured by depraved actions frequently repeated, so likewise it is not a little illuminated by the assiduous practice of good works: for we perceive moral truths much more distinctly when with a pure heart and sincere will we seek, without any prejudice, what must be done.

Thus experience shows that the conscience of those who devote themselves wholly to cultivating virtues becomes more and more tender and delicate. - Yet excess is to be avoided in this, lest one perhaps slip into scruples: to avoid these, one must diligently distinguish between precepts and counsels, grave and light precepts; sin should indeed be cautiously avoided, even venial sin, indeed the will should tend with all its powers toward perfection; if someone consents to some imperfection, let him indeed grieve for it, but as for an imperfection, not as for sin; nor should he hold venial sins, even deliberate ones, as mortal, but flee them out of love toward God.

427. (C) The frequentation of sacramental confession; for this supposes first of all a serious examination of conscience, whose usefulness the pagans themselves recognized. Besides, by manifesting the secrets of the heart to a wise director, the penitent receives counsels for judging what is good and what is more expedient, what is commanded and what is counseled; by proposing doubts, he can solve them more prudently, with the help of a confessor who excels in greater knowledge and experience; by inquiring concerning the means leading to Christian perfection, he walks more safely in the ways of the Lord, and thus forms for himself an altogether right conscience, under the guidance of him who, bearing the place of God, can declare the divine mind more authentically.[1]

[1] The usefulness of a spiritual director, who not only offers counsels, but is held as a witness of actions, pagan philosophers recognized; thus Seneca, epist. 11 to Lucilius (p. 109 ed. Lemaire): "Some good man must be chosen by us, and always held before our eyes, so that thus we may live as if he were looking on, and do all things as if he were seeing. This, my Lucilius, Epicurus prescribed: he gave us a guardian and pedagogue; and not undeservedly. A great part of sins is removed if a witness stands beside the sinner... O happy is he who can so revere someone that he composes and orders himself even at the memory of him."

By these and other means of this kind, a right and true conscience is formed, which, as being conformed to divine reason, is a safe norm of acting: "Follow with heavenly kindness, O Lord, we beseech Thee, the vows of Thy suppliant people; so that they may both see what things are to be done, and may have strength to fulfill the things which they have seen."[2] - "Deign to direct and sanctify, rule and govern, O Lord God, King of heaven and earth, today our hearts and bodies, our senses, words, and acts in Thy law and in the works of Thy commandments, so that here and forever, with Thee helping, we may deserve to be saved and free, O Savior of the world."[3]

[2] Prayer of the Sunday within the Octave of Epiphany.

[3] Prayer at Prime.

428. From the things said, man is held to tend toward the ultimate end, through human acts, conformable to law, with conscience directing. But, because of human infirmity or malice, he sometimes deviates from the right path by sin, or transgression of the law: when the sin is grave, man is truly turned away from the ultimate end; if it is light, he is only retarded from the attainment of the end. Each must be treated. But because we are inclined to sin by vicious habits, or by propensities either innate or acquired, we must discuss these also, so that the roots of sin may be better extirpated.

On Sins and Vices

Art. I. Concerning Sins.

Division: 1. The concept of sin in general. 2. Concerning mortal sin. 3. Concerning venial sin. 4. Concerning the distinction of sins.

§ I. The Concept of Sin in General.

We shall set forth: 1. the biblical notion of sin; 2. the theological notion; 3. the causes which induce to sin.

I. The Biblical Notion of Sin.

429. Etymological notion.[1] Sin is designated by various names among the sacred authors.

[1] Schleusner, *Novus thesaurus philologico-criticus*, Leipzig, 1821; Grimm, *Lexicon graeco-lat. in libr. N. Test.*, Leipzig, 1903; Trench, *Synonyms of the N. Testament*, 9th ed., London, 1880, rendered in French by C. de Faye, *Synonymes du N. Testament*, Paris, 1869.

In Hebrew: *hatta't*, that is, aberration from the mark or end, because the sinner recedes from his end; *awon*, that is, iniquity, depravity; *pesha*, or rebellion, defection; *sarah*, secession, because the sinner withdraws from the law.

But in Greek it is called: ἁμαρτία, that is, aberration from the mark;[1] or ἁμάρτημα, which has the same sound, with this distinction, however, that the former word signifies sin whether habitual or actual, while the latter always designates a sinful act; ἀνομία or παρανομία, that is, violation and contempt of the law[2] (in the Vulgate it is rendered iniquity); παράβασις, or transgression of the law;[3] παρακοή, that is, the will not to hear the voice of God, disobedience;[4] παράπτωμα, that is, fall, because by sin we slip and lie prostrate;[5] ἀγνόημα, ἄγνοια, or ignorance, because every sin imports a certain error, although not altogether excusable;[6] ἥττημα, that is, diminution, defeat, because sinners, overcome by temptations, experience defeat;[7] πλημμέλεια, or that which is beyond measure and harmony, inharmonious.[8]

[1] Rom. 5:12; 7:7, etc.

[2] 1 John 3:4; 2 Pet. 2:16.

[3] Gal. 3:19; 1 Tim. 2:14, etc.

[4] Rom. 5:19; Heb. 2:2.

[5] Mark 11:25-26.

[6] Heb. 9:7; Acts 17:30.

[7] Rom. 11:12.

[8] Lev. 5:15; Num. 18:9, etc.

430. 2. Historical notion. Sin is exhibited in a general way by the sacred authors as something negative, or as something contrary to justice and rectitude, yet in a diverse way.

(A) In the Old Testament. (a) In Genesis, sin is exhibited as disobedience, or the transgression of a divine precept,[9] which not only is reproved by God, but is strictly punished;[10] hence Cain, after killing his brother, suffers remorse of conscience and the divine curse;[11] and, when iniquities were multiplied upon the earth, men are punished by the flood,[12] because especially "every thought of the heart was intent upon evil at all times."

[9] Gen. 2:16; 3:11.

[10] Gen. 3:14-19.

[11] Gen. 4:9-16.

[12] Gen. 6:5-7 and 11-13.

(b) After the election of the Israelite people and the promulgation of the Mosaic law, positive precepts are multiplied, and therefore various species of sins against various laws; but, since God is the special legislator and king of Israel, transgressions of the law assume a special malice of rebellion. Among graver sins, idolatry is principal, by which false gods are preferred to the one and perfect Deity: wherefore whoever indulges idolatry is severely chastised.[13] Among lesser sins are numbered legal impurities, which, although they by no means suppose internal fault, had to be expiated by various ablutions and sacrifices.[14] - Lighter offenses were destroyed by expiatory sacrifices;[15] but graver ones were punished by the penalty of death.[16] In order that the people might be more efficaciously turned away from sinning, abundant blessings are promised to those keeping the law, and dreadful evils, especially temporal ones, are denounced against those violating the same.[1] Yet the fulfillment of the law is also urgently commended on account of gratitude and love toward God.[2] - Another motive for fleeing sin is taken from the fact that one person's offense affects the whole nation because of the law of solidarity;[3] in truth God sometimes punishes the sins of fathers even in sons, "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of those who hate me."[4]

[13] Exod. 32:30-35.

[14] Lev. 11-15.

[15] Lev. 4-6.

[16] Lev. 18:29; 20:6-21, etc.

[1] Deut. 7:11-26; 10:12-22; 11:13-28.

[2] "Love therefore the Lord thy God and observe his precepts." (Deut. 11:1; cf. 8:2-20.)

[3] Josh. 20:20.

[4] Exod. 20:5.

431. (C) From the time of the Prophets, sin is exhibited more vividly as an offense against God and neighbor, and true repentance of heart is more urgently preached as a means for satisfying for offenses. For sin is contempt of God as benefactor and father, and therefore impiety: "I have nourished and exalted sons; but they have despised me";[5] infidelity toward God, who is as it were the spouse of the chosen nation: "But thou hast fornicated with many lovers."[6] It is also often denounced as injustice against neighbor, because it oppresses the poor: "Who crush the heads of the poor upon the dust of the earth, and turn aside the way of the humble."[7]

[5] Isa. 1:2; cf. Jer. 2:4-37.

[6] Jer. 3:1.

[7] Amos 2:7.

Moreover sinners, by leaving God, the fountain of living water, inflict upon themselves the greatest evil: "But they who commit sin and iniquity are enemies of their own soul."[8] Hence sin is truly a certain kind of foolishness, concerning which the impious will grieve bitterly.[9] - Therefore, in order to obtain mercy, nothing remains except to do penance; nor is it sufficient to offer victims or to rend garments, but it is necessary to offer to God a contrite and humbled heart: "Be converted to me with all your heart, in fasting, and in weeping, and in mourning; and rend your hearts and not your garments... A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit; a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."[10]

[8] Tob. 12:10; cf. Jer. 2:13.

[9] Wis. 5:2-13.

[10] Joel 2:12-13; Ps. 50:19.

432. (B) In the New Testament. (a) Christ from the beginning is exhibited as the lamb who takes away the sins of the world, and therefore He speaks more concerning the destruction of sin than concerning its nature.

Nevertheless He supposes sin to be a transgression of the law, an offense against God and neighbor, a disordering of the will, by which one's own glory is preferred to the glory of God.[11] From another side, by teaching and inculcating a more perfect law, by that very fact He indirectly declares the nature and extension of sin: thus, in the sermon on the mount, He reproves as sinful many acts which were presented as honorable by the doctors of the law and the scribes, for example, anger, hatred of enemies, boasting, pride, etc. In a special manner He denounces hypocrisy, scandal, infidelity, and sin against the Holy Spirit.[1] From another side He takes away merely legal sins from the midst, and openly declares that sins go out from the heart:[2] "For from the heart go forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, blasphemies: these are the things which defile a man; but to eat with unwashed hands does not defile a man."

[11] John 12:43.

[1] Matt. 23:5-32; Matt. 18:6; Luke 17:1-2; Matt. 12:31-32; Mark 16:16.

[2] Matt. 15:19-20.

(b) According to St. Paul, sin is a certain servitude, from which we are freed by grace: "But being freed from sin, you have been made servants of justice";[3] it is also the cause of death: "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death";[4] it is deservedly called disobedience and prevarication,[5] and therefore is punished with a terrible judgment, because the sinner tramples underfoot the Son of God and grieves the Holy Spirit.[6]

[3] Rom. 6:18.

[4] Rom. 5:12.

[5] Heb. 2:2.

[6] Heb. 10:26-31; Eph. 4:30.

(c) According to St. John, we all indeed sin, but we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just, who is the propitiation for our sins;[7] but sin is iniquity and the work of the devil; everyone who is born of God does not commit sin[8] (namely, as long as he remains a son of God, by imitating divine morals). Among sins, two especially are to be fled: those which are opposed to charity, and those which are against Christ, especially the denial of His divinity.[9] With regard to gravity, sin is twofold, one which is not unto death, but another which is unto death,[10] that is, to which the will adheres so obstinately that there is scarcely hope of obtaining pardon.

[7] 1 John 1:8-10; 2:1-2.

[8] 1 John 3:4-10.

[9] 1 John 3:15; 5:10-12.

[10] Ibid., 16-17.

II. The Theological Notion of Sin.

433. 1. Definition of sin. It is commonly defined as a free transgression of the law, according to that saying of Augustine: "Sin is some deed, or word, or desire against the eternal law. But the eternal law is divine reason or the will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved, forbidding it to be disturbed."[12] - Hence a twofold element is found in sin: a voluntary act,[13] whether of deed or of mouth or of heart, which Augustine does not mention in his definition, but supposes; and a defect of rectitude, or privation of due order toward the ultimate end, and therefore lack of conformity with divine reason, which is the ultimate rule of morals, and with the dictate of conscience, which manifests the same to us. - This indeed is true even of the transgression of human law: for this is not truly law except insofar as it is consonant with divine reason; and therefore the transgressor of human law indirectly violates divine law.

[11] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71-72; Suarez, *De Peccatis*, disp. I-IV; Salmant., Tr. XX, *De principiis moralitatis*, cap. 8; St. Alphonsus, lib. II, n. 1-10; Billuart, *De peccatis*, diss. I, art. 2-4; L. Billot, *Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati*, 3rd ed., Rome, 1900.

[12] St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, l. XXXII, c. 27; Migne, P.L. XLII, 418. - Concerning the eternal law, we spoke above, n. 210.

[13] Wherefore for formal, or subjective, sin there is required advertence of the intellect and consent of the will, concerning which above, n. 78-84.

434. Corollaries. (A) From this it follows that there is not per se a merely philosophical sin, that is, one opposed to right reason without nevertheless being an offense against God. (a) For the following proposition 2 was condemned by Alexander VIII, 24 August 1690, as scandalous, rash, and erroneous: "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is grave sin, but is not an offense against God nor a mortal sin dissolving friendship with God, nor worthy of eternal punishment."[1] - And deservedly; for of itself he who apprehends some action as morally evil, by that very fact at least implicitly perceives it as prohibited by the supreme legislator, and therefore logically and interpretatively as an offense

against God.[2] (b) Yet from this it cannot be inferred that the opinion of Lugo and of certain other theologians was reproved, who assert that a merely philosophical sin can hypothetically be given, namely in those who inculpably are ignorant of God;[3] for these do not offend God even implicitly, since they by no means know His existence. - But the proposition was condemned because it did not distinguish between vincible and invincible ignorance of God, and from another side supposed this ignorance to be common enough.

[1] Denzing., n. 1157; Viva, on this proposition, where he observes that that proposition, ascribed to a certain professor of Dijon (Musnier), had not been defended by him so absolutely; Mangenot, *Dictionn. de theol.*, t. I, p. 749; A. Vermeele, *La morale de Kant et la theorie du peche philosophique*, apud *Annales de Philos. caret.*, Sept. 1894, p. 543-565.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 7, ad 3.

[3] Lugo, *De Incarnat.*, disp. V, sect. 5; Viva, cited place, n. 22.

435. (B) From this can also be gathered the difference between evil, sin, and fault; for evil indeed is any deformity, whether moral or physical, consisting in the privation of due perfection; but sin is a morally evil act, whether voluntary or involuntary (material, or objective, sin); finally, fault is a morally evil and voluntary act. Yet sin and fault are often taken promiscuously.

(C) It must likewise be noted that, in St. Paul and in ancient authors, by the name sin is also designated that which induces to sin, for example, concupiscence,[1] or that which follows from sin, for example, the stain impressed on the soul by sin; indeed, by extension, the penalty of sin, or sacrifice for sin, or the object of sin.[2] Wherefore, from the context the genuine sense must be defined.

[1] "This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin because it is truly and properly sin in the reborn, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin." (Trent, sess. V, can. 5, apud Denzing., n. 674.)

[2] Lev. 20:20; 2 Cor. 5:21; Deut. 9:21.

436. 2. Divisions of sin. Sin is divided in many ways, because it can be considered under a manifold respect: -

(a) By reason of the principle from which it arises, sin is original or actual: the former is not committed by the proper consent of each one, but is transfused from Adam into his descendants, from a certain moral connection between these and him, as we declared in the Treatise on God the Creator, n. 189-193. But the latter, concerning which alone we treat here, is committed by the proper will of each one.

(b) By reason of the mode in which it is completed, sin of commission consists in a positive act against some forbidding precept, such as homicide; while sin of omission consists in omitting an action prescribed by law, as is the omission of fasting: sin of this kind requires a positive act of the will, by which someone wills to omit the thing commanded, or at least wills something else incompatible with the thing commanded,[3] as was declared above, n. 84.

[3] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 5.

437. (c) By reason of malice, sins of ignorance are distinguished, which proceed from ignorance, although culpable (above, n. 90-97); sins of infirmity, which arise from the impulse of passion,

although not without free consent (above, n. 102-106); sins of malice, which especially draw their origin from an evil and perverse will, without being excused by ignorance or the vehement impulse of passion: these, other things being equal, are graver.

(d) By reason of the powers by which they are committed, sins are of heart, of mouth, and of deed, according as they are completed by the mind alone, or by words externally brought forth, or by external action; suppose if someone first conceives anger in the heart against a neighbor, then expresses it by harsh words, and finally strikes the enemy with blows and wounds. But what malice the external act adds to the internal act of the same kind, we have already explained, n. 162-166.

(e) By reason of gravity, sin is called mortal, from a certain analogy with physical death, when it brings spiritual death upon the soul, by depriving it of sanctifying grace,[1] which is supernatural life; but venial, if it does not deprive the soul of sanctifying grace, and therefore in some way deserves pardon, even when it has not been remitted.

[1] In the state of mere nature, grave sin would not deprive the soul of grace, but of that rectitude and beauty which arises from the ordering of the faculties to God, the ultimate end.

438. From this it follows that the word "sin" is not univocal, but analogous, insofar as it does not have altogether the same sense when it is predicated of certain kinds of sins. For, other divisions being passed over, actual mortal sin, venial sin, and original sin so differ among themselves that they can be reduced to the same genus only analogically; since mortal sin not yet remitted turns us altogether away from the ultimate end, while venial sin indeed retards us from the attainment of the end, but does not turn us away;[2] from another side original sin is not voluntary by one's proper will, while actual sin supposes one's proper fault.

[2] "The division of sin into venial and mortal is not the division of a genus into species which equally participate in the notion of the genus, but of an analogue into those things of which it is predicated according to prior and posterior." (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1.)

Wherefore, original sin being set aside, concerning which something has been said elsewhere, we shall speak separately of mortal and venial sin, since their nature and effects differ as much as heaven from earth.

III. Concerning the Causes Which Induce to Sin.

439. That God is not the author of sin, whatever the Manicheans and not a few Protestants said to the contrary, we have already proved in the Treatise on the One God, n. 94-99; which from another side is established from Trent:[1] "If anyone shall say that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that God works evil works as He works good ones, not only permissively, but also properly and of Himself, so that the betrayal of Judas is His proper work no less than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema." Therefore the efficient cause of sin is the free will of man itself, which, from infirmity or malice, and often from both at the same time, deviates from the right path of virtue, and prefers its own advantage to the will of God. But the will is drawn to sin by various motives or causes, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. The prior and principal intrinsic cause is our corrupted nature, or concupiscence, which, with Trent as witness, is from sin and inclines to sin; but the extrinsic causes are the world and the devil;

concerning these three we must speak separately. Afterward concerning temptation, which is nothing other than an incitement to sin arising from this threefold cause.

[1] Trent, sess. VI, can. 6, apud Denzing., n. 698.

1. Concerning the Internal Cause, or Concupiscence.

440. St. James explains that this is a cause of sin thus:[2] "But every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured; then when concupiscence has conceived, it brings forth sin; but sin, when it is consummated, begets death." Therefore concupiscence is not sin in itself, but the principal internal cause of sin, or incitement to sinning; if the will freely consents to it, then a sinful act arises. - But St. John teaches that concupiscence is threefold:[3] "All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life." (a) Now concupiscence of the flesh is a certain inordinate propensity toward carnal pleasures, especially toward intemperance and lust. (b) Concupiscence of the eyes, according to St. Augustine and St. Thomas,[1] designates inordinate curiosity for knowing, through the eyes of the body or of the mind, all things which please, even dangerous things; or an inordinate propensity toward riches, resources, magnificent houses, and other things of this kind, by whose sight men are delighted, and whose possession they covet. (c) The pride of life is the inordinate desire of honors, dignities, and similar things which render life conspicuous and procure vainglory. Therefore the principal internal propensities which incline to sin are: intemperance and lust, curiosity and covetousness, and also ambition. - But the root of all these is inordinate love of self: "That someone inordinately desires some temporal good proceeds from this, that he inordinately loves himself";[2] for he does not desire riches, pleasures, and honors except in order to enjoy them and to please himself. - Moreover all passions, concerning which above, n. 99-107, can allure us to sin: concerning the principal ones it will be treated where we discuss the capital vices.

[2] Jas. 1:14-15.

[3] 1 John 2:16. Cf. Bossuet, *Traite de la Concupiscence*. - A certain concupiscence is natural to man; this, besides, received an increase from original sin, as was proved in the Treatise on God the Creator, n. 171, 198.

[1] St. Augustine, *Confess*., l. X, c. 35, P.L. XXXII, 802; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 5.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 4.

2. Concerning the Extrinsic Causes of Sin.

441. There are especially two external causes soliciting to sin: the world and the devil.

(A) The world, concerning which the question is, is not the complex of men who live in the world, but that depraved spirit which flourishes among many men; this is often exhibited in Scripture, especially apud St. John, as an occasion of sin. Thus Christ anathematizes the world because of the scandals which it offers,[3] nor does He pray for the world,[4] but for the disciples, not indeed that God take them out of the world, but that He preserve them from the evil which is in the world;[5] He predicts that the disciples will suffer persecution from the world, but inspires confidence in them, because He Himself has conquered the world.[6] The reason for fleeing the world is because the world

"is wholly set in the evil one,[7]... since all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life."[1] Or, in other words, the world in these places is held as the tinder of threefold concupiscence.

[3] Matt. 18:7.

[4] John 17:9.

[5] John 17:5.

[6] John 16:33.

[7] 1 John 5:19.

[1] 1 John 2:16.

In truth it often induces us to sinning: (a) by deceiving the incautious with fallacies which are directly opposed to the doctrine of Christ; for while the Master calls blessed the poor in spirit, the meek and humble, the peacemakers, and those who mourn and suffer persecution for justice, - the world on the contrary pronounces these unhappy and foolish, and places the highest good in riches, pleasures, and honors; (b) by allurements it draws us, by placing before the eyes all those things which please the senses or favor ambition, so that it may deter us from the right path, and by promising any delights to those who wish to serve it; (c) by depraved examples it draws those weak in soul, and terrifies the timid with threats, lest they fulfill their office.[2]

[2] Cf. Marion, *De la solidarite morale*, Paris, 1883, p. 163-231.

Yet it must be noted that those who are strong in soul, and trust in God, not with difficulty despise the vanities of the world and reject its solicitations: "Have confidence, I have overcome the world... And this is the victory which overcomes the world, our faith."[3]

[3] John 16:33; 1 John 5:4.

442. (B) The devil likewise not rarely incites man to sin: he tempted our first parents,[4] did not hesitate to attack Christ Himself,[5] and incited Judas the traitor to hand over the Lord;[6] but in a general way, the Apostles warn us to beware of diabolical temptation: "Be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about, seeking whom he may devour... For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the heavenly places."[7]

[4] Gen. 3:1-16.

[5] Matt. 4:3-10.

[6] John 13:2, 27.

[7] 1 Pet. 5:8-9; Eph. 6:12.

This, according to common doctrine, he accomplishes in these various modes: (a) by acting upon the external and internal senses, namely by proposing to the eyes, imagination, and memory sensible objects or phantasms, from which passions are moved; (b) also by stirring up passions, namely by cooperating with natural causes which are able to excite the sensible appetite. Yet commonly it is said that he cannot act directly on the intellect and will, which, as being spiritual faculties, are subject to

no other external agent except God: "Whence the whole interior operation of the devil seems to be concerned with phantasy and the sensitive appetite; by moving each of these, he can induce to sin."[1] - But here it can be observed that many temptations are attributed to the devil which in truth arise from concupiscence itself.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 80, a. 2. - Yet some think that the demon can also act directly on the intellect.

3. Concerning Temptation.

443. When the aforesaid causes, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, actually incite us to sinning, temptation arises: concerning which it will be helpful to establish these things: -

[2] Cf. Bourdaloue, *Careme*, Sunday of the first week.

(A) Concerning the rules to be followed with regard to temptation. (a) To feel temptation is not sin, but to consent to it is. This Trent openly teaches indeed concerning concupiscence:[3] "But this holy Synod confesses and perceives that concupiscence, or tinder, remains in the baptized: since it has been left for combat, it cannot harm those who do not consent; indeed he who shall have contended lawfully will be crowned." - This surely is established from the things which were said in the Treatise on Human Acts, where it was proved that for merit or demerit a free act, and therefore the consent of the will, is required.

[3] Trent, sess. V, can. 5.

Therefore the whole difficulty is in this: that the distinction between feeling and consenting be clearly established. To understand this better, three things can be distinguished in temptation: evil suggestion, delectation, and consent. The suggestion itself, or evil thought or imagination, however depraved and long-lasting, is not sin, since in it the will has no part. But often from this suggestion, especially if it perseveres for a long time, some natural and as it were necessary delectation arises in the sensitive appetite, and sometimes a commotion of the senses: up to this point, however, there is no sin, because, as is supposed, this motion of the sensitive appetite is indeliberate and involuntary. When the intellect now perceives the depraved suggestion and its malice, and also the delectation arising from it in the sensitive appetite, the will cannot conduct itself passively; if it immediately rejects the pleasure, there is no sin; but, if it freely consents to it, there will be sin more or less grave according to the gravity of the matter, and the consent more or less full.[4]

[4] St. Francis de Sales declares this lucidly, *Introduction a la vie devote*, Part II, ch. 18 and Part IV, ch. 3-6, where he illustrates the matter by various comparisons and examples.

444. (b) It is not licit rashly to expose oneself to temptation, without sufficient reason. For temptation imports a certain danger of sinning more or less grave or proximate; but it is not licit to go to meet the danger of sinning without sufficient reason: for he who foresees and intends to incur the danger of sinning, by that very fact wills the sin very probably joined with the temptation.[1]

[1] Concerning the danger which arises from the occasion of sin, it is said in the moral Treatise on Penance, n. 451-469.

It was said "without sufficient reason"; for if a grave reason is present, it is licit to expose oneself to temptation, provided that there is well-founded hope of overcoming it; for here the principle concerning an indirectly willed effect, n. 175-182, can be applied. For the action placed is supposed to

be honorable in itself, although it is foreseen that temptation will arise from it; from another side the good effect compensates for the evil, by hypothesis; therefore it is licit to place this action. Thus a physician, confessor, and other men of similar condition, who in the exercise of their office experience certain temptations, even grave ones, can nevertheless persevere in their state, provided they apply means for overcoming temptations; for the exercise of an office of this kind is honorable in itself; and from another side the evil effect which sometimes follows from it, that is, grave temptation, is compensated by the good effect which results from the same exercise both to the agent himself and to society.

The sin committed by him who rashly exposes himself to temptation is of the same nature and species as the sin whose danger he undergoes. - But to judge concerning its gravity, one must weigh whether the agent clearly and certainly foresees the danger of sinning, or only confusedly and probably (above n. 80, 179).

445. (B) Concerning the manner of overcoming temptations. In order that temptations may be more efficaciously conquered, these means especially are to be employed: (a) vigilance, to guard against many temptations, according to that saying of St. Peter:[2] "Be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about, seeking whom he may devour." For even if all temptations cannot be guarded against, nevertheless by vigilance their number is diminished and their force weakened. The reason why we ought to watch is because our will, although good and ready, remains weak and infirm, and therefore ought always to be prepared for repelling spiritual enemies.

[2] 1 Pet. 5:8.

To furnish this, occasions of sinning which are not necessary must be diligently avoided, as we explain in the Treatise on Penance, n. 458-469. Besides, our faculties must be turned toward the good, by which they may more easily decline from evil; thus, if we wish to avoid depraved thoughts, it is not enough to repel them when they have preoccupied the mind: but vain and useless wanderings of the soul, from which dangerous phantasms often arise, must be expelled insofar as can be done, not only negatively, but also positively, by turning the soul toward good and useful things. Passions likewise, which often induce us into temptation, must be directed toward the honorable and religious good, as we noted above, n. 107.

446. (b) To vigilance must be joined prayer, by which we are able to obtain the actual grace of God at the opportune time. For, as was proved in the Treatise on Grace, n. 39-45 and 57-60, fallen man cannot, without the grace of God, overcome all grave temptations; and therefore by urgent, frequent, and humble prayer, he ought to ask divine aid, by which, sustained, he may be able to overcome the attacks of the world and the devil and also the movements of his own concupiscence: "Watch and pray that you enter not into temptation."[1]

[1] Matt. 26:41.

Nor is it sufficient to pray at the very time of temptation, but it is expedient before and after temptations often to have recourse to God, according to the warning of Christ, who inserted these words into the prayer which He taught the Apostles: "And lead us not into temptation." This prayer indeed becomes much more efficacious when joined to meditation; for then, reconsidering the

mysteries of faith and the principles of morals, we are moved to pray more fervently and to flee sin and the occasions of sin more vigilantly. The reconsideration of God living everywhere and in the intimate heart will likewise help greatly: for who would rashly wish to offend God present? "Walk before me and be perfect."[2]

[2] Gen. 17:1.

447. (c) But when temptation presses, one must immediately and strenuously resist: "Resist him, strong in faith."[3] For in the beginning, when the enemy is still weak, victory is easier, while it becomes much more difficult if he has already fixed his foot in our camp.[4] Wherefore, if he has appeared from afar, let us defend the citadel of our soul by diverting the soul toward some honorable thing: for nothing is more useful for avoiding the conflicts of rushing temptations than to occupy the mind in good thoughts or assiduous labors; for then the attack of the enemy, having been frustrated, vanishes. - But this must be furnished strenuously: for if we fluctuate hesitatingly, or resist only weakly, the enemy becomes more daring, and attacks us more bitterly. - Whence those who conduct themselves passively toward temptation, by applying no means to overcome it, expose themselves to the danger of sinning, and therefore sin more or less gravely according to the gravity and proximity of the danger. Yet it is licit to contemn temptation, by diverting the soul to other things, from what has just been said, since this is the best means of conquering it.

[3] 1 Pet. 5:9.

[4] What Ovid said about love (*Remedia amoris*, 91-92) is valid concerning all passions:

"Resist beginnings: medicine is prepared too late,
when evils have grown strong by long delays."

448. (C) Concerning the usefulness of temptations. In truth temptation is not without usefulness. (a) For virtue is perfected in temptations; just as soldiers become stronger by fighting strenuously, so Christians, by fighting manfully against the enemies of salvation, are strengthened in virtue; namely thus, mindful of their own frailty, they begin to think humbly of themselves, and to place their whole confidence in God; they also understand better how necessary it is to mortify the senses and passions, lest perhaps, allured by enticements, they fall into sin; by resisting temptations strongly on account of God, by that very fact they begin to love God more fervently. (b) They have the opportunity of satisfying for past sins: if once they indulged base delectation, now by contemning pleasure they undergo a penalty which contributes not a little to destroying the sins of past life. (c) From this our merits are increased: other things being equal, the more difficult the work to be performed is, the greater is the merit; therefore when storms of temptations arise and it is more arduous to row back to the harbor of salvation, by that very fact merits are increased. Surely a stone would be ungrateful if, sculpted by art, it complained of the sculptor who carved a beautiful figure in it; so also we would be ungrateful if we lamented because God, by various temptations, engraves upon our soul a more perfect image of Christ.[1] Merits being increased, the reward is likewise increased, and for each victory won we shall obtain new degrees of glory, to remain forever.

[1] The Church indeed sings this on the day of Dedication:

"By the blows of the saving chisel,
and by very much pounding,
polished by the hammer of the craftsman,
stones build this mass,
and joined by fitting bonds
are placed in the summit."

§ II. Concerning Mortal Sin.

We shall speak: 1. concerning its nature; 2. concerning its effects; 3. concerning the conditions required for mortal sin.

I. Concerning the Nature of Mortal Sin.

It has already been said that mortal sin, by the force of its very name, brings spiritual death upon the soul; but, in order that its nature and its difference from venial sin may be more deeply declared, we shall successively set forth what Scripture, what the Fathers, and what theologians have taught concerning this matter.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71-73; Suarez, *De peccatis*, disp. I-III; Gonet, *Clypeus Theol. thomisticae*, Lyons, 1681, *De vitiis et peccatis*, disp. I-IV; Billot, *Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati*, Rome, 1900, th. I-III; Manning, *Sin and its consequences*, rendered into French by Maillet, *Le Peche et ses consequences*, Avignon, 1894, ch. I-II.

1. The Doctrine of Scripture Concerning Grave Sin Is Set Forth.

449. (A) That there are grave sins which bring death upon the soul and are the cause of damnation is evidently gathered from Scripture. (a) Thus Christ, in the sermon on the mount, reproving sins against neighbor, says: "But I say to you, that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to the judgment; and he who shall say to his brother: Raca, shall be liable to the council; and he who shall say: Thou fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire."[2] Now words of this kind: shall be liable to the judgment, to the council, signify, from a certain analogy with the penalties inflicted by the tribunals of the Jews, that those who gravely offend their brothers, not only in deed, but in heart or word, are to be punished with a grave penalty; but gehenna designates eternal damnation. This indeed He declares more clearly, by prophetically describing the last judgment:[3] "Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry, and you did not give me to eat"...

[2] Matt. 5:22; cf. Maldonat on this place. - The mind of Christ is that not only homicide is grave sin, but also anger internally conceived, when it leads to homicide, or to very contumelious words. From this, however, it is not licit to infer that every motion of anger is grave.

[3] Matt. 25:41-42.

(b) The Apostle lucidly sets forth the same doctrine, both with regard to the sin of our first parents and with regard to actual sins: "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death... That as sin reigned unto death, so also grace might reign through justice unto eternal life."[1] Hence those who sin gravely are excluded from the kingdom of heaven:[2] "Do not err: neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with males, nor thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God." (c) According to John, mortal sin is privation of light for the mind, and privation of life for the soul: "For everyone who does evil hates

the light, and does not come to the light, that his works may not be reproved... He who says that he is in the light, and hates his brother, is in darkness even until now... He who does not love remains in death."[3] The reason is because sin separates us from Christ who is truth and life.

[1] Rom. 5:12, 21. The question concerns each death, corporal and spiritual.

[2] 1 Cor. 6:9-10; cf. Gal. 5:19-21.

[3] John 3:20; 1 John 2:9; 3:14.

450. (B) Among sins, some are graver than others. Thus God, apud Jeremiah,[4] complains of the Jews thus: "They have hardened their neck, and have done worse than their fathers." Christ Himself, addressing Pilate, says: "Therefore he who delivered me to thee has the greater sin."[5] This indeed is especially clear from the fact that certain sins are called irremissible, while others can be remitted: "Therefore I say to you: every sin and blasphemy shall be remitted to men; but the blasphemy of the Spirit shall not be remitted."[6] The context having been inspected, the question here concerns the sin of the Pharisees who attributed the miracles of Christ to the devil, and thus deliberately and pertinaciously denied His divine mission; but this sin is said not to be remitted, because it is altogether difficult for those who pertinaciously abuse grace to repent sincerely. In the same way the words of John can be understood, who distinguishes between sin unto death and sin not unto death.[7]

[4] Jer. 7:26.

[5] John 19:11.

[6] Matt. 12:31; cf. Mark 3:29-30.

[7] 1 John 5:16.

451. (C) From all these things it can be gathered that the malice of mortal sin consists especially in this, that it turns us away from God. Jeremiah had already explained this by comparison, saying:[1] "For my people have done two evils: they have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, which cannot hold waters." The same is established from many texts alleged above, where sin is called the transgression of the divine law, an offense against God, hatred of God, the loss of divine friendship and divine filiation, privation of light and grace, the cause of damnation and of eternal separation from God; for by these and other words of this kind it is signified that man - who through grace is the adoptive son of God, a participant in the divine nature, a son of light, and therefore is united to God by a manifold bond - by mortal sin becomes a son of the devil, a participant in his works, and walks in darkness, and therefore is truly turned away from God. Wherefore the last sentence of the judge against impenitent sinners is situated in declaring that this departure will be eternal: "Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire."[2]

[1] Jer. 2:13.

[2] This is the very sentence which Bossuet, in the sermon *De la gloire de Dieu dans la conversion des pecheurs*, magnificently explains, as is his custom: "Hell, if we understand it, is sin itself; hell is to be far from God." (Ed. Lebarq, t. II, p. 75.)

452. (D) But that certain sins are not mortal, or are not the cause of eternal damnation, is gathered very probably from a few texts of Scripture. (a) For Christ declares that there is lesser and

greater iniquity:[3] "He who is unjust in little, is unjust also in greater." Besides, the Apostles confess that all Christians offend in many things: "In many things we all offend[4]... If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us";[5] nevertheless from the context it is supposed that those sins are not mortal, nor do they take away charity; thus, for example, a little afterward it is added: "But he who keeps His word, truly in him the charity of God is perfected; and in this we know that we are in Him."[6] Therefore certain sins are given so small that they by no means destroy charity and spiritual life.

[3] Luke 16:10.

[4] Jas. 3:2.

[5] 1 John 1:8.

[6] 1 John 2:5.

(b) The same is indirectly deduced from the celebrated and difficult text of St. Paul,[7] as it is understood by many Fathers: "According to the grace of God, which was given to me, as a wise architect I laid the foundation... But if anyone builds upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, the work of each one shall be manifest; for the day of the Lord shall declare it, because it shall be revealed in fire, and the fire shall prove what sort each one's work is. If anyone's work remains which he built upon it, he shall receive a reward. If anyone's work shall burn, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as through fire." For there the discourse concerns certain doctors who, after Paul, had preached the Gospel to the Corinthians; if they had handed down doctrine not solid, but little useful, relying more on the persuasive words of human wisdom than on the power of Christ, the vanity of their labor will appear on the day of judgment: they indeed will not suffer eternal penalty, because they announced the faith, but, on account of their empty work, they will pay some penalty. From this it is deduced that they sinned, but not mortally.

[7] 1 Cor. 3:10-15.

Yet we confess that these arguments are not apodictic, unless the authority of Tradition is added.

2. The Doctrine of the Fathers Concerning the Gravity of Sin Is Set Forth.

453. (A) In the first three centuries, the distinction between mortal and venial sins is not explicitly instituted, but between the greatest and the small, between those which had to be expiated by public penance and those which were remitted by contrition, almsgiving, prayer, and other means of this kind. Nor from the beginning was it clearly and distinctly defined which sins in species were to be held as grave, but only gradually, according to the progress of Christian conscience: since not a few acts which did not seem gravely sinful to those recently converted from paganism were afterward held graver by those who, through Christian education, had formed for themselves a more delicate conscience, as will be clear from what must be said.

[1] Vacandard, *Le traitement des peccata leviora*, apud *Rev. du Clerge francais*, 15 August 1901; id., *La Penitence publique*, 1903 (collection Bloud), p. 25-44; Batiffol, *Etudes d'hist. et de theol. positive*, Paris, 1902, pp. 81, 144, 128 and passim.

454. (a) Already in the second century three sins were considered as most grave, indeed by some as irremissible by the power of the keys, namely apostasy, moechia or adultery, and homicide.[2] From this certain persons inferred that these three alone are mortal sins. But undeservedly; for

Tertullian, who declares these irremissible, enumerates other sins which are grave and must be chastised by public penance: "But there are also those contrary to these (minute offenses), as graver and destructive, which do not obtain pardon: homicide, idolatry, fraud, denial, blasphemy, certainly also moechia and fornication, and whatever other violation of the temple of God."[1]

[2] Cf. Tertullian, *De Pudicitia*, c. 5 and 12, P.L., t. II, 987-989, 1001-1005; cf. A. d'Ales, *La theologie de Tertullien*, Paris, 1905, p. 272-276; J. Turmel, *Tertullien*, Paris, 1905, p. 210-213.

[1] Tertullian, ibid., c. 19, P.L., II, 1020.

455. (b) From another side there are lesser, or small, sins, which are daily committed and can be remitted through penance. For the same Tertullian says:[2] "For to whom does it not happen either to be angry unjustly, and beyond the setting of the sun, or even to put forth the hand, or easily to curse, or to swear rashly, or to destroy the fidelity of a pact, or to lie from shame or necessity? In businesses, in offices, in gain, in food, in sight, in hearing, how many things tempt us, so that if there were no pardon of these, salvation would belong to no one! Therefore there will be pardon for these through Christ, the entreator of the Father." - St. Cyprian testifies that penance was necessary for these lesser offenses:[3] "When in lesser sins sinners do penance for a just time, and, according to the order of discipline, come to exomologesis, and through the imposition of the hands of the bishop and clergy receive the right of communion..." Therefore these lesser offenses are not merely venial according to the present manner of speaking.

[2] *De pudicit.*, c. 19, P.L., II, 1020.

[3] St. Cyprian, epist. 9, P.L., IV, 251.

456. (B) From the fourth century, the distinction is already explicitly made between grave sins, which are to be expiated by public penance, and light sins, concerning which it suffices to do penance privately.

(a) Thus St. Ambrose:[4] "Because as there is one baptism, so also one penance, which nevertheless is done publicly; for we ought to repent of daily sin: but this latter is for light offenses, the former for graver ones."

[4] St. Ambrose, *De Paenitent.*, cap. 10, P.L., XVI, 520.

457. (b) Augustine declares this more fully. Besides original sin, which is destroyed through baptism, he distinguishes two kinds of sins: grave sins or crimes, which are remitted only by long and public penance, namely those which the Apostle describes in the epistle to the Corinthians and to the Galatians; and light sins, which all commit and which are destroyed by prayer: "For those whom you see doing penance have committed crimes, either adulteries or certain monstrous deeds: thence they do penance. For if their sins were light, daily prayer would suffice for destroying these."[5] - The reason for the difference between light and grave sins is taken from this, that the former do not destroy the foundation of faith and charity, while the latter overturn the foundation of charity: "These things therefore (light sins), because when carnally loved by affection they are not lost without sorrow, for this reason those who

have them in such a way that they have in the foundation faith which works through charity, and do not by any reason or cupidity prefer them to this, when they suffer loss in the loss of them, arrive at salvation through a certain fire of sorrow... But he who, for the sake of either keeping or acquiring them, commits homicide, adultery, fornication, idolatry, and any similar things, will not be saved through fire because of the foundation, but, the foundation having been lost, will be tormented by eternal fire."[1]

[5] *De Symbolo*, to Catechumens, c. 7, P.L., XL, 636; cf. *Enchiridion*, c. 68-71, P.L., XL, 264-266; sermon 351, P.L., XXXIX, 1535-1549.

[1] *De fide et operibus*, cap. 16, P.L., XL, 216.

458. (c) With regard to the Eastern Church, the same is established from the canonical epistles of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus and St. Basil. The former, being asked concerning the kind of penance which had to be imposed on those who had sinned on the occasion of the incursion of the Goths, sets forth how one should act with those who had eaten idolothytes, or had committed fornication, robbery, theft, invasion of others' homes, or had unjustly detained captives, or had been cooperators with barbarians.[2] The latter weaves a longer catalogue of offenses which are subject to canonical penance: there are numbered the killing of an animated or unanimated fetus, digamy and trigamy, fornications of deacons and of canonesses who had vowed virginity, and other grave sins against chastity, homicides, beatings, idolatry, violent motions of anger, usury, perjuries; indeed, it is equitable that involuntary killing, or killing done in war, be punished by some penance.[3] Elsewhere he complains that many make little of sins which nevertheless are declared as mortal by Paul:[4] "Assuredly a most evil custom has deceived us; assuredly a perverse tradition of men exists for us as the cause of great evils, which namely, while certain sins have been avoided, has indifferently admitted others, and while it pretends to be vehemently indignant at some, as at homicide and adultery, and at others of the same kind, it judges some to be worthy not even of simple rebuke, such as anger, or reviling, or drunkenness, or avarice, and whatever things are similar to these, against all of which also elsewhere Paul, speaking in Christ, brought forth the same sentence, when he said: Those who do such things are worthy of death." Therefore mortal sins were recognized, besides idolatry, moechia, and homicide. But elsewhere they teach that certain sins are very light, into which all fall.

[2] Canonical epistle, P.G., X, 1019-1047.

[3] Canonical epistle, P.G., XXXII, 663-684; cf. Chardon, *Hist. des Sacrements*, Migne, *Theol. Curs.*, XX, 692-721, where these and other canonical epistles of St. Basil are rendered into French.

[4] *De Judicio Dei*, P.G., XXXI, 670.

459. (C) Around the sixth century, it is already more explicitly declared which sins are grave and which light.

Thus Caesarius of Arles, in a sermon to the people, says:[5] "And although the Apostle has mentioned many capital sins, nevertheless, lest we seem to cause despair, we briefly say which they are: sacrilege, homicide, adultery, false testimony, theft, robbery, pride, envy, avarice; and anger, if it is held for a long time; and drunkenness, if it is assiduous, is computed in their number." These sins

indeed must be expiated by long penance; otherwise they will be punished by eternal flame. Among minute sins he chiefly numbers these: "As often as someone either in food or in drink takes more than is necessary... as often as he speaks more than is fitting, or is silent more than is expedient; as often as he exasperates a poor man asking importunately. As often as, although healthy in body, while others fast, he wishes to dine; or, given over to sleep, rises later to church... As often as he visits the sick later. If he has neglected to call back the discordant to concord. If he has exasperated a neighbor, or wife, or son, or servant more than is fitting; if he has flattered more than is expedient... If he has not given food to the hungry poor; or has prepared for himself banquets too delicate or too costly... For these and things similar to these undoubtedly pertain to minute sins, which, as I have already said, can scarcely be enumerated, and from which not only the Christian people, but no one of the saints could ever have been, or will be, immune. Although we do not believe the soul to be killed by these sins, nevertheless by filling it as it were with certain pustules, and as with a dreadful scab, they make it deformed." Afterward he adds that these minute sins are redeemed by good works, especially fraternal charity and alms. - Elsewhere among minute sins he numbers not a few which today would be held as mortal: "Let us think, from the time when we began to be wise, what for oaths, what for perjuries, what for curses, what for detractions, what for idle words, what for hatred, what for anger, what for envy, what for evil concupiscence, what for gluttony, what for sleepiness, what for filthy thoughts, what for concupiscence of the eyes, what for voluptuous delectation of the ears..."[1] - Therefore it is clear that the difference between mortal and venial sins, from the first centuries, was first indirectly and confusedly, then explicitly and clearly recognized; but that the rules by which they are distinguished from each other were not clearly defined; and therefore some offenses, which today by a rightly cultivated conscience are held as grave, at that time were regarded as light. - This evolution will be better understood by him who attentively runs through the penitential books; for there he will find an examination of conscience which, as the centuries pass, becomes more and more prolix.[2]

[5] Appendix to Serm. St. Augustine, P.L., XXXIX, 1946-1947.

[1] Sermon 257, apud Migne, P.L., XXXIX, 2220.

[2] You will find some of these penitential books apud Morinus, *Comment. histor. de disciplina in administrat. Paenitent.*, Appendices; Chardon, op. cit., p. 712-725.

3. The Theological Doctrine Concerning Mortal Sin.

460. (A) Notion. In mortal sin two things can be considered: the voluntary act by which someone transgresses the law, and the defect of rectitude which is found in such an act. Under this last respect, according to St. Thomas[1] and other theologians commonly, mortal sin is defined as a turning away from God the ultimate end, through a voluntary and inordinate turning toward creatures.[2] Consequently mortal sin is opposed to divine goodness and wisdom, to the eternal law, and also to the rational nature of man, from what was said above, n. 25. For the most part man does not primarily and explicitly will to turn himself away from God, but, when a useful or delectable created good has been proposed to him, he sometimes chooses the disorder inhering in sin, and therefore the turning away from God, rather than to be deprived of the delectation: "They loved the glory of men more than the glory of God."[3] Hence, for grave sin, it is not necessary directly to intend a turning away from the ultimate end, but it suffices to will it indirectly and logically, by desiring a created good which is known to be contrary to the

ultimate end. - In truth man does not desire evil insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it lies hidden under the appearance of good. This indeed is valid even concerning hatred of God: thus the worst sinners do not hate God except insofar as they apprehend Him as opposed to their own good.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 5.

[2] Among Protestants, others more orthodox, as Bovon, define sin as the free transgression of the law, by which egoism is preferred to love of God; others, tending toward rationalism and determinism, as Schleiermacher and Rothe, hold sin to be as it were a necessary stage of human evolution, in which flesh lusts against spirit and turns the same away from God. Cf. Lichtenberger, *Encyclop. des sciences religieuses*, t. X, at the word *Peche*; Bovon, *Dogmatique chretienne*, Lausanne and Paris, 1895, t. I, p. 311-397, and *Morale chret.*, 1897, t. I, p. 257-316.

[3] John 12:43.

Wisdom graphically describes these psychological dispositions of sinners:[4] "For they have said, thinking not rightly within themselves: short and tedious is the time of our life, and there is no refreshment in the end of man, and no one has been known to return from hell... Come therefore and let us enjoy the good things that are, and let us use the creature quickly as in youth... Let us crown ourselves with roses before they wither; let there be no meadow through which our luxury does not pass... Let us oppress the poor just man, and not spare the widow... These things they thought and erred: for their malice blinded them."

[4] Wis. 2:1-21; the whole chapter should be read.

461. Corollaries. (a) From this the difference between mortal sin and venial sin appears: for the latter does not turn man away from God the ultimate end, but only retards him from Him, as will be explained below.

St. Thomas declares this thus:[1] "For there is a twofold disorder: one through the removal of the principle of order, another in which, even with the principle of order preserved, disorder occurs concerning those things which are after the principle; just as in the body of an animal sometimes indeed the disorder of complexion proceeds even to the destruction of the vital principle, and this is death; but sometimes, with the principle of life preserved, there is a certain disorder in the humors, and then it is illness. But the principle of the whole order in morals is the ultimate end... whence when the soul is disordered by sin even to turning away from the ultimate end, namely God, to whom it is united through charity, then it is mortal sin; but when disorder occurs short of turning away from God, then it is venial sin."

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 5.

462. (b) From this also the controversy, long agitated among theologians, whether the formal constitutive element of a sin of commission consists in something positive or in something negative, can be reconciled.[2] A twofold element can be distinguished in sin: the voluntary act and its disorder. Now sin of commission, considered on the part of the act, consists in something positive by which someone tends toward a good at least apparent; but the disorder of the same act essentially consists in the privation of due rectitude, since the will, by inordinately desiring a created good, turns itself away from God.

[2] All indeed confess that sin of omission is something negative. But according to Suarez (*De peccatis*, disp. I, sect. I, n. 4), sin essentially consists in the privation of due rectitude; according to the Wurzburg theologians (*De pecc.*, n. 13), it consists in the positive tendency of the act toward the prohibited object. Billuart, diss. I, art. 2, sets forth the reasons alleged on each side.

Wherefore God indeed concurs toward the positive act, by moving the will to acting; but neither directly nor indirectly is He the cause of the disorder, which proceeds wholly from the depravity of the human will. "Whence this defect is not reduced to God as to a cause, but to free choice; just as the defect of limping is reduced to the curved shin as to a cause, but not to the motive power, by which nevertheless whatever there is of motion in limping is caused."[3] - Nor let it be said that God indirectly cooperates with sin from the fact that He does not prevent it; for most wisely He willed man to be free, and He offers him the helps necessary for avoiding sin; but it is altogether fitting that, after He has sufficiently instructed men toward the good, He allow them to act by their own motion, and by their own efforts to acquire merits and to attain eternal life, with the help of grace which He denies to no one well disposed. For from what was said, n. 185, it is licit to cooperate materially with sin, provided there is a proportionately grave reason.

[3] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 79, art. 2.

463. (B) Concerning the malice of mortal sin.[1] The malice, or disorder, of this sin is manifold, if it is considered on the part of God, on the part of Christ, and on the part of the sinner himself.

[1] Besides the theologians, cf. Manning, op. cit., ch. I; Bourdaloue, *Sermons sur les Mysteres*, 1st sermon on the Passion of Jesus Christ; id., *Exhortations*, *Sur le jugement du peuple contre J.-C.*; id., *Careme*, Wednesday of the 5th Week, concerning the state of sin and the state of grace; Gratry, *Medit. inedites*, Paris, Tequi, 1878, 7th Meditation, Sin.

On the part of God, mortal sin is (a) disobedience and rebellion against God, the supreme legislator: for the sinner deliberately, although created by God and wholly depending on Him, prefers his own will to the will of God, although he knows very well that He is supreme Lord, King of kings, and Lord of lords, and that He prescribes nothing except what is consonant with reason and wisdom. Thus he becomes guilty of rebellion: for since by a manifold title he is justly subject to the dominion of God, nevertheless equivalently[2] he says, "I will not serve," and rejects the authority of God. (b) It is deservedly called injustice or iniquity; for God, as being the infinite good and the font of all beatitude, and also the supreme Lord, has a strict right that He be our ultimate end; and therefore the sinner, turning himself away from God the ultimate end, violates that right, and, insofar as he can, deprives Him of that external glory which he ought to render to the most perfect Being; thus he commits true injustice. (c) It imports a certain irreligiosity: for to God, because of His supreme excellence and majesty, supreme worship and honor is due; but the sinner denies this honor, indeed in some sense dishonors and contemns the Lord, preferring the vilest creature to the Creator, according to that saying:[1] "They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves broken cisterns which cannot hold waters." But this contempt has the character of contumely, because sin is committed in the sight of the omnipresent God: "Against Thee alone have I sinned, and I have done evil before Thee."[2] (d) It is foul ingratitude: for God is a distinguished benefactor: whatever of being, whatever of good we have, proceeds from Him; natural and supernatural gifts He has generously bestowed upon us; He has sanctified and redeemed our souls; but we use His benefits to offend Him, and indeed at the very time when He bestows His gifts upon us!

[2] It is said equivalently, or logically, by way of conclusion, not explicitly; for most often the sinner does not expressly intend this rebellion; hence sacred orators should abstain in this matter from excessive amplifications.

[1] Jer. 2:13. Hence Paul says (Rom. 2:23-24): "By transgression of the law thou dishonorest God: for the name of God through you is blasphemed among the Gentiles."

[2] Ps. 50:6.

464. On the part of Christ, (a) sin was the cause why Christ had to undergo such bitter pains and tortures, and a most shameful and most cruel death; therefore he who, knowing these things, nevertheless sins, by that very fact logically and indirectly becomes an accomplice of those who crucified the Lord, and, as far as lies in him, renews His agony, tortures, humiliations, crucifixion, and death, and therefore in some sense becomes guilty of deicide: "Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God."[3] (b) But because through baptism he entered into a covenant with Christ, and breaks it through sin, by that very fact he is deservedly held as a covenant-breaker, just as the Jewish people when it broke the faith given many times. (c) Since he has likewise been made a living temple of God and marked by a sacramental character, the sinner commits a certain sacrilege, dedicating the temple of God to profane uses and rashly violating his own soul consecrated to Christ. Wherefore the sins of a Christian are graver than the sins of unbelievers, and the sins of a priest graver than the sins of Christians.[4] - Yet for the most part sinners are not conscious of the whole malice which of itself is in mortal sin; and therefore sacred orators, when they speak concerning this matter, ought to have this before their eyes.

[3] Heb. 6:6; here the question indeed concerns apostasy from the faith, but by analogy it can be extended to all mortal sins. Wherefore Christ could address sinners, as He addressed the Jews themselves, thus: "What more ought I to have done for thee and have not done? I indeed planted thee, my most beautiful vineyard: and thou hast become very bitter to me: for with vinegar thou hast given me to drink in my thirst and with a lance thou hast pierced the side of thy Savior." Let the whole reproaches be read, in the Mass of Friday of great week.

[4] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 10.

465. On the part of man, sin is the highest evil, namely: (a) spiritual suicide, since it brings death upon the soul; (b) deformity and defilement, since it deprives the soul of the supernatural beauty with which it shone, and of the many supernatural gifts and habits which adorned it; (c) ignominious servitude, since the sinner is constituted a slave of the devil, and renders himself subject to his attacks. Therefore the Prophet deservedly says:[1] "Know and see, that it is evil and bitter for thee to have left the Lord thy God."

[1] Jer. 2:19.

466. (C) Controversy concerning the infinity of sin. According to all, mortal sin, insofar as it is the evil of man, is not infinite, because the goods of which it deprives him are finite. Likewise the malice of sin, or the disorder of the sinful act considered in the will of the sinner itself, is something finite, since the human will is incapable of infinite malice.[2] But the question concerns the offense, or the injury inflicted by sin; and from this head, all concede that sin is at least extrinsically and objectively infinite, because namely it dishonors God, who is truly infinite. But it is controverted whether the offense inflicted upon God is simply and intrinsically infinite in the genus of morals, or only extrinsically and in a qualified way.

[2] Some theologians indeed say that the malice of sin is in some way infinite, but they confuse this malice with the offense inflicted upon God.

(a) Many Thomists affirm that mortal sin, under the notion of offense, is of simply infinite gravity in the genus of morals.[3] For the gravity of offense grows according to the dignity of the person upon whom it is inflicted, according to that saying: injury is in the injured person; and in truth the same injury inflicted upon a soldier is less grave than if it is inflicted upon a general. But the person offended through mortal sin, namely God, is of simply infinite dignity. - It is confirmed from this, that mortal sin deserves an infinite penalty in duration.

[3] Thus especially Gonet, *Clypeus theol. thomisticae*, concerning Sins, diss. IX, art. 6; the Salmanticenses, *De Incarnat.*, disp. I.

(b) Yet not a few theologians hold, with Scotus and Suarez,[4] that the gravity of sin, even under the notion of offense, is infinite only in a qualified way. For there are mortal sins graver than others; but if they were simply infinite, all would be equal, since there is not given an infinite greater than an infinite. - Besides, the divine majesty and excellence, although infinite, is known only in a finite way; but the malice of the act, even under the notion of offense, is measured according to the dignity of the person not considered in itself, but insofar as it is known by the agent.

[4] Suarez, *De peccatis*, disp. II, sect. 3; Pesch, n. 477-482.

Conclusion. We gladly admit what St. Thomas says:[1] "Sin committed against God has a certain infinity from the infinity of the divine majesty: for the greater is he against whom one offends, the graver the offense is." But we do not think that a certain infinity signifies infinity simply; rather, we assent to those who say that the gravity of offense morally taken is to be measured not only from the dignity of the person offended, but also according to the agent's cognition, which is finite.

[1] St. Thomas, III, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

467. (D) Concerning the inequality of mortal sins.[2] That not all mortal sins are equal we have already learned from Scripture, n. 450. Reason shows the same: for although sin consists essentially in turning away from God, the ultimate end, nevertheless there are degrees in it. For this is not a mere negation of conversion to God, but also a positive opposition against the end, in which there can be many degrees, whether on the part of the will, or on the part of the object and circumstances.

[2] Horace elegantly refutes the theory of the Stoics, who taught that all sins are equal, *Satir.*, I, 3, 96:

"Those to whom it has pleased that sins are nearly equal, labor
when it has come to truth: sense and morals resist,
and utility itself, almost the mother of the just and fair."

(a) On the part of the will; for since sin is an act of the will, it will be greater or lesser according as the volition is more or less perfect: but this, even when it suffices for grave sin, can be more or less intense by reason of deliberation, effort, and duration. Thus, other things being equal, the sin is graver which was preceded by more attentive deliberation, and which was committed with vehement affection, without external solicitation, for a long time.

(b) On the part of the object and circumstances; for since sins are diverse according to the diversity of objects, those which are immediately committed against God are graver, such as voluntary

apostasy from the faith, blasphemy; among those which are perpetrated against man, those which are against his life are graver than those which are against his goods, for example, homicide is worse than theft.[1] Circumstances likewise can increase malice; thus parricide is graver than homicide, and theft of sacred things than simple theft. This will be declared more fully in the course of Moral Theology.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73; cf. Lehmkuhl, t. I, n. 1223-1232.

II. Concerning the Effects of Mortal Sin.

Mortal sin produces a twofold effect, namely: 1. a habitual turning away from God, or guilt of fault; 2. guilt of penalty, or the obligation to penalty.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 86-87; Suarez, disp. VII-VIII; Gonet, disp. VIII; Billuart, diss. VII; Pesch, n. 495-515; Billot, th. 4-6.

1. Concerning Guilt of Fault, or the State of Sin.

468. (A) After the sinful act has passed, man remains habitually turned away from God, until he is freed from sin through penance: but he cannot be exempted from this unless through an act of the will he retracts the evil act placed by himself, and obtains pardon from God.[3] But that state of turning away from God is called habitual sin, or the state of sin; it is not indeed a vicious habit properly so called, for this supposes repeated acts of the same species; but it is a certain inordinate disposition, by force of which the will, which ought to tend toward God, remains turned away from the ultimate end, and therefore is less apt for resisting temptations and for acting well.

[3] St. Thomas declares this thus, I-II, q. 86, a. 2: "Although the act of sin ceases, by which man withdrew from the light of reason or of the divine law, nevertheless man does not immediately return to that in which he had been; but some motion of the will contrary to the first motion is required; just as if someone is distant from another by some motion, when the motion ceases he does not immediately become near to him, but he must approach by returning through a contrary motion."

This disposition is called guilt of fault, because the sinner, as long as he has not retracted nor repaired the injury inflicted upon God, remains guilty of that offense; therefore he ought to do penance as soon as possible, if he wishes to recover grace.

469. (B) For man constituted in the supernatural order, the state of sin includes also the privation of habitual grace and charity; for in the present order, man is not ordered to his supernatural end except through habitual grace, as was said above, n. 8; therefore he is not turned away from the same end except by privation of habitual grace and charity.

(C) But this privation of grace is nothing other than the stain of sin, which the Scriptures often commemorate; for sins are called stain, filth, uncleanness, defilements; from which God washes us with clean water, and Christ washes us in His blood.[1] But this stain is not something positive or a depraved quality, but only the privation of sanctifying grace. St. Thomas declares this by comparison:[2] just as a stain in corporeal things consists in this, that a shining body loses its brightness from contact with another body, so in spiritual things the soul is metaphorically said to be stained when it loses its brightness by clinging to created things through inordinate love.[3]

[1] Josh. 22:17; Isa. 4:4; Ezek. 36:25; Zech. 13:1; 1 Cor. 6:11; Eph. 5:27.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 86, a. 1.

[3] In the natural order, the state of sin would consist in the privation of the rectitude by which man is naturally ordered to God.

2. Concerning Guilt of Penalty, or the Obligation of Undergoing Penalty.

470. Besides the stain left in the soul, sin induces an obligation to undergo some penalty; this indeed is twofold: one which accompanies the fault itself, as remorse of conscience; the other, which is inflicted as a remedy of salvation by God or by man.

(A) Concerning remorse of conscience. The sinner, seeing that he has been turned away from God, and deprived of many goods, because of vile and transitory delights, returns into himself, and, hearing the voice of conscience, at least as long as he is not obstinate in evil, understands that he has erred and done evil.

Wisdom vividly describes this remorse of conscience:[4] "Seeing, they shall be troubled with horrible fear..., saying within themselves, doing penance, and groaning for anguish of spirit... Therefore we have erred from the way of truth... We have been wearied in the way of iniquity and perdition; and we have walked difficult ways, but the way of the Lord we have not known. What has pride profited us, or what has the boasting of riches brought us? All those things have passed like a shadow... but in our wickedness we have been consumed." Too happy are sinners if, vexed by anxieties and remorse of conscience, they return penitent to the heavenly Father, crying out as the prodigal himself did: "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee."[1]

[4] Wis. 5:2-13. - Hugo graphically depicts the remorse which Cain experienced after perpetrating fratricide in *La Conscience*, in the work *La Legende des siecles*, Paris, t. I, p. 35-37.

[1] Luke 15:18.

471. (B) Concerning the various penalties inflicted by God or man. A wise legislator adds sanctions to his laws, by which subjects may be more efficaciously deterred from evil and impelled toward good. (a) Now mortal sin induces guilt of eternal penalty; this indeed is twofold: the penalty of loss, or privation of the beatific vision, which corresponds to the turning away from God, and the penalty of sense, which corresponds to the turning toward creatures:[2] "And these shall go into eternal punishment."[3] Yet this penalty is not inflicted except upon the impenitent, namely those who obstinately die in their sin. And surely he who voluntarily remains turned away from God is deservedly deprived of the vision of God and of the ultimate end; likewise he who inordinately adhered to creatures even to the end justly feels harm from them.[4]

[2] Concerning each it was said in the Treatise on God the Rewarder, n. 23-30.

[3] Matt. 25:46.

[4] In the natural order, the penalty of sin would be the privation of that beatitude which consists in a fuller, although natural, knowledge and love of God.

(b) Besides, sometimes God, even in this life, inflicts medicinal penalties upon sinners, namely various calamities, and also anxieties of soul, illnesses, and other temporal evils, so that, returning to the heart, they may grieve for sins and satisfy for them by salutary penance. But concerning these penalties nothing certain and infallible can be predicated: for Providence sometimes permits the evil

to be afflicted by no special calamities in the present life, nor does He always measure the quantity of temporal penalty according to the gravity of sins. Hence the Psalmist says:[5] "But my feet were almost moved... because I was zealous over the wicked, seeing the peace of sinners... Behold these are sinners, and abounding in the world, they have obtained riches." For God indeed is patient, because eternal. - Whence penalties inflicted upon sinners ought to be regarded, at least for the most part, as benefits: just as physicians give bitter potions to the sick for restoring health, so God chastises those whom He wills to amend.

[5] Ps. 72:2-12.

From these things it is clear how diligently mortal sin is to be avoided, which offends God, defiles the soul, and renders the sinner subject to so many evils. Would that of any Christian it could be said what is narrated concerning Chrysostom:[6] "That man is superior to fear and threats, and is lifted up even against death itself. One thing alone he fears, namely sin, and lest through it he offend God even a little."

[6] Symeon Metaphr., *Vita S. Chrys.*, Migne, P.G., CXIV, 1138.

III. Concerning the Conditions Required for Mortal Sin.

The nature and effects of mortal sin having been described, it remains to inquire what conditions are required in order that sin be mortal. Now three must concur together: grave matter, full advertence, and full consent.

472. 1. Grave matter: but this can be such by reason of the object or circumstances, from what was said above, n. 144-146 and 158-161. - But what matter is grave can be defined both by authority and by reason.

(A) By authority. (a) We have already said that from Scripture it can be discerned that certain sins are mortal, namely those which are said to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, to be worthy of death or eternal damnation, execrable, abominable, etc. (b) The same can be gathered from the decrees of Councils, Pontiffs, or Congregations, or from the common doctrine of the Fathers and theologians, or from the common sense of the faithful. In this matter it must be noted that there has been some progress, so that the catalogue of sins today is longer than in the first times of the Church; this indeed happened not so much from an authentic declaration of the Pontiffs, who have very rarely pronounced concerning the gravity of sin, as from the common sense of doctors or of the faithful, and from the progressive education of Christian conscience.

473. (B) By reason: for this, since it is a certain participation in divine reason, judges concerning the morality of human acts, and therefore concerning the gravity of sins. The general principle is that that sin is to be held as mortal which imports a grave disorder with regard to God, society, oneself, or neighbor. Thus mortal of themselves are:

(a) Sins which inflict grave injury upon God or His divine attributes, such as infidelity, apostasy, despair, hatred of God, blasphemy, irreligion. (b) Sins which induce grave harm to the human race or to society, for example, fornication, rebellion against legitimate authority, all those things which foster discords among the various orders of citizens. (c) Sins which are so opposed to charity or justice toward oneself or neighbor that they bring notable detriment; thus, for example, suicide,

homicide, theft of some moment, hatred of neighbor, detractions and calumnies which greatly injure reputation, etc.

Certain sins are called grave from their whole genus, when namely they admit no smallness of matter, for example, apostasy, hatred of God, blasphemy; these are always mortal of themselves, nor can they become light except by defect of full deliberation or full consent. But others are grave from their genus, insofar as of themselves they have it that they can be grave, yet in such a way that they are venial not only from defect of full deliberation or consent, but also from smallness of matter; for example, theft, detraction, etc.

474. 2. Full advertence, namely that which a man fully master of himself is accustomed to apply to a business of great moment; for when the matter concerns the loss of eternal salvation, or turning away from the ultimate end, semiplene advertence does not suffice, such as exists in one half-asleep or in him who is distracted by another matter. Therefore it is required that the action be clearly apprehended or clearly suspected as illicit, and indeed gravely so: for if this appears only confusedly and obscurely, it cannot be said that the sinner wills, explicitly or implicitly, to turn himself away from God.[1] Yet it is not necessary that someone again and again, for a long time, maturely and reflexively consider the matter as prohibited by God under grave penalty; but it suffices to perceive the act clearly and directly, even for a brief time, as gravely illicit.

[1] *Vieux Moraliste, Peche precis et peche vague,* apud *Ami du Clerge,* t. XX, 1898, p. 1025-1030.

Hence they lack full advertence, and therefore do not sin gravely: (a) the half-asleep, the half-drunk, or all those who are not truly masters of themselves; (b) those who, occupied and distracted by another matter, give only slight attention to the action which they perform; (c) those who, by vehement passion, or agitation of the nerves, or another physical disease or pathological state (above, n. 128-135), are so disturbed that they attend to the matter only imperfectly; (d) those who immediately or a little after the fact, weighing its malice more attentively, judge that they would not have acted so if they had seriously thought beforehand; and a fortiori if they scarcely remember what they did.

475. 3. Full consent, that is, that which follows full advertence, and at the same time is offered with that liberty which a matter of great moment requires. For this liberty it is not necessary that the agent be immune from passion or fear, but it suffices that, notwithstanding vehement passion or fear, he is able to deliberate and choose maturely: thus he is not excused from grave sin who, from fear of death, externally denies the faith, or, in order to preserve a public office, deliberately, although reluctantly, commits injustice.

But in doubt whether someone has fully consented, these can be held as signs of imperfect consent: (a) he who habitually abhors mortal sin, and therefore is of a fearful conscience, so that he is prepared rather to die than to sin gravely, is to be presumed not to have fully consented. (b) He who experienced some desire of doing evil, and abstained from external sin, while an easy occasion of sinning externally presented itself, is generally to be judged not to have offered full consent. (c) The same can be said of him who, as soon as he fully adverted to the temptation, repelled it; or is

anguished or saddened concerning depraved thoughts or desires which invade his mind, even if they have remained for a long time.

476. Corollaries. (A) Therefore it can happen that an action objectively gravely sinful is not mortal sin:

(a) From defect of full advertence or full consent from the things said above; (b) from invincibly erroneous conscience, when namely someone in good faith thinks that the action is only lightly evil; (c) from an excusing cause, when the matter concerns some law, from whose fulfillment sufficient reason can excuse; for example, grave inconvenience excuses altogether from hearing Mass on a feast day, and an inconvenience not so grave can excuse from mortal sin, if not from venial.

477. (B) On the contrary, a sin light from its genus can become grave:

(a) From erroneous conscience, when the agent holds a venial sin as grave, for example, a minute theft; (b) from a gravely evil end, if someone, for example, steals a thing of slight price for committing homicide: for the means which is ordered to a gravely evil end participates in the grave malice of the end itself; for the same reason, he sins mortally who adheres to a thing prohibited only under light sin, yet in such a way that he is prepared rather to offend God gravely than to bid farewell to the thing; (c) by reason of scandal, when it is morally certain that grave scandal will arise from a sin otherwise venial, for example, if a priest acts so lightly that he offers grave scandal to laymen; (d) by reason of danger, if someone, by sinning venially (for example, by idle conversation), foresees that he is going to fall into grave temptation; (e) by reason of contempt, when someone violates the law in light matter, but with the intention of manifesting contempt toward the law or the legislator: which nevertheless occurs very rarely; (f) by reason of matter coalescing, when matters, small of themselves, are so ordered to making some one moral whole that they effect a notable transgression of the same precept; thus sometimes minute thefts coalesce into one and constitute mortal sin, as is declared in the Treatise on Justice, n. 440-444.

478. (C) Since it is very difficult in practice to define whether some sin is mortal, all circumstances having been attended to, and especially the psychological dispositions of the agent, let the confessor not be prone to judging easily that such or such an action is gravely evil, unless this is sufficiently evident.[1] Often he will prudently recognize that the matter is doubtful, and leave it to divine judgment; but he will be solicitous about exciting contrition in the heart of the penitent, and will urgently exhort him to strive to abstain from every deliberate sin.

[1] Cf. *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XX, 1898, p. 1029.

§ III. Concerning Venial Sin.

We shall briefly declare its nature and effects.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88-89, and *Quaest. disp., de Malo*, q. 7; Suarez, disp. II, sect. 5-8; Gonet, disp. IX; St. Alphonsus, nn. 11, 51, 64; Ball. P., n. 670-680; Pesch, n. 516-556; Billot, th. 8-10; Manning, ch. 3; *Pratique progressive de la confession*, Paris, 1902, t. II, p. 115-132.

I. Concerning the Nature of Venial Sin.

479. Already from Scripture and the Fathers (n. 452 sq.) we know that there are lesser, or venial, sins, which do not bring death upon the soul. The same can be gathered from Trent declaring that mortal sins are to be set forth in confession, but that venial sins can be omitted without fault, because they can be expiated by many other remedies.[3] Wherefore this proposition 20 of Baius was condemned by Pius V: "There is no sin venial from its nature, but every sin deserves eternal punishment."[4]

[3] Trent, sess. XIV, cap. 5.

[4] Denzing., n. 900.

480. 1. Notion. Venial, according to the force of the word, signifies that which can obtain pardon, and from this head all sins can be called venial, because remissible. But venial sin, insofar as it is distinguished from mortal, is so called because it does not take away sanctifying grace, and therefore from its own nature is worthy of pardon. It in fact obtains pardon when due retraction has been made and temporal penalty paid.

But with regard to the thing, venial sin is a morally evil act by which, nevertheless, habitual conversion to God is not taken away.

481. 2. Difference between venial and mortal. St. Thomas declares this thus:[1] (a) Since sin is a certain sickness of the soul, it is called mortal when it induces an irreparable defect, or takes away the principle of life. But the principle of spiritual life is order to the ultimate end, and therefore mortal sin, which is a turning away from the ultimate end, is of itself irreparable, and cannot be repaired except by divine power. But sins which have disorder concerning those things which are toward the end, the order to the ultimate end being preserved, are reparable, and are called venial.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1.

(b) In another way he explains the matter:[2] one sinning mortally is truly turned away from God, and therefore recedes from the way which leads to the ultimate end; but one sinning venially is not turned away from God, but is similar to him who delays too much on the road, and therefore is retarded in the attainment of the ultimate end.

[2] St. Thomas, in II Sentent., dist. 42, q. I, a. 3, ad 5.

(c) Hence one sinning venially, although he displeases God, does not cease to love Him. For when something is prohibited only under light sin, it can happen without the agent being turned away from the ultimate end, and without losing divine friendship. Therefore his disposition is this: I know indeed that this thing displeases God, but not so that He denies His friendship to those who elicit it; therefore I enjoy this thing, but I would prefer to lack its advantage than to lose charity. - Something similar also happens in human matters: sometimes a friend does those things which displease a friend, but would by no means wish to furnish anything which would dissolve the covenant of friendship.

In truth just as a man turned away from God by mortal sin can nevertheless do some good works, so likewise man, while he habitually remains turned toward God through grace, can elicit acts venially

evil which, although they are not referred to God, are not for that reason referred to a creature as to an ultimate end.

(d) Venial sin must be diligently distinguished from imperfections which, although they are not against the law, do not reach that degree which the pursuit of perfection imports.

3. In what sense venial is said to be beyond the law. Venial sin is said by St. Thomas[3] and by certain other theologians to be beyond the eternal law, insofar as it is beyond the ultimate end which the eternal law primarily regards, and because it does not destroy charity, which is the fullness of the law. But from this it is not licit to infer that venial sin is only beyond, but not against, the law. Every sin, even light sin, is a transgression of the law; but venial sin is not against the ultimate end, nor therefore, strictly speaking, against the eternal law, by which all beings are ordered to the ultimate end.

[3] St. Thomas, Q. disp., *de Malo*, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1.

482. 4. Conditions required for venial sin. Venial sin can be committed in two ways: (a) when the matter itself is light: then sin remains venial, even if there is perfect knowledge and full consent; (b) when the matter is grave, but full knowledge or full consent is lacking (above, n. 474-475). - But when light matter is had can be gathered from the things said above, n. 472-473, and will be explained more fully in the whole course of this work.

II. Concerning the Effects of Venial Sin.

483. In order that an equitable judgment may be made concerning the malice and effects of venial sin, one must diligently distinguish between those things which are committed from mere frailty, without mature deliberation or full consent; - and those which are done deliberately, from some affection, especially if they are committed frequently and from habit: for these bring much greater detriment to the soul. But because not a few orators and ascetics have not kept these distinctions before the mind, they have amplified the malice and effects of venial sin more than was fair.

1. First indeed it is helpful to set forth what venial fault does not produce in the soul. (a) It neither extinguishes nor diminishes sanctifying grace. For since it is not a turning away from God, it does not destroy divine friendship: indeed, habitual grace in itself it does not diminish: for this, since it is nothing other than the supernatural state of conversion to God, could not be diminished except by acts contrary to the ultimate end or to charity; but from what has been said, venial sin is by no means opposed to the ultimate end or to charity. - Nor from this are the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are connected with habitual grace, diminished, nor merits already acquired.

(b) Hence it does not properly induce a stain into the soul; for the stain of sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace; moreover venial sin by no means takes this away or diminishes it. Yet in a less proper sense it is sometimes said to cause a stain, and is compared to dust and filth which defile the face of man. St. Thomas declares this thus:[1] in the soul there is a twofold brightness, one indeed habitual, from sanctifying grace, the other actual from acts of virtues; now venial sin indeed

impedes the splendor which arises from acts of virtues, but not habitual brightness, because it does not exclude nor diminish the habit of charity.

[1] St. Thomas, q. 89, a. 1.

484. 2. Nevertheless venial sin, frequently and deliberately committed from affection, produces pernicious effects.

(A) It diminishes the fervor of charity; for fervor consists in promptness for doing all things devoutly and generously on account of God; now he who frequently, deliberately, and from affection sins venially is by no means prepared for doing all things on account of God, but in many things deliberately chooses to please himself more than God. Gradually therefore he leaves behind arduous things, and pursues only the easier things: in prayer, he does not greatly care to expel wanderings of soul; in fulfilling the duties of his state, he conducts himself negligently; in virtues he does not strive to progress; works of charity languish, and voluntary mortifications grow torpid; in one word, gradually and without sensing it, tepidity is induced, or the state in which the powers of the soul grow languid.

485. (B) It gradually disposes toward mortal sin, not indeed of itself, since it differs altogether from mortal sin, but through a certain consequence, as St. Thomas says:[1] (a) For, as the disposition of clinging to created things grows from habit and affection, the desire of sinning can so increase that the will, even in matters of greater moment, clings to the creature against the will of God; thus, for example, he who first consents lightly to anger, by repeated acts deliberately committed, easily admits grave motions of anger; likewise he who often indulges curiosity and sensuality, by reading books rather dangerous and by fostering imaginations approaching pleasure, soon, overcome by desire, sins gravely. - The reason for this is that one sinning venially, as the Angelic Doctor says, "from the fact that he becomes accustomed not to subject his will in lesser things to due order, is disposed to this, that he also not subject his will to the order of the ultimate end, by choosing that which is mortal sin from its genus." In truth, with Christ as witness,[2] "he who is unjust in little, is unjust also in greater." (b) Besides, he who frequently and from affection sins venially, by that very fact abuses actual grace, deliberately resisting the inspirations of the Holy Spirit; for this reason he is deprived of more abundant helps, and, when grave temptation arises, he is found weaker for overcoming it.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 3.

[2] Luke 16:10.

486. (C) Venial sin also induces guilt of fault and guilt of penalty: (a) guilt of fault, because, although it does not dissolve divine friendship, nevertheless it displeases God and saddens Him: for one sinning venially prefers his own will to the divine good pleasure, and therefore is truly guilty of fault; if this happens frequently, the guilt is increased daily, and the charity of God toward us grows cold, as does ours toward God: "But I have against thee that thou hast left thy first charity. Remember therefore from where thou hast fallen, and do penance, and do the first works. But if not, I come to thee, and I will move thy candlestick out of its place, unless thou do penance."[1] (b) Guilt of penalty, insofar as one sinning venially, although he does not deserve the eternal penalty of loss, nevertheless ought to undergo some temporal penalty

proportioned to the offense, whether in the present time or in purgatory. But what penalty is due to venial sin cannot be defined, but must be left to divine judgment.[2]

[1] Apoc. 2:4-5. Here the question concerns Timothy, bishop of Ephesus; cf. Fouard, *Saint Jean*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1905, p. 125.

[2] Therefore one must beware of those orators and ascetics who heap up examples taken from the Old Testament to prove that the penalty of death was not rarely inflicted upon those sinning venially. The examples alleged refer to public facts, which are severely chastised on account of the public good: therefore they are undeservedly extended to other cases.

Therefore with St. Francis de Sales it is licit to conclude that affection for venial sins must be extirpated:[3] "Never can we be wholly pure and clean from venial sins, at least so that we live and remain long in this purity; but we can have no voluntary propensity toward venial sins... These affections are directly contrary to devotion, as affection toward mortal sin is contrary to charity; for they weaken the powers of the spirit, and render them languid, impede divine consolations, open the door to temptations, and, although they do not kill the soul, nevertheless they greatly weaken it and render it sick."[4]

[3] St. Francis de Sales, *Introd. a la vie devote*, p. I, ch. 22.

[4] Here it is licit to observe that not all venial sins can indeed be avoided according to Trent (sess. VI, cap. 11), but, according to common doctrine, all fully deliberate venial sins can be avoided. Hence a vow concerning avoiding all venial sins is invalid, but not one concerning avoiding all deliberate venial sins.

§ IV. Concerning the Distinction of Sins.

Since, from Trent, we are held in confession to accuse mortal sins according to species and number, and the confessor ought to instruct and help penitents in this burden, it is necessary to hand down certain rules concerning the specific and numerical distinction of sins in general; to these we shall add opportune principles concerning internal sins.

[5] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72; Billuart, diss. II; St. Alphonsus, n. 12-50; Lehmk., n. 240-256; Ball. P., n. 514-669; Noldin, n. 275-285.

I. Concerning the Specific Distinction of Sins.

487. 1. State of the question. (A) Speculatively, theologians do not agree concerning the principle from which the specific distinction of sins is to be repeated. (a) St. Thomas repeats it from the formally diverse objects of sins;[6] namely, sins differ in species when they are concerned with objects formally diverse in the being of morals; for primary morality is drawn from the object formally taken, as was said above, n. 114. (b) But Scotus repeats it from the diverse virtues to which sins are opposed;[1] for since sin is a privation, it takes its species from the form to which it is opposed, or from virtue. (c) According to Vasquez,[2] sins differ specifically insofar as they are opposed to morally diverse precepts; for since sin is a transgression of the law, or of a precept, it obtains its species from the precept which is violated.

[6] St. Thomas, cited place, a. 1.

[1] Scotus, in 2 Sentent., dist. 37, q. 1, n. 9.

[2] *Disput. in I-II S. Thom.*, disp. 98, c. 2.

488. (B) Practically, however, these three norms can be composed together; for it is true that sins are diverse in species according to the diverse precepts which are violated; but the precepts themselves are generally diverse because they regard diverse virtues; but virtues are not diverse except because they are concerned with specifically distinct objects. Whence it can be said that sins proximately receive their specific distinction from the precepts, or from the virtues to which they are opposed, but remotely from the moral objects concerning which they are concerned.

489. (C) It must likewise be noted that many faithful, ignorant of theological distinctions, bear judgment concerning the various species of sins according to the moral estimation of prudent persons, but that this is diverse according to places, times, moral education, etc. Whence, in practice, confessors ought to look into, insofar as they can, the subjective dispositions of penitents, and judge concerning the malice of sins according to the knowledge and advertence which was in the penitents, and indeed at the very time when they were sinning. Therefore if some apprehended only confusedly the diverse malices contained in their actions, and recognized only one sin in an act which, strictly speaking, had a threefold malice specifically distinct, they are not to be troubled to accuse distinctly what they had perceived obscurely; for they sinned according to the degree of knowledge proper to them: nothing is willed unless foreknown.

490. 2. Practical rules. (A) Sins which are opposed to diverse virtues must be held as specifically diverse; thus infidelity, despair, hatred of God are sins diverse in species, because they are opposed to the three theological virtues; likewise superstition, which is opposed to religion, is specifically distinguished from homicide, which is against justice. - Therefore, if one and the same act harms several virtues specifically diverse, it contains several malices specifically diverse; thus a priest perpetrating adultery with a married blood-relative commits four sins specifically diverse: against chastity, as is clear; against religion, because he is bound by the vow of chastity; against justice, he violates the right of the husband; and against piety, because he sins with a blood-relative.

(B) Sins opposed to the same virtue in a contrary mode are specifically diverse, for example, despair and presumption, which are opposed to the same virtue of hope, but in a contrary mode, the former namely by defect, the latter by excess.

(C) Sins likewise diverse in species are those opposed to the same virtue, but in a morally diverse mode, or to diverse functions of the same virtue; thus detraction, theft, homicide differ in species, although they are opposed to the same virtue of justice, because in a morally diverse mode they violate the rights of neighbor, namely the right to reputation, the right to external goods, the right to life: for these rights, according to the moral estimation of all, are altogether diverse.

491. N.B. When one and the same act is prohibited by various laws, it has only one malice, if precepts of this kind were enacted from the same motive: thus is theft, which is prohibited by natural, divine, canonical, and civil law, because of the same motive. But if the precepts were enacted from a diverse motive, one and the same act contains in itself several malices

specifically diverse; thus he who breaks a fast to which he was held both from a vow and from a precept of the Church commits a twofold sin.

II. Concerning the Numerical Distinction of Sins.

492. Sins specifically diverse by that very fact are numerically distinct. But the question is when sins are numerically distinct in the same species. Nothing concerning this matter has been defined by the Church; and therefore the question must be resolved from the moral estimation of prudent persons, with attention also to the psychological dispositions of the penitent. The things which are more commonly taught can be recalled to two principles; concerning a third principle there is much dispute.

493. 1. First principle. There are as many sins numerically distinct as there are evil acts of the will really distinct. It is said acts of the will, because sin is primarily in the will; really distinct, because if evil acts are at the same time gathered together to effect something morally one, there is only one sin, as will be declared below, n. 494. But if the evil acts of the will are truly and really distinct, each one of them has its own malice and is truly a sin. Thus he who by several acts steals from distinct persons commits as many thefts as he elicits diverse acts; he who by three acts harms the reputation of three persons commits a threefold sin of detraction.

494. 2. Second principle. There are as many sins numerically distinct as there are acts morally interrupted. For as often as acts are morally interrupted, each is complete, and therefore constitutes a sin.

But acts are morally interrupted in a twofold way: (a) by retraction, whether explicit, or even implicit, namely when the will deliberately ceases from the act without the purpose of returning to it, or is turned toward something incompatible with it; (b) by mere cessation, even involuntary, from the act (for example, through sleep, or through another occupation), so long that, in the judgment of prudent persons, the subsequent act does not morally coalesce with the former.

But in order that the matter may be better understood, it is helpful to apply the principles to various kinds of acts, namely to acts merely internal, to internal acts to be consummated externally, and to external acts.

Applications. (A) Acts merely internal, which are consummated in the will itself, such as acts of complacency or morose delectation in depraved thoughts, are multiplied as often as, after retraction or long cessation, they are renewed.

Thus he who voluntarily consents to evil delectation arising from a depraved thought, afterward devotes himself to study for a long time, and then voluntarily returns to the evil delectation, commits two sins; say the same of him who, seeing an enemy, inwardly curses him, afterward plays for a notable time, and again thinking about the enemy, curses him terribly. But if someone perseveres for an hour in morose delectation, from the same impulse of passion, although for a brief time he thinks about another matter, he commits only one sin, because a brief interruption does not prevent the act from being judged morally one. Yet he who for a whole day turns over the same depraved imaginations, and anew consents to them after a notable interruption, commits several sins, since the

sinful acts are interrupted by various occupations. In this case, it is difficult to recount the number of sins accurately; but it suffices that the penitent say that for one or another day he frequently gave consent to these imaginations occurring to him: for from this a prudent confessor, with account taken of all the circumstances, will be able to judge about how many sins were committed, as we explain in the Treatise on Penance, n. 157.

495. (B) Internal acts elicited with the intention of consummating them externally, namely purposes or desires of doing some evil, for example, stealing, killing, are multiplied as often as after revocation, or very long cessation, they are renewed. For moral interruption a longer interval is required for desires than for complacencies in thoughts; for desires, by that very fact that they tend into an external act, are judged to endure virtually until the work is externally completed, unless nevertheless a very long delay is placed between the purpose and its execution.

But what interval is to be held as notable can be determined only from the judgment of prudent persons, according to the diversity of acts. Thus the purpose of reading a depraved book which is at hand is judged to be interrupted by an interval of several hours or at least one day, while the purpose of stealing or taking vengeance can persist through several days or weeks, namely if the opportune time is awaited for carrying out the purpose: for then all the internal acts form something morally one, because they are referred to the same act to be executed externally. But it must be said otherwise if, when the occasion presented itself, the agent did not wish to use it, because, by voluntary cessation from the iniquitous purpose, the first volition was morally interrupted.

496. (C) External acts are multiplied as often as they are repeated, provided they are complete and independent from each other; but they are not multiplied if, as incomplete acts or means, they are ordered to completing one principal act. Whence these acts are not morally interrupted by cessation alone, although long, but only by explicit or implicit retraction.

(a) Therefore he commits several sins who communicates sacrilegiously ten times, even within a brief time, - who omits prescribed fasting through several days, - who successively strikes an enemy several times, without the intention of killing him, - or steals a thousand coins from the same rich man on several occasions, without the prior intention of stealing this whole sum; for these are complete and independent acts.

(b) But he perpetrates one sin who, wishing to kill an enemy, conceives an act of vengeance, thinks about the means for executing it, buys and prepares weapons, takes the road, renews the perverse will of killing several times, wounds the enemy, and finally kills him; - who, wishing to steal a thousand coins from the same person, renews this intention hundreds of times, and at various intervals takes away now more, now less, until he has completed the sum; for all these acts are directed to the same end and constitute one homicide or theft. - The same must be said of him who, from the same impulse of anger, spews out several blasphemies, or afflicts the same person with several contumelies, because these acts are morally united by the same movement of passion.

497. 3. Controversy concerning the distinction of sins from the diversity of objects. When by one and the same act objects numerically distinct are reached, the question arises whether several sins are committed or only one.

(A) According to St. Alphonsus (n. 45) and many others, there are as many sins as there are distinct objects, even if they are apprehended by one act. The reason is because the malice of sin is drawn from the object formally taken, and therefore is multiplied according to diverse objects truly distinct.

Therefore he commits several sins who knowingly and willingly kills several men by one blow, - by one act wishes evil to several or detracts from various persons, - by one purpose wishes to omit prescribed fasting through several days, - by one action steals from several, unless the goods belong to the same community, etc.

498. (B) Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, and others[1] contend that a single act which is referred to several distinct objects, provided they are not specifically diverse, and are apprehended by the mind after the manner of one, constitutes only one sin.

[1] Suarez, in 3 p. St. Thomas, disp. XXII, sect. 5, n. 34; Lugo, *De paenitent.*, disp. XVI, n. 104 seq.; Laymann, l. I, tr. 3, c. 3, n. 2; Noldin, n. 284, 285.

Thus he who by a single explosion wounds and kills several men, whom he apprehends only confusedly after the manner of one multitude, commits one sin; otherwise, if he distinctly apprehends each and wills to kill them. He who in one speech detracts from a family or community, whose members he perceives after the manner of one, perpetrates one sin; otherwise, if he wishes to harm the individual members or some of them distinctly. He who hates ten men by one act commits one sin, because under the confused concept of plurality he reaches them. He who by one desire covets three women sins once; but if he covets three under a diverse notion, an unmarried woman, a married woman, a nun, he perpetrates three sins specifically distinct.

In our judgment, it can be said that in this case there is one sin, but bearing before itself a special malice, which must be declared in confession. Certainly there is a difference, morally speaking, between the killing of one and the killing of several; whence if someone, by one explosion, knowingly and willingly killed and wounded several, it is not sufficient in confession to say: I perpetrated homicide once; but it is necessary to add: by one blow I killed several and wounded others; otherwise the confessor would plainly be deceived. Likewise if someone scandalized several, he ought to confess this, nor is it enough to say: I offered scandal once. When the number was apprehended only confusedly, it can likewise be accused confusedly, even if afterward the number of those who were wounded or scandalized were accurately known.

III. Concerning Internal Sins.

499. State of the question. Since difficulties often arise concerning merely internal sins, it is expedient to speak specially about these. But there are three internal sins: morose delectation, desire, and joy. (a) Morose delectation is referred to an evil work exhibited by the imagination as present. Namely, when the imagination depicts something evil, for example, theft, homicide, a base act, and the will deliberately is delighted in it, without nevertheless the desire being conceived of executing it, evil delectation is had; and this is called morose, because the will stands still in it, or lingers, although perhaps for only one instant. For it is not required for sin that complacency persevere for a long time, but it suffices that consent be voluntarily offered; whence morose delectation signifies the same as voluntary.

(b) Desire looks to a future thing: when someone depicts to himself an evil delectation as future, and deliberately wills to enjoy it, a depraved desire is had.

(c) But joy is free complacency concerning an evil work as past, and is had when someone represents to himself a past evil act, and at the same time deliberately takes complacency in it. Here also belongs sadness concerning a good performed, or concerning an evil not performed, as if someone says: I grieve that at that time, when the occasion presented itself, I did not strike the enemy.

Concerning delectation and joy the same principles hold, with this difference, however, that joy, as concerning a more concrete past thing, more easily puts on the malice of the circumstances of the object depicted in the imagination.

500. 1. Concerning morose delectation and joy. (A) Delectation or joy can be concerning the thing itself thought of, or concerning the knowledge of this thing; thus a physician, hearing that someone has been wounded, can rejoice concerning the wound itself inflicted, because, for example, the wounded person is an enemy, or can rejoice from the fact that he knows such a one to have been wounded, so that he may be able to assist him. To rejoice concerning an evil thing insofar as it is evil is deservedly judged a sin; to rejoice concerning the knowledge of this evil is not of itself sin, indeed it can be good, if this is done from an honorable end. Thus he who studies the medical art ought to learn those things which pertain to generation; if he is delighted intellectually concerning the knowledge acquired, so that he may be able to exercise his art, he in no way sins; but if he deliberately thinks about these matters in order to perceive venereal pleasure from them, he is guilty of sin.

501. (B) Morose, or voluntary, delectation, or joy concerning an evil thing, is a sin of the same species and gravity as the evil work represented by the imagination.

For morose delectation or joy receives its morality from the object formally taken, just as any other human act (above, n. 144). Therefore if the thing about which one deliberately thinks is evil, the delectation arising from it is sin; if the delectation concerning theft is concerned with light theft, the sin is venial; but mortal if the question concerns theft of grave moment.

It must likewise be noted that evil delectation assumes the malice of the object as it is depicted in the imagination; thus delectation concerning theft of a sacred thing puts on a twofold malice, provided the circumstance of the sacred thing is apprehended by the agent. But if the imagination, and therefore the will, does not apprehend these circumstances, probably the special malice arising from these circumstances is not contracted; thus he who is delighted concerning the theft of a sacred thing, not because it is sacred, but because it is precious, probably incurs only the malice of theft, but not of sacrilege.

502. (C) It is illicit to be delighted or to rejoice concerning an evil thing on account of the good effect which followed from it; nevertheless it is licit, speaking of itself, to be delighted concerning the good effect which followed from an evil thing, provided the evil thing itself is sincerely disapproved.

The reason for the former is because it is not licit to approve evil, even on account of a good end, as we explained, n. 151. Whence these propositions 13 and 15, which directly regard joy concerning a past evil and indirectly delectation concerning a present evil, were deservedly condemned by Innocent XI: "If you do it with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened concerning the life of someone, and rejoice concerning his natural death... not indeed from displeasure with the person, but because of some temporal profit. - It is licit for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches obtained from the inheritance thence."[1]

[1] Denzing., n. 1030, 1032; Viva, on this proposition.

The reason for the latter is because delectation is not borne toward the evil object, which is disapproved, but toward the good effect. - Yet it is said speaking of itself, because in practice he who is voluntarily delighted concerning the good effect is not rarely exposed to the danger of consenting to the evil object itself; hence let him not neglect sincerely to disapprove that object.

503. (D) To be delighted or rejoice not concerning the evil work, but concerning the ingenious mode by which it is completed, or concerning the charming mode by which it is narrated, is of itself free from fault, although not rarely dangerous. For the will in this case is borne toward something good or indifferent, but not toward the evil object; but since the passage from the mode to the thing is easy, especially in the matter of chastity, such delectation is not without danger.

Thus to be delighted concerning the artful mode by which someone completes a theft, concerning the ridiculous mode by which women quarrel among themselves, concerning paintings made with the greatest art, although immodest, concerning a charming narration of things less modest, of itself is not sin, but easily leads to sin.

504. 2. Concerning depraved desires. Desire is called efficacious, or a purpose, when someone absolutely intends to execute an evil thing; but inefficacious, if only conditionally, for example, if I could, if it were licit.

(A) The absolute desire of an evil thing or action is a sin of the same species and malice as the external act toward which it is borne. For the malice of an act, and its gravity and species, is drawn from the object toward which it tends. Whence Christ said:[2] "He who looks at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart." - Therefore desire includes all the malices which are found in the object itself, provided they are at least implicitly apprehended; but they are more easily apprehended in the case of desire than in the case of simple delectation; for he who wishes for some thing generally is borne toward it such as it is, - while he who is delighted concerning a thing thought of not rarely abstracts from certain of its qualities.

[2] Matt. 5:28.

505. (B) Conditional desire of itself is not sin, if the condition truly removes the malice; otherwise, it is sin.

To understand this, one must distinguish between those things which are extrinsically evil and those which are intrinsically evil.

(a) In those things which are extrinsically evil, the condition added "if it were licit" removes sin, because it removes the malice of the object; for example, I would eat meat today, if it were not prohibited by the Church; I would marry, if I were not bound by a vow of chastity. - Yet often desires of this kind are not only idle, but dangerous, because the passage from conditional desire to absolute desire is easy.

(b) In all things intrinsically and absolutely evil, the condition added does not remove sin, because malice cannot be separated from these acts; therefore they sin who say: I would wish to blaspheme, steal, act basely, perjure myself, if it were licit.

(c) A fortiori a condition which does not regard liceity does not excuse from sin, for example, I would commit theft if it could be done secretly; I would blaspheme if hell did not exist.

506. Yet it must be noted that sometimes an inefficacious desire of an evil thing is not sin, or at least is not grave, because it is not deliberate, but only the manifestation of a certain natural propensity by which the sensitive appetite is borne into evil, without the will offering consent to it, at least full consent. Thus some who are prone to vengeance, anger, or pleasure, say that they would gladly wish to indulge these vices, unless there were hell; but, because they believe there is hell, they restrain these desires. - Whatever the case may be, thoughts and desires, even conditional ones, concerning evil things must be expelled as soon and as strenuously as possible, lest perhaps the will, allured by these vain and dangerous phantasms, soon offer consent.

Conclusion of This Article: Concerning Material Sin.

507. Material sin is an involuntary transgression of the law, and therefore not imputable to the agent unto fault.

[1] Cf. *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XXI (1899) 1105-1109; 1169-1175; t. XXII (1900) 49-55; 111-117.

1. Now that many sins of this kind are committed can be inferred from the things said either in this Treatise or in the preceding Treatises. Besides, not a few sins which are objectively grave become venial because of the psychological dispositions of the agents.

The principal causes taking away or diminishing the objective malice of sin are (A) on the part of the intellect: (a) ignorance of the law, or of its force of obliging, or at least of the gravity of the precept: for there are so many laws which are altogether unknown by the faithful, or whose force, or extent, or gravity more or less escapes their mind, especially in those places where many hear sacred sermons only rarely, or where sacred orators set forth Christian ethics only in a vague and confused manner, without logical connection! (b) Defect of advertence or deliberation: how many think little before they act, and therefore do not foresee the evils going to follow from their actions? Others, distracted in mind, and wholly clinging to earthly things, advert little to the grave malice of certain acts, or easily omit offices which are of themselves grave, for example, hearing Mass on certain feast days, or fasting, etc. (above, n. 89-98).

(B) On the part of the will: (a) vehement impulses of passions, and propensities which can scarcely be resisted, vicious habits whether innate or acquired, certain pathological states which greatly lessen the powers of the will (above, n. 99-135); (b) external causes, violence, fear unjustly struck in (above, n. 105 and 112), enticements of the world (441), and other things of this kind.

508. 2. These things being posited, for judging concerning the number, specific malice, and gravity of sins which are accused in the sacred tribunal, the confessor ought to keep before the mind not only the rules handed down above (n. 472-498), but also diligently to attend to the psychological dispositions of each penitent. But he will know these better if he receives penitents kindly, even and especially those who are burdened by many and grave sins; if he addresses and questions them with words full of charity and mercy.

(A) With regard to the past, he will easily admit all causes which excuse sinners either wholly or in part. He sits as judge before the tribunal, and therefore ought to bring an equitable judgment, insofar as human infirmity allows; but, if the matter is doubtful, it is helpful to lean toward the more benign part, since penitents are more efficaciously deterred from sin by an excess of benignity than by an excess of severity.

509. (B) But with regard to the future: (a) let the confessor not neglect to instruct those who have sinned through ignorance, without nevertheless omitting the rules of prudence. For material sin, even if it is not imputed unto fault, is a true disorder, as we warned above, n. 356, often offers scandal, harms the good morals of society, and sometimes induces the danger of formally sinning. Wherefore the confessor will try to extirpate it, insofar as can be done, by instructing penitents gradually and prudently; which indeed he ought to furnish, even if he foresees that they will commit certain formal sins from this, provided that their future amendment can seriously be expected. Yet it is not expedient to set forth at the same time all duties unknown to them, but only successively, as opportunity presents itself, and with attention given also to their powers and dispositions. - In private conversations, and also in public sermons, but especially in the sacred tribunal, they can likewise and ought to be instructed.

(b) But if some, because of infirmity of the will and grave temptations, have gradually formed for themselves a lax conscience, let them be taught how they can become strong in the Lord, by setting forth those things which we have handed down concerning the education of will and conscience, n. 136, 422, and also concerning the remedies of lax conscience, n. 358. By these and other similar means many material sins will be guarded against, and the good of penitents and of the whole Christian society will be promoted.

Art. II. Concerning Vices or Capital Sins. — I. Notion and Division of Capital Vices.

510. 1. Often men are inclined to sins through vicious habits, whether innate or acquired. (a) For there are present in man propensions to evil, which flow from his nature: for since he is composed of soul and body, he tends not only toward spiritual good, but also toward sensible good, sometimes against the order of reason, at least in the present

state of fallen nature, as was said in *De Deo Creante*, n. 171 and 198. Moreover, even when he pursues spiritual good, not rarely he inordinately seeks his own excellence, against the divine will, because naturally his reason wishes to be autonomous. - Sometimes also these propensions are confirmed and increased by heredity, above, n. 116-119. (b) The same grow much by education and by repeated acts, as was said above, n. 108 and 123.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 2-3; Quaest. disp., De Malo, q. 8-15; Natalis Alexander, De peccatis (Migne, Theol. Curs., XI, 707-1168); Pruner, Theol. Mor., trans. Belet, Paris, 1880, t. I, p. 336-352; Ball. P., n. 697-744; Alibert, Physiologie des Passions, 2nd ed., Paris, 1827; Noldin, n. 301-312; Descuret, La Medecine des Passions, Paris, 1860; Paulhan, Les Caracteres, Paris, Alcan, 1902.

Now these propensions solicit us toward sin, and therefore are, as it were, sources and heads from which many sins arise; hence they are called capital sins, not indeed in the sense that the acts proceeding from them are always gravely sinful, but because propensions of this kind are, as it were, heads of many delicts. Yet they would better be called capital vices, because they are generally considered not as sinful acts, but as inclinations to sinning.

511. 2. Seven sins or capital vices are commonly enumerated, after St. Gregory and St. Thomas.

(A) The former, describing the vices, teaches that their root is pride, from which seven principal ones are brought forth, which themselves also are divided into many others:[1]

[1] St. Gregory, Moral., lib. XXXI, c. 45, P. L., LXXVI, 620-622.

"For the root of all evil is pride, concerning which, Scripture bearing witness, it is said: the beginning of every sin is pride.[2] But its first offspring, namely the seven principal vices, are brought forth from this virulent root, namely vainglory, envy, anger, sadness, avarice, gluttony of the belly, lust." - But each vice has its own army: "For from vainglory arise disobedience, boasting, hypocrisy, contentions, obstinacies, discords, and presumptions of novelties. From envy are born hatred, whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of one's neighbor, and affliction in his prosperity." And thus to each capital vice he assigns certain less principal vices. - Afterward he describes their genesis and their connection among themselves in this way: "For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which, when it has corrupted the oppressed mind, at once begets envy, because, namely, while it seeks the power of a vain name, it pines away lest any other be able to obtain it. Envy also generates anger, because the more the soul is wounded by the inward wound of spite, the more also the gentleness of tranquillity is lost; and because it is touched as though it were a suffering member, therefore the hand of an opposed action is felt as though pressed more heavily. From anger also sadness arises, because the troubled mind, in proportion as it shakes itself inordinately, by so acting confounds itself... Sadness also is drawn down to avarice, because while the confounded heart has lost within itself the good of joy, it seeks outside what may console it; and the more it has no joy to which it may inwardly recur, the more it desires to obtain exterior goods. But after these remain two carnal vices, that is, gluttony of the belly and lust."

[2] Eccli. 10:15.

512. (B) St. Thomas refined the theory of St. Gregory.[1] He calls those sins capital which are not only principles of others, but also directive and in a certain way leading them. But seven capital

vices are fittingly numbered. For the will inordinately pursues good or flees evil. (a) Insofar as it inordinately seeks a good of the soul, namely excellence of praise or honor, it is called vainglory;[2] by inordinately pursuing a good of the body, it is called gluttony or lust; by seeking external goods, against the order of reason, it is named avarice. (b) It also inordinately flees certain evils: sometimes it is saddened at another's good, insofar as this impedes one's own excellence, and this is envy; if it is saddened at the same with a violent appetite for vengeance, anger blazes up; when it flees labor joined to spiritual good, there arises acedia, or sloth.[3]

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 3-4.

[2] The Holy Doctor reckons vainglory among the capital sins; but declares pride to be the beginning of every sin, and therefore the source of the capital sins, while avarice is the root of all evils on the part of execution (q. 84, a. 2).

[3] Concerning other divisions of the capital sins, which Cassian and St. John Climacus set forth, see Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. II, p. 1689-1690.

But these capital vices take their proximate origin from the threefold concupiscence, and remotely from inordinate love of oneself. Hence by some there is said to be one principle of the vices, namely inordinate love of oneself, - a threefold tinder, namely the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life, - and a sevenfold head, namely the seven capital vices.

513. This division indeed is not adequate, nor opposed in its members, but nevertheless it embraces the principal depraved propensions, to which the others are easily reduced. Therefore we follow it, treating first of pride, and also of envy and anger, which flow more directly from pride; afterward of gluttony and drunkenness, which pursue the sensible goods of the body; then of avarice, which seeks external goods; finally of sloth, which shudders at the difficulty of labor. Of lust in particular there will be discourse in the Treatise on Chastity.

II. Concerning Pride.

514. 1. Pride is described. Pride is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence. To love oneself, to have a good estimation of oneself according to justice and truth, and therefore to seek one's own excellence in a way consonant with reason, is indeed not sin.

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162 and 132; De Malo, q. 8-9; Nat. Alexander, op. cit., 728-818; Bossuet, Tr. de la Concupiscence, c. 10-23; id., Sermon sur l'Ambition; Bourdaloue, Careme, Serm. pour le mercredi de la 2e sem.; Alibert, op. cit., t. I, p. 23-57; Descuret, op. cit., t. II, p. 191-240; Paulhan, Les Caracteres, p. 167, and others alleged at n. 120; also Formation a l'Humilite, Paris, 1902, p. 33-55; Thomas, L'Education des sentiments, Paris, Alcan, 1904, p. 113-124, p. 113-123 and 133-148.

But especially in four ways do we seek this excellence inordinately: (a) when someone thinks that he has from himself what he has from God, or at least acts as though he thought this; now, with the Apostle as witness, whatever is in us in the natural or supernatural order proceeds from God, and is to be attributed primarily to God:[2] "For what do you have that you have not received? But if you have received it, why do you glory as though you had not received it?" (b) When someone thinks that he has received these goods from God, but only from his own merits; which indeed is likewise false; for we receive many things which we in no way merit, and merits themselves, although truly ours, are to be attributed more to God than to us, since we have being, faculties, the faculty of meriting, and

divine help, necessary for meriting, only from the Lord. Wherefore Paul wrote concerning supernatural gifts:[3] "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this not from yourselves: for it is the gift of God; not from works, lest anyone should glory. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works which God has prepared, that we may walk in them." The same can be said of natural goods, which greatly exceed our merits. (c) When someone boasts that he has what he does not have, or at least a greater good than he has; for not rarely, from an inordinate desire of vainglory or from self-deception, we amplify our endowments beyond measure. This John indeed reproves:[1] "Because you say that I am rich, and made wealthy, and have need of nothing; and you do not know that you are wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked." (d) When someone, conscious of his own excellence, thence despises others, and wishes to be singularly seen and esteemed; thus the Pharisee, giving thanks to God that he was not a sinner like other men, despised the publican; but Christ rebuked this manner of acting in this way:[2] "Everyone who exalts himself shall be humbled, and he who humbles himself shall be exalted."

[2] 1 Cor. 4:7. - If the proud man truly believed that he had all these things from himself, he would be a heretic; yet generally he does not think this, but practically bears himself as though these gifts were not from God.

[3] Eph. 2:8-10.

[1] Apoc. 3:17.

[2] Luke 18:14.

515. 2. The daughters of pride are enumerated. Pride, in a general way, is called the mother of all vices; this indeed is true, if it is taken in a broad sense, insofar as it is love of oneself; but if it is understood in the strict sense explained above, certain vices proceed more immediately from it, and are called its daughters in a special sense, namely ambition, presumption, vainglory.

(A) Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of undue honor, or of honor greater than is due, - or of due honor, but by undue mode or means. - The scribes and Pharisees labored under this vice, concerning whom Christ said:[3] "But they love the first places at suppers, and the first chairs in the synagogues, and greetings in the marketplace, and to be called by men rabbi." The Lord willed to be subject to this temptation, when the devil took him onto a high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world and their glory, saying: "All these things I will give you, if, falling down, you will adore me."[4] - Nor today are there lacking those who serve the devil and the world, that they may be able to obtain honors and dignities; in the priestly order itself, there are some, with St. Gregory as witness,[5] who "desire to be seen as teachers, long to surpass the rest, and, with Truth bearing witness, seek the first greetings in the marketplace, the first places at suppers, the first chairs in assemblies." These indeed the Master rebukes with these words:[6] "You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it over them, and those who are greater exercise power over them; it shall not be so among you: but whoever will wish to become greater among you, let him be your minister; and whoever will wish to be first among you, shall be your servant; just as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a redemption for many."

[3] Matt. 23:6-7.

[4] Matt. 4:9.

[5] St. Gregory, Pastoral., p. I, c. 1, P. L., LXXVII, 14.

[6] Matt. 20:24-28.

(B) Presumption, which undertakes works exceeding one's powers. Thus not a few seek dignities and offices for the exercise of which they are unskilled, with great detriment to themselves and others; others, presuming too much on their own powers, imprudently cast themselves into dangers, and there frequently sin.

516. (C) Vainglory, which is the inordinate appetite of manifesting one's own excellence, and of capturing the esteem and praises of men.[1] For there are many who care more for the esteem of their neighbor than for the very practice of virtues: they wish to please, and therefore display to others, with vain ostentation, true or imagined endowments, of body or soul, natural or supernatural.

[1] Pride therefore is distinguished from vainglory in that the latter seeks fame or the esteem of others, while pride takes complacency in its own excellence. Yet these two are often found united in the same man: nevertheless in some pride prevails, in others vanity. Cf. Thomas, L'Education des sentiments, Paris, Alcan, 1904, ch. 14.

There are those who glory in the nobility of their stock or in the favor of great men; others because they are splendidly dressed, or sit upon a noble horse; but who does not see how great this folly is: for if there is any glory in this matter, it is to be attributed to ancestors, great men, the tailor, or the horse. "Others," says St. Francis de Sales,[2] "for one ounce of knowledge wish to be honored and cultivated by all, as though all ought to consult them as an oracle, always learn from them, and have them as masters: hence not undeservedly they are called pedagogues. Others boast of themselves and set themselves forth for sale, while they consider their beauty, and think that on account of it they are cultivated and loved by all. All these things are very vain, foolish, impertinent; and the glory which is borrowed from such empty things is called vain, foolish, and frivolous." But those who wish to be praised for good works Christ thus reproves:[3] "Take heed that you do not do your justice before men, that you may be seen by them; otherwise you shall not have a reward with your Father, who is in heaven."

[2] Introd. a la Vie devote, III p., c. 4; cf. c. 5-7.

[3] Matt. 6:1; cf. 2-9.

Among the daughters of vainglory, of which seven are enumerated,[4] three are eminent: (a) boasting, by which one's own excellence is manifested inordinately by words; (b) ostentation, by which the esteem of men is sought through deeds or other external signs; (c) hypocrisy, which seeks glory through simulated virtues or endowments.

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 5.

517. 3. The malice of pride. This malice can be considered in itself and in its consequences. (A) Concerning the gravity of this sin considered in itself. (a) When pride is complete, namely when someone so seeks to excel others that he wishes to be subject neither to God nor to legitimate superiors, it is a mortal sin from its kind, and indeed most grave: for then he turns himself away from God, not on account of ignorance or infirmity, or on account of the desire of any other good whatever, but because he does not wish to be subjected to God and his supreme dominion.[1] - Yet this kind of pride occurs very rarely.

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 5-6.

(b) Incomplete pride, by which someone, while preserving due subjection to God and superiors, makes more of himself and wishes to be esteemed more by others than is fitting, does not exceed venial sin, because it does not import a grave disorder. But by accident it can become a grave sin, if it inflicts grave injury upon one's neighbor, or induces to other grave sins, for example, if from wounded pride there is stirred up grave anger, or an appetite for vengeance.

518. (B) Concerning the depraved consequences of pride. (a) The Fathers note that pride was the beginning of every sin, that through it the angels were cast from heaven, and men expelled from paradise; they add that there is no evil which can be compared with pride, on account of the depraved effects which it produces: "It makes a man an insulting demon, blasphemous, perjured, it causes murders to be desired. The proud man always lives in griefs and troubles, is always angry, is always sad."[2] For indeed, with Gregory as witness, it is the root of all vices:[3] "Other vices attack only those virtues by which they themselves are destroyed... but pride, which we have called the root of vices, by no means content with the extinction of one virtue, rises up against all the members of the soul, and, like a general and pestiferous disease, corrupts the whole body, so that whatever is done while it invades, even if it is shown to be a virtue, does not thereby serve God, but only vainglory."

[2] St. Chrysostom, in ep. II ad Thessal., cap. I, homil. I, n. 2, P. G. 471.

[3] St. Gregory, Moral., lib. XXXIV, c. 33, n. 48, P. L., LXXVI, 744.

(b) They observe moreover that pride is the greatest evil from the fact that, with Scripture as witness, God resists the proud:[4] "Scripture says: God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble. See, brother, what kind of evil that is which has God as its adversary. On account of this in the Gospel both the arrogant Pharisee is rejected, and the humble publican is heard." In reality God, who has bestowed his goods on us so profusely, does not wish to give his glory to another,[5] and therefore resists the proud who keep for themselves the glory which belongs to God alone; he afflicts them with privation of grace and other penalties: "The day of the Lord is upon everyone proud and high, and upon everyone arrogant: and he shall be humbled."[6]

[4] St. Jerome, ep. 12 ad Anton., n. 26, P. L., XXII, 346.

[5] Isa. 42:8.

[6] Isa. 2:12.

519. 4. Remedies against pride. Since among men, even simple and rustic men, there are many who indulge pride,[1] it is useful to say a few things about the means of tearing it out. (A) For restraining the movements of pride, intimate and sincere knowledge of oneself is certainly of much profit; for he who recalls past sins, and attentively considers his own infirmities or moral defects, and at the same time recognizes that the endowments with which he shines forth are from God,[2] cannot reasonably lift himself above others. This is indeed the more efficacious the more benignly we at the same time consider the virtues and endowments of others, covering their vices with the veil of charity. For since we are prone to amplifying our own virtues and disguising our vices, it is necessary that, prejudices of this kind being set aside, we attend to those things which others rightly do or say: then we will often discover others to be better than ourselves.

[1] Bossuet, Tr. de la Concup., ch. 16-18.

[2] "Yet let it be far from a Christian man to trust or glory in himself, and not in the Lord; whose goodness toward all men is so great, that he wishes those things to be their merits which are his own gifts." (Trent, sess. VI, c. 16.)

520. (B) The vanity of those things in which we are accustomed to glory is likewise to be carefully considered. On this matter Chrysostom should be heard:[3] "Are you strong and proud? For this you ought rather to have been cast down... For even the lion is more courageous than you, and the boar stronger... and robbers and diggers of graves and gladiators and your servants, perhaps also those who are among them the duller, surpass you in strength and powers... But are you beautiful and fair? This is the boasting of crows; you are not more beautiful than the peacock... But do you abound in riches? Whence? In what things do you abound? In gold, silver, precious little stones? This also is the boasting of robbers." And thus he runs through the various goods in which men boast, and shows how foolish it is to glory in them. Moreover, man is mortal; and in the sepulcher who discerns the servant from the master, the poor man from the rich, the conquered from the king, the beautiful from the deformed?

[3] St. Chrysostom, in ep. ad Philip., c. 2, hom. 7, n. 5, P. G., LXII, 235.

Therefore those who are desirous of human glory should lift the mind higher, and seek eternal glory. Those who seek their own excellence should pursue it not in perishable endowments, but in virtue, which is perennial and truly excels, according to what the Apostle wisely wrote:[4] "But he who glories, let him glory in the Lord... Gladly therefore I will glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may dwell in me."

[4] 2 Cor. 10:17; 12:9.

521. (C) But above all it is helpful to contemplate the humility of Christ, who, "though he was in the form of God, did not think equality with God a thing to be grasped; but he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man; he humbled himself, made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."[1] And indeed, when he was an infant, he lay in a manger; he was in the house of a carpenter and of a poor mother, subject to both.[2] At the beginning of his public life, he receives from John the baptism of penance, is tempted by the devil, does not resist those rising up against him, nor did he exercise against his enemies the divine power with which he was endowed. In the Passion, he gave himself over to unjust aggressors as though they were more powerful than he, stood before priests unjustly accusing him, was led to the governor, and, although he could have refuted the false witnesses, he bore the calumnies in silence; he was spat upon by servants, scourged, ignominiously crowned with a crown of thorns, and unjustly handed over to a most disgraceful death. Deservedly therefore he draws us to humility: "Learn from me, because I am meek and humble of heart";[3] deservedly St. Jerome adds:[4] "Have nothing more excellent than humility, and nothing more lovable. For this is the chief preserver, and as it were a certain guardian, of all virtues; nor is there anything which makes us so pleasing both to men and to God, as if, great in the merit of life, we are lowest in humility."

[1] Phil. 2:6-8. The Apostle uses this argument to urge the necessity of humility: "With fear and trembling work out your salvation." (2:12.)

[2] Concerning this Bossuet exclaims, Elevat. sur les Mysteres, 20e Sem., 8: "O God, I am seized once again. Pride, come and burst at this spectacle: Jesus, son of a carpenter, himself a carpenter, known by this occupation, without there being mention of any other employment, or of any other action!" - Cf. 24e Sem., 1, where he treats of the humility of John the Baptist.

[3] Matt. 11:29. - Concerning humility we will speak below, n. 1079.

[4] St. Jerome, ep. ad Celant., 148, n. 20, P. L., XXII, 1213.

III. Concerning Envy.

522. 1. Notion of envy. Envy, which is called also livor, zeal, jealousy, arises from pride: for when someone inordinately seeks his own excellence, he easily is saddened at another's good insofar as it is conceived as diminishing his own excellence, and consequently as our evil. For envy is sadness at another's good insofar as we conceive our excellence to be diminished thereby.

[5] St. Cyprian, De zelo et livore, P. L., IV, 637-652; St. Gregory, Moral., lib. V, c. 46 (alias 31), P. L., LXXV, 727-730; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, and De Malo, q. 10; Natal. Alexander, op. cit., 1027-1061; Alibert, op. cit., t. I, p. 331-340; Descuret, t. II, p. 241-274.

Therefore if someone grieves at another's good because he thinks the other unworthy of a good of this kind, it is not envy, but indignation. - Likewise, if we are saddened at another's elevation because some evil threatens us from it, it is not the effect of envy, but of fear. - To grieve at a neighbor's good because we lack this and wish by honest means to obtain the same or something similar is not envy, but emulation: yet one must beware lest he wish to despoil his neighbor of it.

Generally envy is wont to be found among equals or nearly equals: for when the matter concerns those who greatly excel, there is less fear lest their glory diminish our excellence. - Not rarely, even in perfect men, the seed and first movements of this vice are to be found. It generally arises from those goods which are esteemed honorable, such as dignities, magistracies, insignia of titles, riches, beauty, adornment, celebrity of name, eloquence, erudition, friendships, piety, virtues, etc.

523. 2. The daughters of envy. Five are numbered, namely whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of one's neighbor, affliction in his prosperity, hatred.

For since the envious man grieves at the good of his neighbor, he soon desires that this man be deprived of it. Hence he tries to diminish it or utterly destroy it, for example, by speaking ill of his neighbor, whether secretly through whispering, or more openly through detraction; if he obtains the intended end, he exults in the adversities of the other; otherwise he is afflicted in his prosperity; furthermore all these things, when they endure for a long time, generate hatred.[1]

[1] Concerning whispering and detraction, the matter is treated more fully in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 374-396; concerning the others, it is said where Charity is treated.

524. 3. The malice of envy. (A) Envy properly so called is a sin mortal from its kind, because it is directly opposed to charity, which obliges of itself under grave obligation; for it belongs to the nature of friendship that we wish goods to our neighbor, just as to ourselves; but the envious man, on the contrary, wishes evil to his neighbor, since he is saddened at the good which the other possesses.

But, in order that envy be a grave sin, two things are required: (a) that the good of the neighbor to which it is referred be, all things carefully weighed, of grave moment; whence the greater a good of this kind is, the graver the sin is. Hence St. Thomas says:[2] "There is nevertheless envy which is counted among the gravest sins, namely envying fraternal grace, according as someone grieves at the very increase of God's grace." Akin to this is the envy of those who are saddened at the spiritual good accomplished by other preachers, confessors, pastors. (b) That the envious man deliberately and seriously wish the neighbor to lack this good; from this head, many movements of envy do not exceed venial sin, because they are imperfectly deliberate, or do not obtain the full consent of the will.

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 4, ad 2.

525. (B) Envy is also a grave sin whenever it induces us to inflict grave harm upon our neighbor; for the malice of some act is to be measured not only from its nature, but also from its effects.

Now, with St. Cyprian as witness,[1] many evils have arisen from this vice: "It is the root of all evils, the fountain of calamities, the seedbed of delicts, the matter of faults. From it hatred rises, from it animosity proceeds. Zeal inflames avarice, while someone cannot be content with his own, seeing another richer. Zeal stirs up ambition, while someone sees another higher in honors. With zeal blinding our senses, and bringing the hidden places of the mind under its dominion, the fear of God is despised, the teaching of Christ is neglected, the day of judgment is not foreseen... Hence the bond of the Lord's peace is broken, hence fraternal charity is violated, hence truth is adulterated, unity is split, there is a leap into heresies and schisms, while priests are disparaged, while bishops are envied, while someone either complains that he himself was not rather ordained, or disdains to bear another set over him." Rarely indeed do all these things arise from envy at the same time, but often fraternal charity is wounded, - union, today so necessary among Catholics, is broken, - obedience to legitimate superiors is either disparaged or at least rendered only with difficulty: and these are more than enough!

[1] St. Cyprian, op. cit., P. L., IV, 642.

526. 4. Remedies against envy. (A) One must frequently keep before the mind that spiritual society which prevails among the faithful; for all are sons of the same heavenly Father, all brothers in Christ, citizens of the same Church, called to the same eternal inheritance; we make up one body, of which Christ is the head.[2] Wherefore each ought to regard the goods of another as his own, and therefore to rejoice in the neighbor's endowments, good works, and progress, as though he himself enjoyed all these: for what profits one member of the body profits the others also. Thus Paul felt when, although certain men were preaching not from charity, but on account of envy and contention, that they might stir up pressure for his chains, nevertheless he sincerely wrote:[3] "For what then? So long as in every way, whether by occasion or by truth, Christ is preached; and in this I rejoice, yes and I will rejoice." - And indeed, while the envious waste away in jealousy, are troubled and inflamed in mind, and carry an enclosed wound in the breast on account of another's happiness; on the contrary, those who regard the goods of others as their own enjoy peace and joy.

[2] "And if one member suffers anything, all the members suffer with it; or if one member glories, all the members rejoice together. But you are the body of Christ and members of member." (1 Cor. 12:26-27). Let the whole chapter be read.

[3] Phil. 1:18.

527. (B) Those who know that they are liable to movements of envy should turn that vice into noble emulation.[1] First indeed let them not value perishable things, such as wealth, honors, bodily strength and elegance, or even knowledge and eloquence, so highly as piety and virtues: for why do we envy our neighbor over fragile and perishable things? But with regard to the virtues of others, let us strive to imitate them by manly effort: "Let us consider one another unto the provocation of charity and of good works."[2] Augustine explains this excellently:[3] "Why do you envy the just man, O unjust man? Because you wish to seem just? Quickly do what is better, and more easily you will be what you wish to seem. Be just: thus you will love him whom you envied; because what you grieve that he is, you also will be, and you will love yourself in him, and him in yourself. For if you envied a rich man, it would not be in your power to be rich; if you envied some honorable noble senator, it would not be in your power that you also be noble and distinguished; if you envied a beautiful man, you would never make yourself beautiful... if you envy the just man, the matter is in the will; be what you grieve that the other is."

[1] Concerning this Thomas excellently discusses, Educ. des sentiments, p. 203-222.

[2] Heb. 10:24.

[3] Enarrat. in Ps. 139, P. L., XXXVII, 1807-1808.

(C) To tear out envy entirely, it will be opportune to consider the evils which arise from envy (n. 525); and also to eradicate the root from which it arises, namely pride; for, as Augustine says,[4] "the devil fell by pride, and, because envy is the companion of pride, it cannot happen that the proud man does not envy."

[4] St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 58, P. L., XXXVI, 709.

IV. Concerning Anger.

528. 1. Notion of anger. Anger can be considered under a twofold respect: insofar as it is a passion (above, n. 100), or a vehement movement of the irascible appetite toward repelling a present evil; and insofar as it is an appetite for vengeance. Not rarely these two are joined together and include something immoderate or inordinate. Then anger is defined as an immoderate movement of the soul inordinately seeking vengeance. Therefore it consists of a twofold element: (a) an immoderate movement of the irascible appetite, with commotion of the body, transgressing the just limits prescribed by reason; (b) an inordinate appetite for vengeance, insofar as someone takes or seeks unjust or immoderate revenge from him by whom he has really been injured, or thinks himself to have been injured.

[5] St. Gregory, Moral., lib. V, c. 45, P. L., 723-727; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, and De Malo, q. 12; N. Alex., op. cit., p. 1112-1148; Descuret, t. II, p. 1-57; Thomas, op. cit., ch. 9, p. 94-103.

Hence anger is not a sin unless it bears before itself something inordinate, either as to the mode of being angry, namely when the movement of anger grows immoderately hot either inwardly or outwardly; or as to the object, when, namely, someone seeks vengeance against the order of reason, for example, desiring that he be punished who has not deserved it, or beyond what he has deserved, or with the order of law not preserved, or on account of an end which is not legitimate, for example, from hatred, not from love of justice or a desire of amendment.

Wherefore just indignation, or zeal by which someone, from love of justice, reproves or chastises the wicked, differs much from anger. Christ showed this zeal when he drove the sellers out of the temple, and poured out the money of the money-changers and overturned their tables;[1] but because Heli did not have zeal with regard to his sons, he deservedly stirred up against himself the movement of divine vengeance.

[1] John 2:13-17.

529. Often anger arises from pride; for when the proud think themselves injured, they are easily inflamed and seek vengeance. Nevertheless, since anger is a passion, not rarely it arises also from temperament itself, and from this head it is more easily excused.

St. Gregory graphically describes an angry man:[2] "For the heart kindled by the goads of its anger beats, the body trembles, the tongue trips itself, the face burns, the eyes are sharpened, and acquaintances are in no way recognized. With the mouth indeed it forms a cry, but the sense does not know what it says... Sometimes anger, to a troubled soul, as though from judgment, imposes silence; and because it does not express itself outwardly through the tongue, it burns the worse within... And so it happens that the troubled soul feels the greater clamor of its own silence, and the flame of shut-up anger consumes it more heavily."

[2] Moral., l. c., p. 724-725. - Gregory had been preceded by Seneca, who in Tr. de Ira, l. I, n. 1, thus depicts an angry man: "His eyes flame and flash, there is much redness over the whole face, as blood boils up from the depths of the breast; the lips are shaken, the teeth are clenched, the hairs stand on end and rise up; breath is forced and hissing, the sound of joints twisting themselves, groans and bellowings... You would not know whether the vice is more detestable or deformed."

530. 2. The various degrees of anger. The principal ones are: impatience, by which we are easily moved inwardly and outwardly even by light inconveniences or injuries; outburst, by which we manifest anger inwardly conceived through injurious words and shouts; violence, which incites not only to words, but also to injurious acts and to blows; fury, which adds to violence something unbridled, as it were a certain madness;[1] vengeance, or a vehement and assiduous desire of avenging.

[1] Hence Horace (Epist. I, 2), describing anger, says:

"Anger is a brief madness: rule the soul; unless it obeys, It commands: restrain it with bits, restrain it with chain."

Seneca elegantly describes the various forms of anger:[2] "For there are certain angers which settle within a cry; certain ones no less persistent than frequent; certain ones savage with the hand, sparing in words; certain ones poured out into bitterness of words and curses; certain ones do not go beyond complaints and aversions; certain ones are deep and grave, and turned inward. There are a thousand other species of this manifold evil."

[2] De Ira, lib. I, n. 4.

531. 3. The malice of anger. (A) Concerning anger considered in itself. To judge concerning its gravity, one must distinguish between anger insofar as it is a passion, and anger which is an appetite for vengeance.

(a) Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate movement of the irascible appetite, is a sin venial from its kind. For this anger is not inordinate except in the mode, insofar as someone blazes up beyond what the matter deserves, or more often than is fitting; now an inordination which touches only the mode of acting is not grave of itself.

Nevertheless the excess can be so great that it becomes a mortal sin, when someone deliberately grows too ardently heated within, or outwardly manifests signs of anger, so that he loses the peace of soul, or gravely offends his neighbor. Yet often unexpected movements of anger, even more vehement ones, are excused from mortal sin, because they are not sufficiently deliberate.

532. (b) Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate appetite for vengeance, is a sin mortal from its kind. For it is opposed to charity, and sometimes to justice, namely when he concerning whom we wish to take vengeance is truly innocent; now each virtue obliges under grave obligation, as is explicitly taught where these virtues are treated. Here it is enough to report the words of the Master:[3] "But I say to you, that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment; but he who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be liable to the council; and he who shall say, Fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire." For there he is affirmed worthy of grave punishment who is inwardly angry against his neighbor, or manifests inward anger by grave insults.

[3] Matt. 5:22.

Yet not rarely even the appetite for vengeance is excused from grave sin, either on the part of the one desiring, for example when the movement of anger precedes the mature judgment of the intellect, or on the part of the object, when someone seeks to vindicate himself in some slight matter.

533. (B) But if anger is considered in its effects, it is the graver in proportion as the effects are worse.

(a) When it is carried to the extreme, it introduces many grave evils, which Seneca describes:[1] "You will see murders and poisons, mutual filth of accused men, destructions of cities, and ruins of whole peoples, and the heads of princes sold under the civil spear, and torches set under roofs, and fires not confined within walls, but immense spaces of regions gleaming with hostile flame... Look upon so many leaders handed down to memory: one anger stabbed in his bedroom; another anger struck among the sacred things of the table; another it tore to pieces amid the laws and the crowded spectacle of the forum; another it ordered to give his blood by the parricide of his son..." Yet generally anger does not indulge these unspeakable crimes.

[1] *De Ira*, lib. I, n. 2.

(b) Nevertheless it often brings after itself other effects, which Gregory describes:[2] through anger wisdom is lost, because the mind, vehemently moved, is soon clouded, and can scarcely know what is

to be done and in what order; - the grace of social life is lost, because he acts inhumanely who does not temper by human reason the movement of anger, and thence concord is broken; - justice is abandoned: for while the troubled mind embitters the judgment of its reason, it thinks everything which fury suggests to be right; - grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are excluded: for since he resides only in a quiet soul, by expelling the quiet of mind, we close our soul to the Holy Spirit.

[2] St. Gregory, *Moral.*, l. c., P. L., 724.

534. 4. Remedies against anger. (A) First indeed, insofar as it can be done, anger is to be forestalled, by removing the causes which can excite it.

Thus if we are irascible by nature, we ought carefully to restrain the first movements of anger, and before we break forth into words, to turn the tongue seven times in the mouth, or, as the Greek philosopher used to say, to pronounce the twenty-five letters of the Greek alphabet. - If anger is inflamed by the provocation of certain persons, these persons must be fled: "Choose simple, easy, moderate persons, who neither call forth your anger nor bear it. Still more will the submissive and humane and sweet be of profit, yet not unto flattery; for too much assent offends angry men."[3] - If from too much weariness of body, from disorder of the nerves, attend to health. - If you are much moved by those things which are said against you, do not inquire at all about them: "Do you not wish to be angry? Do not be curious. He who inquires what has been said against himself, who digs out malicious speeches, even if they were held secretly, troubles himself."[1]

[3] Seneca, *De Ira*, lib. III, n. 8.

[1] Seneca, ibid., n. 11.

535. (B) But because we cannot avert all causes of anger, we ought to be prepared to tolerate all injuries with an even soul.

Gregory explains this excellently:[2] "For the first thing is that the solicitous mind, before it begins to do anything, set before itself all insults which it can suffer, so that, thinking of the reproaches of its Redeemer, it may prepare itself for adversities... For he who is caught unprepared by adversity is found by the enemy as though sleeping, and the enemy kills him, because he pierces one not resisting. For he who by solicitude foreknows the evils threatening, awaits hostile attacks as though watching in ambush, and from this is valiently girded for victory." - But in order that we may more patiently tolerate the vexations of others, we must consider our own excesses toward others: "For he patiently tolerates an injury inflicted who piously remembers that perhaps he still has something in which he himself ought to be tolerated. And as fire is extinguished by water, so, when fury of soul arises, each one's own fault is recalled to mind; because he is ashamed not to spare sins, who recalls that he himself has often sinned things to be spared either by God or by neighbor."[3]

[2] St. Gregory, *Moral.*, P. L., t. LXXV, 725-726.

[3] St. Gregory, op. cit., P. L., LXXV, p. 726.

536. (C) But if anger nevertheless has blazed up, as soon as you notice it arising, restrain it; at the beginning indeed it is rather easy to temper it; but if it has grown strong by long delays, this becomes altogether difficult.

Wherefore the Apostle says:[4] "Be angry and do not sin; let not the sun go down upon your anger... Let all bitterness, and anger, and indignation, and clamor, and blasphemy be taken away from you, with all malice. Be kind to one another, merciful, forgiving one another, just as God also in Christ has forgiven you." - For the same motive, one ought to establish or decide nothing about the vindication of some wrong unless anger has cooled; otherwise the mind, troubled by commotion, will not be able to contain vengeance, otherwise just, within just limits.

[4] Eph. 4:26, 31, 32.

537. (D) The best remedy indeed, which Christ taught by word and example, is fraternal benevolence toward all, even enemies, by force of which we do good to those who pursue us with hatred, far from seeking vengeance for their injuries: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those persecuting and calumniating you; that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven, who makes his sun rise upon the good and the evil, and rains upon the just and the unjust."[1]

[1] Matt. 5:44-46.

Christ indeed wonderfully performed this; for at the time when we were still enemies, he gave himself over for us: "When he was cursed, he did not curse; when he suffered, he did not threaten, but delivered himself to him judging him unjustly."[2] The Apostles taught the same:[3] "But if your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he thirsts, give him drink: for doing this, you shall heap coals of fire upon his head." The coals which are treated here are not penalties to be inflicted upon enemies, but, as Augustine says,[4] "burning groans of penance, by which the pride is healed of him who grieves that he has been the enemy of a man by whom his misery is helped." In reality the first Christians patiently tolerated the most savage torments, and, far from being angry with their persecutors, prayed for them and their amendment.[5] "Patience is," says Cyprian,[6] "what both commends and preserves us to God. It is what tempers anger, governs the mind, guards peace, rules discipline, breaks the impulse of lust, compresses the violence of swelling pride, extinguishes the fire of rivalry, restrains the power of the rich, refreshes the poverty of the poor, guards blessed integrity in virgins, laborious chastity in widows, undivided charity in those joined and married."

[2] 1 Pet. 2:23.

[3] Rom. 12:20.

[4] St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, l. III, c. 16, n. 24, P. L., XXXIV, 75. Whence Séailles did not understand this text, who faults Paul because there the Apostle approves the pleasure of vengeance (*Les Affirmations de la Conscience moderne*, Paris, Colin, 1903, p. 73-74).

[5] Concerning patience in persecutions Tertullian discourses eloquently, *De Patientia*, P. L., I, 1249-1274; and St. Cyprian, *De Bono patientiae*, P. L., IV, 621-638.

[6] St. Cyprian, op. cit., c. 20, P. L., 635.

V. Concerning Gluttony, Drunkenness, and Alcoholism.

The three vices of which we have already treated are called spiritual, because they are concerned with goods of the soul; there are two which are called carnal, because they inordinately seek goods of the body, namely gluttony, which is concerned with food and drink, and lust, which inordinately pursues venereal pleasure: but concerning the latter we will treat where Chastity is treated. - We will speak:

1. concerning gluttony in general; 2. concerning drunkenness, or concerning excess in drink which reaches even to the privation of the use of reason; 3. concerning alcoholism, or the habit of frequently drinking alcoholic liquors: these are, as it were, three degrees of one and the same vice.

1. Concerning Gluttony in General.

538. (A) Notion. (a) Gluttony is the inordinate appetite of eating or drinking, and therefore is opposed to the virtue of temperance. That inordination can happen especially in five ways:

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 148; De Malo, q. 14; Nat. Alexander, op. cit., 1081-1110; Jaugey, De quatuor virt. card., 1876, p. 569-574; Ball. P., n. 716-735.

"Too hastily, sumptuously, too much, ardently, daintily."

Sumptuously or daintily, when, namely, more exquisite foods or drinks are sought, or ones prepared too delicately; - too much, when someone exceeds as to quantity, or beyond the appetite of nature; - too hastily, if someone anticipates the due time, or eats or drinks more often than is fitting; - ardently, when someone takes food too eagerly.

(b) The effects which often flow from intemperance (and which are commonly called the daughters of gluttony) are: foolish joy, which provokes a less honorable kind of joking; much-speaking, or too much garrulity, by which secrets are frequently manifested; scurrility, or immoderation in words and external acts transgressing the just limits of honorableness; dullness of mind, which renders a man less apt for the contemplation of truth, and for actions which require the attention of reason and the moderation of prudence; a certain propensity to lust: "Do not be drunk with wine, in which is luxury."[2]

[2] Eph. 5:18.

539. (B) The malice of gluttony. (a) To perceive moderate delectation in food and drink is no sin; for the author of nature joined delectation to foods, that we may use them gladly for preserving bodily health; therefore he who takes delectable food delectably, and consents to this delectation, is not to be blamed, provided that he avoids every excess (above, n. 191). Yet it is more perfect affectively to renounce this delectation, and to take food only on account of an honorable and supernatural end, according to that saying of the Apostle:[3] "Whether you eat, or drink, or do anything else, do all things unto the glory of God." See above, n. 155-157, 195.

[3] 1 Cor. 10:31. This indeed is said concerning things sacrificed to idols, but can be extended to any eating whatever.

(b) But gluttony, insofar as it is an immoderate appetite of food or drink, is a sin[4] slight of itself, which nevertheless becomes mortal, when someone so clings to delectation that he is prepared to transgress a grave precept rather than renounce it.

[4] That gluttony is a sin is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (8) by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "To eat and drink even to satiety on account of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health." (Denzing., n. 1025; Viva, on this proposition.)

Thus those gravely sin who place supreme happiness in food and drink, whose God therefore is the belly; who, in order to satisfy gluttony, do not pay debts, knowingly gravely harm their own health, or render themselves unfit to fulfill offices obliging under grave obligation. Apart from these or similar

excesses, gluttony is indeed a sin, as opposed to right reason, but a light one, because it does not import a grave disorder.

540. (C) Remedies against gluttony. (a) To keep before the mind that food and drink are not the end of man, but only a means for repairing strength, whereby we may be better able to labor for God. Likewise to think about the depraved consequences which follow from gluttony, about diseases of the body, accelerated death, dullness of memory and talent, etc. (b) The incentives to this vice are to be avoided, namely foods too delicate, seasoned exquisitely, frequent banquets especially with those who are accustomed to indulge intemperance; and therefore generally common foods are to be used, which are more beneficial for health. (c) In banquets themselves, temperance is to be carefully cultivated, and something is to be withdrawn especially from those things which are sweeter to the palate.

These things indeed the Wise Man commends in many places: "Do not be in the banquets of drinkers, nor in the feasts of those who bring meats to eat, because those vacant for drinking and giving contributions will be consumed[1]... Exultation of soul and heart is wine drunk moderately... much wine drunk makes irritation, and anger, and many ruins."[2]

[1] Prov. 23:20-21.

[2] Eccli. 30:36-38.

2. Concerning Drunkenness.

541. (A) Its malice. The special malice of drunkenness is situated in this, that it induces privation of the use of reason without cause, and brings the drunken man into danger of perpetrating actions contrary to good morals. - There are degrees in drunkenness: it is called imperfect when the use of reason is diminished, without being utterly taken away, as, for example, when the feet and knees totter, the tongue hesitates, the eyes look upon objects duplicated or moving themselves in a circle; - but it is called complete when the use of reason is utterly taken away, for example, when someone does unusual things which, in control of himself, he is not accustomed to do, or does not know how to distinguish between good and evil, or does not remember notable things which he did while drunk, or collapses destitute of the senses. These things being posited:

542. (a) Voluntary drunkenness, at least that which deprives one of every use of reason, even admitted once, is of itself a mortal sin. It is declared; here the question is of voluntary drunkenness, namely that which is incurred knowingly and willingly; for if someone drinks wine or liquor too strong, yet whose power of intoxicating he did not know, so that he did not foresee at least probably that drunkenness would follow from it, he does not sin; say the same if, on account of weakness of strength or an empty stomach, unexpectedly from a few draughts, without moral foresight, he becomes drunk. - Likewise the question is of drunkenness which is full, or at least gravely disturbs reason and induces the danger of grave disorder; for imperfect drunkenness does not exceed venial sin, as long as someone retains that knowledge which is necessary for acting morally rightly.[1] - This drunkenness, even admitted once, is a grave sin, whatever a few theologians say to the contrary, who think only the custom of drunkenness to be a mortal sin.

[1] Some say that he does not gravely sin who for a short time, which does not reach an hour, deprives himself of the use of reason; thus Noldin, n. 509. - Yet we reject this as less probable; for if someone knowingly and willingly drinks in such a way that he certainly foresees that for half an hour he will be deprived of the use of reason, and indeed without any necessity, this is a grave disorder, and therefore a mortal fault. Besides, as Noldin himself rightly notes, it can scarcely be foreseen that drink will not deprive one of the use of reason for longer than the space of an hour.

It is proved. Scripture vehemently reproves drunkenness, and reckons it among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of God: "Woe to you who rise in the morning to follow drunkenness, and to drink until evening, that you may be inflamed with wine... But take heed to yourselves lest perhaps your hearts be weighed down in surfeiting and drunkenness... Neither thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards... shall possess the kingdom of God."[2]

[2] Isa. 5:11; Luke 21:34; 1 Cor. 6:10.

In reality, through drunkenness, man voluntarily, without necessity, on account of mere pleasure, deprives himself of the most excellent good by which he is distinguished from beasts, namely the use of reason, so that the lower faculties, which are not lulled to sleep, lack the guidance and rule of reason: thus he is made not only unfit for good, but prone to evil. This indeed is a grave disorder, which certainly is not excused by pleasure alone, as is certainly gathered from the common sense of honorable persons.

543. (b) Nevertheless drunkenness is not so intrinsically evil that it cannot be permitted for a grave cause, for example, for curing a disease, or for breaking the force of poison taken from a serpent's bite. Thus more probably, with St. Alphonsus (n. 76), against Collet, Billuart, etc., who think that voluntary privation of reason is wholly and utterly evil. For through drunkenness reason itself is not lost, but only the use of reason for some time; now to render oneself impotent, in a transitory manner, for using reason is something evil if it is done from pleasure alone, because an inferior good is preferred to a superior good; but if this is done on account of a grave cause, which compensates for the evil effect, it cannot be called illicit, because then the lesser of two evils is chosen. Who, for example, will ever blame him who takes an intoxicating drink absolutely necessary for saving life?

544. Hence it is probable that it is licit to bring about privation of the use of reason through intoxicating drink, if this is necessary for more safely performing a surgical operation. - Likewise, more probably, he does not sin who, from fear of death struck into him, drinks with the danger of making himself drunk, because he does not intend drunkenness, but only wishes to avoid death.

545. To provide someone the occasion of drunkenness, without a grave cause, is not licit, as is clear from the things said concerning cooperation in evil, above, n. 185; but, when a proportionately grave cause exists, this is probably licit; for materially to cooperate in an evil action is not prohibited, provided the act is not intrinsically evil, and besides there is a proportionate reason for cooperating, from what was said above, n. 185. Thus he seems to be excused who, captured by robbers, gives them wine abundantly, so that he may be able to escape from their hands. - But we think it is not licit by positive counsel to induce someone to formal drunkenness: for this is nothing other than positively to advise sin. But if it can be foreseen from the circumstances that the drunkenness is not going to be culpable, because, for example, those of

whom the question is are ignorant of the strength of the wine or liquor, it is probably not illicit to induce them to drink, with the foresight that they are going to be made drunk, when this is necessary for avoiding a greater evil, for example, homicide: for then moral evil is not advised, but an action of itself indifferent is placed, with foresight of the evil effect, and indeed for avoiding a greater evil. In any hypothesis, account must also be taken of scandal, or of the effects which are foreseen to follow from drunkenness, even material drunkenness.

546. (c) Sins committed in drunkenness are imputed in the way in which they were foreseen; wherefore, if they are foreseen only confusedly, generally they are not mortal; but if rather clearly and distinctly, by him who knows by experience that in the state of drunkenness he is liable to such sins, nothing prevents them from being mortal in the cause, from the things said above, n. 171.

547. (B) Concerning the use of morphine, cocaine, and chloroform.[1] Today, for easing the pains of the sick and for performing surgical operations more safely, narcotic remedies are often employed, which sometimes take away the use of reason for some time. It is expedient to note a few things concerning their use.

[1] Capellmann, Medicina Pastoralis, 11th ed., Aachen, 1896, p. 34-42.

(a) Morphine (say nearly the same concerning cocaine) is taken not only by way of drink, but also, and more often, by subcutaneous injection. It is altogether efficacious for easing pains; indeed it provokes a certain sense of cheerfulness; but at the same time it weakens the nerves, and induces a great desire of receiving again and again new injections. If the physician, overcome by repeated complaints of the sick person, acquiesces, the power of resisting pains decreases in the sick person, and the injection of morphine is sought more frequently day by day. But the more frequent and more copious use of this remedy soon brings morphinomania with it: then the sick person appears now livid and sluggish, now agitated; he trembles like a drinker, loathes food and digests only with difficulty; he labors under insomnia and anxiety of soul, and not rarely falls into fury and delirium tremens.

548. These things being posited, physicians can use so dangerous a remedy only cautiously and moderately, namely when it is judged necessary or very useful; therefore let them strenuously resist the importunate complaints of the sick, whenever these seek morphine without sufficient reason. But those who already labor under morphinomania generally can be cured only in a special hospital, where for some time they are kept as though imprisoned: otherwise, they soon fall into dementia.

At the article of death, it is not licit to furnish morphine for the purpose that the sick man be deprived of the use of reason and depart without consciousness of pain. This indeed would be wicked, if the sick man were not yet prepared for death, because he would be deprived of the opportunity of doing penance and would incur the danger of eternal damnation. - If he is rightly disposed for death, generally it is not licit to deprive him of the use of reason, because thus he would lack the opportunity of acquiring merits, and of immediately preparing himself for death, and also of eliciting acts of obedience, patience, confidence, love, by which his glory in heaven can be so greatly increased. - Nevertheless if the pains are excessive, and the sick man is very liable to movements of

impatience, so that it can probably be feared that he may fall into sin, the aforementioned use of morphine indeed cannot be positively permitted, but can be tolerated.

549. (b) Chloroform, employed in surgical operations, induces sleep and insensibility, and from this head operations are performed much more easily and safely. But sometimes, although rarely, death is caused from it. Wherefore it is licit to use this remedy only for a grave cause and cautiously, after a diligent examination, from which it is clear that in the case there is no probable danger of death for the sick person. But before someone gives himself over to physicians, prudence suggests that he consult his conscience through devout reception of the sacraments.

3. Concerning Alcoholism.

550. By the name alcoholism is designated the habit of frequently drinking various alcoholic liquors, even without drunkenness, from which it happens that a nearly invincible desire of drinking is contracted, and the whole body, infected by alcoholic poison, is weakened day by day.

[1] Centennial Temperance Volume, New York, 1876; Farrar, Talks on Temperance, London; Cyclopaedia of Temperance, New York; M. Vanlaer, L'alcoolisme et ses remedes, Paris, Colin, 1897; Mgr Turinaz, Trois fleaux de la classe ouvriere, Nancy et Paris; id., Le clerge catholique et la lutte contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1901; Racl, Alcoolisme et decadence, Paris, 1900; Riemain, Plan de campagne contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1901; Dr Legrain, Un fleau social, l'alcoolisme, Paris, Gautier; Oudaille, Le Foyer familial et la femme contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1904; J. Bertillon, L'alcoolisme et les moyens de le combattre, Paris, 1904; Cheysson et Riemain, Premier Congres national contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, Asselin, 1904 (which work we allege below with one word, Congres).

(A) The origin and causes of alcoholism. This vice, very common among pagans,[2] and never entirely extirpated by Christianity, began to revive and creep everywhere from the time when alcoholic liquors, by the help of the chemical art, could more easily be extracted from almost all substances: for then it prevailed not only among the rich, but also among workers and the poor. Politicians favored this vice not a little: for, to obtain the votes of citizens, they did not hesitate to multiply taverns and drinking-shops more than enough; indeed, to capture popular favor, they did not blush to distribute money to be dissipated in drinking bouts. Workers, who often live in sordid houses or rooms, do not care to remain at home in the evening hours, but prefer to converse with companions in taverns and other places where liquors are sold. Moreover, nourished by light and scant food, they not rarely seek a certain compensation in alcoholic drinks.[3] - Sometimes, even among the richer, there are those who, given over to idleness, seek consolation in often repeated libations.[1] - By force of heredity, the propension to drinking is frequently transmitted, and is confirmed by education: for there are not lacking parents who do not blush to pour harmful liquors even for infants! And thus the way is prepared for innumerable evils, which are born from alcoholism.[2]

[2] A. Westphal, L'alcoolisme dans l'antiquite, in Congres, p. 31-50.

[3] Concerning alcoholism prevailing among workers, cf. Pelloutier, La vie ouvriere en France, Paris, 1900, p. 303-322; Congres, p. 341 and 487-518.

[1] M. Peter, L'alcoolisme chez les gens du monde, apud Congres, p. 550.

[2] From the following table, which we borrow from Bertillon, op. cit., p. 5, the reader will understand what quantity of alcohol is consumed in the principal regions.

Number of liters of brandy (reduced by calculation to 50 per cent alcohol), of beer and of wine absorbed in one year by one inhabitant (1891-1895):

Country	Brandy	Beer	Wine
Sweden	6.86	26.0	0.6
Norway	3.54	20.1	0.9
Denmark	14.40	87.7	1.6
British Isles	5.20	135.0	1.7
Germany	8.80	106.9	5.7
Switzerland	6.12	40.0	60.7
France	8.54	22.5	107.0
Italy	1.25	0.6	96.5
Spain	1.00	1.3	115.0
Russia	9.40	4.6	3.3
United States	5.95	64.6	1.5

In some regions alcoholism increases, while in others it gradually diminishes, according as laws and private associations favor or oppose it.[3]

[3] From the same work, p. 11, these things are to be noted concerning the quantity of spirits of wine (brandy) consumed at different times:

Sweden		France	
1850	22.0	1851-60	4.0
1855-70	9.6	1861-70	4.8
1871-80	11.0	1871-80	5.7
1891-95	6.8	1881-90	7.8
		1891-95	8.5

551. (B) The evils which arise from the abuse of alcohol. These are almost innumerable with regard to individuals, the family, society.[4]

[4] Two distinguished physicians, Debove, dean of the Paris Faculty of Medicine, and Faisans, physician of the hospital which is called Hotel-Dieu, briefly described these effects in a publicly published document, in the year 1902 (apud Bertillon, op. cit., p. 217-218): "The habit of drinking brings with it alienation from the family, forgetfulness of all social duties, disgust for work, misery, theft, and crime. It leads, at the least, to the hospital; for alcoholism engenders the most varied and most deadly diseases: paralyses, insanity, affections of the stomach and liver, dropsy; it is one of the most frequent causes of tuberculosis. Finally it complicates and aggravates all acute diseases: a typhoid fever, a pneumonia, an erysipelas, which would be benign in a sober man, quickly kill the alcoholic drinker."

(a) For alcoholism not only diminishes physical powers, but also induces grave diseases, especially paralysis, dropsy, tuberculosis, alteration of the stomach and liver, sometimes delirium tremens, insanity, etc.; moreover it renders incidental diseases much graver, such as pleurisy, pneumonia, erysipelas, and renders them lethal.[1] - It has intellectual and moral effects: thus it gradually dulls the acuteness of mind, diminishes memory, extinguishes noble and generous affections, increases

depraved propensions, and little by little makes man like a brute in body and soul. Hence many more crimes are committed by drunkards and alcoholics than by sober men.[2]

[1] Bertillon, op. cit., p. 44-72; Vanlaer, op. cit., p. 23-36; Congres, p. 375-388; 421-426.

[2] E. Masoin, L'alcool et le crime, apud Revue neoscolastique, Nov. 1901, p. 362-369; cf. Congres, pp. 89 and 92-95.

(b) Moreover, it dissolves the bonds of the family; for generally alcoholic liquors are taken not at home, but at taverns, and therefore fathers of families and adolescents spend a long time in drinking-shops, far from wife, sweet children, or brothers. Meanwhile the money necessary for sustaining the family is dissipated, and children, very badly educated, lead a miserable life. Not rarely they themselves labor under the same vice: infected with the alcoholic plague already from the womb, they desire nothing more eagerly than to imitate paternal morals;[3] if money is lacking, they steal. - How many quarrels, dissensions, divorces must be attributed to this vice? From it families are dissolved and perish.

[3] Roux, L'alcoolisme et l'enfance, apud Congres, p. 321-331.

(c) From it even society itself is endangered; for with the strength of citizens weakened, agriculture, commerce, and industry languish;[4] if war arises, soldiers and leaders, enervated by alcoholism, are unable to repel the invasion of enemies, and soon are forced to give conquered hands.[5] Since alcoholic propension is propagated by heredity, and by education puts down deep roots, the restoration of the nation becomes more difficult day by day, and can be accomplished only by strenuous and heroic efforts.[1]

[4] Roy, apud Congres, p. 349-352.

[5] Cf. Congres, pp. 87, 95-96; 666-674.

[1] What harms alcoholism has brought upon one of the wealthier provinces of France, namely Normandy, Douarche set forth apud Congres, p. 52-84.

552. (C) Remedies against alcoholism. Against so destructive an evil all honorable citizens ought unanimously to fight with manly and assiduous effort:

(a) The necessity of temperance is to be inculcated by word and example upon infants themselves at home, and upon the young in schools, by clearly and strenuously laying open the harms induced by alcoholism.[2] In colleges, academies, and seminaries, and also in public sermons, this plague should be openly denounced and reproved as something shameful, harmful to body and soul, pernicious no less to country than to religion. But parents, teachers, priests, or other educators will profit little or nothing unless by example they confirm what they teach by mouth, and therefore abstain not only publicly, but privately, from the frequent and useless use of liquors, even that which by many is held as moderate: for experience establishes that alcoholism is induced not only by the immoderate, but also by the assiduous, although moderate, use of alcohol.[3]

[2] Galtier-Boissiere, L'enseignement de l'anti-alcoolisme; id., Tableau mural d'Anti-alcoolisme, Paris, Colin; cf. Congres, p. 685-687.

[3] Bertillon, op. cit., p. 37-43.

553. (b) The mother of the family, according to her condition, should keep the home so clean and decorous, and furnished with all things which please husband and sons, that they may not

think of deserting the paternal home, but rather may seek in it the honorable recreations of which they are in need.[4]

[4] "Considering only her action in the anti-alcoholic struggle, the woman who is the first to suffer from the plague can exercise a twofold apostolate: to the child, she will make alcohol unknown; to the man, that great child, she will make him forget it." (Oudaille, op. cit., p. 217). Cf. M. Duclos and Knutzel, apud Congres, p. 558-581; Willard, Woman and Temperance, Hartford.

(c) Everywhere associations favoring temperance should be established. Many already exist: some, such as the societies founded by T. Mathew and spread not only in Ireland and England, but also throughout the whole world, preach total abstinence from every alcoholic liquor, even wine;[5] others prescribe abstinence from distilled liquors, as they say, but commend the moderate use of wine or other liquors of this kind; others, however, only forbid access to taverns and other places where intoxicating drinks are drunk; others establish hospitals for the cure of drunkards, or build shops where non-fermented drinks are sold, in which alcoholic poison is not contained.[1]

[5] Father T. Mathew (1790-1856), born in Ireland, entered the order of the Capuchins, and founded temperance societies in Ireland, Great Britain, and the United States of America, to which, before he died, about 4,000,000 had already adhered; therefore he is deservedly called the apostle of temperance. Cf. J. F. Maguire, Father Mathew, a biography, 1863.

[1] Concerning these societies, cf. Winskill, History of the Temperance Reformation, New York, 1886; Congres, pp. 590-603; 604-610; 627-638. - In France, various anti-alcoholic societies have decreed to constitute one federation; cf. Congres, p. 741-742.

554. (d) Nor is the discreet cooperation of the State to be rejected, which by opportune laws can restrain the vice of intemperance, and furnish help to those societies which favor temperance. In certain States of America the sale of intoxicating liquors has been entirely prohibited; yet generally the law was not observed. In other regions the number of taverns has been limited within certain limits, either by exacting a greater tax from tavern-keepers, or by proportioning taverns to the number of inhabitants. Elsewhere a certain monopoly has been instituted, both for diminishing the quantity of liquor sold and for improving the quality. By these various experiments alcoholism was indeed not extinguished, but weakened.[2] But what is more efficacious depends on many circumstances, and therefore in any region it must be determined from the counsel of the prudent, and especially by experience.

[2] Bertillon wrote concerning these various methods and their outcome, op. cit., p. 80-214.

555. (e) Finally religion can and ought to provide the most efficacious remedy for the diminution of so great a vice: for it is necessary that it instruct the young about the pernicious effects of this vice, and admonish parents that they turn their sons away from it. By inculcating virtues, especially fortitude of soul and mortification of sensuality, it disposes wills for strenuously resisting the temptation of abusing liquors. In the pulpit, and also in the sacred tribunal, priests should frequently teach temperance and sobriety. Where there are sodalities, patronages, and other Catholic societies, certain articles concerning temperance and the means of preserving it should carefully be inserted among the statutes. Finally let them keep before the mind that for extirpating this vice nothing is more efficacious than the example of clerics

themselves: wherefore worthy of all praise are those who not only enroll in temperance societies, but, on account of love of souls, abstain from every intoxicating drink.[1]

[1] To the matter, Council of Baltimore III, n. 262: "We approve and greatly commend the laudable custom of many, who in our times abstain entirely from the use of intoxicating drinks, that they may more safely restrain the vice of intemperance, either by removing from themselves occasions of the same, or by displaying to others a distinguished example of the virtue of temperance." - But concerning priests it establishes, n. 261: "Let them never cease to cry out strongly against drunkenness and its occasions; but especially when they have spiritual exercises for the people... Moreover, since words only move, but examples draw, let priests themselves, who, with the Apostle admonishing, ought to be a form of the flock from the heart, be examples of the virtue of temperance." - In France a Catholic temperance society has recently been established, La Croix Blanche, 1271, Boulevard Raspail, Paris.

All these means being wisely and assiduously employed, it is to be wished that the alcoholic plague may gradually be diminished, and finally utterly extinguished.[2]

[2] J. B. Dumas thus contracts all these things, apud Vanlaer, op. cit., p. 165: "Let us therefore appeal at once to science, to laws, to morals, and to religion. For the enemy whom we have to combat will not be easily conquered. It has as accomplices all the evil sentiments of humanity, all its fatal inclinations. It personifies, in the highest degree, the insubordination of matter against spirit, the subjection of the soul to the fierce appetites of the body. In the name of the family, of the country, and of religion, let us therefore once again appeal to the lights of science, to the devotions of charity, and to the foresight of reason of State, to remove from our beloved country moral miseries which have had their part in its past misfortunes and which could bring about its ruin."

VI. Concerning Avarice and Cupidity.

556. 1. Notion. (A) Avarice is the immoderate love of riches. It can be immoderate especially in three ways: (a) if riches are acquired not from an honorable end, such as is the intention of providing for one's own necessities or those of the family, but from inordinate love of money, which is delighted in accumulated wealth; (b) when riches are acquired with excessive solicitude, so that the mind thinks of nothing, the heart seeks nothing except gain; (c) when money is spent with excessive parsimony, insofar as someone deprives himself and his own of those things which, according to each one's state, are held necessary.

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118; De Malo, q. 13; Nat. Alexander, op. cit., p. 819-951; Ball. P., n. 708-709; Pruner, p. 344-346; Descuret, t. II, p. 275-297; Massillon, Discours synodaux, De l'avarice des pretres, De la compassion des pauvres; Monsabre, Retraites pascales, 1892-1894, Paris, Les Idoles: la richesse.

(B) Avarice is found not only in the rich, but sometimes also in the poor, insofar as they cling with too great affection to the things possessed, or gape with immoderate desire after those things which they do not have. - Although it is sometimes found in the young, nevertheless it is more frequent in the old, who, when the other passions have been weakened, adhere to this one, and, from immoderate prudence, fear lest perhaps they lack necessities.[1] - Formerly, when money was retained at home and carefully guarded in chests, there were not lacking avaricious men who cultivated coins as certain idols, and truly served mammon, depriving even themselves and their own of necessities.[2] But today, since money is fruitful in such diverse ways, generally it is not loved for its own sake, but on account of the diverse conveniences which it brings, namely splendid houses, exquisite foods, pleasures, honors, authority over others, since all things obey money.[3]

[1] "But what is here most deplorable for this vice in a priest is that age and reflections usually cure the other passions, whereas this one seems to revive and take on new forces in old age... The more death approaches, the more one broods with one's eyes over one's miserable treasure; the more one regards it as a necessary precaution for an imaginary future. Thus age rejuvenates, so to speak, this unworthy passion; years, illnesses, reflections, everything thrusts it more deeply into the soul; and it is nourished and inflamed by the very remedies which cure and extinguish the others." (Massillon, op. cit., Oeuvres, Besancon, 1822, t. IX, p. 183).

[2] "The other (the avaricious man) amasses only in order to amass: it is not to provide for his needs; he refuses them to himself: his money is more precious to him than his health, than his life, than his salvation, than himself; all his actions, all his views, all his affections, refer only to this unworthy object." (Massillon, op. cit., p. 180).

[3] Thus many modern rich men (plutocrats), as may be seen apud Carnegie, The Empire of Business.

557. But the effects which it produces (commonly they are called its daughters) are: (a) hardening of heart toward the poor, because the heart, clinging to riches, is not softened by mercy, nor does it wish to help the miserable, but addresses them harshly and repels them, indeed rigorously exacts debts from them, even if they are unequal to paying them; (b) disquiet of heart, or anxious application of the mind to acquiring and preserving riches, or many solicitudes and fears lest the wealth sought with so much solicitude be lost; (c) frauds, fallacies, for deceiving contracting parties concerning the quality or quantity of things sold, so that gain may be perceived more easily and more quickly; to these are sometimes joined perjuries, indeed also betrayals, as is clear concerning Judas, who from avarice betrayed Christ; (d) violence and crimes, by which others' goods are unjustly seized.

558. 2. The malice of avarice and cupidity. (A) Considered in itself, avarice (a) is a mortal sin from its kind, when it is opposed to justice, namely by stealing or retaining the goods of another, as is explained fully in the Treatise on Justice; (b) but it is a venial sin when it is opposed to liberality, because this virtue of itself obliges only under light obligation; nevertheless if someone, in a particular case, from inordinate cupidity, were to deny aid to a poor man placed in extreme necessity, he would sin mortally, as will be clear from the things to be said below concerning Charity.

559. (B) But in its effects, avarice not rarely draws to grave sins against God, neighbor, and oneself: (a) against God, insofar as the avaricious man, on account of temporal good, despises eternal things, and cultivates riches, not God. Hence avarice is called by the Apostle service of idols,[1] and Christ says:[2] "You cannot serve God and mammon," because, namely, no one can serve two masters. In reality there are not lacking those who, on account of love of riches, do not fear to act against the love of God. (b) Against the neighbor, because, as St. Thomas says,[3] "in exterior riches one man cannot abound unless another lacks, because temporal goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time." Now the rich are able to become richer, and sometimes by unjust contracts, wicked lawsuits, monopolies, and iniquitous exactions they vex and despoil the poor. Wherefore St. Ambrose, recalling the history of Naboth, despoiled by cruel Jezebel, writes:[4] "The history of Naboth is old in time, daily in use. For what rich man does not daily covet others' things? What one of the very wealthy does not strive to drive a poor man from his little field, and to eliminate the needy man from the boundaries of his ancestral land? Who is content with his own? Whose rich soul is not inflamed by a neighboring possession?" (c) Against himself, insofar as the avaricious man is made a slave of riches; for he does not

possess gold, but rather is possessed by gold, and is made a captive of his own opulence; for how many labors, solicitudes, vigils are required for gathering or guarding or increasing that wealth? He is cruel against himself, defrauding himself of true spiritual goods in order to obtain perishable riches. In the highest affluence of goods he is needy and poor, not only because he lacks tranquillity of soul and joy of heart, but also because he always seeks greater riches: for avarice is insatiable, and cannot be filled even in man's old age. - Moreover he renders himself liable to many temptations: the richer someone is, the more frequently he falls into occasions of sin, according to that saying of the Apostle:[1] "For those who wish to become rich fall into temptation, and into the snare of the devil, and into many useless and harmful desires, which plunge men into ruin and perdition. For cupidity is the root of all evils."

[1] "For understand this, that every fornicator, or unclean man, or avaricious man, which is service of idols, has no inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God" (Eph. 5:5). Yet not a few think, from the context, that by the name avaricious man is designated him who immoderately indulges lust.

[2] Matt. 6:24.

[3] St. Thomas, q. 118, a. 1, ad 2.

[4] De Nabuthe, c. 1, P. L., XIV, 731.

[1] 1 Tim. 6:9-10.

560. 3. Remedies against avarice and cupidity. (a) The vanity of temporal goods, compared with the excellence of spiritual goods, ought to deter Christians from avarice: "Do not store up treasures for yourselves on earth, where rust and moth destroy, and where thieves dig through and steal. But store up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither rust nor moth destroys, and where thieves do not dig through nor steal... Seek therefore first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added to you."[2]

[2] Matt. 6:19-20, 33.

He indeed is rich who possesses God, and he is very poor who, abounding in wealth, lacks the grace of God. Wherefore the first Christians were not ashamed of their poverty, but gloried in it: "Moreover, because most of us are called poor, this is not our infamy, but glory: for as the soul is loosened by luxury, so it is strengthened by frugality; and yet who can be poor, who does not lack, who does not gape after another's goods, who is rich in God? He is rather poor who, although he has many things, desires more."[3]

[3] Minucius Felix, in Octavio, c. 37, P. L., III, 351; cf. Bossuet, Sermon sur l'eminente dignite des pauvres, - sur nos dispositions a l'egard des necessites de la vie.

Besides, death comes, and separates us even unwilling from all riches, and therefore he acts foolishly who places his hope in perishable things: "Fool, this night they demand your soul from you: but the things which you have prepared, whose shall they be?"[4]

[4] Luke 12:20.

561. (b) Especially powerful above all is the example of Christ, who, although he was rich, became poor for us, that by his poverty we might be rich;[5] namely born of a poor mother in a stable, and wrapped in swaddling clothes in a manger, he led a poor life with the poor, chose poor

disciples, openly declared the poor blessed, died most poor on the cross, despoiled of his own garments. The sign of his divine mission is the evangelization of the poor. Therefore our patrimony is the poverty of Christ, and he denies Christ who glories in riches and adheres to them with his whole heart.

[5] 2 Cor. 8:9.

(c) Therefore let the poor not be ashamed of their poverty, but rather be content with it, gaping after eternal goods. But let the rich redeem past sins by alms, and guard against future ones by using wealth to do good to the poor: "Charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God... to become rich in good works; to give easily, to communicate; to store up for themselves a good foundation for the future, that they may apprehend true life."[1] - In reality nothing more efficaciously turns the mind away from earthly things, nothing renders salvation more secure than the copious pouring forth of alms into the bosom of the poor.

[1] 1 Tim. 6:17-19.

VII. Concerning Acedia and Sloth.

562. 1. Notion of acedia. Thus far concerning the vices which impel us to acting badly; now concerning sloth, which on the contrary induces us to not acting or to acting remissly, when some office to be fulfilled presses. Sloth in a general way is a propension to acting remissly and negligently, or to idleness. When this negligence is concerned with spiritual things and generates a certain weariness, it is called acedia. Therefore this is usually defined as sadness or weariness concerning spiritual good (*degout des choses spirituelles*), on account of the labor joined to it. Namely, in the present order of things we are able to accomplish no good without labor, whether in the natural order or in the supernatural order. Now we naturally flee more or less from every laborious work, and therefore not rarely are saddened when the question is of fulfilling an arduous office, and on account of this we abstain from doing it.

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 35, and De Malo, q. 11; Nat. Alex., op. cit., p. 1148-1170. - In Greek, *akedeia* signifies negligence.

Acedia is concerned with spiritual things; sloth with any offices whatever, even those of natural life. Each defect arises from the same vicious principle, namely horror of difficulty and labor.

563. The effects (or daughters) of acedia are: (a) a certain derision of all things which pertain to piety: for those who neglect their duties, by a certain natural instinct, deride those things which they do not wish to perform; (b) indignation against those who by exhortations, admonitions, and rebukes incite the slothful to perfection and labor: for these men shudder at being disturbed in their rest; (c) torpor, by which the observance of precepts is either utterly omitted, or is performed only perfunctorily and yawningly: thence arises tepidity, which, with Scripture as witness, greatly displeases God;[1] (d) pusillanimity, which disdains and turns away from arduous works; (e) sometimes despair, which is born from the fact that care of one's own salvation, on account of difficulties to be overcome, is cast aside.

[1] Apoc. 3:15-16.

564. 2. The malice of acedia and sloth. (A) Acedia, considered in itself, is a mortal sin whenever it induces perfect sadness concerning divine good, and negligence of one's own salvation and of the means necessary for attaining it. For then it is gravely opposed to the command of loving God from the whole heart, from the whole soul, and from all one's powers. - But sloth is a sin more or less grave according as it induces neglect of an office more or less grave.

(B) But if they are considered in their effects, sloth, and a fortiori acedia, cause many and indeed grave evils: (a) the soul of the slothful man is deservedly compared to a field in which not the crops of good works, but the nettles and thorns of vices grow wonderfully: "I passed through the field of the slothful man, and through the vineyard of the foolish man; and behold nettles had filled it all, and thorns had covered its surface."[2] (b) It is liable to many temptations and sins: "Idleness has taught much malice... This was the iniquity of Sodom, your sister: pride, satiety of bread, and abundance, and her idleness and that of her daughters."[3] In reality, since the mind cannot be entirely empty, nor the will entirely at rest, if we give ourselves to leisure, by this very fact depraved thoughts invade the mind, and solicit the will to depraved actions. (c) It casts one into danger of eternal salvation: for since each one receives his own reward according to his labor,[4] he who does not make good fruit shall be cut down and cast into the fire.[5] For it is not enough, for attaining salvation, to abstain from evil, but it is also necessary to work good, and especially to fulfill diligently the offices of one's state: "For," says St. Chrysostom,[6] "not to have done good, this is to have done evil. For tell me, if you have some servant who neither steals, nor is insulting, nor contradicts, and abstains from drunkenness and from all other things, but perpetually sits idle, and does nothing of those things which a servant ought to render to his master, will you not beat him with lashes, will you not torment him?" Furthermore we are servants of God, condemned to arduous labor, not only on account of the fault of our first parents, but also on account of personal sins; workers hired in his vineyard for obtaining the reward of labors; and therefore we ought to labor strenuously and assiduously, for obtaining the reward of eternal life.

[2] Prov. 24:30-31.

[3] Eccli. 33:29; Ezek. 16:49.

[4] 1 Cor. 3:8.

[5] Matt. 7:19.

[6] St. Chrysostom, in ep. ad Ephes., hom. 16, n. 1, P. G., LXII, 112.

565. 3. Remedies against acedia and sloth. (A) Frequent thought concerning the necessity of working good and laboring strenuously. For God wishes all men, even the rich and noble, to flee idleness and to work good assiduously. But the law which imposed labor upon Adam the sinner[1] binds all sinners, men and women,[2] the richer equally with the poor. For all are held to bring forth fruits of good works, and to labor manfully in the vineyard of the Lord; otherwise the father of the family will deservedly rebuke the slothful in this way:[3] "Why do you stand here all day idle?" and if the fig-tree brings forth no fruit, it will be cut down, according to that saying:[4] "Cut it down therefore; why does it also occupy the ground?"

[1] "In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread" (Gen. 3:19).

[2] Concerning the utility and necessity of labor with regard to girls and wives, the Countess Z. wrote wisely, Sur le Travail, Paris, Lethielleux, 1902; with regard to boys and men, Payot, Educ. de la volonte, l. IV, ch. 4; P. Doumer, Le Livre de mes fils, Paris, 1906, p. 63-72.

[3] Matt. 20:6.

[4] Luke 13:7.

For the rich who are given over to idleness it is indeed difficult to enter into the kingdom of heaven,[5] because idleness has taught much malice, especially that which abounds in wealth; but the rich who labor strenuously will receive their own reward according to their labor: "He who sows sparingly, sparingly also shall reap, and he who sows in blessings, from blessings also shall reap."[6] - And, if difficulty and weariness deter from labor, let thought of the reward promised to good workers inflame one to it: "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory which shall be revealed in us... For that which is present and momentary and light in our tribulation works in us above measure an eternal weight of glory on high."[7]

[5] Luke 18:25.

[6] 2 Cor. 9:6.

[7] Rom. 8:18; 2 Cor. 4:17.

566. (B) Those who do not need to labor for themselves should not disdain to work for the relief of others. For there are so many poor who cannot nourish themselves and their families by their own labor, - so many ignorant of religious things, who need instruction, - so many little ones who receive no education at home and, unless they are educated Christianly, will soon be numbered among socialists and anarchists, - so many workers, imbued with prejudices against religion and the social order, whom it is necessary to teach true principles. Those who tend toward idleness should turn these and other things of this kind over in their mind, and should understand that in present-day society it is licit for no one to indulge acedia and sloth: for useless trees and fruitless fig-trees will soon be cut down and cast into the fire of tribulation.

567. (C) Let them likewise think that none are more miserable than the idle: weariness of life, vices of the flesh, intemperance, often dissensions and discords render these men unhappy. They are deservedly despised by honorable persons, they excite the envy of the poor, and they are made gravely burdensome to themselves and others. But in spiritual things, acedia generates tepidity; and the tepid lead a miserable life: for they enjoy neither the pleasures of the world, which conscience forbids, nor the divine consolation which is reserved for the truly devout, but are contemptuously rejected by God, according to that saying: "I know your works, that you are neither cold nor hot; would that you were cold or hot! But because you are tepid, and neither cold nor hot, I will begin to vomit you out of my mouth."[1]

[1] Apoc. 3:15-16.

Therefore let us burn with the fire of charity, lest we burn with the fire of tribulation: this ardor snatches us upward, to glorifying God, to relieving the neighbor, to cultivating the virtues, concerning which it remains to be treated.

On Virtues in Common

Concerning Virtues in Common.

568. Just as there are vicious habits by which we are inclined to sin, so likewise there are in us good habits, by which we are sweetly disposed to honorable and meritorious acts: but these are called virtues. Habits of this kind can naturally be acquired by repeated acts, or supernaturally be infused into the soul by God. Wherefore, after preliminary notions concerning habits, we will speak:

I. Concerning acquired virtues;

II. Concerning infused virtues.

Preliminary Matters Concerning Habits in General.

Since this matter is more philosophical than theological, we will recall only a few things concerning the notion, subject, origin and increase, loss and division of habits, setting forth those things which are more commonly admitted.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49-54; Suarez, Disput. metaphys., XLIV; John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, Lyons, 1663, Tr. de Passionibus, habitibus et virtutibus, disp. XIII; Lequeux, De Virtutibus, Paris, 1843, diss. I, c. 2, p. 15-29; Barre, Tract. de Virtutibus, Paris, 1886, p. 93-119; Billot, De Virtutibus infusis, Rome, 1901, Prolegomenon, p. 17-29; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXI (1899), p. 529-536; Rabier, Psychologie, p. 571-587; Marion, Lec. de Psychologie, Paris, Colin, p. 140-158.

569. 1. Notion. Habit (from the word *habere*, to have) in a general sense signifies a mode of bearing oneself. But in a more particular sense it designates a stable quality by which some being is perfected. But this can be completed in two ways: in its being and in its operations; in the former case, the habit is called entitative: thus, for example, health of body with regard to the natural order, habitual grace in the supernatural order; in the latter case, the habit is called operative: such are the virtues of prudence, fortitude, etc.

Here we treat of operative habits. In this sense, habit is usually defined as a stable quality which disposes and helps a potency for act. Therefore it is a certain reality, belonging to the genus of quality, added to some faculty, so that this faculty may become ready for acting. According to St. Thomas, it differs in some way from disposition, which is, as it were, an inchoate habit, but does not yet obtain that stability which is desired for habit properly so called.[1]

[1] "Disposition is taken in two ways: in one way according as it is the genus of habit, for disposition is placed in the definition of habit. In another way according as it is something divided against habit. And disposition properly so called can be understood to be co-divided against habit in two ways: in one way as perfect and imperfect in the same species, so that disposition is said to retain the common name when it inheres imperfectly, so that it is lost easily; but habit, when it inheres perfectly, so that it is not easily lost, and thus disposition becomes habit, just as a boy becomes a man... From this it is clear that the name habit imports a certain lastingness, but not the name disposition." (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3.)

570. Habit helps a potency to act in a twofold way; a natural and acquired habit helps it to perform an operation more promptly, more easily, and more delectably; but a supernatural and infused habit[2] of itself does not confer facility, but elevates the potency, which by its nature is unfit for certain acts, so that it may be able to perform these acts; thus the infused virtue of faith indeed does not give promptitude for eliciting acts of faith. Yet it must be noted that facility of operating is acquired by the exercise of infused virtues, for example, by repeated acts of faith, insofar as obstacles are removed, and the potencies are rendered more apt for eliciting these acts, as will be explained below.

[2] To understand rightly the distinction between natural and supernatural habits, there must be recalled to memory the things which we said in Theologia Dogmatica, De Deo Creante, n. 144-146, and above n. 85. Supernatural virtues are infused by God, - tend toward a supernatural end, - are exercised under the influence of actual grace, - and do not of themselves give facility, but only the power for acting supernaturally.

571. 2. The subject of habit. (a) Habits properly so called do not exist in subjects determined to only one thing in operating, or to acting always in one and the same mode: for then it can scarcely be conceived what habit adds to a potency which always does the same thing and acts in the same mode. But it can exist in all subjects which are not determined to one thing, but can operate in diverse ways, and exercise their operations more or less promptly and perfectly: for then it can incline and dispose the faculties toward one or another genus of actions, and toward eliciting those actions more or less promptly and perfectly.

(b) Hence habits can be in the human body, because, insofar as it is substantially united to a spiritual soul, it can be disposed and habituated to serve promptly the operations of the soul.[1] Thus by the assiduous practice of temperance, chastity, and mortification, the body becomes accustomed to obey the command of the will more promptly and more easily; wherefore it is of the greatest moment to subdue the body by good habits, that it may be made a docile instrument of the soul.

[1] Nevertheless St. Thomas holds that habits of this kind are principally in the soul, and secondarily in the body, because the body receives its movement from the soul.

572. (c) The intellectual faculties of the soul are properly the subject of habits, because they are not determined to operating in one way; but the will is the principal subject in which they are rooted, because it, as endowed with free choice, most greatly possesses the power of choosing. Nevertheless also the sensitive powers are the subject of habits, although less principally, insofar as they are subject to the command of the will (above, n. 73-75). This indeed is established by experience; through custom, the imagination is more or less subdued, or on the contrary is accustomed to wander; - through custom, passions are restrained or on the contrary are more easily borne toward illicit things. Indeed, with experience as witness, custom is conquered by custom: thus those prone to anger, by repeated efforts, become meek, the proud learn to cultivate humility, the ambitious turn themselves toward divine things, etc. (above, n. 107). Therefore it matters greatly to acquire good habits already from childhood, but utterly to eradicate evil ones.

573. 3. Concerning the origin and increase of habits. Some are supernaturally infused by God: concerning these below. Others are naturally acquired: and concerning these we must now treat.

(a) That natural propensions transmitted by heredity are given we already noted above, n. 116-117; inclinations of this kind can be called latent habits, insofar as they remain sleeping until, by an external occasion, they are aroused as though from sleep; thus sons born from drunken parents not rarely have contracted an inclination toward alcoholic drinks, which as soon as it is excited by libations passes into habit.

(b) According to St. Thomas,[2] certain habits are implanted by nature itself, at least inchoatively. Thus, with regard to first principles (for example, the whole is greater than its part, good is to be loved), we are so inclined to knowing them that the habit of these principles can be called naturally implanted. Likewise in certain individuals are found certain natural propensions which are, as it were, inchoate habits: for there are some disposed, from the proper complexion of the body, toward chastity, others toward gentleness, others toward fortitude, as was said above, where temperament and character were treated, n. 120-121.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 51, a. 1. - Others indeed, with Suarez (Disput. metaph., disp. 44, sect. 13, n. 7), do not wish these propensions to be called habits; but the question is more about the name than about the thing.

574. (c) But especially from multiplied acts habits are generated and increased, as experience establishes: namely, the more frequently, longer, and more intensely acts are repeated, provided nevertheless that the powers are not exhausted, the greater facility and promptitude are obtained for doing the same acts. The first act already produces some disposition, which the second increases; other acts will complete the generation of the habit. The reason for this is that any faculty is at the same time active and passive; insofar as it is active, it impresses a certain movement, and insofar as it is passive, it receives and retains an impression, by force of which subsequent acts become easier.

Nevertheless, according to St. Thomas,[1] an act does not increase a habit unless it is at least equally intense as the habit itself; for if it is more remiss, it does not dispose toward its increase, but rather toward its diminution; thus he who has already acquired the habit of fervor does not increase it, but rather diminishes it, when he prays remissly and tepidly.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 52, a. 3. - Yet some on the contrary hold with T. Raynaud, De Virtutibus, l. I, c. 2, that even remiss acts increase with some proportion the force of the habit.

575. (d) Habits can grow in two ways, extensively and intensively: extensively, when the object with which they are concerned is multiple and is successively amplified; thus the habit of knowledge grows when it extends itself to more things, and humility is increased when the various degrees of this virtue are reached; intensively, when they are rooted more deeply in the soul, so that actions are elicited more easily and more delectably. This indeed can be explained thus: through the repetition of acts, difficulty in acting is diminished, and therefore with the same effort subsequent acts are performed more easily, and consequently more delectably.[2] But how habits influence liberty we explained at n. 109-110.

[2] "In proportion as the act no longer requires for being repeated except a lesser effort, the excess of power, which the cause does not expend in reproducing it, becomes in some way available for new and superior efforts." (Lemoine, apud Rabier, Psychol., p. 587.)

576. 4. Concerning the loss of habits. That acquired habits are diminished or sometimes utterly perish is established by experience. (a) First, according to all, they decrease or perish through contrary acts, especially intense and long-lasting ones; thus the habit of temperance is gradually diminished and finally utterly taken away through often repeated acts of drunkenness. For contraries are destroyed by contraries, and custom is conquered by custom; thus facility of using food and drink moderately soon decreases when someone begins to indulge gluttony and drunkenness: for, just as by repeated acts of temperance a good habit had been acquired, so by frequent contrary acts an evil habit is contracted; now, when contrary habits are present, the stronger destroys the weaker.

577. (b) Moreover they are diminished and sometimes perish through long cessation from exercise, not indeed directly, as the more probable opinion holds, but indirectly, insofar as, exercise ceasing, impediments are multiplied, and little by little contrary habits are introduced which overwhelm the former ones. Thus memory is diminished unless you exercise it. The same must be said of moral habits: for when someone, for a long time, does not use the habit of virtue for moderating passions, these are accustomed to rise up against reason, and to transgress just limits; thus the inclination to good is gradually diminished, and depraved habits are born which can overturn good ones.[1] Nevertheless, if after some time new efforts are made before the habit is utterly extinguished, it revives more easily.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 53, a. 3.

But by accident habits impressed upon organic powers can be altered by an alteration of the organ itself; thus sometimes memory is diminished or perishes.

578. 5. Concerning the division of habits. (a) By reason of the object with which they are concerned, habits are good or vicious, according as their object is good or evil. Good habits are called virtues, but evil ones vices; here we treat only of the former, since we have already spoken of the latter, where sins were treated. (b) By reason of origin and nature, virtues are acquired or infused: concerning these we must treat separately.

Art. I. Concerning Acquired Virtues.

579. Preliminary matters. (A) Virtue (from the word *vir*, man) first indeed designated a quality proper to a man, or fortitude,[1] but afterward any endowment,[2] especially that by force of which we operate according to the dictate of right reason. In this sense it is usually defined as a habit disposing man's powers to operating rightly,[3] or a good habit. Therefore it is a quality added to the faculties, helping them toward acting according to right reason.

[1] Thus Cicero, Tuscul., l. II, 18: "For virtue was named from man: but what is most proper to a man is fortitude, whose two greatest offices are contempt of death and of pain." Cf. Breal and Bailly, Dict. etymol., p. 441.

[2] Apud Cicero, Brut., 17: "In Cato's orations all oratorical virtues will be found."

[3] According to St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55, a. 4, virtue is a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us. - These last words can be predicated of infused virtues alone; but the former also regard acquired virtues.

580. (B) Therefore virtues properly reside not in the essence of the soul, but in its powers: for these are immediately ordered to act.[4] Now the faculties in which virtues properly so called inhere are rational powers, namely intellect and will, but especially the will.[5] For virtues properly so called rightly order our acts in the moral order; now the only truly moral act is that which proceeds from the will with previous knowledge of the intellect (above, n. 66); and therefore virtues properly inhere in those faculties which elicit moral acts, chiefly in the will. Nevertheless other faculties participate in the nature of virtue insofar as they are subject to the command of the will (above, n. 73-75): for under this respect they are made capable of morality, and therefore secondarily can be the subject of virtue: thus the virtue of temperance in some way inheres in the sensible appetite for moderating sensual passions.[6]

[4] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 1.

[5] Ibid., a. 3 and 6.

[6] Ibid., a. 4; cf. Cajetan, in I-II, q. 74, a. 4.

581. (C) Since there is a twofold order, natural and supernatural, virtues are of a twofold kind, namely natural, or acquired, and supernatural, or divinely infused. Here we treat only of the former.

Acquired virtues can be found even in pagans or heretics, since these are capable of good works and consequently of habits, from the things said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 34. - But the faithful, who enjoy the gift of true faith and sanctifying grace, ought to cultivate with all their powers these virtues, which of themselves are natural, and indeed in a more perfect manner than unbelievers, so that by examples they may manifestly show that grace does not destroy, but on the contrary perfects whatever good is in human nature.[1] But, that they may be truly Christian, they ought to cultivate these virtues in a supernatural manner, that is, on account of a supernatural end, and under the influence of actual grace: for thus they will pursue not only an honorable end, but the supernatural end to which in fact they are ordered, and will acquire supernatural merits.

[1] Concerning certain natural virtues Cardinal Gibbons excellently discusses, The Ambassador of Christ, Baltimore, 1896, ch. 8-10; translated into French by Andre: L'Ambassadeur du Christ, Paris, Lethielleux; cf. St. Francis de Sales, Introd., 3rd Part, ch. 36; Ribet, Honnete avant tout.

Virtues of this kind are of two species: intellectual and moral: the former perfect the intellect with regard to the knowledge of truth; the latter perfect the will with regard to the pursuit of good: concerning both we must speak separately.

I. Concerning Intellectual Virtues.

582. 1. Notion. (A) Three speculative intellectual virtues[3] are commonly distinguished: (a) understanding, or the habit perfecting the intellect for knowing first principles intimately; for to understand is the same as to read within. (b) Knowledge is the habit perfecting the intellect for logically deducing conclusions contained in first principles.

(c) Wisdom is the habit perfecting the intellect for knowing things not only in themselves, but also in their causes, especially in God, who is the highest and ultimate cause of all; wherefore he is called truly wise who knows God as the first principle and ultimate end of all, and judges concerning all things insofar as they are referred to God. - Thus wisdom contains under itself understanding and knowledge, since it judges both concerning principles and concerning conclusions deduced from the same. - Perhaps therefore it can be said that there is one intellectual virtue, namely wisdom, which ascends from created things to God, and uses the knowledge of principles and conclusions for judging concerning created things according to their relation to God.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57-58; Suarez, in I-II, Tr. IV, disp. 3; John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. 16; Billuart, De Passionibus et Virtutibus, diss. II; Lequeux, op. cit., p. 33 and 74-81; Barre, op. cit., p. 143-147 and 165-184.

[3] Besides the speculative virtues, two practical ones are enumerated, prudence, concerning which below where moral virtues are treated, and art, or the habit disposing the intellect to making artificial things rightly, concerning which nothing special occurs to be said.

583. (B) But wisdom, like the other intellectual virtues, is not properly a virtue except insofar as it is ordered to acting rightly. For virtue has regard to forming morals honorably; therefore if someone is endowed with knowledge and speculative wisdom, but does not use it for a right institution of life, from this he cannot be said to be endowed with virtue; but wisdom which is ordered to acting honorably is deservedly called a virtue;[1] and all Christians indeed ought to cultivate it, but especially those upon whom the office rests of illuminating and teaching others, and most of all the ministers of Christ, to whom it was said: "Going therefore, teach all nations."[2]

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 1.

[2] Matt. 28:19.

584. 2. Excellence. Scripture often commends this wisdom, insofar as it rightly orders us to God, and impels us to fulfilling the divine law. (a) Namely, wisdom ought to be preferred to all riches: "I preferred her before kingdoms and thrones, and I thought riches nothing in comparison with her... But all good things came to me together with her, and innumerable honor by her hands."[3] (b) Its endowments are almost innumerable: "For in her is the spirit of intelligence, holy, one, manifold, subtle, eloquent, mobile, undefiled, sure, sweet, loving good, acute, which nothing hinders, beneficent, humane, benign, stable, sure, secure, having every virtue, seeing all things, and who can take in all spirits, intelligible, clean, subtle."[4] (c) Hence God loves only those who cultivate wisdom: "For God loves no one except him who dwells with wisdom."[5] (d) It operates strongly and at the same time sweetly: "Therefore she reaches from end to end strongly, and disposes all things sweetly."[6] (e) It teaches the other virtues: "For she teaches sobriety and prudence, and justice, and virtue, than which nothing is more useful in life to men."[7] From these and many other things which may be read in the books of Proverbs and Wisdom, the excellence of wisdom can be understood.

[3] Wis. 7:8, 11.

[4] Ibid., 22-23.

[5] Ibid., 28.

[6] Wis. 8:1.

[7] Ibid., 7.

But today not a few, especially positivists, by the name of knowledge understand the cognition of things which can be investigated by experience and induction, and at the same time contend that it is impossible to reach the first cause, and therefore reject not only theological, but also metaphysical knowledge; nevertheless they extol positive knowledge as the only norm of the true and honorable, and the means by which the human race will finally attain perfect happiness.[1] We refuted this error above, n. 43-47. That knowledge of this kind is not a virtue, although it discovers and teaches many useful things, is clear from this, that it turns us away from God, far from directing us to him.

[1] Brunetiere excellently shows the insufficiency of knowledge for the right institution of moral life, and true happiness of heart, in Revue des Deux Mondes, Jan. 1, 1895; cf. M. d'Hulst, L'empoisonnement de la Science, in Melanges oratoires, t. IV, p. 174-189.

II. Concerning Moral Virtues.

585. 1. Notion. (A) Moral virtues are acquired habits perfecting the will and appetite for acting rightly. - Insofar as they are natural, they rest upon a natural motive, namely honorableness, which comes from conformity with right reason. The end toward which they of themselves tend is the natural perfection of man and his happiness. - Nevertheless, since in fact man is destined to a supernatural end, virtues of this kind, although of themselves natural, can be referred to a supernatural end, and be exercised under the influence of supernatural grace; indeed they can even be supernaturally infused, as will be said below, n. 598.

586. (B) It has been doubted whether the aforementioned virtues are virtues of the true name. Now it is certain that they truly have the nature of virtue, when through charity they are referred to the ultimate supernatural end. It is likewise certain that the same, as long as they remain within the natural order, cannot merit or attain eternal salvation, since there is lacking proportion between the supernatural end and the acts of natural virtues.

Nevertheless it can be said that these are true and perfect virtues in their own genus; for, as Benedict XIV rightly says, "if unbelievers can do honorable works, and frequently exercise themselves in them, they can also acquire for themselves and procure habits of such works, and thus consequently have true and perfect moral virtues in their own genus."[2]

[2] Benedict XIV, De servorum Dei beatific., lib. III, c. 21, n. 6.

587. 2. Division. Among moral virtues, there are four principal ones, which are called cardinal, because on these, as on hinges, the other virtues lean: namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.[3]

[3] Vacant-Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. II, 1714.

The Fathers and theologians often gather this division from these words of Wisdom:[1] "For she teaches sobriety (that is, temperance), and prudence, and justice, and virtue (fortitude), than which nothing is more useful in life to men." There indeed is not handed down a scientific division of virtues, but an enumeration of certain principal ones. - Pagan philosophers likewise numbered four principal virtues consonant with the aforementioned ones.[2] But this division already from the time of St. Ambrose became common in the Church.

[1] Wis. 8:7.

[2] Cicero, Tuscul., c. 14; De officiis, lib. I, c. 20.

588. (A) He seems to have been the first who called the four praised virtues cardinal: "And indeed we know that there are four cardinal virtues, temperance, justice, prudence, fortitude."[3] But afterward he hands down their notion thus:[4] "In the first place they established prudence, which is concerned with the investigation of truth, and infuses the desire of fuller knowledge; secondly justice, which gives to each his own, does not claim another's, neglects its own utility in order to guard common equity; thirdly fortitude, which both in military matters is eminent by the greatness of an exalted soul, and at home, and excels in the powers of the body; fourthly temperance, which preserves the measure and order of all things which we judge either must be done or must be said."

[3] Ambrose, Exposit. in Luc., lib. V, n. 62, P. L., XV, 1653.

[4] De officiis ministrorum, lib. I, c. 24, P. L., XVI, 57.

589. (B) This theory, generally accepted by the other Fathers, St. Thomas refined, namely by explaining why there are four cardinal virtues, and in what way they are distinguished from one another. He observes first that the cardinal virtues can be considered in two ways: (a) insofar as they signify certain general conditions of the human soul, which are found in all virtues; thus prudence is a certain rectitude of practical judgment, by which discretion is preserved in individual acts; justice is a rectitude of soul by which man bears himself rightly in all things to be done; fortitude is a certain firmness against any impulses of the passions or labors of operations; temperance is understood as a certain moderation in all things. In this sense, these virtues are not distinguished from one another, but are called cardinal, because they are the general conditions or properties of any virtue, which must be at the same time prudent, just, moderate, and strong. (b) But the aforementioned virtues can be considered in another way, according as they are concerned with formally diverse objects, and are subjected in various powers. Thus prudence resides in the practical intellect, and perceives and suggests the means to be used for attaining the honorable end in individual acts; justice inclines the will to bearing itself rightly concerning actions due to another, or to rendering to each his own; fortitude perfects the irascible appetite, so that it may stand firmly against all dangers; temperance is in the concupiscible appetite for restraining sensual delectations, especially those which arise from touch. According to this acceptance, the aforementioned virtues are truly and really distinguished, although they are in some way connected.

590. Moreover in the cardinal virtues there can be distinguished integral, subjective, and potential parts. Integral parts are certain conditions or dispositions which, although they do not

constitute the virtue essentially, are required for its integral perfection; thus for the perfection of prudence memory, understanding, providence, etc., are desired. - Subjective parts are called the various species of some virtue; thus justice is divided into commutative and distributive. - Potential or annexed parts are called certain less principal virtues which are joined to another more principal one, although they do not perfectly attain its nature; thus religion and piety toward parents are potential parts of justice, because they incline us to rendering to God and parents whatever is due to them, yet in such a way that we cannot render to equality what is due to them.

That this division is sufficiently intricate is clear from the mere consideration of the tree of virtues which certain Scholastics delineated. And indeed, for the perfection of Christian life, it is not necessary to hand down an accurate notion of all virtues with all their parts; but it is enough to set forth and cultivate the principal ones; for since many are connected, he who strives to acquire the principal ones, by that very fact makes progress in the others.

591. 3. Concerning the properties of moral virtues. Here we will explain two things, namely in what sense moral virtues are connected, and what is understood by the axiom: virtue stands in the middle.

(A) Concerning the connection of virtues. Already in his time Augustine thought that the four cardinal virtues are so connected among themselves that one cannot truly and properly be cultivated without the others:[1] "Certainly from this they persuade, that whoever has had one virtue has all, and all are lacking to him to whom one has been lacking, because prudence cannot be cowardly, nor unjust, nor intemperate: for if it were any of these, it would not be prudence. Furthermore if there will then be prudence, if it also is strong, and just, and temperate, certainly where it will be, it has the others with itself. So also fortitude cannot be imprudent, or intemperate, or unjust; so it is necessary that temperance be prudent, strong, and just; so justice is not, unless it is prudent, strong, and temperate. Thus where some one of them is true, the others likewise are; but where the others are lacking, that one is not true, even if in some way it seems to be similar."

[1] St. Augustine, epist. 167 (al. 29) ad Hieronymum, P. L., XXXIII, 735.

The Scholastics embraced this theory, in the sense that perfect moral virtues are so connected among themselves that, when one is lost, the others lose their perfection. But virtues are called perfect when they are not mere inclinations, but firm inclinations to following reason, and have all things required for their integrity. Then it can truly be said that these virtues are connected, because we cannot persevere long in one unless we are also adorned with the others; thus no one can be just for a long time unless he is prudent, temperate, and endowed with fortitude. Hence he who perfectly and stably cultivates one of these, by that very fact makes progress in the others, as we were saying just now.

592. (B) Concerning the mean of moral virtues. Virtues of this kind consist in the middle: (a) insofar as they avoid opposed excesses;[1] for example, fortitude stands in the middle between cowardice and rashness. For they are moral because they are conformed to the rule of morals; now they can deflect from the rule in a twofold way, either by exceeding the measure, or by falling short of it; therefore, to avoid this twofold excess, they ought to consist in the middle. (b) Moreover, when there is a collision of rights or duties, the mean of virtues consists in this,

that one virtue is tempered by another: thus, if justice inclines to punishing the guilty strictly, sometimes clemency counsels that, all circumstances attended to, the penalty be mitigated. - But it belongs to prudence, insofar as it is the charioteer of the virtues, to suggest this mean.

[1] This was the doctrine of the Stoics, with Horace as witness, Ep. 18, 9:

"Virtue is the middle of vices, and drawn back from each side."

593. 4. Concerning the increase, diminution, and loss of acquired moral virtues, the principles handed down above concerning acquired habits are valid, n. 573-577.

Art. II. Concerning Infused Virtues.

594. Besides acquired virtues, in the soul of the just there are supernatural habits divinely infused, by which it is directed toward choosing meritorious acts and attaining the supernatural end. For, by a certain analogy with natural life, three things are required for supernatural life: (a) a vital principle, which is nothing other than habitual grace, perfecting and elevating the substance of our soul, so that it can be the remote principle of supernatural actions; (b) operative faculties, or infused virtues, by which the powers naturally implanted in us are so elevated that they can be the proximate principle of supernatural acts; (c) the supernatural concurrence of God, namely actual grace, by force of which our faculties, strengthened by infused virtues, are excited and helped toward eliciting supernatural and meritorious acts.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62-63; Suarez, De Passionibus et habitibus, diss. III; John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. XVI; Lequeux, op. cit., p. 40-49 and passim; Muller, § 114-119; Pesch, Praelect. dogmaticae, t. VIII, n. 19-96; Billot, op. cit., th. 1-5.

I. Notion and Species.

595. (A) Infused virtues are supernatural habits implanted by God, by which the faculties of the soul receive the power of eliciting supernatural acts. (a) For in this they are primarily distinguished from natural virtues, that they are not acquired by repeated acts, but are divinely infused. Certain virtues are called infused of themselves, because they cannot be acquired by the powers of nature alone, and therefore cannot exist unless they are infused; but others are infused by accident, because, although they can be acquired by repeated acts, nevertheless they are conferred by God from his special benevolence. (b) Moreover, according to the common opinion, they do not furnish facility, but only the power of acting supernaturally: for experience seems to establish that those who received infused virtues in baptism are not conscious of this facility for acting supernaturally, - and on the contrary, through repeated acts of these virtues, they are soon sweetly inclined to eliciting the same more easily and delectably.

596. (B) Infused virtues can be theological or moral. (a) The former are so called because they are referred immediately to God; for the material object with which they are concerned is not a created thing, but God himself supernaturally known; but the motive (formal object) on which they rest is one of the divine attributes. There are three, namely faith, hope, charity, concerning which we will soon discuss.

(b) Moral virtues are immediately concerned with some created object (for example, justice renders to each his own), and the motive on account of which they are cultivated is the honorableness of the supernatural act itself. They are recalled to four, which are called cardinal; these do not differ on the part of the object from the four acquired cardinal virtues of which above; but only by reason of origin, since they are divinely infused, by reason of exercise, since they are exercised under the influence of actual grace, and by reason of end, because of themselves they tend toward a supernatural end.

II. Existence of Infused Virtues.

597. Thesis: It is certain that the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are infused in justification itself, and commonly the same is held concerning the moral virtues, especially the cardinal ones.

(A) Scripture rather clearly intimates this with regard to charity, and more obscurely with regard to the others: "The charity of God has been poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us";[1] for there charity (of God toward us, and therefore our charity toward God, since charity is mutual) is said to be infused by the Spirit at the very instant in which he is given to us, that is, in which we are justified. The other virtues likewise are exhibited as a gift of God: "For God has not given us a spirit of fear, but of power, and of love, and of sobriety."[2] - The Fathers, although they do not expressly uphold our thesis, not rarely assert that Christian virtues are the gift of God, the gift of the Holy Spirit, given through grace. Thus, among others, Augustine: "Grace will come after the Law; it is itself the blessing. And what has this grace and blessing furnished to us?" He answers that through grace many virtues are given, which he enumerates, and, after describing the four cardinal virtues, adds: "These virtues now in the valley of weeping are given to us by the grace of God."[3]

[1] Rom. 5:5.

[2] 2 Tim. 1:7.

[3] St. Augustine, in Ps. 73, n. 11, P. L., XXXVII, 1065-1066.

598. (B) At the beginning of the thirteenth century, it was supposed as certain that virtues are infused with habitual grace in adults, but it was doubted whether the same must be said of little ones, and some said that by the virtue of baptism guilt indeed is remitted to little ones, but grace is not conferred, nor virtues.[4] The matter was afterward brought to the Council of Vienne (A.D. 1311), and there it was declared:[5] "But we, attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all the baptized, have thought that the second opinion, which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism upon little ones as upon adults, as more probable and more consonant and concordant with the sayings of the saints and modern doctors of theology, should be chosen, with the sacred council approving."

[4] Decretal. Gregor., l. III, tit. 42, c. 3.

[5] Denzing., n. 411.

The Council of Trent declared the same as certain with regard to the theological virtues:[1] "In justification itself, with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused together through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity." The Catechism of the Council of

Trent holds that the same must be said concerning the other virtues; for, after describing sanctifying grace, it says: "But to this is added the most noble company of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul with grace."[2]

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, apud Denzing., n. 682.

[2] Catech. Trent., De sacram. baptismi, n. 42. The Catechism certainly does not possess the authority of the Council itself, but hands down the commonly accepted doctrine.

599. (C) Reason counsels this. In the natural order, God furnishes to man not only nature as the remote principle of acting, but also faculties by which he is immediately disposed to act. Now there is a certain analogy between natural life and supernatural life; and therefore it is deservedly inferred that God infuses into man not only habitual grace, which is the remote principle of acting supernaturally, but also proximate principles, or virtues. For although supernatural acts can be elicited through merely actual helps, it seems more consonant with divine wisdom that supernatural habits be infused, by whose aid these acts may be regularly produced.

III. Concerning the Increase of Infused Virtues.

600. 1. That virtues can be increased together with grace, Trent thus declares:[3] "Thus therefore, having been justified, and having been made friends and members of the household of God, going from virtue to virtue, they are renewed, as the Apostle says, from day to day;[4] that is, by mortifying the members of their flesh, and exhibiting them as arms of justice unto sanctification, through the observance of the commandments of God and of the Church, in the justice itself received through the grace of Christ, faith cooperating with good works, they grow and are more justified... But the holy Church asks for this increase of justice when she prays: Give us, O Lord, the increase of faith, hope, and charity."

[3] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 10, apud Denzing., n. 685.

[4] 2 Cor. 4:16.

601. 2. Virtues of this kind are increased through the worthy reception of the sacraments, and through merit *de condigno*.

(A) For the sacraments confer sanctifying grace, and indeed *ex opere operato*,[1] upon all who place no obstacle, and therefore they increase it in all who have received first grace; but grace growing, by that very fact the infused virtues which are connected with it grow.

[1] Synops. Theol. Dogmat., De Sacramentis, n. 45.

(B) Likewise supernatural good works, with Trent as witness,[2] truly merit the increase of grace, and consequently the increase of virtues which flow from it.

[2] Trent, sess. VI, can. 32, apud Denzing., n. 724; cf. Synops. dogmat., De Gratia, n. 193.

602. 3. But theologians dispute concerning the mode by which infused virtues are increased. (A) All indeed hold that they grow intensively, and indeed through divine infusion; for

since they are supernatural, and are produced in the soul by God, they cannot be increased by the proper efforts of the will, but only by divine action. Wherefore the repeated acts of these virtues do not concur directly toward their increase, but only as a meritorious cause, insofar as God, in view of these merits, increases grace and virtues.

But when the question concerns the intrinsic reason of this increase, theologians do not agree: (a) Thomists hold that the increase of habits happens not by the addition of a new form or reality, but by a greater rooting in the subject, which the habit more subjects to itself, by more easily reducing its potentiality into act.[3] (b) But Scotists[4] think that the increase happens through the addition of a new reality, or of a new degree, which accedes to the former and with it effects something one and more perfect. - A question of this kind is more philosophical than theological, and modern philosophers generally declare that nothing certain can be defined about this matter.

[3] Thus John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. XIII, art. 6.

[4] Scotus, in Sentent., lib. I, dist. 17, q. 3; Suarez, Disput. metaphys., XLVI, sect. I, where he enumerates the various opinions and critically weighs them.

603. (B) But it is certain that by the exercise of infused virtues facility in exercising acts of the same virtues is gradually acquired. This indeed arises especially from a twofold head: (a) From the removal of impediments; for by the exercise of infused virtue the passions are moderated, prejudices are put away, difficulties are overcome: but, obstacles removed, by that very fact the acts of virtues become easier. (b) From custom itself: for just as, through the frequent repetition of natural acts, a greater facility is acquired for doing the same, so likewise, at least indirectly, through the repetition of supernatural acts, the facility of doing the same is increased: for thus the potency is better disposed and, as it were, inclined to act. Hence a sinner recently converted indeed with difficulty works acts of temperance, chastity, fortitude, etc.; but, provided that, helped by grace, he elicits acts of these virtues, gradually he will perform the same more easily and delectably.

IV. Concerning the Loss of Infused Virtues.

604. 1. Infused theological virtues are lost through acts directly and gravely contrary to them; thus faith is destroyed through the grave sin of apostasy or heresy, - hope through the mortal sin of despair, - charity through any grave sin whatever, since it is opposed to divine charity.

(a) That faith is lost by infidelity (that is, by any grave sin against faith), but not by other grave sins, is clear from Trent:[1] "It must be asserted that not only by infidelity, through which faith itself also is lost, but also by any other mortal sin whatever, although faith is not lost, the received grace of justification is lost."

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 15, apud Denzing., n. 691. Cf. Synopsis Theol. Dogmat., De Fide, n. 141-147.

(b) But that charity is destroyed by any mortal sin whatever is likewise gathered from Trent; for, on the one hand, in the text alleged, it is declared that the grace of justification is lost by any mortal sin whatever; and, on the other, it is defined that justification happens "while through the Holy Spirit the charity of God is poured forth in the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them";[2] from

which it is deservedly inferred that charity does not inhere in sinners. - This is otherwise clear from innumerable texts of Scripture, in which it is asserted that sin is opposed to dilection, and that by charity the sons of God are distinguished from sinners,[3] as was said above, n. 449. And in reality, from what was said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 139-140, such is the nexus between grace and charity that one cannot subsist without the other.

[2] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, apud Denzing., n. 682.

[3] John 14:21; 1 John 2:3-11; 3:7-12.

(c) Concerning hope nothing is expressly defined; but the common and true opinion holds that it is not destroyed when sanctifying grace is lost, on account of the analogy with faith, but is lost through despair or through an act contrary to faith; for since, with the Apostle as witness,[1] faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, with faith hope necessarily perishes; for what can we hope, when the foundation of hope, namely faith in God the remunerator, has already failed?

[1] Heb. 11:1.

605. 2. It is commonly held that infused moral virtues are lost, together with habitual grace, through any mortal sin whatever.

(A) This St. Prosper, disciple of Augustine, had already taught, writing against the semi-Pelagian errors of Cassian: "Virtues cannot dwell with vices: for what participation," says the Apostle,[2] "has justice with iniquity? Or what fellowship has light with darkness? For virtue principally is God: to whom having virtue is not something other than being virtue. When we are participants of this, Christ dwells in us, who is the power of God and the wisdom of God;[3] faith dwells, hope, charity, continence, understanding, counsel, fortitude, and the other virtues. But when we withdraw from this good, all things opposite arise to us from us."[4]

[2] 2 Cor. 6:14.

[3] 1 Cor. 1:24.

[4] St. Prosper, Contra Collatorem, c. 13, P. L., LI, 247.

606. (B) Theologians commonly hold the same, led by this reason: infused moral virtues are, as it were, properties and the most noble company of grace, and therefore are infused so that they may order our life toward the supernatural end. Now, sanctifying grace having been lost, its properties are logically taken away; and since, through mortal sin, man is turned away from the supernatural end, he is consequently deprived of the virtues which tend toward the supernatural end. - It is indeed true, from what was said above, that faith and hope are not taken away by any grave sin whatever; but this happens from the special benevolence of God, who does not permit the very foundation of the spiritual building to be utterly overturned through mortal sin, but wishes faith and hope to remain in the sinner so that more easily he, moved by true penance, may return to the good Shepherd of souls.

Moreover if there are any naturally acquired virtues, they do not necessarily perish when grace is lost; thus he who has obtained the virtue of temperance or justice by repeated acts does not lose it by the very fact that he falls into a grave sin of lust.

607. 3. Corollary: concerning the diminution of infused virtues.

(A) It is commonly taught that infused habits are not diminished by venial sins. For if infused virtues were diminished by any venial sin, through many venial sins infused virtues and habitual grace itself could be totally destroyed; but this is opposed to the doctrine of Trent: "For although in this mortal life, however holy and just they may be, they sometimes fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial, they do not for that reason cease to be just."[1] - This is otherwise clear from what was said concerning venial sin, n. 483; for since infused virtues are the most noble company of grace, they are increased or lost with it; but they are not diminished, because grace itself is not diminished by venial sins, which in no way turn us away from God.

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 11, apud Denzing., n. 686.

608. (B) Nevertheless the fervor of charity and of the other virtues is diminished by venial sins. For (a) the facility of acting according to infused habits is diminished as soon as one sins against them even venially; (b) moreover he who frequently and deliberately commits venial sins, by that very fact is gradually disposed toward grave sin, as was shown above, n. 485, and thus a way is prepared for the very loss of charity: "Whence it follows," says St. Thomas,[2] "that charity can in no way be diminished, speaking directly; nevertheless the disposition toward its corruption can be called indirectly a diminution of charity, which happens either through venial sins, or even through cessation from the exercise of works of charity."

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 10.

For carefully avoiding such harm, nothing is of more profit than a constant effort toward making progress in Christian virtues. Concerning this progress it remains to be spoken in special moral theology.

609. After the consideration concerning human acts in general, insofar as, with law and conscience directing, they tend toward the ultimate end, - after the things said concerning sins and vices which turn us away from God, and also concerning virtues in common by which we are sweetly inclined toward God, it is necessary to discuss human acts in species: "For universal moral discourses are less useful, because actions are in particulars."[1]

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, Prologue.

But this part, which discusses acts in species, is called Special Theology. It is divided in diverse ways by diverse authors: (a) St. Thomas, whom many Scholastics have followed, distributes it into two parts, of which the former treats of those things which pertain to all states of men, but the latter of those things which pertain to determined states. But again he divides the former according to virtues; these are seven in number, namely three theological and four cardinal, concerning which he disputes separately and at length, describing them with all their parts, and with the gifts of the Holy Spirit which correspond to the same.

610. (b) Others, especially casuists,[2] who write for the use of confessors, omitting in their Institutions of Moral Theology all those things which are required for attaining Christian perfection, discuss only the precepts which are necessary for obtaining salvation: 1. concerning the precepts of the theological virtues; 2. concerning the precepts of the decalogue; 3.

concerning the precepts of the Church; 4. concerning the penalties laid down by the Church against graver delicts; 5. concerning the sacraments insofar as they are means for preserving the precepts. - This order is useful indeed to the confessor questioning penitents, but is of less profit to the director, who ought not only to turn souls away from evil, but also to lead them in the way of Christian virtues. The confessor could indeed and even ought to read ascetical authors, but not a few omit this, thinking that moral theology suffices for all things. - Besides, the precepts of the Decalogue or of the Church do not exhibit a logical and scientific order, and often are only negative; therefore this division, although practical enough in catechetical instructions, seems less apt for a scientific exposition of Christian Ethics.

[2] Thus especially Busembaum, S.J. (1600-1668), Medulla Theologiae moralis, whom, among others, Lacroix and St. Alphonsus followed and expounded with commentaries.

(c) Others, adhering to the division of natural Ethics, discuss successively duties toward God, oneself, and neighbor:[1] duties toward God and oneself regard individual morals, duties toward the neighbor regard social morals. This division indeed, by reason of its simplicity and perspicuity, can be of much profit for a popular and compendious exposition of Morals; nevertheless it seems less apt for scientific investigation, because not a few virtues, such as charity, are referred to God, oneself, and neighbor, and things are better understood and connected when the various offices of one and the same virtue are declared in the same Treatise.

[1] Thus, for example, Michel, Theologiae Moralis Principia, Paris, 1901-1902.

611. Therefore we follow the order delineated by the Angelic Doctor, yet accommodating it to present-day morals. Therefore we will discuss:

I. Concerning the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, which immediately reach God, and rest upon one of the divine attributes as upon a motive.

II. Concerning the virtue of religion, which regards divine worship, whether internal or external, and therefore consists as though in the middle between theological and moral virtues; in this treatise are set forth the first three precepts of the Decalogue.

III. Concerning the moral virtues, which sweetly incline us to composing our morals honorably and Christianly, especially concerning prudence, temperance, and fortitude, which are called cardinal; to these is added a supplement concerning Chastity, where the sixth precept of the Decalogue is set forth.

IV. Specifically concerning the virtue of justice, by which to each is rendered his own; this is indeed one of the cardinal virtues, but, on account of the multiple rights and offices which it includes, it demands a fuller exposition. There the four precepts of the Decalogue are declared, namely the fifth, seventh, eighth, and tenth.

V. Concerning the various obligations of states, or concerning the offices which are proper to the principal states of laymen and clerics; there, among other things, the fourth precept of the Decalogue is set forth, concerning the mutual offices of parents and children, masters and servants.

But concerning the sacraments, which include at the same time a dogmatic and moral part, we discuss partly in the Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology, after the Treatise on Grace, partly in the

Synopsis of Moral Theology.[1]

[1] Nevertheless, for the use of Seminaries where the moral doctrine concerning the Sacraments is usually handed down separately, we publish a special volume including practical questions concerning the sacraments in general and in species.

In treating of the cardinal virtues, we will not describe all their integral, subjective, and potential parts, but only those which are more useful for practice. - Moreover, so that confessors may more easily be able to question penitents, in the Supplement concerning the Precepts of God and of the Church we will show how precepts of this kind correspond to various virtues, and what sins are usually committed against the precepts.

612. A theological virtue is a virtue infused of itself, whose immediate object, at least primary, is God himself, and whose motive is one of the divine attributes.

That there are three theological virtues, and only three, can be gathered from the common sense of pastors and of the faithful. Paul commemorates these:[1] "But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." From the context, the matter here is not acts, but virtues, which remain; faith and hope indeed will be made void by the beatific vision, but charity will never fall away. - Augustine treats of the same in a special treatise, whose title is Enchiridion, or Concerning Faith, Hope, and Charity, where among other things he has these words: "On account of which the apostle Paul approves and commends faith, which works through dilection,[2] which certainly cannot exist without hope. Therefore neither is love without hope, nor hope without love, nor both without faith."[3] But elsewhere he explains how virtues of this kind contribute to the spiritual building of perfection: "(The house of God) is founded by believing, raised by hoping, perfected by loving."[4]

[1] 1 Cor. 13:13.

[2] Gal. 5:6.

[3] St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 8, P. L., XL, 235.

[4] Sermon 27, n. 1, P. L., XXXVIII, 178.

613. But why there are three theological virtues, and how they are connected among themselves, St. Thomas declares.[5] (a) Since the supernatural beatitude to which men are ordered is above our powers, it is necessary that we be disposed to it through supernaturally infused habits; but that we may be sufficiently ordered to God, three such habits are required. That our intellect may know God supernaturally in this life, faith is required, by which we assent to divinely revealed truths. But the will intends the supernatural end through hope, by which we trustingly expect eternal salvation and the means for attaining it. Finally the will is spiritually joined to God through charity, through which in some way it is transformed into him. - Nor are more theological virtues than three required; for the intellect, through faith, is referred to God under the aspect of truth; the will, through hope, is borne toward God, as he is our good, by which namely we are able to be perfectly made blessed; but through charity, it is borne toward him insofar as he is the supreme good in himself; and thus by these three we are sufficiently ordered into God.

[5] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62.

(b) A twofold order is distinguished in theological virtues. In the order of generation, faith, as to exercise,[1] precedes hope and charity, for the will cannot be borne into God through hope or dilection, unless he is first supernaturally known through faith; likewise we are not accustomed to love God as good in himself, unless we first apprehend him as our good, and thus hope precedes charity. - In the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope, because both faith and hope are formed by charity, and acquire the perfection of virtue; and thus charity is the mother of all virtues.[2]

[1] I say as to exercise, for the habits themselves of faith, hope, and charity are infused at the same time, from the things said in the Treatise on Virtues, n. 597.

[2] The excellence of charity and its preeminence are excellently described in 1 Cor. 13.

We will describe the theological virtues according to the order of generation, namely:

I. faith, through which we assent with the whole mind to God revealing;

II. hope, by which we trustingly expect the possession of God and the means for attaining it;

III. charity, by which we love God from the whole heart, and the neighbor on account of God.