SYNOPSIS OF MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY

by Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S.

The seventh edition, carefully revised
according to the Code of Canon Law

VOLUME II

Fundamental Moral Theology; the Virtues and Precepts

Tournai: Desclée & Co., 1922 · The Latin is in the public domain.
The English translation is our own, made from the 1922 Latin
for the Morals of the Church library, where the text may be read and searched online.

Contents

Title Pages **13**
Synopsis of Moral and Pastoral Theology 13
Synopsis of Moral and Pastoral Theology 13
On Virtues and Precepts 13

Contents (as printed) **14**

Preface and Approval **20**
Preface — To the Readers of the Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology 20
Preface to the Seventh Edition 21
Approval of His Eminence Francis Cardinal Richard, Archbishop of Paris 21

List of Authors Cited in This Volume **22**
List of Authors More Often Cited in This Volume 22

Fundamental Moral Theology (Volume II) ..... **nn. 1–613** **28**
Prolegomena to Moral Theology ..... nn. 2–55 29
Prolegomena to Moral Theology 29
§ I. The Notion of Moral Theology 29
§ II. Sources of Moral Theology 31
§ III. Brief Survey of the History of Moral Theology 35
I. Moral Science in the Age of the Fathers 35
II. Moral Theology in the Age of the Theologians 44
1° Scholastic Moral Theology 44
2° Modern Moral Theology 48
On the Ultimate End of Human Acts, or the Foundation of Morality ..... nn. 1–65 55
Concerning the Ultimate End of Human Acts, ... 55
Art. I. Concerning the Ultimate End of Man. 55
Preliminary Matters. 56
Art. II. Concerning the Norm of Morality. 65
§ I. The Catholic Norm of Morality. 65
Conclusion Concerning the Excellence of the Catholic Norm. 70
§ II. Systems Alien to the Christian Faith Concerning the Norm of Morality Are Critically Weighed. ... 71
I. Concerning Utilitarianism. — 1. Utilitarianism Is Set Forth. 72
2. Utilitarianism Is Critically Weighed. 75
II. Concerning Rationalism. — 1. Stoicism and Especially Kantism Are Set Forth. 78
2. Kantism Is Critically Weighed. 80
3. Various Systems of Independent Ethics Are Set Forth. 81
4. The System of Independent Ethics Is Critically Weighed. 82

Conclusion of This Treatise. 83
On Human Acts — Chapter I: On Free Acts ..... nn. 66–136 85
Concerning Free Acts. 85
Art. I. Notion and Species of Free Acts. — I. Notion of Free Acts. 85
II. Species of Free Acts. 87
Art. II. Concerning the Principles Which Concur Toward the Production of a Free Act. ... 90
§ I. Concerning the Natural Principles Concurring Toward a Free Act. 90
I. Concerning the Cognition Required for a Free Act. 90
II. Concerning the Volition Required for a Free Act. 91
§ II. Concerning the Supernatural Principles Concurring Toward a Meritorious Act. 92
Art. III. Concerning the Causes Which Influence a Free Act, for Diminishing or Increasing Liberty. ... 93
§ I. Concerning the Causes More Proximately Influencing a Free Act. 94
I. Concerning the Causes Directly Influencing the Intellect, and Especially Concerning Error and Ignorance. ... 94
1. Notion and Species of Ignorance. 94
2. Principles Concerning the Influence of Ignorance on Free Acts. 96
II. Concerning the Passions Directly Influencing the Will. 97
III. Concerning Violence Insofar as It Impedes the Execution of Free Volition. 102
§ II. Concerning the Causes Which More Remotely Influence the Internal Act. 104
I. Concerning Hereditary Propensions and Temperament. 104
1. Concerning Hereditary Propensions. 104
2. Concerning Temperament and Moral Character. 106
II. Concerning Education Insofar as It Influences Liberty. 108
III. Concerning Habits Insofar as They Influence a Free Act. 109
IV. Concerning Pathological States Which Influence Liberty. 111
1. Concerning Abulia and Invincible Propension. 111
2. Concerning Neurasthenia, Hysteria, and Epilepsy. 112
3. Concerning Hypnotic Sleep and Suggestion. 114
Conclusion of the Whole Chapter: Concerning the Education of the Will. 116
On Human Acts — Chapter II: On the Morality of the Human Act ..... nn. 137–195 118
Concerning the Morality of the Human Act. 118
Article I. Concerning the Elements Contributing to the Morality of the Act. 118
§ I. Concerning the Object of the Human Act. 119
§ II. Concerning the End of the Human Act. 120
I. Concerning the Morality Derived from the End. 121
II. Concerning the Obligation of Intending the Ultimate End and an Honorable End. 123
§ III. Concerning the Circumstances of the Human Act. — I. Notion and Species. 125
II. Concerning the Morality Derived from Circumstances. 126
§ IV. Concerning the Morality of the External Act. 127
Article II. Concerning the Extension of Morality. 130

§ I. Concerning the Morality of the Effect Indirectly Willed. 131
§ II. Concerning Cooperation Toward an Evil Act. 135
Scholion: Concerning an Indifferent Act in the Individual Case. 138
To Be Noted for Practice. 141
On Human Acts — Chapter III: On the Merit of the Human Act ..... nn. 196–205 142
Concerning the Merit of the Human Act. 142
I. The Nature of Supernatural Merit. 142
II. Conditions for Merit on the Part of the One Operating. 144
III. Conditions on the Part of the Work. 145
IV. Conditions on the Part of God. 146
On Laws ..... nn. 206–348 148
Concerning Laws. 148
Article I. Concerning the Concept of Law in General. — I. Notion. 148
II. Difference of Law from Precept. 149
III. Difference Between Eternal Law and Law Properly So Called. 149
Article II. Concerning Divine Law. 150
§ I. Concerning Natural Divine Law. 150
I. Concerning the Concept and Existence of the Natural Law. — 1. Concerning the Concept of the Natural Law. ... 151
2. Concerning the Existence of the Natural Law. 151
II. Concerning the Object and Character of the Natural Law. 154
1. Concerning the Object or Matter of the Natural Law. 154
2. Concerning the Character of the Natural Law. 155
III. Concerning the Promulgation and Knowledge of the Natural Law. — 1. Concerning the Promulgation of the Natural Law. ... 156
2. Concerning the Knowledge of the Natural Law. 157
§ II. Concerning Positive Divine Law. 158
I. Concerning the Old Law, or Mosaic Law. 158
1. Concerning the Character and End of the Mosaic Law. 159
2. Concerning the Object of the Mosaic Law. 161
3. Concerning the Obligation and Abrogation of the Mosaic Law. 163
II. Concerning the New Law, or Christian Law. 163
1. Concerning the Character and End of the New Law. 164
2. Concerning the Object of the Evangelical Law. 166
3. Concerning the Perfection and Duration of the New Law. 169
Article III. Concerning Ecclesiastical Law. 169
§ I. Concerning the Author of Ecclesiastical Law. 170
§ II. Concerning the Object of Ecclesiastical Law. 171
§ III. Concerning the Promulgation of Ecclesiastical Law. 173
IV. Concerning the Acceptance of Ecclesiastical Law. 175
§ IV. Concerning the Obligation of Ecclesiastical Law. 176

I. Concerning the Gravity of the Obligation Induced by Ecclesiastical Law. 176
II. Concerning the Extension of This Obligation. 177
1. Concerning the Obligation of a Law Including a Presumption or Founded on a Presumption. ... 177
2. Concerning the Obligation of an Irritant Law. 178
III. Concerning the Subject of Ecclesiastical Law. 180
2. Conclusions Concerning the Obligation of Laws in Certain Cases. 181
IV. Concerning the Manner of Fulfilling Law. 183
§ V. Concerning the Interpretation of the Law of the Church. 184
I. Concerning Authentic Interpretation. 185
II. Concerning Judicial and Usual Interpretation. 185
III. Concerning Doctrinal Interpretation. 186
1. Rules Concerning Laws in General. 186
2. Rules Concerning Certain Laws in Particular. 187
Scholion Concerning Epikeia. 188
§ VI. Concerning the Cessation of Ecclesiastical Law. 188
I. Concerning the Cessation of the Obligation Induced by Law. 188
1. Concerning Moral Impotence. 189
2. Concerning Dispensation from Law. 189
II. Concerning the Cessation of the Law Itself. 192
§ VII. Concerning Custom, or Unwritten Law. 193
I. Concerning the Notion, Division, and Reason of Custom. 193
II. Concerning the Conditions Required That Custom Be Legitimate. 194
Scholion: Concerning the Code of Canon Law. 196
Article IV. Concerning Civil Law. 197
§ I. Concerning the Conditions Required for Civil Law. 198
I. Concerning the Author of Civil Law. 198
II. Concerning the Promulgation of Civil Law. 198
III. Concerning the Object of Civil Law. 199
§ II. Concerning the Obligation of Law. 200
I. Concerning the Obligation of a Law Commanding and Prohibiting. 201
II. Concerning the Obligation of an Irritant Law. 202
III. Concerning the Obligation of Penal Law. 202
On Conscience ..... nn. 349–428 205
Concerning Conscience. 205
Article I. Concerning the Concept and Species of Conscience. — § I. Concerning the Concept of Conscience. ... 205
§ II. Concerning the Species of Conscience. 206
I. Concerning Lax Conscience. 207
II. Concerning Scrupulous Conscience. 209
Art. II. Concerning Certain Conscience as the Proximate Rule of Morals. 214

I. The Genuine Notion of Certain Conscience. 214
II. In What Sense Is Certain Conscience the Rule of Morals? 215
Art. III. Concerning Doubtful Conscience. 217
§ I. Concerning the Genuine Concept of Doubtful Conscience and the Practical Means of Shaking Off Doubt. 218
§ II. Concerning the Various Systems Devised for Solving Practical Doubt. 221
I. Historical View of the Various Systems. 222
II. Present-Day Systems Are Weighed Critically. — 1. Concerning Equiprobabilism. 229
2. Present-Day Probabilism Is Weighed Critically. 232
3. Concerning the System of Compensation. 236
Practical Conclusions. 238
Conclusion of the Whole Treatise: Concerning the Education of Conscience. 239
On Sins and Vices nn. 429–567 243
Art. I. Concerning Sins. 243
§ I. The Concept of Sin in General. 243
I. The Biblical Notion of Sin. 243
II. The Theological Notion of Sin. 246
III. Concerning the Causes Which Induce to Sin. 248
1. Concerning the Internal Cause, or Concupiscence. 249
2. Concerning the Extrinsic Causes of Sin. 249
3. Concerning Temptation. 251
§ II. Concerning Mortal Sin. 254
I. Concerning the Nature of Mortal Sin. 254
1. The Doctrine of Scripture Concerning Grave Sin Is Set Forth. 254
2. The Doctrine of the Fathers Concerning the Gravity of Sin Is Set Forth. 256
3. The Theological Doctrine Concerning Mortal Sin. 259
II. Concerning the Effects of Mortal Sin. 264
1. Concerning Guilt of Fault, or the State of Sin. 264
2. Concerning Guilt of Penalty, or the Obligation of Undergoing Penalty. 265
III. Concerning the Conditions Required for Mortal Sin. 266
§ III. Concerning Venial Sin. 268
I. Concerning the Nature of Venial Sin. 268
II. Concerning the Effects of Venial Sin. 270
§ IV. Concerning the Distinction of Sins. 272
I. Concerning the Specific Distinction of Sins. 272
II. Concerning the Numerical Distinction of Sins. 274
III. Concerning Internal Sins. 276
Conclusion of This Article: Concerning Material Sin. 279
Art. II. Concerning Vices or Capital Sins. — I. Notion and Division of Capital Vices. 280
II. Concerning Pride. 282
III. Concerning Envy. 287

IV. Concerning Anger. 289
V. Concerning Gluttony, Drunkenness, and Alcoholism. 293
1. Concerning Gluttony in General. 294
2. Concerning Drunkenness. 295
3. Concerning Alcoholism. 298
VI. Concerning Avarice and Cupidity. 302
VII. Concerning Acedia and Sloth. 305
On Virtues in Common ..... nn. 568–613 308
Concerning Virtues in Common. 308
Preliminary Matters Concerning Habits in General. 308
Art. I. Concerning Acquired Virtues. 311
I. Concerning Intellectual Virtues. 312
II. Concerning Moral Virtues. 314
Art. II. Concerning Infused Virtues. 317
I. Notion and Species. 317
II. Existence of Infused Virtues. 318
III. Concerning the Increase of Infused Virtues. 319
IV. Concerning the Loss of Infused Virtues. 320

On the Theological Virtues (Volume II) ..... nn. 614–850 326

On the Virtue of Faith ..... nn. 614–694 327
Chapter I. Concerning the Virtue of Faith. 327
Art. I. Concerning the Nature and Excellence of Faith. — I. Concerning the Nature of Faith. 327
II. Concerning the Excellence of Faith. 330
Art. II. Concerning the Necessity of Faith. 332
§ I. Concerning the Necessity of Faith as a Means. 333
II. Concerning the Truths to Be Believed by Necessity of Means. 335
§ II. Concerning the Necessity of Faith by Precept. 338
I. Concerning the Internal Act of Faith. 338
II. Concerning the Precept of External Profession of Faith. 341
Art. III. Concerning Sins against Faith. 344
§ I. Concerning the Sins Themselves against Faith. 344
I. Concerning Heresy. 345
II. Concerning Apostasy. 348
III. Concerning Infidelity. 351
§ II. Concerning the Causes of Sins against Faith. 352
1. Concerning Internal, or Subjective, Causes. 352
2. Concerning Extrinsic Causes. 354
Art. IV. Concerning the Means of Progressing in Faith. 361
On the Virtue of Hope ..... nn. 695–729 364
Concerning the Virtue of Hope. 364

Art. I. Concerning the Nature of Hope. ... 364
I. Concerning the Object of Hope. ... 365
II. Concerning the Motive of Hope. ... 366
III. Concerning the Properties of Hope. ... 368
IV. Concerning the Subject of Hope. ... 370
Art. II. Concerning the Honesty and Necessity of Hope. ... 371
I. Concerning the Honesty of Hope. ... 372
II. Concerning the Necessity of Hope. ... 373
Art. III. Concerning Sins against Hope. ... 375
I. Concerning Despair. ... 376
II. Concerning Presumption. ... 377
Conclusion: Concerning the Means of Progressing in Hope. ... 379
On the Virtue of Charity ... nn. 730–850 381
Concerning the Virtue of Charity. — Preliminary Things concerning Love and Charity in General. ... 381
1. Concerning the Nature, Causes, and Effects of Love. ... 381
2. Concerning the Virtue of Charity in General. ... 384
Art. I. Concerning Charity toward God. ... 387
§ I. Concerning the Nature of Charity. ... 388
I. Concerning the Love of Benevolence. ... 388
II. Concerning the Love of Friendship. ... 389
§ II. Concerning the Necessity of Charity. ... 390
§ III. Concerning Sins against Charity. ... 393
Conclusion: Concerning the Means of Progressing in the Love of God. ... 394
Art. II. Concerning Charity toward Neighbor. — Preliminary Things concerning Charity toward Oneself. ... 397
§ I. Concerning the Precept of Charity toward Neighbor. — I. Concerning the Existence of This Precept. ... 399
II. Concerning the Extension of This Precept. ... 406
1. Concerning the Dilection of Enemies. ... 406
2. Concerning Almsgiving. ... 410
3. Concerning Fraternal Correction. ... 413
4. Concerning the Order to Be Observed in Charity. ... 416
Concerning the Order to Be Followed as Regards Persons to Be Loved. ... 417
Concerning the Order to Be Observed as Regards Goods to Be Loved. ... 419
§ II. Concerning Works of Charity, Especially Social Works. ... 420
I. Concerning Pious Works Pertaining to Education. ... 422
II. Concerning Associations to Be Fostered among the Workers Themselves. ... 424
III. Concerning Associations of the Rich for Helping Workers. ... 428
§ III. Concerning Sins Opposed to Fraternal Charity. ... 431
I. Concerning Discord and Contention. ... 431

II. Concerning Scandal. 434

On the Virtue of Religion (Volume II) ..... nn. 851–1047 **440**

On Religion in General ..... nn. 851–854 441

On the Virtue of Religion. — Preliminary Remarks on Religion in General. 441

Chapter I: On the Principal Acts of Religion, and the Vices Opposed ..... nn. 855–942 443

Concerning the Principal Acts of Religion. 443

Art. I. Concerning the Principal Acts of Religion Themselves. 443

§ I. Concerning Adoration. 443

§ II. Concerning Prayer. 445

I. Concerning the Necessity of Prayer. 446

II. Concerning the Efficacy of Prayer. 451

1. Whether and in what sense prayer is efficacious? 451

2. Concerning the Conditions Required That Prayer Be Efficacious. 454

§ III. Concerning Devotion. 457

Art. II. Concerning the Vices Opposed to Religion. 460

§ I. Concerning the Sins of Superstition. 460

I. Concerning Idolatry. 461

II. Concerning Superstitious Observances. 462

III. Concerning Modern Facts Which Are Circulated Under the Name of Magnetism or Spiritism. ... 465

§ II. Concerning Sins of Irreligiosity. 471

I. Concerning Blasphemy. 471

II. Concerning the Tempting of God. 474

III. Concerning Sacrilege. 475

IV. Concerning Simony. 477

Chapter II: On Oaths and Vows ..... nn. 943–1005 482

Concerning the Secondary Acts of Religion. 482

Art. I. Concerning Oath. 482

I. Concerning the Nature of Oath. 482

II. Concerning the Honesty of Oath. 483

III. Concerning the Obligation Induced by an Oath. 487

IV. Concerning Adjuration. 489

Scholion: Concerning the Vain Assumption of the Name of God. 489

Art. II. Concerning Vow. 490

§ I. Concerning the Nature of a Vow. 491

I. The Genuine Notion of a Vow. 491

II. Concerning the Various Species of Vows. 494

§ II. Concerning the Honesty and Obligation of a Vow. — I. Concerning the Honesty of a Vow. ... 496

II. Concerning the Obligation Arising from a Vow. 499

§ I. Concerning the Cessation of a Vow or of Its Obligation. 501

I. Concerning the Cessation of a Vow from the Nature of the Thing Itself. 502
II. Concerning the Invalidation of a Vow. 502
III. Concerning Dispensation from a Vow. 504
IV. Concerning the Commutation of a Vow. 506
Practical Corollary. 507
Chapter III: On the Sanctification of Sunday ..... nn. 1006–1047 509
Concerning the Social Act of Religion. 509
Preliminary Remarks Concerning the Sanctification of the Sabbath and Sunday. 509
§ I. Concerning the Social Utility of Sunday. 513
§ II. Concerning the Precept of Hearing Mass. 516
I. Concerning the Requisites for Hearing Mass. 517
1. Concerning Bodily Presence. 517
2. Concerning Religious Assistance. 518
3. Concerning the Due Place. 519
II. Concerning the Causes Excusing from Hearing Mass. 520
§ III. Concerning the Prohibition of Servile Works. 522
I. What Works Are Prohibited? 522
II. Concerning the Causes Excusing from Servile Work. 524

On the Moral Virtues ..... nn. 1048–1093 526
Concerning the Moral Virtues. 526
Art. I. Concerning Prudence. — I. The Genuine Notion of Prudence. 526
II. Concerning the Excellence of Prudence and the Means of Acquiring It. 530
Art. II. Concerning Fortitude. — I. The Genuine Concept of Fortitude. 531
II. Concerning the Virtues Annexed to Fortitude. 534
III. Concerning the Means of Progressing in Fortitude. 536
Art. III. Concerning Temperance. 537
I. The Genuine Concept of Temperance. 538
II. Concerning the Virtues Annexed to Temperance. 539
1. Concerning Humility. 539
2. Concerning Meekness. 543
3. Concerning Modesty. 544

Appendix: On the Precepts of God and of the Church ..... nn. 1094–1136 547
Appendix: Concerning the Precepts of God and of the Church. 547
Art. I. A Brief Exposition of the Decalogue. — The First Precept. 547
The Second Precept. 549
The Third Precept. 550
The Fourth Precept. 551
The Fifth Precept. 552
The Sixth Precept. 553

The Seventh Precept. 553
The Eighth Precept. 554
The Ninth and Tenth Precepts. 555
Art. II. Concerning the Precepts of the Church. 555
§ I. Concerning Ecclesiastical Fasting. 556
I. Concerning the Origin and Utility of the Law of Fasting. 556
II. Concerning the Manner of Fasting. 559
III. Concerning Causes Excusing from Fasting. 563
§ II. Concerning the Law of Abstinence outside Fasting. 566
§ III. Concerning the Precept of Sustaining Pastors. 568

On Ecclesiastical Censures ..... nn. 1137–1231 **571**
Concerning Ecclesiastical Censures. 571
Article I. Concerning Censures in General. 571
Article II. Concerning Censures in Species. — § I. Concerning Excommunication. 577
§ II. Concerning Suspension. 580
§ III. Concerning Interdict. 582
Concerning Censures *Latae Sententiae* in the Individual. 583
§ I. Concerning Excommunications. 584
I. Excommunications Reserved to the Roman Pontiff in a Most Special Manner. 584
II. Excommunications Reserved to the Roman Pontiff in a Special Manner. 585
III. Excommunications Simply Reserved to the Roman Pontiff. 590
IV. Excommunications Reserved to Ordinaries. 594
V. Excommunications Reserved to No One. 595
§ II. Suspensions *Latae Sententiae*. — I. Suspensions Reserved to the Holy See. 596
II. Suspensions Not Reserved to the Holy See. 597
§ III. Interdicts. 598
Scholion: the Principal Other Penalties Are Recounted. 599

Appendix: On the Censorship and Prohibition of Books ..... nn. 1232–1240 **601**
Concerning the Previous Censure of Books and Their Prohibition 601
I. - Concerning the Previous Censure of Books 601
II. - Concerning the Prohibition of Books. 603

Addenda from the Code **606**
Addenda from the Code 606

Supplement: On the Virtue of Chastity ..... nn. 1–70 **607**
Concerning the Virtue of Chastity 607
Art. I. Concerning the Nature and Excellence of Chastity. — § I. Concerning the Nature of Chastity. ... 607
§ II. Concerning the Excellence of Chastity. 609

Art. II. Concerning Sins Opposed to Chastity. 611
§ I. Concerning Non-Consummated Sins of Luxury. 613
I. Concerning Internal Sins of Luxury. 613
II. Concerning External Sins of Non-Consummated Luxury. 615
§ II. Concerning Consummated Sins of Luxury. 621
I. Concerning Consummated Sins According to Nature. 621
II. Concerning Consummated Sins Against Nature. 624
Conclusion of This Article: — The Manner of Questioning Concerning the Aforesaid Sins. ... 628
Art. III. Concerning the Means of Cultivating Chastity. 629

Alphabetical Index (Volume II) **637**

Title Pages

Synopsis of Moral and Pastoral Theology

For the use of seminaries.

The author reserves the right of ownership.

Synopsis of Moral and Pastoral Theology

According to the mind of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus, adapted to the morals of the present day.

On Virtues and Precepts

By Ad. Tanquerey

Seventh edition.

Printed by the Society of St. John the Evangelist
Desclee and Associates

Rome - Tournai (Belg.) - Paris
1922

Printed in Belgium.

New edition (1922-1923) of the *Synopsis of Dogmatic and Moral Theology*, and also of the *Shorter Synopsis of Dogmatic and Moral Theology*, by Ad. Tanquerey.

Nihil obstat.

Issy, April 20, 1922.
A. Berrue,
Deputy censor.

Imprimatur:
Paris, May 2, 1922.
Benjamin Octavius,
Bishop of Mosynopolis.

Imprimatur.
Tournai, July 14, 1922.
V. Cantineau, Vicar General.

Printed by the Society of St. John the Evangelist. Desclee et Cie. - Tournai (Belgium).

MADE IN BELGIUM.

Contents (as printed)

- Prolegomena — p. xxi
- Definition and division of Moral Theology — p. xxi
- Sources of Moral Theology — p. xxiv
- Historical survey of Moral Theology — p. xxx
- Division of Fundamental Moral Theology — p. 1
- On the Last End and the Foundation of Morality
    - Art. I. Catholic doctrine concerning the last end — p. 3
    - Preliminary matters — p. 3
    - Man was created for God, the last end — p. 6
    - Man attains his happiness not in created goods, but in the knowledge and love of God — p. 8
    - Man through Christ glorifies God and is beatified — p. 13
    - Art. II. Concerning the norm of morality — p. 14
    - § I. The Catholic norm of morality — p. 14
    - There are actions intrinsically good or evil — p. 16
    - The ultimate norm of morality is the divine reason and will; the proximate norm is right human reason — p. 17
    - The norm of moral obligation — p. 21
    - § II. The systems of non-Catholics concerning the norm of morality — p. 22
    - Utilitarianism is historically set forth, especially evolutionism — p. 22
    - The same is critically weighed — p. 27
    - Stoicism and Kantism are set forth — p. 31
    - Kantism is critically weighed — p. 34
    - Systems of independent ethics are weighed — p. 36
- On Human Acts
    - Object and division of the Treatise — p. 40
    - Chap. I. Concerning free acts — p. 41
    - Art. I. The notion and species of free acts — p. 42
    - Art. II. Concerning the principles concurring in a free act — p. 48
    - Art. III. Concerning the causes which influence a free act — p. 53
    - Concerning error and ignorance — p. 54
    - Concerning passions — p. 58
    - Concerning violence — p. 65
    - Concerning hereditary propensities and temperament — p. 67
    - Concerning education — p. 72
    - Concerning habits — p. 74
    - Concerning pathological states — p. 77
    - Chap. II. Concerning the morality of the human act — p. 86
    - Art. I. Concerning the elements from which morality is derived — p. 87
    - Concerning morality derived from the object — p. 88

    - Concerning morality taken from the end — p. 91
    - Concerning morality derived from circumstances — p. 97
    - Concerning the morality of the external act — p. 99
    - Art. II. Concerning the extension of morality — p. 102
    - As to the indirectly willed effect — p. 103
    - As to cooperation in an evil act — p. 109
    - As to an indifferent act in the individual instance — p. 113
    - Chap. III. Concerning the merit of the human act — p. 118
    - Conditions on the part of the one acting — p. 121
    - Conditions on the part of the work — p. 122
    - Conditions on the part of God — p. 125
- On Laws
    - Art. I. Concerning the concept of law in general — p. 128
    - Art. II. Concerning divine law — p. 131
    - § I. Concerning the divine natural law — p. 131
    - Concerning the concept and existence of this law — p. 131
    - Concerning its object and character — p. 135
    - Concerning promulgation and knowledge — p. 139
    - § II. Concerning the divine positive law — p. 141
    - Concerning the old law — p. 142
    - Concerning the new law — p. 148
    - Art. III. Concerning ecclesiastical law — p. 155
    - Concerning the author, object, and promulgation — p. 156
    - Concerning obligation and the subject — p. 163
    - Concerning interpretation and epikeia — p. 173
    - Concerning cessation and custom — p. 179
    - Art. IV. Concerning civil law — p. 190
    - § I. Concerning the conditions required for this law — p. 191
    - § II. Concerning its obligation — p. 194
- On Conscience
    - Art. I. Concerning the concept and species of conscience — p. 199
    - Concerning the notion and species — p. 199
    - Concerning lax conscience — p. 202
    - Concerning scrupulous conscience — p. 205
    - Art. II. Concerning certain conscience as the rule of morals — p. 211
    - The notion of morally certain conscience — p. 211
    - In what sense is it the proximate rule of morals? — p. 213
    - Art. III. Concerning doubtful conscience — p. 216
    - § I. Concerning its concept and the means of shaking off doubt — p. 216
    - § II. Concerning the various systems for solving practical doubt — p. 221
    - Historical survey of the systems — p. 222
    - Concerning equiprobabilism — p. 231
    - Concerning probabilism — p. 235

    - Concerning the system of compensation — p. 239
    - Conclusion: concerning the education of conscience — p. 243
- On Sins and Vices
    - Art. I. Concerning sins — p. 248
    - § I. Concerning the biblical and theological concept of sin — p. 248
    - Concerning the causes which lead to sin — p. 255
    - § II. Concerning mortal sin: the doctrine of Scripture — p. 262
    - The doctrine of the Fathers and theologians — p. 269
    - Concerning the effects of mortal sin — p. 275
    - Concerning the conditions for mortal sin — p. 278
    - § III. Concerning venial sin: its nature — p. 281
    - Its effects — p. 283
    - § IV. Concerning the specific and numerical distinction of sins — p. 285
    - Especially concerning internal sins — p. 291
    - Conclusion: concerning material sin — p. 294
    - Art. II. Concerning vices or capital sins — p. 296
    - Concerning pride — p. 299
    - Concerning envy — p. 304
    - Concerning anger — p. 307
    - Concerning gluttony, drunkenness, and alcoholism — p. 312
    - Concerning avarice and cupidity — p. 323
    - Concerning acedia or sloth — p. 327
- On Virtues in General
    - Preliminary matters concerning habits — p. 321
    - Art. I. Concerning acquired virtues — p. 326
    - Concerning intellectual virtues — p. 327
    - Concerning moral virtues — p. 339
    - Art. II. Concerning infused virtues — p. 342
    - The notion, species, and existence — p. 343

- Concerning the increase and loss of these virtues — p. 345
- On Theological Virtues
    - Chap. I. Concerning the virtue of faith — p. 355
    - Art. I. Concerning the nature and excellence of faith — p. 355
    - Definition of faith — p. 356
    - Genesis of faith — p. 357
    - Excellence of faith — p. 359
    - Art. II. Concerning the necessity of faith — p. 363
    - Concerning things to be believed by necessity of means — p. 364
    - Concerning things to be believed by necessity of precept — p. 370
    - Concerning the precept of confessing the faith — p. 374
    - Art. III. Concerning sins against faith — p. 373
    - Concerning heresy and doubt in faith — p. 379
    - Concerning apostasy, especially through adherence to Masonic sects — p. 383

- Concerning infidelity — p. 388
- Concerning internal causes of sins against faith — p. 389
- Concerning external causes of sins against faith — p. 392
- Art. IV. Concerning the means of advancing in faith — p. 405
- Chap. II. Concerning the virtue of hope — p. 405
- Art. I. Concerning the nature of hope — p. 406
- Concerning the object of hope — p. 406
- Concerning the motive of hope — p. 407
- Concerning the properties of hope — p. 413
- Concerning the subject of hope — p. 412
- Art. II. Concerning the honesty and necessity of hope — p. 413
- Hope truly has the nature of a virtue — p. 415
- Some act of hope is necessary — p. 417
- Quietism is to be rejected — p. 418
- Art. III. Concerning sins against hope — p. 420
- Concerning the notion and malice of despair — p. 420
- Concerning presumption — p. 422
- Corollary: concerning the means of advancing in hope — p. 424
- Chap. III. Concerning the virtue of charity — p. 426
- Preliminary matters concerning the nature, causes, and effects of love — p. 426
- Concerning the virtue of charity in general — p. 431
- Art. I. Concerning charity toward God — p. 435
- § I. Concerning the nature of this charity — p. 435
- Concerning the love of benevolence — p. 435
- Concerning the love of friendship — p. 437
- § II. Concerning the necessity of this charity — p. 438
- § III. Concerning sins against charity toward God — p. 442
- Conclusion: concerning the means of advancing in the love of God — p. 443
- Art. II. Concerning charity toward neighbor — p. 447
- Preliminary matters concerning charity toward oneself — p. 447
- § I. Concerning the precept of charity toward neighbor — p. 450
- Especially concerning the love of enemies — p. 457
- Concerning alms — p. 462
- Concerning fraternal correction — p. 466
- Concerning the order to be observed in charity — p. 471
- § II. Concerning works of charity, especially social works — p. 477
- General principles adapted to our days — p. 478
- Concerning pious works pertaining to education — p. 479
- Concerning associations to be promoted among workers — p. 482
- Concerning associations to be promoted among the wealthier — p. 487
- § III. Concerning sins opposed to fraternal charity — p. 491
- Concerning discord and contention — p. 491
- Concerning scandal — p. 494

- On the Virtue of Religion
  - Preliminary matters concerning religion in general — p. 501
  - Chap. I. Concerning the principal acts of religion — p. 504
  - Art. I. Concerning the acts of religion themselves — p. 504
  - Concerning internal, external, and public adoration — p. 504
  - Concerning prayer, and first concerning its necessity — p. 507
  - Concerning its qualities — p. 512
  - Concerning its efficacy, and the conditions that it may be efficacious — p. 515
  - Corollary: concerning the Lord's Prayer — p. 521
  - Concerning devotion and the means of advancing in it — p. 523
  - Art. II. Concerning vices opposed to religion — p. 527
  - Concerning idolatry — p. 527
  - Concerning superstitious observances — p. 529
  - Concerning modern facts in which the danger of superstition is found, namely magnetism and spiritism — p. 533
  - Concerning blasphemy — p. 542
  - Concerning tempting God — p. 545
  - Concerning sacrilege — p. 546
  - Concerning simony — p. 549
  - Chap. II. Concerning the secondary acts of religion — p. 555
  - Art. I. Concerning an oath — p. 555
  - Its nature and honesty — p. 555
  - Conditions that an oath may be lawful — p. 558
  - Concerning the obligation induced by an oath — p. 561
  - Concerning adjuration and the vain assumption of the name of God — p. 563
  - Art. II. Concerning a vow — p. 565
  - The nature, conditions, and species of vows — p. 566
  - Concerning the honesty of a vow — p. 572
  - Concerning the obligation arising from a vow — p. 576
  - Concerning the cessation of a vow or of its obligation — p. 580
  - Chap. III. Concerning the social act of religion — p. 589
  - Preliminary matters concerning the sanctification of the Sabbath and Sunday — p. 589
  - Historical exposition — p. 589
  - Conclusion: by what right is this sanctification prescribed? — p. 592
  - § I. Concerning the social utility of Sunday — p. 594
  - § II. Concerning the precept of hearing Mass — p. 599
  - § III. Concerning the prohibition of servile works — p. 605
- On Moral Virtues
  - Art. I. Concerning prudence — p. 612
  - The notion and the elements of which it consists — p. 612
  - Vices opposed to prudence — p. 615
  - Concerning the excellence of prudence and the means of advancing in it — p. 616
  - Art. II. Concerning fortitude — p. 618

- Its nature and degrees — p. 618
- Concerning vices opposed to fortitude — p. 620
- Concerning virtues annexed to fortitude — p. 621
- Concerning the means of advancing in fortitude — p. 624
- Art. III. Concerning temperance — p. 626
- The notion and general rules of temperance — p. 626
- Concerning the virtues annexed to temperance, and first concerning humility — p. 628
- Concerning meekness — p. 632
- Concerning modesty — p. 633

Preface and Approval

Preface — To the Readers of the Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology

Most beloved readers in Christ, at your suggestion I have composed this *Synopsis of Moral and Pastoral Theology*, so that I might complete, by an exposition of Christian Ethics, those things which I have already written concerning Catholic dogmas. For since moral science is indivisibly connected with dogmatic science and depends upon it, it is certainly preferable that, so far as can be done, both should be brought together into one body of doctrine, by which it may appear better that each is joined to the other by a friendly and indissoluble bond.

This *Synopsis* will not be merely casuistic, but also doctrinal and speculative; for although it is necessary to apply the principles of morals to particular cases, it is more necessary to set forth and prove the principles themselves, so that, from them rightly understood, practical conclusions may be logically deduced, which the wise moderator of consciences will adapt to the penitents committed to him, according to the various circumstances of persons, places, and times.

In handing down moral doctrine, we do not entirely pass over pastoral doctrine; but, with deliberate purpose, we briefly outline the practical manner of acting in the administration of the sacraments with regard to little children, the devout, the dying, spouses, and others of this sort, referring the reader, for a fuller exposition of this matter, to approved authors. Likewise, while there is discussion of the virtues, we declare not only what is strictly lawful or prohibited, but also what is expedient, and by what means virtues of this sort can be cultivated and increased.

We adhere, according to our measure, to the footsteps of St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Alphonsus de Liguori; the former, in the second and third part of the *Summa Theologiae*, hands down truly golden principles concerning morals and virtues, and also concerning the Sacraments, with no less solidity than clarity; the latter excels before the rest in prudence and sagacity in the application of principles. Moreover, among the moderns, we have often kept before our eyes Suarez, De Lugo, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart; among recent authors, Carriere, Lehmkuhl, Muller, Bouquillon, Ballerini, and Noldin.[1]

[1] I have often also used the counsels of friends and colleagues, to whom I here offer a grateful mind.

"But in the choice of opinions, to make my own the words of St. Alphonsus,[2] it has always been a matter of great care to me to set reason before authority; and before I brought forth my judgment, I was wholly intent in this, if I am not mistaken, that in individual questions I should hold myself indifferently, and strip myself of every cloud of passion."

[2] Preface to the *Moral Theology*.

But if anything false or less correct has crept into this *Synopsis* of ours, contrary to our intention, let the kindly reader pardon me, and let Holy Mother Church pardon me, to whose judgment I humbly subject all those things which I have written or shall write.

I wrote at Baltimore, on the day of Pentecost, May 18, 1902.

Ad. Tanquerey.

Preface to the Seventh Edition

Besides certain corrections inserted on various pages according to the kindly observations of learned professors, I have brought back to the balance, with the cooperation of M. E. Lesaunier, professor of moral theology in the Seminary of Issy, the treatise on the Last End. I again ask kindly readers that they be willing to manifest openly to me those things which they judge should be corrected.

Issy, near Paris, on the feast of the Blessed Virgin Mary of Mount Carmel, 1922.

Ad. Tanquerey.

Approval of His Eminence Francis Cardinal Richard, Archbishop of Paris

How much it profits toward the right formation of clerics in the theological sciences that doctrine be drawn from the purest sources, set forth in a clear and scientific method, and at the same time adapted to the needs and morals of our time, can be hidden from no one. Now with these qualities there is endowed, as has been reported to Us and thoroughly ascertained, the work whose title is *Synopsis of Dogmatic and Moral Theology*, distributed in five volumes, to which a sixth and last will soon be added, which D. Tanquerey, from the priests of the Society of St. Sulpice and professor of theology in Our Seminary, has written. For in this work the passages of Sacred Scripture have been examined rather diligently, according to the desire of Leo XIII, who greatly wishes that "the use of divine Scripture should flow into the whole discipline of theology and be, as it were, its soul";[1] nor have the testimonies of the Fathers or Councils been neglected, since they themselves also contain revealed truths. And because, according to the precept of the Apostle, the minister of Christ must be able *to exhort in sound doctrine and to refute those who contradict*, the author introduces opponents - opponents, I say, especially of our own time, whom it is chiefly important today to refute - and he makes clear how worn out their arguments are, although perhaps wrapped in new concepts and words, and demonstrates how weak they are, arguments for the most part drawn from their own books.

[1] Encyclical *Providentissimus, On Sacred Scripture*, November 19, 1893, § *Illud autem maximi*.

As to the moral matter, however, the author takes special pains that, according to the Lord's own words, he may bring forth from his treasure new things and old: old things, namely the very principles which are from eternity and which, while other shifting things are moved, remain unmoved; new things, namely new explanations and new conclusions, by which he explains and judges the new forms of acts, contracts, rights, or duties, which are multiplying day by day in modern times, and solves the questions arising thence. Thus

concerning the right of property, against its modern haters, concerning the condition of workers and the ways of bringing it to a better state, concerning the newest contracts regarding the labor of workers, the author treats many things clearly and opportunely.

Therefore it is not only pleasing to Us that this work, already disseminated in many parts of the Catholic Church, is also held in the hands of students in Our Seminary for the use of the schools, but We also earnestly commend it to the whole clergy of our diocese.

Given at Paris, February 18, 1905.

- Francis Card. Richard,
  Archbishop of Paris.

List of Authors Cited in This Volume

List of Authors More Often Cited in This Volume

Acta S. Sedis, or periodicals published at Rome, in which the Acts of the Supreme Pontiff are promulgated, and also the decrees of the Roman Congregations.

Aertnys, C.SS.R., *Theologia moralis*, Tournai, Casterman, 1896.

St. Alphonsus Maria de Ligorio, *Theologia Moralis*, new edition, under the care and study of P. Leonard Gaude, C.SS.R., Rome, 1905.

American Ecclesiastical Review (monthly), edited by Rev. H. J. Heuser, New York and Philadelphia.

Ami du Clerge, review of all ecclesiastical questions, Langres.

D'Annibale, *Summula theologiae Moralis*, 4th ed., Rome, 1896.

Baets, M. de, *Les Bases de la Morale*, Paris (Alcan) and Ghent, 1892.

Bain, A., *The emotions and the will*, rendered into French by P. Le Monnier, *Les Emotions et la volonte*, Paris, Alcan, 1885.

Ballerini-Palmieri, S.J., *Opus theologicum morale A. Ballerini*, completed and edited by D. Palmieri, 3rd ed., Prato, Giachetti, 1899.

Baunard, *Le Doute et ses victimes*, 5th ed., Paris, Poussielgue, 1899.

Barre, *Tractatus de Virtutibus*, Paris, Berche and Tralin, 1886.

Bautain, *Philosophie des Lois*, Paris, 1860; *La Conscience*, Paris, 1869.

Beaussire, *Les principes de la Morale*, Paris, Alcan, 1888.

Benedict XIV, *Bullarium*, Rome, 1760-1761; *De synodo dioecesana*; *Institutiones ecclesiasticae*; *De servorum Dei beatificatione*...

Bentham, *Introduction to the principles of Moral and Legislation*, 1789; in French: *Traites de Legislation civile et penale*, a work drawn from Bentham's manuscripts by E. Dumont, Paris, 1820.

Berardi, *Praxis confessariorum*, 4th ed., Faenza, 1903.

Bertillon, J., *L'alcoolisme et les moyens de le combattre*, Paris, Lecoffre, 1904.

Billot, S.J., *Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati*, 3rd ed., Rome, 1900; *De virtutibus infusis*, Rome, 1901.

Billuart, O.P., *Summa S. Thomae hodiernis Academiarum moribus accommodata*, new ed., Paris, 1872.

St. Bonaventure, *Opera omnia*, Vives edition.

Bossuet, *Oeuvres completes*, Vives ed.; *Sermons*, Lebarcq ed.

Bouquillon, *Theologia moralis fundamentalis*, 2nd ed., Bruges and Paris, 1903.

Bourdaloue, *Oeuvres completes*, Besancon, 1825.

Bourgeois, L., *La solidarite*, Paris, Colin; *Essai d'une philosophie de la solidarite*, Paris, Alcan.

Broglie, abbe de, *La Morale sans Dieu*, Paris, 1886.

Brownson, Orestes, *The spirit rapper*, New York and Detroit.

Burn, A. E., *An introduction to the Creeds*, London, 1899.

Cabrol, Dom Fernand, O.S.B., *Dictionnaire d'archeologie chretienne et de Liturgie*, Paris, Letouzey.

Capellmann, *Medicina pastoralis*, 4th Latin ed., Aachen, 1896.

Capron, E. W., *Modern spiritualism*, Boston, 1855.

Catechismus Concilii Tridentini, or the Roman Catechism, Tournai, 1890.

Caro, E., *Problemes de Morale sociale*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1887.

Carrau, L., *La morale utilitaire*, Paris, 1874.

Cavagnis, *Institutiones juris publici ecclesiastici*, 3rd ed., Rome.

Cheysson and Riemain, *Premier Congres national contre l'alcoolisme*, Paris, Asselin, 1904.

Chollet, A., *La morale stoicienne en face de la morale chretienne*, Paris, Lethielleux.

Coconnier, O.P., *L'hypnotisme franc*, Paris, Lecoffre, 1897.

Coignet, C., *La Morale independante*, Paris, Alcan, 1869.

Collectanea S. Cong. de Propag. Fide, Rome, 1893.

Comte, A., *Cours de Philosophie positive*, Paris, 1839-1842.

Costa Rossetti, S.J., *Philosophia Moralis*, Innsbruck, 1886.

Cresson, A., *La Morale de Kant*, Paris, Alcan, 1904.

Darwin, *The origin of species*; *The descent of man*; in French: *L'origine des especes*; *La descendance de l'homme*, translated by E. Barbier, Paris, Schleicher.

Decretals of Gregory IX, critical edition edited by Richter and Friedberg.

Denzinger, *Enchiridion symbolorum ac definitionum...*, 1900.

Deschamps and C. Jannet, *Les societes secretes et la societe*, Paris, 1880.

Descuret, *La medecine des passions*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1880.

Didiot, *Morale surnaturelle fondamentale*, Lille and Paris.

Dubois, *Les Psychonevroses et leur traitement moral*, Paris, Masson, 1904.

Du Camp, Maxime, *La Charite privee a Paris*, Paris, 1886; *Paris bienfaisant*, Paris, 1888.

Elbel-Bierbaum, O.S.F., *Theologia moralis*, Paderborn, 1894.

Faber, *The Creator and the creature*; *spiritual Conferences*; in French: *Le Createur et la Creature*; *Conferences spirituelles*.

Farges, S.S., *La liberte et le devoir, fondements de la Morale*, Paris, 1902.

Ferraz, M., *Philosophie du Devoir*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1869.

Fonsegrive, *Essai sur le libre arbitre, sa theorie et son histoire*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1896.

Fouillee, *Critique des systemes de Morale contemporains*, 3rd ed., Paris, Alcan, 1893; *Temperament et Caractere*, 1895; *Le moralisme de Kant et l'amoralisme contemporain*, 1905.

St. Francis de Sales, *Oeuvres completes*, Annecy edition.

Frins, S.J., *De actibus humanis ontologice et psychologice*, Freiburg, Herder, 1897.

Gay, Msgr., *La Vie et les vertus chretiennes*, Paris, 1876.

Gaude, C.SS.R., *De morali systemate S. Alfonsi*, Rome, 1894.

Genicot, S.J., *Theologiae moralis institutiones*, 3rd ed., Louvain, 1900.

Gibbons, Cardinal James, *The ambassador of Christ*, Baltimore, 1896; rendered into French by Andre, S.S., *L'ambassadeur du Christ*, Paris, Lethielleux.

Gilfillan, J., *The Sabbath viewed in the light of reason, revelation and history*, Edinburgh, 1861.

Gilles de la Tourette, *L'hypnotisme*, Paris, Plon, 1889.

Gonzalez, Thyrsus, S.J., *Fundamentum theologiae moralis*, Cologne, 1694.

Gousset, Cardinal, *Theologie morale*, 12th ed., Paris, 1861.

Grasset, *L'hypnotisme et la suggestion*, Paris, Doin, 1903; *Le Spiritisme devant la science*, Paris, Masson, 1904.

Guibert, *Etude sur l'hypnotisme*, Paris, Retaux; *La formation de la volonte*, Paris, 1903; *La Bonte*, Paris, 1904; *Le caractere*, Paris, 1905.

Gurney, Myers, Podmore, *Phantasms of the living*; rendered into French by L. Marillier: *Hallucinations telepathiques*, Paris, Alcan.

Gury-Ballerini, S.J., *Compendium theologiae moralis*, 4th ed., Rome, 1877.

Guyau, *Essai d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction*, 4th ed., Paris, Alcan, 1896; *Education et heredite*, Paris, Alcan.

Haar, F. ter, C.SS.R., *De systemate morali antiquorum probabilistarum*, Paderborn, 1894; *Ven. Innocentii XI de Probabilismo decreti, historia et vindiciae*, Tournai and Paris, 1904.

Halleux, J., *L'Evolutionisme en morale*, Louvain, 1901.

Helot, Ch., *Nevroses et possessions diaboliques*, Paris, Bloud, 1897.

Hulst, M. d', *Conferences de N.-Dame*, Paris, 1891-1893.

St. Ignatius de Loyola, *Exercitia spiritualia*, Roothan ed., Rome, 1854.

Janet, Paul, *La Morale*, 6th ed., Paris, Delagrave; *Histoire de la Philosophie morale*, Paris, 1860.

John of St. Thomas, O.P., *Cursus theologicus*, Lyons, 1663.

Kant, Emmanuel, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, 1785; *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, 1788; in French: *Fondements de la Metaphysique des moeurs*, translated by Barni, Paris, 1848; *Critique de la Raison pratique*, translated by Picavet, Paris, Alcan, 1802.

Kenrick, *Theologia moralis*, 2nd ed., Mechlin, 1861.

Konings, C.SS.R., *Theologia Moralis*, 7th ed., New York, 1888.

Lacroix, S.J., *Theologia Moralis*, Venice, 1747.

Laloux, S.S., *De actibus humanis*, Paris, Jouby, 1862.

Lallemand, *Histoire de la Charite*, Paris, Picard, 1902-1903; *Histoire des enfants abandonnes et delaisses*, Paris, 1885.

Lanessan, J. L. de, *La Morale des Religions*, Paris, Alcan, 1905.

Lehmkuhl, S.J., *Theologia Moralis*, 9th ed., Freiburg im Breisgau, 1898.

Lelong, Msgr., *Conferences sur les vertus sacerdotales*, Paris, Tequi, 1901.

Lequeux, *Manuale Compendium doctrinae moralis de Virtutibus*, Paris, 1843.

Lescoeur, *La Science du Bonheur*, Paris, 1873; *La science et les faits surnaturels contemporains*, Paris, Roger, 1900.

Liegeois, J., *De la suggestion et du somnambulisme*, Paris, Doin, 1869.

Littre, *Paroles de Philosophie positive*, Paris, 1859.

Malapert, *Les elements du caractere*, Paris, Alcan, 1897.

Manning, Cardinal, *Sin and its consequences*; rendered into French by Maillet, *Le peche et ses consequences*, Avignon, 1894.

Many, S.S., *Praelectiones de Locis sacris*, Paris, 1904.

Marc, C.SS.R., *Institutiones morales alphonsianae*, 4th ed., Paris and Tournai, 1888.

Marion, H., *Lecons de Morale*, 11th ed., Paris, Colin, 1901; *De la solidarite morale*, Paris, Alcan; *Lecons de psychologie appliquee a l'education*, Paris, Colin.

Martin, *Education du caractere*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1889.

Massillon, *Oeuvres completes*, Besancon, 1822.

Maxwell, *Les phenomenes psychiques*, 2nd ed., Paris, Alcan, 1904.

Meric, *L'imagination et les prodiges*, Paris, Tequi, 1905.

Mercier, *Psychologie*, 6th ed., Louvain, 1904.

Merit, *La Foi*, Tours, Cattier, 1886.

Meyer, S.J., *Institutiones juris naturalis*, Freiburg, 1900.

Mignot, Msgr., *L'apologetique contemporaine*, in *Revue du Clerge francais*, t. XXIV sq.

Mill, Stuart, *Utilitarianism*, rendered into French: *L'utilitarisme*, Paris, Alcan.

Moreau, P. G., *L'hypnotisme, etude scientifique et religieuse*, Paris, 1891.

Muller, *Theologia Moralis*, 7th ed., Vienna, 1894.

Natalis Alexander, *De peccatis* (Migne, *Theol. Curs.*, t. XI).

Noldin, S.J., *Summa theologiae moralis*, Innsbruck, 1902.

Nourrisson, P., *Le club des Jacobins sous la troisieme Republique*, Paris, 1900; *Les Jacobins au pouvoir*, Paris, 1904.

Oudaille, *Le foyer familial et la femme contre l'alcoolisme*, Paris, 1904.

Paulhan, *Les Caracteres*, 2nd ed., Paris, Alcan, 1902.

Payot, *L'education de la volonte*, Paris, Alcan, 18th ed., 1904; *Cours de Morale*, Paris, Colin, 1904.

Perrone, *De virtutibus fidei, spei et caritatis*, Regensburg, 1865.

Pesch, *Praelectiones dogmaticae*, t. VIII and IX, *De virtutibus theologicis et moralibus*, *De peccato*, ... Freiburg im Breisgau, 1899.

Piat, *Historique de la liberte au XIXe siecle*; *Le probleme de la liberte*, Paris, Lethielleux, 1894-95.

Potton, O.P., *De theoria probabilitatis*, Paris, 1874.

Prune, *Theologie Morale*, translated by Belet, 1880.

Rabier, *Psychologie*, 6th ed., Paris, Hachette, 1898.

Reid, T., *An inquiry into the human mind, or the principles of common sense*, Edinburgh, 1765.

Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments*; *L'heredite psychologique*; *Les maladies de la memoire*, Paris, Alcan.

Salmanticenses, *Cursus theologiae moralis*, Venice, 1764.

Sanchez, *De praeceptis Decalogi*, Paris, 1615.

Sayrus, *Clavis regia sacerdotum casuum conscientiae*, Venice, 1618.

Scaramelli, S.J., *Directorium asceticum*, Augsburg, 1770.

Schram, O.S.B., *Institutiones theologiae mysticae*, new ed., Paris, 1868.

Seailles, G., *Les affirmations de la conscience moderne*, Paris, Colin, 1903.

Seneca, *Opera omnia*, especially *Epistolae ad Lucilium*, and *De Ira*.

Shaftesbury, *An inquiry concerning virtue and merit*, 1699.

Spencer, Herbert, *The principles of ethics*, London and New York, 1900; *Principles of Biology*; in French: *Les Bases de la Morale evolutioniste*; *Principes de Biologie*, Paris, Alcan.

Sporer-Bierbaum, O.S.F., *Theologia moralis, decalogalis et sacramentalis*, new ed., Paderborn, 1901.

Suarez, S.J., *Opera omnia*, Paris, Vives, 1856 sq.

Surbled, *La Morale dans ses rapports avec la Medecine*, Paris, Retaux, 1892; *Spiritualisme et spiritisme*, Paris, 1898; *Spirites et Mediums*, Paris, 1901.

St. Thomas, O.P., *Opera omnia*, published by order and at the expense of Leo XIII, Rome; another edition, Paris, Vives.

Thomas, *L'Education des sentiments*, Paris, Alcan, 1904.

Thomassin, Orat., *Traite des Jeunes de l'Eglise*, Paris, 1680.

Turinaz, Msgr., *Trois fleaux de la classe ouvriere*; *Le clerge catholique et la lutte contre l'alcoolisme*, Paris and Nancy, 1901.

Turmann, Max, *Au sortir de l'ecole*, 3rd ed., 1901; *L'education populaire*, 2nd ed., 1904; *Initiatives feminines*, 1905, Paris, Lecoffre.

Tyrrell, *External religion*; in French: *La Religion exterieure*, Paris, Lecoffre, 1902.

Vacandard, *Etudes critiques*, Paris, Lecoffre, 1905.

Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de Theologie*, Paris, Letouzey.

Vallet, *La vie et l'heredite*, Paris, 1891.

Vermeersch, S.J., *De prohibitione et censura librorum*, 2nd ed., Tournai, 1898.

Viva, S.J., *Damnatae theses ab Alex. VII, Innoc. XI et Alexandro VIII*, Naples, 1708.

Waffelaert, Msgr., *La cooperation au mal*, 2nd ed., Bruges, 1892.

Walsh, *De actibus humanis*, Dublin, 1891.

Warner, A. G., *American charities*, New York, 1895.

Wirceburgenses, S.J., *Theologia dogmatica et moralis*, new ed., Paris, 1883.

N.B. - Among the authors cited, there are some who abound in errors, and therefore cannot be read except by obeying the laws of the Church issued in this matter.

Fundamental Moral Theology (Volume II)

Prolegomena to Moral Theology

Prolegomena to Moral Theology

We have already spoken of Theology in general in the first volume of Dogmatic Theology. Here, therefore, it will be enough to premise a few things concerning the notion, sources, and history of Moral Theology.

§ I. The Notion of Moral Theology

1. 1° Definition. (A) Theology in general is defined: the supernatural science concerning God and creatures insofar as they are referred to God.

[1] St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 4-5; Zacharia, *Dissertatio de Casuisticae Theologiae originibus, locis atque praestantia*, in Heilig, *Theol. Moralis S. Alphonsi*, Mechlin, 1845, p. XXVII-CXLVIII; Patuzzi, *Prodromus ad universam morum theologiam*, in Migne, *Theol. Curs. Compl.* XI, col. 9-64; Muller, *Theol. Moralis*, Introduction, § 1-14; T. Bouquillon, *Theologia Moralis Fundam.*, 3rd ed., Introduction, p. 1-167; Hogan, *Clerical Studies*, Boston, 1898, ch. V; which work was rendered into French under the care of Boudinhon, Paris, 1902: *Les Etudes du Clerge*.

It is divided into dogmatic and moral theology: the former, which is more speculative, sets forth and demonstrates the truths to be believed, and deservedly is called the rule of things to be believed; the latter, which is more practical, is concerned with morals or things to be done, and therefore is called the rule of things to be done. Yet from this it is not lawful to infer that dogmatic theology is merely speculative, and moral theology merely practical: for the dogmas which are proposed to our faith, although primarily they present to the mind an objective concept, are finally ordered to our sanctification and glorification; on the other hand, the rule of morals flows logically from Christian dogmas, and nothing more efficaciously allures to the practice of virtues than the attentive and pious contemplation of the divine mysteries, for example, Creation, Providence, and the Incarnation. Hence dogmatic theology is indeed primarily, but not exclusively, the rule of things to be believed; and moral theology, although it is primarily the rule of things to be done, must also embrace speculative questions.

2. (B) Moral theology can be defined: a science, relying at once upon reason and faith, treating of human acts insofar as they are means for attaining the supernatural end.[1] - It is called:

[1] Today not a few defenders of independent ethics ambitiously define this science as the breviary of humanity, namely the compendium of all sciences which render man happier; others, with Payot, *Cours de Morale*, p. 6, assert that it is the science by which human life is made more perfect, more intense, and happier. There is no one who does not see that these definitions are too comprehensive and confused.

(a) A science, that is, a series of conclusions deduced from certain principles and connected in logical order. It differs therefore from that theology which is merely casuistic, and which is situated in the solution of practical difficulties; for Moral Theology ascends higher: it investigates, sets forth, and demonstrates the principles of morals, known both by reason and by faith; afterward from these it deduces in logical order conclusions which approach more nearly to practice; and it hands down rules by which human acts can tend toward our supernatural end.[2]

[2] Recently there has arisen, especially in Germany, a controversy among Protestants and Catholics, and indeed among Catholics themselves, concerning the method to be followed in Moral Theology: for many have contended that the casuistic discipline rests upon no solid foundation, and gives occasion to many abuses. This indeed is true when the rules of morals are set forth independently of dogmatic truths; but it is by no means verified in the works of theologians who, adhering to the footsteps of St. Thomas, diligently investigate principles, with the help of analysis and synthesis, and from them logically deduce conclusions. Cf. Mausbach, *Die katholische Moral, ihre Methoden, Grundsaetze und Aufgaben*, Cologne, 1901; Adloff, *Katholische Moral und Sittlichkeit*, Strasbourg, 1901; E. Van Roey, *Recentes controverses de Morale*, in *Revue Neo-Scolastique*, May-Nov. 1902, pp. 213, 464.

(b) Relying upon reason and faith, that is, obtained not by natural light alone, but also with the help of revelation; and thus it is distinguished from Ethics, or moral Philosophy, which treats of the principles of morals known by reason alone, and insofar as they tend toward the ultimate natural end.

3. (c) Treating of human acts insofar as... by these words the object of this science is declared, namely all human acts, whether internal or external, pertaining to private, domestic, or social life, not indeed under every respect, but insofar as they tend toward the ultimate supernatural end; therefore it treats of human acts both in themselves and in their principles; of the laws by which acts of this kind are regulated; and also of the internal or external means, for example, the sacraments, by whose help we may be able to direct our actions to our supernatural end. And thus it is distinguished from those human sciences which treat of laws pertaining to some particular end, for example, from economic science, which hands down norms by which riches ought to be acquired and distributed; from politics, which hands down norms of prudent governing, etc. - It is likewise distinguished from those ecclesiastical sciences, such as canonical and liturgical science, which are proximately ordered to promoting the external governance of the Church or public worship, although remotely they also tend toward the ultimate end. Nevertheless moral theology uses these various sciences, and even in some respect presides over them, insofar as the proximate end ought to serve the ultimate end.

4. Moral theology taken in the broad sense embraces ascetical and mystical theology; but in the strict sense it is distinguished from them: for it is concerned with the laws of the Christian life; ascetical theology, however, with the rules and counsels of Christian perfection; and mystical theology with the higher ways of contemplation and of intimate union with God.

5. 2° Division. Commonly moral theology is divided into two parts: (a) General, or Fundamental, which treats both of the last end of man and of the norm of morality, which is nothing other than the ordering of acts to the last end, and of the general means by which we tend toward the end; (b) and special, which discusses the particular means by which we tend toward the end; namely, the virtues common to every Christian, and the duties proper to each state; and also the sacraments, by which grace is conferred for rightly fulfilling the duties of the Christian life.

6. But since in the *Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology* the doctrine, not only speculative but also practical, concerning the four sacraments has already been set forth, we first completed the sacramental matter, by setting forth the moral and canonical doctrine concerning the three

other sacraments, namely Penance, Matrimony, and Order; afterward, however, in the following order we shall discuss the various parts of Fundamental and Special Theology:

Fundamental or General Theology:

On the Last End and the norm of morality.
On Human Acts.
On Laws.
On Conscience.
On Sins and Vices.
On Virtues in general.

Special Theology:

On Theological Virtues.
On Moral Virtues, or on the Decalogue.
Appendix concerning the precepts of the Church.
On Justice and Contracts.
On the Various Obligations of States.

7. The reason for the division will be clear to one who attends a little. First, in the Fundamental part, there is treatment of the Last End toward which we tend, according to that saying: in all things look to the end; afterward, of Human Acts, insofar as they are means to the end; of Laws, by which our acts are directed to the end; of Conscience, by whose help general laws are applied to individual persons; of Sins and Vices, by which the human will turns aside from the law; of Virtues, by whose help we are inclined to live according to the law.

Special theology, which treats of particular duties, first treats of theological virtues, and secondly of moral virtues, because under these two genera are comprehended all the common duties of the Christian life; thus the precepts of the Decalogue, which are referred to the virtues, are set forth. By way of Appendix, however, there is joined the Treatise on the Precepts of the Church, as a complement of Decalogal Theology. - But because among the moral virtues justice demands a longer exposition, there is special discussion of it in the Treatise on Justice and Contracts. - Finally, since besides the duties common to all, there are certain duties proper to various states, these are discussed in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States.[1]

[1] In the special edition for the use of seminaries, where Moral Theology is set forth separately from Dogmatic Theology, we follow this division: T. I. Fundamental moral theology; on virtues and precepts. T. II. On Justice and contracts; on the various obligations of States. T. III. On the Sacraments in general and in particular.

§ II. Sources of Moral Theology

The sources from which moral truths are drawn are the same as the theological sources, concerning which there has been treatment in the *Synopsis of Fundamental Theology*. It may be permitted to add only a few things which more directly concern moral discipline.

8. 1° Concerning the use of Scripture in moral matters. All who admit the inspiration of the Scriptures confess that the Scriptures both of the Old and of the New Testament are useful, indeed necessary, for the right institution of morals: "All Scripture, inspired by God, is

profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice; that the man of God may be perfect, furnished to every good work."[1] In truth, in them are found both precepts and examples by which morals are instructed.

[1] II Tim. 3:16-17.

(A) But when we use the books of the Old Testament, three things especially must be kept before our eyes: (a) that there was a constant and progressive increase of revelation from the Patriarchs even to Christ; and that God, in those things which He prescribed, permitted, or tolerated, accommodated Himself to human weakness, so that not all things which were lawful for the Jews are permitted to Christians; for example, polygamy and divorce, which at least were tolerated in ancient times, are wholly prohibited under the new dispensation; and the law of charity toward neighbor was not understood in the same manner by Jews and Christians. Hence texts taken from the Old Testament ought not to be alleged or understood without choice and discrimination, but with account taken of this evolution.

(b) In the legal books there are found precepts of three kinds: moral precepts, which retain their force, provided they are taken not precisely in the manner in which they lie there, but as approved, explained, and perfected by Christ; ceremonial precepts, which regarded worship; and judicial precepts, which constituted the law proper to the Israelite nation. These two latter kinds have now been abrogated, and we cannot use them except for determining more fully what is lawful or expedient in certain circumstances, what pertains to natural or positive law, or also for illustrating by analogy certain Christian truths or practices.

(c) As to the examples which are reported there, many indeed are worthy of imitation; but since even the holiest men are not free from human frailty, not all things which they did are for that very reason commendable, although they are not expressly reprehended by Scripture. Therefore it must be carefully weighed, from the context and parallel places, whether these are approved or not; and if they are approved, whether in themselves, under the moral respect, or under another respect; and if any actions either are evil, or at least bear before themselves the appearance of evil, they are not to be drawn into imitation. - The same must likewise be noted as to certain parables and some examples related in the New Testament.

9. (B) In reading the books of the New Testament, attention must chiefly be given to these three things: (a) Christian revelation was not completed in one moment, but grew successively until the death of the last of the Apostles; even after the Apostles had died, the Spirit of God teaches through the infallible magisterium of the Church, and those things which are contained only obscurely, implicitly, and virtually in the Gospels, Epistles, and divine Tradition, are in the course of time proposed more lucidly, explicitly, and formally by the Church herself. Hence, in order to set forth Christian ethics fully, one must wisely use the various books of the New Testament, the divine Traditions, and the infallible magisterium of the Church, whether extraordinary or ordinary.

(b) Since certain things are handed down under precept, but others under counsel, these must not be mixed indiscriminately, but must be distinguished with great circumspection. The foundation of this distinction is found in the Gospel itself:[1] for when the very rich young man had come to Christ,

asking, "What good shall I do that I may have life everlasting?", the Master answered: "But if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." The young man said that he had kept these from his youth; then Jesus said to him: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven." From this it is inferred that, for attaining eternal life, the observance of the commandments strictly suffices; but for perfection something further is required, namely poverty and the other evangelical counsels. Hence from the text, the context, parallel places, the subject matter, and especially the interpretation of the Church, it must be discerned what is established by way of precept and what by way of counsel.

[1] Matt. 19:16-21; cf. Maldonatus, on this place; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 118, a. 4.

(c) Likewise among precepts, some are universal, some particular, others perpetual, others temporary; for example, the Apostles in the Council of Jerusalem established these things:[1] "For it hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things; that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." Now from elsewhere it is clear that the prohibition of fornication is perpetual, absolute, and universal, but that the other things are prohibited only for a time. Hence likewise the context, parallel places, and the interpretation of the Fathers and of the Church must be diligently inspected.

[1] Acts 15:28-29.

10. 2° Concerning the use of Tradition in Moral Theology. It has already been set forth elsewhere (*On the Sources of Revelation*, n. 961 sq.) by what means Tradition is transmitted and known; what is the authority of the solemn or ordinary magisterium of the Church, of the Fathers, theologians, Congregations, etc. It may be permitted to add only a few things which more nearly regard practice.

(A) In reading the decrees of Councils and Supreme Pontiffs, these things especially must be attended to: (a) Definitions concerning moral matters indeed contain principles of morals which in themselves are immutable; but their application can be diverse according to the diverse circumstances of times and places. Thus definitions concerning usury, established in those times when economic laws differed much from those which now prevail, cannot today be applied in the same way as in the Middle Ages. (b) Disciplinary laws vary according to various times and nations, and therefore can be changed or abrogated; hence more recent decrees sometimes correct and reform older ones. Yet the theologian ought to use these so that he may better understand and explain the new dispositions of laws. (c) As to condemned propositions, in order to uncover their sense, it must be carefully inquired by whom and in what circumstances they were uttered, why and how they were reprobated.[2]

[2] For accomplishing this, cf. D. Viva, *Damnatae Theses*; Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de Theologie*, I, 740, 748, etc.

11. (B) The Roman Congregations, in the name of the Pontiff, often promulgate decisions very useful concerning moral matters. For they not only have the power of authentically interpreting the Tridentine decrees and other ecclesiastical laws, each according to its proper competence, with the approval of the Roman Pontiff preserved; but in addition they settle controversies which are to be solved in a disciplinary or administrative manner:[1] decisions of

this kind, however, which make law only between the parties, bear very great authority for similar cases. But among these one must speak a little more fully concerning the Holy Office, whose duty it is "to guard the doctrine of faith and morals,"[2] and also concerning the Tribunal of the Sacred Penitentiary, whose office it is "to examine and settle questions of conscience."[3]

[1] The examination of questions which are to be treated in judicial order is reserved to the Tribunal of the Sacred Rota; its sentences, which contain the reasons both in fact and in law, are of the greatest importance.

[2] Pius X, Bull *Sapienti Consilio*, June 29, 1908.

[3] Ibid.

(a) The Congregation of the Holy Universal Inquisition, which is commonly called the Holy Office, has the right of proceeding and defining in all causes concerning heresy, schism, apostasy from the faith, magic, and abuse of the sacraments; for which reason it has issued not a few decrees for explaining the Bull *Apostolicae Sedis*, where these crimes are punished by various censures. Its doctrinal responses enjoy great authority, especially because they are not issued except after mature discussion of the matter, and are always approved by the Supreme Pontiff; nevertheless this approval, ordinarily in common form, in no way renders them infallible.

(b) The Sacred Penitentiary solves practical difficulties for the internal forum,[4] but it does not settle speculative controversies; hence its decisions must be received with the greatest reverence, and can be very useful even in similar cases; but they do not have the force of law, since they are issued only for a particular case.

[4] In truth Benedict XIV, Constitution *Pastor Bonus*, granted to the Major Penitentiary that "he may be able, with the counsel of his Doctors and Theologians, to declare all doubts in the matter of sins, or otherwise concerning the penitential forum in any way." - More briefly, Pius X, Bull *Sapienti Consilio*: "It examines questions of conscience, and settles them."

12. 3° Concerning the use of reason in Moral Theology. (A) Although the theologian treats especially of those things which God has revealed and which the Church proposes to us to be believed and done, he cannot pass over the principles of morals which are known by natural reason: for God is the author of reason as well as of faith, and revealed truths

are better understood and set forth when they are compared with truths of the natural order. On the other hand, revealed truths themselves ought to be understood reasonably; from these same truths conclusions and practical conclusions are to be inferred. Therefore Moral Theology can and ought to use reason in order rightly to set forth the principles of morals, to prove and illustrate them, and to unfold them for practical uses.

Yet human reason in moral matters is not independent, but subordinated to faith, and it ought to acknowledge the infallible magisterium of the Church in moral questions as much as in dogmatic ones.

(B) Among the natural sciences which can be useful to moralists are numbered: (a) natural Ethics, which treats of the various duties of men, and therefore the works of philosophers, even pagans, which deal with virtues and duties; (b) Psychology, not only speculative, where there is question of human faculties, habits, passions, etc., but also practical, which is acquired from discreet commerce with men; nor should experimental psychology be passed over, especially that part in which the

various diseases are described which can affect the internal faculties; (c) Pastoral Medicine, where physiological and pathological notions are handed down which, on account of the intimate relations between body and soul, are very useful for judging concerning the morality of certain actions; (d) Sociology, which treats of the rights and duties of citizens, insofar as they are members of the social organism; (e) Political Economy, which hands down principles concerning the production and equitable distribution of temporal goods; (f) Civil Jurisprudence, insofar as it sets forth by law those things which among various nations complete and perfect the natural law; (g) History, especially that part which describes the morals, worship, and moral precepts of various peoples: for in this way the progress or regression of moral science is better understood; and besides, from the experience of past times it is more wisely inferred by what means morals can be restored.

§ III. Brief Survey of the History of Moral Theology

13. In order that the aforesaid sources, especially the works of the Fathers and theologians, may be inspected more deeply, and that the method to be followed in Moral Theology may be better understood, it will not be beside the matter briefly to delineate the history of this science. In it a twofold age can be distinguished: the former, of the Fathers; the latter, of the theologians. In each age, several epochs may be distinguished, which have their own proper character: the difference among these does not proceed from their mutual opposition, but from successive evolution; and, since one epoch is a preparation for another, it can often scarcely be defined where this one begins and the other ends.

[1] Zacharia, *Dissertatio de Casuisticae Theologiae originibus*; Patuzzi, op. cit.; C. F. Standlin, *Geschichte der christlichen Moral*; Luthardt, *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik*; Ziegler, *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik*; E. Muller, *Theologia Moralis*, Introduction, § 11-13; Pruner, *Theologie Morale*, translated by Belet, t. I, p. 19-47; Bouquillon, *Theologia Moralis Fund.*, Introduction, n. 124-195.

I. Moral Science in the Age of the Fathers

14. In the age of the Fathers, Moral Theology is more positive, apologetic, and polemical than speculative and scientific; more paraenetic or exhortatory than casuistic; it does not embrace an integral and systematic exposition of all ethics, but only particular treatises, or a brief and incomplete synopsis of duties. - In this age, three epochs are usually distinguished: the first, from the beginning to the Council of Nicaea; the second, from the Council of Nicaea to St. Gregory the Great (+ 604); the third, from St. Gregory to St. Bernard (1120).

[2] Cf. Le Nain de Tillemont, *Memoires pour servir a l'Hist. ecclesiastique*, Paris, 1701; Dom Ceillier, *Hist. des auteurs ecclesiastiques*, 1758; Fessler, *Institut. Patrologicae*, Innsbruck, 1850; O. Bardenhewer, *Les Peres de l'Eglise*, French translation by Godet and Verschaffel, Paris, 1898.

15. 1° In the first epoch, the principles of morals are not unfolded in a systematic manner, but, as occasion is given, are set forth compendiously in epistles, homilies, commentaries, or particular treatises.

(A) Among the Apostolic Fathers who wrote especially concerning moral matters: - (a) the author of the work *Didache*, or *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles* (around the end of the first century), hands down a compendium of Christian ethics: there are three principal commandments, namely love of God and

neighbor, and also the golden rule that one should not do to another what he would not wish to be done to himself; the graver sins are murder, fornication and adultery, idolatry, theft, blasphemy; finally particular duties toward oneself, the Church, the poor, and the family are described.[1] (b) St. Clement, Pope, in the *Epistle to the Corinthians* (around the year 97), especially commends concord and fraternal charity; envy and jealousy stand in the way of this; these vices must be eradicated through penance, obedience, and humility; just as in the body some members minister to others and all to the head, so the faithful of the Church ought to minister one to another, and all to legitimate superiors; therefore those who dissent should confess their sin, subject themselves to the presbyters, and return to peace and unity.[2] (c) Hermas, in the work entitled *Pastor* (around the year 140), sets forth the chief commandments in the second part of his book: for the Shepherd, or angel of penance, commands that Christ's disciple believe in God, flee detraction, and bestow alms; that he cultivate truth and chastity, and also justice, patience, and penance; that he flee sadness, avoid pseudo-prophets, and remove from himself every evil desire; the devil is not to be feared, but God, who can save and destroy. Other things are handed down here and there concerning divorce in the case of adultery, concerning the use of riches, concerning fasting, and finally concerning the way of salvation.[3]

[1] Funk, *Patres Apostolici*, 2nd ed., Tubingen, 1901, t. I, p. VI-XIX and p. 2-37.

[2] Funk, op. cit., p. XXXII and 98-184.

[3] Funk, op. cit., p. CXXII and 414-639.

16. (B) In the second and third century, besides many Fathers who incidentally, in apologetic books against pagans or polemical books against heretics, vindicated the principles of Christian ethics, certain men wrote entire treatises concerning the chief virtues.

(a) Thus, in the Greek Church, Clement of Alexandria elegantly set forth a brief summary of moral doctrine in the *Paedagogus*, and a more profound exposition in the books of the *Stromata*.[4] The Pedagogue is Christ Himself, always like His eternal Father, who teaches us with meekness what a Christian ought to be like: how we ought to use foods not for pleasure, but for the conservation of our life; how carefully obscene speech and acts, and also luxury and ostentation, are to be avoided; afterward he treats of Christian marriage, which ought to be ordered not to pleasure, but to the procreation of children; of the true beauty of man, which consists not in comeliness or external adornment, but in charity; of riches, which we ought to communicate to others not arrogantly and sparingly, but kindly and liberally;[1] of baths and bodily exercise. In the books of the *Stromata*, among other things, he sets forth that the Christian gnostic or philosopher ought to be adorned especially with two virtues, Stoic insensibility and Christian charity.

[4] Migne, P.G., t. VIII and IX; in t. IX, p. 798 sq., there is to be found the excellent dissertation of Nicolas Le Nourry concerning the works and doctrine of Clement; cf. E. de Faye, *Clement d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1898; W. Capitaine, *Die Moral des Clemens von Alexandrien*, Paderborn, 1903; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. III, p. 137.

[1] Concerning this argument he treats more fully in the little work whose title is *Quis dives salvetur*, P.G., IX, 603-652.

17. Origen wrote many things about ethics, not indeed in an ordered and systematic manner, but incidentally in homilies, commentaries, and various treatises, from which a summary of moral science has been excerpted.[2] For there he sets forth the origin of sin, which had already been committed by spirits and human souls before these were joined to bodies; Christ indeed

satisfied for our sins, but the free will of man must cooperate with grace in order that he may obtain sanctification. Actual sins must be expiated in various ways, but especially by penance, which supposes the confession of sins. Moreover there are two classes of Christians: the perfect and the imperfect. The former, or gnostics, ought to cultivate continence and virginity, and to withdraw from the world. But Origen erred concerning the eternity of punishments.

[2] The works of Origen which survive you will find in Migne, P.G., t. XI-XVII; concerning his moral doctrine Capitaine wrote *De Origenis ethica*, Munster in Westphalia, 1898; cf. Huet's *Origeniana*, P.G., XVII, p. 697-1114.

St. Methodius, about + 311, carefully avoided these errors. Moreover he taught that faith, as well as good works and the observance of the commandments, is necessary for salvation; if we sin, recourse must confidently be had to penance, since God is merciful and ready to pardon. He established the distinction between precepts and counsels, and especially commends virginity, yet without in any way reprobating marriage.[3]

[3] The chief work of St. Methodius, *Convivium decem virginum*, you will find in Migne, P.G., XVIII, 27-228; as to his other works, cf. G. N. Bonwetsch, *Methodius von Olympus*, I, *Schriften*, Erlangen and Leipzig, 1891.

18. (b) In the Latin Church, Tertullian and St. Cyprian especially wrote concerning moral matters. The former favors excessive rigorism, even before he embraced the errors of the Montanists;[4] nevertheless he describes certain duties clearly and eloquently. He treats of civil and public life especially in his little works *De spectaculis*, *De idololatria*, *De corona*, and there he urges the principles of cooperation too strictly, not distinguishing sufficiently between precepts and counsels. He excellently sets forth the virtue of fortitude in the books *Ad martyres*, *De patientia*, and *De fuga*; he treats of temperance in the *Exhortatio castitatis*, *De virginibus velandis*, *Ad uxorem*, *De monogamia*, *De cultu feminarum*, *De jejuniis*, but there he censures second marriages too bitterly.

[4] The works of Tertullian you will find in Migne, P.L., t. I-II; Oehler made the best edition public, Leipzig, 1853-1854; cf. P. Monceaux, *Histoire litteraire de l'Afrique chret.*, t. I, 1901; A. d'Ales, *La Theologie de Tertullien*, Paris, 1905; Turmel, *Tertullien*, 1905.

St. Cyprian, although a disciple of Tertullian, tempered his severity.[1] He carefully distinguishes between precepts and counsels. One of the chief virtues is faith, which is truly free, and makes us capable of good works. By good works we truly merit, while by evil works we are made debtors of God; nevertheless we can satisfy God by just works, and do penance for sins. He treats especially *De habitu virginum*, *De dominica oratione*, *De opere et eleemosynis*, *De bono patientiae*, *De zelo et livore*, *De lapsis*, and, in his letters, of penance, where he asserts the necessity of confession. - He erred concerning the necessity of rebaptizing heretics.

[1] Read the works of St. Cyprian in Migne, P.L., t. IV; nevertheless the best edition is that which G. Hartel edited, Vienna, 1868-1871; cf. E. W. Benson, *Cyprian, his life, his times, his work*, London, 1897; P. Monceaux, *Hist. lit. de l'Afrique chret.*, t. II, 1902.

19. (c) In the same age, certain particular Councils issued decrees concerning practical questions pertaining to the Christian life; thus the First Council of Carthage, about the year 215, established laws concerning heretics to be rebaptized; the Council of Elvira, about the year 300, concerning idolatry, sorceries, adultery, divorce, usury, times of fasts, the excommunicated and energumens, and many other matters; the Council of Arles, in the year

314, concerning the faithful who wish to administer public affairs, concerning the baptism of heretics, divorce, marriage with Gentiles, clerics who take interest, those who hand over the sacred Scriptures or the vessels of the Lord to pagans, etc.[2] Likewise the *Canonical Epistle* of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus[3] (253-258), which hands down the penitential discipline of this age, ought to be read attentively.

[2] Hefele treats learnedly of these councils, *Histoire des Conciles*, t. I, § I-XVII. Cf. Mansi, *Concilia*, t. I; Th. Bruns, *Canones Apostolorum et Conciliorum*, Berlin, 1839, t. I.

[3] Migne, P.G., t. X, p. 1019-1047.

20. 2° The second epoch, from the fourth to the sixth century, is deservedly called the golden age of the Fathers. Moral works were then published not only more numerous in number, but also more profound in doctrine and erudition. On the occasion of rising heresies, the foundations of Christian ethics are more firmly established; from the progress of monastic life there arises a more perfect exposition of ascetical and mystical theology; on the other hand, moral principles are more specifically adapted to the various changes which occur in civil life; thus there is more often treatment of the acquisition, use, and abuse of riches, of usury, of alms, etc. Questions of this kind

questions are weighed not only in epistles, in homilies and sermons, but also in commentaries on Scripture, or in various treatises concerning the chief virtues. At the same time, the letters of the Roman Pontiffs and collections of canons exhibit ecclesiastical discipline and authentic rules of morals.

21. (A) Among the Greeks, there flourished especially:

(a) St. Cyril of Jerusalem, who in the *Catecheses* (347) lucidly treats of the dignity, necessity, and illustrious effects of baptism; of sacred chrism or confirmation; of the Eucharist, of the Mass and its utility not only for the living, but also for the dead; of confession and penance for obtaining the remission of sins.[1]

[1] Migne, P.G., t. XXXIII; cf. J. Marquardt, *S. Cyrillus baptismi, chrismatis, eucharistiae mysteriorum interpres*, Leipzig, 1882.

(b) St. Basil the Great, who flourished in the year 365: he wrote concerning moral and ascetical matters. In the *Moralia* he treats of virtues and vices, whether common or proper to each state; in the homilies, of certain capital vices, avarice, anger, drunkenness, and also of the contrary virtues, alms, humility, fasting. He was also a legislator of the monastic life, both in the Ascetical Treatises and in the Longer or Shorter Rules.[2]

[2] Migne, P.G., t. XXXI; cf. Vasson, *S. Basile le Grand, ses oeuvres oratoires et ascetiques*, Paris, 1894.

(c) St. Gregory Nazianzen (330-390) wrote moral poems in which, after setting forth the nature of virtue, he inculcates the individual virtues, especially patience and equanimity in adversities, chastity, poverty, liberality, and humanity toward the poor; but especially he instructs adolescents devoted to the study of letters with salutary admonitions, and afterward the unmarried and monks, excellently commending virginity.[3]

[3] Migne, P.G., t. XXXVII; cf. Benoit, *S. Gregoire de Nazianze*, Paris, 1876; C. Cavalier, *S. Greg. de Naz.*, Montpellier, 1886.

(d) St. Gregory of Nyssa, who flourished in the year 371, wrote three Treatises concerning Christian and religious perfection, where he shows that Christian profession properly consists in the imitation of Christ, in purification from sins, abnegation of one's own will, assiduous prayer, charity, humility, and modesty. Besides, in a special book, he treats of virginity; in the Orations, he especially commends love of the poor and beneficence.[4]

[4] Migne, P.G., t. XLVI; cf. Diekamp, *La Theologie de S. Greg. de Nysse*, 1896.

22. (e) St. Ephrem, the Syrian (+ 362), after demonstrating free will, declares how man's true beatitude consists in virtue; afterward he treats of the individual virtues, especially of the fear of God joined with confidence, of charity and humility, of obedience and abnegation of oneself, of patience, meekness, and chastity. For cultivating these virtues, spiritual combat is necessary, so that the devil and one's own concupiscence may be overcome. He likewise wrote a little book on the priesthood and very many sermons concerning the perfection of the monastic life.[1]

[1] *S. Ephraem Opera*, Rome, 1732-46, t. II and III; cf. A. Haase, *S. Ephraemi Syri theologia*, Halle, 1869.

23. (f) St. Chrysostom (+ 398), in his homilies, eloquently sets forth almost all the duties of the Christian life. Among virtues, he most greatly commends charity, the love of enemies, and alms; among vices, he strictly reprehends drunkenness and avarice, the luxury of the rich, impurity, and the custom of frequenting theaters and circus games. Afterward he urges penance, to be manifested by confession, tears, humility, and alms. He also wrote many moral little works, especially six books *On the Priesthood*, a book *On Virginity*, two books *To the Younger Widow*, and the book *That No One Is Harmed Except by Himself*.[2]

[2] Migne, P.G., t. XLVII-LXIV; cf. A. Puech, *S. Jean Chrysostome et les Moeurs de son temps*, Paris, Hachette, 1891; Ph. Schaff, *Saint Chrysostom and Saint Augustin*, London, 1891.

(g) St. John Climacus, born at the beginning of the sixth century, excellently described the perfection proper to monks in the *Ladder of Paradise*, which embraces thirty steps. There he ingeniously proposes the means for obtaining virtues and eradicating vices. First indeed he commends abnegation of the world, so that we may be able to adhere wholly to God; afterward obedience, penance, meekness, silence, fasting, chastity, humility, and he describes the vices contrary to the aforesaid virtues. By the practice of virtues and by prayer we can attain full perfection, or apathy, that is, a state free from vices and passions.[3]

[3] Migne, P.G., t. LXXXVIII, 631-1164.

24. (B) At the same time, in the Latin Church, there flourished:

(a) St. Ambrose (+ 397), who wrote three books *On the Duties of Ministers*, in which he proposed to himself to follow Cicero's treatise *On Duties*, yet correcting errors and at the same time completing Stoic ethics by the precepts and counsels of Christ. First of all, he demonstrates that divine retribution is one of the chief motives for fulfilling duties. Afterward he describes various virtues, especially the four cardinal virtues; he declares how it is useful for clerics to win for themselves the love, confidence, and good estimation of others; likewise why one should seek not what profits individuals, but what profits many or all; finally he establishes that nothing is to be sought except what is honorable: therefore let not only utility, but life and friendship, yield to honesty. Elsewhere

he treats of virginity, widowhood, flight from the world, the good of death, and the holy Patriarchs, whom he exhibits as models of the virtues.[4]

[4] Migne, P.L., t. XIV-XVI; nevertheless the Vienna edition is better; cf. Pruner, *Die Theologie des H. Ambrosius*, Eichstaedt, 1862; Duc de Broglie, *L'Eglise et l'Empire romain*, t. 5-6; Thamin, *S. Ambroise et la morale chretienne au IVe s.*, Paris, 1895.

(b) St. Jerome (+ about 385), in his Commentaries and especially in his Letters, hands down many things concerning contempt of the world and Christian perfection, concerning the virtues which are necessary for bishops, clerics, and virgins, concerning monastic life and perfection, etc.

25. (c) St. Augustine (+ 429), easily the chief of the Fathers of the Western Church, wrote many excellent things concerning almost all questions of ethics, although he did not arrange his doctrine into one body. Before all things, he establishes the foundations of ethics: God is the supreme good, the good of all goods, the good from which all goods are, and therefore the ultimate end toward which we ought to tend; wherefore the ultimate norm of morality is the eternal law, or divine reason and will; therefore the source of moral obligation is the supreme dominion of God.[1] We tend toward the end through free and meritorious acts: therefore it does not suffice to believe, but it is necessary to perform good works.[2] Among these the works of charity stand forth, to which the rest are referred: the love of God even to contempt of self builds the heavenly city; the love of self even to contempt of God builds the earthly city.[3] In various works he describes the duties of individual, familial, and social life. Nor does he pass over the various degrees of perfection: "Charity begun, therefore," he says, "is justice begun; charity advanced is justice advanced; great charity is great justice; perfect charity is perfect justice."[4] Augustine did not cease to enjoy very great authority among the later Fathers and the Scholastics, so that he deserved to be called the father of Western theology.[5]

[1] *De Beata vita, De Moribus Ecclesiae, Confessiones*, P.L., t. XXXII; *De doctrina christiana*, P.L., t. XXXIV.

[2] *De libero arbitrio*, P.L., t. XXXII; *De fide et operibus*, P.L., t. XL; *De spiritu et littera*, P.L., t. XLIV.

[3] *De Civ. Dei*, P.L., t. XLI, 439; *Enchiridion*, P.L., t. XL.

[4] *De nat. et gratia*, P.L., t. XLIV, 290.

[5] Grou, *Morale de S. Augustin*, Paris, 1786; Nourrisson, *La Philosophie de S. Augustin*, Paris, 1869; Dorner, *Augustinus*, Berlin, 1873; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, I, 2432.

26. (d) Cassian (+ about 416), in the *Institutes of the Coenobia* and the *Conferences*, gathered the marrow of spiritual doctrine which had been handed down by the monks of Egypt. The end of the monastic life is to promote the kingdom of God, but its aim is to attain purity of heart, or charity. To accomplish this, it is necessary to renounce the threefold concupiscence and to eradicate the eight capital vices. God indeed permits the just to be troubled by diverse calamities and temptations, but all these things can be overcome by prayer. For perfection there are desired perfect chastity, which cannot be cultivated without the grace of God, spiritual knowledge of the Scriptures, fraternal charity toward all, and the right use of the tongue. - Yet it is to be regretted that the author fell into semi-Pelagianism.[6]

[6] The works of Cassian you will find in Migne, P.L., t. XLIX-L; nevertheless the Vienna edition is better, edited by Petschenig, 1886-1888; cf. Lombard, *Jean Cassien, sa vie, ses ecrits, sa doctrine*, Strasbourg, 1863.

(e) Caesarius of Arles (+ 543), in Sermons and Letters, amplified the moral doctrine of the earlier Fathers, especially of Origen, Ambrose, and Augustine, and accommodated it to the morals of the sixth century. Worthy of note are the sermons concerning faith and the necessity of good works, concerning divine judgment and penance, concerning charity toward God and neighbor, where he treats brilliantly of the love of enemies, against impurity and drunkenness. He establishes the distinction between capital and minute sins; but at the same time he shows that the habit of often sinning lightly easily draws one to grave sins; thence he infers that it is a grave evil if progress in good works is neglected.[1]

[1] His chief sermons are found among the works of St. Augustine, to whom they had long been ascribed, P.L., t. XXXV; other works were edited by Migne, P.L., LXVII; cf. A. Malnory, *Saint Cesaire, ev. d'Arles*, Paris, 1894; C. F. Arnold, *Caesarius von Arelate*, Leipzig, 1894; P. Lejay, *Le role theologique de Cesaire d'Arles*, in *Rev. d'Hist. et de Litt. relig.*, t. X, 1905, p. 145 sq.; and Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. Theol.*, t. II, p. 2168.

27. (f) St. Gregory the Great (+ 604) wrote many things concerning morals, for the instruction of pastors and the faithful, but especially the *Moralia in Job*, where he explains allegorically this book of Scripture: Job is a type of Christ and the Church, who form one mystical body; the patriarch's wife designates carnal men; the three friends signify heretics; Leviathan is a figure of the devil. This allegorical exposition, however, provides him the occasion to declare at length almost all the rules of Christian ethics concerning vices and virtues. He also completes these in moral letters, so that a summa of moral theology could be excerpted from his works. Besides, in the excellent book *Regula pastoralis*, he excellently describes the duties of pastors of souls, by setting forth who can and ought to come to this office, how he should live, how he should teach, and how, while teaching, he should acknowledge his own infirmity.[2]

[2] Migne, P.L., t. LXXV-LXXIX; cf. Ed. Clausier, *Saint Gregoire le Grand, sa vie, son pontificat, ses oeuvres, son temps*, Paris, 1886-1891; V. Fevre, *Etude des Morales de S. Gregoire* (thesis), Paris, 1858; A. Snow, *Saint Gregory the Great: his work and his spirit*, London, 1892; Grisar, *S. Gregorio Magno*, in *Civilta*, 1890-1893.

28. (g) In the same age there are already found collections of canons, such as the *Canons of the Apostles* and the *Constitutions of the Apostles*, around the beginning of the fifth century; likewise there are many decrees of general and particular Councils concerning moral matters and penitential discipline;[3] not a few decretal letters of the Roman Pontiffs, especially of St. Siricius, St. Innocent I, Zosimus, Boniface, St. Celestine, Hilary, St. Gelasius, Symmachus, St. Leo, and Gregory the Great.[4]

[3] Concerning these, see Mansi, t. II-X; Hefele, t. I-IV; Bruns, op. cit., t. I-II.

[4] Concerning these letters, see P. Coustant, *Epistolae Rom. Pontificum*, Paris, 1721; A. Thiel, *Epist. Rom. Pontif.*, from St. Hilary to Hormisdas, Braunsberg, 1867; Ph. Jaffe, *Regesta Pontificum Roman.* from St. Peter to the year 1143, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1885.

29. 3° In the third epoch of the Fathers, from St. Gregory to St. Bernard, on account of the bitterness of the times, there is scarcely any progress of theology; most authors are only collectors and compilers. For the most part theological science is cultivated in abbatial and episcopal schools, and gradually becomes scholastic. Hence there already begins a systematic exposition of ethics, and the way is prepared for the Summas of theology.

30. (A) Among the Greeks, John Damascene (+ 740) stands out. In the book *De Orthodoxa fide*, and in the little works *De jejuniis*, *De Virtutibus et vitiis*, he arranged the chief principles of ethics.[1] He attempted to accommodate Aristotelian philosophy to the Christian faith, and thus opened the way for the Scholastics. He establishes that there is a twofold law: the law of God manifested by the testimony of conscience, to which obedience must be given, and the law of sin, which we must resist. By fulfilling the law of God, we are made like Him. To God is owed adoration, or the worship of latria. We likewise glorify Him by exercising the virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Toward neighbor we ought to cultivate justice, charity, and beneficence. But for accomplishing this, two things are necessary: abnegation of oneself and prayer. - Elsewhere he treats brilliantly of the sacraments and the worship of images.

[1] His works were edited by Migne, P.G., t. XCIV and XCV; cf. Grundiener, *Johannes Damascenus* (thesis), Utrecht, 1876; Lupton, *S. John of Damascus*, London, 1884; V. Ermoni, *S. Jean Damascene*, Paris, 1904.

31. (B) Among the Latins, there flourished: (a) St. Isidore of Seville (+ 601), who, in the three books of the *Sentences* and in the two books *De ecclesiasticis officiis*, arranged the moral and ascetical doctrine of his predecessors; he was held by his contemporaries and by the Scholastics as an ornament of the Catholic Church.[2]

[2] See his works in Migne, P.L., t. LXXXI-LXXXIV; Fr. Menendez Pelayo, *S. Isidore et l'importance de son role dans l'histoire intellectuelle de l'Espagne*, in *Annales de Philos. chret.*, new series, t. VII, 1882, p. 258-269.

(b) The Venerable Bede (+ 691), both in commentaries and in homilies, set forth moral doctrine in an exhortatory manner and in a fuller style;[3] most studious and very learned in the Scriptures, he was called Venerable on account of the merits of his doctrine and virtues.

[3] Migne, P.L., t. XC-XCV; cf. Gehle, *De Bedae venerabilis vita et scriptis*, Leyden, 1838; Dom Plaine, *Le Venerable Bede*, in *Revue anglo-romaine*, 1896, t. III, p. 49-96.

(c) Alcuin (+ 755), besides moral commentaries on Scripture, wrote books concerning the use of the Psalms, concerning the ceremonies of baptism, concerning confession, where he proves its necessity, concerning virtues and vices, concerning the reason of the soul, in which he gathered many useful and pious things.[4]

[4] Migne, P.L., t. C-CI; cf. Monier, *Alcuin et Charlemagne*, 1864; Werner, *Alcuin und sein Jahrhundert*, Paderborn, 1876; Hamelin, *Essai sur la vie et les oeuvres d'Alcuin* (thesis), Paris, 1877.

(d) Hincmar, Archbishop of Reims (+ 845), wrote various little works concerning vices to be avoided and virtues to be exercised, concerning the restraining of the plunders of soldiers, concerning the restraining of the abduction of widows, girls, and nuns, etc.[1]

[1] Migne, P.L., t. CXXV-CXXVI; cf. Vidieu, *Histoire de Reims, etude sur le IXe s.*, Paris, 1875.

(e) Rabanus Maurus[2] (+ 847) wrote books concerning the praises of the Holy Cross, the instruction of clerics, marriages of blood relatives, the deceits of magicians and false divinations, sacred orders, ecclesiastical discipline, seeing God, purity of heart and the manner of penance, questions of penitential Canons, etc.

[2] Migne, P.L., t. CVII-CXII; cf. Dahl, *Leben und Schriften des Erzbischofs R. Maurus von Mainz*, Fulda, 1828.

32. (f) St. Peter Damian (+ 1057) published many little works concerning the duties of the faithful, clerics, and monks, concerning the sacraments administered by the impious, concerning the degrees of kinship and relationship, concerning the time of celebrating marriages, concerning Lent, concerning the fast of Saturday, concerning the celebration of vigils, concerning the canonical hours, concerning the celibacy of priests, concerning the common life of clerics, concerning the perfection of monks, etc. He likewise wrote histories of certain saints, so that he might confirm precepts by their examples.[3]

[3] Migne, P.L., t. CXLIV-CXLV; cf. Vogel, *Peter Damiani*, Jena, 1856; Capecelatro, *Storia di S. P. Damiano e del suo tempo*, Florence, 1862.

(g) St. Bernard (+ 1120), "last among the Fathers, certainly not unequal to the first," says Mabillon, wrote concerning moral, ascetical, and mystical matters in such a way that he deserved to be called the Mellifluous Doctor. Besides sermons *De tempore*, *De diversis*, and *De Cantico Canticorum*, he wrote very many little works, especially *De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae*, *De diligendo Deo*, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, *De baptismo*, *De praecepto et dispensatione*, and the five books *De consideratione* to Eugene III. Most devoted toward the Blessed Virgin, he salutes her as mediatrix to the Mediator and as aqueduct of grace; yet he does not acknowledge her immaculate conception. He lays the foundations of mystical theology, and treats brilliantly of the ecstatic love of God.[4]

[4] Migne, P.L., t. CLXXXII-CLXXXV; cf. Neander, *Der heilige Bernhard*, Berlin, 1813; S. Huffer, *Der heilige Bernhard von Clairvaux*, Munster, 1886; Vacandard, *Histoire de S. Bernard*, Paris, 1895; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. II, p. 746-785.

33. (C) To the same epoch must be referred: (a) The penitential books, in which a catalogue is composed of grave sins and of the canonical punishments annexed to these. These books were edited: among the Greeks, by John the Faster, Theodore the Studite, Nicephorus of Constantinople;[5] but among the Latins, by almost innumerable authors, such as St. Columbanus, Cummian, Egbert, Theodore of Canterbury, Rabanus.[1]

[5] You will find these in Migne, P.L., t. LXXXVIII, p. 1889-1918; t. XCIX, p. 1721-1734; t. C, p. 855-864.

[1] See them in Migne, P.L., t. LXXX, p. 228-230; t. LXXXVII, p. 979-998; t. LXXXIX, p. 401-436; t. XCIX, p. 927-938; t. CXII, p. 1397-1424. - Cf. J. Schmitz, *Die Bussbucher und die Bussdisciplin der Kirche*.

(b) Collections of canons and decrees, in which ecclesiastical laws are reported or arranged under various titles. Thus to St. Isidore of Seville is ascribed a very ancient collection, which is distributed into ten books: concerning the institutions of monasteries and monks and the orders of penitents; concerning the institutions of judgments; concerning the institutions of offices and the order of baptizing; concerning the diversities of marriages; concerning the general rules of clerics and of other Christians; concerning the honesty and affairs of princes; concerning God and those things which are to be believed about Him; concerning the abdication of heretics; concerning idolatry and its worshipers.[2] - There are many other collections, which were edited, among others, by Egbert of York, Isaac of Langres, Burchard of Worms, Anselm of Lucca, Ivo of Chartres, and especially by Gratian, whose *Decretum* was inserted into the Body of Canon Law.[3]

[2] In Migne, P.L., t. LXXXIV, p. 25-92; ibid., p. 849-914, there is found a historical-critical preface by C. de la Serna Santander.

[3] The collections of Egbert and Isaac are to be found in Migne, P.L., t. LXXXIX, p. 379; t. CXXIV, p. 1075; cf. Ballerini, *De antiquis collectionibus et collectoribus canonum*.

II. Moral Theology in the Age of the Theologians

34. Moral science, already from the twelfth century, is set forth by theologians in a systematic, didactic, and philosophical manner. The elements elaborated by the Fathers and Councils are united into one organic body and distributed in logical order; nor are they set forth by way of exhortation or under the form of homilies, but didactically, as is usually done in the schools; and at the same time they are accommodated especially to Aristotelian philosophy, which was then handed down in the Universities. There is a twofold epoch: the former, scholastic, which extends from the twelfth century to the sixteenth century; the latter, modern, from the sixteenth century to our own times.

[4] Simler, *Des Sommes de theologie*, Paris, 1871; Haureau, *Hist. de la philos. scolastique*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1880; De Wulf, *Hist. de la philosophie medievale*, Louvain, 1900; Picavet, *Esquisse d'une histoire generale et comparee des philosophies medievales*, Paris, 1905; Hurter, S.J., *Nomenclator litterarius*, t. IV, Innsbruck, 1899. For French authors: *Histoire litteraire de la France*; P. Feret, *La Faculte de Theologie de Paris*, Paris, 1894-1897; for German authors, Michael, S.J., *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes*, Freiburg im Breisgau, t. III, 1903.

1° Scholastic Moral Theology

Three periods can be distinguished in scholastic theology: the first, which is preparatory, in the twelfth century; the second, truly golden, in the thirteenth century; the third, which falls somewhat into subtleties, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

35. (A) In the first period, the way was already being prepared for the evolution of theology by the foundation of certain schools. Thus the school of Bec, founded by Lanfranc[1] and illustrated by St. Anselm,[2] introduced a new method, namely the scholastic method, by whose help many conclusions are deduced from revealed principles, and are arranged into one body of doctrine. Yet these men wrote concerning moral matters only incidentally. Nor can the school of Abelard be passed over, although he erred in several matters; the *Introduction to Theology*, which Abelard wrote, is as it were a summa of theology, which authors not only contemporary but also later used much; another work, *Scito teipsum*, exhibits a compendium of natural Ethics.[3] Likewise the school of St. Victor, in Paris, although less didactic and more mystical, contributed not a little to the progress of theology; among the doctors of this school Hugh of St. Victor stands out, who, in the books *De Sacramentis*, hands down a compendium of all dogmatic and moral theology.[4]

[1] His works were edited by Migne, P.L., t. CL; worthy of note is the little book *De Celanda confessione*, ibid., p. 625-632, where he says that the penitent can, when a priest is lacking, confess to clerics, and even to the faithful; cf. Lecomte, *Ecole de l'Abbaye du Bec*, thesis, Rouen, 1878.

[2] Migne, P.L., t. CLVIII-CLIX; you will find his moral doctrine especially in the homilies, sermons, and meditations; cf. Card. d'Aguirre, *S. Anselmi Theologia*, Salamanca, 1678-1681; Ragey, *Hist. de S. Anselme*, Paris, 1890; J. M. Rigg, *S. Anselm of Canterbury*, London, 1896; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 1327-1350.

[3] Ch. de Remusat, *Abelard, sa vie, sa philosophie et sa theologie*, Paris, 1855; Vacandard, *Abelard, sa lutte avec S. Bernard, sa doctrine, sa methode*, Paris, 1881; Denifle, *Abaelards Sentenzen und die Bearbeitung seiner Theologia*, in *Archiv fur Literatur... des Mittelalters*, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1885, t. I; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 36-55.

[4] Migne, P.L., t. CLXXV-CLXXVIII; cf. Mignon, *Les origines de la Scolastique et Hugues de S. Victor*, Paris, 1895, t. II, p. 77-395; Simler, *Des Sommes de theologie*, thesis, p. 78-96; Engelhardt, *Hugo von S. Victor...*, Erlangen, 1838. - The *Summa*

sententiarum, formerly ascribed to Hugh, was written by one of his disciples, and does not sufficiently recede from the errors of Abelard; cf. Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict.*, t. I, p. 53.

But the most celebrated doctor of this time was Peter Lombard, professor of theology and afterward Bishop of Paris, who in the four books of *Sentences* gathered a summa of Dogmatic and Moral Theology from the Fathers and arranged it by the scholastic method. In the third and fourth book, after setting forth the mystery of the Incarnation, he treats of the

Christian life, which is principally situated in the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, and secondarily in the moral virtues; but besides, in order to attain our end, it is necessary to observe the ten precepts of the Decalogue and the evangelical law. Afterward he treats of the sacraments in general and in particular, and of the consummation of the Christian life in heaven. He was called the Master of the Sentences, and his work was expounded in the schools for many centuries by the most illustrious theologians.[1]

[1] Migne, P.L., t. CXCI-CXCII; cf. Simler, op. cit., p. 89 sq.; Protois, *Pierre Lombard, son epoque, sa vie, ses ecrits, son influence*, Paris, 1881; Baltzer, *Die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus*, Leipzig, 1902.

36. (B) In the second period, Universities had now succeeded the schools, and the little works or books of sentences are succeeded by *Theological Summas* of immense bulk and very great erudition, in which truths not only dogmatic but moral are set forth and demonstrated at length under various respects, and against whatsoever errors. The principal doctors were:

(a) Alexander of Hales (+ 1245), born in England, disciple and afterward Master in the University of Paris, having already advanced in age entered the Order of St. Francis, called the Irrefragable Doctor, wrote a theological Summa in which, after setting forth the mystery of the Incarnation, he treats of Christian ethics: of the eternal and natural law, of the Mosaic and evangelical law, by which man is directed to eternal life; of grace, by whose help we are able to observe the law; of virtues, which incline us to live conformably to the law; of the sacraments, by which we receive the grace necessary for salvation. But, prevented by death, he could not complete his work concerning virtues and sacraments.[2]

[2] *Summa Alexandri Alensis*, Venice, 1475; other editions, of which the best is the Venetian, 1575-1576, under this title: *Universae theologiae Summa*. Cf. Wadding, *Scriptores Ordinis Minorum*; Simler, op. cit., p. 97-133; Vacant, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 772-785.

37. (b) In this age theological schools began to flourish among the regulars. Two lights illustrated the Dominican Order:[3] Albert and Thomas.

[3] Concerning Dominican theologians read Jac. Quetif-Echard, *Scriptores ordinis Praedicatorum*, Paris, 1719.

Blessed Albert the Great[4] (1206-1280), professor at Paris and Cologne, "great in natural magic, that is, in the natural sciences, greater in philosophy, greatest in theology," treats learnedly in the *Summa theologiae*, especially in the second part, of man and his primeval state, of grace and sins; in the *Summa de creaturis* he hands down useful things concerning the psychological propensities of man. But, in theological matters, he formed a disciple superior to himself, Thomas Aquinas.

[4] His works were edited at Lyons, under the care of P. Jammy, 1651. Cf. Sighart, *Albertus Magnus*, Regensburg, 1857, rendered into French, Paris, 1862; Weddingen, *Albert le Grand*, Paris and Brussels, 1881; W. Feiler, *Die Moral des Albertus Magnus*, Leipzig, 1891; Vacant, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 666.

38. St. Thomas (+ 1274), the Angelic Doctor, taught sacred theology learnedly and accurately in the University of Paris and in some academies of Italy. He gathered and joined into one the doctrines of his predecessors, like scattered members of a certain body, arranged them in wondrous order, and increased them by great additions. His ethics is found in the commentaries on the four books of the *Sentences*, the *Summa theologica*, the Disputed Questions, and the Quodlibets. He exhibits an admirable synthesis of all Christian ethics.

In the first part of the *Summa theologica*, he treats of God, insofar as He is the first principle of all creatures; in the second, of the movement of the rational creature toward God. This is the moral part, which was held to be truly golden even by those who rejected his philosophical principles; in the third, he treats of Christ, insofar as He is the way of tending toward God, and of the sacraments.

In the moral part, no less than in the dogmatic part, there shines forth a truly scientific order. First he treats of the ultimate end of man, which is God; afterward of human acts by which we tend toward this end. Human acts are considered both in themselves and in their principles, whether internal or external. With the general notions thus set forth, the Holy Doctor treats of duties which are common to all: these are reduced to the theological and moral virtues, the chief of which are called cardinal; finally, of the duties of each state. There he establishes a comparison between the active and contemplative life, and excellently declares what things are required for the state of perfection. The sacraments, concerning which he treats in the third part, are the means by which grace is conferred for rightly fulfilling Christian duties. When he has discussion of the virtues, he sets forth not only those things which are necessary for avoiding sin, but also those which are desired for perfection: thus he does not tear moral theology away from ascetical theology, but embraces both together.[1]

[1] Touron, *La vie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, avec un expose de sa doctrine et de ses ouvrages*, Paris, 1737; Barelte, *Histoire de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, 4th ed., 1862; Werner, *Der heilige Thomas von Aquino*, Regensburg, 1858-1859; Feret, op. cit., t. II, p. 443-486.

39. (c) In the Franciscan school[2] there flourished especially Bonaventure and Scotus.

[2] Concerning theologians of this school see Wadding, *Scriptores Ord. Minorum*, Rome, 1650.

St. Bonaventure (1221-1274), the Seraphic Doctor, born at Bagnoregio in Etruria, handed down sacred Theology in the University of Paris, and afterward was elected Minister General of the Order, Bishop of Albano, and Cardinal. His moral doctrine is to be found: in the Commentaries on the four books of the *Sentences*; the Disputed Questions, where, among other things, he treats of evangelical perfection, namely humility, poverty, continence, and obedience; the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, where he shows that God can be reached especially through the traces which He has left in the sensible world, through the images implanted in man's faculties, and through speculation or contemplation; the *Collationes* concerning the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, and concerning the ten precepts. Nor should his ascetical works be passed over: *De triplici via*, which is also entitled *Incendium amoris*, where he declares that the soul reaches God by a threefold way, meditation, prayer, and contemplation; *Soliloquium*; *Lignum vitae*, or contemplation concerning the Passion of the Lord, etc. - In speculative matters he cannot be equated with St. Thomas, but in mystical matters he is easily held to be chief; and since between the Angelic and the Seraphic Doctor there is a great likeness of virtue, sanctity, and doctrine, it is worth the effort to read the works of both.[1]

[1] The best edition of the works of St. Bonaventure, under the care especially of Fidelis de Fanna and Jeiler, was printed at Quaracchi, 1882-1902. Cf. Prosper de Martigne, *La scolastique et les traditions franciscaines*, Paris, 1888, p. 79-116; L. de

Cherance, *S. Bonaventure*, Paris, 1899; A. de Margerie, *Essai sur la philosophie de S. Bonaventure*, Paris, 1855; Werner, *Die Psychologie und Erkentnisslehre des Joh. Bonaventura*, Vienna, 1876; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. II, p. 962-986.

John Duns Scotus[2] (+ 1308), the Subtle Doctor, taught theology at Oxford, Paris, and Cologne; he adhered neither to Thomas nor to Bonaventure, but weighing their doctrines critically and subtly, he frequently proposes and defends new opinions, yet without himself falling into heresy. His principal work was the Commentary on the four books of the *Sentences*, which he wrote at Oxford and perfected at Paris. His moral doctrine differs in many respects from Thomistic doctrine: the norm of morality, according to him, depends more on the free will of God than on the very nature of things as perceived by divine wisdom; hence natural law is not so immutable, especially as to duties toward neighbor. Other differences will be set forth in the course of the work.

[2] His works were edited by Wadding, Lyons, 1639. Cf. Werner, *J. Duns Scotus*, Vienna, 1881; Seeberg, *Die Theologie des Duns Scotus*; Pluzanski, *Essai sur la Philosophie de D. Scot*, Paris, 1887; Vacant, *Etudes comparees sur la Philosophie de S. Thom. d'Aquin et celle de D. Scot*, Paris, 1891.

40. (d) Outside the aforesaid schools of the regulars there flourished William, called of Auvergne because of the region in which he was born, and of Paris because he taught theology at Paris and was bishop of this city (+ 1249). He wrote various treatises concerning moral matters, especially the *Summa virtutum et vitiorum*, and little works *De Fide et Legibus*, *De remediis tentationum*, *De claustro animae*, *De paenitentia*, *De pluralitate beneficiorum*, etc.

(e) In the same age St. Raymond of Pennafort[1] collected the Decretals of Gregory IX and made them public law, setting forth in five books the whole canonical doctrine of this time. He also published a summa concerning penitential cases, where he treated of sins against God and neighbor, of the ministers of the sacraments, and also of marriage.

[1] Cf. *Raymundiana*, or documents which pertain to the life or writings of St. Raymond of Pennafort, by Balme, Baran, Colomb, Rome and Stuttgart, 1901.

41. (C) In the third period, moral theology becomes less clear and synthetic, and is deformed by an intolerable abuse of distinctions. The principal causes of this were the propagation of nominalism, dissensions among the various schools of theologians, the Great Schism, and corruption of morals. Therefore only a few works are worthy of note.

Among the chief authors who wrote concerning moral matters are numbered:

(a) Peter of Ailly[2] (1350-1420), who, besides questions on the books of the *Sentences*, arranged little works concerning erroneous conscience, concerning the sacraments, etc. He writes learnedly, but holds that no action is evil in itself, but only because it is prohibited by law.

[2] Tschackert, *Peter von Ailly*, Gotha, 1877; Salembier, *Petrus de Alliaco*, thesis, Lille, 1886; Vacant, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 642.

(b) John Gerson[3] (1363-1429), whose chief moral works shine with wisdom and piety: *Compendium theologiae*; concerning the precepts of the Decalogue; concerning confession and the art of dying; concerning little children to be drawn to Christ; concerning celibacy; concerning prayer; concerning contracts, etc.

[3] Jourdain, *Doctrina Gersonii de theologia mystica*, Paris, 1838; J. B. Schwab, *Johannes Gerson*, Wurzburg, 1859; Masson, *Jean Gerson, sa vie, son temps, ses oeuvres*, Lyon, 1894.

42. (c) In this same age certain works were arranged for the use of confessors, summas of cases of conscience or confessional summas, in which rules were handed down for solving practical questions which occur in the sacred tribunal; the chief authors of these works were: Monaldus, O. Min. (+ 1285), St. Astesanus, an anonymous author from the town of Asti, O. Min. (+ 1330); Bartholomew of San Concordio, O. Praed. (+ 1347); but especially St. Antoninus, O. Praed. (1389-1459), Archbishop of Florence, who wrote a theological Summa, deservedly praised even today in moral matters; Sylvester Prieras (1502), who wrote a *Summa casuum conscientiae*.

(d) Mystical works were published by Meister Eckhart (+ 1327), who nevertheless unknowingly fell into a certain pantheism; John Tauler, O.P. (1290-1361), who wrote concerning true virtues and the degrees of Christian perfection; Henry Suso, O.P., whose works, very pious and pleasant, were recently committed to print under the care of Denifle.[4]

[4] Cf. Delacroix, *Essai sur le mysticisme speculatif en Allemagne au XIVe siecle*, Paris, 1900.

2° Modern Moral Theology

43. Moral theology, which in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had slept, awakened from sleep by the attacks of the Humanists and Protestants, received new strength, and for nearly two centuries made progress; but, as the seventeenth century waned and thereafter, it again declined, especially because the minute, and sometimes too benign, investigation of particular cases, which is called casuistry, had been cultivated too much.

[1] Cf. Hurter, *Nomenclator litterarius recentioris theologiae catholicae*, Innsbruck, 1892-1895, with the various authorities cited there.

44. (A) First progressive period. The principal causes of this progress were: the true reform completed by the Council of Trent; the necessity of defending faith and morals against Protestants and Rationalists; the institution of various orders of clerks regular and Congregations, especially of the Society of Jesus, from which came forth an army of theologians; the institution of new Universities or the renewal of old ones; the invention of the art of printing, by whose help the ancient works of the Fathers and theologians became much more easily available to all. - Therefore theology was called back to its sources, Scripture and the Fathers; the method was not exclusively dialectical, but partly historical; not a few subtleties vanished, and new questions, accommodated to the needs of the times, were carefully weighed. - The book of Sentences of P. Lombard is gradually removed from the schools, while the theological summa of St. Thomas is excellently expounded by commentaries. - It will suffice to enumerate the principal theologians in each school, and the best works which they wrote concerning moral matters.

45. (a) In the Dominican school or Order of Preachers, there flourished: Thomas Cardinal Cajetan (1510): Commentaries on the *Summa* of St. Thomas, *Summa casuum conscientiae*, where he shows himself to be a probabiliorist; Francisco de Vitoria (+ 1546): theological relections, where, among other things, he treats brilliantly of the right of war, marriage, the increase of charity, temperance, homicide, magical art, and simony; Bartholomew Medina (+ 1581): commentary

on the first and third part of the summa of St. Thomas; he is deservedly held to be the prince of the moderate probabilists; Dominic Soto (+ 1560), a serious probabilist author: *De justitia et jure*; concerning caution in the use of oaths; concerning the manner of keeping and revealing a secret; commentary on the four books of the Sentences; Peter Soto (+ 1563): a classic work concerning the institution of priests; Bartholomew of Ledesma: summa of cases of conscience; John of St. Thomas (+ 1644), excellent expositor of St. Thomas; J. B. Gonet (+ 1681), distinguished by keenness of mind, rejected the more benign opinions of probabilism as intolerable laxities and an evasion of the divine precepts, in the moral part of the *Clypeus thomisticus* against its new opponents.

John Martinez de Prado (+ 1668): *Theologiae moralis quaestiones praecipuae*; *De Sacramentis in genere et in specie*.

46. (b) Among the Franciscans: Anthony of Cordoba (+ 1578), *Commentary on the four books of the Sentences*, and a theological questionnaire, or forest of cases of conscience; Emmanuel Rodriguez (+ 1613), *Regular and Canonical Questions*; John of the Trinity, *Against Confessors Who Solicit*; Martin of St. Joseph (+ 1649), *Summa of Moral Theology*; John Mary of Castilento (+ 1653) arranged alphabetically the Seraphic polyanthea of moral theology; Gesuald of Bologna, O. Cap., published an entire course of moral theology; Peter Marchant (+ 1661), a notable probabilist: *The Sacramental and Visible Tribunal of Souls*; *Notable Resolutions of Various Cases and Practical Questions*; Eligius Bassaeus (+ 1670), O. Cap., gathered the flowers of all practical theology.

47. (c) From the nascent Society of Jesus there came forth many theologians of great name:[1] Blessed Canisius (+ 1597), whose *Summa of Christian Doctrine*, translated into many languages, counts almost innumerable editions; Toletus (+ 1596), whom St. Francis de Sales greatly esteemed: *Instruction of Priests*, concerning the seven sins, and a most complete *Summa of Cases of Conscience*; Emmanuel Sa (+ 1596), whose *Aphorisms of Confessors* are most useful; Louis Molina (+ 1600): *De justitia et jure*, a work of great authority among jurists; Gregory de Valentia (+ 1603): *Theological Commentaries*, in which he excellently expounds all the questions contained in the *Summa* of St. Thomas; John Azor (+ 1608), a moderate probabiliorist: *Moral Institutions*; Francis Suarez (+ 1617), among modern theologians most learned, wrote clearly and at the same time profoundly, and indeed with a fuller pen, concerning the principal moral questions; Gabriel Vasquez (+ 1604), celebrated for keenness of mind and profundity, wrote a commentary on the First of the Second of St. Thomas, and also little works concerning almsgiving, scandal, restitution, etc.; Thomas Sanchez (+ 1610), who discusses marriage at length; Vincent Filliuccius (+ 1622), wrote concerning Christian duties and cases of conscience, from which he himself made a synopsis of universal moral theology; he leans toward the more benign opinions; Lessius (+ 1623), whose most praised work treats of right and justice and the other cardinal virtues; Aegidius Coninck, not an unworthy disciple of Lessius (+ 1633): *De sacramentis et censuris*; concerning the morality, nature, and effects of supernatural acts, where he treats of faith, hope, and charity; P. Laymann, a moderate probabilist (+ 1635): *Moral Theology*; Ripalda (+ 1648), wrote excellently concerning the theological virtues; John Cardinal de Lugo (+ 1660), most renowned for keenness of mind and

perspicuity, subjects the opinions of others to accurate criticism and solidly defends his own: concerning the virtue of divine faith; concerning justice and right; concerning the sacrament and sacrifice of the Eucharist; concerning the virtue and sacrament of penance; concerning suffrages and indulgences; moral responses; Theophilus Raynaud (+ 1663), elegantly and eloquently, though not always critically, wrote concerning virtues and vices, and also concerning equivocation and mental restriction; H. Busembaum (+ 1668), a benign probabilist, very celebrated for his clear method, whose *Medulla theologiae moralis* reached more than 200 editions, and was explained by commentaries by Lacroix, St. Alphonsus, and Ballerini; Anthony de Escobar (+ 1669), a more benign probabilist: *Liber theologiae moralis 24 S. J. doctoribus reseratus*; *The More Received Opinions of Universal Moral Theology without Dispute*; Thomas Tamburini (+ 1675): *Explanation of the Decalogue*; *An Expeditious Method of Confession*.

[1] Cf. A. De Backer, *Bibliotheque des Ecrivains de la Compagnie de Jesus*, Liege, 1869-1876; new edition under the care of Ch. Sommervogel, Brussels, 1890.

48. (d) From other orders likewise certain moralists came forth: among the Benedictines:[1] Louis Blosius (+ 1566), who in the *Mirror of Religious* and other ascetical little works discusses the religious virtues with genuine piety; J. Graffius (+ 1620), *Golden Decisions of Cases of Conscience*; L. Engel, who in the year 1661 published a *Manual of Parish Priests*; J. Saenz de Aguirre (+ 1699): *Concerning the Virtues and Vices of Morals*. - From the Order of St. Augustine:[2] Peter Aragon published commentaries on the Second of the Second of St. Thomas concerning faith, hope, and charity, concerning justice and right; Bartholomew Salon likewise wrote learnedly concerning justice. - Alexander Pellegrino (+ 1634), O. Theat., composed a treatise concerning the duel. - Thomas Hurtado, O. Cler. reg., a more benign probabilist: *Various Treatises of Moral Resolutions* (1651). - Seraphinus a Conceptione,[3] O. Carm. (+ 1663): *Treatise concerning the Virtue and Sacrament of Penance*.

[1] Concerning Benedictine writers, go to Ziegelbauer, *Historia rei literariae ordinis S. Benedicti*, Vienna, 1754; Dom Francois, *Biblioth. generale des ecrivains de l'Ordre de S. Benoit*, Bouillon, 1777-1778; Vac.-Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. II, p. 602-628.

[2] Cf. Gandolfus, *Dissertatio historica de ducentis augustinianis scriptoribus*, Rome, 1740.

[3] Concerning him and other Carmelites, cf. *Bibl. Carmelitana*, Orleans, 1752.

49. (e) From the secular clergy: St. Charles Borromeo[4] (+ 1584), restorer of Christian life and discipline, whose moral doctrine is found in the *Acts of the Church of Milan*; worthy of special praise are the instructions for confessors; St. Francis de Sales[5] (+ 1622), easily the chief among ascetical authors; whose principal works are: *Introduction a la vie devote* (*Philothea*); *Traite de l'amour de Dieu* (*Theotimus*); *Spiritual Conferences*, *Letters*, *Sermons*; Martin Azpilcueta, called Navarrus (+ 1587), whose *Manual*, or *Enchiridion of Confessors*, is a classic work; Martin Bonacina (+ 1631), celebrated for abundance of matters and perspicuity of doctrine: *Moral Theology*; three treatises concerning laws, sins, and the precepts of the Decalogue; Francis Sylvius (+ 1648), whose principal work is a very neat commentary on the *Summa* of St. Thomas.

[4] Vac.-Mangenot, *Diction. de Theol.*, t. II, p. 2267.

[5] Hamon, *Vie de S. Francois de Sales*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1858.

50. (B) Second period gradually declining. In this second period, moral theology gradually becomes less scientific, and more casuistic. After a distinction had been made between ascetical and strictly moral theology, the summas or manuals of moral theology often wholly omit, or only touch in passing, the principles of Christian life and the means for cultivating virtues; they set forth especially what is strictly required for avoiding sin. From this, there is sharp dispute between probabiliorists and probabilists as to what is prohibited under grave obligation, what under light obligation, and what can be tolerated; concerning the excellence of virtues, concerning the motives and means of cultivating them, scarcely anything is indicated, under the pretext that these things pertain to ascetical theology. Hence moral theology is turned into a certain spiritual pathology. Moreover, not rarely antiquated or idle questions are treated at length, while new problems, which arise from changed circumstances, are scarcely touched in passing. Wherefore gradually the name of casuist becomes odious.

51. Nevertheless, even in this age, not a few theologians are found who excellently clarified moral matters. Among them:

(a) From the Society of Jesus: Claudius Lacroix (+ 1714), a learned and moderate probabilist:[1] *Moral Theology*; John Reuter (+ 1762), a weighty and wise author: *Theology Morally Divided into Four Parts*; *The New Confessor Practically Instructed*; Dominic Viva (fl. 1710), besides a theological-moral course, wrote a very useful and classic work: *Theses Condemned by Alexander VII, Innocent XI, and Alexander VIII*; P. Gabriel Antoine, a probabiliorist, whose *Universal Moral Theology* (published in the year 1726) was explained by order of Benedict XIV in the College of Propaganda Fide; Edmund Voit (+ 1780), whose moral theology is very practical; P. Gury (+ 1866), whose *Compendium of Moral Theology* and *Cases of Conscience* often appeared: a brief, neat, and clear work, but merely casuistic; various editions illustrated or corrected with notes were published by Cercia, Dumas, Sabetti, especially Ballerini, who in addition wrote a very learned *Moral Work*, which Palmieri made public (3rd ed., 1898); Genicot, who arranged Ballerini's *Moral Work* in better order and briefly (3rd ed., 1900); Lehmkuhl, whose *Moral Theology* (10th ed., 1902) is more scientific and exhibits moderate opinions; Noldin, whose *Moral Summa* (3rd ed., 1902) is notable for perspicuity and solidity of doctrine.

[1] Theologians of the Society of Jesus, with few exceptions, defend probabilism.

52. (b) From the Order of Preachers: Natalis Alexander (+ 1724), outstanding in knowledge and erudition, who, besides historical works, arranged theology

dogmatic and moral neatly; J. Mayol, in the year 1704, published a *Summa of Thomistic Moral Doctrine*, where he defends moderate opinions; Charles R. Billuart (1757), a moderate probabiliorist, wrote a course of universal theology according to the mind of St. Thomas; Benatus Drouin (+ 1742) polished a learned treatise concerning sacramental matters; Vincent Louis Gotti (+ 1742), who likewise lucidly set forth the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor; Daniel Concina (+ 1756), a rigid probabiliorist, attacked the probabilists especially in the work *Della storia del probabilismo e del rigorismo*, and also in *Theologia christiana dogmatico-morali*; John Vincent Patuzzi (+ 1769), a most vehement opponent of probabilism: *Christian Ethics*; *Trattato della regola prossima delle azioni umane*, etc.; M. A. Potton, in a little work concerning the theory of probability, set forth the system of compensation, in the year 1874.

Nor can H. D. Lacordaire (+ 1861) be passed over, who spoke eloquently concerning several Christian virtues in his *Conferences*.

(c) From the Order of Carmelites came forth the celebrated *Cursus theologiae moralis Salmanticensis*, which Francis a Jesu Maria, Andrew a Matre Dei, Sebastian a St. Joachim, and Alphonsus ab Angelis arranged (years 1717-1724): notable for abundance of matters and perspicuity of doctrine, but sometimes more benign.

(d) From the Order of St. Francis: Reiffenstuel (+ 1703), who wrote not only *Canon Law*, but also a clear and solid *Moral Theology*; Fr. Henno elaborated a dogmatic and scholastic theology, in which he sets forth the principal questions (1706-1713); Patrick Sporer (+ 1683) and Benjamin Elbel (+ 1756) wrote a moral theology, in which the scholastic and the casuistic method are happily joined together; both works were recently edited with new care by Irenaeus Bierbaum (1894 and 1901); Pius Van der Velden (+ 1857), *Principles of Moral Theology*, a clear and moderate work.

53. (e) From the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer: St. Alphonsus de Liguori (1696-1787), who deservedly is held to be the prince among modern authors of moral theology. That he might hold a middle way between the excesses of the rigid and of the laxists, he tempered probabilism by refining the system which is called equiprobabilism, as we shall set forth in its place. His principal works are: *Moral Theology*;[1] *The Apostolic Man*; *The Practice of the Confessor*; *Examination of Ordinands*. He wrote besides many ascetical little works, in which the way of perfection is safely shown. Among recent interpreters of St. Liguori are numbered: A. Konings, *Moral Theology*, seventh edition, New York; C. Marc, *Alphonsian Moral Institutions*, 4th ed., Paris, 1888; Jos. Aertnys, *Moral Theology*, 4th ed., 1896: these explain equiprobabilism clearly and moderately.

[1] L. Gaude began to publish a critical edition of the *Moral Theology*, diligently compared with the old editions, reviewed in the individual allegations of the authors, and illustrated with critical notes and commentaries; t. I appeared at Rome, 1905.

54. (f) Outside the aforesaid schools, certain theologians likewise flourished: first, Prosper Lambertini, afterward Supreme Pontiff Benedict XIV (+ 1758), who wrote most wisely concerning canon law, and touched not a few moral questions no less solidly than learnedly in the books concerning the diocesan synod, the ecclesiastical institutions, and in the treatise concerning the Sacrifice of the Mass; L. Habert, a doctor of the Sorbonne: *Dogmatic and Moral Theology*, 1707; P. Collet, Cong. Miss.: *Institutions of Moral Theology*, 1758; Eusebius Amort, canon regular (+ 1795), a moderate and eclectic probabilist, very learned: *Eclectic Moral and Scholastic Theology*; *Christian Ethics*; *Rule of Moral Actions*; *Idea of Divine Love, or Distinct Exposition of the First and Greatest Commandment*; Gaspar Saettler (+ 1779), a moderate probabiliorist, wrote a universal moral theology and admonitions to parish priests; Sailer (+ 1832) wrote many wise things concerning moral, pastoral, and ascetical theology, especially *Handbuch der christlichen Moral*; *Vorlesungen aus der Pastoraltheologie*; J. B. de Hirscher (+ 1865) published, among other works, *Die christliche Moral*, where, indeed learnedly, but not accurately enough, he discusses the Christian life; C. Werner, very versed in theological history and literature, published not only historical works concerning Aquinas, Suarez, Bede, Alcuin, etc., but also an *Enchiridion of Moral Theology* and *System der christliche Ethik*; Pruner, a moderate equiprobabilist, published

Lehrbuch der Kath. Moralth., 1875-77, of which a new edition has recently been reprinted; Bouvier (+ 1854), Bishop of Le Mans, a weighty author and moderate probabilist, elaborated theological institutions, which were explained as a manual in many seminaries of France; Martinet (+ 1874) wrote a *Moral Theology*, in which all things, even the sacraments, are referred to the Decalogue; A. Carriere, Cong. S. Sulpice (+ 1864), wrote learnedly, solidly, and moderately concerning justice and right, concerning contracts, and concerning marriage;[1] Vincent and Bonaly, of the same Congregation, arranged classic compendia of dogmatic and moral theology; Ernest Mary Muller (+ 1888) published a moral theology, which is notable for solidity of doctrine and perspicuity of style: he defends equiprobabilism; Joseph d'Annibale (+ 1892) wrote an elegant and learned little summa of moral theology; Thomas Joseph Bouquillon (+ 1902), a moderate probabilist, very learned, had sketched out a great work of moral theology which he was not able to complete; there exist the following treatises: *Fundamental Moral Theology*, 3rd ed., 1903; *Concerning the Theological Virtues*, 1890; *Concerning the Virtue of Religion*, first part, 1880; Emile Berardi, a probabilist, wisely sets forth practical questions especially in these works: *De recidivis et occasionariis*, 5th ed., Faenza, 1897; *Praxis Confessariorum*, 4th ed., 1903; likewise John Morino, Cong. Miss., arranged a useful compendium, 5th ed., Turin, 1899.

[1] Concerning him and other members of St. Sulpice, see L. Bertrand, *Bibliotheque sulpicienne*, Paris, 1900.

55. Conclusion. From this brief historical survey it is permitted to infer that moral theology, at the time when it flourished, namely that of the Fathers of the fourth and fifth century, of the Scholastics of the thirteenth century, and of the Theologians of the sixteenth century, was not merely speculative nor merely casuistic, but at the same time scientific and practical: the principles of morals were solidly proved both by natural reason and by the authority of Scripture and the Fathers, and from them practical rules were inferred for the Christian ordering of life. Moreover, it was not occupied only with those things which are strictly prohibited, but also with the virtues which are desired for a truly Christian life. And deservedly: indeed, what is forbidden under grave obligation and what under light obligation must be accurately defined; but it is of no less moment to propose motives and means for extirpating vices and cultivating virtues: for unless Christians have before their mind the ideal perfection which Christ Himself exhibited by words and examples, they gradually grow cold and soon fall into sin. Certain recent theologians rightly understood this, such as Muller, Lehmkuhl, Bouquillon.

Therefore in this work, adhering to the footsteps of these men, after the general principles of morals have been set forth, we shall treat of virtues and duties in such a way that to directors of souls it may become clearly known not only what Christ strictly commanded, but also what He commended, and what are the means for making progress in the practice of virtues: "He who is just, let him be justified still; and he who is holy, let him be sanctified still."[1] But because we strive for brevity, we frequently refer readers to authors who have treated more fully of Christian perfection, especially to the Gospel itself.

[1] Apoc. XXII, 11.

Fundamental Moral Theology discusses human acts, insofar as they tend toward the ultimate end, namely:

I. Concerning the Ultimate End toward which we tend through human acts, and consequently concerning the norm of morality, which consists in the ordering of our acts to this ultimate end.

II. Concerning Human Acts considered psychologically and morally, insofar as they are general means to the end.

III. Concerning divine and human Laws, or concerning the external norm by which acts are ordered to the end.

IV. Concerning Conscience, or concerning the internal norm, by whose aid laws are applied to individual persons for the right ordering of life.

V. Concerning Sins, or acts by which the will turns aside from the law and from the ultimate end, and also concerning Vices, or evil propensities and habits by which it is inclined to sin.

VI. Concerning Virtues in general, or concerning good habits, by whose aid we are inclined to living rightly, and therefore to pursuing the ultimate end.

On the Ultimate End of Human Acts, or the Foundation of Morality

Concerning the Ultimate End of Human Acts,

1. Declaration of the title. Deservedly St. Thomas begins the moral part of the *Summa theologica* from the consideration of the ultimate end: for thus the connection between moral and dogmatic theology appears; since the morality of human acts ultimately depends on the ultimate end, both natural and supernatural, this morality cannot be understood unless the ultimate end of man is first set forth. Thus also the question concerning the foundation or norm of morality, which today is agitated with great heat, can be solved: for below it will be demonstrated that the ultimate norm of morality is God, the ultimate end. Wherefore in one and the same treatise we treat concerning the ultimate end and concerning the norm of morality, because these are only two respects of one and the same question.

Division. There will therefore be two articles: the former concerning the ultimate end of man; the latter concerning the norm or foundation of morality.

I. Concerning the ultimate end of man:

- Preliminary matters: concerning end, good, perfection, beatitude.
- God as ultimate end, insofar as:
- He is to be formally glorified by us.
- He beatifies us.
- He is reached through Christ.
- Corollary: concerning the cooperation of God and man.

II. Concerning the norm of morality:

- Catholic norm:
- The intrinsic distinction between good and evil.
- God as the ultimate norm discriminating good and evil, and conscience as the proximate norm.
- God as the ultimate norm commanding.
- Corollary concerning sanction.
- Conclusion concerning the excellence of the Catholic norm.
- Non-Catholic systems:
- Utilitarianism: it is set forth; it is refuted.
- Kantism: it is set forth; it is refuted.
- Independent ethics: it is set forth; it is refuted.
- Comparison between the Catholic norm and the others.

Art. I. Concerning the Ultimate End of Man.

Since in Theology we use a twofold light, reason and faith together, here the end of man is treated, both natural and supernatural. Therefore we presuppose those things which in Philosophy were said

concerning end, and which in the *Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology* we established concerning the elevation of man to the supernatural state.

Preliminary Matters.

Nevertheless, that the matters may be understood more clearly, we recall to memory the things more necessary to know: 1. concerning end, especially concerning the ultimate end; 2. concerning moral good, by which we tend toward the end; 3. concerning perfection, which is the complete evolution of this good; 4. concerning beatitude, which arises from perfection.

2. 1. Concerning end. (A) Notion. End in general is that toward which some being tends. Namely, every being, when it acts, tends toward something certain, determinate, and defined, which therefore is aptly called end, because it completes and, as it were, terminates the being itself; wherefore it is also called appetible, good, perfection.[1] And indeed every nature by its action spontaneously seeks its own perfection and completion. But man has this above other creatures, that he is master of his own operations, and thus not only is moved, but further moves himself toward his own end and good.[2]

[1] Properly speaking, "good either is an end, or is said in order to an end." *Sum. Theol.*, Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 1, ad 2. But "the end principally has the nature of good." Ibid., q. 72, a. 1, ad 1.

[2] St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. XXII, a. 1.

(B) Species. End is twofold: the end of the work and the end of the worker.

(a) The end of the work is that to which the work is destined by its own nature, independently of the intention of the agent: thus the relieving of a poor man is the end of almsgiving. This is called: 1. proximate, or intermediate, when it itself is ordered to another further end; 2. ultimate, however, when it is not ordered to another: ultimate in a certain respect, when it is such only in some series of things (for example, health with respect to medicine), ultimate absolutely and simply, when it is such in relation to all beings.

This ultimate end is more expressly called by St. Augustine "the end of our good,"[1] as it were the full completion of our good.

[1] *De Civit. Dei*, XIX, 1, P.L. XLI, 621.

Hence: a) the ultimate end, from its notion, is necessarily one; b) other goods cannot be desired except as beginnings or means relative to the ultimate end, and thus from the desiring of the ultimate end; c) our ultimate end and our perfect beatitude coincide: "For beatitude is the perfect good, which totally quiets the appetite."[2]

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 2, a. 8.

(b) The end of the worker is the motive on account of which the agent works: thus the end of the worker in almsgiving can be love of neighbor on account of God, or vain glory. This likewise is called proximate when it is so intended that something else is sought through it; ultimate, when one rests in it, and indeed either absolutely or in some series of operations.

3. 2. Concerning good. (A) Notion. Good in general is that which is fitting to some being, or that which terminates and quiets the appetite, or that which perfects a being. These notions complete one another: (a) indeed, that which is fitting to some nature is deservedly called good; (b) but a being deservedly quiets the appetite[3] in the apprehension of some object fitting to itself; (c) on the other hand, it is perfected in the attainment of this good.[4]

[3] Deservedly, therefore, St. Thomas writes (I, q. 5, a. 1): "Good consists in this, that something is appetible"; and *C. Gent.*, III, 3: "This belongs to the nature of good, that it terminates the appetite."

[4] "Each thing is called good insofar as it is perfect" (I, q. 5, a. 5).

(B) Species. Good is distinguished as threefold: honorable, delightful, and useful: honorable, that which perfects a rational being and therefore is consonant with right reason; delightful, that which brings some sense of delight; useful, that which is apt as a means for attaining some other good. - But since the useful good is not desired for its own sake, but insofar as it is a means for obtaining something else, there are only two genera of goods: honorable, which perfects rational nature, and delightful, which delights the appetite. It must likewise be noted that these two genera of goods are indeed diverse, but not necessarily opposed; for some delight can be honorable, namely when it is conformable to right reason.

The honorable good is also called moral, and is a certain reality perfecting and completing man in order to his end: for every being is called good insofar as it pursues its end and comes nearer to it. - Moral evil, on the contrary, is a certain defect of entity, in some way diminishing man, and turning him away from his end, or at least delaying him.

4. 3. Concerning perfection. (A) Notion. The perfection of some being is its complete evolution; for, as St. Thomas says, "that is called perfect to which nothing is lacking":[1] therefore it consists ultimately in the attainment of the end: "Each thing is said to be perfect insofar as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection of the thing."[2]

[1] *In 4 Sentent.*, q. 1, a. 4.

[2] St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 184, a. 1.

Whence "the perfection of anything is its good";[3] for perfection arises from the attainment of the end, which itself also is some good.

[3] *Cont. Gent.*, III, 16.

(B) Species. Perfection is twofold: absolute, in which a being totally attains its end; relative, by which a being tends toward the end because it will have attained it. Deservedly, therefore, St. Thomas says: "But each thing, if it lacks its proper perfection, is moved toward it, so far as it is in itself; but if it has it, it rests in it."[4]

[4] *C. Gent.*, III, 16.

5. 4. Concerning beatitude. (A) Beatitude, which belongs only to intellectual nature, when man is being treated is called "the perfect good of man,"[5] or the stable possession of the perfect good; for it can be nothing other than that which perfectly befits him.

[5] *Sum. theol.*, Ia, q. 26, a. 1.

(B) It can be twofold: a) begun, which sufficiently, but not perfectly, quiets man; b) perfect, which totally quiets him, as it will be in the other life. Perfect beatitude, after Boethius, is described as a state perfected by the gathering together of all goods, or more accurately, the stable possession of the perfect good which totally quiets the soul.

Division. With these things noted beforehand, we shall demonstrate that God is the ultimate end of man, and indeed in a twofold sense: 1. insofar as we are bound to tend toward Him by a free movement and to glorify Him; 2. insofar as in Him we find supreme beatitude; 3. we shall show that Christ is the mediator for glorifying God and attaining beatitude. Whence there will be a threefold thesis.

6. Thesis I: God is the ultimate end of man, in both the natural and supernatural order, insofar as we are bound to glorify Him formally, or by a free movement. It is certain.

It is declared. Irrational creatures tend toward God by necessity of nature and promote His glory only objectively, insofar as they are a trace of His perfections; rational creatures, such as man, are moved freely toward God and formally, or with full consciousness, glorify the Creator by praise, worship, love. - Here it is a question of external glory, which is defined as "clear knowledge with praise,"[1] or the rendering of honor to some person because of his excellence; but it is not a question of the internal glory of God, which consists in the knowledge and love of Himself, and cannot be increased.

[1] *Sum. theol.*, Ia IIae, q. 2, a. 3.

Since man, from the things said in the treatise concerning God the Creator, nn. 152-176, was destined to a supernatural end, he ought to tend toward God not only in the natural order, but also in the supernatural order. Now the natural end of man consists in the knowledge and love of God proportioned to the powers of human nature; but man naturally does not see God intuitively, but knows Him deductively, understanding in some way His existence and attributes from those things which have been made. But there is another mode of knowing God, namely the mode by which God Himself knows Himself, by contemplating His own essence directly, immediately, intuitively. This mode, as altogether exceeding the proper powers of man and of the other creatures, is deservedly called supernatural.

7. It is proved. 1. God is the ultimate end of man in the natural order.

(A) God, in creating man, as a supremely intelligent being, had some end: for every intelligent being acts on account of an end. But God, supremely and infinitely perfect, cannot create on account of any other end than Himself; for every other end, as lower, is wholly unbecoming to Him. Therefore God created man on account of Himself.

(B) Every being is master of those things which it has produced, especially when it is the author of their whole being. But God created man from nothing, giving to him his whole being, and continuously conserving the same; therefore He is master of the whole man. But He would not truly be his master unless man ordered his life to God, by knowing, loving, and worshiping Him. Therefore man is bound to glorify God. - In other words: man, all that he is, is from God; therefore man, all that he is, depends on Him, and ought to tend toward Him by glorifying Him.

8. 2. That God is the ultimate end of man in the supernatural order is established from the things said in the treatise concerning God the Creator and concerning God the Consummator, where it is proved that man is destined to the beatific vision. Here let it suffice to relate the principal texts, from which it is evinced that men in heaven enjoy the immediate vision of God, are already adoptive sons of God, and that all things are to be referred to God.

(a) Men in heaven see God immediately and clearly: "We see now through a mirror in an enigma; but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know, even as I am known";[1] - "Beloved, now we are sons of God; and it has not yet appeared what we shall be; we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is."[2] Therefore in heaven we shall see God face to face, that is, directly, immediately, intuitively; we shall see Him as He is, in the same mode (but not in the same degree) in which He sees Himself. But from Philosophy it is established that this is above all the powers and exigencies of man.

[1] I Cor., XIII, 12.

[2] I John, III, 2.

(b) By such an elevation we do not remain simply servants of God, but we are made partakers of the divine nature, and adoptive sons of God, heirs indeed of God, and coheirs of Christ.[3] For God sent His Son that we might receive the adoption of sons,[4] and as many as received Him, He gave them power to become sons of God.[5] And indeed, since we are sons, God sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying: Abba, Father;[6] for the Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God: but if sons, also heirs, heirs indeed of God, and coheirs of Christ.[1] Whence John deservedly exclaims:[2] "See what manner of charity the Father has given us, that we should be called sons of God and be so." Now divine adoption and also inheritance are in no way owed to man.

[3] Which we set forth in the treatise concerning Grace, 139-145.

[4] Galat., IV, 5.

[5] John, I, 12.

[6] Galat., IV, 6.

[1] Rom., VIII, 16-17.

[2] I John, III, 1.

But to this beatific vision, and to the perfect love which follows it, we are disposed in the present life through the practice of supernatural virtues, and especially of faith, hope, and charity; and thus already we begin to glorify God.

9. (c) From this Scripture infers: 1. that all things were created on account of God, and therefore that all things are subject to His dominion, and conspire unto His glory: "For from Him, and through Him, and in Him (in Greek, *eis auton*, that is, on account of Him) are all things: to Him be glory forever."[3] Therefore we are as things of God, and ought to act on account of Him: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself; for whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord; therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."[4] 2. Especially the works of the Incarnation, Redemption, and Sanctification tend unto

the glory of God: thus, when Christ was born, the angels sing: Glory to God in the highest;[5] but Christ, when about to die, says to the Father: "I have glorified Thee upon earth";[6] the Blessed in heaven say:[7] "Thou art worthy, O Lord our God, to receive glory, and honor, and power"; finally Christ Himself will be subject to Him who subjected all things to Himself, that God may be all in all.[8] - From these things it is deservedly inferred that God is the ultimate end, toward which we ought to tend, by promoting His glory: "All things are yours, but you are Christ's; and Christ is God's."[9]

[3] Rom., XI, 36; cf. Hebr., II, 10; Apoc., XXI, 6; Ps. XVIII, 2.

[4] Rom., XIV, 7-8.

[5] Luke, II, 14.

[6] John, XVII, 14.

[7] Apoc., IV, 11.

[8] I Cor., XV, 28.

[9] I Cor., IV, 22-23.

10. Thesis II: God is the ultimate end of man in the natural and supernatural order, insofar as in Him alone we find supreme beatitude. It is certain.

It is declared. The Vatican Council[10] deservedly declares that God created the world "not to increase His own beatitude, nor to acquire it, but to manifest His perfection through the goods which He imparts to creatures." For God, since He is the fullness of being, is altogether sufficient to Himself, and in the possession of Himself is perfectly blessed; for beatitude consists in the possession of the good which totally satisfies and quiets the appetite; but God, by possessing Himself, infinitely perfect, possesses such a good, since there is nothing outside God which is not already eminently contained in Him; therefore God did not create man in order to obtain something for Himself. - On the other hand, He proposed to Himself some end; therefore He willed to impart His perfection to others in some way, namely by communicating to them some participation of His being and of His beatitude.

[10] Sess. III, cap. I.

11. It is proved: 1. By reason. For true beatitude two things are required and suffice: the possession of the perfect good, which totally quiets every legitimate desire, and the stable or interminable possession of this good. For (a) if we investigate the matter metaphysically, an imperfect good is not appetible for its own sake, but only on account of another, and therefore does not confer true and integral beatitude; on the other hand, if the good possessed is lost or can be lost, beatitude already fails: for that which passes cannot quiet the immortal desires of man. (b) Psychologically the same is established: when we look into our inward aspirations, we are conscious that we wish to attain perfect beatitude by fully developing our faculties, and that we wish to live not only for a long time, but perpetually.

But this possession of the perfect and perennial good is not found in created goods, but in God alone.

12. (A) Man cannot attain beatitude in created goods.[1] For these are of three kinds: external goods of fortune, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But goods of this kind, although in manifold respect they are desirable, lack the two aforesaid conditions.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 11, a. 1-8; *Cont. Gent.*, lib. III, cap. 26-36; Suarez, *De ultimo fine hominis*, disp. V; Meyer, t. I, n. 59-60; P. Lescoeur, *La Science du Bonheur*, Paris, 1873, pp. 9-44; 110-144; 321-341.

(a) External goods, such as riches, dignities, honors, fame, etc.: 1. are not appetible of themselves, but only on account of another, insofar as they help toward procuring goods of soul or body; thus riches are sought to sustain life or to enjoy pleasures, honors suppose that some excellence is present in a man, but they do not confer it. - Nor do they fulfill all the legitimate aspirations of man; for often the more riches and honors abound, the more they inflame desire; not rarely also, after some time, they bring on nausea and weariness of life; furthermore, many other things necessary for felicity can be lacking to those who have all these things, such as bodily health, wisdom, tranquility of soul, etc.

2. Nor are they stable; for they are easily lost by some misfortune; hence they are possessed with solicitude, and at length sometime they pass away at the time of death.

13. (b) Goods of the body, which consist in health, strength, beauty, and the delight of the senses, do not confer true felicity: 1. by their nature they are subordinated to goods of the soul, nor are they truly useful except insofar as they serve the operations and perfection of the soul; for what does strength of body profit, if the mind is weak and the will depraved? Nor do they fulfill all the legitimate desires of man; for they are common to beasts and men, and therefore do not satisfy the nobler faculties of the soul; indeed, when someone indulges immoderately in bodily delights, the powers of the soul are depressed, morals are corrupted, and man, since he delights in the same pleasures and rests in them contrary to the right order of reason, becomes like a beast.

2. Moreover, how uncertain and unstable they are, there is no one who has not experienced it.

14. (c) Goods of the soul, namely those which are acquired through the exercise of the faculties, such as wisdom and virtue, indeed contribute more to man's felicity, especially when they are found joined together with the moderate and legitimate use of the other goods, but they do not perfectly satisfy our desires. For the adequate object of the intellect and will is not any truth or good whatsoever, but universal truth and good, which is found only in God. 1. And indeed our intellect is so constituted that from the knowledge of finite beings it rises to the knowledge of the infinite, and from the notion of particular truths it in some way reaches to universal truth itself. Hence, however great may be the breadth of things which it knows, it wishes to learn many more things, and curiously to search out things unknown. 2. The same must be said of the will, which is able to rest only in the absolute good; wherefore friendship, even the most perfect, which brings friends so many and such great consolations, at least for a time, does not fulfill the desires of the heart; hence the noblest men exclaim with Augustine: "Thou hast made us for Thee, O God, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee."[1]

[1] St. Augustine, *Confess.*, lib. I, n. 1, apud Migne, P.L., XXXII, 661.

15. (B) Man finds his beatitude in the attainment of the ultimate end, or in the perfect knowledge and love of God.

Here it is a question of knowledge and love of God relatively perfect, that is, with respect to the capacity of each man: for absolute perfection belongs to the infinite alone. But man is truly blessed when his capacity, whatever it may be, is sufficiently fulfilled.

It is proved. The supreme good of each being is known from its nature, faculties, and legitimate tendencies: for the most wise Creator placed these in it, as a manifest sign of its destination. But since man's proper faculties are intellect and will, he is perfectly blessed when faculties of this kind rest in the attainment of their object. Now the intellect and will of man, from what has been said, are capable of all truth and good, or of universal good and truth. Therefore they are perfectly satisfied when, according to their capacity, they know and love God, who alone is the highest truth and the highest good.

16. It is declared. 1. Man attains knowledge and love of God only imperfectly in the present life, whether naturally through reason or supernaturally through faith: for he is on the way in relation to perfection, and daily ought to reach a higher degree; and consequently he attains greater felicity the more perfectly he orders his whole life to God.

2. It must likewise be noted that for perfect beatitude the legitimate satiety of man's sensitive faculties is desired. This indeed does not belong to the essence of beatitude, but to its natural complement. For the sensitive faculties are truly a part of man, although subordinated to the intellectual powers; therefore they ought to be subjected to the spiritual part, and to aid it in attaining beatitude; and since the tendencies of these faculties are diverse among themselves, and also often contrary to the higher tendencies of the soul, in the present life they ought to be mortified, so that the spiritual man may be able more easily to attain his end. Nevertheless, when they are subjected to the will, they can attain a certain proper felicity even in the present life;[1] but in the future life, when the struggle between body and soul has ended, the sensitive faculties will enjoy legitimate joys more fully.

[1] The matter can be demonstrated historically, by showing that those who turn themselves to God are much happier than those who turn themselves away from Him. Cf. Baunard, op. cit., and *La Foi et ses victoires*, 7th ed., Paris, 1901-1902.

17. 2. By authority. (A) In the Old Testament, again and again Moses and the Prophets, the Sapiential books and the Psalms call him blessed who loves God from his whole mind, from his whole heart, and with all his powers, but unhappy him who departs from the way of God.

Ecclesiastes declares this clearly: "I have seen all things that are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity and affliction of spirit."[2] For indeed he had rejoiced in riches and pleasures, but in all these he had found nothing except vanity and affliction of spirit: "I enlarged my works, I built houses for myself and planted vineyards... And all

[2] Eccles., I, 14.

which my eyes desired, I did not deny them, nor did I forbid my heart from enjoying every pleasure... And when I had turned myself to all the works which my hands had made, and to the labors in which I had sweat in vain, I saw in all things vanity and affliction of soul, and nothing remaining under the sun."[1] Wherefore he passed over to contemplating wisdom, and proposed to investigate all things which are done under the sun, but soon recognized that in these also there is labor and affliction of spirit, and that there is one and the same end of the wise man and the fool; whence again he exclaims: "If the end of me and the fool shall be one, what does it profit me that I have given greater labor to wisdom?... And therefore my life wearied me, seeing all evils under the sun, and all things vanity and affliction of spirit."[2]

[1] Eccles., II, 4-11.

[2] Eccles., II, 15-18.

(B) In the New Testament, Christ defines the conditions of perfect and eternal beatitude throughout the whole Gospel, but especially in the sermon on the mount, where He proclaims blessed those who, willingly renouncing earthly things, serve God alone, love Him perfectly, and their neighbor on account of God, and thus pursue the kingdom of God. Wherefore the Apostle, writing concerning piety, which embraces love of God and neighbor, exhibits it as most efficacious for earthly and eternal beatitude: "But piety is profitable for all things, having promise of the life which now is and of that which is to come."[3]

[3] I Tim., IV, 8.

Therefore man's beatitude is found in God alone; therefore God is our end insofar as He is the author of our beatitude.

18. Conclusion. From this it is inferred that the glory of God and the beatitude of man are connected intimately, not only extrinsically from the will of God, but also intrinsically, from the very nature of the matter, and in fact fall back into the same thing: for man is blessed by glorifying God, and by pursuing true beatitude he glorifies God: for by the same acts of knowledge and love of God each end is acquired, and deservedly St. Thomas[4] says: "God does not seek His glory on account of Himself, but on account of us."

[4] *Sum. theol.*, IIa IIae, q. 131, a. 1 ad 1.

If, however, we compare one end with the other, the glory of God is the primary ultimate end, man's beatitude the secondary end, since this beatitude by its nature is referred to glorifying God and is subordinated to Him. Therefore let us do all things for the greater glory of God, and by that very fact we shall be blessed.

For attaining each end, we need Christ as mediator.

19. Thesis III: For glorifying God and attaining eternal beatitude, man, in the present state, needs the grace of Christ the Redeemer. It is certain.

It is declared. In the treatise concerning God the Creator we proved that man, raised to the supernatural state, fell, and in the treatise concerning the Incarnate Word that the same man was redeemed by the infinite satisfactions and merits of Christ, so that the Lord is the necessary mediator to God. Therefore it will be enough to touch briefly on a matter proved elsewhere.

It is proved. 1. Christ is the perfect mediator of religion, by whom we are able to glorify God: "One mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave Himself as a redemption for all."[1] Hence St. Peter exhorts all that they honor God through Christ: "That in all things God may be honored through Jesus Christ."[2]

[1] I Tim., II, 5.

[2] I Peter, IV, 11.

In reality the Lord instituted the sacrifice of the Mass, in which anew He offers Himself to the Father as a victim of praise, not only in His own name but in our name, since He is truly the head of the mystical body of which we are members. Moreover, through holy communion, He communicates Himself to us with the spirit of religion, so that through Him and with Him and in Him, not only at the very moment of communion, but throughout the whole day, we may be able to glorify God, by offering our actions to the Father with Christ as so many spiritual victims.

2. Christ is also the perfect mediator of sanctification, insofar as He merited for us all graces by which we may be able to attain perfection and beatitude. For He Himself not only revealed to us the truth which we ought to believe, nor only showed by His virtues the way which we ought to follow, but also merited all graces by which we are able not only to be freed from sin but also to cultivate all virtues, and we tend toward eternal beatitude: "I am the way, and the truth, and the life[3]... And for them I sanctify Myself, that they also may be sanctified in truth[4]... Blessed be God... who has blessed us with every blessing in the heavens in Christ[5]..." - Therefore Jesus is not only the exemplary cause, but also the meritorious cause of our justification: "The causes of this sanctification," says Trent,[1] "are indeed the final cause: the glory of God and of Christ and eternal life; but the efficient cause: the merciful God... and the meritorious cause: His most beloved Only-begotten, our Lord Jesus Christ, who, when we were enemies, on account of the exceeding charity with which He loved us, by His most holy Passion on the wood of the cross merited justification for us and satisfied God the Father for us."

[3] John, XIV, 6.

[4] John, XVII, 19.

[5] Ephes., I, 3.

[1] Sess. VI, cap. VII (Denzing., 799).

There is, therefore, an obligation of tending toward God the ultimate end, of glorifying Him, and thus of attaining salvation through Christ.

20. Corollary. From this it follows that the means for attaining our end are the cooperation of God and of ourselves.

A) Namely, God, out of superabundant goodness, makes deiform the essence and faculties of the soul which He created, through habitual grace, infused virtues, and gifts of the Holy Spirit; moreover He not only assists the exercise of human faculties through natural concurrence, but also fittingly elevates it through actual graces. But God provides these internal supernatural means, in order that

He may accommodate Himself to human nature, constituted of soul and body, through external means, especially through the Sacraments.

B) Thus elevated and made a partaker of the divine nature, man moves himself freely to the end, by acting under God and with Him cooperating, according to the norm of the precepts imposed by God both naturally and supernaturally, with Christ as leader and helper, the perfect exemplar and meritorious cause of all virtues.

This indeed will be clearer from what is to be said concerning the norm of morality.

Art. II. Concerning the Norm of Morality.

That man may attain his end, he needs a rule or norm to which he may render his deliberate acts conformable. This norm can be twofold: general or fundamental, by which a distinction is established between good and evil, obligatory acts and non-obligatory acts; special, by which it is determined in species which actions are licit or not, commanded or not. Here it is a question only of the general norm.

We shall set forth: 1. the Christian norm of morality; 2. various systems of non-Catholics.

§ I. The Catholic Norm of Morality.

21. State of the question. From the things said concerning the ultimate end it is permitted to infer what is the true norm of morality, or that rule by which the distinction is constituted between good and evil acts, between acts obligatory or not. For since the perfection of man consists in the attainment of the ultimate end, actions which tend toward God are good, but those which turn us away from Him are evil; those which are necessary to the end are obligatory, those which are only useful are non-obligatory. We shall weigh three things: 1. whether there is an intrinsic distinction between good and evil; 2. what is the norm discriminating between good and evil; 3. what is the commanding norm, or that which imposes obligation.

As to the first question, certain things are to be noted beforehand.

That there is some distinction between good and evil all philosophers of sound mind admit, but they by no means agree concerning its nature.

(A) For not a few contend that the reason of this distinction arose from man himself: (a) namely from civil laws, according to Hobbes (1588-1679), who teaches that the rules of good and evil, of the just and the unjust, are civil laws, and therefore that is to be held as good which the legislator has commanded, that as evil which he himself has forbidden;[1] this theory J. J. Rousseau renewed and many modern politicians embrace; (b) from education, according to Montaigne (1533-1592); or from public opinion and the tradition of peoples, as Saint-Lambert[2] held (1717-1803); or from the evolution of social sense, as the evolutionists hold.

[1] Hobbes, *Elementa philosophica de Cive*, c. XII, § 1.

[2] St-Lambert, *Principes des moeurs chez toutes les nations*, Paris, 1798. - To this also pertains the opinion of those who, with Levy-Bruhl (*La Science des moeurs*, Paris, Alcan, 1904), hold that ethics is occupied with morals as they exist, not with duties to be fulfilled: for these duties, they say, arise only from social influence (*pression sociale*); these A. Fouillee refuted in the periodical *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, Oct. 1, 1905, p. 519-550.

(B) Some teach that the distinction between honorable and dishonorable acts must be placed in the free will of God, so that, before every law and apart from God's good pleasure, what is good and what is evil cannot be defined; thus Scotus, Descartes, and Samuel Pufendorf[3] (1632-1694).

[3] Pufendorf, *De jure naturae et Gentium*, l. I, c. 2, § 6.

Against these we shall establish that at least certain actions, from their own nature, independently of every will, are good or evil, and that this distinction is ultimately to be placed in the divine reason or nature, which is the supreme norm of good and evil.

22. Thesis I: There are certain actions intrinsically good or evil, even if they had been commanded or prohibited by no law, even divine law. - We indeed confess that there are many actions which are morally good for this reason, that they have been commanded by some divine or human law, and others similarly evil, because they have been prohibited; but there are certain actions which are commanded or prohibited for this reason, that in themselves they are honorable or dishonorable. - This indeed is declared rather than demonstrated.

23. 1. Historically and psychologically it is established that there are certain actions which, by the common and perpetual persuasion of men, have always been held as essentially honorable or dishonorable; thus, for example, to love parents, to do good to one's neighbor, to speak the truth, and other things of this kind, are deservedly reputed good; on the contrary, to pursue parents with hatred,[1] to kill the innocent without legitimate reason, to betray friends unjustly, to utter a lie harmful to one's neighbor, and other things of the same kind, are deservedly judged as something base and dishonorable.[2] This persuasion indeed flourishes among all nations, even barbarous ones, nor is it diminished or lost except when the moral sense is diminished or destroyed.

[1] There are indeed barbarians who cultivate piety toward parents in a singular way, for example by killing the aged, lest they suffer bitter pains longer or be reduced to captivity by enemies; thus they indeed err concerning the manner of cultivating piety, but not concerning the obligation itself of loving parents.

[2] J. L. de Lanessan confesses (*La Morale des Religions*, Paris, Alcan, 1905, p. 557) that in all religions, whether ancient or modern, these duties are found prescribed. - It is evident, on the other hand, from the things to be said below, n. 213, concerning the existence of natural law.

But so constant and universal a persuasion, deeply inhering in minds so diverse and disagreeing about almost all other things, does not arise from civil law, which is diverse among various nations, nor from education or public opinion, which likewise is not the same among diverse peoples, but is derived from nature itself. For public opinion is nothing else than the manifestation of ideas which flourish among individual citizens; education transmits only notions which appeared rational to ancestors; if therefore the distinction between good and evil is recognized by all today, that surely cannot arise except from the common persuasion that such a distinction is so consonant with reason that it draws its origin from nature itself.

Nor can it be said that the morality of these acts depends on a free institution of God; for just as there are certain speculative truths which are true independently of the divine will (for example, that which is, is; two and two make four, etc.), so likewise there are certain moral actions which of themselves are so honorable or dishonorable that not even the divine will can change their morality;

for example, God cannot make blasphemy a praiseworthy act, nor piety a sin: this will be clear from the following argument.

24. 2. Philosophically it is established that an essential distinction must be admitted between good and evil. (a) For from what has been said, every action which tends toward God, the supreme good and ultimate end, cannot fail to be good. But certain actions, considered through themselves, independently of every law, tend toward God in this way; for example, love of God and of neighbor rightly ordered is so disposed in relation to the ultimate end and the common good, that no one of sound mind can say that acts of this kind are depraved; on the contrary, contempt of God, His existence being posited, the unjust killing of the innocent, and other things of this kind are so opposed to right reason that they can never be honorable. Therefore, by the judgment of right reason, these actions can only be good, while the contrary acts are necessarily evil.

(b) This indeed is also clear from the consequences of the contrary opinion; for if there is no essential and objective distinction between good and evil, a broad way is opened to moral skepticism; for that which today is held as evil, tomorrow, with laws or tradition or education changed, can be held as licit; and therefore the true notion of moral obligation perishes. For obligation is conceived as something permanent and universal, prescribing certain actions not hypothetically but categorically, while civil laws or traditions of peoples are something unstable and particular, and can create only hypothetical obligation. Therefore, with this distinction removed, by that very fact the moral order falls, as will be still more clear from the things to be said below concerning other systems of ethics.

25. Thesis II: The ultimate discriminating norm of morality is God Himself, insofar as He is the supreme good and the ultimate end of all things; but the proximate norm, for man, is his rational nature considered integrally, whether in itself or in its relations with others.

It is declared rather than proved. Although all Catholics agree concerning the substance of the norm of morality, nevertheless they differ as to the mode of explaining the same. For all admit that God is the ultimate norm of morality; but, according to some, this norm is the divine essence itself; according to others, it is the divine reason or eternal law,[1] or conformity with divine reason or with the natural order of things. Again, as to the proximate norm for man, some assert that it is man's rational nature, others that it is right reason or conscience.[2] But these are various modes which, when rightly explained, fall back into the same thing.[3]

[1] Thus, for example, St. Thomas (Ia IIae, q. 21, a. 1): "But in those things which are done through the will, the proximate rule is human reason, but the supreme rule is the eternal law. Therefore whenever a man's act proceeds toward the end according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, then the act is right; but when it is turned aside from this rectitude, then it is called sin."

[2] Concerning these various systems, cf. Meyer, op. cit., n. 181-185; Costa Rossetti, op. cit., th. 22-23; Cathrein, *Philosophia Moralis*, 3rd ed., 1900, Freiburg, n. 84-95.

[3] For some hand down the principally objective norm (*the nature of God, the rational nature of man*), others the directly subjective and indirectly objective norm (*divine reason, right reason*); but since divine reason infallibly perceives the divine nature itself, and right human reason judges of things according to man's rational nature, the difference is rather in the mode of speaking than in the thing itself.

1. We have said that the ultimate norm of morality is God, insofar as He is the supreme good and ultimate end. (a) That is the ultimate norm of morality from which, as from a fundamental principle, acts derive their goodness. But God, supreme goodness and the source of all perfection, by that very fact is the fundamental principle of every goodness. Therefore God is the ultimate norm of morality, and therefore our actions are morally good or evil according as they are conformable or deformed in relation to the divine goodness. (b) That is the supreme norm of morality according to which acts attain their ultimate end: for, from what has been said, every being is good insofar as it attains its ultimate end. But God is the ultimate end of all things, and especially of the rational creature, and therefore of human acts. Therefore God is the supreme norm of morality. Therefore human acts are good when they tend explicitly or implicitly toward God, evil when they decline from the ultimate end.

Thus moral goodness depends neither exclusively nor primarily on the divine good pleasure, but ultimately on His wisdom and goodness: for God wills nothing except what is consonant with His infinite wisdom, and wisdom approves nothing except what is consonant with the divine nature itself, or infinite good. Therefore they err who say that the Christian norm of morality is arbitrary, as resting on the free and blind will of God. Even when God promulgates positive laws, He prescribes nothing except what He sees to be good, since His will is not really separated from His wisdom and goodness.

26. 2. We have said besides that the proximate norm of morality, for man, is his rational nature considered integrally, in itself and in its relations with others.

(A) The proximate norm of morality is rational nature. It is proved: (a) in a deductive manner. Every being is good insofar as it attains its end, from what was said above. But it does not attain its end except by perfecting acts conformable to its nature; therefore man acts well by following his rational nature. This is valid especially for man, who, created to the image of God, participates in His goodness in some way. Therefore, by following our rational nature, by that very fact we live conformably with the divine nature and tend toward our ultimate end.

(b) In an inductive manner. Good is called that which perfects us, but evil that which depresses us; but it is established by experience that we are perfected by the harmonious and hierarchical exercise of our faculties, so that the sensitive faculties, as lower, are subjected to the higher reason.[1] Therefore we are perfected by acting according to our rational nature.

[1] A. Eymieu, *La Loi de la Vie*, demonstrates this by many facts, and concludes, p. 157: "... Life, every life composed of diverse elements, exists, lasts, and develops only on the condition that the superior element coordinate and therefore subordinate, dominate, the elements which compose it, and subject them to itself in order to use them."

(B) The proximate norm of morality is nature considered integrally, that is, according to all its parts, both rational and sensitive or vegetative, insofar as these parts also are truly human and ought to be subjected to reason; indeed, even according to the individuating notes proper to each one, namely his temperament, character, propensities, special duties and offices, etc. For human nature ought to be considered not in the abstract, but in the concrete: for it can happen that what is licit to one becomes illicit to another, because, with attention given to his character or condition, it is evil, or at least proximately inducing to evil.

(C) Again, the nature of each man must be considered not only in itself, but in its relations with other men, and also with beings inferior to him, or superior, and especially with God, to whom it is subordinated as to its end.

(D) Since in the present state man is destined to a supernatural end through Christ the Redeemer, man's nature must be considered as Christian, aided by grace and subject to supernatural laws.

27. Conclusion. (a) These things being posited, an action is deservedly called good which is truly consonant with the integral nature of man, and is exhibited to right reason as honorable.[1] For when we pursue the good proportioned to our rational nature, toward which we are naturally inclined, we cannot act badly in the moral order; otherwise the defect would be poured back upon the author of nature Himself. Deservedly therefore St. Thomas[2] says: "For each one, that is good which is connatural and proportioned to him." - From this it follows that the ancient precept "live according to nature" is legitimate, provided it is rightly understood, in the sense explained.

[1] I say honorable, because the delightful or useful is not always consonant with reason, and therefore is not morally good.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 27, a. 1; cf. q. 29, a. 1. - That the matter may be declared by examples, temperance is something good, but intemperance something evil, because it is consonant with rational nature that we use food and drink only moderately for perfecting the whole man; so also acts of justice are good, because it is consonant with rational nature considered in its relations with others that to each one his own right be rendered.

28. (b) Since we have been raised to the supernatural order, God has manifested His will to us not only by the light of reason, but also by the light of faith, by which we know the divine ordering of things in a more perfect and more certain manner. Indeed, the Son of God, made man, led a human life, and by cultivating natural and supernatural virtues, showed the way to attaining the end not only by precepts but by examples, and thus handed down to us a living rule of morals. This rule is briefly contracted in these words: "Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect."[1] For since our perfection consists in the attainment of the ultimate end, namely God the supreme good, we ought, as far as possible, to imitate the divine morals, adhering to the footsteps of Christ.

[1] Matt., V, 48.

29. Thesis III: The ultimate commanding norm of morality (that is, imposing moral obligation) is God the supreme legislator, or the divine command moderated by wisdom; the proximate norm is the necessary connection with the ultimate end perceived by reason.

The first part is proved. (A) Among the goods which lead us to the ultimate end, some are truly necessary for attaining the end, either of themselves or from the wise will of God, but others are only useful. But God, infinitely good and perfect, cannot fail to command those things which are necessary to the end; otherwise He would not truly will the end itself. Therefore He wills certain goods to be truly obligatory. - Other goods, however, which are only useful, He does not command; and these are matters of counsel.

(B) On the other hand, God alone, by reason of the supreme dominion by which He alone has power over all wills, has the right of imposing those things which He wisely judges to be necessary for the end. But He manifests His will both by natural law, manifested through conscience, and by positive law: concerning which things the treatise concerning Laws treats.

30. The second part is proved, or the proximate norm is the necessary connection of actions with the ultimate end. For the will is invincibly borne toward that which is supremely appetible, namely toward beatitude, which is found in the ultimate end. But there are objects which appear to reason as necessarily connected with beatitude or the ultimate end. Therefore there are objects which appear to reason as necessarily to be desired, or as morally obligatory. On the other hand, there are other goods whose connection with beatitude is not established, and these are only matters of counsel.

Therefore the proximate norm of obligation is the necessary connection of acts with the ultimate end or beatitude, perceived by reason.

31. Corollary. Besides the norm of morality and of obligation, there must be admitted a certain sanction, by force of which those acting honorably receive some reward and those acting badly undergo punishments.

(A) From the things said above, n. 10, God willed that men acting honorably should find their beatitude in the attainment of the ultimate end, and that those acting perversely should find, in the loss of the end, the lack of beatitude, and therefore supreme unhappiness. This is the primary and best sanction, flowing from the very nature of things and the divine ordering, or from a certain immanent justice, by force of which virtue ultimately obtains beatitude and vice is punished by the privation of the same.

(B) On the other hand, right reason shows that some sanction is necessary; for, (a) God, as infinitely wise, good, and just, must establish order in the moral order as equally as in the physical order. But the moral order requires that beatitude not be separated from good, at least at the end, since beatitude is nothing other than the quiet possession of good.

(b) God can be considered as ruler and guardian of the moral society, whose members are individual rational beings, and therefore He ought to provide for the common good of that society; but He would not wisely do this unless He rewarded the good and punished the evil; for, given human nature as it exists, many, enticed by passions, will violate the moral order and disturb the peace of society, unless they are deterred from evil by fear of punishments; on the other hand, unless reward is granted to the good, not a few of those who wish to cultivate virtue, broken in spirit because of the innumerable difficulties by which they are beset, and not strengthened by hope of some recompense, will abandon the arduous path of perfection, and soon will increase the number of violators of the law. Therefore, as wise provider and ruler of society, God ought to reward the good and punish the evil.

Conclusion Concerning the Excellence of the Catholic Norm.

32. From the things thus far set forth it is clear that the Catholic norm of morality, such as it has been explained, is at once consonant with reason and most excellently accommodated to

human nature.

For this it is required and sufficient that this norm be: 1. lucid, complete, and accommodated to all; 2. that it provide motives apt for doing good; 3. that it supply efficacious means for fulfilling duty. But these three things are found in the Catholic norm:

1. A neat, complete rule, accommodated to all; since: (a) it clearly sets forth the distinction between good and evil, between duties and counsels, by showing that good is that which is consonant with divine wisdom and will, insofar as it is manifested by right conscience, but evil that which is contrary to this will; duty is that which is wisely commanded by God as a necessary means to the ultimate end; counsel is that which is useful but not necessary to the end.

(b) It commands all duties: 1. toward God, whom, as Creator, Lord, and Father, we ought to reverence, love, and worship; 2. toward neighbor, whom we ought to love as an adoptive son of God and brother in Christ, and whose rights we ought to protect; 3. toward family and society, by revering the very authority of God in parents and rulers; 4. toward ourselves, by polishing through the practice of virtues the image and likeness of God impressed upon our minds.

(c) It is accommodated to all: by its perspicuity it can be understood by the simple, since it sets forth duties not abstractly but concretely; by its profundity it pleases philosophers, since it places the reasons of good and evil, of duty and counsel, in the highest cause.

2. It provides motives most apt for acting well: to deter from evil, it excites fear of God and of punishments; for cultivating virtues, it raises hope by the consideration of rewards; for acting perfectly, it fosters love of God and neighbor; and thus progressively it snatches men from vices and lifts them to the summit of virtues.
3. It supplies most efficacious means, namely:

1. The examples of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and of the Saints, which more efficaciously than words draw even the weak to the perfection of Christian life;
2. Innumerable graces, which, whether through visible signs or sacraments, or in a merely internal manner, perfect our faculties, increase spiritual powers, and render the observance of the commandments not only possible but also easy for all those who, conscious of their own weakness, trustingly invoke the help of God.

This will also be clearer from a simple exposition of the systems of non-Catholics.

§ II. Systems Alien to the Christian Faith Concerning the Norm of Morality Are Critically Weighed.

33. Innumerable are the systems devised by various philosophers concerning the foundation or norm of morality. Yet the principal ones can be reduced to two genera, which we shall weigh historically and critically. These are: 1. utilitarianism, to which modern evolutionism has succeeded, according to which the norm of morality is utility or pleasure, whether individual or social; 2. rationalism, which seeks the norm of morality from human reason alone; of which

there is especially a twofold form: stoicism, whether ancient or modern (Kantism), which contends that the norm of morality is moral obligation itself, or duty, independently of any utility or pleasure, and independently of God; and the system of independent ethics, which is explained in diverse ways by diverse authors, as will be declared below.

I. Concerning Utilitarianism. — 1. Utilitarianism Is Set Forth.

34. Utilitarianism, which is also called hedonism (*hedone*, pleasure), or eudaemonism (*eudaimonia*, beatitude), places the ultimate good of man and his ultimate end in felicity, or pleasure, so that actions are to be called good which, after a prudent estimation of things has been made, bring more pleasure than pain. Therefore the supreme rule is: "Pleasure is to be sought, pain is to be fled." - A twofold utilitarianism is distinguished: individual utilitarianism, which regards only the pleasure of the individual; social utilitarianism, which regards also the felicity of others and of the whole human race.

[1] L. Carrau, with great erudition, described utilitarianism historically and critically, *La morale utilitaire*, Paris, 1874; cf. M. de Baets, *Les Bases de la Morale*, Paris and Ghent, 1892, p. 37-79.

35. (A) Among the ancients, the principal favorers of individual utilitarianism were Aristippus of Cyrene, Epicurus (hence the name Epicureanism), Democritus, Lucretius; among the moderns, La Mettrie, Condillac, Helvetius, Diderot, Feuerbach, and others. The summary of Epicurus's doctrine is this:[2] experience establishes that the supreme rule of life, common to men and beasts, is flight from pain and pursuit of pleasure: for to this nature impels us. Nevertheless we do not embrace every pleasure; for we observe that sometimes greater pains follow from pleasure, and that from the toleration of pains greater delight often follows; wherefore the wise man uses things moderately, and chooses those actions which, all things considered, throughout the whole course of life finally bring more pleasure than pain. - And in this he is distinguished from Aristippus, who admitted only present pleasure as the norm of morality.

[2] Guyau, *La morale d'Epicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines*, 4th ed., Paris, Alcan; cf. L. Carrau, op. cit., p. 10-36.

A nobler form of eudaemonism Aristotle had proposed, the Stagirite, born in Thrace, disciple of Socrates and Plato, according to whom the norm of morality is situated in the highest good of man, such as can be obtained in the present life; but that good consists not in the pleasure of the senses, nor in some state or potentiality of the soul, but in the activity proper to rational man, whose completion is had in the contemplation of honorable and divine things.[1]

[1] L. Olle-Laprune, *Essai sur la Morale d'Aristote*, Paris, 1881.

36. (B) Social utilitarianism was advocated, among others, by Francis Bacon[2] (1561-1626), who held that the common good, or public utility, is the rule of morals; Hartley (1705-1757) and Paley, who likewise taught that one's own advantage does not suffice for morality, but that benevolence toward others, or sympathy, is also required;[3] but especially J. Bentham (1747-1832) and Stuart Mill (1806-1873) perfected and completed that system. As a general principle they defend that the norm of morality must be placed not only in private good, but also in social good, or in the felicity of all men.

[2] Apud Carrau, p. 40-56; Guyau lucidly sets forth the various systems of the English concerning moral matters, *La Morale anglaise contemporaine*, Paris, Alcan.

[3] Apud Carrau, p. 143-165.

37. Bentham[4] contends that the method of experimental observation alone, commended by Bacon, is to be employed in moral matters: "What experience is for the physicist," he says, "that observation is for the moralist."

[4] Bentham, *Introduction to the principles of Moral and Legislation*, 1789; *Traites de Legislation civile et penale*, a work extracted from the manuscripts of Bentham by E. Dumont, Paris, 1820; cf. Carrau, p. 167-217.

(a) Now by observation he finds that all men seek delight and flee pain; therefore, he says, every delight is some good and ought to be sought, while every pain is some evil which ought to be avoided.

(b) Therefore man ought to tend toward the greatest possible sum of delightful good in the whole course of life, with a calculation of things employed, which he calls deontological, namely by comparatively estimating delightful and painful things according to intensity, duration, proximity, extension, purity, and fecundity, which he computes in an arithmetical manner.[1]

[1] Thus he compares drunkenness and sobriety, or temperance:

Drunkenness: intensity + 30; duration + 10; certainty + 10; proximity + 20; purity - 20; extension - 20; fecundity - 10 = 20.

Sobriety: intensity + 20; duration + 10; certainty + 10; proximity + 20; purity + 30; extension + 20; fecundity + 20 = 130.

Therefore sobriety is worth more than drunkenness. - But what is to be understood by characters of this kind, he himself declares: "The value of pains and pleasures can be estimated by their intensity, their duration, their proximity, their certainty, and their extent. Their intensity, their duration, their proximity, and their certainty regard individuals. Their extent concerns the number of persons placed under their influence... A fecund pleasure is one which has the chance of being followed by pleasures of the same kind. A fecund pain is one which has the chance of being followed by pains of the same kind. A pure pleasure is one which does not have the chance of producing pains. A pure pain is one which does not have the chance of producing pleasures." (*Deontologie*, t. I, p. 77; *Traites de legislation*, t. I, p. 58.)

(c) Although man acts on account of a principle that is in itself egoistic, he contributes something to the felicity of others; for, given that men are constituted in society, an intimate and necessary relation exists between general and individual felicity, so that the felicity of one redounds to others and vice versa. Therefore the supreme principle of morality is reduced to this: Direct your activity in such a way that it produces the greatest sum of felicity and the least of pain, not only for yourself, but also for others, or at least for the greatest number of other men. But in a case of collision, place your own felicity before the felicity of others.

38. Stuart Mill[2] polished that system and propagated it widely; for he taught that delightful goods are to be measured not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively, and that those which are of a higher order are much more excellent and to be esteemed far more than those which are of the lowest order; from this he infers that the felicity which is found in the exercise of virtue is to be preferred to the pleasure which arises from the senses. Moreover, according to him, at first indeed we do good to others in order that we may procure our own felicity; but afterward, abstracting from our own advantage, we directly intend the felicity of others; this disposition

indeed can and ought to be increased in the young by education. Thus explained, utilitarianism does not differ much from the eclectic system, in which the norm of morals is situated in right reason.

[2] S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, rendered into French, *L'Utilitarisme*, Paris, Alcan; cf. Carrau, p. 227-268. - Recently Sidgwick adhered to the same system, *Methods of Ethics*; cf. Fouillee, *Critique des syst. de Morale contemporains*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1893, p. 36-38.

39. (C) To social utilitarianism succeeded another form of utilitarianism, which is accommodated to the theories of evolution; whose principal favorers were in England: Herbert Spencer[1] (1820-1904), and C. Darwin[2] (1809-1882); but in France, A. Comte,[3] Littre and Taine[4] defended almost the same system under the name of positivism; to these can be added M. Guyau, who has as the rule of morals the intensity and expansion of life;[5] Bourgeois, Payot, and many others who today advocate solidarity.[6]

[1] H. Spencer, *The Principles of Ethics*, London and New York, 1900; idem, *Les Bases de la Morale evolutioniste*, Paris, Alcan; cf. F. H. Collins, *Resume de la Philosophie de H. Spencer*, translated by H. de Varigny, Paris, 1891, p. 513-542; J. Halleux, *L'Evolutionisme en Morale*, Louvain, 1901.

[2] Darwin, *The Origin of Species*; *The Descent of Man*; in French: *L'origine des especes*; *La Descendance de l'homme*, translated by E. Barbier, Paris, Schleicher.

[3] A. Comte, *Cours de Philosophie positive*; *Politique positive*; L. Levy-Bruhl, *La Philosophie d'A. Comte*, Paris, 1900, p. 349-394.

[4] Littre, *La Science au point de vue philosophique*; Taine, *Les Philosophes francais au XIXe siecle*; cf. Fouillee, *Critique des systemes de Morale*, p. 39-56.

[5] Guyau, *Esquisse d'une Morale*; idem, *Education et heredite*, Paris, Alcan. - Man, he says in the cited work, pursues good from the fact that he naturally desires to expand his life: for when he becomes conscious of his powers, he wishes to exercise them; by instinct and education he understands the necessity of living not only for himself but for others; but he overcomes difficulties by a certain natural desire of going to meet dangers and arduous things; and thus he progresses daily.

[6] L. Bourgeois, *Solidarite*, Paris (Colin); idem, *Essai d'une Philosophie de la solidarite*, Alcan; Payot, *Cours de Morale*, Paris, 1904.

The foundation of this system is the theory of evolution, by force of which higher beings proceed from lower beings by a long process: thus living things drew their origin from non-living things, animals from plants, men from beasts; men themselves first lived for a long time in a state of barbarism, but afterward were gradually made more cultivated. Now morals followed almost the same evolution. In the beginning indeed men, scarcely distinct from beasts, imitated the morals of beasts, and sought nothing except their own advantage; but afterward, living in groups, they gradually understood that they could not seek their own pleasure with the detriment of others: for those to whom injury is done do not hesitate to seek punishments; to avoid these, it is better to suffer something, or to abstain from some pleasure; and thus under the influence of society in which men are united, from egoism is born altruism, or the inclination toward promoting the felicity of others, so that one's own advantage may be better procured.[6]

[6] Littre tries to explain the origin of altruism in another way: there are, he says, two essential functions in man, nutrition, by which the life of the individual is preserved, and generation, by which the human species is propagated. Now nutrition indeed produces egoism, but generation promotes altruism by fostering love. (Apud Fouillee, op. cit., p. 41.) This Fouillee deservedly rejects; for altruism which arises from generation extends only to a few, and often excites

egoism, indeed hatred, against strangers. But he himself thinks that love toward others arises from a purely intellectual idea, which, as universal, impels us to love of humanity; thus especially in the work *La Psychologie des Idees-forces*, Paris, 1893.

40. These things being posited, the origin of the ideas of good and evil can be explained in this way. Men first observe that certain acts are useful to society, but others harmful; the former are praised and sometimes receive some reward, but the latter are disapproved and punished with penalties. From this it is inferred that certain actions are truly praiseworthy and worthy of reward, but others are to be blamed and punished: this indeed is nothing other than the idea of merit and demerit. From it follows the idea of good and evil: namely, an action is declared good if it is praiseworthy, or useful to society, but an action is declared evil if it is demeritorious, or harmful to society. - These ideas, once arisen, are much rooted by heredity and education.

Moreover primitive men devised that there are certain invisible beings which they called gods; and, since virtue often does not receive reward on earth, nor vice sufficient punishment, it belongs to the gods to reward good acts in the other life, and to punish vicious ones. All these things, they say, are nothing other than dreams, as modern science has demonstrated.

41. Nevertheless the evolutionists reject utilitarianism as incomplete: for it does not set forth how and why certain actions are useful, but others pernicious. They themselves explain the matter scientifically by the aid of evolution. For since all nature tends toward a certain evolution of life, those actions are truly useful and good which promote the expansion of life in any order, physical, biological, psychological, and sociological, or when they are rightly ordered to their end, namely the evolution of present life; but those are pernicious and evil which more or less stand in the way of this end. - On the other hand, it is historically established that the human race constantly progresses in every order, and especially that altruism, or the sense of solidarity, prevails more day by day; wherefore the time will come when, by force of perfect solidarity, men will become exceedingly good and happy.

42. Here it is worth the labor to note how Darwin explains remorse of conscience. In a general way the altruistic sense prevails in man; nevertheless, under the influence of violent passion, egoism sometimes conquers. For when the movement of passion is urgent, the will so vehemently desires the object pleasing to itself that it no longer attends to the altruistic sense. If someone in this case yields to pleasure, the appetite is now quieted and the movement of violent passion ceases; wherefore man, now calmed, perceives that he has done something which is repugnant to altruism, and from this perception he experiences a certain sadness which is called remorse of conscience.

2. Utilitarianism Is Critically Weighed.

43. We do not deny that there is something true in the more recent forms of utilitarianism; it is indeed true that there is some connection between virtue and felicity, especially when this is placed not in the pleasure of the senses, but in the fulfillment of the nobler desires of the mind, and in the good of the whole society. Nevertheless that system, even as it is explained by Stuart Mill and H. Spencer, is deficient and imperfect, nor does it hand down the true norm of morality.

(A) First, the method which it uses, namely experimental observation, is incomplete; for determining the rule of morals, historical and psychological observation of facts and actions is indeed useful, but by no means sufficient; for the question is not only what men have done or do, but also and chiefly what they ought to do. Now for this experience is not sufficient, but the exercise of reason itself is required: for we must search out what is the origin and cause of this moral obligation of which we are conscious.

Moreover most utilitarians use the method of observation only imperfectly; when they assert that there is no man who does not ultimately act on account of his own advantage, and who seeks anything other than his own felicity, they do not attend sufficiently to the fact that there are certain men who, on account of God and fellow citizens, spend themselves and all that is theirs. - Likewise, if most men act on account of felicity, they nevertheless have the idea of the right and the just, wholly distinct from the idea of felicity, and they conceive that certain acts are good, indeed best and heroic, which, far from bringing pleasure, cause sadness and detriment: they do not render an explanation of this fact;[1] and therefore they do not explain the norm of morality.

[1] Kant declares this excellently as follows (*Critique de la Raison prat.*, ed. Picavet, p. 63): "He who has lost at play may indeed be angry with himself and his imprudence, but if he is conscious of having cheated (although he gained by this means), he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself with the moral law. Therefore this must be something quite other than the principle of personal happiness. For in order to be obliged to say to oneself: I am infamous, although I have filled my purse, one must have another rule of judgment than in order to approve oneself and say: I am a prudent man, for I have enriched my cashbox."

44. (B) Utilitarianism is not the true and supreme norm of morality, since it can be called neither universal, nor immutable, nor efficacious.

(a) Not universal. For it is not easily accommodated to all; since, according to Bentham, each one ought to weigh and measure the advantages and disadvantages which follow from this or that action, before he can judge whether this is good or evil; but who will be able to do this quickly and wisely at the same time? The difficulty is increased if, according to Stuart Mill and the positivists, he ought to consider not only his own advantage, but also that of the whole society, indeed the good of the human race. And, since he himself is the ultimate judge, is it not to be feared that he will favor himself, to the detriment of others? Will not altruism more often yield to egoism, and private good be placed before public good?

Nor likewise does it explain all honorable acts, especially those which imply self-renunciation. For all men of heart deservedly approve the manner of acting of those who spend themselves and their own things for the utility of others; thus a physician who, when a plague is raging, often offers his life into danger in order to aid others, is judged to act rightly. Now if felicity alone is the norm of morality, why must such a manner of acting be called good? If one's own felicity is sought, surely it is better and safer to flee a city infected by plague. The utilitarians answer that the physician in this case finds his felicity in devoting himself for others. This indeed I understand if virtue is praiseworthy for its own sake, or on account of a higher end; but by no means if only on account of the felicity which it brings; for many physicians will think themselves happier if it is permitted them to abandon a city infected by plague. They indeed remain there, not on account of felicity, but on account of fulfilling duty, because the voice of conscience dictates that this is good.

45. (b) Nor immutable; for since felicity is something subjective and relative, it is not conceived in the same way by all, but according to various times, regions, and men it is understood in diverse ways, so that nothing is more mutable than a rule of this kind. In reality some call felicity whatever pleases the senses; but others contend that the pleasure of the senses must be despised, and that a nobler felicity of the mind must be sought; not a few think that it is enough to obtain one's own advantage, while others hold that attention must be given to the good of others. Now, unless recourse is had to a higher principle, who will be able to define which of these systems is to be preferred? One indeed will say that greater felicity is obtained in promoting public good rather than private good; but another will deny this, and will choose to lead a quiet life rather than undergo the danger of death in order to aid others. In reality, how few there are who care more solicitously for the public good than for their own good? Therefore unless recourse is had to a superior and objective principle, all things will be uncertain and unstable.

46. (c) Nor efficacious for imposing moral obligation. The supreme norm of morality ought to be imperative, or apt for producing moral obligation. But temporal felicity alone, which utilitarians advocate, is able to impose no obligation. For if it is a question of one's own felicity, who can ever bind me to pursue it? We indeed tend naturally toward beatitude, and perhaps we can be called foolish if we do not pursue it; but by what argument can it be proved that we are morally obliged to obtain temporal felicity? The idea of duty by no means follows from the idea of beatitude; we indeed wish in a general way to be blessed, but this volition or inclination by no means demonstrates that we are bound to do this or that, but only that we shall be happier if we in fact elicit such an action. - But if it is a question of the felicity of others, the matter becomes still more difficult. For why does an obligation lie upon us of promoting the good of others, with our own detriment? Why, for example, is a poor man bound to abstain from theft? Why ought he to care for the felicity of a rich man rather than his own? You say to me that greater beatitude is found in doing good to others and especially to society. But, if felicity alone is the norm of morals, I shall say that nothing pleases me more than to pursue my own beatitude, even with the detriment of others, or at least by abstracting from the good of the community: let others devote themselves to the good of the fatherland, if they wish! I pursue a quiet life and find felicity in it.

47. From this it follows that the explanation of remorse which Darwin hands down, above, n. 42, is deficient; indeed he rather happily explains how the sensible emotion is diverse at the instant when passion urges and at the time when, pleasure having been completed, the soul is quieted. But remorse of conscience implies something nobler, namely sadness concerning a violated moral obligation, which Darwin by no means explains: for when passion is urgent, man did not perceive the moral obligation of rejecting pleasure for the utility of others, and therefore was not conscious of violated duty; consequently he ought not to experience moral sadness.

We say nothing of the theory of evolution itself, which is weighed elsewhere;[1] but it is permitted to note that the evolutionists err when they assert that the idea of good and evil arose from the fact that there are actions which are useful and others harmful to society; for between the useful and the good

there is often the greatest contrariety: perjury, for example, can sometimes be useful even to some society, but no one will say that it is good.

[1] *Synopsis Th. Dogm., De Deo Creante,* n. 35-51.

Spencer indeed comes nearer to the truth by saying that the goodness of acts is taken from the fact that they are ordered to an end, namely to the evolution of life; but an end of this kind, namely the evolution of temporal life, is only a subordinated end, and no one can prove that the duty of pursuing such an end lies upon us: it surely is useful, but why it is obligatory Spencer does not explain.

Nor can it be said, with Guyau, that good necessarily follows from the intensity and expansion of life; for life, even the most intense, is not always good, but is sometimes full of injustice, indeed of cruelty; therefore it is necessary that another norm be found, by which life may be ordered to honorable good.

II. Concerning Rationalism. — 1. Stoicism and Especially Kantism Are Set Forth.

48. (A) Among the ancients,[1] stoicism first flourished at Athens, afterward at Rome. The founder was Zeno (336-264), born from the island of Cyprus, and his school was called Stoic from the porch (*stoa*) in which his disciples were accustomed to assemble. To this school adhered, among the Greeks, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, Posidonius, and others; among the Romans, Persius Flaccus, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, etc. The foundation of morality, according to the Stoics, is to live according to reason and nature; but by the name of nature they understand not only the individual nature of man, but also the universal nature of the whole world, which man participates. Virtue consists in this, that the will with all its powers and constantly strives to live conformably to nature; it is more perfect the more intense and constant the striving is; hence the highest good is life agreeing with itself. The good, which does not differ from the beautiful, is to be loved and sought for its own sake, not on account of another; therefore it is an end in itself; but the other things, such as health and riches, are indifferent; nevertheless health and riches are useful things, or advantages which are preferable to sickness and poverty. - But the true wise man follows this rule: endure, abstain; he patiently endures all disadvantages; he abstains from vain joys; he subjects all affections of soul and passions to reason, and, through a certain impassibility, is so elevated above all things that he cannot be disturbed by any influence of pain or pleasure.[2]

[1] Ritter, *Hist. de la Philos. ancienne,* Paris, 1836, t. III, p. 516-583; Card. Gonzalez, *Hist. de la Philosophie,* translated by P. de Pascal, Paris, 1890, t. I, p. 355-367; J. C. Meyer, *Commentatio in qua doctrina Stoicorum ethica cum christiana comparatur,* Gottingen, 1823; A. Chollet, *La Morale stoicienne en face de la Morale chretienne,* Paris, Lethielleux.

[2] The description of the just man outlined by Horace (*Od.*, III, 3, 8) can therefore be accommodated to the Stoic:

The just man, tenacious of his purpose, is not shaken from his solid mind by the ardor of citizens commanding wicked things, nor by the face of a threatening tyrant, nor by the South Wind, stormy leader of restless Hadria, nor by the great hand of thundering Jove; if the shattered world should fall upon him, the ruins will strike him fearless.

49. (B) To ancient stoicism succeeded modern Kantism,[3] although it differs from it not a little. In each system, duty must be fulfilled for its own sake; but, according to the Stoics, we ought to

live conformably to nature, while, if we listen to Kant, we ought always to fight against nature.[1]

[3] Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, 1785; *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, 1788; works rendered into French: *Fondements de la metaphysique des moeurs*, translated by Barni, Paris, 1848; *Critique de la Raison pratique*, translated by Picavet, Paris, 1902. Cf. Theod. Ruyssen, *Kant*, Paris, 1900, p. 191-285; A. Cresson, *La Morale de Kant*, Paris, 1904; A. Fouillee, *Le moralisme de Kant et l'amoralisme contemporain*, Paris, Alcan, 1905; Delbos, *La Philosophie pratique de Kant*, Paris, 1905; H. Sidgwick, *Lectures on the philosophy of Kant*, London, MacMillan.

[1] You will find a comparison between stoicism and Kantism apud Cresson, op. cit., p. 171-179.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), author of critical philosophy, after he had tried to demonstrate that by pure speculative reason the existence of God and the immortality of the soul cannot be proved with certainty, resolved to establish the foundation of ethics by another way, with the help of practical reason.

Now the foundation of ethics is duty; which he declares thus: among worldly things, there is one which is truly and in itself good, namely the good will. But this will is good not from the object which it intends, but from the motive by which it is moved to acting; but that motive can be nothing other than duty to be fulfilled. Duty is nothing other than conformity with the universal moral law, which is engraved in practical reason. Therefore the will, in order to be morally good, ought to do what is commanded, and because it is commanded; for if it fulfills the law on account of obtaining some felicity or utility, now it pursues the useful, not the good, and therefore it is not morally good.

50. The moral law is truly commanding, not conditionally and hypothetically (if you wish to be blessed, do this), but absolutely and categorically: do the good; hence it is called the categorical imperative; and we ought to obey this simply, without any respect to the consequences of the act or the reward to be obtained, and without further inquiry into its authority. For the moral law proceeds from rational nature, which is an end in itself, so that man cannot be ordered as a means to another end. Therefore we ought to act from reverence for the law alone, abstracting even from the divine will, because our will remains autonomous.

That the will may be able to obey this categorical law, it ought to be free: for if it were compelled to act, it could not be morally good.[1]

[1] From this the philosopher rises to God and the immortal soul: the supreme good, he says, consists in the intimate and permanent conjunction between beatitude and virtue; but, in the present life, such a connection by no means exists, since very often we must act against natural tendencies in order to cultivate virtue; therefore it is necessary that there be another life, in which God will grant supreme felicity to those who have cultivated virtue.

51. These things being posited, the fundamental rule established by Kant is this: "Act in such a way that the rule of your will can become a universal rule," that is, before you act, carefully weigh whether something absurd would follow from your action, on the supposition that all were commanded to act in the same way, and thus in fact acted. He explains this rule elsewhere thus: "Act in such a way that you regard yourself and others as an end, but not as a means which you use"; for if you use yourself and others as a means, by that very fact you act on account of utility or pleasure, not on account of duty. From these principles he infers many conclusions, which this is not the place to relate.

52. Renouvier[2] taught and propagated Kantism in France, with a few changes however: indeed he admits that there is some categorical imperative, but he derives its obligatory force from abstract and universal human reason, nor does he disapprove those who act honorably not only on account of duty, but also on account of reward. - Yet Fouillee deservedly observes that this abstract and universal reason does not really exist except in God.[3]

[2] Renouvier, *La science de la Morale*, Paris, 1869; G. Seailles, *La Philosophie de Ch. Renouvier*, Paris, Alcan, 1905.

[3] Fouillee, *Critique des systemes de Morale*, p. 222.

Among the disciples of Kant, some, such as Schopenhauer and Hartmann, fell into pessimism; for, thinking that felicity cannot be obtained, and that the practice of duty is impossible, they held that the miseries of this life must be mitigated by a certain affection of compassion toward others, but that their cessation cannot be obtained except through the annihilation of oneself, or entrance into nirvana.[4]

[4] Schopenhauer, *Fondement de la Morale*, 1841; French translation by Burdeau, 1888. - F. Nietzsche taught pessimism together with sensualism (*Par dela le bien et le mal*; *La Genealogie de la Morale*, translated by H. Albert, Paris, 1900); there are two kinds of men, he says: the former, learned and noble, who are called super-human, need no law, and can freely follow their propensities, whatever they may be; the latter, or the uncultivated, ought to restrain their passions, so that they may humbly serve the former. How much such a system is opposed to right reason, there is no one who does not see. Cf. Fouillee, *Nietzsche et l'immoralisme*, Paris, 1903.

2. Kantism Is Critically Weighed.

53. We say nothing concerning the stoicism of the ancients, which is now antiquated; on the other hand, the principal arguments which we shall bring against Kant are valid also against Zeno.

Kantism surely comes nearer to truth than utilitarianism: for it deservedly asserts that the moral law is absolute, universal, and truly obligatory; likewise it excellently describes duty, and assigns to the human will a motive which is much more perfect than utility or pleasure. Nevertheless a system of this kind is deficient and teems with very many errors.

54. (A) The method which it uses, namely the sole method *a priori*, is incomplete; reason surely is necessary for defining what we ought to do, as we said above, n. 43; but historical and psychological observation of human nature cannot be rejected; otherwise, the rule of morals will not be proportioned to human powers. Thus Kant declares that an act honorable in itself, which is elicited with hope of reward or fear of punishment, is not morally good: now it is established historically and psychologically at the same time that very few men do good without any respect to beatitude, or are deterred from vice without fear of some punishment; therefore a norm of this kind is not accommodated to human weakness. - Moreover, by defending the incapacity of speculative reason for attaining truth, by that very fact he greatly depresses the force of practical reason for knowing good: for why are we more certain concerning the existence of moral obligation than concerning merely speculative truths?

55. (B) Kant affirms that the moral law is universal, absolute, and obligatory, but he does not render the reason of this obligation. He does not derive it from God, but only from human reason:[1] but this is not universal, but individual, nor absolute, but relative and finite,

borrowing its perfections from uncreated Reason, nor can it be conceived by what authority it is able to command so categorically. For this cannot be explained unless our reason is nothing other than a manifestation of uncreated Reason, which, as infinitely wise and supreme mistress of all things, can establish a universal and categorical law. But Kant denies this, when he asserts that reason is autonomous. - He falls into another error, by saying that human nature is an end in itself: for since it is finite and created, it must necessarily be referred to its Creator. - He likewise falsely supposes that those actions alone are good which the moral law absolutely commands, and because it commands them. For often actions are deservedly held as honorable which are in no way commanded, for example, if someone freely devotes himself wholly to works of mercy. Moreover, why would actions not be good which are done, not because they are commanded, but from the motive of charity, because they are useful to the neighbor?

[1] Afterward indeed he recognizes, once the existence of God has been admitted, that the command of reason can be considered as a divine command (*Raison pratique*, pp. 235, 238); but he establishes the foundation of obligation before he has demonstrated the existence of God. - Certain Christians, while they reject the errors of Kant, nevertheless borrow certain principles from him in order to lead to the Christian faith those who favor subjectivism and criticism; cf. Fonsegrive, *Le Kantisme et la pensee contemporaine*, in the periodical *La Quinzaine*, March 1, 1904, p. 86-107.

56. (C) Kant contradicts himself, by asserting on the one hand that an act elicited on account of hope of beatitude is not morally good, and on the other hand that the supreme good is situated in the conjunction of virtue and beatitude. For, if the supreme good implies true beatitude, why are we prohibited from desiring and seeking it? Surely it cannot be evil to pursue what is more perfect; but, with Kant as witness, it is more perfect to cultivate virtue and at the same time to enjoy beatitude; and nevertheless, if we think of beatitude and desire it, our action ceases to be morally good!

3. Various Systems of Independent Ethics Are Set Forth.

All systems of this kind agree in this, that they wish to be independent; nevertheless in a diverse degree and in a diverse manner, as will be clear from the following.

57. (a) Namely, some hold that ethics is indeed independent from revealed religion, but not from God.[1] Concerning these we do not now treat; we by no means deny that some code of moral laws can be established by reason alone; but, as was proved in the treatise concerning True Religion, n. 50, in the present state, the human race cannot morally, without some revelation, know a complete and perfect code of moral truths expeditiously, with firm certitude and with no admixture of error.

[1] Thus Ravaisson; Franck; P. Janet, *La Morale*; J. Simon, *Le Devoir*, Paris, 1854; E. Caro, *Problemes de Morale sociale*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1887, p. 15-95, where he expressly rejects and refutes the system of ethics independent from God.

58. (b) Others say that it is independent even from God, insofar as the essential principles of morals can be safely and certainly defined, without the existence of God being demonstrated, from the sole consideration of the moral order, such as can be detected by reason, once the liberty of man alone is admitted.[1] For we can recognize the existence of liberty by conscience alone, without any metaphysical investigations; but since liberty is an inviolable power, it

supposes some right to which duty responds: and from the twofold idea of right and duty the whole of ethics can be deduced.

[1] Thus C. Coignet, *La Morale independante*, Paris, 1869; M. Ferraz, *Philosophie du Devoir*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1869; Beaussire, *Les principes de la Morale*, Paris, 1888.

On the other hand, it is of the greatest importance that ethics by no means depend on theodicy and metaphysics: for there are so many dissensions concerning metaphysical matters that unless the foundation of ethics is placed outside these controversies, it now becomes impossible to find a commonly received rule of morals.

59. (c) Others contend that the rule of morals is wholly independent from speculative reason itself, and is to be placed in the moral sense: namely, that must be called honorable or dishonorable which excites the sympathy or antipathy of the majority; or, as it pleases others, that which is conformable or deformed in relation to the moral sense. For, whatever may be said concerning merely speculative truths, men commonly agree concerning certain moral rules which by moral sense they recognize as true. But that sense is sometimes called common sense, moral instinct, sometimes moral sympathy and antipathy, or simply conscience. It indeed exists in all, but can and ought to be cultivated, especially by exciting sympathy toward others: then good is easily known and is perfected by a certain natural instinct.[2] This school flourished especially in England, although it gained not a few disciples in other regions.

[2] Thus, among others, Shaftesbury, *An inquiry concerning virtue and merit*, 1699; Adam Smith, *Theory of moral sentiments*; T. Reid, *Inquiry into the Human mind, or the principle of common sense*, Edinburgh, 1765; F. Hutcheson, *System of Moral Philosophy*, Glasgow, 1755; Hoffding, *Morale, Essai sur les principes theoriques et leur application*, translated from the German by L. Poitevin, Paris, 1903.

4. The System of Independent Ethics Is Critically Weighed.

60. We do not deny that something true is found in these systems: indeed right reason can find certain rules of morals from the very contemplation of things and of the end to which they are destined; it is likewise true that some duties are manifested to us, without any discourse, by a certain moral sense, which is called the voice of conscience. But how incomplete and imperfect the norm of morality is when constituted independently from God will be clear from the following.

61. (A) The supreme norm of morals ought to be absolute and universal; but human reason and moral sense, if they are considered independently from God, bear before themselves nothing absolute and immutable: reason, as created and finite, perceives truth only in a finite and imperfect manner, and, unless it rests on divine reason, often errs; hence it is historically established that there have been no fewer dissensions of philosophers concerning the principles of morals than concerning metaphysical truths, as is established from the various systems already set forth above. Therefore human reason, if it is considered separately from divine reason, will often be uncertain, and will propose diverse rules according to diverse times or various nations; and consequently it will be essentially mutable and subjective.

62. (B) Moreover it lacks authority for imposing moral obligation; for this cannot be understood without a superior being. If right reason is a certain participation of divine reason, and the natural order is apprehended as a manifestation of the divine will wisely disposing all things, then there arises the obligation of living and acting according to this order constituted by the supreme Lord of all things; but if reason is considered in itself, without any respect to God, it can indeed perceive that some act is honorable, but it cannot impose the obligation of doing it, since reason is not superior to man, but only a part of man. The same must be said *a fortiori* concerning the moral sense: if it is the same as practical reason, it has no greater force; but if it is held as a special sense, distinct from reason, it will possess still less authority, since sense is or ought to be subordinated to reason. - We indeed confess that moral sense rightly informed is a sign of some obligation, but it cannot create or induce this obligation.

63. (C) In that system likewise sanction is lacking for inciting man to good. God indeed, as just and supreme remunerator, is able to bestow reward upon the good and punishments upon the evil, so that He may draw them to virtue and deter them from vice. But, if one abstracts from God, what will the sanction be? Not human felicity: for not rarely the just are oppressed and the evil abound in riches and pleasures. Nor remorse of conscience; for unless this is held as the voice of God, it terrifies the evil little: indeed the more wicked they are, the less they feel remorse, and by long custom of vice the voice of conscience is finally rendered mute. Therefore there will be no truly efficacious sanction; now although a few men, among the noblest, do not hesitate to fulfill the law without sanction, nevertheless most are accustomed to despise it.

Conclusion of This Treatise.

64. By the critical exposition of these systems the Catholic norm of morality is confirmed not a little. For whatever true and honorable thing they contain is found in Catholic doctrine. Thus with utilitarianism we admit that beatitude is the end, not indeed the primary but the secondary end of man, and indeed true and perfect beatitude which perfectly quiets all his legitimate aspirations; that it is not indeed the norm of morality, but one of the motives by which we are helped toward acting well. With Kantism we confess that the moral law is absolute, universal, and categorically obligatory; but we exhibit the reason why the matter is so, namely because the moral law is nothing other than the manifestation of divine reason and will. We concede to rationalists that right reason is to be followed as the proximate norm of morality; but at the same time we show that this cannot be done except because our reason is a certain participation of divine reason, which is the ultimate and infallible rule of morals. Nor do we deny the existence of some moral sense, and its influence upon human morals; but we show that this sense is nothing other than the judgment of right reason, and a sign of a higher norm, namely of divine reason itself, which cannot be deceived.

With evolutionism we hold that some progress must be admitted, whether in individuals,[1] or in society; thus the new law is more perfect than the old law, and Christian society itself can make progress daily, by better understanding and cultivating Christian virtues; but this progress is directed not by blind necessity, but by wise Providence. We agree with those who, with Guyau, promote life most intense;[1] but we order life to God, the supreme and infinite good.

[1] "And he who is just, let him be justified still; and he who is holy, let him be sanctified still." (Apoc., XXII, 11.)

[1] "I came that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly." (John, X, 10.)

On the other hand, the Catholic rule carefully avoids the errors and rocks of the other systems, as we have shown above; therefore it is to be admitted. Therefore in the whole course of Moral Theology nothing further remains except to weigh how, according to the light of reason and faith, our acts can be ordered to God, the ultimate end.

65. We tend toward the ultimate end through free, moral, and meritorious acts, which therefore are called seeds of eternal life. (a) They ought indeed to be free, because the ultimate end is obtained by way of prize and reward, and therefore through a free act, which alone is apt for reward; (b) moral and honorable, because God cannot reward evil acts; (c) meritorious, or clothed with those conditions which are required for supernatural merit, because in fact we are destined to a supernatural end. Therefore we shall speak:

I. Concerning free acts, or concerning the liberty of the human act.

II. Concerning moral acts, or concerning the morality of the human act.

III. Concerning meritorious acts, or concerning merit.

Concerning free acts:

- Notion and species.
- Principles which produce them.
- Causes influencing them.

Concerning moral acts:

- Elements from which morality is derived.
- Extension of morality to:
- the indirect voluntary;
- cooperation.

Concerning meritorious acts:

- Conditions on the part of:
- the one operating;
- the work;
- God.

On Human Acts — Chapter I: On Free Acts

Concerning Free Acts.

66. State of the question. Among the acts which are performed by man, some are voluntary, others involuntary. The former are performed by the will with a previous cognition of the intellect. But the latter are done without previous cognition or will. Of this kind are the acts of one fully dreaming, drunk, or delirious, who are incapable of conscious cognition;[1] likewise the acts of vegetative life, such as the digestion of foods or the circulation of the blood, which are not subject to the will; and also the acts of a fully distracted man who, although he is capable of attention, in fact does not notice those things which he does, because his attention is turned aside to other things. - The former acts, namely voluntary acts, can be called human acts, because they proceed from man insofar as he is rational man; but the latter are called acts of man, because they indeed proceed from man, but not insofar as he is rational, since they are done without advertence and will.[2]

[1] Thus voluntary acts are distinguished from spontaneous acts, which are done with merely sensitive cognition, such as the acts of infants or the mentally unsound.

[2] Sometimes, however, only those acts are called human which are truly free, and therefore proceed from the deliberate will, according to those things which are set forth below. To the point St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 1: "Of the actions which are done by man, those alone are called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man. But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his own acts. Whence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master. But man is master of his own acts through reason and will... therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will."

Here we treat concerning voluntary acts; nor will there be discussion of the others, except that they may be distinguished from the former. Among voluntary acts, some are necessary, but others free or deliberate. The former indeed proceed from the will with previous cognition, but in such a way that the will cannot abstain from them; thus we necessarily will good in common;[1] for we do not embrace evil except under the species of good, or insofar as in some way it appears to us to be good. On the contrary, free acts so proceed from the will that the will according to its own pleasure can posit the act or not posit it. Thus the voluntary is, as it were, a genus which contains under itself two species: the necessary voluntary and the free or deliberate voluntary; but, since the former is occupied only with good in common, often voluntary and free are taken promiscuously. - We shall declare this more fully by setting forth: 1. the notion and species of a free act; 2. the principles which concur toward its production; 3. the causes which influence a free act.

[1] Certain ones, however, think that man is free even concerning good in common, because, they say, he tends toward it naturally indeed, but not from necessity; thus Piat, *La Liberte*, t. II, *Le Probleme*, p. 262-269. - Nevertheless it is established psychologically that there is some distinction between the desiring of beatitude, which all elicit at least implicitly, and the willing of the means which lead to it: for since these are diverse, and consequently limited goods, they do not solicit our assent necessarily. - For the rest, in practice, it matters little, provided it is admitted that we are truly free concerning the choice of means for obtaining beatitude.

Art. I. Notion and Species of Free Acts. — I. Notion of Free Acts.

67. 1. Definition. An act is called free which is immune from coercion and necessity.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 8-17; Suarez, *Tr. de voluntario et involuntario*, disp. I, II, VI-X; Salmanticenses, *De principiis moralitatis*, cap. I, n. 9-21; Billuart, *De actibus humanis*, diss. I-III; Bouquillon, n. 318-330; Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, n. 1-34.

(a) Liberty or immunity from necessity, which is also called liberty of exercise, or free will, is the faculty of choosing one thing before another, so that the agent is not intrinsically determined to one thing. For liberty it is by no means required that the will be in a state of indifference; but it suffices that, notwithstanding various causes, whether external or internal, which influence it, it ultimately be able to choose either part. - It is threefold: liberty of contradiction, which is exercised concerning contradictories, for example, when we can choose between loving and not loving; liberty of contrariety, which chooses between contraries, for example, between loving and hating, good and evil; liberty of specification, to which belongs choosing between objects diverse in species, such as eating and walking. Now for the essence of liberty the sole faculty of choosing between contradictories suffices, or between acting and not acting.

(b) Liberty from coercion, or liberty of execution, is the unimpeded faculty of acting according to one's pleasure, so that the agent is not forced to act by external violence, nor impeded from acting. Necessity therefore affects the very internal faculty of choosing, while coercion only binds the external power of executing.

68. 2. Existence. (A) The existence of liberty today is denied by determinists,[1] who contend that all actions of man depend on antecedent or concomitant circumstances in such a way that they are truly determined by them, but are not freely chosen by the will. It is not our purpose to vindicate against them the existence of free will; Philosophers do this.

[1] Thus, among others, A. Fouillée, *La liberté et le déterminisme*, 4th ed., Paris, Alcan, 1895. Yet he himself confesses that we become free little by little: for we have the concept of liberty; but every concept tends to burst forth at some time into act and to become real. For the rest, most determinists confess that there is in us some power of changing circumstances, and so of indirectly attaining what we will.

69. Let it suffice to recall their principal arguments to memory:

(a) Psychological.[2] From the inward testimony of conscience it is established that we, at least in many acts, are truly free. For notwithstanding the various motives which impel us to acting in this or that way, we can, according to our own judgment, consider these motives attentively or not, and make a practical judgment about them; we are conscious that we can choose between delightful good and honorable good; at the very instant in which we choose good, pleasure often allures us to evil, and therefore the fulfillment of duty requires an effort, that is, an act of the will contrary to pleasure; if we do good, we impute the action to ourselves as to true authors, as worthy of praise; if we have acted badly, conscience reproves us as worthy of blame. At length sometimes we perceive the distinction between acts arisen from an invincible propensity and those which are performed freely. Therefore unless conscience manifestly deceives us, we are truly free at least in many things.

[2] Piat, *Le problème de la liberté*, p. 37-127; Mercier, *Psychologie*, t. II, n. 203-206; Meyer, op. cit., n. 109-114; Fonsegrive, *Essai sur le libre arbitre*, 2nd ed., Paris, Alcan, 1896, p. 434-452, where he joins the psychological and the metaphysical argument together.

This is confirmed from the concept of duty to be fulfilled, which is present in all, as was shown above. For by duty we are not forced nor determined, but solicited to acting; hence sometimes we resist the command of duty, while conscience resists; sometimes we give consent to it, while concupiscence resists; in the former case, we repent that we have violated the order of nature; in the latter, we rejoice concerning good freely chosen.

(b) Metaphysical. The proper and adequate object of the will is universal good; wherefore, if some object is proposed to the will which is, and evidently appears to be, universally good, according to every consideration, of necessity the will will tend toward it, if it wills anything; for it will not be able to will the opposite. But if some object is proposed which is not, and does not appear, good according to every consideration, the will is not of necessity borne toward it. Now any particular goods, insofar as they are not the universal good, but are deficient from some good, can be taken as not good; and according to this consideration, they can be rejected or approved by the will.[1]

[1] Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 2.

Therefore the subject of liberty is properly the will, to which belongs choosing between acting and not acting, doing this or that. But the root of liberty is reason, which can have diverse conceptions of good:[2] it conceives the highest good and proposes it to the will as something necessary; but particular goods it conceives and proposes as desirable insofar as they are more or less connected with beatitude.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 2 ad 2; I, q. 83, a. 1.

70. (B) Theologians likewise, against Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jansenists, prove that the human will, even in the state of fallen nature and under the influence of grace, remains free from necessity.[3] (a) This surely is established from the general manner of speaking of Scripture; for precepts are given to man; rewards are promised to those doing good, but punishments are inflicted on the evil; sinners are called to penance, the just are warned lest, trusting too much in themselves, they fall into sin; there are in us two kinds of propensities mutually opposed to one another, by which we are allured to good and to evil;[4] but, if without God's help we can do nothing from ourselves, we can do all things in Him who strengthens us.[5]

[3] Which we proved in the treatise concerning Grace, n. 94-98.

[4] Rom., VII, 15-25.

[5] Philip., IV, 13. - Fonsegrive sets forth the doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers concerning liberty, op. cit., p. 79-124.

(b) Therefore the Council of Trent deservedly declares that by Adam's prevarication the free will of man, although weakened and inclined in its powers, was by no means extinguished, and that it can dissent from the grace of God, if it wills.[1] Likewise, as heretical, the third proposition of Jansenius was reproved: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices."

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 1 and can. 4-5 (Denzing., nn. 675, 696, 697).

II. Species of Free Acts.

71. The primary distinction of free acts is taken from the principle from which they proceed: some indeed are elicited and others commanded. Elicited or immanent acts proceed immediately

from the will and are perfected and consummated in it,[2] such as volition, intention, election, etc.; commanded acts are those which do not proceed immediately from the will, but, from its command, from another power, whether internal or external, such as thinking, walking, etc. A few things must be said concerning these, so that the nature of the free act may be better understood.

[2] In a general way those acts are called elicited which are performed by that faculty which is the proper subject of those acts; thus an act of faith is elicited by the intellect and commanded by the will. But in moral matters, an elicited act is so called in relation to the will, to which it belongs to act morally.

72. 1. Concerning elicited acts. Six elicited acts of the will are generally distinguished, when we act not precipitately, but prudently and maturely: simple volition, intention, consent, election, use, fruition.

(a) When the intellect apprehends something as good, the will is borne toward it as lovable in itself, and that inclination is called simple volition, or complacency, or love.

(b) But this volition moves the intellect to weighing whether that good is fitting and possible for the subject; and if the intellect truly judges that the matter is so, intention is born, by which the will tends toward the end as attainable.

(c) By force of this intention, the intellect inquires concerning means suited to obtaining the end, and the will gives consent, or desires the means useful for attaining the thing.

(d) By force of this consent, the intellect is applied to discerning what are the more apt means for attaining the object, and on the part of the will there is election, by which it approves one means before others.

(e) When the means has now been chosen, the will, with the intellect directing, commands the execution of this means, and consequently applies the executive powers to the act; this indeed is called active use, or the command of the will for acting.

(f) Finally, when the will has attained the good, it rests in it and enjoys it, and from this is born fruition, or joyful rest in the possessed end.

73. 2. Concerning commanded acts. For judging rightly concerning the liberty, and consequently concerning the morality, of these acts, it is of the greatest importance that it be defined over which faculties the will can command, and by what kind of command. For a twofold command is distinguished: one absolute, or despotic, which cannot be resisted; and another non-absolute (which was called political by the Scholastics), which we can resist.

(a) Now the will exercises no command over those apprehensions of the intellect which precede every volition; for example, it cannot prevent reason from perceiving the truth proposed to it; directly it does not influence the judgment which is made concerning a thing evidently true or false, but indirectly, insofar as affections of soul incline the judgment in some way toward that part which is more pleasing. - The intellect is subject to the free will as to application, insofar as it can be applied to this or that object, but not absolutely, as is clear from the wanderings of mind to which we are

subject; and in some way as to adherence, when the truth is not evidently clear, for example, in the mysteries of faith; for then the will is able to command an assent firmer than the weight of the reasons which are brought forward deserves.[1]

[1] It is clear from the condemnation by Innocent XI of this proposition: "The will cannot effect that the assent of faith in itself be firmer than the weight of the reasons impelling to assent deserves." (Denzing., n. 1036.)

74. (b) The will cannot exercise command over the first representations of imagination or recollections of memory, which moreover were not willed, nor over the first movements of the sensitive appetite (or of the passions); for all these things anticipate its act. But as to the other acts of these faculties, it is able to exercise some command; for it can excite phantasms, recollections, or passions, and on the contrary in some way restrain the movements of concupiscence, by commanding these faculties that they turn themselves aside to other objects. Often, however, phantasms, recollections, or movements of the passions return even against the command of the will: "But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, which is in my members."[1]

[1] Rom., VII, 23.

(c) Almost the same must be said concerning the external senses: they depend on the will as to application, or turning away from objects, but not as to sensation, or impression: for the senses are so disposed that sensation is produced whenever a sensible object strikes the organs; but from that sensation there necessarily follows some pleasure or sadness. Nevertheless, often the will, when there is place for deliberation, can indirectly prevent sensations and the movements following from them, by commanding the senses to turn themselves away from certain objects. But when pleasure or sadness has arisen, the will can freely consent or dissent.

75. (d) But the motive power of the external members of the body is subject to the command of the will almost absolutely, provided only that it is not impeded by some defect, such as paralysis, or by some extraordinary state, such as hypnotic sleep or diabolical obsession.

(e) Certain functions of vegetative life, such as nutrition, depend on the will only indirectly, insofar as, for example, it can command that this or that food be eaten; certain functions, however, such as respiration, are directed by the will; all are remotely subject to some command of the will, insofar as dispositions of soul, such as joy or sadness and other passions, influence not a little the exercise of these faculties.

All these things indeed must be kept before the eyes for judging rightly concerning the liberty and morality of acts which are more or less commanded by the will.

76. By reason of manifestation, human acts are merely internal, when they are performed by the powers of the soul without any exterior sign, such as thought, imagination, volition; external, when they are exercised through the external organs of the body, such as walking, inclination of the head, etc.; mixed, which are exercised by external and internal powers together, such as pious recitation of the rosary, devout genuflection, etc. - There are other divisions, concerning which we shall speak below in their own place.

Art. II. Concerning the Principles Which Concur Toward the Production of a Free Act.

77. When it is a question of a merely natural act, the internal principles which concur toward its production are the various faculties which are described in Psychology; if it is a question of a supernatural and meritorious act, there are required besides certain supernatural gifts, by which the faculties are completed and elevated; these are declared more fully in the treatise concerning Grace. Here it is sufficient to recall to memory those things which are more useful for the understanding of a free and meritorious act.

§ I. Concerning the Natural Principles Concurring Toward a Free Act.

Although all the faculties of man concur in some way toward the production of a free act, nevertheless there are two which proximately produce it, namely the intellect and the will: the former knows the object, judges concerning its moral goodness or malice, and proposes it to the will: nothing is willed unless previously known; the latter pursues the good proposed by the intellect. - The other faculties indeed concur toward a free act, but only insofar as they are directed by the will, from what was said above, n. 73-75.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 9-15; Suarez, op. cit., disp. VI, VIII; Billuart, diss. III. Confer the Philosophers, where they discuss Psychology.

I. Concerning the Cognition Required for a Free Act.

78. That an act may be truly and in all respects free, cognition or advertence of mind ought to precede the election of the will; and the agent ought to advert to two things: the act itself as moral, and the various elements which can affect its morality: and the more perfect the cognition, the freer the act is, because the will elicits the act more freely the more lucidly the motives of acting are proposed to it.

1. The agent ought to be conscious of the action itself which he elicits, that this may be free; for since a free act is in the power of the one operating, the agent ought to be so disposed that he can posit or not posit the act, continue or interrupt it; but he cannot do this unless he is conscious that he is acting and performing such an act. Nor does it suffice that he advert to the material act itself, but it is required that he perceive its morality.

79. (a) By reason of the subject itself, advertence is full or semi-full: full, when nothing on the part of the intellect impedes the eliciting of the act of adverting, with that perfection which prudent persons are accustomed to employ in matters of some moment, for example, when someone, awake, in possession of himself, neither disturbed nor distracted, attends to a matter; - semi-full, or rather non-full, when something impedes the mind so that the act of adverting is not perfect, for example, when someone thinks about some matter while not yet fully aroused from sleep, or not fully in possession of himself, or distracted by other matters.

According to diverse advertence of mind, three kinds of acts are usually distinguished: first-first movements, or indeliberate ones, which precede all advertence, for example, the natural movement of aversion, anger, revenge when they are excited before they are adverted to; second-first movements, or semi-deliberate ones, of which we are conscious only imperfectly, because we are not

fully awake, or are distracted in some way; second movements, or deliberate ones, which are elicited with full advertence, namely by one who is altogether in possession of himself and fully attends to the matter.

80. (b) By reason of the object, advertence is distinct, when the morality of the object is clearly perceived; confused, when it is apprehended only obscurely. Thus one who throws a stone from a window, foreseeing that from it a passing enemy will be wounded, distinctly adverts to the malice of this action; but if he does this, indeed suspecting that perhaps someone passing by can be wounded, but not knowing whether someone in fact is passing, he adverts only confusedly to the wounding of the neighbor. - This distinction indeed is of the greatest moment, since an effect only confusedly foreseen is much less imputable to the agent than one which is clearly perceived.[1]

[1] Which Vieux Moraliste lucidly sets forth, apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XX, 1898, p. 1025-30.

81. 2. That the agent may freely will all the circumstances of the act, he ought to advert to them; for since nothing is willed unless previously known, if in some object there are several moral elements which the agent does not perceive, he does not freely will the same. Thus if someone kills his father, thinking him to be a man hostile to himself, he is indeed guilty of homicide, but not of parricide, because, on account of darkness or another cause, he did not advert that this man was his father; if he kills him while hunting, thinking that what he saw was a wild animal, he is guilty neither of parricide nor of homicide.

II. Concerning the Volition Required for a Free Act.

Since a free act is directly elicited by the will, it remains to speak concerning volition itself, so that it may be better discerned when it is truly free.

82. 1. By reason of deliberation and adherence, volition, like cognition itself, is called perfect or imperfect, according as it is done with full or semi-full advertence, and at the same time with full or semi-full consent. Therefore in the voluntary, or free, there can be several degrees, according as cognition or volition is more or less perfect. Certain ones think that the perfection of volition depends on cognition alone; but others, whom we follow, judge that there are degrees in consent itself. For sometimes no consent is given, although advertence is full, as in the case of abulia, below, n. 128. Sometimes consent is semi-full, although advertence is full, as in the case of a habit already retracted, n. 125. At other times the will consents only reluctantly, under the influence of fear: thus a Christian who, from fear of death, externally denies the faith; or an official who, in order to preserve an office, reluctantly acts against conscience. In this case, if advertence is full, volition does not cease to be free, and indeed sufficiently full for committing mortal sin: for then the agent deliberately prefers a temporal and transitory good to a spiritual and eternal good, which is commanded under grave obligation. This is illustrated by a comparison: a merchant who, when a storm has arisen, throws his merchandise into the sea to save his life, does this indeed reluctantly, but nevertheless freely and efficaciously, because he places life before riches; thus one who consents to sin from fear acts freely,

although reluctantly. - But at other times consent is given with the whole soul, with the whole heart. Therefore there are various degrees in consent itself.

83. 2. By reason of manifestation, volition is express, when it is distinctly declared externally by words or other signs; tacit, when consent is indeed elicited, but is not distinctly manifested, and is gathered to be present only from some fact or omission of fact: thus, if a superior, knowing that something is being done against the law, does not prohibit it when he easily can, he seems to consent. - From this was born the axiom: he who is silent seems to consent; it must be noted, however, that silence alone of itself does not signify consent, but that its sense is to be defined from the adjuncts, according to the rules which will be handed down in the whole course of the work.

From the voluntary or tacit consent there must carefully be distinguished the presumed voluntary, which someone in fact did not elicit, but would have elicited, if the matter had been proposed to him; for example, if in a particular case a positive law cannot be observed without grave inconvenience, the dispensation of the legislator can be presumed.

84. 3. By reason of the mode in which it is expressed, volition is positive, when it is terminated to some act; negative, when it consists in some omission; for example, a father who adverts that his son is stealing another's good, and does not impede it, negatively wills to cooperate in this theft. But this omission is truly free and imputable when someone can and is bound to act.

Here it can be noted that a voluntary omission can happen in manifold ways. If it is a question, for example, of hearing Mass: (a) someone can expressly say: I do not wish to hear Mass; (b) or choose an action incompatible with hearing Mass, for example, hunting; (c) or positively determine himself to elicit no act, whether of volition or nolition; (d) or behave altogether passively, as happens to those who are found in a state of indifference or abulia, as they say. In the first three ways, the omission is free; in the fourth, it is controverted: for abulia is a psychological disease, which often was voluntary in the cause, but greatly diminishes and sometimes removes liberty.

Other divisions of the voluntary or free, direct and indirect; actual, virtual, and habitual, will more opportunely be declared below.

§ II. Concerning the Supernatural Principles Concurring Toward a Meritorious Act.

85. Natural faculties, aided by divine concurrence, indeed suffice for eliciting an act naturally good, provided it is not too arduous;[1] but, since in fact we have been ordered to a supernatural end, it is useful to say certain things in passing concerning those principles which are superadded to our nature for making a meritorious act.

[1] What fallen man can and cannot do, without grace, as to ethically good works, was declared in the treatise concerning Grace, n. 33-48. - In the same treatise all those things which concur toward a meritorious act are set forth more fully.

1. The Christian, by receiving baptism, is constituted an adoptive son of God and heir of the heavenly kingdom, and receives a certain participation of the divine nature, namely habitual

grace, by force of which human nature is elevated to the supernatural state, and radically becomes capable of acting meritoriously; at the same time virtues are infused into the powers of the soul, which perfect them and render them proximately apt for eliciting supernatural acts; to these are added the gifts of the Holy Spirit, for performing more perfect and more arduous works by a certain divine instinct. Finally, that our faculties, already adorned with supernatural virtues and gifts, may break forth into act and in fact elicit supernatural works, undeserved helps are provided to them, which are called actual graces. Thus in Christians nature is perfected by grace; faculties are completed by infused virtues and gifts; the concurrence by which God cooperates with our acts is supernatural; thus we are able to act not only honorably, but also supernaturally and meritoriously.

But when habitual grace and charity are lost by mortal sin, faith and hope remain in the soul, provided someone has not sinned gravely against these virtues; nor are actual graces denied to him, by whose aid he is able to elicit supernatural acts[1] of fear of God, hope, penance, and love, and to recover sanctifying grace.

[1] These acts of the sinner are indeed supernatural, but not meritorious *de condigno*, as is declared in the treatise concerning Grace.

86. 2. But infidels, who have not been justified by baptismal regeneration, receive at the opportune time undeserved helps, by whose aid they can fulfill the natural law. When for some time they have observed this law, God, according to the common opinion, kindly bestows on them, not from justice, but from mercy, certain actual graces of illumination; if they consent to these, they will be led step by step to faith, hope, charity, and justification; but once justified, they are equated with Christians, and can truly merit. - All these things indeed are set forth at length in the treatise concerning Grace.[2]

[2] Since in the present Treatise we are able to touch these things only in passing, the professor, according to various circumstances, will explain the same things more or less to his students.

Art. III. Concerning the Causes Which Influence a Free Act, for Diminishing or Increasing Liberty.

87. After those things which we have set forth concerning the principles which produce a free act, it remains to inquire concerning the causes which influence the same, for increasing its liberty, or diminishing it, or wholly taking it away. Generally theologians treat only concerning the impediments of a free act, four of which are enumerated by St. Thomas: ignorance, concupiscence, violence, and fear. Yet elsewhere others are listed, concerning which it is useful to say a few things here, so that the confessor may be more equitable in judging the works of penitents. But we consider it more opportune here to treat not only concerning the impediments of liberty, but concerning the principal causes which influence it for diminishing or increasing it. Now certain causes influence the voluntary more proximately: 1. indeed directly in the intellect, and indirectly in the will, such as error and ignorance; 2. directly and principally in the will, such as the passions; 3. directly in the execution of volition, and indirectly in the intellect and will, such as violence. - But other causes influence the intellect

and will more remotely, such as heredity and temperament, education, habit, and also certain morbid states affecting body or soul. Concerning these we must speak separately.

§ I. Concerning the Causes More Proximately Influencing a Free Act.

Since a free act depends on intellect and will, everything which affects either faculty by that very fact can benefit or harm liberty.

I. Concerning the Causes Directly Influencing the Intellect, and Especially Concerning Error and Ignorance.

88. There are certain dispositions of mind and body in which man is not in possession of himself, and concerning which nothing special occurs to be said here, namely: the defect of reason in infants; but in adults, insanity whether total or partial (monomania), sleep whether full or semi-full, drunkenness, hallucination, diabolical obsession. In all these, if the use of reason is wholly lacking, liberty will be lacking; if some advertence remains, the act will be more or less free according to the very degree of cognition. - But since ignorance and error much more frequently influence human acts, these must be treated especially.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 76; Suarez, disp. IV; Salmanticenses, op. cit., cap. XIV; St. Alphonsus, *De act. hum.*, n. 26-29; Billuart, diss. I, art. 9; Bouquillon, n. 332-334; Ballerini P., n. 35-58; Vieux Moraliste, apud *Ami du clerge*, XX, 1898, p. 1153-1161; Didiot, *Morale surnaturelle Fondamentale*, n. 383-432.

1. Notion and Species of Ignorance.

89. (A) Notion. Ignorance in general is the lack of some knowledge in a subject otherwise capable; it is called negative, or simple nescience, when it is the lack of knowledge which we are not bound to acquire, for example, ignorance of medicine in a rustic; it is called privative if it is the lack of due knowledge, as is ignorance of theology in a priest; concerning the latter we treat here.

Ignorance differs from error, which, beyond the lack of knowledge, involves a judgment contrary to truth, as if someone thinks hatred of enemies to be something honorable. It differs also from inadvertence, which consists in this, that the mind does not actually attend to a matter, although it habitually knows it, as occurs in distractions: consequently inadvertence is the lack of actual attention, while ignorance denotes a habitual state. - But, in moral matters, the principles which we shall hand down concerning ignorance can be applied to error, forgetfulness, and inadvertence, with this distinction however, that inadvertence is more easily excused because of the weakness of the human mind.

90. (B) Division. (a) By reason of the object, ignorance is twofold: ignorance of law, when the law itself is unknown, for example if someone does not know that on the vigil of the Assumption fasting must be observed; and ignorance of fact, when someone does not know that the law, otherwise known, must be applied in the case, because, for example, he does not advert that this day is the vigil of the Assumption.[1]

[1] Certain ones besides admit ignorance of the penalty attached to the delict, for example, if someone does not know that the reading of a book defending heresy is punished by excommunication: but this can be referred to ignorance of

law.

91. (b) By reason of the subject, ignorance is: 1) vincible, and therefore culpable, when with moral diligence applied it can and ought to be driven away. The moral diligence of which there is question is not the highest diligence, but that which prudent persons are accustomed to apply in matters of this kind: for this ought to be diverse according to the various circumstances of person, thing, place, etc., nor can it be defined mathematically, but morally from the manner of acting of prudent persons in the same adjuncts. - Moreover, ignorance is not morally called vincible unless when the agent notices or at least suspects the obligation of putting it away, and voluntarily lets go the occasion of inquiring: for of what is unknown there is no desire.

Therefore there can be degrees in vincible ignorance; if someone deliberately wills ignorance, so that he may more freely violate the law, if perhaps it exists, this is called affected ignorance; for example, if someone doubting whether today one must fast does not wish to ask, although he easily can, lest perhaps he become conscious of the obligation of fasting. - But when someone omits due inquiry, not because he wishes to be ignorant of the matter, but from negligence, shame, lightness of soul, or another similar cause, the ignorance is called simply vincible; if no diligence or almost none has been applied, it is called crass or supine.

92. 2. Ignorance is called invincible, and therefore inculpable, when, with moral diligence applied, it cannot be expelled, and *a fortiori* that which is so rooted that not even a suspicion of inquiring arises. If knowledge could in no way have been acquired, the ignorance is absolutely invincible (concerning which, however, there is scarcely question in moral matters); if it could be put away only with difficulty and with extraordinary diligence, it is morally invincible. - Now that today there are many who labor under this ignorance in religious and moral matters, not only among rustics, but also among men otherwise learned in profane matters, those who have given labor to the sacred ministry for some time know very well. And this ignorance indeed is occupied not only with merely positive laws, ecclesiastical or divine, but also with the secondary principles of natural right.

93. (C) Another division, although of lesser moment, is found among theologians, namely into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent ignorance; this, however, is not opposed in its members, but is taken in a diverse way.

1. By reason of the work concerning which it is occupied, ignorance is antecedent when it is truly the cause of the work, so that the agent would not posit the action if he knew the truth; thus the hunter who kills a friend whom he thinks to be a wild animal, and certainly would not have killed him if he had known him to be a friend; - concomitant, when it is not the cause of the work, because the one operating is so disposed that he would posit the action even if he knew the matter: such is the hunter who kills an enemy whom he thinks to be a wild animal, but otherwise would have killed him if he had known.
2. By reason of the will, ignorance is antecedent when it precedes every act of the will, and therefore is altogether invincible, as is ignorance of fasting in him who by no means thinks of

fasting; consequent, which is in some way willed, and consequently vincible, as it exists in him who, thinking about fasting, neglects to inquire concerning it, when he easily can.

2. Principles Concerning the Influence of Ignorance on Free Acts.

94. (A) Ignorance morally invincible, whether actually or in the cause, removes the free, and therefore imputability, concerning that which is unknown. For, by force of the principle that nothing is willed unless previously known, we do not freely will that which we do not know; but that which is invincibly unknown is not known in itself, as is clear, nor even in the cause, since the ignorance is supposed to be invincible, and consequently cannot morally be dispelled.[1]

[1] What is voluntary in itself and in the cause, and also imputability (*responsabilite*), will be set forth more fully where the morality of human acts is treated.

It is said concerning that which is unknown; for it can happen that the one operating perceives some morality of the act, although not the whole: thus one who kills an innocent person whom he does not know to be a priest is not indeed guilty of sacrilege, but of homicide, because he knowingly killed a man unjustly.

On this head, often children and the rude, who do dishonorable things, whose malice they do not well understand, are excused more or less from grave sin according to the degree of ignorance.

95. (B) Ignorance actually vincible does not remove the free, but diminishes it, at least if it is not affected. - It is said actually vincible, that it may be distinguished from ignorance which formerly was vincible, although here and now it is invincible.

(a) The reason for the former is that vincible ignorance, as is clear from the notion itself, supposes at least some cognition or thought concerning the obligation of inquiring; now he who neglects to inquire, when he is bound to do so, by that very fact freely intends, at least confusedly, the effects which are foreseen to follow from his action. Thus, if a hunter discharges a gun at some object, not knowing whether it is a wild animal or a man, he rather freely consents to homicide; if he thinks it is a wild animal, while suspecting it to be a man, he consents less freely, but nevertheless in some degree.

96. (b) The reason for the latter is that something is less free the less knowledge there is of it; but, in our case, there is only confused or probable knowledge, or even mere suspicion; therefore the free and the fault are diminished, and indeed the more so the less the cognition is.

It has been said at least if it is not affected; for more commonly theologians, after St. Thomas,[1] hold that affected ignorance does not diminish, but increases sin, since the agent intends to sin more freely. Yet some deny this with Lugo,[2] because, they say, it is worse to violate a known precept than not to wish to know it in order that it may be violated without remorse: for something of reverence and fear is shown in the second case. - In practice, the matter depends on the intention of the agent at that instant when he does not wish to inquire: if in reality he intends nothing except to sin more freely and boldly, his culpability is not diminished; but if he neglects to inquire from a certain reverence toward the law, which he fears to violate, the fault is diminished.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 76, a. 4.

[2] Lugo, *De Paenitentia*, disp. XVI, n. 183.

97. (C) Ignorance here and now invincible, which nevertheless formerly was vincible, indeed removes the actual free and the free in itself, but leaves the voluntary in the cause.

For it can happen that ignorance was formerly vincible and culpable, without nevertheless being adverted to here and now; suppose, if a confessor has not sufficiently cultivated theology, or has for a long time and culpably interrupted the study of it, he can hand down an erroneous decision to a penitent, without being conscious of this error. In this case he is not free, nor does he incur sin at that instant in which he inadvertently deceives the penitent; but if, while he was studying theology, he was conscious of omitted diligence and foresaw, at least in a confused way, the evil effects that would follow from negligence, by that very fact he willed those effects, more or less freely and culpably according to the degree of cognition; and thus those effects are not actually and in themselves free, but only in the cause.

Hence, if someone has retracted the fault of ignorance formerly committed, by suitable penance and due diligence, he can be equated with one who labors under invincible ignorance.[1] Nevertheless, if even after penance he is ignorant of those things which are necessary for undertaking his office,[2] he ought to abstain from exercising it until he has acquired the necessary knowledge; for by freely exercising an office without competent knowledge, he would commit a new sin.

[1] Gury-Ballerini, t. I, note to n. 37; Bouquillon, nn. 277, 333.

[2] Here it is a question of competent knowledge, not of eminent knowledge, which is found in the most learned; the confessor, judge, physician, etc., who possess the former and use proportionate diligence, can exercise the office without fault, even if sometimes they err.

98. Corollary. Since the will is freer the more perfect cognition is, it is of the greatest interest to acquire true knowledge, especially of those things which are useful for living honorably and religiously. But because knowledge influences the will the more as it occurs more vividly to the agent, frequent reconsideration or meditation of noble things serves not a little for living rightly; for since the will is blind and is illuminated only by the intellect, he who thinks rightly is inclined to acting rightly; and by frequent meditation of honorable things the custom of living honorably is gradually formed.[3] It is likewise very expedient to think seriously concerning the morality of the act in itself and in its effects before we act, so that, with all things carefully weighed, we may choose what is better.

[3] Not only mystics, but also rationalists and positivists have recognized this utility of meditation, such as J. Payot, *Education de la volonte*, Paris, 1904, p. 92-134, and Fouillee, in the cited work, *Les idees-forces*.

II. Concerning the Passions Directly Influencing the Will.

The internal causes which principally move the will are the passions: they indeed influence the intellect, by disturbing the judgment more or less, but besides and especially they add to or diminish the powers of the will, by vehemently impelling it toward good or evil.

[4] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 22-48; q. 6, a. 6-8; Suarez, disp. III; Senault, *De l'usage des Passions*, Paris, 1664; Billuart, *Tr. de Passionibus*, diss. I; idem, *De Actibus hum.*, diss. I, art. 7-8; Meyer, I, n. 119-129; Bouquillon, n. 335-343; Alibert,

Physiologie des Passions, Paris, 1827; Letourneau, *Physiologie des Passions*, Paris, 1868; Belouino, *Des Passions*, Paris, 1883; A. Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*, rendered into French by P. Le Monnier, *Les Emotions et la volonte*, Paris, 1885; Mercier, *Psychologie*, 6th ed., Louvain, 1904, n. 134-137; Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments*, Paris, Alcan.

99. 1. Notion and division of the passions. (A) In a broad sense, passions are called any affections whatsoever of the soul, even merely internal ones. Among the common people, passion denotes any inordinate or excessive propensity of the will: in which sense avarice is called a passion.[1] Philosophically, passions commonly are called affections of the soul which arise from the sensitive appetite with some organic commotion of the body; thus love, hatred, anger, etc., move not only the sensitive appetite, but also the body; for example, the heart is dilated by joy, contracted by sadness.

[1] Certain modern philosophers make this notion their own, such as Rabier, *Psychologie*, 6th ed., Paris, 1898, p. 516.

100. Concerning the division of the passions, which by many moderns are also called emotions, philosophers do not agree.

The more common division is that which St. Thomas hands down, after Aristotle. Eleven are distinguished, six of which look to the concupiscible appetite and pursue delight: love and hatred, desire (or concupiscence) and horror or flight, joy and sadness; but five are referred to the irascible appetite, which tend toward arduous good and toward battle against obstacles: hope and despair, daring and fear (or dread), and also anger, to which there is no contrary.

The reason of the division is this: in man, as in animals, there are two kinds of inclinations, by which we are moved toward sensible good, according as it is simply delightful or arduous. By the concupiscible appetite we tend toward good insofar as it is delightful; namely by love we are inclined toward good, abstracting from whether it is present or absent; by desire we pursue good insofar as absent, and by joy we are delighted in present good; on the contrary, by hatred we absolutely turn away from evil, by horror we flee absent evil, and by sadness we grieve over present evil. But when it is a question of sensible arduous good, which we are able to attain only with strenuous effort, by the irascible appetite we pursue it: if the good, although arduous, is possible to obtain, hope arises; if it appears impossible, despair is born; if it is a question of future evil easily to be fled, daring arises; but if it appears difficult to repel, fear creeps in; finally if a present evil pressing for vengeance is present, anger blazes forth.

Bossuet shows brilliantly how all passions proceed from love and are caused from love;[1] St. Thomas and St. Augustine had already gone before him; for the latter says:[2] "Love longing to have what is loved is cupidity; but having this and enjoying it is gladness; fleeing what is adverse to it is fear; and feeling it if it should happen is sadness."

[1] Bossuet, *Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-meme*, ch. I, n. 6.

[2] St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, lib. XIV, c. 7, apud Migne, P.L. XLI, 410.

101. Other divisions have been proposed by moderns, without nevertheless explaining the matter more clearly. Thus Descartes[3] lists six original passions: admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy, and gladness. According to Hume,[4] there are two species of passions: some direct: desire,

aversion, sadness, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security; others indirect: pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, commiseration, malice, generosity. According to Ribot,[5] there are five original ones, namely fear, anger, sensitive love (*tendresse*), love of oneself, sexual love: from which others are derived by a certain evolution.[6]

[3] Descartes, *Les passions de l'ame*, 2nd part.

[4] Hume, *Tr. on human nature*, B. II, p. I, sect. I.

[5] Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments*, Introduction.

[6] Other divisions are set forth apud A. Bain, op. cit., pp. 68-75 and 568-581.

102. (B) In moral matters, a careful distinction must be made between voluntary and non-voluntary passions. (a) They can be voluntary in a diverse degree: directly and in themselves, 1) when they are deliberately excited, 2) when, having arisen spontaneously, they are freely admitted, 3) when they redound from a vehement voluntary affection; - sometimes they are indeed actually voluntary, but only indirectly, as if someone reads a book from mere curiosity, foreseeing that evil thoughts will arise from it; sometimes they are previously voluntary, but not actually, namely because the cause formerly freely posited has been retracted. (b) They are called involuntary when neither formerly nor actually, neither in themselves nor in the cause, were they willed, but they arise spontaneously either from a fortuitous occasion or from a disposition of the body, without deliberation and consent.

According to the manner of speaking of theologians, passions are called antecedent when they precede the will and allure it to the act; consequent, when they are excited by the will itself, and therefore follow the consent of the will.

103. 2. The influence of the passions on a free act.[7] (A) Antecedent passion indeed increases the intensity of the act, but diminishes the free, and sometimes takes it away.

[7] Concerning this theologians discuss where they treat of concupiscence; for often by this name they designate all the passions of the concupiscible appetite.

(a) The reason for the first assertion is that, under the influence of passion, we apprehend sensible good more vividly, so that it appears greater than before, and our will is borne toward it with a more vehement propensity, as each one can gather from an attentive consideration of himself.

(b) But from this the free is diminished; for liberty is less the more reason is impeded from deliberating quietly and wisely, and the more the will is inclined toward one part; but the antecedent movement of passion more or less disturbs reason and impedes it from considering opposed motives attentively and perseveringly; it also vehemently solicits the will to consenting, and while it increases the powers for pursuing the proposed good, it diminishes not a little the force of resisting.[1] This indeed is established psychologically from the fact that, when the movement of passion has been calmed, the matter is now perceived by reason in a diverse way, and often the will vehemently grieves concerning the consent given.

[1] Which St. James (I, 14) indicates: "But everyone is tempted by his own concupiscence, drawn away and allured."

(c) Indeed sometimes, although rarely, passion is so vehement that it wholly disturbs the mind and impedes the judgment of reason concerning the morality of the act: then the agent is not properly in possession of himself, but for some time is, as it were, insane. Now where no deliberation is present, the action is not truly free.[2] Thus especially in those who suffer from hysteria, as will be said below, or who are inflamed by anger vehemently.

[2] "If concupiscence totally took away cognition, as happens in those who become mad because of concupiscence, it would follow that concupiscence would take away the voluntary." (St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 7, ad 3.)

Usually, however, passion does not wholly take away the use of reason; and then liberty is only diminished. Wherefore, in practice, if penitents say that they could not resist a vehement passion, they must be asked whether they employed means or not for conquering it, and from all the adjuncts it will be judged whether and to what extent they were free and culpable.

104. (B) Consequent passion, which arises from the command of the will, does not diminish the free, but is a sign of intense volition.

(a) The reason for the former is that the passion was freely willed; for example, if someone deliberately recalls an injury done to him so that from this he may conceive anger, he now freely wills to consent to anger.

(b) Indeed such a manner of acting is a sign of intense volition; for someone excites passion in himself for this reason, that he may attain the intended object more efficaciously and vehemently.

Nevertheless it can happen that, once a vehement passion has been excited, the agent is less in possession of himself and proceeds further than he had previously foreseen, for example, that he kills one whom he wished to wound; in which case the aforesaid passion, insofar as it moves to acts not foreseen nor intended, can be called, as it were, antecedent in relation to those acts.

105. Especially concerning fear. (A) Among the passions which disturb the mind and lessen the powers of the will, fear is deservedly numbered; but in moral matters fear is not only a passion, but also a certain spiritual affection, which is customarily defined as trepidation of mind, by reason of an impending or future danger. It arises indeed from the apprehension of an evil perceived by the intellect, but it affects the will, and indeed in a twofold way: it depresses its powers, and at the same time moves it to flee strenuously the imminent evil;[1] wherefore the will, under the influence of fear, often chooses what otherwise it would not have willed; thus a sailor, from fear of shipwreck, casts into the sea those things which otherwise he would have wished to preserve; a sick man, on account of fear of death, chooses the amputation of an arm, although reluctantly.

[1] A. Bain describes the psychological notion, nature, and effects of fear, *Les emotions et la volonte*, p. 147-167.

By reason of intensity, fear is grave or light, according as it disturbs the mind much or not. Generally for grave fear two things are required: apprehension of a grave evil, with a truly probable danger of incurring it; for we do not greatly fear evils which are possible, but not probable. Nevertheless, for judging concerning the gravity of fear, attention must also be given to the character of the person; for evils which move one person only lightly can gravely disturb another; whence in moral matters fear absolutely grave is distinguished, which can seriously disturb even a strong and constant man, such

as fear of death or exile; and fear relatively grave, which, all circumstances of sex, age, character, etc. being considered,

can gravely disturb the person concerning whom there is question. Hence also reverential fear, by which the indignation of parents or superiors is feared, can sometimes be judged grave from the adjuncts. - By reason of influence on the act, fear is called antecedent when it truly is the cause of the act, which consequently is elicited from fear; or concomitant, which is not the cause of the action but nevertheless coexists with it, so that this is done with fear. Thus a traveler who gives his purse to a robber acts from fear of death; but a robber who despoils a traveler sometimes acts with fear lest he be seized by guards.

106. (B) Concerning the influence of fear on a free act. (a) Fear which is so vehement that it altogether disturbs the use of reason takes away the free. For where there is no deliberation on the part of the intellect, there is no liberty; but he who is so vehemently disturbed acts not deliberately but under the influence of a vivid impression. - Yet this rarely happens; for generally fear does not take away every faculty of deliberating, but only impedes it somewhat.

(b) An act posited from fear, even grave fear, does not take away the free, but ordinarily diminishes it. For one operating from fear deliberately chooses the action as a means for avoiding a greater evil and therefore truly wills what he does, although he retains affection toward the opposite; thus the merchant who, from fear of death, throws goods overboard does this freely, although reluctantly, because he deliberately places life before riches.[1]

[1] But when fear excuses from the obligation of observing the law and from sin will be declared below, where we treat concerning Sins, concerning Faith, concerning Contracts, concerning Marriage, etc.

Nevertheless fear diminishes liberty, and indeed the more so the graver it is; for it diminishes the indifference of the will, and moves it toward eliciting what otherwise it would not have chosen. - It is said ordinarily, because sometimes an act begun from grave fear is completed without any repugnance; for example, someone can, from fear of hell, withdraw from an occasion of sin, and afterward altogether freely detest sin.

(c) Light fear, whether in itself or relatively, indeed diminishes the free, but much less than grave fear, since it by no means impedes the use of reason and deliberation; wherefore in the external forum it is not attended to, because a little is reputed as nothing.

107. Concerning the right use of the passions.[1] The passions, considered in themselves, bear nothing dishonorable before them, since they arise from man's sensitive-rational nature, namely from the intimate union of the organic body with the spiritual soul, and moreover were placed in us by the author of nature Himself; in reality they add powers and constancy to human activity, so that a man wholly deprived of these appears, as it were, unarmed, and given over to apathy. Often, however, when they are not rightly ordered, they allure us to sin, against the dictate of reason. Wherefore no less faith than reason commands us to conquer them and subject them to the command of the will: "But they who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with its vices and concupiscences; if we live by the spirit, let us also walk by the spirit."[2] For since reason excels the body and the sensible appetite, the passions ought to obey reason.

[1] Mystics discuss this matter, such as Schram, *Instit. Theologiae mysticae*, Paris, 1868, t. I, § 90; and also philosophers, such as Payot, *L'education de la volonte*, p. 66-108, where he, although a positivist, borrows not a few things from Catholic ascetics; also physicians, such as Descuret, *La medecine des passions*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1860; and Surbled, *La Morale dans ses rapports avec la Medecine*, t. III, p. 16-56.

[2] Galat., V, 24-25.

But the means by which we can rightly order the passions are: (a) immediately and strenuously to turn the mind away from the delightful object which sense or imagination proposes to us, and indeed not only negatively, but also positively, by thinking attentively about an honorable thing and by revolving in the soul those motives of a superior order which dissuade us from dishonorable delights.[3] (b) Carefully to abstain from external acts to which passion provokes, and to exercise contrary acts: for since internal acts of the same kind are excited through external acts, he who externally behaves lasciviously indulges lust much more easily than he who cultivates modesty.[4] (c) To flee external occasions which, from what commonly happens, are accustomed to move the passions;[1] thus the irascible ought to be silent concerning those matters by which they are more easily and vehemently provoked to anger. (d) Finally, the best means is to order the passions to better goods: for since they add powers to the will, the will will profit much if it uses them for pursuing good strenuously. Thus those who are more easily captured by sensible love should turn themselves to Christ, hiding under the Eucharistic species, and sweetly recline in His bosom; let the ambitious promote the glory of God and the salvation of souls with flaming zeal; let the fearful fear not men and their vain judgments, but "Him who can destroy both soul and body in hell";[2] and thus let them prudently flee occasions of sin; let the daring cultivate fortitude; let envy be turned into noble emulation; sadness into penance, and so concerning the rest.

[3] To the point even the agnostic Payot, op. cit., p. 87: "One must even often renounce direct struggle, and for example calm sensual disturbance by getting up, by going out to walk, by going to pay a visit, etc.; in a word, by trying to eliminate the fixed idea, to wear it out, to disturb it, or at least to oblige it to share consciousness with other states introduced thus artificially."

[4] Payot illustrates this thus, op. cit., p. 80: "A desire, a tendency, are absolutely separated from the external world; they can be satisfied only by muscular acts: anger satisfies itself by insults or blows; love by embraces, kisses, caresses; but our muscles depend in large measure on our will: and since we all can momentarily refuse the ministry of our members to a passion, it is clear that we will be able to develop our power and succeed in burying the emotion within ourselves."

[1] More fully concerning these in the moral part of the treatise concerning Penance, n. 451-469.

[2] Matt., X, 28. - Cf. Feuchtersleben, *Hygiene de l'ame*, Paris, 1904, p. 188-247; Senault, op. cit., p. 132-140.

III. Concerning Violence Insofar as It Impedes the Execution of Free Volition.

108. 1. Notion. Besides the causes which act upon the intellect and will, there are those which directly impede the execution of volition and indirectly influence the will itself: such is violence, which is defined as a certain motion impressed from without against the inclination of the will.[4] This is physical violence, and is distinguished from moral violence, which consists in threats, reproaches, and other things of this kind, and falls back into fear: for from these threats arises trepidation of mind. From this it is clear that violence does not properly coerce the will, but falls only upon those acts which can be commanded by the will. Nevertheless it can indirectly influence consent, insofar as the

external act which the agent is forced to effect solicits the consent of the will. Thus, if someone is forced to drink sweet and generous wine, he experiences sensible delight, to which the will is in some way inclined to consent; thus a woman, oppressed by force, falls into the danger of consenting interiorly to pleasure.

[3] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 4-5; Suarez, *De voluntario*, disp. II; Salmanticenses, *De volunt. et involunt.*, disp. V; Billuart, diss. 1, art. 5-6; Frins, *De actibus hum.*, n. 247-280; Bouquillon, n. 344-346; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 67-72.

[4] A few indeed say that violence is present whenever imagination experiences base phantasms, or the appetite suffers movements of inordinate concupiscence, against the inclination of the will; but all these things are better called first-first acts, concerning which above, n. 79.

109. 2. Concerning the influence of violence on free acts. When violence is done to someone, his will can have itself in a diverse way.

(A) If he resists internally and externally, as much as he morally can, the violence is called absolute, and the act so perpetrated is in no way free, nor consequently imputable: such is he whose knees by external force are bent before an idol, and whose hands are moved to offering incense to false gods, against his inclination; or he who is violently forced to sign a contract or testament, against his assent.

110. (B) But if the agent indeed resists externally the force brought upon him, but inwardly consents, the free indeed is diminished, but of itself is not removed.

(a) The free is diminished, for in such a case the mind cannot deliberate quietly, nor is the will left to its own indifference, but is allured to giving consent, and indeed the more vehemently the more vividly the delight is felt which, as it were necessarily, accompanies the external act; whence liberty and imputability are much diminished; such is the case of a woman to whom force is brought.

(b) Yet it is not removed of itself; for, even if the will is powerfully allured, and the mind cannot deliberate so easily, nevertheless, provided the exercise of reason is not wholly impeded, the will can dissent, as St. Anselm[1] excellently notes: "A man can be bound unwillingly, because he can be bound when he is unwilling; he can be tortured... but he cannot will unwillingly, because he cannot will when he is unwilling to will; for everyone willing wills his own willing."

[1] St. Anselm, *De lib. arb.*, c. 5.

111. (C) If the agent outwardly behaves altogether passively, neither consenting nor resisting, although inwardly dissenting, he freely permits the external act, which consequently is imputed to him whenever there is an obligation of resisting.

It can indeed happen that there is an obligation also of resisting externally, whether on account of scandal to be prevented, for example in the cause of faith, or in order to remove an interior danger of consenting, as in the matter of chastity; in which case it is not lawful to behave permissively, as is clear. But if no obligation of this kind is present, external resistance can be judged useless, and therefore not imputable. Wherefore from all the circumstances it must be judged whether the agent has sinned or not.

In practice, when the delight which accompanies the external act is vehement, the obligation falls upon one of resisting externally, insofar as it can be done, lest the will, allured by pleasure, consent interiorly.

§ II. Concerning the Causes Which More Remotely Influence the Internal Act.

The principal ones are: 1. heredity and temperament; 2. education; 3. habit; 4. certain pathological states, in which the exercise of liberty is diminished or removed.

I. Concerning Hereditary Propensions and Temperament.

We comprehend these two together, because what is called temperament is often handed down from the parents themselves, by force of heredity.

1. Concerning Hereditary Propensions.

112. (A) The facts are set forth. All admit that certain propensions are transmitted by heredity, and there is controversy only concerning the extension of this law.

[1] Theologians have few things concerning this matter, especially where they treat concerning the transmission of original sin; thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 1; among moderns, cf. Ribot, *L'hérédité psychologique*, 4th ed., Paris, 1890; M. Guyau, *Education et hérédité*, 4th ed., Paris, 1895; P. Vallet, *La vie et l'hérédité*, Paris, 1891.

Now, although many things concerning this matter are uncertain, generally propensions are handed down more easily and more efficaciously the more nearly they depend upon the organism; thus physical diseases or defects and also bodily qualities are frequently transmitted to descendants, so that certain families are marked for several centuries by certain anatomical and physiological characters;[2] in almost the same way, although not so efficaciously, certain sensitive faculties are handed down, such as keenness in sight, a ready memory, etc.[1] - Mental aptitudes also not rarely pass by heredity from parents to children, although less frequently, such as a special ability for musical art, or for solving mathematical problems.[2] - As regards moral propensions, it seems certain that certain ones likewise are transfused into children, especially those which depend more upon the organism, such as inclinations to anger, drunkenness, vices of the flesh, etc.; in reality, in most regions, examples are alleged of families in which certain virtues or vices were transmitted through many generations.[3]

[2] You have examples in Ribot, p. 3-14; P. Lucas, *Traité philosophique et physiologique de l'hérédité naturelle*, Paris, 1847-1850.

[1] Cf. Ribot, p. 38-64; Darwin, *The descent of man*; in French: *La descendance de l'homme*; H. Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, § 82; in French: *Principes de Biologie*, Paris, Alcan.

[2] Ribot, p. 65-85; Galton, *Hereditary genius*, London, 1869.

[3] Ribot, p. 86-102; Aubry, *La contagion du meurtre*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1894, p. 17-51; R. L. Dugdale, *The Jukes*, New York, where through five generations the history is described of an American family, almost all of whose members publicly indulged in vice.

113. Both parents concur in this transmission of qualities or defects, though not in the same degree: not rarely sons receive the endowments of the mother by heredity, while daughters receive the propensions of the father; nevertheless, for the most part the inclinations of the offspring are

tempered by a certain, as it were, mixture of the qualities of each parent. Sometimes also hereditary transmission is not immediate, but mediate, namely from grandparents to grandchildren; in which case it is called atavism.[4]

[4] Ribot expounds the laws of hereditary transmission known hitherto, p. 157-262.

It is indeed easily understood how physical endowments are handed down together with bodily substance and blood; but others pass into offspring mediately, on account of the intimate and substantial union of body and soul, from which it happens that the physical organism, and especially the nerves and brain, have the greatest influence upon the senses both external and internal, and, through the mediation of the senses, upon the intellect and will.[5]

[5] St. Thomas declares this, Ia, q. 118, a. 1-2 and q. 119, a. 1-2, ad 2, where among other things he has these words: "The assimilation of the generator to the generated does not take place on account of matter, but on account of the form of the agent, which generates something like itself. Whence it is not necessary, in order that someone be assimilated to his grandfather, that the bodily matter of the seed have been in the grandfather, but that there be in the seed some power derived from the grandfather through the mediation of the father." And elsewhere, *Quaest. disp., De Pot.*, q. III, a. 9, ad 7: "It must be said that the very disposition of the body is followed by the disposition of the rational soul, both because the rational soul receives from the body, and because according to the diversity of matter forms also are diversified." Cf. P. Vallet, op. cit., p. 315-334. - Ribot lists and weighs various hypotheses for explaining hereditary transmission, p. 385-409.

114. (B) Concerning the influence of heredity on liberty. (a) Not a few modern determinists contend that by the law of heredity liberty is destroyed: for, on the one hand, propensions are handed down into children without their consent, and on the other hand, it is morally impossible to resist these; to prove this, they bring forward certain examples of families in which vice seems to have been hereditary through several generations.

Yet this is opposed no less to historical facts than to the testimony of conscience. We indeed admit that free will is diminished by hereditary propensions, insofar as reason is darkened by them and the power of the will is in some way weakened, according as we have said concerning the passions to which hereditary inclinations can be assimilated. Nor do we deny that sometimes from vicious parents a certain species of madness is handed down, which wholly takes away liberty. But as often as the use of reason remains, by that very fact there remains the power of deliberating and choosing. This is evident historically; for, even in those families which seem given over to vice, children are found who live rightly,[1] especially when they have obtained a good education; while conversely among very honorable families there are found children who act basely. - Besides, even when propensions of this kind press urgently, some consent to them, while others resist them; indeed one and the same man sometimes allows himself to be overcome, but at other times strenuously resists; therefore even psychologically it is evident that liberty is not wholly extinguished.[2]

[1] You have examples in Aubry, op. cit., pp. 42, 48, 50.

[2] Ribot admits this (op. cit., p. 324), at least for many cases: "The first case is that in which inherited tendencies do not have an irresistible character. Man, inheriting modes of feeling and thinking from his fathers, is solicited to will and consequently to act as they did. This heredity of impulses and tendencies constitutes for him an order of internal influences in the midst of which he lives, but which he has the faculty of judging and conquering. They no more entail than other internal or external circumstances the suppression, the annihilation of the personal factor (whatever its nature may be), the irresistible necessity of acts." - Afterward, however, he adds that in certain cases those propensions

are irresistible; yet this does not occur except when the exercise of reason is suspended. - Cf. Guyau, op. cit., pp. 16-32 and 70-80, where he shows that hereditary propensions can be reformed through education.

115. (b) Nevertheless, since liberty is attenuated by these things and is inclined toward evil, those who have received depraved inclinations from their parents are to be received with great kindness, and gently exhorted that by diligent and constant effort they strive to conquer them, using the means described above, where we treated concerning the passions. - Moreover, where it is a question of the choice of a state of life which requires special virtues, directors of souls ought to attend to these propensions; thus the Church does not readily enroll illegitimate sons in the priesthood, lest they imitate paternal incontinence; the same can be said of the sons of drunkards, who not rarely are vehemently inclined to drunkenness.

2. Concerning Temperament and Moral Character.

116. (A) Notion. The complex of those propensions which, whether from heredity or from the organism proper to each one, belong to some individual and constitute his special disposition is called temperament. But native dispositions of this kind are in some way changed by education, external circumstances, and one's own efforts. From this arises character, or the complex of native propensions insofar as they have been changed by education or by one's own will, and have acquired some stability. - Sometimes, however, temperament and character are taken promiscuously.[2]

[1] As regards ancient systems, cf. Debreyne-Ferrand, *La Théologie morale et les sciences médicales*, Paris, 1884, p. 9-46; as regards new systems, cf. Fouillée, *Tempérament et Caractères*, Paris, 1895; Paulhan, *Les Caractères*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1902; Malapert, *Les éléments du caractère et leurs lois de combinaison*, Paris, 1897; E. Ledos, *Traité de la Physionomie humaine*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1904, t. I, p. 85-161.

[2] Not rarely also temperament designates something physiological, and character something psychological.

Physiologists and moralists by no means agree concerning the species of temperaments. Formerly four were distinguished, according to the four principal elements of the human body, namely: the sanguine, in which the sanguine system prevailed; the nervous, where the nerves dominated; the bilious, in which bile had more force; the lymphatic, or phlegmatic, where the watery part of the blood principally existed. But modern physiology has rejected this division, as lacking a foundation; hitherto, however, no other scientific foundation could be found.

117. Yet commonly enough four principal temperaments are distinguished, which, as regards psychological marks, very nearly approach the division given above. For among men, some are more sensitive, because they feel more vividly, and others more active, because they react more vehemently to sensations. Again, among the former, some excel by abundance of blood, others by organization of the nerves; among the latter, some act more promptly and intensely, as the choleric, others only slowly and weakly, as the phlegmatic. Therefore four temperaments are distinguished:[1]

[1] Thus Fouillée, op. cit., p. 3-80; Paulhan proposes another division, op. cit.

(a) Those who are sensitive and sanguine feel promptly and vividly, but not intensely and perseveringly; wherefore they are very unstable; they easily sin and conceive contrition, but, forgetful

of promises, soon fall into sin. Among these are numbered Mark Antony, Louis XIV, Mirabeau, etc.

(b) Those who are sensitive and nervous feel much more intensely and lastingly; therefore in them the passions, whether they are ordered to good or to evil, are much more vehement; and thus their moral character depends especially upon the object toward which they turn themselves; they likewise have some instability, arising from the various emotions to which they are given: such were Voltaire and Frederick, king of Prussia. Sometimes they become melancholic, when they cannot attain the ideal perfection which they pursue: thus Pascal.

(c) The choleric act not only intensely but perseveringly and with the greatest force; they are ambitious, they wish to dominate others and to obtain glory in whatever way: such were Caesar, Cromwell, Napoleon.

(d) The phlegmatic act more coldly and slowly, but with great strength and unconquered constancy; thus many Dutchmen, but especially, among them, William, duke of Holland, who became king of England.

These four kinds, however, are often found mixed in one and the same individual, and indeed in various degrees.

118. (B) The influence of temperament on liberty. Concerning this Aquinas had already said:[2] "The soul rules the body and resists the passions which follow temperament; for from temperament some are more apt than others for concupiscences or angers; yet they abstain from them more, on account of something restraining them, as is clear in the continent." - In reality it is historically evident that there were not a few who, by temperament prone to anger, became most gentle, as St. Francis de Sales; others, inclined to ambition, became humble and full of zeal for souls, as is clear in the example of St. Francis Xavier. - This is proved no less evidently by experience; for one and the same man often acts according to his character, but sometimes against the same;[3] moreover, temperament is not rarely changed by education, so that some of those who at first excelled in sensibility afterward rejoice in the greatest activity.

[2] *Sum. Cont. Gentil.*, lib. II, cap. 63.

[3] Whence not rarely it is said concerning some action: "it is contrary to his character."

Therefore, if by temperament the exercise of free will is often diminished, it is not wholly removed. But educators and confessors should strive with all their strength to help the younger, so that whatever is good in their character they may assiduously cultivate, and whatever is evil they may correct by contrary acts, as was said where we treated concerning the passions.[1] - Moreover, some psychological notion of the various kinds of character is especially useful to confessors, so that they may more safely direct their penitents to the practice of virtues: the sanguine are to be persuaded to accomplish all things more deliberately and constantly, lest, moved by a passing ardor, they undertake something above their strength, and afterward, cast down in spirit, fall into despair; the nervous and the choleric are to be moderated, lest, through excessive ardor, they indulge excesses, but especially are to be admonished to turn their passions to a good end; the melancholic need consolation, lest they be oppressed by sadness and despair; the phlegmatic are to be stirred up, lest, made sleepy, they become sluggish and lax.

[1] Concerning this see also A. Martin, *L'Education du caractère*, Paris, 1889.

II. Concerning Education Insofar as It Influences Liberty.

119. Hereditary propensions and natural inclinations, which arise from temperament and are strengthened from character, are greatly increased or diminished by education. For the soul of the young is like soft wax, which easily receives external impressions and retains them in itself.

[2] Dupanloup, *De l'Education*, 7th ed., Paris, 1866, t. I, p. 89-402; t. II, p. 108-484 and p. 547-599; Martin, *Educ. du caractère*, p. 126-365; cf. Marion, *Leçons de Psychologie appliquée à l'éducation*, 8th ed., Paris, 1895; H. Spencer, *Education*, New York, 1885; in French, *De l'Education*, 7th ed., Paris, 1888.

Now the young are instructed not only by parents and teachers, but also by all with whom they converse, and by society itself: for civil laws bend minds toward that which they prescribe; if they favor drunkenness, divorce, and other vices, by that very fact they induce many to those sins; but conversely, if vices are punished by proportionate penalties, not a few are deterred from them through fear of just chastisement.

120. Education influences free will especially in a threefold way: by inculcating principles, by presenting example, and by exciting passions.

1. By inculcating principles. For since, from what has been said, the will does not act unless illuminated and moved by the intellect, he who can inspire ideas and emotions by that very fact bends the will. It is evident by experience how much prejudices vividly impressed on the minds of the young avail, especially in religious and moral matters; thus certain persons, among Protestants and socialists, have been so imbued from childhood with prejudices against Catholics that they judge them guilty of any crime whatsoever, and therefore pursue them with contempt and hatred; likewise not a few, among anarchists, are persuaded that nothing is more useful to social order than to plunder the goods of the rich. But others, on account of a defect of moral education, labor under ignorance even concerning certain precepts of the natural law, and acts evil in themselves are perpetrated in good faith.

Now, in these or similar cases, in order to judge whether acts evil in themselves can be called free and imputable or not, the principles set forth above concerning ignorance and error, n. 94-98, must be applied. In other respects one must deal more mildly with these persons, so that, by a kind and sincere exposition of the truth, prejudices may be dispelled and the will turned toward better things.

121. 2. By presenting example. Examples influence liberty in a twofold way: indirectly, by gradually inducing the intellect to approve that which is done by many, especially by those who shine with some authority; directly, by drawing the consent of the will, because, as the adage has it, words move, examples draw: for men, especially the young, by a certain natural propension desire to imitate what they see done by others. Thus not a few boys, otherwise of a good disposition, are often induced by the examples of older persons to blaspheme, steal, or act immodestly; likewise, in prisons where young men and adults are enclosed promiscuously, most come out worse than they were before, because by the words and examples of others they have been enticed to many vices.

By all these things, certainly, the power of maturely deliberating or of freely acting is diminished, but it is not extinguished. Wherefore those who, deceived and seduced by depraved examples, have

indulged in vice are partly to be excused; and one must strive with all one's strength that, having left evil companions, they frequent others stable in good, by whose conversation and example they may return to better things.

122. 3. By exciting or moderating the passions. For just as by the best education the passions are moderated and directed toward good, so likewise by evil education they are excited and carried toward evil. Thus, for example, those who receive and read books in which whatever is true, beautiful, and good is extolled much more easily turn their passions to the practice of virtue; on the contrary, if books of love-affairs are given them to read, in which vices are vividly described, their curiosity is excited, desires are inflamed, and the way is prepared for lust.

Here, therefore, the principles given above concerning the passions, n. 103-104, must be applied; these for the most part do not remove liberty, but diminish it.

III. Concerning Habits Insofar as They Influence a Free Act.

123. 1. Notion. Besides temperament and education, natural habits influence liberty; for since they are acquired by repeated acts, they increase the inclination to performing similar acts. - Here we treat only of natural habits, which are acquired by repeated acts, and not of supernatural habits, which are divinely infused; and indeed insofar as they affect a free act.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 49-54; Suarez, *Disput. metaphysicae*, disp. XLIV; Meyer, t. I, n. 130-139; Bouquillon, n. 338; *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clergé*, XXI, 1899, p. 529-593, 673 sq.; Rabier, *Psychologie*, p. 571-587; F. Ravaisson, *De l'habitude* (thesis), Paris, 1838.

In this sense, habit is defined as a constant inclination acquired by repeated acts for producing similar acts. Already by the first act a certain initial facility is acquired for repeating the same; but when the same acts are often repeated, at a short interval, with attention and with a propension of the will, especially if it is a question of a delightful thing, soon a vehement inclination is formed and rooted; and this not rarely is acquired and strengthened much more easily by the law of ancestral heredity, concerning which above. This inclination is added to various faculties, and therefore can affect not only the sensitive appetite, but also the intellect and the will.

In moral matters one must carefully distinguish between voluntary and involuntary habit. (a) When a habit has been knowingly and freely acquired and has not been efficaciously retracted,[1] it can be called actually voluntary; indeed, if it had been acquired inadvertently, it becomes actually voluntary when it has not been retracted after the agent became conscious of this habit. (b) When an inclination was acquired inadvertently and retracted as soon as the operator was conscious of it, it must be called altogether involuntary. (c) If it was acquired or retained advertently, but afterward efficaciously retracted, it is called antecedently voluntary and actually involuntary, nor is it morally imputed to the agent.

[1] It is efficaciously retracted when means apt for overcoming the custom are applied, even if it is not immediately conquered.

124. 2. Concerning the influence of habits on liberty. (A) What is done from a voluntary habit, not yet retracted, is free and imputable: in itself indeed, if the habit is actually voluntary; in the cause, if it is antecedently voluntary.

(a) For he who actually wills to retain a habit of which he is conscious by that very fact freely wills frequently to elicit the acts which he foresees will naturally follow from that habit; otherwise he would retract the habit.

(b) But if he does not actually will positively to retain the habit, but formerly freely acquired it, without ever having retracted it, the acts which proceed from the habit can be called voluntary in the cause, insofar as the agent, by freely acquiring the inclination, by that very fact freely willed the effects which he foresaw would follow from it. But, as we noted above, n. 97, the free in the cause is less imputable than the free in act.

(c) Indeed, a habit actually willed increases the voluntary, and consequently merit or demerit; for he who is conscious of some habit, good or evil, and positively wills to retain it, by that very fact shows how vehemently he intends the acts proceeding from the habit; for knowing that they arise from the habit frequently and intensively, he nevertheless wills to retain the habit, and therefore intends this frequency and intensity.

125. (B) What is done from an involuntary or efficaciously retracted habit is less free and imputable.

For, on the one hand, the habit itself is not voluntary, and on the other hand, it so impedes the deliberation of reason and allures the will that it weakens its powers and greatly diminishes liberty. - Indeed, sometimes the habit is so vehement that, when it bursts forth into act, it anticipates the judgment of reason and free consent, especially if it affects the executive powers, as is evident in the example of those who utter blasphemous formulas without any deliberation. Not rarely also custom has sent down the deepest roots, so that, even if it does not wholly remove the use of reason, nevertheless it takes away that degree of liberty which is required for grave sin, as can be seen among certain drunkards who, even after the habit has been retracted, are impelled to drinking by a propension almost invincible.

Wherefore, where habit prevails, it must be morally judged from all the adjuncts how great a degree of liberty remains in the agent.

126. 3. Concerning the manner of acting with regard to habits. From this it is given to understand of how great importance it is to acquire good habits and to eradicate evil ones. For by custom the powers of the will are increased a hundredfold, and acts are performed more promptly, more easily, more perfectly, and more delightfully, and thus the way is prepared for true and constant progress: for with less effort a greater effect is produced.[1] Those, therefore, who have obtained the custom of piety and virtue walk expeditiously in the ways of the Lord and ascend the arduous paths of perfection with a great heart; but those who have formed depraved habits fall easily into sins, undergo the tyranny of the passions, and can return to the practice of virtue only with difficulty and by heroic efforts.

[1] Concerning the utility of habit A. Lemoine says, apud Rabier, *Psychol.*, p. 587: "If it were necessary for the will always to make the same efforts to direct the movements of the members, if no trace remained today of yesterday's exercise, man would not walk; he would scarcely drag himself along like a child of tender age. He would not speak, he would stammer. He would see without looking, he would learn without ever knowing. If it were necessary for him always to conquer the same resistance of instincts and passions without passion losing its force, without that of the will increasing, the most valiant man would soon be at the end of moral energy; he would succumb in this struggle ceaselessly renewed, and virtue would be only a word. It is thanks to habit that man can run instead of crawl, that the sciences are constituted and enriched; that virtue is acquired, that in all things progress is accomplished. In proportion as the act no longer requires, in order to be repeated, anything but a simple effort, the surplus of power, which the cause does not expend in order to reproduce it, becomes in some way available for new and superior efforts."

Happy, therefore, are those who, already from childhood, learn to cultivate, by repeated acts, honesty, piety, abnegation of oneself, charity toward others, and the other virtues!

But if depraved habits have already sent down deep roots, nevertheless one must not despair: custom is conquered by custom. In order that a depraved custom may be conquered more efficaciously, (a) there ought to go before it attentive consideration or meditation on all the motives which ought to move us to eradicate it completely; (b) when the evil inclination urges, we ought to divert the mind to other things, and, if an external occasion is present, immediately flee it and direct our whole attention to something honorable; (c) we ought to apply the means described above, n. 107, for overcoming the passions.[1]

[1] Payot, op. cit., p. 200-222, after ascetics, explains how especially sensuality and pleasure can be conquered by the young.

IV. Concerning Pathological States Which Influence Liberty.

127. On account of the intimate connection between body and soul, there are certain pathological states in which liberty is diminished or removed. All states of this kind directly affect the nervous system, and indirectly the will. Among these we shall treat: 1. concerning abulia and invincible propension, which in the state of wakefulness especially harm liberty; 2. concerning neurasthenia, hysteria, and epilepsy, which in the same state harm liberty less; 3. concerning hypnotic sleep and suggestion.

[2] Ribot, *Les maladies de la volonté*, 18th ed., Paris, 1904; translated into English by Fitzgerald, *The diseases of the will*; more briefly Rauh and Revault, *Psychologie appliquée à la Morale*, Paris, 1900, p. 282-286.

1. Concerning Abulia and Invincible Propension.

128. (A) Abulia (lack of will) consists in a certain incapacity of efficaciously willing what is desired. Positivists infer that this is a disease of the will itself from the fact that it is found in men otherwise apparently sound and robust, who by their own initiative cannot or will not will what otherwise they desire and are able to accomplish. But from these facts this conclusion cannot be drawn; for even in those who seem sound, a disease of the nerves or brain can lie hidden. Wherefore all those who admit the spirituality of the soul teach that abulia arises from a certain pathological state of the body, by force of which the organs are not in that condition in which the will can expeditiously exercise its operations.

Sometimes this impotence is universal; sometimes it is limited to certain acts or certain times.[1]

[1] Ribot reports many examples of abulia, op. cit., p. 38-59.

Nothing certain is known concerning the cause of this disease;[2] but those incur the danger of falling into it who more promptly and easily, without sufficient reason, abdicate their own will and show themselves sluggish; or who abuse soporific medicines, for example opium.[3]

[2] Ribot gives a physiological explanation, p. 50-56.

[3] In this way the very well-known T. de Quincey had fallen into abulia; cf. Ribot, p. 40-43; T. Quincey, *Confessions of an opium-eater*.

Whatever the case, when the disease has prevailed, liberty is much diminished, and sometimes it seems to be removed at least as regards certain acts; and therefore the omission of acts which are prescribed is, in itself, either little free or in no way free; but it is free in the cause when someone knowingly and freely has induced this state by his own fault. - Nor is such a disposition altogether incurable; for, with relatives and friends helping, those who labor under abulia begin to will and execute easier things, and step by step more difficult things also, provided they are persuaded that this is not arduous.[4]

[4] Ollé-Laprune, *Le prix de la vie*, Paris, 1896, ch. 24, p. 304-317.

129. (B) Vehement and invincible propension.[5] Here there is question of those propensions which, by an almost unavoidable motion, impel someone to doing that which otherwise he abhors. Sometimes certain persons are so suddenly and vehemently pressed by these impulses that they are not conscious of the things which are perpetrated; but others are conscious of this violent propension and flee to friends so that, being imprisoned or bound by them, they may be able to avoid the evil action to which they are impelled.[6] Thus certain persons are carried unwillingly to suicide, homicide, theft, drunkenness, during the whole time in which the crisis endures, and afterward, when the crisis has been overcome, they detest all these things and become masters of themselves.

[5] Ribot, op. cit., p. 73-95.

[6] "These irresistible impulses are, some unconscious, sudden, followed by immediate execution, without the subject having even had time to take knowledge of them, without his being informed of his action either before or after; the others are fully conscious: the sick person feels that he is no longer master of himself, that he is dominated by an interior force, invincibly pushed to commit acts which he reproves and of which he has horror. A young man adores his mother and is haunted by the idea of killing her; to prevent himself from executing his atrocious desire, he is obliged to beg that he be tied in the barn like a wolf." (Rauh and Revault, op. cit., p. 283).

Whence from all the adjuncts it must be judged whether, in these cases, liberty is only diminished or is removed. In practice, however, as soon as someone is conscious that a crisis is occurring, he ought to ask friends to take care that the invincible propension not pass into act. - Moreover all those things by which propensions of this kind can be induced ought carefully to be avoided.

2. Concerning Neurasthenia, Hysteria, and Epilepsy.

130. (A) Neurasthenia is a certain pathological state in which the nerves appear weakened and exhausted, so that the agent, although master of himself, labors under the greatest inconstancy and is much depressed physically and mentally. Generally a state of this kind is caused by various excesses, whether by working too much, or by indulging pleasures, or by abusing

certain narcotic medicines;[1] sometimes, however, it is transmitted by heredity. It affects the whole body, and therefore can be called not so much a disease as a cohort of diseases.

[1] "All the passions, or even excessive sentiments, are capable of bringing on neurasthenia; whether it is love or ambition or filial affection, or again cupidity, which comes into play, it will suffice that their development be hindered for a consequent neurasthenic state to declare itself. In the intellectual sphere, all excesses of work can be incriminated, and, if moral preoccupations are joined to it, which is not rare, the combination of the two orders of causes will bring on neurasthenia still more easily." (Dr. Block, cited by H. Vigouroux, *Traité de Médecine*, t. III, p. 125.)

From this weakness of the nerves the will becomes very infirm and unstable, unfit for strongly resisting evil propensions; wherefore liberty is diminished, though not removed. - Besides physical medicines, which physicians prescribe, spiritual remedies are of much profit, such as confidence in God,[1] a firm will and hope of repelling this disease, moderation in acting, a quiet life far from the tumult of cities, the society of friends who are able gently to console the sick person and often strongly to exhort him to acting well and quietly.

[1] This is candidly acknowledged by a man otherwise unbelieving, who wrote concerning nervous diseases: "Religious faith could be the best preservative against these maladies of the soul and the most powerful means for curing it, if it were living enough to create in its adherents a true Christian stoicism. In this state of soul, alas! so rare in right-thinking circles, man becomes invulnerable. Feeling himself supported by his God, he fears neither sickness nor death. He can succumb under the blows of a physical disease, but morally he remains standing in the midst of suffering; he is inaccessible to the pusillanimous emotions of neuroses." Dubois, *Les Psychonévroses et leur traitement moral*, Paris (Masson), 1904, p. 245-246; in the same place various therapeutic and moral means for curing those diseases are described; cf. Feuchtersleben, *Hygiène de l'âme*, Paris (Baillière), 1904, p. 147.

131. (B) Hysteria (from the Greek word *hystera*, uterus, because formerly this was thought to be a disease of the uterus) is also a disordering of the nervous system, but much graver than neurasthenia; it consists especially in this, that the sensibility of the nerves is diminished or for a time extinguished in certain parts of the body (anesthesia), while in others it is rendered much more intense (hyperesthesia). This irritability of the nerves changes the whole nature of hysterical persons, disturbs the mind, weakens the will, and opens the way to hallucinations: they vividly represent to themselves phantasms, which induce a state akin to ecstasy or somnambulism. Prone to diverse and contrary affections, and laboring under the greatest inconstancy, they pass immediately from laughter to tears, from love to hatred. Often they have recourse to lying: they simulate sentiments of soul which they do not have, piety, and imaginary visions; sometimes they falsely affirm that force has been brought upon them by a person whose name they reveal, describing the minute circumstances of the crime, and on that account they excite discords and scandals. Not rarely they are prone to theft, and they easily steal whatever pleases them. - Therefore let priests beware lest they be deceived by these persons.

Not only women, but also men can incur hysteria: a soft life, abstinence from physical exercises, the reading of romantic books which excite the imagination and disturb the heart, premature and excessive study, lustful excesses, in one word whatever induces physical debilitation and agitates the nervous system, disposes one toward it. - There are various degrees of hysteria and various stages, which are described by physiologists; sometimes the disease grows stronger and reaches a paroxysm,[1] which by physicians is commonly called great hysteria (*la grande hystérie*).

[1] P. Richer, *Etudes cliniques sur l'hystéro-épilepsie*; Axenfeld and Huchard, *Traité des névroses*, p. 967-1012; Ribot, op. cit., p. 115-125; Surbled, op. cit., t. IV, p. 72-78; Antonelli, *Medicina Pastoralis*, Rome, 1905, t. I, n. 436-449. - Physiologically hysteria is described thus: "Hysteria is a neurosis with numerous and varied manifestations. The three principal ones are: the sensation of a ball which starts from the belly and rises back to the throat, where it determines a feeling of constriction; nervous attacks accompanied by cries, by loss of consciousness; anesthesias or partial paralyses." (Vigouroux, op. cit., p. 95). - Psychologically it is described thus by Huchard, apud Ribot, p. 117: "Their character changes like the views of a kaleidoscope, which could make Sydenham say with reason that what is most constant among them is their inconstancy. Yesterday they were playful, amiable, and gracious; today they are in a bad humor, susceptible and irascible, growing angry at anything and nothing, gloomy and sulky by caprice, discontented with their lot; nothing interests them, they are bored with everything. They experience a very great antipathy against a person whom yesterday they loved and esteemed, or on the contrary manifest an incomprehensible sympathy for another... Sometimes their sensibility is exalted by the most futile motives, while it is scarcely touched by the greatest emotions... By turns gentle and violent, beneficent and cruel, impressionable to excess, rarely mistresses of their first movement, incapable of resisting impulses of the most opposed nature, presenting a defect of equilibrium between the superior moral faculties, the will, the conscience, and the inferior faculties, instincts, passions, and desires."

It is very difficult to define whether and in what degree hysterical persons remain free. Whence, in practice, only from all the circumstances, and from the declaration of the hysterical persons themselves (to which, however, one must not entirely give trust), can it probably be known what liberty remains in them. - Remedies are of two kinds: physical, which a wise[2] physician will prescribe, for example physical exercises, assiduous labor, although moderate; and spiritual, especially a sufficiently constant effort for at once restraining vain phantasms and bridling the passions, while hysterical persons are masters of themselves.

[2] I say wise; for, since hysterical persons fall into hypnotic sleep more easily than others, certain physicians, for the sake of experiment, hypnotize them and often render their condition worse.

132. (C) The epileptic disease is likewise a certain disordering of the nerves which, with longer intervals interposed, induces a crisis of greater or lesser duration, in which the sick person is not master of himself. Now, among epileptics, there are some who do nothing morally evil; but there are others who are vehemently impelled toward something dishonorable, for example toward inflicting injuries on others, toward stealing, toward blaspheming, or toward speaking or acting basely, without retaining any memory of all these things. In which case they are not free;[1] nor can the offenses thus perpetrated be imputed to them, provided they are not voluntary in the cause.

[1] "Some sick persons suddenly begin to utter incoherent words, coarse words, insults against the persons who surround them. Others commit acts of brutality, strike persons, break objects. Under the influence of the impulse, the epileptic is capable of wounding, of killing the persons who approach him; and he is all the more terrible because his vigor, in those moments, is prodigious, and because he strikes with remarkable sureness... After a few moments the sick person comes back to himself, retaining no memory of what happened." (Féré, *L'épilepsie*, p. 51-52). Cf. Surbled, op. cit., p. 78-82.

3. Concerning Hypnotic Sleep and Suggestion.

133. To these pathological states must be added hypnotic sleep, while which endures commands are suggested to be fulfilled either at once or after some interval.

[2] Charcot, *Leçons sur les maladies du système nerveux*, Paris, 1887; and *Oeuvres complètes*, t. V; P. Richer, *Etudes cliniques sur la grande hystérie*, Paris, 1885; Bernheim, *De la suggestion et de ses applications à la thérapeutique*, Paris, 1886; A. Moll, *Der*

hypnotismus, a work rendered into English as *Hypnotism*, 1893; E. Morselli, *Il magnetismo animale, la fascinazione e gli stati ipnotici*; Coconnier, *L'hypnotisme franc*, Paris, 1897; Grasset, *L'hypnotisme et la suggestion*, Paris (Doin), 1903. - You will find a brief synopsis in Lelong, *La vérité sur l'hypnotisme*, and Guibert, *Etude sur l'hypnotisme*, Paris, Retaux, s. d.; Tanquerey, *Synop. Theol. Dogmat., De Deo Creante*, n. 108-115.

(A) The facts are described. Hypnotic sleep is induced by various means, by command of the voice, by the gaze of the eyes, by the handling of the hands, especially by pressing zones which are called hypnogenic, or even by simple mental suggestion. Generally it is asserted that no one, in the state of wakefulness, can be hypnotized unless he has first given consent at least implicitly; but natural sleep can be changed into hypnotic sleep without the consent of the sleeper. Not all can be hypnotized, but many can, and not only women but also men, especially those who are weak in will or labor under a nervous disease.

The phenomena of hypnotism are distinguished into three kinds: somatic, intellectual, or mixed. (a) The first are so called because they especially affect the body (*soma*): catalepsy, lethargy, and somnambulism. In the cataleptic state, the body remains immobile, like a statue, and preserves that manner of bearing itself which is impressed upon it; it appears altogether inert and insensible. In the lethargic state, the eyes previously closed are opened and turn themselves almost necessarily toward the hypnotizer; the members acquire, as it were, waxen flexibility. If some motion is impressed upon the members, the hypnotized person performs or completes the same; thus if the hands are joined, as generally happens at the time of prayer, the whole body behaves just as if the mind were vacant for contemplation. Finally, in the state of somnambulism, the hypnotized person seems to be, as it were, awakened from sleep: he hears, sees, speaks, and acts; but he is not master of himself, for he obeys almost absolutely the command of the hypnotizer.

(b) In the intellectual order, the principal phenomenon is mental suggestion, which can happen especially in the state of somnambulism. Namely, the hypnotized person hears and executes all those things which are suggested and commanded by the hypnotizer; for example, he sees or does not see an object truly present in the room, at the nod of the hypnotizer; if the latter has ordered that a theft be committed, at first indeed he resists, but for the most part, conquered by the stronger will, the theft is perpetrated. Indeed, suggestions to be executed after a week or a month he faithfully fulfills at the appointed time.

(c) Mixed phenomena are called those which are produced in the body through the mediation of the imagination; for example, a bloody sweat, which someone suffers at the suggestion of the hypnotizer.

134. The cause of these facts is assigned diversely by diverse authors.[1] Many explain them through a certain analogy with natural sleep. For very often it happens to those sleeping that they take imaginary likenesses of things, which are represented in their phantasy, as real, and perform various acts under their influence; and this indeed proceeds from the fact that reason, in order to judge rightly concerning the truth of things, lacks the perception of the senses which is necessary to it. Now he who permits himself to be hypnotized by another submits himself to his command; in his phantasy he vividly perceives likenesses of things which are suggested by him, and, judging them to be real, acts in the same way as if he truly perceived the things themselves.[2]

[1] Cf. Wundt, *Hypnotisme et suggestion*, translated from the German by Keller, Paris, 1902.

[2] Coconnier explains this happily, op. cit., p. 347-380.

135. (B) Concerning the liberty of the hypnotized person.[1] (a) It is certain and admitted by all that the exercise of liberty is much diminished by hypnotic sleep and suggestion; indeed, according to all, it is almost entirely removed as long as the sleep endures; for if an honorable person first resists the suggestion of stealing something, this happens by force of a habit previously acquired; but if the hypnotizer orders the same thing again and again, soon the theft is carried out; therefore that liberty which suffices for moral imputability does not remain.

[1] Concerning this see J. Liégeois, *De la suggestion et du somnambulisme*, Paris (Doin), 1889, n. 507-575; Gilles de la Tourette, *L'Hypnotisme*, Paris (Plon), 1889; Mercier, *Psychologie*, 1904, n. 203.

(b) But if it is a question of a suggestion to be fulfilled afterward, in the state of wakefulness, the Parisian school contends that liberty is not wholly removed but only diminished; while, according to the school of Nancy, even in this case the hypnotized person cannot morally resist the suggestion. Wherefore, in practice, he must be interrogated carefully and cautiously, so that, from his own testimony, it can be discerned whether and to what extent he was free in performing the action.

(c) From this it is clear that the evil actions which the hypnotized person perpetrates are sometimes free in the cause, namely when he freely abdicated his own will and gave consent to hypnotic sleep, foreseeing that actions of this kind were to be suggested. - For this reason the use of hypnotism cannot be permitted indiscriminately, but only for most grave reasons, and with precautions applied lest anything morally evil be able to occur, as will be explained below, n. 916.

Conclusion of the Whole Chapter: Concerning the Education of the Will.

136. Since liberty is a necessary condition for acting morally and meritoriously, and otherwise one of the noblest faculties, it is of the greatest importance to fortify and strengthen it against various impediments. The principal means for attaining this are these:

(a) To cultivate reason rightly; for since this especially influences the free act, whatever perfects the intellect by that very fact strengthens the will. For ideas have the greatest force for exciting desires; and these tend toward action.[2] Wherefore, if we conceive honorable, noble, and Christian ideas, and do not dwell upon them perfunctorily, but assiduously and attentively, by that very fact we vehemently desire and strenuously strive to accomplish good. But conversely error and ignorance, together with prejudices imbibed from whatever source, are to be carefully dispelled by the study and meditation of truths which greatly help toward rightly informing morals. Inadvertence and lightness of soul are to be corrected by the custom of doing nothing except on account of an honorable, indeed also supernatural, motive seriously considered: therefore one must think before acting, so that all things may be done not from blind impulse, but deliberately.

[2] Cf. Dr. P. E. Lévy, *L'éducation rationnelle de la volonté*, 4th ed., Paris, Alcan, 1904, p. 22-57; Payot, *Education de la volonté*, p. 35-45 and 66-127.

(b) To moderate the passions and direct them toward good; for since they add powers to the will, they are indeed not to be extinguished, but, with reason going before, ought to obey the will as handmaids. - But if depraved habits have already been formed, let them be conquered by contrary

custom, and by repeated acts let the habit of doing good promptly and expeditiously gradually be acquired.

(c) But because bodily weakness, and especially disturbance of the nervous system, can induce pathological states which greatly retard or impede the free exercise of the will, excesses of every kind are to be avoided, so that there may truly be a sound mind in a sound body.

(d) Finally, since the will is diminished unless you exercise it, it is expedient to choose more often deliberate and free acts of the will; and therefore, in order to act strenuously, the greatest opportunities, which rarely occur, are not to be awaited, but in the smallest matters, which occur daily, the power of the will is to be exercised; for thus hesitation and fluctuation of soul are avoided, from which abulia can be induced; besides, as Christ Himself observed: "He who is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in that which is greater; and he who is unjust in that which is little is unjust also in that which is greater."[1]

[1] Luke XVI, 10. - Cf. Guibert, *La formation de la volonté*, Paris, 1903.

(e) Nor are supernatural means to be passed over, especially prayer and frequent reception of the sacraments, by which grace is obtained and the will is strengthened, according to that saying: "I can do all things in Him who strengthens me."[2]

[2] Philip., IV, 13.

On Human Acts — Chapter II: On the Morality of the Human Act

Concerning the Morality of the Human Act.

137. State of the question. (A) Hitherto we have treated of the free act considered psychologically; but the same act is called moral when it is considered in its relation with the rule of morals. Now, as was proved above, n. 25-26, the proximate norm of morals is the rational nature of man, and the ultimate norm is God, insofar as He is the supreme good and the ultimate end. For this reason morality is defined as the conformity or difformity of a human act with rational nature and divine goodness.[1]

[1] Some define morality as conformity or difformity with the eternal law manifested through reason; for the eternal law is nothing other than divine wisdom insofar as it is directive of all acts, and therefore it is not really distinguished from divine goodness.

Therefore, by reason of morality, human acts are good or evil according as they tend toward God, the highest good and ultimate end, or are turned away from Him. - But those are called indifferent which are neither good nor evil, because they have no relation with the norm of morality. Whether, however, such acts exist not only objectively, but also in the individual case, will be weighed below. Meanwhile it can be noted that indifference is not properly a species of morality, but a negation of morality.

138. (B) Here we treat of an act naturally or ethically good, not of a supernatural and meritorious act. Man indeed has been elevated to the supernatural state, and sometimes ought to elicit supernatural acts; but he is not bound, under penalty of sin, to act supernaturally in all things. Besides, since an act morally, or ethically, good is presupposed as one of the conditions for merit, this must first be discussed, so that it may be defined when an act is morally good.

(C) Intrinsic and extrinsic morality are distinguished: the former arises from the relation of the act to the natural order of things; the latter from the relation to the positive rule alone. Whence an action is called intrinsically evil which of itself is opposed to the natural order of things, which exists necessarily independently of any law whatever, as for example to hate God, to kill the innocent unjustly; an action is called extrinsically evil which is opposed only to the order freely constituted through positive law, such as the violation of the sabbath day, of the precept of communion, or of the law of fast.

These things posited, we shall speak: I. concerning the elements of the human act from which morality is derived; II. concerning the extension of morality, namely to which acts it extends, adding a few things concerning the indifferent act.

Article I. Concerning the Elements Contributing to the Morality of the Act.

139. When the will elicits a human act, it tends toward an object, on account of some end, in certain determinate circumstances, and often under its command an external act is effected.

Therefore there are four elements which can influence morality: the object, the end, the circumstances, the external act; concerning these we must speak separately.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18-20; Suarez, *De bonitate et malit. human. act.*, disp. IV-X; Billuart, diss. IV; St. Alphonsus, n. 34-40; Ball. B., n. 81-102; Bouquillon, n. 351-374; Lehmk., n. 27-36; Noldin, n. 56-65.

§ I. Concerning the Object of the Human Act.

140. 1. Notion. (A) When the will acts deliberately, it tends toward some object; consequently the object of the human act is that toward which the action tends primarily and of itself; thus it is distinguished from the circumstances, which are touched only secondarily and per accidens, and also from the end, which is the motive on account of which the agent operates. If, for example, I bestow a copious alms upon a wounded poor man, on account of the love of Christ, the alms is the moral object toward which my action primarily tends; the abundance of the alms and the condition of poverty of the wounded neighbor are the circumstances of the act; and the love of Christ is the end, or motive, on account of which I relieve the poor man.

141. (B) But the object, by reason of morality, can be threefold: (a) good, if in itself it is consonant with the rule of morals, for example to love God, to love one's neighbor; (b) evil, if, on the contrary, in itself it is opposed to this rule, such as hatred of God, the unjust killing of an innocent person; (c) indifferent, if of itself it has no relation with the rule of morals, as to walk, to write, to read, to eat. Yet Bouquillon, n. 356, rightly observes that an object of this kind does not remain indifferent except when it is considered indeterminately, namely by abstracting from the circumstances and especially from the end; for to walk for the sake of health is a naturally good act; to write in order to instruct others in truth is something very honorable, while conversely to read depraved books is something dishonorable.

142. Here, moreover, it is permitted to observe that some things are evil absolutely, so that they can never become good or indifferent, for example hatred of God or of neighbor; but some things are evil relatively, and indeed in a twofold way: on account of a defect of right in the agent, as if someone takes another's good while the owner is reasonably unwilling; or on account of a danger of sinning which is incurred, for example if someone reads books harmful to faith or to good morals.

143. (C) But the object, whether good or evil, can be considered in two ways: (a) objectively, or materially, insofar as it is considered in itself, relative to the remote rule of morals, but independently of conscience; (b) formally, insofar as its goodness or malice is perceived by the conscience of the agent, and freely intended by the will. Thus another's property can be taken without the injustice of such an action being known, and in this case such an action is materially evil, but not formally; but if it is adverted to and intended insofar as unjust, it is formally evil. From this it is given to understand what material and formal sin are: the former is committed without knowledge or consent; the latter with knowledge and consent.[1]

[1] Concerning this see *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clergé*, XXI, 1899, p. 1105-1109; concerning material sin it will be said below, n. 507.

144. 2. Concerning the morality derived from the object. Human acts receive their primary and essential morality from the object formally taken.

The material object of itself constitutes the objective morality of the act; for certain acts are good of themselves, by reason of the object, as to love God and neighbor; certain acts are of themselves better than others; thus the love of God, by reason of the object, is more perfect than the love of neighbor. - Nevertheless, when the act is considered in the concrete, as it is performed by the agent, the primary and essential morality is taken from the object formally taken; for since morality properly so called is conformity or difformity with the rule of morals insofar as it is perceived by reason, the act is not truly moral unless that relation is adverted to.

But the morality which is derived from the formal object is called primary, because it is conceived before every other morality which comes from the end and circumstances, and, if it is a question of malice, perseveres even when the end and circumstances are changed. Thus the deliberate taking away of another's property, while the owner is reasonably unwilling, is conceived as unjust before the end and circumstances are considered, nor can it be rendered honorable even when the end and circumstances are changed, even if, for example, someone stole in order to give alms.

It is also called essential, because it is intrinsically present in the action itself; thus the love of God deliberately elicited is good by a goodness inhering in the object itself, while conversely hatred of God freely willed is evil by force of the object itself formally considered.

145. Corollaries. (a) In order that a human act receive goodness from a good object, the will must tend toward that object, at least confusedly, on account of its honorable character; for, if good of this kind is not intended, at least confusedly, as honorable, it will be intended as something delightful or useful; consequently the act will not be morally good, because it will have no formal relation with the rule of morals, which is by no means situated in delight or utility: thus to be present at Mass solely for the sake of curiosity. But it suffices to intend this goodness confusedly; this happens as often as an object honorable of itself is not sought ultimately as delightful or useful; thus he acts rightly who gives alms, not indeed formally thinking about its honorable character, but neither exclusively seeking his own delight or utility: this will be better understood from what is to be said where we treat concerning the end.

146. (b) In order that a human act contract the malice of the object, it is not required that this malice be sought in itself, even confusedly, but it suffices that it be known and interpretatively willed, or logically willed by way of consequence. For malice so adheres to the object itself that it cannot be torn away from it even through a good intention. Thus he who knows that it is prohibited to eat meat on Friday, and nevertheless, without sufficient reason, eats it, sins, even if he does not will the malice of the act: for then he truly wills to break the law, although he would not wish to sin; the same must be said concerning him who becomes drunk, intending only the delight from drink, and not the malice of drunkenness: for while he foresees that he will be drunk from the drink, by that very fact he wills, at least interpretatively, the malice of drunkenness.

§ II. Concerning the End of the Human Act.

147. Notion. (A) The end concerning which we are treating is not the end of the work, which is not distinguished from the object formally taken, but the end of the one operating, or the intention, the motive on account of which the agent operates (above n. 4). Thus, if someone gives alms, the end of the work is the relief of the poor man, but the end of the one operating can be love of neighbor for his own sake, love of God or of Christ, the intention of redeeming sins, or vainglory, etc. Indeed one and the same act by the same agent, and at the same instant, can be performed on account of a manifold intention; thus someone can bestow alms in order to relieve the poor man, because he is loved on account of Christ and God, and at the same time in order to obtain remission of sins, etc. - Hence the end of the work is sometimes the same as the end of the one operating, namely when the agent intends the very goodness intrinsically inhering in the act, for example the relief of the poor man in the case of alms. - The intention itself is necessarily good or evil: for since it is deliberate, if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason and is good; otherwise, it is evil.[1]

[1] Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9: "For since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, from this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the nature of evil; but if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason, whence it has the nature of good. But it is necessary that it either be ordered or not be ordered to the due end." Cf. Didiot, op. cit., n. 440-454.

(B) With the end is connected the means, or that through which the agent wills to attain the end. A means, insofar as it is a means,[2] is not desirable or good of itself, because the will does not rest in it; but it is perceived as something useful for attaining the end, and therefore it is intended not on account of itself, but on account of the end. From this arose the axiom: he who wills the end, by that very fact wills the means; and he who wills the means, as it is a means, by that very fact wills the end. For the end cannot be obtained without the means, and consequently no one sincerely wills the end without by that very fact willing the means necessary for attaining the end. Likewise the means, as it is a means, is not intended except insofar as it conduces to the end; therefore no one sincerely wills the means as such unless at the same time he wills to attain the end. Thus he who wills to kill Peter, by that very fact wills the means necessary for perpetrating this homicide; likewise he who knowingly wills to apply, or in reality applies, means of themselves apt for killing Peter, by that very fact wills to kill Peter.

[2] It is said insofar as it is a means; for if it is considered not in order to the end, but in itself, insofar as it is an independent act, it has its own morality from the object, its proper end, and the circumstances.

Therefore the end and the means, by reason of morality, are indivisibly connected and are subjected to the same rules.

I. Concerning the Morality Derived from the End.

148. 1. Principle: A human act receives some principal morality from the end, or intention on account of which it is done. For from this intention it can happen that an action is conformable or difform to right reason: for by force of the intention, an act indifferent of itself can become good or evil, a good act can become better or evil, an evil act can become worse. Thus a walk, indifferent of itself, is good if it is done so that afterward one may be more free for work or prayer, but evil if it is done in order to seek occasions of sinning; alms, good in itself, is rendered better if it is done from love of Christ, but

evil if it is done in order to turn the poor man away from the true faith; theft, evil in itself, becomes worse if it is committed for the sake of drunkenness or lust.

But St. Thomas[1] declares thus that this morality, derived from the end, although not primary or fundamental nor essential, is principal: "To the second it must be said that the end, although it is not of the substance of the act, is nevertheless the most principal cause of the act, insofar as it moves the agent to acting; whence also a moral act most especially has species from the end."

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 7, a. 4, ad 2.

149. 2. Corollaries. (A) An act good from the object, and referred to a good end, besides the objective goodness which it retains or can retain, acquires a new goodness, and sometimes a manifold one, from the intention or end.

Thus alms given to a poor man, for relieving him, on account of the love of God, and at the same time in satisfaction for sins, has a threefold goodness: that of mercy from the object, that of charity from the intention of loving God, and also that of penance, on account of the motive of making satisfaction for sins; for the agent truly seeks this threefold goodness, and his action is virtually and morally threefold.

We said: an act can retain its objective goodness. Indeed it in fact retains it if this is at least implicitly intended; but if it is in no way intended, and only the final goodness is sought, the act derives its morality solely from the end; thus if someone abstains from wine, not on account of the moral goodness of abstinence, about which he cares nothing, but in order more easily to preserve the health of the body.

From this it follows that those who wish to progress in the spiritual life and to acquire greater merits ought especially to take care concerning the purity and perfection of their intention, and to embrace several good ends; for the purer, more perfect, and more manifold the intention is (provided excessive anxiety about this matter is avoided), the more perfect is the manner of acting.

150. (B) An act good from the object, but referred to an evil end, (a) becomes totally evil if the depraved intention is the total and adequate cause for positing it; for example if someone bestows alms solely in order to turn the poor away from the true religion. For then the agent wills the good, not as it is good, but as a means to an evil end, and therefore as something evil.

(b) But if an act good of itself is posited partly on account of a good end and partly on account of an end lightly culpable, it is more probable that the whole is not vitiated, but that it is partly good and partly evil; for example if someone gives alms both in order to relieve the poor man and in order to catch praise. For then the will is truly borne toward the good object, and that tendency is not destroyed by the intention lightly culpable, which by no means turns us away from God.[1]

[1] Thus Billuart, diss. IV, art. 4, § 2; Collet, *De act. hum.*, cap. IV, art. 2, sect. 1, conclus. 1; Gury, n. 30; Ball. P., I, n. 98; Noldin, n. 65. - But Suarez, op. cit., disp. 8, sect. I; Vasquez, in Ia IIae, disp. 70, cap. 2; Walsh, n. 546-561, defend the contrary opinion.

But if the evil intention, although not the adequate cause of the act, is nevertheless gravely culpable - as is alms given partly in order to relieve the poor, but partly and especially in order to turn them

away from the faith - the act is totally evil, at least much more probably; for that intention turns us away from God, and consequently prevents the act itself from pleasing God.

151. (C) An act evil from the object, and known as such, even referred to a good end, remains evil, though less so than if it were elicited on account of an evil end.

(a) It remains evil; for if the object is evil and is known as such, the good end does not prevent the will from seeking evil; for example, if someone steals in order to relieve a friend who is by no means placed in extreme necessity, by that very fact he wills the malice of theft, although the relief of the poor man is good. In this sense the Apostle says:[1] "And not (as we are slandered, and as some claim that we say) let us do evil that good may come." - Therefore it is not lawful to apply a means evil of itself in order to attain a good end.[2]

[1] Rom. III, 8.

[2] Therefore they slander Catholics who ascribe to them this saying: *The end justifies the means*. For theologians reprove it; while certain non-Catholics approve the same, among whom Matthew Prior, who wrote that from a good end even evil means become legitimate, and that only he sins who has a depraved intention:

"The end must justify the means, He only sins who ill intends."

Cf. *The works of the english poets*, London, 1810, t. X, p. 155; *Etudes des PP. Jésuites*, 5 August 1904, p. 357.

(b) Nevertheless a good end diminishes the malice of the act, because it shows that the affection toward evil is lesser, since the evil is not sought except from love of some good, or as a means for attaining an honorable end; thus, in the case brought forward, the malice of theft committed for doing good is less than that committed for harming one's neighbor. - Conversely, however, an evil end adds new malice to an act objectively evil, because it is difform from the rule of morals in a twofold way, as if someone steals in order to become drunk.

152. (D) An act indifferent from the object, but referred to a good end, receives from the end a certain goodness; but if it is ordered to an evil end, it receives moral malice from it. Thus to sing in order to praise God is an act of religion, while to sing in order to excite lust is a sin of scandal: for in the former case the will truly intends something good, in the latter something evil.

From this it is given to understand of how great importance it is to set before oneself an honorable end in all actions, even indifferent ones, so that all may become morally good.

II. Concerning the Obligation of Intending the Ultimate End and an Honorable End.

Having set forth the influence of the end or intention upon morality, another question now arises, namely whether for the morality of an act there is required the ordination of the intention to the ultimate end, or at least to an end morally honorable.

153. 1. Concerning the relation of the act to God. Baius, the Jansenists, and certain Louvain doctors, thinking that human nature had been wholly vitiated by original sin, taught that for the moral goodness of an act it is required that it be referred to God as ultimate end, and indeed not only implicitly, but also explicitly.[1] Now the relation of an act to the

ultimate end is explicit when the agent thinks about it and intends it; implicit, when the ultimate end is not intended in itself, but in another, for example in the objective goodness of the act.

[1] According to Baius and Jansenius, he sins who acts without charity or heavenly delight, because no middle is given between charity and vicious cupidity; the Louvain doctors embraced the doctrine of Baius, although they tried to soften it somewhat. Cf. Vacant-Mangenot, *Dict. de théol.*, t. II, under the word Baius.

154. Thesis: For the moral goodness of an act an explicit relation to God is not required, but an implicit relation suffices. Thus the common and true opinion.

(A) For here there is question of a work good in itself and performed on account of an honorable motive. But he who does good from an honorable end by that very fact acts in a manner consonant with right reason, and consequently with divine reason itself. Therefore such a work of itself, by its own weight, tends to the glory of God, and consequently is truly done on account of God, although implicitly.

155. (B) Nor does the argument taken by the adversaries from the words of St. Paul[2] avail to the contrary: "Whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all things unto the glory of God." Whether those words are to be understood of a precept or of a counsel is controverted among theologians. But even those who, with St. Thomas, hear them as concerning a precept, require nothing else than that all works be referred implicitly and objectively to God, as has already been explained. - Augustine[3] declares this excellently thus: "I suggest a remedy, whence all day long you praise God, if you wish: whatever you do, do it well, and you have praised God... Have you ceased from singing a hymn, do you depart so that you may refresh yourself? Do not become drunk, and you have praised God... Do you carry on business? do not commit fraud, and you have praised God."

[2] I Cor., X, 31.

[3] St. Augustine, on Psalm 34, serm. II, n. 16, Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 341.

And indeed, if the aforesaid words signified a universal precept of referring all acts explicitly to God, it would follow that all the works of unbelievers are sins, since these do not explicitly refer them to the true God; yet this has deservedly been reprobated by the Church.[4] - But if it is said that here there is question of a particular precept binding only the faithful, an intolerable yoke is imposed on them: for most very often act without thinking about the ordination of their works to God; indeed they are persuaded that they act well when, for example, they give alms to relieve a poor man, without thinking about the ultimate end. Therefore such an interpretation is opposed to the common sense and practice of the faithful.

[4] Indeed by Pius V, 1 October 1567, this proposition 25 of Baius was condemned at least as scandalous: "All works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices." (Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, n. 905).

N. B. Although we are not bound to refer all our acts to God, nevertheless there is given a precept of turning oneself to Him several times in the course of life, as will be explained below, where we treat concerning the virtue of charity. - Besides, it is certainly expedient not only in the morning, but also more often during the day, to offer all one's acts to God, that they may become more perfect.

156. 2. Concerning the relation of the act to an end positively honorable. As we noted above, n. 5, honorable good is distinguished from delightful or useful good. Wherefore the question arises whether we ought to act on account of an honorable end, or whether it is lawful to act on account of delightful or useful good. Among theologians themselves the matter is controverted.

(A) For some teach that it is by no means required that the will positively intend an honorable end, but that it suffices that it not exclude it, or apprehend that it is doing nothing contrary to an honorable end; for, they say, for an honorable action it is not required that an honorable end always be intended, but it suffices that it be good from the circumstances, provided the end is not evil; thus he acts well who plays in order to recreate himself, without thinking about the honorable character of this action.[1]

[1] Thus Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, n. 112-129; Genicot, I, n. 39; Noldin, n. 69.

157. (B) But others, more commonly and more truly, teach that delightful or useful good ought not to be sought except on account of an honorable end, positively willed at least implicitly. For delight is ordered by God, the author of nature, primarily to alluring men to necessary or useful operations to which it is annexed; thus a certain delight is annexed to the use of foods, so that man may thereby be allured to eating and may preserve his life; therefore he acts inordinately who, at least implicitly, does not refer this delight to self-preservation, but eats solely on account of pleasure.[2] The same must be said concerning useful good, which from its own nature ought to be referred to a further end. - But he implicitly intends on account of an honorable end who acts moderately; for moderation proceeds from right reason.

[2] To this belongs proposition 8, condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "To eat and drink even to satiety, for pleasure alone, is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its own acts." For, according to Viva (on this proposition, n. 7), the proposition was condemned not only because here there is question of immoderate pleasure, but also because it supposes that it is lawful to enjoy pleasure by intending it uniquely and ultimately. Cf. Denzing., n. 1025.

Nevertheless we can intend useful or delightful good not only insofar as it is honorable, but also insofar as it is useful or delightful, provided the reason of the honorable is not neglected, nor the due order inverted. For the delightful and the useful are something good, although subordinated to honorable good; therefore it is lawful to intend each, not indeed primarily, but secondarily, as an intermediate end to honorable good.

Hence the intention of one's own good, even delightful good, does not render an action evil, provided the will does not rest in it as in the ultimate end; nevertheless he acts more perfectly who, affectively renouncing delights, intends nothing except the properly universal good and that which is consonant with right reason, namely honorable good.

§ III. Concerning the Circumstances of the Human Act. — I. Notion and Species.

158. (A) A circumstance is something accidental, coming upon a human act already constituted in its substance, and affecting it in some way.[1] This, if it regards the act morally, is called moral. Thus in theft, a threefold element morally constitutes the substance of the act: another's

property, the appropriation of it while the owner is unwilling, by one who does not have the right of taking the thing away; now many conditions can come upon this threefold element and influence its morality, for example whether the property of another is sacred or profane, precious or vile; whether the owner is altogether unwilling or has yielded something of his right; whether the thief is poor or rich, layman or priest, etc.

[1] The origin of this name St. Thomas declares, Ia IIae, q. 7, a. 1: "The name circumstance is derived from those things which are in place, and is applied to human acts. But in local matters something is said to stand around, which is indeed extrinsic to a thing, yet touches it or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances."

(B) Seven circumstances are usually recounted, contained in this verse:

Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when.

Aristotle, however, had added an eighth, namely concerning what. St. Thomas[1] expounds the matter thus: "A circumstance is so called as existing outside the substance of the act, yet in such a way that it touches the act itself in some way. Now this can happen in three ways: in one way, insofar as it touches the act itself; in another way, insofar as it touches the cause of the act; in a third way, insofar as it touches the effect. But it touches the act itself either by way of measure, as time and place (when, where); or by way of the quality of the act, as the mode of acting (how). But on the part of the effect, as when one considers what someone has done. But on the part of the cause of the act, as regards the final cause, why is taken; but on the part of the material cause, or of the object, concerning what is taken; and on the part of the principal efficient cause, who acted is taken; but on the part of the instrumental efficient cause, by what aids is taken." - One of these circumstances is the final cause (why), concerning which we have already spoken.

[1] Ibid., a. 3.

II. Concerning the Morality Derived from Circumstances.

159. 1. Principle: A human act receives some morality, although less principal, from circumstances. For (a) Christ Himself declared that the poor widow, who put two mites into the treasury, gave more than the rich who cast in many things; and this indeed is not explained otherwise than by reason of circumstances, namely because "of her want she cast in all that she had, her whole living."[2] (b) Trent defined that it is necessary to confess the circumstances of sins which change the species of sin;[3] certainly because they increase moral malice. (c) For circumstances, when considered in their relation to such a determinate act, can be conformable to the rule of morals or not; for not rarely law determines in what place, time, mode, etc., this act is to be performed. Now, if they are conformable to right reason, they have some goodness which they confer upon the act; but if they are difform, they add a certain malice to the act.

[2] Mark, XII, 41-44.

[3] Trent, sess. XIV, can. 7.

160. 2. Applications. Circumstances can attribute morality to a human act in a fourfold way:

(a) An act indifferent from the object can become good or evil from circumstances; thus to eat temperately, for refreshing one's strength, is good; to do this with excess is evil.

(b) An act good from the object is sometimes rendered evil from circumstances, gravely or lightly, according to the degree of malice which is present in them; thus, for example, the exercise of trade in a sacred place, servile labor on Sunday, marriage entered into with a person bound by a vow of chastity, etc., by reason of circumstances, bear something evil before them.

(c) An act good or evil from the object can receive a new species of goodness or malice from circumstances; for example, he who from a vow preserves continence attains not only the goodness of chastity, but also that of religion; conversely he who unjustly carries off a sacred thing from a place contracts not only the malice of theft, but also of sacrilege. Circumstances of this kind are called those changing the species.

(d) An act good or evil from the object can acquire some degree of goodness or malice from circumstances, or, conversely, lose it. For there are circumstances which, although they do not change the species of the act, nevertheless increase or diminish its goodness or malice. Thus a poor man giving alms performs, other things being equal, a more excellent act of mercy than a rich man; a priest committing the same act of intemperance as a layman sins more gravely; he who steals because he is placed in a certain grave necessity sins less gravely than he who already abounds in wealth.

161. 3. Required conditions. In order that an act derive morality from circumstances, two things are required: (a) the circumstances must bear some goodness or malice before them; for if they are indifferent, they do not morally influence the act; thus generally it matters little whether a theft was committed on Monday or Tuesday; (b) they must be apprehended as moral and intended at least implicitly and in the confused; otherwise, although good or evil in themselves, they are not sought under this respect.

N. B. A gravely evil circumstance takes away the whole goodness of an act; otherwise, if it is lightly evil, as was said above concerning intention, n. 150. - From circumstances differ actions, internal or external, which sometimes are done during the principal action: for example, an idle word during prayer, an act of impatience while working; these are truly distinct acts, which can be evil, but do not take away the goodness of the principal action.

§ IV. Concerning the Morality of the External Act.

162. 1. State of the question. The things which thus far we have said concerning morality regard the human act, whether internal or external. But here the question arises whether the external act, or the execution of the interior act, adds to it a special goodness or malice. (a) We suppose here that there is question of an efficacious internal act, to which full consent has been given, and of an external act which is nothing else than the mere execution of this interior act; for according to all, between a desire more or less ineffectual and its execution there is a great difference; likewise, if the external act adds something to a merely internal desire, as not rarely happens, by that very fact it introduces new morality. (b) All concede that the external act increases per accidens the goodness or malice of the internal act, and indeed especially in a threefold way: by reason of intensity, insofar as the will, in the very execution of the act, is borne toward

the object with greater vehemence, on account of the delight or difficulty which is found in it; by reason of duration, insofar as the one executing, by continuing the act of the will until he has completed the work, perseveres in it longer; by reason of multiplication, because often, on the occasion of the external act, the internal act is renewed several times, and from this becomes better or worse.

163. 2. Opinion of the Scotists. These things posited, the Scotists say that the external act of itself increases the morality of the internal act. For (a) internal and external acts are prohibited by diverse precepts of the Decalogue; thus by the seventh precept the external act of theft is prohibited: you shall not steal; but by the tenth the very desire of theft: you shall not covet; therefore theft outwardly perpetrated has a special malice of itself.

(b) From the common sense of the faithful, the external act of sin must be accused, nor does it suffice for the thief to say: I efficaciously willed to steal; but if the external act adds no malice to the internal act, why are we bound to confess it?

(c) If the opposite opinion is true, something false follows; for example, if someone has an efficacious desire of killing a thousand men, he sins as gravely as if in reality he had killed them; if, conversely, he has an efficacious will of feeding a thousand poor persons, he merits equally as if in fact he had fed them; yet no one admits this.

164. 3. The common opinion of the Thomists and others. The Thomists, with whom in this matter most theologians agree, teach that the exterior act, as it is precisely the execution of a truly efficacious interior act, does not of itself add to this a new goodness or malice.

(a) For here belong the words of Christ:[1] "Everyone who looks at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart"; for there the merely internal act is equated with the external act. Many Fathers, explaining the aforesaid words, in reality declare this explicitly.

[1] Matt., V, 28.

(b) There is no morality without liberty; but the whole liberty of the external act proceeds from the internal one, so that, if that act happens without the free consent of the will, it is neither free nor imputable; therefore the external act of itself has no morality, and consequently cannot increase the goodness or malice of the interior consent.

Hence if desire and its execution are prohibited by diverse precepts, it does not follow from this that these two have distinct malice, but that God willed that a rude people, such as the Israelite people was, should better understand that not only the external act, but also the internal desire, although separated from its execution, is evil.

165. (c) If the opinion of the Scotists were true, someone could deprive another unwilling person of moral goodness by impeding the external act; for example, a thief, by taking away money destined by someone for alms, could deprive this person of the special goodness annexed to the external act of almsgiving; which indeed is altogether repugnant.

Nor is it absurd to say that he who efficaciously wills to feed a thousand poor persons, although he is prevented from accomplishing this by theft or another cause, attains the goodness annexed to such an action; for God looks upon the heart, and rewards the very volition as well as its execution. Thus He said to Abraham, who had immolated his son only intentionally: "Because you have done this thing, and have not spared your only-begotten son for My sake, I will bless you."[2] - Nevertheless the external act must be declared in confession, not because it has per se a distinct malice, but because for the most part it becomes graver per accidens, and besides the confessor can scarcely fulfill his office concerning avoiding occasions, imposing restitution, or suggesting remedies, unless together with the internal consent, the external action is candidly set forth.

[2] Gen., XXII, 16.

166. Conclusion. Speculatively speaking this latter opinion seems more probable. But in practice, for the most part the execution of the interior act supposes a more intense volition and a greater goodness or malice, as was explained above, n. 162. Whence one would be much deceived who cared little about external acts. (a) If it is a question of good acts, these things are to be kept before the eyes: the volition is not truly efficacious which, where it can, does not pass to the external act; besides, by acting externally, we strengthen the will itself by forming good habits; finally many external acts are prescribed by positive laws, and deservedly, since the exterior act often suggests the interior.

(b) If the question is about evil acts, from their execution there not rarely follow scandals, the obligation of restitution, depraved habits, and greater facility for sinning.

Therefore, although care must chiefly be taken about rightly ordering internal acts, the right ordination of external acts cannot be passed over.

167. Corollary concerning the sense of the axiom: Good from the whole cause, evil from any defect. That axiom, which is found in the works ascribed to St. Dionysius the Areopagite,[1] has been commonly received by theologians in this sense: that moral goodness does not belong to an act which, whether from the object, or from the end or circumstances, is evil. Yet this must be understood with the restrictions set forth above.

[1] *Lib. de divinis nominibus*, cap. 4, apud Migne, P. G., t. III, 730.

(A) As regards the object, an act evil from the object and known as such cannot become good from the end or circumstances, n. 151. But an act indifferent of itself can become good from the end or circumstances, nn. 152, 160. Therefore for the goodness of an act, it is not required that the object be good of itself, but it suffices that it receive some goodness from the end or circumstances.

(B) If it is a question of the end, an intention totally and adequately evil suffices for vitiating an act otherwise good from the object and circumstances, n. 150; likewise an intention gravely culpable, although it is not the adequate cause of the act, vitiates it; but an intention lightly culpable accompanying a good intention more probably does not vitiate the whole act, n. 150.

(C) When speech is about circumstances, a gravely evil circumstance vitiates the whole act, but not a lightly evil one, nn. 150, 161.

From this it is likewise understood that the conditions required for moral honorableness are: 1. that the act be free; 2. that the object not be evil at least formally or in knowledge; 3. that the act be good at least on the part of the end, whether of the work or of the one operating; 4. nor otherwise be vitiated by some gravely evil circumstance.

Article II. Concerning the Extension of Morality.

168. State of the question. The things which we have said concerning morality regard the act in itself, or directly willed; but, since there are effects which are voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, it remains to be inquired whether these also are moral and imputable to the agent. For understanding this, a few things must be noted beforehand.

(A) That is voluntary in itself, or directly, which the will immediately and expressly intends either as the end or as the means; thus certainly the death of an enemy which the murderer intends as the end is voluntary in itself, or the killing of a traveler which a thief intends as a means for taking money. - But that is voluntary in the cause, or indirectly, which is intended neither as the end nor as the means, but is foreseen as going to follow from the act directly willed, and consequently is imputed to it in some way; thus he who from curiosity reads a depraved book, foreseeing that doubts concerning the faith are going to arise from reading of this kind, by that very fact indirectly, or in the cause, wills to experience these doubts. - Again an effect can be voluntary in the cause in two ways: positively, if an action is posited from which the effect is foreseen as going to follow; and negatively, if an action is omitted while foreseeing the effect as going to follow from this omission; thus he who sees a house blazing in fire, and does nothing to extinguish the fire, when he could do something, indirectly and negatively wills the conflagration.

169. (B) These things posited, it is asked whether an effect voluntary in the cause is truly voluntary and ought to be imputed to the agent. Namely, an act is imputable when its goodness or malice can and ought to be attributed to the agent as to its proper author; moreover one can be held as the proper author of this action when he freely posited it, with prior knowledge of its morality.

Nevertheless in this matter one must carefully distinguish between a good effect and an evil effect. A good effect, willed only in the cause, is not imputed to the agent; thus he who writes a book for the sake of making profit, foreseeing at the same time good effects going to follow from its reading, but not intending them in themselves, even confusedly, does not perform a morally good act, because he intends his own utility, not honorableness; this is clear from what was said above, n. 145. - But an evil effect, willed only in the cause, can be imputed to the agent; for from what was said in n. 146, an act contracts the malice of the object as often as this is known and interpretatively willed; but when it truly ought to be imputed will be clear from what is to be said below.

(C) The indirect voluntary can occur in two ways: (a) sometimes an evil effect, willed in the cause, follows from an act directly willed without the concurrence of another free agent: then it is called the indirect voluntary simply. (b) Sometimes, however, an evil effect is produced with the concurrence of another free agent: then it is called a case of cooperation, because namely two (or more) concur toward the production of this effect. - Concerning each one, we must speak separately.

§ I. Concerning the Morality of the Effect Indirectly Willed.

170. Preliminary notes. In order that one may judge concerning the morality of an effect, it must first be inquired how it is connected with the cause.

[1] St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 7; Suarez, *De volunt.*, disp. I, sect. 5; Billuart, diss. I, a. 4; Elbel-Bierbaum, t. I, n. 23; Walsh, n. 88-192; Laloux, *De Act. humanis*, diss. 8; Ball. P., I, n. 26-32; Bouquillon, nn. 328, 371-374; Noldin, n. 33-38.

(a) Sometimes a cause is so determined to producing one effect that this effect follows necessarily: then the effect is directly intended and is deservedly imputed to the agent; thus he who knowingly applies fire to wood directly wills to burn it, because fire of itself is determined to burning.

(b) Sometimes, however, the cause produces a double effect, yet in such a way that one is subordinated to the other and follows necessarily from it; thus if someone knowingly and willingly discharges a gun at the father of a family, certainly foreseeing that from his death his children will be deprived of support, the double effect (the death of the father and the miserable condition of the children) is deservedly imputed to the agent, because the former is directly intended as a means to the end, namely vengeance, but the latter indirectly as an effect which necessarily follows from the means directly willed.

(c) Effects produced by a cause can be so coordinated that they proceed equally immediately, because the cause of itself is determined to producing each; thus if a physician gives to a pregnant woman a medicine which can heal her and at the same time cause abortion; in which case each effect is said to follow per se. But if one effect does not proceed equally immediately from the cause, because this is not of itself determined to producing such an effect, this follows per accidens: thus if someone writes a good or indifferent book for the sake of making profit, by whose reading, however, another, on account of his own fragility, is scandalized. - Now the question is whether and when effects of this kind, which proceed either per se or per accidens from the cause, and were willed in the cause, are imputable to the agent.

There will be a double principle: the former declares when an evil effect is imputable; the latter when it can be permitted.

171. First principle: An evil effect, willed only in the cause, is morally imputable when these three things concur at the same time, namely: 1. the agent foresaw the effect at least in the confused; 2. he was able not to posit the cause; 3. he ought to have impeded the effect. It is explained and proved by parts.

1. It is required that the agent have foreseen the effect at least in the confused; for if he did not foresee it in any way, the effect is not voluntary, and therefore not imputable: nothing is willed unless foreknown. - But he foresees the effect in the confused who knows, even obscurely or indistinctly, or at least suspected that the effect was going to follow; thus he who undertakes the office of physician, judge, confessor, etc., adverting that he is wholly lacking the knowledge required for such an office, truly, although indistinctly, foresees the evil effects going to follow from this; likewise the hunter who suspects that what he sees is a man, and nevertheless fires upon it, confusedly foresees the homicide going to follow from this.

Conversely, he who becomes drunk from a small draught of liquor whose force he did not suspect does not incur the malice of drunkenness.

From this it is given to understand when sins committed in drunkenness ought to be imputed: if someone has known by experience that, in the state of drunkenness, he is liable to anger, fights, blasphemies, etc., and nevertheless freely becomes drunk, he is guilty of sins of this kind, because he foresaw them; but if he is not accustomed to commit these things, the same cannot be imputed to him, if perhaps they occur, because they were not foreseen.[1]

[1] Certain theologians assert that for imputability it suffices that the agent could and ought to have foreseen the effect; which falls back into the same thing, for he neither could nor ought to have foreseen it if he in no way actually foresaw it.

172. 2. It is required that the agent could not have posited the cause: for if he is morally bound to posit the cause, he cannot abstain from that act, and therefore the effect is not morally imputable to him; since no one is bound to the impossible. - Thus the priest is not guilty of sacrilege who gives communion to a sinner whose unworthiness he knows only from confession, because he is bound faithfully to keep the sacramental seal.

173. 3. It is required that the agent be bound to impede the evil effect; for if he is by no means bound to this, he permits rather than effects the effect; and besides, if he has a just and proportionate reason for permitting it, such an effect is not to be imputed to him.

Now he is bound to impede the effect if this flows of itself from the cause: for then he who wills the antecedent wills also the consequent. But if the effect follows per accidens, namely from other causes independent of the will of the agent, so that the act posited is rather the occasion than the cause of the evil effect, the agent is not bound to impede this effect by abstaining from an act otherwise good, which is only the occasion of the evil effect. Thus a physician who, in the exercise of his art, is liable to not a few movements of concupiscence, is not guilty of these, even if he foresaw them, because the exercise of medicine produces those movements not of itself, but per accidens.

174. But when the three aforesaid conditions concur, the evil effect, although indirectly willed, is truly free and consequently imputable. Then, however, sin is committed not at that instant in which the evil effect follows, but at that instant in which it was foreseen and intended; and therefore, even if the effect does not follow, the sin has already been committed, because it has been willed.

Thus he who gives poison to another, foreseeing that death will follow from it, at this very instant commits homicide in his heart, even if, on account of the intervention of a physician or some other cause, death does not in fact follow. Thus he who adverts that he will be made drunk by further drink, and by experience knows that in drunkenness he commits many sins, implicitly intends all these sins at that instant in which he intends to drink the further drink.

Whence, in order to judge concerning the gravity of an indirectly willed sin, attention must be paid to the very malice of the internal act: the more distinct and certain the foresight of the evil effect was, the graver is the fault; the less distinct and certain, the lighter is the fault. Whence many are excused

from grave sin because, on account of lightness of soul, they apprehend only confusedly the depraved effects of their actions.[1]

[1] *Vieux Moraliste* rightly explains this, apud *Ami du Clergé*, XX, 1898, p. 1121-1129.

175. Second principle: It is lawful to posit an act good in itself or indifferent, from which a double effect follows, one good and the other evil, provided the good effect is not produced except not by means of the evil, a proportionately grave reason is present, and the end of the agent is honorable.

Therefore four conditions are required:

1. That the act be in itself good or indifferent; for if it is evil in itself, it can never become lawful, even if a good effect follows from it, and a fortiori if an evil effect follows. - But in order to judge whether the act is evil in itself or not, attention must be paid to whether the malice arises from the circumstances, or is found in the act itself according to the common estimation of the prudent: if the former, the act is judged good or indifferent in itself; if the latter, it must be judged evil in itself. - Thus, since hypnotic sleep is evil not in itself, but from circumstances, sometimes, though rarely, it can be permitted on account of a grave reason, provided due precautions are applied for warding off depraved effects.

176. 2. That the good effect not be produced except by means of the evil effect; for if the evil effect immediately follows from the cause, and the good arises only through the mediation of that evil effect, it is not lawful to posit the cause: for then the evil effect is assumed as a means to good, and therefore is directly intended.[2] Thus he acts illicitly who gives an intoxicating drink to a servant so that thereby he may cast horror of drunkenness into others.

[2] Certain persons, however, deny the necessity of this second condition; for, they say, it is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor in order to protect one's own life; now in this case the good effect, namely the preservation of one's own life, is not obtained except through the mediation of the evil effect, that is, the death of the aggressor. Thus Walsh, n. 143-144. - The matter is not without difficulty; nevertheless it can be said that in this case the death of the unjust aggressor is not an effect morally evil in itself: by natural and divine right, the killing of the innocent is indeed prohibited, but not that of the guilty. - Besides, he who, in order to protect himself, kills the aggressor, does not intend his death as a means to the preservation of life, but strikes or fires for the end of rendering him unarmed and incapable of harming, foreseeing nevertheless that perhaps the death of the aggressor will follow from this.

177. 3. That there be present a proportionately grave reason for positing the cause and permitting the evil effect, so that the good effect compensates for the evil. For right reason dictates that it is better to lack a lesser good than to obtain it through an act from which a greater evil follows; but conversely, if the good effect surpasses or at least compensates for the evil, the law which prohibited the evil effect now seems to cease.

The whole difficulty is in defining what reason is proportionately grave. But this, in individual cases, can be discerned only from the judgment of the prudent, all the circumstances being attended to. The principal adjuncts to be carefully weighed are reduced to these:

(A) One must inspect not only the advantage or disadvantage going to arise in the particular case, but also that which would threaten the whole society, if such an action were generally permitted or prohibited. For there are actions for which there does not seem to be a sufficient reason, if attention is paid to the particular case; but it will be recognized as present if regard is had to the universality of cases, with attention to the public good, or the good of the whole society.[1] Thus the social good requires that an unjust aggressor can be killed when other means of preserving one's own life are lacking, even if the aggressor perhaps loses not only temporal life, but eternal life; for otherwise assassins, robbers, and impious men, knowing that good men, for guarding life, would never kill, would become more audacious and would disturb families and society itself with homicides and robberies, as is explained in *De Justitia*, n. 325.

[1] Cf. Laloux, diss. 8, p. 217; Walsh, n. 136-137.

178. (B) Attention must be paid to the gravity of the evil effect: the graver the evil foreseen is, the greater the excusing reason must be. Thus if someone repels an unjust aggressor by bringing death upon him, a greater reason is required than if he inflicts a non-lethal wound: in the former case, it is required that the goods to be defended be of the greatest importance, while in the latter they can be of lesser importance (*De Justitia*, n. 329-331).

179. (C) The influence of the action upon the effect, whether good or evil, must also be inspected. For the evil effect must be compensated by the agent because his action influences that effect; therefore it must be compensated in that proportion in which it influences the effect. - But the measure of the influence depends on several things, namely on proximity, probability, and the positive or negative mode of acting. Generally, the more proximately, the more probably, the more positively the action influences the evil effect, the greater reason is required for lawfully positing it.

(a) A cause is called the more proximate the fewer intermediates there are between it and the effect; for example, if someone learns to read, foreseeing that perhaps he will incur the danger of reading depraved books, and from this of experiencing temptations, this last effect follows quite remotely from the act; but if someone in reality reads a depraved book, movements of concupiscence follow more proximately from this reading; therefore a greater reason is required.

(b) A cause influences the effect the more probably the more likely this effect is foreseen as going to follow from the cause; for example, if someone throws a stone from a window in a city and on a street where many pass by, the wounding of one's neighbor is going to follow much more probably than if he does this in a village where very few make the journey; therefore a much greater reason is required.

(c) The agent influences the effect the more positively the more actively he behaves; thus a greater reason is required for doing something than for omitting something from which an evil effect is going to follow.

180. (D) Attention must also be paid to the connection, more or less necessary, between the cause and the effect; thus, for leasing to heretics some building in which they will spread their errors, a greater reason is required if they cannot find any other building in the place than if they can easily lease others.

(E) Likewise one must keep before the mind the right or office which belongs to the agent of positing the act: certainly a lesser reason is desired if there is question of those who have a special right, or a fortiori an office, of doing the act; for example, if a physician or priest foresees that he will experience some temptation by reading books which he has the right and office of reading, in order rightly to fulfill his duty, a much lesser reason suffices than if there is question of another who wants to read the same books only from curiosity.

181. 4. It is required that the end of the agent be honorable, that is, that the agent not intend the evil effect which he foresees, nor afterward approve it, but behave permissively only with regard to it; wherefore he cannot take complacency in the depraved effect, but ought to be so disposed that he would wish it not to be produced, if he could otherwise obtain the good effect which he intends. This is clear from what was said where we treated concerning the end, n. 150; for he who intends a depraved end, or takes complacency in it, by that very fact wills some evil.

182. When the four aforesaid conditions concur at the same time, the evil effect only indirectly willed is not imputed to the agent; for that effect, insofar as it is evil, must be judged morally involuntary, since the will neither intends it nor takes complacency in it.[1] The agent indeed foresees and permits, or tolerates, the evil effect, but on account of a just and proportionate cause, just as God Himself tolerates evil on account of grave reasons. Now the public good demands that an act, otherwise good or indifferent, not be prohibited on account of an evil effect, if there is present a grave reason for positing it, as is clear from the examples already brought forward and from others to be brought forward in the whole course of the work.

[1] "Nothing prevents there being two effects of one act, one of which alone is in the intention, while the other is outside the intention. But moral acts receive species according to that which is intended, not from that which is outside the intention." (St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 7).

§ II. Concerning Cooperation Toward an Evil Act.

183. State of the question. (A) To cooperate in general is to operate with another; and therefore, if there is question of an evil matter, cooperation is the concurrence furnished to the depraved action of another. But someone can cooperate with the sin of another in two ways: by influencing the will itself through counsels, examples, flatteries, etc.; this kind of cooperation is properly called scandal, concerning which we shall treat where we treat concerning charity; by helping another, already determined to sin, in the perpetration of the sin: and this is cooperation properly so called, about which we must say something.

[2] Most theologians treat this matter where they treat concerning charity; thus St. Alphonsus, lib. III, n. 59-80; Elbel-Bierbaum, t. I, p. 11, n. 361-464; Bouquillon, *De virt. theologicis*, n. 545-555; cf. Waffelaert, *La coopération au mal*, 2nd ed., Bruges, 1892; *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clergé*, XXIII, 1901, pp. 721, 785, 961, 1025, 1073 sq.

(B) But this cooperation can be intentional or formal, or only material: the former is present when the one cooperating knowingly and willingly concurs in the action insofar as it is evil, and therefore truly intends its malice, whether explicitly, or implicitly by exercising a work which is directly ordered to a depraved action; for example, by writing and selling a book which of itself is ordered to corrupting morals. For then he proposes to himself an evil end, and consequently sins,[1] according to

the principles given above, n. 150. - It is material when he concurs in the action of another insofar as it is physical, without the intention of cooperating in the sin. Thus he who hands over the keys of a house to a thief, so that the thief can more easily steal, cooperates formally and culpably; but materially, if he does this only for the end of avoiding his own harm, for example death, in no way intending to cooperate in the theft. Here we do not treat of formal cooperation, which is evidently directly evil; but only of material cooperation, which, as is clear from the notion given, falls back into the case of the indirect voluntary. For the one cooperating directly wills his own utility, for example to preserve life, and only indirectly wills the evil action, for example the theft which he foresees as going to follow from the handing over of the key.

[1] That sin has a double malice: one against charity, by inducing one's neighbor to sin; the other against the special virtue which is harmed by the cooperation.

184. (C) This material cooperation can be immediate, if someone has a part in the depraved action itself, for example by helping a thief to carry off a chest in which another's money is contained; or mediate, if the one cooperating concurs only in those acts which precede or follow the sin itself, for example by opening the door of the house to the thief, so that he may be able to enter or leave. - Again mediate cooperation can be more or less proximate, according as by its own nature or from circumstances it is more or less connected with the sin of another; for example, a servant who on Friday cooks meat cooperates less proximately toward the violation of the law of abstinence than an innkeeper who provides the same meats to be eaten by guests.

185. Principles. (A) He who cooperates only materially and mediately, even proximately, in an evil action does not sin, provided the act which he performs is not intrinsically evil and, besides, there is had a proportionate reason for cooperating.

For he who cooperates in this way does not will the evil effect except indirectly and permissively; but, from what was said above, n. 175, this is lawful when a proportionately grave reason is present. - Besides, when a sufficient reason is lacking, it is not lawful to cooperate with sin, even materially; for something inordinate is found in the act by which one concurs toward sin.[1]

[1] Wherefore the following proposition (51) was condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "A servant who, with shoulders submitted, knowingly helps his master to ascend through windows to violate a virgin, and many times serves him in this by carrying a ladder, opening the door, or cooperating in something similar, does not sin mortally if he does this from fear of notable harm, for example lest he be badly treated by his master, lest he be looked upon with stern eyes, lest he be expelled from the house." (*Denzing.*, n. 1068; Viva, on this proposition.) For since in this case the cooperation is proximate, a very grave reason is required, which is lacking; for the servant here is supposed to have been able to find another master; he ought at least to have sought another, lest he be forced many times to cooperate in a depraved action.

186. (B) Immediate cooperation is not always and necessarily illicit, but sometimes it is permitted, provided there is present a proportionately grave reason. Thus more probably.

Certain theologians deny this, with Billuart,[2] because immediate cooperation is intrinsically evil; for does not he who helps a thief to carry off another's money himself steal? - Yet that argument does not hold in all cases. (a) Let the case of theft, concerning which Billuart treats, be taken; if someone cannot avoid death except by helping thieves in carrying off another's money, the taking away of another's thing in these adjuncts is not morally theft. For no one is bound, apart from a special pact,

to lose his own life for protecting the goods of fortune of another; for the owner of the thing taken away would be unreasonably unwilling if he demanded this, at least when the one cooperating is not bound by a special pact to guard the thing. (b) Again, when someone asks for the sacraments, on account of a grave reason, from an unworthy minister, he by no means sins, according to the common opinion of theologians, although he is truly and immediately a participant in the action by which the minister sins; the reason is that the whole malice of the act holds itself on the part of the minister, who can, if he wishes, recover the state of grace by an act of contrition; and therefore the cooperation of the one asking in those adjuncts is not illicit.

[2] Billuart, *De Justitia*, diss. VIII, art. 13, § 6.

Therefore it cannot be said that in every case immediate cooperation is illicit. - Yet there are many cases in which immediate cooperation is sin; thus it is never lawful to participate immediately in the unjust killing of an innocent person, since such an action taken concretely is intrinsically evil.

The matter, therefore, is to be judged from the very nature of the evil act toward which one concurs, or from the circumstances; namely, if such an act, considered in the concrete, is so intrinsically evil that someone cannot cooperate in its physical perpetration without at least implicitly intending its malice, the cooperation is illicit.

187. (C) To judge whether the reason is proportionately grave, attention must be paid to the gravity of the sin with which one cooperates, to the propinquity and influence of the cooperation, and also to the obligation of impeding the sin.

(a) To the gravity of the sin: the graver the sin toward which someone cooperates is, the greater the excusing reason must be; thus a greater cause is required for someone to cooperate toward homicide than toward theft.

(b) To the propinquity of the cooperation: the more proximate the cooperation is, the greater reason is required; thus remote cooperation is excused on account of a light inconvenience; nearby cooperation, on account of a grave inconvenience; proximate cooperation, from a very grave cause; immediate cooperation, from a most grave cause. Thus he who sells paper to a publisher printing depraved books cooperates only remotely, and is excused from the mere motive of earning money; the worker who moves the machines cooperates nearby, and is excused only on account of a grave inconvenience, for example the loss of notable profit; but he who sets the type cooperates proximately, and is not excused except on account of a very grave cause, for example the greatest difficulty of finding another employer.

188. (c) To the influence of the cooperation; namely if the cooperation so influences the evil effect that, without it, the sin would not happen, a greater cause is required than if the sin would be committed without that cooperation; for example, a lesser reason is required for selling arms to him who is foreseen as going to abuse them, if there are present many other merchants who sell arms in this place.

(d) To the obligation of impeding sin; thus if someone by office of piety, as a father, or of justice, as a magistrate, is bound to impede some sin, a much greater cause is required for him to permit it.

Concerning special cases of cooperation as regards religion, charity, justice, temperance, etc., we shall treat in the course of the work.

Scholion: Concerning an Indifferent Act in the Individual Case.

189. 1. State of the question. After the things said concerning the morality of an act directly or indirectly voluntary, it remains to be inquired whether there is given an act which is neither good nor evil, but indifferent with respect to morals. Concerning this there was keen dispute in the schools. - In order that we may separate certain things from uncertain ones, a few things must be noted beforehand:

(A) A human act can be considered in species, or in the abstract, or in the individual case, or in the concrete: it is considered in the former way when it is inspected in its object, the circumstances and the end of the one operating being set aside: thus to walk, to eat, to play, etc.; it is considered in the individual case when not only the object, but at the same time the circumstances and the end of the one operating are inspected: thus to eat moderately, in order to renew strength and to work better. Now all concede that there are given some acts indifferent in species, at least when the object is inspected in the abstract, without those marks which introduce objective morality, for example to walk, to play, without any other determination; hence St. Thomas says:[1] "But it happens that the object of the act does not include anything pertaining to the order of reason, such as to lift a straw from the ground, to go to the field, and things of this kind; and such acts according to their species are indifferent."

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 8.

190. (B) Here there is question of mere natural honorableness; for, in the supernatural order, acts are given which are neither meritorious nor demeritorious or sinful: thus the works of unbelievers, or of those who are placed in mortal sin, are not truly meritorious, or do not merit an eternal reward, although they can be morally good (for example, alms given from a natural affection of mercy).

(C) Moreover there is question of deliberate acts, that is, acts done with knowledge and advertence; for all confess that there can be indeliberate acts indifferent even in the individual case: for these are not truly human, nor moral.

191. 2. The doctrine of St. Thomas. These things posited, St. Thomas (a) explicitly teaches that there are not given deliberate acts in the individual case which are naturally indifferent; for it is necessary that any individual act have some circumstance through which it is drawn to good or to evil, at least on the part of the intention. For an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason, to which it belongs to order rightly, and has the nature of evil; but if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason, whence it has the nature of good. But it is necessary that it either be ordered or not ordered to the due end.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9; cf. *Quaest. disp., De malo*, q. 2, a. 5.

(b) Yet he does not require, for the honorableness of the act, that this be explicitly referred to God, but only that the natural goodness which is conformable to right reason be intended. Now works indifferent of themselves are consonant with reason when they are done moderately, without any excess; for virtue stands in the mean;[2] wherefore he acts well who eats and drinks, the mode of temperance being observed, or who plays for recreation, the mode of eutrapelia being observed, which keeps the mean in games, or rests in order to repair the powers of the body.[3] Wherefore idle words are reprehended only because they lack the reason of just necessity or pious utility: "For what is done on account of just necessity or on account of pious utility is done laudably and is a good act."[4] Thus, for example, if there is question of play or conversation, the act will be morally good if these three things are observed: if delight is not sought in shameful or harmful operations or words; nor is the gravity of the soul totally relaxed, or, in other words, if one plays or converses moderately; if recreation agrees with the person, time, and place, and is duly ordered according to the other circumstances.[1]

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 64, a. 1.

[3] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9, ad 3; IIa IIae, q. 168, a. 2-4; in 2 *Sentent.*, dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5†.

[4] St. Thomas, *Quaest. disp.*, *De malo*, q. 2, a. 5.

[1] St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 168, a. 2.

(c) Works indifferent of themselves, when they are done deliberately by a just man (i.e. one who is in the state of grace), are not only morally good, but also meritorious of supernatural reward: "It sometimes happens that a man does not order some act to God, while nevertheless that act of itself does not contain any disordering by reason of which it is not referable to God, and because the mind of man is habitually related to God, that act is not only not a sin, but is also a meritorious act." For he who enjoys habitual grace, in a general mode orders his whole life to God, and therefore the act of a just man, which bears before itself nothing inordinate, by that very fact tends to God.[2]

[2] St. Thomas, *Quaest. disp.*, *De malo*, q. 9, a. 2.

192. 3. Opinion of many Thomists. Yet many Thomists progress further, or perhaps declare the matter in a more explicit way, saying that an act is not good unless it is referred to God at least virtually and implicitly: virtually, that is, by force of an actual intention, at least general, previously had and still persevering; and implicitly, namely one which is contained in the general intention of living rightly and always acting according to reason.[3] This they prove from a double text of Scripture: (a) from the words of the Apostle:[4] "Therefore whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all things unto the glory of God"; for there, they say, is included the precept of referring all acts to God, at least virtually and implicitly. (b) Besides, Christ Himself declared that an account must be rendered for every idle word;[5] but a word is called idle, not because it has an evil end, but because it does not have a good and honorable end. (c) In reality, man acting deliberately cannot act except on account of delight or on account of an honorable end: if he acts on account of delight and rests in it, he acts inordinately, since the delightful ought to be subordinated as a means to some end; if on account of an honorable end, the action is good, as implicitly ordered to God.

[3] Thus Billuart, diss. IV, art. 6.

[4] I Cor., X, 31.

[5] Matt., XII, 36.

193. 4. Opinion of the Scotists. But the Scotists, after St. Bonaventure,[6] hold that indifferent acts in the individual case can be given, and therefore they try to blunt the force of the aforesaid arguments.

[6] Scotus, in II lib. *Sentent.*, dist. 40-41; St. Bonaventure, in l. II *Sentent.*, dist. 41, a. 1, q. 3; Vasquez, in Ia IIae, disp. 52; Arriaga, *De act. hum.*, disp. 21; Henno, *Theologia*, Cologne Agrippina, 1718, *De Act. hum.*, disp. III, q. 6.

(a) They understand the words of St. Paul brought above as concerning counsel, not however concerning precept; besides, they say, St. Paul here speaks of supernatural charity and of the supernatural relation of acts to God, not however of their natural honorableness.

(b) What Christ says concerning an idle word is to be understood not of a merely idle word, but of a lying and calumnious word, both from the context and according to the opinion of many Fathers;[1] therefore from this it is by no means inferred that there falls upon man the obligation of referring all acts and all words positively to God.

[1] Cornelius a Lapide reports these on this place.

(c) Nor is this obligation proved by reason. It is indeed true that man is rational, and therefore ought to do nothing against reason; but from this it by no means follows that the office falls upon him always of directing his actions to an honorable end; for since man is composed of soul and body, and his nature is spiritual and bodily, sometimes he can act on account of bodily good, or on account of delight, provided he does not seek an evil end.

194. 5. Conclusion. (A) With the Angelic Doctor we think that per se there are not given deliberate acts morally indifferent in the individual case; for the end which a man deliberately operating intends is either in some way subordinated to the ultimate end, or it is not; if it is subordinated in some way, mediately or immediately, implicitly or explicitly, the act is good; but if in no way, namely if someone rests ultimately in delight, the act is disordered, and consequently evil.[2]

[2] In this sense the doctrine of St. Thomas is embraced not only by Thomists, but by most other theologians, such as Suarez, *De bonit. et malit.*, disp. IX, sect. 3; Costa Rossetti, op. cit., th. 26, p. 84-90; Meyer, op. cit., t. I, n. 193; Bouquillon, n. 377; Walsh, n. 674-688; Noldin, n. 74.

(B) Nevertheless we do not assent to those Thomists who hold that for a good act a positive relation of the act to God is required, even virtual and implicit; for we judge that acts indifferent of themselves, which do not lack the reason of just necessity or true utility, which otherwise do not recede from the mean through excess or defect, are morally good, according to the principles of the Angelic Doctor himself set forth above, even if they are not positively referred to a further honorable end; for acts of this kind, considered in the concrete, are conformable to reason, and consequently tend toward God as by their own weight.

But per accidens indifferent acts in the individual case can be given, namely if they are indeliberate, or are done without advertence to their morality.

To Be Noted for Practice.

195. In practice, however, although it is not certain concerning a precept of referring all acts to God, nothing is more expedient for spiritual progress than often and explicitly to refer oneself and all one's thoughts, affections, words, and works to God, loved on account of Himself. This is the nobler, more useful, safer, and more compendious way to perfection: "If it is kept seriously and perseveringly, it will easily and most sweetly lead a man to the summit of Christian perfection within the proper state of each one, and thence to a sublime and most excellent degree of glory; but if it is not kept, although other things are applied, scarcely can mediocre progress in the spiritual life be obtained."[1]

[1] Card. De Aguirre, *S. Anselmi Theologia*, t. III, tr. VII, disp. 130, n. 149 sq.

On Human Acts — Chapter III: On the Merit of the Human Act

Concerning the Merit of the Human Act.

196. Preliminary notes. As was said above, n. 8, the end toward which we tend is supernatural, and is attained by us by way of remuneration, n. 29. Therefore it does not suffice to act honorably, but supernatural and meritorious acts must be elicited.

[1] Dogmatic theologians treat concerning this matter in the Treatise *De Gratia*, namely St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 114; Suarez, lib. XII, c. 2 sq.; Salmanticenses, disp. I-II, and others whom we list in *Synopsi Th. Dogmat., De Gratia*, n. 184-204.

When someone, by a free and honorable action, brings to another an emolument not owed, he is said to merit with him, or he acquires a right to some retribution; but conversely, if someone freely and unjustly inflicts some detriment on another, he demerits, or incurs the obligation of undergoing some punishment. Yet in order that a reward can be demanded by strict right, it is necessary that some pact, at least implicitly, be entered into, by force of which one of the contracting parties promises some determinate work in favor of the other, and the other promises a determinate reward in retribution for the work. For although a good and free action, performed in favor of another, is of itself apt for obtaining some reward, the strict obligation of conferring it, and also the nature, quantity, and quality of this reward, are by no means determined of themselves; therefore it is necessary that a pact be entered into for determining these things.

From this it is asked whether man can merit with God. The reason for doubting is that, since he has received his whole being from God, he can do nothing which is not owed to God. Nevertheless, since man is of his own right and is endowed with liberty, he can furnish something of his own to God, namely a free act of the will (above, n. 30); and, although this free submission is essentially owed, God, nevertheless, most good, deigns to accept it as worthy of reward, and promises the unfading crown of glory to all those who freely operate good. This promise posited, we acquire a right to retribution, not indeed from an explicit pact, but from the fidelity by which God always fulfills His promises. - But because we have been elevated to the supernatural state, here we shall treat not of natural retribution, but of supernatural merit, setting forth its nature, and also the conditions required for merit on the part of the one operating, of the work, and of God.

I. The Nature of Supernatural Merit.

197. 1. Notion. Meritorious acts are distinguished from supernatural acts in this, that more conditions are required for merit properly so called than for the supernatural.

All honorable acts are called supernatural which proceed from a supernatural principle (i.e. from a faculty elevated by grace, whether habitual or actual), and at the same time are elicited from a motive known through revelation;[1] hence certain acts of unbelievers, by which they prepare themselves for justification, are supernatural, although they are not properly meritorious, from what is to be said.

[1] Certain theologians, with Noldin (n. 79-80), assert that the former condition suffices, and that it is not required that the motive be supernatural; for, when the root and principle of the act is something supernatural, the fruit or effect

must also be supernatural. Yet others more commonly reject that opinion; for since acts are specified by the formal object, supernatural works differ from natural works by reason of the formal object, or motive. - To compose the dispute, perhaps it could be said that an act elicited under the influence of actual grace is already supernatural inchoatively, but does not become totally supernatural unless there is added a motive known by faith.

But a meritorious act is a good and supernatural work done on account of God, from which, divine ordination being posited, there arises a right to supernatural retribution.

It is called (a) a good and supernatural work, so that thus it may be distinguished from natural merit by which someone can obtain a merely natural reward; thus an unbeliever, by acting honorably, can obtain some natural recompense. But a meritorious work ought to be supernatural both by reason of the principle, insofar as it is done under the influence of grace, and more probably by reason of the end, insofar as it is done at least implicitly on account of a supernatural end, as will be declared below. (b) On account of God; for if some work is not done on account of God, there is no reason why retribution should be expected from Him. (c) From which there arises a right...; in this consists the essence of merit, and it is distinguished from impetration; for merit gives a certain right to retribution, while impetration gives no right, but obtains favor from mere mercy. (d) Yet there is added, divine ordination being posited; for unless God had willed to give us supernatural retribution on account of our good works, we would have no right to it: all that we have or do is from God and is owed to God, and therefore we can have no strict right relative to God, unless He Himself confers such a right upon us. (e) To supernatural retribution; in this merit is distinguished from satisfaction; for satisfaction compensates for the injury brought against God, while merit is ordered to obtaining reward.[1]

[1] Therefore a threefold value can be present in our works: impetratory, which arises from petition clothed with due conditions, and is founded partly on the mercy of God, partly on His promises; meritorious, which arises from the supernatural work itself done on account of God, and is founded partly on justice, partly on the divine promise; satisfactory, insofar as it is a penal work which is accepted by God as compensation for the injury brought against Him. In the prayer of the just this threefold value can be found: insofar as it fittingly asks from God, it can impetrate; insofar as it performs a supernatural work acceptable to God, it can merit grace; but insofar as it performs a difficult and laborious work, it makes satisfaction for its sins.

198. 2. Species. A twofold merit is usually distinguished:

(a) Merit de condigno is that to which a reward is owed from justice, or at least from fidelity: from justice, when the work of itself equals the reward; from fidelity, when a promise is present, by force of which the reward, although exceeding the work, is nevertheless infallibly granted. Merit de condigno is true merit, or merit simply and properly so called, and therefore theologians intend to speak of it as often as they do not expressly signify otherwise.

(b) Merit de congruo is that to which reward is owed not from justice or fidelity, but from mere fittingness. - To explain the difference between each, certain theologians use this comparison: a soldier who conducted himself very strenuously in war has a twofold merit: he merits de condigno the stipend promised to soldiers; but he merits de congruo, besides the ordinary stipend, to be promoted to some dignity.

In the Treatise *De Gratia* (n. 193-204), it is proved that a justified man, that is, one placed in the state of grace, can truly merit an increase of grace and eternal life; here therefore it will suffice to set forth the conditions required for merit, especially the conditions required for merit de condigno; for the

conditions for merit de congruo are the same, with two exceptions, namely the state of grace and the promise of God, which are not required for merit de congruo. - Conditions of this kind are taken: 1. on the part of the one operating; 2. on the part of the work; 3. on the part of God.

II. Conditions for Merit on the Part of the One Operating.

199. For merit de condigno, two things are required: the state of wayfarer and the state of grace.

1. The state of wayfarer. (A) For God willed that man merit eternal life while he was dwelling on earth, or in the state of probation. (a) This is certainly proved by those texts of Scripture in which the Prophets, Christ, and the Apostles exhort the faithful that, while they live, they operate good, and thus prepare themselves for judgment, or for the coming of Christ; since, as St. Paul says,[1] "we must all be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may receive the proper things of the body," that is, those things which were done in the body, or during mortal life. For these suppose that after death there is not given a place for penance or merit. (b) This indeed is confirmed not only from the unanimous consent of the Fathers and theologians of all schools, who taught and teach this as one of the primary Christian truths; but also from the intimate persuasion of all the faithful, who therefore wish to act well in the present life or to be reconciled with God before death, because they believe that after death there is no redemption. Wherefore it can be said that this truth was implicitly defined by the ordinary and infallible magisterium of the Church.

[1] II Cor., V, 10.

(B) Reason shows that this is fitting. For it is necessary that the time of probation, through which man can merit or demerit, receive an end; but it altogether befits that this time receive its end at the point of death: for as long as the soul is joined to the corruptible body, on the one hand it is not capable of the beatific vision, and on the other it is in a state most apt for meriting, because it can use the body for acquiring perfection, and in the miseries of this life can find ampler opportunities for meriting. Therefore. Yet we admit that that argument is only an argument of fittingness, because the time of probation depends on the will of God alone.

200. Moreover, the state of sanctifying grace is required. It is certain: (a) From Scripture. For Christ says: "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it remain in the vine; so neither can you, unless you remain in Me";[1] but no one remains in Christ except through habitual grace; therefore. Likewise St. Paul:[2] "And if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor... but have not charity" (and consequently habitual grace), "it profits me nothing."

[1] John, XV, 4.

[2] I Cor., XIII, 3.

(b) From Tradition. From the decree of Trent, in which it is declared that the works of a justified man truly merit;[3] for a justified man is said to be one who is adorned with habitual grace; and from the condemnation of the proposition of Baius denying that sanctifying grace is necessary for merit.[4]

[3] "If anyone shall say that the good works of a justified man... do not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself... and also increase of glory; A. S." (Trent, sess. VI, can. 32).

[4] Apud Denzinger, n. 895; cf. nn. 882, 892.

(c) From theological reason. It is certainly repugnant that someone merit de condigno with God, when otherwise he is an enemy of God and worthy of eternal punishment; but a sinner, not yet justified, is hateful to God and worthy of eternal punishment; therefore he cannot at the same time merit eternal life. - Moreover, there ought to be some proportion between work and reward; but the reward concerning which we are treating is within the order of supernatural filiation; therefore we can be heirs of eternal life insofar as we are adoptive sons of God: "if sons, also heirs";[5] but only through habitual grace are we made adoptive sons of God; therefore only through this grace do we merit.[6]

[5] Rom., VIII, 17.

[6] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 3.

III. Conditions on the Part of the Work.

201. There are three: namely, the work must be free, honorable, and supernatural. 1. A meritorious work must be free, both from coercion and from necessity. It is of faith against the Jansenists.

For the following proposition was condemned as heretical: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices."[1] And in reality no one is rewarded or punished unless he is master of his acts; but man is not master of his acts unless he is truly and intrinsically free. - This, however, does not prevent prescribed works from being meritorious; for God, by His goodness, has promised recompense even to prescribed works; thus, for example, love of enemies is prescribed, and yet it is a very meritorious work, according to that saying: "Love your enemies... and your reward shall be great";[2] indeed, a precept, other things being equal, increases merit, by adding to the work the merit of obedience.

[1] Apud Denzinger, n. 968. - The state of fallen nature is that in which man is placed after original sin; cf. *De Deo Creante*, n. 197-200.

[2] Luke, VI, 35.

202. 2. Moreover it must be honorable, or naturally good, on the part of the object, end, and circumstances; for an evil work evidently cannot be rewarded, but on the contrary is worthy of punishment; but an indifferent work, if there is any in the individual case, of itself neither merits nor demerits; therefore only a good work can be rewarded. Yet a work indifferent of itself can be made good through a supernatural intention; indeed a work materially evil can, according to the common opinion, become good and meritorious, if it is honorable in the mind of the agent: for God looks upon the heart.

203. 3. Supernatural (a) by reason of the principle, in the sense that it must be done under the influence of grace; this is admitted by all. But what grace is required? Certain theologians, ancient and modern,[3] said that habitual grace suffices, without actual grace, because an act elicited under the influence of habitual grace and the infused virtues is already sufficiently supernatural by reason of the principle. - Yet the common opinion is that actual grace is required; for Christ said to the Apostles, already adorned with sanctifying grace: "Without Me you can do nothing";[4] these words indeed are interpreted

by the Fathers not only of habitual grace, but also of actual grace. Here also come all the texts brought forward in the Treatise *De Gratia* (n. 50-60), from which it is evident that even a just man can do nothing in the supernatural order without actual grace. Likewise Trent declares that the works of the just are not meritorious without the virtue of Christ which precedes, accompanies, and follows them; but grace preceding, accompanying, etc., is actual grace.[1] - Besides, that grace is never lacking to men of good will.

[3] Thus D. Soto, *De nat. et grat.*, l. III, c. 4; Terrien, *La Grâce et la Gloire*, Paris, 1897, t. II, p. 56-62.

[4] John, XV, 5.

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16.

(b) By reason of the end or motive, according to the common opinion, in the sense that it must be done not from a human motive, but with at least implicit relation to God or to eternal life, according to that saying: "Whatever you do, do from the heart, as to the Lord and not to men, knowing that from the Lord you shall receive the retribution";[2] all the places where it is said that we ought to act on account of God prove the same.

[2] Coloss., III, 23.

Indeed, according to Thomists, it is required that that work be done under the influence of charity; yet the virtual influence suffices, which remains as long as the act of charity toward God, once elicited, has not been retracted. For they argue thus:[3] in order that an act of some virtue be meritorious of eternal life, it ought to proceed from habitual grace; but from grace no act proceeds except through the mediation of charity: for every movement and influence of grace tends toward God, the supernatural ultimate end; therefore no act can be meritorious of eternal life unless it is referred to God, the supernatural ultimate end, at least virtually by charity. - Yet this is denied by not a few theologians, especially Suarez and Vasquez;[4] for, Scripture being witness, eternal life is promised not only to acts of charity, but also to other supernatural works, namely obedience, poverty, meekness, and the rest of good works in general.[5] Besides, any supernatural work performed in the state of grace has sufficient proportion with eternal life. And this seems to be the mind of St. Thomas, who often teaches that every honorable act performed by him who is placed in the state of grace and elicits an act of charity as often as this is prescribed, is meritorious, because it is habitually and implicitly referred to God (above, n. 191).[6] - The controversy is more in the mode of conceiving than in the matter itself; for Thomists hold that all acts elicited by him who has charity, or is in the state of grace, are done virtually under the influence of charity and are meritorious, unless this is impeded by some disordering of the act. Besides, according to all, it is better often to offer our actions to God from the motive of charity: for thus merit is greatly increased.

[3] Salmanticenses, disp. IV, n. 7.

[4] Suarez, lib. XII, c. 9-10; Vasquez, Ia IIae, disp. 127.

[5] Mark, III, 35; Matt., V, 3-6; Rom., II, 6; I Tim., VI, 17.

[6] St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 5; *De Carit.*, q. un., a. 11, ad 2.

IV. Conditions on the Part of God.

204. In order that our works be truly meritorious, a positive ordination of God is required. For through merit de condigno we acquire a true right to reward; but a creature cannot acquire any strict right toward God unless some positive ordination of God is supposed: for all our acts are already owed to God by the manifold title of dependence, gratitude, etc.; hence, according to Trent, eternal life is "as a reward, from the promise of God Himself, to be rendered to the good works of the just."[1] Besides, our works, even supernatural ones, do not of themselves equal the reward granted to us, namely the beatific vision; and therefore our merit is not from mere justice, but partly from justice and partly from fidelity.

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16.

This can indeed be illustrated by a comparison: if some worker should labor of his own accord in the field of another person, without having been hired by him, he will not have a strict right to payment; but if he has done this from a pact, he will have a strict right to reward. Thus also we, while we labor in the vineyard of the Lord, cannot have a right to supernatural reward, unless God first has sent us into His vineyard and has declared a recompense to be annexed to such labor. Nevertheless it befits God so to act, because the worker is worthy of his pay, and it is fitting that happiness follow virtue.

205. Corollary. From this it is given to understand what circumstances can increase merit: 1. the greater excellence of the act itself, which is taken both from the object formally taken; for example, an act of charity is objectively better than an act of humility; and from the quantity of the work, for example in the case of alms; and from its difficulty: thus it is more meritorious to resist a grave temptation than a light one; 2. the end, or intention of the one operating; thus he merits more who acts from the motive of charity than he who acts from the motive of hope or fear; 3. greater intensity, or fervor, consisting in this, that we act with all our powers, with a great heart and a willing soul; likewise constancy in operating, which supposes a greater and more assiduous effort; 4. more intimate conjunction with Christ; for he who keeps himself more intimately united with Him derives from Him a greater power of meriting; for He Himself is the fountain and origin of all merits; and those who are joined to Him bring forth much fruit, according to the words of Christ Himself:[1] "He who remains in Me, and I in him, he bears much fruit."

[1] John, XV, 5.

Therefore let us act freely, honorably, and meritoriously, through Christ, and with Christ, and in Christ; and our works will truly be seeds of eternal life.

On Laws

Concerning Laws.

206. Human acts cannot tend toward the ultimate end unless they are conformable to the norm of morality, which, from what was said above, n. 25, is twofold, namely God, the supreme good and ultimate end, and the rational nature of man. The former is now to be treated. God is the ultimate norm of morality; for He infallibly sees what is good and how human actions can be ordered to the ultimate end; moreover, by force of His supreme dominion, He commands whatever He judges necessary for the attainment of our end. But this ordination is manifested to us through laws, by which the divine mind and will are signified. Now, among laws, some are divine, because they emanate directly and immediately from the divine will, but others are human, because they emanate directly from human authority, whether ecclesiastical or civil. Nevertheless even human laws, when they are just, proceed mediately from God, since God Himself has handed over to legitimate superiors the power of making laws: "For there is no power except from God."[1] - From this it follows that human acts ought to be conformable to laws, that they may lead us to the ultimate end. - Therefore we shall speak:

[1] Rom., XIII, 1.

I. Concerning the concept of law in general;

II. Concerning divine law;

III. Concerning human ecclesiastical law;

IV. Concerning human civil law.

Article I. Concerning the Concept of Law in General. — I. Notion.

207. 1. Law is defined by St. Thomas as "a certain ordination of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has care of the community."

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 90-93; Suarez, *De Legibus*, lib. I and lib. II, c. 1-4; Salmanticenses, Tr. XI, *De Legibus*, c. 1; Billuart, *De Legibus*, diss. I-II; Bouquillon, n. 53-64; Haine, t. I, *De Legibus*, q. 1-4; Ball. P., I, n. 236-239; Bautain, *Philosophie des Lois*, Paris, 1860, ch. I-II; Didiot, n. 588-607; Farges, op. cit., p. 252-265.

It is said: (a) ordination, or norm or rule, by force of which the acts of subjects are ordered to the due end; (b) of reason, because it pertains to reason to know the end and the means proportioned for attaining this end; yet the will accedes to reason, for commanding what reason has judged equitable; from this it is clear that a norm which is not just cannot truly be called a law, because it is not an ordination of reason. (c) For the common good, and consequently not for evil: for then it would not be an ordination nor law, but tyrannical oppression; for the common good, not however for the particular good of some private person or of some members of society: otherwise it would be a precept, not a law. This good can indeed be spiritual, or temporal, or both, and it tends at least mediately and implicitly to the ultimate end. (d) By him who has care of the community: for not just anyone can command such an ordination authentically, but only he who presides over the

community, that is, God Himself, and those to whom God has entrusted the power of ruling society. (e) Promulgated, or authentically published and imposed by the Prince, or in his name and authority; for in order that a rule can be useful, it must be applied to the subject; but it cannot be applied unless it is known, and knowledge occurs through promulgation.

2. This definition is deservedly held as masterly. Yet in it the obligation which law imposes is not explicitly declared, because the holy Doctor had already established earlier (a. 1) that law is a rule which obliges to acting. Therefore the definition can easily be completed with these words: "and obliging subjects to doing or omitting something." And thus law is distinguished from counsel.

208. According to St. Thomas,[2] law imposes obligation in a fourfold way, namely by commanding, forbidding, permitting, punishing: for it commands certain acts of virtues; prohibits evil acts; permits those which are indifferent, and from this permission there follows the obligation of not impeding others from performing those acts; punishes transgressors of the law, and therefore imposes on judges the obligation of inflicting punishment, and on subjects the obligation of undergoing punishment; sometimes it also irritates an act, rendering it invalid, in order more efficaciously to prohibit the same.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 92, a. 2.

II. Difference of Law from Precept.

209. A particular precept differs from law: (a) by reason of the subject upon whom the obligation is imposed: for a precept is imposed on one or more private persons, on account of a particular good; law on the whole society or community, and indeed for the common good. (b) By reason of the author: for making a law public authority and jurisdiction over some community are required; for a precept private authority suffices, for example the authority of parents over children, of a husband over a wife, of a master over servants. (c) By reason of duration: a precept, since it is enjoined for the good of private persons, perishes with the death of those upon whom it has been imposed, and therefore is not of itself perpetual; while law, which is made for the good of society, by its nature is born to endure; it can indeed be abrogated, but of itself it does not perish by the death of the legislator or of the first subjects: it endures as long as it has not been explicitly or implicitly revoked. Therefore if the legislator restricts the effect of the law to a determinate time, it is not properly a law, but a precept. (d) By reason of place: since law is given to a community, it directly affects the territory, and consequently does not oblige subjects who are legitimately outside the territory; but a precept, since it is directed to subjects, directly affects them and obliges them, even if they go out from the limits of the Prince's territory: it is something personal, and adheres to persons wherever they go.

It must be noted, however, that sometimes, among authors, the names law, precept, or statute are taken indiscriminately, so that the sense can be determined only from the context and various adjuncts.

III. Difference Between Eternal Law and Law Properly So Called.

210. 1. Eternal law, according to St. Thomas,[1] is "the reason of divine wisdom, according as it is directive of all acts and motions." Namely, God from eternity decreed to create creatures from nothing, and to order and direct them, according to His infinite wisdom, to the end. But He willed to direct them according to the proper nature of each: inanimate things, through the powers and properties impressed upon them; sentient things, through the instincts and tendencies placed in them; intellectual things, through the illumination of the intellect, and the motion by which He directs the will without harming its liberty. Now that ordination of all things to the ultimate end, insofar as it is considered as existing from eternity in the divine mind, is called the eternal law. Its existence is logically inferred from the dogmas of creation and providence.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 93, a. 1. - Eternal law, concerning which the pagans spoke only obscurely, is described by the Scriptures especially under the name of the wisdom or word of God: Job, XXXVIII-XXXIX; Prov., VIII-IX; Wisd., VI-XII; Ps. CXVIII. Cf. Corluy, *La sagesse dans l'Anc. Testament*, *Congrès scient. catholique*, 1888, t. I, p. 61-91.

It can indeed be called law in a broad sense, insofar as it is an ordination of reason, for the common good, willed by him who has care of the community; but it is not law in the strict sense set forth above; for from eternity the community upon which that ordination is imposed is lacking, and likewise promulgation is lacking.[1] From this head the eternal law already differs from the other laws: for it is not properly law, but the fountain of all laws.

[1] For that cannot be called a true promulgation which, according to Billuart, is made through the eternal Word and the book of life written from eternity; for this, unless we are mistaken, is a metaphorical manner of speaking.

211. 2. Laws properly so called are derived from the eternal law, insofar as they manifest to us this ordination which from the beginning exists in the divine mind. This is indeed clear as regards divine laws, which signify to us the will of God. But human laws are derived from the eternal law by a threefold reason: (a) as from an exemplary cause, because laws, that they may be just, ought to be conformable to the eternal law; (b) as from an efficient cause, insofar as every legislative power comes forth from God; (c) as from a directing cause, in the sense that divine reason, through the mediation of the light of reason or faith, directs legislators so that they may see what laws are to be established and when, according to the diversity of persons, times, places, and circumstances. Wherefore divine Wisdom deservedly says: "By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things; by me princes command, and the powerful decree justice."[2]

[2] Prov., VIII, 15-16.

Article II. Concerning Divine Law.

212. Divine law is twofold: natural, which is founded in the very nature of things, is necessarily enacted by God, and is promulgated in human conscience; positive, which is freely enacted by God and is promulgated in various external modes. Each must be discussed separately.

§ I. Concerning Natural Divine Law.

Here we hand down only the more general matters, since the various precepts of the natural law must be explained in the course of the work. Therefore we shall speak: 1. concerning the concept and

existence of the natural law; 2. concerning its object and character; 3. concerning its promulgation and knowledge.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 94; Suarez, *De Legibus*, lib. II, c. 5-17; Gonet, *Clypeus Theol. thomisticae*, tr. VI, disp. 3; Billuart, diss. II, art. 2-4; Muller, t. I, § 30-35; Meyer, t. I, n. 242-286; Bouquillon, n. 65-81; Noldin, n. 91-95; Bautain, op. cit., ch. 3-6, p. 46-129; Didiot, op. cit., n. 736-760.

I. Concerning the Concept and Existence of the Natural Law. — 1. Concerning the Concept of the Natural Law.

213. (A) Notion. (a) Natural law, according to St. Thomas,[2] "is nothing other than the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature." For God from eternity knows and ordains whatever is consonant with the nature of each being, and that ordination, from what was said above, n. 210, is called the eternal law. But in time He created rational creatures, and manifested this eternal law to them. Now natural law is nothing other than the manifestation or promulgation of the eternal law in the conscience of the rational creature. Therefore it can be defined: the divine ordination of the rational creature to the ultimate end, founded in nature itself, and perceived by the natural light.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 91, a. 2.

It is called natural for a twofold reason: namely because it embraces only precepts which are founded in the very nature of things, and moreover because it is known by the natural light. Thus it is distinguished from the positive law of God, which concerns things necessary for attaining the ultimate end, not of themselves, but from the will of God, and becomes known only by revelation.

Therefore natural law commands all those things which by their nature are honorable and necessary for the ultimate end; but it prohibits all those things which by their nature are evil. Hence it is thus described by Augustine:[1] "The eternal law is the divine reason or the will of God, commanding that the natural order be preserved, forbidding that it be disturbed."

[1] St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, l. XXII, c. 27, P. L., XLII, 418.

214. (b) Consequently natural law is not the free will of God alone, as the Nominalists used to say: for actions are not good or evil because they are commanded or prohibited by God, but rather are commanded or prohibited because divine reason, which cannot be deceived, sees that they are good or evil (above, n. 22).

Nor is it the dictate of practical human reason, or the categorical imperative of the autonomous will; for human reason is not the rule obliging, but only exhibiting and manifesting obligation (above, n. 26); and the human will is not autonomous, but essentially depends upon God.

2. Concerning the Existence of the Natural Law.

215. All those who acknowledge the existence and providence of God admit that some natural law exists in the sense explained above; but atheists, positivists, and evolutionists reject it, whose systems we have already explained, n. 34-42. - Traditionalists indeed admit the existence of the natural law, but they assert that, in the present state of fallen man, it becomes known to us only by the supernatural light of faith or tradition.

Thesis: A moral law must be acknowledged which deservedly is called natural, because it is inserted into nature by God, and can be known by the natural light of reason, at least as to its primary principles. - It is of faith that the natural law exists, since the ordinary magisterium of the Church clearly teaches this; it is certain that this law can be known naturally.

216. (A) It is proved by authority. St. Paul, after he had reproved the Jews who, notwithstanding the positive law of God, had sinned gravely, writes concerning the Gentiles, who had not received revelation: "For when the Gentiles, who have not the law [the Mosaic law], do naturally those things which are of the law, these, not having the law, are a law to themselves: who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one another, in the day when God shall judge the hidden things of men, according to my gospel, by Jesus Christ."[1] Now (a) there it is declared that the Gentiles, who lacked the Mosaic law, nevertheless observed certain precepts of the natural law, because, namely, this kind of law was written in their hearts, and conscience, reproving evil and approving good, urged its observance; and this law was not merely human, but divine, since according to it God will judge the Gentiles. (b) Moreover, the Apostle in no way teaches that this law was known by tradition, but by natural reason, since it is written in the heart and is confirmed by the testimony of conscience.

[1] Rom., II, 14-16. - That this text is to be understood of pagans we proved in *De Gratia*, n. 35, note 10.

217. The Fathers confirmed this doctrine of Paul; thus Tertullian says:[2] "Therefore do you seek the law of God? You have that common one in the public place of the world, in the natural tablets, to which also the Apostle is wont to appeal... when, in saying to the Romans that the nations by nature do those things which are of the law, he suggests both natural law and legal nature." - The same Fathers likewise teach that this law is inscribed in hearts by the finger of God, innate, inserted, implanted, and therefore known naturally by human understanding; thus St. Ambrose:[3] "Therefore that law is not written, but is born within; nor is it received by any reading, but is expressed in each one by a certain flowing fountain of nature." Nor otherwise Chrysostom:[4] "From the beginning, forming man, God placed the natural law within him. And what, finally, is the natural law? He impressed conscience upon us, and willed the knowledge of good things and of contrary things to have been implanted by nature." - Leo XIII briefly sums this up: "Such is the chief of all, the natural law, which is written and engraved in the souls of individual men, because it is human reason itself commanding right action and forbidding sin."[5]

[2] Tertullian, *De corona*, VI, apud Migne, P. L., II, 83.

[3] St. Ambrose, *Epist*. 73, n. 3, Migne, P. L., XVI, 1251.

[4] St. Chrysostom, homil. XII, *de statuis*, Migne, P. G., XLIX, 131.

[5] Encycl. *Praestantissimum*, 20 Jun. 1888.

218. (B) The same is established psychologically and historically. (a) By the intimate testimony of conscience we know that certain actions are good of themselves, and others depraved (above, n. 22), - that the latter are to be avoided, but the former to be done, at least those which are apprehended as necessary and as commanded by supreme authority, - so that he who obeys

this command obtains peace of soul, while he who transgresses the same is disturbed by the goads of conscience. Now all these things suppose that some natural law exists, promulgated in each one's conscience, which we are bound to obey, and indeed a universal and absolute law: for this authoritatively commands the fulfillment of certain duties for all and unconditionally, independently of any civil law.[1]

[1] J. Simon, *Le Devoir*, 3e p., ch. 1, p. 233-262.

(b) The intimate experience of each person is confirmed in no small degree by the unanimous consent of peoples, who, although they think differently concerning some moral precepts, nevertheless agree in admitting a moral distinction between good and evil; - they hold that there is some law which arises not from kings, nor from the decrees of the people or senate, but from nature itself or from the divine power; - that violators of it are vexed by anxieties, even when they can avoid human punishments; - and that from it other laws draw their force, so that they ought to be conformable to it.

219. Thus, among the Greeks, Sophocles commends the natural law in this way:[2] "Would that fortune be present to me for attaining the holy integrity of all words and works, concerning which sublime laws have been set forth, born in the heavenly ether, of which Olympus alone is father, and the mortal race did not beget them, nor indeed will oblivion ever lull them to sleep: in these there is a great God, and He does not wither with age." Among the Latins, let Cicero be heard:[3] "I see that this was the judgment of the wisest men, that law was neither devised by the talents of men, nor is it some decree of peoples, but something eternal, which rules the whole world by the wisdom of commanding and forbidding... But it arose together with the divine mind. Wherefore true and chief law, apt for commanding and forbidding, is the right reason of supreme Jove." Among the Chinese likewise a universal rule of morals is admitted, which rules heaven and earth, and is read as inscribed in the heart of all.[4] Similar things are found among various nations, even barbarous ones.[5]

[2] Sophocles, *Oedip.*, v. 863-871; cf. *Antigon.*, v. 446-460. Similar things may be seen apud Plato, *Respub.*, l. IV, p. 427, ed. Stephan.

[3] Cicero, *De Legibus*, II, 4. Cf. *Pro Milone*, IV, 10; *Philipp.*, XI, c. 12, n. 28; likewise the fragment preserved apud Lactantius should be read, *Instit*. VI, 8, Migne, P. L., VI, 660-661.

[4] "The rule of moral conduct of man is the law of all intelligences; it illumines the universe in the highest heavens, as in the deepest abysses. The rule of moral conduct of the wise man has its principle in the heart of all men, whence it rises to its highest manifestation, to enlighten heaven and earth with its brilliant rays." (Apud J. L. De Lanessan, *La Morale des Philosophes Chinois*, Paris, Alcan, 1896, p. 44-45.)

[5] Cf. Quatrefages, *L'unité de l'espèce humaine*; *L'espèce humaine*, Paris, Alcan; Carbonnelle, *L'aveuglement scientifique*, in period. *Revue des Quest. scientif.*, VII, 193.

220. (C) Reason supports this. For once the creation of man is posited, natural law already becomes necessary. For God, the most wise creator and orderer of all things, must direct all beings to the end for which they were destined by Him. But no directive principle is suitable for beings endowed with liberty except a moral rule. Beings which lack liberty tend to their end by a certain necessary instinct divinely impressed; but man, since he is free, tends to his end only freely; and therefore he must not be led by a blind and necessary impulse, but by a moral rule

which shows him the way to be followed, without taking away his free will. But this rule, common to all, can be nothing other than a certain participation or manifestation of the eternal law, or, in other words, the natural law.

II. Concerning the Object and Character of the Natural Law.

Once the existence of the natural law has been proved, it is useful to describe its object and character.

1. Concerning the Object or Matter of the Natural Law.

221. In a general way the natural law embraces those things which are so fitting or repugnant to rational nature that they ought to be commanded or prohibited by the Author of nature.

(A) Now, with respect to the logical nexus by which they are connected with one another, the precepts of the natural law are of three kinds: -

(a) Some indeed are most universal, so that the rest flow from them; such are these and similar ones: good is to be pursued and evil avoided; the supreme good is to be loved; what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; live conformably to right reason.

222. Among philosophers and theologians it is asked what is the supreme principle from which the rest flow logically. St. Thomas asserts that it is this: good is to be done and evil avoided.[1] According to others: Live conformably to human nature, considered according to all its essential relations.[2] Berti proposes this, according to the mind of St. Augustine: Love God as the end and the rest on account of Him.[3] Others prefer this formula: Exhibit also by free actions the image of God, absolutely holy, impressed upon you by way of rational nature.[4] Meyer proposes this: Preserve the right order of rational nature as divinely holy.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.

[2] Thus not a few Scholastics.

[3] Berti, *Theolog. discipl.*, lib. XX, c. 4, prop. 3.

[4] Carl Aeger, *Moralphilosophie*, 1873, S. c. 63 ff.

[1] Meyer, op. cit., n. 284.

Of these, the formula of St. Thomas is the simplest and most clearly intelligible; the last, although not so clearly intelligible, seems more complete and scientific; the Augustinian one is in itself most perfect, but in the order of knowledge it is not first, nor explicitly known to all. In any case all agree substantially as to the sense.

223. (b) In the second place come those precepts which are deduced from universal principles by an immediate and easy discourse; for example, honor your father and mother, you shall not steal, you shall not kill, and the rest contained in the Decalogue, if one excepts the sanctification of the Sabbath day, which is a positive law.

(c) In the third place proceed those precepts which are deduced from the first principles remotely and only by diligent study and more difficult discourse; for example, an injury inflicted on someone, in a

well-ordered society, is not to be avenged by one's own authority. Since precepts of this kind are not easily known by all, they are often proposed more clearly and certainly by positive law.

224. (B) With respect to necessity, the precepts of the natural law are some primary and others secondary: the former are so necessary for the particular or social good that, without them, the moral order is impossible; thus blasphemy, the unjust killing of an innocent man, false testimony, etc., are opposed to primary natural right. - But secondary precepts are those which are very useful for the particular or social good, but not necessary, so that the moral order can subsist without them, although less perfectly; thus polygamy and divorce are opposed to secondary natural right.

225. (C) By reason of the object about which they are concerned, natural precepts regard: (a) God, who is to be worshiped and loved; (b) our neighbor, to whom reverence, justice, and charity are owed; (c) ourselves, insofar as we ought to subject the sensitive faculties to reason, and reason to God.

2. Concerning the Character of the Natural Law.

226. The natural law is universal, immutable, and non-dispensable; the reason is because it flows not from the positive will of God, but from the very nature of things. This, however, needs declaration.

(A) The natural law is universal, insofar as it binds all those who enjoy the use of reason; for, on the one hand, it is promulgated in the conscience of each rational being, and on the other it is enacted for every rational creature.

It is asked, however, whether it also reaches infants and the insane. The controversy had concerning this matter can be reconciled in this way: the natural law of itself affects them, insofar as they are radically and potentially rational; but it does not oblige them morally, under penalty of sin:[1] for only those are capable of moral obligation and imputability who enjoy the use of reason.

[1] Adults, however, using reason, sin when they impel them to act against the natural law.

227. (B) The natural law is immutable, in the sense that it cannot be changed in itself, although it admits some changes in its application.

(a) Indeed, it cannot be changed in itself: for it is founded in the very nature of the rational being, considered in its relations with the ultimate end; but the nature of things and their relations to the ultimate end always remain the same. - Yet in order rightly to understand immutability of this kind, we must consider the natural law not in some abstract and insufficiently determined principle, but with all the adjuncts which constitute morality. Thus homicide is prohibited by natural right, and nevertheless there are many cases in which it is licit to kill others. But to one attending even a little, it is clear that not every homicide is prohibited, but only unjust killing, or the killing of an innocent man by private authority, without necessity; consequently, when an unjust aggressor is killed, or a criminal is condemned to death, the natural law is not changed, since it in no way prohibits the legitimate defense of oneself or of society: the circumstances, the adjuncts, are changed; the law itself remains the same.

This is true also of secondary precepts; take, for example, polygamy, which is opposed to secondary natural right, and yet flourished among some Patriarchs; the law itself suffered no change in itself; for at every time it was contrary to the secondary ends of marriage, especially to the peace of families; but, since it did not hinder the primary end of marriage, namely the procreation and education of offspring, it could be permitted or tolerated, with means employed by which abuses would be prevented.[1]

[1] Some older scholastics wrote that the natural law can be changed as to the more remote conclusions; they bring the example of a deposit, which by natural right ought to be returned, and nevertheless sometimes cannot be returned, because, for example, it is foreseen that the owner will use the deposited sword to kill an enemy. - But in a case of this kind there is no change of the natural law; for the law does not establish that a deposit is to be returned in every case, but forbids it to be returned at that time when the owner is going to abuse his own thing.

(b) But in its application it suffers some changes, when secondary precepts are in question. Thus God tolerated, under certain conditions, polygamy and divorce; for in those things which are not absolutely necessary, but only very useful, it can happen that, circumstances having changed, the application of the law, even if very useful, is not urged; for example, among the Jews divorce was tolerated, in order to avoid worse abuses, namely adultery or the killing of a spouse; but divorce of itself remained contrary to the perfect equality of the contract, to the best education of offspring, to the peace of families, etc.

228. (C) The natural law is not properly dispensable; and indeed, if God Himself does not change the natural law, no one on earth, not even the vicar of Christ himself, can dispense in this law.[2] The Church, however, can declare and interpret it, and that infallibly; for she received from Christ the power of teaching, and consequently of explaining and interpreting divine laws, by defining whether in these or those adjuncts they truly oblige. Thus the indissolubility of marriage pertains to secondary natural right; but the Church, by long-standing practice, has implicitly declared that this indissolubility does not belong to a marriage simply ratified.

[2] Likewise some older theologians said that some dispensation can be admitted in secondary natural law; they bring the example of the permission given to the Hebrews to carry off the goods of the Egyptians; but from this nothing can be inferred as to the thesis set forth: for since God is the supreme lord of all goods, He could transfer the ownership of certain goods from the Egyptians to the Hebrews, on account of the reason of the public good, or by way of compensation for the labors furnished.

III. Concerning the Promulgation and Knowledge of the Natural Law. — 1. Concerning the Promulgation of the Natural Law.

229. The natural law certainly obliges all rational creatures as soon as it has been sufficiently promulgated in their conscience: for it is nothing other than the manifestation of divine reason and will, which all must obey.

(A) Now, on God's part, for sufficient promulgation two things are required and suffice: (a) that the most universal principles of the law can easily be known by him who enjoys the use of reason; (b) that from these, through natural means, internal and external, individual and social, those practical conclusions can be deduced which are necessary for the right institution of life. It is in no way required that all men be able to acquire these notions for themselves with equal facility, or know individual conclusions without admixture of error; for this would contradict the natural inequality

and infirmity of men. Therefore it suffices that those who enjoy lesser ability can learn from those who are endowed with a more powerful mind the truths necessary for living rightly.

As to the fact, man is indeed physically capable, by his own powers, of knowing the natural law; but, as the Vatican says,[1] "it is to be attributed to divine revelation that those things which in divine matters are not of themselves inaccessible to human reason, in the present condition also of the human race, can be known by all expeditiously, with firm certitude, and with no admixture of error." - If man had remained in the state of pure nature, God would have furnished men, by a special natural concurrence, the means for knowing the natural law more expeditiously.

[1] Vatican, sess. III, cap. 2, *de Revelatione*; we explained this decree in Tr. *de Vera Relig.*, n. 50.

230. (B) But on man's part, certain things are necessary for attaining knowledge of natural right: (a) positive means, namely one's own study of the truth, recourse to wiser men in more difficult matters, prayer to God, who is the Father of lights; for right reason suggests all these things; (b) negative means, or the removal of impediments, the chief of which are levity of mind and want of reflection, prejudices, depraved customs which cloud the mind, and evil counsels received from others.

If, notwithstanding those means seriously employed, knowledge of some natural precept could not be acquired morally, the ignorance is invincible; otherwise it is called vincible, according to what was explained above, n. 91-92.

2. Concerning the Knowledge of the Natural Law.

231. From this it can be understood what sort of ignorance can be admitted concerning the precepts of natural right.

(A) The first and most universal principles of the natural law cannot be invincibly unknown by an adult who is fully in possession of reason. For these principles stand to practical reason as the first principles of demonstrations stand to speculative reason: both are per se known; thus no one in possession of himself can be ignorant that good is to be done and evil avoided.

232. (B) Particular precepts, which are deduced immediately and clearly from the first principles, cannot be invincibly unknown for a long time by one who uses suitably developed reason. Such are: honor your father, do not kill an innocent man, do not steal, etc. For these, since they flow from known principles by an obvious and easy inference, cannot be unknown for long by one whose reason has been sufficiently cultivated. It can indeed happen that, by prejudices imbued from infancy, by depraved persuasions and examples, and also by evil habits, the mind is clouded for some time; but, when someone in good faith pursues the truth, and thinks seriously about the rule of morals, at least a doubt arises concerning the liceity of acts contrary to these natural precepts; but doubt produces the obligation of inquiring further about the truth, and God does not deny the help of illumination to those who inquire. But if the search for truth is omitted, the ignorance is not without fault: and the gravity of this is judged from what was said, n. 95-97.

233. (C) Remote conclusions of the natural law can be invincibly unknown even by one who uses suitably developed reason. For conclusions of this kind can be known only after diligent study has been premised, and with great difficulty; wherefore they are not rarely unknown by those who cannot diligently devote themselves to the study of truth, whether because of weakness of mind, or because of lack of time, or the necessity of attending to other matters. Moreover, in the more remote conclusions of the natural law, there is often some obscurity and uncertainty: for the more we recede from first principles, the more frequent is the danger of erring or at least of doubting. Hence among theologians themselves it is often disputed whether this or that precept pertains to natural right; thus, for example, Scotus taught that the precepts of the second table are not of natural right,[1] while most others hold otherwise; it is disputed whether there is a natural obligation of referring all acts to God, whether every lie is evil per se, etc.; what wonder, therefore, if the unlearned are ignorant of many other things?

[1] Scotus, in III *Sentent.*, dist. 37.

In fact confessors, who have frequented the sacred tribunal, know very well that certain penitents labor under the greatest ignorance concerning the more remote conclusions of the natural law, for example concerning the malice of internal acts,[2] or even of an officious lie, of perjury for preserving life,[3] of certain acts against chastity,[4] etc. - Therefore penitents are to be questioned prudently, treated benignly when they are in ignorance, - and instructed discreetly.

[2] Cf. Lacroix, lib. I, n. 135; St. Alphonsus, *De conscientia*, n. 9.

[3] Sanchez, *De praeceptis Decal.*, lib. I, c. 16, n. 33.

[4] St. Thomas, *Quaest. disp., de malo*, q. 3, a. 8, thinks it can happen that someone invincibly does not know the prohibition of fornication. Cf. Ball. P., I, n. 48.

§ II. Concerning Positive Divine Law.

234. Since perfect knowledge of the natural law, without admixture of error, is very difficult for the human race, some clear and positive declaration of this law through revelation becomes useful. Indeed, granted that man was elevated to the supernatural state, it is necessary that he be directed to the supernatural end through positive divine law: for means ought to be proportioned to the end. - In fact God, through revelation made to men, promulgated certain precepts of natural right, and also precepts imposed by His positive will. In that revelation a threefold stage is usually distinguished: the primeval law, manifested to the first parents and patriarchs, and therefore destined for the whole human race; the old law, or Mosaic law, manifested through Moses to the Israelite people; the new law, or Christian law, promulgated by the Incarnate Word, or Christ, for the whole human race. - Nothing special occurs here to be said concerning the primeval law, since very few things are known concerning it; wherefore the old and the new law must be briefly discussed.

I. Concerning the Old Law, or Mosaic Law.

235. It is not our purpose to examine the historical questions concerning the Mosaic law which today are agitated with great heat not only among rationalists, but even among Catholics: for this pertains to the history of revelation.[1] Yet it is fitting to outline a few things: 1. concerning

the character and end of this law; 2. concerning its object; 3. concerning its obligation and abrogation, so that the perfection of the new law may be better understood.

[1] Concerning this matter, cf. Vigouroux, *Les Livres Saints et la Critique rationaliste*, 3rd ed., 1891, t. III, p. 3-226; Hummelauer, *Comment. in Exodum*, 1891, p. 16-25; in *Deut.*, 1901, p. 23-110; Pelt, *Histoire de l'Anc. Testament*, 4th ed., Paris, 1904, t. I, ch. XXVII, p. 295-331; Prat, S. J., *Le Code du Sinaï, sa genèse et son évolution*, Paris, Bloud, 1904; Lagrange, O. P., *La Méthode historique*, 3rd ed., 1904, p. 147-182.

1. Concerning the Character and End of the Mosaic Law.

236. Since the natural law, impressed upon minds, and the primeval law given to the first parents and patriarchs, had gradually been obscured, whether because of sin, or because of the long stay of the Israelites in Egypt, it was opportune that the chief precepts of each should again be solemnly promulgated and completed by others, by which the chosen people would be more efficaciously removed from idolatry and corruption of morals. For this reason, in the third month after Israel's departure from the land of Egypt, on Mount Sinai, the ten precepts of the Decalogue were promulgated,[2] which contain the sum of the moral precepts of the ancient law; for the rest, not expressed in the Decalogue, are either presupposed, as the precept of faith and love,[3] or follow from others, as the prohibition of lying,[4] which is inferred from the eighth precept, - and the prohibition of unjust hatred,[5] which is deduced from the fifth. - Yet to these moral precepts were added ceremonial and judicial precepts, which were accommodated to the special condition of the Hebrews, and were ordered to the more perfect observation of the moral precepts.

[2] Exod., XIX-XX; cf. Hummelauer, in hunc loc.

[3] Deut., VI, 5; Levit., XIX, 18.

[4] Exod., XXIII, 1.

[5] Levit., XIX, 17-18.

237. (A) That law is truly divine, insofar as it proceeds from God through revelation or inspiration. For this is declared many times not only in the Old Testament (loc. cit.), but also in the New; thus St. Stephen, the interpreter of Jewish tradition, says:[1] "You received the law in the disposition of angels"; and Paul declares that the law was ordained through angels in the hand of a mediator;[2] for the ministry of angels denotes the intervention of God.

[1] Acts, VII, 53.

[2] Galat., III, 19.

From this, however, it is in no way permitted to infer that the Hebrew legislator borrowed nothing from the primeval law, from the customs of the patriarchs, or from foreign laws: for God, by inspiring the sacred authors, can move them to use all those things which they already know naturally. Thus, for example, abstinence from things strangled and from blood, and circumcision, had already been prescribed before Moses;[3] likewise divorce, polygamy, slavery, and the law of retaliation had been in use, and the Mosaic law limited all these things rather than established them; moreover, certain moral or ritual precepts are almost the same as those which flourished among the Chaldeans and Egyptians.[4]

[3] Gen., IX, 4-6; Gen., XVII, 10-14.

[4] Cf. Prat, op. cit., p. 16-20; Lagrange, op. cit., p. 156-182, where he sets up a comparison between the Mosaic law and the code of Hammourabi recently discovered by V. Scheil, O. P.

But how much the Mosaic law excels foreign laws is clear to one who attends a little: (a) for it clearly and explicitly inculcates monotheism, and strictly prohibits the worship of idols, which flourished among other peoples: "I am the Lord your God... You shall not have strange gods before me. You shall not make for yourself a graven thing..."[5] (b) Moreover slavery, although tolerated, is much milder than among neighboring nations.[6] (c) The sum of the law is the love of God and of neighbor: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole strength;[7]... You shall love your friend as yourself."[8] (d) Not only external sins are prohibited, but also internal ones:[9] "You shall not covet your neighbor's house; nor shall you desire his wife." (e) Nor is only negative holiness commanded, but also positive holiness, which consists in a certain imitation of divine holiness: "Be holy, because I am holy, the Lord your God."[10]

[5] Exod., XX, 2-4.

[6] Exod., XXI, 1-11.

[7] Deut., VI, 5.

[8] Levit., XIX, 18.

[9] Exod., XX, 17.

[10] Levit., XIX, 2.

238. (B) To urge the observance of the precepts, the Mosaic law chiefly, although not exclusively, uses temporal promises and threats. St. Thomas explains the reason for this:[1] just as in speculative matters means are proposed to the hearer according to his condition, so in moral matters men must be led to the observance of laws by means proportioned to their character, namely by punishments and rewards. Now the Israelites, since they were stiff-necked and especially inclined toward temporal things, were more easily led by the hand to execute the commandments through temporal promises and threats. Wherefore God, accommodating Himself to them, leads them to divine worship by the promise of temporal things, which are symbols of eternal goods: "Whence it was fitting for the old law that through temporal things which were in the affection of imperfect men, it should lead men by the hand to God."

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 99, a. 6.

239. (C) The Mosaic law, although divine, received various additions at various times:[2] for God did not cease to accommodate His laws to the condition of the Jews; hence He sent Prophets, who not only recalled the people to the observance of the law, but also authentically interpreted and completed the law.[3] Likewise He inspired other writers, who in the sapiential books and in the psalms explained the ancient precepts of ethics and handed down new and more perfect ones. The historical books also, besides the examples of virtue which they report, contain not a few precepts or counsels which are especially useful for the spiritual life. Hence, in order to know the old law accurately, it is not enough to read the Mosaic books, but it is necessary to run attentively through the other sacred writers.

[2] In the Mosaic books a threefold series of laws can already be distinguished: (a) the Code or volume of the covenant (Exod., XX-XXIII); (b) the priestly Code (Exod., XXV-XXX and XXXV-XL; Levit. in its entirety; Num., I-IX, XV, XVII-XIX, XXVIII-XXX, XXXIV-XXXV); (c) Deuteronomy, which either contracts or more fully explains each code.

[3] You will find certain examples apud Prat, op. cit., p. 48-67.

240. (D) But the end of the law is Christ;[4] for, as St. Peter says,[5] "all the prophets, from Samuel and afterward, who have spoken, announced these days" (messianic days). The law itself was our pedagogue in Christ, that is, leading us to Christ; for its various precepts, not only moral, but also ceremonial, especially those which regard sacrifices and sacraments, were divinely ordered to preparing the way of the Messiah; for by the observation of the law they disposed the Jews to understand and receive more easily the more perfect law of Christ. This indeed is true also of many historical facts, according to that saying of the Apostle:[1] "All these things happened to them in figures"; for many things tended to this, that they might draw minds away from temporal things, and dispose them to awaiting the spiritual kingdom of the Messiah. Therefore the law cannot be rightly understood unless it is kept before the mind that this is a preparation for the evangelical law.

[4] Rom., X, 4.

[5] Acts, III, 24-25. We proved this elsewhere, *De Vera Relig.*, n. 229-265.

[1] 1 Cor., X, 11; cf. Fillon, *La Ste Bible*, t. I, Introduction, p. 2-10.

2. Concerning the Object of the Mosaic Law.

In the old law are contained moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts. -

241. (A) Moral precepts, which are briefly summed up in the Decalogue. For there the chief duties toward God and neighbor are handed down.

St. Thomas declares this as follows:[2] To God, as the principle of the community, three things are owed: fidelity, reverence, service. Fidelity consists in this, that He alone be adored; hence the first precept: "You shall not have strange gods." Reverence demands that nothing injurious be committed against Him; whence the second precept is as follows: "You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain." Service is owed in recompense for benefits received from the Lord: and to this pertains the third precept concerning the sanctification of the Sabbath, in memory of the benefit of creation. - But toward neighbor, the duties to be fulfilled are special or general: special with regard to parents, to whom children ought to show honor, according to the fourth precept. General duties consist in this, that harm be inflicted on no one by deed, mouth, or heart. By deed let no injury be committed against the person himself: You shall not kill, according to the fifth precept; nor against the person joined in marriage: You shall not commit adultery, as the sixth precept bears; nor in external goods: You shall not steal, as the seventh precept declares. Harm of the mouth is prohibited by the eighth precept: You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor. But harm of the heart is prohibited by the ninth and tenth precepts: You shall not desire the wife... You shall not covet your neighbor's house.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 5.

Yet these precepts presuppose another one handed down elsewhere, namely the love of God and of neighbor, as we explained above, n. 236.

242. (B) Ceremonial precepts, which determined the peculiar mode by which God was to be worshiped at that time, and at the same time prefigured the mysteries and sacraments of Christ. From this it can be understood why precepts of this kind were so numerous:[3] (a) to promote the worship of God;

[3] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 101, a. 3.

for since the Jews were prone to idolatry and the neighboring nations worshiped idols in manifold ways, it was necessary likewise to institute many and solemn ceremonial precepts, by which the chosen people might be more efficaciously deterred from the worship of idols; if the worship offered to the true God had been too simple, the Israelites would easily have been led away to the more solemn worship of the gods; and indeed, when Christian rites, much simpler than Jewish rites, succeeded them, not a few Hebrews converted to the faith grieved greatly over the abrogation of the ancient rites, as is evident from the Epistle to the Hebrews. (b) Moreover, the ceremonial precepts prefigured Christ who was to come, as the *Decree for the Jacobites* declares:[1] "All the sacred rites, sacrifices, sacraments, and ceremonies of the Old Testament pre-signified Him [Christ] as one day to come." But the mysteries of Christ, on account of their perfection and multiplicity, could be prefigured only by many rites: for the individual Mosaic rites, as imperfect, signified only one or another aspect of the mysteries of Christ; thus, in order to represent the one sacrifice of the New Law, there were many and diverse old sacrifices, each of which in its own way prefigured the immolation of Christ.[2]

[1] Apud Denzing., n. 602.

[2] Concerning the reason and sense of the ceremonies of the old law, cf. Bähr, *Symbolik des mosaischen cultus*, Heidelberg, 1874, t. I; Broglie, *Confér. sur l'idée de Dieu dans l'Ancien Testament*, Paris, 1892, 6th Conf., p. 197-223; Lesêtre, apud Vigouroux, *Dict. de la Bible*, t. II, 437-441.

243. (C) Judicial precepts, or civil or political ones, which ordered the Israelites toward one another, under the rule of God, the supreme king. For God was held not only as spiritual Lord, but also as temporal king of the Jewish people. Wherefore He determined their political and social state by judicial laws, and ordered it especially to a twofold end: (a) that the Israelites, by living according to justice and equity, might be prepared step by step for the messianic kingdom, which is a kingdom of justice and equity; (b) that by the social rule of the chosen people the constitution of the Church of Christ might in some way be prefigured.[3] - According to St. Thomas,[4] judicial precepts are divided into four species: (a) those which regard the institution of princes and magistrates, their offices, and the reverence to be shown to them; (b) those which pertain to fellow-citizens in their mutual relations, for example purchases, sales, judgments, punishments, etc.; (c) those which regard foreigners, for example wars against enemies, the manner of acting toward pilgrims and strangers; (d) those which refer to domestic life, namely wives, children, servants.[5]

[3] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 104, a. 1-2.

[4] Ibid., a. 4.

[5] Pelt hands down a brief synopsis of these civil laws, op. cit., t. II, p. 40-59.

3. Concerning the Obligation and Abrogation of the Mosaic Law.

244. (A) Concerning obligation. (a) The old law, insofar as it promulgates moral precepts of natural right, obliges all men who have attained knowledge of these, not because it is the Mosaic law, but because it is the natural law impressed upon hearts; and therefore the precepts of the Decalogue, if you except the sanctification of the Sabbath day, which does not pertain to the natural law, bound the Gentiles per se and also bind them today, and likewise Christians themselves; for, according to the common and true opinion, these precepts, with the third excepted, are nothing other than an exposition of the natural law. Wherefore Trent strikes with anathema those who hold that "the ten precepts pertain in no way to Christians."[1]

[1] Trent, sess. VI, can. 19.

(b) But the ceremonial and judicial precepts obliged only the Jews, and the proselytes of justice,[2] who by circumcision were inserted into the Jewish nation: for these were positive precepts, which had been enacted not for the Gentiles, but for the chosen people alone. Just as today clerics and religious are held by certain laws which in no way bind laymen, so the Israelites were bound to observe certain special commandments to which other peoples were not bound.[3] But because legal observances were of no little profit for attaining holiness and salvation more securely, certain Gentiles, who converted themselves to the true God, freely took up the obligation of observing the Mosaic laws.

[2] Proselytes of justice were Gentiles converted to the faith, who by circumcision were inserted into the Jewish people; proselytes of the gate, although truly converted, were not circumcised, but only had to fulfill the precepts which were called Noachic (Gen., IX, 4).

[3] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 98, a. 5.

245. (B) Concerning the abrogation of the old law. From what has already been said, the moral precepts were in no way abrogated by the new law. But the ceremonial and judicial precepts were abrogated through Christ, as is evident from the Council of Jerusalem, which, against the Pharisees, declared that circumcision and the other Mosaic prescriptions were no longer in force,[4] - and from the Epistle to the Galatians, where the Apostle severely reproves the converts who had wished to bind themselves to this law. - And deservedly; for, since they had been instituted to prefigure and prepare the advent of Christ, once Christ had come, they could no longer persist.

[4] Acts, XV, 5-29.

Yet, during the life of Christ, the law was in force together with the Gospel, and He Himself willed to fulfill the law, because the mystery of Redemption had to be consummated only through the passion and death of the Savior. Christ having died, the legal observances were dead in law, because our redemption was then completed; yet in fact they were abrogated only at that time when the Gospel had been promulgated.

II. Concerning the New Law, or Christian Law.

God, who in many portions and in many ways had formerly spoken to the fathers in the prophets, in the fullness of time spoke in the Son, who instituted the new law, preached it by words and

examples, and sealed it by His blood. We shall explain concerning this law: 1. its character and end; 2. its object; 3. its perfection and duration.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 106-108; Suarez, lib. X; Bellarmine, *Controversiae*, *De justificatione*, lib. IV; Muller, § 42-46; Bouquillon, n. 85-103; Bautain, op. cit., ch. 7, p. 142-152; Stevens, *The Theology of the New Testament*, New York, 1899, pp. 17-26, 65-75, 92-149.

1. Concerning the Character and End of the New Law.

246. (A) The Christian law is deservedly said to have been promulgated not through Angels, but through Christ Himself, written not on tablets of stone, but in the hearts of the faithful. For the Prophets had already announced this: "I will give my law in their inward parts, and I will write it in their heart."[2] And St. Paul sees the fulfillment of this prophecy in the new dispensation; for, addressing the faithful, he says:[3] "You are the epistle of Christ, ministered by us, and written not with ink, but with the spirit of the living God, not in tables of stone, but in the fleshy tables of the heart."

[2] Jerem., XXXI, 33; this prophecy is declared to have been fulfilled through the new law, Hebr., VIII, 10, X, 16. - There note that the new law is not presented as something imposed from without, but as an internal rule, which the Christian, under the influence of grace, makes his own.

[3] 2 Cor., III, 3.

This metaphor signifies that the new law has been put into the mind through the abundance of faith, which proposes to us the rules of acting more explicitly and clearly, - and has been inscribed upon the heart through the abundance of love, which sweetly inclines us to do those things which are commanded.[4] Indeed, to the old law there had been joined a certain grace of illumination and love, but much less abundant: for since the price of redemption had not yet been paid, it was not fitting that such copious grace be granted to the Jews; but, once the price was paid by the death of Christ, much more copious grace was poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit.

[4] Thus it is distinguished from the natural law, which indeed is said to be engraved on the heart, but naturally, while the new law is said to be inscribed by the supernatural light of faith.

Paul indeed inculcates this many times, especially in the Epistle to the Romans and to the Galatians: for there he shows that justification is not from the Mosaic law and from the works of the law, but from faith which works through charity; for often the law of itself excites concupiscence and is the occasion of sin, not because it is evil, but because, on account of our infirmity, we act against its prescriptions: "For the law works wrath; for where there is no law, neither is there transgression.[1]... What then shall we say? Is the law sin? God forbid. But I did not know sin except through the law."[2] Grace alone can help us to fulfill the law; this indeed was given to the Hebrews, but sparingly, while it is granted abundantly to Christians: "For the law [the new law] of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has freed me from the law of sin and death."[3]

[1] Rom., IV, 15.

[2] Rom., VII, 7; cf. VII, 11-25.

[3] Rom., VIII, 2.

247. (B) The new law is wholly spiritual; (a) for its sanction does not consist in temporal threats or promises, but in spiritual and eternal ones: "And fear not those who kill the body, and cannot kill the soul; but rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell."[4] - Wherefore it calls blessed those who are poor in spirit, who mourn, who suffer persecution for justice, because their reward is great in heaven.[5] On the other hand, it denounces riches and honors as impediments which retard us from the kingdom of heaven: "Woe to you that are rich, for you have your consolation. Woe to you that are filled, for you shall hunger[6]... For what does it profit a man if he gain the whole world, but suffer the loss of his own soul?"[7]

[4] Matt., X, 28.

[5] Matt., V, 3-12.

[6] Luke, VI, 24-25.

[7] Matt., XVI, 26.

(b) The kingdom which Christ preaches is not a temporal kingdom, such as had been conceived by many Jews, but a spiritual kingdom, for entering which there are required faith in the Gospel, love of God and neighbor, imitation of Christ, and denial of self, as will be more fully explained in the Treatise on the Virtues.

(c) The worship which He promotes, although it ought to be manifested externally, ought especially to be internal: "But the hour comes, and now is, when the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth."[1] Hence the ancient sacrifices, which consisted chiefly in external immolation, have been abolished, and there succeeds to them the sacrifice of Christ Himself, who immolates not only His body, but His soul by most perfect obedience: "Therefore coming into the world he says: Sacrifice and oblation you did not will, but a body you have fitted to me; holocausts for sin did not please you. Then I said: Behold I come; in the head of the book it is written of me that I should do your will, O God."[2] Wherefore He wills His disciples to offer to God spiritual victims, namely good works done for the sake of God, and not from ostentation: "Take heed that you do not your justice before men, to be seen by them; otherwise you shall not have a reward with your Father who is in heaven."[3]

[1] John, IV, 23.

[2] Hebr., X, 5-7.

[3] Matt., VI, 1.

248. (C) The end of the evangelical law is to promote the glory of God and of Christ, - and indeed in the most perfect mode, namely by attaining true and internal sanctification, by which we are made partakers of the divine nature, adopted sons of God, and His heirs, and co-heirs with Christ, - by which consequently we merit eternal beatitude, or the clear vision of God and perfect love. Christ proposed this end to Himself: "I have glorified you on the earth; I have finished the work which you gave me to do. And now glorify me, you, Father, with yourself, with the glory which I had with you before the world was."[4] His disciples ought to set the same end before themselves: "That in all things God may be honored through Jesus Christ[5]... Do all things for the glory of God."[6] To glorify God, they ought to imitate His holiness, insofar as it can be done:[7] "Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect." When we have accomplished this according to our powers, we await glory as the crown of justice;[8] but this is

our glory, that we may see God face to face: then we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is.[9]

[4] John, XVII, 5.

[5] 1 Peter, IV, 11.

[6] 1 Cor., X, 31.

[7] Matt., V, 48.

[8] 2 Tim., IV, 7.

[9] 1 John, III, 2.

2. Concerning the Object of the Evangelical Law.

249. The evangelical law embraces not only precepts, which it is necessary to observe in order that we may attain eternal life, but also counsels, by fulfilling which we attain greater perfection on earth and a more copious reward in heaven.

(A) The foundation of the whole of Christian ethics is situated in this, that God is manifested not only as Creator and Lord, but as Father, who, from His infinite goodness, adopted us as sons, - and redeemed us from the slavery of sin through His only-begotten Son, who washed us from our sins in His blood, - whose infinite merits are applied to each of us through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us. "For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba [Father][1]... For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that everyone who believes in him may not perish, but may have eternal life[2]... The charity of God has been poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us."[3]

[1] Rom., VIII, 15.

[2] John, III, 16.

[3] Rom., V, 5.

Hence the whole law is summed up in two precepts: we ought to love God as Father, and men as brothers and co-heirs: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and in your whole soul, and in your whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like to this: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments depend the whole law and the prophets."[4] Each commandment was already contained in the old law; but in the new law it is declared much more perfectly; formerly God was held and feared especially as Lord, now He is loved as Father; formerly the Jews loved their friends and fellow-citizens, but cared little for strangers, and not rarely hated enemies; today there is no distinction of Jew and Greek, but all are to be held as brothers in Christ, and we are commanded to love enemies: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you."[5] Wherefore Christ could deservedly say that the commandment of fraternal charity was new, not indeed in itself, but as to the perfect mode in which it must be understood and fulfilled: "A new commandment I give to you, that you love one another, as I have loved you."[1]

[4] Matt., XXII, 37-40.

[5] Matt., V, 44.

[1] John, XIII, 34.

From this twofold precept flow all duties toward God and toward neighbor.

250. (B) But because, in the state of fallen nature, we cannot love God and neighbor as we ought, Christ by words and by His own examples preached self-denial as a necessary means for attaining this end: "If anyone wills to come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me."[2] We deny ourselves through mortification of the senses, chastity, temperance, obedience, humility; we take up the cross through patience in adversities, and faithful fulfillment of the duties proper to our state, as will be explained more fully in the course of the work. - But that denial, which is the more arduous the more it must be renewed continually, becomes easier by the examples of Christ, who went before us bearing His cross, so that we also might be able to carry our cross, according to that saying:[3] "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you may follow his footsteps." For thus patience is, as it were, deified, and greatly increases our merits: "If yet we suffer with him, that we may also be glorified with him."[4] How much strength of soul and how much consolation this doctrine brings, the rationalists themselves are compelled to acknowledge.[5]

[2] Matt., XVI, 24.

[3] 1 Peter, II, 21.

[4] Rom., VIII, 17.

[5] Thus, among others, P. Janet, *Histoire de la Philosophie morale*, Paris, 1860, t. I, p. 211: "The Passion, which is the supreme mystery in Christianity, sufficiently indicates that the life of man is nothing but a passion, that is, a sorrow. While all antiquity made the good consist in not suffering, and invited man, either by virtue or by pleasure, to flee sorrow, the Gospel presents sorrow as a good. Sorrow is in some way deified, since God Himself willed to suffer, to groan, to die." - Nor otherwise G. Seailles, *Les affirmations de la Conscience moderne*, Paris, Colin, 1903, p. 51: "Christianity deifies suffering: Jesus, Son of God and God Himself, descended upon the earth; He took with our body all our infirmities; from the point of view of this world, He was one conquered, He was despised, insulted, struck; He willed to suffer, to die; He carried His Cross, He attached Himself to that wood of sorrow, He groaned, He shed tears... The Christian, he who looks at things with the eyes of faith and not with the eyes of flesh, no longer knows one disinherited, one conquered by life. Suffering is a good; it has its price in itself. God gathers up the most unknown, the most obscure, the most humble miseries, to make of them beatitude and glory."

251. (C) The duties of domestic and social life flow both from the love of God and neighbor and from self-denial. Thus children ought to honor parents and obey them, because they hold the place of God.[1] Servants and domestics ought to show honor and obedience to masters, as to Christ;[2] but masters ought to hold their servants as brothers in Christ.[3] - Subjects are bound to obey legitimate superiors, as God Himself: "For there is no power except from God... Therefore he who resists the power, resists the ordinance of God."[4] Superiors, on the other hand, ought to exercise only a paternal rule, and to imitate God, whose power over men is joined with paternal goodness.

[1] Ephes., VI, 1; Coloss., III, 20.

[2] Ephes., VI, 5-6; 1 Peter, II, 18-19.

[3] Ephes., VI, 9; Coloss., IV, 1; Ep. to Philemon.

[4] Rom., XIII, 1-2.

252. (D) Those things which regard worship are concerned with the sacraments and the sacrifice of the Mass; but these derive their virtue and efficacy from the passion of Christ, and therefore tend to this, that they may more perfectly dispose us to receiving the supernatural life of grace, which itself is as it were a foretaste of eternal life. For this reason the ceremonial matters of the new law are fewer in number, easier in act, and far greater in usefulness than the rites of the ancient law, as befits the state of sons, which is proper to the Christian people.[5]

[5] St. Augustine, *Cont. Faustum*, lib. XIX, c. 13, Migne, P. L., XLII, 355.

253. (E) To these precepts, however, evangelical counsels have been added, by which we are able to tend more securely to the perfection of the Christian life. Precepts are given concerning those things which are necessary for attaining the end,[6] and therefore imply a true moral obligation; - but counsels are given concerning those things which lead us to the end more expeditiously and perfectly, and therefore do not oblige per se.

[6] This is easily understood concerning precepts under grave obligation: for the violation of them turns us away from the ultimate end. As to precepts under light obligation, the violation of them retards us from the kingdom of heaven, as long as it is not fully remitted.

Christ indeed did not hand down this distinction explicitly, but implicitly, when He addressed the rich young man thus: "But if you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments... If you wish to be perfect, go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you shall have treasure in heaven, and come, follow me."[1] Paul confirms this concerning virginity, saying: "But concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel... He who gives his virgin in marriage does well, and he who does not give her does better."[2] Yet we do not deny that it is often difficult to define from Scripture what ought to be referred to precepts and what to counsels; for the most part this can be determined only from the traditional sense of the Church.

[1] Matt., XIX, 17-21.

[2] 1 Cor., VII, 25-40.

254. Among the counsels, three are principal, which usually are specially called evangelical, namely poverty and virginity, concerning which there is question in the texts cited above, and also perfect obedience, which is nothing other than the abdication of one's own will, and is commended many times in Scripture. - St. Thomas declares why these three are of the greatest importance:[3] The goods of this world consist in three things: in riches, which pertain to the concupiscence of the eyes; in delights of the flesh, which pertain to the concupiscence of the flesh; and in honors, which regard the pride of life. But these three things are totally abandoned through the aforesaid counsels: for riches are abdicated through poverty, delights of the flesh through perpetual chastity, pride of life through the service of obedience. - And thus he who strives to observe these and other counsels renounces the goods of the world more perfectly, and loves God more fully from the whole heart. Yet the practice of the counsels is not fitting for all, because perfection belongs to few.[4]

[3] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 108, a. 4.

[4] On the counsels see J. Schwane, *De operibus supererogatoriis et consiliis evangelicis in genere*, Monasterii, 1868.

3. Concerning the Perfection and Duration of the New Law.

255. (A) From all these things it is manifest that the new law is much more perfect than the old:[5] (a) by reason of the object, which embraces more moral precepts, and those more luminously explained and better reduced to unity, - but fewer ceremonial precepts, and those conducing more closely to true holiness; (b) by reason of the more abundant grace which accompanies it; (c) by reason of universality, since it was enacted not for one people, but for all, according to that saying:[6] "Going therefore, teach all nations... teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you"; (d) by reason of perpetuity, since it will endure until the consummation of the age, according to that which remains to be explained.

[5] Bourdaloue eloquently discusses the perfection of the Christian law, *Sermon pour le 6e Dim. après l'Epiphanie, sur la sainteté et la force de la loi chrétienne*.

[6] Matt., XXVIII, 19.

256. (B) The Prophets had already announced that the ancient law, in its ceremonial part, was to be abrogated: "Behold the days shall come, says the Lord, and I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah, not according to the covenant which I made with their fathers."[1] Not so concerning the new law, which is called the new and eternal testament, to last until the consummation of the age.[2] In fact, after Christ's advent in the flesh, nothing else is to be expected except His same advent in the clouds of heaven to judge the living and the dead.[3]

[1] Jerem., XXXI, 31-32; cf. Malach., I, 10-11.

[2] Hebr., XIII, 20; cf. Canon of the Mass; Matt., XXVIII, 20.

[3] Matt., XXV, 31-46; XXVI, 64.

Although the new law is perfect, and embraces all essentials, nothing prevents it from being accommodated to various places and times, under the authority of the Church, to whom Christ handed over the power of making laws which help the faithful to observe the divine precepts more safely.

Article III. Concerning Ecclesiastical Law.

257. In the Treatise on the Church (n. 49-100 and n. 199-216), it was proved that Christ conferred on the Church the power of making laws, and that this authority does not indeed reside in the body of the faithful or of simple priests, but with the supreme Pastors, primarily indeed with the Supreme Pontiff, and secondarily with Bishops. In fact, already from the Council of Jerusalem, the Church has not ceased to establish laws, by recalling to memory those things which had already been commanded by divine law, by determining more explicitly those things which divine law had left indeterminate, and by imposing certain things which until then had been free, for promoting the more perfect fulfillment of the evangelical law. Wherefore here certain principles must be handed down concerning ecclesiastical law considered in general; but particular laws are explained in the course of this work, and especially in the *Praelectiones juris canonici*.

[4] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 95-96; Suarez, lib. IV-VI; Billuart, diss. III-IV; Muller, § 48-69; Bouquillon, n. 108-213. - Besides theologians, see the Canonists, especially Reiffenstuel, Schmalzgrueber, De Angelis, Santi, in book I of the Decretals, tit. II, *De Constitutionibus*, tit. III, *De Rescriptis*, tit. IV, *De Consuetudine*. - Concerning ecclesiastical law the manuscripts were of the greatest use which S. Many, professor of canon law in the Catholic University of Paris, kindly handed over to me, and which he will make public at an opportune time.

Division:

- Concerning the author
- Concerning the object
- Concerning the promulgation
- Concerning the obligation of ecclesiastical law
- Concerning interpretation
- Concerning cessation
- Concerning custom

§ I. Concerning the Author of Ecclesiastical Law.

258. From what was said in the Treatise on the Church (loc. cit.), by divine right, the Supreme Pontiff can make laws for the whole Church, but Bishops for the part of the territory assigned to them by the Roman Pontiff,[1] and indeed by ordinary power. Moreover the Pope, who is endowed with supreme legislative power, sometimes grants part of his power to others, either by simple delegation, or by deputation to some office, to which ordinary jurisdiction is annexed.

[1] Whether the jurisdiction of Bishops proceeds immediately from God, or immediately from the Supreme Pontiff and mediately from God, is disputed, from what was said in the Treatise on the Church, n. 208.

259. 1. The Roman Pontiff can establish laws for the universal Church, and for any part of it; and indeed either alone, insofar as he is the vicar of Christ, - or with the sacred Council approving, in which case the Bishops are legislators together with him.[2] And indeed, although he is able by his own authority to make laws, sometimes it is expedient that a Council, whether provincial or ecumenical, be convoked, for knowing better what abuses have crept into various parts of the Church, and by what means he may be able to remedy them; moreover, those things which have been decreed by common counsel are more efficaciously put into execution with concordant mind. - An Ecumenical Council enjoys the same universal authority as the Pontiff himself (On the Church, n. 211-216).

[2] *De Ecclesia*, n. 199-216.

260. 2. A Bishop can make laws for his own diocese, either in synod (that is, with the pastors of his diocese and others to be called by law convoked), or outside synod, - yet under the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, who can set certain limits to their power, and can invalidate their laws if he judges them to be contrary to the common good.

Patriarchs, Primates, Metropolitans can indeed make laws for their own diocese; but not for the whole province over which they preside, except in a provincial or plenary Council, namely with the suffragan Bishops concurring, who possess true lawmaking power. In the western Church, before the

decrees of a plenary or provincial council are promulgated, they must be reviewed by the Sacred Congregation of the Council, or of Propaganda Fide (where missions are in question), so that they can be amended, if there is need;[1] nevertheless that review in common form[2] does not give greater force to these decrees, but only shows that nothing stands in the way of their promulgation.

[1] Sixtus V, Const. *Immensa*, 22 Jan. 1588; cf. Benedict XIV, *De synodo*, l. XIII, c. 3, n. 3; Pius X, Bull *Sapienti consilio*, 29 Jun. 1908.

[2] Decrees are confirmed in solemn form when the Pontiff makes them his own and promulgates them in his own name; this is not customarily done today.

261. By common ecclesiastical right, Vicars and Prefects Apostolic can make laws for their territory (c. 294, § 1), Abbots and Prelates nullius (c. 323), major Superiors and, according to the norm of the Constitutions, Chapters in exempt clerical religions (cc. 198, § 1, 501, § 1). - By particular ecclesiastical right, legates, nuncios, and others can make laws according to the tenor of their faculties.

Abbesses or superioresses, and rectors of lower communities, namely parishes, monasteries, sodalities, universities, etc., do not enjoy legislative power.

§ II. Concerning the Object of Ecclesiastical Law.

262. 1. The general principle is that the Church can make laws concerning all those things which regard the worship of God and the sanctification of man: "Whatever therefore in human affairs is in any way sacred, whatever pertains to the salvation of souls or the worship of God, whether it is such by its own nature, or again is understood to be such because of the cause to which it is referred, all that is in the power and judgment of the Church."[3] For the power of any society is measured by its end; but the end of the Church is the attainment of eternal life through the worship of God and the sanctification of its members. - From this it follows that nothing dishonorable, nothing contrary to natural or divine right, can be prescribed.

[3] Leo XIII, Encycl. *Immortale Dei*, 1 Nov. 1885.

263. 2. Ecclesiastical law cannot command what is too arduous and difficult. For since it is enacted for the good of the community, it ought to be proportioned to the fragility of human nature; otherwise it would not promote the public good, but rather would be a very frequent occasion of sins. Concerning this, however, three things must be noted: (a) it is not repugnant that an arduous law be imposed upon some society or state which not all, but few, freely choose, as is, for example, the law of celibacy or poverty annexed to the clerical or religious state; (b) when the reason of the public good requires it, the Church can command even heroic acts, for example the administration of the sacraments in time of contagious disease; (c) judgment concerning the difficulty of the law belongs to the legislators themselves, not to the subjects: otherwise laws would be done away with.

264. 3. But it is asked whether the Church can command internal acts. Here there is question not of the penitential forum, where the confessor, as minister of Christ, judges

concerning internal things, and can enjoin merely internal works by way of satisfaction; but of the external forum, to which legislative power pertains.

(A) According to all, the Church can prescribe internal acts which are necessarily joined with external acts; for law directs only truly human acts, and therefore can be concerned with the internal dispositions necessary for a human act; thus, by commanding an oath, confession, communion, or the hearing of Mass, by that very fact it commands the internal acts necessarily joined with those external acts, namely the mind of swearing, attrition, the state of grace, attention.

(B) According to the common opinion, which we embrace, the Church cannot prescribe merely internal acts.[1] For (a) the judicial and coercive power of the Church cannot be exercised concerning internal acts, as Innocent III openly declared: "If their excess [of simoniacs] were manifest to the Church, which does not judge hidden things, they would have to be struck with canonical penalty";[2] and elsewhere he adds: "It has been given to us to judge only concerning manifest things."[1] But legislative power cannot proceed without judicial and coercive power: for it is required that the legislator be able to urge the observance of his laws by judgment and penalties; otherwise, his power would be contemned.

[1] Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 4; q. 100, a. 9; Suarez, *De Legibus*, l. IV, c. 12; Schmalzgrueber, in tit. *de Const.*, n. 21; St. Alphonsus, lib. I, n. 100. Bouquillon, n. 114, with certain others, defends the contrary.

[2] Cap. *Sicut*, 33, *de Simonia* (lib. V, tit. 3).

[1] Cap. *Tua nos*, 34, *de Simonia* (lib. V, tit. 3).

(b) Just as the power of the internal forum directly and immediately regards the internal sanctification of individuals, so the power of the external forum directly regards the external governance of the Church, and therefore reaches internal acts only indirectly, namely those which are necessarily joined with external acts.

265. 4. It is asked moreover whether ecclesiastical law can reach past acts. (A) Per se it generally does not extend to them; for since law is primarily a rule, it cannot reach past acts which can no longer be ruled. Hence in canon law it is expressly said:[2] "Since it is certain that laws and constitutions give form to future affairs, they are not to be drawn to past facts, unless provision is made in them by name concerning past things." From this was born the axiom: "The law does not have eyes backward."

[2] Cap. *Quoniam*, 13, *de Constit.* (lib. I, t. 2).

(B) Sometimes, however, the law reaches past acts, not indeed as to the force of commanding or forbidding, as has already been said, but as to other effects: -

(a) As to a penal effect; namely, it cannot reach an act previously prohibited in no way, but it can punish an act which was already previously prohibited, although without sanction or without determinate sanction.

(b) As to an irritant effect; if an act, previously posited, is irrevocable by natural or divine right (for example, a matrimonial contract between Christians), a subsequent law cannot reach it; but if from some part, although valid, it is infirm or capable of being made void (for example, a contract entered

into from fear), the law can irritate it, for a grave cause, provided that it expressly makes provision for this.

(c) A law establishing inabilities, incapacities, and irregularities, which are not properly penalties, can reach past acts for a most grave cause: for since here there is question not of a penalty, but of a condition for obtaining some office, the matter depends upon the will of the legislator.

It must be noted, however, that the things which we have said regard law properly so called, or law constitutive of new right; for if there is question of a law declarative of ancient right, it much more easily reaches past acts, although the agent ought to be excused from fault and from penalty, on account of ignorance and uncertainty of the newly declared right.

§ III. Concerning the Promulgation of Ecclesiastical Law.

266. I. Necessity and mode. Law does not obtain the force of obliging unless it has been intimated, or promulgated, to the subjects. For promulgation is the act by which the legislator authentically intimates his law to the community, or makes it known, with the will of obliging clearly manifested; and this he can accomplish either by himself or through another. The necessity of this promulgation is acknowledged in Canon Law:[1] "This alone suffices, that he be held to the observance of it [the law], who has known that it has been solemnly issued or publicly promulgated." And deservedly, for law cannot direct or bind the will unless it is first known.

[1] *Decretal.*, l. I, tit. 5, *De postulat.*, c. 1, *Ad haec*.

From the nature of the thing, that promulgation is required and suffices by which the law, considering all the adjuncts of times, places, and persons, can morally and in a human manner reach the knowledge of the subjects; once this is posited, the mode of promulgating the law is left to the judgment of the legislator.

267. II. Specifically concerning Pontifical laws. 1. The mode of promulgating laws used by the Pontiffs was not always the same.[2] (a) During the first twelve centuries, they promulgated their constitutions by sending them into the provinces, through clerics of most approved fidelity, either to individual bishops, or to metropolitans or patriarchs, who would take care that the same were transmitted to the bishops. (b) At the beginning of the thirteenth century, they began to promulgate authentic collections of canon law, sending them with a Bull to the more celebrated academies; thus Innocent III, in the year 1210, promulgated the collection of his decretals by letters directed to the University of Bologna. (c) In the course of the same century, they ordered certain Bulls to be promulgated by affixing them in the place of their residence, especially at Rome, with this clause, that such promulgation would suffice for the law to obtain its whole force: thus Martin IV, in the year 1281, issued a Bull against Michael Palaeologus.[3]

[2] Zaccaria, *De varia Ecclesiae, praesertim Latinae, in promulg. sacrar. constitut. disciplina*; Bouix, *De princ. juris can.*, Parisiis, 2nd ed., 1852, p. 248 sq.

[3] *Bull. Rom.*, ed. Cocquelines, t. III, P. 2, p. 30.

268. 2. But afterward they promulgated their decrees in various ways: (a) Constitutions or Apostolic Letters, when they contained a law for the whole world, were promulgated by affixing them at Rome, in one or more of these places: at the doors of the Lateran church, of the basilica of St. Peter in the Vatican, of the Apostolic Chancery, - or in the area of Campo de' Fiori. (b) They promulgated Encyclicals by sending them, according to the ancient custom, to individual bishops, or to metropolitans or apostolic nuncios. (c) Indeed, it had almost come into custom that the acts of the Holy See and its decrees, when published by legitimate authority in the secretarial Office by which they had been issued, were held by that very fact to have been promulgated.

3. But Pius X decreed[1] that an official Commentary should be published (*Acta Apostolicae Sedis*), in which he willed that pontifical constitutions, laws, decrees, and other decisions both of the Roman Pontiffs and of the sacred Congregations and Offices be inserted, and thus promulgated, whenever there is need of promulgation, and no provision has otherwise been made by the Holy See.

[1] Const. *Promulgandi*, 29 Sept. 1908, A. A. S., I, p. 5.

Therefore the opinion of those who formerly thought that promulgation in provinces and dioceses was required for the force of pontifical laws is to be rejected; for this is in no way required from the very nature of the thing, and moreover the legislator has several times declared that the promulgation which is made at Rome suffices.

269. But today, according to the Code, can. 9, "laws are promulgated by the Apostolic See through publication in the official commentary of the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, unless in particular cases another mode of promulgating has been prescribed; and they exercise their force only after three months have been completed from the day which is affixed to the number of the *Acta*, unless from the nature of the thing they bind at once, or in the law itself a shorter or longer vacancy has been specially and expressly established."

Thus an end is imposed upon the controversy formerly agitated concerning the time at which a law begins to oblige. Some said that it obliges at once, namely on the day after promulgation;[2] but others gradually, namely from the time at which each person has known it;[3] and others, finally, only after two months from the day of promulgation.

[2] D'Annibale, *Summula*, t. I, n. 202, note 21, 23.

[3] Suarez, lib. III, c. 17, n. 6, and lib. IV, c. 15, n. 9 sq.

270. III. Concerning the promulgation of episcopal laws. According to the recent Code, can. 335, § 2, the matter is left to the reasonable judgment of the bishop. Thus they are sufficiently promulgated if they are publicly read in the cathedral church, or signified by the voice of a herald in the square of the city, - or, having been written, are affixed in a public place designated for this, for example at the doors of the cathedral church, - or are committed to type in the diocesan sheet. - Indeed, if the law regards only the clergy, it needs no other publication except that which is made in the synod itself, at which the principal part of the clergy is present.[4]

[4] Benedict XIV, *De synodo*, lib. XIII, c. 4, n. 1.

An episcopal law obliges at once once it has been promulgated, unless otherwise declared; for common law establishes no delay for the obligation of particular laws.

IV. Concerning the Acceptance of Ecclesiastical Law.

271. In order that ecclesiastical law may oblige, it in no way needs the acceptance of the community or of secular authority.

1. It does not need the acceptance of the community; for ecclesiastical power does not come from the community, but from Christ Himself, as was proved in the Treatise on the Church. Hence the force of pontifical laws per se does not depend upon the acceptance of the bishops, since they are bound to obey the Roman Pontiff even in those things which regard the discipline and government of the Church; nor does the force of episcopal laws depend of itself upon the acceptance of priests, since they ought to obey their bishops.

Yet if some bishop understands that some pontifical constitution, concerning some head of discipline, can induce some harmful effect in his diocese, he not only can, but even ought, to represent his reasons to the Roman Pontiff.[1] "Nor," says Benedict XIV (loc. cit.), "have the Roman Pontiffs ever refused to lend an ear to the reasons of inferiors; and, as often as they recognized these to be sufficiently valid, they in no way refused to exempt some provinces or dioceses from the law of their general constitutions, as to that kind of discipline of which we are now treating." - Now, during the whole time of supplication, the obligation of the law is more probably suspended;[2] but when the Apostolic See has pronounced judgment, one must stand wholly by this.

[1] Thus Benedict XIV, op. cit., lib. IX, c. 8, n. 3.

[2] Reiffenstuel, in tit. *De Constitut.*, n. 145.

272. 2. It does not need the acceptance of the civil authority, or the royal placet. Sometimes princes have opposed the promulgation of ecclesiastical laws in their kingdom, or prohibited pontifical bulls from entering the kingdom without the royal placet.[3] This abuse, reproved many times by the Supreme Pontiffs, Vatican thus condemned:[4] "Wherefore we condemn and reprobate the opinions of those who say that this communication of the supreme head with pastors and flocks can licitly be impeded, or who make the same subject to secular power, so that they contend that those things which are established by the Apostolic See or by its authority for the government of the Church have no force and value unless they are confirmed by the placet of the secular power." In fact the Church is a complete society, independent from the State (*De Ecclesia*, n. 109-110), and in spiritual matters she is endowed with supreme authority.

[3] The royal placet, among others, was advocated by Van Essen, *De promulg. legis et de placito regio*; whom these refuted: Zaccaria, *Antifebronius vindicatus*, t. IV, diss. 12; Bouix, op. cit., p. 11, sect. 2, c. 4; Tarquini, diss. *de placito regio*; Cavagnis, *Instit. juris publici*, ed. 3a, t. II, lib. III, n. 2-23.

[4] Vatican, sess. IV, c. 3 (Denzing., n. 1675).

Yet sometimes the Church, for the good of peace and to avoid greater evils, tolerates that the royal placet be obtained by bishops; sometimes also, in concordats, some use of the placet is conceded.

§ IV. Concerning the Obligation of Ecclesiastical Law.

273. Ecclesiastical law, duly promulgated, has the force of obliging in conscience, as is clear from the Treatise on the Church (n. 49-67), where it was proved that Christ conferred on the Church the power of making laws. Hence those who despise the pastors are said to despise Christ Himself;[2] and filial obedience is to be shown to spiritual rulers.[3]

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 96; Suarez, lib. IV, c. 17-20; Billuart, diss. IV, art. 3-7; St. Alphonsus, lib. I, n. 140-152; Bouquillon, n. 133-163; Noldin, n. 118-127 and 136-148.

[2] Luke, X, 16.

[3] Hebr., XIII, 17.

But if there is question of a doubtful law, according to the Code, can. 15, "laws, even irritant and inhabilitating laws, do not urge in a doubt of law; but in a doubt of fact, the Ordinary can dispense in them, provided there is question of laws in which the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to dispense."

We shall speak: 1. concerning the gravity; 2. concerning the extension; 3. concerning the subject of this obligation; 4. concerning the manner of fulfilling it.

I. Concerning the Gravity of the Obligation Induced by Ecclesiastical Law.

The gravity of this obligation depends both on the matter of the law and on the will of the legislator.

274. 1. It depends on the gravity of the matter, insofar as the legislator cannot impose under grave obligation except grave matter. For it is not consonant with reason that matter, light under every respect, be commanded under penalty of mortal sin; otherwise sins would be multiplied, and the law would turn to the detriment, rather than to the good, of subjects.

But for judging concerning the gravity of the matter, attention must be given not only to the nature of the thing, but also to the end and other adjuncts. (a) When the end to be attained is of great importance and morally necessary, and moreover the action commanded greatly conduces to obtaining this end, the matter is judged grave; thus the public service of God, the dignity of worship, the holiness of the clergy, etc., are certainly something of great importance, and moreover the observance of feasts, abstinence, fasting, observance of celibacy, and recitation of the breviary greatly conduce to pursuing those ends; therefore all these things can be commanded under grave obligation. (b) When the intended end is not of great importance, or when the action does not greatly conduce to the end, otherwise of great importance, the matter is judged light; thus a law commanding that the various parts of the breviary be recited at certain times of the day, although ordered to the glorification of God and the sanctification of priests, does not conduce greatly to obtaining that end, since God is glorified and priests are sanctified even if the breviary is recited at other times of the same day; therefore this matter is light.

275. 2. It depends also on the will of the legislator: for he, sometimes at least, can command under light obligation a thing grave of itself, for example fasting; for, even when there is question of an end of great importance and of a means very useful for attaining such an end, the legislator can foresee that a precept imposed under grave obligation will be the occasion of manifold spiritual ruin, and therefore prescribe the thing only under light obligation.

But for discerning what the intention of the legislator was, these things especially are to be weighed: (a) the very words of the law, which imply grave obligation when it is said: we command severely, strictly, in virtue of obedience, under threat of divine judgment, etc.; (b) the penalties inflicted or to be inflicted upon transgressors; for a grave penalty, such as excommunication, suspension, interdict, etc., implies grave obligation; (c) the interpretation of doctors and the sense of pious faithful.

276. Corollary. Since law is obligatory, by that very fact the means truly necessary for observing the law are obligatory: for he who sincerely wills to attain the end, logically and consequently wills the means necessary to the end.

Hence (a) subjects ought to apply ordinary diligence to knowing the law: for the law cannot be observed unless it is known.

(b) Likewise they ought to furnish those things which are proximately necessary for the observation of the law; thus he who is bound to recite the divine office ought to obtain and keep a breviary; he who is bound by the law of fasting ought to buy fasting foods at a suitable time.

(c) Moreover they ought to remove or forestall impediments which render observance of the law impossible, provided that this can be done without grave inconvenience; thus he who knows that he cannot fast when he hunts ought to abstain from hunting on a fast day.

II. Concerning the Extension of This Obligation.

There are certain laws which, from their special character, induce a special obligation; thus especially laws including a presumption, or founded on a presumption, and irritant laws.

1. Concerning the Obligation of a Law Including a Presumption or Founded on a Presumption.

A twofold presumption is distinguished: presumption of fact and presumption of danger.

277. (A) A law including a presumption of fact is one which, supposing that some fact always exists in certain adjuncts (because in similar adjuncts it is truly accustomed to exist), establishes rights and obligations for a case of this kind. Thus if someone has been born and educated among Catholics, he is presumed by law to have been baptized: therefore the law by which he is subjected to all the statutes of the Church, although his baptism is not certainly established, is a law including a presumption of fact.

A presumption of fact can be simply of law, or of law and by law: the former is one which is simply expressed or supposed in law, and against which any proof is admitted; thus in the case brought above; - the latter is one which is held by law as so firm that it is considered as truth, and against it

not any proof is admitted, but only proof either indirect, or direct but wholly manifest: thus "a res judicata is held true and just by a presumption of law and by law, and cannot be impugned directly," as the Code, c. 1904, decrees; thus also from c. 1972, "a marriage which, while both spouses were living, was not accused, after the death of either or both spouses, is presumed to have been valid in such a way that no proof is admitted against this presumption, unless the question arises incidentally."

(a) In the external forum, a law founded on a presumption of law simply obliges until the falsity of the presumed fact is proved: and for demonstrating this, any proof suffices. - If there is question of a presumption of law and by law, it likewise obliges until the falsity of the presumed fact is demonstrated; but regularly direct demonstration is not admitted, unless it is wholly manifest. But indirect proof is admitted; for example, a res judicata can be impugned indirectly if the falsity of the documents on which the sentence exclusively rests is proved. - Indeed direct proof is permitted, if it is wholly evident, as judicial confession, a public document, witnesses of extraordinary authority: for the axiom is universally received: presumption yields to truth.

278. (b) In the internal forum, a law founded on a presumption of fact does not oblige in conscience, if the fact truly does not exist: for, in the forum of conscience, presumption always yields to truth. Thus if two spouses contracted marriage invalidly, because of a diriment impediment which cannot be proved in the external forum, they cannot engage in marital intercourse, even if the validity of the marriage is confirmed by the sentence of the judge.[1] - Yet if a law of this kind can be observed without sin, it often ought to be observed in order to avoid scandal.

[1] *Decretal.*, cap. *Inquisitioni*, 44, *de Sentent. excommunicationis*.

279. (B) A law founded on a presumption of danger is one which forbids or commands something, to forestall a danger which is frequently found connected with some action or omission; thus the law which prohibits the reading of depraved books, or forbids mixed marriages; for in these cases the danger of perversion regarding faith or morals is frequently present. Now a law of this kind always obliges, even if in a particular case the danger is not present. For law does not cease unless the end of the law has ceased adequately, that is, totally and as to all, morally speaking: since it is directed to the whole community. But in our case, even if danger does not exist for such an individual, nevertheless it perseveres for the community. Therefore the law retains its force. - Moreover according to the Code,[2] "laws enacted to forestall a general danger urge, even if in a particular case the danger is not present." Otherwise many will rashly judge that no danger threatens them.

[2] Code, can. 21.

2. Concerning the Obligation of an Irritant Law.

280. (A) Notion and species. (a) An irritant law is called one which establishes that some act or contract, on account of some defect, is by that very fact invalid or rescindable; and thus it is distinguished from a prohibiting law, which of itself indeed makes an act illicit, but not invalid. - A law closely related to an irritant law is an inhabilitating law, which decrees that such a

person is incapable for this or that act; whence irritation directly regards the act, and inability directly regards the person; but in practice and morally speaking, both produce the same effects.

(b) From the very notion handed down, a law can irritate in two ways: by the law itself, when the act is rendered null from the beginning, even before the sentence of the judge; - by the sentence of the judge, when the act is valid until it is rescinded by the judge: wherefore, before the sentence of the judge, it is indeed rescindable, but not invalid. - From another head, irritation is called penal, when it is enacted on account of some delict; non-penal, when, on account of the public good, it irritates acts lacking a certain condition.

281. (B) Effects of an irritant law in the external forum. (a) If the act is only rescindable, it is deservedly held as valid until it is rescinded by the judge; for to this pertains what is said in canon law:[1] "Since many things are tolerated through patience, which, if they had been brought into judgment, with justice requiring it, ought not to be tolerated." (b) If the act is null by the law itself, it is held as invalid from the beginning, and the sentence of the judge, if it supervenes, does not properly irritate it, but declares that it was invalid from the beginning.

[1] *Decretal.*, cap. *Cum jamdudum*, 18, *de Praebendis* (lib. III, tit. 5).

282. (C) Effects of an irritant law in the internal forum. When there is question of a rescindable act, there is no difficulty: for it is valid in the forum of conscience until it is rescinded. But very grave difficulties and controversies are present when there is question of an act null by the law itself. We explain those things which seem to us more probable: -

(a) If the question is concerning those acts or contracts which have being and receive force from canon law alone (as, for example, religious profession), they must be held as invalid, even in the internal forum, before any declaratory sentence of a judge; since they do not have being and force from natural law, but only from canon law, - and moreover canon law in the case irritates them, they have no existence or force.

(b) If the question is concerning those acts or contracts which receive being and force from natural law, the difficulty increases: 1) if the canonical legislator clearly manifests his will of irritating the act even in the internal forum, this must be wholly stood by: for he is endowed with the power of doing this; 2) if there is question of a matrimonial contract, the same must be said; the reason is because if that contract is once admitted as valid, thereafter it can be rescinded by no human power, even ecclesiastical, on account of the indissolubility of the matrimonial bond established by divine right; 3) but if there is question of other acts or contracts (for example, alienation of ecclesiastical goods), and nothing else is lacking for their validity except a certain solemnity prescribed by canon law, certain canonists of great name probably hold that the contract can be held as valid in the forum of conscience, until it is declared null by a judge; for it seems too hard that someone ought to despoil himself of a good justly acquired (considered according to natural right), before the declaratory sentence of a judge, on account of the defect of some solemnity; whence, in this case, it can be said that the act is not valid canonically, but retains its natural force until the contrary is authentically declared.

III. Concerning the Subject of Ecclesiastical Law.

Laws do not oblige except subjects; but for defining who are subject to ecclesiastical law, we shall set forth 1. the general principle; 2. conclusions to be deduced therefrom concerning certain laws or certain persons.

[1] Suarez, lib. III, c. 31-35 and lib. IV, c. 19; Billuart, diss. IV, art. 8; Bouquillon, n. 151-163.

283. 1. General principle: All and only baptized persons, habitually in possession of reason, are subject to ecclesiastical laws.[2]

[2] "Those who have not received baptism are not held by merely ecclesiastical laws, nor baptized persons who do not enjoy sufficient use of reason, nor those who, although they have attained the use of reason, have not yet completed the seventh year of age, unless something else is expressly provided by law." (Code, c. 12).

(A) All baptized persons, as Trent openly defined:[3] "If anyone shall say that the baptized are free from all the precepts of holy Church, which are either written or handed down, so that they are not held to observe them, unless they shall have wished to submit themselves to them of their own accord, let him be anathema." - For by receiving baptism, they become members of Christ and citizens of the Church (*De Baptismo*, n. 27).

[3] Trent, sess. VII, *de Baptismo*, can. 8, apud Denzing., n. 745.

Heretics and schismatics also are bound per se by these laws. For if there is question of those who freely and culpably separated from the Church, they cannot by unjust rebellion exempt themselves from the obedience owed to legitimate superiors; in fact in the *Corpus juris* many laws are found concerning heretics, schismatics, and apostates, and it has several times been declared that they are held by impediments diriment of marriage. - But if the question is concerning those who are born in heresy, and remain in it in good faith, some have thought that the Church, for her benignity, does not wish to bind them by at least certain laws; but, as to the fact, the Church has never declared that they are immune from these laws. Therefore it can only be said that those who are in good faith are excused from every formal and culpable transgression of ecclesiastical laws, because they are wholly ignorant of them.

284. (B) Only baptized persons; for those who have not yet been regenerated by baptism are outside the Church. Now the Apostle teaches that the Church does not judge those who are outside;[1] the Pontiffs acknowledge that pagans are not bound by canonical constitutions;[2] and Trent declares that the Church exercises judgment over no one who has not first entered into her through the gate of baptism.[3] Consequently infidels, Jews, and others not baptized are in no way held by ecclesiastical laws.

[1] 1 Cor., V, 12-13.

[2] *Decretal.*, lib. IV, tit. 19, cap. *Gaudemus*, 8, *De divortiis*.

[3] Trent, sess. XIV, cap. 2, apud Denzing., n. 775.

285. (C) Habitually in possession of reason, that is, those who have attained the use of reason and at least habitually retain it, such as not only those who actually enjoy reason, but also the insane who have lucid intervals, the drunk, and the delirious; but not infants and the perpetually insane. - For ecclesiastical law tends to this, that it direct the actions of subjects to

a spiritual end; but the actions of those who enjoy reason neither actually nor habitually cannot be directed to the end; on the contrary, the actions of those who habitually enjoy reason can be directed, even if actually they lack the use of it. - Therefore it is licit (although it is not fitting) to furnish meat to infants and the insane on a forbidden day.

286. Yet certain exceptions are given: (a) laws granting rights, or irritating some act, can affect even those who do not habitually have the use of reason, - because they are not directive laws; (b) the impubescent are not subject to penal laws of the Church, unless the contrary is expressed in law: for, on account of defect of more mature judgment, they are worthy of mercy; (c) but the faithful are subject to the other laws suited to their age; hence they are not held by the precept of fasting unless they have reached the twenty-first year; but those who have completed the seventh year ought to hear Mass and abstain from meat, and those who have attained the use of reason ought to communicate at Easter time.

[4] Who are adults, impubescent persons, infants, the Code, c. 8, thus declares: "§ 1. A person who has completed the twenty-first year of age is an adult; below this age, a minor. § 2. A minor, if male, is judged pubescent from the completed fourteenth year, if female, from the completed twelfth year. § 3. An impubescent before the full seventh year is called an infant or child or little one and is judged not in possession of himself; but when the seventh year has been completed, he is presumed to have the use of reason. To an infant are assimilated all who are habitually destitute of reason."

287. (D) It is asked whether the legislator himself is bound to obey his laws? (a) The legislator properly and directly is not held by his laws, at least more probably; for no one can command himself and exercise jurisdiction over himself. But he is held indirectly and consequently, insofar as he ought to observe the law established for the good of the whole community, in order to furnish subjects good example, and lest they be scandalized. But the gravity of this obligation depends on the gravity of the scandal caused by violation of the law.

(b) But those who compose a college endowed with legislative power are subject to the laws enacted by the college or council; thus bishops and the metropolitan ought to obey the laws which they themselves enacted in a provincial Council; for, taken singly, they cannot enact these laws, and therefore the provincial council is truly above the individual bishops, not excepting the metropolitan, and can impose precepts upon them. - But the Roman Pontiff, who, while he presides over an ecumenical council, remains above the council, is not directly obliged by the disciplinary laws of the Council.

2. Conclusions Concerning the Obligation of Laws in Certain Cases.

288. State of the question. General laws, enacted by the Roman Pontiff or by ecumenical Councils, indeed oblige all the baptized, as we have said; but particular laws enacted by bishops and provincial councils are presumed territorial; therefore the question arises who are held by these laws. Now in relation to territory, there are distinguished inhabitants, newcomers, pilgrims, travelers, vagi, and exempt persons.[1]

[1] Code, c. 91: "A person is called: an inhabitant, in the place where he has domicile; a newcomer, in the place where he has quasi-domicile; a pilgrim, if he is staying outside the domicile and quasi-domicile which he still retains; a vagus if he has domicile or quasi-domicile nowhere."

(a) Inhabitants of some place are called those who have their domicile there. Now from the Code, c. 92, § 1, "Domicile is acquired by residence in some parish or quasi-parish, or at least in a diocese, vicariate apostolic, prefecture apostolic; which residence is either joined with the intention of remaining there perpetually, if nothing calls one away from it, or has been protracted to a completed decade." It is lost as soon as these two things concur at the same time: actual departure from the place, and the intention of not returning.

(b) Newcomers are those who have a quasi-domicile somewhere. Now quasi-domicile is acquired "by residence as above, which is either joined with the intention of remaining there at least for the greater part of a year, if nothing calls one away from it, or is in fact protracted to the greater part of a year."[2] But it is lost if these two things concur at the same time: actual departure and the intention of not returning.

[2] According to the Canonists, six months are judged to be the greater part of a year.

(c) Pilgrims are called those who reside in some place for a short time, while retaining their domicile or quasi-domicile elsewhere.

(d) Vagi are those who nowhere have a domicile or quasi-domicile, either because the intention of remaining in a certain place is lacking to them, or because, having left their domicile, they are seeking where they may establish a seat.

(e) Finally, exempt persons are those who, by a fiction of law, are placed outside the territory of any diocese, are exempted from the jurisdiction of bishops, and are immediately subject to the Roman Pontiff.

289. (A) Concerning inhabitants and newcomers. Inhabitants and newcomers are bound by the laws of the territory when they actually live in it. The matter was formerly doubtful concerning newcomers; but today, from the practice of the Holy See, it has become certain: for those who have quasi-domicile in some place are subject to the pastor of this place, and therefore to the bishop of the diocese.

290. (B) Concerning pilgrims. Pilgrims, according to the Code, c. 14, "are not bound by the particular laws of their own territory as long as they are absent from it,[1] unless either the transgression of them harms in their own territory, or the laws are personal; nor by the laws of the territory in which they are staying, excepting those which provide for public order, or determine the solemnities of acts; but they are held by general laws, even if these are not in force in their own territory, but not at all if they do not oblige in the place in which they are staying." Whence: -

[1] This holds even when they leave their own diocese *in fraud of the law*, that is, with the very purpose of evading the law; for in so acting they *use their own right*, namely the right of departing from the place where a special law is in force. Yet the two cases set forth in the Treatise on Penance, n. 353, and on Marriage, n. 410, are excepted.

(a) Pilgrims are not held by common laws which are in force in their own diocese - from which they are absent - but are not in force in the place where they are sojourning. For, by entering another diocese, they enjoy the privileges of the place in which they are staying; thus those who, during Lent, are sojourning in the United States of America, enjoy the privilege granted there of eating meat on all days, except Wednesday and Friday, even if that privilege is not had in their own diocese.

(b) But pilgrims are held by common laws which are in force in the place where they are staying, even if they do not oblige in their own diocese. Thus French and Americans, staying at Rome during Holy Week, ought to fast according to the Roman or strict manner, even if in their own regions the common law has been mitigated by custom or indult; for the common law is in force where they live, and moreover they cannot enjoy the local privilege of the diocese from which they are absent, from what has already been said.

(c) Pilgrims are certainly held to observe certain special laws of the places where they are staying, namely those which regard the validity of contracts, - or have been enacted for the common security of the place and public order, - or specially regard pilgrims.[1] - As to other laws, today, from the Code, pilgrims are not strictly held to observe them, outside the case of scandal; for laws oblige only subjects; but pilgrims, who have neither domicile nor quasi-domicile in the place where they are sojourning, are not truly subjects of that diocese. Thus those who pass through a place where a special fast has been prescribed are not held to fast. Indeed, if a special law is in force in the diocese of the pilgrim and in the place where he is living, he is not strictly held to observe it: not by reason of the precept of his own diocese, because he is outside it, nor by reason of the precept of the diocese in which he is living, because he is not a subject of the legislator. - But, from a certain equity and decency, it is altogether expedient that he observe it.

[1] Thus pilgrims are held by the reservations of places (A. A. S., 1 Dec. 1920).

291. (C) Concerning vagi, it was formerly controverted; not a few said that they are held to the laws of the place in which they are staying; but others held that they probably are not held except to the universal laws of the Church, and to those local laws which bind pilgrims. But today, from the Code, c. 14, "vagi are obliged by both general and particular laws which are in force in the place in which they are staying."

292. (D) Exempt persons per se are not held by the laws of the diocese within whose boundaries they have their houses: for they are called exempt for this reason, that they are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of bishops. - It is said per se, because they can be held per accidens, as often as this is necessary to avoid scandal or to procure the public good; or if they have received pastoral care: for then they are held by certain laws, not as Regulars, but as pastors.[2]

[2] Cf. Leo XIII, Constit. *Romanos Pontifices*; C. Plen. Baltimorense III, n. 85-99.

IV. Concerning the Manner of Fulfilling Law.

293. 1. General principle: Law must be fulfilled in the mode determined by the legislator, whether explicitly or implicitly; for that mode, like the act itself, falls under the precept. Hence it must be fulfilled: -

(a) In a human mode, that is, with advertence and liberty.

(b) In an honorable mode, so that the act is not substantially vitiated under that respect under which it is commanded; thus one does not satisfy the obligation of annual confession through a sacrilegious confession, but he satisfies the precept of hearing Mass who is duly present at the sacred rite, even if

because of vain glory. Nor is it required that the law be fulfilled in the state of grace, unless the prescribed act by its nature supposes that state.

(c) At the time prefixed, and if no time has been assigned, as soon as morally possible. If the time has elapsed, and at the same time it was determined for urging the obligation, this obligation does not cease (for example, the law of annual confession); but if it was determined for defining the obligation, the obligation is extinguished (for example, the law of fasting affixed to such a day).

294. 2. Concerning a prohibiting law. This commands nothing other than the negation of the act, without any intention of fulfilling the law. Wherefore he does not transgress the law of fasting who, sleeping the whole day, does not eat, nor the law of abstinence who on a forbidden day abstains from meat because he lacks it.

295. 3. Concerning a commanding law: (a) There is required at least the implicit will of placing the prescribed work; otherwise the law is not fulfilled in a human mode. But there is not required the intention of satisfying the precept, nor a fortiori of attaining the end intended by the legislator; for the end of the precept does not fall under the precept. - Yet it is better to propose this intention to oneself, so that the merit of obedience may be had.

Thus he who, for the sake of devotion, hears Mass, not knowing that it is a feast day, satisfies the precept, because he implicitly wills the prescribed work; but he who, sleeping or coerced, assists at the sacred rite, does not satisfy the precept. He fulfills the law of fasting who observes the form of the fast, even if he eats sumptuously and does not intend mortification of the body.

(b) He who cannot fulfill the whole law is held to nothing if the thing commanded is indivisible, as a pious pilgrimage; but if it is divisible, he is held to the part which he can fulfill; thus he who cannot recite the entire office, but only vespers and compline, is held to that.

(c) It is licit by the same act to satisfy several precepts, unless it is established that the legislator's mind was otherwise; and this is known from the circumstances and the judgment of prudent men. - Thus he who receives viaticum at Easter time satisfies the twofold precept of communicating at Easter time and in danger of death. But if alms are prescribed for the jubilee, and another alms is owed from a vow, one does not suffice for fulfilling both obligations.

(d) It is licit at the same time to satisfy several precepts, provided that the various works commanded do not exclude one another, or unless it is established that the mind of the legislator was otherwise. Thus someone can hear a prescribed Mass and at the same time recite the hours.

§ V. Concerning the Interpretation of the Law of the Church.

296. Written law, however clearly expressed, often needs interpretation, whether because of the weakness of human understanding, or because of the change of circumstances and customs.

Interpretation is nothing other than an explanation of the will of the legislator. (a) By reason of the author, it can be authentic, if it is given by the superior himself; - judicial, when it is made by a judge sitting for a tribunal; - usual, if it proceeds from the community through observance; doctrinal, whenever it is proposed by private doctors. (b) By reason of its character, it is called declarative, or

comprehensive, if it elucidates obscure things and adds or takes away nothing from the law; - suppletive, when it adds what is lacking in the words of the law, especially with attention to the reason of the law, and therefore either extends the law to a case not comprehended in it, or restricts it, by excluding a case contained in the law.

I. Concerning Authentic Interpretation.

297. 1. The authentic interpreter is the legislator himself, or his successor, and "he to whom the power of interpreting has been granted by the same." Authentic interpretation, exhibited by way of law, has the same force as the law itself; and if it only declares words of the law which are certain in themselves, it does not need promulgation and has retroactive force; if it narrows or extends the law or explains a doubtful one, it is not drawn back and must be promulgated. (Code, can. 17).

Now the Supreme Pontiff can interpret general laws not only through himself, but also through the Congregations, to which he delegates his authority.[1] Yet it must be noted that the Sacred Congregations do not proceed in one manner in explaining laws: (a) for sometimes, by a solemn and general decree, approved by the special authority of the Pontiff, they settle a controversy, and therefore in this case their decrees have the force of law;[2] (b) sometimes they explain the sense of the law, by authority granted to them by the Holy See, and with approval in common form: then also merely declarative interpretation obtains the force of law;[3] (c) but often they respond to proposed doubts for a particular case, without issuing a general decree; decisions of this kind indeed hand down a prudent and very probable norm of acting for similar cases, but not, according to the Code, c. 17, an authentic interpretation to be held: "But one given by way of judicial sentence or rescript in a particular matter does not have the force of law, and binds only the persons and affects the things for which it was given."

[1] For interpreting the canons of the Code authentically, a special Commission was instituted by the Supreme Pontiff Benedict XV by the Motu proprio of 15 September 1918.

[2] Thus the decree of 7 Apr. 1879, declaring that civil marriage, where the law of clandestinity was promulgated, does not produce the impediment of public honesty (*De Matrim.*, n. 363). Then the Pontiff makes the decree his own, and promulgates it by his own authority.

[3] Thus the decisions of the Sacred Congregation of the Council in moral and disciplinary matters, when they are not extensive, which are promulgated in this way: The report having been made, the Most Holy One approved and confirmed.

298. 2. In order that decrees of the Sacred Congregations may have the force of obliging, they must be authentic, that is, with the conditions and formalities prescribed by the Pontiff having been observed; and moreover they must be certainly established, whether through insertion in an authentic collection, or from the relation of trustworthy writers. - If the interpretation is merely comprehensive, it does not need new promulgation. But when it is extensive or restrictive, it more probably needs new promulgation, because it is deservedly judged a new law.

II. Concerning Judicial and Usual Interpretation.

299. 1. Judicial interpretation is made through ecclesiastical judges, who apply the law to a particular fact. From this it follows that that interpretation has obligatory force as to the parties who subjected the matter to the judges, unless they have appealed to a superior judge at an opportune time; but as to others, it has only doctrinal authority, yet greater than that which is given by private doctors. - Therefore judgments issued by the Sacred Tribunals, even for a particular case, help greatly for rightly understanding the law itself; yet they can be adduced only cautiously and prudently, because not rarely the sentence depends on special circumstances which are found in such a case, but not in another.

300. 2. Usual interpretation is that which is had from the general observance of the community. For since laws are ordered to the good of the community, account must be taken of the commonly received sense; thence was born the axiom: custom is the best interpreter of law.

But custom can contribute in three ways to understanding the law: (a) antecedent custom discloses the mind of the legislator, because he is judged to have accommodated himself to the customs of the community; (b) concomitant custom furnishes the same, because, by exhibiting the common sense of subjects at the time when the law was enacted, it greatly helps for understanding the words used by the superior; (c) subsequent custom can determine the extension of the law; for since, from what is to be said, it can introduce a new obligation and abolish an old one, a fortiori it can define the extension of the obligation: in this last case it can be truly authentic, namely when it enjoys all the qualities required for establishing law.

III. Concerning Doctrinal Interpretation.

This is made by private doctors, canonists and moralists; it is indeed very useful, provided that they seek to explain the sense of the law, and not to pervert it. Hence certain rules are handed down, by which they may be helped in a matter of such importance, both as to laws in general and as to certain laws in particular.

1. Rules Concerning Laws in General.

301. (A) The words of the law are to be taken in their proper sense, unless from the adjuncts it is manifestly established that the legislator thought otherwise.

(a) The reason for the former is because the legislator ought to have used words apt for manifesting his will to the community. Whence, from the Code, c. 18: "Ecclesiastical laws are to be understood according to the proper signification of the words considered in text and context; and if this remains doubtful and obscure, one must have recourse to the parallel places of the Code, if there are any, to the end and circumstances of the law, and to the mind of the legislator."

(b) The reason for the latter is because, since law is an ordination of reason, nothing unjust, absurd, or useless ought to be imputed to the legislator; therefore if the proper sense contained something of this kind, one would have to depart from the letter, in order better to attain the mind of the superior. - Wherefore rule 88 of law, in the Sixth, is as follows: "It is certain that he acts against the law who, embracing the words of the law, strives against the will of the law."

302. (B) General words are to be understood generally; for example, if it is said all, no one, nothing, the whole, etc., nothing ought to be excepted from the law, unless from the context, parallel places, or other adjuncts, the contrary mind of the legislator is established. For canon law made its own this axiom of civil law: Where the law does not distinguish, neither shall we distinguish.[1]

[1] *Decretal.*, cap. *Quia circa*, 22, *de privilegiis* (lib. V, tit. 33): "Since he excepted nothing and could have excepted."

303. (C) Law is contained in the dispositive part, but not in the reason assigned. For the motives which the legislator adduces are not the law itself, and, although they often help for understanding his mind, nevertheless sometimes they lack a solid foundation; while the dispositive part manifests the will of the legislator.

Thus, when the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) restricts the impediment of consanguinity to the fourth degree, it hands down this reason, which certainly lacks foundation: "Because there are four humors in the body, which consist from the four elements."[1] - Whence the intrinsic end of the law must be inferred not only from the reason assigned, but from the monuments of history, or from other adjuncts; and that saying is to be applied only cautiously: the reason of the law is the soul of the law.

[1] *Decretal.*, cap. *Non debet*, 8, *de Consanguinitate* (lib. IV, tit. 14).

2. Rules Concerning Certain Laws in Particular.

304. (A) It is fitting that odious things be restricted and favors enlarged.[2] To understand this rule, these things must be noted: (a) From the Code, c. 19, "laws which establish a penalty, or restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception from the law, are subject to strict interpretation." (b) Favors, or favorable things, are understood as graces granted to someone, provided that they are not against common right or against the acquired right of a third party.

[2] Rule 15 of law, in the Sixth.

Having posited these things, an odious law is restricted, that is, it extends no more widely than the words themselves; thus, if an interdict is brought against the people, the clergy is not subject to the same.[3] - If the law is favorable, it is enlarged, or is understood in the whole amplitude which the property of the words permits; thus, in favorable matters, the word people embraces the clergy, the word sons embraces bishops, etc.

[3] *Decretal.*, cap. *Si sententia*, 16, *de sentent. excomm.* in the Sixth.

Yet there are exceptions, concerning which in the course of the work.

305. (B) In obscure matters the minimum is to be followed.[4] By obscure things here are understood laws or statutes whose sense, whether in whole or as to part, is so obscure that neither from the text of the law, nor from the context or subject matter, or from custom or other adjuncts, does the true mind of the legislator appear. In this case, it is licit to follow the minimum, that is, to embrace the sense which burdens subjects less. For laws are more inclined to freeing than to obliging, and interpretation is to be made against him who could have spoken clearly.

[4] Rule 30 of law in the Sixth.

306. (C) A special law derogates from a general law, even one enacted afterward,[5] that is, when two dispositions are contrary to one another, that which is special prevails, and thus derogates from the general law, but only in that in which it is contrary to the general law.

[5] Rule 34 of law in the Sixth signifies the same: "The genus is derogated from by the species."

Now a special law is one which establishes something concerning a thing contained under some genus; thus a law concerning testaments for pious causes is special relative to a law concerning testaments in general; a law concerning donations between spouses is held as special relative to a law concerning donations in general, and this is special relative to a law concerning gratuitous contracts.

Scholion Concerning Epikeia.

307. Epikeia (epieikeia, equity) obtains place when it is judged that some particular case, although certainly comprehended in the general words of the law, is nevertheless exempt from the obligation of the law on account of special circumstances.

The legitimacy of epikeia, admitted by Roman law, is thus explained by St. Thomas:[1] "Because human acts, concerning which laws are given, consist in singular contingents, which can be varied in infinite ways, it was not possible for any rule of law to be instituted which would fail in no case; but legislators attend to that which happens in the greater number of cases, enacting the law according to this; yet to observe this law in some cases is against the equality of justice, and against the common good which the law intends... Therefore in these and similar cases it is evil to follow the law posited; but it is good, the words of the law being put aside, to follow that which the reason of justice and the common utility demand."

[1] St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 120, a. 1.

308. Yet rules must be observed in epikeia: (a) if someone, on account of special adjuncts, certainly or probably judges that the legislator did not will to comprehend such a case in the law, and moreover cannot easily approach the superior, he can with safe conscience omit the law; but, since no one ought to be judge in his own cause, this judgment is not to be left to the agent himself, but, insofar as it can be done, to a prudent and learned man.

(b) If, when there is only a probable judgment, he can easily approach the superior, he is generally held to have recourse to him; for it is disordered for a subject to put aside the words of the law, on account of some doubt, where the will of the legislator can be certainly established. - I said generally; for it is not necessary to have recourse to the legislator if the special case of which there is question has already been solved in this way by doctors and ecclesiastical judges.

§ VI. Concerning the Cessation of Ecclesiastical Law.

The obligation of law can cease in two ways: 1. by the cessation of the obligation itself, while the law itself nevertheless remains; 2. by the cessation of the law.

I. Concerning the Cessation of the Obligation Induced by Law.

309. Sometimes a law, even if it remains in itself, ceases to oblige certain subjects, on account of a special reason. Now there are three principal causes exempting from the obligation of law: ignorance, concerning which we have already spoken (above, n. 89-97), moral impotence, and dispensation, concerning which we must discuss separately.

1. Concerning Moral Impotence.

310. Impotence is nothing other than the incapacity of the subject for fulfilling the law; it is called absolute when the work prescribed by the law can in no way be effected, because, for example, powers, instruments, or the required conditions are lacking; moral impotence is present when the work cannot be accomplished except with extraordinary labor, or with the imminent danger of grave evil or deprivation of a notable good. - It is involuntary when it exists without the free consent of the agent; voluntary, when it has been freely contracted.

(A) Involuntary impotence generally exempts from the obligation of law, not only absolute impotence, but also moral impotence. For from what was said, n. 263, the legislator cannot command something too burdensome; otherwise he would command unto destruction, not unto edification; therefore, if in a particular case observance of the law becomes too difficult, or impossible, the legislator does not intend to urge it.

Sometimes that impossibility arises from the concurrence of a superior law; then the natural law is to be preferred to the positive law, divine law to human law, ecclesiastical law to civil law, negative law to affirmative law, at least commonly. - But sometimes it proceeds from grave inconvenience, and in the course of the work it will be explained how great a difficulty excuses from the law; for this depends on the character of the law itself and many other adjuncts.

It was said that moral impotence generally excuses; for it can happen that the law is of such importance that it must be observed, notwithstanding any inconvenience whatever.

311. (B) Even impotence voluntarily contracted generally exempts from the obligation of the law, provided that it is not contracted directly so that the law cannot be fulfilled, and moreover that there is a proportionately grave reason. For here recurs the principle explained above concerning an indirectly willed effect (n. 170-182).

Thus someone can make a journey, even if he foresees that he cannot hear Mass on a feast day, provided that he has a sufficient reason for traveling; but it is not licit on a fast day to go hunting, for the sole cause of recreation, with foresight that in this way impotence for fasting is induced. - But for judging what reason suffices, these things must be kept before the mind: the graver the law is, and the rarer the return of its obligation, and the more proximately it urges, the greater the reason required; likewise a much graver cause is required if someone frequently or continually renders himself impotent for fulfilling the law than if he does so once or rarely.

2. Concerning Dispensation from Law.

312. (A) Notion. (a) Dispensation in general is prudent administration; but since it pertains to prudent administration to use moderation, and to remit certain things from benignity, the word dispensation signifies a certain lenity and condescension in the application of laws. - It is

usually defined as the relaxation of law made by the superior in some particular case in which the law would otherwise oblige. Therefore it differs from epikeia, which judges that some case is not comprehended in the law; and from abrogation or derogation of law, by which a law is taken away in whole or in part for the whole community.

(b) St. Thomas thus declares the reason why it is sometimes expedient to grant a dispensation:[1] it happens sometimes that some precept, which is for the advantage of the multitude, is not suitable to this person or in this case, because through this something better would be impeded, or even some evil would be induced: therefore it is expedient that in this particular case the law be relaxed; but because it would be dangerous to commit this to the judgment of anyone whatever, except because of evident and sudden danger, it is fitting that he who has the power of ruling the multitude have the power of dispensing in human law, which rests on his authority.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 97, a. 4.

313. (B) Concerning the author of dispensation. He who has the authority of making law can dispense by ordinary power, - but he who is deputed to this by the legislator himself can dispense by delegated power.

(a) By ordinary or native right, both the legislator and his superior as to this, that is, as to dispensation, can dispense. Concerning the legislator himself and his successor there is no difficulty, since the law, in its whole extent, depends on their will. Wherefore the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in all ecclesiastical laws, even those enacted by an ecumenical council; but a bishop can dispense in the statutes of his own diocese, even those enacted in synod.

The same must be said concerning the superior as to this; for he, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, has the whole power of inferiors; thus the Pope can dispense in episcopal laws. But a metropolitan cannot dispense in the laws of a suffragan bishop, because he is not his superior as to all things, nor as to this, namely as to the granting of dispensations.

314. (b) By delegated, or borrowed, right, an inferior can sometimes dispense in the law of a superior, namely whenever he has received this power from the superior; by quasi-ordinary right, when this power is permanently annexed to some office; by merely delegated right, when it has been transiently granted by the superior.

Thus Ordinaries, by power delegated from common law, dispense in irregularities arising from occult delict, except the one which arises from voluntary homicide and except others brought to the contentious forum;[1] likewise they dispense in abstinence and fasting with particular persons, indeed sometimes with the whole community;[2] they dispense in certain impediments of marriage, in a case of urgent necessity.[3]

[1] Code, c. 990, § 1.

[2] Code, c. 1245.

[3] What bishops can do as to impediments of marriage we explained in the Treatise on Marriage, n. 1046 sq.

Thus also pastors, who by proper right cannot grant any dispensation, by delegated common law, in particular cases, dispense in fasting and abstinence and also in servile works prohibited on a feast

day; thus also confessors.[4]

[4] Code, cc. 1044-1045.

The Roman Congregations likewise have received the power of dispensing in pontifical laws, according to predefined limits.

315. (C) Concerning the subject of dispensation. Since dispensation is an act of jurisdiction, only subjects can be dispensed by a superior. As to the Supreme Pontiff, there is no difficulty: for all the baptized are his subjects.

But as to bishops, and others whose jurisdiction is exercised within the limits of some territory, these things are to be noted: (a) they can dispense with inhabitants and newcomers who, by reason of domicile or quasi-domicile, are subject to them; indeed with vagi, who, since they are subject to the laws of the place in which they are staying, are judged subjects as to the means necessary or useful for salvation, and therefore as to dispensation in the common laws of the Church; more probably also with pilgrims, who in a case of necessity cannot have recourse to their own bishop, and this indeed from the presumed consent of the bishop proper to the pilgrims: for otherwise pilgrims would be deprived of a means very useful for salvation.

(b) Since dispensation is an act of voluntary jurisdiction, and this can be exercised outside the territory, a bishop, pastor, or delegates can dispense with inhabitants and newcomers, even those dwelling outside the territory, provided nevertheless that these remain subjects, that is, retain domicile or quasi-domicile in the territory of the one dispensing.

(c) He who possesses the faculty of dispensing can dispense with himself, unless something else is established from the nature of things or from law, as is clear from the Code, c. 201, § 3: for voluntary jurisdiction, such as the power of dispensing, of itself does not require a distinction of persons, and moreover no law requires it in the present matter. - Hence he who has ordinary or delegated general power of dispensing in laws, or in vows and oaths, can use this with regard to himself.[1]

[1] Suarez, liber VI, caput 12, n. 8-12; Sanchez, *de Matrimonio*, liber VIII, disp. 3; Schmalzgr., in titulo *de Constit.*, n. 65; St. Alphonsus, liber I, n. 183; liber III, n. 249, 256.

316. (D) Concerning the conditions required for dispensation. For validity, there are required:

(a) In the one granting, a just and reasonable cause, if he dispenses in the law of a Superior; but none if he dispenses in his own law or in the law of an inferior; in doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause, a dispensation can be granted validly.[2]

[2] Code, c. 84: "§ 1. Let there be no dispensation from an ecclesiastical law without a just and reasonable cause, with account taken of the gravity of the law from which dispensation is made; otherwise a dispensation given by an inferior is illicit and invalid. - § 2. A dispensation in doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause is licitly sought, and can be licitly and validly granted."

(b) In the petitioner, there is required the allegation of a thing necessarily to be declared, unless the rescript has been granted motu proprio (Code, c. 45); the truth of at least one final or motive cause at the time when the rescript was given or at the time of execution; and recourse to the competent Superior, especially when a dispensation has already been denied (cf. cc. 43-44).

317. For the liceity of dispensation, there is required a cause at least probably sufficient, under light obligation if the legislator dispenses, under grave obligation in a grave matter if a delegate dispenses.

As to other things, cf. in the Code the titles concerning rescripts and concerning dispensations.

II. Concerning the Cessation of the Law Itself.

The law itself can cease especially in a threefold way: 1. through abrogation and derogation; 2. through cessation of the end; 3. through contrary custom; we treat here of the first two, since there must be discussion of custom in the following paragraph.

318. 1. Concerning abrogation and derogation. Abrogation is the total abolition of a law made by the legislator himself; derogation is the partial abolition of a law.

(A) Since the existence of a law depends on the will of the legislator, he himself, or his successor or superior, can take it away totally or partially.

But for this to be done licitly, a reasonable cause is required, namely nothing other than the good of the community itself. And this, according to St. Thomas,[1] can happen in two ways: (a) indeed it is consonant with human reason that it pass from the imperfect to the perfect; wherefore the first institutors of laws, not being able to consider and foresee all things, established certain imperfect things and things deficient in many respects, which they themselves or their successors wisely changed; (b) moreover what, in ancient times, was useful to society can, circumstances having changed, become useless or harmful.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 97, a. 1.

(B) But change can be made in two ways: (a) by expressly revoking the old law; therefore in practice, as soon as the will of the legislator to abrogate the law is certainly known, subjects are no longer held to observe it;[2] (b) by enacting a new law contrary to the pre-existing law: then the later law "obrogates the former, if it expressly says this, or is directly contrary to it, or orders the whole matter of the former law anew from the beginning." (Code, c. 22).

[2] Suarez, l. VI, c. 27, n. 14-18.

319. 2. Concerning cessation of the end. Since law is an ordination of reason, if the reason which moved the superior to enact the law totally ceases, by that very fact the law itself ceases. But, to avoid the dangers which easily occur from private judgment in a matter of this kind, certain conditions are required:

(a) That the end of the law cease totally: for if one of the motives subsists, the law does not become useless, and therefore does not cease; thus if a bishop has commanded prayers for attaining peace with enemies and the cessation of internal sedition, the law does not cease when peace has been obtained, if sedition still rages; (b) that the end cease adequately, that is, for all the articles of the law: for if it ceases only for one or another, the obligation of those articles is indeed taken away, but not of the others which remain useful, lest, namely, the useful be vitiated by the useless;[1] (c) that it cease generally and permanently, that is, for the whole community and for a very long time: for if it

ceases for one or another private person, there is no place for abrogation, but for dispensation or epikeia; if for a short time, suspension of the law suffices.

[1] Rule of law 37, in the Sixth.

§ VII. Concerning Custom, or Unwritten Law.

Thus far concerning written law; but since law is sometimes introduced or taken away through custom, we must treat of this, which is often called unwritten law.

[2] Reiffenstuel, Pirhing, Schmalzgrueber, De Angelis, Santi, and other canonists in tit. *de Consuetudine*; Suarez, lib. VII; Billuart, diss. V, art. 2; St. Alphonsus, n. 107-109; Ball. P., n. 257-286; Bouquillon, n. 209-213; Noldin, n. 175-180; Kreutzwald, *De canonica juris consuetudinarii praescriptione*, Friburgi Brisg., 1873.

I. Concerning the Notion, Division, and Reason of Custom.

320. 1. Notion. Custom, or rather customary right, is right induced by the customs of the community, with some consent of the superior.

It is explained: (a) In democratic government, where the people enjoy lawmaking power, the consent of a superior is not required for custom, or rather, since the people itself is the superior, its consent is contained implicitly in the customs themselves. But, in the Church of Christ, in which the people does not enjoy legislative power, custom has the force of law uniquely from the consent of the competent Superior (Code, c. 25). - (b) Yet customary right, although ultimately it obtains its force from the will of the superior, is not originally induced by him, but by the community itself, which frequently and universally manifests its mind by such or such a mode of acting.

Custom is distinguished from prescription: for this is the mode by which private citizens or private communities acquire some right, or free themselves from some obligation; while custom is law induced for the whole society.[3]

[3] We treat of prescription in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 243-263.

321. 2. Division. (a) By reason of extension, custom is general or particular, according as it has been received in the whole Church or in some part of the Church.

(b) By reason of relation to law, one is according to law, when by use it confirms or interprets an existing law; another is beside law, which induces a new obligation; another is against law, which derogates from written law in whole or in part.

322. 3. Reason of customary right. (a) That a new law can be induced by custom is easily understood. For laws attain their end, namely the public good, more efficaciously the more they are accommodated to the customs of the community: for then they are observed more easily and sweetly; but nothing is certainly more accommodated to these customs than a custom induced by the community itself and strengthened through a long time; therefore it was altogether fitting that the legislator should confirm by his authority customs apt for promoting the good of society. Thus certain impediments were introduced, such as disparity of cult, and also certain fasts. - The same can be said concerning a custom which interprets law.

(b) A custom which abrogates an existing law must likewise be said to be consonant with reason. For, that a law may promote the good of society, it ought not to be too arduous nor inaccessible to human infirmity; now if a law is opposed to a long-standing custom, which moreover we suppose to be reasonable, from this it is deservedly inferred that that law is too arduous and therefore to be abolished. - And this indeed appears more evident for the Church than for any other society: for the Church is perpetual and universal; but a law which is accommodated to one age, or to some region, often, with the passing of ages or with changed adjuncts, loses its usefulness, indeed sometimes has several inconveniences, especially in such or such a region. Therefore it was altogether fitting that antiquated laws could be abolished by contrary custom.

II. Concerning the Conditions Required That Custom Be Legitimate.

They arise from a fivefold source: on the part of the legislator, - of the community, - of the matter, - of the acts by which it is induced, and of time.

323. 1. On the part of the legislator consent is required, as is clear from what has already been said, n. 320. - (a) Yet consent which is called personal, by which namely the legislator, knowing some individual custom existing somewhere, assents to it either expressly or tacitly, namely when he does not protest though he easily can, is not strictly required, but plainly suffices. (b) Consequently legal consent suffices, which is given by way of general law, namely when the legislator, in the law itself, declares that any customs whatever will be valid, provided that they are clothed with the designated conditions; for thus he clearly expresses his consent, although in a general mode. Now that the matter is thus in canon law is clear from the celebrated declaration of Gregory IX: "For although the authority of long-standing custom is not worthless, nevertheless it is not going to prevail to such a degree that it ought to generate prejudice even to positive right, unless it has been reasonable and legitimately prescribed."[1]

[1] *Decretal.*, c. *Cum tanto*, 11, *De consuetud.*, lib. I, tit. 4.

324. 2. On the part of the community, two things are necessary: (a) that custom be induced by a community upon which law can be imposed; for if it is not capable of receiving law, neither is it capable of inducing law. Now the communities which, from canon law, enjoy that capacity are: the universal Church, a province, diocese, city, town, and more probably a parish, - and also a religious order, a religious community, a chapter, seminary, and confraternity: for upon all these a law can be imposed by the Pontiff or bishop; - but a family or a private man cannot induce a custom.

(b) That the greater part of the community elicit acts inductive of custom; indeed the lesser part does not suffice, since this cannot command the greater; nor is universality required, since even in a legislative assembly universality of votes is not necessary; therefore the greater part suffices, which morally represents the community.

325. 3. On the part of the matter, or object, it is required that it be reasonable, at least negatively; and therefore that it not be contrary to natural or divine right of the new law, since, from what was said above, n. 227 and 256, each is immutable; nor expressly or

equivalently reprobated by canon law itself; nor furnish an occasion of sin or be pernicious to society. But the judgment concerning the reasonableness of custom pertains to prudent men, doctors, confessors, honorable men, - or to a judge, if the matter is brought to the external forum. - But it is not required that it begin without sin; not rarely the first who prescribe against the law sin; but custom, even begun in bad faith, is valid, provided that it is negatively reasonable in the sense explained.

326. 4. On the part of the acts by which custom is induced. These ought to be: (a) free, that is, proceeding neither from ignorance or error, nor from force or fear, but from free will with previous knowledge; otherwise, they are not truly human acts, and therefore cannot induce or take away an obligation; (b) frequent and continuous, or uninterrupted: for if they occur very rarely, or are interrupted either on the part of the people, or on the part of the Prince punishing transgressors, they can no longer be said to constitute the customs of the community, which suppose a certain frequency and continuity; (c) with at least interpretative intention of inducing right or derogating from right: for acts morally do not operate beyond the intention of the agent; and therefore those who act from mere devotion (for example, in daily hearing of Mass) do not impose a new obligation on themselves, nor do they prescribe against the law, if from want of consideration they do not observe its prescriptions. - A custom prevails prescriptively, even if the law against which prescription is made is not explicitly known, provided that there is had an interpretative intention of abolishing the law; thus a diocese which prescribes against the law of fasting in general, and does not observe a new fast unknown to it, has sufficiently the intention of abolishing that fast.

327. 5. On the part of time. According to the Code, can. 27, 28, custom against the law is not valid unless it has been "legitimately prescribed through forty continuous and complete years; but against an ecclesiastical law which contains a clause prohibiting future customs, only reasonable centenary or immemorial custom can prescribe. A custom which is expressly reprobated in law is not reasonable. A custom beside the law, which has knowingly been observed by the community with the mind of obliging itself, induces law, if likewise it has been reasonable and legitimately prescribed through forty continuous and complete years."

328. Corollary. From this it can be inferred how certain clauses, added to pontifical laws for reprobating customs, can be understood.

(a) A universal law indeed takes away a universal custom contrary to itself, but per se does not take away particular customs which the legislator can be ignorant of.

(b) The clause "notwithstanding any custom whatever" indeed takes away every ordinary custom, but not an immemorial one, namely that of whose beginning no memory exists.

(c) The clause "notwithstanding any custom whatever, even immemorial" indeed takes away all previous universal customs, but does not prevent a new custom contrary to the law from being formed.

(d) The clause "any custom in the future being excluded" renders impossible an ordinary custom contrary to the new law, but in no way renders impossible a contrary centenary or immemorial custom, as is clear from the Code, c. 27, § 1. Hence against disciplinary Tridentine laws, centenary or immemorial custom is admitted.

See the rest concerning custom and ecclesiastical law apud the Canonists.

Scholion: Concerning the Code of Canon Law.

329. Ecclesiastical legislation, which formerly was contained in the *Corpus juris canonici*[1] and in many other documents of the subsequent age, today is found in the *Code of Canon Law*, arranged by order of Pontiff Pius X, and promulgated by the authority of Pope Benedict XV, which had the force of obliging in its entirety from the day of Pentecost 1918, the 19th day of May.

[1] The best critical edition of the *Corpus juris canonici* was published by Richter, which afterward Friedberg polished and furnished with notes, Leipzig, 1879-1881: there you will find learned Prolegomena concerning the character and authority of the parts of which the *Corpus juris* consists. - The *Corpus juris canonici* consisted of six parts: 1. the *Decretum* of Gratian; 2. the Decretals of Gregory IX; 3. the Sixth of Decretals of Boniface VIII; 4. the Clementines of Clement V; 5. the Extravagants of John XXII; 6. the Common Extravagants.

(A) The scope of the Code was "to gather into one, arranged in a clear order, all the laws of the Church published up to these times; removing from it those which had already been abrogated or had become obsolete; adapting others, where there was need, more suitably to our present customs; and also establishing others anew, whenever it seemed necessary or expedient."

(a) It regards the Latin Church alone, and does not oblige the Oriental Church, unless there is question of those things which, from the very nature of the thing, also affect the Oriental Church (Can. 1).

(b) For the most part it decrees nothing concerning rites and ceremonies; wherefore all liturgical laws retain their force, unless some one of them is expressly corrected in the Code (c. 2).

(c) By the Code there are in no way abrogated conventions entered into by the Apostolic See with various Nations, nor privileges and indults granted to persons, whether physical or moral, unless they are expressly revoked by the canons of the Code.

(B) As to laws previously enacted, the Code decrees these things (c. 6):

"1. Any laws whatever, whether universal or particular, opposed to the prescriptions of this Code, are abrogated, unless concerning particular laws something else is expressly provided;

2. Canons which refer the old right in its entirety are to be judged from the authority of the old right, and therefore from the interpretations received among approved authors;

3. Canons which agree only in part with the old right, insofar as they agree, are to be judged from the ancient right; insofar as they differ, they are to be judged from their own meaning;

4. In doubt whether some prescription of the canons differs from the old right, one must not depart from the old right;

5. As to penalties of which no mention is made in the Code, whether they are spiritual or temporal, medicinal or, as they call them, vindictive, latae or ferendae sententiae, let them be

held as abrogated;

6. If any of the other disciplinary laws which have flourished up to now is contained neither explicitly nor implicitly in the Code, it must be said to have lost all force, unless it is found in approved liturgical books, or the law is of divine right, whether positive or natural."

(C) Division of the Code. At the very threshold three things are found: (a) the Preface in which Cardinal Gasparri learnedly sets forth the history of collections of Canon Law, and clearly declares the reason and method of the Code; (b) the Constitution of Benedict XV promulgating the Code and decreeing that it has the force of law for the universal Church; (c) the Profession of Catholic faith to be emitted in certain circumstances.

The Code itself embraces 2414 canons distributed in five books.

In the first book are proposed the General Norms.

Book II treats of persons, namely clerics, religious, laymen.

Book III treats of things, namely concerning the sacraments in general and in particular; concerning sacred places and times, concerning divine worship, concerning the ecclesiastical magisterium, concerning benefices and other non-collegial institutes, concerning the temporal goods of the Church.

Book IV treats of processes, namely concerning trials, concerning causes of beatification and canonization, concerning the manner of proceeding in certain business or penal sanctions.

Book V treats of delicts and penalties.

There follow the Code eight documents, among which especially should be noted the Constitution of Pius X, *Vacante Sede Apostolica*, 25 Dec. 1904, where all those things are prescribed which are to be done while the Apostolic See is vacant.

Article IV. Concerning Civil Law.

332. Just as ecclesiastical society can make laws for the spiritual good of the faithful, so likewise civil authority can establish laws for directly promoting the temporal happiness of citizens, and mediately their spiritual good; for even temporal happiness itself is reduced to a higher end, namely the practice of virtues, which ultimately conducts to eternal beatitude. Therefore civil law itself, provided that it is an ordination of reason, is truly a norm of human acts, since it ultimately tends to perfecting citizens and leading them to their end.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 95-96; Suarez, lib. III, V, VI; Billuart, diss. III-IV; Muller, § 50-60; Bouquillon, n. 214-252; Van Gestel, *De Justitia et lege civili*, Groningae, 1896; Bautain, op. cit., ch. 11-12, 16-17; Waffelaert, *Etude de Théol. Morale sur l'obligation en conscience des lois civiles*, Tournai, 1884.

Here, from what was said in Philosophy, we presuppose that man is by nature a social being, and therefore that civil society is from nature, or, in other words, from God the author of nature, and does not arise from a mere social pact. But in every society there ought to be some authority which presides over the commonwealth; and this authority, in whatever way it is designated, whether by the vote of the nobles or of the people, or by received right of birth, proceeds from God, according to that saying of the Apostle:[2] "For there is no power except from God; but those things which are, are

ordained by God... For he is God's minister to you for good." In fact, as Leo XIII argues, society can neither exist nor be understood in which there is not some superior who moderates wills and impels them rightly to the common good; therefore God willed that in civil society there be those who command the multitude. By force of this authority, those who preside over society, whether Princes or legislative Assemblies, can, as ministers of God, establish laws which oblige in conscience. Wherefore we shall speak: 1. concerning the conditions required for civil law; 2. concerning its moral obligation.

[2] Rom., XIII, 1, 4. Cf. Leo XIII, Encyc. *Diuturnum*, 29 Jun. 1881, and *Immortale Dei*, 1 Nov. 1885.

§ I. Concerning the Conditions Required for Civil Law.

In order that civil law may be just, and therefore have the force of obliging, certain conditions are required on the part of the author, promulgation, and object.

I. Concerning the Author of Civil Law.

333. 1. The faculty of making laws, as to temporal matters, resides in legitimate superiors, who are different according to the different constitution of society. Under a regime of absolute monarchy, this authority is exercised by the king, or supreme prince. Where aristocracy, or the power of the nobles, prevails, laws are established by the Assembly of nobles. Under a democratic regime, power resides in the assembly elected by the community. In most modern societies, laws are proposed by ministers of the State, or members of the legislative Assembly, and, after public discussion before the same Assembly, are accepted by vote and sanctioned by the supreme power.

Therefore it is necessary that all those upon whom the care of establishing laws lies act equitably and honorably, and intend the public good, not that of a few. Therefore they sin gravely who accept money for casting a vote for a law which is foreseen to be harmful to the public good.

334. 2. A usurper, who obtains public power, of himself indeed does not have the right of making laws; but as soon as he enjoys quiet possession of the government, with the people at least tacitly acquiescing, it is necessary, on account of the public good, to obey his precepts and laws, otherwise just, until his authority is shaken off by legitimate means. Leo XIII clearly taught this: "But that in matters not unjust those who preside are to be obeyed, for the sake of preserving order, in which the foundation of public safety is found, no one doubts: yet it does not follow that, by obeying, whatever is unjust either in the Constitution or in the administration of the state is approved."[1]

[1] Leo XIII, Epist. 22 Oct. 1880, to the Archbishop of Paris.

II. Concerning the Promulgation of Civil Law.

335. 1. Civil law must be promulgated and made public right, but the mode of doing each is diverse among various nations. In many modern States, promulgation is made by an act of the supreme authority, which holds the law as ratified, and commands that it be published, generally in the official journal, and committed to execution. For the most

part it does not begin to oblige until one or another day, or several days, after promulgation.[1]

[1] Thus, in France, from the decree of 5 Nov. 1870 still in force, "a new law is executable in each arrondissement one full day after the number of the *Journal officiel* which contains it has arrived at the chief town of that arrondissement" (Planiol, *Tr. élém. de Droit Civil*, Paris, 1901, t. I, n. 170). - In Belgium: "Laws, after their promulgation, are inserted into the *Moniteur*, the French text and Flemish text facing one another. They are obligatory in the whole kingdom on the tenth day after their publication, unless the law has fixed another delay" (De Le Court, *Codes Belges, Complément*, p. 300). - In Italy: "The law does not become obligatory on the very day of its publication, but on the fifteenth day afterward (that is, the dies a quo excluded, and the dies ad quem included), unless something else has been provided in the law itself" (E. Gianturco, *Istituzioni di Diritto civile*, Firenze, 1901, p. 13). - As to the United States of America, general laws issued by Congress oblige at once once they have been promulgated, unless otherwise established in the law itself; thus apud A. Carlier, *La République américaine*, Paris, Guillaumin, 1890, t. 3, p. 257; cf. Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, New York, 1896, t. I, ch. 16 and 40.

336. 2. For the force of civil law the acceptance of the people is not per se necessary; for, even under a democratic regime, legislative power can be exercised without recourse to the people: for once the delegation of authority has been legitimately made, the legislative Assembly or other superiors are restricted in the exercise of their power only by a superior authority. But, in certain regions,[2] provision has been made that certain laws of greater importance would not oblige except after the acceptance of the people: then indeed they must be referred to the people. And this often favors good government, provided that citizens have care for the public good, and freely give their votes: for thus laws are better accommodated to the customs of the people and are observed more willingly.[3]

[2] Thus in Switzerland, and in certain American States, concerning which see Bryce, op. cit., ch. 39.

[3] Hence, even in the Middle Ages, many kings, especially Charlemagne, did not hesitate to seek the consent and acceptance of the people as to new laws, as G. Kurth reports, *Les origines de la civilisation moderne*, Paris, 1903, t. II, ch. 13, p. 225-229.

III. Concerning the Object of Civil Law.

337. 1. Civil law in a general way can regulate all those things which regard the temporal good of citizens, and consequently: (a) goods of fortune, namely their legitimate acquisition and transmission, whatever favors agriculture, industry, commerce, or the various human arts; (b) goods of the body, by taking care that by apt means the number of citizens be preserved and increased, that nothing be done contrary to public health, that orphanages, hospitals, and other charitable institutes be erected for assisting those who are in necessity; (c) goods of the intellect, by providing for the right instruction of youth in letters, sciences, and human arts, which contribute greatly to the good of private persons and of society; (d) goods of the will, by promoting moral virtues, restraining and punishing vices; (e) goods properly social, namely the very constitution of society, the form of government, the administration of public affairs, relations between the various orders of citizens, and also the defense of the rights of the whole community against the unjust aggression of foreign nations.

338. 2. In matters which are merely temporal, the State can establish laws independently from the Church, but not independently from God.

Hence, (a) it can sanction the natural law by positive prescriptions, for example by compelling parents to nourish minor children, and children to provide sustenance to parents; (b) it can more specifically determine prescriptions of the natural law which are too vague and general, for example by establishing conditions for the validity of contracts, for the succession of children in the goods of parents; (c) it can complete the natural law by additions, by prescribing certain things which of themselves are indifferent, but, by reason of circumstances, can promote the common good, for example in relation to roads or streets, to fishing or hunting, etc. - But in no way can it enact statutes against the natural law; for since law is an ordination of reason, human law has so much of the power of law insofar as it is consonant with right reason: "but if in something it disagrees from the natural law, it will no longer be law, but a corruption of law."[1]

[1] St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 95, a. 2.

339. 3. But in those things which are mixed, that is, which are referred to a spiritual and temporal end at the same time, the State cannot make laws while prescinding from ecclesiastical society, but concerning these it can make agreement with the Church, as often happens in Concordats. For since each power can prescribe something concerning these matters, conflict will easily arise unless the matter is defined equitably and peacefully by common counsel. Thus, for example, in scholastic legislation, provision must be made for sciences and arts in such a way that nothing is attempted against faith or good morals; in the matrimonial contract, concerning civil effects, concerning the mutual rights and duties of spouses, concerning the legitimacy of children, things must be established in such a way that no detriment is brought to the unity and sanctity of the matrimonial bond.[1]

[1] We discuss these things more explicitly in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 6-11, and in the dogmatic part of the Treatise on Marriage, n. 32-39.

340. 4. In merely spiritual matters, the State can establish nothing by its own authority; but indirectly and ministerially it can, and, with the due conditions posited, must help the Church in defending the true religion, as we explained in the Treatise on the Church, n. 233-238.

§ II. Concerning the Obligation of Law.

341. State of the question. 1. Civil law obliges only subjects; but subjects can be either citizens or foreigners dwelling in the territory. Citizens, who dwell in their own territory, per se are subjected to all laws suited to their condition;[2] if they live outside their homeland, they remain subject to certain laws, especially those which regard personal status and personal duties, but not all, specifically those which are held as territorial. - Foreigners, when they dwell in the territory of some society, are subject to some laws, chiefly those which regard public order and tranquility, or goods possessed there. - As to particular matters, the various Codes must be consulted.

[2] For certain citizens can be immune from some laws. - The immunity of clerics is treated in canon law.

2. But here we especially inquire concerning the moral obligation of civil law, whether 1. a law commanding and prohibiting, 2. an irritant law, 3. a merely penal law, obliges in conscience.

I. Concerning the Obligation of a Law Commanding and Prohibiting.

342. Thesis. A just civil law, commanding or prohibiting something, truly obliges in conscience, and indeed per se under grave obligation.

(A) For the Scriptures declare this many times: (a) Since every power is from God, "he who resists the power, resists the ordinance of God; and those who resist acquire damnation for themselves... therefore be subject of necessity, not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience";[1] from which it follows that civil laws at least sometimes oblige in conscience, and indeed under penalty of damnation. (b) The reason assigned shows the same: for princes and other superiors in the civil order are to be obeyed because they are ministers of God, sent by Him, and therefore in some way participate in His authority: "For he is God's minister to you for good... For he is God's minister, an avenger unto wrath against him who does evil";[2] - "Be subject therefore to every human creature for God's sake: whether to the king as excelling; or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, but for the praise of the good."[3] Consequently, just as God can oblige in conscience, and indeed under grave obligation, so likewise can those who hold His place on earth.

[1] Rom., XIII, 1-5.

[2] Rom., XIII, 4.

[3] 1 Peter, II, 13-14.

(B) The reason is taken from the very concept of civil law handed down above, n. 332. For since civil law, although immediately ordered to the temporal good, is mediately and ultimately referred to the eternal good, namely to the practice of virtues which lead to God, it can truly be said that by the observation of civil law citizens are directed to the ultimate end, and by violation of it are turned away from the ultimate end; but aversion from the ultimate end is sin, and indeed grave sin.

343. Yet it was said: per se it obliges under grave obligation. For, that sin be grave, two things are required: gravity of matter, which must be judged not only from the thing commanded itself, but from the intended end (above, n. 274-275); and the intention of the legislator, which is discerned from various adjuncts, but especially from the sense of the people and the interpretation of prudent men. But here it must be noted that from a grave penalty the gravity of the transgression is not always inferred; for sometimes a grave penalty is inflicted for a light delict (for example, in the case of hunting and fishing), by which citizens may be more efficaciously deterred from violation of the law. - Nor are those to be heard who contend that modern legislators do not intend to impose a moral obligation upon citizens, because they themselves reject the existence of God and every foundation of morality; for, even if some of these defend those wicked errors, nevertheless they will to promote the observance of their laws in the best way they can, and therefore implicitly to bind subjects by a moral bond, since this is the most efficacious means.

344. Corollary. Generally laws of this kind oblige in conscience before the sentence of the judge, even in the matter of justice. For understanding this, it must be known that in this matter laws can be made in two ways: laws determinative of property, and laws irritating certain acts translative of property. Here we treat of the former; of the latter below, n. 345.

Laws determinative of property are those which more explicitly and distinctly define the rights of citizens as to ownership. For the right of nature not rarely remains obscure and indeterminate in this matter; and therefore it pertains to the civil power to declare the natural law more accurately concerning this matter, so that disputes and lawsuits may be forestalled; thus as to things found or lost, as to the prescription of goods, as to the rights of writers over the offspring of their own mind, etc., civil authority has accurately defined the more or less uncertain right of nature. Now laws of this kind oblige in conscience, even before the sentence of the judge, according to the common opinion. The arguments adduced in the thesis prove this; for here there is question of a temporal matter, insufficiently determined by the right of nature, concerning which therefore the State, as minister of God, can make laws immediately obliging in conscience.

II. Concerning the Obligation of an Irritant Law.

345. To civil authority belongs the power of irritating certain acts of subjects, which otherwise by the right of nature are valid. Theologians commonly admit this against a few; and deservedly. For supreme and independent authority, such as civil society is, can establish, in its own forum, whatever is required for promoting the public good; but the public good sometimes demands that certain acts and contracts, although valid by the right of nature, be held as null; such are, for example, certain contracts entered into by minors, or from fear, or without legal forms. - Moreover sometimes the public good requires that those contracts be held invalid not only in the external forum and after the sentence of the judge, but also in the forum of conscience and before the declaratory sentence: for otherwise lawsuits would be multiplied, and the poor, who cannot pay the expenses of lawsuits, would easily be oppressed by the more powerful. Therefore civil law can, for grave reasons, irritate certain acts in conscience, even before the sentence of the judge.

Yet, since we are dealing with odious matter, a law wholly irritating is not easily presumed, but must be certainly proved; therefore if it can reasonably be understood of mere prohibition, the more benign interpretation is to be followed; likewise, if in a particular case it is doubted whether the legislator willed to irritate some act before the intervention of the judge, and moreover the public good does not evidently require the rescission of the act, the sentence of the judge can be awaited.[1]

[1] We explain this more fully in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 617-619.

The reason for the distinction between this case and the other (n. 344) is because a law determinative of property is favorable matter, while a law irritating an act valid of itself is something odious.

III. Concerning the Obligation of Penal Law.

346. 1. All concede that by civil law penalties can be decreed against delinquents; for otherwise laws would be violated by many with impunity; wherefore those who are not inclined to

good by persuasion must be turned away from evil by penalties. - Yet penalty supposes fault, and ought to be proportioned to it: otherwise it would not be equitable. - Yet, in the external forum, fault which is called juridical is admitted, namely omission of that diligence which is required by law, whatever may be the case concerning internal guilt. Whence it can happen that someone is held guilty juridically, even if before God he is innocent, because of inadvertence: in which case civil law, imposing the burden of repairing damage, does not oblige except after the sentence of the judge.[2] - Moreover a penal law indeed obliges ministers of justice to prosecute the guilty, and judges to inflict penalties on those who have been juridically proved guilty; but it does not oblige the guilty themselves to undergo the penalty before the sentence of the judge: for this would be too odious.

[2] We declare the matter in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 474-476.

347. 2. But here it is asked whether there are merely penal laws, that is, laws which obligate disjunctively either to placing or omitting the act, or to undergoing the penalty inflicted upon violators of the law. It is commonly answered affirmatively; for, when there is question of things useful to the common good, but not necessary, some coercion is very expedient, and moreover it seems less opportune to command or prohibit the thing under penalty of sin; wherefore the legislator sometimes sanctions his law by a fine or another penalty, without nevertheless intending that violators incur some guilt of fault; thus many think that the law which prohibits hunting without a special license (*permis de chasse*) is merely penal. - Yet the general principle is that civil laws are not merely penal, but generally oblige in conscience, unless the contrary is proved. Whence, in particular cases, for judging whether a law is merely penal or not, attention must be given to the will of the legislator, insofar as it can be discerned from his declaration, from the nature of the law and penalty, and from other adjuncts. - We treat specifically of the law of taxes in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 590-598.

348. Corollary. From what has been said it follows that those err who think little of equitable civil laws, and, without grave reason, violate them: for thus they contradict Christ, who said:[1] "Render therefore the things that are Caesar's to Caesar, and the things that are God's to God"; they contradict the Apostles, who command obedience to superiors even difficult ones; they contradict the earliest Fathers and Christians, who did not hesitate to submit themselves to the just laws of the empire. And indeed Catholics ought to furnish example in all things, even in the observance of civil laws.

[1] Matt., XXII, 21.

But if some civil law is unjust (which is not presumed, but must be proved by valid arguments), it does not oblige in conscience, because it is not an ordination of reason, and therefore is not law. Indeed, in a democratic society, in which citizens in some way participate in legislative power, the duty lies upon honorable men of striving with all their powers to procure the abrogation of an unjust law. For this those associations of citizens are especially useful which, taking care for public matters, carefully see to it that those who favor unjust laws are not elected to the legislative Assembly.

"Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord."[2] All indeed desire beatitude, but very many do not know how one comes to it. The Psalmist shows them the way: the undefiled or perfect, and therefore blessed, are those who faithfully keep the law of the Lord: for by fulfilling the law, whether inscribed in hearts, or divinely revealed, or promulgated by legitimate authority, they tend with unoffending foot toward God Himself, the fountain of perfection and beatitude.

[2] Ps. 118 (Hebr. 119), 1; the entire psalm embraces praises of the divine law; cf. St. Augustine, Commentary on this psalm.

On Conscience

Concerning Conscience.

349. In order that we may be able to tend to the ultimate end, laws are not sufficient, by which the way to be followed is shown in a general mode; but it is required that laws of this kind be applied to each action in particular. Now that application of the rule of morals, in individual cases, is made through the practical reason of each man, which bears judgment concerning the morality of this or that act, all circumstances having been considered, and is, as it were, the proximate and subjective rule of morals. But this practical reason is called conscience. - In the present Treatise, we shall discuss:

I. Concerning the concept and species of conscience.

II. Concerning certain conscience, insofar as it is the proximate rule of morals.

III. Concerning doubtful conscience, and the means of removing doubt.

Article I. Concerning the Concept and Species of Conscience. — § I. Concerning the Concept of Conscience.

350. The word conscience, which is derived from knowledge,[2] designates several things, but especially: (a) the intimate sense, by which we perceive and discern internal sensations; (b) psychological conscience, by which we apprehend our spiritual operations, namely acts of cognition and volition; (c) moral conscience, by which we judge concerning the morality of our acts. Now the intimate sense, which is concerned with sensible things, is something altogether distinct from conscience properly so called, which perceives spiritual things. But psychological and moral conscience are not two distinct faculties, but one and the same faculty, namely reason (or intellect), which, insofar as it is conscious of spiritual operations, is called psychological conscience, - and insofar as it judges concerning their morality, is called moral conscience.

[1] St. Thomas, Ia, q. 79, a. 13; Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 5; *Qq. disputatae, de Veritate*, q. 17; *Quodlibet.*, III, a. 26-27; Suarez, in Ia IIae, tr. III, disp. XII, n. 1-4; Salmanticenses, Tr. XX, cap. 7; Sayrus, *Clavis regia sacerdotum casuum conscientiae*, Venetiis, 1618, lib. I, c. 2-5; Billuart, *De Act. hum.*, diss. V; St. Alphonsus, lib. I, n. 2-19; Brocardus, Tr. *de Conscientia* (Migne, *Theol. Curs.*, t. XI), q. II, art. 1-5; Sporer-Bierbaum, Tr. I, n. 1-30; Elbel-Bierbaum, P. I, n. 113-141; Ball. P., t. I, n. 130-159; Lehmkuhl, n. 41-66; Muller, § 71-74; Bouquillon, n. 253-282; Bautain, *La Conscience*, Paris, 1869, ch. 13-14; Didiot, n. 233-253; F. Bouillier, *De la Conscience en psychologie et en morale*, Paris, 1872.

[2] Cf. Bréal and Bailly, *Dict. etymol. latin*, Paris, 1898, p. 327-328, where he also notes that the word *scire* (from which *scientia* is derived) primarily signifies the same as to discern, or to judge.

Moral conscience is sometimes considered as a habit, insofar as it inclines us to pronounce concerning the liceity of actions; more often, however, as an act, insofar as it brings forth a judgment. But it is an act of the intellect, not of the will; and in this it agrees with psychological conscience; but it differs from it because it is not a mere apprehension of the intellect, but a true judgment or dictate concerning the liceity of an act, or concerning its relation to the rule of morals: whether it is licit or

prohibited, whether there is an obligation of placing it or merely a counsel, whether under grave or under light obligation. Nor is it a speculative judgment, but practical, because it does not regard the liceity of an action in general and in the abstract, but in particular and in the concrete; indeed it is a proximately practical judgment, because it is borne concerning an action to be placed here and now, and therefore expresses an order to acting.

351. Moral conscience is therefore distinguished: (a) from synderesis, which is usually defined as the habit of the first moral principles, or a certain innate promptitude of reason for easily knowing the first moral principles, such as these: good is to be done, - what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another, etc. (above, n. 221); (b) from science, which is knowledge of general conclusions deduced from first principles; (c) from prudence, which is the right estimation of all the circumstances regarding the morality of some action. - Yet it depends on these three: for it uses the knowledge of principles and conclusions, and also the prudent consideration of all circumstances, for judging whether this action in particular, all things considered, is licit or not.

Many say that the judgment of conscience is, as it were, the conclusion of some prosyllogism. Namely the major is some general principle, proposed by synderesis, for example, every evil is to be avoided; the first minor declares that such a genus of action is comprehended under the general law, for example, theft is evil; from this moral science infers that theft is to be avoided. Then prudence adds: but the action which is here and now proposed as to be done, all things considered, falls under the concept of theft; and the last conclusion is the practical judgment of conscience: therefore here and now one must abstain from that theft. - For the most part, however, conscience does not explicitly syllogize, but, with all adjuncts considered, by a simple judgment, without any reasoning, decrees that this or that action is to be done, or omitted.

352. Therefore conscience can be defined as a practical judgment concerning the morality of an action to be placed here and now.

This is conscience properly so called, insofar as it is the rule of morals. Yet under the name conscience also comes the judgment which our reason bears concerning the morality of a past act: when it approves this, it is called the testimony of a good conscience; but if it reproves it, it is called remorse or the worm of conscience. Here we treat of conscience properly so called.

1. Many moderns do not distinguish the intimate sense from conscience; Rabier reports their various theories concerning the nature of conscience, *Psychologie*, ch. 6, p. 52-79. - Some think that conscience is a special faculty distinct from the intimate sense and the intellect: thus Reid, Garnier, Fabre, apud Bouillier, op. cit., p. 54-59.

§ II. Concerning the Species of Conscience.

353. State of the question. Conscience is divided from a manifold head.

(a) By reason of the obligation which it manifests, conscience, like the law itself, is called commanding, forbidding, permitting, according as it commands, prohibits, or permits certain acts (above, n. 208).

(b) By reason of the mode in which it enunciates the judgment, it is certain, when, without prudent fear of erring, it judges that some act is good or evil, and therefore to be done or avoided; doubtful when it hangs suspended concerning the liceity of an action,[1] or at least pronounces not without prudent fear. We shall speak below concerning each.

[1] That suspension of soul is not properly a judgment, but it implicitly supposes the prior conscience that one must abstain from pronouncing concerning the liceity of the action.

(c) By reason of conformity with the objective rule of morals, conscience is true,[1] if it agrees with truth, that is, with divine goodness and reason, or law; erroneous, if it differs from the same. But erroneous conscience is lax or scrupulous: lax, when someone, from a lighter cause, judges something to be licit which truly is not licit, or something light which is grave; scrupulous, if someone, from a futile cause, judges something to be illicit which in fact is licit, or something grave which is light.

[1] Often true conscience is called right; yet there is some distinction between each: right conscience is that which is formed according to the rules of prudence; but sometimes conscience is true, although imprudently formed. But for the most part these two words are taken interchangeably.

From this it is clear that certain conscience differs from true conscience: the former regards the subjective judgment which is borne concerning the morality of an action; the latter the objective conformity of this interior judgment with truth. Wherefore conscience can be certain without being true, such as invincibly erroneous conscience; likewise true conscience can remain doubtful, namely when truly probable arguments are present for the liceity and against the liceity of some action.

Whether and in what sense erroneous conscience is a rule of acting, we shall explain below; but a few things must be pre-noted concerning lax and scrupulous conscience, so that it may be better understood how a right conscience is formed.

I. Concerning Lax Conscience.

354. 1. Notion. Here we treat of lax conscience, especially insofar as it denotes a habit, or a disposition of soul which inclines reason to diminishing or denying moral obligations, and therefore to extending liberty too much. By force of this habit, in a particular case, conscience judges, without sufficient reason, that something which is truly prohibited is licit, or that what is grave is a light sin. - Sometimes, from a long-standing habit of sinning, the moral sense is so clouded that conscience thinks little or nothing of even very grave sins, calling evil good, and drinking iniquity like water:[1] then it is called seared.[2]

[2] Bourdaloue excellently explains its causes and dangers, *Sermon pour le 3e Dim. de l'Avent, sur la fausse conscience*; cf. *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clergé*, t. XXIV, 1902, p. 737-743.

[1] Isa., V, 20; Job, XV, 16.

[2] 1 Tim., IV, 2.

355. 2. Causes. Among the causes which form a lax conscience, these can be numbered: (a) depraved education: for those who from infancy have been instructed not in the law of the Lord, but in worldly corruptions and false opinions, and have had before their eyes

examples of all vices, easily are ignorant of not a few precepts of the natural law, and judge as indifferent certain acts shameful and dishonorable in themselves; (b) defect of consideration and counsel: those who do not think before acting, and in more difficult matters do not seek the counsels of the wise, are often deceived, and hold as good or at least indifferent what is truly evil; (c) the impulse of desires: namely, when various passions urge, reason is not rarely clouded: what we vehemently desire appears licit; whatever we will is good, and whatever pleases is holy; movements of anger seem to be nothing other than pious indignation, - unbridled ambition nothing other than noble emulation, - avarice is held as legitimate foresight, - commercial frauds are judged an exhibition of industry, etc.; (d) the habit of doing evil: for, sins having been multiplied, the moral sense is dulled, fear of God and reverence for law gradually vanish; hence those things which at the beginning were judged very grave crimes are soon considered as light or no delicts; (e) presumptuous trust in God: God, they say, good and merciful, will forgive us; for He has known our frame and the infirmity of human flesh; wherefore He is much more inclined to benignity than theologians and preachers, nor does He so strictly reprove what moreover is done by most.

356. 3. Harms. Lax conscience, like the ignorance upon which it rests, can be vincibly or invincibly erroneous, according as it can be corrected by moral diligence having been applied or not, according to what was said above, n. 90-98: yet each is full of dangers.

(A) Even when conscience is invincibly erroneous, it induces many evils;[1] for it is the cause why many acts sinful in themselves and objectively are perpetrated. Now an objectively evil act: (a) is a disorder, since it is opposed to the law which is an ordination of reason, and therefore of itself, without the formal malice of the agent, gradually depresses the moral sense, and, when it is often repeated, generates habits evil of themselves and very harmful; thus he who, even from ignorance, often acts against truth or chastity, even if he does not formally sin, commits something shameful and dishonorable in itself, which gradually dulls his moral sense; (b) it gives scandal: for many, seeing evil acts often committed by others, from this take occasion of sinning, and easily persuade themselves that those acts are not very depraved, indeed perhaps even licit, since they are done daily by so many men; from this, gradually and imperceptibly, morals are corrupted, with great detriment to private persons and to the whole of society; (c) it induces the danger of sinning formally: for by acts against the law often repeated, even ignorantly, habits of themselves vicious are soon acquired; and, when afterward conscience awakens, and their malice clearly appears, they are not easily eradicated; thus one incurs the danger of formally consenting to acts which are now apprehended as evil.

[1] This is clearly explained by *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clergé*, t. XXI, 1899, p. 1169-1175.

357. (B) But often lax conscience is vincibly erroneous, and therefore culpable, because it was voluntarily formed, insofar as the agent, entangled in the snares of the passions and burning with pleasure, desired and suggested to himself, while conscience resisted, that this or that action was not prohibited, and afterward suffocated the remorse of conscience; or because, doubting or at least suspecting that the matter was evil, nevertheless he was unwilling to take counsel, lest perchance he discover the truth and no longer be able to enjoy the intended

pleasure.[2] Then indeed he sinned formally, and indirectly or in the cause willed the depraved effects which he foresaw would follow therefrom (above, n. 97 and 171-174).

[2] If it is actually vincibly erroneous, by that very fact it is not certain, and therefore not to be followed, as is declared below.

Moreover if, at the very time at which he acts, someone doubts or suspects that the matter is evil, and moreover knows that his conscience is lax, he cannot follow it, because he is conscious that it is not a right rule of morals, but is held to reform it by the means soon to be set forth. Wherefore by following it he voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of sinning, and therefore actually sins.

By these grave sins often committed the way is prepared for blindness of mind and hardness of heart: for the intellect is clouded insofar as it has become accustomed to approving false things as true, evil things as good; and the will is hardened in evil, insofar as, by indulging pleasure, it acquires a vehement propensity toward depraved acts, so that it obeys conscience only with difficulty.

358. 4. Remedies. As soon as someone becomes conscious that he has entered the way of laxity, he ought seriously to strive, under the guidance of a prudent confessor, to reform his conscience.

(a) First of all he will have recourse to prayer, so that, helped by divine light, he may attain practical knowledge of the rule of morals, - and, relying on divine help, may be able not only to hear, but also to follow the voice of right conscience, notwithstanding human infirmity: "Give me understanding, and I will search your law, and I will keep it with my whole heart."[1] (b) Afterward there is required the agent's own consideration before acting, with a sincere will of knowing and doing what is honorable, and not what pleases; but to discover the truth more easily, let the counsels of skilled and honorable men be sought, and not those of men who are easily deceived by the fallacies of the age; (c) finally let the impediments be removed, namely disordered passions and vicious habits, by which conscience is frequently clouded.

[1] Ps. 118, 34.

But the confessor should receive with paternal affection those who seriously wish to be amended, even if for a long time they have walked in broad ways; and he should instruct them rather than rebuke them, - he should add courage to them, and persuade them that the reformation of conscience, although difficult, is in no way impossible, provided that prayer is joined to good will and assiduous efforts.

II. Concerning Scrupulous Conscience.

359. 1. Notion. Here likewise we treat of scrupulous conscience, insofar as it is a habitual disposition,[3] by force of which the agent, from a futile foundation which he thinks solid, believes or doubts that something is illicit which in fact is not, and therefore with anxiety fears lest he frequently sin, and indeed mortally. For the most part this vain trepidation is accompanied by a certain sensible impression or commotion, arising from vivid imagination, which more or less disturbs judgment and vexes the mind with anguish.[1]

[2] Besides the authors alleged, see Scaramelli, *Director. asceticum*, Augustae Vindelicorum, 1770, tr. II, n. 421-467; Reuter, *Neo-Confessarius*, Ratisbonae, 1870, n. 255-274; Schram, *Instit. theol. myst.*, Parisiis, 1868, t. I, § 73-83; Lombez, *Paix intérieure*, 2e p., ch. 7; Dubois, *l'Ange conducteur des âmes scrupuleuses*, Lille et Paris, 1901; *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clergé*, t. XXIV, 1902, p. 673-678.

[3] A judgment brought by scrupulous conscience is sometimes certain and sometimes doubtful: in the former case, conscience is said to be informed by scruples, and its dictate must be followed, from what will be said below concerning certain conscience; in the latter case, conscience is agitated by scruples, and concerning it we treat here; this is not to be followed, but the doubt is to be put aside by force of a reflex principle handed down by the confessor (n. 364).

[1] The word scruple (*scrupulus* or *scrupus*) literally signifies a little stone (*pierre pointue*); for just as this, inserted between the foot and the shoe, torments the one walking, so scruple vexes the soul.

(A) The principal signs by which scrupulous persons are recognized are these: (a) fear of sinning in all things, even indifferent and honorable things, or the vain apprehension that fault otherwise light is grave; (b) excessive anxiety concerning past confessions, and consequently the desire of making general confessions again and again, especially when from these doubts and anxieties increase; (c) lengthy accusations of circumstances which do not pertain to the matter, even if the confessor has several times said that all these things are useless; (d) pertinacity of judgment, which does not wish to acquiesce in the decisions of the confessor, but to seize upon the counsels of others: from which greater anguishes of soul are born; (e) frequent change of opinion on account of light reasons, and the greatest disturbance of soul in acting, which is sometimes exhibited by ridiculous gestures.

360. (B) Scruples are sometimes concerned with all things and sometimes with one or another object, especially (a) concerning past confessions: whether due examination was premised, and all circumstances rightly declared; whether contrition was had, and indeed at the very time of absolution; whether a good purpose was efficaciously elicited, etc.; (b) concerning depraved thoughts against chastity, or doubts against faith, to which they assert that they have given full consent, or intentions which they suppose to have been evil; (c) concerning scandal which perhaps they gave to others; (d) concerning a habit of acting with serious doubt whether the action is licit, from which it happens that most of their actions are sins, etc.

Scrupulous conscience differs from tender, or delicate, conscience, which perceives the smallest defects, and, on account of love of God, wills to amend them, well knowing that they are not grave, but harm perfection; this disposition indeed is laudable.

361. 2. Causes. Some are natural, others supernatural.

(A) Natural causes are physical or moral. (a) Among physical causes are especially numbered: a melancholic disposition, which often arises from temperament, and injects vain fears; and a certain morbid inclination to despair, arising from character, sickness, or various misfortunes; - excess in labors, abstinence, fasts, vigils, and other austerities, which, by diminishing the strength of the body, depress the strength of the soul; and also long-standing flight from all human conversation and honorable recreation, from which arises an assiduous and morose investigation of one's own conscience. (b) Among moral causes are numbered: weakness and inconstancy of soul, which follows the impressions of a vivid imagination rather than mature judgment; and from this head, more women than men are prone to scruple; - defect of science, whether speculative or psychological, by

force of which the extent of duties is exaggerated, or impression is confused with consent; this defect is sometimes increased by the ignorance or imprudence of certain confessors; - excessive fear of divine justice, proceeding from this, that God is held not as a merciful Father, but rather as a severe Judge, scrutinizing and punishing all things strictly; - hidden pride, by which the scrupulous person tenaciously adheres to his own judgment, and does not consent to obey a spiritual director.[1]

[1] To these causes, which hold themselves on the part of the subject, external ones are sometimes added: conversation with scrupulous persons, - reading of books favoring rigid opinions, - counsels of a director who is ignorant, or lacking discretion.

(B) To these sometimes supernatural causes are added: (a) namely God indeed does not send false concepts into conscience, but sometimes withdraws His light for a time even from the just, and permits them to be vexed by scruples, so that, by patient tolerance of this trial, they may satisfy more perfectly for past sins, and, by detesting them more efficaciously, may withdraw more vigilantly from dangerous occasions; - and also that, conscious of their own infirmity, they may have recourse to God with greater confidence and obey a spiritual director with more sincere humility.

(b) The devil can also act upon our sensitive faculties, especially upon the imagination, for exciting or increasing vain fears; or, when the soul is already held by sadness, he strives to suggest despair by various persuasions; or, if the conscience is delicate, "he strives to make it much more delicate also, and to drive it into a certain extreme degree of anxiety, so that thus, being miserably disturbed, it may finally fall away from spiritual progress."[2]

[2] St. Ignatius of Loyola, *Exercitia spiritualia*, ed. Roothaan, Romae, 1854, Rules concerning scruples, p. 160; P. Jennesseaux, S. J., rendered it in French, Paris, Poussielgue, 13th edition, 1891, p. 323.

362. 3. Harms. Scruples to which consent is given, from whatever cause they arise, can induce the greatest harms, temporal and spiritual at the same time: -

(A) Temporal indeed; for, when they last for a long time, (a) they weaken or disturb the brain and nervous system: for by force of the intimate union between body and soul, vain fears, sadness, anguishes, and other things of this kind, to which scrupulous persons are liable, lessen physical strength and greatly harm health. (b) The powers having been weakened, the way is prepared for neurasthenia, hysteria, and other illnesses described above, n. 130-133. (c) Indeed, as anxieties increase, sometimes reason itself is dulled, and falls into dementia, if the scruples are universal, or into monomania, if they are concerned with one object.

(B) Spiritual harms: they break the powers of the soul, and gradually turn virtues once acquired into vices: (a) they weaken hope: scrupulous persons, thinking themselves to be in the state of mortal sin, regard God as a most severe exactor and flee from Him. (b) Wherefore they cannot pray: too solicitous concerning the state of their own conscience, and fearing God too much, they do not dare to remain in His presence and be united to Him. (c) From this they lack fortitude: for since they retain only slight confidence in God, and moreover exaggerate their own infirmity, and do not trust their spiritual director, they undertake nothing great, but waste time uselessly in vain anxieties. Hence they are rendered unfit for acting fruitfully for the usefulness of others, and for diligently fulfilling the duties of their state; indeed they are usually burdensome to themselves and to others. (d) They also easily incur the danger of sinning gravely: for, their powers weakened, and exhausted by assiduous efforts against natural inclinations, they sometimes slip into despair, and, for the sake of

consolation, loosen the reins to their desires; whence not rarely they fall into extremes, today indulging excessive mortifications, but tomorrow pleasure: for human nature cannot long resist such cruel torture.

363. 4. Remedies. (A) The primary and most efficacious remedy, to which the others are subordinated, is perfect obedience to be shown to a prudent confessor. For a scrupulous person, since he is destitute of the right dictate of conscience, cannot form a right judgment concerning things to be done; and therefore there is no other mode of rightly operating available to him than to submit himself to the judgment of a prudent man, by whose aid he will gradually put aside vain doubts and erroneous judgments. But the prudent man in question can scarcely be anyone other than the spiritual director, to whom the secrets of the heart are trustingly opened.

(a) But the confessor, as soon as he knows that some penitent is agitated by scruples, will strive to win his confidence by paternal benignity, and afterward will address him in these or similar words: I can and will, with God's help, restore peace of soul to you, provided, however, that you will open all things sincerely to me, and obey in all things, having set aside your own judgment for a time; if you promise this, you will certainly be freed from all doubts and anxieties at the opportune time; otherwise, you will be vexed perpetually. For a scrupulous person cannot act rightly by his own counsel,[1] but ought to follow without hesitation the counsel of a prudent man; practically, he never errs who obeys a wise director.

[1] Often he will not acknowledge that he is scrupulous; but the confessor will affirm that the matter is clear from the doubts, fluctuations, and anxieties set forth by the penitent.

(b) The first time, let him allow the scrupulous person to set forth his doubts fully; if he wishes to make a general confession, this can be permitted once, provided that he has not made such a confession to another a little before: let him kindly help him in the examination of conscience and in eliciting the act of contrition; but once this confession has been duly completed, let him no longer be permitted to repeat confessions. If nevertheless afterward he says that he did not confess all things, let the confessor order him to swear that he certainly remembers some sin certainly mortal and certainly never declared in a valid confession: if he fears to swear, let him not be heard; if he swears without hesitation, let it be permitted to him to declare this sin.

364. (c) The confessor will strive to know the cause and object of the scruples, so that he may be able better to hand down practical rules of acting to the penitent. If the cause is physiological, proceeding from weakness of the brain or disturbance of the nerves, he will send him to a wise physician, yet without omitting spiritual remedies. - If the cause is doubt concerning the liceity of such or such an action, he will inculcate in him the rule which is valid at least for the scrupulous: a doubtful law is no law; if, after the action has been performed, he doubts whether he sinned gravely, in practice he ought to act as if he had not sinned gravely, and therefore not abstain from Holy Communion: for he ought not to hold as mortal sin except that which he can swear to be certainly mortal. - He ought to take care that the scrupulous person absolutely obey the rules handed down; whence even if with tears he asks to repeat confessions, or wishes to be absolved from doubtful sins before communion, let him be sweetly but firmly repelled: this severity is the highest clemency. - Nor let him permit him to

spend a long time in examination of conscience (which increases scruples), but let him set a brief time, which he should never exceed; the same must be said concerning the act of contrition, about which scrupulous persons are greatly tormented.[1]

[1] For theologians deservedly teach that one of the privileges of scrupulous persons is situated in this, that they are not held to examine their conscience with the same diligence as others, nor to accuse all sins, but only those which, after a brief examination, they evidently know to be grave (*De Paenitent.*, n. 204 and 192).

The scrupulous person sometimes objects: the confessor does not know my intimate dispositions well; I myself know them better, and I would not wish to die in this uncertain state. - The director will respond: Unless your conscience had been sufficiently known to me, I would not have prescribed a manner of acting; since you are agitated by scruples, you cannot form a right judgment concerning your own dispositions, but you ought to obey the judgment of the wise, even in the article of death; nor can God damn him who has trustingly submitted himself to a superior.

In all these things let the confessor not speak as one opining and hesitating, but as one certainly knowing and having authority: let him adduce either no reasons, or only very brief ones; otherwise, the discussions will be interminable. - Yet firmness of soul should be tempered by charity, so that the scrupulous person may understand that the confessor is a most devoted friend.

365. (B) Other remedies, besides obedience, to be employed are: (a) fervent prayer to God, as a kind and merciful Father, by which light may be trustingly obtained for seeing the way clearly, and strength for following it assiduously; (b) contempt of scruples, by acting strenuously against them, according to the prescriptions of the confessor; (c) Christian mortification, especially that which consists in immediately expelling vain phantasms, impressions, thoughts, and anxieties: hence assiduous and strenuous labor, and the faithful observance of the duties of one's state are especially useful; for thus the mind is efficaciously turned away from torturing doubts; but the scrupulous person should be warned never to hesitate long, but, after brief consideration, to act deliberately according to the counsels given or presumed of the confessor; (d) right formation of conscience, by which gradually, according to the general rules handed down by the director, he will prudently bear judgment concerning his own actions, as if they were the actions of another.

366. Corollaries. (A) Concerning perplexed conscience. Sometimes a scrupulous person, placed between two precepts, believes that he will sin, whichever part he chooses: then his conscience is called perplexed;[1] such is, for example, one who, assisting a sick person on Sunday, thinks that he sins if he leaves him, and likewise sins if he omits Mass.

[1] Sometimes, however, someone can be perplexed from mere ignorance, because namely he does not know how to form his conscience in the conflict of two obligations: then it suffices to instruct him.

In this case, (a) if the matter admits delay, and is of grave moment, he is bound to defer the action until he can obtain the counsel of a prudent man: for each one ought to avoid what he thinks is sin.

(b) But if the matter does not admit delay (which for the most part happens) or is of slight moment, he ought to choose that which seems to him to be the lesser evil, and therefore rather to transgress a positive law than a natural law. But if he cannot discern the lesser evil, and remains perplexed, whichever part he chooses, he does not sin: for he lacks that moral liberty which is required for sin.

Therefore penitents of this kind are rightly to be instructed so that, laying aside vain anxieties, they may learn that in no case does there exist a necessity of sinning.

(B) Concerning pharisaical conscience. Sometimes also, on account of ignorance or prejudices, conscience is lax in matters of great moment, pertaining to natural or divine right, while it is too narrow and scrupulous in matters of lesser moment, especially those pertaining to merely positive right: then it is called pharisaical, because it imitates the morals of the Pharisees, of whom Christ said:[2] "Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, who tithe mint, and anise, and cumin, and have left the weightier things of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith... straining out a gnat, but swallowing a camel." - From this vice today they do not sufficiently depart who are too anxious about many devotions, and, on the other side, neglect fraternal charity or the duties of their state. These are to be diligently instructed so that, putting aside superfluous devotions, they may assiduously cultivate the Christian virtues congruent with their condition.

[2] Matt. 23:23-24; the whole chapter should be read.

Art. II. Concerning Certain Conscience as the Proximate Rule of Morals.

We shall set forth two things: 1. what certain conscience is; 2. whether and in what sense it is the rule of morals.

I. The Genuine Notion of Certain Conscience.

367. 1. Preliminary remarks concerning certitude. Certitude in general is the firm adherence of the mind to some notion or fact, without fear of erring. By reason of the foundation on which it rests, certitude is distinguished as threefold: (a) metaphysical, which is founded in the very essence of things and ideas; thus we are metaphysically certain that the whole is greater than its part, because the truth of this proposition clearly shines forth from the very comparison of the ideas; (b) physical, which is founded in the constancy of natural laws; thus we are physically certain that fire burns, because from constant experience it is established for us that there is in fire the power of burning; (c) moral, which rests on the constancy of the laws of the moral order, or on the common manner of acting of free beings. This is: speculative, if it concerns abstract truths or the liceity of an action in general; and practical, if it concerns the liceity of an action to be placed here and now.

368. 2. Concerning the certitude which belongs to conscience. (A) Now the certitude which belongs to the practical judgment of conscience is moral and practical certitude: for since it pronounces concerning the liceity of such or such an action, not in general and in the abstract, but in the individual and in the concrete, with attention given to all the circumstances, the judgment brought forth is not infallible, but rests on human prudence,[1] which can be mistaken.

[1] Not a few theologians say that conscience sometimes enjoys absolute certitude, because it is founded on a motive altogether infallible; such, they say, is the certitude which is had concerning the precepts of the Decalogue and their proximate conclusions. - But in speaking thus they confuse synderesis or moral science with conscience: for this latter does not judge concerning the precepts of the Decalogue, but concerning the practical question whether such or such an action, in these or those circumstances, is prohibited by the Decalogue or not.

(B) Practical certitude itself admits several degrees: (a) sometimes it excludes every doubt and every fear of erring, and is called strict moral certitude; this can be had with regard to practical judgments altogether evident, for example, here and now I ought to abstain from such a theft; (b) sometimes, however, there is had only practical certitude broadly so called, or prudential certitude, which does not exclude every doubt, but only prudent doubt; thus, for example, we are not absolutely, but only prudently, certain concerning the validity of baptism or of orders received: for it can happen that the minister lacked the required intention; wherefore we have some fear of erring, but that fear, as being slight, does not destroy prudential certitude. This suffices in the moral matter, since often we cannot have another; now reason itself dictates to us that that certitude suffices which is accommodated to the infirmity of human nature; otherwise man would frequently remain perplexed, not knowing what was to be done.

369. (C) But this practical certitude, taken strictly or broadly, can be acquired in two ways, directly or indirectly: (a) directly, when, from the very comparison of the action with the law, we come to a morally certain conclusion; thus, given the law of hearing Mass on a feast day, unless a grave inconvenience is present, I judge morally certainly that I am held by that precept, because I see here and now that in my case there is not a grave inconvenience; (b) indirectly, that is, either from authority, or from an external, or reflex, principle, as they say, when we cannot come to a certain conclusion unless a certain principle extrinsic to the thing itself is called into the middle; thus a judge, after attentive consideration of the proofs brought forward in a criminal case, sometimes doubts whether the accused is truly culpable; then he has recourse to an external, or reflex, principle: in doubt, favor is to be shown to the accused; and therefore practically and morally certainly he concludes: this accused man, all things considered, is to be absolved. - That external principle can be the judgment of a prudent man, and especially of a confessor.

370. (D) Certain conscience is not always true, as we have already noted, but can be erroneous, since one can err even when he prudently judges concerning the liceity of some action: then it is called invincibly erroneous, according to the things said above, where we treated ignorance, n. 92. If conscience is actually vincibly erroneous, by that very fact it is not morally certain; for in this case the agent can expel the error, or at least prudently doubts concerning the liceity of the action here and now to be performed. But it must be said otherwise of conscience previously vincibly erroneous, but which at present is actually invincibly erroneous, because namely the agent does not think about the necessity of inquiring: for this is now morally certain, because, although previously he had thought about the necessity of investigating the truth, now he prudently thinks the action to be licit, without suspecting that the matter must be further investigated. Thus a seminary student, while he was studying theology, foresaw that from his negligence he would give certain erroneous decisions: then his conscience was vincibly erroneous; afterward, however, having forgotten this negligence, he brings forth a false judgment concerning a matrimonial case, without at that instant suspecting that he errs: his conscience is invincibly erroneous, and subjectively morally certain.

II. In What Sense Is Certain Conscience the Rule of Morals?

371. 1. Principle: Conscience morally and practically certain, and indeed it alone, is the proximate rule of morals.

(A) Conscience morally and practically certain is the proximate rule of human actions. For conscience morally and practically certain, in whatever way this certitude has been acquired, is that which, without prudent fear of erring, judges that some action is licit or illicit, obligatory or permitted; but it cannot happen that he sins who is prudently certain that the action which he does is honorable, or that the one which he omits is illicit. For no action or omission is imputable to anyone unless it is voluntary; but the malice of an action is not voluntary unless it is apprehended as such by the intellect; therefore he does not sin, but acts rightly, who follows a morally certain conscience; therefore this is deservedly called the proximate rule of morals.

372. (a) Concerning this there is assuredly no difficulty when certain conscience is at the same time true: for then it is altogether consonant with the ultimate rule of morals, namely divine reason. - But the same thing must be said even when certain conscience is invincibly erroneous, because, although it disagrees with the law, the defect of conformity is not imputed to the agent, because it is invincibly unknown by him; and therefore an act elicited according to an invincibly erroneous conscience is objectively and materially evil, as often as namely it is opposed to a law commanding or forbidding, - but subjectively and formally good, because it is apprehended and intended as such. - The same thing must be said of conscience here and now invincibly erroneous, which antecedently was vincibly erroneous. For an act placed according to such a conscience not only is materially evil, but can also be called formally evil in its cause (above, n. 97). Nevertheless it is not in itself actually evil: for it is elicited in good faith, and is not apprehended nor intended as evil: "Every human act has the character of sin or merit insofar as it is voluntary; but the object of the will according to its proper character is the apprehended good: and therefore a human act is judged virtuous according to the apprehended good toward which the will is borne of itself, and not according to the material object of the act."[1]

[1] St. Thomas, *Quodlibet.*, III, a. 27; cf. I-II, q. 19, a. 7; q. 76, a. 3.

This can be confirmed from proposition 28, condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 December 1690, at least as rash:[2] "Although invincible ignorance of natural right be given, this, in the state of fallen nature, does not excuse the one acting from formal sin itself"; therefore invincible ignorance, and consequently invincibly erroneous conscience, excuses from formal sin.

[2] Denzing., n. 1159.

373. (b) This holds even when moral certitude is only prudential, and was had by the aid of a reflex principle. For since the question is concerning things to be done, that certitude suffices which can be obtained in practice; now, when the question concerns performing or omitting such or such an action, not rarely only prudential certitude can be acquired. Sometimes speculative doubts arise which it is impossible to solve directly; from another side the necessity of acting presses; therefore nothing remains except to solve the speculative doubt practically by the aid of some reflex principle (above, n. 369). Thus he who, after all things have been diligently weighed, follows the prudent dictate of conscience, acts rightly before God.

374. (B) Certain conscience alone, morally and practically certain, is the right norm of actions. For he who acts with conscience which is not practically certain, by that very fact voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of transgressing the law, since he prudently and practically doubts whether the action, here and now to be placed, is licit; moreover, he who voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of sinning, while he can easily avoid it, by that very fact implicitly wills to sin. Therefore he who practically doubts concerning the liceity of an action here and now to be performed cannot, while the doubt stands, proceed further, but ought to form for himself a practically certain conscience, by the aid of a reflex principle, according to the manner to be explained below.

375. Corollaries. (A) Conscience here and now vincibly erroneous is not a legitimate rule of acting. For, from one side, that conscience is not consonant with the objective rule of morals; and from the other, that defect, as being actually voluntary, is imputable to the agent; since, in this case, the agent prudently doubts concerning the liceity of the action, and therefore ought to inquire further, if he can, and put away the error. - But if he cannot, and from another side the necessity of acting presses, he ought to choose that part in which evil, or the greater evil, is more safely guarded against; for by acting thus, he puts aside the practical doubt, and the error is not imputed to him unto fault. But if he chooses that of whose liceity he practically doubts, by that very fact he sins, by rashly exposing himself to perpetrating evil.

376. (B) To discern whether the conscience of the penitent was vincibly or invincibly erroneous, the confessor will ask: (a) whether the penitent perceived some indecency in the act, or at least doubted concerning its liceity; (b) whether conscience dictated to him that the confessor or another prudent man was to be asked, and he voluntarily neglected the occasion of inquiring. If he sincerely denies both, the error was invincible; if he affirms either, the error must be called vincible. - But the nature and gravity of the sin committed from vincibly erroneous conscience depends on the very disposition of the agent at the time when he acts: if he apprehends the matter rather clearly as of great moment, and as contrary to this or that virtue, he sins gravely against that same virtue; but if the matter seems to him of slight moment, or its malice appears only confusedly, the sin will be venial. - From this it is clear how necessary it is for confessors kindly and prudently to explore the conscience and character of each penitent, so that they may form a true judgment concerning the sins committed by him.

377. Hence penitents are deceived who, after they have acted in doubt, seek in books or from a prudent man whether the action is licit, and lay aside every anxiety if they learn that the matter is not objectively evil: the morality of an action depends on the dictate of conscience brought forth at the very instant at which the action is completed, but not on the judgment which is afterward brought, when the matter has been better investigated. Whence that investigation will indeed be greatly useful for the future, but by no means for the past time.

Art. III. Concerning Doubtful Conscience.

To certain conscience is opposed doubtful conscience, concerning which we shall set forth two things: 1. what it is and how it can be rendered practically certain; 2. what are the various systems devised for solving practical doubt.

[1] Suarez, *Tr. de Actibus hum.*, disp. XII, sect. 5-6; St. Alphonsus, n. 20-54; Billuart, *De Act. hum.*, diss. V, art. 6; Lehmk., n. 48-51; Ball. P., n. 160-168; Muller, § 73; Bouquillon, n. 267-291; Noldin, n. 196-201; *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XXII, 1900, p. 369-374.

§ I. Concerning the Genuine Concept of Doubtful Conscience and the Practical Means of Shaking Off Doubt.

378. 1. Preliminary remarks concerning doubt and probability. (A) When the mind cannot judge morally certainly concerning the liceity of some action, it can comport itself in a twofold way: either it adheres to neither part and suspends assent, or it assents to one part more than to another, yet with a prudent fear of erring; in the former case, doubt is called strict; in the latter, it is called broad, or opinion.[2] But opinion is distinguished from suspicion, which is a certain initial adherence, or propensity toward judging, but not a true assent.

[2] Here opinion is treated insofar as it is a subjective judgment of the mind; the same word often signifies the proposition itself to which the mind adheres with fear of erring, or opinion objectively taken.

379. (B) Sometimes opinion is taken objectively; then it can be more or less probable. Probable, according to the force of the name, is said of that which can be proved; but, from common usage, it signifies that which, although not manifestly true, bears before itself certain signs of truth which can move a prudent man to assent to it. But the degrees of probability depend on the greater or lesser verisimilitude which the opinion seems to have; thus that opinion is called more probable which rests on graver motives than the contrary opinion; on the contrary, the one which is supported by lighter arguments is called simply probable, or less probable; again, an opinion is notably more probable, or most probable, if the excess of probability is very notable: then the opposed opinion is slenderly or doubtfully probable.

(C) This probability indeed is called intrinsic or extrinsic: the former rests on reasons drawn from the very nature of the thing, the latter on the authority of learned or wise men. Often, however, each is joined, and the authority of doctors is worth the more, the greater is the weight of the reasons which they bring forward.

380. (D) Again probability is absolute or relative: absolute, which is supported by those reasons by which the mind of a prudent man is accustomed to be moved; relative, which does not bend all minds, but a certain one in particular, because of his special character, or the special circumstances in which he is placed. For in matters which are not evident of themselves, the will can command the assent of the intellect, because of extrinsic motives, whether legitimate or more or less dishonorable; thus in doubts, those who are right of heart adhere to the part which more favors the divine honor, the good of neighbor, or the peace of the community; on the contrary, those who are prone to laxity not rarely adhere to the part which favors pride or pleasure.

(E) Finally, doubt is speculative or practical: speculative, or remote, which concerns the law considered in itself, or its application in general - namely, whether such a law has been sufficiently promulgated, or has been abrogated by custom, - whether to paint on a feast day is a prohibited

servile work, etc.; practical, or proximate, which concerns the liceity of such or such an action in particular, for example, whether it is licit for me to paint on this feast day.

381. 2. Concerning doubtful conscience itself. Merely speculative doubt does not directly affect conscience itself, but pertains to moral science, which weighs those questions; nevertheless often it indirectly affects conscience, by rendering it uncertain concerning the liceity of such or such an action in particular to be placed here and now by the agent; thus, for example, if it is doubted whether painting is a servile work, by that very fact a practical doubt will frequently arise whether Peter can here and now paint on this Sunday.

But here we treat only of practical doubt,[1] and therefore doubtful conscience is called that which either remains suspended concerning the honesty of some action in particular, or pronounces concerning the same not without a prudent fear of erring. - But this state of mind can be induced from the fact that on both sides reasons are present which are equally probable; or because on one side there is a more probable reason, which nevertheless does not remove the probability of the adverse opinion, or a reason only merely but solidly probable. - But for conscience of this kind merely negative doubt does not suffice, which rests on reasons so slight that they would not move a prudent man; for notwithstanding merely negative doubt, we judge concerning the liceity of the action without prudent fear of erring; - hence positive doubt is required, resting on grave arguments, which are accustomed to move a prudent man.

[1] For concerning speculative doubt we have already said something in the Treatise on Laws, and it is treated in the whole course of Moral Theology, by setting forth what opinions are more or less probable.

382. 3. Concerning the manner of solving practical doubt. (A) From what has been said above, n. 374, it is not licit to act with a practically doubtful conscience, but doubt must be shaken off by diligently investigating the matter.

For man ought to try, insofar as he can, to attain truth, and therefore, in a moral matter, to investigate the law and its genuine sense, and also attentively to consider all the circumstances, so that, in the best way that can be done, he may conform his actions to the law, which is nothing other than the manifestation of divine reason and will. Therefore he who, laboring under practical doubt, does not wish seriously to weigh the matter, acts rashly, and voluntarily and culpably exposes himself to the danger of sinning against the law. But, on the contrary, he who uses moral diligence to shake off doubt acts prudently, and the error into which perhaps he involuntarily falls is not imputed to him.

But that examination ought to be more or less diligent according to the gravity of the matter, and the quality or duties of the person; thus, if the question concerns a matter of slight moment, a prolonged investigation is by no means necessary. But this is required if the matter concerns a grave precept, especially concerning the strict rights of another person, or if from office an obligation lies upon some person to solve a doubt which concerns not only his own good, but also the common good.

383. (B) To perform rightly an examination of this kind, that natural prudence which is called right judgment (*bon sens, common sense*) is indeed required, but it does not suffice; rather, in those

who are able to devote themselves to study, there is desired competent knowledge of the principles of moral theology, and in others recourse to prudent men, by whose counsels they may be able rightly to form their conscience. For when the question concerns not only positive right, but also many conclusions of natural right, some aspect often escapes the mind which, if it had been known, would have greatly helped conscience to form a right judgment. For although knowledge of principles pertains directly to synderesis, nevertheless it is especially useful for rightly forming the dictate of conscience: the better the sense of the law becomes known, the easier its application to a particular case becomes.

384. Confessors especially are held to devote themselves to study of this kind, as we have proved elsewhere.[1] Wherefore Benedict XIV admonishes them,[2] "that in a doubtful matter they should not rely on their own opinion, but, before they decide the cause, should consult very many books, especially those whose doctrine is more solid, and then should descend into that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms." (a) Namely, they should not rely on their own opinion, which is often fallacious: for more wisdom is found in the judgment of many than in the judgment of one. (b) They should consult very many books, in order more easily to guard against the same inconvenience; for what could have escaped one author will not so easily escape many, especially if they do not belong to the same school, but to diverse schools: for experience shows how easily authors of the same school, without further examination, confidently repeat the opinions and arguments of their predecessors! (c) But they should choose those books whose doctrine is more solid, those namely which, by knowledge, prudence, and piety, have acquired a greater reputation for themselves, and have weighed the matter expressly, not incidentally: nor are the authors whose works are read to be so much counted as weighed. (d) Let them descend into that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Hence, insofar as can be done, attention must be given both to intrinsic reasons and to extrinsic authorities: the arguments brought forward should be critically weighed, with attention given to the circumstances of times and places, and, generally speaking, the authority of theologians should not be estimated at more than the weight of the reasons which they bring forward. Nevertheless, if some conclusion is confirmed by the common doctrine of all schools, by that very fact it has great probability, even independently of the arguments brought forward; nor should one depart from it unless a new reason which up to this time was unknown is brought into the middle.

[1] *Syn. Theol. Mor., De Paenit.,* n. 370-374.

[2] Benedict XIV, Apostolic Constitution *Constit.* concerning preparation for the Jubilee, year 1750, § 21.

385. (C) After all these things have been weighed, if conscience cannot bring a morally certain judgment, it remains that we have recourse to a reflex principle, by whose aid the practical doubt may be converted into moral certitude. Now, among reflex principles, some are universal, because they can be applied in any doubt concerning the liceity of an action for forming a practically certain conscience; such are: a doubtful law does not oblige, - in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and others which we shall soon explain in the critical exposition of the systems; others, however, are particular, which can be applied only in certain matters, for example, in doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be proved, - in doubt one must

stand for the validity of the act, - in doubt the presumption stands for the superior, etc.; these indeed are explained in the various Treatises. By their aid doubt is shaken off, and a morally and practically certain conscience is formed. If someone, for example, after mature investigation of the matter, has judged that the law of fasting in such a case is truly doubtful, because of grave reasons, and at the same time admits the truth of the principle "a doubtful law does not oblige," he can immediately conclude: a law of this kind does not oblige me in this case; and this judgment indeed is morally and practically certain. For, from one side, probabilists hold as morally certain the principle "a doubtful law does not oblige"; from another side, it is morally certain that in this case the law of fasting is doubtful; therefore it is morally certain that this law does not oblige me.

386. But the uneducated, who have not explicitly learned the use of a reflex principle, nevertheless form for themselves a practically certain conscience, because, rightly using moral sense, they judge that they act prudently, since such or such an action does not seem, all things considered, clearly and certainly prohibited;[1] but if doubt tortures them too much, they approach a prudent man, especially the pastor or confessor, and ask from him what must be done.

[1] *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XXII, 1900, p. 753-758.

§ II. Concerning the Various Systems Devised for Solving Practical Doubt.

387. State of the question. While practical doubt remains concerning the liceity of an action to be performed, some reflex principle is necessary for forming a practically certain conscience, as we said above. But what is the universal and morally certain principle by whose aid practical doubt can be solved has been keenly disputed among Catholic doctors for many centuries, and is still much disputed today. For understanding this controversy, a few things must be noted beforehand.

1. When moral certitude, even broad certitude, cannot be obtained, the mind practically doubts whether the law obliges in such a case or not; now the law, or obligation, appears as most probable, or much more probable, equally probable, solidly probable, or slenderly probable, according to the weight of the reasons which are brought forward to prove the obligatory force of the law; and from this it is already given to understand how there can be diverse principles for solving doubt, according to the diverse degrees of probability.

Moreover, from the commonly received manner of speaking, the safe or safer part is called that which favors the law or obligation; but the part which favors liberty is called less safe. Wherefore, if it is asserted that the safer part is to be followed, by that very fact it is signified that the law is to be observed as truly obligatory.

388. 2. The reflex principles proposed by the various systems are not valid, according to all prudent men, except where the matter concerns only the licit or illicit; for if it does not concern only the licit, but the valid, or an effect necessarily to be obtained, generally the safer part is to be followed; which occurs especially in three cases: -

(A) When the matter concerns a means necessary for salvation; for since, eternal salvation having been lost, all goods are lost together, whatever may be the intimate persuasion of the soul, surely nothing is to be done from which eternity is endangered. Thus, where the matter concerns truths to be believed by necessity of means, for example, concerning faith in God incarnate, it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, as is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (4) by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679: "An unbeliever who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief."[1]

[1] Denzing., n. 1021; which proposition was reproved at minimum as scandalous and pernicious in practice; cf. Viva, on this proposition.

389. (B) When the matter concerns the validity of a sacrament, as is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (1) by the same Pontiff:[2] "It is not illicit, in conferring sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of a sacrament, the safer opinion being left aside." Namely, in doubt whether such matter is sufficient for the validity of a sacrament, the minister is bound, on account of reverence for the sacrament and the good of the faithful, to apply the safer matter, if he has it at hand; but if this is lacking, and it is necessary to administer the sacrament, it is right to apply the doubtful matter, in order to provide, insofar as can be done, for the salvation of the faithful. - Yet an exception is given in a case in which the Church can and is reasonably presumed to supply the defect, as sometimes happens for jurisdiction required for the validity of absolution, or for merely ecclesiastical impediments of marriage, as we explain in its own place.

[2] Ibid., n. 1018.

390. (C) When the matter concerns the danger of temporal or spiritual harm, either one's own or another's, which we are bound to guard against or prevent from justice or from charity. Thus it is not licit, without necessity, to take food probably poisoned; nor to apply doubtful remedies to a sick person when other remedies certainly efficacious are at hand; nor probably to expose oneself or others, without sufficient reason, to the proximate danger of formally sinning; because in all these things probability does not remove some danger of inflicting an evil which, moreover, we are certainly bound to avert.

Outside these cases, when the matter concerns only the licit, there are various systems.

I. Historical View of the Various Systems.

391. No system before the sixteenth century. For very many centuries, no system properly so called was devised and arranged for solving practical doubts; but the Fathers and Theologians, as opportunity was given, solved occurring doubts with a certain benignity, by diverse reflex principles, but especially by teaching that the obligation of a doubtful law was not to be urged.

(A) Among the Fathers, St. Augustine, treating the question agitated in the first centuries whether it was licit for Christians to contract marriage with unbelievers, declares that in the Gospel or apostolic letters the matter had not been defined without ambiguity, and therefore that this was not reputed a sin, "because truly in the New Testament nothing has been prescribed concerning it, and therefore it has either been believed to be licit, or left as doubtful."[1] - Elsewhere, being asked whether, in a case

of necessity, it was licit to eat food offered to idols, he responded: "Either it is certain that it is idolothyte, or it is certain that it is not, or it is unknown: therefore if it is certain that it is, it is better rejected by Christian virtue; but if it is either known not to be, or is unknown, it is taken for use of necessity without any scruple of conscience."[2]

[1] St. Augustine, *De fide et operibus*, c. 19, n. 35, apud Migne, P. L., XL, 221; cf. *De conjug. adult.*, lib. I, c. 25, n. 31, Migne, P. L., XL, 468-469.

[2] St. Augustine, Epist. 47, to Publicola, n. 6, Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 187.

Thus also St. Gregory Nazianzen replies to a certain Novatian, asserting that second marriages are illicit: "By what argument do you confirm this? Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot do this, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and facility prevail."[3]

[3] St. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 39, *In sancta lumina*, n. 19, Migne, P. G., XXXVI, 358.

392. (B) But the Scholastics, down to the sixteenth century, did not propose an entire moral system, but taught that an uncertain law either does not bind, or at least does not bind in the same way as a certain law, and they began to distinguish between more or less probable opinions; according to many, the more probable part was to be followed; according to others, a doubtful obligation was not to be urged. But since in those times it was not yet customary to institute an accurate distinction between speculative and practical doubt, and between direct or indirect certitude, it is often difficult to know their mind with certainty.

(a) Thus St. Thomas asserts that no one is bound by a precept except through knowledge or notice of the precept:[4] "Whence no one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept; and therefore he who is not capable of notice is not bound by the precept; nor is anyone ignorant of the precept of God bound to fulfill the precept, except insofar as he is held to know the precept." But what degree of certitude he requires for knowledge or notice is not clearly explained there; this assuredly excludes merely conjectural opinion, or slenderly probable opinion; but whether more probable knowledge suffices or moral certitude is required is not sufficiently clear from this place. - Elsewhere he declares that he sins who doubts whether he can have several benefices, and nevertheless, while such doubt remains, retains them, because he exposes himself to the danger of sinning;[1] and thus he seems to favor probabiliorism; but since he says "while such doubt remains," some understand this place concerning him who, practically doubting, retains these benefices without having formed a conscience for himself. Wherefore probabiliorists, equiprobabilists, and probabilists try to draw the Angelic Doctor into their own sense; to us his mind seems doubtful, because he arranged no system concerning this matter. - The same can be said of St. Bonaventure, of Scotus, St. Antoninus, and many other Doctors.

[4] St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 17, a. 3.

[1] *Quodlib.*, 8, a. 13. - Concerning the mind of St. Thomas, Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., wrote at length in the famous work whose title is: *Fundamentum Theologiae moralis*, that is, Theological Treatise concerning the right use of probable opinions, diss. IX; you will find a compendium of this work apud Migne, *Curs. Theol.*, t. XI, p. 1397-1476.

393. (b) Nevertheless, as Medina, the first favorer of probabilism, admits, not a few theologians before the sixteenth century held that the more probable opinion was to be followed, the probable one being left aside. Behold his very words:[2] "The most learned Soto explains this

question, difficult enough, in book 3 *De Justitia*, q. 6, a. 5, ad 4, in this manner: for he says that, although in speculative matters and in the school it is sometimes licit to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one being left aside, nevertheless in morals and in matters which pertain to the right of a third party, it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one being left aside. Sylvester feels the same, at the word opinion, § 2, Conradus, in the book *De Contract.*, the last question, and, what moves more, Lord Cajetan in his *Summa*, at the word opinion." Afterward he sets forth the arguments by which the aforesaid authors supported their opinion: 1. He who follows a probable opinion, the more probable one being left aside, exposes himself to the danger of sinning, and chooses that which is less certain, by leaving behind that which is more certain: therefore he sins. 2. In doubts the safer part is to be chosen; but the more probable opinion is safer; therefore it is to be followed. 3. When there is danger on each side, one must incline to that part which is confirmed by greater reasons. 4. A judge who would pronounce sentence against him who adduces more probable testimonies would certainly sin mortally, and would commit injustice; therefore he who follows a probable opinion, the more probable one being left aside, without doubt sins. - Therefore, when Medina was writing (in the year 1577), probabiliorism was already flourishing, supported by arguments not to be despised.

[2] Bartholom. a Medina, *Expositio in I-II*, q. 19, a. 6, concl. 3, p. 178-179 of the Venetian edition, 1580.

394. 1. System of the old probabilists.[3] (A) The first who expressly defended that system is the aforesaid Medina, who, in the cited place, thus declares his mind: "But it seems to me that if an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite one is more probable."

[3] Concerning the mind of the old probabilists, Fr. Ter Haar has written learnedly, *De systemate morali antiq. probab.*, Paderborn, 1894.

But he adduces these arguments: (a) in speculative matters, a probable opinion is that which we can follow without danger of error and deception; therefore in practical matters a probable opinion is that which we can follow without danger of sinning. (b) An opinion is called probable from this, that we can follow it without reprehension: for it is that which wise men assert and excellent arguments confirm; therefore it implies a contradiction that it should be probable and that we cannot licitly follow it. (c) A probable opinion is conformable to right reason and to the estimation of prudent men; and although the more probable opinion is more conformable and safer, we are not held to follow it, because no one is obliged to that which is better and more perfect. (d) The opposite opinion tortures fearful souls, by obliging them to inquire which opinion is the more probable. - From another side, whatever adversaries say, he who follows a probable opinion does not expose himself to the danger of sinning, because, although the more probable is safer, the probable is secure and safe. - These arguments can be contracted into one: he who acts probably acts prudently, and therefore does not sin.

395. (B) Medina's system was first spread abroad in Spain, but afterward in the other regions, and soon became common enough down to the seventeenth century. Yet it was defended in a threefold way: (a) some indeed, whom they call moderate, say that a probable opinion is not to be followed when it is doubtfully or much less probable; but that the opinion on behalf of the

law is to be chosen when this is certainly or notably more probable; (b) but according to others, who are called simple or pure probabilists, it is licit to follow a probable opinion, even if the contrary opinion is certainly or notably more probable; (c) finally, a few laxists contended that it is licit to follow an opinion even slenderly probable.

396. (a) Among the moderates are numbered not a few distinguished theologians of the Society of Jesus: Suarez (1548-1617), who indeed teaches that it is licit to follow a probable opinion concerning the honesty of an act,[1] but elsewhere added:[2] "Greater probability is a certain moral certitude, if the excess of probability is certain"; - Rebellus (+ 1608), who writes:[3] "But it is certain, as will be shown elsewhere, that no one can with a safe conscience follow an opinion which is known by him to be less probable"; from the context, the question concerns an opinion certainly less probable, and in other places he favors equiprobabilism; - Gregory of Valentia (+ 1603), asserting that it is licit to follow a probable opinion when it is truly doubted which one is true, but not when the other opinion is truly more probable;[1] - Theophilus Raynaudus, who holds the same when the reasons are equally or almost equally valid; - Esparza, writing in the year 1667 that it is right to follow a probable opinion, provided however that the other is not altogether indubitably more probable;[2] - Terillus (+ 1676) teaches the same, provided the opposite opinion is only a little more probable;[3] - Mamianus de Ruvere, who says:[4] "When the probability of the less safe opinion, speculatively conceived with regard only to material honesty, is equal with the probability of the safer opinion... or when the excess of probability is not very notable... then it is licit to follow such a less safe opinion, the safer one being left aside"; - Rassler (+ 1713), Antonius Mayr, Gabr. Daniel (+ 1728), Joa. Reuter (+ 1762), J. Biner (+ 1766), F. Manhart, etc., taught almost the same.[5] - With these agree some Dominicans, such as Martinez Prado, Fr. de Arauxo, Passerini de Sextula, and also Benedictines, such as Ant. Perez (1559-1637), Bened. Schmier, - and others, whether regulars, such as Joan. Bossius, O. Barnab., Ant. Cotonius, O.S.F., G. Herincx, O.M., Ant. Schiara, O. Theat., Roncaglia, C.M.D., Eusebius Amort, canon regular, Fr. Sylvius.

[1] *De Religione*, Tr. IX, I, IV, c. 15, n. 21.

[2] *De Legibus*, I, VIII, c. 3, n. 19.

[3] *De obligat. Justitiae, Religionis et Caritatis*, 1608, P. I, l. 3, q. 5, n. 5.

[1] *In II-II*, disp. V, q. 7, punct. 4, dub. 3.

[2] *De actibus hum.*, Appendix to q. 23.

[3] *Tract. de Conscientia probabili*, q. 2, n. 15.

[4] *Concordia doctrinae Probabilistarum cum doctrina Probabilioristarum*, P. III, 100, ed. 1707.

[5] F. Ter Haar reviews the opinions of these and of others whom we allege below, op. cit., p. 52-65.

397. (b) Among pure or simple probabilists are numbered many theologians of diverse schools; thus, from the Society of Jesus: Fr. Toletus (+ 1596), Emmanuel Sa (+ 1596), Joa. Azor (+ 1607), G. Vasquez (+ 1604), Lessius (+ 1623), Laymann (+ 1625), Castropalaus (+ 1633), J. Lugo (+ 1660), Cardenas (+ 1684), Dechamps (+ 1701), Lacroix (+ 1714), Mazzotta (+ 1748), Gury Ballerini, Sabetti, Genicot, Noldin, etc. - With these can be joined: Bonacina, bishop of Utica (+ 1631), C. Lupus, O.S.A. (+ 1681), Sporer, O.S.F. (+ 1714), the

Salmanticenses, Order of Carmelites (+ 1717-1734), and many others especially of the nineteenth century.

398. (c) Yet certain probabilists did not hesitate to favor laxism more than was fair; sometimes they held that opinions only slenderly or doubtfully probable were truly probable, and therefore licit; sometimes they said that it was licit to follow probable opinions even when the matter concerns those things to which they ought not to be extended (above, n. 388). Thus, for example, Joa. Sanchez, or Sancius (+ 1624), Bauny, S.J. (+ 1649), Leander, O. SS. Trin. (+ 1663), Diana, Theatine (+ 1663), Tamburini, S.J. (+ 1675), Moya, S.J. (+ 1684), J. Caramuel, Cistercian and bishop of Vigevano, in Italy (+ 1682), whom St. Alphonsus calls the prince of the laxists. The Supreme Pontiffs Alexander VII (1665-1666) and Innocent XI (1679) condemned various excessively lax propositions, and the very principle of laxism contained in this proposition: "Generally, when relying on probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not go outside the limits of probability, we do something, we always act prudently."[1]

[1] Apud Denzing., n. 1020.

399. 2. Tutiorism. To avoid the excesses of the probabilists, some theologians defended tutiorism, contending that in doubt the safer part is to be chosen, even when the matter concerns only the licit. A twofold tutiorism is distinguished: absolute, according to which it is not licit to follow an opinion favoring liberty, even if it is most probable; mitigated, which holds that the opinion on behalf of liberty cannot be chosen unless it is most probable.

(A) Absolute tutiorism was advocated by Sinnichius, doctor of Louvain (+ 1666), and the Jansenists. For they taught that certain precepts are truly impossible for men, and, in order more easily to maintain this proposition, indulged rigorism, and did not hesitate to impose unbearable burdens on the faithful. It is not licit, they said, voluntarily to expose oneself to the danger of sinning; but by following an opinion even most probable, we incur the danger of sinning, since this can be false.[2]

[2] To the point Sinnichius, in the work *Saul ex-rex*, lib. I, c. 95, n. 357: "No one is ignorant that any human opinion, by this very fact, is liable to the danger of error, because it does not transcend the limits of probability... For if an opinion, whether less probable, or even less than probable, can be true; so on the contrary an opinion more probable, or even most probable, can be false."

Alexander VIII condemned this error, 7 December 1690, by reproving this proposition 3: "It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among the probable."[3] And deservedly; for, if certitude strictly so called were required in order to act licitly, and it were not licit in doubts to form for oneself a practically certain conscience from a reflex principle, in many circumstances either one would have to abstain from acting, or one would have to sin; for from one side doubts often occur, and from the other, the human will is so infirm that it cannot always choose the safer way. - Wherefore tutiorism is not truly safe: for by imposing an intolerable yoke, contrary to the mind of the Gospel,[4] it increases sins, generates despair, and bars many from the practice of religion; with regard to many, therefore, it is a most safe way of damnation.

[3] Denzing., n. 1160.

[4] For Christ says: "For my yoke is sweet, and my burden light" (Matt. 11:30). Cannot that be preached concerning tutiorism which Peter was saying about the Mosaic law: "Now therefore why do you tempt God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" (Acts 15:10.)

400. (B) Mitigated tutiorism was defended by certain doctors of Louvain, who tried to soften Jansenist errors by saying that it is right to follow a most probable opinion; among them were Opstraet (+ 1720), Steyart (+ 1701), Henry of St. Ignatius (+ 1719), Dens (+ 1775), to whom Cardinal Gerdil (+ 1802) adhered. It rested on almost the same argument as above: namely, by following an opinion which is not most probable, we are exposed to the danger of sinning. - This indeed is false; for even when such an excess of probability is not present, a practically certain conscience can be formed from a reflex principle, and thus every danger, at least of formally sinning, is avoided. - Tutiorists indeed reject the reflex principle, but undeservedly; for the most probable opinion, which they permit to be followed, either produces a certain conscience, or it does not; if the former, we fall into absolute and condemned tutiorism; if the latter, conscience remains practically doubtful, and it is not safe to follow it. Wherefore today tutiorism is a thing done with.

401. 3. Probabiliorism. (A) To avoid the rocks of laxism and tutiorism, in the middle of the seventeenth century, probabiliorism, which had already flourished before Medina, was renewed. Certain pontiffs, especially Alexander VII and Innocent XI, contributed not a little to this revival.

The former condemned forty-five propositions "relaxing Christian discipline and bringing ruin upon souls"; and to his exhortation it is especially to be ascribed that the Dominicans, gathered in a general Chapter in the year 1656, decreed to fight against the laxer doctrines. From that time namely almost all defended probabiliorism; among them: Julius Mercorus (+ 1669), J. Gonet (+ 1681), Contenson (+ 1674), Fagnanus (+ 1678), Natalis Alexander (+ 1724), Concina (+ 1756), Billuart (+ 1757), Patuzzi (+ 1769). With these are to be numbered a few Jesuits, such as Antoine (+ 1743), Elizalde; but especially Thyrsus Gonzalez (+ 1681), who, seeing the excesses of probabilism, wrote a Treatise concerning the right use of probable opinions, in which he defended probabiliorism;[1] after many difficulties had been overcome, by the counsel of Innocent XII, he made the same public, and within the space of one year committed it to the press twelve times. From that time, not a few Jesuits advocated the same system, for example, Estrix, D. Nunnez, Blanchet, Bonnet, Malatra, Ehrentreich, Muniessa, Taberna, Gisbert, Gabriel Antoine; many, however, continued to adhere to probabilism. - The Franciscans, very many of whom had defended probabilism, gathered at Mantua in a general Chapter, in the year 1762, decreed to follow the more probable opinion.[1] The General Assembly of the Gallican clergy had already declared the same before, in the year 1700, at the suggestion of Bossuet.[2] Many other authors, in the same eighteenth century, taught probabiliorism, among whom were F. Genet (+ 1702), L. Habert (+ 1718), J. Pontas (+ 1728), the brothers Ballerini, Peter and Jerome (+ 1764). Indeed Benedict XIV ordered that the moral theology of Father Antoine, S.J., a probabiliorist, be expounded in the Seminary of the Propagation of the Faith.

[1] Gonzalez, *Fundam. Theologiae moralis*. - Here we subjoin the text of the famous decree of Innocent XI, concerning which there has been sharp dispute between Father Brucker, S.J. (*Etudes*, t. 86, p. 779 sq., t. 91, p. 831 sq.) and Father Mandonnet, O.P. (*Revue Thomiste*, Sept. 1901 - Jan. 1903, separately edited as *Le decret d'Innocent XI, contre le Probabilisme*,

Paris, 1903); the genuine text of that decree, long unknown, was made public by the authority of J. B. Lugari, assessor of the Holy Office, on 21 April 1902.

[1] Apud Ter Haar, op. cit., p. 85.

[2] Bossuet, *Oeuvres completes*, ed. Vives, t. XXII, p. 768; you will find the doctrine of Bossuet in the same place, p. 712, and t. XXXI, p. 1-20.

402. (B) But Billuart sets forth the doctrine of probabiliorism clearly and moderately thus:[3] (a) In the concurrence of two opinions concerning the objective honesty of an action, it is not licit to follow the less probable and less safe one, the more probable and safer one being left aside. (b) In the conflict of two equally probable opinions concerning the objective honesty of an act, we are held to follow the safer one. (c) When the matter concerns only the objective honesty of an act, it is licit to follow the manifestly and solidly more probable less safe opinion, or the one favoring liberty, in the concurrence of the less probable safer one, or the one favoring the law. (d) In order that it be licit to follow the more probable opinion, it is not required that it be most probable, nor does just any slight excess in probability suffice, but a notable and morally grave excess is required, which moves a grave and prudent man to assent to it rather than to the other.

[3] Billuart, *De Act. hum.*, diss. VI.

403. But the arguments which he brings forward are reduced to almost these: (a) It is not licit to follow a less safe opinion if it is not properly, solidly, and readily probable; but the less probable opinion in conflict with the more probable is not properly, solidly, and readily probable; for the motives on which it rests do not suffice for obtaining the assent of a prudent man, but only for introducing some fear concerning the opposite: for the force of those motives is broken by the stronger motives, and a prudent man cannot assent to an opinion which he judges more probably false. From another side he cannot form for himself a morally certain conscience by force of the reflex principle: he who operates probably operates prudently, or a doubtful law does not oblige; for that principle is not morally certain, since all anti-probabilists deny it and attack it with reasons at least probable; and therefore the practical conclusion deduced from this principle is not morally certain. (b) Just as in speculative doubts we are held to embrace that opinion which approaches nearer to truth and more excludes the danger of erring, so in doubts concerning the honesty of an action, we are held to follow that opinion which is more verisimilar and more efficaciously turns away from the danger of sinning; but assuredly the more probable opinion is more verisimilar and more removes the danger of sinning.

404. Nevertheless the probabilists try to solve these arguments thus. (a) In this system the order of knowledge is confused with the order of operation: in doubt concerning the truth of some opinion, generally we ought to assent to that which appears more probable, but in doubt concerning the liceity of an action, we do not adhere to either opinion, but, by force of a reflex principle, a practically certain conscience is formed. The probabiliorists themselves ought to use a reflex principle, namely, in doubt it is licit to follow the more probable opinion; now they cannot prove the truth of this principle except through an argument taken from invincible ignorance of the law: but this argument equally proves the truth of the other principle: a

doubtful law does not oblige. (b) A moral system cannot be true which in its application seems morally impossible; but such is probabiliorism; for most cannot judge whether such an opinion is more probable or only probable; besides, what appears certainly more probable to one appears only probable to another; thus men of fearful conscience are cast into scruples and perpetual anxieties.

Today there are very few probabiliorists, but three systems flourish: equiprobabilism, probabilism, and compensationism, concerning which we must now speak.

II. Present-Day Systems Are Weighed Critically. — 1. Concerning Equiprobabilism.

405. (A) Its origin. Equiprobabilism, which does not differ substantially from moderate probabilism as set forth above, had as its principal defender St. Alphonsus de Liguori, who was numbered among the Doctors of the Church on 23 March 1871. He at first had adhered to the Probabiliorists, but, in hearing confessions, understanding well that their system could be applied only with difficulty, he embraced moderate probabilism, and defended it against the probabiliorists in a dissertation, published in the years 1749 and 1755, whose title was: *Dissertatio scholastico-moralis pro usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris*; but already at that time he reproved the opinion of the laxists no less severely. In the first edition (1749), he had made the system of the probabilists his own in these words: "It is licit to follow a probable opinion in the concurrence of a more probable one, provided that it rests on a grave motive, whether intrinsic, namely from reason, or extrinsic, from the authority of doctors"; but in the second edition he added this restriction: "unless the excess of probability is notable." Afterward, however, fearing lest by this formula certain persons might abuse it for favoring too benign opinions, in the year 1762 he published a new dissertation, in which he established these two things: "When the less safe opinion is equally probable, one can licitly follow it"; - "It is not licit to follow a less probable opinion when the opinion which stands for the law is notably and certainly more probable"; in these words the sum of equiprobabilism is contained. He polished this system more and more, and in the year 1767, in the sixth edition of *Theologia Moralis*, he explained it thus: "Therefore I say that it is not licit to follow the less probable opinion when the opinion which stands for the law is notably[1] or certainly more probable; I say or certainly, because when the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything but notably more probable"; - from another side: "When the less safe opinion is equally, or almost equally, probable, one can licitly follow it."[2] Toward the end of his life, attacked by tutiorists with accusations of laxism, and fearing lest his system be confused with simple probabilism, he openly declared that he was not a probabilist: "I again declare in this brief little Work that I am not a probabilist, nor do I follow probabilism; indeed I reprove it."[1] - It is helpful to observe that the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus was specially praised by the Roman Pontiffs, because "amid the tangled opinions of theologians, whether laxer or stricter, he paved a safe way, by which the directors of the souls of the Christian faithful could walk with unoffending foot."[2]

[1] This word is omitted in the seventh edition, because it adds nothing to the word certainly; cf. *Theologia moralis*, cura Gaude, 1905, t. I, p. xx.

[2] These and other texts of the Holy Doctor you will find in the work *Vindiciae Alphonsianae*, Rome, 1873, P. I, p. 1-125, - more briefly apud Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 911-915. Moreover, concerning the mind of St. Alphonsus there has been much dispute, and there is still dispute today, between equiprobabilists and probabilists; besides the works cited, cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, Appendix I, *Diss. de genuina S. Alphonsi sententia circa usum opinionis probabilis*, p. 632-706; Bouquillon, n. 315-317; Wittmann, *S. Alphonse et le pur probabilisme*, Gien, s.d.; Ter Haar, op. cit. p. 99-107; Gaude, *De Morali systemate S. Alphonsi*; De Caigny, *Apologetica de aequiprobabilismo alphonsiano*, 1894.

[1] Apud Bouquillon, n. 317; cf. *Vindiciae*, p. 70-72.

[2] Decree of 22 March 1871, concerning the concession of the title Doctor; this testimony and very many others are reported by *Vindiciae*, preliminary dissertation, and more briefly by Marc, *Instit. Mor. Alphonsianae*, t. I, at the beginning.

The system of St. Alphonsus is defended by Redemptorists, among whom are Konings, Marc, Aertnys, Ter Haar, Wouters, etc.; and by not a few others, Gousset, Del Vecchio, Savini, Pruner, Muller, Simar, C. Martin, and also many Dominicans, who, setting aside probabiliorism, adhere to equiprobabilism.

"Wednesday, 26 June 1680. After a report had been made by Father Laurea concerning the contents of the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzales, S.J., directed to Our Most Holy Lord, the Most Eminent Lords said that it should be written through the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of the Spains, so that he might signify to the said Father Thyrsus, that His Holiness, having kindly received and not without praise read through his letters, commanded that he freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; and that he should make him certain that whatever he shall have done and written in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

"Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness, that he not only permit Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those asserting that in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; but also that he write to all Universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that each one, as it pleases him, freely write for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary opinion; and command them that they wholly submit themselves to the mandate of His Holiness." F. Ter Haar, C.SS.R., gives the history and commentary of this decree in the little work *Ven. Innocentii PP. XI de Probabilismo Decreti historia et vindiciae*, Tournai and Paris, 1904; Arendt, S.J., explains the same decree in a plainly different sense apud *Analecta ecclesiastica*, 1902, p. 306 sq. and p. 353 sq. Cf. *Revue thomiste*, Jan. 1903, May-Oct. 1903, May-June and Sept.-Oct. 1904, where you will find diverse disputations concerning the same decree; *Etudes*, t. 86, p. 778 and t. 91, p. 831.

406. (B) Equiprobabilism is set forth.[3] It can be contracted into these three propositions, according to C. Marc (n. 91-103):

[3] Besides St. Alphonsus, *Systema morale*, cf. Marc, op. cit., n. 88-108; Konings, n. 63-96; Aertnys, n. 80-121; Gousset, *Theol. Morale*, n. 79-88; Wouters, *De minusprobabilismo*, 1905.

(a) When opinions equally or almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the existence of a law, it is licit to follow the opinion favoring liberty; thus against the Probabiliorists. For 1. a law truly and strictly doubtful does not oblige; for it is insufficiently promulgated, and can be called invincibly

unknown: since on each side there are reasons equally or almost equally probable, morally speaking there is no greater reason for affirming than for denying, and therefore in this case the existence of the law, or obligation, is invincibly unknown. 2. From another side, in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; a principle of this kind, which in the matter of justice is admitted by all, can be extended to the other virtues: for when someone, after diligence has been applied, could not find the truth, he perseveres in possession of his liberty, and therefore cannot be deprived of his right by a strictly doubtful law.

(b) When arguments equally or almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, the opinion which favors the law is to be followed; thus against the Probabilists. It is gathered from the principle: in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; for, just as liberty possesses when the law is not certain, so the law possesses when this is certain and it is doubted whether it has been revoked; therefore the law is to be observed until its revocation is established. - This is confirmed from received principles of law, such as, for example: in doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated; now the revocation of a law, or desuetude, or dispensation is a fact which is not sufficiently demonstrated by equiprobable reasons. - Yet these authors note that liberty possesses much more frequently than the law.

(c) In the concurrence of an opinion certainly more probable on behalf of the law, it is not licit to follow the less probable on behalf of liberty; against the probabilists. - For, in this case, the law is not strictly doubtful: for only then does the intellect fluctuate between two opposed parts, when the motives on each side are either none or appear nearly equal; but in the case, the motives on behalf of the law appear certainly stronger than those on behalf of liberty, and thus the force and efficacy of the reasons on which the less probable opinion rests is certainly overcome and broken by the stronger arguments of the contrary opinion; for that reason man does not act prudently by following the less probable opinion, since by his own will he forces the intellect to leave behind what seems more verisimilar, and to adhere to an opinion which appears less verisimilar. - Nor is it licit to have recourse to the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; for this is valid only when the law is strictly doubtful, namely when the mind fluctuates because of arguments nearly equal on each side, but not when it certainly sees stronger arguments favoring the law.

407. (C) The arguments brought against equiprobabilism are set forth. Against the equiprobabilists the probabilists, especially Noldin, n. 219-222, argue thus: (a) Equiprobabilists, in order to establish their system, use these principles: a doubtful law does not oblige, and an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; but from these not equiprobabilism, but probabilism follows by necessary inference; for even a law which more probably exists remains truly doubtful and uncertain, provided that against its existence or force a probable argument is brought forward. Nor can it be said that the lesser probability is broken by the greater probability of the other opinion; for often the lesser probability rests on an entirely independent foundation, and therefore subsists, even if the contrary opinion is truly more probable. - Nevertheless the equiprobabilists respond that, even in this case, the less probable opinion, which considered apart appears probable, when compared with the opposed notably more probable one, is no longer solidly probable.

(b) A moral system which for its use necessarily requires that the moments of reasons be weighed on each side, and that it be established whether adverse opinions are equally or almost equally probable, is less apt for solving difficulties practically: for often it is impossible to determine when probability is equal or almost equal, and those who think that they can furnish this without difficulty deceive themselves and others. - This impossibility by no means exists, say the adversaries, for with ordinary diligence it can be recognized whether such or such an opinion is notably more probable or not, all the more because St. Alphonsus and modern theologians determine this accurately enough.

(c) From another side, the principle: in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, is falsely applied: for it is false that in doubt concerning the cessation of a law, the law previously certainly existing possesses. And indeed in doubt concerning the cessation of a law, liberty is certain and the law is doubtful, since it is truly probable that the law has ceased. - Besides, the right of liberty is in itself prior to the right of law, because liberty, if not in time, at least in nature and reason, precedes law, and therefore in doubt the presumption stands for liberty. - Yet equiprobabilists say that liberty is no longer in possession when it is certainly established that some law has been promulgated; for liberty was morally bound by the very promulgation of the law, and therefore cannot be called immune from obligation until the revocation is sufficiently established.

(D) Conclusion. Equiprobabilism assuredly is supported by solid arguments, and, although it does not perfectly solve some difficulties, it lays down a safe way between the laxer and stricter opinions.[1] Wherefore the Sacred Penitentiary, being asked "whether a professor of sacred theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which Blessed Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology," on 5 July 1831 judged that it should be answered: "Affirmatively, without, however, those being judged reprehensible who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors." - Yet let these last words be noted, from which it is clear that other systems, not reproved by the Church, can freely be defended.

[1] Yet to us it seems that the principle "in doubt, the condition of the possessor is better" is not rightly applied in the case in which the law, as they say, possesses; for whether the matter concerns the existence or the cessation of the law, we do not think that it obliges when the reasons brought forward on each side are equally or almost equally probable: for then there is truly and strictly a doubt, and the Liguorian principle is deservedly applied: a law truly and strictly doubtful does not oblige.

2. Present-Day Probabilism Is Weighed Critically.

408. (A) The system is set forth:[1] In every doubt, where the matter concerns only the licit, it is licit to follow an opinion certainly and solidly probable, even if the contrary opinion is truly more probable. It is said:

[1] We chiefly borrow the exposition and arguments of probabilism from Lehmkuhl, n. 79-118, and from Noldin, n. 209-216; cf. Ball. P., n. 175-198.

(a) In every doubt, namely whether of law or of fact, - whether the matter concerns human law or divine or natural law, - and indeed concerning the existence of the law or the cessation of the law.

(b) Where the matter concerns only the licit, for even probabilists admit the restrictions enumerated above where the matter concerns the valid, etc., n. 388-390.

(c) It is licit to follow an opinion certainly and solidly probable, but not one doubtfully or slenderly probable. Now, for an opinion truly and solidly probable three things are required: that it rest on a truly grave motive of reason or authority; - that neither a definition of the Church nor a certain reason be opposed to it; - that its motives, compared with the motives of the opposed opinion, retain their probability. These things being posited, the more probable opinion on behalf of the law can be neglected, as long as it itself remains within the terms of probability, and is not morally certain. - But it is required that the opinion be certainly and solidly probable to the very one who follows it; otherwise the law is not truly doubtful and uncertain to him.

This certain and solid probability can be constituted by arguments not only internal, but also external, or taken from the authority of theologians: "For if several authors, and grave ones, call an opinion probable, ordinarily it cannot happen that it is not supported by probable internal reasons... Not only an opinion which is called probable by most theologians, but also an opinion which five or six theologians distinguished for probity, knowledge, and prudence hold as true or probable, ought to be considered truly and certainly probable, unless their authority is weakened either by a declaration of the Church or by manifest reason."[2]

[2] Noldin, n. 212.

409. (B) Arguments favoring probabilism are proposed. Two especially are brought forward: (a) A doubtful law does not oblige; but a law against which there is certain and solid probability is truly doubtful; therefore. - The major is declared: a law cannot oblige unless it is sufficiently known: "No one," says St. Thomas,[1] "is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept"; but only certain cognition is true cognition: for he who doubts concerning some law indeed knows the doubt concerning it and the obligation of inquiring, but he does not know the law itself; therefore a doubtful law cannot oblige. - The minor is proved: certitude and opposite probability concerning the same truth mutually exclude one another; therefore as long as the opinion on behalf of liberty is probable, the opposite on behalf of the law cannot be certain, even if it certainly appears truly more probable; therefore the law against which there is certain probability is truly doubtful, and therefore does not oblige.

[1] St. Thomas, *De verit.*, q. 17, a. 3.

(b) An uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; for the right of liberty precedes the right of law, even if not in time, at least in nature and reason, since obligation supposes a free will which is bound; and therefore the certain and prior right of liberty cannot be restricted except by a certain law; but a law against which an opinion certainly and solidly probable fights is truly uncertain, as is clear from the things already said; therefore an uncertain law cannot beget a certain obligation.

Yet Noldin adds, n. 213, with moderate probabilists: "If, however, the opinion on behalf of the law is most probable or notably more probable than the opposite one, we are held to observe the law. For although an opinion of this kind does not attain true certitude, nevertheless practically it is equivalent to a certain opinion, because its opposite is not truly and certainly probable and therefore cannot furnish a norm of acting, since it does not suffice for informing a practically certain conscience." From this head, moderate probabilists come near to equiprobabilists.[2]

[2] This St. Alphonsus repeats again and again in all works published from the year 1762; cf. Gaude, n. 38-62.

410. (C) The arguments against Probabilism are set forth. Besides those which have already been proposed by the probabiliorists, above, n. 403, the equiprobabilists and compensationists urge others. (a) The principle "a doubtful law does not oblige" is not valid where the law is certainly more probable than liberty; for a law certainly more probably existing is sufficiently known so that it obliges indirectly, by force of the general principle that we ought sincerely to tend toward truth, and therefore to follow the opinion which approaches truth more closely.[3] - Nor can it be said that a certainly more probable law is invincibly unknown: in strict doubt alone, because of the equality of reasons, is the law inculpably unknown; but where the objective obligation is certainly more probable, it is no longer licit to suspend judgment, but the mind ought to adhere to the opinion which is held as more verisimilar. - Nor can it be added that a certain right of liberty cannot be taken away by an uncertain law; for the right of liberty does not remain certain when there is opposed to it an office certainly more probable, but becomes truly doubtful, and indeed less probable than the duty itself.

[3] D. N. de Caigny recently tried a conciliation between each system, *De Gemino probabilismo licito*.

411. (b) Probabilism easily opens the way to laxism; for once the right of following opinions even certainly and notably less probable has been granted to all, easily to each one the opinion which pleases more will appear probable; likewise, once it has been granted that the authority of five or six grave authors suffices for recognizing the probability of some opinion, who is there who, in the long series of probabilist theologians, would not find five or six, otherwise grave, approving an opinion more or less lax? Already in his own time St. Alphonsus wrote:[1] "And truly in the past century very many abuses occurred in opining in order to prove many lax opinions as probable; and therefore the Church proscribed several opinions, because they were undeservedly called probable, such as propositions 27 and 40 proscribed by Alexander VII, and 1, 3, 6, 35, 44 and 57 proscribed by Innocent XI. All these were condemned because in them it was said: it is probable, etc." A little afterward he adds that he too was deceived by the authority of many:[2] "It is true, in the first printings of my moral theology, led by the authority of several authors, I admitted as probable many opinions not sufficiently firm; but when the matter had been better weighed, I revoked or reformed them."

[1] St. Alphonsus, *Homo apost.*, Tr. I, n. 73.

[2] Ibid., n. 78.

412. (D) The responses of the probabilists are handed down. Nevertheless the probabilists try to solve these difficulties.[3] (a) They observe indeed that an opinion solidly, although less, probable, even when compared with the more probable, retains its probability, nor is its force entirely broken: otherwise the contrary opinion would no longer be more probable, but morally certain. Now, while an opinion certainly and solidly probable stands, the law remains truly and strictly doubtful, and therefore the principle can legitimately be applied: a doubtful law does not oblige. Nor is there present an obligation practically to follow the more verisimilar opinion; for otherwise this would have to be done even when the opinion favoring the law is slenderly more probable, and thus we would fall into probabiliorism. - Wherefore an obligation, even certainly more probable, remains uncertain, as long as the opinion favoring liberty is certainly and solidly probable; nor therefore is it to be strictly imposed under penalty

of sin, lest perchance a yoke too burdensome be imposed upon human infirmity and men still weak in virtue be kept away from religion.

[3] Lehmk., n. 94-106; Ball. P., n. 198; Noldin, n. 216.

(b) Nor is laxism seriously to be feared, provided that probabilism is prudently applied, that is, only when the opinion favoring liberty, even when compared with the contrary opinion, remains solidly probable, - and from another side with this caution, that a probable opinion is not held as something perfect, but as something strictly speaking licit. Therefore let these words of the probabilist Noldin (n. 216) be attended to: "If a Christian man in the service of God were to do nothing other than what the law strictly demands from the principles of probabilism, he would certainly lead a life little worthy of a Christian; but the practice of probabilists is this: where the question concerns imposing an obligation and judging sins, they are benign in order to avoid the dangers of formally sinning; but where the matter concerns pursuing perfection and the exercise of virtues, they strive toward the highest things, measuring the service owed to God not from the obligation of law, but from love and gratitude toward the divine majesty."

413. Conclusion. These things being posited, we admit probabilism, not indeed as a norm of perfection or of Christian life, but as a system from which there can be discerned the minimum which is required for avoiding sin. For when the matter concerns canonical laws, the Church herself, whose office it is to interpret her laws authentically, equivalently declares that it is licit to follow an opinion certainly probable and favoring liberty; thus, among the Rules of Law in the Sixth, one reads: "It is fitting that odious things be restricted, and favors enlarged" (reg. 15); "In obscure matters the minimum is to be followed" (reg. 30); "In penalties the more benign interpretation is to be made" (reg. 49); "Interpretation is to be made against him who could have stated the law more openly" (reg. 57). - Now what is said of ecclesiastical laws can be said of all others by equal reason; for if God had willed to bind us strictly, under penalty of sin and eternal damnation, He would have manifested His mind clearly to us; therefore where the divine law, whether positive or natural, is uncertain because of a grave doubt concerning its existence, who will dare to say that man is strictly held to observe it, under penalty of damnation?

414. Nevertheless, in order that an opinion be certainly and solidly probable, we do not admit that the authority of five or six grave theologians suffices of itself, when namely a most grave reason, which they have not solved, fights against them.[1] For it can happen that these men, although grave, were deceived, and held as probable an opinion which, all things diligently weighed, is not truly probable; hence their arguments must be seriously weighed, as we warned above, n. 384, and, if they appear weak either in themselves or because of changed circumstances, their opinion must be rejected. - Besides, we make more of the universal sense of the faithful, resting on solid reason, than of the authority of five or six grave theologians, which in a particular case is opposed to the same; wherefore, if an opinion which the common sense of the faithful reproves is called probable by some theologians,[1] we reject it as improbable. - With regard to intrinsic reasons, in a moral matter those are of greater weight which appeal to moral sense than those which are too subtle and deduced from metaphysical principles; for any science has its own genus of proofs: now moral science rests not so much on

metaphysical arguments as on moral principles which the practical reason of prudent and honorable men perceives. But those who wish not only to abstain from sin, but to cultivate Christian virtues, will seek rules of perfection not among casuists, but among ascetics, and especially among the sacred authors and the Fathers, who have discussed the virtues.

[1] That this is the mind of St. Alphonsus is clear from the things which he says, l. I, Tr. I, n. 82: "The confessor, before he embraces some opinion, is certainly held to weigh the intrinsic reasons; and when some convincing reason for the safer opinion occurs to him, to which he does not see that an adequate response is available, then he cannot embrace the opposite less safe opinion, although the authority of very many doctors favors it: provided the authority is not of such weight that it seems to him that he must defer to it rather than to the apparent reason."

[1] You have an example in the Treatise concerning the Virtue of Justice, n. 483, where the question concerns error about the person injured, when someone, for example intending to kill Caius, kills Titius.

3. Concerning the System of Compensation.

415. (A) Exposition. Since not a few difficulties are found in the aforesaid systems, certain authors devised a new system for solving doubt from the principle of sufficient reason, or compensation: thus, among others, Manier, Laloux, Potton.[2] (a) According to them indeed, a doubtful law is not lacking every obligatory force, nor does it have all its force of obliging, but it obliges more or less, according as it is more or less known: as often as the law is wholly known, it has its whole force of obliging in relation to us; as often, on the contrary, as it is altogether unknown to us, it in no way obliges; therefore, if the law is imperfectly known, it binds us imperfectly. Now, so that we can act licitly against a law even imperfectly obliging, some excusing cause, or sufficient reason, or compensation, is required. Or, in other words, a doubtful law is not worth as much as a certain law, but is worth more than no law, and therefore, for relaxing its obligation, some sufficient reason is required, although less grave than for a certain law.

[2] Manier, *Compendium Philosophiae*, 10th ed., t. III, Appendix I, p. 539-553; Laloux, *De Actibus humanis*, diss. IV, p. 42-148 (which work, not yet completed, was published not by the author himself, but by a disciple); Potton, O.P., *De Theoria probabilitatis*, Paris, 1874.

(b) This is declared in another way: in even a material transgression of a just law, some evil is always found; for, from what has been said, law is an ordination of reason, and he who violates it even ignorantly inflicts some detriment on himself or on others: thus dueling, infanticide, and other things of this kind, although committed ignorantly, truly harm individuals and society; and therefore knowingly to expose oneself to the danger of material evil, without sufficient reason, is a sin, but it is licit if there is a sufficient reason proportionately grave. For here the principles handed down above, n. 175-182, concerning the indirectly voluntary, can be applied: it is licit to place an act in itself good or indifferent, from which an evil effect is foreseen as probably going to follow, provided that there is a proportionately grave reason. Namely, he who violates a doubtful law indeed foresees the evil effect probably going to follow from it, - the material transgression of the law; - but his action is not intrinsically evil, and therefore he is excused from sin, provided that he has a sufficient reason for acting thus; but if there is no reason of this kind, the agent in some way sins, because freely, without cause, he exposes himself to the danger of at least materially transgressing the law. - Wherefore, in order to know whether it is licit to act against some doubtful law, attention must be given: (a) to the

gravity of the law and to its probability: the more holy and grave the law is, and the more probable its existence, the greater the reason ought to be so that it may be sufficient; (b) to the goods which are obtained from the transgression of the doubtful law: the greater they are and the higher their order, the more easily the material transgression of the law can be permitted.

416. (B) The system of compensation is weighed critically. The probabilists attack the aforesaid system thus:[1] (a) Compensationism leads to tutiorism: for if a doubtful law always obliges in some degree, unless an excusing reason occurs, the safer part must always be followed, even when the opinion favoring liberty is most probable: which nevertheless was reproved by Alexander VIII, above n. 399. - Yet it can be said that this system does not lead to tutiorism any more than probabilism draws toward laxism: for just as probabilists avoid laxism by rejecting the sufficiency of an opinion slenderly probable, so likewise compensationists escape tutiorism by asserting that a doubtful and uncertain law does not oblige except when a sufficient reason for transgressing it is wholly lacking, and that an altogether slight cause excuses from a very doubtful law.

[1] Gury, *Casus consc.* 7, concerning Conscience; Montrouzier, in the periodical *Revue des Sciences eccles.*, t. XXI, 1870, p. 220 sq.; two anonymous authors in the same periodical, t. XXV, 1872, p. 383 sq.; whom Potton tries to refute, op. cit., p. 169-240.

(b) It is by no means proved, say the probabilists, that an imperfect obligation is induced from imperfect cognition of the law: what does this half and partial obligation mean? What degree is required for sinning gravely or lightly? Is it not better deduced from an uncertain law that it gives no obligation? - The compensationists respond that there are certain degrees in obligation, since an obligation light is distinguished by all from a grave one, and that those degrees can be discerned from all the circumstances from which grave sin is distinguished from venial.

Nevertheless, in our judgment, a response of this kind does not completely remove the difficulty. For, in a moral matter, a little is reckoned as nothing, and therefore we think that a law whose existence is only slenderly probable imposes no obligation, even under light sin. It can indeed be said that it is better to obey this law if there is no reason for receding from it; but with the common opinion of theologians we judge that no one is held to this.

(c) The probabilists add that there is nothing evil in the material violation of a law; - which assuredly we do not admit, from what was said above, n. 356. They also say that in the aforesaid system the danger of private judgment or private inspiration is incurred, since each one must judge whether in each case a sufficient reason is present or not; - which argument is easily retorted, since in any system someone must judge whether such an opinion is truly probable, equiprobable, or not.

417. Conclusion. Nevertheless we do not admit compensationism as a general system by which practical doubt can be solved; but we think that prudent confessors, in the use of equiprobabilism or probabilism, ought to use a certain prudent compensation: namely, to attend not only to what is licit, but also to what is expedient, and therefore diligently to weigh whether or not there is had a sufficient reason for counseling the use of such or such a probable opinion, in such a determinate case, with attention given not only to external circumstances, but also to the psychological dispositions of the penitent.

Practical Conclusions.

418. In so great a conflict of opinions, let it be licit for each one speculatively to assent to one of the systems which are permitted by the Church to free discussion; but in practice, let these things especially be attended to.

1. Let it always be kept before the mind that even probabilists today extend their system only to cases where the matter concerns only the licit or illicit, according to the things set forth above, n. 388-390.

419. 2. It is not licit for the confessor to impose his own system upon a penitent who has formed his conscience according to one of the permitted systems; for the proximate rule of morals is each one's conscience.

Hence if a probabilist penitent wishes to follow an opinion certainly and solidly probable, and from another side is rightly disposed, a probabiliorist confessor cannot deny him absolution; otherwise he would violate the right which the Church leaves to each of the faithful, of following a truly probable opinion. - But if the penitent has not formed a conscience for himself, and asks the confessor what is licit or illicit, the latter, after the dispositions of the penitent have first been investigated, will respond according to the system which he will judge in the Lord to be more expedient for his spiritual good. Thus, if the penitent tends toward better things, to him he will generally advise that which, all things considered, seems better. But if, given the infirmity of the penitent, he foresees that this man will not follow the more probable opinion favoring the law, and from another side knows that the more benign opinion is truly probable, he can suggest this, so that the penitent may continue to frequent the sacraments, and, fortified by divine grace, may gradually tend toward better things; indeed, in many cases, he ought to furnish this from charity: for even if he himself adheres to equiprobabilism, he can permit others to follow probabilism.

But when the doubt concerns the very dispositions of the penitent, it pertains to the confessor himself to judge concerning them, according to his own system: for here the question concerns an action to be placed by the confessor himself; nevertheless let him temper judgment by charity and prudence, according to what was said in the Treatise on Penance, n. 407-409.

420. 3. In any system whatsoever, the confessor ought to weigh not only what is licit, but also what is expedient, all circumstances of times, places, and persons having been attended to: "All things are lawful to me, but all things are not expedient."[1]

[1] 1 Cor. 6:12.

Therefore the probabilist who would always recommend to penitents to follow less probable opinions would act altogether imprudently: from the fact that it is not strictly prohibited under sin to follow such opinions, it is rashly inferred that this is good and opportune. An upright Christian, who wishes to cling to the footsteps of Christ, ought not only to avoid mortal sin, but also, according to his condition and powers, to tend toward moral perfection; otherwise he will lead a life little worthy of a Christian, and soon will fall into sin. For he who so indulges himself that he wishes to enjoy all delights which are not strictly prohibited, quickly also desires prohibited pleasures, and, accustomed to delights, is exposed to the danger of sinning. Therefore even if a probabilist knows very well that it

is licit to follow all truly probable opinions, very often he will advise well-disposed penitents that, not indeed from fear of hell, but from love of God and of Christ, they turn themselves toward better things. - In this sense temperate probabilism by no means tends toward laxism.

421. 4. When two opposed opinions are truly probable, it is licit for each one to follow either, indeed to use each in various circumstances, yet in such a way that he is practically consistent with himself and violates the rights of no one.

The matter is made clear by an example: let a testament be supposed destitute of legal forms, concerning whose validity there is a twofold truly probable opinion. Titius, as heir, can indeed today use the probable opinion favoring him and enter upon the inheritance, as long as he is not disturbed in his possession by the sentence of a judge; at another time, he can impugn the validity of another testament destitute of legal forms, and enjoy the benefit of the law. But after, relying on a probable opinion, he has accepted the inheritance, he cannot decline the burdens annexed to the inheritance under the pretext that the testament is probably invalid; for he ought to be consistent with himself, and if he receives the inheritance, he ought to pay the legacies: he who feels the advantage ought likewise to feel the burden; otherwise the rights of the legatees would be violated.

Conclusion of the Whole Treatise: Concerning the Education of Conscience.

Since conscience is the proximate norm of actions, and the right ordering of our life to God depends especially on it, it is of the greatest moment to form it rightly and prudently by means both natural and supernatural.

[1] Bouquillon, n. 280; H. Marion, *Lecons de Morale*, 2nd ed., Paris, Colin, 1901, p. 387-406; B. Perez, *L'Education morale des le berceau*, 3rd ed., Paris, Alcan, 1896, p. 29-110; P. Vignot, *La Vie meilleure*, Paris, 1898, p. 41-142; Thamin, *De puerorum indole*, Paris, 1895, p. 46.

422. Concerning natural means. (A) Already from infancy the younger are to be diligently and gradually taught by parents and teachers, but especially by those who explain the catechism, that there is a difference between good and evil, that certain actions are conformable to divine reason and will, but others altogether deformed from them. When they do some good thing, let them receive not only praises and rewards, but let them be persuaded that they have fulfilled a duty, and that the principal reward is situated in the testimony of conscience and the approbation of God.[1] On the contrary, if they perform something evil or less right, let them be rebuked sweetly indeed but strongly, as violators of moral obligation; and at the same time let it be explained to them that the greatest punishment is remorse of conscience, and also divine reprobation. Wherefore let the necessity be inculcated upon them of lending attentive ears to conscience, as to the voice of God Himself, and in actions of seeking not pleasure or one's own advantage as the end, but whatever is honorable, whatever is holy, whatever is pleasing to God; but if they doubt concerning the liceity of some action, let them approach skilled and honorable persons, not depraved or imprudent persons. In order that they may know their duties better, and more diligently fulfill the same, it is necessary to explain to them not only what they ought to do, but why, namely by declaring the reasons on account of which they ought to do this and avoid that: for thus they will learn to do good not from blind instinct, but from the intimate persuasion of the soul. - But while horror of sin is instilled into them, let

nothing false or less true be said: thus small thefts or lies should not be exhibited as mortal sin, but as something unbecoming and dishonorable and base, although, because of lightness of matter, it is a venial sin.

[1] This, in Virgil (*Aeneid*, IX, 252-254), wise Aletes excellently promises, before all other rewards, to the most noble youths Nisus and Euryalus:

"What, O men, what worthy rewards for praises so great
can I think can be paid to you? First the fairest rewards
the gods, and your own morals, will give...."

423. (B) Let their conscience be rightly instructed not only by words, but by the examples of those who educate them: for since the younger are accustomed to imitate what they have before their eyes, if they see splendid actions performed by parents, teachers, and other educators, by that very fact they will be moved to acting splendidly, and by acting well they will form for themselves a right conscience; on the contrary, by depraved examples they are easily drawn toward evil, and by acting badly they deprave conscience. But since it can scarcely happen that they are not at some time witnesses of some depraved action, educators will seize this very opportunity to manifest the turpitude of that action, and to inspire horror and hatred of sin into their souls.

They will likewise take care that the young read books in which examples of virtue are praised, but vices are severely condemned: for from the things which they read, their mind and reason are vehemently borne toward good or evil. - Let them likewise frequent those companions who conduct themselves honorably and in a Christian manner: gradually and without sensing it we for the most part embrace the judgments and manner of acting of those with whom we often associate. Nevertheless, because it is almost impossible to avoid altogether those who act perversely, let adolescents learn as soon as possible to despise the judgments of the depraved; and, notwithstanding contrary opinions and examples, let them manfully arrange their life according to the dictate of conscience and the law of God.

424. (C) Let them cultivate perfect sincerity not only with others, but also with themselves, candidly scrutinizing their own conscience, and judging their own actions equitably, as if they had been performed by another.

This pagan philosophers had already commended to their disciples; thus, among others, Seneca:[1] "Knowledge of sin is the beginning of salvation. Epicurus seems to me to have said this excellently; for he who does not know that he sins does not wish to be corrected: you must detect yourself before you amend yourself. Some glory in vices. Do you think that he considers anything concerning a remedy, who counts his evils in the place of virtues? Therefore, as much as you can, convict yourself! Inquire into yourself; first perform the parts of accuser, then of judge, finally of intercessor." - The Fathers advise the same; thus St. Chrysostom:[2] "Do you not have a book at home in which you write daily accounts? Have likewise a book in conscience, and write daily sins; for example, when you lie in your bed, and there is no one who causes you business, before sleep steals in bring the little book into the middle, and reckon your sins with yourself, saying within yourself: Have I today sinned either in word or in deed?... But when you compute these things, suspend your soul, rend it, open it

with fear of gehenna... so that on the next day you may approach more slowly to perpetrating sins." In truth, he who seriously and sincerely recalls and discusses his actions, and investigates the causes of his sins and foresees their consequences, more easily and efficaciously grieves for past offenses, guards against future ones, and in this way rightly forms his conscience; on the contrary, one often offending without penance easily slips into laxism.

[1] Seneca, Epist. 28, to Lucilius, p. 214 ed. Lemaire.

[2] St. Chrysostom, Appendix on Ps. 50, hom. II, n. 5-6, apud Migne, P.G., LV, p. 581-582.

425. 2. Concerning supernatural means. Among these can be numbered: (A) frequent and fervent prayer to God, who is deservedly called the Father of lights: for in order that conscience be rightly instructed, it ought to be consonant with divine reason and will, which is the supreme rule of morals; now, for detecting the mind of God, nothing surely helps more than prayer, by whose aid we ask the grace of illumination. Therefore let these or similar words often be repeated: "Give me understanding, and I will search thy law, and I will keep it with my whole heart.... Incline my heart unto thy testimonies, and not to covetousness."[1] Let divine strength likewise be urgently asked, by which the law may be more easily fulfilled, and the manner of acting become conformable to the dictate of conscience.

[1] Ps. 118:34-36.

426. (B) The practice of Christian virtues; for just as conscience is easily obscured by depraved actions frequently repeated, so likewise it is not a little illuminated by the assiduous practice of good works: for we perceive moral truths much more distinctly when with a pure heart and sincere will we seek, without any prejudice, what must be done.

Thus experience shows that the conscience of those who devote themselves wholly to cultivating virtues becomes more and more tender and delicate. - Yet excess is to be avoided in this, lest one perhaps slip into scruples: to avoid these, one must diligently distinguish between precepts and counsels, grave and light precepts; sin should indeed be cautiously avoided, even venial sin, indeed the will should tend with all its powers toward perfection; if someone consents to some imperfection, let him indeed grieve for it, but as for an imperfection, not as for sin; nor should he hold venial sins, even deliberate ones, as mortal, but flee them out of love toward God.

427. (C) The frequentation of sacramental confession; for this supposes first of all a serious examination of conscience, whose usefulness the pagans themselves recognized. Besides, by manifesting the secrets of the heart to a wise director, the penitent receives counsels for judging what is good and what is more expedient, what is commanded and what is counseled; by proposing doubts, he can solve them more prudently, with the help of a confessor who excels in greater knowledge and experience; by inquiring concerning the means leading to Christian perfection, he walks more safely in the ways of the Lord, and thus forms for himself an altogether right conscience, under the guidance of him who, bearing the place of God, can declare the divine mind more authentically.[1]

[1] The usefulness of a spiritual director, who not only offers counsels, but is held as a witness of actions, pagan philosophers recognized; thus Seneca, epist. 11 to Lucilius (p. 109 ed. Lemaire): "Some good man must be chosen by us, and always held before our eyes, so that thus we may live as if he were looking on, and do all things as if he were seeing. This, my Lucilius, Epicurus prescribed: he gave us a guardian and pedagogue; and not undeservedly. A great part of sins is removed if a witness stands beside the sinner... O happy is he who can so revere someone that he composes and orders himself even at the memory of him."

By these and other means of this kind, a right and true conscience is formed, which, as being conformed to divine reason, is a safe norm of acting: "Follow with heavenly kindness, O Lord, we beseech Thee, the vows of Thy suppliant people; so that they may both see what things are to be done, and may have strength to fulfill the things which they have seen."[2] - "Deign to direct and sanctify, rule and govern, O Lord God, King of heaven and earth, today our hearts and bodies, our senses, words, and acts in Thy law and in the works of Thy commandments, so that here and forever, with Thee helping, we may deserve to be saved and free, O Savior of the world."[3]

[2] Prayer of the Sunday within the Octave of Epiphany.

[3] Prayer at Prime.

428. From the things said, man is held to tend toward the ultimate end, through human acts, conformable to law, with conscience directing. But, because of human infirmity or malice, he sometimes deviates from the right path by sin, or transgression of the law: when the sin is grave, man is truly turned away from the ultimate end; if it is light, he is only retarded from the attainment of the end. Each must be treated. But because we are inclined to sin by vicious habits, or by propensities either innate or acquired, we must discuss these also, so that the roots of sin may be better extirpated.

On Sins and Vices

Art. I. Concerning Sins.

Division: 1. The concept of sin in general. 2. Concerning mortal sin. 3. Concerning venial sin. 4. Concerning the distinction of sins.

§ I. The Concept of Sin in General.

We shall set forth: 1. the biblical notion of sin; 2. the theological notion; 3. the causes which induce to sin.

I. The Biblical Notion of Sin.

429. Etymological notion.[1] Sin is designated by various names among the sacred authors.

[1] Schleusner, *Novus thesaurus philologico-criticus*, Leipzig, 1821; Grimm, *Lexicon graeco-lat. in libr. N. Test.*, Leipzig, 1903; Trench, *Synonyms of the N. Testament*, 9th ed., London, 1880, rendered in French by C. de Faye, *Synonymes du N. Testament*, Paris, 1869.

In Hebrew: *hatta't*, that is, aberration from the mark or end, because the sinner recedes from his end; *awon*, that is, iniquity, depravity; *pesha*, or rebellion, defection; *sarah*, secession, because the sinner withdraws from the law.

But in Greek it is called: ἁμαρτία, that is, aberration from the mark;[1] or ἁμάρτημα, which has the same sound, with this distinction, however, that the former word signifies sin whether habitual or actual, while the latter always designates a sinful act; ἀνομία or παρανομία, that is, violation and contempt of the law[2] (in the Vulgate it is rendered iniquity); παράβασις, or transgression of the law;[3] παρακοή, that is, the will not to hear the voice of God, disobedience;[4] παράπτωμα, that is, fall, because by sin we slip and lie prostrate;[5] ἀγνόημα, ἄγνοια, or ignorance, because every sin imports a certain error, although not altogether excusable;[6] ἧττημα, that is, diminution, defeat, because sinners, overcome by temptations, experience defeat;[7] πλημμέλεια, or that which is beyond measure and harmony, inharmonious.[8]

[1] Rom. 5:12; 7:7, etc.

[2] 1 John 3:4; 2 Pet. 2:16.

[3] Gal. 3:19; 1 Tim. 2:14, etc.

[4] Rom. 5:19; Heb. 2:2.

[5] Mark 11:25-26.

[6] Heb. 9:7; Acts 17:30.

[7] Rom. 11:12.

[8] Lev. 5:15; Num. 18:9, etc.

430. 2. Historical notion. Sin is exhibited in a general way by the sacred authors as something negative, or as something contrary to justice and rectitude, yet in a diverse way.

(A) In the Old Testament. (a) In Genesis, sin is exhibited as disobedience, or the transgression of a divine precept,[9] which not only is reproved by God, but is strictly punished;[10] hence Cain, after killing his brother, suffers remorse of conscience and the divine curse;[11] and, when iniquities were multiplied upon the earth, men are punished by the flood,[12] because especially "every thought of the heart was intent upon evil at all times."

[9] Gen. 2:16; 3:11.

[10] Gen. 3:14-19.

[11] Gen. 4:9-16.

[12] Gen. 6:5-7 and 11-13.

(b) After the election of the Israelite people and the promulgation of the Mosaic law, positive precepts are multiplied, and therefore various species of sins against various laws; but, since God is the special legislator and king of Israel, transgressions of the law assume a special malice of rebellion. Among graver sins, idolatry is principal, by which false gods are preferred to the one and perfect Deity: wherefore whoever indulges idolatry is severely chastised.[13] Among lesser sins are numbered legal impurities, which, although they by no means suppose internal fault, had to be expiated by various ablutions and sacrifices.[14] - Lighter offenses were destroyed by expiatory sacrifices;[15] but graver ones were punished by the penalty of death.[16] In order that the people might be more efficaciously turned away from sinning, abundant blessings are promised to those keeping the law, and dreadful evils, especially temporal ones, are denounced against those violating the same.[1] Yet the fulfillment of the law is also urgently commended on account of gratitude and love toward God.[2] - Another motive for fleeing sin is taken from the fact that one person's offense affects the whole nation because of the law of solidarity;[3] in truth God sometimes punishes the sins of fathers even in sons, "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of those who hate me."[4]

[13] Exod. 32:30-35.

[14] Lev. 11-15.

[15] Lev. 4-6.

[16] Lev. 18:29; 20:6-21, etc.

[1] Deut. 7:11-26; 10:12-22; 11:13-28.

[2] "Love therefore the Lord thy God and observe his precepts." (Deut. 11:1; cf. 8:2-20.)

[3] Josh. 20:20.

[4] Exod. 20:5.

431. (C) From the time of the Prophets, sin is exhibited more vividly as an offense against God and neighbor, and true repentance of heart is more urgently preached as a means for satisfying for offenses. For sin is contempt of God as benefactor and father, and therefore impiety: "I have nourished and exalted sons; but they have despised me";[5] infidelity toward God, who is as it were the spouse of the chosen nation: "But thou hast fornicated with many lovers."[6] It is also often denounced as injustice against neighbor, because it oppresses the poor: "Who crush the heads of the poor upon the dust of the earth, and turn aside the way of the humble."[7]

[5] Isa. 1:2; cf. Jer. 2:4-37.

[6] Jer. 3:1.

[7] Amos 2:7.

Moreover sinners, by leaving God, the fountain of living water, inflict upon themselves the greatest evil: "But they who commit sin and iniquity are enemies of their own soul."[8] Hence sin is truly a certain kind of foolishness, concerning which the impious will grieve bitterly.[9] - Therefore, in order to obtain mercy, nothing remains except to do penance; nor is it sufficient to offer victims or to rend garments, but it is necessary to offer to God a contrite and humbled heart: "Be converted to me with all your heart, in fasting, and in weeping, and in mourning; and rend your hearts and not your garments... A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit; a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."[10]

[8] Tob. 12:10; cf. Jer. 2:13.

[9] Wis. 5:2-13.

[10] Joel 2:12-13; Ps. 50:19.

432. (B) In the New Testament. (a) Christ from the beginning is exhibited as the lamb who takes away the sins of the world, and therefore He speaks more concerning the destruction of sin than concerning its nature.

Nevertheless He supposes sin to be a transgression of the law, an offense against God and neighbor, a disordering of the will, by which one's own glory is preferred to the glory of God.[11] From another side, by teaching and inculcating a more perfect law, by that very fact He indirectly declares the nature and extension of sin: thus, in the sermon on the mount, He reproves as sinful many acts which were presented as honorable by the doctors of the law and the scribes, for example, anger, hatred of enemies, boasting, pride, etc. In a special manner He denounces hypocrisy, scandal, infidelity, and sin against the Holy Spirit.[1] From another side He takes away merely legal sins from the midst, and openly declares that sins go out from the heart:[2] "For from the heart go forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, blasphemies: these are the things which defile a man; but to eat with unwashed hands does not defile a man."

[11] John 12:43.

[1] Matt. 23:5-32; Matt. 18:6; Luke 17:1-2; Matt. 12:31-32; Mark 16:16.

[2] Matt. 15:19-20.

(b) According to St. Paul, sin is a certain servitude, from which we are freed by grace: "But being freed from sin, you have been made servants of justice";[3] it is also the cause of death: "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death";[4] it is deservedly called disobedience and prevarication,[5] and therefore is punished with a terrible judgment, because the sinner tramples underfoot the Son of God and grieves the Holy Spirit.[6]

[3] Rom. 6:18.

[4] Rom. 5:12.

[5] Heb. 2:2.

[6] Heb. 10:26-31; Eph. 4:30.

(c) According to St. John, we all indeed sin, but we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just, who is the propitiation for our sins;[7] but sin is iniquity and the work of the devil; everyone who is born of God does not commit sin[8] (namely, as long as he remains a son of God, by imitating divine morals). Among sins, two especially are to be fled: those which are opposed to charity, and those which are against Christ, especially the denial of His divinity.[9] With regard to gravity, sin is twofold, one which is not unto death, but another which is unto death,[10] that is, to which the will adheres so obstinately that there is scarcely hope of obtaining pardon.

[7] 1 John 1:8-10; 2:1-2.

[8] 1 John 3:4-10.

[9] 1 John 3:15; 5:10-12.

[10] Ibid., 16-17.

II. The Theological Notion of Sin.

433. 1. Definition of sin. It is commonly defined as a free transgression of the law, according to that saying of Augustine: "Sin is some deed, or word, or desire against the eternal law. But the eternal law is divine reason or the will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved, forbidding it to be disturbed."[12] - Hence a twofold element is found in sin: a voluntary act,[13] whether of deed or of mouth or of heart, which Augustine does not mention in his definition, but supposes; and a defect of rectitude, or privation of due order toward the ultimate end, and therefore lack of conformity with divine reason, which is the ultimate rule of morals, and with the dictate of conscience, which manifests the same to us. - This indeed is true even of the transgression of human law: for this is not truly law except insofar as it is consonant with divine reason; and therefore the transgressor of human law indirectly violates divine law.

[11] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71-72; Suarez, *De Peccatis*, disp. I-IV; Salmant., Tr. XX, *De principiis moralitatis*, cap. 8; St. Alphonsus, lib. II, n. 1-10; Billuart, *De peccatis*, diss. I, art. 2-4; L. Billot, *Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati*, 3rd ed., Rome, 1900.

[12] St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, l. XXXII, c. 27; Migne, P.L. XLII, 418. - Concerning the eternal law, we spoke above, n. 210.

[13] Wherefore for formal, or subjective, sin there is required advertence of the intellect and consent of the will, concerning which above, n. 78-84.

434. Corollaries. (A) From this it follows that there is not per se a merely philosophical sin, that is, one opposed to right reason without nevertheless being an offense against God. (a) For the following proposition 2 was condemned by Alexander VIII, 24 August 1690, as scandalous, rash, and erroneous: "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is grave sin, but is not an offense against God nor a mortal sin dissolving friendship with God, nor worthy of eternal punishment."[1] - And deservedly; for of itself he who apprehends some action as morally evil, by that very fact at least implicitly perceives it as prohibited by the supreme legislator, and therefore logically and interpretatively as an offense

against God.[2] (b) Yet from this it cannot be inferred that the opinion of Lugo and of certain other theologians was reproved, who assert that a merely philosophical sin can hypothetically be given, namely in those who inculpably are ignorant of God;[3] for these do not offend God even implicitly, since they by no means know His existence. - But the proposition was condemned because it did not distinguish between vincible and invincible ignorance of God, and from another side supposed this ignorance to be common enough.

[1] Denzing., n. 1157; Viva, on this proposition, where he observes that that proposition, ascribed to a certain professor of Dijon (Musnier), had not been defended by him so absolutely; Mangenot, *Dictionn. de theol.*, t. I, p. 749; A. Vermeele, *La morale de Kant et la theorie du peche philosophique*, apud *Annales de Philos. caret.*, Sept. 1894, p. 543-565.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 7, ad 3.

[3] Lugo, *De Incarnat.*, disp. V, sect. 5; Viva, cited place, n. 22.

435. (B) From this can also be gathered the difference between evil, sin, and fault; for evil indeed is any deformity, whether moral or physical, consisting in the privation of due perfection; but sin is a morally evil act, whether voluntary or involuntary (material, or objective, sin); finally, fault is a morally evil and voluntary act. Yet sin and fault are often taken promiscuously.

(C) It must likewise be noted that, in St. Paul and in ancient authors, by the name sin is also designated that which induces to sin, for example, concupiscence,[1] or that which follows from sin, for example, the stain impressed on the soul by sin; indeed, by extension, the penalty of sin, or sacrifice for sin, or the object of sin.[2] Wherefore, from the context the genuine sense must be defined.

[1] "This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin because it is truly and properly sin in the reborn, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin." (Trent, sess. V, can. 5, apud Denzing., n. 674.)

[2] Lev. 20:20; 2 Cor. 5:21; Deut. 9:21.

436. 2. Divisions of sin. Sin is divided in many ways, because it can be considered under a manifold respect: -

(a) By reason of the principle from which it arises, sin is original or actual: the former is not committed by the proper consent of each one, but is transfused from Adam into his descendants, from a certain moral connection between these and him, as we declared in the Treatise on God the Creator, n. 189-193. But the latter, concerning which alone we treat here, is committed by the proper will of each one.

(b) By reason of the mode in which it is completed, sin of commission consists in a positive act against some forbidding precept, such as homicide; while sin of omission consists in omitting an action prescribed by law, as is the omission of fasting: sin of this kind requires a positive act of the will, by which someone wills to omit the thing commanded, or at least wills something else incompatible with the thing commanded,[3] as was declared above, n. 84.

[3] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 5.

437. (c) By reason of malice, sins of ignorance are distinguished, which proceed from ignorance, although culpable (above, n. 90-97); sins of infirmity, which arise from the impulse of passion,

although not without free consent (above, n. 102-106); sins of malice, which especially draw their origin from an evil and perverse will, without being excused by ignorance or the vehement impulse of passion: these, other things being equal, are graver.

(d) By reason of the powers by which they are committed, sins are of heart, of mouth, and of deed, according as they are completed by the mind alone, or by words externally brought forth, or by external action; suppose if someone first conceives anger in the heart against a neighbor, then expresses it by harsh words, and finally strikes the enemy with blows and wounds. But what malice the external act adds to the internal act of the same kind, we have already explained, n. 162-166.

(e) By reason of gravity, sin is called mortal, from a certain analogy with physical death, when it brings spiritual death upon the soul, by depriving it of sanctifying grace,[1] which is supernatural life; but venial, if it does not deprive the soul of sanctifying grace, and therefore in some way deserves pardon, even when it has not been remitted.

[1] In the state of mere nature, grave sin would not deprive the soul of grace, but of that rectitude and beauty which arises from the ordering of the faculties to God, the ultimate end.

438. From this it follows that the word "sin" is not univocal, but analogous, insofar as it does not have altogether the same sense when it is predicated of certain kinds of sins. For, other divisions being passed over, actual mortal sin, venial sin, and original sin so differ among themselves that they can be reduced to the same genus only analogically; since mortal sin not yet remitted turns us altogether away from the ultimate end, while venial sin indeed retards us from the attainment of the end, but does not turn us away;[2] from another side original sin is not voluntary by one's proper will, while actual sin supposes one's proper fault.

[2] "The division of sin into venial and mortal is not the division of a genus into species which equally participate in the notion of the genus, but of an analogue into those things of which it is predicated according to prior and posterior." (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1.)

Wherefore, original sin being set aside, concerning which something has been said elsewhere, we shall speak separately of mortal and venial sin, since their nature and effects differ as much as heaven from earth.

III. Concerning the Causes Which Induce to Sin.

439. That God is not the author of sin, whatever the Manicheans and not a few Protestants said to the contrary, we have already proved in the Treatise on the One God, n. 94-99; which from another side is established from Trent:[1] "If anyone shall say that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that God works evil works as He works good ones, not only permissively, but also properly and of Himself, so that the betrayal of Judas is His proper work no less than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema." Therefore the efficient cause of sin is the free will of man itself, which, from infirmity or malice, and often from both at the same time, deviates from the right path of virtue, and prefers its own advantage to the will of God. But the will is drawn to sin by various motives or causes, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. The prior and principal intrinsic cause is our corrupted nature, or concupiscence, which, with Trent as witness, is from sin and inclines to sin; but the extrinsic causes are the world and the devil;

concerning these three we must speak separately. Afterward concerning temptation, which is nothing other than an incitement to sin arising from this threefold cause.

[1] Trent, sess. VI, can. 6, apud Denzing., n. 698.

1. Concerning the Internal Cause, or Concupiscence.

440. St. James explains that this is a cause of sin thus:[2] "But every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured; then when concupiscence has conceived, it brings forth sin; but sin, when it is consummated, begets death." Therefore concupiscence is not sin in itself, but the principal internal cause of sin, or incitement to sinning; if the will freely consents to it, then a sinful act arises. - But St. John teaches that concupiscence is threefold:[3] "All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life." (a) Now concupiscence of the flesh is a certain inordinate propensity toward carnal pleasures, especially toward intemperance and lust. (b) Concupiscence of the eyes, according to St. Augustine and St. Thomas,[1] designates inordinate curiosity for knowing, through the eyes of the body or of the mind, all things which please, even dangerous things; or an inordinate propensity toward riches, resources, magnificent houses, and other things of this kind, by whose sight men are delighted, and whose possession they covet. (c) The pride of life is the inordinate desire of honors, dignities, and similar things which render life conspicuous and procure vainglory. Therefore the principal internal propensities which incline to sin are: intemperance and lust, curiosity and covetousness, and also ambition. - But the root of all these is inordinate love of self: "That someone inordinately desires some temporal good proceeds from this, that he inordinately loves himself";[2] for he does not desire riches, pleasures, and honors except in order to enjoy them and to please himself. - Moreover all passions, concerning which above, n. 99-107, can allure us to sin: concerning the principal ones it will be treated where we discuss the capital vices.

[2] Jas. 1:14-15.

[3] 1 John 2:16. Cf. Bossuet, *Traite de la Concupiscence*. - A certain concupiscence is natural to man; this, besides, received an increase from original sin, as was proved in the Treatise on God the Creator, n. 171, 198.

[1] St. Augustine, *Confess*., l. X, c. 35, P.L. XXXII, 802; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 5.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 4.

2. Concerning the Extrinsic Causes of Sin.

441. There are especially two external causes soliciting to sin: the world and the devil.

(A) The world, concerning which the question is, is not the complex of men who live in the world, but that depraved spirit which flourishes among many men; this is often exhibited in Scripture, especially apud St. John, as an occasion of sin. Thus Christ anathematizes the world because of the scandals which it offers,[3] nor does He pray for the world,[4] but for the disciples, not indeed that God take them out of the world, but that He preserve them from the evil which is in the world;[5] He predicts that the disciples will suffer persecution from the world, but inspires confidence in them, because He Himself has conquered the world.[6] The reason for fleeing the world is because the world

"is wholly set in the evil one,[7]... since all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life."[1] Or, in other words, the world in these places is held as the tinder of threefold concupiscence.

[3] Matt. 18:7.

[4] John 17:9.

[5] John 17:5.

[6] John 16:33.

[7] 1 John 5:19.

[1] 1 John 2:16.

In truth it often induces us to sinning: (a) by deceiving the incautious with fallacies which are directly opposed to the doctrine of Christ; for while the Master calls blessed the poor in spirit, the meek and humble, the peacemakers, and those who mourn and suffer persecution for justice, - the world on the contrary pronounces these unhappy and foolish, and places the highest good in riches, pleasures, and honors; (b) by allurements it draws us, by placing before the eyes all those things which please the senses or favor ambition, so that it may deter us from the right path, and by promising any delights to those who wish to serve it; (c) by depraved examples it draws those weak in soul, and terrifies the timid with threats, lest they fulfill their office.[2]

[2] Cf. Marion, *De la solidarite morale*, Paris, 1883, p. 163-231.

Yet it must be noted that those who are strong in soul, and trust in God, not with difficulty despise the vanities of the world and reject its solicitations: "Have confidence, I have overcome the world... And this is the victory which overcomes the world, our faith."[3]

[3] John 16:33; 1 John 5:4.

442. (B) The devil likewise not rarely incites man to sin: he tempted our first parents,[4] did not hesitate to attack Christ Himself,[5] and incited Judas the traitor to hand over the Lord;[6] but in a general way, the Apostles warn us to beware of diabolical temptation: "Be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about, seeking whom he may devour... For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the heavenly places."[7]

[4] Gen. 3:1-16.

[5] Matt. 4:3-10.

[6] John 13:2, 27.

[7] 1 Pet. 5:8-9; Eph. 6:12.

This, according to common doctrine, he accomplishes in these various modes: (a) by acting upon the external and internal senses, namely by proposing to the eyes, imagination, and memory sensible objects or phantasms, from which passions are moved; (b) also by stirring up passions, namely by cooperating with natural causes which are able to excite the sensible appetite. Yet commonly it is said that he cannot act directly on the intellect and will, which, as being spiritual faculties, are subject to

no other external agent except God: "Whence the whole interior operation of the devil seems to be concerned with phantasy and the sensitive appetite; by moving each of these, he can induce to sin."[1] - But here it can be observed that many temptations are attributed to the devil which in truth arise from concupiscence itself.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 80, a. 2. - Yet some think that the demon can also act directly on the intellect.

3. Concerning Temptation.

443. When the aforesaid causes, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, actually incite us to sinning, temptation arises: concerning which it will be helpful to establish these things: -

[2] Cf. Bourdaloue, *Careme*, Sunday of the first week.

(A) Concerning the rules to be followed with regard to temptation. (a) To feel temptation is not sin, but to consent to it is. This Trent openly teaches indeed concerning concupiscence:[3] "But this holy Synod confesses and perceives that concupiscence, or tinder, remains in the baptized: since it has been left for combat, it cannot harm those who do not consent; indeed he who shall have contended lawfully will be crowned." - This surely is established from the things which were said in the Treatise on Human Acts, where it was proved that for merit or demerit a free act, and therefore the consent of the will, is required.

[3] Trent, sess. V, can. 5.

Therefore the whole difficulty is in this: that the distinction between feeling and consenting be clearly established. To understand this better, three things can be distinguished in temptation: evil suggestion, delectation, and consent. The suggestion itself, or evil thought or imagination, however depraved and long-lasting, is not sin, since in it the will has no part. But often from this suggestion, especially if it perseveres for a long time, some natural and as it were necessary delectation arises in the sensitive appetite, and sometimes a commotion of the senses: up to this point, however, there is no sin, because, as is supposed, this motion of the sensitive appetite is indeliberate and involuntary. When the intellect now perceives the depraved suggestion and its malice, and also the delectation arising from it in the sensitive appetite, the will cannot conduct itself passively; if it immediately rejects the pleasure, there is no sin; but, if it freely consents to it, there will be sin more or less grave according to the gravity of the matter, and the consent more or less full.[4]

[4] St. Francis de Sales declares this lucidly, *Introduction a la vie devote*, Part II, ch. 18 and Part IV, ch. 3-6, where he illustrates the matter by various comparisons and examples.

444. (b) It is not licit rashly to expose oneself to temptation, without sufficient reason. For temptation imports a certain danger of sinning more or less grave or proximate; but it is not licit to go to meet the danger of sinning without sufficient reason: for he who foresees and intends to incur the danger of sinning, by that very fact wills the sin very probably joined with the temptation.[1]

[1] Concerning the danger which arises from the occasion of sin, it is said in the moral Treatise on Penance, n. 451-469.

It was said "without sufficient reason"; for if a grave reason is present, it is licit to expose oneself to temptation, provided that there is well-founded hope of overcoming it; for here the principle concerning an indirectly willed effect, n. 175-182, can be applied. For the action placed is supposed to

be honorable in itself, although it is foreseen that temptation will arise from it; from another side the good effect compensates for the evil, by hypothesis; therefore it is licit to place this action. Thus a physician, confessor, and other men of similar condition, who in the exercise of their office experience certain temptations, even grave ones, can nevertheless persevere in their state, provided they apply means for overcoming temptations; for the exercise of an office of this kind is honorable in itself; and from another side the evil effect which sometimes follows from it, that is, grave temptation, is compensated by the good effect which results from the same exercise both to the agent himself and to society.

The sin committed by him who rashly exposes himself to temptation is of the same nature and species as the sin whose danger he undergoes. - But to judge concerning its gravity, one must weigh whether the agent clearly and certainly foresees the danger of sinning, or only confusedly and probably (above n. 80, 179).

445. (B) Concerning the manner of overcoming temptations. In order that temptations may be more efficaciously conquered, these means especially are to be employed: (a) vigilance, to guard against many temptations, according to that saying of St. Peter:[2] "Be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about, seeking whom he may devour." For even if all temptations cannot be guarded against, nevertheless by vigilance their number is diminished and their force weakened. The reason why we ought to watch is because our will, although good and ready, remains weak and infirm, and therefore ought always to be prepared for repelling spiritual enemies.

[2] 1 Pet. 5:8.

To furnish this, occasions of sinning which are not necessary must be diligently avoided, as we explain in the Treatise on Penance, n. 458-469. Besides, our faculties must be turned toward the good, by which they may more easily decline from evil; thus, if we wish to avoid depraved thoughts, it is not enough to repel them when they have preoccupied the mind: but vain and useless wanderings of the soul, from which dangerous phantasms often arise, must be expelled insofar as can be done, not only negatively, but also positively, by turning the soul toward good and useful things. Passions likewise, which often induce us into temptation, must be directed toward the honorable and religious good, as we noted above, n. 107.

446. (b) To vigilance must be joined prayer, by which we are able to obtain the actual grace of God at the opportune time. For, as was proved in the Treatise on Grace, n. 39-45 and 57-60, fallen man cannot, without the grace of God, overcome all grave temptations; and therefore by urgent, frequent, and humble prayer, he ought to ask divine aid, by which, sustained, he may be able to overcome the attacks of the world and the devil and also the movements of his own concupiscence: "Watch and pray that you enter not into temptation."[1]

[1] Matt. 26:41.

Nor is it sufficient to pray at the very time of temptation, but it is expedient before and after temptations often to have recourse to God, according to the warning of Christ, who inserted these words into the prayer which He taught the Apostles: "And lead us not into temptation." This prayer indeed becomes much more efficacious when joined to meditation; for then, reconsidering the

mysteries of faith and the principles of morals, we are moved to pray more fervently and to flee sin and the occasions of sin more vigilantly. The reconsideration of God living everywhere and in the intimate heart will likewise help greatly: for who would rashly wish to offend God present? "Walk before me and be perfect."[2]

[2] Gen. 17:1.

447. (c) But when temptation presses, one must immediately and strenuously resist: "Resist him, strong in faith."[3] For in the beginning, when the enemy is still weak, victory is easier, while it becomes much more difficult if he has already fixed his foot in our camp.[4] Wherefore, if he has appeared from afar, let us defend the citadel of our soul by diverting the soul toward some honorable thing: for nothing is more useful for avoiding the conflicts of rushing temptations than to occupy the mind in good thoughts or assiduous labors; for then the attack of the enemy, having been frustrated, vanishes. - But this must be furnished strenuously: for if we fluctuate hesitatingly, or resist only weakly, the enemy becomes more daring, and attacks us more bitterly. - Whence those who conduct themselves passively toward temptation, by applying no means to overcome it, expose themselves to the danger of sinning, and therefore sin more or less gravely according to the gravity and proximity of the danger. Yet it is licit to contemn temptation, by diverting the soul to other things, from what has just been said, since this is the best means of conquering it.

[3] 1 Pet. 5:9.

[4] What Ovid said about love (*Remedia amoris*, 91-92) is valid concerning all passions:

"Resist beginnings: medicine is prepared too late,
when evils have grown strong by long delays."

448. (C) Concerning the usefulness of temptations. In truth temptation is not without usefulness. (a) For virtue is perfected in temptations; just as soldiers become stronger by fighting strenuously, so Christians, by fighting manfully against the enemies of salvation, are strengthened in virtue; namely thus, mindful of their own frailty, they begin to think humbly of themselves, and to place their whole confidence in God; they also understand better how necessary it is to mortify the senses and passions, lest perhaps, allured by enticements, they fall into sin; by resisting temptations strongly on account of God, by that very fact they begin to love God more fervently. (b) They have the opportunity of satisfying for past sins: if once they indulged base delectation, now by contemning pleasure they undergo a penalty which contributes not a little to destroying the sins of past life. (c) From this our merits are increased: other things being equal, the more difficult the work to be performed is, the greater is the merit; therefore when storms of temptations arise and it is more arduous to row back to the harbor of salvation, by that very fact merits are increased. Surely a stone would be ungrateful if, sculpted by art, it complained of the sculptor who carved a beautiful figure in it; so also we would be ungrateful if we lamented because God, by various temptations, engraves upon our soul a more perfect image of Christ.[1] Merits being increased, the reward is likewise increased, and for each victory won we shall obtain new degrees of glory, to remain forever.

[1] The Church indeed sings this on the day of Dedication:

"By the blows of the saving chisel,
and by very much pounding,
polished by the hammer of the craftsman,
stones build this mass,
and joined by fitting bonds
are placed in the summit."

§ II. Concerning Mortal Sin.

We shall speak: 1. concerning its nature; 2. concerning its effects; 3. concerning the conditions required for mortal sin.

I. Concerning the Nature of Mortal Sin.

It has already been said that mortal sin, by the force of its very name, brings spiritual death upon the soul; but, in order that its nature and its difference from venial sin may be more deeply declared, we shall successively set forth what Scripture, what the Fathers, and what theologians have taught concerning this matter.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71-73; Suarez, *De peccatis*, disp. I-III; Gonet, *Clypeus Theol. thomisticae*, Lyons, 1681, *De vitiis et peccatis*, disp. I-IV; Billot, *Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati*, Rome, 1900, th. I-III; Manning, *Sin and its consequences*, rendered into French by Maillet, *Le Peche et ses consequences*, Avignon, 1894, ch. I-II.

1. The Doctrine of Scripture Concerning Grave Sin Is Set Forth.

449. (A) That there are grave sins which bring death upon the soul and are the cause of damnation is evidently gathered from Scripture. (a) Thus Christ, in the sermon on the mount, reproving sins against neighbor, says: "But I say to you, that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to the judgment; and he who shall say to his brother: Raca, shall be liable to the council; and he who shall say: Thou fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire."[2] Now words of this kind: shall be liable to the judgment, to the council, signify, from a certain analogy with the penalties inflicted by the tribunals of the Jews, that those who gravely offend their brothers, not only in deed, but in heart or word, are to be punished with a grave penalty; but gehenna designates eternal damnation. This indeed He declares more clearly, by prophetically describing the last judgment:[3] "Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry, and you did not give me to eat"...

[2] Matt. 5:22; cf. Maldonat on this place. - The mind of Christ is that not only homicide is grave sin, but also anger internally conceived, when it leads to homicide, or to very contumelious words. From this, however, it is not licit to infer that every motion of anger is grave.

[3] Matt. 25:41-42.

(b) The Apostle lucidly sets forth the same doctrine, both with regard to the sin of our first parents and with regard to actual sins: "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death... That as sin reigned unto death, so also grace might reign through justice unto eternal life."[1] Hence those who sin gravely are excluded from the kingdom of heaven:[2] "Do not err: neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with males, nor thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God." (c) According to John, mortal sin is privation of light for the mind, and privation of life for the soul: "For everyone who does evil hates

the light, and does not come to the light, that his works may not be reproved... He who says that he is in the light, and hates his brother, is in darkness even until now... He who does not love remains in death."[3] The reason is because sin separates us from Christ who is truth and life.

[1] Rom. 5:12, 21. The question concerns each death, corporal and spiritual.

[2] 1 Cor. 6:9-10; cf. Gal. 5:19-21.

[3] John 3:20; 1 John 2:9; 3:14.

450. (B) Among sins, some are graver than others. Thus God, apud Jeremiah,[4] complains of the Jews thus: "They have hardened their neck, and have done worse than their fathers." Christ Himself, addressing Pilate, says: "Therefore he who delivered me to thee has the greater sin."[5] This indeed is especially clear from the fact that certain sins are called irremissible, while others can be remitted: "Therefore I say to you: every sin and blasphemy shall be remitted to men; but the blasphemy of the Spirit shall not be remitted."[6] The context having been inspected, the question here concerns the sin of the Pharisees who attributed the miracles of Christ to the devil, and thus deliberately and pertinaciously denied His divine mission; but this sin is said not to be remitted, because it is altogether difficult for those who pertinaciously abuse grace to repent sincerely. In the same way the words of John can be understood, who distinguishes between sin unto death and sin not unto death.[7]

[4] Jer. 7:26.

[5] John 19:11.

[6] Matt. 12:31; cf. Mark 3:29-30.

[7] 1 John 5:16.

451. (C) From all these things it can be gathered that the malice of mortal sin consists especially in this, that it turns us away from God. Jeremiah had already explained this by comparison, saying:[1] "For my people have done two evils: they have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, which cannot hold waters." The same is established from many texts alleged above, where sin is called the transgression of the divine law, an offense against God, hatred of God, the loss of divine friendship and divine filiation, privation of light and grace, the cause of damnation and of eternal separation from God; for by these and other words of this kind it is signified that man - who through grace is the adoptive son of God, a participant in the divine nature, a son of light, and therefore is united to God by a manifold bond - by mortal sin becomes a son of the devil, a participant in his works, and walks in darkness, and therefore is truly turned away from God. Wherefore the last sentence of the judge against impenitent sinners is situated in declaring that this departure will be eternal: "Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire."[2]

[1] Jer. 2:13.

[2] This is the very sentence which Bossuet, in the sermon *De la gloire de Dieu dans la conversion des pecheurs*, magnificently explains, as is his custom: "Hell, if we understand it, is sin itself; hell is to be far from God." (Ed. Lebarq, t. II, p. 75.)

452. (D) But that certain sins are not mortal, or are not the cause of eternal damnation, is gathered very probably from a few texts of Scripture. (a) For Christ declares that there is lesser and

greater iniquity:[3] "He who is unjust in little, is unjust also in greater." Besides, the Apostles confess that all Christians offend in many things: "In many things we all offend[4]... If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us";[5] nevertheless from the context it is supposed that those sins are not mortal, nor do they take away charity; thus, for example, a little afterward it is added: "But he who keeps His word, truly in him the charity of God is perfected; and in this we know that we are in Him."[6] Therefore certain sins are given so small that they by no means destroy charity and spiritual life.

[3] Luke 16:10.

[4] Jas. 3:2.

[5] 1 John 1:8.

[6] 1 John 2:5.

(b) The same is indirectly deduced from the celebrated and difficult text of St. Paul,[7] as it is understood by many Fathers: "According to the grace of God, which was given to me, as a wise architect I laid the foundation... But if anyone builds upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, the work of each one shall be manifest; for the day of the Lord shall declare it, because it shall be revealed in fire, and the fire shall prove what sort each one's work is. If anyone's work remains which he built upon it, he shall receive a reward. If anyone's work shall burn, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as through fire." For there the discourse concerns certain doctors who, after Paul, had preached the Gospel to the Corinthians; if they had handed down doctrine not solid, but little useful, relying more on the persuasive words of human wisdom than on the power of Christ, the vanity of their labor will appear on the day of judgment: they indeed will not suffer eternal penalty, because they announced the faith, but, on account of their empty work, they will pay some penalty. From this it is deduced that they sinned, but not mortally.

[7] 1 Cor. 3:10-15.

Yet we confess that these arguments are not apodictic, unless the authority of Tradition is added.

2. The Doctrine of the Fathers Concerning the Gravity of Sin Is Set Forth.

453. (A) In the first three centuries, the distinction between mortal and venial sins is not explicitly instituted, but between the greatest and the small, between those which had to be expiated by public penance and those which were remitted by contrition, almsgiving, prayer, and other means of this kind. Nor from the beginning was it clearly and distinctly defined which sins in species were to be held as grave, but only gradually, according to the progress of Christian conscience: since not a few acts which did not seem gravely sinful to those recently converted from paganism were afterward held graver by those who, through Christian education, had formed for themselves a more delicate conscience, as will be clear from what must be said.

[1] Vacandard, *Le traitement des peccata leviora*, apud *Rev. du Clerge francais*, 15 August 1901; id., *La Penitence publique*, 1903 (collection Bloud), p. 25-44; Batiffol, *Etudes d'hist. et de theol. positive*, Paris, 1902, pp. 81, 144, 128 and passim.

454. (a) Already in the second century three sins were considered as most grave, indeed by some as irremissible by the power of the keys, namely apostasy, moechia or adultery, and homicide.[2] From this certain persons inferred that these three alone are mortal sins. But undeservedly; for

Tertullian, who declares these irremissible, enumerates other sins which are grave and must be chastised by public penance: "But there are also those contrary to these (minute offenses), as graver and destructive, which do not obtain pardon: homicide, idolatry, fraud, denial, blasphemy, certainly also moechia and fornication, and whatever other violation of the temple of God."[1]

[2] Cf. Tertullian, *De Pudicitia*, c. 5 and 12, P.L., t. II, 987-989, 1001-1005; cf. A. d'Ales, *La theologie de Tertullien*, Paris, 1905, p. 272-276; J. Turmel, *Tertullien*, Paris, 1905, p. 210-213.

[1] Tertullian, ibid., c. 19, P.L., II, 1020.

455. (b) From another side there are lesser, or small, sins, which are daily committed and can be remitted through penance. For the same Tertullian says:[2] "For to whom does it not happen either to be angry unjustly, and beyond the setting of the sun, or even to put forth the hand, or easily to curse, or to swear rashly, or to destroy the fidelity of a pact, or to lie from shame or necessity? In businesses, in offices, in gain, in food, in sight, in hearing, how many things tempt us, so that if there were no pardon of these, salvation would belong to no one! Therefore there will be pardon for these through Christ, the entreator of the Father." - St. Cyprian testifies that penance was necessary for these lesser offenses:[3] "When in lesser sins sinners do penance for a just time, and, according to the order of discipline, come to exomologesis, and through the imposition of the hands of the bishop and clergy receive the right of communion..." Therefore these lesser offenses are not merely venial according to the present manner of speaking.

[2] *De pudicit.*, c. 19, P.L., II, 1020.

[3] St. Cyprian, epist. 9, P.L., IV, 251.

456. (B) From the fourth century, the distinction is already explicitly made between grave sins, which are to be expiated by public penance, and light sins, concerning which it suffices to do penance privately.

(a) Thus St. Ambrose:[4] "Because as there is one baptism, so also one penance, which nevertheless is done publicly; for we ought to repent of daily sin: but this latter is for light offenses, the former for graver ones."

[4] St. Ambrose, *De Paenitent.*, cap. 10, P.L., XVI, 520.

457. (b) Augustine declares this more fully. Besides original sin, which is destroyed through baptism, he distinguishes two kinds of sins: grave sins or crimes, which are remitted only by long and public penance, namely those which the Apostle describes in the epistle to the Corinthians and to the Galatians; and light sins, which all commit and which are destroyed by prayer: "For those whom you see doing penance have committed crimes, either adulteries or certain monstrous deeds: thence they do penance. For if their sins were light, daily prayer would suffice for destroying these."[5] - The reason for the difference between light and grave sins is taken from this, that the former do not destroy the foundation of faith and charity, while the latter overturn the foundation of charity: "These things therefore (light sins), because when carnally loved by affection they are not lost without sorrow, for this reason those who

have them in such a way that they have in the foundation faith which works through charity, and do not by any reason or cupidity prefer them to this, when they suffer loss in the loss of them, arrive at salvation through a certain fire of sorrow... But he who, for the sake of either keeping or acquiring them, commits homicide, adultery, fornication, idolatry, and any similar things, will not be saved through fire because of the foundation, but, the foundation having been lost, will be tormented by eternal fire."[1]

[5] *De Symbolo*, to Catechumens, c. 7, P.L., XL, 636; cf. *Enchiridion*, c. 68-71, P.L., XL, 264-266; sermon 351, P.L., XXXIX, 1535-1549.

[1] *De fide et operibus*, cap. 16, P.L., XL, 216.

458. (c) With regard to the Eastern Church, the same is established from the canonical epistles of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus and St. Basil. The former, being asked concerning the kind of penance which had to be imposed on those who had sinned on the occasion of the incursion of the Goths, sets forth how one should act with those who had eaten idolothytes, or had committed fornication, robbery, theft, invasion of others' homes, or had unjustly detained captives, or had been cooperators with barbarians.[2] The latter weaves a longer catalogue of offenses which are subject to canonical penance: there are numbered the killing of an animated or unanimated fetus, digamy and trigamy, fornications of deacons and of canonesses who had vowed virginity, and other grave sins against chastity, homicides, beatings, idolatry, violent motions of anger, usury, perjuries; indeed, it is equitable that involuntary killing, or killing done in war, be punished by some penance.[3] Elsewhere he complains that many make little of sins which nevertheless are declared as mortal by Paul:[4] "Assuredly a most evil custom has deceived us; assuredly a perverse tradition of men exists for us as the cause of great evils, which namely, while certain sins have been avoided, has indifferently admitted others, and while it pretends to be vehemently indignant at some, as at homicide and adultery, and at others of the same kind, it judges some to be worthy not even of simple rebuke, such as anger, or reviling, or drunkenness, or avarice, and whatever things are similar to these, against all of which also elsewhere Paul, speaking in Christ, brought forth the same sentence, when he said: Those who do such things are worthy of death." Therefore mortal sins were recognized, besides idolatry, moechia, and homicide. But elsewhere they teach that certain sins are very light, into which all fall.

[2] Canonical epistle, P.G., X, 1019-1047.

[3] Canonical epistle, P.G., XXXII, 663-684; cf. Chardon, *Hist. des Sacrements*, Migne, *Theol. Curs.*, XX, 692-721, where these and other canonical epistles of St. Basil are rendered into French.

[4] *De Judicio Dei*, P.G., XXXI, 670.

459. (C) Around the sixth century, it is already more explicitly declared which sins are grave and which light.

Thus Caesarius of Arles, in a sermon to the people, says:[5] "And although the Apostle has mentioned many capital sins, nevertheless, lest we seem to cause despair, we briefly say which they are: sacrilege, homicide, adultery, false testimony, theft, robbery, pride, envy, avarice; and anger, if it is held for a long time; and drunkenness, if it is assiduous, is computed in their number." These sins

indeed must be expiated by long penance; otherwise they will be punished by eternal flame. Among minute sins he chiefly numbers these: "As often as someone either in food or in drink takes more than is necessary... as often as he speaks more than is fitting, or is silent more than is expedient; as often as he exasperates a poor man asking importunately. As often as, although healthy in body, while others fast, he wishes to dine; or, given over to sleep, rises later to church... As often as he visits the sick later. If he has neglected to call back the discordant to concord. If he has exasperated a neighbor, or wife, or son, or servant more than is fitting; if he has flattered more than is expedient... If he has not given food to the hungry poor; or has prepared for himself banquets too delicate or too costly... For these and things similar to these undoubtedly pertain to minute sins, which, as I have already said, can scarcely be enumerated, and from which not only the Christian people, but no one of the saints could ever have been, or will be, immune. Although we do not believe the soul to be killed by these sins, nevertheless by filling it as it were with certain pustules, and as with a dreadful scab, they make it deformed." Afterward he adds that these minute sins are redeemed by good works, especially fraternal charity and alms. - Elsewhere among minute sins he numbers not a few which today would be held as mortal: "Let us think, from the time when we began to be wise, what for oaths, what for perjuries, what for curses, what for detractions, what for idle words, what for hatred, what for anger, what for envy, what for evil concupiscence, what for gluttony, what for sleepiness, what for filthy thoughts, what for concupiscence of the eyes, what for voluptuous delectation of the ears..."[1] - Therefore it is clear that the difference between mortal and venial sins, from the first centuries, was first indirectly and confusedly, then explicitly and clearly recognized; but that the rules by which they are distinguished from each other were not clearly defined; and therefore some offenses, which today by a rightly cultivated conscience are held as grave, at that time were regarded as light. - This evolution will be better understood by him who attentively runs through the penitential books; for there he will find an examination of conscience which, as the centuries pass, becomes more and more prolix.[2]

[5] Appendix to Serm. St. Augustine, P.L., XXXIX, 1946-1947.

[1] Sermon 257, apud Migne, P.L., XXXIX, 2220.

[2] You will find some of these penitential books apud Morinus, *Comment. histor. de disciplina in administrat. Paenitent.*, Appendices; Chardon, op. cit., p. 712-725.

3. The Theological Doctrine Concerning Mortal Sin.

460. (A) Notion. In mortal sin two things can be considered: the voluntary act by which someone transgresses the law, and the defect of rectitude which is found in such an act. Under this last respect, according to St. Thomas[1] and other theologians commonly, mortal sin is defined as a turning away from God the ultimate end, through a voluntary and inordinate turning toward creatures.[2] Consequently mortal sin is opposed to divine goodness and wisdom, to the eternal law, and also to the rational nature of man, from what was said above, n. 25. For the most part man does not primarily and explicitly will to turn himself away from God, but, when a useful or delectable created good has been proposed to him, he sometimes chooses the disorder inhering in sin, and therefore the turning away from God, rather than to be deprived of the delectation: "They loved the glory of men more than the glory of God."[3] Hence, for grave sin, it is not necessary directly to intend a turning away from the ultimate end, but it suffices to will it indirectly and logically, by desiring a created good which is known to be contrary to the

ultimate end. - In truth man does not desire evil insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it lies hidden under the appearance of good. This indeed is valid even concerning hatred of God: thus the worst sinners do not hate God except insofar as they apprehend Him as opposed to their own good.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 5.

[2] Among Protestants, others more orthodox, as Bovon, define sin as the free transgression of the law, by which egoism is preferred to love of God; others, tending toward rationalism and determinism, as Schleiermacher and Rothe, hold sin to be as it were a necessary stage of human evolution, in which flesh lusts against spirit and turns the same away from God. Cf. Lichtenberger, *Encyclop. des sciences religieuses*, t. X, at the word *Peche*; Bovon, *Dogmatique chretienne*, Lausanne and Paris, 1895, t. I, p. 311-397, and *Morale chret.*, 1897, t. I, p. 257-316.

[3] John 12:43.

Wisdom graphically describes these psychological dispositions of sinners:[4] "For they have said, thinking not rightly within themselves: short and tedious is the time of our life, and there is no refreshment in the end of man, and no one has been known to return from hell... Come therefore and let us enjoy the good things that are, and let us use the creature quickly as in youth... Let us crown ourselves with roses before they wither; let there be no meadow through which our luxury does not pass... Let us oppress the poor just man, and not spare the widow... These things they thought and erred: for their malice blinded them."

[4] Wis. 2:1-21; the whole chapter should be read.

461. Corollaries. (a) From this the difference between mortal sin and venial sin appears: for the latter does not turn man away from God the ultimate end, but only retards him from Him, as will be explained below.

St. Thomas declares this thus:[1] "For there is a twofold disorder: one through the removal of the principle of order, another in which, even with the principle of order preserved, disorder occurs concerning those things which are after the principle; just as in the body of an animal sometimes indeed the disorder of complexion proceeds even to the destruction of the vital principle, and this is death; but sometimes, with the principle of life preserved, there is a certain disorder in the humors, and then it is illness. But the principle of the whole order in morals is the ultimate end... whence when the soul is disordered by sin even to turning away from the ultimate end, namely God, to whom it is united through charity, then it is mortal sin; but when disorder occurs short of turning away from God, then it is venial sin."

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 5.

462. (b) From this also the controversy, long agitated among theologians, whether the formal constitutive element of a sin of commission consists in something positive or in something negative, can be reconciled.[2] A twofold element can be distinguished in sin: the voluntary act and its disorder. Now sin of commission, considered on the part of the act, consists in something positive by which someone tends toward a good at least apparent; but the disorder of the same act essentially consists in the privation of due rectitude, since the will, by inordinately desiring a created good, turns itself away from God.

[2] All indeed confess that sin of omission is something negative. But according to Suarez (*De peccatis*, disp. I, sect. I, n. 4), sin essentially consists in the privation of due rectitude; according to the Wurzburg theologians (*De pecc.*, n. 13), it consists in the positive tendency of the act toward the prohibited object. Billuart, diss. I, art. 2, sets forth the reasons alleged on each side.

Wherefore God indeed concurs toward the positive act, by moving the will to acting; but neither directly nor indirectly is He the cause of the disorder, which proceeds wholly from the depravity of the human will. "Whence this defect is not reduced to God as to a cause, but to free choice; just as the defect of limping is reduced to the curved shin as to a cause, but not to the motive power, by which nevertheless whatever there is of motion in limping is caused."[3] - Nor let it be said that God indirectly cooperates with sin from the fact that He does not prevent it; for most wisely He willed man to be free, and He offers him the helps necessary for avoiding sin; but it is altogether fitting that, after He has sufficiently instructed men toward the good, He allow them to act by their own motion, and by their own efforts to acquire merits and to attain eternal life, with the help of grace which He denies to no one well disposed. For from what was said, n. 185, it is licit to cooperate materially with sin, provided there is a proportionately grave reason.

[3] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 79, art. 2.

463. (B) Concerning the malice of mortal sin.[1] The malice, or disorder, of this sin is manifold, if it is considered on the part of God, on the part of Christ, and on the part of the sinner himself.

[1] Besides the theologians, cf. Manning, op. cit., ch. I; Bourdaloue, *Sermons sur les Mysteres*, 1st sermon on the Passion of Jesus Christ; id., *Exhortations, Sur le jugement du peuple contre J.-C.*; id., *Careme*, Wednesday of the 5th Week, concerning the state of sin and the state of grace; Gratry, *Medit. inedites*, Paris, Tequi, 1878, 7th Meditation, Sin.

On the part of God, mortal sin is (a) disobedience and rebellion against God, the supreme legislator: for the sinner deliberately, although created by God and wholly depending on Him, prefers his own will to the will of God, although he knows very well that He is supreme Lord, King of kings, and Lord of lords, and that He prescribes nothing except what is consonant with reason and wisdom. Thus he becomes guilty of rebellion: for since by a manifold title he is justly subject to the dominion of God, nevertheless equivalently[2] he says, "I will not serve," and rejects the authority of God. (b) It is deservedly called injustice or iniquity; for God, as being the infinite good and the font of all beatitude, and also the supreme Lord, has a strict right that He be our ultimate end; and therefore the sinner, turning himself away from God the ultimate end, violates that right, and, insofar as he can, deprives Him of that external glory which he ought to render to the most perfect Being; thus he commits true injustice. (c) It imports a certain irreligiosity: for to God, because of His supreme excellence and majesty, supreme worship and honor is due; but the sinner denies this honor, indeed in some sense dishonors and contemns the Lord, preferring the vilest creature to the Creator, according to that saying:[1] "They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves broken cisterns which cannot hold waters." But this contempt has the character of contumely, because sin is committed in the sight of the omnipresent God: "Against Thee alone have I sinned, and I have done evil before Thee."[2] (d) It is foul ingratitude: for God is a distinguished benefactor: whatever of being, whatever of good we have, proceeds from Him; natural and supernatural gifts He has generously bestowed upon us; He has sanctified and redeemed our souls; but we use His benefits to offend Him, and indeed at the very time when He bestows His gifts upon us!

[2] It is said equivalently, or logically, by way of conclusion, not explicitly; for most often the sinner does not expressly intend this rebellion; hence sacred orators should abstain in this matter from excessive amplifications.

[1] Jer. 2:13. Hence Paul says (Rom. 2:23-24): "By transgression of the law thou dishonorest God: for the name of God through you is blasphemed among the Gentiles."

[2] Ps. 50:6.

464. On the part of Christ, (a) sin was the cause why Christ had to undergo such bitter pains and tortures, and a most shameful and most cruel death; therefore he who, knowing these things, nevertheless sins, by that very fact logically and indirectly becomes an accomplice of those who crucified the Lord, and, as far as lies in him, renews His agony, tortures, humiliations, crucifixion, and death, and therefore in some sense becomes guilty of deicide: "Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God."[3] (b) But because through baptism he entered into a covenant with Christ, and breaks it through sin, by that very fact he is deservedly held as a covenant-breaker, just as the Jewish people when it broke the faith given many times. (c) Since he has likewise been made a living temple of God and marked by a sacramental character, the sinner commits a certain sacrilege, dedicating the temple of God to profane uses and rashly violating his own soul consecrated to Christ. Wherefore the sins of a Christian are graver than the sins of unbelievers, and the sins of a priest graver than the sins of Christians.[4] - Yet for the most part sinners are not conscious of the whole malice which of itself is in mortal sin; and therefore sacred orators, when they speak concerning this matter, ought to have this before their eyes.

[3] Heb. 6:6; here the question indeed concerns apostasy from the faith, but by analogy it can be extended to all mortal sins. Wherefore Christ could address sinners, as He addressed the Jews themselves, thus: "What more ought I to have done for thee and have not done? I indeed planted thee, my most beautiful vineyard: and thou hast become very bitter to me: for with vinegar thou hast given me to drink in my thirst and with a lance thou hast pierced the side of thy Savior." Let the whole reproaches be read, in the Mass of Friday of great week.

[4] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 10.

465. On the part of man, sin is the highest evil, namely: (a) spiritual suicide, since it brings death upon the soul; (b) deformity and defilement, since it deprives the soul of the supernatural beauty with which it shone, and of the many supernatural gifts and habits which adorned it; (c) ignominious servitude, since the sinner is constituted a slave of the devil, and renders himself subject to his attacks. Therefore the Prophet deservedly says:[1] "Know and see, that it is evil and bitter for thee to have left the Lord thy God."

[1] Jer. 2:19.

466. (C) Controversy concerning the infinity of sin. According to all, mortal sin, insofar as it is the evil of man, is not infinite, because the goods of which it deprives him are finite. Likewise the malice of sin, or the disorder of the sinful act considered in the will of the sinner itself, is something finite, since the human will is incapable of infinite malice.[2] But the question concerns the offense, or the injury inflicted by sin; and from this head, all concede that sin is at least extrinsically and objectively infinite, because namely it dishonors God, who is truly infinite. But it is controverted whether the offense inflicted upon God is simply and intrinsically infinite in the genus of morals, or only extrinsically and in a qualified way.

[2] Some theologians indeed say that the malice of sin is in some way infinite, but they confuse this malice with the offense inflicted upon God.

(a) Many Thomists affirm that mortal sin, under the notion of offense, is of simply infinite gravity in the genus of morals.[3] For the gravity of offense grows according to the dignity of the person upon whom it is inflicted, according to that saying: injury is in the injured person; and in truth the same injury inflicted upon a soldier is less grave than if it is inflicted upon a general. But the person offended through mortal sin, namely God, is of simply infinite dignity. - It is confirmed from this, that mortal sin deserves an infinite penalty in duration.

[3] Thus especially Gonet, *Clypeus theol. thomisticae*, concerning Sins, diss. IX, art. 6; the Salmanticenses, *De Incarnat.*, disp. I.

(b) Yet not a few theologians hold, with Scotus and Suarez,[4] that the gravity of sin, even under the notion of offense, is infinite only in a qualified way. For there are mortal sins graver than others; but if they were simply infinite, all would be equal, since there is not given an infinite greater than an infinite. - Besides, the divine majesty and excellence, although infinite, is known only in a finite way; but the malice of the act, even under the notion of offense, is measured according to the dignity of the person not considered in itself, but insofar as it is known by the agent.

[4] Suarez, *De peccatis*, disp. II, sect. 3; Pesch, n. 477-482.

Conclusion. We gladly admit what St. Thomas says:[1] "Sin committed against God has a certain infinity from the infinity of the divine majesty: for the greater is he against whom one offends, the graver the offense is." But we do not think that a certain infinity signifies infinity simply; rather, we assent to those who say that the gravity of offense morally taken is to be measured not only from the dignity of the person offended, but also according to the agent's cognition, which is finite.

[1] St. Thomas, III, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

467. (D) Concerning the inequality of mortal sins.[2] That not all mortal sins are equal we have already learned from Scripture, n. 450. Reason shows the same: for although sin consists essentially in turning away from God, the ultimate end, nevertheless there are degrees in it. For this is not a mere negation of conversion to God, but also a positive opposition against the end, in which there can be many degrees, whether on the part of the will, or on the part of the object and circumstances.

[2] Horace elegantly refutes the theory of the Stoics, who taught that all sins are equal, *Satir.*, I, 3, 96:

"Those to whom it has pleased that sins are nearly equal, labor
when it has come to truth: sense and morals resist,
and utility itself, almost the mother of the just and fair."

(a) On the part of the will; for since sin is an act of the will, it will be greater or lesser according as the volition is more or less perfect: but this, even when it suffices for grave sin, can be more or less intense by reason of deliberation, effort, and duration. Thus, other things being equal, the sin is graver which was preceded by more attentive deliberation, and which was committed with vehement affection, without external solicitation, for a long time.

(b) On the part of the object and circumstances; for since sins are diverse according to the diversity of objects, those which are immediately committed against God are graver, such as voluntary

apostasy from the faith, blasphemy; among those which are perpetrated against man, those which are against his life are graver than those which are against his goods, for example, homicide is worse than theft.[1] Circumstances likewise can increase malice; thus parricide is graver than homicide, and theft of sacred things than simple theft. This will be declared more fully in the course of Moral Theology.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73; cf. Lehmkuhl, t. I, n. 1223-1232.

II. Concerning the Effects of Mortal Sin.

Mortal sin produces a twofold effect, namely: 1. a habitual turning away from God, or guilt of fault; 2. guilt of penalty, or the obligation to penalty.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 86-87; Suarez, disp. VII-VIII; Gonet, disp. VIII; Billuart, diss. VII; Pesch, n. 495-515; Billot, th. 4-6.

1. Concerning Guilt of Fault, or the State of Sin.

468. (A) After the sinful act has passed, man remains habitually turned away from God, until he is freed from sin through penance: but he cannot be exempted from this unless through an act of the will he retracts the evil act placed by himself, and obtains pardon from God.[3] But that state of turning away from God is called habitual sin, or the state of sin; it is not indeed a vicious habit properly so called, for this supposes repeated acts of the same species; but it is a certain inordinate disposition, by force of which the will, which ought to tend toward God, remains turned away from the ultimate end, and therefore is less apt for resisting temptations and for acting well.

[3] St. Thomas declares this thus, I-II, q. 86, a. 2: "Although the act of sin ceases, by which man withdrew from the light of reason or of the divine law, nevertheless man does not immediately return to that in which he had been; but some motion of the will contrary to the first motion is required; just as if someone is distant from another by some motion, when the motion ceases he does not immediately become near to him, but he must approach by returning through a contrary motion."

This disposition is called guilt of fault, because the sinner, as long as he has not retracted nor repaired the injury inflicted upon God, remains guilty of that offense; therefore he ought to do penance as soon as possible, if he wishes to recover grace.

469. (B) For man constituted in the supernatural order, the state of sin includes also the privation of habitual grace and charity; for in the present order, man is not ordered to his supernatural end except through habitual grace, as was said above, n. 8; therefore he is not turned away from the same end except by privation of habitual grace and charity.

(C) But this privation of grace is nothing other than the stain of sin, which the Scriptures often commemorate; for sins are called stain, filth, uncleanness, defilements; from which God washes us with clean water, and Christ washes us in His blood.[1] But this stain is not something positive or a depraved quality, but only the privation of sanctifying grace. St. Thomas declares this by comparison:[2] just as a stain in corporeal things consists in this, that a shining body loses its brightness from contact with another body, so in spiritual things the soul is metaphorically said to be stained when it loses its brightness by clinging to created things through inordinate love.[3]

[1] Josh. 22:17; Isa. 4:4; Ezek. 36:25; Zech. 13:1; 1 Cor. 6:11; Eph. 5:27.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 86, a. 1.

[3] In the natural order, the state of sin would consist in the privation of the rectitude by which man is naturally ordered to God.

2. Concerning Guilt of Penalty, or the Obligation of Undergoing Penalty.

470. Besides the stain left in the soul, sin induces an obligation to undergo some penalty; this indeed is twofold: one which accompanies the fault itself, as remorse of conscience; the other, which is inflicted as a remedy of salvation by God or by man.

(A) Concerning remorse of conscience. The sinner, seeing that he has been turned away from God, and deprived of many goods, because of vile and transitory delights, returns into himself, and, hearing the voice of conscience, at least as long as he is not obstinate in evil, understands that he has erred and done evil.

Wisdom vividly describes this remorse of conscience:[4] "Seeing, they shall be troubled with horrible fear..., saying within themselves, doing penance, and groaning for anguish of spirit... Therefore we have erred from the way of truth... We have been wearied in the way of iniquity and perdition; and we have walked difficult ways, but the way of the Lord we have not known. What has pride profited us, or what has the boasting of riches brought us? All those things have passed like a shadow... but in our wickedness we have been consumed." Too happy are sinners if, vexed by anxieties and remorse of conscience, they return penitent to the heavenly Father, crying out as the prodigal himself did: "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee."[1]

[4] Wis. 5:2-13. - Hugo graphically depicts the remorse which Cain experienced after perpetrating fratricide in *La Conscience*, in the work *La Legende des siecles*, Paris, t. I, p. 35-37.

[1] Luke 15:18.

471. (B) Concerning the various penalties inflicted by God or man. A wise legislator adds sanctions to his laws, by which subjects may be more efficaciously deterred from evil and impelled toward good. (a) Now mortal sin induces guilt of eternal penalty; this indeed is twofold: the penalty of loss, or privation of the beatific vision, which corresponds to the turning away from God, and the penalty of sense, which corresponds to the turning toward creatures:[2] "And these shall go into eternal punishment."[3] Yet this penalty is not inflicted except upon the impenitent, namely those who obstinately die in their sin. And surely he who voluntarily remains turned away from God is deservedly deprived of the vision of God and of the ultimate end; likewise he who inordinately adhered to creatures even to the end justly feels harm from them.[4]

[2] Concerning each it was said in the Treatise on God the Rewarder, n. 23-30.

[3] Matt. 25:46.

[4] In the natural order, the penalty of sin would be the privation of that beatitude which consists in a fuller, although natural, knowledge and love of God.

(b) Besides, sometimes God, even in this life, inflicts medicinal penalties upon sinners, namely various calamities, and also anxieties of soul, illnesses, and other temporal evils, so that, returning to the heart, they may grieve for sins and satisfy for them by salutary penance. But concerning these penalties nothing certain and infallible can be predicated: for Providence sometimes permits the evil

to be afflicted by no special calamities in the present life, nor does He always measure the quantity of temporal penalty according to the gravity of sins. Hence the Psalmist says:[5] "But my feet were almost moved... because I was zealous over the wicked, seeing the peace of sinners... Behold these are sinners, and abounding in the world, they have obtained riches." For God indeed is patient, because eternal. - Whence penalties inflicted upon sinners ought to be regarded, at least for the most part, as benefits: just as physicians give bitter potions to the sick for restoring health, so God chastises those whom He wills to amend.

[5] Ps. 72:2-12.

From these things it is clear how diligently mortal sin is to be avoided, which offends God, defiles the soul, and renders the sinner subject to so many evils. Would that of any Christian it could be said what is narrated concerning Chrysostom:[6] "That man is superior to fear and threats, and is lifted up even against death itself. One thing alone he fears, namely sin, and lest through it he offend God even a little."

[6] Symeon Metaphr., *Vita S. Chrys.*, Migne, P.G., CXIV, 1138.

III. Concerning the Conditions Required for Mortal Sin.

The nature and effects of mortal sin having been described, it remains to inquire what conditions are required in order that sin be mortal. Now three must concur together: grave matter, full advertence, and full consent.

472. 1. Grave matter: but this can be such by reason of the object or circumstances, from what was said above, n. 144-146 and 158-161. - But what matter is grave can be defined both by authority and by reason.

(A) By authority. (a) We have already said that from Scripture it can be discerned that certain sins are mortal, namely those which are said to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, to be worthy of death or eternal damnation, execrable, abominable, etc. (b) The same can be gathered from the decrees of Councils, Pontiffs, or Congregations, or from the common doctrine of the Fathers and theologians, or from the common sense of the faithful. In this matter it must be noted that there has been some progress, so that the catalogue of sins today is longer than in the first times of the Church; this indeed happened not so much from an authentic declaration of the Pontiffs, who have very rarely pronounced concerning the gravity of sin, as from the common sense of doctors or of the faithful, and from the progressive education of Christian conscience.

473. (B) By reason: for this, since it is a certain participation in divine reason, judges concerning the morality of human acts, and therefore concerning the gravity of sins. The general principle is that that sin is to be held as mortal which imports a grave disorder with regard to God, society, oneself, or neighbor. Thus mortal of themselves are:

(a) Sins which inflict grave injury upon God or His divine attributes, such as infidelity, apostasy, despair, hatred of God, blasphemy, irreligion. (b) Sins which induce grave harm to the human race or to society, for example, fornication, rebellion against legitimate authority, all those things which foster discords among the various orders of citizens. (c) Sins which are so opposed to charity or justice toward oneself or neighbor that they bring notable detriment; thus, for example, suicide,

homicide, theft of some moment, hatred of neighbor, detractions and calumnies which greatly injure reputation, etc.

Certain sins are called grave from their whole genus, when namely they admit no smallness of matter, for example, apostasy, hatred of God, blasphemy; these are always mortal of themselves, nor can they become light except by defect of full deliberation or full consent. But others are grave from their genus, insofar as of themselves they have it that they can be grave, yet in such a way that they are venial not only from defect of full deliberation or consent, but also from smallness of matter; for example, theft, detraction, etc.

474. 2. Full advertence, namely that which a man fully master of himself is accustomed to apply to a business of great moment; for when the matter concerns the loss of eternal salvation, or turning away from the ultimate end, semiplene advertence does not suffice, such as exists in one half-asleep or in him who is distracted by another matter. Therefore it is required that the action be clearly apprehended or clearly suspected as illicit, and indeed gravely so: for if this appears only confusedly and obscurely, it cannot be said that the sinner wills, explicitly or implicitly, to turn himself away from God.[1] Yet it is not necessary that someone again and again, for a long time, maturely and reflexively consider the matter as prohibited by God under grave penalty; but it suffices to perceive the act clearly and directly, even for a brief time, as gravely illicit.

[1] *Vieux Moraliste, Peche precis et peche vague,* apud *Ami du Clerge,* t. XX, 1898, p. 1025-1030.

Hence they lack full advertence, and therefore do not sin gravely: (a) the half-asleep, the half-drunk, or all those who are not truly masters of themselves; (b) those who, occupied and distracted by another matter, give only slight attention to the action which they perform; (c) those who, by vehement passion, or agitation of the nerves, or another physical disease or pathological state (above, n. 128-135), are so disturbed that they attend to the matter only imperfectly; (d) those who immediately or a little after the fact, weighing its malice more attentively, judge that they would not have acted so if they had seriously thought beforehand; and a fortiori if they scarcely remember what they did.

475. 3. Full consent, that is, that which follows full advertence, and at the same time is offered with that liberty which a matter of great moment requires. For this liberty it is not necessary that the agent be immune from passion or fear, but it suffices that, notwithstanding vehement passion or fear, he is able to deliberate and choose maturely: thus he is not excused from grave sin who, from fear of death, externally denies the faith, or, in order to preserve a public office, deliberately, although reluctantly, commits injustice.

But in doubt whether someone has fully consented, these can be held as signs of imperfect consent: (a) he who habitually abhors mortal sin, and therefore is of a fearful conscience, so that he is prepared rather to die than to sin gravely, is to be presumed not to have fully consented. (b) He who experienced some desire of doing evil, and abstained from external sin, while an easy occasion of sinning externally presented itself, is generally to be judged not to have offered full consent. (c) The same can be said of him who, as soon as he fully adverted to the temptation, repelled it; or is

anguished or saddened concerning depraved thoughts or desires which invade his mind, even if they have remained for a long time.

476. Corollaries. (A) Therefore it can happen that an action objectively gravely sinful is not mortal sin:

(a) From defect of full advertence or full consent from the things said above; (b) from invincibly erroneous conscience, when namely someone in good faith thinks that the action is only lightly evil; (c) from an excusing cause, when the matter concerns some law, from whose fulfillment sufficient reason can excuse; for example, grave inconvenience excuses altogether from hearing Mass on a feast day, and an inconvenience not so grave can excuse from mortal sin, if not from venial.

477. (B) On the contrary, a sin light from its genus can become grave:

(a) From erroneous conscience, when the agent holds a venial sin as grave, for example, a minute theft; (b) from a gravely evil end, if someone, for example, steals a thing of slight price for committing homicide: for the means which is ordered to a gravely evil end participates in the grave malice of the end itself; for the same reason, he sins mortally who adheres to a thing prohibited only under light sin, yet in such a way that he is prepared rather to offend God gravely than to bid farewell to the thing; (c) by reason of scandal, when it is morally certain that grave scandal will arise from a sin otherwise venial, for example, if a priest acts so lightly that he offers grave scandal to laymen; (d) by reason of danger, if someone, by sinning venially (for example, by idle conversation), foresees that he is going to fall into grave temptation; (e) by reason of contempt, when someone violates the law in light matter, but with the intention of manifesting contempt toward the law or the legislator: which nevertheless occurs very rarely; (f) by reason of matter coalescing, when matters, small of themselves, are so ordered to making some one moral whole that they effect a notable transgression of the same precept; thus sometimes minute thefts coalesce into one and constitute mortal sin, as is declared in the Treatise on Justice, n. 440-444.

478. (C) Since it is very difficult in practice to define whether some sin is mortal, all circumstances having been attended to, and especially the psychological dispositions of the agent, let the confessor not be prone to judging easily that such or such an action is gravely evil, unless this is sufficiently evident.[1] Often he will prudently recognize that the matter is doubtful, and leave it to divine judgment; but he will be solicitous about exciting contrition in the heart of the penitent, and will urgently exhort him to strive to abstain from every deliberate sin.

[1] Cf. *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XX, 1898, p. 1029.

§ III. Concerning Venial Sin.

We shall briefly declare its nature and effects.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88-89, and *Quaest. disp., de Malo*, q. 7; Suarez, disp. II, sect. 5-8; Gonet, disp. IX; St. Alphonsus, nn. 11, 51, 64; Ball. P., n. 670-680; Pesch, n. 516-556; Billot, th. 8-10; Manning, ch. 3; *Pratique progressive de la confession*, Paris, 1902, t. II, p. 115-132.

I. Concerning the Nature of Venial Sin.

479. Already from Scripture and the Fathers (n. 452 sq.) we know that there are lesser, or venial, sins, which do not bring death upon the soul. The same can be gathered from Trent declaring that mortal sins are to be set forth in confession, but that venial sins can be omitted without fault, because they can be expiated by many other remedies.[3] Wherefore this proposition 20 of Baius was condemned by Pius V: "There is no sin venial from its nature, but every sin deserves eternal punishment."[4]

[3] Trent, sess. XIV, cap. 5.

[4] Denzing., n. 900.

480. 1. Notion. Venial, according to the force of the word, signifies that which can obtain pardon, and from this head all sins can be called venial, because remissible. But venial sin, insofar as it is distinguished from mortal, is so called because it does not take away sanctifying grace, and therefore from its own nature is worthy of pardon. It in fact obtains pardon when due retraction has been made and temporal penalty paid.

But with regard to the thing, venial sin is a morally evil act by which, nevertheless, habitual conversion to God is not taken away.

481. 2. Difference between venial and mortal. St. Thomas declares this thus:[1] (a) Since sin is a certain sickness of the soul, it is called mortal when it induces an irreparable defect, or takes away the principle of life. But the principle of spiritual life is order to the ultimate end, and therefore mortal sin, which is a turning away from the ultimate end, is of itself irreparable, and cannot be repaired except by divine power. But sins which have disorder concerning those things which are toward the end, the order to the ultimate end being preserved, are reparable, and are called venial.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1.

(b) In another way he explains the matter:[2] one sinning mortally is truly turned away from God, and therefore recedes from the way which leads to the ultimate end; but one sinning venially is not turned away from God, but is similar to him who delays too much on the road, and therefore is retarded in the attainment of the ultimate end.

[2] St. Thomas, in II Sentent., dist. 42, q. I, a. 3, ad 5.

(c) Hence one sinning venially, although he displeases God, does not cease to love Him. For when something is prohibited only under light sin, it can happen without the agent being turned away from the ultimate end, and without losing divine friendship. Therefore his disposition is this: I know indeed that this thing displeases God, but not so that He denies His friendship to those who elicit it; therefore I enjoy this thing, but I would prefer to lack its advantage than to lose charity. - Something similar also happens in human matters: sometimes a friend does those things which displease a friend, but would by no means wish to furnish anything which would dissolve the covenant of friendship.

In truth just as a man turned away from God by mortal sin can nevertheless do some good works, so likewise man, while he habitually remains turned toward God through grace, can elicit acts venially

evil which, although they are not referred to God, are not for that reason referred to a creature as to an ultimate end.

(d) Venial sin must be diligently distinguished from imperfections which, although they are not against the law, do not reach that degree which the pursuit of perfection imports.

3. In what sense venial is said to be beyond the law. Venial sin is said by St. Thomas[3] and by certain other theologians to be beyond the eternal law, insofar as it is beyond the ultimate end which the eternal law primarily regards, and because it does not destroy charity, which is the fullness of the law. But from this it is not licit to infer that venial sin is only beyond, but not against, the law. Every sin, even light sin, is a transgression of the law; but venial sin is not against the ultimate end, nor therefore, strictly speaking, against the eternal law, by which all beings are ordered to the ultimate end.

[3] St. Thomas, Q. disp., *de Malo*, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1.

482. 4. Conditions required for venial sin. Venial sin can be committed in two ways: (a) when the matter itself is light: then sin remains venial, even if there is perfect knowledge and full consent; (b) when the matter is grave, but full knowledge or full consent is lacking (above, n. 474-475). - But when light matter is had can be gathered from the things said above, n. 472-473, and will be explained more fully in the whole course of this work.

II. Concerning the Effects of Venial Sin.

483. In order that an equitable judgment may be made concerning the malice and effects of venial sin, one must diligently distinguish between those things which are committed from mere frailty, without mature deliberation or full consent; - and those which are done deliberately, from some affection, especially if they are committed frequently and from habit: for these bring much greater detriment to the soul. But because not a few orators and ascetics have not kept these distinctions before the mind, they have amplified the malice and effects of venial sin more than was fair.

1. First indeed it is helpful to set forth what venial fault does not produce in the soul. (a) It neither extinguishes nor diminishes sanctifying grace. For since it is not a turning away from God, it does not destroy divine friendship: indeed, habitual grace in itself it does not diminish: for this, since it is nothing other than the supernatural state of conversion to God, could not be diminished except by acts contrary to the ultimate end or to charity; but from what has been said, venial sin is by no means opposed to the ultimate end or to charity. - Nor from this are the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are connected with habitual grace, diminished, nor merits already acquired.

(b) Hence it does not properly induce a stain into the soul; for the stain of sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace; moreover venial sin by no means takes this away or diminishes it. Yet in a less proper sense it is sometimes said to cause a stain, and is compared to dust and filth which defile the face of man. St. Thomas declares this thus:[1] in the soul there is a twofold brightness, one indeed habitual, from sanctifying grace, the other actual from acts of virtues; now venial sin indeed

impedes the splendor which arises from acts of virtues, but not habitual brightness, because it does not exclude nor diminish the habit of charity.

[1] St. Thomas, q. 89, a. 1.

484. 2. Nevertheless venial sin, frequently and deliberately committed from affection, produces pernicious effects.

(A) It diminishes the fervor of charity; for fervor consists in promptness for doing all things devoutly and generously on account of God; now he who frequently, deliberately, and from affection sins venially is by no means prepared for doing all things on account of God, but in many things deliberately chooses to please himself more than God. Gradually therefore he leaves behind arduous things, and pursues only the easier things: in prayer, he does not greatly care to expel wanderings of soul; in fulfilling the duties of his state, he conducts himself negligently; in virtues he does not strive to progress; works of charity languish, and voluntary mortifications grow torpid; in one word, gradually and without sensing it, tepidity is induced, or the state in which the powers of the soul grow languid.

485. (B) It gradually disposes toward mortal sin, not indeed of itself, since it differs altogether from mortal sin, but through a certain consequence, as St. Thomas says:[1] (a) For, as the disposition of clinging to created things grows from habit and affection, the desire of sinning can so increase that the will, even in matters of greater moment, clings to the creature against the will of God; thus, for example, he who first consents lightly to anger, by repeated acts deliberately committed, easily admits grave motions of anger; likewise he who often indulges curiosity and sensuality, by reading books rather dangerous and by fostering imaginations approaching pleasure, soon, overcome by desire, sins gravely. - The reason for this is that one sinning venially, as the Angelic Doctor says, "from the fact that he becomes accustomed not to subject his will in lesser things to due order, is disposed to this, that he also not subject his will to the order of the ultimate end, by choosing that which is mortal sin from its genus." In truth, with Christ as witness,[2] "he who is unjust in little, is unjust also in greater." (b) Besides, he who frequently and from affection sins venially, by that very fact abuses actual grace, deliberately resisting the inspirations of the Holy Spirit; for this reason he is deprived of more abundant helps, and, when grave temptation arises, he is found weaker for overcoming it.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 3.

[2] Luke 16:10.

486. (C) Venial sin also induces guilt of fault and guilt of penalty: (a) guilt of fault, because, although it does not dissolve divine friendship, nevertheless it displeases God and saddens Him: for one sinning venially prefers his own will to the divine good pleasure, and therefore is truly guilty of fault; if this happens frequently, the guilt is increased daily, and the charity of God toward us grows cold, as does ours toward God: "But I have against thee that thou hast left thy first charity. Remember therefore from where thou hast fallen, and do penance, and do the first works. But if not, I come to thee, and I will move thy candlestick out of its place, unless thou do penance."[1] (b) Guilt of penalty, insofar as one sinning venially, although he does not deserve the eternal penalty of loss, nevertheless ought to undergo some temporal penalty

proportioned to the offense, whether in the present time or in purgatory. But what penalty is due to venial sin cannot be defined, but must be left to divine judgment.[2]

[1] Apoc. 2:4-5. Here the question concerns Timothy, bishop of Ephesus; cf. Fouard, *Saint Jean*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1905, p. 125.

[2] Therefore one must beware of those orators and ascetics who heap up examples taken from the Old Testament to prove that the penalty of death was not rarely inflicted upon those sinning venially. The examples alleged refer to public facts, which are severely chastised on account of the public good: therefore they are undeservedly extended to other cases.

Therefore with St. Francis de Sales it is licit to conclude that affection for venial sins must be extirpated:[3] "Never can we be wholly pure and clean from venial sins, at least so that we live and remain long in this purity; but we can have no voluntary propensity toward venial sins... These affections are directly contrary to devotion, as affection toward mortal sin is contrary to charity; for they weaken the powers of the spirit, and render them languid, impede divine consolations, open the door to temptations, and, although they do not kill the soul, nevertheless they greatly weaken it and render it sick."[4]

[3] St. Francis de Sales, *Introd. a la vie devote*, p. I, ch. 22.

[4] Here it is licit to observe that not all venial sins can indeed be avoided according to Trent (sess. VI, cap. 11), but, according to common doctrine, all fully deliberate venial sins can be avoided. Hence a vow concerning avoiding all venial sins is invalid, but not one concerning avoiding all deliberate venial sins.

§ IV. Concerning the Distinction of Sins.

Since, from Trent, we are held in confession to accuse mortal sins according to species and number, and the confessor ought to instruct and help penitents in this burden, it is necessary to hand down certain rules concerning the specific and numerical distinction of sins in general; to these we shall add opportune principles concerning internal sins.

[5] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72; Billuart, diss. II; St. Alphonsus, n. 12-50; Lehmk., n. 240-256; Ball. P., n. 514-669; Noldin, n. 275-285.

I. Concerning the Specific Distinction of Sins.

487. 1. State of the question. (A) Speculatively, theologians do not agree concerning the principle from which the specific distinction of sins is to be repeated. (a) St. Thomas repeats it from the formally diverse objects of sins;[6] namely, sins differ in species when they are concerned with objects formally diverse in the being of morals; for primary morality is drawn from the object formally taken, as was said above, n. 114. (b) But Scotus repeats it from the diverse virtues to which sins are opposed;[1] for since sin is a privation, it takes its species from the form to which it is opposed, or from virtue. (c) According to Vasquez,[2] sins differ specifically insofar as they are opposed to morally diverse precepts; for since sin is a transgression of the law, or of a precept, it obtains its species from the precept which is violated.

[6] St. Thomas, cited place, a. 1.

[1] Scotus, in 2 Sentent., dist. 37, q. 1, n. 9.

[2] *Disput. in I-II S. Thom.*, disp. 98, c. 2.

488. (B) Practically, however, these three norms can be composed together; for it is true that sins are diverse in species according to the diverse precepts which are violated; but the precepts themselves are generally diverse because they regard diverse virtues; but virtues are not diverse except because they are concerned with specifically distinct objects. Whence it can be said that sins proximately receive their specific distinction from the precepts, or from the virtues to which they are opposed, but remotely from the moral objects concerning which they are concerned.

489. (C) It must likewise be noted that many faithful, ignorant of theological distinctions, bear judgment concerning the various species of sins according to the moral estimation of prudent persons, but that this is diverse according to places, times, moral education, etc. Whence, in practice, confessors ought to look into, insofar as they can, the subjective dispositions of penitents, and judge concerning the malice of sins according to the knowledge and advertence which was in the penitents, and indeed at the very time when they were sinning. Therefore if some apprehended only confusedly the diverse malices contained in their actions, and recognized only one sin in an act which, strictly speaking, had a threefold malice specifically distinct, they are not to be troubled to accuse distinctly what they had perceived obscurely; for they sinned according to the degree of knowledge proper to them: nothing is willed unless foreknown.

490. 2. Practical rules. (A) Sins which are opposed to diverse virtues must be held as specifically diverse; thus infidelity, despair, hatred of God are sins diverse in species, because they are opposed to the three theological virtues; likewise superstition, which is opposed to religion, is specifically distinguished from homicide, which is against justice. - Therefore, if one and the same act harms several virtues specifically diverse, it contains several malices specifically diverse; thus a priest perpetrating adultery with a married blood-relative commits four sins specifically diverse: against chastity, as is clear; against religion, because he is bound by the vow of chastity; against justice, he violates the right of the husband; and against piety, because he sins with a blood-relative.

(B) Sins opposed to the same virtue in a contrary mode are specifically diverse, for example, despair and presumption, which are opposed to the same virtue of hope, but in a contrary mode, the former namely by defect, the latter by excess.

(C) Sins likewise diverse in species are those opposed to the same virtue, but in a morally diverse mode, or to diverse functions of the same virtue; thus detraction, theft, homicide differ in species, although they are opposed to the same virtue of justice, because in a morally diverse mode they violate the rights of neighbor, namely the right to reputation, the right to external goods, the right to life: for these rights, according to the moral estimation of all, are altogether diverse.

491. N.B. When one and the same act is prohibited by various laws, it has only one malice, if precepts of this kind were enacted from the same motive: thus is theft, which is prohibited by natural, divine, canonical, and civil law, because of the same motive. But if the precepts were enacted from a diverse motive, one and the same act contains in itself several malices

specifically diverse; thus he who breaks a fast to which he was held both from a vow and from a precept of the Church commits a twofold sin.

II. Concerning the Numerical Distinction of Sins.

492. Sins specifically diverse by that very fact are numerically distinct. But the question is when sins are numerically distinct in the same species. Nothing concerning this matter has been defined by the Church; and therefore the question must be resolved from the moral estimation of prudent persons, with attention also to the psychological dispositions of the penitent. The things which are more commonly taught can be recalled to two principles; concerning a third principle there is much dispute.

493. 1. First principle. There are as many sins numerically distinct as there are evil acts of the will really distinct. It is said acts of the will, because sin is primarily in the will; really distinct, because if evil acts are at the same time gathered together to effect something morally one, there is only one sin, as will be declared below, n. 494. But if the evil acts of the will are truly and really distinct, each one of them has its own malice and is truly a sin. Thus he who by several acts steals from distinct persons commits as many thefts as he elicits diverse acts; he who by three acts harms the reputation of three persons commits a threefold sin of detraction.

494. 2. Second principle. There are as many sins numerically distinct as there are acts morally interrupted. For as often as acts are morally interrupted, each is complete, and therefore constitutes a sin.

But acts are morally interrupted in a twofold way: (a) by retraction, whether explicit, or even implicit, namely when the will deliberately ceases from the act without the purpose of returning to it, or is turned toward something incompatible with it; (b) by mere cessation, even involuntary, from the act (for example, through sleep, or through another occupation), so long that, in the judgment of prudent persons, the subsequent act does not morally coalesce with the former.

But in order that the matter may be better understood, it is helpful to apply the principles to various kinds of acts, namely to acts merely internal, to internal acts to be consummated externally, and to external acts.

Applications. (A) Acts merely internal, which are consummated in the will itself, such as acts of complacency or morose delectation in depraved thoughts, are multiplied as often as, after retraction or long cessation, they are renewed.

Thus he who voluntarily consents to evil delectation arising from a depraved thought, afterward devotes himself to study for a long time, and then voluntarily returns to the evil delectation, commits two sins; say the same of him who, seeing an enemy, inwardly curses him, afterward plays for a notable time, and again thinking about the enemy, curses him terribly. But if someone perseveres for an hour in morose delectation, from the same impulse of passion, although for a brief time he thinks about another matter, he commits only one sin, because a brief interruption does not prevent the act from being judged morally one. Yet he who for a whole day turns over the same depraved imaginations, and anew consents to them after a notable interruption, commits several sins, since the

sinful acts are interrupted by various occupations. In this case, it is difficult to recount the number of sins accurately; but it suffices that the penitent say that for one or another day he frequently gave consent to these imaginations occurring to him: for from this a prudent confessor, with account taken of all the circumstances, will be able to judge about how many sins were committed, as we explain in the Treatise on Penance, n. 157.

495. (B) Internal acts elicited with the intention of consummating them externally, namely purposes or desires of doing some evil, for example, stealing, killing, are multiplied as often as after revocation, or very long cessation, they are renewed. For moral interruption a longer interval is required for desires than for complacencies in thoughts; for desires, by that very fact that they tend into an external act, are judged to endure virtually until the work is externally completed, unless nevertheless a very long delay is placed between the purpose and its execution.

But what interval is to be held as notable can be determined only from the judgment of prudent persons, according to the diversity of acts. Thus the purpose of reading a depraved book which is at hand is judged to be interrupted by an interval of several hours or at least one day, while the purpose of stealing or taking vengeance can persist through several days or weeks, namely if the opportune time is awaited for carrying out the purpose: for then all the internal acts form something morally one, because they are referred to the same act to be executed externally. But it must be said otherwise if, when the occasion presented itself, the agent did not wish to use it, because, by voluntary cessation from the iniquitous purpose, the first volition was morally interrupted.

496. (C) External acts are multiplied as often as they are repeated, provided they are complete and independent from each other; but they are not multiplied if, as incomplete acts or means, they are ordered to completing one principal act. Whence these acts are not morally interrupted by cessation alone, although long, but only by explicit or implicit retraction.

(a) Therefore he commits several sins who communicates sacrilegiously ten times, even within a brief time, - who omits prescribed fasting through several days, - who successively strikes an enemy several times, without the intention of killing him, - or steals a thousand coins from the same rich man on several occasions, without the prior intention of stealing this whole sum; for these are complete and independent acts.

(b) But he perpetrates one sin who, wishing to kill an enemy, conceives an act of vengeance, thinks about the means for executing it, buys and prepares weapons, takes the road, renews the perverse will of killing several times, wounds the enemy, and finally kills him; - who, wishing to steal a thousand coins from the same person, renews this intention hundreds of times, and at various intervals takes away now more, now less, until he has completed the sum; for all these acts are directed to the same end and constitute one homicide or theft. - The same must be said of him who, from the same impulse of anger, spews out several blasphemies, or afflicts the same person with several contumelies, because these acts are morally united by the same movement of passion.

497. 3. Controversy concerning the distinction of sins from the diversity of objects. When by one and the same act objects numerically distinct are reached, the question arises whether several sins are committed or only one.

(A) According to St. Alphonsus (n. 45) and many others, there are as many sins as there are distinct objects, even if they are apprehended by one act. The reason is because the malice of sin is drawn from the object formally taken, and therefore is multiplied according to diverse objects truly distinct.

Therefore he commits several sins who knowingly and willingly kills several men by one blow, - by one act wishes evil to several or detracts from various persons, - by one purpose wishes to omit prescribed fasting through several days, - by one action steals from several, unless the goods belong to the same community, etc.

498. (B) Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, and others[1] contend that a single act which is referred to several distinct objects, provided they are not specifically diverse, and are apprehended by the mind after the manner of one, constitutes only one sin.

[1] Suarez, in 3 p. St. Thomas, disp. XXII, sect. 5, n. 34; Lugo, *De paenitent.*, disp. XVI, n. 104 seq.; Laymann, l. I, tr. 3, c. 3, n. 2; Noldin, n. 284, 285.

Thus he who by a single explosion wounds and kills several men, whom he apprehends only confusedly after the manner of one multitude, commits one sin; otherwise, if he distinctly apprehends each and wills to kill them. He who in one speech detracts from a family or community, whose members he perceives after the manner of one, perpetrates one sin; otherwise, if he wishes to harm the individual members or some of them distinctly. He who hates ten men by one act commits one sin, because under the confused concept of plurality he reaches them. He who by one desire covets three women sins once; but if he covets three under a diverse notion, an unmarried woman, a married woman, a nun, he perpetrates three sins specifically distinct.

In our judgment, it can be said that in this case there is one sin, but bearing before itself a special malice, which must be declared in confession. Certainly there is a difference, morally speaking, between the killing of one and the killing of several; whence if someone, by one explosion, knowingly and willingly killed and wounded several, it is not sufficient in confession to say: I perpetrated homicide once; but it is necessary to add: by one blow I killed several and wounded others; otherwise the confessor would plainly be deceived. Likewise if someone scandalized several, he ought to confess this, nor is it enough to say: I offered scandal once. When the number was apprehended only confusedly, it can likewise be accused confusedly, even if afterward the number of those who were wounded or scandalized were accurately known.

III. Concerning Internal Sins.

499. State of the question. Since difficulties often arise concerning merely internal sins, it is expedient to speak specially about these. But there are three internal sins: morose delectation, desire, and joy. (a) Morose delectation is referred to an evil work exhibited by the imagination as present. Namely, when the imagination depicts something evil, for example, theft, homicide, a base act, and the will deliberately is delighted in it, without nevertheless the desire being conceived of executing it, evil delectation is had; and this is called morose, because the will stands still in it, or lingers, although perhaps for only one instant. For it is not required for sin that complacency persevere for a long time, but it suffices that consent be voluntarily offered; whence morose delectation signifies the same as voluntary.

(b) Desire looks to a future thing: when someone depicts to himself an evil delectation as future, and deliberately wills to enjoy it, a depraved desire is had.

(c) But joy is free complacency concerning an evil work as past, and is had when someone represents to himself a past evil act, and at the same time deliberately takes complacency in it. Here also belongs sadness concerning a good performed, or concerning an evil not performed, as if someone says: I grieve that at that time, when the occasion presented itself, I did not strike the enemy.

Concerning delectation and joy the same principles hold, with this difference, however, that joy, as concerning a more concrete past thing, more easily puts on the malice of the circumstances of the object depicted in the imagination.

500. 1. Concerning morose delectation and joy. (A) Delectation or joy can be concerning the thing itself thought of, or concerning the knowledge of this thing; thus a physician, hearing that someone has been wounded, can rejoice concerning the wound itself inflicted, because, for example, the wounded person is an enemy, or can rejoice from the fact that he knows such a one to have been wounded, so that he may be able to assist him. To rejoice concerning an evil thing insofar as it is evil is deservedly judged a sin; to rejoice concerning the knowledge of this evil is not of itself sin, indeed it can be good, if this is done from an honorable end. Thus he who studies the medical art ought to learn those things which pertain to generation; if he is delighted intellectually concerning the knowledge acquired, so that he may be able to exercise his art, he in no way sins; but if he deliberately thinks about these matters in order to perceive venereal pleasure from them, he is guilty of sin.

501. (B) Morose, or voluntary, delectation, or joy concerning an evil thing, is a sin of the same species and gravity as the evil work represented by the imagination.

For morose delectation or joy receives its morality from the object formally taken, just as any other human act (above, n. 144). Therefore if the thing about which one deliberately thinks is evil, the delectation arising from it is sin; if the delectation concerning theft is concerned with light theft, the sin is venial; but mortal if the question concerns theft of grave moment.

It must likewise be noted that evil delectation assumes the malice of the object as it is depicted in the imagination; thus delectation concerning theft of a sacred thing puts on a twofold malice, provided the circumstance of the sacred thing is apprehended by the agent. But if the imagination, and therefore the will, does not apprehend these circumstances, probably the special malice arising from these circumstances is not contracted; thus he who is delighted concerning the theft of a sacred thing, not because it is sacred, but because it is precious, probably incurs only the malice of theft, but not of sacrilege.

502. (C) It is illicit to be delighted or to rejoice concerning an evil thing on account of the good effect which followed from it; nevertheless it is licit, speaking of itself, to be delighted concerning the good effect which followed from an evil thing, provided the evil thing itself is sincerely disapproved.

The reason for the former is because it is not licit to approve evil, even on account of a good end, as we explained, n. 151. Whence these propositions 13 and 15, which directly regard joy concerning a past evil and indirectly delectation concerning a present evil, were deservedly condemned by Innocent XI: "If you do it with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened concerning the life of someone, and rejoice concerning his natural death... not indeed from displeasure with the person, but because of some temporal profit. - It is licit for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches obtained from the inheritance thence."[1]

[1] Denzing., n. 1030, 1032; Viva, on this proposition.

The reason for the latter is because delectation is not borne toward the evil object, which is disapproved, but toward the good effect. - Yet it is said speaking of itself, because in practice he who is voluntarily delighted concerning the good effect is not rarely exposed to the danger of consenting to the evil object itself; hence let him not neglect sincerely to disapprove that object.

503. (D) To be delighted or rejoice not concerning the evil work, but concerning the ingenious mode by which it is completed, or concerning the charming mode by which it is narrated, is of itself free from fault, although not rarely dangerous. For the will in this case is borne toward something good or indifferent, but not toward the evil object; but since the passage from the mode to the thing is easy, especially in the matter of chastity, such delectation is not without danger.

Thus to be delighted concerning the artful mode by which someone completes a theft, concerning the ridiculous mode by which women quarrel among themselves, concerning paintings made with the greatest art, although immodest, concerning a charming narration of things less modest, of itself is not sin, but easily leads to sin.

504. 2. Concerning depraved desires. Desire is called efficacious, or a purpose, when someone absolutely intends to execute an evil thing; but inefficacious, if only conditionally, for example, if I could, if it were licit.

(A) The absolute desire of an evil thing or action is a sin of the same species and malice as the external act toward which it is borne. For the malice of an act, and its gravity and species, is drawn from the object toward which it tends. Whence Christ said:[2] "He who looks at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart." - Therefore desire includes all the malices which are found in the object itself, provided they are at least implicitly apprehended; but they are more easily apprehended in the case of desire than in the case of simple delectation; for he who wishes for some thing generally is borne toward it such as it is, - while he who is delighted concerning a thing thought of not rarely abstracts from certain of its qualities.

[2] Matt. 5:28.

505. (B) Conditional desire of itself is not sin, if the condition truly removes the malice; otherwise, it is sin.

To understand this, one must distinguish between those things which are extrinsically evil and those which are intrinsically evil.

(a) In those things which are extrinsically evil, the condition added "if it were licit" removes sin, because it removes the malice of the object; for example, I would eat meat today, if it were not prohibited by the Church; I would marry, if I were not bound by a vow of chastity. - Yet often desires of this kind are not only idle, but dangerous, because the passage from conditional desire to absolute desire is easy.

(b) In all things intrinsically and absolutely evil, the condition added does not remove sin, because malice cannot be separated from these acts; therefore they sin who say: I would wish to blaspheme, steal, act basely, perjure myself, if it were licit.

(c) A fortiori a condition which does not regard liceity does not excuse from sin, for example, I would commit theft if it could be done secretly; I would blaspheme if hell did not exist.

506. Yet it must be noted that sometimes an inefficacious desire of an evil thing is not sin, or at least is not grave, because it is not deliberate, but only the manifestation of a certain natural propensity by which the sensitive appetite is borne into evil, without the will offering consent to it, at least full consent. Thus some who are prone to vengeance, anger, or pleasure, say that they would gladly wish to indulge these vices, unless there were hell; but, because they believe there is hell, they restrain these desires. - Whatever the case may be, thoughts and desires, even conditional ones, concerning evil things must be expelled as soon and as strenuously as possible, lest perhaps the will, allured by these vain and dangerous phantasms, soon offer consent.

Conclusion of This Article: Concerning Material Sin.

507. Material sin is an involuntary transgression of the law, and therefore not imputable to the agent unto fault.

[1] Cf. *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XXI (1899) 1105-1109; 1169-1175; t. XXII (1900) 49-55; 111-117.

1. Now that many sins of this kind are committed can be inferred from the things said either in this Treatise or in the preceding Treatises. Besides, not a few sins which are objectively grave become venial because of the psychological dispositions of the agents.

The principal causes taking away or diminishing the objective malice of sin are (A) on the part of the intellect: (a) ignorance of the law, or of its force of obliging, or at least of the gravity of the precept: for there are so many laws which are altogether unknown by the faithful, or whose force, or extent, or gravity more or less escapes their mind, especially in those places where many hear sacred sermons only rarely, or where sacred orators set forth Christian ethics only in a vague and confused manner, without logical connection! (b) Defect of advertence or deliberation: how many think little before they act, and therefore do not foresee the evils going to follow from their actions? Others, distracted in mind, and wholly clinging to earthly things, advert little to the grave malice of certain acts, or easily omit offices which are of themselves grave, for example, hearing Mass on certain feast days, or fasting, etc. (above, n. 89-98).

(B) On the part of the will: (a) vehement impulses of passions, and propensities which can scarcely be resisted, vicious habits whether innate or acquired, certain pathological states which greatly lessen the powers of the will (above, n. 99-135); (b) external causes, violence, fear unjustly struck in (above, n. 105 and 112), enticements of the world (441), and other things of this kind.

508. 2. These things being posited, for judging concerning the number, specific malice, and gravity of sins which are accused in the sacred tribunal, the confessor ought to keep before the mind not only the rules handed down above (n. 472-498), but also diligently to attend to the psychological dispositions of each penitent. But he will know these better if he receives penitents kindly, even and especially those who are burdened by many and grave sins; if he addresses and questions them with words full of charity and mercy.

(A) With regard to the past, he will easily admit all causes which excuse sinners either wholly or in part. He sits as judge before the tribunal, and therefore ought to bring an equitable judgment, insofar as human infirmity allows; but, if the matter is doubtful, it is helpful to lean toward the more benign part, since penitents are more efficaciously deterred from sin by an excess of benignity than by an excess of severity.

509. (B) But with regard to the future: (a) let the confessor not neglect to instruct those who have sinned through ignorance, without nevertheless omitting the rules of prudence. For material sin, even if it is not imputed unto fault, is a true disorder, as we warned above, n. 356, often offers scandal, harms the good morals of society, and sometimes induces the danger of formally sinning. Wherefore the confessor will try to extirpate it, insofar as can be done, by instructing penitents gradually and prudently; which indeed he ought to furnish, even if he foresees that they will commit certain formal sins from this, provided that their future amendment can seriously be expected. Yet it is not expedient to set forth at the same time all duties unknown to them, but only successively, as opportunity presents itself, and with attention given also to their powers and dispositions. - In private conversations, and also in public sermons, but especially in the sacred tribunal, they can likewise and ought to be instructed.

(b) But if some, because of infirmity of the will and grave temptations, have gradually formed for themselves a lax conscience, let them be taught how they can become strong in the Lord, by setting forth those things which we have handed down concerning the education of will and conscience, n. 136, 422, and also concerning the remedies of lax conscience, n. 358. By these and other similar means many material sins will be guarded against, and the good of penitents and of the whole Christian society will be promoted.

Art. II. Concerning Vices or Capital Sins. — I. Notion and Division of Capital Vices.

510. 1. Often men are inclined to sins through vicious habits, whether innate or acquired. (a) For there are present in man propensions to evil, which flow from his nature: for since he is composed of soul and body, he tends not only toward spiritual good, but also toward sensible good, sometimes against the order of reason, at least in the present

state of fallen nature, as was said in *De Deo Creante*, n. 171 and 198. Moreover, even when he pursues spiritual good, not rarely he inordinately seeks his own excellence, against the divine will, because naturally his reason wishes to be autonomous. - Sometimes also these propensions are confirmed and increased by heredity, above, n. 116-119. (b) The same grow much by education and by repeated acts, as was said above, n. 108 and 123.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 2-3; Quaest. disp., De Malo, q. 8-15; Natalis Alexander, De peccatis (Migne, Theol. Curs., XI, 707-1168); Pruner, Theol. Mor., trans. Belet, Paris, 1880, t. I, p. 336-352; Ball. P., n. 697-744; Alibert, Physiologie des Passions, 2nd ed., Paris, 1827; Noldin, n. 301-312; Descuret, La Medecine des Passions, Paris, 1860; Paulhan, Les Caracteres, Paris, Alcan, 1902.

Now these propensions solicit us toward sin, and therefore are, as it were, sources and heads from which many sins arise; hence they are called capital sins, not indeed in the sense that the acts proceeding from them are always gravely sinful, but because propensions of this kind are, as it were, heads of many delicts. Yet they would better be called capital vices, because they are generally considered not as sinful acts, but as inclinations to sinning.

511. 2. Seven sins or capital vices are commonly enumerated, after St. Gregory and St. Thomas.

(A) The former, describing the vices, teaches that their root is pride, from which seven principal ones are brought forth, which themselves also are divided into many others:[1]

[1] St. Gregory, Moral., lib. XXXI, c. 45, P. L., LXXVI, 620-622.

"For the root of all evil is pride, concerning which, Scripture bearing witness, it is said: the beginning of every sin is pride.[2] But its first offspring, namely the seven principal vices, are brought forth from this virulent root, namely vainglory, envy, anger, sadness, avarice, gluttony of the belly, lust." - But each vice has its own army: "For from vainglory arise disobedience, boasting, hypocrisy, contentions, obstinacies, discords, and presumptions of novelties. From envy are born hatred, whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of one's neighbor, and affliction in his prosperity." And thus to each capital vice he assigns certain less principal vices. - Afterward he describes their genesis and their connection among themselves in this way: "For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which, when it has corrupted the oppressed mind, at once begets envy, because, namely, while it seeks the power of a vain name, it pines away lest any other be able to obtain it. Envy also generates anger, because the more the soul is wounded by the inward wound of spite, the more also the gentleness of tranquillity is lost; and because it is touched as though it were a suffering member, therefore the hand of an opposed action is felt as though pressed more heavily. From anger also sadness arises, because the troubled mind, in proportion as it shakes itself inordinately, by so acting confounds itself... Sadness also is drawn down to avarice, because while the confounded heart has lost within itself the good of joy, it seeks outside what may console it; and the more it has no joy to which it may inwardly recur, the more it desires to obtain exterior goods. But after these remain two carnal vices, that is, gluttony of the belly and lust."

[2] Eccli. 10:15.

512. (B) St. Thomas refined the theory of St. Gregory.[1] He calls those sins capital which are not only principles of others, but also directive and in a certain way leading them. But seven capital

vices are fittingly numbered. For the will inordinately pursues good or flees evil. (a) Insofar as it inordinately seeks a good of the soul, namely excellence of praise or honor, it is called vainglory;[2] by inordinately pursuing a good of the body, it is called gluttony or lust; by seeking external goods, against the order of reason, it is named avarice. (b) It also inordinately flees certain evils: sometimes it is saddened at another's good, insofar as this impedes one's own excellence, and this is envy; if it is saddened at the same with a violent appetite for vengeance, anger blazes up; when it flees labor joined to spiritual good, there arises acedia, or sloth.[3]

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 3-4.

[2] The Holy Doctor reckons vainglory among the capital sins; but declares pride to be the beginning of every sin, and therefore the source of the capital sins, while avarice is the root of all evils on the part of execution (q. 84, a. 2).

[3] Concerning other divisions of the capital sins, which Cassian and St. John Climacus set forth, see Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. II, p. 1689-1690.

But these capital vices take their proximate origin from the threefold concupiscence, and remotely from inordinate love of oneself. Hence by some there is said to be one principle of the vices, namely inordinate love of oneself, - a threefold tinder, namely the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life, - and a sevenfold head, namely the seven capital vices.

513. This division indeed is not adequate, nor opposed in its members, but nevertheless it embraces the principal depraved propensions, to which the others are easily reduced. Therefore we follow it, treating first of pride, and also of envy and anger, which flow more directly from pride; afterward of gluttony and drunkenness, which pursue the sensible goods of the body; then of avarice, which seeks external goods; finally of sloth, which shudders at the difficulty of labor. Of lust in particular there will be discourse in the Treatise on Chastity.

II. Concerning Pride.

514. 1. Pride is described. Pride is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence. To love oneself, to have a good estimation of oneself according to justice and truth, and therefore to seek one's own excellence in a way consonant with reason, is indeed not sin.

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162 and 132; De Malo, q. 8-9; Nat. Alexander, op. cit., 728-818; Bossuet, Tr. de la Concupiscence, c. 10-23; id., Sermon sur l'Ambition; Bourdaloue, Careme, Serm. pour le mercredi de la 2e sem.; Alibert, op. cit., t. I, p. 23-57; Descuret, op. cit., t. II, p. 191-240; Paulhan, Les Caracteres, p. 167, and others alleged at n. 120; also Formation a l'Humilite, Paris, 1902, p. 33-55; Thomas, L'Education des sentiments, Paris, Alcan, 1904, p. 113-124, p. 113-123 and 133-148.

But especially in four ways do we seek this excellence inordinately: (a) when someone thinks that he has from himself what he has from God, or at least acts as though he thought this; now, with the Apostle as witness, whatever is in us in the natural or supernatural order proceeds from God, and is to be attributed primarily to God:[2] "For what do you have that you have not received? But if you have received it, why do you glory as though you had not received it?" (b) When someone thinks that he has received these goods from God, but only from his own merits; which indeed is likewise false; for we receive many things which we in no way merit, and merits themselves, although truly ours, are to be attributed more to God than to us, since we have being, faculties, the faculty of meriting, and

divine help, necessary for meriting, only from the Lord. Wherefore Paul wrote concerning supernatural gifts:[3] "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this not from yourselves: for it is the gift of God; not from works, lest anyone should glory. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works which God has prepared, that we may walk in them." The same can be said of natural goods, which greatly exceed our merits. (c) When someone boasts that he has what he does not have, or at least a greater good than he has; for not rarely, from an inordinate desire of vainglory or from self-deception, we amplify our endowments beyond measure. This John indeed reproves:[1] "Because you say that I am rich, and made wealthy, and have need of nothing; and you do not know that you are wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked." (d) When someone, conscious of his own excellence, thence despises others, and wishes to be singularly seen and esteemed; thus the Pharisee, giving thanks to God that he was not a sinner like other men, despised the publican; but Christ rebuked this manner of acting in this way:[2] "Everyone who exalts himself shall be humbled, and he who humbles himself shall be exalted."

[2] 1 Cor. 4:7. - If the proud man truly believed that he had all these things from himself, he would be a heretic; yet generally he does not think this, but practically bears himself as though these gifts were not from God.

[3] Eph. 2:8-10.

[1] Apoc. 3:17.

[2] Luke 18:14.

515. 2. The daughters of pride are enumerated. Pride, in a general way, is called the mother of all vices; this indeed is true, if it is taken in a broad sense, insofar as it is love of oneself; but if it is understood in the strict sense explained above, certain vices proceed more immediately from it, and are called its daughters in a special sense, namely ambition, presumption, vainglory.

(A) Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of undue honor, or of honor greater than is due, - or of due honor, but by undue mode or means. - The scribes and Pharisees labored under this vice, concerning whom Christ said:[3] "But they love the first places at suppers, and the first chairs in the synagogues, and greetings in the marketplace, and to be called by men rabbi." The Lord willed to be subject to this temptation, when the devil took him onto a high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world and their glory, saying: "All these things I will give you, if, falling down, you will adore me."[4] - Nor today are there lacking those who serve the devil and the world, that they may be able to obtain honors and dignities; in the priestly order itself, there are some, with St. Gregory as witness,[5] who "desire to be seen as teachers, long to surpass the rest, and, with Truth bearing witness, seek the first greetings in the marketplace, the first places at suppers, the first chairs in assemblies." These indeed the Master rebukes with these words:[6] "You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it over them, and those who are greater exercise power over them; it shall not be so among you: but whoever will wish to become greater among you, let him be your minister; and whoever will wish to be first among you, shall be your servant; just as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a redemption for many."

[3] Matt. 23:6-7.

[4] Matt. 4:9.

[5] St. Gregory, Pastoral., p. I, c. 1, P. L., LXXVII, 14.

[6] Matt. 20:24-28.

(B) Presumption, which undertakes works exceeding one's powers. Thus not a few seek dignities and offices for the exercise of which they are unskilled, with great detriment to themselves and others; others, presuming too much on their own powers, imprudently cast themselves into dangers, and there frequently sin.

516. (C) Vainglory, which is the inordinate appetite of manifesting one's own excellence, and of capturing the esteem and praises of men.[1] For there are many who care more for the esteem of their neighbor than for the very practice of virtues: they wish to please, and therefore display to others, with vain ostentation, true or imagined endowments, of body or soul, natural or supernatural.

[1] Pride therefore is distinguished from vainglory in that the latter seeks fame or the esteem of others, while pride takes complacency in its own excellence. Yet these two are often found united in the same man: nevertheless in some pride prevails, in others vanity. Cf. Thomas, L'Education des sentiments, Paris, Alcan, 1904, ch. 14.

There are those who glory in the nobility of their stock or in the favor of great men; others because they are splendidly dressed, or sit upon a noble horse; but who does not see how great this folly is: for if there is any glory in this matter, it is to be attributed to ancestors, great men, the tailor, or the horse. "Others," says St. Francis de Sales,[2] "for one ounce of knowledge wish to be honored and cultivated by all, as though all ought to consult them as an oracle, always learn from them, and have them as masters: hence not undeservedly they are called pedagogues. Others boast of themselves and set themselves forth for sale, while they consider their beauty, and think that on account of it they are cultivated and loved by all. All these things are very vain, foolish, impertinent; and the glory which is borrowed from such empty things is called vain, foolish, and frivolous." But those who wish to be praised for good works Christ thus reproves:[3] "Take heed that you do not do your justice before men, that you may be seen by them; otherwise you shall not have a reward with your Father, who is in heaven."

[2] Introd. a la Vie devote, III p., c. 4; cf. c. 5-7.

[3] Matt. 6:1; cf. 2-9.

Among the daughters of vainglory, of which seven are enumerated,[4] three are eminent: (a) boasting, by which one's own excellence is manifested inordinately by words; (b) ostentation, by which the esteem of men is sought through deeds or other external signs; (c) hypocrisy, which seeks glory through simulated virtues or endowments.

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 5.

517. 3. The malice of pride. This malice can be considered in itself and in its consequences. (A) Concerning the gravity of this sin considered in itself. (a) When pride is complete, namely when someone so seeks to excel others that he wishes to be subject neither to God nor to legitimate superiors, it is a mortal sin from its kind, and indeed most grave: for then he turns himself away from God, not on account of ignorance or infirmity, or on account of the desire of any other good whatever, but because he does not wish to be subjected to God and his supreme dominion.[1] - Yet this kind of pride occurs very rarely.

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 5-6.

(b) Incomplete pride, by which someone, while preserving due subjection to God and superiors, makes more of himself and wishes to be esteemed more by others than is fitting, does not exceed venial sin, because it does not import a grave disorder. But by accident it can become a grave sin, if it inflicts grave injury upon one's neighbor, or induces to other grave sins, for example, if from wounded pride there is stirred up grave anger, or an appetite for vengeance.

518. (B) Concerning the depraved consequences of pride. (a) The Fathers note that pride was the beginning of every sin, that through it the angels were cast from heaven, and men expelled from paradise; they add that there is no evil which can be compared with pride, on account of the depraved effects which it produces: "It makes a man an insulting demon, blasphemous, perjured, it causes murders to be desired. The proud man always lives in griefs and troubles, is always angry, is always sad."[2] For indeed, with Gregory as witness, it is the root of all vices:[3] "Other vices attack only those virtues by which they themselves are destroyed... but pride, which we have called the root of vices, by no means content with the extinction of one virtue, rises up against all the members of the soul, and, like a general and pestiferous disease, corrupts the whole body, so that whatever is done while it invades, even if it is shown to be a virtue, does not thereby serve God, but only vainglory."

[2] St. Chrysostom, in ep. II ad Thessal., cap. I, homil. I, n. 2, P. G. 471.

[3] St. Gregory, Moral., lib. XXXIV, c. 33, n. 48, P. L., LXXVI, 744.

(b) They observe moreover that pride is the greatest evil from the fact that, with Scripture as witness, God resists the proud:[4] "Scripture says: God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble. See, brother, what kind of evil that is which has God as its adversary. On account of this in the Gospel both the arrogant Pharisee is rejected, and the humble publican is heard." In reality God, who has bestowed his goods on us so profusely, does not wish to give his glory to another,[5] and therefore resists the proud who keep for themselves the glory which belongs to God alone; he afflicts them with privation of grace and other penalties: "The day of the Lord is upon everyone proud and high, and upon everyone arrogant: and he shall be humbled."[6]

[4] St. Jerome, ep. 12 ad Anton., n. 26, P. L., XXII, 346.

[5] Isa. 42:8.

[6] Isa. 2:12.

519. 4. Remedies against pride. Since among men, even simple and rustic men, there are many who indulge pride,[1] it is useful to say a few things about the means of tearing it out. (A) For restraining the movements of pride, intimate and sincere knowledge of oneself is certainly of much profit; for he who recalls past sins, and attentively considers his own infirmities or moral defects, and at the same time recognizes that the endowments with which he shines forth are from God,[2] cannot reasonably lift himself above others. This is indeed the more efficacious the more benignly we at the same time consider the virtues and endowments of others, covering their vices with the veil of charity. For since we are prone to amplifying our own virtues and disguising our vices, it is necessary that, prejudices of this kind being set aside, we attend to those things which others rightly do or say: then we will often discover others to be better than ourselves.

[1] Bossuet, Tr. de la Concup., ch. 16-18.

[2] "Yet let it be far from a Christian man to trust or glory in himself, and not in the Lord; whose goodness toward all men is so great, that he wishes those things to be their merits which are his own gifts." (Trent, sess. VI, c. 16.)

520. (B) The vanity of those things in which we are accustomed to glory is likewise to be carefully considered. On this matter Chrysostom should be heard:[3] "Are you strong and proud? For this you ought rather to have been cast down... For even the lion is more courageous than you, and the boar stronger... and robbers and diggers of graves and gladiators and your servants, perhaps also those who are among them the duller, surpass you in strength and powers... But are you beautiful and fair? This is the boasting of crows; you are not more beautiful than the peacock... But do you abound in riches? Whence? In what things do you abound? In gold, silver, precious little stones? This also is the boasting of robbers." And thus he runs through the various goods in which men boast, and shows how foolish it is to glory in them. Moreover, man is mortal; and in the sepulcher who discerns the servant from the master, the poor man from the rich, the conquered from the king, the beautiful from the deformed?

[3] St. Chrysostom, in ep. ad Philip., c. 2, hom. 7, n. 5, P. G., LXII, 235.

Therefore those who are desirous of human glory should lift the mind higher, and seek eternal glory. Those who seek their own excellence should pursue it not in perishable endowments, but in virtue, which is perennial and truly excels, according to what the Apostle wisely wrote:[4] "But he who glories, let him glory in the Lord... Gladly therefore I will glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may dwell in me."

[4] 2 Cor. 10:17; 12:9.

521. (C) But above all it is helpful to contemplate the humility of Christ, who, "though he was in the form of God, did not think equality with God a thing to be grasped; but he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man; he humbled himself, made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."[1] And indeed, when he was an infant, he lay in a manger; he was in the house of a carpenter and of a poor mother, subject to both.[2] At the beginning of his public life, he receives from John the baptism of penance, is tempted by the devil, does not resist those rising up against him, nor did he exercise against his enemies the divine power with which he was endowed. In the Passion, he gave himself over to unjust aggressors as though they were more powerful than he, stood before priests unjustly accusing him, was led to the governor, and, although he could have refuted the false witnesses, he bore the calumnies in silence; he was spat upon by servants, scourged, ignominiously crowned with a crown of thorns, and unjustly handed over to a most disgraceful death. Deservedly therefore he draws us to humility: "Learn from me, because I am meek and humble of heart";[3] deservedly St. Jerome adds:[4] "Have nothing more excellent than humility, and nothing more lovable. For this is the chief preserver, and as it were a certain guardian, of all virtues; nor is there anything which makes us so pleasing both to men and to God, as if, great in the merit of life, we are lowest in humility."

[1] Phil. 2:6-8. The Apostle uses this argument to urge the necessity of humility: "With fear and trembling work out your salvation." (2:12.)

[2] Concerning this Bossuet exclaims, Elevat. sur les Mysteres, 20e Sem., 8: "O God, I am seized once again. Pride, come and burst at this spectacle: Jesus, son of a carpenter, himself a carpenter, known by this occupation, without there being mention of any other employment, or of any other action!" - Cf. 24e Sem., 1, where he treats of the humility of John the Baptist.

[3] Matt. 11:29. - Concerning humility we will speak below, n. 1079.

[4] St. Jerome, ep. ad Celant., 148, n. 20, P. L., XXII, 1213.

III. Concerning Envy.

522. 1. Notion of envy. Envy, which is called also livor, zeal, jealousy, arises from pride: for when someone inordinately seeks his own excellence, he easily is saddened at another's good insofar as it is conceived as diminishing his own excellence, and consequently as our evil. For envy is sadness at another's good insofar as we conceive our excellence to be diminished thereby.

[5] St. Cyprian, De zelo et livore, P. L., IV, 637-652; St. Gregory, Moral., lib. V, c. 46 (alias 31), P. L., LXXV, 727-730; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, and De Malo, q. 10; Natal. Alexander, op. cit., 1027-1061; Alibert, op. cit., t. I, p. 331-340; Descuret, t. II, p. 241-274.

Therefore if someone grieves at another's good because he thinks the other unworthy of a good of this kind, it is not envy, but indignation. - Likewise, if we are saddened at another's elevation because some evil threatens us from it, it is not the effect of envy, but of fear. - To grieve at a neighbor's good because we lack this and wish by honest means to obtain the same or something similar is not envy, but emulation: yet one must beware lest he wish to despoil his neighbor of it.

Generally envy is wont to be found among equals or nearly equals: for when the matter concerns those who greatly excel, there is less fear lest their glory diminish our excellence. - Not rarely, even in perfect men, the seed and first movements of this vice are to be found. It generally arises from those goods which are esteemed honorable, such as dignities, magistracies, insignia of titles, riches, beauty, adornment, celebrity of name, eloquence, erudition, friendships, piety, virtues, etc.

523. 2. The daughters of envy. Five are numbered, namely whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of one's neighbor, affliction in his prosperity, hatred.

For since the envious man grieves at the good of his neighbor, he soon desires that this man be deprived of it. Hence he tries to diminish it or utterly destroy it, for example, by speaking ill of his neighbor, whether secretly through whispering, or more openly through detraction; if he obtains the intended end, he exults in the adversities of the other; otherwise he is afflicted in his prosperity; furthermore all these things, when they endure for a long time, generate hatred.[1]

[1] Concerning whispering and detraction, the matter is treated more fully in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 374-396; concerning the others, it is said where Charity is treated.

524. 3. The malice of envy. (A) Envy properly so called is a sin mortal from its kind, because it is directly opposed to charity, which obliges of itself under grave obligation; for it belongs to the nature of friendship that we wish goods to our neighbor, just as to ourselves; but the envious man, on the contrary, wishes evil to his neighbor, since he is saddened at the good which the other possesses.

But, in order that envy be a grave sin, two things are required: (a) that the good of the neighbor to which it is referred be, all things carefully weighed, of grave moment; whence the greater a good of this kind is, the graver the sin is. Hence St. Thomas says:[2] "There is nevertheless envy which is counted among the gravest sins, namely envying fraternal grace, according as someone grieves at the very increase of God's grace." Akin to this is the envy of those who are saddened at the spiritual good accomplished by other preachers, confessors, pastors. (b) That the envious man deliberately and seriously wish the neighbor to lack this good; from this head, many movements of envy do not exceed venial sin, because they are imperfectly deliberate, or do not obtain the full consent of the will.

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 4, ad 2.

525. (B) Envy is also a grave sin whenever it induces us to inflict grave harm upon our neighbor; for the malice of some act is to be measured not only from its nature, but also from its effects.

Now, with St. Cyprian as witness,[1] many evils have arisen from this vice: "It is the root of all evils, the fountain of calamities, the seedbed of delicts, the matter of faults. From it hatred rises, from it animosity proceeds. Zeal inflames avarice, while someone cannot be content with his own, seeing another richer. Zeal stirs up ambition, while someone sees another higher in honors. With zeal blinding our senses, and bringing the hidden places of the mind under its dominion, the fear of God is despised, the teaching of Christ is neglected, the day of judgment is not foreseen... Hence the bond of the Lord's peace is broken, hence fraternal charity is violated, hence truth is adulterated, unity is split, there is a leap into heresies and schisms, while priests are disparaged, while bishops are envied, while someone either complains that he himself was not rather ordained, or disdains to bear another set over him." Rarely indeed do all these things arise from envy at the same time, but often fraternal charity is wounded, - union, today so necessary among Catholics, is broken, - obedience to legitimate superiors is either disparaged or at least rendered only with difficulty: and these are more than enough!

[1] St. Cyprian, op. cit., P. L., IV, 642.

526. 4. Remedies against envy. (A) One must frequently keep before the mind that spiritual society which prevails among the faithful; for all are sons of the same heavenly Father, all brothers in Christ, citizens of the same Church, called to the same eternal inheritance; we make up one body, of which Christ is the head.[2] Wherefore each ought to regard the goods of another as his own, and therefore to rejoice in the neighbor's endowments, good works, and progress, as though he himself enjoyed all these: for what profits one member of the body profits the others also. Thus Paul felt when, although certain men were preaching not from charity, but on account of envy and contention, that they might stir up pressure for his chains, nevertheless he sincerely wrote:[3] "For what then? So long as in every way, whether by occasion or by truth, Christ is preached; and in this I rejoice, yes and I will rejoice." - And indeed, while the envious waste away in jealousy, are troubled and inflamed in mind, and carry an enclosed wound in the breast on account of another's happiness; on the contrary, those who regard the goods of others as their own enjoy peace and joy.

[2] "And if one member suffers anything, all the members suffer with it; or if one member glories, all the members rejoice together. But you are the body of Christ and members of member." (1 Cor. 12:26-27). Let the whole chapter be read.

[3] Phil. 1:18.

527. (B) Those who know that they are liable to movements of envy should turn that vice into noble emulation.[1] First indeed let them not value perishable things, such as wealth, honors, bodily strength and elegance, or even knowledge and eloquence, so highly as piety and virtues: for why do we envy our neighbor over fragile and perishable things? But with regard to the virtues of others, let us strive to imitate them by manly effort: "Let us consider one another unto the provocation of charity and of good works."[2] Augustine explains this excellently:[3] "Why do you envy the just man, O unjust man? Because you wish to seem just? Quickly do what is better, and more easily you will be what you wish to seem. Be just: thus you will love him whom you envied; because what you grieve that he is, you also will be, and you will love yourself in him, and him in yourself. For if you envied a rich man, it would not be in your power to be rich; if you envied some honorable noble senator, it would not be in your power that you also be noble and distinguished; if you envied a beautiful man, you would never make yourself beautiful... if you envy the just man, the matter is in the will; be what you grieve that the other is."

[1] Concerning this Thomas excellently discusses, Educ. des sentiments, p. 203-222.

[2] Heb. 10:24.

[3] Enarrat. in Ps. 139, P. L., XXXVII, 1807-1808.

(C) To tear out envy entirely, it will be opportune to consider the evils which arise from envy (n. 525); and also to eradicate the root from which it arises, namely pride; for, as Augustine says,[4] "the devil fell by pride, and, because envy is the companion of pride, it cannot happen that the proud man does not envy."

[4] St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 58, P. L., XXXVI, 709.

IV. Concerning Anger.

528. 1. Notion of anger. Anger can be considered under a twofold respect: insofar as it is a passion (above, n. 100), or a vehement movement of the irascible appetite toward repelling a present evil; and insofar as it is an appetite for vengeance. Not rarely these two are joined together and include something immoderate or inordinate. Then anger is defined as an immoderate movement of the soul inordinately seeking vengeance. Therefore it consists of a twofold element: (a) an immoderate movement of the irascible appetite, with commotion of the body, transgressing the just limits prescribed by reason; (b) an inordinate appetite for vengeance, insofar as someone takes or seeks unjust or immoderate revenge from him by whom he has really been injured, or thinks himself to have been injured.

[5] St. Gregory, Moral., lib. V, c. 45, P. L., 723-727; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, and De Malo, q. 12; N. Alex., op. cit., p. 1112-1148; Descuret, t. II, p. 1-57; Thomas, op. cit., ch. 9, p. 94-103.

Hence anger is not a sin unless it bears before itself something inordinate, either as to the mode of being angry, namely when the movement of anger grows immoderately hot either inwardly or outwardly; or as to the object, when, namely, someone seeks vengeance against the order of reason, for example, desiring that he be punished who has not deserved it, or beyond what he has deserved, or with the order of law not preserved, or on account of an end which is not legitimate, for example, from hatred, not from love of justice or a desire of amendment.

Wherefore just indignation, or zeal by which someone, from love of justice, reproves or chastises the wicked, differs much from anger. Christ showed this zeal when he drove the sellers out of the temple, and poured out the money of the money-changers and overturned their tables;[1] but because Heli did not have zeal with regard to his sons, he deservedly stirred up against himself the movement of divine vengeance.

[1] John 2:13-17.

529. Often anger arises from pride; for when the proud think themselves injured, they are easily inflamed and seek vengeance. Nevertheless, since anger is a passion, not rarely it arises also from temperament itself, and from this head it is more easily excused.

St. Gregory graphically describes an angry man:[2] "For the heart kindled by the goads of its anger beats, the body trembles, the tongue trips itself, the face burns, the eyes are sharpened, and acquaintances are in no way recognized. With the mouth indeed it forms a cry, but the sense does not know what it says... Sometimes anger, to a troubled soul, as though from judgment, imposes silence; and because it does not express itself outwardly through the tongue, it burns the worse within... And so it happens that the troubled soul feels the greater clamor of its own silence, and the flame of shut-up anger consumes it more heavily."

[2] Moral., l. c., p. 724-725. - Gregory had been preceded by Seneca, who in Tr. de Ira, l. I, n. 1, thus depicts an angry man: "His eyes flame and flash, there is much redness over the whole face, as blood boils up from the depths of the breast; the lips are shaken, the teeth are clenched, the hairs stand on end and rise up; breath is forced and hissing, the sound of joints twisting themselves, groans and bellowings... You would not know whether the vice is more detestable or deformed."

530. 2. The various degrees of anger. The principal ones are: impatience, by which we are easily moved inwardly and outwardly even by light inconveniences or injuries; outburst, by which we manifest anger inwardly conceived through injurious words and shouts; violence, which incites not only to words, but also to injurious acts and to blows; fury, which adds to violence something unbridled, as it were a certain madness;[1] vengeance, or a vehement and assiduous desire of avenging.

[1] Hence Horace (Epist. I, 2), describing anger, says:

"Anger is a brief madness: rule the soul; unless it obeys, It commands: restrain it with bits, restrain it with chain."

Seneca elegantly describes the various forms of anger:[2] "For there are certain angers which settle within a cry; certain ones no less persistent than frequent; certain ones savage with the hand, sparing in words; certain ones poured out into bitterness of words and curses; certain ones do not go beyond complaints and aversions; certain ones are deep and grave, and turned inward. There are a thousand other species of this manifold evil."

[2] De Ira, lib. I, n. 4.

531. 3. The malice of anger. (A) Concerning anger considered in itself. To judge concerning its gravity, one must distinguish between anger insofar as it is a passion, and anger which is an appetite for vengeance.

(a) Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate movement of the irascible appetite, is a sin venial from its kind. For this anger is not inordinate except in the mode, insofar as someone blazes up beyond what the matter deserves, or more often than is fitting; now an inordination which touches only the mode of acting is not grave of itself.

Nevertheless the excess can be so great that it becomes a mortal sin, when someone deliberately grows too ardently heated within, or outwardly manifests signs of anger, so that he loses the peace of soul, or gravely offends his neighbor. Yet often unexpected movements of anger, even more vehement ones, are excused from mortal sin, because they are not sufficiently deliberate.

532. (b) Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate appetite for vengeance, is a sin mortal from its kind. For it is opposed to charity, and sometimes to justice, namely when he concerning whom we wish to take vengeance is truly innocent; now each virtue obliges under grave obligation, as is explicitly taught where these virtues are treated. Here it is enough to report the words of the Master:[3] "But I say to you, that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment; but he who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be liable to the council; and he who shall say, Fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire." For there he is affirmed worthy of grave punishment who is inwardly angry against his neighbor, or manifests inward anger by grave insults.

[3] Matt. 5:22.

Yet not rarely even the appetite for vengeance is excused from grave sin, either on the part of the one desiring, for example when the movement of anger precedes the mature judgment of the intellect, or on the part of the object, when someone seeks to vindicate himself in some slight matter.

533. (B) But if anger is considered in its effects, it is the graver in proportion as the effects are worse.

(a) When it is carried to the extreme, it introduces many grave evils, which Seneca describes:[1] "You will see murders and poisons, mutual filth of accused men, destructions of cities, and ruins of whole peoples, and the heads of princes sold under the civil spear, and torches set under roofs, and fires not confined within walls, but immense spaces of regions gleaming with hostile flame... Look upon so many leaders handed down to memory: one anger stabbed in his bedroom; another anger struck among the sacred things of the table; another it tore to pieces amid the laws and the crowded spectacle of the forum; another it ordered to give his blood by the parricide of his son..." Yet generally anger does not indulge these unspeakable crimes.

[1] *De Ira*, lib. I, n. 2.

(b) Nevertheless it often brings after itself other effects, which Gregory describes:[2] through anger wisdom is lost, because the mind, vehemently moved, is soon clouded, and can scarcely know what is

to be done and in what order; - the grace of social life is lost, because he acts inhumanely who does not temper by human reason the movement of anger, and thence concord is broken; - justice is abandoned: for while the troubled mind embitters the judgment of its reason, it thinks everything which fury suggests to be right; - grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are excluded: for since he resides only in a quiet soul, by expelling the quiet of mind, we close our soul to the Holy Spirit.

[2] St. Gregory, *Moral.*, l. c., P. L., 724.

534. 4. Remedies against anger. (A) First indeed, insofar as it can be done, anger is to be forestalled, by removing the causes which can excite it.

Thus if we are irascible by nature, we ought carefully to restrain the first movements of anger, and before we break forth into words, to turn the tongue seven times in the mouth, or, as the Greek philosopher used to say, to pronounce the twenty-five letters of the Greek alphabet. - If anger is inflamed by the provocation of certain persons, these persons must be fled: "Choose simple, easy, moderate persons, who neither call forth your anger nor bear it. Still more will the submissive and humane and sweet be of profit, yet not unto flattery; for too much assent offends angry men."[3] - If from too much weariness of body, from disorder of the nerves, attend to health. - If you are much moved by those things which are said against you, do not inquire at all about them: "Do you not wish to be angry? Do not be curious. He who inquires what has been said against himself, who digs out malicious speeches, even if they were held secretly, troubles himself."[1]

[3] Seneca, *De Ira*, lib. III, n. 8.

[1] Seneca, ibid., n. 11.

535. (B) But because we cannot avert all causes of anger, we ought to be prepared to tolerate all injuries with an even soul.

Gregory explains this excellently:[2] "For the first thing is that the solicitous mind, before it begins to do anything, set before itself all insults which it can suffer, so that, thinking of the reproaches of its Redeemer, it may prepare itself for adversities... For he who is caught unprepared by adversity is found by the enemy as though sleeping, and the enemy kills him, because he pierces one not resisting. For he who by solicitude foreknows the evils threatening, awaits hostile attacks as though watching in ambush, and from this is valiently girded for victory." - But in order that we may more patiently tolerate the vexations of others, we must consider our own excesses toward others: "For he patiently tolerates an injury inflicted who piously remembers that perhaps he still has something in which he himself ought to be tolerated. And as fire is extinguished by water, so, when fury of soul arises, each one's own fault is recalled to mind; because he is ashamed not to spare sins, who recalls that he himself has often sinned things to be spared either by God or by neighbor."[3]

[2] St. Gregory, *Moral.*, P. L., t. LXXV, 725-726.

[3] St. Gregory, op. cit., P. L., LXXV, p. 726.

536. (C) But if anger nevertheless has blazed up, as soon as you notice it arising, restrain it; at the beginning indeed it is rather easy to temper it; but if it has grown strong by long delays, this becomes altogether difficult.

Wherefore the Apostle says:[4] "Be angry and do not sin; let not the sun go down upon your anger... Let all bitterness, and anger, and indignation, and clamor, and blasphemy be taken away from you, with all malice. Be kind to one another, merciful, forgiving one another, just as God also in Christ has forgiven you." - For the same motive, one ought to establish or decide nothing about the vindication of some wrong unless anger has cooled; otherwise the mind, troubled by commotion, will not be able to contain vengeance, otherwise just, within just limits.

[4] Eph. 4:26, 31, 32.

537. (D) The best remedy indeed, which Christ taught by word and example, is fraternal benevolence toward all, even enemies, by force of which we do good to those who pursue us with hatred, far from seeking vengeance for their injuries: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those persecuting and calumniating you; that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven, who makes his sun rise upon the good and the evil, and rains upon the just and the unjust."[1]

[1] Matt. 5:44-46.

Christ indeed wonderfully performed this; for at the time when we were still enemies, he gave himself over for us: "When he was cursed, he did not curse; when he suffered, he did not threaten, but delivered himself to him judging him unjustly."[2] The Apostles taught the same:[3] "But if your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he thirsts, give him drink: for doing this, you shall heap coals of fire upon his head." The coals which are treated here are not penalties to be inflicted upon enemies, but, as Augustine says,[4] "burning groans of penance, by which the pride is healed of him who grieves that he has been the enemy of a man by whom his misery is helped." In reality the first Christians patiently tolerated the most savage torments, and, far from being angry with their persecutors, prayed for them and their amendment.[5] "Patience is," says Cyprian,[6] "what both commends and preserves us to God. It is what tempers anger, governs the mind, guards peace, rules discipline, breaks the impulse of lust, compresses the violence of swelling pride, extinguishes the fire of rivalry, restrains the power of the rich, refreshes the poverty of the poor, guards blessed integrity in virgins, laborious chastity in widows, undivided charity in those joined and married."

[2] 1 Pet. 2:23.

[3] Rom. 12:20.

[4] St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, l. III, c. 16, n. 24, P. L., XXXIV, 75. Whence Séailles did not understand this text, who faults Paul because there the Apostle approves the pleasure of vengeance (*Les Affirmations de la Conscience moderne*, Paris, Colin, 1903, p. 73-74).

[5] Concerning patience in persecutions Tertullian discourses eloquently, *De Patientia*, P. L., I, 1249-1274; and St. Cyprian, *De Bono patientiae*, P. L., IV, 621-638.

[6] St. Cyprian, op. cit., c. 20, P. L., 635.

V. Concerning Gluttony, Drunkenness, and Alcoholism.

The three vices of which we have already treated are called spiritual, because they are concerned with goods of the soul; there are two which are called carnal, because they inordinately seek goods of the body, namely gluttony, which is concerned with food and drink, and lust, which inordinately pursues venereal pleasure: but concerning the latter we will treat where Chastity is treated. - We will speak:

1. concerning gluttony in general; 2. concerning drunkenness, or concerning excess in drink which reaches even to the privation of the use of reason; 3. concerning alcoholism, or the habit of frequently drinking alcoholic liquors: these are, as it were, three degrees of one and the same vice.

1. Concerning Gluttony in General.

538. (A) Notion. (a) Gluttony is the inordinate appetite of eating or drinking, and therefore is opposed to the virtue of temperance. That inordination can happen especially in five ways:

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 148; De Malo, q. 14; Nat. Alexander, op. cit., 1081-1110; Jaugey, De quatuor virt. card., 1876, p. 569-574; Ball. P., n. 716-735.

"Too hastily, sumptuously, too much, ardently, daintily."

Sumptuously or daintily, when, namely, more exquisite foods or drinks are sought, or ones prepared too delicately; - too much, when someone exceeds as to quantity, or beyond the appetite of nature; - too hastily, if someone anticipates the due time, or eats or drinks more often than is fitting; - ardently, when someone takes food too eagerly.

(b) The effects which often flow from intemperance (and which are commonly called the daughters of gluttony) are: foolish joy, which provokes a less honorable kind of joking; much-speaking, or too much garrulity, by which secrets are frequently manifested; scurrility, or immoderation in words and external acts transgressing the just limits of honorableness; dullness of mind, which renders a man less apt for the contemplation of truth, and for actions which require the attention of reason and the moderation of prudence; a certain propensity to lust: "Do not be drunk with wine, in which is luxury."[2]

[2] Eph. 5:18.

539. (B) The malice of gluttony. (a) To perceive moderate delectation in food and drink is no sin; for the author of nature joined delectation to foods, that we may use them gladly for preserving bodily health; therefore he who takes delectable food delectably, and consents to this delectation, is not to be blamed, provided that he avoids every excess (above, n. 191). Yet it is more perfect affectively to renounce this delectation, and to take food only on account of an honorable and supernatural end, according to that saying of the Apostle:[3] "Whether you eat, or drink, or do anything else, do all things unto the glory of God." See above, n. 155-157, 195.

[3] 1 Cor. 10:31. This indeed is said concerning things sacrificed to idols, but can be extended to any eating whatever.

(b) But gluttony, insofar as it is an immoderate appetite of food or drink, is a sin[4] slight of itself, which nevertheless becomes mortal, when someone so clings to delectation that he is prepared to transgress a grave precept rather than renounce it.

[4] That gluttony is a sin is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (8) by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "To eat and drink even to satiety on account of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health." (Denzing., n. 1025; Viva, on this proposition.)

Thus those gravely sin who place supreme happiness in food and drink, whose God therefore is the belly; who, in order to satisfy gluttony, do not pay debts, knowingly gravely harm their own health, or render themselves unfit to fulfill offices obliging under grave obligation. Apart from these or similar

excesses, gluttony is indeed a sin, as opposed to right reason, but a light one, because it does not import a grave disorder.

540. (C) Remedies against gluttony. (a) To keep before the mind that food and drink are not the end of man, but only a means for repairing strength, whereby we may be better able to labor for God. Likewise to think about the depraved consequences which follow from gluttony, about diseases of the body, accelerated death, dullness of memory and talent, etc. (b) The incentives to this vice are to be avoided, namely foods too delicate, seasoned exquisitely, frequent banquets especially with those who are accustomed to indulge intemperance; and therefore generally common foods are to be used, which are more beneficial for health. (c) In banquets themselves, temperance is to be carefully cultivated, and something is to be withdrawn especially from those things which are sweeter to the palate.

These things indeed the Wise Man commends in many places: "Do not be in the banquets of drinkers, nor in the feasts of those who bring meats to eat, because those vacant for drinking and giving contributions will be consumed[1]... Exultation of soul and heart is wine drunk moderately... much wine drunk makes irritation, and anger, and many ruins."[2]

[1] Prov. 23:20-21.

[2] Eccli. 30:36-38.

2. Concerning Drunkenness.

541. (A) Its malice. The special malice of drunkenness is situated in this, that it induces privation of the use of reason without cause, and brings the drunken man into danger of perpetrating actions contrary to good morals. - There are degrees in drunkenness: it is called imperfect when the use of reason is diminished, without being utterly taken away, as, for example, when the feet and knees totter, the tongue hesitates, the eyes look upon objects duplicated or moving themselves in a circle; - but it is called complete when the use of reason is utterly taken away, for example, when someone does unusual things which, in control of himself, he is not accustomed to do, or does not know how to distinguish between good and evil, or does not remember notable things which he did while drunk, or collapses destitute of the senses. These things being posited:

542. (a) Voluntary drunkenness, at least that which deprives one of every use of reason, even admitted once, is of itself a mortal sin. It is declared; here the question is of voluntary drunkenness, namely that which is incurred knowingly and willingly; for if someone drinks wine or liquor too strong, yet whose power of intoxicating he did not know, so that he did not foresee at least probably that drunkenness would follow from it, he does not sin; say the same if, on account of weakness of strength or an empty stomach, unexpectedly from a few draughts, without moral foresight, he becomes drunk. - Likewise the question is of drunkenness which is full, or at least gravely disturbs reason and induces the danger of grave disorder; for imperfect drunkenness does not exceed venial sin, as long as someone retains that knowledge which is necessary for acting morally rightly.[1] - This drunkenness, even admitted once, is a grave sin, whatever a few theologians say to the contrary, who think only the custom of drunkenness to be a mortal sin.

[1] Some say that he does not gravely sin who for a short time, which does not reach an hour, deprives himself of the use of reason; thus Noldin, n. 509. - Yet we reject this as less probable; for if someone knowingly and willingly drinks in such a way that he certainly foresees that for half an hour he will be deprived of the use of reason, and indeed without any necessity, this is a grave disorder, and therefore a mortal fault. Besides, as Noldin himself rightly notes, it can scarcely be foreseen that drink will not deprive one of the use of reason for longer than the space of an hour.

It is proved. Scripture vehemently reproves drunkenness, and reckons it among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of God: "Woe to you who rise in the morning to follow drunkenness, and to drink until evening, that you may be inflamed with wine... But take heed to yourselves lest perhaps your hearts be weighed down in surfeiting and drunkenness... Neither thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards... shall possess the kingdom of God."[2]

[2] Isa. 5:11; Luke 21:34; 1 Cor. 6:10.

In reality, through drunkenness, man voluntarily, without necessity, on account of mere pleasure, deprives himself of the most excellent good by which he is distinguished from beasts, namely the use of reason, so that the lower faculties, which are not lulled to sleep, lack the guidance and rule of reason: thus he is made not only unfit for good, but prone to evil. This indeed is a grave disorder, which certainly is not excused by pleasure alone, as is certainly gathered from the common sense of honorable persons.

543. (b) Nevertheless drunkenness is not so intrinsically evil that it cannot be permitted for a grave cause, for example, for curing a disease, or for breaking the force of poison taken from a serpent's bite. Thus more probably, with St. Alphonsus (n. 76), against Collet, Billuart, etc., who think that voluntary privation of reason is wholly and utterly evil. For through drunkenness reason itself is not lost, but only the use of reason for some time; now to render oneself impotent, in a transitory manner, for using reason is something evil if it is done from pleasure alone, because an inferior good is preferred to a superior good; but if this is done on account of a grave cause, which compensates for the evil effect, it cannot be called illicit, because then the lesser of two evils is chosen. Who, for example, will ever blame him who takes an intoxicating drink absolutely necessary for saving life?

544. Hence it is probable that it is licit to bring about privation of the use of reason through intoxicating drink, if this is necessary for more safely performing a surgical operation. - Likewise, more probably, he does not sin who, from fear of death struck into him, drinks with the danger of making himself drunk, because he does not intend drunkenness, but only wishes to avoid death.

545. To provide someone the occasion of drunkenness, without a grave cause, is not licit, as is clear from the things said concerning cooperation in evil, above, n. 185; but, when a proportionately grave cause exists, this is probably licit; for materially to cooperate in an evil action is not prohibited, provided the act is not intrinsically evil, and besides there is a proportionate reason for cooperating, from what was said above, n. 185. Thus he seems to be excused who, captured by robbers, gives them wine abundantly, so that he may be able to escape from their hands. - But we think it is not licit by positive counsel to induce someone to formal drunkenness: for this is nothing other than positively to advise sin. But if it can be foreseen from the circumstances that the drunkenness is not going to be culpable, because, for example, those of

whom the question is are ignorant of the strength of the wine or liquor, it is probably not illicit to induce them to drink, with the foresight that they are going to be made drunk, when this is necessary for avoiding a greater evil, for example, homicide: for then moral evil is not advised, but an action of itself indifferent is placed, with foresight of the evil effect, and indeed for avoiding a greater evil. In any hypothesis, account must also be taken of scandal, or of the effects which are foreseen to follow from drunkenness, even material drunkenness.

546. (c) Sins committed in drunkenness are imputed in the way in which they were foreseen; wherefore, if they are foreseen only confusedly, generally they are not mortal; but if rather clearly and distinctly, by him who knows by experience that in the state of drunkenness he is liable to such sins, nothing prevents them from being mortal in the cause, from the things said above, n. 171.

547. (B) Concerning the use of morphine, cocaine, and chloroform.[1] Today, for easing the pains of the sick and for performing surgical operations more safely, narcotic remedies are often employed, which sometimes take away the use of reason for some time. It is expedient to note a few things concerning their use.

[1] Capellmann, Medicina Pastoralis, 11th ed., Aachen, 1896, p. 34-42.

(a) Morphine (say nearly the same concerning cocaine) is taken not only by way of drink, but also, and more often, by subcutaneous injection. It is altogether efficacious for easing pains; indeed it provokes a certain sense of cheerfulness; but at the same time it weakens the nerves, and induces a great desire of receiving again and again new injections. If the physician, overcome by repeated complaints of the sick person, acquiesces, the power of resisting pains decreases in the sick person, and the injection of morphine is sought more frequently day by day. But the more frequent and more copious use of this remedy soon brings morphinomania with it: then the sick person appears now livid and sluggish, now agitated; he trembles like a drinker, loathes food and digests only with difficulty; he labors under insomnia and anxiety of soul, and not rarely falls into fury and delirium tremens.

548. These things being posited, physicians can use so dangerous a remedy only cautiously and moderately, namely when it is judged necessary or very useful; therefore let them strenuously resist the importunate complaints of the sick, whenever these seek morphine without sufficient reason. But those who already labor under morphinomania generally can be cured only in a special hospital, where for some time they are kept as though imprisoned: otherwise, they soon fall into dementia.

At the article of death, it is not licit to furnish morphine for the purpose that the sick man be deprived of the use of reason and depart without consciousness of pain. This indeed would be wicked, if the sick man were not yet prepared for death, because he would be deprived of the opportunity of doing penance and would incur the danger of eternal damnation. - If he is rightly disposed for death, generally it is not licit to deprive him of the use of reason, because thus he would lack the opportunity of acquiring merits, and of immediately preparing himself for death, and also of eliciting acts of obedience, patience, confidence, love, by which his glory in heaven can be so greatly increased. - Nevertheless if the pains are excessive, and the sick man is very liable to movements of

impatience, so that it can probably be feared that he may fall into sin, the aforementioned use of morphine indeed cannot be positively permitted, but can be tolerated.

549. (b) Chloroform, employed in surgical operations, induces sleep and insensibility, and from this head operations are performed much more easily and safely. But sometimes, although rarely, death is caused from it. Wherefore it is licit to use this remedy only for a grave cause and cautiously, after a diligent examination, from which it is clear that in the case there is no probable danger of death for the sick person. But before someone gives himself over to physicians, prudence suggests that he consult his conscience through devout reception of the sacraments.

3. Concerning Alcoholism.

550. By the name alcoholism is designated the habit of frequently drinking various alcoholic liquors, even without drunkenness, from which it happens that a nearly invincible desire of drinking is contracted, and the whole body, infected by alcoholic poison, is weakened day by day.

[1] Centennial Temperance Volume, New York, 1876; Farrar, Talks on Temperance, London; Cyclopaedia of Temperance, New York; M. Vanlaer, L'alcoolisme et ses remedes, Paris, Colin, 1897; Mgr Turinaz, Trois fleaux de la classe ouvriere, Nancy et Paris; id., Le clerge catholique et la lutte contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1901; Racl, Alcoolisme et decadence, Paris, 1900; Riemain, Plan de campagne contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1901; Dr Legrain, Un fleau social, l'alcoolisme, Paris, Gautier; Oudaille, Le Foyer familial et la femme contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1904; J. Bertillon, L'alcoolisme et les moyens de le combattre, Paris, 1904; Cheysson et Riemain, Premier Congres national contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, Asselin, 1904 (which work we allege below with one word, Congres).

(A) The origin and causes of alcoholism. This vice, very common among pagans,[2] and never entirely extirpated by Christianity, began to revive and creep everywhere from the time when alcoholic liquors, by the help of the chemical art, could more easily be extracted from almost all substances: for then it prevailed not only among the rich, but also among workers and the poor. Politicians favored this vice not a little: for, to obtain the votes of citizens, they did not hesitate to multiply taverns and drinking-shops more than enough; indeed, to capture popular favor, they did not blush to distribute money to be dissipated in drinking bouts. Workers, who often live in sordid houses or rooms, do not care to remain at home in the evening hours, but prefer to converse with companions in taverns and other places where liquors are sold. Moreover, nourished by light and scant food, they not rarely seek a certain compensation in alcoholic drinks.[3] - Sometimes, even among the richer, there are those who, given over to idleness, seek consolation in often repeated libations.[1] - By force of heredity, the propension to drinking is frequently transmitted, and is confirmed by education: for there are not lacking parents who do not blush to pour harmful liquors even for infants! And thus the way is prepared for innumerable evils, which are born from alcoholism.[2]

[2] A. Westphal, L'alcoolisme dans l'antiquite, in Congres, p. 31-50.

[3] Concerning alcoholism prevailing among workers, cf. Pelloutier, La vie ouvriere en France, Paris, 1900, p. 303-322; Congres, p. 341 and 487-518.

[1] M. Peter, L'alcoolisme chez les gens du monde, apud Congres, p. 550.

[2] From the following table, which we borrow from Bertillon, op. cit., p. 5, the reader will understand what quantity of alcohol is consumed in the principal regions.

Number of liters of brandy (reduced by calculation to 50 per cent alcohol), of beer and of wine absorbed in one year by one inhabitant (1891-1895):

Country	Brandy	Beer	Wine
Sweden	6.86	26.0	0.6
Norway	3.54	20.1	0.9
Denmark	14.40	87.7	1.6
British Isles	5.20	135.0	1.7
Germany	8.80	106.9	5.7
Switzerland	6.12	40.0	60.7
France	8.54	22.5	107.0
Italy	1.25	0.6	96.5
Spain	1.00	1.3	115.0
Russia	9.40	4.6	3.3
United States	5.95	64.6	1.5

In some regions alcoholism increases, while in others it gradually diminishes, according as laws and private associations favor or oppose it.[3]

[3] From the same work, p. 11, these things are to be noted concerning the quantity of spirits of wine (brandy) consumed at different times:

Sweden		France	
1850	22.0	1851-60	4.0
1855-70	9.6	1861-70	4.8
1871-80	11.0	1871-80	5.7
1891-95	6.8	1881-90	7.8
		1891-95	8.5

551. (B) The evils which arise from the abuse of alcohol. These are almost innumerable with regard to individuals, the family, society.[4]

[4] Two distinguished physicians, Debove, dean of the Paris Faculty of Medicine, and Faisans, physician of the hospital which is called Hotel-Dieu, briefly described these effects in a publicly published document, in the year 1902 (apud Bertillon, op. cit., p. 217-218): "The habit of drinking brings with it alienation from the family, forgetfulness of all social duties, disgust for work, misery, theft, and crime. It leads, at the least, to the hospital; for alcoholism engenders the most varied and most deadly diseases: paralyses, insanity, affections of the stomach and liver, dropsy; it is one of the most frequent causes of tuberculosis. Finally it complicates and aggravates all acute diseases: a typhoid fever, a pneumonia, an erysipelas, which would be benign in a sober man, quickly kill the alcoholic drinker."

(a) For alcoholism not only diminishes physical powers, but also induces grave diseases, especially paralysis, dropsy, tuberculosis, alteration of the stomach and liver, sometimes delirium tremens, insanity, etc.; moreover it renders incidental diseases much graver, such as pleurisy, pneumonia, erysipelas, and renders them lethal.[1] - It has intellectual and moral effects: thus it gradually dulls the acuteness of mind, diminishes memory, extinguishes noble and generous affections, increases

depraved propensions, and little by little makes man like a brute in body and soul. Hence many more crimes are committed by drunkards and alcoholics than by sober men.[2]

[1] Bertillon, op. cit., p. 44-72; Vanlaer, op. cit., p. 23-36; Congres, p. 375-388; 421-426.

[2] E. Masoin, L'alcool et le crime, apud Revue neoscolastique, Nov. 1901, p. 362-369; cf. Congres, pp. 89 and 92-95.

(b) Moreover, it dissolves the bonds of the family; for generally alcoholic liquors are taken not at home, but at taverns, and therefore fathers of families and adolescents spend a long time in drinking-shops, far from wife, sweet children, or brothers. Meanwhile the money necessary for sustaining the family is dissipated, and children, very badly educated, lead a miserable life. Not rarely they themselves labor under the same vice: infected with the alcoholic plague already from the womb, they desire nothing more eagerly than to imitate paternal morals;[3] if money is lacking, they steal. - How many quarrels, dissensions, divorces must be attributed to this vice? From it families are dissolved and perish.

[3] Roux, L'alcoolisme et l'enfance, apud Congres, p. 321-331.

(c) From it even society itself is endangered; for with the strength of citizens weakened, agriculture, commerce, and industry languish;[4] if war arises, soldiers and leaders, enervated by alcoholism, are unable to repel the invasion of enemies, and soon are forced to give conquered hands.[5] Since alcoholic propension is propagated by heredity, and by education puts down deep roots, the restoration of the nation becomes more difficult day by day, and can be accomplished only by strenuous and heroic efforts.[1]

[4] Roy, apud Congres, p. 349-352.

[5] Cf. Congres, pp. 87, 95-96; 666-674.

[1] What harms alcoholism has brought upon one of the wealthier provinces of France, namely Normandy, Douarche set forth apud Congres, p. 52-84.

552. (C) Remedies against alcoholism. Against so destructive an evil all honorable citizens ought unanimously to fight with manly and assiduous effort:

(a) The necessity of temperance is to be inculcated by word and example upon infants themselves at home, and upon the young in schools, by clearly and strenuously laying open the harms induced by alcoholism.[2] In colleges, academies, and seminaries, and also in public sermons, this plague should be openly denounced and reproved as something shameful, harmful to body and soul, pernicious no less to country than to religion. But parents, teachers, priests, or other educators will profit little or nothing unless by example they confirm what they teach by mouth, and therefore abstain not only publicly, but privately, from the frequent and useless use of liquors, even that which by many is held as moderate: for experience establishes that alcoholism is induced not only by the immoderate, but also by the assiduous, although moderate, use of alcohol.[3]

[2] Galtier-Boissiere, L'enseignement de l'anti-alcoolisme; id., Tableau mural d'Anti-alcoolisme, Paris, Colin; cf. Congres, p. 685-687.

[3] Bertillon, op. cit., p. 37-43.

553. (b) The mother of the family, according to her condition, should keep the home so clean and decorous, and furnished with all things which please husband and sons, that they may not

think of deserting the paternal home, but rather may seek in it the honorable recreations of which they are in need.[4]

[4] "Considering only her action in the anti-alcoholic struggle, the woman who is the first to suffer from the plague can exercise a twofold apostolate: to the child, she will make alcohol unknown; to the man, that great child, she will make him forget it." (Oudaille, op. cit., p. 217). Cf. M. Duclos and Knutzel, apud Congres, p. 558-581; Willard, Woman and Temperance, Hartford.

(c) Everywhere associations favoring temperance should be established. Many already exist: some, such as the societies founded by T. Mathew and spread not only in Ireland and England, but also throughout the whole world, preach total abstinence from every alcoholic liquor, even wine;[5] others prescribe abstinence from distilled liquors, as they say, but commend the moderate use of wine or other liquors of this kind; others, however, only forbid access to taverns and other places where intoxicating drinks are drunk; others establish hospitals for the cure of drunkards, or build shops where non-fermented drinks are sold, in which alcoholic poison is not contained.[1]

[5] Father T. Mathew (1790-1856), born in Ireland, entered the order of the Capuchins, and founded temperance societies in Ireland, Great Britain, and the United States of America, to which, before he died, about 4,000,000 had already adhered; therefore he is deservedly called the apostle of temperance. Cf. J. F. Maguire, Father Mathew, a biography, 1863.

[1] Concerning these societies, cf. Winskill, History of the Temperance Reformation, New York, 1886; Congres, pp. 590-603; 604-610; 627-638. - In France, various anti-alcoholic societies have decreed to constitute one federation; cf. Congres, p. 741-742.

554. (d) Nor is the discreet cooperation of the State to be rejected, which by opportune laws can restrain the vice of intemperance, and furnish help to those societies which favor temperance. In certain States of America the sale of intoxicating liquors has been entirely prohibited; yet generally the law was not observed. In other regions the number of taverns has been limited within certain limits, either by exacting a greater tax from tavern-keepers, or by proportioning taverns to the number of inhabitants. Elsewhere a certain monopoly has been instituted, both for diminishing the quantity of liquor sold and for improving the quality. By these various experiments alcoholism was indeed not extinguished, but weakened.[2] But what is more efficacious depends on many circumstances, and therefore in any region it must be determined from the counsel of the prudent, and especially by experience.

[2] Bertillon wrote concerning these various methods and their outcome, op. cit., p. 80-214.

555. (e) Finally religion can and ought to provide the most efficacious remedy for the diminution of so great a vice: for it is necessary that it instruct the young about the pernicious effects of this vice, and admonish parents that they turn their sons away from it. By inculcating virtues, especially fortitude of soul and mortification of sensuality, it disposes wills for strenuously resisting the temptation of abusing liquors. In the pulpit, and also in the sacred tribunal, priests should frequently teach temperance and sobriety. Where there are sodalities, patronages, and other Catholic societies, certain articles concerning temperance and the means of preserving it should carefully be inserted among the statutes. Finally let them keep before the mind that for extirpating this vice nothing is more efficacious than the example of clerics

themselves: wherefore worthy of all praise are those who not only enroll in temperance societies, but, on account of love of souls, abstain from every intoxicating drink.[1]

[1] To the matter, Council of Baltimore III, n. 262: "We approve and greatly commend the laudable custom of many, who in our times abstain entirely from the use of intoxicating drinks, that they may more safely restrain the vice of intemperance, either by removing from themselves occasions of the same, or by displaying to others a distinguished example of the virtue of temperance." - But concerning priests it establishes, n. 261: "Let them never cease to cry out strongly against drunkenness and its occasions; but especially when they have spiritual exercises for the people... Moreover, since words only move, but examples draw, let priests themselves, who, with the Apostle admonishing, ought to be a form of the flock from the heart, be examples of the virtue of temperance." - In France a Catholic temperance society has recently been established, La Croix Blanche, 1271, Boulevard Raspail, Paris.

All these means being wisely and assiduously employed, it is to be wished that the alcoholic plague may gradually be diminished, and finally utterly extinguished.[2]

[2] J. B. Dumas thus contracts all these things, apud Vanlaer, op. cit., p. 165: "Let us therefore appeal at once to science, to laws, to morals, and to religion. For the enemy whom we have to combat will not be easily conquered. It has as accomplices all the evil sentiments of humanity, all its fatal inclinations. It personifies, in the highest degree, the insubordination of matter against spirit, the subjection of the soul to the fierce appetites of the body. In the name of the family, of the country, and of religion, let us therefore once again appeal to the lights of science, to the devotions of charity, and to the foresight of reason of State, to remove from our beloved country moral miseries which have had their part in its past misfortunes and which could bring about its ruin."

VI. Concerning Avarice and Cupidity.

556. 1. Notion. (A) Avarice is the immoderate love of riches. It can be immoderate especially in three ways: (a) if riches are acquired not from an honorable end, such as is the intention of providing for one's own necessities or those of the family, but from inordinate love of money, which is delighted in accumulated wealth; (b) when riches are acquired with excessive solicitude, so that the mind thinks of nothing, the heart seeks nothing except gain; (c) when money is spent with excessive parsimony, insofar as someone deprives himself and his own of those things which, according to each one's state, are held necessary.

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118; De Malo, q. 13; Nat. Alexander, op. cit., p. 819-951; Ball. P., n. 708-709; Pruner, p. 344-346; Descuret, t. II, p. 275-297; Massillon, Discours synodaux, De l'avarice des pretres, De la compassion des pauvres; Monsabre, Retraites pascales, 1892-1894, Paris, Les Idoles: la richesse.

(B) Avarice is found not only in the rich, but sometimes also in the poor, insofar as they cling with too great affection to the things possessed, or gape with immoderate desire after those things which they do not have. - Although it is sometimes found in the young, nevertheless it is more frequent in the old, who, when the other passions have been weakened, adhere to this one, and, from immoderate prudence, fear lest perhaps they lack necessities.[1] - Formerly, when money was retained at home and carefully guarded in chests, there were not lacking avaricious men who cultivated coins as certain idols, and truly served mammon, depriving even themselves and their own of necessities.[2] But today, since money is fruitful in such diverse ways, generally it is not loved for its own sake, but on account of the diverse conveniences which it brings, namely splendid houses, exquisite foods, pleasures, honors, authority over others, since all things obey money.[3]

[1] "But what is here most deplorable for this vice in a priest is that age and reflections usually cure the other passions, whereas this one seems to revive and take on new forces in old age... The more death approaches, the more one broods with one's eyes over one's miserable treasure; the more one regards it as a necessary precaution for an imaginary future. Thus age rejuvenates, so to speak, this unworthy passion; years, illnesses, reflections, everything thrusts it more deeply into the soul; and it is nourished and inflamed by the very remedies which cure and extinguish the others." (Massillon, op. cit., Oeuvres, Besancon, 1822, t. IX, p. 183).

[2] "The other (the avaricious man) amasses only in order to amass: it is not to provide for his needs; he refuses them to himself: his money is more precious to him than his health, than his life, than his salvation, than himself; all his actions, all his views, all his affections, refer only to this unworthy object." (Massillon, op. cit., p. 180).

[3] Thus many modern rich men (plutocrats), as may be seen apud Carnegie, The Empire of Business.

557. But the effects which it produces (commonly they are called its daughters) are: (a) hardening of heart toward the poor, because the heart, clinging to riches, is not softened by mercy, nor does it wish to help the miserable, but addresses them harshly and repels them, indeed rigorously exacts debts from them, even if they are unequal to paying them; (b) disquiet of heart, or anxious application of the mind to acquiring and preserving riches, or many solicitudes and fears lest the wealth sought with so much solicitude be lost; (c) frauds, fallacies, for deceiving contracting parties concerning the quality or quantity of things sold, so that gain may be perceived more easily and more quickly; to these are sometimes joined perjuries, indeed also betrayals, as is clear concerning Judas, who from avarice betrayed Christ; (d) violence and crimes, by which others' goods are unjustly seized.

558. 2. The malice of avarice and cupidity. (A) Considered in itself, avarice (a) is a mortal sin from its kind, when it is opposed to justice, namely by stealing or retaining the goods of another, as is explained fully in the Treatise on Justice; (b) but it is a venial sin when it is opposed to liberality, because this virtue of itself obliges only under light obligation; nevertheless if someone, in a particular case, from inordinate cupidity, were to deny aid to a poor man placed in extreme necessity, he would sin mortally, as will be clear from the things to be said below concerning Charity.

559. (B) But in its effects, avarice not rarely draws to grave sins against God, neighbor, and oneself: (a) against God, insofar as the avaricious man, on account of temporal good, despises eternal things, and cultivates riches, not God. Hence avarice is called by the Apostle service of idols,[1] and Christ says:[2] "You cannot serve God and mammon," because, namely, no one can serve two masters. In reality there are not lacking those who, on account of love of riches, do not fear to act against the love of God. (b) Against the neighbor, because, as St. Thomas says,[3] "in exterior riches one man cannot abound unless another lacks, because temporal goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time." Now the rich are able to become richer, and sometimes by unjust contracts, wicked lawsuits, monopolies, and iniquitous exactions they vex and despoil the poor. Wherefore St. Ambrose, recalling the history of Naboth, despoiled by cruel Jezebel, writes:[4] "The history of Naboth is old in time, daily in use. For what rich man does not daily covet others' things? What one of the very wealthy does not strive to drive a poor man from his little field, and to eliminate the needy man from the boundaries of his ancestral land? Who is content with his own? Whose rich soul is not inflamed by a neighboring possession?" (c) Against himself, insofar as the avaricious man is made a slave of riches; for he does not

possess gold, but rather is possessed by gold, and is made a captive of his own opulence; for how many labors, solicitudes, vigils are required for gathering or guarding or increasing that wealth? He is cruel against himself, defrauding himself of true spiritual goods in order to obtain perishable riches. In the highest affluence of goods he is needy and poor, not only because he lacks tranquillity of soul and joy of heart, but also because he always seeks greater riches: for avarice is insatiable, and cannot be filled even in man's old age. - Moreover he renders himself liable to many temptations: the richer someone is, the more frequently he falls into occasions of sin, according to that saying of the Apostle:[1] "For those who wish to become rich fall into temptation, and into the snare of the devil, and into many useless and harmful desires, which plunge men into ruin and perdition. For cupidity is the root of all evils."

[1] "For understand this, that every fornicator, or unclean man, or avaricious man, which is service of idols, has no inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God" (Eph. 5:5). Yet not a few think, from the context, that by the name avaricious man is designated him who immoderately indulges lust.

[2] Matt. 6:24.

[3] St. Thomas, q. 118, a. 1, ad 2.

[4] De Nabuthe, c. 1, P. L., XIV, 731.

[1] 1 Tim. 6:9-10.

560. 3. Remedies against avarice and cupidity. (a) The vanity of temporal goods, compared with the excellence of spiritual goods, ought to deter Christians from avarice: "Do not store up treasures for yourselves on earth, where rust and moth destroy, and where thieves dig through and steal. But store up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither rust nor moth destroys, and where thieves do not dig through nor steal... Seek therefore first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added to you."[2]

[2] Matt. 6:19-20, 33.

He indeed is rich who possesses God, and he is very poor who, abounding in wealth, lacks the grace of God. Wherefore the first Christians were not ashamed of their poverty, but gloried in it: "Moreover, because most of us are called poor, this is not our infamy, but glory: for as the soul is loosened by luxury, so it is strengthened by frugality; and yet who can be poor, who does not lack, who does not gape after another's goods, who is rich in God? He is rather poor who, although he has many things, desires more."[3]

[3] Minucius Felix, in Octavio, c. 37, P. L., III, 351; cf. Bossuet, Sermon sur l'eminente dignite des pauvres, - sur nos dispositions a l'egard des necessites de la vie.

Besides, death comes, and separates us even unwilling from all riches, and therefore he acts foolishly who places his hope in perishable things: "Fool, this night they demand your soul from you: but the things which you have prepared, whose shall they be?"[4]

[4] Luke 12:20.

561. (b) Especially powerful above all is the example of Christ, who, although he was rich, became poor for us, that by his poverty we might be rich;[5] namely born of a poor mother in a stable, and wrapped in swaddling clothes in a manger, he led a poor life with the poor, chose poor

disciples, openly declared the poor blessed, died most poor on the cross, despoiled of his own garments. The sign of his divine mission is the evangelization of the poor. Therefore our patrimony is the poverty of Christ, and he denies Christ who glories in riches and adheres to them with his whole heart.

[5] 2 Cor. 8:9.

(c) Therefore let the poor not be ashamed of their poverty, but rather be content with it, gaping after eternal goods. But let the rich redeem past sins by alms, and guard against future ones by using wealth to do good to the poor: "Charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God... to become rich in good works; to give easily, to communicate; to store up for themselves a good foundation for the future, that they may apprehend true life."[1] - In reality nothing more efficaciously turns the mind away from earthly things, nothing renders salvation more secure than the copious pouring forth of alms into the bosom of the poor.

[1] 1 Tim. 6:17-19.

VII. Concerning Acedia and Sloth.

562. 1. Notion of acedia. Thus far concerning the vices which impel us to acting badly; now concerning sloth, which on the contrary induces us to not acting or to acting remissly, when some office to be fulfilled presses. Sloth in a general way is a propension to acting remissly and negligently, or to idleness. When this negligence is concerned with spiritual things and generates a certain weariness, it is called acedia. Therefore this is usually defined as sadness or weariness concerning spiritual good (*degout des choses spirituelles*), on account of the labor joined to it. Namely, in the present order of things we are able to accomplish no good without labor, whether in the natural order or in the supernatural order. Now we naturally flee more or less from every laborious work, and therefore not rarely are saddened when the question is of fulfilling an arduous office, and on account of this we abstain from doing it.

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 35, and De Malo, q. 11; Nat. Alex., op. cit., p. 1148-1170. - In Greek, *akedeia* signifies negligence.

Acedia is concerned with spiritual things; sloth with any offices whatever, even those of natural life. Each defect arises from the same vicious principle, namely horror of difficulty and labor.

563. The effects (or daughters) of acedia are: (a) a certain derision of all things which pertain to piety: for those who neglect their duties, by a certain natural instinct, deride those things which they do not wish to perform; (b) indignation against those who by exhortations, admonitions, and rebukes incite the slothful to perfection and labor: for these men shudder at being disturbed in their rest; (c) torpor, by which the observance of precepts is either utterly omitted, or is performed only perfunctorily and yawningly: thence arises tepidity, which, with Scripture as witness, greatly displeases God;[1] (d) pusillanimity, which disdains and turns away from arduous works; (e) sometimes despair, which is born from the fact that care of one's own salvation, on account of difficulties to be overcome, is cast aside.

[1] Apoc. 3:15-16.

564. 2. The malice of acedia and sloth. (A) Acedia, considered in itself, is a mortal sin whenever it induces perfect sadness concerning divine good, and negligence of one's own salvation and of the means necessary for attaining it. For then it is gravely opposed to the command of loving God from the whole heart, from the whole soul, and from all one's powers. - But sloth is a sin more or less grave according as it induces neglect of an office more or less grave.

(B) But if they are considered in their effects, sloth, and a fortiori acedia, cause many and indeed grave evils: (a) the soul of the slothful man is deservedly compared to a field in which not the crops of good works, but the nettles and thorns of vices grow wonderfully: "I passed through the field of the slothful man, and through the vineyard of the foolish man; and behold nettles had filled it all, and thorns had covered its surface."[2] (b) It is liable to many temptations and sins: "Idleness has taught much malice... This was the iniquity of Sodom, your sister: pride, satiety of bread, and abundance, and her idleness and that of her daughters."[3] In reality, since the mind cannot be entirely empty, nor the will entirely at rest, if we give ourselves to leisure, by this very fact depraved thoughts invade the mind, and solicit the will to depraved actions. (c) It casts one into danger of eternal salvation: for since each one receives his own reward according to his labor,[4] he who does not make good fruit shall be cut down and cast into the fire.[5] For it is not enough, for attaining salvation, to abstain from evil, but it is also necessary to work good, and especially to fulfill diligently the offices of one's state: "For," says St. Chrysostom,[6] "not to have done good, this is to have done evil. For tell me, if you have some servant who neither steals, nor is insulting, nor contradicts, and abstains from drunkenness and from all other things, but perpetually sits idle, and does nothing of those things which a servant ought to render to his master, will you not beat him with lashes, will you not torment him?" Furthermore we are servants of God, condemned to arduous labor, not only on account of the fault of our first parents, but also on account of personal sins; workers hired in his vineyard for obtaining the reward of labors; and therefore we ought to labor strenuously and assiduously, for obtaining the reward of eternal life.

[2] Prov. 24:30-31.

[3] Eccli. 33:29; Ezek. 16:49.

[4] 1 Cor. 3:8.

[5] Matt. 7:19.

[6] St. Chrysostom, in ep. ad Ephes., hom. 16, n. 1, P. G., LXII, 112.

565. 3. Remedies against acedia and sloth. (A) Frequent thought concerning the necessity of working good and laboring strenuously. For God wishes all men, even the rich and noble, to flee idleness and to work good assiduously. But the law which imposed labor upon Adam the sinner[1] binds all sinners, men and women,[2] the richer equally with the poor. For all are held to bring forth fruits of good works, and to labor manfully in the vineyard of the Lord; otherwise the father of the family will deservedly rebuke the slothful in this way:[3] "Why do you stand here all day idle?" and if the fig-tree brings forth no fruit, it will be cut down, according to that saying:[4] "Cut it down therefore; why does it also occupy the ground?"

[1] "In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread" (Gen. 3:19).

[2] Concerning the utility and necessity of labor with regard to girls and wives, the Countess Z. wrote wisely, Sur le Travail, Paris, Lethielleux, 1902; with regard to boys and men, Payot, Educ. de la volonte, l. IV, ch. 4; P. Doumer, Le Livre de mes fils, Paris, 1906, p. 63-72.

[3] Matt. 20:6.

[4] Luke 13:7.

For the rich who are given over to idleness it is indeed difficult to enter into the kingdom of heaven,[5] because idleness has taught much malice, especially that which abounds in wealth; but the rich who labor strenuously will receive their own reward according to their labor: "He who sows sparingly, sparingly also shall reap, and he who sows in blessings, from blessings also shall reap."[6] - And, if difficulty and weariness deter from labor, let thought of the reward promised to good workers inflame one to it: "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory which shall be revealed in us... For that which is present and momentary and light in our tribulation works in us above measure an eternal weight of glory on high."[7]

[5] Luke 18:25.

[6] 2 Cor. 9:6.

[7] Rom. 8:18; 2 Cor. 4:17.

566. (B) Those who do not need to labor for themselves should not disdain to work for the relief of others. For there are so many poor who cannot nourish themselves and their families by their own labor, - so many ignorant of religious things, who need instruction, - so many little ones who receive no education at home and, unless they are educated Christianly, will soon be numbered among socialists and anarchists, - so many workers, imbued with prejudices against religion and the social order, whom it is necessary to teach true principles. Those who tend toward idleness should turn these and other things of this kind over in their mind, and should understand that in present-day society it is licit for no one to indulge acedia and sloth: for useless trees and fruitless fig-trees will soon be cut down and cast into the fire of tribulation.

567. (C) Let them likewise think that none are more miserable than the idle: weariness of life, vices of the flesh, intemperance, often dissensions and discords render these men unhappy. They are deservedly despised by honorable persons, they excite the envy of the poor, and they are made gravely burdensome to themselves and others. But in spiritual things, acedia generates tepidity; and the tepid lead a miserable life: for they enjoy neither the pleasures of the world, which conscience forbids, nor the divine consolation which is reserved for the truly devout, but are contemptuously rejected by God, according to that saying: "I know your works, that you are neither cold nor hot; would that you were cold or hot! But because you are tepid, and neither cold nor hot, I will begin to vomit you out of my mouth."[1]

[1] Apoc. 3:15-16.

Therefore let us burn with the fire of charity, lest we burn with the fire of tribulation: this ardor snatches us upward, to glorifying God, to relieving the neighbor, to cultivating the virtues, concerning which it remains to be treated.

On Virtues in Common

Concerning Virtues in Common.

568. Just as there are vicious habits by which we are inclined to sin, so likewise there are in us good habits, by which we are sweetly disposed to honorable and meritorious acts: but these are called virtues. Habits of this kind can naturally be acquired by repeated acts, or supernaturally be infused into the soul by God. Wherefore, after preliminary notions concerning habits, we will speak:

I. Concerning acquired virtues;

II. Concerning infused virtues.

Preliminary Matters Concerning Habits in General.

Since this matter is more philosophical than theological, we will recall only a few things concerning the notion, subject, origin and increase, loss and division of habits, setting forth those things which are more commonly admitted.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49-54; Suarez, Disput. metaphys., XLIV; John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, Lyons, 1663, Tr. de Passionibus, habitibus et virtutibus, disp. XIII; Lequeux, De Virtutibus, Paris, 1843, diss. I, c. 2, p. 15-29; Barre, Tract. de Virtutibus, Paris, 1886, p. 93-119; Billot, De Virtutibus infusis, Rome, 1901, Prolegomenon, p. 17-29; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXI (1899), p. 529-536; Rabier, Psychologie, p. 571-587; Marion, Lec. de Psychologie, Paris, Colin, p. 140-158.

569. 1. Notion. Habit (from the word *habere*, to have) in a general sense signifies a mode of bearing oneself. But in a more particular sense it designates a stable quality by which some being is perfected. But this can be completed in two ways: in its being and in its operations; in the former case, the habit is called entitative: thus, for example, health of body with regard to the natural order, habitual grace in the supernatural order; in the latter case, the habit is called operative: such are the virtues of prudence, fortitude, etc.

Here we treat of operative habits. In this sense, habit is usually defined as a stable quality which disposes and helps a potency for act. Therefore it is a certain reality, belonging to the genus of quality, added to some faculty, so that this faculty may become ready for acting. According to St. Thomas, it differs in some way from disposition, which is, as it were, an inchoate habit, but does not yet obtain that stability which is desired for habit properly so called.[1]

[1] "Disposition is taken in two ways: in one way according as it is the genus of habit, for disposition is placed in the definition of habit. In another way according as it is something divided against habit. And disposition properly so called can be understood to be co-divided against habit in two ways: in one way as perfect and imperfect in the same species, so that disposition is said to retain the common name when it inheres imperfectly, so that it is lost easily; but habit, when it inheres perfectly, so that it is not easily lost, and thus disposition becomes habit, just as a boy becomes a man... From this it is clear that the name habit imports a certain lastingness, but not the name disposition." (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3.)

570. Habit helps a potency to act in a twofold way; a natural and acquired habit helps it to perform an operation more promptly, more easily, and more delectably; but a supernatural and infused habit[2] of itself does not confer facility, but elevates the potency, which by its nature is unfit for certain acts, so that it may be able to perform these acts; thus the infused virtue of faith indeed does not give promptitude for eliciting acts of faith. Yet it must be noted that facility of operating is acquired by the exercise of infused virtues, for example, by repeated acts of faith, insofar as obstacles are removed, and the potencies are rendered more apt for eliciting these acts, as will be explained below.

[2] To understand rightly the distinction between natural and supernatural habits, there must be recalled to memory the things which we said in Theologia Dogmatica, De Deo Creante, n. 144-146, and above n. 85. Supernatural virtues are infused by God, - tend toward a supernatural end, - are exercised under the influence of actual grace, - and do not of themselves give facility, but only the power for acting supernaturally.

571. 2. The subject of habit. (a) Habits properly so called do not exist in subjects determined to only one thing in operating, or to acting always in one and the same mode: for then it can scarcely be conceived what habit adds to a potency which always does the same thing and acts in the same mode. But it can exist in all subjects which are not determined to one thing, but can operate in diverse ways, and exercise their operations more or less promptly and perfectly: for then it can incline and dispose the faculties toward one or another genus of actions, and toward eliciting those actions more or less promptly and perfectly.

(b) Hence habits can be in the human body, because, insofar as it is substantially united to a spiritual soul, it can be disposed and habituated to serve promptly the operations of the soul.[1] Thus by the assiduous practice of temperance, chastity, and mortification, the body becomes accustomed to obey the command of the will more promptly and more easily; wherefore it is of the greatest moment to subdue the body by good habits, that it may be made a docile instrument of the soul.

[1] Nevertheless St. Thomas holds that habits of this kind are principally in the soul, and secondarily in the body, because the body receives its movement from the soul.

572. (c) The intellectual faculties of the soul are properly the subject of habits, because they are not determined to operating in one way; but the will is the principal subject in which they are rooted, because it, as endowed with free choice, most greatly possesses the power of choosing. Nevertheless also the sensitive powers are the subject of habits, although less principally, insofar as they are subject to the command of the will (above, n. 73-75). This indeed is established by experience; through custom, the imagination is more or less subdued, or on the contrary is accustomed to wander; - through custom, passions are restrained or on the contrary are more easily borne toward illicit things. Indeed, with experience as witness, custom is conquered by custom: thus those prone to anger, by repeated efforts, become meek, the proud learn to cultivate humility, the ambitious turn themselves toward divine things, etc. (above, n. 107). Therefore it matters greatly to acquire good habits already from childhood, but utterly to eradicate evil ones.

573. 3. Concerning the origin and increase of habits. Some are supernaturally infused by God: concerning these below. Others are naturally acquired: and concerning these we must now treat.

(a) That natural propensions transmitted by heredity are given we already noted above, n. 116-117; inclinations of this kind can be called latent habits, insofar as they remain sleeping until, by an external occasion, they are aroused as though from sleep; thus sons born from drunken parents not rarely have contracted an inclination toward alcoholic drinks, which as soon as it is excited by libations passes into habit.

(b) According to St. Thomas,[2] certain habits are implanted by nature itself, at least inchoatively. Thus, with regard to first principles (for example, the whole is greater than its part, good is to be loved), we are so inclined to knowing them that the habit of these principles can be called naturally implanted. Likewise in certain individuals are found certain natural propensions which are, as it were, inchoate habits: for there are some disposed, from the proper complexion of the body, toward chastity, others toward gentleness, others toward fortitude, as was said above, where temperament and character were treated, n. 120-121.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 51, a. 1. - Others indeed, with Suarez (Disput. metaph., disp. 44, sect. 13, n. 7), do not wish these propensions to be called habits; but the question is more about the name than about the thing.

574. (c) But especially from multiplied acts habits are generated and increased, as experience establishes: namely, the more frequently, longer, and more intensely acts are repeated, provided nevertheless that the powers are not exhausted, the greater facility and promptitude are obtained for doing the same acts. The first act already produces some disposition, which the second increases; other acts will complete the generation of the habit. The reason for this is that any faculty is at the same time active and passive; insofar as it is active, it impresses a certain movement, and insofar as it is passive, it receives and retains an impression, by force of which subsequent acts become easier.

Nevertheless, according to St. Thomas,[1] an act does not increase a habit unless it is at least equally intense as the habit itself; for if it is more remiss, it does not dispose toward its increase, but rather toward its diminution; thus he who has already acquired the habit of fervor does not increase it, but rather diminishes it, when he prays remissly and tepidly.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 52, a. 3. - Yet some on the contrary hold with T. Raynaud, De Virtutibus, l. I, c. 2, that even remiss acts increase with some proportion the force of the habit.

575. (d) Habits can grow in two ways, extensively and intensively: extensively, when the object with which they are concerned is multiple and is successively amplified; thus the habit of knowledge grows when it extends itself to more things, and humility is increased when the various degrees of this virtue are reached; intensively, when they are rooted more deeply in the soul, so that actions are elicited more easily and more delectably. This indeed can be explained thus: through the repetition of acts, difficulty in acting is diminished, and therefore with the same effort subsequent acts are performed more easily, and consequently more delectably.[2] But how habits influence liberty we explained at n. 109-110.

[2] "In proportion as the act no longer requires for being repeated except a lesser effort, the excess of power, which the cause does not expend in reproducing it, becomes in some way available for new and superior efforts." (Lemoine, apud Rabier, Psychol., p. 587.)

576. 4. Concerning the loss of habits. That acquired habits are diminished or sometimes utterly perish is established by experience. (a) First, according to all, they decrease or perish through contrary acts, especially intense and long-lasting ones; thus the habit of temperance is gradually diminished and finally utterly taken away through often repeated acts of drunkenness. For contraries are destroyed by contraries, and custom is conquered by custom; thus facility of using food and drink moderately soon decreases when someone begins to indulge gluttony and drunkenness: for, just as by repeated acts of temperance a good habit had been acquired, so by frequent contrary acts an evil habit is contracted; now, when contrary habits are present, the stronger destroys the weaker.

577. (b) Moreover they are diminished and sometimes perish through long cessation from exercise, not indeed directly, as the more probable opinion holds, but indirectly, insofar as, exercise ceasing, impediments are multiplied, and little by little contrary habits are introduced which overwhelm the former ones. Thus memory is diminished unless you exercise it. The same must be said of moral habits: for when someone, for a long time, does not use the habit of virtue for moderating passions, these are accustomed to rise up against reason, and to transgress just limits; thus the inclination to good is gradually diminished, and depraved habits are born which can overturn good ones.[1] Nevertheless, if after some time new efforts are made before the habit is utterly extinguished, it revives more easily.

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 53, a. 3.

But by accident habits impressed upon organic powers can be altered by an alteration of the organ itself; thus sometimes memory is diminished or perishes.

578. 5. Concerning the division of habits. (a) By reason of the object with which they are concerned, habits are good or vicious, according as their object is good or evil. Good habits are called virtues, but evil ones vices; here we treat only of the former, since we have already spoken of the latter, where sins were treated. (b) By reason of origin and nature, virtues are acquired or infused: concerning these we must treat separately.

Art. I. Concerning Acquired Virtues.

579. Preliminary matters. (A) Virtue (from the word *vir*, man) first indeed designated a quality proper to a man, or fortitude,[1] but afterward any endowment,[2] especially that by force of which we operate according to the dictate of right reason. In this sense it is usually defined as a habit disposing man's powers to operating rightly,[3] or a good habit. Therefore it is a quality added to the faculties, helping them toward acting according to right reason.

[1] Thus Cicero, Tuscul., l. II, 18: "For virtue was named from man: but what is most proper to a man is fortitude, whose two greatest offices are contempt of death and of pain." Cf. Breal and Bailly, Dict. etymol., p. 441.

[2] Apud Cicero, Brut., 17: "In Cato's orations all oratorical virtues will be found."

[3] According to St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55, a. 4, virtue is a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us. - These last words can be predicated of infused virtues alone; but the former also regard acquired virtues.

580. (B) Therefore virtues properly reside not in the essence of the soul, but in its powers: for these are immediately ordered to act.[4] Now the faculties in which virtues properly so called inhere are rational powers, namely intellect and will, but especially the will.[5] For virtues properly so called rightly order our acts in the moral order; now the only truly moral act is that which proceeds from the will with previous knowledge of the intellect (above, n. 66); and therefore virtues properly inhere in those faculties which elicit moral acts, chiefly in the will. Nevertheless other faculties participate in the nature of virtue insofar as they are subject to the command of the will (above, n. 73-75): for under this respect they are made capable of morality, and therefore secondarily can be the subject of virtue: thus the virtue of temperance in some way inheres in the sensible appetite for moderating sensual passions.[6]

[4] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 1.

[5] Ibid., a. 3 and 6.

[6] Ibid., a. 4; cf. Cajetan, in I-II, q. 74, a. 4.

581. (C) Since there is a twofold order, natural and supernatural, virtues are of a twofold kind, namely natural, or acquired, and supernatural, or divinely infused. Here we treat only of the former.

Acquired virtues can be found even in pagans or heretics, since these are capable of good works and consequently of habits, from the things said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 34. - But the faithful, who enjoy the gift of true faith and sanctifying grace, ought to cultivate with all their powers these virtues, which of themselves are natural, and indeed in a more perfect manner than unbelievers, so that by examples they may manifestly show that grace does not destroy, but on the contrary perfects whatever good is in human nature.[1] But, that they may be truly Christian, they ought to cultivate these virtues in a supernatural manner, that is, on account of a supernatural end, and under the influence of actual grace: for thus they will pursue not only an honorable end, but the supernatural end to which in fact they are ordered, and will acquire supernatural merits.

[1] Concerning certain natural virtues Cardinal Gibbons excellently discusses, The Ambassador of Christ, Baltimore, 1896, ch. 8-10; translated into French by Andre: L'Ambassadeur du Christ, Paris, Lethielleux; cf. St. Francis de Sales, Introd., 3rd Part, ch. 36; Ribet, Honnete avant tout.

Virtues of this kind are of two species: intellectual and moral: the former perfect the intellect with regard to the knowledge of truth; the latter perfect the will with regard to the pursuit of good: concerning both we must speak separately.

I. Concerning Intellectual Virtues.

582. 1. Notion. (A) Three speculative intellectual virtues[3] are commonly distinguished: (a) understanding, or the habit perfecting the intellect for knowing first principles intimately; for to understand is the same as to read within. (b) Knowledge is the habit perfecting the intellect for logically deducing conclusions contained in first principles.

(c) Wisdom is the habit perfecting the intellect for knowing things not only in themselves, but also in their causes, especially in God, who is the highest and ultimate cause of all; wherefore he is called truly wise who knows God as the first principle and ultimate end of all, and judges concerning all things insofar as they are referred to God. - Thus wisdom contains under itself understanding and knowledge, since it judges both concerning principles and concerning conclusions deduced from the same. - Perhaps therefore it can be said that there is one intellectual virtue, namely wisdom, which ascends from created things to God, and uses the knowledge of principles and conclusions for judging concerning created things according to their relation to God.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57-58; Suarez, in I-II, Tr. IV, disp. 3; John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. 16; Billuart, De Passionibus et Virtutibus, diss. II; Lequeux, op. cit., p. 33 and 74-81; Barre, op. cit., p. 143-147 and 165-184.

[3] Besides the speculative virtues, two practical ones are enumerated, prudence, concerning which below where moral virtues are treated, and art, or the habit disposing the intellect to making artificial things rightly, concerning which nothing special occurs to be said.

583. (B) But wisdom, like the other intellectual virtues, is not properly a virtue except insofar as it is ordered to acting rightly. For virtue has regard to forming morals honorably; therefore if someone is endowed with knowledge and speculative wisdom, but does not use it for a right institution of life, from this he cannot be said to be endowed with virtue; but wisdom which is ordered to acting honorably is deservedly called a virtue;[1] and all Christians indeed ought to cultivate it, but especially those upon whom the office rests of illuminating and teaching others, and most of all the ministers of Christ, to whom it was said: "Going therefore, teach all nations."[2]

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 1.

[2] Matt. 28:19.

584. 2. Excellence. Scripture often commends this wisdom, insofar as it rightly orders us to God, and impels us to fulfilling the divine law. (a) Namely, wisdom ought to be preferred to all riches: "I preferred her before kingdoms and thrones, and I thought riches nothing in comparison with her... But all good things came to me together with her, and innumerable honor by her hands."[3] (b) Its endowments are almost innumerable: "For in her is the spirit of intelligence, holy, one, manifold, subtle, eloquent, mobile, undefiled, sure, sweet, loving good, acute, which nothing hinders, beneficent, humane, benign, stable, sure, secure, having every virtue, seeing all things, and who can take in all spirits, intelligible, clean, subtle."[4] (c) Hence God loves only those who cultivate wisdom: "For God loves no one except him who dwells with wisdom."[5] (d) It operates strongly and at the same time sweetly: "Therefore she reaches from end to end strongly, and disposes all things sweetly."[6] (e) It teaches the other virtues: "For she teaches sobriety and prudence, and justice, and virtue, than which nothing is more useful in life to men."[7] From these and many other things which may be read in the books of Proverbs and Wisdom, the excellence of wisdom can be understood.

[3] Wis. 7:8, 11.

[4] Ibid., 22-23.

[5] Ibid., 28.

[6] Wis. 8:1.

[7] Ibid., 7.

But today not a few, especially positivists, by the name of knowledge understand the cognition of things which can be investigated by experience and induction, and at the same time contend that it is impossible to reach the first cause, and therefore reject not only theological, but also metaphysical knowledge; nevertheless they extol positive knowledge as the only norm of the true and honorable, and the means by which the human race will finally attain perfect happiness.[1] We refuted this error above, n. 43-47. That knowledge of this kind is not a virtue, although it discovers and teaches many useful things, is clear from this, that it turns us away from God, far from directing us to him.

[1] Brunetiere excellently shows the insufficiency of knowledge for the right institution of moral life, and true happiness of heart, in Revue des Deux Mondes, Jan. 1, 1895; cf. M. d'Hulst, L'empoisonnement de la Science, in Melanges oratoires, t. IV, p. 174-189.

II. Concerning Moral Virtues.

585. 1. Notion. (A) Moral virtues are acquired habits perfecting the will and appetite for acting rightly. - Insofar as they are natural, they rest upon a natural motive, namely honorableness, which comes from conformity with right reason. The end toward which they of themselves tend is the natural perfection of man and his happiness. - Nevertheless, since in fact man is destined to a supernatural end, virtues of this kind, although of themselves natural, can be referred to a supernatural end, and be exercised under the influence of supernatural grace; indeed they can even be supernaturally infused, as will be said below, n. 598.

586. (B) It has been doubted whether the aforementioned virtues are virtues of the true name. Now it is certain that they truly have the nature of virtue, when through charity they are referred to the ultimate supernatural end. It is likewise certain that the same, as long as they remain within the natural order, cannot merit or attain eternal salvation, since there is lacking proportion between the supernatural end and the acts of natural virtues.

Nevertheless it can be said that these are true and perfect virtues in their own genus; for, as Benedict XIV rightly says, "if unbelievers can do honorable works, and frequently exercise themselves in them, they can also acquire for themselves and procure habits of such works, and thus consequently have true and perfect moral virtues in their own genus."[2]

[2] Benedict XIV, De servorum Dei beatific., lib. III, c. 21, n. 6.

587. 2. Division. Among moral virtues, there are four principal ones, which are called cardinal, because on these, as on hinges, the other virtues lean: namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.[3]

[3] Vacant-Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. II, 1714.

The Fathers and theologians often gather this division from these words of Wisdom:[1] "For she teaches sobriety (that is, temperance), and prudence, and justice, and virtue (fortitude), than which nothing is more useful in life to men." There indeed is not handed down a scientific division of virtues, but an enumeration of certain principal ones. - Pagan philosophers likewise numbered four principal virtues consonant with the aforementioned ones.[2] But this division already from the time of St. Ambrose became common in the Church.

[1] Wis. 8:7.

[2] Cicero, Tuscul., c. 14; De officiis, lib. I, c. 20.

588. (A) He seems to have been the first who called the four praised virtues cardinal: "And indeed we know that there are four cardinal virtues, temperance, justice, prudence, fortitude."[3] But afterward he hands down their notion thus:[4] "In the first place they established prudence, which is concerned with the investigation of truth, and infuses the desire of fuller knowledge; secondly justice, which gives to each his own, does not claim another's, neglects its own utility in order to guard common equity; thirdly fortitude, which both in military matters is eminent by the greatness of an exalted soul, and at home, and excels in the powers of the body; fourthly temperance, which preserves the measure and order of all things which we judge either must be done or must be said."

[3] Ambrose, Exposit. in Luc., lib. V, n. 62, P. L., XV, 1653.

[4] De officiis ministrorum, lib. I, c. 24, P. L., XVI, 57.

589. (B) This theory, generally accepted by the other Fathers, St. Thomas refined, namely by explaining why there are four cardinal virtues, and in what way they are distinguished from one another. He observes first that the cardinal virtues can be considered in two ways: (a) insofar as they signify certain general conditions of the human soul, which are found in all virtues; thus prudence is a certain rectitude of practical judgment, by which discretion is preserved in individual acts; justice is a rectitude of soul by which man bears himself rightly in all things to be done; fortitude is a certain firmness against any impulses of the passions or labors of operations; temperance is understood as a certain moderation in all things. In this sense, these virtues are not distinguished from one another, but are called cardinal, because they are the general conditions or properties of any virtue, which must be at the same time prudent, just, moderate, and strong. (b) But the aforementioned virtues can be considered in another way, according as they are concerned with formally diverse objects, and are subjected in various powers. Thus prudence resides in the practical intellect, and perceives and suggests the means to be used for attaining the honorable end in individual acts; justice inclines the will to bearing itself rightly concerning actions due to another, or to rendering to each his own; fortitude perfects the irascible appetite, so that it may stand firmly against all dangers; temperance is in the concupiscible appetite for restraining sensual delectations, especially those which arise from touch. According to this acceptance, the aforementioned virtues are truly and really distinguished, although they are in some way connected.

590. Moreover in the cardinal virtues there can be distinguished integral, subjective, and potential parts. Integral parts are certain conditions or dispositions which, although they do not

constitute the virtue essentially, are required for its integral perfection; thus for the perfection of prudence memory, understanding, providence, etc., are desired. - Subjective parts are called the various species of some virtue; thus justice is divided into commutative and distributive. - Potential or annexed parts are called certain less principal virtues which are joined to another more principal one, although they do not perfectly attain its nature; thus religion and piety toward parents are potential parts of justice, because they incline us to rendering to God and parents whatever is due to them, yet in such a way that we cannot render to equality what is due to them.

That this division is sufficiently intricate is clear from the mere consideration of the tree of virtues which certain Scholastics delineated. And indeed, for the perfection of Christian life, it is not necessary to hand down an accurate notion of all virtues with all their parts; but it is enough to set forth and cultivate the principal ones; for since many are connected, he who strives to acquire the principal ones, by that very fact makes progress in the others.

591. 3. Concerning the properties of moral virtues. Here we will explain two things, namely in what sense moral virtues are connected, and what is understood by the axiom: virtue stands in the middle.

(A) Concerning the connection of virtues. Already in his time Augustine thought that the four cardinal virtues are so connected among themselves that one cannot truly and properly be cultivated without the others:[1] "Certainly from this they persuade, that whoever has had one virtue has all, and all are lacking to him to whom one has been lacking, because prudence cannot be cowardly, nor unjust, nor intemperate: for if it were any of these, it would not be prudence. Furthermore if there will then be prudence, if it also is strong, and just, and temperate, certainly where it will be, it has the others with itself. So also fortitude cannot be imprudent, or intemperate, or unjust; so it is necessary that temperance be prudent, strong, and just; so justice is not, unless it is prudent, strong, and temperate. Thus where some one of them is true, the others likewise are; but where the others are lacking, that one is not true, even if in some way it seems to be similar."

[1] St. Augustine, epist. 167 (al. 29) ad Hieronymum, P. L., XXXIII, 735.

The Scholastics embraced this theory, in the sense that perfect moral virtues are so connected among themselves that, when one is lost, the others lose their perfection. But virtues are called perfect when they are not mere inclinations, but firm inclinations to following reason, and have all things required for their integrity. Then it can truly be said that these virtues are connected, because we cannot persevere long in one unless we are also adorned with the others; thus no one can be just for a long time unless he is prudent, temperate, and endowed with fortitude. Hence he who perfectly and stably cultivates one of these, by that very fact makes progress in the others, as we were saying just now.

592. (B) Concerning the mean of moral virtues. Virtues of this kind consist in the middle: (a) insofar as they avoid opposed excesses;[1] for example, fortitude stands in the middle between cowardice and rashness. For they are moral because they are conformed to the rule of morals; now they can deflect from the rule in a twofold way, either by exceeding the measure, or by falling short of it; therefore, to avoid this twofold excess, they ought to consist in the middle. (b) Moreover, when there is a collision of rights or duties, the mean of virtues consists in this,

that one virtue is tempered by another: thus, if justice inclines to punishing the guilty strictly, sometimes clemency counsels that, all circumstances attended to, the penalty be mitigated. - But it belongs to prudence, insofar as it is the charioteer of the virtues, to suggest this mean.

[1] This was the doctrine of the Stoics, with Horace as witness, Ep. 18, 9:

"Virtue is the middle of vices, and drawn back from each side."

593. 4. Concerning the increase, diminution, and loss of acquired moral virtues, the principles handed down above concerning acquired habits are valid, n. 573-577.

Art. II. Concerning Infused Virtues.

594. Besides acquired virtues, in the soul of the just there are supernatural habits divinely infused, by which it is directed toward choosing meritorious acts and attaining the supernatural end. For, by a certain analogy with natural life, three things are required for supernatural life: (a) a vital principle, which is nothing other than habitual grace, perfecting and elevating the substance of our soul, so that it can be the remote principle of supernatural actions; (b) operative faculties, or infused virtues, by which the powers naturally implanted in us are so elevated that they can be the proximate principle of supernatural acts; (c) the supernatural concurrence of God, namely actual grace, by force of which our faculties, strengthened by infused virtues, are excited and helped toward eliciting supernatural and meritorious acts.

[2] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62-63; Suarez, De Passionibus et habitibus, diss. III; John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. XVI; Lequeux, op. cit., p. 40-49 and passim; Muller, § 114-119; Pesch, Praelect. dogmaticae, t. VIII, n. 19-96; Billot, op. cit., th. 1-5.

I. Notion and Species.

595. (A) Infused virtues are supernatural habits implanted by God, by which the faculties of the soul receive the power of eliciting supernatural acts. (a) For in this they are primarily distinguished from natural virtues, that they are not acquired by repeated acts, but are divinely infused. Certain virtues are called infused of themselves, because they cannot be acquired by the powers of nature alone, and therefore cannot exist unless they are infused; but others are infused by accident, because, although they can be acquired by repeated acts, nevertheless they are conferred by God from his special benevolence. (b) Moreover, according to the common opinion, they do not furnish facility, but only the power of acting supernaturally: for experience seems to establish that those who received infused virtues in baptism are not conscious of this facility for acting supernaturally, - and on the contrary, through repeated acts of these virtues, they are soon sweetly inclined to eliciting the same more easily and delectably.

596. (B) Infused virtues can be theological or moral. (a) The former are so called because they are referred immediately to God; for the material object with which they are concerned is not a created thing, but God himself supernaturally known; but the motive (formal object) on which they rest is one of the divine attributes. There are three, namely faith, hope, charity, concerning which we will soon discuss.

(b) Moral virtues are immediately concerned with some created object (for example, justice renders to each his own), and the motive on account of which they are cultivated is the honorableness of the supernatural act itself. They are recalled to four, which are called cardinal; these do not differ on the part of the object from the four acquired cardinal virtues of which above; but only by reason of origin, since they are divinely infused, by reason of exercise, since they are exercised under the influence of actual grace, and by reason of end, because of themselves they tend toward a supernatural end.

II. Existence of Infused Virtues.

597. Thesis: It is certain that the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are infused in justification itself, and commonly the same is held concerning the moral virtues, especially the cardinal ones.

(A) Scripture rather clearly intimates this with regard to charity, and more obscurely with regard to the others: "The charity of God has been poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us";[1] for there charity (of God toward us, and therefore our charity toward God, since charity is mutual) is said to be infused by the Spirit at the very instant in which he is given to us, that is, in which we are justified. The other virtues likewise are exhibited as a gift of God: "For God has not given us a spirit of fear, but of power, and of love, and of sobriety."[2] - The Fathers, although they do not expressly uphold our thesis, not rarely assert that Christian virtues are the gift of God, the gift of the Holy Spirit, given through grace. Thus, among others, Augustine: "Grace will come after the Law; it is itself the blessing. And what has this grace and blessing furnished to us?" He answers that through grace many virtues are given, which he enumerates, and, after describing the four cardinal virtues, adds: "These virtues now in the valley of weeping are given to us by the grace of God."[3]

[1] Rom. 5:5.

[2] 2 Tim. 1:7.

[3] St. Augustine, in Ps. 73, n. 11, P. L., XXXVII, 1065-1066.

598. (B) At the beginning of the thirteenth century, it was supposed as certain that virtues are infused with habitual grace in adults, but it was doubted whether the same must be said of little ones, and some said that by the virtue of baptism guilt indeed is remitted to little ones, but grace is not conferred, nor virtues.[4] The matter was afterward brought to the Council of Vienne (A.D. 1311), and there it was declared:[5] "But we, attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all the baptized, have thought that the second opinion, which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism upon little ones as upon adults, as more probable and more consonant and concordant with the sayings of the saints and modern doctors of theology, should be chosen, with the sacred council approving."

[4] Decretal. Gregor., l. III, tit. 42, c. 3.

[5] Denzing., n. 411.

The Council of Trent declared the same as certain with regard to the theological virtues:[1] "In justification itself, with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused together through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity." The Catechism of the Council of

Trent holds that the same must be said concerning the other virtues; for, after describing sanctifying grace, it says: "But to this is added the most noble company of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul with grace."[2]

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, apud Denzing., n. 682.

[2] Catech. Trent., De sacram. baptismi, n. 42. The Catechism certainly does not possess the authority of the Council itself, but hands down the commonly accepted doctrine.

599. (C) Reason counsels this. In the natural order, God furnishes to man not only nature as the remote principle of acting, but also faculties by which he is immediately disposed to act. Now there is a certain analogy between natural life and supernatural life; and therefore it is deservedly inferred that God infuses into man not only habitual grace, which is the remote principle of acting supernaturally, but also proximate principles, or virtues. For although supernatural acts can be elicited through merely actual helps, it seems more consonant with divine wisdom that supernatural habits be infused, by whose aid these acts may be regularly produced.

III. Concerning the Increase of Infused Virtues.

600. 1. That virtues can be increased together with grace, Trent thus declares:[3] "Thus therefore, having been justified, and having been made friends and members of the household of God, going from virtue to virtue, they are renewed, as the Apostle says, from day to day;[4] that is, by mortifying the members of their flesh, and exhibiting them as arms of justice unto sanctification, through the observance of the commandments of God and of the Church, in the justice itself received through the grace of Christ, faith cooperating with good works, they grow and are more justified... But the holy Church asks for this increase of justice when she prays: Give us, O Lord, the increase of faith, hope, and charity."

[3] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 10, apud Denzing., n. 685.

[4] 2 Cor. 4:16.

601. 2. Virtues of this kind are increased through the worthy reception of the sacraments, and through merit *de condigno*.

(A) For the sacraments confer sanctifying grace, and indeed *ex opere operato*,[1] upon all who place no obstacle, and therefore they increase it in all who have received first grace; but grace growing, by that very fact the infused virtues which are connected with it grow.

[1] Synops. Theol. Dogmat., De Sacramentis, n. 45.

(B) Likewise supernatural good works, with Trent as witness,[2] truly merit the increase of grace, and consequently the increase of virtues which flow from it.

[2] Trent, sess. VI, can. 32, apud Denzing., n. 724; cf. Synops. dogmat., De Gratia, n. 193.

602. 3. But theologians dispute concerning the mode by which infused virtues are increased. (A) All indeed hold that they grow intensively, and indeed through divine infusion; for

since they are supernatural, and are produced in the soul by God, they cannot be increased by the proper efforts of the will, but only by divine action. Wherefore the repeated acts of these virtues do not concur directly toward their increase, but only as a meritorious cause, insofar as God, in view of these merits, increases grace and virtues.

But when the question concerns the intrinsic reason of this increase, theologians do not agree: (a) Thomists hold that the increase of habits happens not by the addition of a new form or reality, but by a greater rooting in the subject, which the habit more subjects to itself, by more easily reducing its potentiality into act.[3] (b) But Scotists[4] think that the increase happens through the addition of a new reality, or of a new degree, which accedes to the former and with it effects something one and more perfect. - A question of this kind is more philosophical than theological, and modern philosophers generally declare that nothing certain can be defined about this matter.

[3] Thus John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. XIII, art. 6.

[4] Scotus, in Sentent., lib. I, dist. 17, q. 3; Suarez, Disput. metaphys., XLVI, sect. I, where he enumerates the various opinions and critically weighs them.

603. (B) But it is certain that by the exercise of infused virtues facility in exercising acts of the same virtues is gradually acquired. This indeed arises especially from a twofold head: (a) From the removal of impediments; for by the exercise of infused virtue the passions are moderated, prejudices are put away, difficulties are overcome: but, obstacles removed, by that very fact the acts of virtues become easier. (b) From custom itself: for just as, through the frequent repetition of natural acts, a greater facility is acquired for doing the same, so likewise, at least indirectly, through the repetition of supernatural acts, the facility of doing the same is increased: for thus the potency is better disposed and, as it were, inclined to act. Hence a sinner recently converted indeed with difficulty works acts of temperance, chastity, fortitude, etc.; but, provided that, helped by grace, he elicits acts of these virtues, gradually he will perform the same more easily and delectably.

IV. Concerning the Loss of Infused Virtues.

604. 1. Infused theological virtues are lost through acts directly and gravely contrary to them; thus faith is destroyed through the grave sin of apostasy or heresy, - hope through the mortal sin of despair, - charity through any grave sin whatever, since it is opposed to divine charity.

(a) That faith is lost by infidelity (that is, by any grave sin against faith), but not by other grave sins, is clear from Trent:[1] "It must be asserted that not only by infidelity, through which faith itself also is lost, but also by any other mortal sin whatever, although faith is not lost, the received grace of justification is lost."

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 15, apud Denzing., n. 691. Cf. Synopsis Theol. Dogmat., De Fide, n. 141-147.

(b) But that charity is destroyed by any mortal sin whatever is likewise gathered from Trent; for, on the one hand, in the text alleged, it is declared that the grace of justification is lost by any mortal sin whatever; and, on the other, it is defined that justification happens "while through the Holy Spirit the charity of God is poured forth in the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them";[2] from

which it is deservedly inferred that charity does not inhere in sinners. - This is otherwise clear from innumerable texts of Scripture, in which it is asserted that sin is opposed to dilection, and that by charity the sons of God are distinguished from sinners,[3] as was said above, n. 449. And in reality, from what was said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 139-140, such is the nexus between grace and charity that one cannot subsist without the other.

[2] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, apud Denzing., n. 682.

[3] John 14:21; 1 John 2:3-11; 3:7-12.

(c) Concerning hope nothing is expressly defined; but the common and true opinion holds that it is not destroyed when sanctifying grace is lost, on account of the analogy with faith, but is lost through despair or through an act contrary to faith; for since, with the Apostle as witness,[1] faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, with faith hope necessarily perishes; for what can we hope, when the foundation of hope, namely faith in God the remunerator, has already failed?

[1] Heb. 11:1.

605. 2. It is commonly held that infused moral virtues are lost, together with habitual grace, through any mortal sin whatever.

(A) This St. Prosper, disciple of Augustine, had already taught, writing against the semi-Pelagian errors of Cassian: "Virtues cannot dwell with vices: for what participation," says the Apostle,[2] "has justice with iniquity? Or what fellowship has light with darkness? For virtue principally is God: to whom having virtue is not something other than being virtue. When we are participants of this, Christ dwells in us, who is the power of God and the wisdom of God;[3] faith dwells, hope, charity, continence, understanding, counsel, fortitude, and the other virtues. But when we withdraw from this good, all things opposite arise to us from us."[4]

[2] 2 Cor. 6:14.

[3] 1 Cor. 1:24.

[4] St. Prosper, Contra Collatorem, c. 13, P. L., LI, 247.

606. (B) Theologians commonly hold the same, led by this reason: infused moral virtues are, as it were, properties and the most noble company of grace, and therefore are infused so that they may order our life toward the supernatural end. Now, sanctifying grace having been lost, its properties are logically taken away; and since, through mortal sin, man is turned away from the supernatural end, he is consequently deprived of the virtues which tend toward the supernatural end. - It is indeed true, from what was said above, that faith and hope are not taken away by any grave sin whatever; but this happens from the special benevolence of God, who does not permit the very foundation of the spiritual building to be utterly overturned through mortal sin, but wishes faith and hope to remain in the sinner so that more easily he, moved by true penance, may return to the good Shepherd of souls.

Moreover if there are any naturally acquired virtues, they do not necessarily perish when grace is lost; thus he who has obtained the virtue of temperance or justice by repeated acts does not lose it by the very fact that he falls into a grave sin of lust.

607. 3. Corollary: concerning the diminution of infused virtues.

(A) It is commonly taught that infused habits are not diminished by venial sins. For if infused virtues were diminished by any venial sin, through many venial sins infused virtues and habitual grace itself could be totally destroyed; but this is opposed to the doctrine of Trent: "For although in this mortal life, however holy and just they may be, they sometimes fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial, they do not for that reason cease to be just."[1] - This is otherwise clear from what was said concerning venial sin, n. 483; for since infused virtues are the most noble company of grace, they are increased or lost with it; but they are not diminished, because grace itself is not diminished by venial sins, which in no way turn us away from God.

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 11, apud Denzing., n. 686.

608. (B) Nevertheless the fervor of charity and of the other virtues is diminished by venial sins. For (a) the facility of acting according to infused habits is diminished as soon as one sins against them even venially; (b) moreover he who frequently and deliberately commits venial sins, by that very fact is gradually disposed toward grave sin, as was shown above, n. 485, and thus a way is prepared for the very loss of charity: "Whence it follows," says St. Thomas,[2] "that charity can in no way be diminished, speaking directly; nevertheless the disposition toward its corruption can be called indirectly a diminution of charity, which happens either through venial sins, or even through cessation from the exercise of works of charity."

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 10.

For carefully avoiding such harm, nothing is of more profit than a constant effort toward making progress in Christian virtues. Concerning this progress it remains to be spoken in special moral theology.

609. After the consideration concerning human acts in general, insofar as, with law and conscience directing, they tend toward the ultimate end, - after the things said concerning sins and vices which turn us away from God, and also concerning virtues in common by which we are sweetly inclined toward God, it is necessary to discuss human acts in species: "For universal moral discourses are less useful, because actions are in particulars."[1]

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, Prologue.

But this part, which discusses acts in species, is called Special Theology. It is divided in diverse ways by diverse authors: (a) St. Thomas, whom many Scholastics have followed, distributes it into two parts, of which the former treats of those things which pertain to all states of men, but the latter of those things which pertain to determined states. But again he divides the former according to virtues; these are seven in number, namely three theological and four cardinal, concerning which he disputes separately and at length, describing them with all their parts, and with the gifts of the Holy Spirit which correspond to the same.

610. (b) Others, especially casuists,[2] who write for the use of confessors, omitting in their Institutions of Moral Theology all those things which are required for attaining Christian perfection, discuss only the precepts which are necessary for obtaining salvation: 1. concerning the precepts of the theological virtues; 2. concerning the precepts of the decalogue; 3.

concerning the precepts of the Church; 4. concerning the penalties laid down by the Church against graver delicts; 5. concerning the sacraments insofar as they are means for preserving the precepts. - This order is useful indeed to the confessor questioning penitents, but is of less profit to the director, who ought not only to turn souls away from evil, but also to lead them in the way of Christian virtues. The confessor could indeed and even ought to read ascetical authors, but not a few omit this, thinking that moral theology suffices for all things. - Besides, the precepts of the Decalogue or of the Church do not exhibit a logical and scientific order, and often are only negative; therefore this division, although practical enough in catechetical instructions, seems less apt for a scientific exposition of Christian Ethics.

[2] Thus especially Busembaum, S.J. (1600-1668), Medulla Theologiae moralis, whom, among others, Lacroix and St. Alphonsus followed and expounded with commentaries.

(c) Others, adhering to the division of natural Ethics, discuss successively duties toward God, oneself, and neighbor:[1] duties toward God and oneself regard individual morals, duties toward the neighbor regard social morals. This division indeed, by reason of its simplicity and perspicuity, can be of much profit for a popular and compendious exposition of Morals; nevertheless it seems less apt for scientific investigation, because not a few virtues, such as charity, are referred to God, oneself, and neighbor, and things are better understood and connected when the various offices of one and the same virtue are declared in the same Treatise.

[1] Thus, for example, Michel, Theologiae Moralis Principia, Paris, 1901-1902.

611. Therefore we follow the order delineated by the Angelic Doctor, yet accommodating it to present-day morals. Therefore we will discuss:

I. Concerning the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, which immediately reach God, and rest upon one of the divine attributes as upon a motive.

II. Concerning the virtue of religion, which regards divine worship, whether internal or external, and therefore consists as though in the middle between theological and moral virtues; in this treatise are set forth the first three precepts of the Decalogue.

III. Concerning the moral virtues, which sweetly incline us to composing our morals honorably and Christianly, especially concerning prudence, temperance, and fortitude, which are called cardinal; to these is added a supplement concerning Chastity, where the sixth precept of the Decalogue is set forth.

IV. Specifically concerning the virtue of justice, by which to each is rendered his own; this is indeed one of the cardinal virtues, but, on account of the multiple rights and offices which it includes, it demands a fuller exposition. There the four precepts of the Decalogue are declared, namely the fifth, seventh, eighth, and tenth.

V. Concerning the various obligations of states, or concerning the offices which are proper to the principal states of laymen and clerics; there, among other things, the fourth precept of the Decalogue is set forth, concerning the mutual offices of parents and children, masters and servants.

But concerning the sacraments, which include at the same time a dogmatic and moral part, we discuss partly in the Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology, after the Treatise on Grace, partly in the

Synopsis of Moral Theology.[1]

[1] Nevertheless, for the use of Seminaries where the moral doctrine concerning the Sacraments is usually handed down separately, we publish a special volume including practical questions concerning the sacraments in general and in species.

In treating of the cardinal virtues, we will not describe all their integral, subjective, and potential parts, but only those which are more useful for practice. - Moreover, so that confessors may more easily be able to question penitents, in the Supplement concerning the Precepts of God and of the Church we will show how precepts of this kind correspond to various virtues, and what sins are usually committed against the precepts.

612. A theological virtue is a virtue infused of itself, whose immediate object, at least primary, is God himself, and whose motive is one of the divine attributes.

That there are three theological virtues, and only three, can be gathered from the common sense of pastors and of the faithful. Paul commemorates these:[1] "But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." From the context, the matter here is not acts, but virtues, which remain; faith and hope indeed will be made void by the beatific vision, but charity will never fall away. - Augustine treats of the same in a special treatise, whose title is Enchiridion, or Concerning Faith, Hope, and Charity, where among other things he has these words: "On account of which the apostle Paul approves and commends faith, which works through dilection,[2] which certainly cannot exist without hope. Therefore neither is love without hope, nor hope without love, nor both without faith."[3] But elsewhere he explains how virtues of this kind contribute to the spiritual building of perfection: "(The house of God) is founded by believing, raised by hoping, perfected by loving."[4]

[1] 1 Cor. 13:13.

[2] Gal. 5:6.

[3] St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 8, P. L., XL, 235.

[4] Sermon 27, n. 1, P. L., XXXVIII, 178.

613. But why there are three theological virtues, and how they are connected among themselves, St. Thomas declares.[5] (a) Since the supernatural beatitude to which men are ordered is above our powers, it is necessary that we be disposed to it through supernaturally infused habits; but that we may be sufficiently ordered to God, three such habits are required. That our intellect may know God supernaturally in this life, faith is required, by which we assent to divinely revealed truths. But the will intends the supernatural end through hope, by which we trustingly expect eternal salvation and the means for attaining it. Finally the will is spiritually joined to God through charity, through which in some way it is transformed into him. - Nor are more theological virtues than three required; for the intellect, through faith, is referred to God under the aspect of truth; the will, through hope, is borne toward God, as he is our good, by which namely we are able to be perfectly made blessed; but through charity, it is borne toward him insofar as he is the supreme good in himself; and thus by these three we are sufficiently ordered into God.

[5] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62.

(b) A twofold order is distinguished in theological virtues. In the order of generation, faith, as to exercise,[1] precedes hope and charity, for the will cannot be borne into God through hope or dilection, unless he is first supernaturally known through faith; likewise we are not accustomed to love God as good in himself, unless we first apprehend him as our good, and thus hope precedes charity. - In the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope, because both faith and hope are formed by charity, and acquire the perfection of virtue; and thus charity is the mother of all virtues.[2]

[1] I say as to exercise, for the habits themselves of faith, hope, and charity are infused at the same time, from the things said in the Treatise on Virtues, n. 597.

[2] The excellence of charity and its preeminence are excellently described in 1 Cor. 13.

We will describe the theological virtues according to the order of generation, namely:

I. faith, through which we assent with the whole mind to God revealing;

II. hope, by which we trustingly expect the possession of God and the means for attaining it;

III. charity, by which we love God from the whole heart, and the neighbor on account of God.

On the Theological Virtues (Volume II)

On the Virtue of Faith

Chapter I. Concerning the Virtue of Faith.

614. Presupposing the things which we wrote in Dogmatic Theology concerning the object and act of faith, here we will weigh moral questions:

I. Concerning the nature and excellence of faith;

II. Concerning its necessity;

III. Concerning sins against faith;

IV. Concerning the means of making progress in faith.

Art. I. Concerning the Nature and Excellence of Faith. — I. Concerning the Nature of Faith.

615. Divine faith, of which we are treating, must be distinguished both from natural science and from human faith. Natural science, such as Philosophy, is concerned with truths which can be acquired by the light of reason alone, and rests upon intrinsic evidence, which is attained by a deductive or inductive method. Human faith rests upon the testimony of men, and gives us those cognitions which we cannot attain from the intrinsic evidence of things or by our own investigation; thus historical sciences rest upon human testimony. But divine faith is concerned with things divinely revealed, and we assent to them not on account of the intrinsic evidence of the things, nor on account of the testimony of men, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing.

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 1-2; Suarez, *De fide*, disp. I and VII; Lugo, *De Virtute fidei*, disp. XV, and others whom we cited in *Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae, De Fide*, p. 10; Newman, *University Sermons*; idem, *Grammar of Assent*; whose doctrine concerning the nature and genesis of faith H. Bremond arranged in the work: *Newman, Psychologie de la Foi*, Paris, Bloud, 1905.

Yet human faith, or the propensity which is in us to accept testimony as one of the sources for investigating truth, is an excellent disposition toward divine faith; for, "if we receive the testimony of men, the testimony of God is greater."[2] For who of sound mind, and free from prejudices, can reject the testimony of God, when he already admits the existence of God infinitely wise and truthful? Therefore the natural propensity of believing men, innate in us, is as it were a preparation for receiving the gift of divine faith.[3]

[2] 1 John 5:9.

[3] M. d'Hulst, *Confer.*, 1892, 3rd Conf., p. 91.

These things being laid down, we shall briefly gather together what elsewhere[4] we have already written concerning the definition of faith, the conditions for the act of faith, and its genesis.

[4] *Synop. Th. Dogmat., De Fide*, nn. 19-26 and 102-119.

616. 1. Definition. (A) Faith, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, is described as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing."[5] The Vatican Council professes the same,[6] that it is "a supernatural virtue, by which, with the grace of God inspiring and assisting, we believe that the things revealed by Him are true, not on account of the intrinsic truth of the things perceived by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive." From this a definition of faith can be drawn, either as a habit or as an act.

[5] Heb. 11:1. This description Dante expounds poetically, *La Divina Commedia, Paradiso*, canto 24. From the Pauline definition it follows that faith is concerned with things to be hoped for, namely those which pertain to our supernatural beatitude.

[6] Sess. III, cap. 3, Denzing., n. 1638.

(B) Faith, as a habit, is usually defined: a supernatural and theological virtue infused, disposing the mind, that is, the intellect and the will, to assent firmly, under the influence of actual grace, on account of the divine authority, to all things revealed by God.[7] - But the act of faith can be defined: the act by which the intellect, at the command of the will assisted by grace, firmly assents, on account of the authority of God, to all things divinely revealed.

[7] Recently this definition was attacked because it is not sufficiently psychological, nor does it sufficiently show how supernatural faith rests upon the natural faculty of believing; and therefore this other definition was proposed: the natural faculty supernaturally transmuted by God through grace, disposing the mind to assent firmly, etc. (Pichegut, in *Rev. du Clerge francais*, t. XXIX, Dec. 1901, pp. 72-76). But this natural faculty supernaturally transmuted presents a very obscure concept: for in what does a transmutation of this kind consist? - Moreover the classical definition, which rests upon the Vatican Council, can be explained psychologically: for it is already signified clearly enough that the virtue of faith is inserted in the intellect and will, with the grace of God cooperating, and in the declaration of the definition, especially where the act of faith is treated, the psychological process of faith can be described. - Concerning the controversies had on this matter between Pichegut and Gayraud, Guillemant, Le Bras, see *Rev. du Clerge francais*, t. XXIX, pp. 206, 320, 537, 636.

617. 2. Conditions for faith. These are required from a threefold head, namely on the part of the object, of the subject, and of God:

(a) On the part of the object: the revelation of some truth; otherwise nothing could be believed by divine faith; - the proposition of this truth, or its manifestation made to those to whom God did not immediately reveal it; - motives of credibility, or reasons and proofs by which it can be judged with moral certainty that some truth has been revealed, and therefore is credible and to be believed. But that moral certitude is sufficient which excludes a prudent fear of erring.

(b) On the part of the subject: the absence of prejudices; for, especially in a moral matter, nothing more clouds and blinds the intellect than judgments formed a priori without sufficient foundation, such as, for example, these or like ones: a miracle is impossible; preternatural facts cannot be demonstrated; - besides this, a pious affection for believing is desired. For since the truths of faith are often obscure, and are especially opposed to human passions, the intellect, by a certain natural instinct, is prone to deny them, unless it is gently inclined by the will.

(c) On the part of God, there is required actual grace, which precedes man, illumines his intellect so that he may more easily perceive the force of the motives of credibility, and moves the will so that it commands the assent of the intellect. For faith is a truly supernatural act, a special gift of God which

is truly gratuitous: "No one, however, can consent to the evangelical preaching, as is necessary for obtaining salvation, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all sweetness in consenting to and believing the truth."[8]

[8] Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 3, apud Denzing., n. 1640.

618. 3. Concerning the genesis of faith. These things being laid down, it can be understood how regularly the act of faith, by a logical process, is elicited by an adult who has not yet embraced the Christian faith. We suppose him to be rightly disposed, so that he is prepared to receive the truth, even when opposed to prejudices or passions; otherwise he will scarcely be able to grasp the force of the arguments. (a) First, he must recognize naturally the existence of God and His infallible truthfulness, either by reasoning, namely by considering the arguments which are set forth in the *Philosophical Lectures*, or by other natural means, for example, the authority of parents or of more learned men, who propose these truths. For cognition of this kind the natural concurrence of God is sufficient of itself. (b) Afterward, conscious of his own inability to discover all the truths whose knowledge he needs in order to order life rightly, the fact of revelation is investigated, with the help of history and criticism, by considering the motives of credibility, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, which are set forth in the *Treatise on True Religion*, especially the arguments by which the divinity of Christ's mission is proved. These motives, especially if all are reviewed together attentively and sincerely, generate moral certitude, which excludes a prudent fear of erring. For this also the natural concurrence of God is sufficient of itself, although God is accustomed to assist both the intellect and the will in this study by preternatural help; hence it is very expedient that the help of God be sought by frequent prayer. (c) From this twofold consideration there can now be formed a speculative judgment concerning the possibility and the obligation of believing, or, as they say, concerning credibility and credendity. For if God, infallibly truthful, has revealed certain truths, we are bound to give assent to them. Such a judgment in itself is natural; but, since it is the proximate and positive preparation for the act of faith itself, our faculties are now in fact aided by supernatural grace to form it. (d) There follows upon this an act of the will commanding the assent of the intellect; for since the matter is one in itself not evident, and one which moreover is established only with moral certainty, a certainty excluding prudent doubt, it is necessary that the will command this prudent assent of the intellect. From this there is elicited an act of implicit faith, or the practical judgment of the intellect assenting in a general way to all the truths revealed by God, on account of the authority of God revealing. This is truly an act of supernatural faith, elicited by the intellect, under the command of the free will, with the grace of God exciting and cooperating, which illumines the intellect and moves the will: it is therefore a free act, and, the requisite conditions being posited, meritorious. (e) Afterward it remains to be investigated which, in species, are the truths revealed by God, so that they may be believed explicitly. Now one of the truths manifested by Christ is the infallible authority granted to the Church, for authoritatively proposing the truths to be believed: supernatural assent to this truth is an act of explicit faith, elicited by the intellect, under the command of the will and the influence of grace.

This being accomplished, the way will now be easy for believing explicitly whatever the infallible Church shall have proposed as of faith.

II. Concerning the Excellence of Faith.

619. Faith, especially that which is joined to confidence and works through charity, contributes greatly indeed to private and public good.

[9] Lacordaire, 12th Conference; Largent, *Une station de Careme*, Paris, 1881, p. 33; Bouquillon, *De virt. theologicis*, nn. 198-204; M. d'Hulst, *Confer.* 1892, pp. 123-129; Gay, *Vie et Vertus chret.*, Paris, 1876, t. I, l. III, *De la Foi*, pp. 142-155.

1. To private good. For (A) faith, taken in a general way, according to Trent,[10] is deservedly called "the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God and to come to the fellowship of His sons." It is, namely, the beginning of salvation; for we cannot use the means necessary for salvation unless we have known them; nor are we able to know them except through faith, since they are supernatural: by faith we know God as the ultimate supernatural end, - Christ as Redeemer and mediator, - and all things instituted by Christ for obtaining justification and for increasing and preserving grace. Hence, according to the Apostle,[11] the just man lives by faith, is justified by faith, and is saved through faith. Therefore faith is truly the foundation of the whole spiritual building, and as it were the cornerstone without which it cannot stand. It is rightly also called the root of the whole of justification; for as the root not only sustains the tree, but also supplies sap to it, by which it brings forth leaves and fruit, so faith not only sustains spiritual life, but also nourishes it, while it pours into us, as it were, the various and pious affections of fear, hope, and others like these, as a certain sap, from which the fruits of charity spring up.

[10] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 8 (Denzing., n. 683).

[11] Rom. 1:17; 5:1; Gal. 3:11; 1 Cor. 15:1-2, etc.

620. (B) If it is considered insofar as it perfects the intellect, it is as it were a new light superadded to the light of reason, by which we are able to attain truths inaccessible to human reason; for, as was said in the *Treatise on True Religion*, nn. 142-145, there are many problems of the moral order, and indeed of the greatest moment, which the human mind left to itself cannot solve, especially concerning man's origin, nature, ultimate end, and the means necessary for attaining it. Now to all these questions faith gives an answer that is certain, consonant with reason, and adapted to the intelligence of all; thus it frees us from manifold doubt and error, and is as it were a lighthouse showing the path of the right way, amid the rocks of errors, and the port of salvation toward which we tend.

621. (C) With regard to the will, faith is deservedly called a perennial fountain of strength and consolation. (a) Of strength indeed; which the Apostle splendidly declares: after describing the excellent deeds done by the Fathers with faith assisting, he adds these things:[1] "Who through faith conquered kingdoms, wrought justice, obtained promises... recovered strength from weakness, became mighty in war."

[1] Heb. 11:33-34; let the whole chapter be read.

In truth faith sets before our eyes whatever God has done for our salvation, with what charity He loved us from eternity, how He adopted us as sons, and delivered His Only-begotten Son for the salvation of sinners; - how many and how great benefits Christ bestowed upon us, what torments He willingly suffered to redeem us, what means He benignly instituted for our sanctification, with what unfailing love He follows after us while hidden on the altar; - what eternal rewards or torments are prepared for us, according as we have acted well or badly. Now all these things, and many others which faith suggests, stir men in the best way possible to the love of God and of neighbor, and add new strength to them, so that, despising the vanities of the world and spurning the enticements of pleasures, they may pursue the good strenuously and constantly.

(b) Faith likewise offers the greatest consolation amid the miseries of life; for if every creature groans, by the example of Christ suffering and dying on the cross, and also by the hope of future goods, pains are lightened not a little: "Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ... And not only so; but we glory also in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience; and patience trial; and trial hope... If, however, we suffer with Him, that we may also be glorified with Him. For I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory which shall be revealed in us... And we know that to them that love God all things work together unto good."[2]

[2] Rom. 5:1-4; Rom. 8:17-18; Rom. 8:28.

This indeed appears most of all when we lose parents, relatives, and intimately beloved friends: "And we will not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning those who are asleep, that you be not sorrowful, even as others who have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so God will bring with Him those who have slept through Jesus."[3] For through death "life is changed, not taken away, and, the house of this earthly dwelling being dissolved, an eternal dwelling in the heavens is prepared."[4] Meanwhile, by force of the communion of saints, we remain intimately joined to departed friends: we pray for them detained in purgatory, and they, having entered heaven, now secure concerning their immortality, become solicitous for our salvation and intercede for us.[5]

[3] 1 Thess. 4:12.

[4] *Missale*, Proper for Gaul, Preface for the dead.

[5] How great a consolation faith offers to the afflicted is eloquently declared by Bougaud, *Le Christianisme et les temps presents*, t. I, ch. XI sq.; Gay, op. cit., l. XIII, *De la douleur chretienne*; H. Perreyve, *La journee des malades*; Ctesse de Flavigny, *L'Annee des malades*, Paris, 1905.

622. (D) From this it follows that faith is very meritorious, for this is the most excellent homage of our mind, by which we freely subject at once both will and intellect to divine authority. For since the things to which we assent are not evident, but for the most part difficult to believe, and are also opposed to the passions, especially to pride, pleasure, and egotism, it is necessary that our will gently and strongly incline the intellect not only to consider attentively the motives of credibility, but also to offer assent humbly to revealed truths; and no one fails to see that this is very meritorious.

From this also it is gathered that faith is as it were the dawn and foretaste of the beatific vision; for by faith we believe those things which through the light of glory we shall contemplate, and, although we perceive the same things only obscurely, we give certain and firm assent on account of the

authority of God, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. Therefore of Christians much more than of the patriarchs it can be said: "All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off, and saluting them, and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers upon the earth."[6]

[6] Heb. 11:13.

623. 2. To public or social good. (A) Since society is an association of families, it cannot flourish without rightly ordered families. Moreover, it is established no less historically than psychologically that families are not stable except where the unity and indissolubility of marriage flourish.[7] Now Christian faith teaches and fosters both of these, and through the centuries has furnished the greatest security to families. But when faith decreases, divorces are soon multiplied, family bonds are broken, and from this society is weakened.

[7] *Synop. Theol. Dogmat., De Matrimonio,* n. 45 and nn. 58-63.

624. (B) Society, moreover, cannot long and peacefully stand without the constant exercise of justice, by which his own is rendered to each, and of charity, which inclines citizens to give mutual help to one another. Now Christian faith constantly inculcates and inspires these virtues, as will be said below; but when faith is diminished, and all the more when faith is removed, the very notion of the just and equitable is gradually obscured, charity languishes and grows cold; soon quarrels, dissensions, and struggles of parties are increased; the rich become harsher toward the poor, and the poor envy the richer and pursue them with hatred, as lamentable experience today establishes; and thus the foundations of society seem to totter.[8] - Philosophers indeed, both ancient and modern, have sought the norm of the just and equitable, and the foundation of charity, or, as they say, of altruism and solidarity, in various systems, but in vain, as we have shown above, *On the Ultimate End*, nn. 33-64.

[8] To the point M. d'Hulst, op. cit., pp. 127-128: "Everyone agrees today that, without justice and without love, the earth would be a hell. There remains, therefore, only one question to resolve: where is the guarantee of justice? where is the source of love? The despisers of Christianity promise us that they will find both the one and the other in the scientific education of instincts. But, since the time when they keep repeating this promise, we see growing among their authentic disciples only the ferocity of egoism and the cult of force. And yet society still lives on the remains of the Christian inheritance. What will it be when it has finished dissipating it? One of those who call our faith an illusion was admitting it recently, mixing a blasphemy with his admission: 'Religious persons,' he said, 'live on a shadow.' This is the blasphemy; here is the admission: 'We, we live on the shadow of a shadow. On what will people live after us?' (Renan, *Preface des Feuilles detachees*.)" Taine proves the same from those things which happened at the time of the French Revolution: faith having indeed been rejected, the cruelty and lust of pagans soon flourished. (*Les origines de la France contemporaine: le Regime moderne*, t. II, pp. 118-119.)

Art. II. Concerning the Necessity of Faith.

625. State of the question. (A) Once man's elevation to the supernatural state has been posited, revelation becomes necessary for manifesting the means conducing to this end; but once revelation has been posited, faith becomes necessary for salvation, as the Vatican Council teaches:[2] "Since man depends wholly upon God as upon his Creator and Lord, and created reason is entirely subject to uncreated Truth, we are bound to render to God revealing the full

obedience of intellect and will by faith... But because without faith it is impossible to please God and to come to the fellowship of His sons, therefore justification has never befallen anyone without it, nor will anyone attain eternal life unless he has persevered in it unto the end." It afterward thus defines this obligation of believing: "If anyone shall say that human reason is so independent that faith cannot be commanded to it by God, let him be anathema."

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, aa. 3-8; Suarez, *De Fide*, disp. 12-12; Lugo, disp. XII-XIV; Billuart, *De Fide*, disp. 3; St. Alphonsus, lib. III, tr. I, *De praecepto fidei*; Lequeux, op. cit., nn. 145-169; Bouquillon, op. cit., nn. 156-197; Merit, *La Foi*, Tours, Cattier, 1886, pp. 187-264; Pesch, nn. 426-465.

[2] Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 3 and can. 1 *de Fide*, apud Denzing., nn. 1638, 1642, 1657.

626. (B) But something can be necessary in two ways, namely by necessity of means and by necessity of precept. (a) That is necessary by necessity of means which is a means, and indeed a necessary means, of justification, and therefore without which, even if it is inculpably omitted, salvation cannot be obtained; in this case, therefore, neither ignorance nor inability can excuse. But something can be necessary by necessity of means in two ways: intrinsically, when by its nature it is ordered as a necessary means to salvation, so that it cannot be supplied by another, for example, the love of God; extrinsically, when it is required for salvation only by the free institution of God, so that, if God wills, it can be supplied by other means: for example, Baptism of water.

(b) That is necessary by necessity of precept which is so prescribed that it cannot be freely omitted without sin; therefore if it is culpably omitted, it is a cause of damnation; but if it is inculpably omitted, on account of ignorance or inability, salvation can be obtained without it. Now that faith is necessary both by necessity of means with respect to some objects, and by necessity of precept with respect to others, will be established from what is to be said.

§ I. Concerning the Necessity of Faith as a Means.

627. Faith, as an infused habit, is altogether necessary by necessity of means for salvation, as can be gathered from what has already been said. For without the grace of justification no one can be saved, as is clear from the *Treatise on Grace*; moreover, in the present order of things, justification is not conferred without the infusion of the virtues of faith, hope, and charity (*On the Virtues*, n. 597); therefore he who lacks the habit of faith by that very fact lacks sanctifying grace.

But the question is concerning the act of faith, and indeed with regard to adults: for infants and others lacking the use of reason, if through baptism they have received the infused habit of faith, are saved without an act of faith, of which they are incapable.[3] Therefore concerning adults it must be asked whether and what they are bound to believe by necessity of means.

[3] Concerning the state of children who die without baptism, it was said in *Tr. de Deo Creante*, nn. 201-205.

628. I. Thesis: For adults some act of theological faith is absolutely necessary for justification, and therefore for obtaining salvation. It is certain.

1. Trent clearly teaches this; for concerning sinners it says: "They are disposed to this justice when, aroused and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God." Afterward it adds that the instrumental cause of justification is the sacrament of baptism, "which is the sacrament of faith, without which justification has never befallen anyone." Finally it declares the matter more openly in these words: "But when the Apostle says that man is justified by faith and freely, those words are to be understood in that sense which the perpetual consensus of the Church has held and expressed: namely, that we are said to be justified by faith because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification: without which it is impossible to please God and to come to the fellowship of His sons."[4]

[4] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6, 7, 8, apud Denzing., nn. 680, 681, 683.

629. 2. Scripture hands down the same thing in various ways: (a) it asserts that faith is the beginning and foundation of human salvation; thus Christ, in His discourse to Nicodemus, says:[5] "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that everyone who believes in Him may not perish, but may have eternal life"; likewise, when He sends the Apostles into the world, He addresses them thus: "Preach the gospel to every creature. He who believes and is baptized shall be saved; but he who does not believe shall be condemned."[6] Hence the deacon Philip replies to the eunuch asking for baptism:[7] "If you believe with all your heart, you may"; and the Apostles require faith in Christ from the newly converted; thus the jailer at Philippi asks Paul and Silas: "Sirs, what must I do to be saved? But they said: Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you shall be saved, you and your house."[8] - (b) It declares that works of the law and natural works are insufficient without faith: this the Apostle expressly and often inculcates, especially in the Epistle to the Romans and to the Galatians: "For we account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law... But knowing that man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ."[9] - (c) Finally it is asserted that faith is a necessary means to spiritual life and to pleasing God: "But My just man lives by faith; but if he withdraws himself, My soul shall not be pleased with him... But without faith it is impossible to please God; for he who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him."[10]

[5] John 3:14-15.

[6] Mark 16:15-16.

[7] Acts 8:37. This text, however, is lacking in some manuscripts.

[8] Acts 16:30-31.

[9] Rom. 3:28; Gal. 2:16.

[10] Heb. 10:38; 11:6.

630. 3. It is confirmed by reason, once man's elevation to a supernatural end has been supposed. For since an end of this kind so exceeds our powers that we cannot even know it naturally, and moreover the means for attaining it, such as Christ's sacrifice and the sacraments instituted by Him, transcend the natural vision of the mind, it was necessary

that all these things be known by faith. - Moreover the end toward which we tend is the perfect vision of God; now it was fitting that we should be led by the hand toward this perfect knowledge through faith, which is as it were an inchoate vision of divine things, insofar as it makes us sharers in divine knowledge:[11] for, relying upon divine testimony, we believe those things which He Himself sees, and which we shall afterward see.

[11] "Faith... joins man to divine knowledge through assent" (St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. XIV, a. 8).

II. Concerning the Truths to Be Believed by Necessity of Means.

631. 1. It is certain that it is necessary by necessity of means explicitly to believe in God existing and rewarding.

(A) This is declared. Indeed we are bound in a general way to believe all those things which God has revealed; and he who would deliberately deny one truth which he knows to have been divinely revealed would by that very fact be a heretic, as will be explained below. But besides this certain truths must be believed explicitly, or in themselves, in their own proper concept; nor is it enough to believe them implicitly, that is, insofar as they are contained in other truths explicitly believed.

(B) It is proved. (a) The existence of God and His providence with regard to the remuneration of the good and the evil must be explicitly believed, according to that saying of the Apostle:[12] "For he who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him." - Moreover, by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679, this proposition (22) was condemned: "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in the Rewarder."[13] Therefore explicit faith in both truths is necessary.

[12] Heb. 11:6.

[13] Denzing., n. 1039; Viva, on this proposition.

(b) This indeed is consonant with right reason. For since God is our ultimate end both in the natural and in the supernatural order, we cannot attain Him unless we know His existence. - Some indeed say that this is sufficient; for, as soon as we know that God is the highest good, we can proceed to an act of perfect charity and contrition, and thus be justified. But, given man's nature and imperfection, he in fact does not arrive at perfect contrition except through fear and hope, namely by considering God as the supreme rewarder, who justly renders punishments to the evil and rewards to the good, according to the laws of equity.

632. (C) But it is asked in what sense we must believe in God the rewarder.

(a) With regard to the existence of God, many Thomists say that there is required faith in God as He is the author of the supernatural order, but not faith in God as He is the author of the natural order; for we know this truth by reason, and moreover what is certainly and evidently known cannot be believed.[14] Yet many others, such as Suarez, Lugo,[15] etc., hold that faith in God as He is the author of the natural order is necessary, or insofar as He is endowed with those perfections which can be known by the natural light: for we can believe by faith what we already know by reason, and moreover St. Paul requires this faith.

[14] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, aa. 4-5; Gonet, *Clypeus*, *De fide*, disp. I, art. 5-6; Salmanticenses, *De Fide*, disp. III, dub. 2; Berthier, *De locis theolog.*, n. 504.

[15] Suarez, *De Fide*, disp. III, sect. 8, and disp. XII, sect. 3, n. 4; Lugo, disp. XII, sect. 5, n. 123; Pesch, n. 445. - Cf. *Synop. Theol. Dogmat., De Fide*, nn. 129-132.

In truth the Apostle makes no distinction, but teaches only that God must first be believed as existing, afterward as rewarding. Moreover he is treating of supernatural faith, namely of that which is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing,[16] and therefore of that which rests not upon human reasoning, but upon divine testimony. But for this faith it is not required that there be a distinct concept of supernaturality, which cannot be demanded from the common people; rather, it is enough that the believer understand that these truths are in some way divinely proposed, whether through external revelation or through an internal manifestation made to conscience.

[16] Heb. 11:1. - Which M. d'Hulst thus explains, *Confer.* 1892, pp. 113-114: "The second domain of faith is the natural truths which serve as a basis for revelation. Man first discovers them by the effort of his reason, if he is capable of this effort. But, when faith has supervened, it shows him these same truths under a new light, as forming part of divine teaching; and what was matter for reasoning becomes an object of belief. Such are the teachings relating to the existence of God, to His perfections, to the immortality of the human soul... For the cultivated mind, these truths are therefore illumined by a double light, one which comes from nature, the other which is kindled at the hearth of grace."

633. Therefore that faith in the broad sense, resting upon natural discourse, which takes its origin from the testimony and knowledge of creatures, insofar as they manifest the invisible attributes of God, is not sufficient. For this proposition (23) was condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "Faith in the broad sense from the testimony of creatures, or from a similar motive, suffices for justification."[17] For faith arising from the knowledge of creatures alone cannot rise up to the supernatural end, nor beget supernatural charity, which is especially necessary for salvation.

[17] Denzing., n. 1040; Viva, on this proposition.

634. Corollary. From this it is understood how God provides for the salvation of those who live among pagans, where they have heard nothing of evangelical faith. According to St. Thomas and theologians commonly, if some pagan "were to follow the guidance of natural reason in the pursuit of good and the flight from evil, it must most certainly be held that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration those things which are necessary to be believed, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, as He sent Peter to Cornelius."[1] And indeed God, who once spoke to the patriarchs and to others outside the Jewish people, can without difficulty speak inwardly to those who are rightly disposed, so that they understand themselves to be instructed by the supreme Deity.

[1] St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1.

635. 4. It is controverted whether explicit faith in the Most Holy Trinity and in Christ the Redeemer is necessary by necessity of means.

(A) It is commonly held that, before the coming of Christ, it was not necessary by necessity of means explicitly to believe the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the incarnate Word; for these had

not yet been sufficiently revealed to men, as is clear from what was said in the *Treatise on the Triune God*, nn. 29-36.

(B) But some, supported by the authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas,[2] think that, after the fall of Adam, it was necessary for justification by necessity of means explicitly to believe in some mediator, by whose merits salvation could be obtained. They allege the words of Scripture: "For there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved";[3] and from this they infer that no one can be saved without faith in Christ, or in some mediator.

[2] St. Augustine, *De Civit. Dei*, lib. XVIII, cap. 47, P. L., XLI, 610; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 7; Bouquillon, n. 169. - You may see the whole controversy set forth apud Perrone, *De virtutibus fidei, spei et carit.*, Ratisbon, 1865, nn. 344-379.

[3] Acts 4:12; cf. 1 Cor. 11:11.

636. (C) Nevertheless today, as more probable, many theologians teach that explicit faith in the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation, or even of Christ the mediator, is not necessary by necessity of means.[4] For (a) so grave a necessity ought not to be established without a compelling reason; but this reason is lacking. For when the Apostle speaks of the necessity of faith, in the place cited above, he speaks only of faith in God the rewarder; moreover the acts of faith, hope, charity, and penance required for justification can be elicited without faith in the Trinity and Incarnation; as soon as we believe that God is, and indeed that He is supremely good and perfect, rendering to each according to his works, there is now nothing to prevent the acts necessary for justification from being elicited. Therefore, from the nature of the thing, even after the supernatural end has been posited, faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation is not absolutely required; if it is necessary, this is only by the positive will of God; but this will has not been clearly manifested. (b) Moreover, if this faith is required, the salvation of those who have heard nothing of the Gospel becomes morally impossible, that is, of more than half of the human race; for an extraordinary light would be necessary for pagans to be instructed concerning this twofold mystery, the existence of which most do not suspect.

[4] Suarez, disp. XII, sect. 4.

Therefore we think it more probable that this explicit faith is not required. But the texts of Scripture concerning the necessity of faith in Christ can be understood of necessity of precept, or of implicit necessity of means, or even in this sense, that no one is saved except through the merits and satisfactions of Christ.

637. Corollary. In practice, since here the question is of a thing necessary for salvation, the safer part must be followed. Therefore: (a) all those who have the care of souls must diligently teach the faithful committed to them not only God existing and rewarding, but also God triune and the Word incarnate and Redeemer. Yet it is not required that a scientific knowledge of these mysteries be handed on to the simple, of which they are incapable; it is enough that it be taught that there are three persons in God, distinct and equal, namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and that these three are one God, - and that the second person of the Trinity, or the Son of God, made man, redeemed us by His death.

638. (b) Regularly those who labor under ignorance of these mysteries, even invincible ignorance, are neither to be baptized nor absolved;[5] but, in a case of extreme necessity, if time for

instructing the catechumens is lacking, they are to be baptized absolutely, because, where there is question of requisites not for the valid but only for the fruitful reception of baptism, no condition should be placed; if they survive, they should be diligently instructed. But penitents are to be absolved under condition if they are capable, and, if they survive, they must be instructed and absolved again. For on the one hand, where there is question of means necessary for salvation, the safer part must be chosen, and on the other hand, in a case of necessity, where certain remedies are lacking, probable remedies must be used (above, nn. 388-389).

[5] Hence the Holy Office, Jan. 25, 1703, declared that "a missionary is bound to explain to an adult, even one dying, who is not altogether incapable, the mysteries of Faith which are necessary by necessity of means, as are especially the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation" (*Collect. P. F.* n. 549). This was declared concerning an adult in relation to baptism; but the same reason applies with regard to absolution. - It is established besides from the condemnation by Innocent XI of this proposition 64: "A man is capable of absolution, however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith, and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ." (Denzing., n. 1081; Viva, on this proposition.)

(c) When there is question of the semi-foolish or the very ignorant, an act of faith in God one and triune, and in Christ the Redeemer, should be suggested to them before they are absolved, so that the validity of the absolution may become safer.

§ II. Concerning the Necessity of Faith by Precept.

Two things are prescribed: an internal act of faith, and an external profession of faith; concerning these we must speak separately.

I. Concerning the Internal Act of Faith.

639. There is given a divine precept of believing the truths revealed by God, at once negative and positive. Insofar as it is negative, it forbids revealed truths sufficiently proposed and known to be rejected or called into doubt; insofar as it is positive, it obliges us to elicit acts of faith at times. We shall speak concerning the existence and extension of this precept, and also concerning the time at which it obliges.

640. 1. Existence. There is given a divine precept of explicitly eliciting internal acts of faith concerning the principal truths revealed by God.

(a) This Christ Himself taught, when He sent the apostles into the world:[1] "Preach the Gospel to every creature: he who believes and is baptized shall be saved; but he who does not believe shall be condemned"; from which it is clear that faith in the Gospel preached by the apostles, no less explicitly than baptism, is necessary for salvation. The apostles held the same, among whom John equates the precept of faith with the precept of charity:[2] "And this is His commandment, that we should believe in the name of His Son Jesus Christ, and love one another, as He has given commandment to us": for there it is a question of explicit faith in Christ.

[1] Mark 16:16.

[2] 1 John 3:23.

(b) And indeed by the very fact that God reveals something, He commands that faith be given to Himself; for he who, revelation having been certainly known, refuses faith, cannot fail to inflict an injury upon the wisdom and truthfulness of God, whether by doubting revealed things or by denying them. - Moreover, if he is unwilling to assent to them, he withdraws himself from the supreme dominion of God. For man is not more independent of the Creator with regard to the intellect than with regard to the will, and therefore God can demand from us the assent of the intellect no less than the obedience of the will.

641. 2. Extension. Here there is question of those things which are to be believed explicitly by all, not of those things which must be known by the more learned, especially by God's ministers, according to their office. In a general way the faithful must explicitly believe whatever is required for feeling and acting as Christians, and therefore, besides the truths necessary by necessity of means enumerated above:

(a) The principal truths which are contained in the Apostles' Creed:[3] for there, in a brief and simple way, are set forth the principal articles by which Catholics are distinguished from infidels and heretics, namely those which formerly were proposed to catechumens before the reception of baptism. Indeed articles of this kind gradually increased, but substantially they are already contained in the Scriptures, and the Church by her infallible authority proposes all these to be believed by us.

[3] Concerning the Creed we spoke in the *Treatise on Theological Sources*, nn. 17-18. Today it is not admitted that the individual articles are to be ascribed to individual apostles; the Creed is called Apostles' because the apostles themselves handed down the substance of the dogmas which it comprises. The very word *Symbolum Apostolorum* is found for the first time in the letter of the Council of Milan to Siricius, toward the end of the fourth century (Migne, P. L., t. XVI, 1125); before that, the confession of faith which catechumens and the faithful professed was called the rule of faith, doctrine, tradition, watchword. How the brief formula of faith in the Trinity, which was recited before baptism, was successively enlarged, so that sprouting heresies might be forestalled, is declared by the authors cited by us (loc. cit.), and besides by S. Baumer, *Das apostoliche Glaubensbekenntniss*, Mainz, 1893; A. E. Burn, *An Introduction to the Creeds*, London, 1899; Sanday, *Recent Research on the Origin of the Creed*, in *Journal of Theological Studies*, Chicago, Oct. 1899 and Oct. 1901; Semeria, *Dogma, Gerarchia e Culto*, Rome, 1902; Ermoni, *Histoire du Credo*, Paris, Bloud, 1903; Vacandard, *Etudes de critique*, Paris, 1905, pp. 3-68; Vacant, *Diction. de Theol.*, t. I, p. 1660.

The divine precept indeed is not concerned with the very words of the Creed, as they are read today, but with the substance of the dogmas which are expressed by these words. It is altogether expedient that the very words themselves be faithfully committed to memory and recited daily: for thus the truths expressed by these words are retained more effectively. But probably no precept, whether divine or ecclesiastical, is given concerning this.[4]

[4] Yet, according to St. Alphonsus and Lehmkuhl, I, n. 280, the faithful are bound under venial sin, from custom, to retain the Creed itself by memory.

642. (b) The principal precepts of the Decalogue: for these comprise the principal natural and divine rules of morals; and, since the obligation of observing them is incumbent upon Christians, first they must know and believe them. - The precepts of the Church, as merely ecclesiastical and not revealed, are not indeed an object of faith, but they must be known, so that they can be fulfilled.

(c) The domestic prayer, at least very probably, because it comprises those things which Christ taught us to ask, and which are more necessary for salvation. Besides this, it must be known under grave obligation that prayer in general is necessary for salvation. It is also required that each faithful person know how to elicit acts of faith, hope, and charity; to retain a definite formula by memory is altogether expedient. - The Angelic Salutation, or Hail Mary, is indeed of great profit, and it helps to recite it piously; but we are not bound to know it or to believe it explicitly.

(d) The sacraments necessary for all, namely baptism, penance, and the Eucharist: for since all Christians are bound to receive these, they must believe those things which are required for their worthy reception. With regard to the other sacraments, those who receive them are first bound to know and believe the things revealed concerning them.

643. From this it follows that those sin who neglect to learn the aforesaid truths; - and also parents and pastors who, neither by themselves nor by others, do not instruct their children or subjects concerning these things: for they do not fulfill a grave duty.[5]

[5] Pius X recently urged the fulfillment of this duty, Encycl. *Acerbo nimis*, Apr. 15, 1905 (*Acta S. Sedis*, t. XXXVII, p. 613), where, among other things, he established these things, p. 623: "All pastors, and generally all who have the care of souls, on Sundays and feast days, through the space of a whole hour, shall instruct boys and girls from the catechism booklet concerning those things which each must believe and do in order to obtain salvation.... In all and individual parishes there shall be canonically established an association commonly called the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine. In it pastors, especially where the number of priests is small, will have lay helpers in handing on catechesis.... In larger cities, and especially in those where universities of studies, lyceums, and gymnasia are open, schools of religion shall be founded for instructing in the truths of faith and the institutions of Christian life the youth who frequent public schools, where no mention at all is made of religious matters." - Let the whole letter be attentively read and faithfully put into execution.

Hence also confessors ought not absolve penitents ignorant of these truths, unless these seriously and sincerely wish to learn them; otherwise they are not rightly disposed, since they are unwilling to fulfill a grave precept.

644. 3. Concerning the time at which the precept of faith obliges. That precept obliges either of itself or by accident:

(A) Of itself, or by force of the precept itself of believing: (a) When some revealed truth has been sufficiently proposed, or when the obligation of believing is manifested to the conscience with moral certainty; likewise when a new definition is proposed, for example, when the decrees of the Vatican Council were promulgated.

The same is to be said concerning children of the faithful, who, having attained the use of reason, have been so instructed in faith that they clearly perceive that such and such a truth has been divinely revealed; and concerning infidels and heretics, as soon as it is morally certain to them that the Catholic religion was instituted by God. For the reverence and obedience which we must offer to God demands that we believe as soon as something is shown with moral certainty to be divinely revealed; otherwise His infallible authority is contemned. Therefore those sin who put off for a long time the act of faith and entrance into the Church after they have clearly perceived the obligation of believing. - But those who apprehend the motives of credibility only probably are not indeed bound to believe

immediately, but they must pray, and at the same time seriously inquire, so that the truth may shine more clearly before their eyes: for God does not deny light and grace to those rightly disposed.

645. (b) Often in life, although the times cannot or should not be determined more particularly.[6] This indeed is clear from the propositions 17 and 65 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in life. - It suffices to have believed those mysteries (of the Trinity and Incarnation) once." - Some indeed said that acts of faith must be elicited on feast days, others once a year: but nothing certain can be defined on this matter. Besides, this seems of little utility; for, morally speaking, it cannot happen that a Christian man, who has embraced and retained the Christian faith, does not repeat acts of faith often, whether explicitly, - or implicitly, by exercising supernatural works, resisting temptations, or fulfilling other precepts, which can scarcely be observed without some act of faith.

[6] Denzing., nn. 1034 and 1082; Viva, on proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII.

646. (c) Probably in the article of death, because then especially we are bound to tend toward God, the ultimate supernatural end. Yet some say that then an act of faith is not necessary of itself, but only if a grave temptation against faith urges.

(d) After the denial of some truth of faith; for he who has become a heretic or apostate must turn himself to God by a positive act of faith. - The same is to be said if a temptation against faith urges which cannot be overcome except through an act of faith; often, however, the temptation is more effectively driven away by diverting the mind to other things.

(e) For repelling those temptations which cannot be overcome without an act of faith, for example, temptations against faith or hope.

647. (B) By accident, or by force of other precepts; namely, as often as we are bound to elicit an act of faith, as often as this is necessary for observing another precept which then obliges: for he who is bound to some end is bound also to use the means necessary for attaining it. This obligation is had: (a) when someone prepares himself for justification, which cannot be obtained without an act of faith; (b) when the precept of hope and charity urges: for neither can be fulfilled without an act of faith; (c) when a grave temptation against some virtue urges, and cannot otherwise be conquered without an act of faith.

II. Concerning the Precept of External Profession of Faith.

We shall speak concerning the existence and extension of this precept.

648. 1. Existence: There exists a divine precept of externally professing faith at times.

This Christ indeed taught:[7] "Everyone therefore who shall confess Me before men, I also will confess him before My Father who is in heaven. But he who shall deny Me before men, I also will deny him before My Father who is in heaven." Paul inculcates the same:[8] "For with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."

[7] Matt. 10:32-33; cf. Luke 9:26; 12:8-9.

[8] Rom. 10:10.

And rightly; for he who, believing in his heart, fears externally to profess faith: (a) is exposed to the danger of losing faith: for by this voluntary omission the firm assent to revealed things is diminished, and little by little doubts arise; on the other hand, by open confession internal faith is strengthened not a little. (b) He commits irreverence toward God, since, on account of vain fear, he refuses to offer the reasonable service owed to the supreme Lord: for by that very fact he seems to prefer human judgments to divine wisdom. (c) Moreover he is guilty of cowardice; for he who is not ashamed to act against his own persuasion of soul by that very fact shows that he is not a man, but a weak immature person, who is deterred by vain fears from fulfilling his duty. (d) Finally he shows himself an unworthy citizen of the Church; for since the Church is a visible society, which demands the visible union of her members, he who does not externally profess faith weakens this external unity, - and is compared to a soldier who is ashamed to defend the banner of his fatherland.

649. 2. Extension. That precept, insofar as it is affirmative, demands confession of faith at times; and insofar as it is negative, forbids that faith ever be denied.

(A) The affirmative precept of professing faith obliges, according to St. Thomas,[1] when "by the omission of this confession the honor due to God would be withdrawn, and also the utility to be bestowed upon neighbors":

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3, a. 2.

(a) When the honor due to God demands it, namely if, from the omission of this profession, God is dishonored or deprived of the honor due to Him. Thus if someone is questioned publicly or privately by public authority, in a cause of faith, for example, whether he is Catholic, or what he thinks concerning such and such an article of faith, he must confess his faith without hesitation and ambiguity, even with danger to life: this indeed the honor of God demands, and in these circumstances silence would be equivalent to denial of faith. Therefore this proposition 18 was condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone is questioned by public power, I counsel him to confess the faith frankly, as glorious to God and faith; to be silent, I do not condemn as sinful in itself."[2] For although public power has no right to question concerning faith, but only concerning things pertaining to the temporal good of society, yet the faithful person is bound to respond, on account of the honor of God, and in order to avoid scandal, lest from silence it be inferred that the true faith has been denied. Yet make exception if silence, from the circumstances, indicates constancy in faith clearly enough. - The same must be said if someone is questioned, in hatred of the faith, even by a private person, at least in those circumstances in which silence would be equivalent to denial of faith.

[2] Denzing., n. 1035; Viva, on this proposition.

But if only by a general edict it is commanded that the faithful present themselves before the magistrates, or betray themselves as Catholics by a certain sign, they are not bound to obey; for their silence cannot be held as a denial of faith, when they are not questioned in particular.

650. (b) When the spiritual utility of neighbor demands it: for from charity we are bound to prevent, insofar as this can be done, lest the neighbor incur great spiritual harm. Therefore a profession of faith is necessary whenever, from its omission, someone is turned away from faith or delayed, or is deprived of some great spiritual advantage, provided that the good of

neighbor cannot otherwise be provided for; for example, if from such omission the newly converted or the weak in faith would be scandalized.

(c) At times in life: for since we are bound to adhere visibly to the Church, we must at times manifest this adhesion by external profession of faith. But for this it is sufficient to fulfill Christian duties which imply this profession, such as the reception of the sacraments, attendance at Mass, etc.

651. N.B. Besides the divine precept, there is present an ecclesiastical precept imposed upon certain persons, in determined circumstances, of making a profession of faith according to the formula which is called Piana.[3] In a general way those are bound to make this who are promoted to some dignity or ecclesiastical office or to the subdiaconate, as is explained in the Code, c. 1324, cited at the end of the work.

[3] Which profession of faith, together with the oath prescribed by Pius X to drive away the danger of modernism, must be made by: (a) professors of universities and seminaries, every year; (b) clerics to be initiated into major orders; (c) priests destined for hearing confessions and sacred preachers; (d) pastors, canons, beneficiaries before entering possession of the benefice; (e) diocesan officials and judges; (f) superiors and teachers of religious families. Cf. *A.A.S.*, Sept. 9, 1910.

652. (B) The precept of confessing faith, insofar as it is negative, forbids that faith ever be denied, even externally. For he inflicts injury upon God not only who interiorly embraces heresy, but also who externally denies faith, and by deed or word simulates himself to be a follower of a false religion: for although he believes internally, he commits a grave lie, and for the most part gives scandal to others. - Yet there is a difference between denying and concealing faith: the former is never permitted, the latter for a grave cause is permitted in certain circumstances.

653. (a) Whoever by words or deeds denies faith universally, or some article of faith, is guilty of grave sin. 1) By words, for example, he who denies that he is Catholic, or that he believes in the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff; or affirms that he is a rationalist, positivist, Protestant, Mohammedan. 2) By deeds, by exercising actions which of themselves or from circumstances imply denial of faith, for example, to kneel before idols or to burn incense, to communicate in the supper of heretics, to use circumcision as a religious rite (but not as a means of preventing certain diseases); or by using garments or other signs which, from usage and custom, indicate adhesion to some sect,[4] for example, if someone were to wear the insignia of Freemasons, so that he would seem to have given his name to this sect. But it is not prohibited to use garments, for example, the Turkish cap, which are distinctive of a people rather than of a religious sect. - Likewise to enter the temples of heretics from curiosity, or in order to fulfill a civil office, is by no means considered an external denial of faith; otherwise, if such entrance bears before it the appearance of cooperation in divine rites, and seems to signify denial of faith.[5] - Therefore in one word, all things must be avoided which, from all the circumstances, seem to imply denial of faith.

[4] Thus, in the decree of the S. C. of Prop. Fide, Feb. 19, 1774 (*Collectanea*, n. 1653), it is declared: "Therefore in the first place, the deceitful manner of acting of those cannot be excused from the mark of simulated infidelity, who, while on more solemn days they are present at the sacrifice of the Mass, fearing the presence of Turks standing by out of curiosity, never at all uncover the head, nor sign themselves with the sign of the cross, and abstain from the other acts of the Catholic religion, which are wont to be openly exercised by others who are reckoned by the Christian name; and

those acting thus obtain this, that they are regarded as followers of Mohammedan superstition." - Thus also in the first centuries, the Church regarded as guilty of very grave fault the *libellatici*, who, although they had not sacrificed to idols, obtained with money certificates from magistrates by which it was declared that they had fulfilled the commands of the emperor.

[5] Thus it once happened in England, when Catholics by royal edict were compelled, under very grave penalties, to be present at the prayers and sermons of Protestants. Then Paul V wrote to them, Sept. 22, 1606: "We are compelled to admonish you and call upon you, that in no way should you approach the temples of heretics, or hear their sermons, or communicate with them in rites, lest you incur the wrath of God."

654. (b) But it is permitted to conceal or dissimulate faith, when the precept of confessing faith does not urge, and moreover there is a grave reason: for this is not evil of itself, and therefore is permitted for a grave cause.

Thus if some Catholic passes through places of infidels or heretics, he can eat meats on prohibited days, if he seriously fears (which today rarely occurs) lest, having been recognized as a Catholic, he should undergo some grave harm; for this eating of itself does not signify denial of faith; otherwise, however, if someone were urged to eat meats in contempt of faith or of the Church: for in these circumstances, it would seem to be a denial of faith.[6] - Likewise he can use those garments which are distinctive of a people rather than of religion, as was said above.

[6] "Besides, it is not without grave fault that the same secretly believing persons, when on days consecrated to ecclesiastical fast or abstinence they recline at the tables of the Turks, eat foods forbidden on those days by the Church, or pretend to eat them; for this simulation cannot be presumed to have been done with any other intention than that they may be seen as in no way bound by the laws of Christians, but may be thought plainly Mohammedans among Mohammedans." (S. C. de Prop. F., Feb. 19, 1774, *Collectanea*, n. 1653.)

All the more is it permitted to flee persecution, unless there is question of pastors of souls whose presence is necessary for the salvation of their subjects: for these, when the parish cannot otherwise be provided for, must lay down their life for their sheep.

Art. III. Concerning Sins against Faith.

We shall speak both concerning the sins themselves and concerning their causes.

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10-12; Suarez, disp. XV-XXIII; Lugo, disp. XVIII-XXV; Billuart, diss. V; St. Alphonsus, lib. III, nn. 17-19; Lequeux, nn. 173-178; Ball. P., nn. 73-108; Muller, §8-11; Noldin, nn. 27-42.

§ I. Concerning the Sins Themselves against Faith.

655. One can sin against faith by omission and commission.

(a) By omission, not only by omitting the prescribed act of faith, as was said above, n. 640; but also by omitting due diligence in learning the truths necessary to be known, n. 643, or in seeking the solution of difficulties which are proposed against faith. Yet by this sin the infused habit of faith is not lost, but there is incurred the danger of eliciting an act contrary to faith, by which the habit itself would be lost.

(b) By commission, and indeed in two ways: by excess, by accepting or handing on to others through rash credulity as revealed what has not been revealed, for example, by believing private revelations without sufficient reason, by proposing one's own opinions as dogmas of faith, not without great

scandal of the faithful and of unbelievers;[2] - by defect, especially in a threefold way, namely by heresy, apostasy, and infidelity, concerning which it is necessary to discuss separately. These three sins formerly were called by the general name of infidelity:[3] by these indeed the habit of faith is lost, when they are committed knowingly and willingly.

[2] Therefore these words of St. John must be kept before the mind (1 John 4:1): "Dearly beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits if they be of God, because many false prophets have gone out into the world."

[3] We say nothing concerning schism; when it is nothing else than a secession from legitimate authority, it is indeed opposed to obedience and charity, but not to faith; but when, as usually, it denies the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff or another defined truth, it is joined with heresy, and then concerning it one must say what we hand down concerning heresy.

I. Concerning Heresy.

656. 1. Notion. Heresy (Greek *hairesis*, selection) designates a sect which selects certain truths and rejects others; in the ecclesiastical sense, it signifies error in faith.

(A) Heresy properly so called, or formal heresy, is a voluntary and pertinacious error of a baptized man against some truth of the Catholic faith. Hence for heresy properly so called several conditions are required:

(a) That he who falls into it has been validly baptized; if he has in no way received baptism, for example, if he is still a catechumen, he is not a heretic in the forum of the Church, although in the forum of God he is held as such; for the Church does not judge concerning those who have not yet entered the body of the Church through baptism. - But if someone has been baptized invalidly, he is held not as a heretic, but as an infidel.

(b) A voluntary and pertinacious error, that is, a false judgment of the intellect by which some truth of faith is knowingly and willingly denied or positively called into doubt. Therefore he who, from levity, fear, or some other motive, denies a truth of faith only externally, by speech or work, while faith is retained internally, is not truly a heretic, although he can be held as such in the external forum; likewise he who is agitated by doubts and remains uncertain is not properly a heretic, because he does not render a judgment: otherwise, however, if he positively judges some dogma to be doubtful. - For pertinacity it is not required that someone be admonished several times and persevere long in his obstinacy, but it is enough that knowingly and willingly he denies assent to a truth sufficiently proposed, whether this is done from pride, or from desire of contradicting, or from another cause. Therefore he is not pertinacious who denies a truth of faith from ignorance, even vincible and affected ignorance, provided he is so prepared that he would give assent if he knew it as revealed and defined.

(c) Against some truth of the Catholic faith, that is, a truth divinely revealed and proposed as such by the Church, by either solemn or ordinary magisterium. Therefore he is not a heretic who denies a truth which many recognize as revealed, but which has not yet been proposed by the Church; nor all the more he who rejects a theological conclusion, or a truth indeed proposed by the Church, but not as revealed: in which case an error is indeed incurred rashly, but not against faith. It was said against some truth: for if all are rejected, then it is not heresy but apostasy.

657. (B) Material heresy, or involuntary heresy, is that which proceeds from ignorance, without pertinacity of the will, and exists in him who is prepared to submit himself to the authority of God revealing and to the infallible judgment of the Church, as soon as he shall know that such a truth has been divinely revealed.

(a) Many Protestants and schismatics are materially heretics, who, having been born in heresy or schism, have conceived no serious doubt concerning the truth of their religion, because the Catholic religion has either in no way, or insufficiently, been proposed to them. Converts testify that there are not a few, even among the more learned themselves, who persevere in good faith, as do those who have frequented heretics.[4]

[4] Thus, when a Catholic priest on a certain day wondered how learned men could believe in good faith that the Anglican sect was the true Church, Manning, a Protestant minister converted to the Catholic faith, said: "You are in a profound error. It is only after much time, prayer, and study that many minds, the best and the most gifted, but born in heresy, come to understand that their church is not the true one. When you propose to someone, even one very intelligent, a riddle of which you yourself have the solution, you are astonished to see your interlocutor hesitate, search, and not find a solution which seems to you of childish simplicity. Give him the explanation sought; he himself will be astonished at not having found it at once. So it is with the most instructed heretic and one of the best faith; he can study and pray for a long time without being enlightened; and it is only at a certain moment, marked by grace, that he discovers the truth, and is astonished that he had not recognized it earlier." (Apud Abbe de Broglie, *Les fondements intellectuels de la Foi*, Paris, Bloud, 1905, p. 223, note 1.)

658. (b) Likewise certain Catholics, instructed only imperfectly in religion and living among non-Catholics, sometimes in good faith deny certain defined truths, because they do not clearly perceive that these are revealed. - But whether they can depart from the Catholic Church without formal sin against faith is controverted.

Some deny it, because, on the one hand, there is no just cause of calling faith into doubt, and, on the other, God deserts no one unless He is first deserted, and therefore assists Catholics by His grace lest they fall into heresy. Others affirm it; for there are younger Catholics who, insufficiently instructed and strengthened in faith, hear many things against the Catholic religion from heretics or rationalists which they are not able to solve; thus little by little and insensibly they conceive some doubts, and soon lose faith in the authority of the Church, without, however, having formally committed grave sin against faith, because they find no one who sufficiently solves the difficulties proposed.

659. If it is permitted to open our mind in so difficult a matter, we indeed think that no one can depart from the true faith once received without some fault, at least of imprudence;[5] but this fault is not always mortal, nor against faith, and therefore does not necessarily expel the habit of faith. We judge this to be the mind of the Vatican Council; for the Vatican Council says:[6] "For the most benign Lord both arouses and assists those who are erring by His grace, so that they may be able to come to the knowledge of the truth; and those whom He has translated from darkness into His admirable light, He confirms by His grace in this same light, not deserting unless He is deserted. Wherefore the condition of those is by no means equal who have adhered to Catholic truth through the heavenly gift of faith, and of those who, led by human opinions, follow a false religion; for those who have received faith under the magisterium of the Church can never have any just cause for changing, or for recalling this same faith into doubt." From these words two things may be gathered: (a) that God assists us

by His grace so that we may persevere in faith, so that, if we faithfully cooperate with divine help, we are able to retain it; (b) that no objectively just cause exists for recalling faith into doubt or for denying it.

[5] He is guilty of imprudence, for example, who, little instructed in religion, does not hesitate to frequent non-Catholics and to hear them, who reads journals and books attacking faith, and does not have recourse to a learned priest when doubts against faith occur.

[6] Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 3, Denzing., n. 1642.

Yet we observe, after Granderath,[7] that it was not defined by the Council that it can never happen that a Catholic man, without formal sin against faith, may call into doubt the divinity of the Church or fall away from her. For the Vatican Council here wished only to condemn the error of Hermes, who taught that there is an objectively just cause of doubting, indeed recommended doubt to the learned, as is openly declared by the very writers of the schema proposed to the Fathers of the Council: "Nor, moreover, in the proposed declaration of doctrine and condemnation of error is that touched upon which some older theologians do not hesitate to concede, that it can happen by accident, and in certain circumstances, that the conscience of some rude Catholic man may be so led into invincible error, that he embraces some heterodox sect without formal sin against faith; in which hypothesis he would not lose faith, nor would he be a formal heretic, but a material one (Tanner, *de fide*, q. 2, dub. 5, n. 139; Platelius, *de fide*, n. 61). These things indeed, unless they are explained most cautiously, are disputed dangerously; but they are very alien from the heresy which is proposed to the sacred Council to be examined."

[7] Granderath, *Constitut. C. Vaticani explicatae*, 1892, p. 61; cf. Vacant, op. cit., t. II, nn. 731-737.

660. 2. The malice of heresy. Heresy properly so called, or voluntary heresy, like apostasy and infidelity, is a most grave sin, of itself graver than all other sins, one excepted, hatred of God; for to deny the assent owed to God revealing implies a certain contempt of divine authority. Besides, heresy radically tears out not only habitual grace, but also the habit of faith, which is the root of justification.[8]

[8] Those guilty of formal heresy are absolute Liberals, who profess the full independence of the State from the Church (*De Ecclesia*, n. 910); and also Modernists who embrace the whole system condemned by Pius X or some opinions of this system which are truly heretical. Cf. *Motu proprio*, Nov. 18, 1907 (*A. S. S.*, t. XL, p. 723).

Therefore the Church strikes with excommunication *latae sententiae*, reserved in a special way to the Pontiff, "all apostates from the Christian faith and all and individual heretics, by whatever name they are reckoned and of whatever sect they may exist, and those believing them, and their receivers, favorers, and generally any defenders of them."[9] To incur this excommunication, it is necessary that heresy, conceived internally, be manifested externally by word, writing, or deed, because the Church does not judge concerning merely internal things; but it is not required that this manifestation be made before others, nor that the heretic join himself to some sect.

[9] Constit. *Apostolicae Sedis*, 1869, § I, n. 1.

661. 3. Corollary: concerning doubt in faith. (A) With regard to Catholics. When doubt occurs concerning a truth of faith, the mind can hold itself in different ways: (a) if the will does not consent to the doubt, but promptly repels it, it performs a meritorious act; if it

shows itself negligent in repelling it, without danger of consent, it sins only venially. (b) If someone doubts concerning an article of faith from ignorance, prepared to assent as soon as he shall know that the matter is revealed, he commits no sin of heresy, but sins or does not sin according as the ignorance is vincible or invincible. (c) He who doubts concerning an article sufficiently proposed by a merely negative doubt, that is, who suspends judgment, without positively consenting to the doubt, - for example, because he wishes to divert the mind to other things, or to inquire into the motives by which he may be more sweetly inclined to believing, etc., - is not properly a heretic, because he does not render a false judgment, but only abstains from judging; yet sometimes he acts imprudently, and falls into the danger of positively doubting. (d) He who deliberately and positively doubts concerning some article of faith sufficiently proposed by the Church, and known as such, is truly a heretic, because he positively and erroneously judges that this article is not certain, and consequently that the Church errs while proposing the same article to our faith.

662. (B) With regard to non-Catholics. Most non-Catholics recognize private judgment as the proximate norm of faith, for detecting revealed truths contained in the sacred Scriptures. These indeed cannot, without sin, doubt concerning the authority of God revealing, or of the books which they recognize as inspired. But when there is question of such and such a truth to be believed, they are not bound to accept the authority of ministers or synods, since they do not admit their infallibility. Therefore, according to their principles, they can conceive some doubts concerning such and such a truth, indeed concerning the truth of their own sect. But when doubt has arisen, they are bound seriously to investigate the truth, and at the same time to pray that they may be able to discover and embrace the truth. If they purposely neglect this duty, they commit a sin more or less grave according to the degree of negligence. Not a few are deterred from further inquiry by an innate contempt of the Church; but others by fear of temporal harms which they foresee they will suffer from conversion; to these must be recalled these words of Christ:[1] "And do not fear those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul; rather fear Him who can destroy both soul and body in hell."

[1] Matt. 10:28.

II. Concerning Apostasy.

663. 1. Concerning apostasy in general. Apostasy (*apo*, *histemi*, I depart) is a total withdrawal from the Christian faith received through baptism. It therefore differs from heresy in this, that it rejects the whole faith, while heresy denies only one or certain truths. Yet for someone to be an apostate it is not necessary that he pass over to a false religion, for example, Judaism or Mohammedanism; but it is enough that, after having received baptism, he externally bids farewell to the Christian faith, by slipping, namely, into deism, positivism, atheism, indifferentism, etc. If a catechumen, not yet baptized, who had conceived faith in his mind, deserts it totally, he will indeed be an apostate before God, who looks upon the heart, but not before the Church, to which he had not yet been externally joined.

Those things which we said concerning the malice and penalties of heresy are true also concerning apostasy, since it radically tears out the foundation of faith, and recedes farther from God than heresy. But among apostates, those are certainly worse and more pernicious who withdraw more fundamentally from the Christian faith, such as atheists, positivists, monists, or materialists, whose number increases day by day.

664. 2. Concerning apostasy by adhesion to Masonic sects.[2] But among these Masons (*francs-macons*, *free-masons*) stand out, who, scattered through the whole world, not only defend naturalism, but show themselves the most hostile enemies of the Christian name, and promote with all their strength the universal apostasy of nations from the faith.[3]

[2] Deschamps and C. Jannet, *Les societes secretes et la societe*, Paris, 1880; Copin-Albancelli, *La franc-maconnerie et la question religieuse*, Paris, 1892; P. Nourrisson, *Le club des Jacobins sous la troisieme Republique*, Paris, 1900; idem, *Les Jacobins au pouvoir*, Paris, 1904; Prache, *La petition contre la franc-maconnerie*; Goyau, *La Fr. Maconnerie en France*, Paris, 1904; M. Le Francois, *Le Plan Maconnique*, Lille, 1905, where you will also find other works cited, p. 145.

[3] The origin of this sect is very obscure. It is certain that it flourished in England already in the year 1717, and was very swiftly propagated in the principal regions of Europe in the middle of the eighteenth century. But also around the end of the preceding century certain Masonic assemblies had been held in Scotland and Sweden. It is very probable that these sects arose from associations of workers who gave their labor to constructing buildings: in the sixteenth century men were enrolled in these associations who were not workers, but furnished patronage to them; among these, however, there were found some who, imbued with philosophical and religious errors, changed the nature and character of these associations. Cf. Gyr, *La Franc-maconnerie*, Paris, 1859, pp. 238-250; Findel, *Les principes de la franc-maconnerie*.

(A) In order that they may more easily deceive the incautious, they declare themselves patrons of philanthropy, democracy, and the fraternal solidarity of all, and defenders of workers and the oppressed: "They have readily on the tongue zeal for a more cultivated civility, charity for the poorer people: they claim that they wish only to seek better things for the multitude, and to share with as many as possible the advantages which are had in civil society."[4] Besides, they skillfully accommodate themselves to the morals and opinions of different nations:[5] where the Christian religion has many and strenuous followers, they do not openly attack Christianity, but advocate a liberal form of religion; elsewhere they favor deism and acknowledge God as the Great Architect; but in some regions, as in France, they openly favor atheism. Everywhere, however, they veil their purposes with the seal of secrecy, and manifest them not to all associates, but only to a few initiates, so that many Masons are entirely ignorant of them. Yet all by oath promise blind obedience to the leaders,[6] and thus, unknowingly, cooperate toward a most evil end.

[4] Thus Leo XIII, Encycl. *Humanum genus*, concerning the sect of Masons, Apr. 20, 1884. Concerning secret societies in the United States of America, cf. Council of Baltimore III, nn. 244-245.

[5] This is openly established from the Masonic convention held at Geneva in the year 1902; thus it is read in the periodical *Revue maconnique l'Acacia*, Dec. 1902: "It is certain that Masonry is not understood everywhere in the same way. The Anglo-Saxons have made of it an aristocratic and conservative confraternity from the double political and religious point of view... As for Latin Masonry, it owes its distinctive character to the struggle which it sustains against Catholicism." - In the French general convention, in the year 1903, F. Mayoux said: "We say that a Freemason can be a materialist, yes; that he can be a positivist, yes; that he can be a deist, a spiritualist, yes; but that he be Catholic, Protestant, or Jew, never, never, never. (Applause.) I know well that, in past centuries, there were priests who formed part of Freemasonry, I know well that even today Freemasonry raises to its highest functions dignitaries of Protestant and Jewish churches, but that, my brothers, is the past." (Apud P. Nourrisson, *Les Jacobins au pouvoir*, pp. 249-250.)

[6] Concerning this oath Leo XII said, Constit. Apost. *Quo graviora*, Mar. 13, 1825: "That nefarious oath, which has already been mentioned, and which must be sworn even in that lower enrollment, is sufficiently of itself, so that you may understand that it is unlawful even to be enrolled in those lesser grades."

665. (B) That this end is the overthrow of Christianity is established from the open declarations of the leaders, at least in those regions where they have become more daring.[7] In order to pursue this more securely, first indeed with all their strength they take care that neutral schools be instituted by the State, by which the way is prepared for indifferentism and naturalism; afterward, however, they endeavor gradually to overthrow religious schools by various vexations, indeed they wish that the education of the young be committed to the State alone; finally they take care that in public schools positivism or agnosticism be taught.[8] By means of denunciation, they gradually remove Christians from public functions and offices.[9] They tear apart the foundations of the family by promoting divorce and free union.[10] They do not hesitate to favor the disturbance of society, joining forces with socialists, so that they may be able to obtain the votes of workers.[11]

[7] For recently, May 30, 1904, F. Leon Martin, in the convention of Masons of the Parisian region, said: "Freemasonry must pursue the dechristianization of France, by ceaselessly extending its moral and philosophical influence." (*Compte-rendu*, p. 31.) - Cf. A. Leroux, *La Franc-Maconnerie sous la 3e Republique*, t. I, pp. 168, 173; that these places, where the existence of God is denied, were excerpted from genuine Masonic documents, F. Mouret, our colleague, had as certain and established, who himself examined these texts.

[8] How impious doctrines of this kind are scattered in schools, colleges, and universities was set forth by G. Goyau, *L'Ecole d'aujourd'hui*, Paris, 1899. - In reality books are already used in certain schools, written by Masons, in which it is asserted that neither the existence of God nor the immortality of the soul can be demonstrated.

[9] M. Le Francois, *Le plan Maconnique*, Lille, 1905, pp. 108-118.

[10] Thus, in the Masonic *Ritual*, by F. Blatin, p. 20, it is read: "The spouses will understand by this symbol (a glass rod which is broken before their eyes), that their union can be voluntarily and legally broken by them, just as this rod has just been. We do not admit, among free citizens, indissoluble bonds and contracts without a resolutory clause." (Ap. M. Le Francois, op. cit., pp. 54-55.)

[11] Thus, in the year 1896, F. Rouanet, addressing Masons, said: "If Masonry wishes to continue its role, it will be socialist. Masonry has killed God and emptied Heaven, but if Heaven is empty, the earth is not yet yours. Neither God nor Master, such will soon be the Masonic formula." (Ap. M. Le Francois, op. cit., p. 134.) Likewise, in the general convention in the year 1900, F. Bedarride asserted "that in socialism alone, and socialism applied in its integrity, is found the key of the social question... the logical conclusion and the only consequent crowning of the ideas of solidarity of universal Masonry." (Ap. Nourrisson, *Les Jacobins*, p. 32.)

Indeed not all, nor everywhere, openly pursue all these things; but experience establishes that they gradually become more daring, and publicly manifest what before they had conceived in mind, but had carefully dissembled.[12]

[12] You will find many examples of this dissimulation in the conventions of Masons; thus, for example, first they advocate neutral education, lest they offend the ears of deists, but a little afterward they declare that the same ought to be anti-religious, indeed atheistic, and therefore they earnestly demand that the name of God be banished from all books which are handed to pupils. (Cf. M. Le Francois, op. cit., pp. 10-13.)

From these things it is gathered that one of the principal causes of apostasy is the adhesion of the young to Masonic sects: as soon as they have given their name to secret societies, they fall into the

danger of withdrawing totally from faith, and indeed permanently; for they fear lest, if they return to faith, they be punished with dreadful penalties as violators of an oath.

Therefore deservedly they incur the excommunication *latae sententiae* reserved to the Supreme Pontiff: "those giving their name to the Masonic or Carbonarian sect or to other sects of the same kind, which plot against the Church or legitimate powers either openly or secretly, and also those furnishing any favor whatsoever to the same sects, and those not denouncing their hidden chiefs and leaders, until they shall have denounced them."[13]

[13] Bull *Apostolicae Sedis*, § II, n. 4. - Besides Masons and Carbonarians, the Fenians are subject to this excommunication, from the decree of the Holy Office, Jan. 12, 1870, nihilists and anarchists, and probably socialists properly so called, insofar as they plot against the Church and legitimate powers.

666. Therefore with all their strength priests and upright laymen should strive to turn the young away from entering secret societies of this kind, by opportunely revealing "what are the arts of societies of this kind in flattering and enticing, and what is the depravity in their opinions, and the turpitude in their actions."[14] But in order that they may be removed from these more effectively, honorable societies are to be instituted everywhere: for since strength and consolation are found together in associations, and in our days adolescents are prone to joining leagues, it is altogether necessary that honorable societies be opposed to depraved societies.[15] In France especially, where Masons, although few in number, rule everything today, the Catholic religion will not be able to flourish again unless the faithful and priests, vain complaints being altogether put aside, join forces and strenuously and constantly institute the good combat against the most hostile haters of the Christian name.[16]

[14] Leo XIII, Encycl. *Humanum genus*, which should be read wholly and attentively.

[15] To the point Council of Baltimore III, n. 257: "For the young, because they are exposed to greater dangers, we wish greater care to be spent; accordingly we establish that in every parish or mission, where a sufficient number of them is found, special societies for them be instituted by the rector and fostered by every effort." In reality in most places societies of this kind have been instituted, for example, in the United States the society called Knights of Columbus, in France *Le Sillon*, *L'Assoc. cath. de la jeunesse francaise*, etc.

[16] That hope is in Masons of overthrowing the Catholic religion, and of openly preaching their wicked errors in our churches, is established from this declaration of F. Blatin, in the convention of 1883 (*Bul. du G. Orient*, p. 645): "In these edifices, raised on all sides to religious superstitions and priestly supremacies, perhaps we shall be called in our turn to preach our doctrines, and instead of the clerical psalmodies which still resound there, it will be the gavels, the batteries, and the acclamations of our Order, which will make their broad vaults and vast pillars resound." The same words F. Masson uttered, Feb. 25, 1884, as can be read apud *Bull. Mac. de la grande Loge symbolique*, t. V, p. 63.

III. Concerning Infidelity.

667. Infidelity taken broadly is any defect of internal faith, and under this respect it also comprises heresy and apostasy. Taken strictly, insofar as it is distinguished from heresy and apostasy, it is the lack of faith in those who have not been baptized, and who therefore have not received the habit of faith.

(a) There are merely negative infidels, namely those who have heard nothing concerning the faith, or to whom faith has not been sufficiently proposed, so that they are not conscious of the obligation of believing. These certainly do not sin: nothing is willed unless it has been known beforehand. Hence

deservedly this proposition 68 of Baius was condemned by Pius V, Oct. 1, 1567: "Purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is a sin."[1]

[1] Apud Denzing., n. 948. - In our days there are many infidels of this kind, not only among foreign nations, but also among Christian nations, especially in great cities; many, I say, were not baptized, nor have they heard anything concerning the Catholic religion except that it is hostile to all progress and liberty.

668. (b) But there are others who have heard of the Christian faith, and at the same time have had the opportunity of inquiring further concerning its truth, but have knowingly and willingly neglected this; their infidelity is called privative, and of itself is gravely culpable, because in a matter of such great moment they are bound to inquire seriously. Yet certain persons are excused from grave sin if they are not conscious of this grave obligation.

(c) There are also those to whom the Christian faith has been sufficiently proposed, with motives of credibility accommodated to their intelligence, so that they understood the obligation of believing, and who nevertheless denied assent. Their infidelity is called positive, and it is a grave sin, because it includes contempt of God revealing and rejection of the means necessary for salvation: "He who does not believe shall be condemned."[2]

[2] Mark 16:16.

Therefore it is of the greatest moment to adhere to those associations which furnish preachers to infidels, by whom they may be able to be converted to the true faith. To bring help to these by alms, prayers, and other opportune means is a work supremely pleasing to God and especially efficacious for not only preserving but also increasing faith.

§ II. Concerning the Causes of Sins against Faith.

669. That many today, whether learned or unlearned, fall into infidelity among all Christian nations, lamentable experience establishes.[3] Therefore it is useful to inquire concerning the causes which induce loss of faith, so that the remedies for unbelief may be more easily detected. Now causes of this kind are of two kinds: some are internal, arising from dispositions of soul; others are external, or arising from the very state of present-day society.

[3] To the point Msgr. Mignot, *L'Apologetique contemporaine*, apud *Revue du Clerge francais*, t. XXIV, 1900, p. 581: "One must not be deceived by appearances: true faith, we do not say religiosity, diminishes every day. Externally, one still seems believing, one still calls oneself Catholic, Protestant; in reality, one is scarcely so any longer except by habit, family tradition, in a homeopathic dose. And then we live in an atmosphere saturated with unbelief. Even in our most Christian populations, in the best preserved milieus, true faith has lost part of its influence over minds." Cf. Gayraud, *La Crise de la Foi*, 2nd ed., Paris, Bloud, 1901.

1. Concerning Internal, or Subjective, Causes.

Since faith is elicited by the intellect under the influence of the will, with grace assisting, difficulties of believing can arise from this threefold head.

670. (A) Concerning intellectual causes. In order to preserve faith safely and reasonably, knowledge of the motives of credibility is necessary; but these are unknown by many, and rejected by others on account of prejudices.

(a) Many lose faith because of ignorance, because, while they attentively read the works of unbelievers, they pass over the books of apologists; thus they cannot solve the difficulties proposed against faith, and soon slip into infidelity. Therefore there must be inculcated upon laymen the necessity of inquiring from the more learned the solution of difficulties, and upon priests the necessity of studying, so that they may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to refute those who contradict; but let them beware lest they hand down as dogmas those things which have not yet been proposed by the infallible magisterium of the Church: for not a few are deterred from faith on account of the opinions of certain theologians, which are presented as truths of faith.[4]

[4] Those indeed understand this who read through books written by modern unbelievers; cf. A. D. White, *Warfare of Science and Theology*, New York, in French, *Histoire de la lutte entre la Science et la Theologie*, Paris, Guillaumin, 1899.

(b) Besides, the mind of modern men, imbued with many prejudices, perceives the force of the motives of credibility with difficulty. Not a few, namely, favoring Kantianism, proclaim the autonomy of reason, and denounce revelation as something extrinsic and unworthy of human reason. Others, trusting more than is right in the methods of positivists, reject miracles, as not proved by sufficiently constant experience or observation,[5] or, as others say, because they are repugnant to modern consciousness.[6] - There are indeed other motives for believing, which are drawn from the fact that the legitimate aspirations of the intellect, of the will, and of our whole soul are fulfilled only in the Christian religion; but this argument, which pleases some, is accepted only by those who are rightly disposed, who thirst for truth and justice, and who seek divine consolation.

[5] "Pride of mind is therefore often the great obstacle to believing. One does not resign oneself to relying upon the testimony of another when one has explored all the mysteries of nature, from the resolution of nebulae to the role of microbes... Too intelligent to be frankly materialists, many of our scholars take shameful refuge in the mists of agnosticism; as if, because we cannot know everything, we could know nothing at all. From this results, as we have said, a general tendency no longer to believe in miracles, to identify the miracle with the unexplained: which is still a new form of agnosticism." (Mignot, loc. cit., p. 584.)

[6] "If we no longer admit the miracle, it is not only because it is produced only when one believes in it, it is because it is rejected by consciousness even more than it is denied by science. Far from being proof, henceforth the miracle is a reason to put in doubt and to submit to examination the truths which one pretends to support by this singular authority." (Seailles, *Les affirmat. de la conscience*, p. 34.)

Therefore apologists must offer not only one argument or another, but diverse arguments adapted to diverse minds. First of all these principles must often be recalled to memory: in a moral and religious matter, only moral certitude is to be expected; very probable arguments produce moral certitude when all taken together conspire toward the same end.[7] Likewise it must be shown that by revelation the light of reason and legitimate autonomy are not destroyed, but perfected.[8]

[7] "It is necessary then, in our opinion, to proceed by accumulation of proofs, by a view of the whole. One resists one proof, perhaps two or three: one does not resist a hundred, unless one is biased. If we arrive at certitude by the *congeries probabilitatum*, as they say, much more surely shall we arrive there by the *congeries probationum*. By a singular inconsistency, one would wish to demand in religious questions a certitude which one does not have in the things of ordinary life. Why this difference?" (Mignot, loc. cit., p. 578.)

[8] F. Dubois, apud *Rev. du Cl. francais*, t. XXXIX, 1904, pp. 113-136.

671. (B) Concerning moral causes, or on the part of the will. In order to believe it is necessary that the will move the intellect to assenting to revealed truths (above, n. 618). But the will, which wishes to remain independent, not rarely does not command the assent of faith, because, on

the one hand, it bears with difficulty the authority of God, and, on the other, it desires to indulge the passions, which the Christian religion restrains. This disposition is often increased by abuse of the democratic spirit, which pervades the minds of many, and incites some to shake off the yoke of any authority whatsoever, not only civil but also divine: hence by a certain natural instinct they abhor a religion which rests upon authority. Moreover, because the love of pleasure insinuates itself more and more into all orders of citizens,[9] they naturally flee a religion which preaches self-denial and mortification of the passions to all: how much more easily would arguments in favor of revelation be admitted, if, as happens in mathematical truths, they in no way stood in the way of lusts!

[9] "To do what pleases, to move as one likes, to satisfy all one's needs, according to the order in which they present themselves and their degree of intensity, this is to enjoy, this is to be happy. On the contrary, not to do what pleases, not to move according to one's liking, not to satisfy one's needs, this is to suffer, this is to be unhappy... To live, to be happy, to be free, is all one." Thus many conceive the moral life, as can be seen apud Seailles, *Les affirmat. de la conscience moderne*, pp. 130-131.

Therefore it must be inculcated upon these that no society, civil or religious, can subsist without some authority, and that a reasonable submission to legitimate authority is the most efficacious means for avoiding the tyranny of many; but that the passions do not contribute to true happiness except insofar as they are ordered to the good, and that in the Christian religion all helps are found for moderating and rightly ordering the passions.

672. (C) Since faith cannot be acquired and preserved without the grace of God, not a few fall away from it because, trusting too much in their own powers, they neglect to pray. The necessity of prayer for overcoming temptations against faith must frequently be recalled to their memory: "I believe, Lord; help my unbelief... Increase our faith."[10]

[10] Mark 9:23; Luke 17:5. - Nor is prayer less necessary for obtaining faith when it has been lost, as M. d'Hulst splendidly explains, *Confer.* 1892, p. 110: "I believe, Lord, come to the aid of my unbelief! How many poor souls could repeat this cry of distress and confidence! I believe, that is to say I see that it is necessary to believe; the trials of life have instructed me; my failing reason has not been able to resolve the problems which torment me. I have looked toward those who believe, I have envied their happiness. I have opened the Gospel and I thought I recognized my Savior. I have listened to the great voice of the Christian centuries and I have been moved by their testimony. But between this inclination to believe and the final abdication of my doubt; between these reasons for believing and this voluntary gift of my mind and my heart which is called faith, I feel that there is an abyss to cross, that it depends upon me to cross it, and I do not yet dare. *Credo, Domine, adjuva incredulitatem meam.* Ah! Gentlemen, I beg you, seize upon this prayer; God will hear it, He will answer it by the gift of faith."

2. Concerning Extrinsic Causes.

673. There are many extrinsic causes today which concur in diminishing and utterly overthrowing faith:

(A) Neutral education handed down in schools, colleges, and universities, which often begets indifferentism, and sometimes irreligiosity. Almost everywhere on earth in our days very many schools are found in which nothing is taught concerning the Christian religion, indeed nothing concerning the Supreme Deity.[1] Thus the way is prepared not only for religious indifferentism, but also for atheism. For the authority and dignity of religion is greatly diminished among the young,

when it is wholly banished from the course of studies. But neutrality cannot long be preserved in schools; in historical and moral matters, the opportunity of speaking about religion presents itself many times, namely in order to attack and mock it.[2]

[1] Things have come to such a point in France that from certain schools books have been expelled in which the name of God can be read; indeed expurgated editions of classical books are printed, in which the name of God is wholly banished. (M. Le Francois, op. cit., p. 19, note 1.)

[2] In France, the matter has today become certain. For in the work written by J. Payot, *Cours de Morale... destine aux Maitres de l'Enseignement primaire et de l'Enseignement secondaire, aux ecoles normales d'Instituteurs et d'Institutrices...*, Paris, Colin, 1904, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are already called into doubt, pp. 189-213. Other books, for the use of children, diffuse the same errors into many schools. Cf. Goyau, *L'Ecole d'aujourd'hui*.

674. (B) The reading of books attacking faith. That there are innumerable books and journals in which the mysteries of our faith are denied or mocked, there is no one who is ignorant; they are the more dangerous insofar as they are written in a more elegant style and with a more scientific apparatus, and are adapted not only to the intelligence of the learned but also of the simple. Many Catholics, drawn by curiosity, read them, and begin to conceive doubts against revealed truths; very few take care to solve these doubts by reading Catholic books; moreover, difficulties are more easily proposed than solved.

675. Therefore deservedly these are prohibited by the Church:

"Books of apostates, heretics, schismatics, and any writers whatsoever defending heresy or schism, or overthrowing in any way the very foundations of religion... books of non-Catholics which treat professedly of religion, unless it is established that nothing is contained in them against Catholic faith;

"Books in which God, or the Blessed Virgin Mary, or the Saints, or the Catholic Church and its worship and sacraments, or the Apostolic See is disparaged...; works in which the concept of the inspiration of sacred Scripture is perverted, or its extension is too greatly restricted...

"Books which establish duel, suicide, or divorce as lawful, which deal with Masonic sects or other societies of the same kind, and contend that these are useful and not pernicious to the Church and civil society, and which defend errors proscribed by the Apostolic See...

"Daily papers, sheets, and periodical booklets which purposely attack religion or good morals are to be held proscribed not only by natural, but also by ecclesiastical law. But let Ordinaries take care, where there is need, opportunely to warn the faithful concerning the danger and harm of reading of this kind."[3]

[3] Leo XIII, Constit. *Officiorum ac munerum*, Jan. 25, 1897, nn. 2, 3, 11, 14, 21. For the understanding of these, one may read Vermeersch, *De prohibitione et censura librorum*, 2nd ed., Tournai, 1898; Gennari, *La costituzione Officiorum*, Naples, 1898; G. Peries, *L'Index*, Paris, 1898; A. Boudinhon, *La nouvelle legislation de l'Index*, Paris, 1899.

But in order that the faithful may be kept away more efficaciously from the reading of depraved books, it is necessary that Catholic books be recommended for them to read, accommodated to the capacity of each, distinguished no less by elegant style than by solidity of doctrine.

676. (C) Frequenting heretics, apostates, and infidels. For today, in most regions, Catholics live among non-Catholics, haters of our faith, and have frequent and sometimes intimate relations with them, whether in colleges and academies, or in workshops, in political life, indeed in family life. Therefore erroneous opinions, or conversations in which truth is mixed indiscriminately with errors, are often heard. From this not a few begin to waver in faith: for when they hear difficulties moved against religion by men by no means ignorant, and moreover do not know what to answer, certain persons easily doubt concerning the truth of religion, or bid farewell to it altogether.[4]

[4] In France the difficulty is increased by the secularization, as they say, of all institutions. To the point Msgr. Mignot, loc. cit., pp. 581-582: "The secularization of the State in all its services, the willed absence of every religious character in the official world contributes in large part to the weakening of beliefs. Religion is regarded as a purely personal and individual affair; the nation as nation has none. On leaving childhood, the young man, if he has not received strong convictions in the family, since he has not even been spoken to of God in his school stage, will fatally undergo the deleterious action of his surroundings. Far from being sustained, encouraged, strengthened by examples, his faith will go on weakening every day."

Therefore it is necessary to instruct the faithful in such a way that, whatever they read or hear, they may remain unmoved in faith.[5] Therefore they are to be warned that they seriously apply themselves to the study of religion, and have recourse to the more learned, especially priests, when difficulties occur which they themselves cannot solve.

[5] Therefore worthy of all praise are pastors who have special sermons for fortifying the faith of men against present-day objections. Cf. Gibier, *Confer. aux hommes, Les objections contemporaines contre la religion*, Paris, 1902 and 1903.

677. But the Church, in order to avert or at least remove the danger which arises from communication with heretics and infidels, has made special laws concerning this matter, which it helps to explain briefly.

The general principle is that communication with heretics or infidels in civil and social matters is not prohibited, the danger of perversion being removed;[6] but active communion in sacred things is forbidden, insofar as it implies an external profession of false religion. - Again, communication with infidels is more strictly prohibited than with heretics, because their worship is altogether false and superstitious. - Finally, in regions in which Catholics have already for a long time lived mixed with heretics, many things are tolerated which are strictly prohibited in other regions, for example, in Italy, where heretics are beginning to spread their errors: for there the danger of perversion is much greater. - Let us set forth certain particulars.

[6] Formerly it was forbidden that Christians live with Jews in the same house, or be present at the same banquet, use a Jewish physician, or serve Jews, etc.; but these things have fallen into disuse, and today one must attend only to the danger of perversion.

678. (a) Concerning the attendance of heretics and infidels at Catholic offices. These can indeed enter our churches, and there hear sermons and attend Mass, because good fruit is hoped for from this; but, from the decree of the Holy Office, June 8, 1859, "it is unlawful in sacred functions to invite heretics into the choir, to chant alternately, to give them the peace, sacred ashes, candles and blessed palms, and other external worship of this kind, which are rightly and deservedly considered indications of an interior bond and agreement, both in the active

sense, namely by giving similar things to them, and in the passive sense, by receiving them from them in their sacred rites."[7] Likewise it is not permitted to allow them to sing in the musical choir,[8] or to carry torches or lights at liturgical functions.[9]

[7] Apud *Collectanea S. C. Prop. F.*, n. 1843. - What is said there and in the following concerning heretics is to be applied to schismatics, since in fact they are heretics.

[8] Holy Office, May 1, 1889, apud *Collectanea*, n. 1851.

[9] Ibid., n. 1840.

679. (b) Concerning the attendance of Catholics in the sacred rites of heretics. Scandal and the danger of perversion being removed, Catholics may enter the temples of heretics for the sake of mere curiosity, without any communication in sacred things; for "to enter the temples of heretics is an act indifferent of itself, which becomes evil only from a depraved end or from circumstances. Namely it becomes evil: 1) if someone goes to them with the intention of assisting at the sacred functions of heretics; 2) or even without such intention, if the very entrance into the churches of heretics carries or seems to carry some communication with these same heretics in divine things, and hence offers an occasion of scandal; 3) or if such entrance has been commanded by a heretical government, as a protestation of the same faith and religion between Catholics and non-Catholics; 4) or if either is commonly held as a token of one and the same communion of Catholics and non-Catholics."[10] - Therefore of itself it is not permitted to be present at the sermons of heretics, unless there is question of learned men, who wish to hear them in order to know and refute the errors scattered there. - Nor is it permitted in the temples of heretics, when they exercise false worship there, to play the organ or sing; for this would be active communication in sacred things.[11]

[10] Holy Office, Jan. 13, 1818, apud *Collectanea*, n. 1833.

[11] Holy Office, July 8, 1889, apud *Collectanea*, n. 1854.

With regard to the funerals of heretics, it is permitted to be present at them by material attendance, for the sake of a civil duty, on account of a grave reason, and provided that there is no communication in sacred rites and ceremonies.[12] - With regard to pastors and priests, the Holy Office declared, March 30, 1859 and May 8, 1889, that "a pastor, as pastor, cannot be present at funerals of non-Catholics: but if he assists only civilly, without sacred vestments and without any communication in the sacred rite with heretics, it can be tolerated, provided that it is notoriously established that there was a bond of kinship or friendship between the pastor and the deceased non-Catholic."[13]

[12] Holy Office, Jan. 13, 1818, apud *Collectanea*, n. 1833.

[13] *Collectanea*, n. 1852.

680. (c) Concerning simultaneity. It is not permitted to allow heretics to celebrate their rites in Catholic churches, nor that Catholics perform sacred rites in their temples; for this is the same as consenting to their heretical rites, or at least providing Catholics an occasion of communicating with non-Catholics in sacred matters.[1] - Yet, for a very grave cause, especially for more easily promoting the conversion of schismatics and infidels by consideration of the sacred ceremonies, sometimes missionaries are permitted the faculty of celebrating Mass by the Catholic rite upon altars in the temples of heretics or schismatics, "so that the same altars

serve only as bare tables, and are arranged after the manner of Catholics with a consecrated stone, linens, the image of the Most Holy Crucified One, candlesticks, and other necessary furnishings for the use of the sacrifice of the Most Holy Mass in the aforesaid rite."[2]

[1] Holy Office, May 10, 1753, apud *Collect.*, n. 1816.

[2] Holy Office, Apr. 12, 1704, apud *Collect.*, n. 1808; cf. n. 1853.

681. (d) Concerning participation in the sacraments. It is not permitted for Catholic parents to allow their children to be baptized by a heretical minister; if this cannot be avoided without grave inconvenience, let them hold themselves passively. Absolutely it is not permitted to them, "neither by themselves nor by others, to perform the office of sponsor in baptisms which are administered by heretics to the children of heretics."[3]

[3] Holy Office, May 10, 1770, apud *Collect.*, n. 1825.

With regard to weddings, it is indeed permitted to attend the wedding feast, but regularly Catholics ought not be present at weddings celebrated before a minister by a heretical rite; yet "it can be tolerated that Catholics be present at weddings of this kind for the sake of civil duty only, scandal and any danger of perversion being removed, and also contempt of ecclesiastical authority being absent."[4] But it is not permitted there to perform the function of witness or groomsman, because this is active cooperation in a heretical rite.

[4] Holy Office, Jan. 14, 1874, apud *Collect.*, n. 1848.

Concerning mixed marriages, or marriages with infidels, or weddings celebrated before a heretical minister, we spoke in the *Treatise on Matrimony*, nn. 237-253 and 366-371.

682. (e) Concerning disputation with heretics. Public disputations, that is, those which are held on a fixed day and hour, before a multitude and judges of the controversy, are to be avoided: "Let Catholics beware lest they have disputations or conferences, especially public ones, with non-Catholics, without the permission of the Holy See or, if the case urges, of the local Ordinary."[5]

[5] Code, can. 1325, § 3.

Therefore the Holy See frequently prohibited that disputations of this kind be held without the permission of the Apostolic See, or at least of the Bishop, when recourse to the Supreme Pontiff cannot be had.[6] - But private disputations, before a few hearers, are permitted to clerics when some fruit is hoped for in the hearers, and moreover the clerics are skilled and instructed with sufficient doctrine. But even private disputations are not permitted to laymen by common law, because generally it is presumed that they are not sufficiently instructed in matters of faith. Today, however, this prohibition has fallen into disuse, especially where errors rage; therefore, if laymen are learned and capable of turning back sophisms, they can privately refute heretics and infidels.

[6] Cf. *Decretal.*, lib. V, c. 2 *Quicumque, de Haereticis*, in Sexto; *Collectanea*, n. 1674. - Perrone, op. cit., n. 570, says that these disputations are sometimes useful, "because, even if the disputant grows hardened, fruit is at least hoped for from the hearers, either from the conversion of some, or from the confirmation of Catholics, or even from the lesser boldness of heretics." St. Thomas had gone before (*Comment. in II Timoth.*, c. 2, lect. 2): "But should someone not dispute without contention before the people concerning faith? I answer: a distinction must be made on the part of the hearers, because either they are being solicited by infidels, and then public disputation is useful, because through this the simple

become more instructed when they see those erring refuted; but if they are not solicited by infidels, then disputation is not useful, but dangerous."

Besides, today there are not rarely held conferences, as they say, contradictory conferences, in which learned laymen, before a multitude, set forth and defend, with happy outcome, religious, moral, and social truths, with certain adversaries nevertheless contradicting. This indeed is to be left to the prudent judgment of Ordinaries: for it belongs to them to judge when and under what conditions disputations of this kind can be called lawful and opportune.[7]

[7] The S. C. assigned to extraordinary affairs declared that disputations with socialists are subject to the same rules, Jan. 27, 1902, apud *Acta S. Sedis*, t. XXXVIII, p. 407; cf. *Canoniste*, t. XXV, p. 335; *Etudes*, Aug. 20, 1905, p. 480; *Ami du Clerge*, Apr. 27, 1905, p. 354.

The conditions commonly required are these: (a) that the defender of Catholic truth be so firm in faith that he incurs no danger of falling into heresy; (b) that he be suited to set forth and defend the truth, so that the faith of the hearers is not weakened; (c) that there be founded hope that from this great utility will arise for the faithful or for adversaries.

683. (D) Concerning cooperation in matters pertaining to faith. Today, in mixed societies in which Catholics live together with infidels or heretics, there are many occasions of cooperating in matters pertaining to false religion. And certainly every formal, or intentional, cooperation is unlawful; but cooperation merely material can be lawful on account of a proportionately grave cause. It will not be beside the matter to set forth certain particular cases.

(a) Concerning the building of heterodox temples. With regard to the temples of heretics, we have an instruction of the Holy Office, given Jan. 14, 1818, to the Apostolic Vicar of Kentucky, and confirmed July 7, 1864.[8] To the question "whether it is permitted to build churches or synagogues of heretics," the answer was: "They are not to be disturbed, provided that scandal is not present, nor that it is in contempt of religion. But let the bishop take care that the artisans be opportunely instructed by missionaries and confessors... Namely they are bound to abstain from the work: 1) where a work of this kind is commonly held for a sign protesting false religion; 2) or something is contained in it which of itself directly and uniquely expresses reprobation of Catholic worship, and approbation of the condemned worship of heretics; 3) or it is established that Catholic artisans are driven to or called to the work by heretics in contempt of the Catholic religion. - Moreover, although outside these cases they are to be left in good faith, yet they are always to be warned lest they intend to cooperate with the worship of heretics." Here there is question of workmen; but if the question is of architects, a graver cause is required for them lawfully to construct a heretical temple, because the cooperation is more proximate.

[8] *Collectanea*, n. 1845.

With regard to Mohammedan temples, Catholics likewise are not to be disturbed, "provided that they act compelled by fear of grave evil, and do not intend to cooperate with the superstitions of Mohammedans."[9]

[9] S. C. de Prop. F., apud *Collect.*, n. 1733.

684. But if there is question of temples or altars of idols, the Holy See has declared many times that this is not permitted, even to avoid death: "The Japanese faithful cannot, in order to avoid

danger of death or exile, build altars or temples for idols or cooperate in their building."[10] The reason seems to be that, in the individual cases proposed, the erection of a temple was considered to be a sign protesting false religion. Therefore, if in some case the cooperation were merely material, and were not held as approbation of the worship of idols, it could be tolerated for a very grave reason.

[10] S. C. de Prop. F., apud *Collect.*, n. 1697; cf. nn. 1700, 1704, 1706, 1748.

685. It was also asked whether it is lawful for Catholics to contribute money for the building of heretical temples; the Sacred Penitentiary answered (in the year 1822): "Affirmatively, but only for freeing themselves and their temples from that inconvenient and scandalous simultaneity with Protestants."[11] From this it follows that this cooperation is not intrinsically evil, but can be permitted on account of a very grave cause. The Sacred Congregation, in the aforesaid case, alleged only one cause, because perhaps, in this case, there was no other which seemed sufficient; but grave authors[12] say that this is also permitted whenever a very grave reason is present, for example, lest a merchant's shop be utterly deserted by Protestants; which indeed we judge probable; and in fact many Catholic merchants act thus in mixed regions. - It is also permitted, by way of tribute, to pay monies which are in fact expended on idolatries, provided it is established, from circumstances or from open declaration, that Catholics do not consent to false superstitions.[13]

[11] Bucceroni, *Enchiridion*, ad n. 192.

[12] Konings, n. 313; Genicot, n. 237; Noldin, n. 122.

[13] Holy Office, Apr. 21, 1847, ad 4, apud *Collect.* I, n. 742.

686. From the same principle the question must be solved whether it is lawful to sell utensils or works of art for adorning a non-Catholic temple. When these can have a good or indifferent use, for example, benches, organs, bells, it is permitted to sell them on account of a grave reason. But if the question is of idols, which are destined not for adorning gardens or houses, but for superstitious worship, it is for the most part altogether unlawful, and can be tolerated only from a very grave and most urgent cause.

687. (b) Concerning the erection and support of non-Catholic schools and orphanages. Since the end of these institutions is not directly religious, a lesser cause is required than where there is question of temples. Yet, in order that scandal may be removed, money must be granted to non-Catholics not as followers of a sect, but as fellow-citizens; and care must be taken lest money thus contributed be used for perverting Catholics.

688. (c) Concerning calling a heretical minister to a dying person. It had been asked of the Holy Office whether nuns, taking care of a hospice in which non-Catholics are received, can call a heretical minister, if Protestants ask for one, so that they may receive from him the helps and consolations of religion. It was answered, on March 15, 1848, "according to the things set forth, it is not permitted; let them hold themselves passively." This decree indeed was confirmed Dec. 16, 1898, but at the same time it was declared that nothing prevents the minister from being called through a non-Catholic person;[14] moreover a non-Catholic person

can be made more certain concerning the state of the dying person. - But if the minister does not come, a Catholic priest or nun can arouse the dying person, being in good faith, so that he may elicit an act of contrition, and thus prepare himself for a Christian death.

[14] Apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XXI, 1899, p. 497.

Art. IV. Concerning the Means of Progressing in Faith.

It is not enough to avoid sins against faith; he who is truly Christian strives with all his strength to progress in faith daily. We shall briefly describe what means are to be used for this end.

[4] Scaramelli, *Directorium asceticum*, Tr. IV, art. 1, c. 4-5; Gay, op. cit., Tr. III, *De la foi*; Msgr. Lelong, *Confer. sur les vertus sacerdotales*, Paris, Tequi, 1901, 3rd Conf.

689. 1. Since faith is a gift of God, prayer is required first of all, especially for a twofold reason: for obtaining heavenly light, without which we cannot rightly understand eternal truths; and for fostering the pious affection of the will by which the mind is sweetly inclined to offer firmer assent to revealed truths and to taste them spiritually. Like the Apostles, let us frequently say: "Increase our faith."[2] This indeed seems more opportune either at the time when temptation against faith urges, or when an occasion presents itself of exercising faith more vividly, for example, in tribulations, in anxieties.

[2] Luke 17:5.

690. 2. Since faith is more vivid, other things being equal, the more fully revealed truths are known, it is of great profit, for strengthening it, to read the sacred Scriptures, as they are explained by the Church and the Fathers, - and also books in which Christian dogmas are declared no less substantially than lucidly. For as the reading of depraved books is very dangerous, so on the contrary the pious reading of the Scriptures is apt to increase faith: for there we find the very word of God, and if we read it in the spirit in which it was written, the mind of God is manifested to us, and the assent given to it is truly an act of faith.[3] It must be read constantly[4] with simplicity of heart, seeking nothing except the divine mind, wishing nothing except to live conformably to it, according to that saying: he painted by his acts the page which he had read. - Yet it must be read furnished with commentaries, in which the sense is declared from the works of the Fathers and the best interpreters of today.[5] Nor should books be omitted in which the excellent deeds of those who lived according to faith are narrated;[6] for by their examples faith is nourished and increased not a little.

[3] "Many Catholics would think they were inclining toward Protestantism if they read the Bible. What an aberration! One is Protestant when one seeks in the Bible, arbitrarily interpreted, the rule of faith; one is Catholic when one seeks in the Bible, interpreted by the Church, the food of Christian thought, the nourishment of the soul; for the Bible is the word of God; it is the bread of the soul, says the Savior." (M. d'Hulst, *Confer.* 1892, p. 120.)

[4] Jerome writes concerning Nepotian (*Ep.* 60, P. L., XXII, 595): "And by constant reading and long meditation, he had made his breast the library of Christ." - Experience establishes that the reading of the Gospel is no less delightful than useful, not only to clerics, but also to workers.

[5] Thus, for example, the commentaries edited by Fr. Rose and others in the collection *Pensee chretienne*, or the French translation by Crampon.

[6] In French there is the collection, edited by H. Joly, namely *Les Saints*; in English, *Lives of the Saints*, under the care of the Fathers of the Oratory.

To pious reading is equated the hearing of sermons in which the truths of faith are set forth; indeed the word of God uttered by mouth has greater force and efficacy, provided that sacred orators preach Christ, and not themselves.

691. 3. But the most efficacious means is the exercise of faith itself. For although faith properly is not increased, as a supernatural habit, except by divine operation (above, n. 602), facility of eliciting acts is acquired by exercise (n. 603). Therefore he progresses much in it who lives by faith, and therefore rightly orders judgments, words, and works according to the light of faith.[7] For as man is distinguished from beasts by reason, so the Christian is distinguished from pagans by faith; and as by frequent exercise of reason man is perfected, so the more frequently and intensely faith is exercised, the more perfect is the Christian.

[7] Therefore, in the prayer at Prime, we say daily: "Deign, O Lord God, King of heaven and earth, today to direct and sanctify, rule and govern our hearts and bodies, our senses, words, and acts in Thy law."

(A) According to the light of faith and the doctrine and examples of Christ, we must think rightly and judge concerning all things. Daily experience establishes that there are many Christians who judge concerning riches, honors, and pleasures according to the maxims of worldly men. St. Bernard refutes these by the example of Christ being born in poverty and humility:[8] "The judgment of the world is not such: either He (Christ) is deceived, or the world errs. But it is impossible for divine wisdom to be deceived. Deservedly therefore both the prudence of the flesh (for it also is death) is an enemy to God;[9] and also the prudence of the world is named foolishness.[10] What then? Christ indeed, who is not deceived, chose what is more troublesome to the flesh. Therefore that is better, that more useful, that rather to be chosen: and whoever teaches or advises otherwise must be guarded against as against a seducer."

[8] Sermon 3 *in Nativit.*, n. 1, P. L., CLXXXIII, 123.

[9] Rom. 8:7.

[10] 1 Cor. 3:19.

What Bernard writes concerning poverty and mortification is true of the rest: namely, we must judge concerning all things and events, tribulations, persecutions, and anxieties, as Christ Himself would judge: But what would Christ say to these things? For we are not truly Christians if we assent to worldly fallacies contrary to the Gospel.

692. (B) Therefore also, in speeches and conversations, we must speak according to the Gospel. But how many Christians accommodate themselves to the prejudices of the world, approving what Christ reproved, and esteeming less what He Himself praised?

Thus, while He Himself calls blessed the poor in spirit, the meek of heart, those who suffer persecution, do not many call happy those who glory in riches and to whom all things turn out prosperously? The true Christian is not ashamed of the Gospel, but manfully, without boasting,

speaks concerning all things and events according to the sayings of Christ Himself, and thus daily progresses in true faith.

693. (C) But especially he manifests the same virtue by his works: for he lives not according to flesh and blood, but according to the spirit, seeking nothing except to cling to the footsteps of Christ. Therefore he works the good not that he may be seen by men, but that he may please God; without ostentation he performs prayer, almsgiving, and other Christian works, not from a desire of vain glory, but from a supernatural motive.

Rising in the morning, he signs himself with the sign of the cross, and joyfully offers all his actions to God through Christ. If he prays, he asks in the name of Christ whatever he needs, mindful of that word: "Amen, amen I say to you, if you ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it to you."[11] If one must obey a superior, he places the image of Christ upon his superior, according to that saying: "He who hears you hears Me."[12] If the poor person must be assisted, he furnishes alms or other help to him as to Christ, according to that saying:[13] "As long as you did it to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me." If he is vexed by various temptations and afflictions, he trusts in Christ: "I can do all things in Him who strengthens me."[14] In one word, he does all things with Christ, and through Him and in Him, and thus grows daily in faith and at the same time in good works: "He who abides in Me, and I in him, he bears much fruit."[15]

[11] John 16:23.

[12] Luke 10:16.

[13] Matt. 25:40.

[14] Phil. 4:13.

[15] John 15:5.

694. 4. But the final means consists in cooperating strenuously for protecting and propagating faith in others.

For today it is permitted to no Christian to rest in tranquil possession of faith. For enemies rising up on every side fiercely attack the Christian religion; many burn with zeal for utterly overthrowing the Church, and the words of Christ have already been fulfilled: "I came not to send peace, but the sword."[16] Therefore nothing remains except to fight the good fight of faith, defending faith not only in ourselves but in others, indeed, when occasion is given, exhorting and urging others to embrace our religion. This will be a work of gratitude toward God, who, by freely giving the light of faith, has given us the greatest and precious gift; a work of charity toward others, who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, and indeed the most excellent one, since, from what was said above, faith is the beginning and root of all justification; and also a work of charity toward ourselves, since God is accustomed to reward zeal of this kind by strengthening the faith of those who preach the Gospel to others.

[16] Matt. 10:34; cf. Luke 12:51.

Therefore "through patience let us run to the contest proposed to us, looking to Jesus, the author and finisher of faith."[17]

[17] Heb. 12:1-2.

On the Virtue of Hope

Concerning the Virtue of Hope.

695. From faith hope is born: for by faith we know that the miseries and temptations of this life are not perpetual, but are as it were a transitory stage for obtaining immortal life. Therefore the faithful firmly expect eternal beatitude and the means necessary for obtaining it.

Hope in general designates three different things: (a) one of the passions, namely a movement of the appetite by which we tend toward a future, arduous, and possible good: future, because hope does not rest in a good already possessed, but tends toward an absent good which we wish to possess; arduous, because things very easy to obtain, which can be obtained immediately, without effort, are not properly hoped for, but are already had in our power; yet possible, because what can in no way be obtained excites despair rather than hope.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 40, a. 1.

(b) A movement of the will, by which we desire some good with confidence of obtaining it; for as the appetite is borne toward sensible good, so the will tends toward the intellectual good of the natural order through hope, which includes two things: desire and confidence of obtaining it.

(c) The supernatural virtue of hope, by which we confidently await heavenly goods. It differs indeed from natural hope, because it tends toward supernatural things; but it agrees with it in this, that it pursues a future, arduous, and possible good, and indeed by a twofold act, namely by desire and confident expectation. Desire supposes and involves love of the hoped-for good, namely a love of concupiscence,[2] by which we tend toward the object as toward our proper and beatifying good; but confidence supposes a certain elevation of soul, and an effort of the will toward obtaining the arduous good which is hoped for.

[2] The love of concupiscence, which among moderns often sounds bad, among the ancients is nothing else than the love by which we desire something insofar as it is our good.

We shall speak: 1. concerning the nature of hope; 2. concerning its honesty and necessity; 3. concerning sins against hope; adding a few things, by way of corollary, concerning the means of progressing in hope.

Art. I. Concerning the Nature of Hope.

696. Hope, as a habit, is a theological virtue disposing the will to desire God as our supreme good, and firmly to expect from Him supernatural beatitude and the means for obtaining it, on account of the infinite goodness of God toward us, and His power and fidelity in promises.

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 17-18 and *Quaest. disp., de Spe*; Suarez, *De Spe*, disp. I; Perrone, op. cit., *de Spe*, nn. 1-70; Bouquillon, op. cit., nn. 309-344; Pesch, op. cit., nn. 467-513; Billot, th. 25-26; M. d'Hulst, *Confer.* 1892, 5th.

For the understanding of this definition, we shall explain: 1. the object; 2. the motive; 3. the properties; 4. the subject of hope.

I. Concerning the Object of Hope.

697. The primary and principal object of hope is God Himself, insofar as He is the supreme good beatifying man; but the secondary object is all the goods which are ordered to the possession of God.

1. God Himself, to be possessed by man and about to beatify him, is the primary object of hope. (A) Scripture teaches this many times; for when the parents and relatives of Tobias insulted the pious servant of God, saying: Where is your hope? he answered: "Do not speak so, because we are children of the saints, and we await that life which God is about to give to those who never change their faith from Him."[4] But in what this life consists is taught more clearly in the New Testament: "Now this is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent";[5] - "Dearly beloved, we are now the sons of God; and it has not yet appeared what we shall be; we know that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is."[6]

[4] Tob. 2:17-18.

[5] John 17:3.

[6] 1 John 3:2.

(B) The Fathers often inculcate this doctrine, among whom Augustine, namely explaining these words "God is my portion forever," says: "He who asks another reward from God, and therefore wishes to serve God, makes dearer what he wishes to receive than Him from whom he wishes to receive it. What then? no reward of God? None besides Himself. The reward of God is God Himself."[7]

[7] *In Ps.* 72, n. 32, P. L., XXXVI, 928; the same holy Doctor expounds this philosophically in the little work *De Beata Vita*, P. L., XXXII, 959-976.

(C) Reason suggests the same thing. For that must be the primary object of our hope which is the supreme good, the cause of our beatitude, and to which all our works are ordered; but, from what was said above, nn. 13-20, our supreme beatitude consists not in created goods, but in the perfect knowledge and love of God.

698. 2. But the secondary object of hope is all the helps which are ordered to the possession of God: (a) first of all the supernatural helps of grace, by which we are daily assisted for knowing the truth, conquering desires, overcoming temptations, avoiding sins, and also exercising Christian virtues, according to that saying:[8] "Having therefore a great high priest who has passed into the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God, let us hold fast our confession... Let us therefore go with confidence to the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace in seasonable aid." (b) Afterward, however, even temporal goods, insofar as they are referred to eternal beatitude; for merely natural goods, which in no way pertain to the supernatural end, cannot be called the object of Christian hope. On the contrary, however, the evils of this life, tribulations, anxieties, persecutions, and other things of this kind, insofar as they contribute to our salvation, increase our hope, according to that saying:[9] "And we know that to those who love God all things work together unto good, to those who, according to His purpose, are called to be saints."

[8] Heb. 4:14-16.

[9] Rom. 8:28.

II. Concerning the Motive of Hope.

699. 1. Various opinions. Since hope can be considered under different respects, there are different opinions concerning the motive upon which it rests, according to the different way in which this virtue is regarded.

(a) The Scotists, considering hope chiefly as an appetite of the supreme good insofar as it beatifies us, say that the sole motive of hope is God, as He is our supreme good;[10] for what seems principal in this virtue is the love of God, insofar as He is the supreme good of man: the rest, namely desire and expectation of grace, is something accessory.

[10] Suarez, *De Spe*, disp. I, sect. 3.

(b) The Thomists, considering hope as the pursuit of an arduous good, think that its motive is the helping omnipotence of God; for the reason on account of which we tend toward an arduous good is divine power insofar as it can help us.

(c) But some place the motive of hope in the fidelity of God; for since there is question of supernatural beatitude and the means proportioned to this end, which exceed the powers and merits of man, we cannot hope for these unless God has promised to bestow the same upon us.

(d) Finally, there are many today who, observing that the act of hope is virtually threefold, or can be regarded under a threefold respect, contend that the three aforesaid motives concur together for the production of this act; this opinion indeed seems to us more probable.

700. 2. The more probable opinion: The adequate motive of hope is the goodness of God toward us, and at the same time His helping power, and also fidelity in keeping promises.

(A) The motive of hope, insofar as it includes love of the supreme good, is the goodness of God toward us. For hope tends toward divine good through love; for we do not hope except for that which we love. But the motive of this love is not divine goodness absolute, or regarded in itself, which is the motive of charity, but the relative goodness of God, or His goodness toward us; for as in the natural order we hope for those things which seem good to us, so in the supernatural order we hope for the supreme good insofar as it is ours and makes us blessed.

Thus Christ proposes the kingdom of God to the elect as the reward prepared for them and hoped for by them:[11] "Come, blessed of My Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." Wherefore the Apostle, after many labors bravely endured for Christ, expects the crown of justice which will beatify him:[12] "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day."

[11] Matt. 25:34.

[12] 2 Tim. 4:7-8.

701. (B) The motive of hope, insofar as it includes elevation of soul, is the helping power of God. For since the supreme good which we hope for is truly arduous, and cannot be attained without divine help, there accedes another motive of hope, namely the helping power of God: this comprises not only omnipotence, by which God can help us, but also mercy, by which He is kindly prepared to furnish His help in our weakness.

This indeed is gathered from innumerable texts of Scripture in which we are commanded to hope in the Lord, because He is powerful and merciful, and therefore our helper: "In God is my salvation and my glory; He is the God of my help, and my hope is in God. Hope in Him... God is our helper forever."[13] - "But I, as a fruitful olive tree in the house of God; I have hoped in the mercy of God forever and ever."[14] - "And God is able to make all grace abound in you, that in all things, always having all sufficiency, you may abound unto every good work."[15] - "But God, who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, quickened us together in Christ, by whose grace you are saved, and raised us up together and made us sit together in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus, that He might show in the ages to come the abundant riches of His grace in His goodness toward us in Christ Jesus."[16]

[13] Ps. 61:8-9. This is often repeated in the Psalms.

[14] Ps. 51:10.

[15] 2 Cor. 9:8.

[16] Eph. 2:4-7.

The same can be gathered from Trent, where it declares that the gift of perseverance is not had "except from Him who is powerful to establish him who stands, that he may stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falls; let no one promise himself anything certain with absolute certitude, although all ought to place and repose the firmest hope in the help of God."[1]

[1] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 13, Denzing., n. 689.

In truth, in order that amid the multiple temptations and miseries of life by which we are surrounded we may be able to raise the soul to the supernatural good which is not only arduous but also surpasses our powers, it is necessary that we expect help from Him who, on account of His power, is able, and, on account of His mercy, wills to help us.

702. (C) The motive of hope, insofar as this includes confidence, or a firm and certain expectation of heavenly goods, is the fidelity of God in promises. For since God is by no means bound to bestow upon us supernatural goods, we cannot hope for these with firm certitude unless He has promised to grant the same to men; moreover, since He is faithful, we can rely upon His promises with all confidence.

Therefore Scripture not rarely derives the certitude of our hope from the promises or fidelity of God: "Let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering, for He is faithful who has promised";[2] - "unto the hope of eternal life, which God, who does not lie, has promised."[3] - In the same sense must be understood the words of Paul cited above (n. 700); for eternal life is not a crown of justice unless the promise of God accedes.

[2] Heb. 10:23; cf. 6:13-20.

[3] Titus 1:2.

703. Corollary. Although properly the motive of our hope is God, good, helping, and faithful, yet it is certain that our confidence is much increased from the merits and satisfactions of Christ: for He, as the moral head of the whole human race, satisfied for our sins, and merited for us all spiritual helps which we need for obtaining eternal life, as was proved in the *Treatise on the Incarnate Word*, nn. 179-214.

Therefore He is truly the meritorious cause of our justification and salvation, according to that saying of Trent:[4] "Who, when we were enemies, on account of the exceeding charity with which He loved us, merited justification for us by His most holy passion on the wood of the cross, and satisfied God the Father for us." Therefore when we act and pray through Christ and in Christ, relying upon His merits, we are certainly able to conceive greater confidence.

[4] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, Denzing., n. 681.

Besides, by force of the communion of saints, the intercession of the Blessed Mary and of the elect reigning in heaven, and also the prayers of the just on earth, can increase our confidence secondarily; for these can obtain for us opportune helps, by which we are assisted not a little toward obtaining eternal beatitude. (*De Verbo Incarnato*, nn. 292-294 and nn. 304-306.)

III. Concerning the Properties of Hope.

704. 1. State of the question. That the act of hope is supernatural and free is easily understood from what has already been said; but it will not be useless to consider whether and in what sense it can be called certain and firm.

Certitude is directly and properly predicated of cognition, but indirectly of those acts of the will which depend upon prior cognition; yet with this difference, that certitude of the intellect excludes doubt, while certitude or firmness of the will excludes fluctuation or fear. Therefore the act of hope is called certain insofar as it cannot be frustrated, and firm insofar as it excludes fear. But in order that the matter may be understood better, hope can be considered both on the part of God and on the part of ourselves.

705. 2. Thesis: Theological hope, as much as is on the part of God, is supremely certain and firm; but as much as is on the part of ourselves, it admits a certain uncertainty and fear.

(A) On the part of God it is supremely certain and firm.

(a) This indeed is inculcated very often in the Psalms: "My God, in Thee I trust; let me not be ashamed. Neither let my enemies laugh at me; for none of those who wait on Thee shall be confounded... In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped, let me not be confounded forever... Our God is our refuge and strength, a helper in troubles which have found us exceedingly; therefore we will not fear when the earth shall be troubled... He who dwells in the help of the Most High shall abide in the protection of the God of heaven."[5] (b) The same is taught in the sapiential books: "Know that no one has hoped in the Lord and has been confounded. For who has continued in His commandments, and has been forsaken, or who has called upon Him, and He has despised him? For God is pious and merciful, and will forgive sins in the day of tribulation."[6] (c) Nor does Paul speak otherwise:

"Tribulation works patience, and patience trial, and trial hope; but hope does not confound."[7] Wherefore elsewhere he teaches that hope is like a sure and firm anchor of the soul;[8] and, near the end of life, he writes confidently:[9] "For I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep my deposit unto that day." - (d) This is confirmed by Trent:[10] "All ought to place and repose the firmest hope in the help of God."

[5] Ps. 24:2-3; Ps. 30:2; Ps. 45:2-3; Ps. 90:1; let the whole Psalm be read with the Commentary of St. Bernard.

[6] Ecclus. 2:11-13.

[7] Rom. 5:3-5.

[8] Heb. 6:19.

[9] 2 Tim. 1:12.

[10] Sess. VI, cap. 13, Denzing., n. 689.

In truth this is gathered from what was said concerning the motive of hope. For that act is certain and firm which rests upon an infallible motive; but the motive upon which hope rests is altogether infallible, since the goodness, omnipotence, mercy, and fidelity of God can never be frustrated; therefore the act of hope must be altogether firm: otherwise injury is inflicted upon the divine attributes.

706. (B) On the part of ourselves, insofar as hope supposes our cooperation, it admits a certain uncertainty, from which there arises fear lest by our own fault we lose the heavenly kingdom.[10] For the divine promise of eternal beatitude to be given to each is conditioned, namely on this supposition, that we cooperate with the grace of God and persevere unto the end; but, on account of weakness or malice, we can fail and fall away from the state of grace; therefore from this head hope is not absolutely certain, but can be frustrated.

[10] Thus against the *Protestants*, who think that each one must trustingly hope and believe that he is inscribed among the number of the predestined. This is refuted in the Treatise on Grace, n. 164-167.

This indeed Scripture teaches; thus Paul wrote to the faithful: "Therefore he who thinks himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall... With fear and trembling work out your salvation";[11] indeed concerning himself he said: "For I am conscious of nothing to myself, yet I am not hereby justified; but He who judges me is the Lord... I chastise my body and bring it into servitude, lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become reprobate."[12]

[11] 1 Cor. 10:12; Phil. 2:12.

[12] 1 Cor. 4:4; 9:27.

Trent declared the same against the Protestants:[13] "For as no pious person ought to doubt concerning the mercy of God, concerning the merit of Christ, and concerning the efficacy of the sacraments: so each person, while he looks upon himself and his own proper weakness and indisposition, can fear and be afraid concerning his grace; since no one can know with the certitude of faith, to which falsehood cannot be subject, that he has obtained the grace of God... Nevertheless those who think themselves to stand, let them take heed lest they fall; and let them work out their salvation with fear and trembling, in labors, in watchings, in alms, in prayers and oblations, in fastings and chastity. For

they ought to fear, knowing that they have been reborn unto the hope of glory and not yet unto glory."

[13] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 9 and 13, Denzing., nn. 684 and 689; cf. n. 688.

707. Corollary. Therefore no one, unless from a special revelation, can be certain concerning his own justification and salvation. Therefore with fear and trembling we must work out our salvation.

But this fear does not diminish our hope, but rather sharpens and raises it, because it impels us to flee to God: for while we fear, on account of our weakness, lest we fall into sin, we are rendered more watchful, and place all our confidence in God; and at the same time we devote ourselves more perseveringly to good works, so that our salvation may become more certain, according to that saying:[14] "Labor the more, that by good works you may make your vocation and election sure: for doing these things, you shall not sin at any time."

[14] 2 Pet. 1:10.

IV. Concerning the Subject of Hope.

708. From what has been said, it is easily understood that the proximate subject of hope is the will: for hope cannot be placed in the intellect, which regards the true, since it tends directly toward the good; nor in the sensitive appetite, which is concerned with sensible good; therefore it is in the will, since it inclines toward spiritual good.

But the question arises what persons are capable of eliciting an act of hope. (A) With regard to the dead: (a) the blessed in heaven no longer hope, at least for essential beatitude,[15] since they already enjoy the same, according to that saying:[16] "But hope which is seen is not hope; for what a man sees, why does he hope for?" (b) The damned likewise cannot hope, since they know that they cannot escape damnation and arrive at beatitude. (c) But hope can be elicited by souls detained in purgatory, according to the common opinion, because, although they are already certain of their salvation, nevertheless they cannot arrive at it except by enduring the sufferings and anxieties to which they are subjected; and thus the future possession of heaven appears to them as something certain but arduous.

[15] Some indeed assert that they hope for the accidental beatitude of the body; yet St. Thomas denies this, II-II, q. 18, a. 2 ad 4, because the glory of the body does not have the character of an arduous good with respect to one having the glory of the soul.

[16] Rom. 8:24.

709. (B) If the question is of the living: (a) hope does not remain in those who are formally heretics (above, n. 604), because the foundation of hope is faith itself, which is lacking in these; nor in those who have fallen into despair or heretical presumption, because by these sins hope is lost, from what is to be said below. (b) Yet it can remain in other sinners, who must prepare themselves for justification by hope, according to Trent:[17] "While sinners, understanding that they are sinners, by the fear of divine justice, by which they are usefully shaken, turning themselves to consider the mercy of God, are raised into hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ."

[17] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6, Denzing., n. 680.

Art. II. Concerning the Honesty and Necessity of Hope.

710. Once the nature of hope has been explained, it is easy enough to understand its excellence. (a) Nevertheless, some contended that hope, considered separately from charity, or the desire of some reward, is of itself infected by some stain of baseness, and cannot be made honest unless it is converted into an affection of benevolence and charity; and therefore they said that a work exercised with a view to eternal reward, without charity, is not truly honest: thus the Calvinists, Baius, and the Jansenists.[2] Besides, not a few modern philosophers, especially Kantians, and (what is astonishing) evolutionists, turn it into a fault of the Christian religion that it proposes a reward to those doing good; for thus, they say, virtue is mercenary (above, nn. 30 and 56).

[1] Suarez, *De spe*, disp. I, sect. 5; Perrone, op. cit., nn. 82-124; Bouquillon, nn. 346-371; Billot, th. 27-28; Pesch, nn. 514-530.

[2] Calvin, *Instit.*, lib. III, c. 16, § 3, and c. 18, § 2; Baius, lib. *de Caritate*, c. 6; *de virtutibus impiorum*, c. 5-6; with regard to the Jansenists, see propositions 44-45 of Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI, Sept. 8, 1713, apud Denzing., nn. 1259-1278.

(b) The Quietists, under the leadership of Michael Molinos, did not proceed so far, but, thinking that perfection consists in a continuous act of contemplation and love, asserted that hope, which regards one's own good, is imperfect, and therefore cannot be composed with the pure love of God and the highest perfection. From this they also inferred that all desires, even pious ones, all petitions, all acts except the pure love of God, as imperfect, are to be omitted; and that temptations are not to be resisted actively, but only passively.[3] The will, they said, ought to remain altogether quiet, and not act except when divine grace impels, which alone works good in us. From this error the pious widow Guyon did not withdraw far enough; her defense was undertaken by the Archbishop of Cambrai, Fenelon, in the work *Explication des Maximes des Saints*, where he taught that there is given a habitual state of pure love which excludes hope.[4]

[3] Yet the greatest difference must be established between the errors of M. Molinos and of Fenelon. The former indeed proceeded much farther both speculatively and practically, by deducing immoral conclusions from his principles. Theoretically he taught: "The soul must not think either of reward, or of punishment, or of paradise, or of hell, or of death, or of eternity." Practically: "The free will having been handed over to God, and the care and thought of our soul having been left to Him, there is no longer to be any account of temptations; nor should any resistance be made to them except negative resistance, with no effort being used: and if nature is moved, it is necessary to allow it to be moved, because it is nature... When violences of this kind (diabolical temptations) occur, it is necessary to allow Satan to work, by applying no effort and no proper endeavor, but man ought to remain in his nothingness: and even if pollutions and obscene acts by one's own hands, and even worse things, follow, there is no need to disturb oneself..." (Ap. Denzing., nn. 1094, 1104, 1134.)

[4] Fenelon said: "There is given a habitual state of the love of God, which is pure charity and without any admixture of the motive of one's own interest. Neither fear of punishments nor desire of rewards any longer has a part in it. God is no longer loved on account of merit, nor on account of perfection, nor on account of the happiness to be found in Him... In this state the soul loses every hope of its own proper interest; but never loses in the higher part, that is, in its direct and intimate acts, perfect hope, which is the disinterested desire of the promises." (Ap. Denzing., nn. 1193 and 1203.) It is known to all with how great humility Fenelon retracted his errors, condemned by Innocent XII. - The history of quietism has been sketched among others by Gosselin, *Analyse de la controverse du Quietisme* (*Oeuvres de Fenelon*,

Versailles, t. IV); L. Crouste, *Fenelon et Bossuet*, Paris, 1894-1895, t. I, pp. 375-564, t. II in entirety. - You will find the doctrine of Bossuet especially in the work *Instruction sur les etats d'oraison*, where the articles called Issy are set forth, concerning quietism.

Against these errors we shall prove the honesty and necessity of hope.

I. Concerning the Honesty of Hope.

711. Thesis. Theological hope, by which we work good with a view to eternal beatitude, not only bears before itself nothing disordered, but truly has the character of virtue.

(A) This indeed is clear from the texts of Scripture cited above, nn. 700-702, in which hope in God is commended; but besides, from many others in which works done with a view to eternal reward are explicitly praised as good: "Seek therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."[5] - "Make unto yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity, that, when you shall fail, they may receive you into eternal dwellings."[6] Therefore the Apostle exhorts the Corinthians that, like athletes, they abstain from all things and thus receive an incorruptible crown,[7] and elsewhere adds:[8] "Whatever you do, work from the soul, as to the Lord, and not to men; knowing that from the Lord you shall receive the retribution of the inheritance." Now God cannot so earnestly and frequently exhort us to hope unless it is honest and praiseworthy. Indeed St. John explicitly declares that this hope is sanctifying:[9] "And everyone who has this hope in Him sanctifies himself, as He also is holy."

[5] Matt. 6:33.

[6] Luke 16:9.

[7] 1 Cor. 9:25.

[8] Col. 3:23-24.

[9] 1 John 3:3.

(B) Therefore deservedly Trent reproved those "who establish that in all works the just sin, if in those works, by arousing their own sluggishness and exhorting themselves to run in the stadium, with this, that God first of all be glorified, they also look to eternal reward"; and afterward declared: "And therefore to those working well unto the end and hoping in God, eternal life is to be proposed, both as grace mercifully promised through Christ Jesus to the sons of God, and as a reward faithfully to be rendered, from the promise of God Himself, to their good works and merits."[10]

[10] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 11 and 16, Denzing., nn. 687 and 692.

712. (C) It is consonant with reason to hope in God, to love Him as our good, and to expect from Him eternal life and the means for obtaining it. (a) Certainly good and honest is the act by which we tend toward God as our end and the fountain of supreme beatitude; for thus our faculties are rightly developed, while they are ordered to infinite good; moreover, by loving God as good for us, we easily love Him as lovable in Himself.

Some say that thus the order is perverted, because we refer God to ourselves as to an end. But undeservedly; for when we seek our beatitude in the knowledge and love of God, by that very fact we recognize God to be our ultimate end; wherefore we refer ourselves to God as to the ultimate end.

(b) Moreover, when we confidently expect divine help, by that very fact we adhere to God helping; now the perfection of man consists in this, that he is united to God. Besides, to hope in the Lord is honorable to Him: for thus we recognize His power, goodness, and fidelity: "Because he has hoped in Me, I will deliver him; I will protect him because he has known My name."[11]

[11] Ps. 90:14.

713. Therefore they err, as we showed above, n. 30, who say that a work done with a view to eternal life is mercenary: for hope of a merely spiritual and future reward does not exclude an honest motive, but, given human weakness, powerfully incites us to the good.[12] - And indeed those who boast that they act well on account of duty, and not on account of reward, deceive themselves or others: for experience establishes that men are only gradually drawn to the good of a higher order, to pure love, elicited without any hope of gratitude or reward. - The Catholic doctrine seems much more adapted to the weakness of human nature, which draws men to spiritual good by hope of future reward, and gradually raises them from hope to the supreme good loved for its own sake. We confess besides that our acts are more perfect the less they regard our own advantage.[13]

[12] This Seailles himself admits, although otherwise hostile to Catholic doctrine: "It is not my intention to diminish or calumniate Christian morality; what it has obtained from men, what it has given them suffices to defend it from voluntary injustices and unintelligent bias. It has deepened souls, it has made them more delicate and more pure, it has restrained the impatient and brutal beast, it has opposed to its immediate desires the dream of paradise and the nightmares of hell: by binding beatitude to sacrifice, it has made disinterestedness come forth from egoism itself. Some are scandalized by this: instinct is found again, fear, desire, hope, trembling or appetite of the beast in this expectation of reward; but, to what is seen, to what is touched, victoriously to oppose an image, a dream of happiness, what one does not verify by the senses, what exists only to the extent that one believes it, is this not already idealism, proof that the idea can conquer?" (*Les affirmat. de la conscience*, pp. 49-50.)

[13] Which M. d'Hulst splendidly explains, *Careme* 1891, pp. 200 and 412: "It is not because the virtuous man will have made a calculation that he will be beatified, it is because he will have done his duty. The more he has forgotten himself in the virtuous effort, the greater will be his reward. To mediocre souls, enamored of themselves even in the practice of good, the lesser happiness; to heroic souls, unoccupied with themselves even in the care of their salvation, the highest felicity."

II. Concerning the Necessity of Hope.

714. That the infused habit of hope is necessary by necessity of means for salvation is gathered from the fact that justification is not infused except with the virtues of faith, hope, and charity (above, n. 597). But the question is moved concerning the act of hope, namely whether this is at times necessary for obtaining or preserving justification. The Quietists denied this, asserting that there is given a perfect state in which every act of hope is excluded (above, n. 710).

715. 1. Some act of theological hope, according to the ordinary law, is necessary for adults by necessity of means for obtaining justification.

(A) For Trent, describing the dispositions necessary by necessity of means for justification, places hope among them:[14] "They are raised into hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ." In truth the first movement which follows faith and fear of God in sinners is confidence of obtaining remission of sins, which they conceive by turning themselves to the mercy of

God; for unless they trust in God, they fall into despair, they do not think of doing penance,[15] and therefore they cannot be justified.

[14] Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6; Denzing., n. 680.

[15] "For no one," says St. Ambrose, "can do penance well unless he has hoped for pardon." (*De Paenitent.*, c. I, n. 4, P. L., XVI, 466.)

Absolutely speaking, it can indeed happen that they pass immediately to eliciting an act of perfect charity or contrition, by which they are justified, and therefore we said "according to the ordinary law." But this act of charity virtually includes hope: for by loving God as a friend, we hope that He will be propitious to us.

(B) Scripture does not openly declare the matter, since it inculcates the utility rather than the necessity of hope. Yet this necessity is logically inferred from it. For the Apostle, when he preaches the absolute necessity of faith, defines it as the substance of things to be hoped for,[16] and therefore supposes that hope is required for justification just as faith itself is; for the sinner who believes and does not hope easily falls into despair, and thus cannot be saved.[17]

[16] Heb. 11:1, 6.

[17] Below, n. 720.

716. 2. He who is already justified is bound at times to elicit acts of hope for persevering and obtaining salvation.

(A) Scripture indeed insinuates this in many places, in which hope is so commended that it seems to fall under precept: "Command the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God."[1] - "But Christ as a son in His house: which house we are, if we hold fast confidence and the glory of hope firm unto the end."[2] Hence the Apostle often exhorts the faithful to Christian hope: "So run that you may obtain. And everyone who strives for the mastery abstains from all things; and they indeed that they may receive a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible one";[3] - "Let us live piously in this world, awaiting the blessed hope."[4] All these things indeed suppose that acts of hope are to be elicited at least at times.

[1] 1 Tim. 6:17.

[2] Heb. 3:6.

[3] 1 Cor. 9:24-25.

[4] Titus 2:13.

(B) This likewise is gathered from the necessity of prayer. That this is necessary for salvation was proved in the *Treatise on Grace*, nn. 42 and 58, and below will be demonstrated in the *Treatise on the Virtue of Religion*. But prayer to God supposes hope: for we ask graces from Him for this reason, because we hope in Him; wherefore James says:[5] "But let him ask in faith (confidence), nothing wavering." Therefore acts of hope are to be elicited at times.

[5] James 1:6.

717. 3. Corollary. Therefore quietism must be rejected, nor can there be admitted a habitual state of the love of God which altogether excludes hope. Man can indeed at times elicit

an act of perfect charity, by which, without any admixture of a motive of his own interest, he loves God solely as supremely lovable in Himself; he can arrive at that excess of charity that, with Paul, conditionally (that is, if it were possible, without loss of divine love), he would renounce eternal happiness: "I wished myself to be anathema from Christ for my brethren";[6] but soon with the same Apostle he must return to hope: "I press toward the mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation of God in Christ Jesus... As to the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day."[7] Therefore in the present life, while we are pilgrims away from God, we must not only love Him, but hope in Him.

[6] Rom. 9:3.

[7] Phil. 3:14; 2 Tim. 4:8.

This is also clear from the condemnation of 68 propositions of Michael de Molinos by Innocent XI, Nov. 20, 1687, - and of 23 propositions excerpted from the work of Msgr. Fenelon by Innocent XII, Mar. 12, 1699. For from this condemnation it is certainly gathered that there is not given a habitual state of the love of God without any admixture of proper interest.[8]

[8] You will find these propositions apud Denzing., nn. 1088-1155 and 1193-1215. - Here it is also worthwhile to refer to some of the Issy articles, concerning which Bossuet, Noailles, bishop of Chalons, Fenelon, and Tronson, S.S., agreed: "1) Every Christian in every state is bound to preserve the exercise of faith, hope, and charity, and to elicit their acts, as acts of distinct virtues. 2) It is not permitted for a Christian to be indifferent to salvation and to the things which are referred to it: holy indifference regards the outcome of this life (sin excepted), and the dispensation of spiritual consolations and aridities."

718. 4. Concerning the time at which the precept of hope obliges. Almost the same must be said as concerning faith, nn. 644-647; namely this precept:

(A) Obliges of itself: (a) when someone has attained the use of reason, and at the same time eternal beatitude toward which he must tend has been sufficiently proposed to him; (b) in danger of death, at least more probably, so that the mind, the terrors of judgment having been overcome, may confidently tend toward God the ultimate end; (c) often in life, although the times cannot be determined more particularly; besides, he who lives as a Christian, prays, and worthily receives the sacraments, by that very fact satisfies the precept; (d) when a temptation against hope urges which can be conquered only by an act of hope; (e) when the habit of hope has been lost through the mortal sin of despair.

(B) By accident: (a) when a precept must be fulfilled which cannot be fulfilled without an act of hope, for example, prayer, penance; (b) if a temptation urges which cannot be overcome unless the soul is raised by an act of hope.

Art. III. Concerning Sins against Hope.

719. One can sin against hope in a twofold way: by omission, when the prescribed act of hope is not elicited; by commission, when hope is cast away through despair or perverted through presumption. From what has been said it is sufficiently understood when one sins against hope by omission. Yet it may be observed that the principal cause of these sins is disordered adhesion to earthly goods, by which temporal goods are preferred to eternal goods, so that not

a few desire to remain perpetually in this life. This happens especially to those who abound in riches and pleasures: for these sometimes contemn heavenly goods and place their happiness in earthly things;[10] and this sin is grave when it turns us away from the love of God and from other duties of the Christian life which oblige under mortal sin. - Therefore it remains to speak concerning despair and presumption.

[9] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20-21; Suarez, disp. II, sect. 2-3; Billuart, *De spe*, art. 5; St. Alphonsus, lib. III, nn. 20-21; Perrone, nn. 145-158; Bouquillon, nn. 372-383; Lehmkuhl, nn. 310-313; Ballerini-Palmieri, nn. 124-132.

[10] This M. d'Hulst thus explains, *Careme*, 1892, p. 201: "Hope is therefore a duty, and this duty, so sweet, is costly at its hours. Yes, gentlemen, when life seems to smile upon our earthly hopes, it is hard to disdain those flattering promises which take us by the sensible side of ourselves; it is hard to withdraw from the embrace of pleasure, to say to the happiness which offers itself to us: you could not suffice for me... The Christian needs something of this heroism (of the martyrs) to disengage himself from the caressing embraces of pleasure and to entrust to the distant promises of a mysterious beyond all the hope of his happiness."

I. Concerning Despair.

720. 1. Notion and causes. (A) Despair is a voluntary diffidence of obtaining beatitude, or the means necessary for it.

In order that it be a sin, it must be voluntary; it is therefore distinguished from involuntary disturbance, which frequently arises in those who fear God, or in the scrupulous: for these, from an empty motive, often fear lest they are in the state of mortal sin, or lest, on account of their malice, they fall into danger of damnation. It likewise differs from that sense of spiritual dereliction which sometimes the most perfect suffer: for these, with God permitting it thus, are deprived of spiritual consolation, and are pressed by various temptations, so that they seem to themselves to have been forsaken by the Lord Himself, and become altogether despondent.[11]

[11] Christ wished to suffer this spiritual dereliction on the cross, namely when He cried out: "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" (Matt. 27:46). Bona describes this state thus (*De discretione spirituum*, c. 13): "But in the higher part the mind is darkened by the densest darkness, the will languishes, finding consolation nowhere, neither in God nor in creatures: every ardor of love grows cold; and, what is most grave, it is pressed by so many temptations that it often seems to itself to have given assent to diffidence, blasphemies, and despair. Those who have experienced it liken this horrible torment to the pains of hell." Cf. Schram, *Instit. mysticae*, § 226-237.

In order to know whether a penitent has truly consented to the sin of despair, the confessor will opportunely ask him whether or not he has omitted the accustomed exercises of religion and piety: if, notwithstanding fears and anxieties, he has not ceased to pray, he can be judged free from the sin of despair; but if he has ceased from praying, thinking that God is unwilling to come to his aid, of itself he sins gravely; but if, desponding in soul from a certain disordered sadness, he becomes tepid and remiss, he sins venially.

721. (B) Among the principal causes of despair are numbered:

(a) Defect of faith, because faith is the foundation of hope; such was the despair of Cain when he said:[12] "My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon"; for he seemed to suppose that God does not remit sins even to those truly penitent. (b) Disordered adhesion to pleasures, especially lust; for from affection for these delights a man grows disgusted with spiritual goods; and when he

wishes to come to his senses, it is so arduous to restrain lust and to leave the enticements of the flesh,[13] that not a few despair concerning victory and eternal salvation. (c) Spiritual sloth (above, n. 562), that is, languor and weariness in the exercise of virtue, horror of difficulty, labor of combat, by force of which we consider the good to be done as too difficult and impossible, and therefore abstain from it.[14] (d) Presumption, insofar as it leads us into temptation, but afterward into multiple sins and despair; namely, the Seducer deceitfully leads the incautious into sin, by persuading them of the lightness of sin and the ease of pardon; but, once sin has been committed, he deters them from penance, by magnifying its enormity, the inescapable weight of depraved custom, and the implacable justice of God. (e) Among natural causes is numbered a certain melancholic disposition, which begets sadness and dejection of soul.

[12] Gen. 4:13.

[13] Augustine graphically describes this (*Confess.*, lib. VIII, c. 11, n. 26, P. L., XXXII, 761): "Trifles of trifles and vanities of vanities, my old friends, held me back, and they muttered softly: Do you send us away? and from this moment shall we not be with you any more forever? and from this moment will this and that not be permitted to you any more forever? And what things did they suggest?... what filth did they suggest! what disgraces!... Yet they delayed me, hesitating to tear myself away and shake myself free from them and leap across whither I was called, while violent custom said to me: Do you think you will be able to live without these?"

[14] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, a. 4.

722. 2. The malice of despair. (A) Despair properly so called, which is concerned with salvation or the means necessary for obtaining it, is a mortal sin of its whole kind, less indeed than infidelity and hatred of God, but graver than the sins which are committed against the moral virtues; for it is directly opposed to the very motive of faith, since it at least implicitly denies the mercy or power of God; and therefore it utterly destroys hope itself, without which salvation becomes impossible. Besides, "hope being removed, men slide unrestrained into vices, and are drawn back from good labors."[15] Sometimes it is also joined with heresy, insofar as someone believes that God cannot or does not will to save him: then it contracts the special malice of heresy.

[15] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, a. 3.

(B) But diffidence concerning those things which are not necessary for salvation, for example, concerning avoiding some venial sin or attaining such a degree of perfection, is not despair properly so called, and of itself is a light sin. The same must be said concerning a certain pusillanimity, by force of which we in some way despair concerning our cooperation with grace, but not concerning divine mercy.

II. Concerning Presumption.

723. 1. Notion and causes. (A) Presumption, insofar as it is opposed to hope, is a rash expectation of beatitude and of the means for obtaining it, contrary to the order of Providence. For God, in the conferring of His gifts, has established certain laws conformable to wisdom; and the sin of presumption is situated in this, that spiritual goods are desired without conformity with these laws. This happens in various ways.

(a) Presumption is heretical, namely when it imports some error against faith; such is Pelagian presumption, situated in this, that someone hopes to obtain the remission of sins, or some other grace, and heavenly beatitude by his own powers; or Lutheran presumption, by which someone trusts that he will obtain remission of sins and eternal beatitude from the merits of Christ alone, without penance properly so called and the observance of the commandments;[1] or Calvinist presumption, by which someone hopes for divine help in carrying out something evil, for example, in taking vengeance upon an enemy, as if God could positively cooperate with sin.

[1] From this error they do not sufficiently withdraw who hope, on account of some offices of piety toward the Blessed Virgin, that they will obtain salvation, even if they live carnally and sin more freely. Cf. Tyrrell, *External Religion* (French, *La religion exterieure*, Paris, 1902), lect. V.

(b) Presumption is simple, or non-heretical, when someone, without error in faith, presumes too much concerning divine mercy or his own powers, for example, if he trusts that he will obtain extraordinary graces, such as are granted only to the greatest saints, - or assumes divine mercy as a motive for sinning more freely, multiplying sins because, he says, God remits many just as easily as one, and is always ready to spare penitents even when they return late to virtue.

But if someone sins or perseveres in sin from passion or frailty, with hope of obtaining pardon, or because of the ease of accusing sins, this is not properly presumption, but an abuse of grace to be diligently avoided.

724. (B) The principal causes of presumption, besides the errors in faith recounted above, are pride and vainglory.

From pride especially arises that presumption by which someone trusts that he will obtain glory without merits, or pardon without penance; for he esteems himself so highly that he hopes that even while sinning he will not be excluded from glory. From vainglory proceeds especially the presumption by which we attempt something above our powers, expecting thereby to be esteemed by others.[2] Yet sometimes it also arises from levity of mind, by force of which, forgetful of our own infirmity, we presume too much upon our own strength: then the sin is lighter.

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 21, a. 4.

725. 2. Concerning the malice of presumption. (A) Heretical presumption is of itself a most grave sin, since it is opposed both to faith and to hope, and inflicts injury upon the divine attributes; when it is voluntary, it destroys the habit of hope, since it overturns faith, which is deservedly held to be the foundation of hope. - Yet I said of itself, because there can be, among Lutherans, those who in good faith think that salvation can be obtained from the merits of Christ alone, without observance of the commandments.

(B) Simple presumption is of itself a grave sin, but can admit smallness of matter;[3] nor of itself does it destroy the habit of hope, because it preserves its motive: for although someone presumes too much upon himself, he does not for that reason altogether reject divine help.

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 21, a. 2.

In practice, in order to judge whether a penitent has sinned against hope, and at the same time against faith, he must be asked why and how he despaired or presumed, and from his answers the

nature and gravity of this sin will be able to be recognized.

Conclusion: Concerning the Means of Progressing in Hope.

726. First of all it must be noted that hope is increased by the same means by which faith grows (above, nn. 689-694), since faith is the foundation of hope. But besides this, like the other virtues, it is strengthened by exercise and becomes more prompt.

[4] Scaramelli, op. cit., art. II, concerning Hope, ch. 7-8; Schram, *Instit. theol. mysticae*, § 119-123; M. d'Hulst, *Careme* 1892, conf. 4-5.

(A) But in order that hope may be rightly exercised, there is required first a good conscience, that is, the state of grace and the practice of good works, or at least a sincere and efficacious desire of recovering grace; for he who remains in the state of mortal sin rightly fears damnation; while the just man, who knows that he is a son of God, easily trusts in his heavenly Father: "If our heart does not reprehend us, we have confidence toward God, and whatsoever we shall ask, we shall receive from Him, because we keep His commandments and do those things which are pleasing before Him."[5]

[5] 1 John 3:21-22.

Augustine explains the reason for this thus:[6] "A good conscience bears hope: as an evil conscience is wholly in despair, so a good conscience is wholly in hope... For he hopes who bears a good conscience. But he whom an evil conscience stings withdraws himself from hope, and hopes for nothing for himself except damnation. Therefore, in order that he may hope for the kingdom, let him have a good conscience; and in order that he may have a good conscience, let him believe and work."

[6] *In Ps.* XXXI, n. 5, P. L., XXXVI, 261.

727. (B) When someone enjoys a good conscience, he ought now no longer to trust in man or in other creatures, but in God; wherefore, in all events, he should ask and expect from God alone counsel, strength, and grace, recalling to memory the motives of hope set forth above, nn. 700-703, namely the infinite power, mercy, and fidelity of God. For then, relying on divine help, he can overcome all adverse things: "The Lord is my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear? The Lord is the protector of my life; of whom shall I be afraid?... If armies in camp should stand together against me, my heart shall not fear."[7]

[7] Ps. 26:1-3.

The reason is that nothing can separate us from the charity of God, which is plainly sufficient for rendering us blessed: "I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come... nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the charity of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."[8]

[8] Rom. 8:38-39.

728. (C) But especially in adverse things all hope must be placed in God, who alone can rescue us from dangers, and at the same time give grace that we may use tribulations for increasing eternal beatitude.

Thus indeed Paul says: "Not only so, but we glory also in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience, and patience trial, and trial hope; and hope confounds not..."[9] The reason is that if we suffer with Christ and for Christ, with Him we shall be glorified; and our glory will be proportioned to the tribulations patiently endured, and every arduous work done for God works in us an eternal weight of glory: "Yet so if we suffer with Him, that we may also be glorified with Him. For I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come that shall be revealed in us."[10] - "For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation works for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory."[11]

[9] Rom. 5:3-5.

[10] Rom. 8:17-18.

[11] 2 Cor. 4:17.

729. (D) But also in prosperous things we must raise the mind to eternal goods; otherwise we shall adhere to creatures and to pleasure, with the greatest detriment to the soul. Namely, when all things proceed prosperously, we are prone to pass God by, and to place our hope in creatures, riches, and friends; whence it happens that we become earthly, gaping after pleasure and contemning heavenly goods.

Wherefore it is necessary to look upon heaven, "while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal."[12] It is also necessary to pray, that, despising temporal and earthly things, we may learn to love heavenly things: "Grant to Thy peoples to love that which Thou commandest, to desire that which Thou dost promise; that, amid worldly changes, our hearts may there be fixed where true joys are."[13]

[12] 2 Cor. 4:18.

[13] Missal, prayer for the 4th Sunday after Easter.

Concerning the exercise of hope, or confidence, in prayer we shall speak below.

By these and other means of this kind hope is strengthened and raised up, and the way is prepared for charity, concerning which it remains to speak.

On the Virtue of Charity

Concerning the Virtue of Charity. — Preliminary Things concerning Love and Charity in General.

Among the theological virtues charity stands out, as Paul bears witness: "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greater of these is charity."[1] But because charity is a certain kind of love,[2] a few things concerning love must be noted beforehand.

[1] 1 Cor. 13:13.

[2] St. Thomas declares this thus (I-II, q. 26, a. 3): "For every dilection or charity is love, but not conversely; for dilection adds to love a preceding election, as the very name sounds; whence dilection is not in the concupiscible, but only in the will, and exists only in a rational nature. But charity adds to love a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price, as the very name designates." - In reality the word *carus* etymologically signifies something of great price (Breal and Bailly, *Dict. etymol.*, p. 36).

1. Concerning the Nature, Causes, and Effects of Love.

730. (A) Notion and species of love. Love in general is a movement toward good, or the complacency of the appetite in good. A threefold love is usually distinguished: natural, sensible, and rational.

[3] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 26-29; St. Francis de Sales, *Tr. de l'Am. de Dieu* (ed. Annecy, 1894), l. I, ch. 1-13; Barre, *De virtutibus*, t. I, n. 12-20.

(a) Natural love is a certain propensity of any being toward its own proper end: for each thing seeks its own end, and is borne toward it by a certain natural instinct. This exists even in beings lacking liberty, and is not properly a moral act; accordingly we shall not treat it here. (b) Sensible, or sensitive, love is one of the eleven passions described above, n. 100, and can be defined as the complacency of the sensitive appetite in a sensibly apprehended good. It is therefore concerned with qualities which please the senses, and is not borne toward intelligible good except insofar as this kind of good is presented sensibly to the appetite by the imagination. But because these qualities are frivolous and mutable, the love which is born from them is vain and inconstant.[4] - If it exists between persons of different sex, in order to carnal delights, it is called sexual love, and often passes into a vehement passion.[5]

[4] "Love founded upon the communication of sensual pleasures is altogether gross, and unworthy of the name of friendship, as also that which glories in certain vain and frivolous endowments perceived by the senses. But I call sensual pleasures those which immediately and principally are concerned with the external senses, such as that pleasure which arises from the sight of bodily beauty, from the hearing of a sweet voice, from soft touch, and others of this kind. But I call frivolous endowments certain vain habits of nature, which the inexperienced and futile call by the name of virtues and perfections... Thus he is judged to be endowed with great virtue who dances elegantly, is most skilled in every kind of game, dresses elegantly, sings, jokes, or converses, and has elegant gestures." (St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction*, p. III, c. 17).

[5] Descuret, op. cit., t. II, p. 151-180; *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XXI, 1899, p. 129-137 and 241-248; Ribot, *Psychologie des sentiments*, Paris, 1896, p. 244-255.

731. (c) Rational love, or dilection, is the complacency of the will in good intellectually apprehended; it arises from endowments not external and frivolous, but intellectual and moral, for example, knowledge, prudence, kindness, fortitude, and other virtues of this kind. Wherefore it is more constant, because it rests upon endowments which are less mutable; it is worthy of man and honorable, as being founded upon truly human qualities. This likewise is twofold: when we love someone chiefly on account of our advantage, namely because he is good and useful to us, this love is called love of concupiscence; but if, on the contrary, we love him especially because we will good to him, it is called love of benevolence. Usually both motives are joined together, and we love others on account of both our own and their advantage. - Moreover, since man is at once rational and sensible, intellectual love is often found mixed with sensible love.

732. But love is called friendship when it is mutual, known as such to each lover, and therefore imports a certain communication of goods: "Not every love is friendship: for we can love and yet not be loved, and then there is love, but not friendship, since friendship is a certain mutual and reciprocal love. Secondly, it is not enough that it be mutual, but it is moreover necessary that the friends loving one another know their reciprocal affection; for if they are ignorant of this, they will indeed have love, but not friendship. Thirdly, it is required that there be between them some communication, which is the basis and foundation of friendship. Now, according to the diversity of communications, friendship also is diverse... if the things communicated are false and vain, friendship is false and vain; if they are true and solid, friendship also is true; and the more excellent goods of this kind are, the more excellent is friendship."[6]

[6] St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction*, p. III, c. 17. - Cicero wrote an excellent treatise concerning friendship, *Laelius sive de Amicitia*.

Ambrose writes splendidly concerning true friendship:[7] "For it is a solace of this life that you have one to whom you may open your breast, with whom you may share hidden things, to whom you may commit the secret of your heart; that you may place for yourself a faithful man, who may rejoice with you in prosperous things, suffer with you in sad things, encourage you in persecutions... Friendship is the guardian of piety and the mistress of equality, so that the superior shows himself equal to the inferior, and the inferior to the superior... For friendship is not venal, but full of beauty, full of grace. For friendship is a virtue, not gain, because it is not produced by money, but by grace; not by the bidding of prices, but by the contest of benevolence." - Scripture had gone before Ambrose:[8] "A faithful friend is a strong protection; and he that has found him has found a treasure; nothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and silver is worthy to be put in balance against the goodness of his fidelity; a faithful friend is the medicine of life and immortality."

[7] St. Ambrose, *De officiis*, lib. III, c. 22, P. L., XVI, 181-182.

[8] Ecclus. 6:14-16.

733. (B) Causes of love.[9] There are especially three things which induce or increase love: good, likeness, familiar association.

[9] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 27; St. Francis de Sales, *Traite de l'Am. de Dieu*, l. I, ch. 8; M. d'Hulst, *Careme* 1892, 6th Conf., p. 217-220.

(a) Good indeed is the principal cause of love, since the appetite, whether sensitive or rational, is naturally borne toward sensible or intellectual good; and generally love is more intense the more perfect the beloved object appears. If evil is sometimes loved, this happens only because it appears under the aspect of good; thus iniquity is not loved except because it offers delight or advantage. - To this cause is referred the beautiful, which is nothing other than the good insofar as it pleases sight.

(b) Likeness between lovers induces love secondarily, according to that saying:[10] "Every living creature loves its like; so also every man loves his neighbor." In reality man naturally loves himself primarily, and therefore, among men, by force of a certain affinity and sympathy, he loves those who are more like himself, for example, those who belong to the same nation or family, or who enjoy similar endowments. Hence friendship either receives equals or makes them. - Yet this likeness, which is the cause of love, does not exclude certain differences; indeed, usually those who, while they are similar in many things, nevertheless differ in a few things, love one another more intensely, so that one seeks in the other a complement of himself; thus one who is gentle but weak is more easily joined in friendship to him who is irascible indeed, but strong and energetic.[11] Hence not perfect equality, but a certain proportion between lovers is required.

[10] Ecclus. 13:19.

[11] "In this sort the melancholy and the joyful, the sharp and the gentle, sometimes love one another reciprocally, on account of the mutual impressions which they receive from one another, by means of which their humors are mutually moderated. But when this mutual correspondence is joined with likeness, love without doubt is begotten much more powerfully." (St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. I, ch. 8).

(c) Familiar association increases love not a little; for nothing is willed unless it is first known, and therefore goodness, beauty, and likeness do not move to friendship except insofar as they are known. Therefore intimate and frequent conversation and colloquies greatly foster friendship: for thus friends know one another better, thus they are delighted by the presence of the beloved object, and from this double source love grows. To this cause is referred the manifestation of love and being loved in return; for, as Seneca says,[12] "if you wish to be loved, love"; and according to Augustine,[13] "there is no greater invitation to love than to anticipate by loving, and too hard is the soul which, if it was unwilling to bestow love, is unwilling to repay it."

[12] Epist. IX to Lucilius.

[13] *De catechiz. rudibus*, c. 4, P. L., XL, 314.

734. (C) Effects of love.[14] The principal ones are union, ecstasy, zeal, and the ordering of actions toward the beloved object.

[14] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 28.

(a) Union indeed; for every love tends to this, that it may join lovers and morally make one out of two or more, according to that saying: "And the multitude of believers had one heart and one soul."[15] It effects a twofold union: one affective, by force of which friends strive to will the same things and not to will the same things, and the lover is in the beloved, as considering the goods of his friend his own; thus it is read in Scripture:[16] "The soul of Jonathan was knit to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul"; - the other real, which consists in the presence and possession of the thing loved;[17] and this, although desired by lovers, is sometimes impeded or delayed by obstacles.

[15] Acts 4:32.

[16] 1 Kings 18:1.

[17] This St. Francis de Sales vividly describes, *Tr. de l'amour de Dieu*, l. I, ch. 9.

(b) Ecstasy (*ekstasis*, departure), by which the lover is as it were placed outside himself; this happens by a twofold act, of the intellect and of the will. According to the intellect, the lover, forgetful of himself, frequently thinks of the beloved; according to affection he is borne outside himself: through love of concupiscence, not content with the good which he has, he seeks another good outside himself by which he may enjoy; through love of friendship, he acts not for himself alone, but wills and works good for his friend, and takes care of him. Wherefore it is of the greatest importance to love only honorable and holy things, since the lover as it were goes out from himself and becomes like the beloved object.[18]

[18] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 28, a. 3; St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. I, ch. 10.

735. (c) Zeal likewise comes from the intensity of love: for the more vehemently we tend toward something, the more strongly we repel whatever is opposed to this propensity. Thus, in love of concupiscence, he who intensely desires something is by that very fact borne against everything which stands in the way of obtaining it or peacefully enjoying it; in love of friendship, he who sincerely wills the good of a friend is by that very fact vehemently moved against everything which is repugnant to his good.[19]

[19] St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 4.

(d) Besides, he who vehemently loves someone orders his actions toward him, namely toward pleasing him and obtaining his friendship; and, since the other passions proceed from love, all movements of the soul are more or less ruled by the predominant love. From this it follows that nothing is more important than rightly ordering one's affections, so that life itself may be rightly established. Therefore they are truly wise who love God from their whole heart; for, as Augustine says, "two loves therefore made two cities: the earthly, namely, love of self even to contempt of God; but the heavenly, love of God even to contempt of self."[20]

[20] *De Civitate Dei*, lib. XIV, c. 28, P. L., XLI, 436.

2. Concerning the Virtue of Charity in General.

736. Charity, as a habit, is a theological virtue by which we are inclined to love God above all things in the manner in which He loves Himself, and all things which God loves and as He loves them.

This definition is equivalent to that which is usually handed down, namely, it is a theological virtue by which we are inclined to love God above all things for His own sake, and ourselves and our neighbor for God's sake. In order that this may be understood better, it must be explained what the object, motive, and subject of charity are.

737. (A) The primary and principal object of charity is God Himself, to be loved above all things: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind."[1] But the secondary object is all creatures insofar as they

are capable of divine grace and glory: "And the second (commandment) is like to this: thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."[2] For, since love essentially tends toward good, the primary object of dilection cannot be anything except the supreme and infinite good; but the secondary object is all beings which in some way participate in divine goodness.

[1] Luke 10:27; cf. Matt. 22:37.

[2] Matt. 22:38.

738. (B) The proper motive of charity is the absolute goodness of God, in itself and for its own sake infinitely lovable. Thus it is distinguished from the love of hope, whose motive is the relative goodness of God, namely that God is good toward us. For He can be loved in a twofold way: insofar as He is good for us, indeed our supreme good, by the enjoyment of whom we shall sometime be blessed, and this is the love of hope, or of chaste concupiscence; He can besides be loved as good in Himself, or because He is infinitely lovable for His own sake: this is the love of charity.

739. (a) A few theologians indeed, such as Bolgeni and Ballerini,[3] have contended that the love of concupiscence is referred also to charity, and suffices for justification before the actual reception of the sacraments. For, they say, in Sacred Scripture the love of God loved solely for His own sake is never proposed to us, but God is often shown as to be loved insofar as He is our supreme good, the source of all our joy, etc. Besides, the single motive which excites man to acting is self-love, and therefore we do not love God except insofar as we conceive Him as the source of our beatitude. - But theologians commonly reject this opinion as erroneous. (a) For although Scripture does not directly and explicitly teach that God is to be loved for His own sake, nevertheless it insinuates this when it asserts that He is to be loved from the whole mind, from the whole heart, from all the powers, - or when it teaches that charity itself is more excellent than hope,[4] - or proposes for imitation the charity by which someone lays down his life for his friends.[5] (b) Otherwise, although man often acts from self-love, nevertheless he does not always act so, nor exclusively; but little by little he rises from the love of God, insofar as He is good to us, to the love of God as lovable in Himself and for His own sake, because he understands that He who is infinitely good in Himself is to be loved in Himself and for His own sake.[6]

[3] Bolgeni, *Della carita o amor di Dio*, Rome, 1788; Ballerini-Palmieri, t. II, n. 135-139; - whom Muzzarelli refuted, *Del motivo formale dell'atto di carita*, Foligno, 1791; Perrone, op. cit., concerning Charity, n. 29-62; Pesch, n. 537-564; Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. II, p. 2220.

[4] 1 Cor. 13:13.

[5] John 15:13.

[6] From this opinion the doctrine of St. Francis de Sales differs greatly (op. cit., l. X, ch. 10), asserting that we cannot love God except insofar as we can be joined to Him: "But if, by imagination of an impossible thing, there were an infinite goodness to which we had no sort of belonging, and with which we could have no communication, we would certainly esteem it more than ourselves... but, properly speaking, we would not love it, since love regards union; and much less could we have charity toward it, since charity is a friendship, and friendship can only be reciprocal, having communication for its foundation and union for its end."

740. (b) But both motives are often found united in one and the same act, and the love of hope in no way impedes the exercise of charity. For, on the one hand, God is supremely good in Himself, and therefore to be loved with love of benevolence, and supremely good to us, and therefore to be loved with the love of chaste concupiscence; but on the other hand, our ultimate end is both the glory of God, which we desire with love of benevolence, and our eternal beatitude, which we pursue with love of concupiscence. Indeed the love of concupiscence rightly ordered leads us to the love of benevolence: for the more we desire to possess God, the more we breathe after His honor.[7]

[7] Thus St. Bonaventure, in lib. III *Sentent.*, dist. 27, a. 2, q. 2.

Wherefore the proposition by which Fenelon asserted that there is given a habitual state[8] of the love of God without admixture of a motive of one's own interest was condemned (above, n. 710). For it is psychologically evident that we cannot for a long time, or at least through a whole life, exclude the consideration and desire of heavenly beatitude (above, n. 717). This the pious Bernard lucidly declares, distinguishing four degrees in love:[9] "First, therefore, man loves himself for his own sake. For he is flesh, and can relish nothing except himself. And when he sees that he cannot subsist by himself, he begins to seek and love God by faith, as necessary to himself. Thus in the second degree he loves God, but for his own sake, not for God's. But truly, when he has begun to cultivate and frequent Him by occasion of his own necessity, by thinking, reading, praying, obeying, by a certain familiarity of this kind God little by little and insensibly becomes known, and consequently grows sweet; and thus, having tasted how sweet the Lord is, he passes to the third degree, so that he loves God, no longer for his own sake, but for God's. Assuredly one stands in this degree, and I do not know whether the fourth is apprehended by any man in this life, namely, that man should love himself only for God's sake. Let those assert this who have experienced it: to me, I confess, it seems impossible."

[8] According to the common doctrine, however, acts of pure benevolence, or of pure love toward God, can be elicited without any regard of one's own advantage: for if we sometimes love men without any hope of reward, why can we not sometimes love God without any appetite for reward? Wherefore Bossuet went further (*Instr. sur les Etats d'oraison*) when he contended that there is no act of love of God which excludes every regard for one's own good. (Gosselin, op. cit., p. CXLVI-CLXXXIII).

[9] St. Bernard, Epist. XI, n. 8, P. L., CLXXXII, 113-114.

741. (c) The goodness of God, which is the proper motive of charity, must be known not only from natural light, but also and especially from the light of faith; for charity is a supernatural virtue, and accordingly its object and motive must be perceived supernaturally. This divine goodness in itself embraces all the perfections of God. - Yet many theologians think that any divine perfection accepted separately, for example, wisdom, kindness, mercy, is a sufficient motive of charity;[10] and deservedly, as we think, for in God the various perfections are not really distinguished from the divine essence, and any perfection, as infinite, can provoke us to supreme love. In practice, there is no difficulty; for men are not accustomed to establish a distinction between God and His perfections, but love God Himself as infinitely wise, kind, merciful: and this certainly suffices for charity.

[10] Ripalda, disp. XXV, concerning Charity, sect. 1-2; Wirceburgenses, n. 287; Lehmkuhl, n. 315.

The same divine goodness is the motive of charity toward ourselves and our neighbor: "And this commandment we have from God, that he who loves God love also his brother."[11] For, through charity, we love our neighbor because he is a son of God, destined to His glory, because he bears His image and likeness, and therefore on account of the goodness of God manifested in him.

[11] 1 John 4:21.

742. (d) The love of gratitude, by which namely we show God a grateful mind for benefits received, is often said to pertain to the perfect love of charity. At least it is certain that benevolent love toward the benefactor himself most easily arises from gratitude; and this love can be held as an act of charity, since it rests upon one of the divine attributes, namely beneficence. Therefore it is often expedient to excite men to gratitude toward God from benefits received - as in reality is usually done in the Scriptures - and then to love of the benefactor Himself: for when He is loved as good to us, He is easily loved as good in Himself.

743. (e) Likewise love toward Christ, who suffered and was crucified for us, most easily passes into the love of charity: for the faithful believe that Christ is God, and when they love Christ, by that very fact they love God; otherwise, if moved by gratitude they love the divine Redeemer as good to themselves, soon they love the same as simply good and infinitely lovable.[12] Since this way is very easy and accommodated to human nature, preachers and confessors, by excellent counsel, will make the same known to the faithful, so that these may more easily elicit acts of charity and of perfect contrition.

[12] The Apostle used this motive to excite the faithful to the practice of charity: "And walk in love, as Christ also loved us, and delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness." (Eph. 5:2).

744. (C) The subject of charity is all and only those who possess habitual grace: for charity is indivisibly connected with sanctifying grace (above, n. 604). - This virtue inheres properly in the will, since the love of the divine good, which is perceived only by intellect and faith, is elicited by the will;[13] nevertheless, because nothing is willed unless first known, knowledge and faith contribute much to charity, by providing motives by which the will is enticed to loving; besides, divine love sometimes redounds into the sensitive faculties, and begets in them pious emotions.

[13] "The object of the sensitive appetite is good apprehended by sense; but the object of the intellective appetite, or of the will, is good under the common aspect of good, insofar as it is apprehensible by the intellect. But the object of charity is not some sensible good, but the divine good, which is known by intellect alone. And therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive appetite, but the intellective appetite, that is, the will." (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 1).

Division. Since the object of charity is twofold, namely God and neighbor, we shall speak: 1. concerning charity toward God; 2. concerning charity toward neighbor.

Art. I. Concerning Charity toward God.

We shall speak: 1. concerning its nature; 2. necessity; 3. sins opposed to it.

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 23-27; Suarez, concerning Charity, disp. I-VI; St. Francis de Sales, *Tr. de l'Amour de Dieu*, entire; Muller, § 19-23.

§ I. Concerning the Nature of Charity.

Charity embraces a twofold species of love, namely love of benevolence, which intends the good of the beloved, and love of friendship, which besides imports mutual love in return.

I. Concerning the Love of Benevolence.

745. This love consists in this, that, insofar as we can, we will good to God. It embraces three acts, namely joy concerning the divine goods, desire of increasing the same, insofar as this can be done, and zeal for promoting the glory of God.

1. Joy, or complacency, concerning the goods which God possesses; for when we truly love someone, we have his goods as our own, and therefore we rejoice concerning his goods and take complacency in them, as if they were our own. Christ insinuates this in these words:[2] "If you loved Me, you would indeed be glad, because I go to the Father," namely because I leave this valley of misery, that I may obtain divine felicity.

[2] John 14:28.

(a) Wherefore the just rejoice concerning the infinite perfections of God considered in themselves, concerning His power, wisdom, kindness, etc.; indeed they rejoice more concerning the glory of God than concerning their own beatitude. Thus Augustine is reported to have said:[3] "Lord God, I love Thee so, that if I were God and Thou Augustine, I would will myself to be Augustine, that Thou mightest be God." Thus likewise St. Francis de Sales:[4] "O most beloved of my heart, I do not indeed desire that I could wish anything good to Thy majesty, but with my whole heart I take complacency in that supreme degree of goodness which Thou hast, to which neither by desire nor even by thought can anything be added; but, if such a desire were possible, O infinite Deity and divine Infinity, my soul would wish to be this very desire and nothing else." (b) They rejoice likewise concerning the external manifestation of the attributes of God, and therefore concerning divine providence, which disposes all things sweetly and strongly, concerning the extension of the kingdom of God, concerning the external glory which He receives from the Angels, the Saints reigning in heaven, and also the just on earth fighting for His honor. (c) From this complacency there spontaneously arises praise of God, by which we congratulate Him concerning all things which contribute to His glory: "Glory to God in the highest... We praise Thee, we bless Thee, we glorify Thee... Thee, O God, we praise, Thee, O Lord, we confess."[5]

[3] St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. V, ch. 6.

[4] Ibid.

[5] In the psalms and liturgical prayers of the Church the divine praises are continually celebrated.

746. 2. The desire of increasing divine goods, insofar as this can be done, or benevolence properly so called.

(a) If there is question of the intrinsic perfections of God, we cannot indeed desire an increase of them absolutely, since nothing good can accrue to the Infinite; but conditionally, as is read in St. Francis de Sales:[6] "I said to the Lord, Thou art my God, full of immense goodness, who needest neither my goods nor those of anyone else; nevertheless, if it were possible that Thou shouldst need

some good, I would never cease to desire it for Thee, and, to procure it for Thee, I would gladly spend my life and all things most dear to me."

[6] Ibid.

(b) If there is question of the extrinsic glory of God, by love we are induced to promote it both in ourselves and in others: in ourselves indeed, insofar as we are prepared to suffer and do all things in order to make progress in divine love; thus St. John of the Cross, when asked by Christ what he desired for so many and such great labors undertaken for God, answered: "Lord, to suffer and to be contemned for Thee."[7] But as to others, we sincerely desire that they, who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, may be illumined, and may know, love, and glorify God: "Let the peoples confess to Thee, O God, let all the peoples give praise to Thee... Praise the Lord from the heavens... Praise the Lord from the earth... kings of the earth and all peoples, princes and all judges of the earth."[8]

[7] Breviary, Nov. 24, lect. 6.

[8] Ps. 66:4; 148:1, 7, 11.

(c) Thence arises sorrow concerning sins committed by us or by others, insofar as they offend God, the supreme good; and also filial fear lest God be offended; for when we love someone, we suffer with him and grieve concerning the things by which he is saddened.

747. 3. Zeal for promoting the glory of God, or beneficence. For love does not consist in affection alone, but is manifested by work. This happens in two ways: by vehemently repelling those things which are contrary to the honor of God,[9] and by positively carrying out those things which promote this honor. Therefore those who truly love God labor strenuously to procure the external glory of God: (a) in themselves, by doing all those things which can increase His honor, by better observing the commandments and counsels, by devoting themselves and their things to Him, and by making all works toward pleasing Him. (b) In others, namely by drawing them to Christ by prayer, word, and example.

[9] St. Thomas, I-II, q. 28, a. 4; St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. X, ch. 12.

II. Concerning the Love of Friendship.

748. Friendship, from what has been said, n. 732, imports three things: love of benevolence, mutual love, and the communication of some good between lovers. Now these three can be found in charity toward God. (a) God certainly embraces us with love of benevolence, for He has gratuitously given us many and very great goods: "And I have loved thee with perpetual charity; therefore have I drawn thee, taking pity...[10] For God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son...[11] Who also spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how has He not also, with Him, given us all things?"[12] And truly this love is benevolent, since God is plainly sufficient to Himself and does not need our goods. Otherwise, we too can love God with love of benevolence, in the sense set forth above, n. 745.

[10] Jer. 31:3.

[11] John 3:16.

[12] Rom. 8:32.

(b) That this kind of love is mutual and known as such is no less evidently clear; for the Lord many times declared that He loves those who love Him: "I love them that love Me, and they that in the morning watch for Me shall find Me...[13] If anyone love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come to him and will make Our abode with him."[14]

[13] Prov. 8:17.

[14] John 14:23.

(c) That from this mutual love arises a communication of goods is no less clearly evident; for God has bestowed upon us goods both natural and supernatural, indeed a certain participation of His own life: "By whom He has given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature."[15] On our part, indeed, we are able to add nothing to the divine perfections, but whatever we are and have we can give to God, by carrying out all our actions on account of Him, unto His glory;[16] we can also take complacency in His attributes, and promote His external glory, according to what has been set forth above, n. 746. And thus there comes about a mutual communication of goods, and a mutual friendship, insofar as this can exist between God and men.

[15] 2 Pet. 1:4.

[16] This is expressed very beautifully in this prayer of St. Ignatius (*Spiritual Exercises*, from the Spanish autograph, Rome, 1854, p. 118-119): "Take, Lord, and receive all my liberty, my memory, my intellect, and all my will, whatever I have and possess: Thou hast given all these things to me; to Thee, Lord, I restore them: all things are Thine, dispose of them according to all Thy will. Give me Thy love and grace, for this is sufficient for me."

Hence Scripture often declares us friends of God; thus Abraham is called the friend of God,[17] and those who cultivate wisdom are sharers in the friendship of God;[18] but especially in the New Testament those who keep His commandments are called friends of God: "You are My friends, if you do the things that I command you";[19] but in a special way the apostles are friends of Christ, because they knew His secrets: "But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of My Father I have made known to you."[20]

[17] Isa. 41:8; Judith 8:22.

[18] Wis. 7:14.

[19] John 15:14.

[20] John 15:15.

§ II. Concerning the Necessity of Charity.

749. That the habit of charity is necessary by necessity of means for salvation is clear from the fact that charity and sanctifying grace are indivisibly joined, n. 597. The question therefore concerns the act of charity. This is not necessary by necessity of means for obtaining justification when the sacraments of baptism and penance are received: for then imperfect contrition, or attrition, suffices, for which the love of charity is not required, as we have explained elsewhere.[21] But an act of perfect contrition, and therefore of charity, is necessary by necessity of means for adults who are in the state of mortal sin and cannot receive the

sacraments.[22] Besides, there is a precept of eliciting acts of charity at certain times in life: concerning its existence and extension it remains to speak.

[21] *Synop. Theol. Dogmat., De Baptismo,* n. 52, and *Syn. Theol. Mor., De Paenitent.,* n. 85-92.

[22] *De Paenitent.,* n. 86-97.

750. 1. Existence: There is a special precept of eliciting acts of perfect charity toward God at certain times in life.

(A) This precept had already been handed down in the Old Law, and indeed as primary, to be inculcated upon all, even little ones, and always to be kept before the eyes: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength. And these words which I command thee this day shall be in thy heart; and thou shalt tell them to thy children, and thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising."[23] - In the New Testament, it is shown as essential, and the sum of the whole law:[24] "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and first commandment." Therefore it is necessary that we elicit acts of divine love at least at certain times, since a precept of this kind is the greatest of all.

[23] Deut. 6:5-7.

[24] Matt. 22:37-38. - The difference between the Old and the New Law is in this, that in the former God is shown especially as Lord, while in the latter He is often shown as Father. Cf. Batiffol, *L'Enseignement de Jesus*, Paris, Bloud, 1905, p. 94-105.

(B) Indeed a precept of this kind is consonant with reason: for since God is our ultimate end, and at the same time infinitely lovable, nature itself demands that we refer to Him the mind, the will, the whole soul, and also our actions, and therefore that we love Him above all things: for love is the gift of oneself, and he who orders his life unto God by that very fact loves Him above all things. But we cannot furnish this unless at certain times in life we elicit a positive act of love.

This precept is special, or distinct from the others, so that it obliges us to distinct acts; this is gathered from the texts cited, and from the documents to be cited below concerning its extension.

751. 2. Concerning the extension of this precept. (A) We ought indeed to love God with our whole heart, with our whole mind, with our whole soul, and with all our powers. St. Thomas declares this thus:[25] "It is therefore commanded to us that our whole intention be borne toward God, which is from the whole heart; and that our intellect be subjected to God, which is from the whole mind; and that our appetite be regulated according to God, which is from the whole soul; and that our exterior act obey God, which is to love God from the whole strength, or virtue, or powers."

[25] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 44, a. 5.

752. (B) By the precept of charity we are bound to love God above all things with a love appreciatively supreme, but not intensively supreme.

(a) With a love appreciatively supreme, insofar as we ought to value Him in our mind more than any other good, so that we are prepared to suffer the loss of all things rather than of His friendship. This

is clear from the texts cited, and from these words of Christ:[1] "He that loves father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me; and he that loves son or daughter above Me is not worthy of Me." - In reality God is the supreme good, infinitely lovable, embracing in Himself all and each of the perfections of creatures, and indeed in an infinitely higher mode and without any imperfection; therefore he would inflict injury upon Him who should value some creature more than God. - But appreciatively supreme love, since it resides in the higher part of the soul, can coexist with a more sensible love of creatures; for creatures, since they are visible, often excite sensible love more than the contemplation of the invisible perfections of God. Hence they do not sin who love parents, friends, spouses more sensibly than God Himself, provided that in mind and will they are prepared to lose all things rather than God's friendship.

[1] Matt. 10:37.

753. (b) But not with a love intensively supreme; for no degree of love is prescribed in Scripture, except that which excludes mortal and venial sin. - For the understanding of this, it must be known that a threefold degree is commonly distinguished in the love of God: the first degree indeed consists in this, that a man withdraws from mortal sin, and therefore strenuously resists concupiscences which can tear out charity; the second is in this, that he makes progress in good, by withdrawing from deliberate venial sin and by assiduously cultivating virtues; in the third, he chiefly intends this, that he adhere to God and enjoy Him, by eliciting his principal acts under the influence of charity.[2]

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 4; St. Bonaventure, *De profectu religiosorum*, c. 15 (Opera, ed. Vives, t. XII, p. 386); M. d'Hulst, *Careme* 1892, p. 234-237.

Now, in order to satisfy the precept, it is enough to have the first degree of charity.

754. (C) As regards the time, the precept of charity obliges of itself:

(a) When a man, having now attained the use of reason and having been sufficiently instructed concerning the goodness of God, clearly understands the obligation of loving Him above all things; for then he is bound to turn himself toward God: and this is done by an act of charity. (b) Often in life,[3] although the time cannot be mathematically determined: some say once a week, others once a month or a year, others every three years; wherefore in practice the faithful are to be exhorted often to elicit acts of charity, whether explicitly, or implicitly by praying devoutly that God's name be sanctified, that His kingdom come, - by eliciting an act of perfect contrition and avoiding sin because it displeases God, - by exercising good works because they please God, etc. (c) More probably, at the moment of death, because at the departure from life we ought to adhere to the ultimate end through charity. (d) If a temptation against charity presses, which can be overcome only by an act of dilection; but often it can be conquered in another way, for example, by diverting the mind to other things.

[3] To this belong the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of dilection of God only once in life, we do not dare to condemn. - It is probable that not even rigorously every five years does the precept of charity toward God oblige of itself. - Then only does it oblige, when we are bound to be justified and have no other way by which we can be justified." (Denzing., n. 1022-1024; Viva, on the first proposition of Alexander VII).

It obliges by accident:

(a) When someone is in the state of mortal sin and is bound to recover the state of grace, for example, in order to receive or administer a sacrament, and otherwise cannot receive sacramental absolution: for then he cannot be justified without an act of perfect contrition, and therefore of charity. (b) When a grave temptation presses against some Christian virtue, which cannot be removed without an act of charity.

In practice, those who live as Christians and are accustomed assiduously to recite morning or evening prayers are not to be made anxious about this matter, since by these prayers they fully satisfy the precept of charity.

§ III. Concerning Sins against Charity.

755. Besides sins of omission, which can easily be understood from what has now been said, there are sins of commission against charity toward God. All mortal sins indeed are in some way against charity, since they destroy it. But there are two which are directly and especially opposed to charity: sloth, or sadness concerning spiritual goods, concerning which above, n. 562; and hatred of God, concerning which it remains to speak.

756. Concerning hatred of God. (A) Hatred in general is an act by which someone turns away from another. It can be twofold: (a) when we turn away from something as evil for us or for our own, there is had that hatred which is called hatred of abomination; this is directly opposed to love of concupiscence; for just as we desire something good for us, so we abominate whatever is evil for us. (b) If we will evil to some person, insofar as it is evil for him, there is had hatred of enmity or malevolence, which is directly opposed to love of friendship or benevolence.

Now hatred of God can be committed in this twofold way: for sometimes men turn away from God and are indignant with Him because He has forbidden such an action, or inflicts punishments upon sinners, or sends adversities:[4] this is hatred of abomination. - But sometimes they will evil to God, namely with hatred of enmity; for example, they are saddened that He is omniscient, or omnipotent, or just; they wish that God did not exist, or that He were not omnipotent; they strive to diminish His external glory, by persecuting the Church and oppressing the just.

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 34, a. 1.

That such hatred exists, even in our days, is clear from history and experience. In the Sacred Letters there are mentioned many times enemies of God, who hate God and Christ;[5] but today there are those who would wish the very name of God to be utterly erased, and therefore teach the young atheism, or monism, or positivism, who proclaim that God is evil, and bitterly blaspheme against Him or curse Him.[6]

[5] Num. 10:35; Deut. 32:41; Ps. 73:23; John 15:24.

[6] Thus, in a Masonic convention held in the year 1903, F. Delpech exclaimed: "The gods are dying: the peoples, at last disabused, are constrained to recognize, by the light of certain facts, that the gods, no more Christ than Buddha and Mohammed, have kept the promises made to the human races by the priests." (Apud P. Nourrisson, *Les Jacobins*, p. 253). In the periodical *La Raison*, Feb. 28, 1904, E. D., a pedagogue, wrote these things: "Let us make a policy of true apaches; let us crush the infamous thing" (*Correspondant*, June 25, 1904, p. 1027). And these among many things!

757. (B) Hatred of God is an intrinsically evil sin, and indeed of itself the gravest of all, because it is directly opposed to the most perfect virtue, namely charity, and does injury to the infinite goodness of God. It does not admit smallness of matter, and therefore, provided that it is deliberate, it is a mortal sin of its whole kind.

If the two species distinguished above are compared with one another, the sin of enmity is graver than the sin of abomination, because the former is opposed to the internal goodness of God, while the latter is opposed to an external manifestation of the same.

Conclusion: Concerning the Means of Progressing in the Love of God.

758. 1. Since disordered love of oneself is contrary to divine love, it is necessary first of all to lessen this disordered love and little by little to root it out, so that we may be able to make secure progress in the love of God.

[7] St. Bonaventure, *Stimulus amoris* (Opera, ed. Vives, t. XII, p. 631-703); *De Imit. Christi*, lib. III, c. 5-6; St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. V-X; Scaramelli, *Directorium*, Tr. IV, art. 3, c. 3-4; Gay, op. cit., Tr. XII, *de la Charite envers Dieu*; Faber, *The Creator and the Creature*, rendered in French, *Le Createur et la creature*, l. II.

Wherefore the nourishment of charity is the diminution of cupidity, and we make as much progress in charity as we depress self-love. Hence he who wishes to be a disciple of Christ must first deny himself, according to that saying:[8] "If anyone wishes to come after Me, let him deny himself." These words the pious writer of the book *On the Imitation of Christ* explains splendidly: "If a man should give all his substance, it is still nothing; and if he should do great penance, it is still little... still much is lacking to him, namely one thing, which is supremely necessary to him. What is that? That, all things being left, he should leave himself, and go out from himself totally, and retain nothing of private love; and when he has done all things which he knows are to be done, let him feel that he has done nothing."[9] In order to furnish this, let those things be recalled to memory which we said concerning the remedies of pride, nn. 519-521.

[8] Matt. 16:24.

[9] *De Imit.*, l. II, c. 11, n. 4.

759. 2. We ought also frequently to consider the motives which can inflame the will to divine love. Psychologically one can proceed thus: God is the lover of us, - God wills to be loved by us, - God is infinitely lovable.

(A) God is the lover of us. From eternity, namely, He loved us, thought of each one of us, and willed to do good to us: among innumerable possibles He chose us that He might bring us to existence. At the opportune time He created us, and whatever being, whatever good is in us, both in the natural and in the supernatural order, He gratuitously and benignly bestowed, "not to increase His own beatitude, nor to acquire it, but to manifest His perfection by the goods which He imparts to creatures."[10]

[10] Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 1.

But when, through original sin, supernatural goods had been lost, God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, that everyone who believes in Him, with that faith which works through

charity, may be saved through Him. He loved us at that time when through sin we were children of wrath and His enemies, and indeed while certainly foreseeing that many would contemn Him. Now, who would not love in return One so loving us? - Besides, one can consider the labors and sorrows of Christ patiently endured for us, but especially all those things which He lovingly suffered in the garden of Gethsemane and on the cross; for when we contemplate Christ crucified, can we not cry out with the Church:[11] "For His whole figure breathes love and provokes to loving in return: the head inclined, the hands extended, the breast opened?" From the love of Christ, however, we easily ascend to the love of God.

[11] Breviary, on the feast of the Seven Sorrows, response at the first lesson.

By these and other thoughts of this kind the love of gratitude is fostered, which, if it is not the love of charity, easily leads to it (above, n. 742).

760. (B) God wills to be loved by us: (a) for to this tends the precept set forth above, n. 750, by which we are commanded to love God from the whole mind, from the whole heart, from all the powers: for by such a precept, which is the first and greatest, He clearly shows how much He values our love, and how ardently He desires to be loved by us. Hence Augustine exclaims:[12] "What am I to Thee, that Thou commandest me to love Thee, and, unless I do it, art angry with me, and threatenest great miseries?" (b) The same is gathered from the promises, threats, benefits, and punishments by which God endeavors to allure His people to love of Himself: thus, among the Prophets, He compares Himself to a benefactor, who, for the innumerable benefits which he has conferred, earnestly demands gratitude and dilection; to a father, who wills to be loved by his children; to a spouse, who demands the love of his bride. To those loving Him He promises remission of sins and temporal and spiritual goods; but, on the contrary, He threatens dire punishments to those who contemn His love.[13]

[12] St. Augustine, *Confess.*, lib. I, c. 5, P. L. XXXII, 663.

[13] Thus, for example, Isa. 1:2-31; 5:3-30; Jer. 2:2-37; 3:1-5; 31:1-39; Ezek. 20:1-44; Joel 2:1-29, etc.

(c) He expressed that desire still more vividly by sending His own Son to earth, who, veiling His majesty and putting on the infirmities of our humanity, by His kindness allures us to divine love: "The benignity and humanity of our Savior appeared."[14] John, the apostle of dilection, splendidly urges this motive:[15] "In this has the charity of God appeared in us, because God sent His only-begotten Son into the world, that we may live through Him... Let us therefore love God, because God first loved us." (d) In reality Christ Himself provokes us to divine love, asserting that God loves those who love Him, and pleasantly remains in their heart:[16] "If anyone love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come to him and will make Our abode with him." He sweetly exhorts the disciples that they remain joined to Him by intimate affection, as a branch remains grafted into the vine:[17] "I am the vine, you the branches... Remain in My love."

[14] Tit. 3:4.

[15] 1 John 4:9, 19.

[16] John 14:23.

[17] John 15:5, 9; the whole passage should be read attentively.

Thence there is an easy transition to the love of God, not only of gratitude, but also of friendship: "Who would not love in return One so loving us?"

761. (C) From these things it is easily understood that God is in Himself infinitely lovable. For by faith we know that whatever of beauty and whatever of good is in creatures is only an imperfect vestige of divine beauty and goodness. Wherefore, if we admire anything holy, anything heroic, anything powerful and kind in some man, all this is found in God, without any admixture of imperfection, and indeed in an infinitely more perfect degree. Therefore if we are allured to love by the beauty or goodness of creatures, how much more by divine perfection? Likewise, if love ought to be proportioned to the endowments of the beloved object, is not the mode of loving the supreme good to love it without mode? - And this is properly love of complacency, which soon is followed by love of benevolence, and afterward by love of beneficence, or zeal for promoting the glory of God.

Augustine declares this splendidly; he had sought pleasure and felicity in creatures; but having at last returned to better things, he addresses God thus:[1] "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee... What then art Thou, my God? what, I ask, except the Lord God... Highest, best, most powerful, most omnipotent, most merciful and most just, most hidden and most present, most beautiful and most strong, stable and incomprehensible; immutable, changing all things; never new, never old; renewing all things and bringing the proud into old age, and they know it not; always acting, always at rest; gathering, and not needing; bearing, and filling, and protecting; creating, and nourishing, and perfecting; seeking, though nothing is lacking to Thee. Thou lovest, and art not inflamed; Thou art zealous, and art secure; Thou repentest, and dost not grieve; Thou art angry, and art tranquil; Thou changest works, and dost not change counsel; Thou receivest what Thou findest, and hast never lost... My God, my life, my holy sweetness... Late have I loved Thee, beauty so ancient and so new, late have I loved Thee!"

[1] St. Augustine, *Confess.*, lib. I, cc. 1, 4; lib. X, c. 27, P. L., XXXII, 661, 662-663, 795.

762. 3. But charity is especially increased by the frequent exercise of acts of love: (A) Explicitly, namely by eliciting acts of gratitude toward God, an outstanding benefactor, and toward Christ, who loved us and delivered Himself for us; acts of complacency, by rejoicing over the divine attributes and praising them; acts of benevolence, namely by desiring that the name of God be sanctified, that His kingdom come, and that His will be done as in heaven and on earth; acts of beneficence, by promoting the glory of God with all one's powers; acts of perfect contrition, by detesting sins because they offend God, infinitely good.[2]

[2] These acts we have already described above, n. 745. Cf. St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. V and VI.

763. (B) Implicitly, by eliciting acts of the other virtues, which are informed by charity; for example, acts of obedience, which, according to the testimony of Scripture, are deservedly held to be truly acts of dilection: "If you love Me, keep My commandments... He that has My commandments and keeps them, he it is that loves Me."[3] - The same can be said of any Christian action; prayer, labor, study, self-denial, mortifications of whatever kind, carried out

on account of the love of God, obtain the merit of dilection (above, n. 149), and therefore increase charity.

[3] John 14:15, 21; cf. 1 John 2:4; 5:3.

Indeed, since by the divine will we are bound to fulfill the duties of our state, it is necessary that we devote ourselves to the active life, and show our love by works from the deeds of charity.[4] - Thus even common works become more pleasant, if they are performed from love, according to Augustine himself:[5] "For in no way are the labors of those who love burdensome, but they even delight, as those of hunters, bird-catchers, fishermen, vine-dressers, merchants, and those delighting themselves with some game. Therefore what is loved matters. For in that which is loved, either labor is not felt, or even labor itself is loved."

[4] To the point St. Vincent de Paul: "Let us love God, but let it be at the expense of our arms; let it be by the sweat of our faces; for very often so many acts of love of God, of complacency, of benevolence, and other similar affections of a tender heart, although very good and very desirable, are nevertheless very suspect when one does not come to effective love... Several flatter themselves with their heated imagination; they are content with the sweet conversations which they have with God in prayer; they even speak of them like angels: but, on leaving there, if there is question of working for God, of suffering, of mortifying oneself, of instructing the poor, of going to seek the lost sheep, of loving that something be lacking to them, of accepting illnesses or some other disgrace, alas! there is no one any more." (Apud Abelly, *La vie de S. Vincent*, Paris, 1891, t. I, ch. 19, p. 124-125.)

[5] St. Augustine, *De bono viduitatis*, c. 21, P. L., XL, 448.

Among these works the works of charity toward neighbor stand out, which contribute very greatly to the love of God itself.

Art. II. Concerning Charity toward Neighbor. — Preliminary Things concerning Charity toward Oneself.

764. We cannot rightly love God unless we love His works, especially those in which divine goodness shines forth more perfectly, namely intellectual creatures, which were made to the image and likeness of God, angels and men. Passing over angels and the blessed, concerning whom there is treatment where the communion of saints is discussed, it remains to treat men who are wayfarers. Now we ought to love ourselves and our neighbor.

765. Concerning love of oneself there is no explicit precept, because, as Augustine notes, man does not need a precept in order to love himself:[1] "Therefore, since there is no need of a precept that each one should love himself and his body... it remained that we should receive precepts both concerning that which is above us and concerning that which is beside us." Nevertheless Christ implicitly commanded this dilection, saying:[2] "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Naturally indeed man loves himself; this love is not properly friendship, but something greater: for friendship imports a certain union; "but to each one toward himself there is unity, which is more powerful than union toward another; whence just as unity is the principle of union, so the love by which someone loves himself is the form and root of friendship: for in this we have friendship toward others, that we conduct ourselves toward them as toward ourselves."[3]

[1] St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, c. 26, P. L., XXXIV, 29.

[2] Matt. 22:39.

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 4.

766. But by force of the divine precept, man ought to love himself supernaturally, for God's sake: (A) first of all his soul, which was created by God, made through grace a sharer in the divine nature, - and also redeemed by the blood of Christ, - the temple of the Holy Spirit, - capable of eternal beatitude.

Hence St. Thomas says:[4] "And according to this the good love themselves, as to the interior man, because they will that he be preserved in his integrity; and they desire for him the goods which are spiritual, and also spend effort in order to attain them, and delightfully return to their own heart, because there they find both good thoughts in the present, and the memory of past goods, and the hope of future goods, from which delight is caused." Wherefore we ought to put the salvation of our soul and its sanctification before all things: "Seek therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added to you."[5] Therefore we ought to cultivate Christian virtues, and rather die than be defiled; and therefore do good and meritorious works rather than heap up money: "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth, where rust and moth consume, and where thieves break through and steal; but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither rust nor moth consumes, and where thieves do not break through nor steal."[6] Accordingly we ought to esteem grace, and the means for preserving and increasing it, more than temporal helps. - We ought to fear one thing, sin, as we reported concerning Chrysostom, n. 471.

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 7.

[5] Matt. 6:33.

[6] Matt. 6:19-20.

767. (B) We ought likewise to love the body for God's sake; for it is the instrument of the soul for rendering honor to God and carrying out good works: "Neither yield ye your members as instruments of iniquity unto sin, but present yourselves to God as those that are alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of justice unto God";[7] - and also the temple of God, sanctified through redemption, and capable of some beatitude, which from the glorious soul will redound into the risen body: "Do you not know that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you? For you are bought with a great price; glorify and bear God in your body."[8] - "It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption. It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory. It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power. It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body."[9]

[7] Rom. 6:13; cf. 19.

[8] 1 Cor. 6:19-20.

[9] 1 Cor. 15:42-43.

But, in order that the matter may be so, we ought to mortify the concupiscence of the flesh and disordered desires, lest otherwise we be drawn to unlawful things and incur damnation: "Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth, fornication, uncleanness, lust, evil concupiscence, and covetousness."[10] Wherefore the Apostle chastised his own body, lest he be allured to sin:[11] "But I

chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become reprobate."

[10] Col. 3:5.

[11] 1 Cor. 9:27.

768. They sin against love of self: (a) by excess, who indulge egotism, inordinately seeking private advantage, by passing over the good of God and neighbor: "For all seek the things that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ's."[12] We can indeed seek our own things, but not exclusively:[13] "Let no one seek what is his own (that is, only), but what belongs to another."

[12] Phil. 2:21.

[13] 1 Cor. 10:24.

(b) By defect, by loving exterior goods in such a way that spiritual goods are contemned: for thus the good of the body is preferred to the good of the soul, contrary to right reason and the divine precept: "And fear ye not them that kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear Him who can destroy both soul and body in hell";[14] - or even by esteeming the goods of fortune in such a way that they are preferred to the salvation and life of the body; - or a fortiori by taking bodily life away by one's own hands, through suicide.[15]

[14] Matt. 10:28.

[15] Concerning suicide, concerning care of one's own body, etc., we spoke in *De Justitia,* n. 288-310.

Concerning all these things we speak only briefly, because they are developed more fully in the course of Moral Theology.

Concerning charity toward neighbor we shall examine three things: 1. the precept of charity; 2. the works of charity, especially those which are called social; 3. sins against charity.

§ I. Concerning the Precept of Charity toward Neighbor. — I. Concerning the Existence of This Precept.

769. Thesis: There is a special and grave precept of loving one's neighbor with supernatural love, both affective and effective.

It is explained. (A) Here there is question not of sensual love, by which a neighbor is loved on account of external endowments which please the senses, - nor of merely intellectual love, by which he is loved on account of the endowments of soul with which he is furnished; - but of supernatural love, by which he is loved for God's sake, namely insofar as divine perfection shines forth in a rational creature. Thus divine goodness is truly the motive why we love our neighbor; thus it appears how the love of God and of neighbor is referred to the same virtue: for the motive of both is the same. From this it also follows that love of neighbor necessarily flows from love of God: for wherever divine goodness is found, there it ought to be loved; but all men are called to the beatific vision, and therefore to supernatural participation in the divine nature; the just indeed already possess this inchoatively through sanctifying grace; but if they are in the state of sin, they remain capable of justification as long as they live, and as such can and ought to be loved.

In order that this may be understood better, it must be known that neighbor can be loved for God's sake in a threefold way: (a) insofar as he is the work of God, both natural and supernatural, pertaining to His glory, just as a painting contributes to the glory of the painter; (b) insofar as divine goodness is participated by the neighbor, shines forth in him, and renders him lovable; in this way we love sinners also, because they are sons of God, not indeed in act, but in potency; (c) insofar as the neighbor is loved by God: for friendship makes friends so unanimous, or of one will, that whatever one loves, the other also loves.

770. But it is controverted whether participation in the divine nature, insofar as it inheres in an intellectual creature, is a sufficient motive of charity. Some indeed, such as Vasquez,[1] contend that love resting only upon this created participation does not properly pertain to the virtue of charity, but to a certain lower supernatural love, by which the neighbor is loved on account of the supernatural goods with which he is adorned. But, with Suarez and others,[2] we think that this love pertains to the virtue of charity; for even that goodness which inheres in the just through grace is divine goodness, proceeding from God and tending toward Him, and therefore can be loved for God's sake.

[1] Vasquez, in 3 part. St. Thomas, disp. 98, c. 2; Lessius, *de Justitia*, l. II, c. 36, n. 23.

[2] Suarez, concerning Charity, disp. I, sect. 3; Salmanticenses, disp. II, dub. 4; Bouquillon, n. 411.

771. (B) That supernatural love ought to be not only affective, but also effective: (a) affective, namely consisting in those acts of complacency and benevolence by which we rejoice concerning the endowments of our neighbor and sincerely desire supernatural goods for him; (b) but also effective, inclining us to beneficence, that is, to all acts of mercy by which we are able to help our neighbor.

772. (C) By the name of neighbor are to be understood all rational creatures[3] capable of eternal beatitude, namely: (a) those who are inseparably united to God through the beatific vision, the angels and saints reigning in heaven; (b) those who are indefectibly friends of God, although they have not yet obtained eternal beatitude, such as are souls detained in purgatory; (c) those who are truly friends of God, although defectibly, as the just on earth; (d) those who are able to obtain divine friendship, although they lack the same, as sinners, heretics, infidels, as long as they live. - Excluded from this supernatural friendship are those who are irreparably enemies of God, such as demons and the damned.[4]

[3] In irrational creatures the natural endowments which shine forth in them and proceed from God can indeed be loved; but this love does not pertain to supernatural charity. Nevertheless, by the ladder of creatures, we are able to ascend to God Himself. Cf. Bellarmine, *De ascensione mentis in Deum per scalas rerum creatarum*.

[4] Yet it is by no means prohibited to love in them whatever good God naturally bestowed and left.

773. It is proved. 1. From Scripture. Yet it must be noted that the law of charity was not fully promulgated in the Old Testament, but attained its perfection only in the New.

(A) In the Mosaic Law (a) not only are hatred and vengeance reproved, but love of neighbor is commanded, and indeed for God's sake, with however some distinction between fellow citizens and foreigners. "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart, but openly rebuke him, lest thou have sin

upon him. Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy citizens. Thou shalt love thy friend as thyself. I am the Lord."[5] Here there is no question of all men, but of brothers, fellow citizens, and friends, that is, of members of Hebrew society; for at that time a great distinction was established between fellow citizens and foreigners. Yet a certain benevolence is commended toward strangers who dwell within the borders of the Jews: they ought to be loved not as brothers, but as if they were fellow citizens: "If a stranger has dwelt in your land and has stayed among you, do not reproach him; but let him be among you as one born in the land, and you shall love him as yourselves; for you also were strangers in the land of Egypt. I am the Lord your God."[6]

[5] Lev. 19:17-18.

[6] Lev. 19:33-34; cf. Exod. 22:21; 23:9.

(b) Beneficence toward the poor, and all who are in some necessity, is often commanded: "The poor shall not be wanting in the land of thy habitation; therefore I command thee that thou open thy hand to thy needy and poor brother, who dwells with thee in the land."[7] The Jews ought to furnish mutual help to themselves as regards things lost: "Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or sheep going astray, and pass by; but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother, even if thy brother is not near, nor dost thou know him; thou shalt bring them into thy house, and they shall be with thee until thy brother seeks them and receives them."[8]

[7] Deut. 15:11.

[8] Deut. 22:1-2; cf. Exod. 22:4-5.

(c) Among works of beneficence is counted a loan without increase: "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money at usury, nor grain, nor any other thing, but to a foreigner. But to thy brother thou shalt lend without usury that which he needs, that the Lord thy God may bless thee in every work of thine."[9] There note also the distinction between brothers and foreigners.

[9] Deut. 23:19-20; cf. Exod. 22:25.

(d) Widows, orphans, the blind, the lame, and others of this kind are worthy of special mercy: "You shall not hurt a widow or an orphan. If you hurt them, they shall cry out to Me, and I will hear their cry; and My fury shall be indignant";[10] - "Thou shalt not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling-block before the blind."[11]

[10] Exod. 22:22-23.

[11] Lev. 19:14; cf. Deut. 27:18.

(e) Besides, certain legal privileges were granted to the needy.[12] Thus a small part of the crops in any field was preserved for the poor, who besides had the right of gathering the remaining ears: "When thou shalt reap the crops of thy land, thou shalt not shear the surface of the land down to the ground (in Hebrew, thou shalt not reap the whole field, but shalt reserve a certain corner for the poor); nor shalt thou gather the remaining ears."[13] - Likewise, in the sabbatical year, which occurred every seventh year, the land remained uncultivated, and the fruits growing spontaneously were common,[14] and chiefly contributed to relieving the poor; the same was observed in the jubilee year, which recurred every fiftieth year.[15] - Moreover, every third year, the tenth part of the fruits was given to widows, orphans, and the other poor.[16]

[12] Many, apud Vigouroux, *Dict. de la Bible*, t. I, 1245-1247; Lallemand, *Histoire de la Charite*, Paris, Picard, 1902, p. 16-28.

[13] Lev. 19:9.

[14] Lev. 25:2-7.

[15] Lev. 25:8-12.

[16] Deut. 14:28-29.

774. (B) In the New Testament the law of charity is completed and perfected, insofar as we are commanded to love all, even enemies, without distinction of Jew and Greek; and in a more perfect mode, by loving all as Christ loved us, and because we ought to love Christ Himself in others.

(a) This indeed is clear from the sermon on the mount, where Christ says: "You have heard that it has been said: an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say to you not to resist evil; but if anyone strikes thee on thy right cheek, offer him also the other."[17] Namely, among the Jews[18] and many Gentiles, the law of retaliation was in force, not indeed to be applied by private men, but by magistrates; Christ teaches us to tolerate injuries patiently, without vengeance being sought through judges.

[17] Matt. 5:38-39.

[18] Exod. 21:24-25; Lev. 24:19-22.

The Lord continues: "You have heard that it has been said: thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thy enemy. But I say to you: love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, and pray for those persecuting and calumniating you; that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven, who makes His sun to rise upon the good and the evil, and rains upon the just and the unjust."[19] Scripture nowhere commended hatred of enemies; but from the fact that certain foreign tribes had been exterminated by the Jews,[20] and because the sacred writers sometimes rejoiced concerning the fall and confusion of the impious,[21] not a few rabbis approved hatred toward enemies as legitimate. But the Lord commands us to love all, even enemies, and to do good to them, so that thus we may imitate our heavenly Father. Nor must love be extended to fellow citizens alone, but also to Greeks and barbarians: "For there is no distinction of Jew and Greek; for the same Lord is over all, rich unto all who call upon Him."[22] From the same texts it is clear that the motive on account of which we ought to love brothers is because God is the heavenly Father of all.

[19] Matt. 5:43-45.

[20] Deut. 7:1-11; 20:12-18.

[21] Ps. 7:5-7; 53:7.

[22] Rom. 10:12; cf. Gal. 5:6; 6:15.

775. (b) We are bound to love them in a more perfect mode than before, namely as Christ Himself loved us: "A new commandment I give unto you, that you love one another as I have loved you, that you also love one another. By this shall all know that you are My disciples, if you shall have love for one another."[23] But Christ loved us so that He delivered His soul for us; wherefore, if we wish to cultivate perfect charity, "we also ought to lay down our lives for the brethren,"[24] that is, to deny ourselves so that we may be able to procure the good of our neighbor, especially spiritual good. That so perfect a charity may become easier, Christ declares

that whatever is bestowed upon the least of the brethren is held as bestowed upon Christ Himself: "Amen I say to you, as long as you did it to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me."[25]

[23] John 13:34-35.

[24] 1 John 3:16.

[25] Matt. 25:40.

776. (c) But this charity must be shown not only by affection and words, but by work.

This indeed is clear from the very words by which the supreme judge addresses the elect and the reprobate: the former possess the kingdom of God because they gave to the poor food, drink, clothing, and other things of this kind; but the reprobate, on the contrary, are damned because they did not perform these works of charity.[26] From this it also appears that certain works of charity were commanded under grave obligation. Wherefore James deservedly says: "Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit orphans and widows in their tribulation."[27] Nor otherwise John:[28] "He that has the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall close his bowels from him, how does the charity of God abide in him? My little children, let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth." - The first Christians understood the matter thus, concerning whom it is said:[29] "And the multitude of believers had one heart and one soul; neither did anyone say that anything of the things which he possessed was his own, but all things were common to them." This community of goods was not indeed of precept,[30] but it shows how perfectly charity was cultivated in the church of Jerusalem.

[26] Matt. 25:34-46.

[27] James 1:27; cf. 2:2-8 and 14-19.

[28] 1 John 3:17-18.

[29] Acts 4:32.

[30] Acts 5:4.

(d) All these things the Apostle splendidly condenses, describing the excellent endowments of charity thus:[31] "Charity is patient, is kind; charity envies not, deals not perversely, is not puffed up; is not ambitious, seeks not her own, is not provoked to anger, thinks no evil; rejoices not over iniquity, but rejoices with the truth; bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things."

[31] 1 Cor. 13:4-7.

777. The Fathers confirm and develop the doctrine of Scripture, commending fraternal charity, often inculcating the precept of almsgiving, and promoting other works of beneficence.

(a) Thus St. Cyprian praises fraternal charity:[1] "The charity of brotherhood is a bond, the foundation of peace, the tenacity and firmness of unity, which is greater than both hope and faith, which precedes even the works of martyrdom, which will always remain with us eternally before God in the heavenly kingdoms." To the point also Augustine:[2] "Wherefore, brethren, pursue charity, the sweet and salutary bond of minds, without which the rich man is poor, and with which the poor man is rich. This bears in adversities, tempers in prosperities; in hard sufferings it is strong, in good works

cheerful; in temptation most secure, in hospitality most spacious; among true brothers most joyful, among false ones most patient." A little later he explains the words of the Apostle cited above concerning the excellence and endowments of charity.

[1] St. Cyprian, *De bono patient.*, c. 15, P. L., IV, 632.

[2] St. Augustine, sermo CCCL, P. L., XXXIX, 1534.

778. (b) The Fathers often speak concerning almsgiving. St. Cyprian has an entire treatise concerning work and alms.[3] St. Ambrose also relates that sacred vessels were broken and sold in order to redeem captives, and he altogether approves this against the envy of the Arians: "The Church has gold, not that she may preserve it, but that she may spend it and come to aid in necessities. Will not the Lord say: why did you suffer so many needy persons to die of hunger? And surely you had gold; you should have supplied food. Why were so many captives led away for sale, and, not redeemed, were killed by the enemy? It would have been better that you preserve vessels of the living than of metals." He likewise narrates how the holy martyr Lawrence distributed the treasures of the Church to the poor, and, when the judge asked where the treasures were which he had promised to hand over, showed the poor, saying: These are the treasures of the Church. This he declares in these words:[4] "These are the treasures of the Church. And truly treasures, in whom Christ is, in whom faith is... What better treasures has Christ than those in whom He said that He is?" - Fortunatus splendidly declares that Christ Himself, hidden in the poor, is to be loved and helped:[5]

[3] St. Cyprian, lib. *de opere et eleemosynis*, P. L., IV, 601-622.

[4] St. Ambrose, *De officiis*, l. II, c. 28, n. 140, P. L., XVI, 141.

[5] Apud Le Blant, *Inscript. chretiennes*, t. II, n. 645.

"Believing that he was feeding Christ under the form of the poor,
before all others with him the needy man received help,
and not only refreshing, but secretly ministering gifts,
he is more pleasing from this, that he gave without a witness."

The poor were also held as sons; for Jerome, speaking of Paula, who relieved many poor and had left them to her husband Pammachius, writes to him: "As many poor as there are in Rome, so many sons have you suddenly begotten."[6]

[6] Jerome, ep. 66 to Pammachius, n. 4, P. L., XXII, 641.

But to urge the precept of almsgiving, the Fathers rather often teach that the rich are, as it were, stewards and dispensers of the riches of God, so that if they refuse to hand over necessary things to the poor, they are guilty of theft and robbery: "The bread which you detain belongs to the hungry; the cloak which you keep in the chest belongs to the naked; the shoe which rots with you belongs to the barefoot; the silver which you have buried belongs to the needy. Wherefore, to as many men as you can give, to so many do you inflict injury."[7]

[7] St. Basil, homil. on that text of Luke: *Destruam*, etc., P. G., XXXI, 278; cf. St. Ambrose, *De Nabuthe lib. unus*, P. L., XIV, 747; St. Augustine, *in Ps.* 147, P. L., XXXVII, 1922; St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De pauperibus amandis*, P. G., XLVI, 466; St. Chrysostom, in ep. I to the Corinthians, homil. 10, c. 3, P. G., LXI, 86. C. Guignebert condenses the doctrine of the

Fathers on this matter, *Tertullien* (thesis), Paris, Leroux, 1901, p. 508-350. - Yet we proved that these Fathers are not favorers of socialism, *De Justitia*, n. 84-86.

Yet alms are not to be bestowed indiscriminately upon all, but upon those who are truly needy and use well the things given. Thus, in the Constitutions called Apostolic, alms are not to be bestowed upon those who are evil, envious, drunken, or lazy, lest a reward be given to vice.[8]

[8] *Constit. apostol.*, II, 1-63; III, 4-6.

Likewise Chrysostom forbids widows who have been caught acting basely in thefts, taverns, and other similar things to be supported at the expense of the Church: "For who would ever wish to bestow the money which he was commanded to give to Christ upon those who bring calumny upon the name of Christ? And therefore much and careful scrutiny is needed, that neither they nor others, for whom their household property can suffice, consume the table of the poorer."[9] - But those who belong to another nation or religion are not excluded from charity: "For whatever is God's is common in our use, and no one is kept away from His benefits and gifts; much less is the whole human race prevented from enjoying His goodness and largess equally."[10]

[9] St. Chrysostom, *De sacerdotio*, l. III, c. 16, P. G., XLVIII, 655.

[10] St. Cyprian, *De opere et eleemos.*, c. 25, P. L., IV, 620.

(c) Likewise other works of charity are promoted, such as visitation of the sick and imprisoned, redemption of captives, emancipation of slaves, care of widows and orphans, etc.[11] Wherefore deacons and deaconesses (or widows not less than sixty years old) were instituted in every church, that they might take care of the poor, orphans, widows, girls, etc. Collections were made on every Sunday, that the necessities of all might be more abundantly relieved.

[11] Concerning these see L. Lallemand, *Histoire de la charite*, t. II, Paris, 1903, with many authors cited there. These works of charity even rationalists themselves could not fail to admire, as Lecky, *History of European Morals*, London and New York, ch. IV, where he confesses that nothing similar was ever found among the pagans: "The high conception that has been formed of the sanctity of human life, the protection of infancy, the elevation and final emancipation of the slave classes, the suppression of barbarous games, the creation of a vast and multifarious organisation of charity, and the education of the imagination by the christian type, constitute together a movement of philanthropy which has never been paralleled or approached in the pagan world." (T. II, p. 100, 3rd ed., New York, 1891).

779. The doctrine of Scripture and of the Fathers Leo XIII splendidly condenses, proposing the motives of fraternal charity to masters and workers thus: "For all will feel and understand that all men alike have been begotten by God, the common parent; that all tend to the same end of goods, which is God Himself, who alone can affect both men and angels with perfect and absolute beatitude; that each likewise has equally been redeemed by the benefit of Jesus Christ and restored to the dignity of sons of God, so that they are plainly contained in a fraternal relationship both with one another and also with Christ the Lord, the firstborn among many brethren."

And these things are sufficient concerning charity in general; but how far the precept of loving enemies and of bestowing alms extends will be clear from the following things.

II. Concerning the Extension of This Precept.

The question can be examined as regards the dilection of enemies, almsgiving, fraternal correction, and the order to be observed in charity.

1. Concerning the Dilection of Enemies.

780. State of the question. From the general precept of charity, n. 769, we are bound to love enemies with common dilection. But those are called enemies who pursue us with hatred, or have inflicted some offense or injury upon us, or even those whom, on account of some antipathy or other motive, we naturally turn away from. To love them seems very arduous to human infirmity, but by grace it becomes possible. We are not indeed commanded to love them because they are enemies, but although they are enemies; nor to love their vices or defects, but, notwithstanding these vices, to love them on account of the endowments which God has conferred upon them and intends to confer, and therefore for the sake of God and Christ. Nor is there question of sensible affection, which does not depend upon the will, but of true love by which we will good to them.

But the precept chiefly embraces three things: that hatred and vengeance be avoided, that injuries be forgiven and therefore common signs of dilection be shown, and that reconciliation be sought.

781. (A) Concerning hatred to be avoided. (a) Hatred of abomination, which is concerned not with the person himself, but with his endowments, is not always and of itself evil; but it is good or evil according as the quality itself which is hated is evil or good.

Thus it is licit to hate sin in a neighbor, for example, his pride, or envy, or lust. On the other hand, it is gravely illicit of itself to hate natural or supernatural endowments which are in the neighbor, for example, his wisdom, humility, chastity. For, as St. Thomas says,[1] "love is owed to the neighbor according to that which he has from God, that is, according to nature and grace; but love is not owed to him according to that which he has from himself and the devil, namely according to sin and defect of justice."

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 34, a. 3.

782. (b) Hatred of enmity toward the neighbor himself is a sin mortal from its kind; nevertheless it can be light, not only because of imperfect deliberation or volition, but also because of smallness of matter, for example, if someone wills only a slight evil to the neighbor.

John thus reproves hatred of this kind: "But he that hates his brother is in darkness, and walks in darkness, and knows not where he goes, because the darkness has blinded his eyes...[2] He that loves not abides in death. Whosoever hates his brother is a murderer; and you know that no murderer has eternal life abiding in himself."[3] Indeed he establishes that it is impossible to love God unless the neighbor is loved:[4] "If any man say, I love God, and hates his brother, he is a liar. For he who does not love his brother whom he sees, how can he love God, whom he does not see?"

[2] 1 John 2:11.

[3] 1 John 3:14-15.

[4] Ibid., 4:20.

The reason is that our enemies do not cease to be sons of God, called to heavenly beatitude, redeemed by the blood of Christ, and therefore members of the same body,[5] and, even if perhaps they have sinned, they can be converted by grace and numbered among the saints. Therefore if we hate them, we not only fail to imitate our Father, who makes His sun rise upon the good and the evil, but we openly contradict Him, pursuing with hatred those whom He loves, and wishing evil to those to whom He does not cease to do good.

[5] "We, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another." (Rom. 12:5). Cf. Bossuet, *Serm. sur la charite fraternelle*, t. III, p. 181, ed. Lelarcq.

783. Corollaries. (a) Therefore it is not licit to wish some evil to a neighbor, even an enemy, except that a greater evil be avoided; for to wish an evil which is not compensated by a greater good is nothing other than to will evil to someone. But if the evil is wished only in order to avoid a greater evil, by that very fact we will good to someone.

Thus we cannot wish eternal damnation to anyone, not even to a persecutor of the Church, because this evil cannot be sufficiently compensated by any good. Nor can the death of some person be desired in order to seize his inheritance;[6] for the order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor be preferred to one's own or another's temporal advantage. - But it is licit to wish some temporal evil to a wicked man, for example, tribulation, illness, loss of some goods, so that his spiritual good, or conversion, may be more easily promoted. Likewise we can rejoice concerning the death of a scandalous sinner, not insofar as it is an evil for him, but lest he further be a cause of the spiritual ruin of others. It is commonly also said that the death of a heresiarch or persecutor can licitly be desired on account of the common good, lest he lead others into error or sin. But it is better to ask for conversion, according to that saying:[7] "I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." Wherefore the death of the impious can be sought only conditionally, namely with the supposition that, according to God's knowledge, there is no other means of removing scandal.

[6] To this belong propositions 12, 13, 14 condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679 (Denzing., n. 1030-1032; Viva, on these propositions): "If you do it with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened concerning the life of someone, and rejoice concerning his natural death, seek and desire it with inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal advantage. - It is licit with an absolute desire to desire the death of a father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one desiring, because namely a rich inheritance is going to come to him. - It is licit for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the great riches thereafter obtained from the inheritance."

[7] Ezek. 33:11.

Therefore the desire of private vengeance is illicit where civil authority has already been orderly constituted; but it is licit, from zeal for justice and public security, to wish that a punishment proportioned to the offense be inflicted upon the guilty by legitimate authority, after diligent and equitable judgment: for this is nothing other than to will that order be preserved in society.

784. (b) Cursing, by which we imprecate evil upon someone, is against the order of charity and is a grave sin from its kind; for it is nothing other than an external manifestation of some internal

hatred. - Besides, cursing which is done before others can put on the malice of detraction; if it is done in the presence of the enemy himself, it is contumely (*De Justitia*, nn. 374, 397).

785. To be noted for practice. Although hatred is of itself a grave sin, nevertheless often penitents who accuse sins of hatred are not guilty of grave sin: for sometimes there is question of natural antipathy or aversion of mind, which is not fully voluntary; sometimes defects or depraved actions are hated, but not the person himself. If they consent to pray for the conversion or progress of those from whom they thus turn away, they are not to be made anxious. - Likewise curses, even those grave of themselves, are often excused from mortal sin, because they are uttered from vehement anger, without sufficient advertence or perfect consent, more for casting terror than with serious desire that evils of this kind truly happen.

786. (B) Concerning forgiveness of injuries and signs of dilection. (a) Regularly we are bound to forgive, from internal affection, injuries inflicted upon us by the neighbor, even an enemy, that we ourselves may be able to obtain pardon for our own offenses, according to that saying: "Forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors."

(b) Therefore we are bound to show enemies common signs and benefits of dilection, namely such as a Christian is accustomed to give to a Christian, a citizen to a fellow citizen, a priest to a priest, a blood-relation to a blood-relation; for to deny these would be a sign of hatred and vengeance. - Except, however, if there is a reasonable cause for denying these for a time, for example, for the correction of children or subjects, or on account of a founded fear lest the enemy become more obstinate in his malice, provided that the affection of charity is not lacking internally. - Denial of common signs of charity is of itself a grave sin when it proceeds from internal hatred, or is the cause of grave scandal; often, however, it is excused from mortal sin because of good faith, since many think that they are not bound to these signs when they have suffered injury.

But we can, as a sign of just sorrow, deny special signs of dilection to an enemy: for since these are not owed to all, we are by no means bound to show them to an enemy, who is not of better condition than the rest.

Yet they are worthy of all praise who, adhering to the footsteps of Christ and the saints, show special signs of dilection and benevolence to enemies: "But if thy enemy is hungry, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink. For doing this, thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head (that is, burning groans of penance, according to Augustine). Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good."[8]

[8] Rom. 12:20-21.

Likewise it is licit to exact satisfaction for an injury inflicted, and restitution for damage caused, provided this is done not from hatred or vengeance, but from sincere love of justice. Litigants are to be warned concerning this prudently and opportunely; and if the matter can be composed peacefully through arbitrators, without recourse to a tribunal, this is much more consonant with Christian charity.[9]

[9] "Does any one of you, having a matter against another, dare to be judged before the unjust, and not before the saints?... So is there not any wise man among you, who can judge between his brother?" (1 Cor. 6:1-5).

787. Practical conclusions. (a) Since we ought to pray in a general way for all, it is not licit to exclude enemies from common prayers. For Christ, in the Lord's prayer, taught us to pray for all, and, far from wishing enemies to be excluded, said elsewhere:[10] "Pray for those persecuting and calumniating you." Although we are not bound to pray specifically for them, this is opportunely to be counseled whenever hatred otherwise cannot be laid aside.

[10] Matt. 5:44.

(b) It is not licit to exclude enemies from common alms, - from the sale of goods exposed for sale, - or from other contracts which are entered into indiscriminately with all.

(c) We are not bound to greet an enemy unless perhaps in a place where the custom obtains of greeting all indiscriminately; but if he greets first, we ought to return his greeting: otherwise we are judged to contemn him. Nor are we strictly bound to visit a sick enemy, to console him when sad, or to receive him in hospitality, since these are special signs of love; but the true disciple of Christ will seize this opportunity of acting kindly with an enemy, that he may reconcile him to himself.

788. (C) Concerning reconciliation to be made. When friendship has been broken by hatred or by injury, reconciliation is to be sought, according to these words of the Savior: "If therefore thou offer thy gift at the altar, and there remember that thy brother has anything against thee (that is, a just complaint), leave there thy gift before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother: and then coming thou shalt offer thy gift."[11]

[11] Matt. 5:23-24. Note the word there, at the very altar, at the time of the sacrifice begun; moreover "to leave a sacrifice imperfect was held to be a great sin," says Maldonatus on this place.

(a) As regards the order to be observed in reconciliation, regularly he who offended the other is bound to seek reconciliation first, either by himself or through a friend. If an offense has intervened on both sides, he ought first to seek reconciliation who offended the other more gravely, and, if the mutual offense is almost equal, he who offended first. But in practice, since not rarely each one is persuaded that he was offended first or more gravely, both are to be advised to begin reconciliation; and indeed as soon as morally possible, lest otherwise hatred grow; yet sometimes it is expedient to defer the matter a little while, so that anger may more easily be laid aside.

789. (b) Otherwise he who was injured is bound to forgive the injury to an enemy seeking reconciliation: "For if you forgive men their offenses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you your offenses; but if you do not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins."[12]

[12] Matt. 6:14-15.

(c) Reconciliation can be made by asking pardon, or by friendly conversation,[13] by various duties or benefits mutually furnished, or by gradually restoring the former friendship. Yet it must be noted that a full reintegration of the old friendship is not strictly required: for familiar friendship is owed to no one, and, when it exists, it can be dissolved for a legitimate cause. - The mediation of a friend who is acceptable to both parties greatly conduces to true reconciliation; this office especially belongs to the priest, who, by force of his office, ought to be acceptable to all the faithful committed to him.

[13] Often enmities arise from a false interpretation of words or deeds, which usually vanishes from an honorable and sincere conversation.

The dilection of enemies and the forgiveness of injuries seem to many something arduous, indeed even impossible. Let them think of blessed Stephen, who prayed for the enemies stoning him, and thus led Paul to the true faith; but especially of Christ hanging on the cross and praying for His persecutors: "Father, forgive them: for they know not what they do."[14] And, if they have sinned, let them recall to memory that they say daily: "And forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors"; therefore unless they wish to be condemned, let them kindly forgive injuries to others.

[14] Luke 23:34.

2. Concerning Almsgiving.

790. Notion and obligation. (A) It is not enough to love all with affection, even enemies, but we ought to show dilection by effect and work through beneficence. This beneficence indeed, when exercised toward the wretched, is called mercy. Since the misery of the neighbor can be bodily and spiritual, some works of mercy are corporal, but others spiritual.

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32; Suarez, concerning Charity, disp. VII; Billuart, disp. V; St. Alphonsus, n. 31-33; Bouquillon, n. 481-496; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 193-215; Bourdaloue, Sermon for the First Friday of Lent, on Almsgiving.

Here there is treatment of the former, while we shall soon speak concerning spiritual works, where we treat fraternal correction. Among the corporal works of mercy is counted especially almsgiving, concerning which there is a special precept, as has already been said; we must now treat it, in order to define how far it is commanded: concerning social works of charity we shall speak below. By the name of almsgiving, however, we understand any bodily benefit furnished to one in need from compassion, in order to relieve his want.

(B) That there is a precept of giving alms is clear from the preceding thesis; but how far it extends must now be determined. Now, in a general way, the precept obliges whenever these two things concur at the same time: true necessity on the part of the needy person, and moral possibility on the part of the giver, insofar as he possesses goods concerning which he can dispose: "There is some time in which he sins mortally if he omits giving alms; on the part of the receiver indeed, when evident and urgent necessity appears, and it does not appear that someone is at hand who may help him; but on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous things, which according to the present state are not necessary to him, as can probably be estimated."[2]

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32, a. 5, ad 3.

791. In order that this may be understood better, a threefold necessity is usually distinguished: (a) extreme necessity, in which the necessities of life are lacking, or certain danger is imminent of losing goods more precious than goods of fortune, for example, danger of losing the integrity of members, health, liberty, chastity. To this approaches quasi-extreme necessity, when someone is in a very probable danger of losing life or one of the aforesaid goods. (b) Necessity is called grave in which the neighbor will very probably suffer notable loss of goods, or loss of state, unless he is helped by the aid of another. (c) Finally, that necessity is called common in which ordinary poor persons are found, who, unless they are helped, live a rather troublesome life, although they are able to provide the necessaries for themselves. - These things being posited, the following seem to be established.

792. Practical rules. (A) A neighbor constituted in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity is to be aided under grave obligation, provided it can be done without truly great damage. For if charity at some time obliges under grave obligation, surely it does when the neighbor is in the aforesaid necessity. - Moreover, according to the order of divine Providence, the goods of the earth are primarily ordained to supplying the necessities of man; and therefore if the neighbor is in extreme necessity, he has a right to obtain whatever is necessary for his own support (*De Justitia*, n. 446).

Yet no one is bound to help his neighbor from goods necessary for his own life or that of his family: for there is no obligation of loving others more than oneself or one's own family.

Nor is there a strict obligation of using extraordinary means to help the neighbor; thus we are not bound, at our own expense, to send a sick man, who would die shortly in his homeland, into a far-off region, that he may find there a healthier air: for this is an extraordinary means to which generally no one is bound, even for the sake of saving his own life. - Nor is there an obligation of spending a great sum of money upon a poor man so that by an extraordinary surgical operation his life can be saved, both on account of the same motive and because today there are hospitals where these operations are performed gratuitously, or at least for a lesser price.

For those who are in the aforesaid necessity, strictly speaking, it suffices to give as much as is required to relieve their necessity here and now; hence if the use of a thing suffices, it is enough to lend it, without the thing itself being given: thus if the use of some vehicle or horse is necessary, there is no obligation of giving the things themselves. - When some family is found for a long time in quasi-extreme necessity, one and the same rich man is not bound to provide all necessaries to it, when there are others who can help the same; it suffices that he contribute a part proportioned to his resources. In reality, in present societies, there are many charitable institutions for alleviating these necessities.

793. (B) A neighbor constituted in grave or common necessity is sometimes to be aided from superfluous goods; and indeed under mortal sin when there is question of grave necessity.

The rich are not indeed bound to help all who are in grave or common necessity, but only some; nor to provide totally for their want when there are other rich persons who can help them; but they ought to bestow upon the poor, especially those constituted in grave necessity, a part of superfluous goods. "No one certainly," says Leo XIII,[3] "is commanded to aid others from that which pertains to the necessary uses both of himself and of his own; indeed, not even to hand over to others that by which he himself needs to preserve what befits and what becomes his person: for no one ought to live unbecomingly.[4] But when necessity and decorum have been satisfied, it is a duty to give to the needy from that which remains over: 'that which remains, give as alms.'"[5]

[3] Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, May 16, 1891.

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32, a. 6.

[5] Luke 11:41.

This obligation indeed is grave, since, according to the testimony of Christ, those are guilty of eternal damnation who refuse to give food, drink, clothing, and hospitality to the poor.[6] - Therefore they sin

mortally who never provide alms, or repel all poor indiscriminately.

[6] Matt. 25:41-46.

794. But what comes under the name of superfluous things, and what part of the superfluous it is necessary to give, cannot easily be determined. Superfluous goods can be called those which are not necessary for the decent support of oneself and one's own.[7] But everyone sees that these cannot be defined by a common rule: for many things are to be attended to in this matter: necessities not only present, but future, namely those which will probably occur, for example, from old age or incapacity for labor, from diminution of income, from increase of family, education and dowering of children, etc. He would indeed be imprudent who, for providing for future necessities, neglected moderately to increase his resources.

[7] Theologians commonly distinguish goods necessary for life and necessary for state: the former are required for protecting oneself and one's own against extreme necessity, and what remains are called superfluous for life; the latter are called those without which someone cannot live decently and support his family according to his state, and what remains are called superfluous for state, or simply superfluous.

Besides, not all superfluous things are to be bestowed upon the poor; a certain part must be set aside so that industry, commerce, and agriculture may be promoted: for thus the progress of the whole nation is fostered, and the resources of the community are increased, and the poor are more easily relieved. Thus from the multiplication of railways famine becomes almost impossible in cultivated nations, because grain is easily transported from one region to another. - Today, moreover, there are many public works of beneficence instituted by private persons, the State, and the Church, in which provision is made for the necessities of the poor, orphans, the aged, and the sick; therefore those who pay taxes or contribute something in collections for pious works in some way fulfill the office of charity.

795. Practical conclusion. Therefore the faithful are altogether to be exhorted to bestow liberally a part of their superfluous goods upon the poor or upon pious works, without this part being mathematically defined: for exhortations of this kind, resting upon the words of Christ and the Fathers,[8] have more force than a strict determination of a gravely incumbent duty, which often is impossible.

[8] Besides the works of the Fathers cited above, cf. Bossuet, *Sermon sur l'eminente dignite des pauvres*, t. III, p. 117-136, ed. Lebarcq; Msgr. Pie, *Inst. pastorales sur l'urgente necessite de l'aumone* (Works, t. II and IV).

Moreover charity ought to be: (a) prudent, namely that it be done for one truly poor, but not for an idle man who simulates poverty,[9] and that it tend to render the poor man capable, insofar as it can be done, of working and soon sufficing for himself; (b) and therefore sufficiently abundant that the poor may truly be relieved, and may be able to obtain not only the necessities for supporting themselves for the present day, but also the instruments of labor by which afterward they may be able to nourish themselves and their own; (c) swift, or prompt, that it may be opportune, lest otherwise the poor fall into abject misery and desperation: "Say not to thy friend: go, and return; tomorrow I will give to thee; when thou canst give immediately";[10] (d) as to intention, secret, humble, supernatural: "When therefore thou dost alms, sound not a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may be honored by men. Amen I say to you, they have received their

reward. But when thou dost alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand does, that thy alms may be in secret; and thy Father, who sees in secret, will repay thee."[11]

[9] Today, in many regions, societies have been instituted to detect false poor, especially those who feign poverty in order to become rich; thus in France the society called *Office central des Oeuvres de bienfaisance*, 175 boulevard St-Germain, Paris.

[10] Prov. 3:28.

[11] Matt. 6:2-4.

3. Concerning Fraternal Correction.

796. The precept of charity extends not only to corporal works of mercy, but also to spiritual ones, which are commonly counted as seven:[13] to teach the ignorant, especially as regards things necessary for salvation; to give counsel to the doubtful; to console the sad; to forgive an injury received; to tolerate the troublesome patiently; to pray for the living and the dead; to correct those who offend. Here only fraternal correction must be treated, since it alone carries before itself a special difficulty.

[12] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 33; Suarez, disp. VIII; Billuart, diss. VI; St. Alphonsus, n. 34-42; Bouquillon, n. 462-477; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 216-239.

[13] "Counsel, reprove, teach, console, forgive, bear, pray."

This is usually defined as a warning made privately to an offending neighbor, for his correction. - It therefore differs from judicial correction, which proceeds from a judge, in order to punish the offender on account of the common good.

797. (A) Concerning the obligation of fraternal correction. There is a natural and divine precept, grave of itself, of making fraternal correction to a neighbor gravely offending, when certain conditions have been posited.

(a) This precept Ecclesiasticus already inculcates:[14] "Reprove a friend, lest perhaps he has not understood, and says: I did not do it; or, if he did it, lest he add to do it again; reprove thy neighbor, lest perhaps he has not spoken; and if he has spoken, lest perhaps he repeat it." But Christ prescribes not only the correction itself, but also the order to be followed in it thus:[15] "But if thy brother shall sin (against thee), go and reprove him between thee and him alone; if he shall hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother; but if he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may stand. And if he will not hear them, tell the Church; but if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican."

[14] Ecclus. 19:13-14.

[15] Matt. 18:15-17. - The words against thee are lacking in the Vatican and Sinaitic codices. - Cf. 2 Thess. 3:14-15.

Augustine lucidly explains these words:[16] "Therefore we ought to correct by loving, not with eagerness of doing harm, but with zeal for correcting... If you have neglected (to correct), you are worse. He has done an injury, and by doing the injury has struck himself with a grave wound: do you contemn the wound of your brother? You see him perishing, or having perished, and you neglect him? You are worse by being silent than he by reviling."

[16] St. Augustine, Sermo LXXXII, P. L., XXXVIII, 506-514.

798. (b) Natural reason persuades the same. For, if by the law of charity we are bound to aid the bodily misery of the neighbor, a fortiori his spiritual infirmity, since wounds of the soul are much worse than wounds of the body. Wherefore, if we see a brother gravely wounded by sin and lying in the way, ought we not, adhering to the footsteps of the good Samaritan, to heal his spiritual wounds, and to exhort him with gentle admonition, so that, the blindness of the intellect having been driven away and depraved passions overcome, he may turn aside from the mire of vices and return to the path of virtue?

Hence certain persons among the pagans had recognized the necessity of a spiritual guardian, especially for conquering the corruption which is born from depraved examples and conversations. Hear Seneca:[1] "And therefore in individuals there are the vices of peoples, because the people gave them. While each one makes another worse, he has been made worse: he learned worse things, then he taught them; and that immense wickedness was effected, by gathering into one what is known to be worst in each. Therefore let there be some guardian, and let him from time to time pull the ear, and drive away rumor, and cry out against peoples praising. For you err if you think vices are born with us: they have come upon us, they have been brought in. Therefore by frequent admonitions let the insults which resound around us be repelled." Plautus likewise poetically teaches the same:[2]

[1] Seneca, ep. to Lucilius, XCIV; cf. ep. XXII, LII.

[2] Plautus, in *Trinummus*, Act 1, sc. 2, v. 95-97.

"But you, from certain friends, are most certain to me;
if you know that I have done anything foolishly or basely,
if you do not accuse me of it, you yourself are to be rebuked."

799. (B) Concerning the conditions required for correction. The precept of correction does not oblige under grave obligation unless certain conditions have been posited, namely:

(a) That it be morally certain concerning a grave sin committed, or concerning the will of committing it. For if there is question of a sin light in itself and in relation to the person, there is no grave obligation of warning the neighbor, unless it is certainly foreseen that grave fault will follow from it; for if it were necessary to correct light offenses, the whole life would be consumed in admonitions. - Likewise, if the sin is not certain, there is no strict obligation of diligently inquiring concerning it, unless there is question of superiors, who have care of the community and ought to watch over the morals of subjects.

800. (b) That there be truly probable hope of correction for the offender, or at least for others, whether immediately or after some time; for no one is bound to what is useless.

Correction therefore does not oblige when it is foreseen that it will be harmful, by driving the offender to new and graver sins, or at least will be useful to no one. Hence generally it is not expedient to correct an unknown person, because scarcely in this case can correction be hoped for. If it is foreseen as useless as regards the sinner himself, but useful to others, who otherwise would be induced to grave sin by depraved examples or counsels, it is not licit to neglect it. - But if it remains uncertain whether it will be useful or harmful, one must abstain from it.

Therefore, if the sinner has already been corrected, or is about to be corrected shortly, it is not necessary to correct him.

801. (c) That it can be done without great inconvenience of the one correcting; for if, for example, a servant or inferior seriously fears that from the admonition some grave damage will happen to himself, he is not bound to make it: for the law does not oblige with so great an inconvenience.

Wherefore inferiors are very rarely bound to it; equals, however, only when superiors or friends are lacking: for these furnish it more opportunely and efficaciously, and also with less inconvenience. Otherwise, although all are bound of themselves to make correction, nevertheless primarily superiors,[3] who from office have spiritual care of inferiors, such as pastors, rectors of communities, magistrates, etc.

[3] "For to this end watchmen, that is, prelates of peoples, have been constituted in churches, that they should not spare, by rebuking sins." (St. Augustine, *De Civit. Dei*, l. I, c. 9, P. L., XLI, 23).

The scrupulous are generally exempted from this office, both because they easily exaggerate their obligation in this matter, and because they seem less fit for this office: for, on account of anxiety and disturbance of mind, they usually lack the necessary discretion.

802. (C) Concerning the order to be observed in correction. Fraternal correction must be made with kindness and sincere humility, since we too remain liable to temptations and sins: "Brethren, and if a man be overtaken in any fault, you who are spiritual instruct such a one in the spirit of mildness; considering thyself, lest thou also be tempted."[4] This indeed is more necessary if in fact we have fallen into the same sins: for then the admonition will not profit unless before God we acknowledge our own fault, and at the same time sincerely will our correction.

[4] Gal. 6:1.

Therefore the reputation of the neighbor is to be spared when the sin is hidden, and therefore in making correction the order prescribed by Christ must be followed (n. 797). (a) One must begin from a secret admonition: "Go and reprove him between thee and him alone"; for perhaps, if you accuse him publicly, "through shame he begins to defend his sin, and him whom you wish to make more corrected you make worse."[5] (b) But if private correction has not profited, let two or three witnesses be taken, so that they too may exhort the offender to repentance, and, moved by the authority of several, the sinner, shame or salutary fear having been cast in, may betake himself to better fruit. (c) If he is not yet willing to be corrected, let him be denounced to the Church or superior, so that the latter, with greater authority, may gravely reprove the sinner, inflict a moderate punishment, remove him from a place or office, or watch over him especially. Yet the superior will not furnish this unless after he has given the accused an opportunity of knowing the facts alleged against him and of defending himself: for experience shows that offenses are sometimes greatly amplified by informers. (d) If the guilty party has not been sufficiently corrected by paternal and secret correction, and, on account of the public good, it is necessary that the offense be publicly punished, the legitimate superior will be able to proceed judicially, and, the order of law having been observed, pronounce a public sentence and public punishment: this last degree is not fraternal, but judicial correction.

[5] St. Augustine, Sermo LXXXII, P. L., XXXVIII, 509.

803. Exceptions. Yet there are cases in which one licitly departs from this order, by immediately denouncing the offender to the superior:

(a) If the offense is public, because in this case the sinner has lost his right to reputation, and otherwise the public good immediately demands correction; (b) if, by reason of the public good, effective correction is immediately required, and cannot be obtained without recourse to the superior, for example, if there is question of grave damage to be incurred by the community as regards faith or good morals;[6] (c) if, all things considered, correction is foreseen to be ineffective unless it is made by a superior; (d) if the offender has renounced his right in this matter, for example, freely entering a religious order in which, according to the rule, denunciation of offenses is to be made directly to the superior. Yet, even in this case, if it is certain that the brother has perfectly corrected his offense, and danger of relapse is not to be feared, charity demands that the matter not be denounced to the superior: for then, from the principles set forth above, n. 800, there is no place for correction; charity always obliges us to aid the neighbor with the least damage to him.[7]

[6] To the point Lehmkuhl, n. 614: "In communities, when there is question of a harmful offense, especially if there is danger of perverting several, or there is question of grave common damage: private admonition is generally dangerous and ineffective, but immediate report of the matter to the Superior is required, who will see whether he should rather avert the evil by paternal admonition or by punishment." Cf. Muller, § 31, n. 6.

[7] Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 233-234.

804. Corollary. When a neighbor, from invincible ignorance, commits some material sin, charity sometimes demands that he be warned, namely:

(a) If such a sin gravely harms the offender himself, or another, for example, by giving scandal, by retaining another's thing; (b) or if it dishonors God, for example, if someone utters blasphemous words whose meaning he does not know. Yet this must be done opportunely and prudently, that is, with the conditions set forth above being posited, where warning was discussed, especially provided there is hope of correction: otherwise the merely material sin would become formal.

4. Concerning the Order to Be Observed in Charity.

805. Charity prescribes not only the works to be furnished, but also the order to be observed in dilection, whether as regards persons or as regards goods.

St. Augustine explains that a certain order is to be established among things to be loved: "But he lives justly and holily who is an uncorrupted appraiser of things: and he is the one who has ordered dilection, lest he either love what is not to be loved, or not love what is to be loved, or love more what is to be loved less, or love equally what is to be loved either less or more, or love less or more what is to be loved equally. Every sinner, insofar as he is a sinner, is not to be loved; and every man, insofar as he is a man, is to be loved for God's sake, but God for His own sake. And if God is to be loved more than every man, each one ought to love God more than himself. Likewise another man is to be loved more than our body: because all these things are to be loved for God's sake, and another man can enjoy God with us, which the body cannot; because the body lives through the soul by which we enjoy God. But all are to be loved equally: yet since you cannot benefit all, you must especially consult for those who, according to opportunities of places and times or of any things

whatever, are joined more closely to you by a certain lot."[9] These words, which embrace the sum of Catholic doctrine, we shall explain by setting forth the order to be followed as regards the persons and goods to be loved.

[9] St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, lib. I, c. 27-28, P. L., XXXIV, 35-36.

Concerning the Order to Be Followed as Regards Persons to Be Loved.

That God is to be loved in the first place is clear from what has been said above, nn. 752-753; but the question concerns the order of dilection to be observed among men. Now the general principle is that each one is generally bound to love himself more than his neighbor, but other men more or less according as they are nearer to God and to himself.

[8] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 26; Suarez, disp. IX; Billuart, diss. IV; St. Alphonsus, n. 25-27; Bouquillon, n. 415-435; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 152-168.

806. (A) Concerning the order between love of self and of neighbor: Each one is ordinarily bound, other things being equal, to love himself more than his neighbor. - I say other things being equal, that is, in the same order of goods and in the same necessity, as will be clear from what is to be said.

For (a) the precept of fraternal charity is contained in these words:[1] "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"; and thus dilection of oneself is established as the rule of dilection toward neighbor; but this supposes love of self to be something more known and more powerful than love of neighbor: for the rule is prior and more powerful than the thing ruled. (b) Otherwise, psychologically man is inclined to love himself more than others: for he is nearer to himself than another is (above, n. 765); hence he loves God as the principle of every good, himself as a participant of the divine good, but the neighbor as a sharer of this participation. Hence the axiom was born: well-ordered charity begins from oneself.

[1] Matt. 22:39.

Yet we are also commanded to love the neighbor as Christ loved us, and therefore in certain cases we ought to prefer the spiritual good of the neighbor to our own temporal good. In order to understand this rightly, certain rules are handed down.

807. Practical rules. (a) As regards spiritual goods, it is not licit to sin, even lightly, in order to procure the temporal or spiritual good of the neighbor: for evils are not to be done that goods may come. - Nor is it licit to expose oneself to a proximate and certain danger of sinning in order to help the neighbor, unless the danger can morally be removed by prayer, serious effort of the will, or other spiritual remedies; for he who exposes himself to a danger of this kind already sins, from what has been said in the *Treatise on Penance*, n. 458. Yet it must be noted that those who by office are engaged in the temporal or eternal salvation of others, such as priests and physicians, are helped by special grace for resisting temptations occurring in the exercise of their office, provided that they themselves have recourse to God by frequent prayer: therefore these can, and often ought, approach occasions proximate of themselves, provided that by spiritual remedies they render the danger of sinning remote.

But someone can, and sometimes ought, to omit or at least defer useful spiritual goods, but not necessary ones, for the salvation or sanctification of the neighbor, for example, to defer meditation in

order to hear confessions; for then he is not truly deprived of a spiritual good, but, by laboring for the salvation of souls for God's sake, exercises charity and does not cease to pray; otherwise, after the confessions have been heard, he will be able to return to meditation.

Nor is it illicit to desire the delay of heavenly beatitude, in order to devote oneself longer to the salvation of souls; for thus many saints thought, who with the Apostle said: "I am straitened between two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ, a thing by far the better; but to abide still in the flesh is needful for you."[2] - Likewise we can desire greater spiritual goods for others than for ourselves, hoping that in the neighbor they will conduce to the greater glory of God: for this proceeds from charity toward God and from humility.

[2] Phil. 1:23-24. Thus St. Martin: "Lord, if I am necessary to Thy people, I do not refuse labor"; of St. Ignatius (Breviary, July 31, lect. 6) it is read: "He was heard once to say: if a choice were given, he would prefer to live uncertain of beatitude and meanwhile to serve God and the salvation of neighbors, than, certain of the same glory, to die at once."

808. (b) As regards temporal goods, regularly each one is bound to prefer his own temporal life to the life of another; for each one is commanded to preserve his own life, and therefore to care for it before he provides for others.

Yet not rarely it is licit to place the life of others before our own: on account of the public good, for example, if there is question of protecting the life of a man who is very useful to the Church or the State, or of a community or multitude in danger: for the public good is to be set before the private. - Likewise it is licit to expose one's own life in order to save the life of the neighbor, on account of the exercise of virtue, especially charity, because an act of heroic charity is of greater worth than temporal life; therefore it is laudable to serve those infected by plague, to leap into the sea to snatch another from the waves, even with danger to one's own life.

809. (B) Concerning the order to be observed among different neighbors. Other things being equal, we ought to love more those neighbors who are nearer to God or to ourselves.

(a) If there is question of love of complacency, we ought to love more those who are nearer to God, or holier; thus a holy man should be loved more than an impious parent; for love of complacency, which rests upon qualities already possessed, ought to be proportioned to the virtues of those whom we love.

(b) But if there is question of affective and effective love, or of benevolence and beneficence, those who are nearer to us are to be loved more; for here there is question of goods not yet possessed, and it is consonant with reason that we desire or confer them upon those whose necessities, on account of a special bond of piety or gratitude, we are bound to provide for more strictly.

810. But the nearness by which men are joined among themselves can be threefold: carnal, by which by reason of blood they are connected to one another, as parents and children, husband and wife, blood-relations, relatives by marriage; - civil, by which those who are members of the same society are joined among themselves, for example, fellow citizens, fellow soldiers, friends, associates, etc.; - spiritual, when by force of some spiritual office they are united among themselves, such as superiors and inferiors, pastors and their subjects, confessors and penitents. - Now, in any kind of conjunction, those are to be preferred who are nearer in the

same kind; thus, in those things which pertain to nature, blood-relations are to be preferred to strangers;[3] in civil matters we ought to love fellow citizens more than foreigners; in spiritual matters, those who are joined by a more intimate bond are to be loved more.

[3] Among blood-relations themselves a diverse order is assigned, according to diverse respects. Thus, outside the case of extreme necessity, or in ordinary necessities, the following are to be helped: wife, children, parents, brothers and sisters, other blood-relations according to the degree of blood-relationship. - In extreme necessity, parents of themselves are to be preferred to wife and children. (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 26, a. 9-11). But in practice, before the fact, there is scarcely room for deliberation, and, after the fact, the matter is to be judged from the dispositions of the subject.

Yet it must be noted that not rarely special and extraordinary circumstances intervene, which permit some inversion of order; thus, by reason of a special friendship otherwise legitimate, friends are loved more than blood-relations; likewise, among blood-relations, sometimes those who have conferred greater benefits are loved more, although less near. But those who feel thus are not to be made anxious, provided that they render due love to those nearer.

Concerning the Order to Be Observed as Regards Goods to Be Loved.

811. In ordering charity, attention must be paid not only to persons, but also to the goods which are to be procured for these persons. The first place is held by supernatural, or spiritual, goods, such as eternal beatitude and the means necessary for obtaining it, as grace and virtues; the second by natural goods, whether of the mind, as the faculties of the soul, or bodily, as life, health, etc.; the third by external goods, as honor, reputation, riches, etc. - How, in the different necessities which occur, the neighbor is to be helped as regards these different goods must now be established.

812. (A) Man is bound to love the supernatural good of the neighbor more than his own natural good; for the eternal beatitude of the soul far surpasses bodily life and external goods, and therefore ought to be set before them. This must be explained more fully: -

(a) When the neighbor is in extreme spiritual necessity, so that without another's aid he cannot morally escape eternal damnation, regularly anyone is bound to help him, even with danger of life. Thus commonly. For from what has been said we ought to love brothers as Christ loved us; but He loved us so that He laid down His soul for His brothers; therefore, according to the testimony of John, "we also ought to lay down our lives for the brethren."[4] For the loss of temporal life, compared with the loss of eternal beatitude, is a light evil.

[4] 1 John 3:16.

Sometimes, although rarely, cases of this kind occur; for example, an infant not yet baptized and about to die shortly; an adult who is certainly known to be in mortal sin and is about to die before he can morally elicit an act of contrition: for if he can easily elicit such an act, he can now help himself.

But, in order that this precept urge, it is necessary that there shine forth a very probable hope of helping him before he dies; - that graver spiritual damage not arise thence, for example, scandal, or impossibility of finding another priest to care for other sheep; - and that there be no other who can and will help him. - But let no one be delayed from this by the thought that he himself is in the state of sin: for by a heroic act of charity all sins are blotted out.

813. (b) If the neighbor is in grave spiritual necessity, that is, if without another's aid he can be saved only with great difficulty, one is not bound to help him with very grave temporal damage, unless he is obliged to this by reason of office or the public good.

For since the neighbor in this case absolutely can, if he wills, free himself from the danger of damnation without another's help, no one is strictly bound to expose himself to death or to very grave damage, when otherwise he has not undertaken special care of him; this would indeed be an exercise of heroic virtue, but by no means is it commanded.

Otherwise it must be said concerning those who by office, by force of their duty, have care of souls, such as pastors: for these, by accepting such an office, by force of a quasi-contract, have undertaken the obligation of ministering to subjects, even with danger of life, when these are in grave necessity: "The good shepherd gives his life for his sheep."[5] And indeed if soldiers, physicians, and various administrators undergo danger of death even for furnishing temporal aid to others, how much more ought the ministers of God to be prepared to give life for the sheep committed to them! - Hence, in time of plague or public calamity, it is not licit for a pastor to desert his flock, even if he substitutes another suitable priest.[6]

[5] John 10:11.

[6] Benedict XIV, *De Synodo*, lib. XIII, c. 19, n. 2; cf. *De Sacramentis in genere*, n. 105; *De Paenitentia* (moral part), n. 365-366.

Say the same in grave public necessity, for example, if some parish or community lacks a priest, or if errors against faith are spread in some place: for when such a public danger occurs, we are bound to undergo danger of life in order to protect the faith or morals of the people; for the spiritual public good must be preferred to temporal life; otherwise in the grave necessity of a community, it can scarcely happen that there is not extreme necessity with respect to some.

814. (c) In common spiritual necessity, from which namely anyone can free himself without another's aid and without great difficulty, no one is bound to help him with great damage; but only the principles handed down above concerning fraternal correction are to be applied.

815. (B) We are bound to love the neighbor as regards bodily goods more than ourselves as regards external goods; for the life or health of the body is to be valued more than money. - Yet, in order to save the life of the neighbor, we are not bound to use extraordinary means, or to make great expenses, as has already been explained, n. 792.

816. Corollary. All these things can be briefly condensed thus: (a) our own necessary spiritual good is to be preferred to every good of the neighbor; (b) the necessary spiritual good of the neighbor is to be set before our bodily good, even our own life; (c) regularly we ought to prefer our bodily good to the bodily good of the neighbor; (d) among different neighbors, we are bound, other things being equal, to prefer the good of the neighbor more closely joined to us.

§ II. Concerning Works of Charity, Especially Social Works.

817. Necessity of these works. Besides almsgiving, concerning which there has been treatment above, there are many other works of charity, which are usually comprehended in this verse:

[1] C. S. Loch, *Charity Organization*, London, 1890; A. G. Warner, *American Charities*, New York, 1895; Lefebure, *L'organisation de la charite privee en France*, Paris, 1900; id., *Paris charitable et prevoyant*, Paris, Plon, 1900; M. du Camp, *La Charite privee a Paris*, Hachette, 1886; id., *Paris bienfaisant*, ibid., 1888; E. Rostand, *L'Action sociale par l'initiative privee*, Paris, 3 vols., 1892, 1897, 1902; V. Brants, *Les grandes lignes de l'Economie polit.*, 4th ed. 1904, Louvain and Paris, t. II, p. 266-317; Millot, *Que faut-il faire pour le peuple?* Paris, Lecoffre, 1901.

I visit, I give drink, I feed, I redeem, I clothe, I gather, I bury.

Seven are counted: to visit the sick, to give drink to the thirsty and food to the hungry, to redeem captives, to clothe the naked, to receive strangers in hospitality, to bury the dead. And these indeed are laudable. But today, on account of the social dissensions which exist between masters and workers, and on account of the miserable condition of many workers, certain social works of charity are opportune, indeed necessary, by which dissensions between the rich and proletarians may more easily be composed, and the condition of workers made better.

Leo XIII wrote excellently concerning this matter; after describing the duties of justice which oblige masters and workers alike,[2] he also sets forth the duties of charity which masters ought to exercise toward workers, and the rich toward the poor. (a) He proposes these things after the manner of a general principle: "Whoever has received a greater abundance of goods by the gift of God, whether they are of the body and external, or of the soul, has received them for this cause, that he may employ them for the perfection of himself and likewise, as a minister of divine providence, for the advantages of others." (b) Afterward he treats especially of the miserable condition of workers, which we are bound to render better: "Concerning proletarians in particular she wills and contends that they emerge from a most miserable state and obtain a better fortune." This indeed the Church furnishes first by restraining "the twin plagues of life, which too often make man miserable in the very abundance of wealth, excessive appetite for things and thirst for pleasures." The Pontiff continues: "But besides, that proletarians may fare well, she rightly provides by instituting and fostering those things which she understands to be conducive to relieving their want." - What institutions today are more conducive to this relief of proletarians we shall explain in the following things.

[2] Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, May 16, 1891; cf. *Graves de Communi*, Jan. 18, 1901; Letter *Notre charge apostolique* (Pius X, Aug. 25, 1910).

818. General principles concerning these works. But first it is helpful to set forth certain general principles concerning these works: (a) It is much more expedient to prevent want than to cure it. Wherefore well-ordered charity ought to tend to this, that it render the poor capable of sustaining themselves and their own, namely by a manly, Christian, and professional education, by providing means and opportunities of labor rather than alms; for thus not only is want more efficaciously prevented, but also love of labor and consciousness of personal dignity are promoted. Likewise one must beware lest, while help is given to orphans, workers are harmed by accepting the lowest wage for labor.[3]

[3] To the point Count d'Haussonville, *Salaires et miseres de femmes*, Paris, 1900, p. 42-43: "If the ten or twelve congregations which hold, in Paris, all the orphanages, workrooms, patronages, agreed among themselves... and if, instead of disputing among themselves, as they too often do, for orders by means of discounts, they settled by common agreement, for all articles, prices below which they would not work, as, on the other hand, they work under conditions of regularity, care, and cleanliness which are very much appreciated, the large stores would end by passing through where they wished, provided however that their demands were reasonable. A union of congregations could therefore render great services by raising the prices of female labor."

(b) It must be altogether cared for that the truly needy be helped, yet without a reward being given to the lazy and vagabonds,[4] who do not wish to work. Wherefore, before alms are bestowed, inquiry must be made concerning the true state of beggars, and, since it is very difficult for any private person to inquire seriously concerning individuals, societies are to be promoted everywhere whose special office is to investigate these things especially; but those societies ought to be joined together by a certain federation, so that beggars who falsely call themselves needy may more easily be detected and denounced.[5]

[4] Concerning beggars and vagabonds, and the means instituted in various regions for correcting or punishing them, L. Riviere wrote wisely, *Mendiants et Vagabonds*, Paris, Lecoffre, 1902.

[5] In many regions societies of this kind have already been instituted; for Great Britain, see C. S. Loch, *Charity Organization*, London, 1890; for America, A. G. Warner, *American Charities*, New York, 1895; for France, Lefebure, *L'organisation de la charite privee en France*, Paris, 1900.

819. (c) True charity provides not only for the temporal necessities of the poor, but also induces them to the practice of virtues. Therefore generally private beneficence profits more than public, because, while the latter thinks in an official manner only of bodily relief, the former, by fraternal visitation and care of the poor, promotes their moral and religious education.

To the point Leo XIII (loc. cit.): "Today indeed many, as once the heathen did in the same way, pass over to accusing the Church even of this so excellent charity: in place of which it has seemed good to substitute beneficence constituted by public laws. But no human arts will be found which can supply for Christian charity, extending itself wholly to the advantages of others. To the Church alone belongs that virtue, because unless it is drawn from the most sacred Heart of Jesus Christ, it is nowhere; but whoever departs from the Church wanders far from Christ."

Now among social works, these especially are to be commended: 1. those which promote good education; 2. associations among the workers themselves, for protecting their rights; 3. associations of the rich, for helping workers or the poor, whether corporally or spiritually.

I. Concerning Pious Works Pertaining to Education.

820. It must always be kept before the mind that the best education is that which is provided at home by the parents themselves, when they are honorable and Christian. But it not rarely happens that there are many young persons of both sexes who in fact are not rightly instructed by their parents; for often husband and wife must labor outside the home, in order to sustain themselves and their own, and they cannot care for the education of the children; sometimes resources are lacking for feeding them; sometimes also the parents, addicted to vices, abandon their offspring or educate them depravedly.[6] - Everyone knows that many orphanages were instituted in ancient and more recent times in order to help these little ones.[7]

[6] G. Bonjean, *Enfants revoltes et parents coupables*, Paris, Colin, 1895; H. Joly, *L'Enfance coupable*, Paris, Lecoffre, 1904.

[7] Concerning various institutions of this kind, in diverse nations and centuries, L. Lallemand wrote learnedly, *Histoire des enfants abandonnes et delaisses*, Paris, Picard, 1885.

But these by no means suffice: it is necessary that a Christian education be furnished to those who are kept at home or frequent neutral schools: this happens in pious works which are called

patronages.[8] But when young persons are growing older and soon are to be numbered among workers, it is necessary that they receive a special education, by which they may be able to protect themselves against the errors of socialists, agnostics, or materialists: this can be handed down in those associations which are called study circles (*cercles d'etudes, debating clubs*) or popular institutes.[9] There also they are gradually prepared for forming professional unions.

[8] Max Turmann, *Au sortir de l'ecole, les Patronages*, 3rd ed., Paris, Lecoffre, 1901; Gatouillat, *Patronages de jeunes gens*, Troyes, 1899; Schaffer, *Comment diriger nos patronages de jeunes filles*, Paris, Lecoffre, 1905.

[9] Max Turmann, *L'Education populaire*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1904, p. 57-80, 335, etc. - Max Turmann, op. cit., p. 297.

To these institutions, which directly regard moral education, others can be joined which indirectly promote the same, by directly procuring physical education. Thus, since in great cities, during summer time, not a few youths are prone to contract diseases from the unhealthiness of the air, societies have been formed (*Oeuvres des saines vacances*) by whose aid not a few of them can breathe purer air in the country, and at the same time receive moral and religious education. May all these works, with devoted pupils of seminaries and priests, and also pious laymen favoring and promoting them, be multiplied everywhere!

But, in order that the intended end may be obtained, and a new generation of workers be established, who by only legitimate means may wisely and strenuously vindicate their own rights, the education handed down in these various institutions ought to be Christian, manly, professional.[10]

[10] That education of this kind is handed down in certain orphanages G. Bonjean explains, *La Protection de l'Enfance abandonnee ou coupable*, apud *La Nouvelle Revue*, Feb. 1, 1896; cf. P. Delay, *Les Oeuvres de preservation et de rehabilitation*, apud *Correspondant*, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 723, Dec. 10, 1903, p. 936.

821. (A) Christian, that is, tending to this, that in young persons it opportunely cultivate religious and moral sense, true and solid piety, and also the natural and supernatural virtues which are necessary for living as Christians and attaining the supernatural end. Therefore let no one be forced, but by examples and persuasion let each be sweetly induced to embrace and cultivate religion. Because today errors are spread everywhere, let the principal dogmas of our faith be not only rightly set forth, but also strengthened by solid arguments, such as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the divine mission of Christ, the authority of the Church, etc. Let adolescents be taught how, according to their capacity, they may answer the common difficulties of unbelievers, and, in more arduous ones, have recourse to the learned. Among them let certain ones be chosen, endowed with sharper intellect and nobler disposition, who may form a special society imbued with apostolic spirit, and may allure other young people by words and examples to piety and to the practice of virtues: these will be, as it were, so many apostles, who will very greatly help priests in propagating the faith.

822. (B) Manly, that is, tending to this, that it furnish fortitude of soul and unconquered strength of will; and therefore little by little transform boys into men, who are able to suffice for themselves. For workers are exposed to various enticements, whether internally from passions, or externally from vain fear of men and diverse occasions by which they are allured to evil; therefore it is of the greatest importance that they firmly believe, and manifest their faith externally by works, without boasting and without shame; likewise that, strengthened in virtue, they contemn the enticements of pleasures and strenuously resist depraved

companions. Wherefore let them gradually be taught how, with the grace of God helping, they can act manfully, by fleeing useless occasions of sin, but by fighting bravely in necessary ones.[11] Let it be explained to the same how great is the efficacy of association for overcoming difficulties and multiplying the strength of each individual; and how necessary it is that the upright be united together, that they may crush the boldness of the evil: for thus, amid very grave temptations, they will remain stable in faith and virtue.

[11] "Obliged doubtless to preserve the child from certain dangers superior to his age or to his powers, education nevertheless does not have preservation for its end: this would be the substitution of the master's effort for the child's effort. On the contrary it aims to form energies which can suffice for themselves and guard themselves: the weak must be helped, but one must arrive at rendering them robust enough to do without helps... One word sums up all: our moral education wishes to make men." (Ackermann, apud *Congres internat. du Patronage de la Jeunesse ouvriere*, 1900, Paris, 1901.) Cf. Guibert, *Le Caractere*, Paris, 1905.

823. (C) Professional, insofar as it forms workers skilled in their own art;[1] for the more skilled and at the same time the more honorable they are, the more they will be esteemed both by companions and by masters; wherefore in opportune time they will obtain a greater wage and nobler offices. But in our days it is altogether expedient that the principal principles of social science be handed down to them, so that they may more easily be able to refute the sophisms of socialists and have very much authority in assemblies of workers; for thus moderately and wisely, by opportune and just means, they will be able to protect their own rights and those of their companions; thus also the way will be prepared for concord between masters and workers.

[1] "Yes, it is necessary to develop professional formation and to prepare the young man for social cooperation. Industrial evolution obliges to the one, social evolution imposes the other: these are two new elements which it is urgent to introduce into the education of the child of the people. Therefore his instruction will be completed, therefore his intelligence and his technical skill will be developed. Then he will be accustomed to foresight, to economy, to the sentiment of solidarity by initiating him into all sorts of institutions of foresight and mutual help."

But to girls let there be given an education not only speculative in letters and arts, but practical, so that they may learn how they can attend to domestic affairs and fulfill the duties proper to themselves.

II. Concerning Associations to Be Fostered among the Workers Themselves.

824. Today, by force of the ineluctable competition which flourishes everywhere, workers who are not united in various associations cannot vindicate their rights, but are soon handed over, alone and defenseless, to the unbridled cupidity of competitors, as Leo XIII says, loc. cit. Therefore it is necessary that, with forces associated, they protect their rights and gradually render their condition better by legitimate means. To this various associations will greatly serve:

1. Workers' associations, or unions (*syndicats professionnels, labor-unions*), concerning which there has been treatment in the *Treatise on Justice*, n. 833-843. But in order that these associations may be truly useful, it is necessary that, the prejudices and passions of political parties having been set aside, they intend only, and pursue by just means, the physical, intellectual, and moral

good of workers. Therefore upright and Catholic men should not be kept away from these under the vain pretext that by these associations dissensions between masters and workers are fostered. For if only non-Catholics enter these societies, the errors of socialists will easily be spread in them, and thence many dissensions and contests will arise. Therefore let associations or unions of good workers be promoted; let the best Catholics join themselves to these, strengthened in faith, endowed with sincere piety, and skilled in their art, so that by words and examples they may be able to instruct their companions and lead them to the practice of virtues: for just as a little leaven raises the whole mass, so a little flock of Catholics will little by little convert the whole multitude of workers to better things. For if they join perfect honesty and kindness to sincere piety, and at the same time show themselves industrious and modest, they will reconcile to themselves the confidence and benevolence of many, and reverence and honor to the Catholic religion.[2]

[2] To the social and Christian instruction of young workers the societies called *Le Sillon*, or *l'Association de la Jeunesse francaise*, contribute much; and it is much to be desired indeed that these and other associations of this kind, although distinct and autonomous among themselves, be joined by a friendly league and agree concerning common action. Cf. M. Turmann, *Education populaire*, p. 216-256.

825. But in order to avoid or compose dissensions which not rarely arise between masters and workers, it is indeed very expedient to institute and promote councils of conciliation and arbitration. These consist of an equal number of masters and workers, who meet on fixed days in order to solve difficulties which often arise concerning matters pertaining to industry, for example, concerning the amount of wages, the duration of labor, the rules to be followed in the workshop: by a sincere exposition of facts and reasons, made on both sides, many prejudices are dismissed, and the way is prepared for concord and social peace.[3]

[3] Concerning this more fully in the *Treatise on Justice*, n. 849-850, where many authors are cited.

826. 2. Mutual associations (*mutuelles*) are also very useful, by which workers can furnish help and aid to one another, and increase thrift.[4] For since workers receive a modest wage, and are liable to many losses from unexpected events or illnesses, or from cessation from labor, they will indeed profit much if by living soberly, chastely, and frugally, at the time when things are succeeding rather prosperously, they set aside some money and deposit it with those societies called mutual, which have been instituted in various regions. Certain ones have been created in schools, so that already from childhood young persons may be able to pursue thrift, and, vain prodigality having been contemned, may become accustomed to providing something for future necessities;[5] it is altogether expedient to institute these in Catholic schools.

[4] F. Lepine, *La Mutualite, ses principes, ses bases veritables*, Paris, Colin, 1903; L. Mabilleau, *La Prevoyance sociale en Italie*; E. Dede, *Les Societes de secours mutuels*, Paris, Bonne Presse, 1904.

[5] Lepine, op. cit., p. 53-67; M. Turmann, *Educ. populaire*, p. 50-56.

827. 3. To these can be joined cooperative societies, whether for buying merchandise at a lower price, and therefore for diminishing the expenses of members, or also for making certain things, and consequently for increasing the advantages of workers.[6] The former are

easily instituted and managed; but in small towns it is usually expedient to create societies which do not directly buy merchandise in order to sell it to cooperators at a lower price, but enter into an agreement with merchants so that these consent to cede some determined part of their profit to cooperators; otherwise, the hatred and envy of merchants is excited, who, from the founding of a cooperative society, not rarely lose the greatest part of their profit. - It is much more difficult successfully and prosperously to manage societies which are called productive; for to this two things are desired: not a small capital, not only for acquiring instruments, but also for paying the multiple expenses which must necessarily be incurred for several months before any profit is received; and a skilled administrator, who can manage the matter wisely and possesses sufficient authority for commanding the other workers; and these indeed can scarcely be found.[7]

[6] Ch. Gide, *La Cooperation*, Paris, 1900; id., *L'Economie Sociale a l'Exposition de 1900*, Paris, 1902, p. 273-294; id., *Les societes cooperatives de consommation*, Paris, 1904; Clavel and Soria, *Guide pour l'organisation et l'administration des societes cooperatives de consommation*, 4th ed. Paris, 1901; Hubert-Valleroux, *La Cooperation*, Paris, 1904; *Congres des Associat. ouvrieres de production*, Paris, 1900; *Comptes-rendus du Congres de l'Alliance cooperative internationale*, Paris, 1902; Bertrand, *Histoire de la Cooperation en Belgique*, Brussels; Beatrice Potter, *The Cooperative Movement in Great Britain*, London, 1888.

[7] Yet bakery societies, or those instituted for making bread, progress better, both because the baker's art is fairly easy, and because in well-organized bakeries (*boulangeries*) the price of bread is much diminished, as can be seen apud Gide, *Coop. de consommation*, p. 84. - Socialists successfully manage not a few productive societies; among these that one stands out which is called *Vooruit*, concerning which read *Le Vooruit, la cooperation et l'organisation socialiste en Belgique*, apud *Musee social*, Dec. 20, 1897; - concerning societies of the same kind in France, cf. *Une Enquete sur les boulangeries cooperatives rurales*, apud *Musee social*, Dec. 1899. - How necessary it is for Catholics to institute cooperative societies is clear from the fact that socialists use these to spread their errors; for M. Lauzel says, *Manuel du Cooperateur socialiste*, Paris, 1900, p. 17: "In the hands of socialists, cooperation is only a means of socialist action, a powerful lever, capable of moving the capitalist world upon its bases of individual property and social injustice. We do not wish to be cooperators for the satisfaction of diminishing a little the infinite misery of the proletariat: We wish to be cooperators in order to cooperate more efficaciously in the social revolution."

Whatever the case may be, if a priest has been the promoter of these societies, let him consent to lie hidden in obscurity, and let him commit the matter to be managed to upright and prudent laymen, who at the opportune time will render an account of the whole matter to the members.[8] Likewise one must beware lest societies of this kind seem to bring any profit to the priests themselves; for if workers were to suspect this, they would soon be turned away from those societies.

[8] "I call the attention of the pastor-founder very particularly to this important point. Do you wish to have men in your church? Do you wish to form a numerous, lasting, and honorable meeting? Let them administer themselves. Give them a home of their own: they must not be at your place, but at theirs... The changes which have occurred for a century in French society have only made more imperious this need of autonomy, of self-government, as the English say." (L. de la P., *Les Associations d'hommes*, Marseille, 1903, p. 759.)

828. 4. To these can be numbered those banks first invented by Raiffeisen (*caisses Raiffeisen*), and also called mutual credit societies (*pret mutuel*), because they hand over money as a loan with the least increase.[9] They consist of farmers of the same parish, who possess certain immovable goods; these form a certain civil society, constituted according to the laws of each region; directors are elected, who fulfill their office gratuitously; only the treasurer (*tresorier*) receives some recompense, though a minimal one. Now poor farmers can

borrow money from the society, with the directors approving, if they promise to repay the capital with a modest increase; each year accounts are rendered to the presidents of the society; and if any profit remains, it is not distributed to creditors, but either is guarded or is spent upon a work of public utility, for example, for acquiring those recently invented machines by which the work of sowing and harvesting is carried out much more promptly and easily. - To these societies can be attached insurances against fire, hail, pestilence of animals, etc.[10]

[9] A. Kannengieser, *Catholiques allemands*, Paris, 1892, p. 138-148; Max Turmann, *Associations agricoles*, p. 322-374; G. Malherbe, *Le Raiffeisenisme*, Brussels, 1902; C. Ract, *Les Caisses de Famille*, Paris, 1896.

[10] Max Turmann, op. cit., p. 375-498; de Rocquigny, *Les petites Institutions mutuelles de prevoyance contre la mortalite des animaux*, apud *Musee social*, June 1898.

829. 5. But, that a truly Catholic spirit may pervade these societies, it is necessary that Christian workers among themselves, with priests as leaders, form associations for fulfilling religious duties more perfectly and for living a more intense Christian life. It would profit little to render the temporal lot of workers better, unless at the same time their moral and religious condition becomes more perfect. In vain indeed will the wages paid to workers be doubled, in vain will the price of those things necessary for food or clothing be diminished, or the hours consumed in labor be shorter, unless at the same time proletarians are well-mannered, sober, chaste, honorable, and religious. For if they waste wages and time in feasts, drinking, games of chance, and other things of this kind, their condition will become more miserable than before.[11] Therefore it is necessary that societies be entered into for solidly instructing the ignorant, for strenuously strengthening the weak, and for confirming those unstable in faith; for converting those who have been alienated from true religion, and gradually alluring all who already believe to a more perfect practice of virtues and religion; and also for extirpating vices, especially drunkenness and alcoholism (n. 541-555).

[11] Leo XIII explains this splendidly in the Encyclical *Graves de Communi*: "Suppose indeed that wages are doubled for those hiring out their work; suppose also that the price of food is low: yet if the wage-earner hears those doctrines, as he is accustomed, and uses those examples, which allure to casting off reverence for the Divinity and to corrupting morals, his labors and his substance must also fall apart. By trial and use it is evident that many workers live narrowly and miserably who, although they have work for a shorter time and more abundant wages, nevertheless live with corrupted morals and no discipline of religion. Remove from souls the sentiments which Christian wisdom inserts and cultivates; remove providence, modesty, thrift, patience, and the other right habits of nature: you will pursue prosperity in vain, even if you strive much. This plainly is the cause why we have never exhorted Catholic men to enter associations for preparing better things for the people, and similarly to introduce other institutions, without likewise warning that these things should proceed under the auspice of religion, and with it as helper and companion."

In this matter it is necessary today that priests assume as cooperators certain upright and pious laymen who burn with zeal for souls. For everywhere socialists, positivists, and rationalists daily strive with all their powers to spread their errors among the common people; and unless Catholic priests and laymen unite counsels, powers, and efforts, and provoke themselves by fraternal emulation to furnishing better things, it will be impossible successfully to resist the associated powers of adversaries, and to lead those wandering from the way of truth back to the right path.

But what sodalities are to be instituted, by what method, and by what rules they are to be governed, depends on various circumstances: a prudent priest, using the method of observation, will diligently survey and inspect those which have already flourished for some time in the same region, so that, taught by the experience of others, he may avoid rocks and proceed more safely: for rules must be adapted to the mind and traditions of places and persons.

III. Concerning Associations of the Rich for Helping Workers.

830. Since, in many cases, workers can scarcely sustain and educate themselves and their own by their own strength, especially when the offspring is numerous, or when the father of the family, on account of illness or another cause, cannot work, it is equitable that the master relieve his own workers from his superfluous goods; for, as Cardinal Zigliara said,[1] "the work of the worker yields to the advantage of the master; therefore whenever the latter is driven by the precept of charity in individual cases to exercising the offices of charity, he is also bound to observe the order of charity. This order indeed makes workers carrying out long labor for his utility nearer to the master than other poor persons doing nothing for him. Wherefore a master able to exercise the offices of charity ought to prefer his own workers."

[1] Epistle to the Archbishop of Mechlin, for explaining the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, 1891.

But because it is better to prevent want than to give alms, charity demands that societies be instituted among the wealthier for providing aid to proletarians more wisely and efficaciously. Now, among those which have already been founded in various regions, the following stand out: -

831. 1. Societies for building healthy houses,[2] which can be rented or sold to workers at a lower price. This indeed is of the greatest importance: for when workers inhabit a decent home, they not only remain in good health, but also think less of entering taverns, and live a domestic life, which greatly favors good morals and social order. Hence among various nations, laws have been enacted by which advantages not to be despised are conferred upon these societies, especially immunity from certain taxes.[3] But, in order that houses of this kind may remain healthy, it is very expedient that the wives and daughters of workers learn in schools[4] the practical art of caring for domestic affairs cleanly and in order.

[2] Rostand, *L'action sociale par l'initiative privee*, t. I, p. 147; II, p. 313; Siegfried, *Les Habitations a bon marche*; Gans and Weber, *L'Ouvrier stable et l'Habitation ouvriere*, Paris, 1897; H. Barrau, *Le Congres internat. des Habitations a bon marche*, apud *Musee social*, July 1900; C. Wright and Gould, *The Housing of the Working People*, 1895; J. Perez Canto, *El Obrero propietario*, Santiago de Chile, 1903; *Reforme sociale*, March 1, 1904, p. 382-395.

[3] For France, see P. Pic, op. cit., n. 1368, where the laws of Nov. 30, 1894 and March 31, 1896 are set forth; for other regions, *Ann. de legislation etrangere*, 1898, p. 546; 1900, p. 26, etc.

[4] Schools of this kind have been instituted in certain cities, which are called *ecoles menageres*; concerning which see Van Gehuchten, *Guide de la jeune menagere*, Lierre (Belgium), 1894; F. de Diesbach, *L'enseignement menager*, Paris, 1903; Max Turmann, *Initiatives feminines*, Paris, 1905, p. 87-149.

832. 2. To these can be joined societies which rent gardens to workers gratuitously or sell them at a modest price;[5] for they can cultivate these by their own hands, and receive fruits from them by which they are helped not a little in domestic affairs. Besides, experience

has found that the cultivation of gardens makes relations better between the rich, who rent them gratuitously or for a modest price, and the workers who enjoy the same, - that drunkenness is diminished, - thrift increased, - and the vanity of socialism made apparent, insofar as cultivators of gardens better perceive the utility of private ownership.

[5] L. Riviere describes the origin, utility, and practical organization of these societies, *La Terre et l'Atelier, Jardins ouvriers*, Paris, 1904. Cf. D. Lancry, *Une visite aux Jardins ouvriers de Sedan*, apud *Democratie chretienne*, Oct. 1897; Lemire, who wrote various things on this matter in the periodical *Le Coin de terre et le Foyer*.

833. 3. To these can be added various associations of insurance against accidents, old age, or involuntary cessation from labor. For since the workers themselves often cannot pay the whole sum of money for protecting themselves against diverse dangers, it is indeed expedient that they be helped by the wealthier in this matter: this can be done so that when the former provide such a sum of money, benefactors bestow another equal or even twice greater.[6] - In certain regions, as in Germany, insurance is prescribed by civil law, and a fund is constituted from which pensions can be paid to all workers who labor under illness or old age: to this fund the workers themselves, masters, and the State contribute a determined sum of money. This system indeed has been attacked by many as invading too much the rights of private persons; nevertheless in reality it has had rather happy effects;[7] whence, in other regions, laws more or less similar to the law which prevailed in Germany are being prepared. Catholics can favor these, watching however that excessive power not be granted to the State, but that their rights be preserved for private societies and individuals.

[6] L. Lefebure, *Le Devoir social*, Paris, 1890, p. 217-247; 292-297.

[7] P. Pic, n. 1388-1391, 1394. - Ibid., n. 1392-1393, what has been established in other regions is set forth; and n. 1396-1397, what has been proposed in France on this matter. Cf. Salaun, *Les retraites ouvrieres en Belgique*, apud *Musee social*, June 1901, July 1902; Ghio, *Les retraites ouvrieres en Italie*, *Musee social*, Dec. 1902; Lemire, *Discours sur les Caisses de retraites ouvrieres*; *Les Questions actuelles*, t. LIX, 1901, pp. 354, 386, 418; t. LX, 1901, p. 2, 72, 107, 112, 130; t. LXVII, 1903, p. 56-63; t. LXXVII, 1905, p. 212, 240.

A remedy cannot be brought so easily to involuntary cessation from labor (*chomage force*). Yet this brings with it many evils; for it hands over a strong worker to idleness, and to all the vices which follow from it, deprives him of the means of sustaining himself and his own honorably, and not rarely makes the same a beggar, vagabond, and drunkard.[8] This miserable condition is indeed sometimes alleviated by private charity, especially when not only alms are given, but also labor to be furnished is offered; or also by workers' associations, which provide to their members a modest sum of money until they are hired;[9] or by those private or public institutions by whose aid workers can more easily be hired (*bureaux de placement*),[10] without being forced for this reason to undergo useless expenses; and indeed it is very much to be desired that institutions of this kind be multiplied among Catholics. But since, notwithstanding all these means, not a few are forced to be idle from work, in certain regions a new form of insurance has been created, by force of which the fund is increased which workers' associations divide among members hired by no one. Likewise in certain cities subsidies have been granted to these associations; this indeed can be expedient at a time when a special crisis

flourishes; but outside this case it is indeed better so to order the production of things that the number of those who involuntarily cease from work is diminished.

[8] Varlez, *Les Formes nouvelles de l'assurance contre le chomage*, Paris, 1903, vividly describes these evils, p. 13-15; and also the remedies, p. 23-265; cf. Rostand, t. II, p. 817-897; t. III, p. 609-629; Gide, *Econ. sociale*, p. 235-244; Crafts, *Practical Christian Sociology*, New York, 1896, p. 138-146.

[9] Thus in the periodical *Bulletin de l'Office du Travail*, June 1903, p. 485-488, it is set forth what the Federation of Typographers furnished in this matter; cf. M. Lecoq, *L'Assistance par le Travail en France*, Paris, 1900.

[10] Le Bailly, *Bureaux Municipaux de Placement gratuit*, Paris, 1890.

834. 4. Among workers, women, whether married or unmarried, merit special benevolence. For, on the one hand, other things being equal, they earn less wages than men, so that often they either waste away from hunger or hand themselves over to vice, unless they are helped at an opportune time;[11] and, on the other hand, a few weeks before or after childbirth, they ought to cease from labor, if they wish to provide for their own health and that of their offspring. And indeed it is to be desired that mothers can remain at home, for nursing and educating their offspring.[12] - There are certain kinds of labors for which, on account of the weakness of the sex, they are unfit: thus they cannot stand for long hours without undergoing danger of contracting certain illnesses.[13] - Otherwise, in workshops, women are liable to many temptations, and, unless they are helped, easily fall into vice. Therefore it is necessary that special associations be fostered for bringing remedy to these evils.

[11] Concerning this miserable condition of women, among others, these have discussed: J. Simon, *L'Ouvriere*, Paris, 1861; Ch. Benoist, *Les ouvrieres de l'aiguille a Paris*, Paris, 1895; d'Haussonville, *Miseres et salaires de femmes*, Paris, 1900; Bonnevay, *Les ouvrieres lyonnaises*; Abbe du Lac, *Le fil et l'aiguille*, Paris, Lecoffre, 1903; M. Turmann, *Initiatives feminines*, p. 151-250; H. Wadlin, *Women in Industry*, Boston, 1890; Mary A. C. Reilly, *Women Wage Earners*; Helen Campbell, *Prisoners of Poverty*.

[12] Fauquet, *La protection legale des femmes avant et apres l'accouchement*, Paris, Alcan, 1903; M. Turmann, op. cit., p. 157-165.

[13] M. Turmann, op. cit., p. 167-193.

In reality, in various regions, societies of wealthier women have been founded for bringing remedy to these evils. First, unions have been instituted in which rich and poor meet together, so that the former may provide the latter with labor, decent habitation, or other helps.[14] There are other unions in which women workers alone meet, for protecting their rights; but to these are often attached societies called mutual, to which wealthier women contribute money and time.[15] - Besides, in order to protect women workers, honorable women have created a league among buyers (*ligues d'acheteurs, consumers' league*), who promise that they wish to buy nothing except from merchants treating women workers well; thence the condition of women in many workshops has been made not a little better.[16] - To relieve mothers, before or after childbirth, maternal and infant societies have likewise been created, by which care is taken for the health of the mother about to give birth and of infants.[17] Moreover, in order to educate as Christians the children whom the wives of workers are forced to leave at home in order to procure food for themselves and their own, pious women do not disdain to teach catechism.[18]

[14] Abbe du Lac, *Le fil et l'aiguille*; M. Turmann, op. cit., p. 209-222.

[15] Mlle Rochebillard, *Synd. d'ouvrieres lyonnaises*, Paris, Lecoffre; M. Turmann, op. cit., p. 194-208.

[16] M. Turmann, op. cit., p. 281-324.

[17] M. Turmann, p. 339-335.

[18] M. Turmann, op. cit., p. 256-258: "In the diocese of Paris, nearly three thousand ladies thus contribute to making known the principles of religion to more than thirty-two thousand children." - Concerning another means of alluring the poor to a better life, which in English is called settlement, and in French *residence sociale, colonie sociale*, see M. Turmann, p. 325-337.

In one word, Christian charity wisely and lovingly accommodates itself to the various necessities of the poor and of workers. But because there are still many women who uselessly spend time in trifles or pleasures, the duty is incumbent upon priests of exhorting Christian girls and wives opportunely and prudently, that they spend not only part of their superfluous goods, but also part of their superfluous time in works of charity: for thus, avoiding the dangers of idleness and luxury, they will show themselves pleasing to God and useful to the neighbor, and in the exercise of charity will experience greater happiness than in earthly pleasures.

835. 5. Even when all these means and others of this kind have been wisely employed, there are certain poor persons who, broken in strength or worn out by old age or illness, cannot suffice for themselves. Therefore various institutions have deservedly been created for helping their necessities. Among these stand out those called Conferences of St. Vincent de Paul, which F. Ozanam happily instituted and propagated;[19] for the members frequently visit the poor, the sick, the aged, and provide them not only temporal food and other things necessary for sustaining life, but also the bread of the divine word and of human consolation. Thus indeed they have profited greatly in soothing the sorrows of many; yet it is very much to be desired that, in our days, they devote themselves more and more to social works, and furnish to strong workers the means by which they may be able honorably to earn daily bread.[20]

[19] C. A. Ozanam, *Vie de Fred. Ozanam*, 2nd ed., Paris, Poussielgue, 1882, ch. 4-5, where the beginnings and evolution of these Conferences are described; J. Schatt, *Adolphe Baudon*, Paris, 1897.

[20] In the letter *Notre charge apostolique*, His Holiness Pius X exhorts bishops to choose priests learned in social matters who are to be placed over works of Catholic action.

§ III. Concerning Sins Opposed to Fraternal Charity.

Many sins opposed to charity are enumerated: hatred, which is directly opposed to internal love (above, n. 782); envy, which is opposed to complacency in the goods of the neighbor (above, n. 522); discord, which is repugnant to the union of minds and wills; scandal, which is opposed to spiritual beneficence: of these last two it remains to speak.[2]

[1] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 31-43; Suarez, disp. VI; Billuart, diss. VII; St. Alphonsus, n. 43-80; Bouquillon, n. 506-576; Ballerini-Palmieri, vol. I, n. 240-302; Noldin, n. 99-129; M. d'Hulst, *Careme* 1896, 2nd Conference.

[2] Some also enumerate here duel, war, and sedition, of which we treat in *De Justitia*, n. 334-363; and also cooperation in the sins of the neighbor, of which we treated above, n. 183-188.

I. Concerning Discord and Contention.

836. 1. Notion. (a) Discord is the dissent of wills concerning a good in which, by charity, we are bound to agree. Therefore two things are required for discord: a dissent of wills, and not of the intellect alone; and a dissent concerning a necessary good, or one about which we are bound to agree. For if it concerns free opinions, and does not exceed the limits of moderation, it is not a sin.[3] For the most part it arises from pride, by which we love our own judgment and our own will more than is just.

[3] Such was, very probably, the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas (Acts 15:35-40).

(b) From discord contention often arises, that is, an inordinate battle of words, or altercation, by which truth is attacked, or is defended with excessive acrimony. This, moreover, is frequently increased from vain glory, by which each of those contending strives to gain victory over the other. Sometimes also it arises from immoderate nationalism, by force of which certain persons, fostering love of their own nation more than is just, despise and pursue with hatred peoples of another stock, after the manner of pagans; for thus contentions are sown between foreigners and citizens, indeed even among citizens themselves who differ in stock.

Sometimes contentions are had in a religious matter, and schism arises, by which certain Catholics of their own accord withdraw from the unity of the Church. But since the unity of the Church consists in two things, namely, in the connection of members with one another, and again in the order of all members to one head, namely Christ and His vicar on earth, those are called schismatics who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff, or to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him.[4]

[4] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 39, a. 1.

837. 2. Malice. Discord and contention, in those things in which we are bound to agree, are mortal sins from their genus; moreover schism is a most grave sin not only against charity, but also against the obedience due to the Church.

(A) Scripture often reproves discord as altogether contrary to the Christian spirit, and gravely sinful. For Paul, hearing that there were contentions among the Corinthians, beseeches them to put these away, and to live in concord and peace: "Now I beseech you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you; but that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment."[5] Those who indulge in discords are still carnal:[6] "For whereas there is among you envying and contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to man?" For God hates dissensions:[7] "For God is not of dissension, but of peace." Elsewhere he enumerates contentions and quarrels among lethal sins.[8] Wherefore he exhorts Timothy to avoid contentions, as useless and harmful:[9] "Do not contend in words: for it is useful for nothing, except for the subversion of the hearers."

[5] 1 Cor. 1:10.

[6] 1 Cor. 3:3.

[7] 1 Cor. 14:33.

[8] Gal. 5:20.

[9] 2 Tim. 2:14.

838. (B) Tradition frequently inculcates the same. Among the Fathers, let Cyprian be heard, who before the rest commends concord, and strictly reproves discords or schisms:[10] "For God commands that men be peaceful and concordant and unanimous in His house, and as He made us by the second birth, so He wills those reborn to persevere; that we who have begun to be sons of God may remain in the peace of God, and that those to whom there is one spirit may also have one mind and sense. Thus God does not receive the sacrifice of one dissenting, and commands the one returning from the altar first to be reconciled to his brother, so that by peaceful prayers God also may be appeased. Our peace and fraternal concord, and a people united from the unity of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, is a greater sacrifice to God... But one discordant and dissenting and not having peace with his brethren, according to what the blessed Apostle and sacred Scripture testify, even if he should be killed for the name of Christ, will not be able to escape the crime of fraternal dissension."

[10] St. Cyprian, *De oratione Dominica*, c. 23-24, P. L., IV, 535-536. He develops the same more fully in the book *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, P. L., IV, 493-520.

(C) Reason itself dictates that nothing is more contrary to the Christian spirit, nothing more harmful to individuals or to the Church itself, than discords, contentions, or schisms. For Christ wills that His disciples be one as He Himself is one with the Father:[11] "Holy Father, keep them in Thy name, whom Thou hast given Me, that they may be one as We also are"; but dissensions destroy this moral unity. On the other hand, one of the notes of the Catholic Church, one of the causes which bring strength and consolation to it, is the perfect unity of its members; therefore those who sow discords and contentions among Catholics, by that very fact perform a diabolical work, tearing up the foundations of the Church itself and diminishing its strength; for Christ testifies:[12] "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand." Therefore those gravely sin who knowingly scatter the seeds of discords and schisms.

[11] John 17:11.

[12] Matt. 12:25; cf. Luke 11:17.

839. 3. Remedy. In order to avoid dissensions of this kind, which have introduced so many and so great evils into the Church of God, two things especially are to be done: (a) we ought to pass over those things of slight moment which tend to cause dissensions, and, on the contrary, attentively consider all those things which bind us by a manifold and sweet bond; concerning these hear the Apostle:[13] "Careful to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace. One body and one spirit, as you are called in one hope of your calling. One Lord, one faith, one baptism. One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all." And truly, when there are so many motives for loving neighbors as brothers, would it not be foolish to break the bond of charity because of certain slight differences which exist between us and them? (b) Since the chief cause of discords is disordered love of self, we ought to cultivate humility and meekness, and thus root out the very roots of dissensions. To the same point the Apostle says: "I therefore, a prisoner in the Lord, beseech you that you walk worthy of the vocation in which you are called, with all humility and meekness, with patience, supporting one another in charity[14]... If therefore there be any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of charity, if any fellowship of the spirit, if any bowels of commiseration, fulfill my joy, that

you be of one mind, having the same charity, being unanimous, thinking the same thing; let nothing be done through contention, nor through vain glory, but in humility, each esteeming others better than themselves; each one not considering the things that are his own, but those that are of others."[15] These words indeed preach charity and humility together so sweetly and strongly that they need no commentary.

[13] Eph. 4:3-6.

[14] Eph. 4:1-2.

[15] Phil. 2:1-4.

II. Concerning Scandal.

840. 1. Notion and species. (A) Scandal, from the word *skandalon*, literally designates any obstacle placed in the way, at which, if someone strikes, he must stumble or fall; metaphorically it is someone or something by which a man is induced to err or to sin.[2] It is defined by St. Thomas as "a saying or deed less right, furnishing occasion of (spiritual) ruin."

[1] Besides the authors cited above, cf. *Vieux Moraliste*, apud *Ami du Clerge*, t. XXIII, 1901, p. 1195.

[2] Grimm, *Lexicon graeco-latinum*, 4th ed., 1903, p. 401.

Therefore three things are required for scandal: (a) an external act, or the omission of the same; for a merely internal act, since it is unknown to others, cannot induce them into sin. This act can consist in words, deeds, manner of conducting oneself, etc.; or in the omission of some external act, when from this the neighbor can be induced to the omission of some duty. (b) An act less right, whether in itself, or by reason of the person or circumstances; for an act good in every respect does not allure others to evil; yet it suffices that the act have the appearance of evil; thus one who eats meat in the presence of others on a prohibited day can scandalize those who do not know that this is done for a legitimate cause. (c) An act furnishing to another an occasion of ruin, or at least of some spiritual harm. It is not required that the neighbor actually suffer some spiritual harm, but it suffices that, all things considered, an occasion is probably furnished to him for sinning, whether gravely or lightly. It matters little whether the sin to which the neighbor is induced is of the same or of a different species; scandal is truly given whenever it is probably foreseen that, by the less right action which is performed before him, the neighbor will commit some sin which otherwise he would not have committed. Wherefore, if it is morally certain that those before whom the evil action is performed are so confirmed in virtue, or already so determined to sin, that this action has no influence upon them, there is not truly a sin of scandal. Yet it is not licit to ask from the neighbor an evil thing, even if he is habitually disposed to doing it; for it is more grave actually to sin than to be disposed to sin.

Theologians commonly say that scandal properly is not committed by one who draws others back from perfection, without inducing them to sin. Whatever may be the case, by acting thus he sins against charity, which demands that we furnish others a good example: "So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven."[3]

[3] Matt. 5:16.

841. (B) Scandal, on the part of the intention, is direct, when the sin of another is truly intended; indirect, when it is only foreseen, without being intended in itself (above, n. 168). (a) Direct scandal is called diabolical when the sin of the neighbor is intended insofar as it is an offense of God, or the ruin of another, for example, when someone has conversations against the faith directly in order to tear faith out of hearts; it is called simply direct when the sin of the neighbor is intended for another end, for example, for one's own utility or pleasure, as often happens in filthy speech. - To direct scandal can be referred in practice the sin of inducement, by which someone, by command, prayers, counsel, and other modes of this kind, solicits or provokes another to sin: then he is not only the occasion, but also a partial cause of the sin. (b) Indirect scandal happens in many ways, for example, when someone sins before others, foreseeing that they will fall from this into the same sin; when he does those things which, although not evil in themselves, are morally dangerous and probably allure others to sin; when something less right is accomplished, from which it is foreseen that certain persons will abandon the faith or despise religion; when something legitimate in itself is required, from which, however, it is foreseen that others will fall into sins of hatred or blasphemy.

842. 2. Malice of scandal. (A) Scandal directly willed is a grave sin from its genus, both against charity, and against the virtue to which the neighbor is induced to do injury.

(a) Scripture strictly reproves scandal:[4] "But he that shall scandalize one of these little ones that believe in Me, it were better for him that a millstone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals! For it must needs be that scandals come. Nevertheless woe to that man by whom the scandal cometh!"

[4] Matt. 18:6-7; cf. Mark 9:42; Luke 17:1.

(b) Truly, if God so loves men that, for their salvation, He handed over His only-begotten Son, if Christ gave His own blood for the redemption of souls, does not he gravely offend God and Christ who by word or deed induces others to sin, and wills to destroy those for whom the Redeemer died? - Again, if charity commands that we love the neighbor and sincerely desire his eternal salvation, if we are bound to correct the neighbor who is slipping, and to turn him away from evil, do we not sin gravely when we intend his spiritual ruin, and allure him to evil by words or examples?

843. Moreover the gravity of scandal depends upon many circumstances. (a) Generally speaking, scandal is grave when the sin to which another is moved is lethal; otherwise it is light. Hence a sin venial in itself can be mortal by reason of scandal, namely when the neighbor is induced to grave fault; on the contrary, a sin mortal in itself sometimes causes only light scandal, by reason of the circumstances. (b) Besides, the gravity of scandal depends much upon the influence of the scandalous action upon the ruin of the neighbor; and this influence can be greater if the person acting is constituted in dignity, or if the person suffering scandal is weaker in mind; thus, other things being equal, scandal given to younger persons is more grave, since they more easily contract depraved habits from it. Hence parents, superiors, priests, and religious ought carefully to abstain from less right actions, which furnish scandal much more easily to children, subjects, or laypersons than if they were performed by the common people.

(c) The gravity is also increased from the number of persons who are scandalized by the same action, although it is disputed whether scandal is multiplied numerically according to the number of these persons.

(d) Finally it depends most of all upon the foresight and intention of the agent: for nothing is willed unless first known; therefore, the graver the harms foreseen by the agent, the greater is the scandal.

From this it is inferred that scandal, even direct scandal, is sometimes light from lightness of matter, or lightness of influence, or from imperfect advertence.

844. Disputed question. Here, moreover, it is asked whether it is licit to advise a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater one. (a) It is not licit to advise a lesser evil to which the neighbor is not yet determined; for example, if someone is ready to kill an enemy, it is not licit to advise him to theft, to which he was not determined; for evils are not to be advised that goods may come. (b) But if someone is already determined to perpetrate some evil, and cannot be turned from it, according to many it is licit, in order to avoid a greater evil, to advise him to a lesser evil of the same species; thus one who is ready to steal one hundred coins from Peter can be advised that he steal only fifty. We think this probable, provided however that the counselor so speak that he by no means seem to approve the evil action; for example, in the case brought forward, if Titius, after having tried with all his strength to turn Caius away from theft, says: at least do not steal one hundred, since fifty are enough for you. Or, in other words, to advise sin is forbidden; to turn away from a greater sin is licit.[5]

[5] St. Alphonsus, n. 57; Laloux, *De act. humanis*, p. 344.

845. (B) Indirect scandal is not licit, except when the action is good in itself or indifferent, the end of the agent is honorable, and a proportionately grave reason is had for permitting the sin of the neighbor. For then the principle concerning the indirect voluntary, set forth above, n. 175, can be applied.

(a) The Apostle inculcates this, setting forth the manner of acting concerning idolothytes, or foods which were offered to idols. Certain Christians, knowing that idols were nothing but vain images, did not doubt to eat idolothytes; but others suffered scandal from this, because they thought the eating of these things polluted the conscience. Paul indeed agreed with the former, but admonishes them not to furnish scandal to weaker brothers:[6] "But take heed lest perhaps this your liberty become a stumbling-block to the weak. For if a man see him who hath knowledge sit at meat in the idol's temple, shall not his conscience, being weak, be emboldened to eat those things which are sacrificed to idols? And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died? Now when you sin thus against the brethren, and wound their weak conscience, you sin against Christ. Wherefore, if meat scandalize my brother, I will never eat flesh, lest I should scandalize my brother."

[6] 1 Cor. 8:9-13.

(b) Reason suggests the same. For, on the one hand, we are generally bound, by the law of charity, to avoid whatever can induce the neighbor into sin, and therefore to abstain from an action on whose occasion we foresee that the neighbor will sin. On the other hand, however, if there is a grave reason

for doing some act, private and public good demands that this act not be prohibited because of an evil effect which is foreseen to follow from the weakness or malice of the neighbor.

When, moreover, the good effect compensates the evil can be judged from the things already said, n. 175-181, and from the following rules.

846. Practical rules. (a) If there is question of works which, although not prohibited, nevertheless have in themselves the appearance of evil, one must generally abstain from them, unless an urgent and grave reason is present, or unless scandal can be removed by some explanation. Thus a priest ought to abstain from frequenting suspicious persons, even if he is moved by no depraved motive, unless a reason urges him to administer the sacraments to them; likewise a cleric ought to abstain from prohibited food, unless he informs those standing by that, on account of weak health, he has been dispensed from the law of abstinence.

(b) When there is question of good or indifferent works not prescribed, we are generally bound to omit them in order to avoid scandal, if this can be done without grave inconvenience; but not with grave inconvenience.

If a woman knows that she is shamefully loved by a determined man, so that she is for him an occasion of sinning, she ought to flee his sight, if she easily can, for example, by walking by another way, by not coming to a meeting where he will be present. But under this head she is not bound to abstain from every walk or recreation: for this would be too burdensome.

847. (c) If there is question of works prescribed by positive law, whether divine or human, they can be omitted on account of scandal, and indeed sometimes they ought to be, for a time, if a proportionately grave reason requires this. For when two precepts concur which cannot be fulfilled at the same time, generally the natural precept of avoiding scandal prevails, as the greater and stricter one.

Hence a girl who knows that a young man takes occasion from the sight of her for sinning can, and sometimes ought for a time, abstain from hearing Mass in the church where this young man is present. Likewise a wife can and ought sometimes to omit the hearing of Mass or fasting, if she foresees that her husband, in such or such a circumstance, will from this take occasion of blaspheming and despising religion. But I have said for a time, because we are indeed bound to defer a prescribed work in order to avoid a greater evil, but not for a long time or altogether to abstain from it, with great spiritual detriment. Wherefore, if a husband altogether forbids his wife to hear Mass or to make confession, the wife can abstain from these for a time, in the hope of alluring the man to better things; but, after some time, she ought sweetly and firmly to vindicate and exercise her rights.

848. Corollaries. (a) From this it is possible to understand what must be said about the scandal of the little ones and pharisaical scandal. Scandal of this kind is not active, or given, but passive, or received: if it arises from the ignorance or weakness of the one sinning, it is called scandal of the little ones; if from his malice, it is called pharisaical.

These things posited, scandal of the little ones is to be avoided whenever this can be done without grave inconvenience. For this is gathered from the text of Paul cited above, n. 845. Pharisaical scandal, however, is not necessarily to be avoided, provided there is even a slight reason for acting; for the whole malice of the act proceeds from him who is scandalized. Thus a priest, for a slight cause, can pass through streets where he will find haters of religion who for that reason will blaspheme.

(b) From the same principles the question can be solved whether it is licit not to remove an occasion of sinning, or even to place one, although it is foreseen that the neighbor will sin from it. Each is licit, provided a proportionately grave reason is had; for, of itself, to place such an occasion is not to cause evil, but only to permit it; which is licit for a just cause. Thus parents and masters can leave money in an open place, or purposely open a chest in which coins are stored, in order to test the fidelity of children or servants; for it is of great moment that they be able to correct or dismiss them, if they are found unfaithful.

849. 3. Reparation of scandal. (A) That there exists some obligation of repairing scandal, insofar as this can be done, can be inferred from what has already been said: for if by fraternal correction we are bound to procure the amendment of the one sinning and to forestall his relapse, *a fortiori* when we ourselves by scandal furnished the occasion of sinning.

We incur this obligation from charity alone, if we have seduced others only by persuasion or bad example; but from justice, if by unjust means, for example by deceit, force, fear, or false doctrine, we have drawn them to sin; from office, if superiors have induced to evil subjects whom, by force of their office, they were bound to edify.

850. (B) The mode of reparation is diverse according to diverse circumstances. (a) If the scandal was public, it ought also to be repaired publicly, so that the reparation may become known and profit all to whom it was given. (b) If the scandal was given by depraved counsel, false doctrine, or bad books, one must strive first that the further influence of the scandal be removed, and second that the evil already caused be compensated by good example. Thus, if wicked counsel was given and still remains efficacious, it is necessary to revoke it, by oneself or by another, by suggesting good counsel. If certain persons were seduced by false doctrine, the errors ought to be retracted and corrected by an exposition of the truth. If many have been corrupted by depraved books, their diffusion must be impeded, insofar as this can be done, and good books written or spread.

(c) Ordinary scandals, which are furnished only by bad example, are usually sufficiently removed by cessation from the scandal, by public frequentation of the sacraments, by good example, by prayer for the one scandalized, and by other similar means.

Moreover, in order that sins opposed to charity may be avoided more securely, nothing is more efficacious than assiduously to cultivate kindness,[1] mercy, and patience, according to the words of the Apostle: "Put ye on therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, the bowels of mercy, kindness, humility, modesty, patience; bearing with one another, and forgiving one another, if any have a complaint against another; even as the Lord hath forgiven you, so also do you. But above all these things have charity, which is the bond of perfection."[2]

[1] Cf. Faber, *Spiritual Conferences*, Kindness; rendered in French as *Conferences spirituelles*, Bonte; Guibert, *La Bonte*, Paris, 1904.

[2] Col. 3:12-14.

On the Virtue of Religion (Volume II)

On Religion in General

On the Virtue of Religion. — Preliminary Remarks on Religion in General.

851. 1. Notion. The theological virtues, of which we have treated, intimately and directly unite us to God; nevertheless, because we remain distinct from God and dependent upon Him, it is necessary that we acknowledge His infinite excellence by a special worship. Now the supernatural virtue by which the will is inclined to render to God the worship due to Him on account of His infinite excellence is called religion.[2]

[1] In this treatise we shall set forth the first three precepts of the Decalogue: the first, namely: "I am the Lord thy God... Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me. Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything that is in heaven above or in the earth beneath... Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them"; the second: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; the third: "Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath day" (Exod. 20:2-8).

[2] Worship in general is an act by which we venerate someone on account of his excellence; it is also called veneration, and is rendered to any person truly excellent. But the worship which is rendered to God, on account of His infinite excellence, is called the worship of *latria* or adoration, while the worship rendered to the saints retains the name of *dulia* or veneration. Formerly, however, these words were predicated indiscriminately of God and creatures. Cf. *De Incarnatione*, n. 255-256.

852. 2. Principal acts. Considered psychologically, religion embraces manifold acts. (a) First, when we consider the divine excellence, we cannot but admire His infinite perfections and supereminent goodness. (b) This admiration, moreover, soon begets love: for the will is drawn affectively toward the infinite goodness which we have perceived with the mind. (c) Yet reverential fear is joined to love: for while we think of the divine majesty and holiness, we clearly behold our own littleness and imperfection, and we appear before God only with fear. (d) Thence arises the religious sense, or veneration and adoration, by which, with love and fear together, we worship God as first principle and supreme Lord, and subject our whole being to Him. Moreover the habitual will of promptly handing over and devoting oneself to divine worship is called devotion.[3] (e) But because we know that all the goods which are in us, both natural and supernatural, have been conferred gratuitously by God, we acknowledge Him as a distinguished benefactor, and offer Him acts of thanksgiving. (f) But, since daily we need new benefits and new graces, which we are able to obtain only from God, we have recourse to Him by prayer, that we may obtain them. (g) Sometimes also it happens that, because of our frailty, we commit sin and inflict upon God an offense which ought to be repaired: thence arises a sense of penance, by which we strive to compensate the injury inflicted upon the Supreme Deity. (h) Among the various acts which are able to express the aforesaid dispositions, sacrifice certainly stands forth, or the offering and immolation of a victim publicly made, in the name of the whole community, in order to acknowledge the supreme dominion of God.[4]

[3] Devotion, when it is exercised, becomes an act; but generally it is taken as a habitual disposition.

[4] The acts of religion are enumerated somewhat differently by St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 82-91) according to the ontological order: a) interior acts, which are the more principal, namely devotion and prayer; b) exterior acts, by which some exterior things are offered to God, namely sacrifices, offerings, first-fruits, and tithes; or by which something is promised to God, as vows; or by which something divine is assumed, namely an oath and the assumption of the divine name.

These indeed are the principal acts of the virtue of religion. Others are less principal, as oath and vow; others, from positive law, are ordered to the sanctification of certain days, as cessation from servile work and assistance at the sacrifice of the Mass.

853. 3. Place among the virtues. From this it follows that the virtue of religion is a special virtue, not properly theological, but the most excellent among the moral virtues.

(a) The virtue of religion is a special virtue, or one distinct from others. For it pursues a special good, namely the worship due to God, and indeed on account of a special motive, namely His supreme and singular excellence. Now where a particular object and motive are present, there is a distinct virtue.

(b) Theologians unanimously teach that this virtue is not properly theological: for while a theological virtue immediately regards God Himself, religion of itself directly regards the worship due to God. Nevertheless supernatural religion, of which we are here treating, supposes the theological virtues, and cannot be perfect unless in its own sphere it embraces certain acts of these virtues. Thus only by faith do we know the supernatural excellence of God, which we worship by religion; when we pray, we must elicit an act of hope; true devotion, by which we hand ourselves and our goods over to God, involves an act of charity.[5]

[5] Some spiritual authors, especially of the school of the seventeenth century in France, take the virtue of interior religion as a complex of the theological virtues by which we perfectly worship God through Christ, the perfect adorer of the Father. Thus Olier, *Introduction a la vie et aux vertus chretiennes*, ch. I, where, among other things, he writes: "Finally Our Lord, in order to expand His holy religion toward God, and to multiply it in our souls, comes into us and leaves Himself on earth in the hands of priests as a host of praise, in order to communicate to us His spirit of a host... He pours Himself out in us, He insinuates Himself into us, He perfumes our soul and fills it with the interior dispositions of His religious spirit."

(c) Wherefore religion far surpasses the other moral virtues. For virtues are more perfect insofar as they are nearer to the last end; and therefore the theological virtues are better than the rest, because they immediately attain God, the last end. But among the moral virtues religion stands forth: for it approaches God more nearly, because it is ordered directly to divine honor and worship, while the other moral virtues tend only indirectly to the honor of God, by prescribing duties toward the neighbor and ourselves.

854. 4. Division of the treatise. Treating of the acts of the virtue of religion, and treating of the vices opposed to the same, we shall speak:

I. Of the more principal acts, adoration and prayer;

II. Of the secondary acts, oath and vow;

III. Of the social act, or the sanctification of Sunday and feasts.

And thus we shall set forth the first three precepts of the Decalogue.

Chapter I: On the Principal Acts of Religion, and the Vices Opposed

Concerning the Principal Acts of Religion.

We shall speak both of the principal acts of religion themselves, and of the sins opposed to religion.

Art. I. Concerning the Principal Acts of Religion Themselves.

Passing over those acts of which we have already spoken, sacrifice, the worship due to Christ, the Blessed Virgin, the Saints, relics, and images, we shall briefly treat of adoration and prayer, and also of devotion, which renders us more prompt for each act.

§ I. Concerning Adoration.

855. 1. Notion. In the broad sense, adoration is an act by which we profess the excellence of another and our subjection toward him; in this sense kings and men endowed with excellence are said to be adored.[2] In the strict sense it designates the act by which we profess the infinite excellence of God and His supreme dominion, and our dependence upon Him; of this we speak here. Adoration embraces a twofold act: internal, by which the intellect and will together acknowledge the divine excellence and their own subjection;[3] external, or the manifestation of this interior sense by some sensible sign, for example, by sacrifice, prostration upon the earth, genuflection, and other such things, which vary among different nations.

[1] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 84; Suarez, *De Virtute et Statu Religionis*, Tr. I, l. II, c. 1-2; Billuart, diss. III, art. 1; Bouquillon, *De virtute religionis*, Bruges, 1880, n. 46-50; Muller, § 40; M. d'Hulst, *Careme* 1893, Conf. I; Tyrrell, *External Religion*, *La Religion exterieure*, lectures II-IV.

[2] 3 Kings 1:16; Acts 10:25.

[3] St. Thomas, with many other theologians, enumerates adoration among the external acts of religion, because he considers it especially as a bodily act; but he supposes that it is nothing other than the expression of interior adoration (*Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 84, a. 2).

856. 2. Thesis: properly so-called adoration, internal, external, and public, is due to God. (A) Scripture. Christ, tempted by the devil, answered him:[4] "For it is written: The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and Him only shalt thou serve." Moreover He thus openly declares to the Samaritan woman that this adoration ought to be internal:[5] "But the hour cometh, and now is, when the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth. For the Father also seeketh such to adore Him. God is a spirit; and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." That it ought likewise to be public, and therefore external, is clear from the institution of the eucharistic sacrifice, by which the sacrifice of Christ on the cross is vividly represented:[6] for sacrifice is an external and public act of adoration, offered to God in the name of the whole community.

[4] Matt. 4:10.

[5] John 4:23-24.

[6] This we proved in *De Eucharistia*, n. 153-161.

857. (B) Reason shows the same. (a) For God is the supreme Lord of men: since He created them out of nothing, and indeed as to their whole being, both as to substance and as to faculties; besides, He conserves them in being; for by their own weight they tend to nothingness, since they are from nothing, and unless they were positively sustained by God at every instant, they would be reduced to nothing; indeed, He concurs with them in acting: for although they enjoy activity implanted in them by God, they cannot break forth into act unless they are helped by the supreme cause of all things. Therefore men, entirely as they are, depend upon God and are constituted under His dominion. But the supreme Lord, upon whom all things depend, has a right, and indeed a strict right, that His dominion be acknowledged by all rational creatures: for they are rational for this reason, that they may follow the order of reason and spontaneously and freely confess their dependence upon the supreme Cause; this indeed is done by adoration, by which we profess God as first principle and last end, or, in other words, as supreme Lord; therefore God has a strict right that He be adored by men, and he who denies it to Him is guilty of true injustice.

858. (b) That this adoration ought to be not only internal, but also external, is clear from a twofold argument:

1. External worship is necessary by reason of itself. For God is the author not only of the soul, but also of the body, and has lavished upon us not only spiritual but also bodily benefits; therefore we depend upon God also as to the body; therefore we ought to express that dependence not only internally, but also in a sensible mode, namely by using the body which we have received from Him. - This indeed will be still more apparent if it is noted that man, as leader of sensible creatures, is as it were the pontiff of irrational nature, and therefore is bound to praise and adore God not only in his own name, but also in the name of inferior creatures. But this he cannot do better than by exhibiting external worship by the help of the body, which is a microcosm, or compendium of the whole of sensible nature.
2. External worship is necessary also by reason of internal worship, namely to express and foster it. For we are so constituted by nature that the interior affections of the soul, especially when they are more vivid, are expressed in a sensible mode, by the eyes, countenance, gesture, and whole bearing of the body; therefore if man truly and sincerely reveres and loves God, spontaneously and as it were necessarily he will manifest reverence and love by external acts, words, gesture, and the whole bearing of the body; but we are bound sincerely to love and adore God; therefore also to express this worship by external acts. - Otherwise internal worship would soon perish: for since, from what has been said, man is naturally prone to manifest outwardly the interior feelings of the soul, when external signs and ceremonies decrease, generally the very sentiments of religion are diminished, and when such signs are removed, commonly religion itself perishes. Nor is this wonderful: for man is led by sensible things to spiritual things, by external things he is stirred to the thought and practice of interior things, and if incentives of this kind are lacking, gradually even the dispositions of the soul languish and are extinguished.

Augustine had already observed this:[7] "For those praying," he says, "do with the members of their body what is fitting for suppliants, when they fix their knees, when they extend their hands, or even prostrate themselves on the ground, and if they visibly do anything else; although their invisible will and the intention of the heart are known to God, nor does He need these signs in order that the human mind may be opened to Him; but by this man rather stirs himself to praying and groaning more humbly and fervently." Nor can it be said that from this it happens that our religion consists only in external rites; for, as the Angelic Doctor deservedly says,[8] "because in all acts of latria, that which is external is referred to that which is internal, as to the more principal, therefore external adoration itself is done for the sake of internal adoration; namely that, through the signs of humility which we exhibit bodily, our affection may be stirred to subject itself to God, because it is connatural to us that we proceed through sensible things to intelligible things."

[7] *De Cura pro mortuis*, c. V, Migne, P. L., XL, col. 597.

[8] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 84, a. 2.

859. (c) This adoration ought not only to be external, but also public or social. For man was born for society, and in fact lives in society. Now not only each man, but also society itself, as a moral person, arises from God and depends upon Him; therefore it is necessary that not only private individuals worship God, but also that the whole commonwealth, after the manner of one body, exhibit adoration to God. - For this reason indeed God chose a special day, which would be as it were exclusively devoted to divine worship: for He willed that on this day all should rest from servile work, so that they might be able to exhibit public honor to God, as we shall explain below.

860. 3. Points to be noted for practice. (a) Therefore the faithful should be admonished that external and public acts of religion are indeed necessary, but derive their principal value only from interior acts: "God is a spirit; and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." Wherefore genuflections, inclinations of the head, and other signs of adoration should be performed with the intention of worshiping and loving God.

(b) Since, from what was said in the Treatise on the Incarnate Word, n. 243-246, Christ is the mediator of religion and the supreme Pontiff, through whom the Angels praise the divine majesty and the Dominations adore it, nothing is more fitting than to praise, adore, and glorify God through Christ: "Through Him, and with Him, and in Him, is to Thee, God the Father almighty, in the unity of the Holy Spirit, all honor and glory."[9]

[9] Roman Missal, Canon of the Mass.

§ II. Concerning Prayer.

After the preliminary notions concerning prayer have been set forth, we shall explain: 1. its necessity; 2. its efficacy.

[3] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 83; Suarez, Tr. IV, lib. I-III; Billuart, diss. II, art. 2-6; St. Alphonsus, little work on prayer written in Italian (*Del gran mezzo della preghiera*) and translated into various languages; Bouquillon, op. cit., n. 129-225; Lehmkuhl, n. 338-347; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 313-324; M. d'Hulst, *Careme* 1893, 3rd Conference; O. Lefranc, *La Priere*, Paris, Lethielleux, 1904.

861. Notion and species. Prayer, in the broad sense, is a pious elevation of the mind to God; it is distinguished from study, by which we think of divine things without pious affection. Under this respect it embraces the principal acts of religion, namely adoration, thanksgiving for benefits received, penance for sins, meditation on divine things, petition for spiritual goods, etc. - In the strict sense, it is commonly defined as the petition of fitting things from God. That this petition, when it is made with due submission, is truly an act of religion is easily understood: for it proceeds from an intimate sense of our need, and is at the same time a practical acknowledgment of divine excellence and goodness; for we do not ask graces from God unless we are inwardly persuaded that He is the fountain of goods, and at the same time full of mercy, so that He can and wills to help us.

Prayer is mental when it is performed by the mind alone, namely by the intellect and will: by the intellect, namely, we think of God, of the things to be asked, and of the motives on account of which it is expedient to obtain them; by the will, we desire that such or such a grace be granted to us by God. - It is called vocal, or oral, when it is performed not only by the mind, but by the mouth, by words or other signs. - Again, vocal prayer is private if it is made by the one praying in his own name; public if it is made in the name and authority of the Church, by a minister deputed for this; thus the recitation of the divine office is public prayer: of this we treat in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 132-160.

I. Concerning the Necessity of Prayer.

862. 1. Errors. Not only atheists, pantheists, and agnostics deny both the necessity and the utility of prayer, but also most rationalists,[1] because, they say, it is foolish to ask God to change the immutable laws of nature, or decrees conceived from eternity. But the Quietists rejected prayer as something imperfect for interior souls; thus Molinos said:[2] "It is not fitting for one resigned to the divine will to ask anything from God; because to ask is an imperfection, since it is an act of one's own will and choice, and is to will that the divine will be conformed to ours, and not that ours be conformed to the divine; and that saying of the Gospel: Ask and you shall receive, was not said by Christ for interior souls, who do not wish to have a will; indeed souls of this kind come to such a point that they cannot ask anything from God."

[1] J. Simon, *La Religion naturelle*, 4th Part, ch. 2; for refuting him, see Bougaud, *Le Christianisme*, t. V, ch. 4; Gondal, *La Religion*, 1894, l. III; Tanquerey, *De Veri Religione*, n. 16-19.

[2] Proposition 14, condemned by Innocent XI, apud Denzinger, n. 1101.

863. 2. Thesis: Prayer is necessary for all adult wayfarers by necessity of precept, indeed by necessity of means, at least according to the ordinary law of God.

Here there is question of prayer properly so called, or of the petition of supernatural goods from God. This, according to all, is necessary as to adults, as long as they live, from a divine precept; but, according to the common and true opinion, it is necessary also by necessity of means, from the ordinary law, insofar as it is a means instituted by God for obtaining, in the present order of things, graces necessary for salvation.

864. (A) Scripture often inculcates the necessity of prayer, asserting that petition is an efficacious means for obtaining grace, or for overcoming temptations, and indeed in such a way that from this it can be gathered that without prayer grace cannot be obtained or temptations overcome: "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you. For everyone that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened";[3] as if He were saying: petition is the means of obtaining grace; therefore, if you do not ask, it will not be given to you. Again Christ says:[4] "Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation." The Apostles likewise command the faithful to be instant in prayer,[5] and to watch in prayers.[6] These things indeed, taken all together, suppose not only a precept, but a necessity of means; for the exhortation to pray that we may obtain grace and overcome temptations supposes that we cannot, at least from the ordinary law of God, attain either without prayer.

[3] Matt. 7:7-8; cf. Luke 11:9-10.

[4] Matt. 26:41.

[5] Rom. 12:12; Col. 4:2.

[6] 1 Pet. 4:7.

865. (B) The Fathers likewise often attribute victory against temptations and perseverance in good to prayer, as if it were a means necessary for this. Their doctrine is thus summarized by the author of the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, who very probably is Gennadius of Marseilles (flourished in the year 495): "We believe that no one comes to salvation unless God invites him; that no one invited works out his salvation unless God helps him; that no one merits help unless he prays."[7] Augustine especially taught this, asserting that the gift of perseverance is given only to those praying,[8] and that God does not command impossibilities; since He admonishes "both to do what you can, and to ask what you cannot."[9] Trent made these words its own:[10] "For God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes both to do what you can, and to ask what you cannot; and He helps that you may be able." Manifestly therefore the Council supposes that certain things are impossible, if the grace by which they can be done is not asked.

[7] *De ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, c. 56, P. L., LVIII, 995.

[8] "Indeed, since it is clear that God has prepared some things to be given even to those not praying, as the beginning of faith; but others only to those praying, as perseverance unto the end, certainly he who thinks he has this from himself does not pray that he may have it" (*De dono perseverantiae*, c. 16, n. 39, P. L., XLV, 1017).

[9] *De natura et gratia*, c. 43, n. 50, P. L., XLIV, 271.

[10] Sess. VI, ch. 11, Denzinger, n. 686.

866. (C) The matter indeed depends upon the will of God, who could, if He wished, grant grace even to those not praying. Nevertheless it was altogether fitting that grace should be given only to those asking. For it is consonant with reason that man himself, who needs grace for salvation, should concur, as he can, at least by prayer, in coming to the aid of his own necessity. The Catechism of the Council of Trent declares this thus:[11] "For, since God owes nothing to anyone, it surely remains that the things which we need should be sought from Him by

prayers; and He gave these prayers to us as a necessary instrument for obtaining that which we should desire: especially since it is clear that there are certain things which it is not permitted to obtain except by His help." Afterwards it explains the utility of prayer: (a) by praying we exhibit honor to God; for thus we profess that we are subject to Him, whom we acknowledge as the author of all goods, in whom alone we hope, whom alone we have as the refuge and protection of safety and salvation. (b) By praying we also exercise the virtues of the soul: faith, because the more studiously we pray, the greater and more certain faith we have in divine care and providence; hope, because we ought to ask grace only with confidence; charity, since it is necessary to contemplate the divine goodness in prayer, and, besides, by frequent conversation with God we are enkindled to His love; humility, since, in order to pray, we ought to be conscious of our own need. - Therefore it was most fitting that at least certain goods should be granted only to those asking.

[11] Catechism of the Council of Trent, P. IV, c. I, n. 3.

867. (D) From this the difficulties proposed by the Quietists already remain solved: for an act commanded by God, which otherwise carries with it such great utility, cannot be imperfect. - Nor do the arguments of the Rationalists have greater force.

They indeed object that God cannot acquiesce in our petitions unless He changes His counsels. St. Thomas had already anticipated this difficulty; for, as he rightly observes,[12] God indeed decreed all things from all eternity, but, in disposing the present order of things, He foresaw our prayers, and could so order secondary causes that effects consonant with our petitions would be produced at the due time. Hence, when we pray to God, we do not pray for this purpose, that we may change the divine disposition, but that we may obtain that which God disposed to be fulfilled through prayers, namely, that in time we may receive what almighty God disposed before the ages to give to us. - In vain likewise do they add that our prayers cannot be heard without the laws of nature perishing. For this is first of all false when we ask spiritual goods: if we pray God that He help us to do good, by enlightening the intellect or strengthening the will, we by no means demand that our liberty be destroyed, but rather that it be strengthened. The same can be said of temporal goods: when we ask for health, we do not ask that physiological laws cease, but only that God so dispose secondary causes that, these being rightly applied, we can be cured from illness.

[12] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 83, a. 2.

Nor does it help to say that prayer is not necessary because God, who knows all things, does not need that we set forth our necessities to Him, as Kant said, reheating an old objection; for, as St. Thomas rightly says,[13] "it is not necessary that we offer prayers to God in order to manifest to Him our needs or desires, but that we ourselves may consider that in these things recourse must be had to divine help"; for thus we better acknowledge our weakness, conceive greater confidence toward God, and concur with Him by greater effort in acting well.

[13] Ibid., a. 2, ad 1.

868. 3. Practical corollaries. (A) The law of praying, like the precept concerning faith, hope, and charity (above, nn. 644, 718, 754), obliges either by itself or by accident:

(a) By itself, rather frequently in life, though the time cannot be mathematically determined. Hence the faithful are to be exhorted to pray daily, especially in the morning, to ask the helps which they need for that day, and in the evening, to give thanks for benefits received, to elicit penitence for sins, and to hand over their soul to God before they take sleep. Those who omit morning and evening prayers do not indeed sin directly; but experience shows that those who do not recite them, other things being equal, fall into sin more frequently than those who pray daily.

(b) By accident, as often as some duty of Christian life cannot be fulfilled, or a temptation overcome, without prayer. Hence the faithful are to be exhorted to have recourse to prayer whenever some more arduous duty presses, some business of greater moment, or a more dangerous temptation.

869. (B) Prayer must indeed be made in spirit and truth: for God, to whom the hidden thoughts of men lie open, hears prayers even if they are not uttered by the mouth. Yet vocal prayer has its own utility:[14] (a) for stirring up interior devotion, by which the mind is more easily elevated to God, because through external signs internal affection is suggested and rendered more intense; (b) for rendering more perfect service to God, namely that man may serve God according to that whole which he has received from Him, not only by the mind, but also by the body, and thus offer the accumulated sacrifice of soul and body.

[14] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 83, a. 12; Catechism of the Council of Trent, l. c., n. 28.

Yet one must not indulge in much speaking, by which the mind is often distracted; for it is better to recite fewer and shorter prayers attentively and devoutly than more extended ones with almost no attention or mediocre devotion: "And when you are praying, speak not much, as the heathens. For they think that in their much speaking they may be heard. Be not you therefore like to them. For your Father knoweth what is needful for you, before you ask Him."[15] - Especially to be avoided is the vain display of hypocrites:[16] "And when ye pray, ye shall not be as the hypocrites, who love to stand and pray in the synagogues and corners of the streets, that they may be seen by men... But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy chamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret; and thy Father who seeth in secret will repay thee." The chamber of which there is question here "can be referred to the heart of man, which it is not enough to enter, but which, besides, ought to be closed, lest anything break in or flow into souls from without, by which the integrity of prayer could be violated."[17]

[15] Matt. 6:7-8.

[16] Matt. 6:5-6.

[17] Catechism of the Council of Trent, n. 28.

870. (C) Therefore prayer ought to be attentive; for it would be foolish to ask God that He kindly lend an ear to our prayers, if we ourselves do not attend to what we say. For since prayer is an ascent of the mind to God, the words of prayer are poured forth rashly and irreverently if the mind voluntarily wanders from God, and no effort is applied to dispel distractions. - Nor does external attention suffice for true prayer, by which only every action by its nature incompatible with internal attention is excluded; but, more probably, internal attention, or application of the mind to God, is required.[1]

[1] Yet according to Lugo (*De Eucharistia*, disp. XXII, n. 25-41), probably internal attention is not required for the essence of prayer, but external attention suffices, provided prayer is begun with the intention of praying and attention of mind, and attention perseveres virtually. - But it is difficult to conceive how attention virtually remains in one who is fully distracted, as is said below.

(a) Attention, on the part of the object, can be diverse: if the mind is occupied with rightly pronouncing the words, it is called superficial, or verbal; if with rightly understanding the words, it is called literal, or intellectual; when attention is given to worshiping God Himself, or to a particular mystery, or to the good which is asked, spiritual, or mystical, attention is had; and this is more perfect than the rest, provided however that the mind is truly attentive and does not wander in vain thoughts.

On the part of the subject, attention is more or less perfect and intense or remiss, directed to one object, or divided among several. - Some distinguish between actual attention, which is actually exercised, and virtual attention, which perseveres in virtue as long as it has not been retracted. But this distinction by no means pleases St. Alphonsus, and deservedly: for it is difficult to conceive how attention, which is an act of the mind, remains virtually in one who is distracted, even involuntarily. The matter is otherwise with intention, which, since it belongs to the will, perseveres virtually in the effect. But he who has his mind occupied elsewhere, even if involuntarily distracted, cannot be called attentive even virtually, since he by no means attends to the things which he recites.

871. (b) For the validity of prayer any internal attention suffices, even superficial and remiss. For, the intention of praying being posited, which we suppose to have been elicited from the beginning of prayer and not retracted, as soon as attention is present, even verbal and remiss, there is true speech with God, and a pious petition to Him, as is clear from comparison with men who recite words which they do not understand well, but nevertheless will to express all those things which are contained in the writing.

872. (c) Voluntary distractions in themselves or in their cause, admitted without a sufficient motive, are a venial sin by their nature, because they imply a certain irreverence against God; but they are not a mortal sin, unless otherwise gravely evil or shameful; involuntary distractions, however, even many and long-lasting, constitute no sin.

They are voluntary in themselves when one actually gives consent to them; in their cause, when, before prayer, vain thoughts are freely admitted which are foreseen to be a cause of distractions. They are involuntary when we apply ordinary diligence to forestall or expel them. - Voluntary distractions are venial sins, even in prayers which are not from precept, unless they are excused by a sufficient motive: because, as soon as we will to speak with God, we are bound to do this reverently. But if, while praying, a useful thought occurs, to turn it over for some time is not even a venial sin, provided a proportionately sufficient reason is present.

Distractions, even voluntary ones, do not destroy the substance of prayer; for, notwithstanding these distractions, the soul can remain turned toward God, and sincerely desire to obtain graces; but God, who has known our frame and is prone to mercy, deigns to hear prayers, even if they are infected by certain light faults. - Nor are certain external actions incompatible with true prayer, such as walking, working with the hands, etc., which by no means impede the elevation of the mind to God. Wherefore it is altogether expedient to pray while walking or working; nor is it to be feared that the

distractions which then naturally occur are sins: for to admit useful distractions while someone recites certain prayers among manual labors is no sin; for who will accuse as guilty of irreverence him who, among common actions, strives to rise in mind to God, although several times he admits other thoughts even voluntarily? The rigid Concina indeed did not hesitate to assert this, but in this he was deservedly reproved by the other theologians.[2]

[2] Concina, *In Decalogum*, lib. II, diss. 2, c. 9, § 3, n. 8-9; Bouquillon, n. 219, refutes him.

873. (D) We ought to pray, from charity, not only for ourselves, but also for the neighbor, and indeed preserving the order described above, n. 805: for prayer is one of the principal means by which we can help him spiritually. We are not bound to pray specially for determined persons, unless these are constituted in grave or very grave necessity, or are joined to us by a special bond of blood or office. It is not licit to exclude enemies from common prayers.

Nor should the souls detained in Purgatory be passed over, since they are joined to us by a peculiar bond, as we explained in the Treatise on God the Rewarder, n. 49.

II. Concerning the Efficacy of Prayer.

874. The effect of prayer is threefold: meritorious, insofar as it can obtain sanctifying grace and its increase, the conditions required for merit being posited, above, n. 199-200; satisfactory, because, since it is an arduous work, it can satisfy for sins; impetratory, insofar as it has the power of obtaining the actual graces which are asked from God, the conditions enumerated below being posited. Since the first two effects have been treated elsewhere (above, n. 196, and *De Poenitentia*, dogmatic part, n. 75-79), it remains here to speak of the last: 1. whether and in what sense prayer is efficacious; and 2. by what conditions?

1. Whether and in what sense prayer is efficacious?

875. Thesis: Prayer, clothed with the due conditions, has the power of obtaining, with moral infallibility, what is asked from God.

It is explained. This infallibility is not absolute, but conditioned, nor does it arise from the dignity of prayer alone, but from the superadded promise of God. For if only the dignity of prayer in itself is considered, it indeed has a certain aptitude for obtaining those things which are asked, namely from the goodness and mercy of God; but it does not have infallible efficacy, because of itself it introduces no necessity, since God remains free in such a case to exercise or not to exercise His mercy. But when the divine promise accedes, God owes it to Himself to bestow those things which He has promised, not indeed from strict justice, nor from mere liberality, but from fidelity. Wherefore the infallibility is not absolute, but conditioned and moral, namely provided that the thing asked is necessary or very useful for salvation (below, n. 879-883). For the primary reason on account of which God promised to hear prayers is that He wills us to attain our supernatural end, since all temporal and spiritual goods are finally referred to this end. Hence, if, according to His wisdom, He foresees that some grace in particular, all things considered, will be more harmful than useful, He is not bound by force of His promise to grant it, but will give another more useful or more opportune one.

876. It is proved. (A) Scripture many times proclaims the efficacy of prayer.

(a) An example is had in the prayer of Abraham, who by repeated prayers obtained that wicked Sodom would be spared if ten just men were found in that city;[3] in the preservation of the city of Segor, which was saved only by the prayers of Lot;[4] in the case of the Israelite people, which, when it had deserved to be destroyed, was able to escape ruin by the intercession of Moses.[5] Besides, Ecclesiasticus thus describes the wondrous effect of prayer:[6] "The prayer of him that humbleth himself shall pierce the clouds; and till it come nigh he will not be comforted; and he will not depart till the Most High behold... My son, in thy sickness neglect not thyself: but pray to the Lord, and He shall heal thee." The angel of Tobias declares the same poetically:[7] "When thou didst pray with tears and didst bury the dead... I offered thy prayer to the Lord." - Likewise, in the Gospel, the publican who poured forth a humble prayer went down justified to his house.[8]

[3] Gen. 18:16-33.

[4] Gen. 19:18-22.

[5] Exod. 32:7-14; cf. Ps. 105:23.

[6] Eccli. 35:21; 38:9.

[7] Tob. 12:12.

[8] Luke 18:14.

877. (b) But the promises of Christ, repeated rather often, have special force:[9] "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you. For everyone that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened. Or what man is there among you, of whom if his son shall ask bread, will he reach him a stone?... If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him!" - This is true especially of prayer made in the name of Christ, that is, through Him, and with Him, and in Him, insofar as we trust not in our merits, but in His: "And whatsoever you shall ask the Father in My name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. If you shall ask Me anything in My name, that I will do[10]... Amen, amen I say to you, if you ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it you. Hitherto you have not asked anything in My name. Ask, and you shall receive, that your joy may be full."[11]

[9] Matt. 7:7-11.

[10] John 14:13-14.

[11] John 16:23-24.

(c) Truly, promises of this kind have been proved true by the event. One of the thieves who hung from the cross with Christ prayed thus: "Lord, remember me when Thou shalt come into Thy kingdom. And Jesus said to him: Amen I say to thee, this day thou shalt be with Me in paradise."[12] - The Apostles in the cenacle "were persevering with one mind in prayer, with the women, and Mary the mother of Jesus";[13] and on the day of Pentecost, "they were all filled with the Holy Spirit."[14] - Stephen the protomartyr prays for his persecutors: "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge,"[15] and soon Saul is converted. - Cornelius the centurion prays earnestly, and thus obtains the gift of true faith: "Thy prayers and thy alms are ascended for a memorial in the sight of God."[16] - Peter, prince of the apostles, is kept in prison: "Prayer was made without ceasing by the Church unto God for him";[17]

soon an angel leads him out of prison. - Paul and Silas, who had preached the Gospel at Philippi, are sent into prison; but there "praying, they praised God,"[18] and soon they are divinely delivered. - And many other such facts could be alleged from ecclesiastical history, by which the truth of the promises of Christ would be confirmed.

[12] Luke 23:42-43.

[13] Acts 1:14.

[14] Acts 2:4.

[15] Acts 7:60.

[16] Acts 10:4.

[17] Acts 12:5.

[18] Acts 16:25.

878. (B) The Fathers often inculcate the same, not a few of whom wrote entire treatises on prayer.

(a) Thus, among others, Tertullian concludes his book *On Prayer* thus:[19] "For what has God denied to prayer from spirit and truth, He who requires it? We read and hear and believe how great are the proofs of its efficacy. Ancient prayer indeed delivered from fires, and from beasts, and from hunger, and yet it had not received its form from Christ. But by how much more fully is the prayer of Christians prayed! It does not station an angel of dew in the midst of fires, nor close the mouths of lions... but it instructs those suffering, and feeling, and grieving, with endurance; it enlarges grace with virtue, so that faith may know what it obtains from the Lord, understanding what it suffers for the name of God... But now the prayer of justice turns away all the wrath of God, keeps watch for enemies, supplicates for persecutors... It also washes away faults, repels temptations, extinguishes persecutions, consoles the fainthearted, delights the magnanimous, leads travelers, calms waves, stupefies robbers, feeds the poor, rules the rich, raises the fallen, supports those falling, holds those standing. Prayer is the wall of faith, our arms and weapons against the man who watches us on every side." St. Cyprian has similar things in the book *On the Lord's Prayer*.[20]

[19] Tertullian, *Liber de Oratione*, c. 29, P. L., I, 1195-1196.

[20] Apud Migne, P. L., IV, 520-544.

(b) Among the Greeks, let Gregory of Nyssa be heard:[21] "Prayer is the defense and safeguard of chastity, the moderation of anger, the calming and repressing of pride, the cleansing away of the tenacious memory of injuries, the routing of envy, the removal of injustice, the correction of impiety. Prayer is the strength of bodies, the abundance of the home, the right constitution of law and statutes in the city, the strength of the kingdom, the trophy of war, the security of peace, the reconciliation of those dissenting, the preservation of those joined together. Prayer is the seal of virginity, the fidelity of marriage, a shield for travelers, the guardian of those sleeping, the confidence of those watching, fertility for farmers, safety for sailors. Prayer is the advocate of the accused and of those pleading a cause, the relaxation and loosening of the guilty and of chains, rest for the weary, consolation of the sorrowing, delight of the soul for the rejoicing, solace of those mourning, the crown of those contracting marriage, the celebration of a birthday feast, the funeral of the dying." Our Gregory proceeds, enumerating very many facts from which the efficacy of prayer is clear.

[21] *De oratione dominica,* Orat. I, P. G., XLIV, 1123.

2. Concerning the Conditions Required That Prayer Be Efficacious.

879. In order that prayer be truly efficacious, certain conditions are required on the part of the object which is asked, of the subject praying, and of those for whom one prays.

(A) On the part of the object, the things which are asked ought to be such that they conduce to eternal salvation: for prayer, like other supernatural goods, ultimately tends to eternal beatitude.

Wherefore, if there is question of supernatural goods, namely salvation and the means necessary or truly useful for it, they can be asked absolutely, but not against or beyond the order of divine Providence. Thus graces by which all difficulties and temptations are removed, which in the present life are necessary for our probation, ought not to be asked; nor, without condition, graces gratis given, as the gift of prophecy or miracles, since from these pride is not rarely nourished.

Natural goods, as knowledge, prosperity, health, riches, honors, can be asked only conditionally, namely insofar as God foresees that they will profit us; for not rarely these are harmful to us. Say the same concerning the removal of certain evils, which can be useful for our sanctification. Hence it is not becoming to ask things altogether indifferent to salvation, for example, gain from a game. But to ask things morally evil, for example help for stealing or for killing an enemy, is in itself a grave sin, both because it involves desire of an evil thing and because a grave injury is inflicted upon God by asking that He cooperate in an evil action.

880. (B) On the part of the subject praying, the state of grace, humility, confidence, and perseverance are desired:

(a) The state of grace; for although the prayers of sinners are often heard, when otherwise they will to do penance, as is clear from the examples of the publican and the thief alleged above, nevertheless a special infallibility is attached to the prayers of the just, as is clear from many words of Scripture: "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just: and His ears unto their prayers";[1] - "If you abide in Me, and My words abide in you, you shall ask whatever you will, and it shall be done unto you";[2] - "If our heart do not reprehend us, we have confidence toward God; and whatsoever we shall ask, we shall receive of Him, because we keep His commandments and do those things which are pleasing before Him."[3] And deservedly: for those who enjoy the state of grace are the friends of God, keep His commandments, and strive to please Him; therefore it is not wonderful that their prayers are more easily heard by God.

[1] Ps. 33:16.

[2] John 15:7.

[3] 1 John 3:21-22.

881. (b) Humility, by which, conscious of our weakness and misery, we lean not upon our merits or strength, but upon the divine mercy. Thus indeed Abraham, who prayed thus:[4] "I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes"; and thus Daniel:[5] "For it is not for our justifications that we present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy tender mercies"; thus also the publican, humbly beseeching God, was heard, while the proud Pharisee, who trusted

too much in his own justice, by no means pleased God.[6] On the other hand it is openly said:[7] "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble." The reason is that God does not will to give His glory to another, and therefore refuses grace to those who abuse it in order to exalt themselves against Him.

[4] Gen. 18:27.

[5] Dan. 9:18.

[6] Luke 18:9-14.

[7] James 4:6.

(c) Confidence, which altogether trusts in the merits and promises of Christ. For this honors God, and sweetly disposes Him to hear us:[8] "Because he hoped in Me, I will deliver him: he shall cry to Me, and I will hear him." Wherefore Christ required confidence of those whom He cured: "Have confidence, son, thy sins are forgiven thee."[9] Hence also James said:[10] "But let him ask in faith [confidence], nothing wavering. For he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea, which is moved and carried about by the wind. Therefore let not that man think that he shall receive anything of the Lord." Truly, if someone lacks confidence, by that very fact he doubts the goodness and promises of God, and therefore does not deserve to obtain mercy. "Let us go therefore with confidence to the throne of grace."[11]

[8] Ps. 90:14-15.

[9] Matt. 9:2.

[10] James 1:6-7.

[11] Heb. 4:16.

882. (d) Perseverance, because, while God grants certain goods at once, namely those which are necessary here and now, He does not usually give certain others except after assiduous prayers, so that meanwhile we may be better disposed for receiving graces. Christ teaches this by various parables and examples: thus the importunate friend finally obtains the loaves which first had been denied him;[12] thus the Canaanite woman, first repulsed, and indeed several times, on account of perseverance in prayer, obtains the healing of her daughter.[13] - And indeed it is not rarely expedient that only after long and fervent prayers do we obtain what we desire; for thus we more vividly conceive our unworthiness and inability, and esteem more highly what is obtained with more difficulty.

[12] Luke 11:5-8.

[13] Matt. 15:21-28.

883. (C) On the part of those for whom one prays. It is controverted among theologians whether prayer made for others is infallibly efficacious or not.

Many with St. Thomas respond negatively:[14] "For it happens sometimes that prayer made for another does not obtain, even if it is made piously and perseveringly, and concerning things pertaining to salvation, because of the impediment which exists on the part of him for whom one prays, according to that saying:[15] If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not toward this people.

Nevertheless prayer will be meritorious for the one praying, who prays from charity." Yet not a few, after Suarez,[16] hold the affirmative opinion; for the words of Christ "Whatever you shall ask" are altogether universal; besides, prayer for others is not only commended, but is declared efficacious: "He that knoweth his brother to sin a sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him who sinneth not to death";[17] - "Pray for one another that you may be saved; for the continual prayer of a just man availeth much."[18]

[14] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 83, a. 7, ad 2.

[15] Jer. 15:1.

[16] Suarez, *De religione*, Tr. IV, lib. I, c. 27.

[17] 1 John 5:16.

[18] James 5:16.

In our judgment, the matter can be composed thus: prayer made for others is infallibly efficacious in the sense that it obtains some effect of grace; but those for whom one prays are sometimes badly disposed and pertinaciously resist the grace offered to them. - Whatever may be the case, to pray for others is a most excellent work of charity.

884. Corollary: concerning the Lord's Prayer. Among the prayers which we are accustomed to recite, the Lord's Prayer stands forth, which Christ Himself taught the apostles as the norm of other prayers. In it indeed, as St. Thomas rightly says,[19] "not only are all things asked which we can desire, but also in that order in which they ought to be desired; so that this prayer not only instructs us to ask, but is also formative of our whole affection."

[19] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 83, a. 9; many Fathers explained this Lord's Prayer, such as Tertullian, St. Cyprian, and, after them, the Catechism of the Council of Trent, p. IV. Cf. Hurter, *Patrum opuscula selecta*, t. II.

In the preface, very brief indeed but full of mysteries, filial confidence is stirred by these words: Our Father, who art in heaven. If He is Father, in Him shine forth charity, indulgence, kindness, mercy; if He is in heaven, His power is great and infinite; and therefore He can and wills kindly to hear our prayers. By the word our, the faithful are taught that they are brothers to one another and ought to pray for one another.

Moreover the petitions are ordered according to the order of charity, so that we attend first to God, then to ourselves. In relation to God, we ask that the sanctity and glory of the divine name be increased: Hallowed be Thy name; then, moreover, that the kingdom of God be extended, or the preaching and practice of the Gospel: "Thy kingdom come"; and therefore that the will of God be fulfilled on earth, His laws diligently observed and commandments kept, so that He may be able to reign in the minds of men: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." - In relation to ourselves, we ask first "our daily bread," that is, not only the supports of material life, but also and especially spiritual food, namely the word of God, the eucharistic bread, and the other graces by which the soul is nourished; afterwards, that the impediments to eternal beatitude be removed, namely sins: "And forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors"; from which we are powerfully moved to forgiving others, since the remission of sins depends upon the condonation of injuries; and consequently that we may overcome the temptations by which we are allured to sin: "And lead us not into temptation." Finally, as in a brief compendium, we ask that we be delivered from evil, not indeed

from all evils, but only from those which can bring no utility to the soul; and that the evils by which we are sometimes pressed, we may bear with a patient, indeed even willing, soul.

885. Note. Thus far concerning prayer which is directed to God Himself. And indeed God alone is to be prayed to as the first and principal author and giver of goods. Since Christ is the God-Man, our prayers can and ought also to be directed to Him; besides, as man, He is the most perfect mediator, "always living to make intercession for us";[20] and therefore our prayers, offered through Christ, obtain greater efficacy.

[20] Heb. 7:25.

Besides, from what has been said in the Treatise on the Incarnate Word, n. 300-306, it is good and useful to invoke the saints, and especially the Blessed Virgin; for Trent declares:[21] "that the Saints reigning together with Christ offer their prayers to God for men; that it is good and useful suppliantly to invoke them: and, in order to obtain benefits from God through His Son Jesus Christ our Lord, who alone is our Redeemer and Savior, to have recourse to their prayers, assistance, and help." From these things it is clear: (a) that the invocation of the saints is indeed good and useful, but not necessary for salvation; (b) that graces are to be expected not from the saints themselves, but from God; (c) that the intercession of the saints rests upon the merits of Christ, who alone is our Savior and Mediator properly so called, while the saints are mediators only improperly and secondarily.

[21] Trent, sess. XXV, apud Denzinger, n. 860.

§ III. Concerning Devotion.

886. 1. Genuine concept of devotion. In order that the other offices of religion may be more easily fulfilled, devotion is infused into our hearts and increased by repeated acts, or the will of promptly handing oneself over to God and to His worship. For devotion is so called from devoting, and among the Gentiles the devoted were those who devoted themselves to the gods unto death for the safety of the commonwealth. Therefore it is proper to devotion to hand oneself wholly over to the service of God promptly and cheerfully. It can indeed be considered as an act, but here it is taken for a habitual disposition.

[1] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 82; Suarez, op. cit., Tr. IV, lib. II, c. 6-8; St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction a la Vie devote* (*Philothea*), where devotion is excellently treated.

(a) This indeed presupposes the love of God and arises from it, but it is as it were a more intense degree of charity. The first degree of charity consists in this, that all the precepts of God be rightly observed; but when we arrive at that degree of perfection that we not only keep the commandments, but also solicitously, diligently, promptly, and cheerfully do good works, charity receives the name of devotion. Wherefore, according to St. Francis de Sales, if charity is compared to fire, devotion can be likened to flame.

887. (b) Devotion therefore ought to be distinguished from diverse devotions, or spiritual acts and services by which worship toward such a mystery or such a saint is exercised: these are diverse according to the disposition and inclination of each one, and according to various times, while the former is substantially the same in all minds and in various ages. Besides, devotions have

their force from interior devotion, and profit insofar as they increase this; wherefore, if true devotion is diminished by their multiplication, they are carefully to be cut back, lest devotion itself perish.

888. (c) From true devotion differs that sweet and sensible affection, or delight, which we sometimes experience in the service of God. For there are those who enjoy these consolations and a little later hand themselves over to vices, while others are deprived of them, who serve God from their whole heart and from all their strength. Nor is this wonderful: for pious emotions of this kind often arise from the natural temperament itself, and sometimes are also divinely granted to beginners, so that these may gradually be drawn to true piety by sensible affections. Therefore they are not to be despised,[2] since they deter us from the vanities and pleasures of the world: for the least spiritual joy far surpasses all the consolations of the world. Yet one must not trust too much in these pious affections: for they are something transitory and accessory, and they have value insofar as they draw us to solid piety. If they render us arrogant, presumptuous, vain, curious, impatient, disobedient, they are very pernicious; if, on the contrary, they make us more humble, kinder, more fervent, more prone to obedience, mortification, and the fulfillment of the duties of our state, they are truly useful and proceed from God.

[2] Wherefore this proposition 27 of Molinos was condemned by Innocent XI, Nov. 20, 1687 (Denzinger, n. 1114): "He who desires and embraces sensible devotion does not desire nor seek God, but himself; and he acts badly when he desires it and strives to have it, who walks by the internal way, both in sacred places and on solemn days." St. Francis de Sales discusses splendidly the utility and dangers of sensible consolations, and also spiritual aridities, *Introduction a la Vie devote*, p. IV, ch. 13-15.

Therefore when spiritual consolations occur, they are to be used for fostering humility, self-denial, and the mortification of passions and vices. But it must be kept before the mind that true and solid devotion is not that which rests upon pious emotions and is situated in the sensible appetite, but that which is nourished by faith and charity, remains in the will, and induces one to do arduous things for the sake of God and the neighbor.

889. 2. Means of progressing in devotion. That true devotion is very useful is clear from the fact that it renders us prompt and cheerful for fulfilling the offices of religion, and therefore greatly promotes spiritual progress, and brings true peace and internal joy. Therefore it is of the greatest moment to progress assiduously in devotion.

(A) For this, first, certain impediments must be removed: (a) a proclivity toward earthly consolations and pleasures; for no one can serve two masters, the world and Christ, pleasure and devotion, the flesh and the spirit, but between these two one must necessarily choose. For nothing turns us more away from the service of God than disordered affection for earthly and carnal things, since the mind ensnared by these delights is not able to savor the things that are of God: "For they that are according to the flesh mind the things that are of the flesh; but they that are according to the spirit mind the things that are of the spirit... Because the wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be. And they who are in the flesh cannot please God."[3]

[3] Rom. 8:5-8.

(b) Immoderate solicitude for temporal things, and excessive occupation in external affairs. The duty is indeed incumbent upon Christians of sustaining themselves and their own, and therefore of laboring strenuously; but it is a vice to be so immersed in business, labors, and earthly solicitudes, that scarcely any thought is had of heavenly things, and the offices of religion are passed over, or are fulfilled only negligently.

On this matter let the Lord be heard:[4] "Therefore I say to you, be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat, nor for your body, what you shall put on. Is not the life more than the meat, and the body more than the raiment?... For your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things. Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God, and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you." Therefore, among the various solicitudes and occupations of the world, the mind should sometimes be raised to God; and fixed times for praying and thinking of salvation should be predetermined, lest the mind be plunged into the depth of earthly solicitude.

[4] Matt. 6:25-33; let the whole passage be read with the comparisons there given.

890. (c) Excessive curiosity, and immoderate affection for studies, even theological ones; for these, unless they are tempered by pure intention and frequent elevation of the mind to God, easily drink up the sap of devotion and completely dry out the mind. On the contrary, however, if we devote ourselves to study with the intention of pleasing God and instructing the neighbor, if we use acquired knowledge for nourishing our own faith and charity and that of others, we certainly progress much in devotion.[5]

[5] To the point St. Thomas says, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 82, a. 3, ad 3: "Knowledge and whatever else pertains to greatness is an occasion for man to trust in himself; and therefore not to hand himself over totally to God... Yet if man perfectly subjects knowledge and any other perfection to God, devotion is increased from this very thing."

Wherefore St. Bernard earnestly exhorts his disciple and friend Eugenius III, raised to the chair of Peter, that among the innumerable occupations by which he is pressed, he not neglect consideration:[6] "And first indeed consideration purifies its own fountain, that is, the mind from which it arises. Then it rules the affections, directs acts, corrects excesses, composes morals, honors and orders life, finally confers knowledge both of divine and human things... This is what pre-orders things to be done, and reconsiders things done, so that nothing may reside in the mind either uncorrected or needing correction. This is what foresees adversities in prosperity, and in adversities as if does not feel them: of which the one belongs to fortitude, the other to prudence."

[6] St. Bernard, *De consideratione*, lib. I, c. 7, P. L., CLXXXII, 737.

891. Moreover the positive means by which devotion is fostered are: (a) attentive and pious consideration of divine benefits and of one's own defects.

St. Thomas splendidly declares this:[7] for since devotion is an act of the will, it is necessary that it proceed from some consideration of the intellect. "A twofold consideration induces one to this: one indeed which is on the part of the divine goodness and His benefits, according to that saying:[8] It is good for me to adhere to God, and to put my hope in the Lord God; and this consideration excites love, which is the proximate cause of devotion. The other is on the part of the man considering his own defects, from which he needs to lean upon God, according to that saying:[9] I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, whence help shall come to me: my help is from the Lord who made heaven

and earth; and this consideration excludes presumption, by which someone is impeded from subjecting himself to God, while he leans upon his own strength." Among the divine benefits, it especially helps to recall the Lord's passion: for while we recall Christ's anguish, torments, and ignominious death, we easily understand that our whole life, all labors, and all services are owed to Him who suffered such things for us.

[7] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 82, a. 3.

[8] Ps. 72:27.

[9] Ps. 120:1.

892. (b) Nor is frequent thought of the divine presence less profitable, with brief ejaculatory prayers, and the often repeated offering of actions. For by these exercises our whole life is ordered to God; and certainly as often as we turn the eyes of the mind to God, especially if we recall that He dwells assiduously in the temple of our heart, and offer our actions to Him as spiritual victims, so often do we dedicate and devote ourselves and our goods to God, and thus devotion wondrously grows.

(c) Finally, prayer itself greatly helps devotion, just as it is rendered easier through devotion: for there is a mutual and constant influence of prayer upon devotion, and of devotion upon prayer. For since true devotion is a gift of God, we ought earnestly to ask it; on the other hand, since devotion renders us prompt for the service of God, it makes us pour forth more fervent prayers.

893. Corollary. From this it follows that genuine devotion is fitting not only for clerics and religious, but also for every kind of vocation and state of men: for all can and ought to love God and promptly and cheerfully order their life to Him. If devotion were situated in fasts and tears, in the assiduous reciting of prayers, or contemplation, in austerities or vigils, it would indeed be adapted to few. But true devotion, far from hindering the duties of any state from being fulfilled, greatly helps us to execute them more perfectly: thus a mother of a family who is truly devout will better love her husband and children, because she will strive to do good to them not only on account of natural motives, but also on account of God and Christ. Therefore let spiritual directors take care, adhering to the footsteps of St. Francis de Sales,[10] to teach devotion in such a way that they may sweetly induce penitents to fulfill all the duties of their proper state more perfectly.

[10] Cf. St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction a la Vie devote*, p. I, ch. 3; Hamon, *Vie de S. Fr. de Sales*, Paris, 1858, l. V, ch. 1.

Art. II. Concerning the Vices Opposed to Religion.

Besides sins of omission, which can be understood rather easily from what has been said above, there are two genera of sins which are opposed to religion: superstition, by excess; and irreligiosity, by contempt.

[2] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 92-100; Suarez, op. cit., Tr. III; Billuart, diss. VII, VIII; St. Alphonsus, lib. IV, *De Praeceptis*, n. 1-117; Lehmkuhl, n. 351-404; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 325-531.

§ I. Concerning the Sins of Superstition.

894. Superstition (from the word *super-sto*) etymologically designates that which is excessive (beyond that which is due); and as to the thing, a vice by which divine worship is exhibited to a creature to whom it is not due, or to God, yet in an undue manner.

We shall speak: 1. of idolatry; 2. of superstitious observances; 3. of modern facts of magnetism and spiritism, in which supernatural agents can intervene.

I. Concerning Idolatry.

895. 1. Notion. Idolatry is situated in this, that divine worship is exhibited to some creature. When someone offers supreme worship to an idol, thinking that it is God, idolatry includes an error of the intellect, infidelity or heresy: such were the Gentiles and Manichaeans, such are modern pagans. But if someone, knowing that there is one God, exhibits divine honor to some creature, from hatred of God or cupidity of obtaining something from a demon, there is not indeed infidelity, but the greatest depravity of heart.

Under another respect, idolatry is true and internal, when someone has the intention of adoring a false deity; simulated or external, if someone, from fear or command, externally adores an idol, without internally wishing to offer this service: thus, in the time of persecutions, not a few, who were called the lapsed, sacrificed to idols.

896. 2. Malice. Idolatry is in itself a most grave sin. (a) It was most strictly prohibited by the first precept of the Decalogue, and indeed under most grave penalties; truly, from the whole history of the Jews it is clear that they were severely reproved and chastised with dreadful calamities whenever, having abandoned the Supreme Deity, they sacrificed to false gods. (b) In the first ages of the Church, idolatry was held as one of the most grave sins, on account of which public penance was imposed, often prolonged even to the end of life: hence reconciliation was not granted to the lapsed except a little before death, or when a new persecution arose.

(c) Truly, he who bestows divine honor upon a creature, "as much as is in him, makes another God in the world, diminishing the divine principality";[2] and, just as in the civil order, it is most grave to bestow royal honor upon another than the true king, because thus the whole order of the commonwealth is disturbed, so he who exhibits divine honors to a false deity overturns the authority of God.

[2] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 94, a. 3.

897. But simulated idolatry is less grave than internal idolatry, although of itself it constitutes a mortal sin both because of the external denial of faith (above, n. 653), and because of the scandal given to others. Furthermore idolaters who ignorantly worship false deities sin less gravely than heretics who knowingly adulterate the faith which they have received.

898. Corollary. Those approach near to idolatry who so worship and invoke the saints, relics, and images, that they believe there is in them by their own powers the power of bestowing natural or supernatural gifts; for thus that which belongs to the Creator alone is attributed to

creatures. Wherefore the faithful are carefully to be instructed, lest perhaps, while they indulge in these devotions, they gradually fall into superstition.

II. Concerning Superstitious Observances.

899. 1. General concept. Superstitious observances are called those modes of acting by which a vain and disproportionate means is applied so that some effect may be obtained. Therefore two things manifest a vain observance: the manifest insufficiency of the means for obtaining the effect, and the infallibility which is attributed to these means. For when these two concur, the intended effect can be expected only from a supernatural agent; and thus there is superstition, because such an effect is expected either from God or His angels, against the divinely instituted order, or from the demon, through a pact either explicit or implicit.

[1] Besides the authors already cited, cf. Del Rio, S.J.; *Ami du Clerge, Le Spiritisme*, t. XXII, 1900, pp. 328, 488, 758; *Le Demonisme*, t. XXIV, 1902, pp. 289, 625, 849, 897, 977, 1057. Yet it seems to us that there more is attributed to the devil than is necessary, if the facts are critically inspected.

Thus these or similar things savor of superstition: to will to hear Mass before sunrise, or with a certain number and order of candles, celebrated by a priest whose name is John, etc., if there is the persuasion that by these various circumstances special and extraordinary effects of grace are infallibly obtained: for there is no proportion, either of itself or from divine institution, between these ridiculous things and the intended effect. - Generally this kind of superstition does not exceed venial sin, on account of good faith and simplicity; yet it must carefully be reprehended and corrected, because otherwise men who are little strengthened in faith are kept away from true religion.

900. But more often an extraordinary effect is expected from the devil or an evil spirit. Sometimes there is as it were an explicit pact (real or imaginary) with the demon, or at least he is expressly invoked; sometimes there is only tacit invocation, insofar as the agent knows that the cause applied is unfit for obtaining the effect, unless an evil spirit intervenes.

But experiments which are made by experts, for detecting new laws of nature hitherto unknown, differ altogether from these superstitions. For there are many hidden things which can be detected only by patient and long observation; and not a few phenomena which formerly were ascribed to magic are today explained naturally.

901. 2. Specifically concerning divination. Among superstitions is enumerated divination, by which the demon is expressly or tacitly invoked for knowing hidden things by his help.

It can be manifold: evocation of spirits, when these appear in a sensible form; necromancy, when the apparition of the dead is sought; oneiromancy, if the manifestation of hidden things is made through a dream; pythonism, if, through men or women, spirits teach hidden things; haruspicy, if secrets are sought from the entrails of animals immolated to the gods; augury or auspice, if the manifestation of hidden things is expected from the cries of animals, the song or flight of birds; chiromancy or physiognomy, when someone tries to detect future things from the lines of the hands or countenance; sortilege, if knowledge of hidden things is sought from arbitrarily chosen signs, for example from the cast of dice, etc.

902. 3. Vain observance. This differs from divination, because it is ordered not so much to detecting hidden things as to producing some effect.

A threefold kind is usually distinguished: (a) the notorious art, or the art of acquiring knowledge without labor, by means altogether unfit, for example by uttering certain words; (b) the art of healings,[4] or the art of curing diseases by unfit means, for example by amulets hung on the neck, by diverse signs or words which are thought to produce their effect *ex opere operato*; (c) malefice, by which someone, through similarly unfit means, tries to inflict some evil upon the neighbor; it is called amatory if it tends to excite a most vehement love or hatred, and venomous if it tends to bring harm upon a person, family, or goods.

[4] This superstition indeed ought altogether to be distinguished from the gift, natural or supernatural, of curing certain diseases, which belongs to certain men. When these do nothing ridiculous, and otherwise are honest, and have not entered into any pact with the devil, they are not to be prohibited from exercising this gift, especially if they protest that they will to reject whatever would be diabolical. Cf. Noldin, n. 161.

903. 4. Concerning the malice of superstitious observances. (A) It must first be noted that many of the phenomena which are called superstitious must be ascribed to fraud or imagination. For since it is very well known that there is in men an innate propensity for detecting hidden things or seeing marvelous things, in all ages and regions clever men have been found, greedy for money, who, in order to favor curiosity, feigned that they had commerce with supernatural agents, and by skillful industry deceived them.[5] Besides, those who are endowed with a vivid imagination often take phantasms for true phenomena,[6] especially when a third person suggests it. - Moreover certain other facts which formerly were attributed to the devil, when the matter has been better weighed, can be ascribed to natural forces: for recent discoveries show that there are many forces, formerly unknown, by which marvelous effects are obtained. - Yet, since there truly are evil spirits, who solicit men to evil, as was said in *De Deo Creante*, n. 91-99, it is not wonderful that, by their help, preternatural and prodigious things are sometimes accomplished, so that the unwary may more easily be deceived and drawn to illicit things. Therefore in individual cases all circumstances ought carefully to be weighed, so that it can be discerned whether the alleged facts are diabolical or not, and whether penitents had a superstitious intention or not.

[5] Thus the famous Home, who in great cities, and especially in Paris, had exercised the magic art and had obtained responses from rotating tables, when near death declared that he himself had given responses of this kind. Cf. P. Davis, *La fin du monde des esprits, le spiritisme devant la raison et la science*, Paris, 1887, p. 287; Surbled, *Spirites et Mediums*, Paris, 1901, p. 93-105.

[6] Malefactors, who were thought to gather to celebrate a sabbath, used narcotic medicines, and for the most part dreamed that they saw the things which they afterward narrated. Surbled, *La morale*, t. IV, ch. 19.

904. (B) Whatever may be the case concerning the speculative question, the moral malice of superstitions ought to be judged especially from the intention itself of the agents, from the effects which they foresaw, and from the dangers of sinning to which they expose themselves.

(a) First, if there was an explicit pact with the demon, real or imaginary, or an express invocation of the same, it is certainly a most grave sin; for he inflicts a grave injury upon God who seriously enters,

or wishes to enter, into society with the devil, the most bitter enemy of God: "Neither let there be found among you... any one that consulteth soothsayers, or observeth dreams and omens, neither let there be any wizard, nor charmer, nor any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead; for the Lord abhorreth all these things."[7]

[7] Deut. 18:10-11; cf. Lev. 19:31; 20:27.

(b) Even when there is no explicit pact, if, from superstition, a means is knowingly applied which is unfit for the intended effect, a grave sin is committed of itself, because diabolical intervention is implicitly desired. Yet, in this case, many are excused from mortal sin on account of simplicity or ignorance, or because they act from mere curiosity, especially if there is not a certain expectation of the event, but only a certain hope. Nevertheless penitents are to be turned away from superstitions of this kind, which gradually divert the mind from true religion.

(c) If someone uses malefice, he sins besides against charity and justice; and if harm is truly inflicted upon the neighbor, there is an obligation of repairing it.

(d) In doubt whether phenomena are natural or diabolical, the principles concerning cooperation are to be applied (above, n. 185): therefore it is licit to posit an action which of itself is not evidently evil, provided there is a proportionately grave reason for acting, and the good effect is intended, not however the evil one, or diabolical cooperation.

905. (C) There are certain extraordinary phenomena which today are quite commonly held, or at least can be held, as natural, and therefore are licit from what has already been said: (a) Thus the use of the divining rod for detecting waters or certain metals cannot be condemned: for the movement of this rod is rather easily explained from a certain influence of water or metals; in truth pious Christians and priests use it without any fear of diabolical intervention.[8]

[8] *Revue du monde invisible*, Oct. 15, 1898; July 15, 1899; Surbled, *Le secret des Sourciers*, in *Science Catholique*, Sept. 1902.

(b) Sometimes certain hidden things are manifested to those dreaming, and sometimes to those awake, either by God,[9] or in a natural way through a certain, as they say, telepathy;[10] on the other hand, it is commonly admitted that the demon can excite some phantasms in the mind of those sleeping.[11] Therefore from the circumstances it must be discerned whether these dreams or presentiments are sent by God, or are diabolical, or natural. If they proceed from God, the thing manifested bears nothing ridiculous before it, impels to good, leaves the soul tranquil and also more cheerful for performing works of piety. - But it would be rash to direct one's actions from those things which appeared in sleep, since hallucination frequently occurs in this matter. - Sometimes, however, to posit or omit some indifferent action on account of a dream is not prohibited, since warnings received in sleep are sometimes true.

[9] Num. 12:6; Acts 2:17.

[10] Facts of telepathy, which occur not only through sleep but also in the state of wakefulness, you will find set forth in the work *Phantasms of the Living*, by Gurney, Myers, and Podmore, rendered in French by L. Marillier under this title *Hallucinations telepathiques*, Paris, Alcan; Surbled, *Morale*, t. IV, ch. 14; C. Flammarion, *L'Inconnu et les Problemes psychiques*, Paris, 1900; J. Maxwell, *Les Phenomenes psychiques*, 2nd ed., 1904, Paris, Alcan, p. 183-191; *Civilta cattolica*, Serie XVII, vol. VII, p. 144, 411, 673, etc.

[11] This is also inferred from Deut. 18:10.

III. Concerning Modern Facts Which Are Circulated Under the Name of Magnetism or Spiritism.

906. 1. Historical overview. In our age, under the name of magnetism or spiritism, many phenomena have been made public, concerning which it can be inquired whether they are diabolical or not.

(a) The principal promoter of animal magnetism is recognized to be Anthony Mesmer, a Viennese physician, who around the end of the eighteenth century, seeking new modes of curing, thought that he had found a marvelous means in a certain most subtle fluid, which is similar to magnetic fluid, and is supposed to flow from the bodies of animals, indeed to pervade absolutely all bodies. His disciples developed his system, especially Puysegur and J. Braid.[1] There are especially three phenomena attributed to magnetism, which are produced either by gestures of the hands, or by magnetized substances, or even by the simple nod of the will expressed in words: convulsions, and various physiological effects which are diverse according to the diverse condition of the sick; a certain state of paralysis and catalepsy, in which the members become rigid and sensibility vanishes; magnetic sleep, in which the magnetized person, although deprived of the use of the senses, nevertheless sees, hears, and speaks, indeed knows marvelous things which before were unknown to him, and perceives actions which are done secretly or far away. - Hypnotism soon succeeded magnetism; its phenomena were described above, n. 134.

[1] Cf. Deleuze, *Histoire critique du magnetisme animal*, Paris, 1813; Puysegur, *Memoire pour servir a l'histoire... du magnetisme*, Paris, 1830; J. Braid, *Neurypnology, or the Rationale of Nervous Sleep*, London, 1843; A. Wood, *What is Mesmerism*, Edinburgh, 1851; Heidenhain, *Animal Magnetism*, London, 1880; Perrone, *De Virtute Religionis*, n. 400 sq.; *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, word "Magnetism animal"; Gasc-Desfosses, *Magnetisme vital*, Paris, 1897; Surbled, *Morale*, t. IV, ch. 6. - Concerning diabolical obsession and possession we spoke in *De Deo Creante*, n. 95-99. Sometimes, however, certain facts similar to obsession are mere hallucinations. Cf. Veronnet, *La possession diabolique*, in *Revue du Clerge francais*, t. XXXVII (1904), p. 570, and t. XXXIX, p. 423.

907. (b) Modern spiritism[2] had its origin in the Federated States of America. Already in the year 1832, three boys playing, with a hand placed upon a certain table, made it rotate, and practice of this kind immediately was diffused far and wide through America. But in the year 1848 a new phase of the same thing began in a little town of the State of New York, called Hydesville; namely, in the house which the Fox family, of the Methodist sect, inhabited, knocks and noises were heard: indeed amazed, but not terrified, two young girls who lived there, thinking that a spirit was present, asked from it that it would respond by distinct blows; and this indeed succeeded in such a way that a little afterward they became mediators between spirits and persons who wished to communicate with them. Sometimes also various utensils of the house were thrown here and there, whether in closed rooms, or in the presence of the Fox family. From this the matter became frequent not only in America but in all Europe, and in the years 1852-1854 became common. Everywhere it was noted that the principal phenomena occurred only when certain persons were present; these persons are called media or mediators, since the phenomena are produced only through their mediation. Nor do individual media have equal force or aptitude for accomplishing them, but some are more skilled than others; besides, the same media do not seem equally apt for producing the same effects in any session whatever, but succeed more or less according to various circumstances. - Moreover there were diverse

forms of spiritism: for sometimes spirits gave responses through rotating tables, either by striking various blows, or by writing with the help of a pen or stylus, or by the hand of the medium; but sometimes there was a direct evocation and apparition of spirits. All these things indeed were accompanied by various mechanical phenomena, for example of levitation, by which the laws of nature concerning the gravity of bodies seemed to be suspended; luminous phenomena, with flashes and splendors suddenly appearing; or even by noises imitating the whistling of winds or the roar of waters; or by harmonious sounds imitating human voices; physiological phenomena, namely the vital functions being more or less disturbed, but especially the nervous system being more or less shaken and as it were exhausted. Yet it must by no means be doubted that very many frauds have intervened in all these things, and it is often difficult to distinguish the true from the false.[3]

[2] E. W. Capron, *Modern Spiritualism*, Boston, 1855; Edmonds and Dexter, *Spiritualism*, New York, 1854-57; Allan Kardec, *Le livre des esprits*, *Le livre des mediums*, Paris, 1864-1865; O. Brownson, *The Spirit Rapper*; Crookes, *Researches on the Phenomena of Spiritualism*; *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, word "Spiritualism"; E. Meric, *Le Merveilleux et la Science*, Paris, 1887; id., *L'imagination et les prodiges*, Paris, 1905; E. Dupouy, *Sciences occultes et physiologie psychique*, Paris, 1898; Surbled, *Spiritualisme et spiritisme*, Paris, 1898; Gibier, *Le Spiritisme*, Paris, Doin, 1904; Grasset, *Le Spiritisme devant la Science*, Paris, Masson, 1904; Maxwell, *Les Phenomenes psychiques*, where the phenomena observed by him are described methodically and accurately. - L. Denis sets forth modern theories of spiritism, *Christianisme et spiritisme*, Paris, Leymarie, 1903; id., *Apres la mort*.

[3] For not a few of the persons who boast that they are media try to deceive not only the simple, but also the learned; others, who are truly media, use frauds to amplify the phenomena which they produce. Cf. *Proceedings Soc. for Psych. Researches*, VI, p. 253; XIII, p. 45; Maxwell, op. cit., p. 116 and 256-312. Thus, concerning the Fox sisters, certain American physicians said: "The double raps were produced by a rapid movement of dislocation and relocation of the knee" (Maxwell, op. cit., p. 258).

908. 2. Principal phenomena. Among the phenomena which have been scientifically weighed and are thought to be free from fraud, these especially can be enumerated:

(A) Physical phenomena: (a) the noise of a table, whose foot, raising itself and afterward descending, strikes the earth and thus gives responses; these motions and noises sometimes occur not only when the bystanders extend their palms over the table, but also when they have already withdrawn from it.[4] Sometimes also a rotating table strikes one or another of the bystanders. (b) Objects fixed to the walls, or those which are in the room, fall or are moved confusedly, not without great noise; after some time, all return to their former state.[5] (c) Sometimes a stool or table, where the medium sits, is raised into the air (which is called levitation), without any cause of motion appearing.[6] (d) Not rarely flames or lights of diverse color appear in a dark room.[7] (e) Sometimes human hands, feet, a head appear; indeed, although rarely, an entire human body, ordinarily clothed in long and broad garments, walking, speaking with those present, which leaves a photographic impression of itself, either in paper, or in wax or gypsum, and otherwise can be touched:[8] these phenomena are called materializations of spirits, because they are thought to be the bodily apparition of some spirit or of the soul of one deceased. But many are persuaded that these spirits are nothing other than human persons who are called media, clothed with special garments and masks; that the matter is thus has been discovered in some cases.[9]

[4] Maxwell, op. cit., p. 67-85.

[5] Maxwell reports facts of this kind observed by trustworthy witnesses, op. cit., p. 232-255. To this belong the phenomena which are called haunting, haunted house, concerning which see E. Dupouy, op. cit., p. 273-309; Surbled, *Hantise*, in *Science Catholique*, 1899; *Civilta cattolica*, Serie XVIII, vol. III and IV.

[6] Maxwell, p. 87-92.

[7] Maxwell, p. 118-146.

[8] Maxwell, p. 135-162 and 209-212. - Especially celebrated is the apparition, for three years, of the spirit who called herself Katie King; the very well-known W. Crookes described her various manifestations, who affirms that he observed not a few differences between the bodily form of this spirit and the medium, namely Miss Cook. Apud Dupouy, op. cit., p. 216-231. Yet certain persons think that the most learned Crookes was deceived: thus Davis, op. cit., p. 39-90; the same author explains, p. 224, how in New York those who wish to deceive the common people by apparitions of spirits are taught.

[9] Cf. Davis, op. cit., p. 163 sq.

909. (B) Intellectual phenomena. By the blows of a rotating table, or by the writing of the medium, or even by conversation with the same, certain hidden or secret things can be known. (a) Sometimes facts are manifested which occur in a distant place, for example the illness or death of some person;[10] at other times objects are detected which had been lost or placed in a hidden place. (b) Often indifferent things and things little connected among themselves are brought forth; not rarely false things are mixed with true.[11] (c) Generally the responses given are accommodated to the mind, disposition, and dispositions of those present; if they are Christians and devout, nothing is said against religion, but rather the doctrine of Christ and worship toward God are commended. But if impious or unbelieving persons are present, certain Catholic dogmas are denied, especially the eternity of punishments, the indissolubility of the matrimonial bond; the name of God is retained, but a little afterward pantheism is proposed.[12] Finally, when men of little honesty are present, shameful things are sometimes brought forth and commended. - But whether secrets of hearts and future events are revealed with certainty is not so certain; for the alleged facts seem to some to be nothing other than those things which probably can be detected or foreseen from things already known.

[10] Dupouy, op. cit., p. 115-126 and 140-143, 151-173; Gurney, Myers, Podmore, op. cit.

[11] Maxwell, op. cit., p. 202-212; 242-255.

[12] This is clear, for example, from the works edited by Allan Kardec, *Le livre des esprits*, *Le livre des mediums*.

910. 3. Various opinions concerning the cause of these phenomena. Although certain persons still deny most of the facts hitherto described, today they are rather commonly recognized as true by many even unbelievers, except however apparitions of spirits, as is clear from the authors cited, not a few of whom admit no revelation. Nevertheless they are explained in diverse ways:

(a) Some say that all these things are merely natural, although the same cannot be scientifically explained because of the limits of modern science; but as science progresses, the natural reason for these things will at last one day be manifested.[13] (b) Others, on the contrary, hold that at least the principal and almost all facts of this kind must be attributed to the devil;[14] for, on the one hand, they not only go beyond the laws of nature, but also often contradict them; on the other, they cannot be

ascribed either to God or to the good angels, since ridiculous, false things, contrary to faith and morals, are often found mixed with them; therefore they must be attributed to the devil alone.

[13] Thus, among others: A. Maury, *La magie et l'astrologie dans l'antiquite et le moyen-age*, Paris, 1864; C. Richet, Preface to the already cited work of Maxwell; Gibier, op. cit.; M. de Rochas, *Les etats profonds de l'hypnose*.

[14] Franco, *L'hypnotisme remis a la mode*, Paris, 1891; id., *La nouvelle theorie de la suggestion*, Paris, 1892; Ch. Helot, *Nevroses et possession diaboliques*, Paris, Bloud, 1897.

(c) Between these two extremes, not a few Catholics are found who ascribe many of these phenomena to the laws of nature, and only certain ones to a supernatural agent, whose nature, in any case whatever, ought to be judged from the circumstances, according to the laws of the discernment of spirits.[15] And we assent to these. For since new laws of nature, or at least new applications of the same, are detected daily, and on the other hand supernatural agents usually intervene rarely, a fact often occurring can be held as natural, probably at least, as long as the contrary is not morally certain. Ferraris had already wisely observed this.[16]

[15] Thus Meric, *Le merveilleux et la Science*, and in the periodical *La Revue du monde invisible*; Coconnier, *L'hypnotisme franc*; P. G. Moreau, *L'hypnotisme, etude scientifique et religieuse*, Paris, 1891; Guibert, *Etude sur l'hypnotisme*; Surbled, *Spirites et Mediums*; id., *Les Frontieres du surnaturel*; Lescoeur, *La Science et les faits surnaturels contemporains*, Paris, Roger, 1900; P. de la Barre, *L'ordre de la nature et le miracle*; P. Grasset, *L'hypnotisme et la suggestion*, Paris, 1903; id., *Le spiritisme devant la Science*, 1904.

[16] Ferraris, *Prompta Bibliotheca*, word "superstitio."

911. 4. The more probable opinion is proposed. (A) Moreover the opinion which we defend seems clearly to be inferred from various responses of the Holy Office concerning magnetism.

Thus, on June 23, 1840, the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, to the question whether magnetism, taken generally and in itself, ought to be considered licit or illicit, responded: "Every error, sortilege, and explicit or implicit invocation of the demon being removed, the use of magnetism, namely the mere act of applying physical means otherwise licit, is not morally forbidden, provided it does not tend to an illicit end, or in any way depraved. But the application of principles and means purely physical to things and effects truly supernatural, so that they may be physically explained, is nothing but an altogether illicit and heretical deception."[1] From this it is clear that not every species of magnetism (say the same of hypnotism) is condemned, but only that by which effects truly supernatural are expected from merely physical means. Moreover what those supernatural effects are is declared in the Encyclical of the Holy Office, issued on Wednesday, July 30, 1856, and sent to all Bishops: "Although by this general decree the licitness or illicitness in the use or abuse of magnetism is sufficiently explained; yet the malice of men has so increased that, neglecting the licit pursuit of knowledge, and rather pursuing curious things, with great loss of souls and detriment to civil society itself, they boast that they have obtained a certain principle of soothsaying and divining. Hence, by the tricks of somnambulism and clear vision, as they call them, little women, carried away by gestures not always modest, babble that they see all invisible things, and undertake discourses about religion itself, evoke the souls of the dead, receive responses, detect unknown and distant things, and rashly presume to exercise other superstitious things of this kind, certain to obtain great gain for themselves and their masters by divining. In all these things, whatever art or

illusion they may finally use, since physical means are ordered to non-natural effects, there is an altogether illicit and heretical deception, and scandal against the honesty of morals."[2]

[1] *Collectanea S. C. de Prop. F.,* n. 1743.

[2] *Acta Sanctae Sedis*, t. I, p. 177; *Collectanea*, n. 1754.

912. (B) But if we descend to particulars, these things can be established:

(a) When there is question of merely physical phenomena, such as rotations of tables, blows, various motions even of levitation, they are not to be attributed to a preternatural agent, unless it is morally certain that these same things, from various circumstances, evidently contradict the laws of nature. For many today probably think that there is in the human body, especially of certain persons in whom the nervous system preemininently stands out, a certain fluid, analogous to the magnetic or electric fluid, which can be projected outwardly and influence surrounding objects, either by immediate contact, or by mediate contact transmitted through the ether;[3] and thus, at least hypothetically, the blows and movements of rotating tables can be explained.

[3] To the point S. Cox, apud Davis, op. cit., p. 293: "The theory of psychic force is simply to recognize a fact almost indisputable under some respects, but still imperfectly known under others. This fact establishes that at an indefinite distance from the body of certain persons, having a special nervous organization, there exists a force producing, without the aid of muscles, a particular action capable of giving motion or making solid substances move, and of producing sounds in these same bodies."

913. (b) The same can be said concerning intellectual phenomena which do not transcend the intellectual powers of those present and of the medium; for if, under the influence of the medium, responses are given, they certainly do not proceed from the table itself, nor necessarily from a supernatural agent, but only from the very mind of the person who, by force of the fluid emitted by him, directs the motion of the table. - On the contrary, however, if the phenomena denote knowledge of things which surpass the capacity either of the medium or of those present, they ought to be attributed to a supernatural agent; such are, according to the Roman Ritual, "to speak with many words in an unknown tongue, or to understand one speaking; to disclose distant and hidden things; to show powers above the nature of one's age or condition; and other things of this kind, which, when several concur, are greater indications." From this it follows that generally not one of these indications suffices for producing moral certainty, but several are desired. As to speech in an unknown tongue, it is not enough, in a state of feverish excitement, to recite certain words which were heard formerly, but it is necessary that someone indubitably show that he has suddenly learned or truly understands a language which he by no means knew. As to distant and hidden things, it is not enough to conjecture them, or even to see something about them in a certain state of hyperesthesia;[4] but, if things which can be known only by revelation or inspiration are distinctly manifested, such as secrets of hearts, future events, and indeed not conjecturally, but with certainty, this must be ascribed to a supernatural agent. But what kind of agent this is cannot be defined except from all the adjuncts, from object, end, and circumstances, by investigating whether all these things tend to good or to evil.

[4] For certain facts of telepathy or clear vision, which occur transiently in a state of hyperesthesia (that is, abnormal sensibility), are not wholly certain indications of supernatural intervention.

914. 5. Practical conclusions. Whatever may be the case concerning the nature and cause of these phenomena, these things seem to be established in practice:

(A) The faithful are carefully to be turned away from the use of magnetism, hypnotism, and spiritism for the sake of mere curiosity; for it usually disturbs the nervous system and prepares the way for neurasthenia and hysteria, concerning which above, n. 130-131; besides, it favors superstition, and turns the mind away from the practice of true religion, insofar namely as those who are addicted to these extraordinary things neglect the ordinary duties of Christian life as too common; not rarely it stirs up dissensions between persons and families, by spreading suspicions or defamations; sometimes it also harms good morals, insofar as young persons of different sex are present at these gatherings, and seek responses from the medium which are less honorable.

915. (a) Hence, on July 1, 1841, the use of magnetism was declared illicit, as it was being expounded by the Bishop of Lausanne; and among other things this was being expounded:[5] the magnetized person, who is generally of the female sex, questioned about her own illness and the illness of persons absent and entirely unknown to her, although evidently unlearned, most accurately states anatomical matters; she points out the cause, seat, nature of internal diseases in the human body, which are most difficult for experts to know and define, and unfolds their progress, variations, and complications, and this by proper terms; often also she exactly pronounces the duration of the said diseases, and prescribes the simplest and most efficacious remedies. If the hair of an absent person is placed against the palm of the magnetized woman, she immediately declares whose hair it is, where the person to whom it belongs now is, what he is doing, and discusses his illness no otherwise than if, after the manner of physicians, she herself were looking within the body. With covered eyes she can read a book or manuscript, open or closed, placed upon the head or stomach. - Deservedly indeed the use of such magnetism was prohibited, since, from the things set forth, it is very dangerous and can be attributed either to fraud or to the devil; in either case the simple are deceived, are made prone to vain superstitions, and, while they intend to be cured, can contract graver diseases.

[5] You have the complete petition apud Gury-Ballerini, n. 280.

916. (b) The indiscriminate use of hypnotism likewise is illicit, because, as physicians admit, unless it is cautiously applied by honorable and skilled men, it brings in almost the same dangers as magnetism in both the physical[6] and moral order, insofar namely as the hypnotized person, losing the use of reason for some time, depends wholly, as to the exercise of his own activity, upon the nod of the hypnotizer and is subject to his dominion. But if it is applied within its own limits, without any intention of rashly knowing hidden and future things, by physicians or physiologists, both skilled and honorable, with due caution, and for a grave cause, it is not in itself illicit.[7] For, according to Catholics who have investigated these things, hypnotic phenomena which are certain do not seem to go beyond the powers of the natural order; on the other hand, the temporary privation of the use of reason can be permitted for a grave cause, as indeed sleep induced by ether is permitted; moreover abuses which can arise from this can be forestalled by due caution; indeed some utility can arise from the prudent use of hypnotism, not only as to the cure of diseases, but also as to the correction of depraved habits: for experience shows that certain young men, given to drunkenness and lust, have been

corrected somewhat by mental suggestion prudently applied.[8] Therefore hypnotism is not illicit in itself, but, as dangerous, is to be applied only cautiously. - Besides, the good effects described above are produced more prudently, without disturbance of the nerves, by suggestion in the state of wakefulness.[9]

[6] Grasset, *L'hypnotisme*, p. 352-369; Coconnier, op. cit., p. 155-158.

[7] Lehmkuhl, n. 994, note 1; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 365; Coconnier, p. 260 sq.

[8] Coconnier, op. cit., p. 215 sq. - In truth, the Holy Office, July 26, 1899 (*Collectanea*, t. II, n. 2061), responded that new experiments can be tolerated, after a protestation that one wills to have no part in preternatural facts has been made, provided danger of scandal is absent, and there is not question of facts which certainly go beyond the forces of nature.

[9] Cf. Grasset, *La Psychotherapie*, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Sept. 15, 1905, p. 350.

917. (c) But spiritism, or the evocation of spirits, when it truly happens, is a superstition illicit under grave sin; for good spirits are not accustomed to appear to men, unless they are sent by God for promoting His glory; therefore, if sometimes spirits seem to favor human curiosity, they certainly are not good, but evil. Hence it is necessary to exhort the faithful that for no reason, not even from curiosity, should they assist at gatherings where the phenomena of spiritism are exhibited. And so the Holy Office, on April 24, 1917, declared that it is not licit, through a Medium or without a Medium, hypnotism being applied or not, to assist at spiritistic manifestations, even those bearing before themselves the appearance of honesty or piety, even with tacit or express protestation that one wills to have no part with malign spirits.

918. (B) But if there is question of expert men who wish scientifically to weigh psychic and biological phenomena, so that, insofar as can be done, the laws of nature may be better known, they certainly can carry out those experiments which are necessary for the scientific investigation of the matter, provided supernatural intervention is not sought, and provision is made for the modesty and health of the media.

§ II. Concerning Sins of Irreligiosity.

Sins of irreligiosity are committed against God Himself, or against sacred things. To the first genus are referred blasphemy and the tempting of God; to the latter, sacrilege and simony: concerning these we must speak separately.

[1] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 13 and q. 97-100; Suarez, op. cit., Tr. III, l. I, III-IV; Billuart, diss. VIII, XXI; St. Alphonsus, lib. IV, n. 29-132; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 369-531; Lehmkuhl, n. 364-404; Noldin, n. 171-208.

I. Concerning Blasphemy.

919. 1. Notion. Blasphemy in general is an insult inflicted upon God. Sometimes it is conceived only internally, and, if consent accedes, the malice of blasphemy is already truly incurred.[2] But often it is expressed by some sensible sign, by speech or deed, for example by shooting an arrow against heaven, or discharging a gun, or trampling upon a crucifix. Yet more properly blasphemy is called insulting speech against God; hence if ecclesiastical penalties are enacted against blasphemy, they touch this alone, unless the contrary is explicitly said.

[2] "If it consists only in the heart, it is blasphemy of the heart; but if it proceeds outwardly by speech, it is blasphemy of the mouth" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 13, a. 1).

And so he truly blasphemes who either denies something concerning God which belongs to Him, or asserts concerning Him what does not belong to Him; for in either case insult is inflicted upon Him, for example if God is said to be cruel, or if it is denied that He is omniscient, omnipotent. Consequently he is guilty of blasphemy who attributes to a creature what belongs to God alone, because indirectly the infinite perfection of God, which is incommunicable to creatures, is denied; for example, if someone were to say: I can do that equally as God; - or he who speaks only ironically, or with contempt, concerning God and His attributes, or concerning the Incarnate Word, for example: Thou hast conquered, Galilean; - he who brings forth something insulting against divine or sacred things, or against the Blessed Virgin or the saints, insofar as they are friends of God: for then the injury is ultimately referred to God.

920. Therefore blasphemy is distinguished from imprecations or maledictions, which are uttered against rational or irrational creatures, without relation to God, for example when Job cursed the day of his birth, David cursed the mountains of Gelboe, or when we curse ourselves or the neighbor. These can indeed be sins of anger, or opposed to fraternal charity, but they do not inflict insult upon God.

Thus much more probably these or similar expressions are imprecatory, but not blasphemous: May God damn me! May God damn you, may the devil snatch you, go to hell, etc.; but otherwise, if someone were to say or wish to signify: May God be damned; which however happens very rarely.[3]

[3] E. Brahm explains this fully, *Dissertatio de formula "G. V. D., Deus damnet me"*, Brussels, 1904.

Likewise from blasphemy are distinguished expressions by which the name of God is taken in vain, even if they are preceded by the word sacred (for example, the sacred name of God!); or words which in themselves are blasphemous, but, according to common estimation, are not held as such, but only as a manifestation of anger against persons or irrational creatures (for example, a thousand gods!). For those who assert such things generally by no means intend to bring forth something against God, but only to express their indignation.[4]

[4] To the point Gousset, *Theol. Morale*, t. I, n. 459-460: "It is not a blasphemy, nor a mortal sin, to pronounce, whether in cold blood or in a movement of anger or impatience, the word sacred, which one most often uses with certain coarse expressions, more or less injurious to the neighbor... Nor is it properly so-called blasphemy to pronounce in vain the holy name of God, by saying for example: Name of God! sacred name of God! These words, which one most often brings forth in a movement of impatience, are not against God in the intention of him who permits them to himself, but against men, animals, or inanimate beings with regard to which one gives himself over to anger."

921. Hence, in all these things, the intention and affection of the one speaking ought especially to be attended to: if injury and dishonoring of God are truly intended, there is blasphemy; otherwise, there will be a certain imprecation, which is often excused from mortal sin, because it arises from a movement of indignation imperfectly deliberate. In doubt whether some expression is blasphemous or not, St. Alphonsus says (n. 130), it is by no means to be taken as blasphemy.

Yet expressions of this kind are carefully to be avoided, as unbecoming, unworthy of an honorable man, movements of disordered anger, and not rarely opposed to charity.

922. 2. Malice of blasphemy. (A) Every properly so-called blasphemy is a sin mortal from its whole genus. (a) In the old law, blasphemy was punished by death:[5] "The man that curseth his God shall bear his sin; and he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die: all the multitude shall stone him, whether he be a citizen or a stranger." Under the new law, blasphemy is enumerated among the grave sins which are to be fled:[6] "But now put you also all away: anger, indignation, malice, blasphemy, filthy speech out of your mouth." - Wherefore the Fathers reprove it as most grave; thus St. Jerome writes:[7] "For nothing is more horrible than blasphemy, which sets my mouth on high... for every sin, compared with blasphemy, is lighter."

[5] Lev. 24:15-16.

[6] Col. 3:8.

[7] St. Jerome, *In Isaiam*, l. VII, c. 19, P. L., XXIV, 247.

(b) Truly, blasphemy is directly opposed to religion, by which we are bound to render reverence and honor to God; and therefore, when it is fully deliberate and free, it does not admit smallness of matter.

923. (B) Heretical and imprecatory blasphemy add special malice to simple blasphemy. (a) Heretical blasphemy is called that which embraces heresy, and therefore is opposed not only to religion, but also to faith; for example if someone says: God is a cruel tyrant. (b) Imprecative blasphemy is that by which evil is wished to God, and consequently it is opposed both to religion and to charity; for example, if someone were to say: Let God perish, cursed be God! (c) Yet blasphemy, although most grave in itself, is not rarely a venial sin from defect of advertence or full consent, for example when blasphemous words are brought forth in the heat of passion without sufficient attention of the mind.

924. 3. Remedies against blasphemy. (a) If there is question of true blasphemy, which proceeds both from irreverence toward God and from anger, both these roots must be torn out: one must seriously think how foolish it is to inflict injury and insult upon Him who, on account of His infinite goodness, deserves supreme honor,[8] and, before His omnipotence, can afflict blasphemers with dreadful punishments. But for conquering anger, let the remedies set forth above, n. 534-537, be applied.

[8] M. d'Hulst lucidly explains why the name of God is to be revered and how carefully blasphemy is to be avoided, *Careme* 1903, p. 111-122.

(b) If there is question of blasphemies improperly so called, or of imprecations, they generally arise from anger or long custom. Wherefore irascibility is likewise to be restrained, - and custom conquered by custom, namely by using other words altogether innocent, until anger is at last put away. Besides, the custom should be seriously and sincerely retracted: for then words which suddenly proceed from vehement affection are not imputed as sin, at least grave sin.

II. Concerning the Tempting of God.

925. 1. Notion. The tempting of God is a saying or deed by which, without a just cause, we rashly expect from God some unusual effect.

For to tempt is to take an experiment concerning someone; this is done by words, deeds, or the omission of some deed. By words we tempt God when we rashly ask something from Him with the intention of testing His knowledge, power, or goodness; by deeds, by doing something with the intention of testing the divine attributes, for example if someone casts himself from a high tower, wishing to try whether God wills to save him or not; by omission of some deed, namely by omitting those things which prudence demands for obtaining the intended effect, for example by rejecting all medicines in a grave illness, or by giving a sermon without any preparation, rashly expecting that thoughts and words are to be suggested to him divinely.

926. The tempting of God arises especially from a threefold cause: (a) from unbelief, when someone truly doubts concerning some perfection of God; for example when the Jews said to the Crucified:[9] "If Thou be the Son of God, come down from the cross"; or when the impious say: if God exists, now is the time for Him to show His power by killing me; (b) from rashness or curiosity, if someone, not doubting concerning the power of God, wishes to test whether He wills to do it, for example if someone, firmly holding the real presence of Christ under the eucharistic species, nevertheless asks that the divine Infant appear in the consecrated host; (c) from presumption, if someone, although not wishing to test the power or goodness of God, indubitably expects from Him, without sufficient reason, some miracle, for example if one gravely sick rejects a physician, expecting healing from God, or if a priest, in order to convert sinners and unbelievers, promises to perform some miracle (the case of special inspiration being excluded).

[9] Matt. 27:40.

But the tempting of God is not given in these or similar cases: if in a grave matter, after ordinary means for knowing the will of God have been applied, and doubt remaining, some sign is humbly sought by which the will of God may become known; or if, from a just and grave cause, a miracle is conditionally asked; if someone, in view of a great good, exposes himself to grave danger, hoping that God will be favorable to him: for then, on account of the grave reason, divine help is deservedly hoped for.

927. 2. Malice. (A) The tempting of God which involves unbelief is a mortal sin from its whole genus, since it calls some truth of faith into doubt, and otherwise imports contempt of God, by testing His power or goodness without reason.

(B) The tempting of God arising from rashness, curiosity, or presumption is a sin grave from its genus, because it supposes some contempt of God; but it often admits smallness of matter, on account of the smallness of the danger to which the agent exposes himself, for example if in a light illness someone rejects medicine; it is also often excused from mortal sin on account of ignorance, inconsideration, good faith, etc.

In practice, in order to avoid a sin of this kind, it must be inculcated upon the faithful that God helps those who strenuously and unceasingly exercise their own powers, and at the same time humbly and confidently implore divine help. Therefore let us act with all our strength, using means both natural and supernatural, and place our whole hope in God: He will provide.

928. 3. Corollary. From this it follows that, the case of divine inspiration being excluded, those trials which formerly were called judgments of God are by no means to be approved, as passage through fire for proving the innocence of someone: for then a miracle is asked without necessity. Formerly indeed they had been used in good faith; but afterward they were prohibited by canon law, and deservedly indeed, since there are other means of detecting truth.[10]

[10] Vacandard, *Etudes de critique*, Paris, 1905, ch. 4.

III. Concerning Sacrilege.

929. 1. Notion. Sacrilege is properly called the violation, or unworthy treatment, of a sacred thing or person, insofar as it is sacred.

(a) A thing or person is called sacred which, by the authority of God or of the Church, has been deputed for divine worship: therefore a purpose or vow made privately does not suffice for this.

(b) For sacrilege it is required that the thing or person be violated insofar as sacred, that is, precisely under that respect under which it was consecrated to God. Thus a priest by fornicating commits sacrilege, because he has been consecrated that he might live continently; but he does not commit sacrilege by blaspheming, by being proud, by being angry, because he has not been specially deputed to avoiding these sins.

930. 2. Species. A threefold sacrilege is distinguished: personal, real, and local, according as a person, thing, or place is violated.

(A) Personal sacrilege is the violation of a sacred person. Moreover a person becomes sacred by reason of the clerical state, or by reason of the vow of chastity emitted in solemn religion.[1] He who has emitted a vow privately or in a simple congregation, and afterward violates chastity, indeed sins against religion by violating the faith given to God, and therefore ought to accuse the circumstance of the vow, but more probably he does not commit sacrilege properly so called, since he is not a sacred person by the authority of God or the Church.

[1] Certain persons add that even a private vow, and *a fortiori* a simple vow emitted in a Congregation, makes the person vowing sacred, and therefore its violation is sacrilegious. This indeed is probable, but the contrary is held by the more probable opinion, which Ballerini-Palmieri defends, n. 386-390, with the authors there cited.

Personal sacrilege can be committed in three ways: (a) by laying violent hands upon a cleric or religious, against the privilege of the canon; (b) by usurping jurisdiction over ecclesiastical persons, where ecclesiastical immunity still flourishes, for example by drawing clerics to a secular tribunal, against the privilege of the forum, or by enrolling the same into military service, against the privilege of immunity; (c) by a sin of lust committed either by a person consecrated to God by chastity, or with such a person; hence, if each is sacred, a double sacrilege is committed on each side. According to the

common and true opinion, a sacred person commits sacrilege not only by external sins, but also by merely internal sins against chastity, provided true consent is given to them.

931. (B) Real sacrilege is that which is concerned with sacred things. Now things can be sacred in a fourfold way:

(a) From divine institution itself, such as the sacraments, which cannot be administered or received unworthily without sacrilege, as is more fully declared in the Treatise on the Sacraments. Under this head sacrilege is also incurred if knowingly and willingly the sacred species are not renewed at the opportune time, with danger of corruption; if the sacred Eucharist is touched or treated irreverently, etc. Likewise if the words of Sacred Scripture are mocked or applied to dishonorable uses.

(b) From consecration or blessing, those things are sacred which are sanctified by the prayers of the Church, as are sacred buildings, altars, sacred vessels, baptismal water, chrism and holy oils, liturgical vestments used in sacred functions, holy water and blessed things. Therefore those commit sacrilege who use these things for profane and indecent uses, or with contempt and mockery.[2]

[2] Those also commit sacrilege who pollute a church; concerning this see the Canonists, especially S. Many, *Praelect. de Locis sacris*, Paris, 1904, n. 30-40.

(c) From representation, images of Christ, of Blessed Mary and of the Saints, crosses, even not blessed, are called sacred. To this also belong sacred relics, which not only recall the saints to memory, but also once were informed by a holy soul. Therefore those are sacrilegious who use these things irreverently.

(d) From destination, ecclesiastical goods, both movable and immovable, are called sacred, which are deputed for sacred or pious uses, when they have already been accepted by the Church for this end, and therefore not only those things which serve divine worship, but also for the support of ministers, the fabric of the church, ecclesiastical hospitals and hospices, etc.; indeed those things which have been deposited in a church or handed over in pledge. Therefore those are sacrilegious who unjustly invade or usurp these goods. But if someone steals in a church a thing which belongs to a private person, but by no means to the church, more probably he does not commit sacrilege.[3]

[3] Many, op. cit., n. 45.

932. (C) Local sacrilege is the violation of a sacred place; therefore it is equated with real sacrilege, since a sacred place is a thing; yet it is treated specifically on account of the special difficulties which occur in this matter.

A sacred place is properly called one which has been deputed to divine worship by episcopal authority, for example churches, cemeteries, public oratories, but not private ones. In a broader sense a place deputed to pious use by the authority of the Church is also called sacred, as the palace of the bishop, a parish house, a seminary, a monastery; but not a place destined for pious works by private authority. Against a place sacred in the broad sense, sacrilege was formerly committed by violating the right of asylum. But today, from can. 1179, the right of asylum belongs only to churches, in this sense, that those who have fled to them are not to be drawn out from there, unless necessity urges, without the assent of the Ordinary or at least the rector of the church.

933. A sacred place properly so called can be violated in four ways:

(a) By sins by which a church or cemetery is polluted, even if they remain hidden, and therefore the church is not polluted from them, namely voluntary and injurious homicide, gravely culpable shedding of human blood, impious or filthy uses, burial of an excommunicated person to be avoided or of an infidel.[4]

[4] Concerning this see Many, op. cit., n. 47-61; n. 30-40 and n. 147.

(b) By profane actions which, from their nature, ecclesiastical law, or common estimation, dishonor the sanctity of the place, as markets, games, banquets, vain conversations, secular meetings, the clamor of judgments, etc., unless urgent necessity excuses. - Sometimes, however, literary or musical exercises are permitted, especially when they tend to fostering religion; likewise the sale of candles and other things pertaining to exciting devotion is tolerated, but, in all these things, care must be taken lest the house of God become a house of trade.

(c) By theft of a sacred thing, in the sense explained above; likewise by burning or breaking into a sacred place.

(d) By actions by which the right of asylum is violated, where it still flourishes.

Other sins committed in a sacred place do not contract the grave malice of sacrilege, necessarily to be explained in confession; but they bear before themselves some special indecency, on account of the circumstance of the sacred place, and thus put on the venial malice of sacrilege.

934. 3. Malice of sacrilege. (A) Sacrilege is a mortal sin from its genus against religion. For he who treats a sacred thing unworthily, insofar as it is sacred, by that very fact offends God Himself, to whom the thing is dedicated. - The sin is grave from its genus, because the precept of religion obliges under grave sin. Yet smallness of matter can be given, from the fact that the sacred thing serves divine worship more remotely, or the irreverence committed, all things considered, is judged light.

Hence, for judging concerning the gravity of the sin, three things especially ought to be attended to: (a) the sanctity of the person, thing, or place: the fault is graver insofar as the person or thing was more proximately dedicated to God; (b) the sacrilegious action, which is graver if greater irreverence is committed, according to the common estimation of the pious; (c) the intention of the agent, who can intend irreverence more or less directly, more or less distinctly.

IV. Concerning Simony.

935. 1. Notion. Simony (so called from Simon Magus, who wished to purchase spiritual graces with money) is a certain species of real sacrilege, since it imports irreverence toward a sacred thing. It is commonly defined, after St. Thomas,[5] as the studious (or deliberate) will of buying or selling something spiritual or annexed to the spiritual.

[5] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 100, a. 1.

Therefore three things are required for simony: (a) a spiritual thing, concerning which an agreement is made or intended to be made, or at least a temporal thing annexed to a spiritual thing. Now by the

name of a spiritual thing here is understood a supernatural thing ordered to salvation: such are grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, - or the cause of a supernatural thing, as the sacraments, sacramentals, prayers, sermons, - or the effect or use of a supernatural power, for example dispensation from vows, consecration, blessing, health restored by the help of a miracle. - But a temporal thing annexed to a spiritual thing is that which is ordered to something spiritual, or depends upon it, or is intimately connected with it, whether from its nature or from the institution of the Church. Thus chalices, altars which are consecrated antecedently for the sacrifice of the Mass; labor and time, which are concomitantly annexed to sacred functions; the revenues of a benefice, which are consequently received on account of some spiritual office.

(b) A price paid for a spiritual thing; this can be threefold: a gift from the hand, that is, not only money, but a movable or immovable thing estimable by price, for example remission of a debt, concession of a right, a loan, etc.; - a gift from the tongue, that is, any patronage, any favor conceded or promised, as for example the promise of a vote in an election; - a gift from service, or any temporal service, servitude, administration of affairs, etc., with the intention of obtaining something spiritual.

(c) The deliberate will of making a pact concerning a spiritual thing for a temporal thing. Hence it is not required that the pact be completed by mutual consent, nor *a fortiori* that it be committed to execution, but it suffices that one truly intend to make a pact with another.

He does not commit simony who gives a spiritual thing for a spiritual thing, for example, you will say Mass for me and I will recite the rosary for you; nor he who exchanges an annexed spiritual thing for an annexed spiritual thing, for example a chalice for a ciborium.

But it is simoniacal to hand over a spiritual thing for something annexed to the spiritual, for example to hand over relics for a chalice or for a certain number of Masses, because the chalice and Mass stipends have a certain temporal value.

936. 2. Species of simony. (A) By reason of the law by which it is prohibited, simony is of divine or ecclesiastical law:

(a) Of divine law, when for a temporal thing a spiritual thing or a thing annexed to the spiritual is given, so that truly and intrinsically the malice of simony is had. Thus, for example, to give or accept something temporal as a price or just compensation for sacraments, relics, sermons, indulgences, etc. But if, on the occasion of sacred functions, some stipend or honorarium is offered or accepted, not as the price of the sacred thing, but as a means of support, simony is not incurred: "Know you not that they who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the holy place; and they that serve the altar partake with the altar? So also the Lord ordained for them that preach the Gospel to live by the Gospel."[6] Likewise some special stipend can be exacted for extrinsic and undue labor, for example, for celebrating in a chapel three miles distant.[7]

[6] 1 Cor. 9:13.

[7] Cf. Treatise on the Eucharist, n. 185.

(b) Of ecclesiastical law only, when a pact, although not simoniacal of itself, has the appearance of simony or induces danger, and therefore is prohibited by the Church from a motive of religion; for example, the sale of holy oils, of a rosary enriched with indulgences, the resignation of a benefice in favor of another, etc.; for although to sell holy oils and blessed rosaries for as much as they are worth,

the matter alone being considered, is not of itself simoniacal, yet there is danger lest they be sold more dearly on account of the consecration or indulgences.[1]

[1] Hence if rosaries or medals enriched with indulgences are sold, by that very fact they lose the indulgences, as is explained in the Treatise on Penance, n. 582.

937. (B) By reason of the pact, simony is mental, conventional, real, and confidential:

(a) Mental, when it is done internally, without any pact outwardly manifested. It is twofold: purely mental, restricted to the internal forum and content with intention alone: this is simony improperly so called and therefore is not subject to ecclesiastical penalties; not purely mental, which indeed excludes every pact, but is manifested by some external act: thus, for example, if a cleric serves a bishop with the intention that, as wages, he may obtain some benefice, - or if a bishop confers a benefice gratuitously with the intention that thus he may induce the beneficed man to manage the bishop's affairs.

(b) Conventional, which is made by a pact of giving or receiving something spiritual for something temporal, without however the agreement being fulfilled on each side; it is called purely conventional if it has been committed to execution on neither side, semi-real, or mixed, if it has been committed to execution on either side, at least partially.

(c) Real, when the agreement has been fulfilled on each side at least inchoately, for example if, the benefice having been handed over, part of the money has been paid, or at least a written obligation has been given by which someone obliges himself to paying the money.

(d) Confidential, which obtains only in ecclesiastical benefices, consists in this, that someone procures a benefice for another under a certain confidence, that is, with the obligation that he resign it to himself or to a third person, or from it pay a pension or part of the fruits. The Canonists discuss this fully.

938. 3. Malice of simony. (A) Simony of divine law is a mortal sin from its whole genus. (a) It is most strictly reproved by Scripture; for when Simon Magus wished to purchase from the apostles with money the power of giving the Holy Spirit, Peter said to him:[2] "Keep thy money to thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money!" For Christ wills that graces and spiritual gifts be conferred gratuitously: "Freely have you received, freely give."[3] (b) And indeed religion is gravely violated when a spiritual and sacred thing is not esteemed more highly than a temporal and profane thing.

[2] Acts 8:20.

[3] Matt. 10:8.

To buy or sell temporal things intrinsically annexed to a spiritual thing, whether concomitantly, as labor in the celebration of Mass, or consequently, as the revenues of a benefice, is simony of divine law, according to the common opinion; but not if it is connected to it antecedently, as a chalice.

939. (B) Simony of ecclesiastical law is a sin grave from its genus, because it is prohibited by the Church from a motive of religion, in order to remove the grave danger of simony; but it admits

smallness of matter, because the Church accommodates its prohibitions to the matter forbidden, and does not prohibit under grave sin what, whether in itself or by reason of the danger which it induces, is only light. But what matter is grave, and what light, ought to be judged from the common estimation of prudent men.

The Church strikes the guilty of simony with various penalties, which the Canonists describe. Specifically, in the Bull *Apostolicae Sedis*, II, n. 8-10, it enacted excommunication *latae sententiae*, reserved to the Roman Pontiff, against: "Those guilty of real simony in any benefices whatsoever and their accomplices: those guilty of confidential simony in any benefices whatsoever, of whatever dignity they may be:[4] those guilty of real simony on account of entrance into religion."[5]

[4] When simony is confidential, only those are excommunicated who receive and retain an ecclesiastical benefice from that pact, but not the accomplices, nor the one himself conferring or resigning the benefice in confidence, because the matter was so in the old Bulls. Cf. Thesaurus, *De poenis ecclesiasticis*, Rome, 1770, word "Simonia," c. 3, p. 396.

[5] This penalty is incurred when something temporal is given for this end, that someone be received into religion, and indeed by those making the pact, and by him who thus admits or is received. But simony is not committed when something is accepted under the title of mere alms, or under the title of support for the time of novitiate in monasteries of men, or when nuns make a pact concerning the dowry which sometimes is required by the rule.

940. 4. Concerning the obligation of restoring what was simoniacally received. Before completed simony, whatever was accepted ought to be restored, since a contract entered into concerning an illicit thing is null, as is proved in the Treatise on Justice, n. 644. After the completed contract, the question can be weighed as to the spiritual thing or the price.

(A) As to the spiritual thing: (a) if the thing accepted is an ecclesiastical benefice, it must be dismissed with the fruits unjustly perceived, excepting only those which correspond to one's own labor; restitution of the benefice is to be made to the legitimate collator, restitution of the fruits to the successor in the benefice, or to the poor, unless a composition is obtained from the Supreme Pontiff, with a just cause acceding.

(b) But if there is question of a spiritual thing distinct from a benefice, it is not to be restored, unless restitution, when possible, is enjoined as a penalty of the crime; thus the sacraments cannot be restored, but relics ought not to be restored unless a sentence of a judge intervenes.

941. (B) As to the accepted price, if commutative justice has not been injured, it is not to be restored except after the sentence of a judge: because this is prescribed by no law. But restitution is imposed when simony was committed in a beneficiary matter, in the conferral of orders, and in entrance into religion.

But if commutative justice has been injured, because, for example, the price was extorted by fear or deceit, or because it exceeds the advantage of the thing annexed to the spiritual, according to the common estimation of the pious, restitution ought to be made to him who was injured, before the sentence of a judge, because it is required by natural law.

942. To be noted for practice. Not rarely cases occur in which it is doubted whether some action should be called simoniacal or not. Then attention must be paid to the general practice of the

Church, the customs of places not reproved, and the estimation of prudent men.

Thus if someone is unjustly troubled in possession of a benefice, he can free himself by paying money; likewise a faithful person, to whom the sacraments are unjustly denied unless money is furnished, can pay it. Likewise, if you have a right to obtaining some office, and are unjustly troubled by someone, you can give him money that he may abstain from harming you; but you ought not pay an elector anything, lest perhaps he cast a vote against you. He does not act simoniacally who by money impedes the election of an unworthy person; but you cannot buy votes, nor impede another from competing, who has a right of competing.

To avoid the danger of simony, clerics and priests should often meditate upon these words of the Apostle: "Having food and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content."[6] Otherwise they are mercenaries, they feed themselves and not the sheep: "Their turpitude and wickedness not only pours great darkness upon the priestly order, so that now almost nothing can be held more contemptible and abject by the faithful people; but also brings it about that they themselves obtain nothing more from the priesthood than Judas obtained from the office of apostle, which brought eternal destruction upon him."[7]

[6] 1 Tim. 6:8.

[7] Catechism of the Council of Trent, *De Ordinis sacramento*, n. 5.

Chapter II: On Oaths and Vows

Concerning the Secondary Acts of Religion.

Two secondary acts of religion are enumerated: oath, by which God is called as witness of truth, and vow, or a promise made to God. They are called secondary, not because they are less perfect than the acts described above, but because they are not so necessary for the exercise of religion.

Art. I. Concerning Oath.

We shall speak: 1. of its nature; 2. of its honesty; 3. of the obligation which it induces; 4. of adjuration, which is akin to oath.

[1] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 89-90; Suarez, op. cit., Tr. V; Sayrus, *Clavis regia sacerdotum*, lib. V; St. Alphonsus, n. 133-193; Bouquillon, n. 503-725; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 532-601; Muller, § 58-62; Lehmkuhl, n. 405-427; Noldin, n. 243-260; M. d'Hulst, *Careme* 1893, 4th Conference, p. 123; Codex, c. 1316 sq.

I. Concerning the Nature of Oath.

943. 1. Notion. An oath, which is also called a sacrament, is the invocation of the divine name in testimony of those things which are said or promised. When men wish to confirm the truth of the things which they say, they are accustomed to bring in witnesses for confirming the matter. But sometimes the matter of which there is question cannot be fully proved by human testimony, because it is hidden or future: then not rarely, especially if there is question of a momentous matter, God Himself is invoked as witness so that, when it pleases Him, whether in this or in the other life, He may confirm the hidden truth.

Therefore two things are required for an oath: (a) invocation of the divine name, either express or tacit, namely through external signs sufficiently expressing this invocation, such as the touching of the cross or of the Gospel, or the extension of the hand toward a crucifix. The word I swear does not of itself suffice for an oath, unless from the context or other adjuncts it is clear that God is truly invoked. Likewise, to swear by creatures or saints does not suffice, unless, from the adjuncts, the creatures have a special relation to God, so that their invocation is deservedly held as the invocation of the divine name.

(b) Besides, the calling upon God as witness of the truth declared is required, and therefore the intention of obliging oneself to speaking the truth; for the end of this invocation is the confirmation of the truth which is asserted. Psychologically the matter is declared thus: when the one swearing, who is supposed to fear God, confirms by oath the things which he says, he is judged sincerely to declare the truth: for he invokes God as witness, who can neither be deceived nor deceive, and is accustomed strictly to chastise the perjured, if not in the present life, at least in the other life. But, as is clear, the force of this confirmation arises from faith in God the rewarder, and therefore the oaths of atheists lack it.

944. Applications. (a) Among oaths these or similar expressions cannot be enumerated: by my faith, by the faith of a man, by the faith of a priest, by my honor, because then only the conscience, honor, veracity of man is called upon; otherwise if it were said: by the Christian faith. (b) To say: it is as true as it is true that God exists, or as true as the Gospel, is not of itself an oath, since God is not invoked as witness; nor generally is it heretical blasphemy, since the speaker does not will to equate the certainty of his own assertion to the truth of the Gospel; but, if it is brought forth for the sake of confirming a lie, it is not excused from simple blasphemy, since injury is inflicted upon God. (c) These formulas: may I die, may the devil snatch me, if this is not true, are not properly oaths, unless, from the adjuncts, there is the intention of calling upon God, but imprecations; otherwise, if it were said: may God destroy me if I lie: for then there is an execratory oath, by which God is invoked as the avenger of perjury. (d) Uncivil words, which the common people improperly call oaths (*pardi, parbleu, sacristi, sacredii*, etc.), although etymologically certain ones import blasphemy, are generally neither blasphemies nor oaths, the intention of the speakers being considered; but, according to common estimation, they are nothing other than meaningless words brought forth by an angry person; yet a Christian man will carefully try to avoid them.

945. 2. Divisions. (a) By reason of the object about which it is concerned, an oath is assertory, if God is invoked as witness of a past or present thing, for example, I swear that I saw Paul standing there, I swear that I am a cleric; or promissory, if He is invoked as witness of a future thing, for example, God is witness to me that I will give you one hundred coins: it is called promissory, because it is generally applied to confirming a promise.

(b) By reason of form, it is called invocatory, or contestatory, when God is simply invoked as witness; imprecatory, or execratory, when He is invoked not only as witness, but as avenger of perjury, namely when the one swearing imprecates evils upon himself or his own, if he asserts a false thing or does not keep what he promises, for example, may God destroy me, if I do not speak the truth. - The formula: so may God help me and these holy Gospels, approaches an imprecatory oath, and the sense is: if I speak the truth, may God help me; if a false thing, may God deprive me of His help.

(c) By reason of the mode in which it is uttered, it is simple, if it is made without any apparatus; solemn, if with special ceremonies, for example, by touching the Gospel, raising the hand, before a crucifix, with candles lit, etc.

Moreover these diverse oaths are of the same moral species, since all agree in the invocation of the divine name, and differ only accidentally.

II. Concerning the Honesty of Oath.

946. Certain heretics contended that oath is prohibited under the new law, among whom were the Waldenses and certain Protestants, such as the Quakers, relying on these words of the Lord: "Again you have heard that it was said to them of old: Thou shalt not forswear thyself... But I say to you not to swear at all, neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God; nor by the earth, for it is His footstool; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King; neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your speech

be: yea, yea; no, no; and that which is over and above these is of evil."[2] Nevertheless not only Catholics, but most Protestants, hold that an oath is licit, certain conditions being posited.

[2] Matt. 5:33-37.

947. 1. Thesis: An oath, clothed with the due conditions, is honest and laudable.

(A) That oath was in use under the old Law and approved by God Himself is clear from many texts:[3] "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and shalt swear by His name." In the new law likewise oath is often exhibited as something honest, used by the apostles; thus Paul writes:[4] "For God is my witness, whom I serve in my spirit in the Gospel of His Son, that without ceasing I make a commemoration of you... But I call God to witness... For God is my witness, how I long after you all in the bowels of Jesus Christ." Wherefore, unless a contradiction is admitted between the words of Christ and the words of Paul, it must be said that the passage cited above is to be understood of the prohibition of swearing without cause, without necessity; for in common circumstances it is not necessary to confirm by oath the truth of the things which are said; for Christians ought to be so sincere that, even without any oath, their words are believed confidently.

[3] Deut. 6:13; cf. Josh. 9:15; Judg. 21:5; Ps. 14:4 and 62:18, etc.

[4] Rom. 1:9; 2 Cor. 1:23; Phil. 1:8.

(B) The practice of the Church has approved this interpretation; for in judgments, whether ecclesiastical or secular, oath is frequently used, either so that witnesses may be induced by religion to manifest the truth completely, or to strengthen an argument otherwise incomplete. And deservedly; for, provided God is invoked as witness of the truth brought forth not frequently, but only in a matter of great moment, no irreverence is committed against Him, but on the contrary His supreme veracity is acknowledged, and His justice, which strictly pursues and chastises perjury. Wherefore in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is read:[5] "For men swear by one greater than themselves, and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy."

[5] Heb. 6:16.

948. 2. Conditions, moreover, are required for the liceity of an oath. Three are deduced from this text of Jeremiah,[6] namely truth, judgment, and justice: "And thou shalt swear: As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice."

[6] Jer. 4:2.

(A) Truth, that is, conformity of words with the knowledge and intention of the one swearing. Therefore it excludes a lie in asserting or promising, and fiction, or an oath uttered without the mind of swearing or obliging oneself.

(a) He who by oath confirms that which he knows to be false commits the mortal sin of perjury, because he commits grave irreverence against God, bringing Him in as witness of falsity. Nor does lightness of matter excuse here; for, even in light or joking matter, it is gravely repugnant to invoke God as witness of falsity. Therefore this proposition 24 was deservedly reproved by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "To call God as witness of a light lie is not such irreverence on account of which He wills or can damn a man."[7]

[7] Apud Denzinger, n. 1041; Viva, on this proposition.

(b) It is not licit to swear with only probable knowledge of the matter, but moral certainty is required, namely that against which no prudent doubt fights; one swearing with prudent doubt concerning the truth sins mortally, because he inflicts grave irreverence upon God, by invoking Him as witness of something about which he doubts.

949. (c) Nor is it licit to swear with a mental restriction whose sense cannot be detected; indeed not even with a mental restriction whose sense can be detected, except from a most grave cause: for the former restriction is a lie; the latter is a distorted mode of speaking, which, when an oath accedes to it, can be used only in a case of true necessity, namely when there is no other means of protecting oneself or others against unjust aggression or a most grave evil.[8] - Therefore these propositions were deservedly condemned by Innocent XI:

[8] For understanding this, see what we wrote concerning lying, *De Justitia*, n. 408-417. - If the theory of equivocations and restrictions is rejected, and with moderns it is admitted that false speech is licit in a case of necessity, it must be said that false speech cannot be confirmed by oath, unless when there is no other means of averting a most grave harm, for example the death of an innocent person.

26. "If someone, either alone or before others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other end, swears that he has not done something which in reality he has done, understanding within himself something which he did not do, or another way than that in which he did it, or any other true addition, he in reality does not lie, nor is he perjured."[9]

[9] Here there is question, from the context, of a purely mental restriction, whose sense cannot be detected by a prudent man.

27. "A just cause of using these amphibologies is whenever this is necessary or useful for the health of the body, honor, preserving family goods, or for any other act of virtue, so that the hiding of truth is then judged expedient and studious."

28. "He who, by means of custom or gift, has been promoted to a magistracy or public office, will be able with mental restriction to take the oath which, by command of the king, is customarily exacted from similar persons, no regard being had to the intention of the one exacting it: because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime."[10]

[10] As Viva testifies (on this proposition), thus is condemned the practice of those who use equivocation whenever, by command of legitimate authority, they swear that they were not promoted because of recommendations or gifts.

950. (d) He who promises something by oath without the intention of swearing or obliging himself, and therefore simulates an oath, commits a grave sin from its genus; for although he does not emit an oath, he uses the name of God in vain, and deceives others. Wherefore if this is done before a judge, or in contracts, the sin is grave. But in other matters of slight moment, the sin is probably light, according to many theologians, because it is nothing other than the vain use of the name of God. But all fictions of this kind, as unworthy of an honorable man and easily drawing one to perjury, are altogether to be avoided. - But he who with the mind of swearing

promises something, yet without the intention of fulfilling it, sins mortally, since he brings God in as guarantor of a false promise.

951. (B) Justice, in an assertory oath, requires that the one swearing have the right of asserting what he says, and, in a promissory oath, that the thing promised be honest.

(a) Thus, in an assertory oath, he sins who manifests another's hidden crime without cause, or boasts of a sin committed: for he does not have the right of saying these things, nor, a fortiori, of confirming them by oath. Moreover, the gravity of the sin depends both on the intention of the agent and on the gravity of the things which are said.

(b) In a promissory oath, he certainly sins mortally who swears that he will commit some grave thing: for he inflicts a grave injury upon God by making Him witness and, as it were, guarantor of this iniquity. But if the act which is promised under the faith of an oath is only venially evil, the malice against religion is probably only venial, although, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 146) and others, it is more probably mortal, on account of the injury inflicted upon God. Whatever the case, oaths of this kind are carefully to be avoided, not only because of the reverence due to God, but because they savor of foolishness: for who of sound mind can invoke God as witness of the promise of a thing less honest?

952. (C) Judgment, or discretion, requires two things, namely, that there be a just cause for swearing, and besides that the oath be furnished with that reverence, internal and external, which the divine majesty requires.

(a) Therefore they sin who frequently swear, without sufficient reason, that is, without necessity or great utility: "Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing; for in it there are many falls... A man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity, and a scourge shall not depart from his house. And if he make it void, his sin shall be upon him; and if he dissemble, he offendeth doubly; and if he swear in vain, he shall not be justified."[1] Moreover, the gravity of the sin depends both on the frequency of the acts and on the intention of the agent; to swear once or twice without sufficient cause does not exceed venial sin, unless contempt of the divine majesty is present.

[1] Ecclus. 23:9-14.

(b) They also sin who utter oaths jokingly or in a manner little becoming. This happens by no means rarely when they are taken too frequently.[2] - Civil authority can indeed, from a just cause, exact an oath to be taken upon a book of Scripture; but it ought to permit Catholics to swear upon Catholic Bibles.[3]

[2] In the United States of America oaths are perhaps required too often in the matter of tributes and taxes; whence it happens that perjuries are easily committed in this matter. By a very excellent counsel all Christians ought to join their forces, so that they might obtain a change of the civil laws in this matter.

[3] To the point, S. Cong. de Prop. Fide, Sept. 8, 1869 (*Collectanea*, n. 1664): "It has been reported that, in several regions of India, Catholics have been accustomed, if an oath occurs, to swear upon Bibles corrupted by Protestants and presented by the government... Therefore let all Apostolic Vicars, in whose missions use of this kind has been accustomed to be employed, diligently take care that the Anglo-Indian government leave to the faithful the liberty of swearing upon Sacred Scripture received by the Catholic Church. But until they shall have obtained this from the civil

authority, let them prudently be silent, if they see the faithful take an oath upon the Bibles of heretics, provided that there is question of a lawful oath."

III. Concerning the Obligation Induced by an Oath.

953. Here there is question only of a promissory oath; for an assertory oath produces no obligation for the future, since it consists in the mere affirmation of some thing. - Every promise induces an obligation of justice or fidelity, according to the principles set forth in the Treatise on Justice, n. 677; when an oath accedes to this, it produces a new obligation of religion: of which we must now speak.

954. 1. The existence and gravity of this obligation: A promissory oath, concerning an honest thing, induces an obligation of religion, grave from its genus, for the one swearing. For the one swearing invokes God not only as witness of the promise, but also as guarantor of its execution; and therefore, from reverence toward God, he is bound to execute what was promised. - Nevertheless, he who utters the formula of an oath without the intention of swearing, whether from inadvertence or from deliberation, does not contract an obligation: say the same of him who does not have the intention of obliging himself; for in both cases one of the elements necessary either for an oath or for contracting an obligation is lacking.[4]

[4] But what obligation is incumbent on him who emitted a promissory oath in favor of a third party can be inferred from what was said in the Treatise on Justice, n. 621.

(a) Moreover, the gravity of the obligation depends on the gravity of the thing promised; for since the one swearing is judged to have had a sincere will of fulfilling what was promised, he sins only insofar as he does not put the same into execution; but if the thing promised is of slight moment, its non-execution cannot be grave; for an oath does not change the nature of the act, but only adds to it an obligation of religion.

(b) The obligation of a personal oath belongs to the one swearing, and therefore does not pass to heirs, while the obligation of justice or fidelity arising from the promise itself can be real and can pass to heirs (*De Justitia*, n. 679).

955. (c) An oath concerning an impossible, illicit, or plainly useless thing induces no obligation. For no one is held to the impossible; besides, an oath cannot be the bond of iniquity, or even of a vain thing, which in no way turns to the honor of God. If the thing afterward becomes licit or useful, an oath which was null from the beginning does not revive: for that which by law does not subsist from the beginning is not made firm by the passage of time.[5]

[5] Rule of law 18 in the Sext.

(d) From the Code, can. 1317, "an oath extorted by force or grave fear is valid, but can be relaxed by an ecclesiastical Superior." Nevertheless, from can. 1318, "a promissory oath follows the nature and conditions of the act to which it is added. If an oath is added to an act directly tending to the harm of others or to the prejudice of the public good or of eternal salvation, the act consequently obtains no firmness."

956. 2. Concerning the extension and interpretation of this obligation.[6] (A) The general principle is that the obligation of an oath does not extend more widely than the promise itself to which it accedes; for an oath is something accessory to the promise itself, which it confirms; but it is fitting that the accessory follow the nature of the principal.[7] - Except if the one swearing intended the matter otherwise; for the extension of the obligation, like its existence, depends chiefly on the intention of the one swearing.

[6] In the Treatise on Justice, n. 662-664, there is weighed what sort of obligation an oath adds to a contract.

[7] Rule of law 42 in the Sext.

(B) Moreover, two particular rules are to be noted: (a) The obligation ought not be extended beyond the sense of the words strictly accepted. For hateful things are to be restricted; but an obligation which arises from an oath is judged hateful, as restricting liberty. Besides, an oath depends on the intention of the one swearing; but he is not judged to will to oblige himself beyond the expressed and strict sense of the words.

(b) A promissory oath is to be interpreted according to the conditions and restrictions which are understood from the nature of the matter, or from the principles of law, or from the common sense of prudent men. Moreover, the chief restrictions of this kind are the following: - if I am able, physically and morally; - without prejudice to the right of superiors, who from a just cause can invalidate the obligation or dispense in it; - if the matter has not been notably changed: for if it is notably changed, the intention of the one swearing did not extend to it; - if the other has kept faith: for in vain does someone ask that faith be kept toward himself by him toward whom he himself refuses to keep the faith pledged;[8] - unless the other cedes his right: for since a promissory oath is made in favor of another, and this other can renounce his right, it is in some way subjected to his will; - unless there is a grave reason for changing the proposal: for if execution cannot take place without a grave danger of death, infamy, etc., not foreseen before, the one swearing is not judged to have willed to oblige himself.

[8] Rule of law 75 in the Sext.

957. Corollaries. (a) An oath of observing the statutes of some college, congregation, office, etc., ought to be understood of statutes already issued, not of those to be issued, - of those which then are in force, not of those which have fallen into desuetude or are not observed by the greater part of the community, - and indeed in that manner in which the statutes oblige, that is, under grave sin, under light sin, or only to a penalty, according to the statutes themselves: for an oath does not change the nature of the obligation, but only adds to it the bond of religion.

(b) An oath of observing a secret does not oblige when the obligation of the secret itself ceases (*De Justitia*, n. 421-425).

(c) An oath of fidelity and obedience to some Prince or Government, or of observing a Constitution, does not oblige except according to the common sense of honorable men; accordingly it does not oblige one to embrace in mind all things which are contained in the Constitution, but only to undertake nothing illegitimately against the same.[9]

[9] Bouquillon, op. cit., n. 660-714, discusses learnedly the various political oaths.

(d) An obligation induced by oath ceases: by the cessation of the end, - by condonation made by him in whose favor the oath was uttered, - by invalidation, or dispensation, or commutation, according to the principles set forth below, n. 990 sq.

IV. Concerning Adjuration.

958. 1. Notion and species. (A) Adjuration, which is akin to oath, is called the interposition of the divine name or of a sacred thing, by which someone is induced to do or omit something. Accordingly it differs from an oath, because God is not invoked as witness or guarantor, for confirming truth, but as a motive for obtaining something more efficaciously.

(B) It is deprecatory when it is made through prayers, for example: "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God..."[1]; thus also God Himself is sometimes prayed by way of adjuration, for example, through the mystery of Thy holy Incarnation, through Thy Passion, etc. - It is preceptive, or imperative, when it is made by command or mandate; for example, when the high priest said to Christ:[2] "I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us if thou be the Christ." - God can be adjured only deprecatorily, because no one can command Him; the devil only imperatively, because he is not capable of deprecation; man both imperatively and deprecatorily, because he is capable both of command and of deprecation.

[1] Rom. 12:1.

[2] Matt. 26:63.

Adjuration is called solemn when it is made in the name of the Church, by ministers specially deputed, as in exorcisms; but private if it is employed in a private name.

959. 2. Principles. (A) Adjuration does not induce an obligation of religion in the person adjured: for it is not used for this, but for exciting in him fear or love of the divine name, by which he may be moved more easily and efficaciously to perform what is asked. If a subject is already bound to obey a superior, he ought indeed to comply with him, not by force of the adjuration, but by force of the precept joined with the adjuration.

960. (B) But on the part of the one adjuring, certain conditions are required so that he may act licitly; for on his part, adjuration is an act of religion, which ought to be adorned with the same qualities as an oath: (a) truth, insofar as the one adjuring ought to set forth only a true cause: from this head a fictitious poor man sins who, by God or by the Virgin, asks alms without cause; (b) justice, insofar as only a licit thing can be asked; (c) judgment, that is, for a reasonable motive, but not from vanity alone, or curiosity. The defect of these conditions is grave or light sin, according as the matter is grave or light. Thus a fictitious poor man who squeezes out a great sum of money, or who asks for a gravely illicit thing, sins mortally; but venially, if he solicits a modest alms, or induces to a light sin.

Scholion: Concerning the Vain Assumption of the Name of God.

961. 1. The second precept forbids that the name of God be taken in vain:[3] "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." And deservedly; for the name of God is holy, and

ought to be pronounced only with due reverence. The same must be said, due proportion being observed, of the vain assumption of the names of saints, since irreverence toward the saints or sacred things ultimately redounds upon God.

[3] Exod. 20:7.

This vain appellation of the divine name arises especially from a twofold cause: from anger, and from lightness or custom.

(A) From anger, when from commotion of mind one says, for example: the name of God, a thousand names of God! For the most part that usurpation does not exceed venial sin, because it proceeds from sudden and little deliberated commotion; nevertheless it could be mortal, on account of deliberate contempt of God, or scandal.

962. (B) From lightness, or custom, when without cause the name of God is frequently used in conversation, for example: My God! Great God! Good Jesus! Sweet mother of God! This frequent appellation is indeed reproved by Scripture:[4] "Let not the naming of God be continual in thy mouth"; and in reality it bears before it some irreverence toward God and the saints. But it does not exceed venial fault, since in it there appears only a light disorder; indeed, it often is free from all fault, on account of inadvertence.

[4] Ecclus. 23:10; cf. above, n. 952.

963. 2. But by no means is frequent invocation of the divine name from an internal sense of reverence and from devotion of heart prohibited; rather, it is commended. Thus in the Scriptures the prophets more often say: The Lord liveth; thus also today pious Christians greet one another with these words: Praised be Jesus Christ!

Wherefore it is permitted to conclude with the Catechism of the Council of Trent:[5] "Then we venerate and worship the divine name when, by reason of office and religion, we celebrate the divine praises, and give Him singular thanks for all things, both prosperous and adverse... Therefore, when we are tortured by pains of soul and body, when we are tormented by miseries and afflictions, let us at once turn all the zeal and powers of our soul to praising God, saying that saying of Job:[6] Blessed be the name of the Lord!"

[5] Catechism, second precept of the Decalogue, n. 4.

[6] Job 1:21.

Art. II. Concerning Vow.

964. Through an oath God is assumed as witness of the things which are asserted or promised; through a vow a promise is made to God Himself; for just as we promise something to men, so likewise also to God. Moreover, a promise made to the Lord is counted among the acts of religion, because it tends to furnish service to Him. We shall speak: 1. of the nature of a vow; 2. of its honesty and obligation; 3. of the cessation of this obligation.

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88; Suarez, op. cit., tr. VI, l. 1-6; Billuart, diss. IV; St. Alphonsus, n. 194-262; Bouquillon, op. cit., n. 302-502; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 602-710; Noldin, n. 209-242; Berardi, *Praxis*, t. I, n. 489-562; M. d'Hulst, *Careme*,

1893, 4th Conf., p. 131-145; Codex, c. 1307-15.

§ I. Concerning the Nature of a Vow.

In order that the nature of a vow may be better understood, it is fitting to declare its notion and species.

I. The Genuine Notion of a Vow.

A vow is commonly defined as a deliberate promise made to God concerning a possible and better good. Hence two things especially are desired for a vow: a true promise made to God, and apt matter. When these have been rightly set forth, it will easily be understood what conditions are required for its validity.

965. 1. A true promise made to God. (A) The promise of which there is question here is a sincere will of obliging oneself to do or omit something; accordingly it differs from a mere proposal, or intention of doing something, which is elicited without the will of assuming a true obligation. The faithful sometimes doubt whether they have emitted a proposal or a vow; for solving this doubt, attention must be paid not only to the words which they used, but also and especially to their intention. For not rarely the word "I promise before God" signifies nothing other than a proposal; indeed "I vow" does not necessarily import a vow; but if there is the intention of obliging oneself under penalty of sin, there is a vow, whatever words were employed.[8] If, all things considered, the matter remains truly doubtful, in practice there is not a strict obligation of fulfilling the vow, because its existence is not established.

[8] The will of fulfilling the thing promised is not essentially required for the existence and obligation of a vow, but it is required that the vow be honest and an act of religion; for he who intends to contract an obligation, but not to fulfill it, by no means honors God, but offends Him, and therefore commits a sin more or less grave according to the gravity of the matter itself.

966. (B) A promise of this kind ought to be true, or deliberate: for no one imposes upon himself any moral obligation unless he sincerely wills this; but for this there is required a deliberate volition, namely that which is necessary for a truly human act (above, n. 78-84). Indeed, since a vow is an act grave in itself, a greater deliberation is required for its validity than for other common acts; and the graver the obligations which it imposes, the greater deliberation it requires. Nevertheless, in order that a vow be valid, lengthy and mature deliberation is not necessary, but only that which, according to the common estimation of prudent men, is proportioned to the gravity of the obligation to be undertaken. But when mature deliberation is lacking, the obligation contracted is less strict, and is more easily dispensed or commuted.

Therefore invalid are vows emitted by children not yet perfectly masters of themselves, - by the half-drunk or half-asleep, - by those who are wholly ignorant of the obligations which vows induce, or conceive them only imperfectly and confusedly: for in these and similar adjuncts, there is not found a deliberation proportioned to the gravity of the obligation.

967. (a) But an attentive consideration of all the circumstances of the thing promised is not required, but only of those which morally pertain to its substance. Thus he who emits religious

vows, understanding sufficiently clearly what they substantially import, vows validly, even if he has not maturely considered all the burdens which naturally follow from them.

(b) Nor for a vow is there required an actual and explicit will of undertaking the obligation, but a virtual and implicit will suffices, provided it be true. A virtual will suffices, namely one which truly was had and still perseveres, although not actually elicited; thus an adolescent who freely resolves to receive the subdiaconate and, by force of this proposal, receives ordination, truly emits the vow of chastity, which he knows to be annexed to this order, even if at the time of ordination he does not actually think about it; the same must be said of him who emits religious profession. - An implicit will likewise suffices, namely one which is included in the general volition of undertaking all the obligations annexed to such a promise; thus he who wills to profess the religious state, by that very fact implicitly vows poverty, chastity, and obedience annexed to this profession, when he has sufficiently understood that all these things are included in the religious state.

968. (c) From this it also follows that all those impediments which harm the liberty of human acts obstruct the validity of a vow: if liberty is thoroughly destroyed, the vow is by that very fact invalid; if it is diminished, yet so that the one vowing enjoys liberty proportioned to the gravity of the obligation, the vow is indeed valid, but dispensation in it is easier.

1. Thus he who emitted a vow from error is not held to fulfill it, if the error is truly the cause of the vow, so that, the truth having been known, he would not have vowed the thing; for example, one who promises chastity, in no way knowing of what matter there is question, - one who vows a pilgrimage to a sanctuary which he thinks to be distant one hundred miles, while in reality it is distant one thousand, - one who vows a Mass for the health of his father, whom he falsely heard to be ill. - On the contrary, an error of less moment about the circumstances of the matter, knowledge of which would not have impeded the vow, does not render it invalid.

When there is question of religious vows, it is commonly held that they are not invalidated except by error concerning their substance: for since there is question of a complex of obligations, it suffices that their substance be sufficiently understood.

If an invalid vow is renewed because it was believed valid, by this it does not become firmer, because it was renewed only from error.

2. A vow emitted from grave fear unjustly inflicted for extorting the vow is not valid,[9] because it lacks due liberty, and besides God cannot accept a promise of this kind, lest He seem to approve the very injury brought upon the one vowing. But it is otherwise if it is from light fear,[10] or from fear justly inflicted, or not for extorting consent. Thus a vow emitted from fear of shipwreck or of another danger is valid: for then it is not made unwillingly, but from the soul, for obtaining the grace of safety.

[9] This can be inferred from cap. 1 *Perlatum*, lib. I, tit. 40, and also from Trent, sess. XXV, c. 19.

[10] Thus always in public vows; but in private vows, if it were established in fact that fear, even light fear, was the true and sole cause of vowing, the vow more probably would not be valid in the forum of conscience.

969. (C) A promise made to God: for a vow properly so called is an act of religion by which we furnish service to God and acknowledge His supreme dominion, and so it pertains to the worship of latria. Nevertheless, sometimes vows are said to be pronounced to the saints, that is, to God in honor of the saints, just as altars are dedicated to the saints, that is, to God in their honor: for the honor rendered to them redounds upon God Himself. - But if someone should directly intend to promise something to the saints themselves, it would not properly be a vow, but a religious promise, pertaining to the worship of dulia.

970. 2. Apt matter, that is, honest, concerning a better good, and possible.

(A) Honest, or morally good; for since a vow is emitted for furnishing service to God, nothing can be promised except a thing pleasing and acceptable to Him. Therefore a vow concerning a thing altogether indifferent is void, unless from the end or circumstances it becomes good: thus the one vowing sins venially, as taking the name of God in vain; and, a fortiori, a vow concerning a morally evil thing is void: thus the one vowing sins gravely in itself, unless he is excused by ignorance or inconsideration (as often happens), because he supposes that an evil thing can please God: which in itself brings a grave injury upon Him.

Here it is asked whether a vow of a good thing is valid, but from an end of the one vowing which is in some way evil. (a) It is indeed not valid, if the depraved intention is the motive and total cause of the vow, because then the act becomes totally evil (above, n. 150); for example, if someone vows alms that he may successfully commit injustice: for such an end renders the vow evil and impious. (b) But it is valid if the depraved intention is only the impulsive and partial cause of the vow, because then the whole act is not vitiated; for example, if someone vows alms both that he may please God and that he may be praised by men: for notwithstanding a vain intention of this sort, the action remains good in part and can be offered to God. - The same must be said concerning an evil condition added to a vow, for example, if someone promises a rich alms, on condition that he come out unharmed from a duel; for although the duel is evil, to preserve life unharmed is good, and the vow is not concerned with the evil thing, namely the duel, but with safety, which is certainly good.

971. (B) Concerning a better good, that is, concerning a work which is more perfect than its opposite, all the circumstances being considered; for since a vow is made for pleasing God, one cannot promise Him a good which impedes a greater good: for if a lesser good is promised, by that very fact the one vowing obliges himself to omit the greater: which surely cannot please God. Moreover, a better good must be estimated not only in itself and absolutely, but also in relation to the one vowing and all the adjuncts.

Thus a vow of marrying is not valid in itself, because it is opposed to a better good, namely virginity. But in special adjuncts matrimony can be the matter of a vow, for example, if someone, under the hope of matrimony, has corrupted some virgin, or if such a matrimony is very useful to the republic. Likewise a vow of not vowing is not valid in itself, because it concerns a lesser good; but a vow of not vowing except with the permission of a confessor is valid, since it is an act of prudence.

An action already prescribed can be the matter of a vow, because a thing prescribed is good; besides, from what is to be said, to do something from vow is better than to perform the same thing without

vow. Nevertheless, that which already falls under a precept should not be vowed without reason, lest bonds be multiplied rashly in this way.

972. (C) Concerning a possible good, not only physically, but morally: because no one can oblige himself to the impossible.

Wherefore a vow of avoiding all venial sins, even semi-deliberate ones, is not valid, since this is impossible without a special privilege of God, from what was said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 63; but a vow of avoiding all fully deliberate venial sins is valid, because persons firmly rooted in virtue can fulfill this, with the help of grace; but such a vow cannot be permitted to others, since it is above their strength. A vow of avoiding all mortal sins is also valid, but is by no means to be counseled to the frail, lest perhaps by violating it they commit a double sin.

Since the matter of a vow ought to be in the power of the one vowing, we cannot properly vow the deed of another, or something to be performed by another; thus a mother cannot vow that her son will enter religion. If in reality such a vow has been emitted, it ought to be explained thus: that the mind of the one vowing was to oblige herself to take care, insofar as she can, that the other perform it; but his liberty remains intact. Vows made by cities, monasteries, or colleges do not bind posterity, unless the obligation arises from elsewhere, for example from a statute, law, or custom having the force of law.

973. If the matter of a vow is partly possible and partly impossible, before all else the intention of the one vowing must be explored: if he promised both indivisibly, or in the manner of one thing, he is held to nothing when either part is impossible; otherwise, if he promised two things divisibly, or independently from one another, because the useful is not vitiated by the useless. If the intention of the one vowing is not established, it ought to be presumed from the matter itself of the vow: when this is divisible, the possible part must be fulfilled; thus he who vowed ten fasts, and can fulfill only two, is held to these two. If the matter is indivisible, or if the impossible part is altogether principal in relation to the other, no obligation subsists; thus he who vowed a Roman pilgrimage, and can travel only half the way, is held to nothing; but if he promised to make the journey on foot (which he cannot do), yet can easily go to Rome by railroad, he should indeed do this, since the Roman pilgrimage itself is principal, and the mode of going is accessory.

II. Concerning the Various Species of Vows.

974. 1. By reason of the object about which it is concerned, a vow is: (a) personal, if the thing promised is some action to be placed or omitted, such as the recitation of some prayer, a pilgrimage, etc.; (b) real, when the thing promised is directly some thing external to the one vowing and estimable by price, such as alms, the donation of a chalice, etc.; (c) mixed, if the object of the vow is at the same time an action and a thing, for example, a vow of going to Loreto, and there offering a chalice.

2. By reason of duration, it is called temporary or perpetual according as it is promised to be observed for a certain time or throughout one's whole life.

975. 3. By reason of the mode in which it is made, it is called absolute or conditioned, according as it is made simply, without any restriction, or with some condition added: an example of this is had if someone vows a rich alms on condition that he receive such an inheritance. - If the condition added is joined by way of a penalty to be inflicted, the vow is penal, as if someone promises alms, on condition that he shall have relapsed into such a sin.

976. 4. By reason of form and effects, a vow is public when it is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior; otherwise it is private; - solemn, if it has been recognized as such by the Church; otherwise simple (Codex, c. 1308). - As to the fact, the Church regards two genera of vows as solemn: the vow of chastity emitted in sacred orders, and religious vows emitted in those orders which have been approved by the Church as solemn.

977. Hence arises the question, long debated among canonists and theologians, whence the solemnity of vows comes, or in what a solemn vow differs from a simple one. All today indeed confess that this distinction arises only from the authority of the Church, since neither Christ nor the Apostles established anything concerning this matter. This, moreover, Boniface VIII declared in the single chapter *De Voto*, in the Sext: "We, considering that the solemnity of a vow has been found by the constitution of the Church alone"... Nevertheless it is further asked whether this solemnity is situated in the will alone of the Church, or in some special effect which, by the Church so establishing, has been annexed to a solemn vow.

(a) According to St. Thomas[1] and many others, the solemnity of a vow consists in a certain spiritual consecration, by force of which the person or thing designated by the vow is thoroughly withdrawn from human uses and, of itself irrevocably, is dedicated to God, so that it cannot be converted to profane uses without sacrilege. (b) According to others,[2] however, the distinction between a solemn and a simple vow is merely external, and consists in this, that the Church dissolves solemn vows far more difficultly than simple ones. - Nevertheless we hold the former opinion, rightly understood, as the more probable; for, although the solemnity of vows depends on the Church, it produces some effects permanent in themselves which do not proceed from a simple vow: thus acts contrary to solemn vows are rendered not only illicit, but also invalid; for example, a marriage contracted by him who has emitted a solemn vow of chastity is invalid. This can be declared thus: just as, in civil matters, those contracts are called solemn in the making of which public authority intervenes, which confers upon them a special firmness on account of the public good; so likewise, in our matter, the public authority of the Church intercedes, so that it may concede a special indissolubility to solemn vows, which it publicly recognizes as such. Moreover this indissolubility proceeds from this, that publicly, and from the very authority of the Church accepting and confirming the vows emitted, persons vowing are consecrated to God in a special and indissoluble manner, as regards those acts which they promised to do or omit.

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 7 and 9; Lehmkuhl, n. 500.

[2] Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 603; Noldin, n. 210.

Moreover, since this indissolubility arises from the authority of the Church, it is not so firm that dispensation cannot be made in it from a most grave cause.

§ II. Concerning the Honesty and Obligation of a Vow. — I. Concerning the Honesty of a Vow.

978. 1. Errors. Many Protestants, from the fact that they reject the distinction between precepts and counsels, contend that vows concerning things not prescribed, from the motive of worshiping God, are not only illicit, but impious, since they suppose that there are certain supererogatory works which are by no means owed to God. Nevertheless, they concede that the same vows are licit if they are made from another motive, for example, for the sake of avoiding sin, or of freeing oneself from the bonds of the world. - Today, however, not a few rationalists and politicians reprove all vows, especially religious and perpetual vows, as harmful to liberty and to society: for since man is essentially mutable and progressive, no one can abdicate his liberty, especially in perpetuity; besides, religious, by vowing poverty, obedience, and chastity, become not only useless to society, but even harmful: for they produce nothing, and by their example draw others to idleness under the pretext of contemplation. - Hence we shall premise a few things concerning the honesty and excellence of vows.

[1] St. Thomas vindicated the excellence of religious vows in two opuscule works: Opusc. I, *Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem*; Opusc. III, *Contra pestiferam doctrinam retrahentium homines a religionis ingressu* (Works, ed. Vives, t. XXIX).

979. 2. Thesis: Vows prudently emitted, from the motive of worshiping God, are honest and laudable.

(A) That vows made in honor of God are acceptable to Him and are commended by Him is clear from many texts of Scripture: the Patriarchs emit vows, and on account of this are blessed by Him;[2] in the Mosaic law, prescriptions are established concerning the fulfillment of vows: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it: and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin. If thou wilt not promise, thou shalt be without sin."[3] Although vows do not fall under precept, as is clear from the words just cited, nevertheless elsewhere they are commended:[4] "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God." - Under the new law, the Apostles are presented as paying vows;[5] and many Fathers understood of the vow of chastity the words of Paul concerning younger widows, who have made void their first faith.[6]

[2] Gen. 28:20.

[3] Deut. 23:21-22.

[4] Ps. 75:12.

[5] Acts 18:18; 21:23.

[6] 1 Tim. 5:12.

980. (B) Wherefore, already in the first centuries of the Church, vows were in use, especially the vow of chastity, and afterward the three vows of religious. Thus Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome wrote entire treatises on virginity, insofar as it is confirmed by vow. Let Augustine be heard addressing the spouses Armentarius and Paulina, who by mutual consent had emitted a vow of chastity: "But now, because thy pledge is held before God, I do not invite thee to great justice (if I exhort thee not to recede from the vow), but I deter thee from great

iniquity. For thou wilt not be such as thou wouldst have remained if thou hadst vowed nothing of this kind. For then thou wouldst have been lesser, not worse; but now so much the more miserable, which may God avert, if thou shalt break the same to God, as thou art happier if thou shalt pay it. Nor therefore should it repent thee to have vowed; rather rejoice that now that is not licit for thee which would have been licit to thy loss... Happy is the necessity which compels to better things."[7] - Wherefore the Church approved the vows of religious, condemned their impugners,[8] and, against Protestants, in a general manner defined the honesty of vows thus:[9] "If anyone shall say that men are to be so recalled to the remembrance of baptism received that they understand all vows which are made after baptism to be void by force of the promise already made in baptism itself, as if by them both the faith which they professed and baptism itself were detracted from, let him be anathema."

[7] St. Augustine, Epist. 127, Migne, P.L., XXXIII, 487. - Cf. St. Jerome to Eustochium on the custody of virginity, P.L., t. XXII, 394-425.

[8] In Denzinger, n. 497-499.

[9] Trent, sess. VII, *De Baptismo*, can. 9; Denzinger, n. 746.

981. (C) Reason itself shows that vows, prudently emitted, turn to the glory of God and to the utility of those vowing. (a) To the glory of God; for man, offering and promising to God a thing pleasing and better to Him, studies to please Him and acknowledges His supreme dominion; but because he cannot fulfill the vow except by renouncing his own will and pleasure, at the same time he offers an internal sacrifice and spiritual hosts by which God is worshiped most greatly. - Even conditioned vows, by which something is promised if God grants such a grace, glorify Him, although less perfectly than absolute vows; for thus it is acknowledged that God provides for human affairs, and that one must flee to Him so that opportune helps may be obtained in temporal or spiritual matters. - Nevertheless that mercenary disposition of soul by which something is never vowed to God or to the saints except for obtaining some temporal advantage should by no means be commended; they act much more perfectly who vow something to God absolutely, confidently awaiting from Him whatever it shall please Him to repay at the opportune time.

(b) To the utility of those vowing; for since human nature is weak and inconstant, it greatly benefits, in certain adjuncts, to furnish it strength and firmness by binding oneself to more perfect things through a vow: for thus the will is strengthened and confirmed in good; since an honorable man is, as it were, compelled by a sense of honor to execute promises seriously made; and, if there is question of promises made to God, he is induced gently and strongly by the virtue of religion to fulfill them. Wherefore he will employ every fortitude to overcome difficulties and execute the thing, and thus his powers for doing good will be doubled. Besides, God Himself, in whose honor the vow was emitted, will not disdain to assist the one vowing by His powerful virtue, and from this head his strength will be increased not a little.

982. The adversaries indeed object that liberty is destroyed by vows, since thus the moral power of choosing between contraries is taken away. - The argument is retorted; for the same can be said of all human promises and contracts; for by these the power of choosing is restricted,

since the contracting parties impose true obligations upon themselves, whether for a time or in perpetuity. - Therefore the adversaries falsely suppose that liberty is diminished or destroyed by a moral obligation; on the contrary, we are the freer the more faithfully and perfectly we fulfill our duties. For although we have the power of choosing between good and evil, we do not lose this by choosing good, which perfects our nature, but use it well. Is not liberty, on the contrary, diminished when, serving passions and pleasures, contrary to the dictate of right reason, we desire evil? Therefore they are freer who, their passions having been subdued, fulfill their duties more frequently and perfectly. But those who not rashly but prudently, not quickly but after mature deliberation, spontaneously oblige themselves to doing something better, far from binding their liberty with new bonds, become freer: for they bid farewell to pleasures, that they may serve right reason and God Himself more faithfully. - Thus certainly do they judge who, after a long life spent in the practice of virtue, are no longer drawn to evil by the vehement impulse of the passions.[10]

[10] M. d'Hulst, *Careme* 1893, p. 134-136, eloquently declares this as follows: "The vow an enemy of liberty? But do you not perceive the equivocation? Liberty, that is, the right to do: yes, this liberty, which after all is only a benefit, is restricted by the vow. What was permitted is so no longer. But since when is it a moral diminishment to renounce a benefit? Is not everything great in the world of souls made of this stuff? Do you wish to see whom the vow profits? Look at whom it saddens. It saddens egoism, the need to enjoy, to seize goods. Ah! if egoism is not satisfied, so much the better; it is that virtue triumphs... The power of choosing one's acts, that is free will; and such is the moral signification of the word liberty. Well then, this power, where is it exercised, where is it affirmed more? Speak; I appeal to your consciences. Is it in enjoyment permitted, or in enjoyment sacrificed? Ah! in enjoyment permitted, I am not very sure of being free. Perhaps I grant it to myself because it is permitted; then it is a good act; but perhaps I yield to its attractions because it is enjoyment, and then I am no longer free, I am dragged along. If on the contrary I react; if, by going back up the current of my covetous desires, I pass even beyond the line of duty; if I venture, bold and proud, into the regions of perfection; if I do more; if, modest as much as strong, I distrust, in my fervor of today, my weakness of tomorrow, and if, in order to cut it short, like that Spanish conqueror, I burn behind me the ships of return and bind myself by a voluntary bond to heroic actions which it was permitted to me to omit; oh! then, say if it pleases you, that I am no longer free. I shall answer you, for my part, that one is free in the measure in which one does a work of will, and that I have willed more strongly than you, since I have willed more difficult things. And, if returning to the charge, you speak to me of my chains, I shall tell you that I bear them because I chose them, and that I am proud of them, while perhaps you bear some which you did not choose and of which you are ashamed."

983. 3. Corollary. A good work done from vow, other things being equal, is more meritorious than the same work without vow. St. Thomas demonstrates this by a threefold argument: (a) to vow is an act of latria, or of religion, which is the chief among the moral virtues; but since an act of an inferior virtue is better and more meritorious from the fact that it is commanded by a superior virtue, the works of inferior virtues, such as fasting, abstinence, continence, are rendered better and more meritorious when they are done from vow, because thus they are commanded by the virtue of religion, which excels the other moral virtues. (b) He who vows something and does it subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, and therefore subjects himself more perfectly; just as he gives more who hands over to a neighbor the tree with the fruits than he who hands over the fruits only. (c) Through a vow the will is immovably confirmed in good, from what was said above, n. 982; but to do something from a will confirmed in good pertains to the perfection of virtue, which from its nature is stable, just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates sin.

Nevertheless I said other things being equal; for, since charity is the most perfect of all the virtues, he who acts from charity accomplishes more perfect works than he who acts from vow, or from the virtue of religion. Moreover, he who, not from vow, but from repeated acts, accomplishes the same things as one vowing, sometimes acquires greater merit from the greater effort which he must renew more frequently.

II. Concerning the Obligation Arising from a Vow.

984. 1. Principle: By a vow there is induced in conscience an obligation of performing that which was promised; moreover, the gravity of this obligation depends both on the intention of the one vowing and on the gravity of the matter.

(A) From Scripture it is clear that vows must be diligently fulfilled under penalty of sin: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God requireth it, and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin"[1]... "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him... and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised."[2] In truth, if promises made to men must be kept from the virtue of fidelity, a fortiori those things which are made to God must be fulfilled, and indeed from the virtue of religion; for fidelity toward God, as pertaining to divine worship, is deservedly adorned with the name of religion. It is indeed true that a promise does not strictly oblige unless it has been accepted; but, from the texts cited above, it is clearly established that vows, clothed with the due conditions, are accepted by God, and that their fulfillment is urged; wherefore there can be no doubt concerning the obligation which they induce.

[1] Deut. 23:21.

[2] Eccles. 5:3-4.

985. (B) The gravity of this obligation depends chiefly on the very intention of the one vowing: for since a vow is, as it were, a private law which he imposes upon himself, he can oblige himself under grave sin or under light sin, according as he wills. It also depends on the gravity of the matter itself. Nevertheless, even when there is question of matter grave in itself, a vow can be emitted under light sin only. Yet those vows are excepted whose gravity the Church herself has defined, namely the vow of chastity emitted by sacred ministers, and the vows of religious: for then legitimate authority, on account of the public good, manifestly declares that vows of this kind cannot be made except under penalty of grave sin. - Besides, matter light in itself cannot be vowed under grave sin, because the intention of incurring a grave obligation in light matter is not reasonable, and therefore is not approved by God (*De Legibus*, n. 274).

Hence, in order that a vow oblige under grave sin, two things are required: that the matter be grave, and that the one vowing have the intention of obliging himself under mortal sin. - Moreover, matter is judged grave which, if it were prescribed by the Church, would oblige under grave sin, such as assistance at Mass, fasting, Communion, etc.; this indeed must be determined from the estimation of prudent men. - When several light matters have been promised by the same vow, they coalesce or do not coalesce into grave matter according as, from the intention of the one vowing, they were promised as one thing or as singular things; when this intention is lacking, the matter must be judged from the estimation of prudent men.

986. 2. Corollaries. (A) A vow directly obliges only the one vowing; for since the obligation of a vow arises from a promise freely made, he alone is bound by this obligation who freely undertook it. Hence:

(a) Children are not held to fulfill the personal vows of their parents, unless afterward they have made these vows their own. Subjects are not held to execute vows made by the superior of the community, by force of the vow itself, unless they have consented to the same, but by force of religious obedience, if the superior legitimately commands this. Likewise posterity is not compelled to observe the vows of ancestors by force of the vow; but, if the community itself, through its legitimate presidents, has emitted some vow, the subjects ought to execute the acts promised by reason of precept, or of custom having the force of law: for presidents can, on account of the common good, prescribe some work which even posterity must fulfill; but because the work is enjoined from the motive of religion, it must indirectly be performed by the subjects from the same motive.

(b) When there is question of a real vow, heirs are held to execute, not from religion, but from justice, those things which had been promised by deceased predecessors, yet not beyond the forces of the inheritance. For a real vow, for example, the promise of some alms, is as it were a burden annexed to the inheritance itself; but the inheritance passes to heirs with its burdens. Therefore these are held to pay the burdens, first indeed debts of justice, but afterward debts of religion, arising from vow, which precede pious legacies.

(c) Moreover a personal vow must be fulfilled by the one vowing himself, since his own action was promised; if the one vowing cannot fulfill it, he is not held to perform it through another. - The contrary must be said of a real vow: for since a thing was promised, the one vowing can give it either by himself or through another.

987. (B) A vow must be fulfilled in the manner in which it was made. Accordingly:

(a) If it is conditioned, it does not oblige unless the condition has been fulfilled. Nevertheless, it is not licit fraudulently to impede the execution of the condition; and therefore he sins against the vow who by deceit, force, threats, or other unjust means impedes this execution. But he who prevents the added condition from being verified only by prayers, persuasion, or licit ways, does not strictly sin, and is freed from his vow, since in reality the condition was not fulfilled. Likewise, if the condition is fulfilled not properly but only equivalently, the vow probably does not oblige; for example, he who vowed entrance into religion if his widowed mother entered second nuptials is not strictly held to enter if she has died, even if the reason for the condition added was the support of the mother.

(b) If it is disjunctive, for example, if I recover, I shall fast for three days or give twenty coins to the poor, the option belongs to the one vowing; but he must execute one or the other. If, before the election has been made, one part becomes impossible without the fault of the one vowing, probably he is held to nothing, because the faculty of choosing does not remain; but a pious and honorable man will nevertheless execute the other part. But once the election has been made, the chosen part is to be performed, even if the other part becomes impossible; but if the chosen part becomes impossible without the fault of the one vowing, he is held to nothing.

988. (C) As to time, a vow must be fulfilled at the prefixed time, without its being necessary to anticipate it, even if a future impediment is foreseen; and notable delay, without just cause, in a grave matter, is of itself a grave sin.

But what constitutes notable delay depends on many circumstances: on the nature of the vow, the age of the one vowing, the danger of forgetfulness or of inability to execute the vow in the future. All these things can be judged only from the estimation of prudent men. Thus he who vowed to enter religion at once, and without cause defers for three or four years, of itself sins gravely, because he withdraws a notable part of the service promised; but if there is question of a pious pilgrimage, a long delay does not seem grave, unless from this there is probable danger of future inability to execute the pilgrimage. - If the vow has not been fulfilled at the prefixed time, its obligation ceases if the time was added for ending the obligation, but by no means if it was added for urging the same: prudent men will judge concerning this, according to the true or presumed intention of the one vowing and the other circumstances. - If no time was prefixed, the vow must be fulfilled as soon as morally possible: for it is as a debt, which must be paid as soon as possible.

989. (D) When there is question of the interpretation of a vow, these things especially are to be attended to: (a) First, a vow must be interpreted according to the expressed or presumed intention of the one vowing, as is established from what has already been said.

Thus he who vowed that he would give annually, for ten years, one hundred coins to Titius, so that he might help him in supporting his family, is held to perform this even after Titius has died, if his primary intention was the support of the family; but not if the primary intention was the relief of the father from anxiety in supporting the family.

(b) When the intention of the one vowing is not established, the vow must be interpreted according to the nature of the vow, the common usage of the place, or the general custom of the Church.

Thus he who vowed to recite the rosary can recite it alternately with a companion; he who vowed a fast can use lacticinia where this custom is in force; if you vowed a fast for a month, you are not held on Sunday, since, from the practice of the Church, fasting does not take place on that day.

(c) If, all things having been weighed, doubt remains concerning the sense of the vow, it is licit to follow the more benign part; for in hateful matters, to which the bond of a vow is referred, the more benign part is to be followed.

Therefore he who promised alms, without determining the quantity, satisfies the vow, provided the sum disbursed is not ridiculous, all things considered; he who vowed a chalice, without a determined quality of matter, is not held to offer a gold one, but can offer a silver one.

Moreover, as to all doubts which arise concerning the existence or extension of a vow, the principles handed down in the Treatise on Conscience, where the various systems of probabilism are treated, must be kept in mind; nor is the fulfillment of a truly doubtful vow to be urged.

§ I. Concerning the Cessation of a Vow or of Its Obligation.

The obligation of a vow can cease in four ways: 1. by its own nature, from a change of matter or cessation of the end; 2. by invalidation, or annulment or suspension by him who has power; 3. by

dispensation; 4. by commutation by a legitimate superior.

I. Concerning the Cessation of a Vow from the Nature of the Thing Itself.

990. A vow, like a law, can cease from the nature of the thing itself, namely from a notable change of matter or circumstances, or from the cessation of the principal end.

1. From a notable change of matter or circumstances, namely if the thing promised becomes illicit, useless, or impeding a greater good: for the thing ceases to be apt matter of a vow.

Thus a pastor who vowed a pilgrimage on such a day, if then he must assist the gravely sick; or one who promised to come to the aid of some necessity which has already come to an end; or who vowed a fast on such a day, which would impede a very useful work of charity. The same must be said when circumstances are so notably changed that, if the one vowing had foreseen the change, he would not have emitted the vow: for then he did not intend to oblige himself for such circumstances. Thus he who vowed to give a rich alms, and afterward became poor, is not held to bestow it; he who had promised to relieve a poor man is not held to give him money when he notices that this man uses the same to make himself drunk. On the contrary, however, a vow of chastity is valid, even if vehement temptations afterward arise: for these could have been foreseen from things commonly occurring.

991. 2. From the cessation of the principal end; for since a vow is ordered to obtaining some end, when the principal end for which it is intended ceases, by that very fact the reason of the obligation ceases. Therefore he who vowed a pilgrimage for obtaining the health of a friend is not held to execute the vow after the friend has died. But when the secondary, or impulsive, end ceases, the vow does not by that very fact cease, if the principal end endures; he who vowed to educate a pious young man for the clerical state, and chose Titius on account of a pleasing voice, is not freed from the vow if the voice becomes less pleasing, because this end is altogether secondary.

II. Concerning the Invalidation of a Vow.

992. 1. Notion. The invalidation of a vow is its annulment or suspension made by him who has dominative power[1] over the will of the one vowing, or over the matter of the vow. Therefore a twofold invalidation is customarily distinguished: (a) direct, or properly so called, which is the annulment of a vow made by him who has power over the will of the one vowing: this dissolves the obligation in perpetuity, so that it never revives. This can be declared thus: he who is subject to the power of another cannot emit an absolute vow, but only a conditioned one, namely with the tacit condition added: unless the superior contradicts; wherefore, if in reality the superior has contradicted, by that very fact the vow does not oblige, because the annexed condition was not fulfilled. (b) Indirect, or less properly so called, is the suspension of a vow made by him who has power not directly over the very will of the one vowing, but over the thing promised: this does not thoroughly remove the obligation of the vow, but only suspends it, namely as long as the matter remains subject to the will of the superior; therefore the obligation revives as soon as this matter is withdrawn from his power.

[1] Dominative power, which belongs to private masters as regards subjects, differs from the power of jurisdiction: for the latter arises from a public office, while the former arises from a private office. Dominative power sometimes flows from the law of nature, as paternal authority; sometimes also from ecclesiastical law, as the authority of religious superiors over subjects.

993. 2. Who are able to invalidate vows? (A) Directly, those can do this who have dominative power over the will of others:

(a) A father can directly invalidate all vows emitted by children before puberty, and probably those of non-emancipated minors (Codex, 88, 89). This power indeed rests on natural law, by force of which children depend on the father as long as they are immature in judgment, but it was determined by ecclesiastical law alone within these precise limits. This faculty extends to all vows emitted before puberty, even reserved vows and vows made in favor of a third party; indeed even to vows confirmed after puberty, unless these are made firm by a new vow altogether independent from the former. The same privilege belongs to all those in whom paternal power is present by law, namely to a tutor, and, this lacking, to the paternal grandfather; indeed probably, according to some, to the mother, if, the father or tutor being present and not contradicting, she exercises this authority.

(b) It is controverted whether a husband can directly invalidate all the vows of his wife emitted after marriage. Those who affirm with St. Thomas[2] argue from the fact that the man is the head of the woman, and therefore has power over her will. Yet many deny this, because the subjection of the wife, arising from marriage, does not extend beyond matrimonial duties; therefore the husband can invalidate only indirectly those vows which are opposed to his rights. We embrace this opinion as the more probable.

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad 3. - Num. 30:7-9 is also alleged for confirming this opinion; but this text pertains to the ceremonial Mosaic law, which has been abrogated.

(c) A regular Superior can directly invalidate all private vows of subjects emitted after profession: for by the vow of obedience they have subjected their will to the superior in all licit things. Nevertheless, the vow of passing to a stricter religion is excepted; this, from ecclesiastical law,[3] no one can invalidate, since it is always free to each one to tend to better things. - The vows of novices can be invalidated only indirectly, since they have not yet vowed obedience.

[3] Decretals, l. III, tit. 21, c. 18.

This same power belongs to superioresses of nuns as regards the vows of their subjects. - The Sovereign Pontiff, insofar as he is the supreme prelate of all religious, can invalidate their vows; Bishops enjoy the same authority only as regards religious who depend on the Ordinary.

994. (B) From the Code, all superiors who have power over the matter of a vow can suspend the vows of subjects which wound their rights. The reason is that, even by natural law, promises which wound the rights of another cannot be made. Wherefore:

(a) A husband can invalidate all vows of his wife, even those emitted before marriage, which are opposed to his matrimonial rights, for example, a vow of continence, of a long pilgrimage, etc.; the wife enjoys the same right, and therefore can invalidate a vow of living for a long time far from the conjugal home.

(b) A father can invalidate the vows of children, even of those who have reached puberty, which are opposed to his rights or the rights of the family, for example, a vow of a distant pilgrimage.

(c) Masters, or lords, can invalidate the vows of servants which render them unfit to furnish the services owed, such as vows of fasting daily or of spending a long time in churches.

(d) Regular prelates can invalidate the vows of novices which are incompatible with the observance of the rule; the same must be said of all superiors of colleges as regards the vows of pupils which bring an impediment to due obedience.

(e) The Sovereign Pontiff and Bishops can a fortiori invalidate the vows of subjects incompatible with their just prescriptions.

995. Note. For the validity of invalidation, in these or similar cases, no reason is required, because the superior who invalidates a vow subject to himself uses his own right. But for the licit exercise of this right, a just cause is required; for one who without reason invalidated the vows of subjects would irrationally impede their spiritual good. Thus from the Code, can. 1312: "... he can render his vows invalid validly and, from a just cause, also licitly."

From the Code, c. 1315, vows emitted before religious profession are suspended as long as the one vowing remains in religion.

III. Concerning Dispensation from a Vow.

996. 1. Notion and required conditions. Vows, even firm in themselves, sometimes it is expedient to remove by dispensation, which is defined as the relaxation of an obligation induced by vow, made in the name of God by him who has the power of jurisdiction.

(A) From this the distinction between invalidation and dispensation is clear: (a) for the latter is made in the name of God, while invalidation is made in the proper name of the one invalidating; (b) the latter requires the power of jurisdiction, while the former supposes only dominative power: for since, by force of the vow, a man has contracted an obligation before God, this cannot be dissolved except by him who has divinely received the power of jurisdiction, by force of which he can dissolve spiritual bonds in the name of God Himself; (c) hence a just cause is required for a valid dispensation, which is not necessary for invalidation; (d) invalidation can be made even when the one vowing is unwilling, while dispensation supposes the consent of the one vowing, who imposed the obligation upon himself.

997. (B) That the power of dispensing in vows belongs to the Church is clear: (a) from the general concession of dissolving all spiritual bonds which can obstruct the salvation of souls: "And whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven";[4] for sometimes it happens, on account of human frailty, that vows even maturely emitted can be observed only with difficulty, with the greatest danger to souls; therefore it is of the greatest interest that they be able to be relaxed, so that those vowing may provide for their salvation more easily. Wherefore Christ conferred upon the Church the power of dispensing in vows, in the name of God Himself, who alone can condone an obligation contracted toward Himself. (b) From the

long-standing and universal practice of the Church, which very often, for just causes, is accustomed to dispense in vows.

[4] Matt. 16:19.

998. (C) But because one dispensing acts not in his own name, but in the name of God, a just cause is required for dispensing validly, and indeed a cause graver according as the vow is more excellent. The sufficiency of this cause must be left to the prudent judgment of superiors; and the faithful, who in good faith have set forth the whole matter, ought not be disquieted concerning this. - The general causes which can move superiors to grant a dispensation legitimately are the honor of God, the utility of the Church, and the necessity of the one vowing.

Among particular causes, certain ones stand on the part of the vow, and others on the part of its execution. (a) On the part of the vow, namely if someone vowed indiscreetly, from anger, sadness, before puberty, without deliberation; or under compulsion, from fear even light fear, deceit, etc. (b) On the part of the execution, if this becomes too arduous, or impedes a greater private or public good, or becomes an occasion of spiritual or temporal evil; for example, if, the frailty of the one vowing being considered, it is an occasion of frequent violation.

If the vow was made for the utility of a third party, dispensation can be made as long as the promise has not been accepted, because this does not produce an obligation toward neighbor; but, if it has already been accepted, generally dispensation cannot be made without the consent of the third party, because otherwise his rights would be violated. Nevertheless, if the promise was made principally in honor of God, and only secondarily in favor of the third party, it can be dispensed by the Sovereign Pontiff, because the accessory follows the principal.

999. 2. Concerning those who are able to dispense. All and only those are able to dispense in vows who have jurisdiction in the external forum: for such dispensation pertains to the government of the Church.

(a) The Sovereign Pontiff can dispense in all vows for the universal Church: for supreme and universal jurisdiction belongs to him. He grants this power to the Major Penitentiary for the whole Christian world, and to Apostolic Legates in the provinces to which they are sent; and this power, although by commission of the Pontiff, is judged to be ordinary, and not merely delegated, since it has been handed over to them by reason of office and by ordinary law.

(b) Ordinaries and all having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction are able to dispense in all vows of their subjects, except those which are reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff; and therefore also capitular vicars when the see is vacant. - Vicars general enjoy this power from the Code (c. 1313) by force of their office; but pastors do not, because they do not enjoy jurisdiction in the external forum, except by delegation.

(c) Superiors of exempt orders can dispense in the non-reserved vows of their subjects (Codex, c. 514).

(d) By special privilege, regular confessors can commute the non-reserved vows of the faithful by dispensing; indeed, according to many, they can also dispense simply, from the privilege granted by

Julius II to the Canons Regular of St. Saviour, and by Leo X to the Camaldolese hermits, which, by force of the communication of privileges, passed to other regulars. - Secular confessors sometimes obtain the same privilege by delegation. - In both cases, this privilege can be exercised even outside confession, unless the contrary is declared in the concession.

1000. 3. Concerning vows reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff. The Sovereign Pontiff has reserved to himself certain vows, in which he alone can dispense; these are:

(a) Solemn vows of religion; indeed, from recent law,[1] simple religious vows which precede solemn profession, and those which are emitted in congregations approved by the Holy See, whether perpetual or temporary.

[1] S. Cong. Bishops and Regulars, June 12, 1858.

(b) The vow of entering a religion of solemn vows.

(c) The vow of perpetual and perfect chastity, even emitted by laypersons.

The vows of a Roman pilgrimage, to the thresholds of the Apostles; of a Jerusalem pilgrimage, to the sepulcher of the Lord; of a Compostelan pilgrimage to the relics of St. James, are no longer reserved.

1001. Yet these vows are not reserved except in the strict sense set forth above; - and indeed when they are perfect, that is, obliging under grave sin; - fully free and emitted after the completed eighteenth year of age; - absolute, but not conditioned or disjunctive; - and certain, but not doubtfully emitted or doubtfully reserved. The reason is that, since reservation is hateful, it is to be interpreted strictly.

Wherefore vows of not marrying, of not sinning against chastity, of conjugal chastity, of temporary chastity, of virginity (as distinguished from a vow of perfect chastity), of receiving sacred orders, of entering a congregation in which only simple vows are emitted, ought by no means to be held reserved. - Likewise even reserved vows are reserved only as regards substance, but not as regards circumstances; thus he who vowed to enter a stricter religion can be dispensed by the Bishop so that he may enter a milder one.

Besides, when necessity urges, namely when grave spiritual or temporal harm is imminent and, on the other hand, the Sovereign Pontiff cannot be approached at once, Bishops can dispense in reserved vows. - When, by force of an apostolic concession, a reserved vow has been commuted into other works, these works indeed have the nature and obligation of a vow, but not of a reserved vow.

IV. Concerning the Commutation of a Vow.

1002. 1. Notion. The commutation of a vow is the substitution of another work in place of that which had been promised, with the same obligation. Therefore in commutation the obligation of the vow is not relaxed, as in invalidation or dispensation, but, the bond of the vow remaining, the obligation contracted is transferred to another matter.

This commutation can be made in three ways: into a better work, into an equal work, into a less good work.

1003. 2. Conditions. For commutation two things are required: legitimate power and a just cause.

(A) Now (a) commutation into something better can be made even by the proper authority of the one vowing, unless a prescription of the Church or the good of a third party stands in the way; for what is better, that is, what contributes more, all things diligently considered, to the glory of God or the utility of the one vowing, includes in itself the less perfect, and without doubt is accepted by God.[2] But by the statute of the Church, reserved vows must be excepted, which cannot be commuted except into religious vows, and the vow of passing to a stricter religion. Likewise a vow in favor of a third party, accepted by him, cannot be commuted without his consent.

[2] Thus religious vows include the others in themselves, and therefore vows emitted in the world are extinguished by religious profession, or rather are commuted into it.

(b) Commutation into an equal work, according to the Code (can. 1314), does not require the intervention of a superior, but can be made by one's proper authority.

Thus an end is imposed on the controversy previously debated among theologians; and therefore we omit what we had written concerning this controversy.

Thus, for example, the daily recitation of the Rosary can be commuted into hearing Mass three or four times in the week; the fast of one day into one confession; the vow of a pilgrimage of one day into one fast, by applying the expenses of the pilgrimage to a pious work.

(c) Commutation into a lesser work, since it involves a true dispensation, cannot be made without the intervention of a superior. All those enjoy this faculty who have the power of dispensing, whether ordinary or delegated. - Those who have obtained only the power of commuting can use it for commuting vows into a morally equivalent work, or even into a work a little less good, but not into a notably lesser work.

1004. (B) As regards cause, a vow can be changed into something better without cause; into something equal, with a light cause, such as the greater devotion or utility of the one vowing; into something lesser, from a grave cause, which is required not only for liceity, but also for validity: this cause nevertheless can be less than that required for dispensation.

Moreover, once commutation has been made, it is licit to return to the first work, - even when this had been made into a better work, at least more probably: for commutation is a favor which no one is held to use. - Nevertheless, in practice inconstancy should carefully be avoided, which is found by no means rarely in pious women, and harms their progress not a little.

If the work into which the vow has been changed becomes impossible: (a) it is necessary to return to the first, if the commutation was made by one's own authority, because the obligation is not judged extinguished except by an equal or better work; (b) if the commutation was made by the authority of a superior, it is not necessary to return to the first work, because the prior obligation has been dissolved by the superior.

Practical Corollary.

1005. Confessors ought not be too inclined in suggesting or permitting vows, especially where there is question of the vow of perpetual chastity. For experience establishes that certain young women, at a time when sensible devotion is fervent, easily vow chastity, and afterward, when temptations arise and an opportunity of marrying is offered, seek marriage and bid farewell to their vows, not without great danger to the soul. Therefore those are not to be heard who at once wish to vow perpetual chastity; but, after mature investigation, let a vow of chastity be permitted the first time for three or six months, afterward for a whole year, then for two years. Very rarely is the vow of perpetual chastity to be counseled to those remaining in the world, unless they are already of advanced age and have furnished examples of firmness.

Likewise, let confessors not easily commute vows without cause, but let them exhort penitents to fulfill their vows, and to serve God with fortitude of soul and unconquered constancy: for thus they will make more progress than by easily changing their proposals.

Chapter III: On the Sanctification of Sunday

Concerning the Social Act of Religion.

Since man was born for society, and in reality lives in society, it is altogether fitting that worship be rendered to God not only private, but also social. The determination of worship of this kind, under the law of nature, would pertain to the presidents of society. But once the institution of supernatural religion is supposed, this determination pertains to God Himself, or to those to whom the care of spiritual things has been committed, namely to ecclesiastical authority.

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 122, a. 4; Suarez, *de Virt. relig.*, Tr. II, l. II; Billuart, *de Relig.*, diss. VI; St. Alphonsus, n. 263-332; Sporer-Bierbaum, t. I, tr. 3, n. 482-541; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 711-814; Berardi, t. I, n. 563-620; Noldin, n. 261-277.

Preliminary Remarks Concerning the Sanctification of the Sabbath and Sunday.

1006. Historical exposition.[2] In reality God Himself, under the old law, selected the seventh day of any week as to be dedicated to divine worship: "Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath day. Six days shalt thou labor, and shalt do all thy works. But on the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God: thou shalt do no work on it, thou, and thy son and thy daughter, thy manservant and thy maidservant, thy beast, and the stranger who is within thy gates."[3] The reason assigned is chiefly twofold: one, on the part of God: for He rested on the seventh day, and blessed it, and sanctified it, or separated it from profane uses; wherefore we also ought to rest on the same day, for testifying our dependence upon God: "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them, and rested on the seventh day: therefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day, and sanctified it"[4]... "See that you keep my sabbath: because it is a sign between me and you in your generations: that you may know that I am the Lord, who sanctify you."[5] - But the other reason stands on the part of man, namely that the Jews and their servants may enjoy necessary rest: "Thou shalt not do any work therein, thou nor thy son... that thy manservant and thy maidservant may rest, even as thyself. Remember that thou also didst serve in Egypt, and the Lord thy God brought thee out from thence with a strong hand and an outstretched arm. Therefore He commanded thee that thou shouldst observe the sabbath day."[6] - The violation of this precept was punished by the penalty of death.[7]

[2] J. Gilfillan, *The Sabbath viewed in the light of reason, revelation and history*, Edinburgh, 1867; A. Villien, *Hist. des Commandements de l'Eglise*, first Commandment, in *Rev. du clerge francais*, t. XLI, 1905, p. 563-584; and t. XLIII, p. 339-366.

[3] Exod. 20:8-10. - That the sabbath day was observed by the Patriarchs before Moses is very probable. Sayce, *Hibbert's Lectures*, p. 76-77, hands down that among the Assyrians there were certain sabbath days, or days of rest from work. Cf. M. d'Hulst, *Careme* 1893, p. 281-283.

[4] Exod. 20:11.

[5] Exod. 31:13.

[6] Deut. 5:14-15.

[7] Num. 15:32-36.

On the sabbath day not only was rest observed, but sacrifices were offered to God: "And this holocaust shall the prince offer to the Lord: on the sabbath day six lambs without blemish, and a ram without blemish."[8] On the same day the loaves of proposition were renewed; besides, the Jews were accustomed to assemble in synagogues, to pray and to hear the word of God:[9] "For Moses of old time hath in every city them that preach him in the synagogues, where he is read every sabbath."

[8] Ezek. 46:4.

[9] Acts 15:21; cf. 13:27.

1007. 2. Through the new law the ceremonial part of sabbath observances has been abrogated. For Christ declared that the Father is to be worshiped in spirit and in truth,[10] and, to root out Pharisaic interpretations, taught that the sabbath was made for man, but not man for the sabbath.[11] Wherefore Paul reproved the Galatians, who, after conversion to the Christian faith, observed days and months and times and years,[12] according to the Mosaic law; and he admonishes the Colossians that the obligation of observing new moons and sabbaths is no longer in force.[13] Yet Christ often inculcated the necessity of glorifying God not only interiorly, but also exteriorly; and to promote this worship He instituted the Eucharistic sacrifice, which, since it is the renewal of the sacrifice of the cross, is much more excellent than all ancient oblations.[14] He Himself indeed did not determine the special day and manner by which God was to be worshiped, but left to the Church the power of establishing all these things.

[10] John 4:23.

[11] Mark 2:27.

[12] Gal. 4:10.

[13] Col. 2:16.

[14] Cf. Treatise on the Eucharist, n. 157 sq.

1008. The Apostles and the first Christians for some time, together with the Jews, assembled on the sabbath day to praise the Lord.[15] But soon they had special assemblies, and there they prayed and celebrated the Eucharistic supper;[16] and the custom prevailed that they assemble in this manner on the day following the sabbath, or on the first day of the week, which afterward was called the Lord's day.[17] In reality, already in the second century, from various documents it is clear that this practice was universal.[18] And so by apostolic authority and universal custom of the Church it came about that Sunday was substituted for the sabbath. Hence the *Apostolic Constitutions* (fourth century) attribute the institution of the Lord's day to the Apostles Peter and Paul: "I Peter and I Paul decree that servants work for five days, but on the sabbath and the Lord's day be free in church on account of the doctrine of religion."[19] In the same place it is asserted that the Lord's day was selected in commemoration of the day of Christ's resurrection. "On the day of the resurrection of the Lord, which we call the Lord's day, assemble without any interruption for giving thanks to God, and for professing the benefits with which God has affected us through Christ... so that your sacrifice may be without blame."[20]

[15] Acts 2:46; 3:1; 5:12; 21:26.

[16] Acts 2:42.

[17] Acts 20:7; 1 Cor. 16:2; Apoc. 1:10. - According to Nicephorus Callistus, H.E., l. VII, c. 46, the emperor Constantine willed that this day be called the Lord's day.

[18] You will find the testimonies in A. Villien, l.c., p. 565-566.

[19] *Constit. Apost.*, l. VIII, c. 33, Mansi, t. I, 579.

[20] Ibid., l. VII, c. 31, Mansi, 506.

1009. From the testimonies cited, and many others, it is clear that Sunday was consecrated to God not only by cessation from work, but also by prayers, preaching of the word, and especially by the offering of the sacrifice of the Mass. Already at the beginning of the fourth century, the Council of Elvira imposed canonical penalties on those who neglected to assist at Mass for three Sundays: "If anyone placed in a city shall not have gone to church for three Sundays, let him abstain for a short time (from Communion), so that he may seem to have been corrected."[21] - In the sixth century, Caesarius of Arles exhorts the faithful to sanctify the whole day, and commands that they assist at the sacred rite: "Therefore let him to whom it is possible come to the evening and nightly celebration, and let him pray there in the assembly of the Church to God for his sins. But he who cannot do this, let him at least pray in his own house, and not neglect to pay his vow to God and render the payment of servitude: but during the day let no one separate himself from the sacred celebration of Masses, nor let anyone remain idle at home."[22] And elsewhere he adds that the omission of any prayer and reading on Sunday is a grave sin: "If on the whole Lord's day we neglect to attend to reading and to supplicate God, we sin against God not lightly."[23] At the same time the Council of Agde (a. 506) prescribed "that Masses on the Lord's day be held whole by laymen... so that the people not presume to go out before the blessing of the priest."[24]

[21] Elvira, c. 21, in Mansi, t. II, 9.

[22] Serm. 280, among the works of Augustine, P.L., XXXIX, 2275.

[23] Serm. 281, ibid., 2270.

[24] Council of Agde, c. 47, Mansi, t. VIII, 322.

1010. Besides Sunday, certain feasts in the course of the centuries were instituted by the Church, and celebrated in the same manner. Since Bishops were able to institute feast days of precept, the discipline of various churches in this matter was diverse.

By common law, from the Constitution *Universa* of Urban VIII, Sept. 13, 1642, thirty-six days besides Sundays were to be observed by precept.[25] But Pius X retained only eight days,[26] namely the feasts of the Nativity, Circumcision, Epiphany, and Ascension of Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Immaculate Conception and Assumption of the Blessed Mary Mother of God, of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, and of All Saints.[27]

[25] The Nativity of the Lord, Circumcision, Epiphany, Monday and Tuesday after Easter, Ascension, Monday and Tuesday after Pentecost, the Feast of Corpus Christi, the Finding of the Holy Cross; Purification, Annunciation, Assumption, Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, (the Immaculate Conception, added to the catalogue by Clement XI), Saints Peter

and Paul, St. Andrew, St. James, St. Bartholomew, St. Matthew, Saints Simon and Jude, St. Matthias, St. Stephen Protomartyr, the Holy Innocents, St. Lawrence Martyr, St. Sylvester Pope, St. Joseph, St. Anne, the Feast of All Saints; one of the more principal patrons in any kingdom or province; another more principal patron in any city, town, or village.

[26] Motu proprio *Supremi disciplina*, July 2, 1911, A.A.S., III, p. 305.

[27] Feast days of patrons are not subject to ecclesiastical precept. But local Ordinaries can transfer the exterior solemnity to the nearest following Sunday.

From the Code, c. 1247, two feasts must be added to these, namely that of the most holy Body of Christ and of Saint Joseph (March 19).

By particular law, in France and other regions, from the concession of Cardinal Caprara on Apr. 9, 1802, the feasts to be celebrated outside Sundays were reduced to four: the Nativity and Ascension of the Lord, the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and the feast of All Saints. The solemnity of certain principal feasts is transferred to the following Sunday.

In Great Britain, the feasts to be observed by precept remain seven: the Nativity of Our Lord Jesus Christ, Circumcision, Epiphany, Ascension, Saints Peter and Paul, Assumption, and the feast of All Saints.

For the Federated States of America, there are likewise six feasts of precept: the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary; the Nativity of the Lord; Circumcision; Ascension; Assumption; the feast of All Saints. The feast of Saints Peter and Paul is transferred, as to solemnity, to the following Sunday.

1011. Conclusion. The law which prescribes the hearing of Mass and cessation from servile work on Sundays and feast days rests indeed on divine law, but has received its determination from ecclesiastical law.[28]

[28] This conclusion differs little from that which St. Thomas hands down, II-II, q. 122, a. 4, ad 1: "The precept concerning the sanctification of the sabbath, understood literally, is partly moral, but partly ceremonial. It is moral indeed as to this, that man assign some time of his life for attending to divine things... But insofar as in this precept a special time is determined as a sign of the creation of the world, thus it is a ceremonial precept. Similarly it is ceremonial according to its allegorical signification, insofar as it was a sign of the rest of Christ in the sepulcher, which was on the seventh day." And he adds in the same place, ad 4: "The observance of Sunday in the new law succeeds to the observance of the sabbath, not by force of a precept of the law, but from the constitution of the Church and the custom of the Christian people." Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 263.

(A) Certain theologians thought that not only the institution of the sabbath, but also the substitution of Sunday in place of the sabbath, is of divine law.[29] But it is commonly held that this substitution is of ecclesiastical law, as is clear from what was said above, n. 1008. (B) Others said that the sanctification of Sunday is only from ecclesiastical law,[30] since through the new law the precept of sanctifying the sabbath was abrogated, and only from the authority of the Church was Sunday substituted for the sabbath.

[29] Sporer-Bierbaum, tract. III, n. 485.

[30] Suarez, *de relig.*, tr. II, l. II, c. 1-4.

(C) Nevertheless we think, with certain others,[31] that the matter must be distinguished thus: (a) the sanctification of one day per week seems to be from divine law; for God Himself instituted the

division of time into weeks, and commanded that the seventh day be devoted to divine worship; the ceremonial part of this precept, namely the choice of the sabbath, was abrogated; but nothing proves that the precept was altogether deleted as regards the obligation of specially sanctifying one day per week. (b) But the selection of Sunday in place of the sabbath, as well as the mode of sanctifying this day by hearing Mass and cessation from servile work, proceeds from the authority of the Church. It was indeed very fitting that, once the institution of the Eucharistic sacrifice was posited, the faithful be held sometimes to hear Mass, especially on Sundays; but sound exegesis does not permit one certainly to infer this from the text[32] "Do this in commemoration of Me." Likewise, that God may be better worshiped on this day, it is altogether expedient that men abstain from works which turn the mind away from divine things; but what these works are, how many hours one must cease from them, was defined only by ecclesiastical law.

[31] Fr. Schmid, *Worin grundet die Pflicht der Sonntagsruhe, Quartalschrift Linz,* 1900, p. 12 ff.; Noldin, n. 261.

[32] Luke 22:19.

1012. From this it follows that the universal abrogation of this law is not to be expected. This even the defenders of the second opinion admit, among whom is Lehmkuhl, n. 546: "The universal abrogation of this law cannot therefore be made, because a sufficient reason can scarcely be conceived; and this law is to be conserved all the more holily, because it is traced back to apostolic institution, indeed in some way to the very origin of things, and precedes every institution of the old law." - But particular dispensations both from the hearing of Mass and from cessation from work can be granted, and in fact are granted not only to individual citizens, but also to communities.

These things having been set forth, we shall speak: 1. of the social utility of the sanctification of Sunday; 2. of the precept of hearing Mass; 3. of the precept of abstaining from servile works.

§ I. Concerning the Social Utility of Sunday.

1013. Thesis: The sanctification of Sunday, although it is not prescribed by natural law, but by positive law, is nevertheless most fitting both on the part of God and on the part of man.

It is explained. Natural law indeed prescribes that God be worshiped by man, from what was said above, n. 856, but it determines neither the mode nor the time in which worship is to be rendered. Likewise experience establishes that man needs rest, so that he may be able to work better, and perfect and develop his faculties: yet nothing is defined by natural law as regards the duration of this rest. Nevertheless, from the almost unanimous consent of Christian peoples, and also from long experience, it is established that sabbatic or Sunday rest, with the pious exercises which are celebrated on this day, bears before it very great social utility.

1014. It is proved: 1. On the part of God. (A) For although God can and ought to be adored daily, it is altogether expedient, indeed morally necessary, that certain times be determined in which special worship is rendered to Him. For man, oppressed by continual labors for sustaining himself and his own, often distracted by various cares and solicitudes, and allured by many pleasures, by no means rarely forgets his Creator and Lord; if at some time the thought of honoring God occurs, many put off this duty until tomorrow, because other duties, as they

think, urge immediate fulfillment; thus first the exercise of religion is deferred, then soon altogether neglected; thus man, forgetful of God and of his last end, thinks only of temporal things, of increasing wealth, of pleasures; he scarcely cares for the moral law and the practice of virtues, and little by little declines toward animal life. - But, on the contrary, if on any week a certain day is prefixed, on which we are held to cease from work and pay praises to God, divine worship already becomes easier. For when servile work ceases, the mind soon ascends to the Lord, becomes solicitous concerning the last end and the means of attaining it, and pays due praises to the supreme Creator and Governor of all. Sacred sermons, which devout Christians hear, pious readings of the Scriptures, prayers recited in church, and especially the celebration of Mass, which vividly commemorates the Passion of Christ and the benefits of Redemption, surely contribute much to this; also the works of charity or beneficence which on these days we perform more solicitously.

1015. (B) Besides, not only internal and private worship is owed to God, but also social worship, n. 859. Now, unless certain days are assigned on which Christians may pray together, social worship becomes impossible: for each one, either alone, or with parents, relatives, and a few friends, will pay praises to God privately. But if on any week, on a prefixed day, all Christians are gathered into churches, and there through Christ, and with Him, and in Him, pour forth prayers with one accord and glorify God; if they devoutly assist at the same sacrifice in which the Most Holy Trinity, in the name of the whole Church, is adored, praised, and receives thanksgiving, all easily understand that they are members of the same body, sons of the same heavenly Father; and they pay social worship to God not only as private men, but as members of the human family.

1016. 2. On the part of man. The celebration of Sunday confers many advantages upon man: bodily, moral, and religious.

(A) Bodily advantages: the physical powers of man, as limited, are easily diminished by continual labor; and unless they are restored by weekly rest, they are soon thoroughly exhausted.[1] This indeed is more true whenever labor becomes more intense, and demands greater application of mind and tension of nerves, as the matter stands today in most industrial workshops. But unless a certain day of rest is assigned, it will scarcely be possible for workers to cease from work. For by force of the unavoidable competition which prevails everywhere, masters do not wish machines, acquired at great expense, to remain unproductive on any day, and therefore often demand from workers that they labor daily; not a few, whether from hope of greater gain or from fear that they be thrown out of the workshop, in reality perform this, and soon, broken in strength, contract long-lasting diseases, or must abstain from work for a long time, not without great detriment to the family. Therefore it is necessary that on certain days servile works be prohibited, with the exception of those which are necessary for the public good. Experience likewise establishes that on any week one day of rest is morally necessary;[2] and it is altogether fitting that this day be Sunday, since it has already been observed for many centuries among Christian nations.

[1] To the point Heyl de Herrnsheim, in the international congress held at Berlin concerning Sunday rest, in the year 1890 (p. 48, official Paris edition): "For thousands of years, the seventh day has been a day of rest. At all times, it has been recognized as necessary that man periodically interrupt his work in order to repair his strength. If he does not do this, his body wears out rapidly, his strength and his power of work diminish gradually and end by being prematurely

annihilated. It is therefore in the interest of humanity to prescribe one day of rest per week. As for the choice of this day, Germany is of the opinion that it ought to fall for each person on Sunday, which, moreover, by tradition is already consecrated to rest; and, following the example given by England, Austria, and Switzerland, the German authority proposes to extend to adults, by legislative means, the obligation which already exists for minors of interrupting all industrial work on Sunday, except in case of absolute necessity." - In reality, in most cultivated nations, laws have been passed concerning Sunday rest; A. Morel, *Le repos dominical*, Paris, p. 15-32, exhibits a summary of them; and in France a law concerning this matter will soon be promulgated, which the socialists themselves earnestly demand.

[2] At the time of the French Revolution, it was established by law that on every tenth day the people should cease from labor; but the experiment had an unhappy outcome, and soon it was necessary to return to the observance of Sunday.

1017. (B) Moral advantages. For man lives not by bread alone, but ought to cultivate his intellectual and moral faculties; otherwise, in the manner of acting, he scarcely differs from brute animals. But, once the necessity of laboring daily for sustaining the body is posited, most men would hardly find any opportune time for investigating truth and the moral law, unless on certain days they were held to abstain from servile work: for they would consume all time in temporal affairs, and would postpone the study of truth indefinitely. - But given the opportunity of ceasing from manual labor, man can raise his eyes and mind to higher things, think of the last end, of moral matters, of duties to be fulfilled. He can hear sermons, read the best books, cultivate the higher faculties, and thus become more humane.[3] In reality, wherever Sunday is honestly and Christianly sanctified, a greater culture of minds flourishes, more refined manners are formed, and the moral law is observed more perfectly.

[3] M. d'Hulst, *Careme* 1893, p. 189-190, explains this excellently: "The day of God frees the worker. It is not for him the day of inaction; it is the glorious day on which the rest of his members sets free the activity of his soul. To shake off the yoke which weighed upon it, to take its flight toward the heights, his thought has no need of the initiations of science: religion has prepared for it a better initiation, higher and more elementary all at once. It is not through the long deductions of reasoning which gropes and seeks; it is by the straight avenues of adoration that it makes its way toward the sublime Ideal. And when it has found Him, it communicates in Him with the thought of the scholar, the philosopher, and the artist; it attains Truth in its source, Good in its substance, Beauty in the hearth from which it radiates; it bathes in a divine atmosphere, and there renews the forces of courage and hope, of resignation and love." - Cf. Gilfillan, op. cit., p. 192-202; 225-236.

Thus also the domestic life of families can be kept intact. The various members of a family often are occupied in different works during the week; especially in industrial workshops, spouses are separated from one another, children from parents, and when in the evening hours they are united, generally, broken in strength, they can scarcely enjoy the consolations of domestic life. But if all cease from manual labor on Sunday, they can come together in the paternal home, converse together, enjoy the society of parents, relatives, and friends, and all the consolations which are found in the family.[4]

[4] Cheysson explained this splendidly, in an address delivered at Paris, Mar. 9, 1898 (in Morel, op. cit., p. 51-52): "Without Sunday there is no possible family. It is only on that day and in that blessed center of the domestic hearth, of the home, that, together with the tired muscles of the father of the family, his brain, his heart, and his soul relax. It is only on that day that his wife and children possess him, that the family affirms itself and unfolds itself in its moral beauty and beneficent healthfulness, that the worker, bent for six days over his trade and enslaved to the panting work of production, rises upright; that he lays aside cares with his work clothes; that instead of belonging to the workshop, to the employer, he belongs to himself, and he belongs to his dear surroundings; that he becomes again father, husband, finally man, in the magnificent acceptance of this word." Cf. Gilfillan, op. cit., p. 236-249.

1018. (C) Religious advantages. For experience establishes that religion flourishes the more perfectly according as Sunday is more perfectly observed. This is easily understood if the psychological dispositions of each one are inspected. For those who are occupied about material things the whole time, and cling to them unceasingly, easily omit all other things: they think of temporal things, of acquiring wealth, of business, of pleasures, of honors, and thus become earthly and care by no means for heavenly things. Prayers, which from infancy they had been accustomed to recite, duties of religion which they previously paid to God, first indeed are shortened, and soon omitted. But since the virtue of religion, like the other virtues, is little by little diminished and at length thoroughly extinguished unless it is frequently exercised, it is necessary that a certain day be established for cultivating religion especially. Among Christians, this day is Sunday: on this day they can devote themselves to the study of religion, think of God and eternal things, pour forth prayers more abundantly, fulfill religious duties; but if they have performed this, on the other days also they will not be altogether forgetful of God, nor of Christian virtues; but, before they begin the day's work, they will raise their eyes rather easily to God, and will keep in mind that the acquiring of riches and the attainment of temporal things profit little, unless they use these as means for attaining the last end.

1019. Practical corollary. Therefore it must be attempted with all strength that Sunday be sanctified more and more. Two principal means greatly help toward this: (a) private associations, in which those who sincerely promise that they will promote Sunday rest are joined in a friendly league, whether at home and among neighbors, or even among merchants, for example by favoring those who sell nothing on Sunday. It is well enough known that certain societies of this kind have already been instituted in various regions.[5] Sometimes congresses are held, whether national or international, and often indeed with a happy outcome: for in these practical means are devised and commended for promoting the universal observance of Sunday. (b) The intervention of the State: for since, especially in great industrial and commercial undertakings, it is morally impossible to cease from labor, on account of the competition prevailing everywhere, unless the same law be imposed on all, it is necessary that by an opportune law the day of rest be determined. This has already been performed in many regions, and soon, with all Christians and honorable men favoring it, it will be performed in every region.

[5] Thus, in France, the societies which are called: *L'oeuvre dominicale de France, - L'association pour l'observation du repos du dimanche, - La ligue populaire pour le repos du dimanche en France*, etc. - Concerning the practical means hitherto employed for promoting Sunday rest, cf. A. Morel, op. cit., p. 94-116; F. Gibon, *La croisade du Dimanche*.

§ II. Concerning the Precept of Hearing Mass.

1020. This precept touches all the faithful who enjoy the use of reason, and also priests who are not celebrating, unless they are legitimately excused. It obliges under grave sin, as is clear from proposition 52 condemned by Innocent XI:[1] "The precept of observing feasts does not oblige under mortal sin, scandal being set aside, if contempt is absent." - Hence we shall speak: 1. of the requisites for hearing Mass; 2. of the causes excusing from hearing it.

[1] In Denzinger, n. 1069; cf. Viva on this proposition.

I. Concerning the Requisites for Hearing Mass.

The precept of hearing Mass on Sundays and feast days comprises three things: bodily presence, - religious assistance, - and indeed in a due place.

1. Concerning Bodily Presence.

1021. Since those who assist at the sacred rite, together with the celebrant, in some way offer the sacrifice, that presence is required and suffices which is necessary so that they can be said to be morally united to the priest celebrating, and to follow his actions, during the whole time in which Mass is celebrated.

(A) Presence of this kind is moral, namely that which, according to the estimation of prudent men, suffices so that those assisting are judged to be present at the sacred rite which is offered.

Therefore they satisfy the precept: (a) who are within the church, even if they stand behind the altar, a wall, or a column, - or in a chapel where they can neither see nor hear the priest, provided that from the movements of those assisting, the sound of the little bell, or other external signs, they can notice what is being done by the priest; this holds even if, in a large church, they are very far distant from the altar. (b) Likewise those who are in the sacristy, or in another place from which they can see or hear the priest; and also those who for a short time withdraw from the church to ring the bells or to perform something else connected with the sacred rite. (c) Indeed those who, outside the church, stand near the door, so that they are judged joined with the others assisting; indeed, those who are in a nearby house, from which through a window or door they can see the ceremonies of Mass, provided nevertheless that the house is not far distant from the church.[2]

[2] "Not beyond thirty paces," says Lugo, *De Eucharistia*, disp. XXII, n. 21. But the matter cannot be determined mathematically; moreover here one cannot be permitted without a reasonable cause.

1022. (B) Presence ought to be continuous during the whole time of the Mass, that is, from the psalm *Judica* up to and including the priestly blessing. Therefore they sin who, without cause, omit a part of Mass, and indeed gravely or lightly according as the part omitted is notable or small. Moreover, the gravity of the part omitted ought to be judged not only from duration, but especially from its dignity. Generally a third part of the Mass is judged notable, but if there is question of an essential action, a smaller part is held as grave.

1023. The omission of those things which precede the offertory, - the omission of the offertory alone, or of the preface, or of those things which follow Communion, is judged a light sin.

But it is grave to omit all things up to and including the offertory, - the whole canon, or from the consecration up to the *Pater noster*, because it is an essential part, - indeed even the consecration alone, which pertains to the essence of the sacrifice, - Communion alone, according to those who think that it pertains to the essence of the sacrifice, - to omit at the same time all those things which precede the Gospel and those which follow Communion.

He does not satisfy the precept who hears two or more parts of Mass from different priests celebrating at the same time, for example, the beginning of Mass up to the Canon from one priest, and at the same time the rest from another priest celebrating at a nearby altar. This is clear from the

condemnation of this proposition 53 by Innocent XI: "He satisfies the precept of the Church concerning hearing the sacred rite who hears two of its parts, indeed four, at the same time from different celebrants."[3] - But if someone hears these parts successively, yet so that he is present at the consecration and Communion of the same Mass, he strictly satisfies the precept, because he hears one whole Mass as regards the essentials, and supplies the rest; but otherwise, if he is present at the consecration of one Mass and the Communion of another, because he is not present at one and the same whole sacrifice.

[3] Denzinger, n. 1070; Viva on this proposition.

From these things it is gathered that he who cannot assist at an entire Mass is held to assist at least at the essential and integral part, that is, the consecration and Communion, if he can. But if he can assist only at accessory parts, for example, the prayers which precede the Gospel or follow Communion, he is not strictly held to this. - He who was present at the essential and integral part of Mass, and omitted the rest, is held to supply these things, if he can, by assisting at another sacred rite.

1024. Things to be noted for practice. For judging the sin of those who come to church when Mass has already begun, attention must be paid not only to the aforesaid rules, but also to their mind, namely to the greater or lesser negligence of which they are conscious, and to the more or less clear foresight of the danger of not hearing the whole Mass.

Where many Masses are celebrated, those who have come late are altogether to be exhorted to hear the whole following Mass, if they easily can: Christian piety and the abundance of fruits which are derived from this surely advise it.

2. Concerning Religious Assistance.

1025. It is not enough to be corporally present at the sacred rite; but the assistance ought to be religious, since the sacrifice is an act of religion. This involves two things: intention and attention.

(A) On the part of intention, there is required and suffices at least the implicit intention of worshiping God. Therefore he does not satisfy the precept who goes to church for this end alone, that there he may wait for a friend, or hear music, without any respect to divine worship; - but he who is present there from fear of parents or from another human motive, but at the same time wills to worship God, satisfies the precept.

1026. (B) Some attention of mind is likewise required, the notion of which we declared above, n. 870. (a) For satisfying the precept, at least external attention is certainly required, by which every action incompatible by its nature with internal attention is excluded; wherefore he does not satisfy the precept who, during Mass, attentively reads profane books, or writes or paints, plays, converses, attentively considers images or pictures, without religious affection.

(b) As regards internal attention, it is controverted: according to Lugo[4] and others, it is not strictly required, because an act of divine worship can be performed even by those distracted in mind: for to this it suffices that at the beginning of the action there be the intention of worshiping God, and at the

same time attention to the action which is placed, and that both virtually persevere; this can happen provided external attention is had. According to St. Alphonsus (n. 313) and others, more probably, internal attention is required, at least remiss, extending to the principal parts of Mass: for the Church prescribes an act by which God is worshiped; but God is not worshiped by merely external attention, internal attention having been voluntarily omitted. But according to St. Alphonsus, virtual attention suffices, that is, the intention of attending had at the beginning and not retracted; wherefore if someone is even voluntarily distracted, without nevertheless noticing that he is being distracted from Mass, he satisfies the precept of the Church, although he commits a venial sin. - In practice, serious effort must be made that the mind be occupied with pious thoughts and prayers; but he who has a general intention of worshiping God and strives with common diligence to turn his mind to prayers, or mysteries, or God Himself, ought not be anxious.

[4] Lugo, *De Eucharistia*, disp. XXII, n. 27-41.

1027. Those sufficiently satisfy the precept who, during Mass, recite the breviary or rosary; read a pious book; perform an examination of conscience; doze a little, provided they notice the principal parts of Mass; indeed probably, according to some, those confessing their sins: this can be admitted if the confession is brief, or cannot be deferred to another time without grave inconvenience.

So that more abundant fruits may be gathered from the sacred rite, the faithful are to be exhorted to unite themselves to the priest, and especially to Christ Himself the high priest, and to pour forth prayers with Him, especially those which are found in the missal; or to think piously of the mysteries of the Passion; or to perform acts corresponding to the four ends of the sacrifice, according to the method of St. Leonard of Port Maurice.

3. Concerning the Due Place.

1028. Although formerly, for several centuries, in many dioceses it was prescribed to hear Mass in the parish church,[5] today the faithful can satisfy the precept in any church, and in any public or semi-public oratory, and in private cemetery chapels erected by families or private persons for their own burial; and also in the erected oratories of Cardinals and of residential or titular Bishops.[6] - Nevertheless assistance at parish Mass is altogether to be recommended, so that the sheep may know their pastor and hear the word of God.

[5] A. Villien, l.c., pp. 575, 578. - From this law there was first derogation through privileges granted to the mendicants (Pius V, Const. *Etsi mendicantium*, May 16, 1567, § 2; n. 8); afterward through contrary custom now in force in the whole world.

[6] According to the Code, can. 1188, § 2, an oratory is: "1. Public, if it has been erected chiefly for the convenience of some college or even of private persons, yet so that all the faithful, at least during the time of divine offices, have a legitimately approved right of going to it; 2. Semi-public, if it has been erected for the convenience of some community or gathering of the faithful coming together there, and it is not free for everyone to approach it; 3. Private or domestic, if it has been erected in private houses for the convenience of some family only or private person." Moreover, from can. 1189-1190, "Oratories of Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church and of Bishops, whether residential or titular, although private, nevertheless enjoy all the rights and privileges by which semi-public oratories rejoice. - Chapels in a cemetery erected by families or private persons for their own burial are private oratories."

1029. But, excluding a special privilege, they do not fully satisfy the precept who hear Mass in merely private oratories, except those who are expressed in the concession itself of the indult; wherefore the tenor of the indult must be carefully inspected.

Generally, in order that it be licit to celebrate in a private oratory, it is required that one of the persons to whom the indult was principally granted, or to whom the brief is directed, be present at Mass. Moreover, only one Mass can be celebrated on the same day; indeed, unless the indult was granted by reason of infirmity, the celebration of Mass is prohibited on the more solemn feasts of the Nativity of the Lord, Epiphany, Easter Sunday, Pentecost, Thursday in the Supper of the Lord, Ascension, Immaculate Conception, Annunciation, Assumption, St. Joseph, the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, All Saints, and the feast of the patron of the place.[7] - In these oratories, the following satisfy the precept: those to whom the indult was principally granted; - their blood relatives and relatives by marriage up to the fourth degree, when they live with the privileged master in the same house; - guests who lodge with the master; - servants and household members who at the time of Mass are necessary for serving the masters.

[7] S.C. Rit., Apr. 10, 1896, n. 3896, new edition.

1030. Disputed question. When those who enjoy the privilege of a private oratory cannot go to church, it is asked whether they are held to use the privilege, if they can conveniently have a priest. (a) Some deny this, because no one is held to use a privilege, and besides the precept does not oblige one to employ an extraordinary means. (b) Others, with St. Alphonsus (n. 319), affirm this, and indeed more reasonably, as we think: for the privileged are held not by force of the privilege, but by force of the precept, which obliges all who are able to fulfill it without grave inconvenience to hear Mass.

II. Concerning the Causes Excusing from Hearing Mass.

1031. Any grave cause, or any notable harm, whether one's own or that of neighbor, excuses from the precept of hearing Mass: for since there is question of a positive law, which in its determination is merely ecclesiastical, a proportionately grave cause excuses from its observance. Generally a fourfold cause is assigned: 1. moral impossibility; 2. charity; 3. duty to be fulfilled; 4. custom.

1032. 1. Impossibility, not only absolute and physical, but also moral. From this head the following are excused:

(a) The sick and convalescents who, on account of bodily weakness, roughness of the road, inclemency of the air, prudently fear some detriment to health: concerning this they themselves can judge, nor are they strictly held to recur to the judgment of a physician.

(b) Those who are far distant from church, so that they cannot go to church without notable fatigue or expense, all the circumstances of persons, roads, inclemency of the air, etc., being considered; in this matter the judgment of prudent men must be followed, which is diverse for various regions. Those who can easily be conveyed by horse or carriage are not as easily excused as those who must undertake the journey on foot.

(c) Those who cannot be present at the sacred rite without undergoing a notable loss of money; thus travelers who cannot interrupt or defer a necessary journey; those who otherwise incur grave loss, or are deprived of an opportunity of making notable gain; those laboring in workshops in which they cannot abandon work begun: in which case, nevertheless, the master of the workshop ought to order matters so that the workers successively have time for hearing Mass, as often as this can be done.

(d) Those who deservedly fear the loss of honor, for example, women who lack garments suitable to their condition (which today rarely happens, because decent garments are procured for a small price), or those pregnant from a crime, as long as their disgrace is hidden, unless they can be present at the sacred rite very early in the morning or in a church where they are unknown.

(e) Those who are not under their own right, and cannot hear Mass without undergoing indignation or vexations: thus wives, children, servants, soldiers, when they seriously fear that they will be subject to the very troublesome mockeries of husbands, parents, masters, commanders.

But, in all these adjuncts, those who are thus prevented ought seriously to attempt to remove the impediments as soon as morally possible.

1033. 2. Charity excuses those who are held to assist a neighbor in bodily or spiritual necessity, and cannot perform this without omitting Mass; for example, those who assist the sick, - bring help to neighbors who otherwise would suffer grave harm from fire, storm, or another calamity, - settle quarrels and disputes or impede grave sins.

1034. 3. Duty to be fulfilled excuses all those who are impeded by the duties of their state from being present at the sacred rite: mothers and nurses, servants, guards, soldiers keeping watch, who cannot be absent on account of a necessary ministry. Nevertheless servants who are frequently impeded by the bad will of the master ought, when opportunity is given, to seek another position.

1035. 4. Custom, where it is in force, excuses widows within the first month of widowhood; women after childbirth, for a month or six weeks; brides, on those days on which their nuptials are proclaimed, if they cannot be present at another Mass.

1036. Practical admonition. (a) When penitents confess that they have omitted the sacred rite, let the confessor ask about the cause, so that he may be able to judge the gravity of the sin, and also hand down opportune counsels for the future.

(b) If any are legitimately impeded from assisting at the sacred rite on Sundays and feast days, they are to be advised to supply this at home by prayers and good works. But if any are prevented throughout the whole year, they are to be exhorted to hear Mass sometimes on weekdays, lest they be altogether deprived of the most abundant fruits of the sacrifice; indeed, according to those who think that by divine law the faithful are held sometimes to be present at the sacred rite (Lehmkuhl, n. 567), they are obliged to this: and this opinion is not lacking in probability; for, given the institution of the Eucharistic sacrifice, it is very probable that Christ willed Christians sometimes to be present at it.

(c) Although there is no special obligation of assisting at Vespers and of performing the other pious exercises on Sundays and feast days, nevertheless this is earnestly to be commended.

§ III. Concerning the Prohibition of Servile Works.

1037. So that Christians might more easily sanctify Sunday, the Church at various times prohibited those works from being performed which are morally incompatible with hearing Mass or with the exercise of religion. At the close of the second century, Tertullian testifies that the faithful devote themselves to rest on Sunday.[1] The emperor Constantine, in the year 321, prohibited forensic works and the exercise of mechanical arts on the same day, yet permitted farmers to give their work to cultivation, on account of the intemperate weather often prevailing.[2] Around the end of the fourth century, the Council of Laodicea established (can. 29): "Let Christians not Judaize, nor be idle on the sabbath day, but let them labor; but let them specially honor the Lord's day, and, if it can be done, not labor on it."[3] But among works, servile works were especially prohibited, which are exercised chiefly by the body, and formerly were accustomed to be done by servants; and forensic works, which pertain to market, fairs, and judicial acts: for by these the mind is especially turned away from divine things. But what must be understood by servile works was never determined by a general definition, but must be defined from particular decrees, the custom of places, and the common opinion of theologians.[4] In this matter, the various customs of times and places and the estimation of prudent men must especially be attended to: for discipline was not the same in all times and places. Moreover, for judging whether some work is prohibited or not, it must be inspected whether it so occupies the mind that it turns it away from divine things.

[1] *Apologet.*, n. 16, and *Ad nationes*, I, n. 13, P.L., I, 371 and 579.

[2] Cod. Justin., l. II, t. XII, *De feriis*, law 3.

[3] Mansi, t. II, p. 569. - From this it follows that the obligation of abstaining from servile work at that time was not altogether strict. But, in the sixth century, Caesarius of Arles taught that the glory of the Judaic sabbatism had been transferred to Sunday, and therefore that from the evening of the sabbath day to the evening of the Lord's day one must abstain from every business and rural work (P.L., t. XXXIX, 2238 and 2274-2275). Yet this excessive severity was wisely mitigated by the Third Council of Orleans (538), whose statutes you may read in Mansi, t. IX, p. 19; cf. Villien, *Rev. du clerge fr.*, t. XLIII, p. 342-344.

[4] How difficult it is to define servile work is clearly established from the controversy which was debated among various authors in the periodical *Revue du Cl. francais*, t. XXXVII (1903), p. 83; t. XXXIX (1904), p. 194 and 436; t. XL, p. 103.

I. What Works Are Prohibited?

1038. On Sundays and feast days, servile and forensic works are prohibited, throughout the whole day from midnight to midnight, and indeed of themselves under grave sin. Matter is judged grave when labor is prolonged beyond two hours.

1. So that it may be better understood what servile works are, theologians are accustomed to distinguish a threefold genus of works: (a) servile, so called because they were formerly exercised by servants, are those which are performed chiefly by bodily labor and are immediately ordered to the utility of the body, such as plowing, digging, sewing; (b) liberal, so called because they were accustomed to be exercised by free men, are those which proceed

chiefly from the mind and regard the cultivation of the soul, such as reading, teaching, singing, playing the organ; (c) common, or intermediate, which were done indiscriminately by servants and free men, and serve either the body or the soul, for example, making a journey, hunting, playing.

1039. (A) But what works are servile in species must be defined not from the intention of the worker, the length of time, or bodily fatigue, but from the nature itself of the work, custom, and the estimation of prudent men.

Thus the following are certainly servile: rural works, such as plowing, sowing, digging, collecting the harvest; - mechanical works, for example, the exercise of the tailor's, shoemaker's, or blacksmith's art; - industrial works in factories, mines; - certain manual works, even if they demand modest labor, for example, making rosaries, scapulars, or artificial flowers, picking roses, peeling apples. - On the contrary, those works are not forbidden which are done daily on account of some necessity, such as cooking foods, making beds, sweeping the house, etc.

But there are many works whose character remains doubtful in itself, and can be determined only from circumstances and custom: - to sculpt is a liberal and licit work if there is question of the final perfection of the work, but is held as mechanical work if wood or marble is first cut. - To paint with a brush is a liberal work when there is question of a truly artistic painting, but a servile work if walls are painted, as is done by ordinary workmen. To embroider can be held as a liberal work if it is done for the sake of recreation, or for avoiding idleness, but as servile if directly for the sake of gain. - To fish is not prohibited if it is done for the sake of recreation, otherwise when it is exercised for gain. - To set type, if it is done privately, seems to certain persons a liberal work, because it does not differ much from writing, but it is servile when in a workshop, for the sake of gain. - To grind is in itself a servile work, but if the mill is driven by wind, water, or steam, with slight labor of man, it is held by some as licit.

In these and other works of this kind, in our judgment, all those ought to be held as prohibited which, from common estimation, are judged to be the exercise of a lucrative art, which of itself turns the mind away from the sanctification of Sunday.

Certainly liberal are works which regard the cultivation of letters, sciences, or liberal arts, even if they are exercised for pay, such as teaching, writing, transcribing, drawing, singing, playing the organ or other musical instruments, etc. - Certainly common, and therefore not prohibited in themselves, are these and similar works: making a journey on foot, on horseback, by carriage, ship, railroad; hunting, bird-catching, fishing with a hook or small nets for the sake of recreation, etc. - These works are licit in themselves, unless from common persuasion they are held as prohibited; but to be occupied in the same for the whole day, so that Sunday is in no way sanctified, is a grave sin.

1040. (B) Forensic works are also prohibited: (a) judicial acts of the forum, whether civil or ecclesiastical, which are done with noise, for example, to cite parties, examine witnesses, exact a judicial oath, pronounce sentence, etc.; but acts which are done without noise are licit, for example, to consult an advocate, inform a judge, dispense, absolve, etc.; - (b) markets, or commercial acts, solemn contracts; thus public fairs, unless they are excused by custom; public sales by auction, unless they likewise are tolerated by custom after divine offices have been

completed; solemn contracts, which are completed by notaries; but not private contracts which are entered privately.

II. Concerning the Causes Excusing from Servile Work.

Five are chiefly enumerated: necessity or very great utility, piety toward God, charity toward neighbor, custom, dispensation. But in all these cases, at least some time should be devoted to divine worship, if this can be done.

1041. 1. Necessity or very great utility excuses from labor whenever this cannot be omitted without grave inconvenience or harm. By this reason the following are excused:

(a) Farmers, who, on account of past or imminent rain or hail, must collect crops or fruits; (b) workmen who cannot interrupt works begun without very notable loss; such are those melting glass or iron, burning lime or bricks; those who, in a case of necessity, repair bridges, public roads, machines in workshops; blacksmiths, if they shoe the horses of travelers or of those who are about to set out very early the following day; those repairing the machines of those who otherwise would not be able to work on the following day; (c) shoemakers and tailors who make shoes or garments necessary for funerals, weddings, or other solemnities which cannot be deferred; or finish garments which they promised to hand over on the appointed day, provided that by their own fault they have not wasted time uselessly, nor are accustomed to undertake more works than they are able to complete;[5] (d) public bakers and butchers, who in large towns are morally compelled daily to bake bread or kill animals; but not those who in small towns can do this for two days, unless several continuous feast days occur; (e) servants, wives, children, who are compelled to labor by a master, husband, or parent, when they cannot resist without founded fear of grave inconvenience; (f) poor persons, who otherwise are not able to sustain themselves and their own, or would be deprived of extraordinary gain.[6]

[5] Let the richer also take care not to demand more quickly the garments which they hand over to tailors or seamstresses to be made; otherwise they are the cause why workers are morally compelled to labor at night and also on Sundays even unwillingly.

[6] Led by this reason, Alexander III (Decretals, lib. II, tit. IX, *De feriis*, c. 3), permitted fishermen the capture of fish which in shoals approach the land at certain times: "We grant that it be licit for your parishioners on Sundays and other feasts (except on the greater solemnities of the year), if herrings have inclined themselves toward the land, to attend to their capture when necessity presses: in such a way that after the catch has been made they provide a fitting portion to the surrounding churches and to Christ's poor." Likewise S. Cong. Prop. Fid., Sept. 30, 1848, by authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, granted to certain apostolic vicars the faculty of dispensing poor Christians, who greatly need their own works, so that they may be able to labor servilely on Sundays and feast days, yet after hearing Mass (*Collectanea*, Paris edition, n. 1232; cf. n. 1226-1227; *Ami du Clerge*, t. XII (1899), p. 246).

1042. 2. Piety toward God excuses those who perform servile works proximately regarding divine worship, such as adorning altars, sweeping the church, covering the walls with tapestries; but it is to be counseled that these things be done the day before, if possible. But those things are prohibited which serve worship only remotely, such as building a church, whitewashing walls, making ornaments, unless another cause accedes, for example, an urgent necessity of worship.

1043. 3. Charity toward neighbor renders licit works, otherwise servile, by which we assist the grave necessity of neighbor, for example, to serve the sick; to plead the causes of the poor; to labor for the poor for whom, by reason of necessity, it is licit to labor, for example, to make garments, when winter is raging, for those who otherwise would perish from cold.

1044. 4. From custom, where it is in force, certain works otherwise prohibited are permitted; thus it is licit for barbers to shave a beard on a feast day; for gardeners to water vegetables; for farmers to turn or separate crops on the threshing floor; for merchants to sell drinks and food, even in public shops, etc. But what is licit from this head in any region depends on the particular usage of places.

1045. 5. To these causes is added dispensation granted by one's proper superior, namely by the Sovereign Pontiff for the whole Church, by the Bishop or capitular Vicar for the diocese, and by Prelates having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction. These cannot dispense without a just cause, which nevertheless can be less grave than that which of itself excuses from the law. - From the Code, c. 1245, pastors can, from a just cause, in individual cases, dispense individual faithful or individual families, even outside the territory, from the common law concerning the observance of feasts.

1046. Practical corollaries. (a) It is asked whether the reason of avoiding idleness excuses from servile work. - This indeed by itself alone does not excuse, since idleness can be driven away by licit occupations. But circumstances can be given in which idleness is a proximate danger of sinning, and at the same time can scarcely be driven away otherwise than by being occupied in servile work for some time: then it is licit to labor as long as is necessary for putting temptations to flight. In this case it can be counseled to girls and women that they make garments for the poor, or ornaments for churches.

1047. (b) It is likewise asked whether it is licit for workmen dwelling in a city to spend some time on Sunday in cultivating gardens which are rented or given to them. - Scandal being removed, this can be permitted, with deference to better judgment, whenever otherwise the workers are exposed to a grave danger of going to taverns and making themselves drunk, or of consenting to other temptations, - or when they are so poor that they need this work for sustaining themselves or their own, - or when the labor is so modest that it can be held as recreation and solace, - but especially when these three motives concur together.[7] But it must be attempted with all strength that they first hear Mass, and for some time devote themselves to the study of Christian doctrine; nor should they labor longer.

[7] *Ami du Clerge*, t. XXV (1903), p. 968; *Rev. du Clerge francais*, t. XXVII (1903), p. 83.

But let it never recede from the mind that the virtue of religion is among the most excellent moral virtues, and that God, best and greatest, repays a hundredfold those who, vain cares and solicitudes having been put aside, sincerely and devoutly promote divine worship.

On the Moral Virtues

Concerning the Moral Virtues.

1048. Through the theological virtues and the virtue of religion, we tend directly toward God, our last end; through the moral virtues, our actions are rightly disposed concerning those things which are toward the end, namely duties toward ourselves and neighbor. We have already said above, n. 585, that moral virtues, insofar as they are natural, can be defined as acquired habits by which we are disposed to acting; and insofar as they are supernatural, that they are divinely infused, exercised under the influence of supernatural grace, and ultimately ordered to a supernatural end. Likewise it has been said, n. 587, that all these virtues can be referred to four, which are called cardinal, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47-170, who discusses these virtues splendidly before others; and his Commentators, among whom John of St. Thomas; Billuart, *Tract. de Prudentia, Fortitudine*, etc.; the Wurzburg theologians, Appendix *de Virt. cardinalibus* (t. IV, ed. 1883, Paris); Lequeux, *De Virtutibus*, diss. II; Pesch, *Praelectiones*, t. IX, n. 1-292; Lehmkuhl, t. I, n. 682-735. - Cf. ascetical authors, such as Schram; Alvarez de Paz; Rodriguez; Olier, *Introduction a la vie et aux vertus chretiennes*; Scaramelli; Philippus a SS. Trinitate; Gaudier, *de Perfect. vitae spiritualis*; Gay, *De la vie et des vertus chretiennes*; Ribet, *Les Vertus et les Dons*, Paris, Lecoffre, 1901; especially St. Francois de Sales, *Introduction, Amour de Dieu, Sermons et Lettres*.

Prudence directs all our acts to the honest good, whether toward ourselves or toward others; justice inclines us to render to another what is owed to him; fortitude and temperance directly help us to fulfill duties toward ourselves (above, n. 589). - Since justice, on account of the manifold rights and duties which it embraces, demands a fuller exposition, we discuss it in a special Treatise; therefore it remains to speak of the three virtues, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, yet briefly, since a fuller exposition of these virtues is found among ascetical theologians.

Art. I. Concerning Prudence. — I. The Genuine Notion of Prudence.

1049. 1. Definition. Prudence (in Greek, *phronesis*), which is often called wisdom, is a virtue directing the intellect so that, in individual operations, we may discern what is honest and conducing to the end. Accordingly here there is no question of merely human prudence, or cleverness, which pursues only the useful, but of that which orders our acts to the last end, and especially of supernatural prudence.

(a) Prudence primarily perfects the intellect, namely practical reason; and it is, as it were, the director of morals, insofar as it disposes the mind to judging rightly concerning those things which conduce to the end, by pronouncing what is honest or base: for prudence which considers only what is useful is very imperfect, from what was said above, n. 44-47. From this it is clear that its object is very broad, since it embraces all human actions capable of morality.

(b) Yet it differs from the science of morals; for the latter is concerned with universal good and the general rules of ethics, while the former applies the universal principles of morals to individual actions, pronouncing what in this or that circumstance is honest. - Nor, however, is it the same as conscience (above, n. 350-351): for conscience is considered as a faculty, or as an act by which we

judge concerning the liceity of acts; while prudence is the virtue perfecting conscience itself and inclining it to judge rightly concerning the honesty of actions.

1050. 2. The elements by which it is constituted. Prudence primarily supposes a natural faculty of judging rightly (*bon sens*, common sense), and, as regards supernatural things, the light of faith by which right reason is perfected and illuminated. It consists especially in three elements, which are necessary for rightly choosing means to the end: consultation, by which we diligently inquire concerning all the means and their utility and honesty; judgment of mind, by which practical reason, all things having been weighed, rightly pronounces concerning the honesty and opportuneness of this or that means; precept, by which reason commands those acts which it has already declared necessary or useful for the end.

1051. (A) The first act of prudence is solicitous consultation, or investigation, by which we seriously and attentively think about the various means which can conduce to the intended end, about their honesty and opportuneness, not only in general, but with all adjuncts attended to.[2] Toward obtaining this more efficaciously, five things especially serve:

[2] This indeed is done, according to St. Thomas (II-II, q. 51, a. 2), under the influence of *eubulia*, which is a virtue annexed to prudence.

(a) Memory of past things, insofar as these can help for judging rightly concerning present things. For since for the most part at least the same means, employed in the same circumstances, produce the same effects, from past things we can often judge how one must act in present adjuncts. Wherefore history has deservedly been called the teacher of men, and the method which they call of observation, or experience, is held by moderns as the best directress of life. Therefore the prudent man considers those things which are far off, so that from them he may learn what must be done here and now.

(b) Understanding of present things; for, past things having been considered, it is also necessary that the present operation be attentively inspected, both in its nature and in its circumstances; and not only on the surface, but intimately; and not under one respect only, but under diverse respects. For since there is question of the honesty of some action not in general, but in the concrete, all adjuncts being posited, all these things must be attended to, so that the action to be placed here and now may be good under every respect. For it belongs to prudence wisely to adapt the general principles of morals, which are immutable in themselves, to all circumstances of places, times, and persons.

(c) Providence of future things: for the honesty of an act does not depend only on its nature, but also on its effects, whether as regards the agent or as regards others; therefore these, insofar as human frailty permits, must be foreseen, so that from them the honesty or opportuneness of the action to be placed here and now may be judged.

1052. (d) Docility in taking the counsel of others: for since the judgment of very many is worth more than the judgment of one, to rely exclusively on our own wisdom is not without folly; therefore the prudent man will frequently, solicitously, and reverently take the counsels of others, especially of elders and prudent men; he will inquire with them concerning the matter to be done, will lend an attentive ear to their reasons, and will not despise their judgment:

"Prudence," says St. Thomas,[3] "consists about particular operable things, in which, since there are infinite diversities, all things cannot be sufficiently considered by one man, nor in a short time, but through length of time. Hence in those things which pertain to prudence, man especially needs to be instructed by others, and especially by elders, who have obtained sound understanding concerning the ends of operable things." Yet the counselor must be chosen cautiously, a prudent and upright man, who cares for the good of others, and not solely for his own advantage.[4]

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 3.

[4] Concerning which Ecclesiasticus wrote excellent things, 37:7-29.

(e) Prayer to God, according to that saying:[5] "And in all these things beseech the Most High, that He direct thy way in truth." For, even in natural matters, it is expedient that we humbly ask from the Father of lights, who is the best counselor, what we ought to do; but in matters regarding the supernatural end, this is necessary, since only by supernatural light can we find the way of salvation.

[5] Ecclus. 37:19.

1053. (B) The second act of prudence is judgment: for when all things have been diligently investigated, it remains that practical reason bear judgment concerning them, by pronouncing what, all things having been weighed, is honest and opportune. For this there is required first of all the faculty of judging rightly; but besides, immunity from prejudices and passions, which easily turn the mind away from the right path of truth; deliberate consideration of all motives and circumstances, so that it may be discerned which of the various means devised conduces more efficaciously to the end; finally a firm pronouncement of judgment, so that the mind not remain uncertain.[6]

[6] For performing this, St. Thomas asserts that there are two virtues which are joined to prudence: *synesis*, or right sense (*bon sens*), by which we judge rightly concerning things to be done according to common rules; and *gnome*, or perspicacity, by which we judge rightly concerning the same things beyond common rules.

1054. (C) The third act of prudence is precept, by which practical reason not only pronounces what must be done, but commands it: for it is not enough to take counsel and to judge, but it is necessary to operate; but operation proceeds from the command of reason, which, after it has judged what is good and what is evil in such adjuncts, says to the will: this must be done by you.

An act of this kind is the principal one, according to St. Thomas:[7] "And because this act is nearer to the end of practical reason, hence it is that this is the principal act of practical reason, and consequently of prudence..."

[7] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 8.

For rightly commanding, there is especially required solicitude, which strenuously urges the execution of those things which are to be done: for if it was necessary to deliberate slowly, it is necessary to operate quickly, nor is that to be put off until tomorrow which can and ought to be done today.

1055. 3. Concerning the various species of prudence. Prudence assumes various names, and is distributed into various species, according to the various objects about which it is concerned. It is customarily called personal prudence, or monastic, by which a man governs himself; domestic, or economic, by which someone rightly orders whatever regards the good of the family; social, or political, when it regards the common good of the state; military, when it is concerned with military affairs, etc. But in all these, the same essential elements which we have described are found; but those things which are particular to each species are set forth in various treatises.

1056. 4. Concerning the vices opposed to prudence. From this one is given to understand what the vices opposed to prudence are. Certain ones are directly opposed to this virtue, namely by defect; others indirectly, insofar as they have a false likeness with it.

(A) The vices which are directly opposed to this virtue are called by the common name of imprudence; but because prudence consists in three principal acts, above, n. 1050, three vices likewise are customarily distinguished: precipitation, which omits consultation; inconsideration, which harms judgment; negligence and inconstancy, which are opposed to precept.

(a) Precipitation consists in this, that a man, neglecting the various means of inquiry which are at hand, acts before he considers; wherefore he is borne toward acting, not from the dictate of reason, but from the impulse of prejudice or passion. When precipitation arises from contempt of the directing rule, it is properly called rashness, and is a graver sin.

(b) Inconsideration consists in this, that someone despises or neglects diligently to weigh all those things which are required so that he may bear an equitable judgment; for thus he exposes himself to the danger of judging badly concerning those things which are here and now to be done, and therefore of acting badly.

(c) Negligence is the defect of a prompt will in executing the judgment of reason, or in commanding those things which have been judged necessary or useful. Akin to this vice is inconstancy, which, without sufficient reason, withdraws from a good proposal already elicited: it arises for the most part from the impulse of passions which resist the good proposal, and little by little induce a man to change his counsel, and therefore to leave those things which had already been wisely begun.

In all these things, a grave sin is committed if someone acts in such a way that he contemns divine rules; but if he acts without contempt, and without detriment to those things which are of the necessity of salvation, it is a venial sin.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 1.

1057. (B) To the virtue of prudence there are opposed, by a false likeness, prudence of the flesh, craftiness, and excessive solicitude for future things.

(a) Prudence of the flesh, which seeks ways of living according to the desires of corrupt nature, and therefore tends to an end which is not truly good, but apparent. Concerning this the Apostle says:[2] "For the prudence of the flesh is death; but the prudence of the spirit is life and peace. Because the wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be. And they who are in the flesh cannot please God."

[2] Rom. 8:6-8.

(b) Craftiness, which is not necessarily concerned with an evil end, but uses simulated and fallacious means for attaining the intended end, whether good or evil. It is, as it were, a practical lie, and is opposed to Christian simplicity. Exteriorly it is manifested by deceit and fraud, of which there is treatment where Contracts are discussed, n. 630.

(c) Excessive solicitude for future things, which is vicious when it preoccupies a man outside the opportune time, or in an immoderate way. Christ reproves this as a defect of trust in God:[3] "Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat, nor for your body, what you shall put on... Behold the birds of the air, for they neither sow, nor do they reap, nor gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not you of much more value than they?" St. Thomas explains this more fully,[4] by setting forth that this excessive solicitude is illicit in three ways: if we seek temporal things as an end, - or if we so set our heart upon temporal things that we are drawn back from spiritual things, which we ought more principally to serve, - or if we fear that, by doing what we ought, necessary things may fail us, which is opposed to divine providence: "Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."[5]

[3] Matt. 6:25-26.

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6.

[5] Matt. 6:33.

These sins indeed are grave when the last end is constituted in creatures, or when means gravely culpable in themselves are assumed.

II. Concerning the Excellence of Prudence and the Means of Acquiring It.

1058. 1. The excellence of prudence. (A) Scripture praises prudence many times, which it often calls wisdom, especially in the books of Proverbs, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus.

Thus in Proverbs:[6] "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom, and who aboundeth in prudence. The purchasing thereof is better than the merchandise of silver, and her fruit than the first and purest gold... Possess wisdom, possess prudence... Take hold on her, and she shall exalt thee; thou shalt be glorified by her when thou shalt embrace her: she shall give to thy head increase of graces, and protect thee with a noble crown." - Likewise in Wisdom,[7] prudence is described as the directress of our life, and the fountain of all goods, to be preferred to all riches. - Wherefore Ecclesiasticus exhorts young men that from youth they receive prudence, and cultivate the same up to old age.[8]

[6] Prov. 3:13-14; 4:5-9.

[7] Wis. 6-9.

[8] Ecclus. 6:18-37.

The Fathers teach no less clearly that prudence is the charioteer and fountain of the other virtues, so that without it it is impossible to cultivate the other virtues: for it chooses the means by which the other virtues can grow.[9]

[9] St. Ambrose, *De officiis*, l. I, c. 27, P.L., XVI, 60; St. Augustine, *De moribus eccl.*, l. I, c. 15, P.L., XXXII, 1322; St. Gregory the Great, *Moral.*, l. II, c. 49, P.L., LXXV, 592.

1059. (B) Reason shows the same thing. For prudence helps and perfects all virtues, so that without it the others cannot subsist. (a) For every moral virtue ought to hold a middle way between two extremes; thus liberality subsists as a mean between prodigality and avarice. But it belongs to prudence to prescribe to the virtues what the mean to be held between extremes is, since, from what was said, it inquires and judges concerning all things in order to the end, and solicitously determines what is honest. (b) Besides, so that a man may act well, he ought to know not only what he should do, but also how he should do it; but it belongs to prudence to define, after attentive consideration of all the circumstances, what the better means are for attaining the end, and how these can opportunely be employed.

Wherefore a man destitute of prudence is deservedly compared to a ship lacking a pilot, which is driven hither and thither by the impulse of winds and waves, and at length is forced to perish by shipwreck. On the contrary, prudence is called the moderator and charioteer of the virtues, the orderer of affections and teacher of morals, since it directs all our acts safely to the port of salvation.

1060. 2. Means of progressing in prudence. These can be gathered from what was said concerning the elements in which prudence consists, n. 1050.

(a) First of all, since God is the author of all wisdom, prudence must be earnestly asked from Him: for He Himself assigned us the end, and also the means opportune for attaining it; therefore when we do not know what must be done, it is necessary to implore the divine light: "But as we know not what we ought to do, we have only this left, that we direct our eyes to Thee."[10] In the book of Wisdom (IX), a very beautiful prayer is found for obtaining wisdom, or prudence.

[10] 2 Par. 20:12.

(b) Since prejudices and passions, especially pleasure, cloud the mind, and hinder it from attentive and sincere consideration of motives consonant with reason, it is altogether necessary that we renounce prejudices and conquer passions; otherwise reason, disturbed and blinded, will not bear judgment according to equity and honesty, but according to the vicious propensities of corrupt nature.

(c) Before you bear judgment, attentively consider and weigh all motives, all circumstances, and the effects probably going to follow from your action, both as regards yourself and as regards others; and concerning all these things judge in order to eternity, as if you were soon to die and to render account of your action to the supreme judge. - Nor should you rely on your own prudence, but "do nothing without counsel, and after the deed thou shalt not repent"[11]... "Always seek counsel from a wise man."[12] By these and other means of this kind, you will progress in prudence.

[11] Ecclus. 32:24.

[12] Tob. 4:19.

Art. II. Concerning Fortitude. — I. The Genuine Concept of Fortitude.

1061. 1. Definition. Fortitude (*andreia*), of which there is question here, is fortitude of mind, and can be defined: the virtue by which the will is so strengthened that it does not desist from pursuing the arduous good, neither because of difficulties, nor even because of the danger of death.[1]

[1] This is the definition of fortitude, insofar as it is a cardinal virtue. Sometimes, however, by this name is designated that constancy by which we strive to overcome ordinary difficulties which are accustomed to occur in the exercise of all virtues: this is not a special virtue.

Fortitude, like the other moral virtues, is both natural and supernatural, according as it pursues an arduous natural or supernatural good, and indeed by natural or supernatural means.

(a) The object of this virtue is the arduous moral good, or that which bears before it a special difficulty. Every good indeed is arduous in some way; but when special difficulties and great dangers occur, especially the danger of death,[2] the special virtue of fortitude is required for overcoming all these. Hence the chief act of this virtue is martyrdom undertaken for God, of which there is treatment in the Treatise on Baptism, n. 42-44.

[2] The Scholastics, after Aristotle, held that fortitude especially shines forth in that genus of death which threatens in war, because then the common good of the fatherland is preferred to a private good; but St. Thomas (II-II, q. 122, a. 1) notes that under the name of war come all attacks which someone sustains on account of truth and justice. Cicero, moreover (*De offic.*, lib. I, 22), deservedly says: "Although most men think military affairs greater than civil ones, this opinion must be diminished... But truly, if we wish to judge, many civil affairs have arisen greater and more renowned than military ones."

1062. (b) The subject of this virtue is commonly said to be the irascible appetite: for this is concerned with the arduous good, and uses anger duly moderated for overcoming difficulties; for it pertains to anger to leap upon obstacles and conquer them. Nevertheless it seems to us that fortitude exists primarily in the will, and secondarily in the irascible appetite; for here there is question of pursuing the honest good, which is properly the object of the will, but not of the useful or sensible good, which is the object of the lower appetite. Therefore the virtue of fortitude resides primarily in the will, which deliberately and firmly adheres to the honest good. But because difficulties and dangers often stand in the way, which frighten not only the will but also the lower appetite, it is necessary that fortitude secondarily influence the irascible appetite, for strengthening it against vain fears, and exciting it to approach arduous things strenuously.

1063. (c) The act of fortitude is chiefly twofold: to endure and to attack: to endure, that is, to stand immovably in dangers and tolerate the gravest torments with an unconquered soul;[3] to attack, that is, strenuously to do arduous and dangerous things. - Generally to endure, other things being equal, is more difficult and more meritorious than to attack: for he who endures already feels imminent dangers, while he who attacks has them as future; moreover, to endure imports length of time, while to attack can be from a sudden movement; but it is more difficult to remain immovable for a long time than to be borne by a sudden movement toward something arduous.[4]

[3] Horace expressed this elegantly (*Odes*, III, 3, 8): "The just man and tenacious of purpose is not shaken in his solid mind by the ardor of citizens commanding perverse things, nor by the face of a threatening tyrant... If the shattered world should fall upon him, the ruins will strike him undaunted."

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123, a. 6.

1064. 2. The various degrees of fortitude. (a) The first consists in the restraint and mortification of passions. This is true fortitude; for if those are called strong who tame wild beasts

and conquer the enemies of the fatherland, they surely must be judged stronger who so restrain and govern anger, lust, and cupidity that they use these not for evil, but for strenuously working good: "The patient man is better than the valiant: and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh cities."[5] - Especially to be praised are those who, despising the vain judgments of men, are never deterred from duty by the mockeries of others.

[5] Prov. 16:32.

(b) The second degree, which surpasses the first, is this: that, for the spiritual or bodily good of neighbor, they expose liberty, reputation, and their own life to probable danger. The Apostle excelled by this fortitude, who, for the salvation of souls, often exposed himself to diverse dangers, "in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils from his own nation, in perils from the Gentiles, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils from false brethren."[6] Today the same fortitude is exercised not only by missionaries who preach the Gospel among remote peoples, but also by laymen and priests who, among Christian nations, invincibly defend the orthodox faith against rising unbelievers and politicians, with risk of reputation, goods, and even liberty.

[6] 2 Cor. 11:26.

1065. (c) They attain the third degree who, in sudden cases, tolerate horrible evils with a strong and unconquered soul. For he who could not prepare himself against rushing evils by previous meditation, and sustains all things undaunted, shows that he has acquired the habit of fortitude by long exercise.

(d) But they ascend to the fourth degree who willingly and lovingly undergo martyrdom for Christ, as St. Ignatius the martyr underwent it, who, writing to the Romans, said: "Would that I may enjoy the beasts which are prepared for me, which I also pray may be swift for my destruction and punishments!" - Few indeed today suffer martyrdom properly so called; but the peace of the Church has its own martyrs: for those who, for Christ and the salvation of souls, spend all things and themselves, sustain all things, attack all things, daily ready to give their life for their sheep, can truly, although not in the strict sense, be called martyrs.

1066. 3. Concerning the vices opposed to fortitude. There are two chief ones: (a) Timidity, or cowardice, which does not endure strongly enough, by fearing where one must not fear, or more than is fitting. To fear those things which are deservedly to be feared, and in the way in which they are to be feared, for example sin or hell, is not timidity; nor is it illicit to flee evils, from the toleration of which no good comes, all things having been diligently weighed. But to consent to vain fears, and from this to neglect duties, is the sin of timidity, whose gravity depends on various circumstances, especially on the gravity of the duty omitted. - In our days that fear which is called human respect must carefully be avoided, by force of which so many Christians omit their religious duties, lest perhaps they displease others.

(b) Excessive daring, or rashness, which is an excess in attacking the arduous good, which is not fitting, or when it is not fitting, or in a manner in which it is not fitting. It arises from contempt of

life or of other goods, - from pride, which trusts too much in its own powers, - from boasting, which desires to show its own powers, - or from a certain stupidity of soul. The sin committed from this head must be judged both from the cause from which it arises and from the effects which it induces; for example, he sins gravely who, without cause, exposes himself to grave danger.[7]

[7] To these vices is generally added fearlessness, which does not fear when one ought to fear (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 126, a. 1-2); but almost the same can be said of it as of rashness.

II. Concerning the Virtues Annexed to Fortitude.

1067. To attack and to endure are the two offices of fortitude, from what was said above, n. 1063; for fulfilling these more easily, certain virtues are joined to fortitude: namely magnanimity and magnificence, which are ordered to attacking great things; patience and constancy, which regard enduring harsh things. These must be discussed separately.

1. Magnanimity is promptness of soul for performing great acts of virtues, namely those which are worthy of great honors.

(A) It differs from ambition, which attacks great things on account of human honors; for the magnificent man wills to work those things which are great before God, because it befits a rational creature to intend not only those things which are common, but also those which are excellent. He despises riches, pleasures, honors of this world, and breathes after heavenly things. He indeed intends great honors, but such as are conferred by God: "And therefore he is not lifted up by great honors, because he does not reckon them above himself, but rather despises them... and similarly he is not broken by dishonors, but despises them, as things which he reckons are brought upon him unworthily."[8]

[8] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 129, a. 2, ad 3.

Wherefore true magnanimity is not opposed to humility, as the Angelic Doctor excellently declares:[9] "In man there is found something great, which he possesses from the gift of God; and some defect, which belongs to him from the infirmity of nature. Therefore magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things according to the consideration of the gifts which he possesses from God; thus if he has great virtue of soul, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue... But humility makes a man account himself little, according to consideration of his own defect." - And so the magnanimous man relies not so much on his own powers as on divine help, and places his trust especially in God.

[9] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 129, a. 3, ad 4.

1068. (B) To this virtue there is opposed, by excess, presumption, and by defect, pusillanimity.[10]

[10] Two others are commonly enumerated, ambition and empty glory; but of these there was treatment above, where the capital vices were discussed, n. 515-516.

(a) Presumption is the sin by which someone attacks that which is far beyond his powers; for example, he who undertakes the offices of judge, confessor, pastor, etc., for the fulfilling of which he is altogether unequal, from defect of knowledge, prudence, and other virtues; or he who, existing in the state of imperfect virtue, at once tries to do the greatest works. Let Peter be an example, who,

trusting too much in himself, was ready to die for Christ, and soon at the voice of a maidservant denied the Master. (b) Pusillanimity is a disposition of soul by which someone flees those things which, all circumstances being considered, he could and ought to do; thus he who, frightened by difficulties and not sufficiently trusting in divine help, flees offices proposed to him by superiors,[11] or does not fulfill the duties of his own state from empty fear.

[11] Accordingly there is no question here of him who, for the sake of humility, declines offices and honors, but of him who is frightened by difficulties and lacks trust in God.

For judging the malice of sins arising from this double vice, attention must especially be paid to the gravity of the effects which follow from them.

1069. 2. Magnificence seems to be a certain part of magnanimity, and inclines one to do great things through great expenses, for example, in constructing splendid churches, or erecting colleges, universities, monasteries, when the good of the Church or the fatherland demands this.

To this virtue two vices are opposed: (a) excessive sumptuousness, when someone makes great expenses in matters of slight moment; this indeed is irrational, especially when works very necessary for the honor of God and the good of the faithful are neglected; (b) parvificence, which in great matters wills to make only small expenses, so that the works which are undertaken remain very unbecoming.

1070. 3. Patience is the virtue which so moderates sadness arising from present evils that, because of it, the will is not moved away from good, but rather is confirmed in it. Therefore this is not insensibility, or apathy, of which the Stoics boasted, and which in reality is a vice. The patient man feels pain in the body and sadness in the soul, but moderates both, and does not allow them to proceed beyond the limits of reason; for he remembers the words of Paul:[1] "Tribulation worketh patience; and patience trial; and trial hope; and hope confoundeth not."

[1] Rom. 5:3-5. Cf. St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction*, p. III, ch. 3; Olier, *Introduction*, ch. 9.

Various degrees are distinguished in patience: (a) to bear with an equal soul the loss of riches, reputation, health, parents, and friends, even when these things happen to us without our fault; (b) to bear those things which are repaid by the ungrateful for benefits received; (c) to sustain all these things not only patiently, but with joy, like the apostles, who "went rejoicing from the presence of the council, because they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus."[2]

[2] Acts 5:41.

To this virtue is opposed impatience, by which someone grieves too much and from sorrow withdraws from what is right, for example, by complaining bitterly about God and men, and for that reason seeking consolation in pleasures or in idleness. - Impatience is in itself a venial sin, but it can become grave if someone deliberately murmurs gravely against God and divine ordinances, or from this commits lethal sins.

1071. 4. Constancy, or perseverance, is a virtue confirming the mind against fear of impending evils, and for overcoming difficulties which arise from the long exercise of virtue. -

> Therefore it regards future difficulties, while patience regards present evils; moreover, it is ordered to overcoming that special difficulty which generally proceeds from long practice of virtues: for many experience a certain fatigue and weariness from the fact that the same efforts must often be repeated; for overcoming this, the special virtue of constancy is desired. - Of how great a moment it is to cultivate this virtue is established from this, that only by often-repeated efforts, carried through to the end of life, is solid virtue acquired and the crown of justice obtained: "But he that shall persevere unto the end, he shall be saved."[3]

[3] Matt. 10:22.

To this virtue there is opposed: (a) by defect, inconstancy, or softness of soul, which easily withdraws from a good proposal on account of occurring difficulties, or from weariness of duration; this disposition indeed arises partly from natural temperament, partly from the custom of indulging pleasures and from horror of difficulties; (b) by excess, or abuse, pertinacity, or inclination to persist in a proposal where right reason dictates that one must desist; for, although we ought to persevere in a proposal as long as it appears good to right reason, one must withdraw from it when it is certainly detected as having been undertaken from erroneous judgment, or when circumstances so change that what before was good and opportune now becomes evil or at least less good.

III. Concerning the Means of Progressing in Fortitude.

1072. Besides prayer, to which it is necessary to have recourse for all virtues, the chief means by which fortitude can be acquired or increased are these:

1. Frequent meditation on the fragility of temporal goods, when they are compared with eternal goods. For Christian fortitude arises first of all from the intimate persuasion that temporal evils are nothing in comparison with eternal ones; indeed, they become desirable when they are considered as means of obtaining or increasing eternal happiness. For then the Christian does not fear the evils of this world, nor flee arduous things, but rather embraces them, so that from this he may receive an unfading crown. Likewise he is not easily allured by the pleasures and honors of this world, but rather despises them as impediments by which he is kept from attaining eternal beatitude. Wherefore he is deterred from fulfilling duty neither by threats nor by flatteries, but undauntedly endures evils and attacks arduous things, so that he may securely attain his end.
2. Foresight of evils which can happen, so that we may be able to strengthen the will against them. For from long premeditation we prepare our soul against dangers: just as in war an unforeseen enemy easily oppresses the unprepared, so in spiritual combat we are easily overcome by enemies, if we are unprepared. But, on the contrary, dangers long foreseen become less terrible. The reason for this is that fear, against which fortitude is ordered, weakens our powers unless we resist it strenuously; but if we foresee the evils which can happen, and apprehend them not as harmful, but as useful for virtue and salvation, fear soon withdraws, and the will turns all its powers toward pursuing good, notwithstanding any dangers whatever.

1073. 3. The custom of acting strenuously in the lesser dangers occurring daily: for by this means the soul acquires the firmness necessary for strongly sustaining graver evils and manfully attacking more arduous things. Just as a soldier by daily exercise prepares himself for more arduous and dangerous things, so a Christian, by acting strongly in lesser things, becomes fit for greater things. Therefore those labor under presumption who desire to suffer or do grand things, and at the same time neglect lesser things: if they are weak in the least things, they cannot be strenuous in greater things: "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in that which is greater: and he that is unjust in that which is little, is unjust also in that which is greater."[4]

[4] Luke 16:10.

4. Fervent love for God adds the greatest powers to the will. For "love is strong as death,"[5] and therefore renders the lover intrepid, fit for tolerating all adverse things strongly, and for performing the greatest arduous things manfully. If love of creatures inspires such fortitude in the hearts of mortals, as daily experience establishes, how much greater fortitude will pure love of God, love of the infinite good, inspire! This indeed can be illustrated by the example of Paul, who, from the fact that he burned with love of Christ, vehemently desired to suffer all things, to do all things on account of Christ: "Who then shall separate us from the charity of Christ? Shall tribulation? or distress? or famine? or nakedness? or danger? or persecution? or the sword?... But in all these things we overcome because of Him that hath loved us."[6] - Wherefore it will help much frequently to consider the fortitude which the Savior exhibited throughout His whole life, and especially in the Passion, from the time when He began to agonize in the garden of Gethsemani up to the hour in which, dying, He cried out:[7] "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" By this example the Apostles exhorted the faithful to tolerate all things strongly: "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you should follow His steps... Christ therefore having suffered in the flesh, be you also armed with the same thought."[8] And in reality many Christians, adhering to the footsteps of the beloved Master, went rejoicing because they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for His name. But because today many Christians are desired who are endowed with unconquered fortitude, for defending and promoting the faith against innumerable enemies, it is necessary that an ardent love of Christ be inspired in the souls of the young, by which, being inflamed, they may be able strenuously and cheerfully to fight for the Christian faith.

[5] Cant. 8:6.

[6] Rom. 8:35-37; let the whole passage be read.

[7] Matt. 27:46.

[8] 1 Pet. 2:21; 4:1.

Art. III. Concerning Temperance.

1074. As fortitude moderates the irascible appetite, strengthening it against arduous things, so temperance moderates the concupiscible appetite, restraining the inordinate love of pleasurable things. Here therefore temperance is treated, not as it is a general virtue

moderating all human operations and passions, but insofar as it is a special virtue restraining sensible pleasures.

I. The Genuine Concept of Temperance.

1075. 1. Definition. Temperance is a virtue so restraining the appetite for sensible pleasures, especially of taste and touch, that on account of them the will does not withdraw from good, but rather is confirmed in it.

(a) For understanding this, it must be known that pleasure was annexed by the Author of nature to our operations, for this end, that we might operate more easily and so tend toward our end. No pleasure is evil in itself, but it must be regarded as a means instituted by God for attaining some end. Therefore to will pleasure on account of the end predetermined by God is not evil, but honorable (above, n. 157); but it is evil to act on account of pleasure alone, without any relation to the end. It belongs to temperance so to moderate pleasure that it is sought, not for itself, but for an honorable end, and therefore without any excess.

(b) Among the pleasures of the senses, there are two which attract most men more vehemently, namely, pleasures in food and drink, which are ordered to the conservation of the individual, and venereal pleasures, which are ordered to the conservation of the human species. Therefore temperance chiefly tends to moderate these. St. Thomas explains this thus:[1] "And because pleasure follows upon a natural operation, some pleasures are the more vehement in proportion as they follow upon operations that are more natural. But the operations by which the nature of the individual is conserved through food and drink, and the nature of the species through the union of male and female, are most natural to animals; and therefore temperance is properly concerned with pleasures of food and drink, and with venereal pleasures."

[1] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, a. 4.

1076. 2. The general rule of temperance. For rightly ordering pleasures of this kind, right reason, enlightened by faith, proposes a double rule: one proximate, which is taken from the necessities of this life; the other remote, which is the attainment of supernatural beatitude.

(a) According to the first rule, all pleasurable things which come into man's use must be referred to some necessity of life as to their end. For this reason, first of all, we must cut off all pleasures which stand in the way of honorable good, or prevent some present or future duty from being fulfilled. Moreover, one must act not on account of pleasure itself, but on account of an honorable, necessary, or truly useful end. Thus, with respect to food and drink, it is lawful to take whatever is necessary or truly useful for preserving life and health, and also for rightly performing the operations of the mind. And the same must be said of other pleasures.

(b) But the second rule, which is more perfect, demands that those pleasures be cut off which do not serve the good of the soul; for example, that only so much food and drink be taken as is fitting for exercising virtues; and therefore that one abstain from food and drink insofar as this is necessary for taming the body and its vicious propensities: "They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh, with the vices and concupiscences."[2]

[2] Gal. 5:24.

Augustine hands down both rules thus: "Therefore the temperate man has, in mortal and fleeting things of this kind, a rule of life confirmed by both Testaments, that he love none of them, think none of them to be sought for its own sake, but use them for the necessity of this life and of duties, insofar as is enough, with the modesty of one using, not with the affection of one loving."[3] - And elsewhere: "For hunger and thirst are certain pains; they burn and, like a fever, kill, unless the medicine of nourishment comes to their aid. Since this medicine is at hand from the consolation of Thy gifts, in which earth and water and heaven serve our infirmity, calamity is called delights. This hast Thou taught me, that I should approach food to be taken as medicines are taken. But while I pass to the quiet of satiety from the trouble of need, in that very passage the snare of concupiscence lies in wait for me... These temptations I strive daily to resist, and I invoke Thy right hand for my salvation."[4]

[3] St. Augustine, *De moribus ecclesiae*, l. I, c. 21, n. 39, P. L., XXXII, 1328.

[4] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, l. X, c. 31, P. L., XXXII, 797.

1077. 3. The species of temperance. Temperance, insofar as it preserves moderation in food, is called abstinence; insofar as it preserves the same in drink, it is called sobriety; but insofar as it does this in venereal matters, it is named chastity; to this is referred pudicity, the guardian of chastity, which moderates pleasures in kisses, touches, and embraces.[5] - To abstinence is opposed gluttony; to sobriety, drunkenness; to chastity, lust. Concerning the first two vices we have already spoken above, n. 538-555; concerning lust, the treatment will be given in the Treatise on Chastity.

[5] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 143, a. un.

II. Concerning the Virtues Annexed to Temperance.

1078. Temperance properly so called is concerned with sensible pleasures; but to it are annexed virtues which restrain even spiritual pleasures. Among these are counted: humility, which moderates the interior movements of hope and boldness; meekness, which restrains the movements of anger tending to revenge; modesty, which moderates bodily movements.[6]

[6] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 143, a. un. There also the holy Doctor counts continence, which restrains the interior movements of carnal concupiscence; but this belongs to chastity, concerning which elsewhere.

1. Concerning Humility.

1079. (A) The genuine concept. Humility is a virtue which checks the inordinate appetite for one's own excellence, and inclines a man to acknowledge his own lowliness according to truth.

[3] St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction*, p. III, ch. 4-7; Olier, *Introduction*, ch. 5; the pious author of the work *Formation a l'humilite*, Paris, 1902.

(a) I say according to truth; for there are some who think humility consists in fictitiously exaggerating our defects, or diminishing our endowments, and in fleeing every honor and glory. This indeed is false; for true virtue cannot be an enemy of truth. It does indeed repress the inordinate appetite for one's own excellence, according to what was said above, n. 514; but it by no means forbids us gladly to acknowledge the natural and supernatural goods which God has bestowed on us:

to be unwilling to acknowledge them is not humility, but ingratitude. - Nor likewise is it forbidden to seek some honor or glory, provided it be sought with God, according to His good pleasure and according to our merits. Thus Christ said of Himself:[8] "I have glorified Thee on the earth... And now glorify Thou Me, O Father, with Thyself, with the glory which I had, before the world was, with Thee." Nor otherwise did the Blessed Virgin say:[9] "For behold from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed, because He that is mighty hath done great things to me." Paul indeed says: "Let no man therefore glory in men";[10] but before this he had said: "He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord";[11] and he himself expected the crown of justice "which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day."[12]

[8] John 17:4-5.

[9] Luke 1:48-49.

[10] 1 Cor. 3:22.

[11] 1 Cor. 1:31.

[12] 2 Tim. 4:8.

1080. (b) But in order that we may estimate ourselves and our endowments according to truth, to God first of all must be attributed whatever proceeds from Him. Now the Apostle testifies that all natural and supernatural endowments which are in us are from God:[13] "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received?" - We do indeed have good works and merits; but these must be attributed primarily to God, although they are truly ours, since we have existence, faculties, the power of meriting, and the divine help necessary for merit only from the Lord; therefore concerning these we can glory only in the Lord, and the chief part of the glory must be rendered back to God. - Moreover we have sinned, and under this title we deserve ignominy and confusion before God and men.

[13] 1 Cor. 4:7.

1081. (c) If we compare ourselves with our neighbor, we ought first to admire and esteem the gifts, both natural and supernatural, granted to him by God: if greater gifts are seen in him than in us, we ought gladly to acknowledge his superiority. Furthermore, if he has committed lesser sins than we have, he is worthy of lesser ignominy, and under this title it is necessary to confess that we ourselves are inferior. But because we are prone to magnify our own endowments and to diminish the qualities of others, equity demands that we guard ourselves in our judgments against this unjust propensity. Nor must this be passed over: often there are hidden defects in us and hidden qualities in others, so that it is not lawful, on account of manifest things alone, to prefer oneself to others; therefore the neighbor is wisely presumed to be better than he appears: "In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves."[14]

[14] Phil. 2:3.

To the point Augustine says:[15] "This also must be considered, that there is no man who cannot have some good which thou dost not yet have, even if it lies hidden, in which without doubt he can be superior to thee. This thought avails for crushing and taming pride, lest thou think that, because

certain goods of thine stand out and appear, therefore another has none hidden, and perhaps goods of greater weight by which, while thou dost not know it, he surpasses thee."

[15] St. Augustine, *Quaestiones 83*, q. 71, n. 5, P. L., XL, 82.

1082. (B) Concerning the chief acts of humility. (a) The humble man acknowledges himself to be nothing before God: for just as a little drop of water is said to be nothing when compared with the ocean, so our being, compared with the divine, can be held as nothing: "All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to Him as nothing, and vanity."[16] Moreover he confesses that whatever good is in him ultimately proceeds from God, in the sense explained above, n. 1080.

[16] Isa. 40:17.

(b) He further confesses himself to be a sinner, and under this title to be worthy of contempt, especially if he has sinned lethally (above, n. 463).

(c) He judges himself unworthy of all the gifts of God, and of himself unfit for every good work, especially supernatural work. For since by sin he has offended God, he has incurred His wrath and indignation, and therefore is unworthy of His benefits. On the other hand, by his own powers, without divine concurrence, he can do nothing good, especially in the supernatural order, according to that saying:[17] "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God."

[17] 2 Cor. 3:5; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 6, ad 1.

1083. (d) He is not puffed up in prosperity, nor cast down in adversities; for he knows that prosperous events, and also adverse ones, are wisely ordered by God according to His good pleasure, and do not ultimately depend on us. Wherefore with all his powers he indeed strives to act well, so as to please God: if things turn out prosperously, he returns praises to God; if unfortunately, he patiently bears the humiliation taken from this: "I know both how to be humbled, I know also how to abound..."[18] "In all things we suffer tribulation, but are not distressed; we are straitened, but are not destitute; we suffer persecution, but are not forsaken; we are cast down, but we perish not."[19] Indeed he receives humiliations gladly, as means for obtaining grace and glory from God: "And do ye all insinuate humility one to another; because God resisteth the proud, but to the humble He giveth grace. Be you humbled therefore under the mighty hand of God, that He may exalt you in the time of visitation; casting all your solicitude upon Him, for He hath care of you."[20]

[18] Phil. 4:12.

[19] 2 Cor. 4:8-9.

[20] 1 Pet. 5:5-7.

1084. (e) Wherefore, impelled by love of truth, he does not desire to be made great or to be praised by others, judging that this belongs not to himself but to God, from whom all good things proceed: for a picture or statue does not deserve praise, but the artist. Therefore if he sees himself honored by others, he does not keep the honor for himself, but refers it to God, to whom alone are honor and glory: "Not to us, O Lord, not to us; but to Thy name give glory."[1] -

Where the will of God and an undertaken duty do not demand the contrary, he flees honors and chooses the lowest place. For Christ taught this by word and example:[2] "The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them; and they that have power over them are called beneficent. But you not so: but he that is the greater among you, let him become as the younger; and he that is the leader, as he that serveth. For which is greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? Is not he that sitteth at table? But I am in the midst of you as he that serveth." When, by force of office and duty, he must receive honors, he is not puffed up by them, but receives them as one bearing the place of God.

[1] Ps. 113:1.

[2] Luke 22:25-27; cf. John 13:15-16; Matt. 23:12.

(f) Indeed, since he is conscious of his own lowliness and of the sins which he has committed, he sincerely desires, as far as lies in him, to be despised by others; for he desires to be esteemed by others as he knows himself to be according to truth. Yet prudence often demands that we not disclose our defects to others, lest perhaps we lose that good esteem which we need for rightly fulfilling our duties.

1085. (g) The saints, comparing themselves with others, generally judge themselves more vile and worse than all; for this is the character of humility, to look in ourselves upon the defects which proceed from us, and in others upon the endowments which are from God. Wherefore they leave the better things to others, but seek the baser things for themselves. - Yet the truly humble man generally does not vilify himself by words, nor deliberately seek to be vilified by others; but he is silent concerning himself, loving to be unknown and to be counted as nothing. Besides, as St. Thomas says,[3] "in the exterior acts of humility, as also in the acts of the other virtues, due moderation must be employed, lest they be able to turn to the detriment of another."

[3] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 3, ad 3.

1086. (C) Concerning the excellence of humility. (a) Some so extol humility that they seem to prefer it to the other virtues. This, however, is not agreeable to truth. For certainly the theological virtues, by which we tend directly to God, are more excellent; more excellent is the virtue of religion, by which we profess the excellence of God and render Him due worship. It is also commonly taught that prudence is more excellent than humility, because it is more universal and necessary. But it seems more excellent than the other moral virtues. For humility subjects man to the order of reason and to the divine law with respect to all things, while other virtues do so only with respect to some special matter;[4] for he who is humble by that very fact gladly acknowledges the supreme dominion of God, and is prepared to obey Him in all things. Moreover it is of no little profit for the practice of the theological virtues, because it removes pride, which most harms these virtues.

[4] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 5.

(b) In truth humility is deservedly held as the foundation of many virtues, their mother and nurse, insofar as it is necessary for acquiring and retaining them.

To the point Augustine says:[5] "Dost thou wish to be great? Begin from the least. Dost thou think to construct a great building of height? First think of the foundation of humility. And how great a mass of building each one wills and disposes to place above, the greater the building will be, the deeper he digs the foundation... But because the summit is great, think of the foundation. What foundation, thou askest? Learn from Him, because He is meek and humble of heart. Dig this foundation of humility in thyself, and thou shalt come to the summit of charity." - For he who cultivates humility renounces inordinate love of self, which is the greatest impediment of Christian perfection; he easily subjects his mind to God through faith, charity, and obedience; and, since he judges himself inferior to others, he cultivates love toward the neighbor without difficulty; the same can be said of many other virtues.

[5] St. Augustine, *Sermo* 69, n. 2, P. L., XXXVIII, 441 sq.

Therefore it is of the greatest importance to cultivate humility assiduously, either by taming pride through the means explained above, n. 519, or by eliciting the acts described above, n. 1082.

2. Concerning Meekness.

1087. Meekness is a virtue which moderates anger according to right reason. It is born from humility and fortitude: for since the chief cause of anger is inordinate love of oneself, bearing with difficulty injuries received from others, he is easily meek who humbly acknowledges that he is worthy of many injuries on account of the sins which he has committed. On the other hand, for restraining anger, the greatest fortitude is required.

[6] St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction*, p. III, ch. 8-9; Olier, op. cit., ch. 10.

(A) Meekness tempers anger especially in two ways: (a) it forbids us to be angry without sufficient cause; for anger is ordered to repelling evil, and therefore it is lawful only insofar as it is necessary for repelling some evil; (b) it prevents anger, when it is legitimate, from passing beyond just limits, lest, for example, it arise too quickly or last too long, or exceed as to mode.

But the perfectly meek not only temper anger, but generally abstain from it, even when it is otherwise legitimate. Christ indeed counsels this when He says:[7] "But I say to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other. And if a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him."

[7] Matt. 5:39.

Concerning the means of restraining anger, and therefore of acquiring meekness, we have already spoken, n. 534-537.

1088. (B) Akin to this virtue is clemency, which inclines superiors to mitigate the punishment owed to offenders, insofar as justice permits, and therefore to spare when it is fitting. It arises from meekness and from a certain sweetness of affection, by which one recoils from everything that can sadden another;[8] yet they differ from each other, insofar as clemency moderates exterior punishment, while meekness properly diminishes the passion of anger.[9] To clemency are opposed cruelty and, by abuse, excessive leniency.

[8] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 157, a. 2.

[9] St. Thomas, ibid., a. 1.

3. Concerning Modesty.

1089. (A) Definition. Modesty is a virtue inclining man to preserve decorum in exterior things. - For man's exterior movements must be composed according to reason, insofar as they are subject to the command of the will; likewise clothing and bodily adornment ought to be ordered according to the laws of honorableness. The virtue of modesty performs both; the Greeks call it eutaxia and eutrapelia.

1090. (B) Various acts. (a) Therefore modesty first tempers the exterior movements of the body, so that nothing unbecoming is done.

The pagans wrote many things on this matter; among them Cicero:[10] "Let posture, gait, sitting, reclining, countenance, eyes, and movement of the hands preserve that decorum. In these matters two things are especially to be fled: lest anything be effeminate or soft, and lest anything be harsh or rustic... Cleanliness is also to be employed, not offensive, nor too exquisite, only such as avoids boorish and inhuman negligence... The same rule must be observed in dress, in which, as in most things, moderation is best. But one must beware lest we use softer slownesses in walking... or in haste assume excessive swiftnesses, for when these happen the breath is moved, faces change, mouths are twisted, from which there is a great sign that constancy is not present... But in the voice let us follow two things, that it be clear, that it be pleasant."

[10] Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 35-37.

Sacred writers likewise observe that from a man's exterior bearing his character is manifested:[11] "By the sight a man is known, and by the meeting of the countenance a sensible man is known; the attire of the body and the laughter of the teeth and the gait of a man declare concerning him."

[11] Eccli. 19:26-27.

But the Fathers hand down minute rules of modesty; among them St. Ambrose:[12] "Even in movement itself, gesture, and gait, modesty must be kept. For the habit of the mind is seen in the state of the body. Hence the hidden man of our heart is judged either lighter, or more boastful, or more troubled, or on the contrary more grave and constant and purer and more mature... There is also an approved gait, in which there is an appearance of authority and the weight of gravity, the trace of tranquility, yet in such a way that effort and affectation be absent, and the movement be pure and simple; for nothing feigned pleases... The voice itself should not be slack, not broken, sounding nothing feminine, such as many have been accustomed to imitate under the appearance of gravity, but preserving a certain form and rule and masculine substance. For this is to hold the beauty of living: to render to each sex and person what is fitting. This is the best order of gestures, this adornment accommodated to every action. But as I do not approve a somewhat soft and broken sound of voice or gesture of body, so neither do I approve what is boorish and rustic. Let us imitate nature: her image is the formula of discipline, the form of honorableness."

[12] St. Ambrose, *De officiis*, l. I, c. 18-19, P. L., XVI, 44-49.

In one word, in all movements of the body, whatever savors of affectation or rusticity must be avoided.

1091. (b) Modesty also moderates games, which are done for relaxing the mind.[13] For since man, who for a long time applies himself to works, especially intellectual ones, is accustomed to experience fatigue, by which he is made unfit for labor, it is necessary that he restore his powers through rest and play. Yet in this some moderation is required, so that every excess may be avoided: first, whatever is base or harmful must be avoided; then, what is unbecoming in mode; nor must time be spent in prolonged games which ought to be spent on necessary things; likewise there are games which befit laymen, but not priests. Now the virtue which tempers these excesses is modesty, or eutrapely. Against it sin not only those who exceed, but also those who, unwilling ever to play, show themselves morose and difficult.

[13] St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction*, p. III, ch. 31-32.

1092. (c) Finally modesty regards clothing and bodily adornment, and tends to this, that exterior equipment correspond to the person according to sex, state, place, time, and other circumstances of this kind. Thus those who are placed in dignities, or are richer, are clothed in more costly garments than others.

In this matter one sins by excess when adornment is beyond one's condition or received custom; when too much care and time are spent in adorning oneself, as happens to not a few women and to certain effeminate youths; when costly garments are deliberately worn for the sake of ostentation, on account of vain glory, for catching eyes and exciting admiration.

Yet garments should be clean, neat, and, according to each one's condition, decently and elegantly composed.[1]

[1] St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction*, p. III, ch. 25.

On this occasion, it is asked whether it is lawful for women to adorn themselves so as to please men. - It is certainly unlawful to use lascivious adornment, which provokes others to lust: "And if indeed they adorn themselves with this intention, that they provoke others to concupiscence, they sin mortally; but if from a certain levity, or even from a certain vanity on account of a certain boasting, it is not always mortal sin, but sometimes venial."[2] - This intention being excluded, it is lawful for wives to adorn themselves so that they may please their husbands, and so foster conjugal love; the same is lawful for marriageable girls, so that they may more easily find a spouse. But those women who do not have husbands, nor wish to have them, cannot without sin desire to please men and to excite their concupiscence, since this is nothing other than to offer them an incentive to sin.

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 2.

But some sin by defect, neglecting the care of the body, so that they give weariness or scandal to others; this is more unbecoming among those who, by force of office or duty, ought to enjoy the good esteem of others.

Therefore Christian men and women should cultivate simplicity and decorum at the same time, according to their state, not unmindful of these words of the Apostle:[3] "In like manner women also in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, and not with plaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire; but as it becometh women professing godliness, with good works."

[3] 1 Tim. 2:9.

1093. Let these few things concerning the cardinal virtues suffice for our purpose. If inquiry is made concerning their relative perfection, with St. Thomas[4] we answer: "Among the other (that is, moral) virtues, prudence is the greatest, because it is the moderator of the others; and after this, justice, through which man is well disposed not only in himself, but toward another; and after this, fortitude, through which man, on account of good, despises dangers of death; and after this, temperance, through which man, on account of good, despises the greatest pleasures of bodily things." - Besides, since virtues of this kind are connected among themselves (n. 591), he who becomes perfect in one, by that very fact makes progress in the others; and thus the ascent from virtue to virtue is made easier.

[4] St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae, De virtutibus*, q. 5, a. 3.

Appendix: On the Precepts of God and of the Church

Appendix: Concerning the Precepts of God and of the Church.

1094. In explaining the moral doctrine concerning the theological and moral virtues, by that very fact we have declared the precepts of the Decalogue connected with them, and also the principal ecclesiastical laws; for these cannot be separated from one another. But since, as St. Augustine testifies, the Decalogue is the sum and epitome of all laws[5] which must be observed by man, and especially by the Christian, so that he may tend suitably to the last end and happily attain it, it is of no small importance to meditate upon the precepts of the Decalogue and to understand them distinctly, so that by frequent preaching they may be clearly proposed to the faithful, and consciences may be composed, judged, and reformed according to them. In order that pastors and other priests may be as equal as possible to this duty, although we treat the virtues at length in the whole course of the moral *Synopsis*, it is useful to present a compendious exposition of the individual precepts.

[5] *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, q. 140, P. L., XXXIV, 644. - Here the Decalogue is treated as it has been completed and perfected by Christ. During the first four centuries, the Fathers scarcely speak of the Decalogue. But St. Augustine, pouring the Christian spirit into the interpretation of the Decalogue, presents it as the sum of the Christian law; for "the ten precepts (depend) upon those two, namely the love of God and of the neighbor, on which the whole Law and the prophets depend." The interpretation which we briefly contract, with the cooperation of E. M. Quevastre, is that which the Catechism of the Council of Trent digested more fully from Christian Tradition. - We have already described the origin and character of the Decalogue in the Treatise on Laws, n. 235-245. Cf. Mangenot, *Dict. de Theol.*, t. IV, 171-176.

Art. I. A Brief Exposition of the Decalogue. — The First Precept.

"Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me."[6]

[6] Exod. 20:3.

1095. This precept, first and greatest of all not only in order, but in reason, dignity, and excellence, consists of a double part, as do the other precepts, namely an affirmative and a negative part; these we shall touch on successively.

1. As affirmative, it commands the eliciting of acts of faith, hope, and charity, by which we worship God as faithful, whose oracles we rightly and deservedly assent to; as omnipotent and merciful, in whom we place all our hopes; as full and overflowing with goodness and perfection, whom we embrace with the whole heart. Against this precept sin those who fall into heresy, who put faith in dreams, auguries, and other most vain things, who cast away hope of their salvation, who rely on riches and on bodily health and strength, who conceive hatred and weariness of God, etc.

1096. 2. By the other part of the precept, which is negative, idolatry, or the worship of false divinities, is prohibited.

(a) But the veneration and invocation of the holy angels and blessed souls are not prohibited, nor even the cult of sacred relics. For we honor the saints as the household members, friends, and ministers of God: this manner of acting is commended by manifold theological reason, apostolic and ecclesiastical custom, the benefits and patronage of the saints themselves, and many and great miracles.[7]

[7] On these things cf. St. Ambrose, Epist. XXII, P. L., XVI, 1019 sq.; St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XXII, 8, P. L., XLI, 700; *Confessions*, IX, 7, P. L., XXXII, 770.

(b) Nor is the art of fashioning or sculpting prohibited, unless the majesty of God be injured. This could happen for a double reason: one, if idols and images were worshiped as God, or it were believed that some divinity or power was in them, or that something was to be asked from them, or that confidence was to be fixed in images; the other, if someone tried to fashion the form of the divinity by some art, as if it could be seen by bodily eyes or expressed by colors or figures.

(c) Hence it is lawful to represent by images the persons of the Most Holy Trinity, especially after the manner of the apparitions which are related in Sacred Scripture; it is lawful to fashion or paint images of Angels, Saints, the Blessed Virgin Mary, and Christ Himself. For representations of this kind teach us the attributes and benefits of God, the virtues and intercession of the Saints, and consequently excite us to worship, invocation, and imitation. Besides, pastors should take care to restrain abuses and superstitions which can creep into the use of images, according to the decree of Trent.

All these things indeed we have explained above, namely: (A) as to the virtues: (a) the necessity of faith for salvation, n. 628-630; the truths which must be explicitly believed by necessity of means, n. 631-637; the truths by necessity of precept, n. 639-647; and also the obligation of externally professing the faith, n. 648-654; - sins against faith, namely heresy and doubt in faith, 656-662; apostasy and adhesion to Masonic sects, 663-666; infidelity, 667-668; and the chief causes which induce loss of faith, 669-688; nor did we pass over the means by which we are able to progress in faith, 689-694.

(b) The nature and properties of hope, 696-713; its necessity, 714-718; sins against hope, namely despair and presumption, 720-725; adding a few things concerning the means of progressing in hope, 726-729.

(c) The nature of charity toward God, 745-748; the necessity of loving God above all things, 749-754; sins against this virtue, especially hatred of God, 755-757; the means of progressing in the love of God, 758-763.

(d) The precept of charity toward the neighbor, 769-779; insofar as it includes the love of enemies, 780-789; alms to be given to the poor, 790-795; fraternal correction, 796-804; and also the order to be observed in charity, 805-816; the works of social charity so necessary today, 817-835; sins opposed to fraternal charity, namely discord and contention, 836-839; scandal, 840-850.

(e) The necessity of the virtue of religion, especially of adoration and prayer, 855-873, and also of devotion, 886-893. - Concerning the cult of Blessed Mary and the saints, concerning sacred images and relics, we have written elsewhere, in *De Verbo Incarnato*, near the end.

(B) As to vices: (a) idolatry, 895-896; (b) vain observances and various superstitions in which the devil intervenes, 899-905; (c) tempting God, by which an unusual effect is expected from God without cause, 925-928; (d) sacrilege and simony, or the unworthy handling of a thing or person sacred to God, 929-942.

The Second Precept.

"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."[8]

[8] Exod. 20:7.

1097. Although, in the first precept of the divine law, this which follows in the second place is necessarily contained, nevertheless God, because of the greatness of the matter, willed to give separately this law concerning the honoring of His own divine and most holy name.

1. As affirmative, the second precept commands us to honor the name of God, and by it to swear holily.

But we are commanded to honor not the name itself taken literally, according to the vain superstition of certain Jews, but the omnipotent and eternal majesty of the one and triune Deity which the name of God signifies.

The name of God, thus understood, is honored: (a) by confession, by which we acknowledge God and His Christ to be our Lord and the author of our salvation; (b) by meditation on the word of God, by which His will is declared; (c) by praise, by which, following the example of David and Job, we celebrate the magnificent attributes and works of God, and give singular thanks to Him for all things, both prosperous and adverse; (d) by prayer, by which we confidently implore His help; (e) by vow, by which we irrevocably refer certain works to the worship of God; (f) we pursue the name of God with honor when, for the sake of making faith, we call God as witness, whatever the form and conception of words by which this is done; for both "God is my witness" and "By God" are the same. We can also swear by created things, as by the sacred Gospels of God, by the Cross, by the relics of the Saints, and other things of that kind, insofar as the splendor of the divine majesty shines forth in those things.

There are two kinds of swearing: one assertory, when we religiously affirm something concerning a present or past matter, as the Apostle does in the Epistle to the Galatians;[9] the other promissory, to which also threats are referred, looking to future time, when we promise and confirm as certain that something will be so; of this kind is that oath of David directed to Bersabee.[10]

[9] Gal. 1:20.

[10] 3 Kings 1:29.

For a legitimate oath three things are required: (a) truth, insofar as what is asserted is itself true, and he who swears judges that it is so, or insofar as he who promises something is so disposed that, when the time comes, he will actually perform it; (b) judgment, by which the oath is employed not rashly and inconsiderately, but advisedly and thoughtfully; whence it has been established that an oath not be exacted from children before the fourteenth year;[11] (c) justice, which is especially required in promises; therefore if someone promises something unjust and dishonorable, he both sins by swearing, and by making promises heaps crime upon crime, as Herod[12] and the Jews did, who wickedly pledged that they would taste nothing until they had killed Paul.[13]

[11] Gratian, *Decretum*, p. II, C. 22, q. 5, c. 16.

[12] Mark 6:23.

[13] Acts 23:12.

Under these conditions it is plainly lawful to swear, as is established by the authority of Scripture[14] and by manifold reason.[15]

[14] Ps. 18:8; Deut. 6:10, 13; Ps. 62:12; Apoc. 10:3.

[15] Cf. Catech. Rom., here, 7.

2. As negative, the second precept forbids: (a) to swear without counsel, without truth, without justice, or with some contempt, as if someone were to swear that he would not obey the evangelical counsels, or were to swear by false gods; (b) to injure the word of God, either by bending Sacred Scripture from its right and genuine meaning to the dogmas and heresies of the impious, or by twisting it to scurrilous and fabulous things; (c) to blaspheme, which is a far more detestable crime.

Concerning this we have treated in the Treatise on the Virtue of Religion, explaining namely: (a) how there are prohibited: blasphemy, n. 919-924; the vain taking of the name of God, 961-963; rash oath and the violation of a legitimate oath, 947-957; and also violation of a vow, 984-989; - (b) how reverence for the name of God is prescribed, which is shown by frequent invocation and praise, n. 963; by the religious observance of an oath, 947-952; and by the faithful fulfillment of a vow, 979-989.

The Third Precept.

"Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath day."[1]

[1] Exod. 20:8.

1098. By this precept of the law exterior and social worship is prescribed, which is, as it were, a certain fruit of the preceding precept. This duty of religion was once assigned to the sabbath, yet by positive ordinance; hence the cult of the sabbath, instituted as a sign of creation and of liberation from Egyptian servitude, could be transferred to Sunday in memory of the Resurrection of Christ and of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit.

Although this precept differs from the rest in this, that with respect to time, rite, and ceremonies it is positive, nevertheless it agrees with them because it has something which is prescribed by natural right. For to render worship and religion to God is an inclination and law of nature; whence among all nations we see that there have been certain fixed and public feasts, which were consecrated to sacred things and to divine duties.

1. By the third precept we are commanded to assist at the most holy sacrifice of the Mass; but besides this, there are commended frequency of the sacraments, especially confession of sins and Communion, the hearing of the word of God, prayer and divine praises, and works of mercy.

2. Works which impede divine worship are prohibited, namely every kind of servile work, and besides and especially sin; but by no means those things which pertain to worship itself, such as preparing the altar, adorning churches, or other things that are necessary.

Concerning these things the treatment was given at n. 1006-1047.

The Fourth Precept.

"Honor thy father and thy mother, that thou mayest be long-lived upon the earth..."[2]

[2] Exod. 20:12.

1099. 1. This precept agrees with the first three: for if we do not venerate and honor parents, whom we ought to love next after God, since they are almost always before our eyes, what honor, what worship shall we give to God, the supreme and best parent, who falls under no sight?[3]

[3] 1 John 4:20.

(A) Besides those who begot us, there are many whom we ought to honor in the place of parents, either by reason of power, or dignity, or utility, or some excellent function and office. Thus there are to be honored: (a) prelates of the Church and priests, who have begotten us in Christ Jesus through the Gospel,[4] and as it were travail again with their little children until Christ be formed in us;[5] (b) magistrates who govern the republic; (c) guardians and teachers, to whose care, fidelity, probity, and wisdom we are entrusted; (d) the aged and those worn out by age.

[4] 1 Cor. 4:14.

[5] Gal. 4:19.

(B) But especially are father and mother to be honored by us, who are certain images, as it were, of the immortal God, from whom life has been given to us, whom God used in order to impart to us an immortal soul, by whom we were led to the sacraments, instructed in religion and in human and civil culture, and educated to integrity of morals and holiness.

2. The honor of parents includes: (a) love, since they are so disposed toward us that they flee no labor, no striving, no dangers for our sake; (b) prayer, that they may be most commended to God and to the saints; (c) obedience, by which we conform our manner of acting to their judgment and will; (d) imitation, since we seem to attribute very much to those to whom we wish to be as similar as possible; (e) help as to the necessities of body and soul, especially in sickness, taking care lest they omit anything that pertains either to confession of sins or to the other sacraments; (f) care for burial and funeral rites, and also suffrages for hastening the repose of the soul.

In this same manner Bishops and Pastors are to be honored, assisted, and heard; Princes are to be observed and helped by prayers. The same is true of others who rightly and deservedly are called fathers, such as magistrates and the aged: for they are worthy to receive honor and benefit from our charity, obedience, and help.

3. Parents also have their own proper duties and functions: (a) that they imbue their children with most holy disciplines and morals; (b) that by their examples they inculcate equity, continence, modesty, and religion; (c) moreover that they especially avoid three things: 1) lest they speak or determine anything too harsh against their children, so that they do not become fainthearted;[6] 2) lest by dissolute indulgence they corrupt their children; 3) lest in the education and instruction of their children they enter into preposterous counsels, being occupied in this one thought and care, that they may leave a rich and ample patrimony, while not solicitous about eternal salvation.

[6] Col. 3:21.

Concerning these things it has been said in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 969-1002 (30-63).

The Fifth Precept.

"Thou shalt not kill."[7]

[7] Exod. 20:13.

1100. 1. It is not prohibited: (a) to kill animals, "because they are not associated with us by any reason,"[8] and to eat them has been granted by God to men; (b) to inflict capital punishment upon wicked and criminal men, by which the life of men may be kept safe; (c) to take life from enemies, with only the aim of public utility; (d) to kill another for the sake of defending one's safety; (e) nor is he guilty of this precept who by chance kills a man; in this, however, one can sin for two reasons: 1) if someone, occupied in an unjust matter, kills a man; 2) if, not having examined all things, he negligently and incautiously kills someone.

[8] St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, I, 20, P. L., XLI, 35.

2. What is forbidden. (a) But other killings are prohibited, whatever be the difference either of the killer, or of the one killed, or of the killing. All, namely even the rich, even the powerful, even parents, ought to abstain from killing; all, even those of humble and abject condition, are defended by the force of this law; nor is it lawful for anyone to kill himself; every manner also of accomplishing killing is interdicted, namely physical perpetration and moral cooperation. (b) It is also prohibited to indulge anger without just cause, by which a way can be prepared for killing.

3. But we are commanded to have peace and charity with all, even enemies and those causing troubles;[9] and consequently to cultivate patience,[10] beneficence, meekness, and forgiveness of injuries.

[9] Matt. 5:23.

[10] 1 Cor. 13:4.

4. Indeed, for the perfect observance of the precept we receive from the Lord the counsel of not resisting evil, of offering the other cheek to one striking the right, and of letting go cloak and

coat to one seeking them.[11]

[11] Matt. 5:39.

Concerning these things we discuss in the Treatise on Justice, namely: concerning suicide and self-mutilation, n. 289-308; concerning the killing of the innocent, of malefactors, and of an unjust aggressor, 311-333; concerning duel, 334-344; concerning war, 345-363.

The Sixth Precept.

"Thou shalt not commit adultery."[12]

[12] Exod. 20:14.

1101. 1. As to the negative part, by this precept there are prohibited: (a) adultery, which, besides the baseness which is common to it with other kinds of intemperance, also has joined to it a sin of injustice not only against the neighbor, but also against civil society; (b) every kind of impurity and immodesty, indeed every intimate lust of the soul, insofar as these dispose to adultery and disturb the order of generation divinely instituted.

2. As to the affirmative part, chastity is prescribed to each one, to be observed according to his state. For procuring this, these will be of the greatest help: (a) consideration of the baseness inhering in carnal sins, and of the injustice by which adultery is compounded, together with the infamy and manifold ruin which follow sins of this kind; (b) avoidance of idleness, excess in food and drink, immodest looking with the eyes, more elegant adornment, lascivious speech, and obscene books; (c) for suppressing the force of lust, confession and Communion should be employed, assiduous prayers joined with alms and fasting, vigils, pious pilgrimages, and other afflictions of this kind.

Concerning these things we have treated in the Treatise on Chastity and in the Supplement to the Treatise on Matrimony.

The Seventh Precept.

"Thou shalt not steal."[13]

[13] Exod. 20:15.

1102. 1. By this precept there is prohibited any taking away or possession of another's thing, which in the broad sense is called theft. But if we speak more strictly, there is distinguished: theft, by which something private is taken from a private person; peculation, by which something public is taken; plagium, by which a free man is carried off into servitude; sacrilege, by which a sacred thing is seized.

(A) How grave these sins are appears: (a) from their nature, by which they are contrary to justice and sometimes to religion; and from their consequences, which are hatred, enmities, and condemnations of innocent men.

(B) Guilty of theft are: (a) those who occupy the things of others; (b) those who employ frauds in the quality of merchandise, in weight and measure; (c) those who do not furnish owed work or who

plunder the resources of masters; (d) those who extort money by deceitful begging; (e) those who do not fulfill an office undertaken; (f) nor are sons of families and wives alien from the same fault, when they steal money from fathers and husbands. All these injustices are committed secretly and furtively; whence they are called thefts in the stricter sense.

(C) But guilty of rapine, which is the taking of another's thing openly and sometimes by force and violence, are: (a) those who do not pay wages to workers; (b) those who practice usury; (c) those who have judgments for sale; (d) those who, after taking a period of time for paying, buy goods on their own or another's credit and do not free the pledge; (e) those who exact debts owed to themselves too harshly; (f) those who withhold grain in time of necessity.

(D) Bound to restitution are not only those who have committed theft, but also all those cooperating in theft, such as those commanding, advising, consenting, participating in the thing taken, not prohibiting, not disclosing, and receiving. Nor do these excuse: care of preserving status and of having the convenience of life, the abundance of those from whom a thing is taken, the custom or occasion of stealing, the desire of taking revenge, the necessity of paying debts.

2. They observe the seventh precept more abundantly who exercise various works of mercy, devote themselves to labor, and cultivate frugality and thrift, so that they may do good to others.

Concerning this we treat in the Treatise on Justice, 431-610, 613-938.

The Eighth Precept.

"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor."[14]

[14] Exod. 20:16.

1103. 1. There are prohibited: (a) false testimony against any man whatever, even for favoring him, not only in judgment, but also outside judgment; (b) detraction through calumny and backbiting; (c) the stirring up of discords; (d) flattery; (e) lying; (f) simulation; (g) contumely; (h) rash judgment.

2. But there is commanded: (a) that judges exercise forensic judgments justly and according to the laws; (b) that the accused and the guilty confess the truth when they are legitimately interrogated; (c) that witnesses bring true and certain testimony when they are questioned by a judge according to the norm of law; (d) that advocates defend just causes justly and measure their fee according to right and equity by their work; (e) that accusers and petitioners exactly observe truth and justice toward all, even adversaries.

Concerning these things the treatment was given in the Treatise on Justice: (a) concerning rash judgment, n. 365-373; (b) concerning detraction, or defamation, through evil-speaking and calumny, 374-395; (c) concerning contumely, or injury to honor, 397-400; (d) concerning false testimony and lying, 401-417; and in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, where the duties of judges, accused persons, witnesses, advocates, etc., are treated, n. 992-1020.

The Ninth and Tenth Precepts.

"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house: neither shalt thou desire his wife, nor his servant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is his."[15]

[15] Exod. 20:17.

1104. By these precepts we are admonished that the law of God is of such a kind that it must be observed not only in external acts, but also in the intimate sense of the soul.

1. Here there is prohibited, not the very power of desiring, which may be used both for good and for evil, but only that lust of desiring which the Apostle calls the concupiscence of the flesh.[16] Now this cupidity is condemned either because it seeks evil, as adulteries, or because the things sought are another's, such as house, field, wife, ox, ass, and many other things, which, by the very fact that they are another's, the divine law forbids one to covet.

[16] Gal. 5:16, 24.

Above others, however, those labor under this vice of cupidity: (a) those who delight in dishonorable games, or who abuse games immoderately; (b) merchants who desire a shortage of goods and high prices of grain, and who take it ill that others besides themselves sell or buy, so that they themselves may sell more dearly or buy more cheaply; (c) those who desire others to be in need so that they themselves may gain by selling or buying; (d) physicians who desire diseases; (e) legal consultants who covet the force and abundance of causes and lawsuits, etc.

2. The affirmative part of the precept, especially of the tenth, consists in this, that if riches abound, we not set the heart on them, and be prepared to cast them away through zeal for piety and divine things, and gladly spend money in relieving the miseries of the poor; if means are lacking, that we bear poverty with an equal and cheerful soul. By this law likewise it is prescribed that with ardent zeal and the highest desire we choose that to be done, not which we covet, but which God wills, as is explained in the Lord's Prayer.

Concerning internal sins and desires we have treated above, n. 499-506.

These are, summarily set forth, the holy precepts of God, of which a richer explanation can be found both in the course of our moral *Synopsis* and in the reading and meditation of the third part of the Roman Catechism. Moreover, the Roman Catechism teaches us both the manner of proposing doctrine persuasively and clearly, and the considerations by which souls may be moved to observing the law of God, whether considered in general or in the individual precepts.

Art. II. Concerning the Precepts of the Church.

1105. That authority belongs to the Church for making laws binding in conscience, we have already proved in the Treatise on the Church, n. 843. In truth she has promulgated many laws, concerning which we spoke above, n. 257-331. But among manifold laws of this kind, some are by antonomasia called the precepts of the Church, because they are of greater moment and touch all the faithful: five, six, or seven are numbered according to diverse times and various provinces of the Church.

The collection of these precepts under a common name does not seem ancient: for it is not found in the Catechism of the Council of Trent, published in the year 1566; but Peter Binsfeld (*Enchiridion theol. pastoralis*, 1591) already enumerated five precepts of the Church; Bellarmine, in his Catechism, 1598, set forth six; and P. Fagundez (+ 1645) published an entire treatise on the five precepts of the Church.[1]

[1] A. Villien, *Histoire des Command. de l'Eglise*, in *Revue du Cl. francais*, t. XLI (1905), p. 562.

Formerly five were numbered as contained in these little verses:

"Keep the feasts, be present at the sacred rite; observe the fasts;
Let confession be annual; let Communion be at Easter."

Therefore the first precept is the sanctification of feasts which the Church has instituted, according to what was said above, n. 1010. - The second commands the hearing of Mass on Sundays and feast days, above, n. 1020-1037. - The third embraces fasting and abstinence from flesh: these two precepts formerly formed one, but today they are commonly distinguished, since often, according to today's discipline, abstinence is imposed without fasting. - The two latter, annual confession and paschal Communion, you will find declared in the Treatises on Penance and on the Eucharist. - In certain regions, however, a seventh precept is added concerning the contribution of support for the sustenance of pastors.

Therefore it remains to speak of three things: 1. concerning fasting; 2. concerning abstinence from flesh; 3. concerning the sustenance of pastors.

§ I. Concerning Ecclesiastical Fasting.

1106. Fasting is threefold: (a) natural, which consists in complete abstinence from food and drink: such is the Eucharistic fast, which is required from the midnight preceding Communion; (b) ecclesiastical, which consists in abstinence from food, not total, but according to limits predefined by the Church; (c) moral, which is moderation in taking food and drink, and, by extension, in other pleasures either of the soul or of the body.

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 147; Billuart, *De Jejunio*; St. Alphonsus, l. III, n. 1005 sq.; Ball. P., n. 1103-1153; Marc, n. 1218-1243; Lehmkuhl, n. 1210-1222; Noldin, n. 662-680.

Here ecclesiastical fasting is treated; we shall explain: 1. its origin and utility; 2. the manner of observing the law of fasting; 3. the causes which excuse from it.

I. Concerning the Origin and Utility of the Law of Fasting.

1107. 1. Historical evolution of the law of fasting.[3] (A) Under the Old Law, fasting is commended many times, and sometimes also prescribed.

[3] Thomassin hands down fully and learnedly the brief history which we outline, *Traite des Jeunes de l'Eglise*, Paris, 1680.

(a) Thus it is presented as conferring greater force on prayer: "Prayer is good with fasting";[4] hence David fasted that he might obtain from the Lord the health of his child;[5] Judith is praised because she fasted all the days of her life, except the sabbaths and new moons and the feasts of the house of Israel;[6] Esther fled to the Lord in prayer and fasting;[7] Judas Machabeus, with his companions,

prepared himself for battle by prayer and fasting.[8] - Fasting, moreover, is preached as a means of doing penance and obtaining mercy from God: "Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping";[9] and so the Ninivites obtained their conversion and salvation by prayer, lamentation, and fasting.[10]

[4] Tob. 12:8.

[5] 2 Kings 12:16.

[6] Judith 8:6.

[7] Esth. 14:2.

[8] 2 Mach. 13:12; cf. 1 Esdr. 8:23.

[9] Joel 2:12.

[10] Jonah 3:5, 10.

(b) Moreover the Jews had been commanded to fast on the tenth day of the seventh month;[11] and in the time of captivity the fasts of the fourth, fifth, and tenth month had been instituted.[12] - The Pharisees fasted more frequently.[13] - But God was not placated by external fasting unless they at the same time cultivated true penance, justice, and charity.[14]

[11] Exod. 16:29.

[12] Zach. 8:19.

[13] Luke 18:12.

[14] Isa. 58:3-7.

1108. (B) Under the New Law, (a) Christ commended fasting by His own example, fasting forty days and nights before He preached the Gospel.[15] He did not impose a law of fasting on His disciples, but at the same time announced that they would afterward be occupied with fasting;[16] and He commands those who fast to avoid hypocrisy and ostentation, lest they be seen by men as fasting, but by the Father who sees in secret.[17] - Nowhere, however, is it read that Christ Himself established certain fasts.

[15] Matt. 4:2.

[16] Matt. 9:14-15.

[17] Matt. 6:16-18.

(b) The Apostles and first disciples are said to have fasted sometimes, especially when there was question of the election and consecration of ministers of God.[18] Paul relates that he and other ministers of Christ often fasted.[19] Yet it is not read in the sacred Scriptures that they established the law of fasting; but some Fathers say that the Lenten fast is observed in the Church according to the tradition of the Apostles; nevertheless Augustine confesses that it was not defined by Christ and the Apostles on which days one ought to fast.[20]

[18] Acts 13:2-3; 14:22.

[19] 2 Cor. 6:5; 11:27.

[20] St. Augustine, Epist. 36, c. 14, P. L., XXXIII, 151.

1109. (c) Whatever the case, in the Church the custom soon prevailed of fasting in the time of Lent, for imitating Christ and doing penance before paschal Communion. Thus St. Jerome wrote to Marcella:[21] "We, according to the tradition of the Apostles, with the whole world agreeing with us, fast one Lent; they (the Montanists) make three Lents in a year, as if three Saviors had suffered." - In truth, already in the fourth century, the Lenten fast was observed in both Churches, with this difference, however, that in the Eastern Church the fast lasted through seven weeks, because it was interrupted on every sabbath and Sunday, while in the Western Church it lasted only six weeks, because it was interrupted only on Sunday.[22] - A few days were added to this fast by private persons, for the sake of devotion, namely the days of the weeks of Sexagesima and Quinquagesima; and, from the ninth century, the obligatory custom of fasting on the four days preceding Lent was introduced, so that, Sundays being deducted, the fast of forty days might be completed.[23] - But the devotion of the faithful did not stop here: certain persons began to fast outside Lent on two or three days each week, though this was not commanded by law. But gradually the custom prevailed, around the fifth century, of fasting for a few days at the four seasons of the year, to imitate the practice of the Jews and to dedicate the whole year to God; afterward the ordinations of priests and deacons could be celebrated only on these days.[24] - Later, in the sixth century, in certain churches there was instituted a fast of three days in each week of Advent.[25] At almost the same time, it was established that fasting be done during the triduum of the Rogations, first in particular Churches, soon in the universal Church. - Finally, from the sixth century, the custom also began of fasting on the vigils of the principal feasts, for example, of the Nativity of the Lord, Epiphany, Assumption, and the feasts of the Apostles.[26]

[21] St. Jerome, Epist. 41, P. L., XXII, 475.

[22] See the authorities in Thomassin, op. cit., I, ch. 7, p. 33-44.

[23] Thomassin, op. cit., II, ch. 1, p. 224 sq.

[24] Thomassin, op. cit., I, ch. 21.

[25] Thomassin, I, ch. 23.

[26] Thomassin, II, ch. 14.

1110. (d) But the manner of fasting was much stricter in the first times than in ours: namely, one meal was taken in the Latin Church after Vespers, that is, toward the end of the day; in the Greek Church a meal was taken more often, but a very small one.[27] In those times, the faithful abstained not only from food, but also from wine, and they took only a little water at certain hours to extinguish thirst.[28] - But gradually and imperceptibly, from the tenth century, the custom prevailed of taking the meal at the ninth hour (that is, three o'clock after midday), and, a little later, at the noon hour.[29] In the thirteenth century, only one eating was permitted, as St. Thomas witnesses.[30] But a little later the use prevailed, borrowed from monks, of taking a small collation in the evening hour.[31] - Finally, in the nineteenth century, the custom began of taking a small quantity of coffee in the morning with a little piece of bread.

[27] Thomassin, op. cit., II, ch. 9.

[28] Thomassin, II, ch. 7.

[29] Thomassin, II, ch. 12.

[30] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 147, a. 6.

[31] Thomassin, II, ch. 11.

From this it is clear that the law of fasting is ecclesiastical, introduced by custom, and is to be understood and applied by the custom of various places.

1111. 2. Utility of fasting. The Church, in the Lenten Preface, thus describes the spiritual utility of fasting: "O God, who by bodily fasting dost restrain vices, elevate the mind, bestow virtue and rewards." - In truth fasting, moderately and wisely employed: (a) restrains vices, insofar as it moderates the concupiscence of the flesh; for experience has found that concupiscence is inflamed not a little, not only by sumptuous meals, but by any excess in food and drink, while lust is cooled by abstinence. Now men are prone, on account of the pleasure annexed to food, to indulge in some excesses; but by fasting established at fixed times, they learn moderation, and repair excesses, if any have been committed.

(b) It elevates the mind; for just as man, by taking food immoderately, becomes animal, unfit for intellectual operations, and prone to earthly things; so, on the other hand, he who at fixed times moderately deprives himself of food and drink becomes spiritual, thinks more frequently of spiritual things, and tends more easily to heavenly things.

(c) It bestows virtue, first of all sobriety and temperance: for he who sometimes abstains from lawful things, by that very fact moderates intemperance more easily; and also penance, because fasting, from what was said above, contributes to true amendment of heart: for since we are allured to sin by pursuing pleasure, we are turned away from sin by mortification.

(d) It bestows rewards, namely the eternal crown of glory: for he who, on account of God, abstains from many things will receive a hundredfold in the other life. Wherefore the Apostle said:[32] "And every one that striveth for the mastery refraineth himself from all things; and they indeed that they may receive a corruptible crown; but we an incorruptible one."

[32] 1 Cor. 9:25. Cf. St. Basil, homilies 1 and 2 on fasting.

II. Concerning the Manner of Fasting.

1112. 1. Extension of the law. The law of ecclesiastical fasting obliges all baptized persons having the use of reason, from the completed twenty-first year of age to the begun sixtieth year (*Code*, c. 1254). - That this obligation is grave is established from the condemnation of this proposition 23 by Alexander VII, September 24, 1665: "He who breaks the fast of the Church, to which he is bound, does not sin mortally, unless he does this from contempt or disobedience, for example, because he does not wish to subject himself to the precept."[1]

[1] In Denzinger, n. 994; cf. Viva on this proposition.

The days on which, from common law, fasting is prescribed are: (a) the Lenten season, from Ash Wednesday[2] up to Holy Saturday inclusive, except Sundays and feasts of precept, where these are

observed, except, however, during Lent; the fast ceases on Holy Saturday after midday (*Code*, c. 1252).

[2] In the Milanese church the use is retained of beginning the fast from the first Sunday of Lent, as formerly was commonly done.

(b) The Wednesday and Friday and also the Saturday of the Ember Days; this is done so that at each season of the year the faithful may expiate their sins, obtain new graces, and obtain good ministers from God (for then sacred orders are conferred).

(c) The vigils of certain feasts, namely of the Nativity of the Lord, Pentecost, Assumption, and All Saints: namely for this end, that these feasts may be celebrated devoutly. - But previgils, with respect to fasting and abstinence, are not anticipated. Thus if the feast of the Nativity of the Lord occurs on Monday, the fast and abstinence which are impeded on Sunday are not now to be observed on the preceding Saturday.

1113. 2. Concerning lawful meals. On days of fasting, according to today's discipline, one full meal is permitted, to which can be added a moderate collation and a morning morsel.

(A) Concerning the one meal. From midnight to midnight, only one full meal is permitted, the quantity of which, moreover, has not been determined. Therefore he satisfies the precept who dines more sumptuously so that he may bear the burden of the fast more easily. If he indulges in some excess, he sins indeed against temperance, but not against the law of fasting.

1114. (a) The time at which, from almost universal custom, this meal must be taken is around noon. It is lawful, however, notably to anticipate it when a just cause is present, for example, the necessity of beginning a journey, transacting business, or weakness of constitution. Indeed a notable anticipation (for example, of one hour), even without cause, is not a mortal sin, because it does not remove the substance of the fast, which consists in one full eating.

It is likewise lawful to invert the time of dinner and collation, for a reasonable cause, for example, to take the collation around the eleventh morning hour, and dinner around the sixth evening hour:[3] this is very practical today in cities, where people are accustomed to dine in the evening. Indeed, according to some,[4] when a just cause is present, it is lawful to take the collation in the morning, dinner at midday, and the morsel in the evening, because in this way the substance of the fast is preserved.

[3] To the question: "Whether on days of fasting the time of eating can be inverted, by taking the little evening refreshment between the tenth and eleventh morning hour, but deferring dinner to the fourth or fifth evening hour," the Sacred Penitentiary, January 19, 1834, answered: "If there is some cause for the aforesaid inversion, penitents who use this custom are not to be disturbed." (*Acta S. Sedis*, I, p. 424).

[4] D'Annibale, III, n. 134; Noldin, n. 674.

(b) Dinner must be morally continuous and not immoderately prolonged. For if it is notably interrupted, it is no longer one meal, but several. What interruption is notable must be judged from the estimation of prudent persons, with attention especially to two things, the intention of the one fasting and the length of the interruption. Generally an interruption is considered slight which does not exceed half an hour; but if someone has begun to dine, and afterward has been legitimately

interrupted for an hour, he can complete the dinner, because he had the intention of returning. Moreover, if the interruption is had for a grave cause, for example, for administering the sacraments or helping those dangerously sick, even after two hours it is lawful to return to the dinner; for the Church does not require that someone be forced to pass the day without sufficient refreshment when some duty to be fulfilled presses.

It is not lawful to prolong dinner immoderately, for example, beyond two hours, unless a special cause is present, for example, the custom of prolonging dinner when friends are invited, as happens in certain regions.

1115. (B) Concerning the collation, or little supper. Besides dinner, a collation is permitted, which is commonly taken in the evening; here one must attend to what is lawful to take by custom as to the quantity and quality of foods.

(a) As to the quantity of food, about a fourth part of a full dinner can be taken; and, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 1025), eight ounces (about 240 gr.) can be permitted to all indiscriminately, even if they would be fully refreshed by this quantity. - Besides, attention must be paid to the constitution, duties, and functions of each one, the duration of the fast, etc.; thus in colder regions more is customarily conceded than in warmer ones, more to one laboring through the whole day than to one spending time in leisure, more to one weak and voracious than to one robust and lacking hunger. The general principle is that whatever is necessary can be taken so that one may be able fittingly to obey his duties.

By universal custom it is lawful on the vigil of the Nativity of the Lord to take a quantity twice as great.

(b) As to the quality of foods, the custom of each region is to be followed, since the collation was introduced by custom. In certain regions, fish, eggs, milk products, butter, and cheese are not permitted, but only cakes, bread, fruits, vegetables, and legumes. In others, either by custom or by indult, eggs and milk products are permitted, little fish, or even two or three ounces of larger fish. Hence, in practice, the mandates which Bishops promulgate concerning this matter at the beginning of Lent must be diligently read.

1116. (c) Concerning the morning morsel, or breakfast. From the Code, c. 1251, it is lawful in the morning to take something of food, that is, a small quantity of coffee, chocolate, tea, or something of this kind, with a little piece of bread;[5] the quantity of nutritive food generally ought not to exceed two ounces (about 60 gr.), unless more is required on account of constitution or duties to be fulfilled.

[5] Thus from the declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary, November 21, 1843. The doubt being proposed: "Whether it can be permitted that in the morning on days of fasting a small quantity of coffee or chocolate be taken with a morsel of bread, as is done in the Canadian region"; it was answered that "those who follow such a use are not to be disturbed."

1117. 3. Concerning those things which can be taken outside these meals. According to today's discipline, outside the aforesaid meals, it is lawful to take something by way of drink or medicine, according to the saying: liquid does not break the fast. By way of drink, it is lawful to drink water, even sugared water, wine, beer, and various liquors, even if in

some way they nourish; by way of medicine, coffee, tea, very diluted chocolate, electuaries (in a small quantity) which are made from sugar, juniper, lemon, etc., can be taken, if they are taken for digesting food, preserving the voice, removing stench of the mouth, etc.; indeed, a very small piece of bread before drink, lest the drink harm, provided this is not done frequently, but once or twice in the day. - But what properly has the character of food cannot be taken, for example, broth, honey, milk,[6] sugar, oil.

[6] In certain regions purified milk is lawfully taken as a drink.

The quantity of food which is required for grave sin cannot be determined mathematically; it is rather commonly admitted that grave matter is what exceeds four ounces (120 gr.), whether it be taken at one time or in parts through the day. For small eatings taken on the same day coalesce and can constitute grave matter, from proposition 29 condemned by Alexander VII:[7] "On a day of fasting, he who more often eats some small thing, even if at the end he has eaten a notable quantity, does not break the fast."

[7] Denzinger, n. 1000; cf. Viva on this proposition.

1118. 4. Concerning abstinence to be observed on days of fasting. (A) From the Code, c. 1252, "the law of abstinence and fasting is to be observed on Ash Wednesday, the Fridays and Saturdays of Lent, and the Ember Days," and the four previgils mentioned above (1112). By the name of flesh understand not only flesh properly so called, but also all parts of animals, such as blood, marrow of bones, brain, fat, lard, and broth expressed from flesh. By no means, however, are fish prohibited. But what is flesh and fish in the ecclesiastical sense must be determined not from the theories of natural philosophers, but from common estimation and the custom of places; for this distinction was especially introduced by custom.

Ancient authors generally held as prohibited the flesh of animals "resting on the earth and breathing,"[8] and as lawful the flesh of aquatic animals, which live and breathe in water, or at least are nourished by fish. Today, however, with attention to custom, by the name of fish are understood not only fish properly so called, but also: crustaceans, such as crabs, crayfish, sea-urchins (*crabes, ecrevisses, homards, langoustes, oursins de mer*); mollusks, such as shells, oysters, snails (*coquillages, huitres, limacons*); reptiles and amphibians, as frogs, turtles (*grenouilles, tortues*). But the flesh of mammals and birds is prohibited, with a few exceptions from custom; thus otters, beavers or castors, seals (*loutres, castors, phoques*) are permitted, and in certain regions ducks of a certain species (*canards sauvages*).[9]

[8] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 147, a. 8.

[9] According to some (Noldin, n. 664), the same is to be said of coots, because their use was conceded to the Minims; but, since this was conceded as a grace, it cannot be inferred from this that it is lawful for all without indult; in truth this faculty was denied to the Carthusians.

1119. (B) In the time of Lent, formerly even on Sundays, besides flesh, eggs and milk products were prohibited by common law, that is, milk and all those things which are made from milk, such as butter, cheese, etc.; but, from can. 1250, the law of abstinence "forbids eating flesh and broth from flesh, but not eggs, milk products, and any condiments even from the fat of animals."

1120. (C) As to gravity of matter, authors do not agree; nevertheless most concede that, as to flesh, matter which exceeds two ounces (60 gr.) is grave. But a greater quantity is required if there is question of a condiment which comes from flesh, or of eggs and milk products.

Since the law of abstinence today differs from the law of fasting, he who knowingly violates both, without reason, commits a double sin in itself. Indeed, according to the common opinion, one sins against abstinence as many times as flesh is eaten by morally distinct acts. Otherwise one must speak of the law of fasting, which can be violated only once in a day. - In practice, however, attention must be paid to the psychological dispositions of violators of the law: often they apprehend all these things only confusedly, by way of one thing, and commit only one sin.

1121. 5. Concerning the forbidden mixing of flesh and fish. By a law handed down by Benedict XIV,[10] one who by force of dispensation had received license to eat flesh could not, on days of fasting, eat flesh and fish together in the same meal. This prohibition has been abrogated by the Code, can. 1251: "It is not forbidden to mix flesh and fish in the same meal."

[10] Benedict XIV, Const. *Non ambigimus*, May 31, 1741; *In suprema*, August 22, 1741; *Libentissime*, June 10, 1745. You will find these prescriptions fully explained in *Ami du Clerge*, t. XXII, 1900, p. 104-108.

III. Concerning Causes Excusing from Fasting.

1122. Three can be distinguished: 1. impotence; 2. duties of state incompatible with fasting; 3. dispensation.

1. By reason of impotence, all those are excused who, on account of weakness of body, poverty, or other grave inconveniences, cannot morally fulfill the law; for a law, especially a positive one, does not oblige with so great an inconvenience.

(A) Thus, by reason of weakness, there are excused: the sick, the convalescent, or those of ill health, pregnant or nursing women, who cannot fast without notable harm; likewise sexagenarians, even if they seem rather robust, because their strength decreases and they need more frequent restoration; but not quinquagenarian women, unless another reason concurs, for, according to physicians, they do not need food more than men of the same age.[1]

[1] Cf. *Ami du Clerge*, 1903, p. 13.

(B) By reason of poverty, all those are excused "who cannot at the same time have what suffices them for sustenance,"[2] that is, for a full eating, or who have nothing else than bread and legumes or other foods that are little nutritive.

[2] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 147, a. 4, ad 4.

(C) By reason of grave inconvenience, there are excused those who from fasting suffer grave headache or notable deprivation of sleep; wives and sons of families, who by fasting would incur grave indignation of husbands or parents; those who perform works of charity or piety which they would have to abandon while fasting; in one word, those who cannot fulfill the law without grave inconvenience.

1123. 2. By reason of duties of state, all those are excused who by fasting would not be able rightly to fulfill their duties without great fatigue or weakening of powers. Therefore not every labor exempts from fasting,[3] but only labor that is arduous and continuous for many hours, such as today is the labor of many in fields, workshops, industrial or liberal arts. Here there is question not only of works of the hands, but also of intellectual labor, which weakens the brain and nerves more than servile work.[4] Now today, because of the law of competition prevailing almost everywhere, many men, otherwise rich, have the duty of working intensely and for a long time. Therefore many under this title are exempted from the law.

[3] This is established from the condemnation of proposition 30 by Alexander VII, March 18, 1666: "All officials who labor bodily in the republic are excused from the obligation of fasting, nor ought they to make certain whether the labor is compatible with fasting." (Denzinger, n. 1001.)

[4] Under this title, therefore, professors and students who labor arduously are excused, but not those who indulge sloth.

Here theologians are accustomed to enumerate workers who, according to the nature of their labor, are excused or not; but many things which they formerly wrote cannot be applied today, circumstances having changed. Thus they say that printers turning the press are excused, but by no means those who compose type; now today this work, because of the application of mind which it requires, is often more arduous than turning the press. Therefore the only general rule is that every labor, whether manual or intellectual, exempts from fasting when it is both arduous and continuous for many hours; this must be judged with attention to all the circumstances of persons, health, inclemency of the air, etc.

1124. Hence a journey undertaken for a just cause suffices to exempt from fasting if, with all things considered, it is long and arduous; this indeed depends upon the traveler's health and the manner of traveling. Thus a journey on foot of 12 or 15 miles is sufficiently arduous, especially if the road is rough, while a journey of 150 miles on railways scarcely induces any fatigue. Now a journey does not excuse from the law unless it causes notable fatigue.[5]

[5] This is established from proposition 31 condemned by Alexander VII: "All those who travel on horseback are absolutely excused from the precept of fasting, however they travel, even if the journey is not necessary, and even if they complete the journey of one day." (Denzinger, n. 1002.)

Those who are excused by reason of labor are not bound to fast on the few days on which they interrupt labor, at least generally, because they must repair the powers necessary for proximate labors. - Nor are even the rich bound to interrupt labors incompatible with fasting; for the public good demands that they be occupied with ordinary occupations. - Yet it is not lawful to undertake labor incompatible with fasting for the sake of mere recreation, for example hunting, unless rarely and on account of some utility.

1125. 3. Concerning dispensation. When there is not a cause sufficient in itself for excusing from fasting, nevertheless a dispensation can be conceded by a legitimate superior.

(A) Concerning the author of dispensation. The legitimate superior is: (a) the Supreme Pontiff, who can always validly dispense for the whole Church, and licitly when a just cause is present; (b) the

Bishop, in his diocese, for particular cases, from a just cause, but not for the whole diocese or even community, unless from indult;[6] (c) likewise the pastor can dispense individual faithful or individual families, even outside the territory, but not the whole parish; likewise his vicar, when, in the absence of the pastor, he exercises jurisdiction in the parish; or when he is delegated by the pastor who is present; (d) regular superiors as to subjects taken individually. - But confessors, unless they have been expressly delegated, cannot properly dispense, but only declare whether in the case a cause excusing is present; this, moreover, physicians and superioresses of nuns can do.

[6] For Benedict XIV established this, Const. *Libentissime*, June 24, 1745. - From the Code, "Not only local Ordinaries, but also pastors, in individual cases and for a just cause, can dispense individual faithful or individual families subject to them, even outside the territory, and also pilgrims in their territory, from the common law concerning the observance of feasts, and likewise concerning the observance of abstinence and fasting or even both. Ordinaries, from the peculiar cause of a great concourse of people or of public health, can also dispense the whole diocese or place from fasting and from abstinence, or both laws at once. In an exempt clerical religion the Superiors have the same power of dispensing after the manner of a pastor." (c. 1245.)

When a dispensation is conceded, a lesser cause is required than that which excuses of itself. Indeed the superior can dispense not only when the cause is sufficient, but also when he doubts whether it is sufficient. But if he certainly knows that the cause is not wholly sufficient, he can dispense by commuting, enjoining pious works, such as prayers and alms, in place of fasting.

By the law of Benedict XIV, dispensation ought not to be conceded to private persons except on the counsel of both physicians, that is, of physician and confessor; but in many regions this precept has gone into desuetude.

1126. (B) Things to be noted concerning the interpretation of dispensation. (a) He who has received from the Holy See license to eat flesh on days forbidden by the Church, with the law of fasting preserved, can use this dispensation not only on days of abstinence, but also on days of fasting, but only for the principal meal, not for the collation.

(b) The faithful who, by reason of age, infirmity, or labor, are exempted from the law of fasting (but not dispensed by a superior), can eat flesh as often as they take food, when the eating of flesh is permitted by a general indult of the bishop, unless, however, the dispensing bishop restricts this faculty.

(c) When, by force of indult, the use of condiment of fat is conceded on days of fasting or abstinence, today, from the more recent decrees, it is understood not only as swine lard, but also fat (*graisse*) of any animal whatever, but not broth of flesh.

1127. For practice it must be noted. Today the law of fasting is wholly observed by few in many regions. This happens from a manifold cause, but especially from the lessening of the Christian spirit of mortification, from the general weakness of men, especially in great cities, and also from the more intense labor which industrial and commercial matters require.

To provide some remedy for this evil, a milder discipline has been introduced into certain regions, such as Germany and Austria:[7] there indeed, both from custom and from indults, the practice of fasting became easier, and the mitigated law was better observed. But where the law was applied

more strictly, and the morning morsel was denied by confessors, very few observe the fast, since it is morally impossible.

[7] Cf. *Le Correspondant*, February 25, 1898, *Mandements de Careme en France et en Autriche*; *Ami du Clerge*, t. XX, 1898, p. 884-886. - In Spain also, and in Spanish regions where the Bull of the Crusade is in force, the law of fasting has been made milder. Cf. *N. Rev. Theolog.*, 1891, p. 586; *Ami du Clerge*, t. XXII, p. 1032-1034.

Therefore one must beware lest by too much rigor the law be wholly abolished. Let it indeed be integrally observed by those who can perform this without grave inconvenience. But if some are not able to observe it strictly, let confessors deal more mildly with them, exhorting them to keep the spirit of the law, faithfully and sincerely doing whatever does not exceed their powers. But by no means let them judge themselves excused from all mortification because they cannot fast integrally; let them do whatever they can in this matter; what they cannot perform, let them supply by other works of self-denial, for example, by depriving themselves of more delicate foods and certain lawful pleasures, more efficaciously restraining internal concupiscences, more frequently cultivating pious works of charity, etc.; in one word, by leading a more Christian life.

§ II. Concerning the Law of Abstinence outside Fasting.

1128. I. Origin and extension of the law. 1. Abstinence from flesh was formerly annexed only to days of fasting; but certain fasts having been suppressed, the law of abstinence persevered; and thus today there are days of abstinence which are not days of fasting.

Already in the first centuries the custom prevailed of fasting and abstaining from flesh on Friday of each week, in honor of the Lord's Passion. At almost the same time, in the Latin Church, but not in the Greek, the same custom prevailed on the sabbath day, in honor of the burial of Christ; but, in some provinces, a law of this kind went into desuetude.

1129. 2. Today the precept of abstinence from flesh: (A) from common law, obliges, besides the days of fasting enumerated above, n. 1118,[8] only on Friday of each week.

[8] Motu proprio, July 2, 1911 (*A. A. S.*, t. III, 306), Pius X decreed: "But if one of the feasts which we wish to be observed (above, n. 1010) falls on a day consecrated to abstinence or fasting, we dispense from both." This dispensation does not apply where the aforesaid feasts are not observed by indult. S. C. C., August 28, 1911.

1130. (B) A law of this kind touches all the faithful enjoying the use of reason, and therefore those who have completed the seventh year, unless they are insane. - Parents are to be exhorted to accustom children to abstinence as soon as possible, even before the seventh year, so that afterward they may observe the law more easily.

The law obliges under grave sin; although it cannot be absolutely determined what matter is grave, it is rather commonly taught that he sins mortally who, without any reason, knowingly eats about two ounces. - It is likewise unlawful to eat broth from flesh, but not condiments from the fat of animals.

In itself one sins against the law of abstinence as many times as, without reason, flesh is eaten by morally distinct acts (above, n. 496); but in fact many violators think that they have sinned once, even if they have eaten flesh several times on the same day.

1131. II. Concerning causes excusing from the law of abstinence. All can be reduced to moral impotence, by reason of which all are excused who cannot abstain from flesh without great inconvenience:

(a) The poor, who receive flesh as alms and have nothing else by which they may be fed; those who, lacking butter and oil, use lard or fat for seasoning foods.

(b) The sick, convalescent, those weak in stomach, nursing women, and all those who, in the judgment of a physician or prudent man, cannot be sufficiently nourished by meager foods. Say the same of pregnant women who, even if they do not strictly need flesh, suffer from a great appetite for flesh: for then they can take a morsel of flesh, lest they be too much tormented by this appetite.

(c) Workers who daily apply themselves to very arduous labors, or labors that remove the appetite for foods, such as those who work in foundries, glassworks, ironworks, metallic or coal mines, factories, and locomotives.[9]

[9] Therefore the Holy See granted license to the bishops of the United States of America to permit workers and their families the use of flesh in those circumstances of places and persons in which they judged that a true difficulty of observing the law of abstinence existed, excepting however Fridays, Ash Wednesday, the whole time of Holy Week, and the vigil of the Nativity of the Lord, and with the prohibition of mixing foods remaining firm. But counsel is to be given to the faithful that on the days on which they use the indult, they exercise some other work of penance, for example, abstain from intoxicating drink.

(d) Wives, sons of families, and servants who cannot have other foods:[10] but servants are bound to seek another master, if this can be done. - For the same reason, travelers are excused who cannot find other sufficiently nutritive foods in inns; but they ought seriously and insistently to ask for these, and they are not excused by the sole fear of provoking slight mockeries; and likewise guests who, contrary to expectation, find the whole meal prepared with forbidden foods and cannot otherwise leave without grave inconvenience; but if the matter is foreseen, they are bound to refuse the invitation, as often as this can be done.

[10] If the father of a family has obtained license to eat flesh, and he cannot or will not prepare two meals, one of flesh and another of meager foods, the sons of the family and others bound to the service of the father can eat flesh, not indeed by force of the indult, but because they are in impotence of observing the precept. This is established from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, January 19, 1834: "Persons who are under the power of the father of a family, to whom legitimate faculty of eating flesh has been made, can be permitted to use foods granted by indult to the father of the family; with the condition added concerning not mixing lawful and forbidden foods, and concerning one eating in the day for those who are bound to fast." - "The reason for this permission is not the indult conceded to the father of the family, but the impotence in which the sons of the family are placed of observing the precept." (May 27, 1863.)

If by error a meal has been prepared with forbidden foods, and otherwise without grave inconvenience it cannot be deferred, for example when there is question of weddings, it is lawfully taken; otherwise, if without grave inconvenience the meal can be deferred to the following day.

(e) Soldiers and sailors, fed in camps or stations by the Government. - As to military commanders, the matter is controverted. But in France, from custom founded on an ancient indult, these can eat flesh, with a few days excepted, and communicate this privilege to the members of their family living with them.[11] The same has been conceded for the United States of America, with six days excepted, namely Ash Wednesday, the last three days of Holy Week, and the vigils of the Nativity of the Lord and of the Assumption.

[11] Cf. *Ami du Clerge*, t. XX, 1902, p. 636.

§ III. Concerning the Precept of Sustaining Pastors.

1132. 1. Origin of the law. The institution of the priesthood being posited, and the deputation of special ministers for exercising sacerdotal offices in the name of the whole people, the faithful are bound to furnish the things necessary for sustenance to pastors and others having the care of souls. For since these must devote the chief part of life to preparation for, and exercise of, the sacred ministry, they are not able, from what commonly happens, to sustain themselves, and therefore they must receive food and clothing from others. But since they labor for the souls committed to them, it is wholly equitable that they receive necessities from them.

(A) Thus the matter stood under the Old Law. In the partition of the land of Chanaan, no part had been assigned to the priests and Levites, because the Lord wished to be their portion and inheritance.[1] But priests had a right to the firstfruits, which were offered to God by the sons of Israel;[2] Levites had a right to the tenth part of the fruits;[3] but these were bound to give the tenth part of the tithes to the priests.[4] Moreover the Lord commanded the sons of Israel "that they give to the Levites from their possessions cities to dwell in, and their suburbs round about; that they themselves may remain in the towns, and that the suburbs may be for cattle and beasts."[5] In truth forty-eight cities were assigned to the Levites, of which thirteen were reserved for the priests. - From these things it is clear that God, on the one hand, willed the Levites to be immune from temporal cares, and, on the other hand, wisely provided for their necessities.

[1] Num. 18:20.

[2] Num. 18:8-19.

[3] Num. 18:21.

[4] Num. 18:26.

[5] Num. 35:2-4.

1133. (B) Under the New Law, it was declared in a general way that every worker, even he who labors for the salvation of souls, is worthy of his food;[6] and that those who serve the altar can eat of the altar: "Know you not, that they who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the holy place: and they that serve the altar partake with the altar? So also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel."[7]

[6] Matt. 10:10.

[7] 1 Cor. 9:13-14.

In truth, in the first centuries of the Church, clerics assigned to the care of souls were sustained by the spontaneous offerings of the faithful, especially those which were offered on the occasion of the Eucharistic sacrifice. To this custom succeeded the payment of tithes, which already from the ninth century flourished in many provinces.[8] Elsewhere benefices were instituted, from the revenues of which ministers of the Church received whatever was necessary for their own sustenance.[9] But in many regions tithes were abolished; in certain others benefices were usurped, in place of which a

pension was to be paid by the Government. But certain Governments, as in France, no longer wish to pay pensions; and thus we are compelled to return to the ancient custom of offerings. Besides, in the missions, clerics often have nothing except what the faithful freely offer.

[8] You will find documents in the Decretals, l. III, tit. 30, *De decimis, primitiis et oblationibus*.

[9] Read the documents in the Decretals, l. III, tit. 5-13.

From these things it is clear that in every time, by divine right, the duty has lain upon the faithful of providing for the legitimate necessities of pastors, but that this duty has been fulfilled in diverse ways, according to diverse times and various regions, according to the prescriptions of canon law.

1134. 2. Character and extension of the law. (A) By divine and ecclesiastical right, the duty lies upon the faithful, according to each one's resources, of contributing something to the sustenance of their own pastors.

This is already established from the brief historical exposition outlined above; and it is confirmed by the following argument: when a pastor or other minister is legitimately deputed by ecclesiastical superiors to exercise the care of souls in such a parish or mission, a quasi-contract is entered into between the pastor and the faithful: he indeed assumes the obligation of duly performing sacred functions and administering the sacraments; but they oblige themselves to sustain the pastor decently, according to their powers.

That this is wholly agreeable to reason St. Thomas thus declares:[10] "That the people should minister the necessities of sustenance to those who ministered to divine worship for the salvation of the whole people is dictated by natural reason; just as to those who watch over the common utility, namely princes and soldiers, and others of this kind, the stipends of sustenance are owed by the people. Whence also the Apostle proves this by human customs, saying:[11] 'Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charges? Or who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof?'"

[10] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 87, a. 1.

[11] 1 Cor. 9:7.

Therefore, by force of quasi-contract, the faithful are bound to provide necessities for pastors and others having the care of souls.

1135. (B) The existence of this obligation is indeed certain, but to define its extension strictly is very difficult, unless an ecclesiastical law intervenes clearly determining it. Where the payment of tithes still flourishes, the tenth part of the fruits must be paid. But where it does not exist, the only general rule is that individuals contribute something according to their own part, lest priests lack necessary sustenance.

Whence we make our own the words of Kenrick:[12] "As long as no burden is imposed and defined by a certain law, we do not dare to condemn as guilty of mortal sin him who omits to contribute an equitable portion, as often as there is no danger lest priests be in need for that cause, or other faithful be too much burdened. But those who out of avarice refuse to give anything, in the circumstances which we have indicated, seem gravely guilty, and unworthy of sacramental forgiveness: for they violate the law of Christ the Lord concerning the sustenance of the ministers of the Gospel, and expose themselves and others to the risk of salvation."

[12] Kenrick, *Theologia Moralis*, Mechlin, 1861, tract. IV, n. 64.

Wherefore it is wholly fitting that priests exact their rights not so much by threats and harsh rebukes as by kindly admonition and persuasion; for, as St. Thomas rightly says,[13] "ministers of the Church ought to have greater care for promoting spiritual goods among the people than for collecting temporal goods; and therefore the Apostle did not wish to use the power handed down to him by the Lord, namely that he should receive the stipends of sustenance from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest some impediment be given to the Gospel of Christ."

[13] St. Thomas, II-II, q. 87, a. 1, ad 5.

One must especially beware lest the sacraments be denied to the faithful who are unwilling to give an offering in collections, to which it is not established that they are bound under grave sin, especially to those who are near death.[14] Even if certain faithful had sinned gravely by providing nothing, when they could and ought, this sin is not more irremissible than others.

[14] On this see the Third Council of Baltimore, n. 292.

Besides, experience establishes that those priests receive abundant offerings from the faithful who, on the one hand, labor strenuously for the salvation of souls, and, on the other, show themselves kindly and merciful toward the people committed to them, especially if honestly and in detail, insofar as this can be done, they render an account of the monies which they have received.

1136. (C) It belongs to the Bishop to determine the manner in which money ought to be collected for providing for the expenses of worship and the honorable sustenance of priests, and to pursue disobedient pastors with canonical penalties. Wherefore the S. C. of the Council, being asked whether a Bishop can compel pastors to collect the offerings of the faithful, on April 29, 1911, answered: "The Bishop in the case can under grave obligation compel pastors to collect the offerings of the faithful, either by themselves or through another, and after warnings pursue them with canonical penalties, and, if they have been contumacious, with the things to be observed by law having been observed, even remove them from the parish."[15]

[15] *A. A. S.*, III, 273.

And let these things suffice concerning the precepts of the Church, which, if they are rightly kept, will promote temperance and chastity not a little, and also pious sentiments of mutual love between pastors and the sheep committed to them.

On Ecclesiastical Censures

Concerning Ecclesiastical Censures.

1137. In order that laws may be observed more efficaciously, they must be fortified by some sanction; for this reason the Church is accustomed to sanction principal delicts with certain penalties. Now an ecclesiastical penalty is "the privation of some good, inflicted by legitimate authority, for the correction of the delinquent and the punishment of the delict."[16]

[16] *Code*, c. 2215.

There are three kinds of penalties: 1. medicinal penalties or censures, which directly tend to the amendment of the delinquent; 2. vindicative penalties,[17] which directly tend to the expiation and avoidance of the delict, for example, local interdict, infamy of law, deposition, degradation; 3. penal remedies,[18] such as admonition, correction, precept, vigilance; and also penances,[19] which are imposed so that the delinquent may either avoid a penalty, or receive absolution or dispensation from a contracted penalty, for example, spiritual exercises, recitation of determinate prayers.

[17] *Code*, c. 2286.

[18] *Code*, c. 2306.

[19] *Code*, c. 2312.

Here, however, it must be noted that these penalties do not obtain their full effect in the external forum except after a declaratory sentence, as is established from can. 2232: "A penalty latae sententiae, whether medicinal or vindicative, binds the delinquent who is conscious of his delict ipso facto in both forums; nevertheless, before a declaratory sentence, the delinquent is excused from observing the penalty as often as he cannot observe it without infamy, and in the external forum no one can exact from him the observance of the same penalty..."

Here we shall treat especially of censures, leaving the other things to be explained by Canonists.

There will be three articles: in the first, we shall hand down general principles concerning censures; in the second, we shall treat censures in species, namely excommunication, suspension, and interdict; in the third, censures latae sententiae in the individual.

Article I. Concerning Censures in General.

1138. 1. Definition of censure. Censure is defined: a spiritual and medicinal penalty, by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived of certain spiritual goods, or goods annexed to spiritual things, until, withdrawing from contumacy, he is absolved.[1]

[1] *Code*, c. 2241.

It is said: a) penalty, or something bringing trouble; and thus it is distinguished from irregularity, which is an inability for receiving or exercising orders, and from reservation, by which the jurisdiction of the confessor is limited without a penalty properly being inflicted on the penitent. b) This penalty consists in privation of certain spiritual goods, such as the sacraments, or of goods

annexed to spiritual things, such as ecclesiastical benefices. c) Hence the penalty is spiritual. d) It is moreover medicinal, or tending to the amendment of the delinquent: whence it is imposed only until the guilty person, withdrawing from contumacy, receives absolution.[2]

[2] *Code*, c. 2248.

1139. 2. Division of censures. a) By reason of the manner in which they are established, censures are *a jure*, if the determined penalty is established in the law itself; *ab homine*, if it is brought by way of a particular precept, or by a judicial condemnatory or declaratory sentence, even if established in law.[3] b) By reason of the manner in which they are incurred, censures are *latae* or *ferendae sententiae*, according as they are incurred by the fact itself before any condemnatory sentence, or only after such a sentence. c) By reason of the manner in which they are absolved, censures are reserved, or reserved to no one, according as absolution is reserved to Ordinaries, or even to the Roman Pontiff, or can be given by all confessors. d) By reason of divulgation, censures are notorious when either by the sentence of a judge, or by the confession of the delinquent made in judgment, or by the perpetration of the delict in a public place, it is so known that someone has incurred a censure that this cannot be concealed; otherwise, they are called occult.[4] e) By reason of the effects, that is, of the goods of which the censured person is deprived, three censures are enumerated, namely: excommunication, suspension, and interdict. We shall speak of each species in the following article.

[3] *Code*, c. 2217.

[4] *Cod. jur. can.*, 2197.

3. Concerning the author of censures.

1140. A) He who enjoys the power of making law or imposing precepts[5] can bring censures. - A vicar general without special mandate does not have this power.[6]

[5] Ibid., 2220.

[6] Ibid.

a) Therefore the power of bringing censures is had by: 1) the Roman Pontiff and the ecumenical Council for the universal Church; 2) apostolic legates, for the territory assigned to them; 3) the provincial Council, for its province; 4) bishops,[7] upon their diocesans while they are staying in the diocese; also upon diocesans staying outside the diocese when they violate not the law but a precept of the bishop (more probably), or after they have committed a delict in their own diocese, indeed outside the diocese; upon pilgrims who, while they are traveling in some diocese, there commit a delict; upon exempt persons in cases determined by law; 5) superiors of religious, according to the statutes of their order, upon their subjects existing in any place whatever, since their jurisdiction is personal rather than territorial.[8]

[7] Say the same, when the see is vacant, of the capitular vicar, or of the Chapter itself before the deputation of the capitular vicar. Abbots having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction are also assimilated to bishops in this respect.

[8] Pastors cannot bring censures, because they never had true jurisdiction in the external forum.

b) All and only clerics to whom this has been committed by those having ordinary power have delegated power of bringing censures. But delegates cannot subdelegate unless this is expressly conceded to them, or they have been delegated by the Roman Pontiff, or for the universality of causes.

1141. B) Concerning the solemnities to be observed in bringing censures.

a) If there is question of censures *ferendae sententiae* and *ab homine*, a threefold warning, or at least one equivalent to three, which is called peremptory, must be sent beforehand;[9] for censures can be brought only upon the contumacious (n. 1144). But the sentence must be delivered in writing, for liceity indeed, but not for validity.[10]

[9] *Cod. jur. can.*, 2233, 2242.

[10] Cf. *Code*, c. 1877 and c. 2239, § 2.

b) But if there is question of censures *latae sententiae* or even of a censure *ferendae sententiae* but *a jure*, no special warning is required, since the law itself or the precept continually warns.[11]

[11] *Code*, c. 2232, 2242, § 2.

1142. 4. Concerning the subject of censures.

From the definition itself of censure, it is required that the one to be censured be a man, baptized, delinquent, and contumacious.

A) A man,[12] wayfaring and capable of guile, that is, of sin, since censure supposes a delict.

[12] Excommunication against harmful animals, which was long in use, is not properly excommunication, but a suppliant prayer that God drive them away. Against demons, the Church uses exorcisms, not censures.

"Those who have not reached puberty are excused from penalties *latae sententiae*, and should be corrected by educative punishments rather than by censures or other more grave vindicative penalties; but those who have reached puberty, who have induced them to violate the law or have concurred with them in the delict, themselves indeed incur the penalty established by law."[13]

[13] *Code*, 2230.

B) Baptized. For the Church does not judge those who are outside.[14]

[14] 1 Cor. 5:12; Trent, sess. XIV, *De Paenit.*, c. 2.

1143. C) Delinquent. Now the delict must be external, mortal, and consummated.

a) External: for the Church does not judge concerning internal things. We do not say public; for even an occult sin can be external, for example, heresy pronounced by mouth, even without any witness.

b) Mortal: otherwise there would not be proportion between the delict and the penalty, since censure is a most grave ecclesiastical penalty.

Therefore whatever excuses from mortal sin also excuses from censure.[15] Hence if in fact the one against whom a censure has been brought has not committed a subjectively mortal sin, although in the external forum he must be held and conduct himself as censured in order to avoid scandal,

nevertheless he is not truly censured before God, nor therefore deprived of those spiritual goods of which censure deprives.

[15] "Not only the things which excuse from all imputability, but also those which excuse from grave imputability, likewise excuse from any penalty, whether *latae* or *ferendae sententiae*, even in the external forum, if the excuse is proved for the external forum." *Code*, 2218.

Moreover, the delict must be mortal insofar as it is external, so that, if the sin is mortal but not insofar as it is external, censure is not incurred: for example, a very slight striking of a cleric from a gravely evil intention.

c) Consummated: that is, it is required that precisely that delict which the legislator intends to prohibit under penalty be perfectly completed; for penal laws are of strict interpretation.[16] Yet if the attempt of a delict is punished in law by a peculiar penalty, it constitutes a true delict and suffices for incurring censure.[17]

[16] Cf. *Cod. jur. can.*, 2219, 2228.

[17] *Code*, c. 2212.

1144. D) Contumacious. For contumacy it is required that the delinquent know, at least habitually, even if he does not actually think about the prohibition and penalty, that something is prohibited by ecclesiastical law and under censure, and nevertheless freely act against the ecclesiastical prohibition.

But the following excuse from contumacy: a) grave fear, indeed even light fear when the censure is brought against those presuming, acting with rash daring, doing something spontaneously or knowingly or deliberately; b) ignorance of the law or penalty which is not affected, crass, or supine.[18]

[18] Yet when a censure is brought against those who sin "rashly," "with rash daring," "knowingly," "deliberately," etc., even crass or supine ignorance excuses, but not affected ignorance. *Cod. jur. can.*, 2229. - If there is question of a penalty *ferendae sententiae*, he is called contumacious who, having been canonically warned, perseveres in the delict (can. 2233, § 2).

1145. Various things to be noted. a) "Unless they are expressly named, Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church are not comprehended under a penal law, nor Bishops under penalties *latae sententiae* of suspension and interdict."[19] Moreover those who hold the supreme principate of peoples, and their sons and daughters, or those who have the right of immediately succeeding to the principate, incur only penalties inflicted or declared by the Roman Pontiff.[20]

[19] *Code*, c. 2227, § 2.

[20] *Code*, c. 2227 and 1557.

b) In censures, the more benign interpretation is to be made.[21] Hence censures brought upon the people do not bind the clergy; those brought upon the clergy do not bind the people, nor regulars who emit solemn vows, but more probably they bind religious of simple vows.

[21] *Code*, c. 19, 20, 2219.

c) Someone can be simultaneously liable to several censures of different species (excommunication, suspension), or to several of the same species (for example, several excommunications): either because by the same or distinct action he has committed different delicts, each of which has a

censure annexed; or because the same delict is punished by different censures by distinct Superiors; or because the delict punished by censure is repeated several times. - Censure *ab homine* is multiplied if several precepts or several sentences are violated.[22]

[22] Ibid., 2244.

d) In doubt whether a censure has been contracted or not, the censure does not bind,[23] unless there is doubt whether the penalty, inflicted by a competent Superior, is just.[24]

[23] Can. 2233.

[24] Can. 2219.

1146. 5. Concerning absolution from censures.

Censure properly so called, once it has been contracted, is not removed by the death either of the censured person or of the one censuring; nor by the cessation of the law or precept; nor by the amendment of the guilty person, but only by absolution given by a competent superior.[25]

[25] Can. 2248.

A) No one can absolve from censures brought *ab homine*, except the one who brought the censure, or his successor, or superior (provided he has jurisdiction over the censured person), or their delegate. In danger of death, every reservation ceases.

1147. B) Censures brought by common law are either reserved to no one, or reserved to the Roman Pontiff or to the Ordinary.

a) From censures reserved to no one, any confessor validly and licitly absolves in the sacramental forum; outside the sacramental forum, anyone who has jurisdiction over the guilty person in the external forum.[26]

[26] *Code*, c. 2253.

b) From censures reserved to the Roman Pontiff, the following can absolve: the Roman Pontiff himself and the Major Penitentiary; bishops; delegated priests; indeed sometimes any priest, under conditions and with limitations to be explained in the Treatise on Penance.

c) In occult cases, the Ordinary can, by himself or through another, remit penalties *latae sententiae* established by common law, except censures reserved to the Holy See in a most special or special manner.[27]

[27] *Code*, c. 2232, § 2.

1148. d) But from censures reserved to the Ordinary, the Roman Pontiff, the Bishop, the capitular Vicar, the vicar general, the regular Prelate (his own subjects), the Archbishop in the case of visitation or appeal, and their delegate absolve;[28] indeed sometimes any priest, as is explained in the Treatise on Penance.

[28] He who has delegated power of absolving from censures reserved to the Roman Pontiff is not for this reason able to absolve from censures reserved to the Ordinary. But he who has a special faculty of absolving from censures even reserved to the Roman Pontiff can absolve from censures (of common law) reserved to the Ordinary.

1149. C) From censures brought by particular law and not reserved, any confessor can absolve validly and licitly in the sacramental forum; outside the sacramental forum, anyone who has jurisdiction over the guilty person in the external forum.[29] - But if they are reserved, no one can absolve from them, except the one to whom they are reserved, or his superior, or successor, or delegate; yet in an urgent case, and in danger of death, any priest can absolve, under certain conditions, as is explained in the Treatise on Penance.

[29] *Code*, c. 2253, 1.

1150. Things to be noted concerning absolution from censures. A) For absolving from censures, jurisdiction over the one to be absolved is required in the one absolving, but not necessarily sacramental jurisdiction; for absolution from censures can be given by a Superior, or his delegate, even one who is not a priest.

B) Absolution from censures can be separated from absolution from sins.

Hence if sacramental confession cannot be had immediately, and on the other hand reasons are present that the guilty person be absolved immediately from censures, he can be absolved from censures, although not from sins: for example, if a priest having power of absolving from reserved censures does not have time to hear an integral confession, or if the guilty person is not prepared to make it, the priest can hear only the cases which have a censure annexed, and absolve from censures, and send the penitent to another who, after hearing the confession, would absolve from sins.[30]

[30] Gury-Ballerini, n. 954.

"But if there is question of a censure which does not impede the reception of the Sacraments, the censured person, rightly disposed and withdrawing from contumacy, can be absolved from sins, with the censure remaining firm" (can. 2250).

If, from a rescript, absolution from censures cannot be given unless sacramental confession has first been heard, care must be taken that the penitent be disposed for the absolution of sins. But the absolution from censures would be valid provided the sacramental accusation of sins had preceded.[31]

[31] S. Penit., January 4, 1839.

C) No special formula is required for imparting absolution from censures in the sacramental forum, unless otherwise prescribed in the rescript. The confessor absolves by the very formula of absolution. Yet for absolution from excommunication in the non-sacramental forum, it is regularly fitting to use the form handed down in the ritual books.[32]

[32] Can. 2250.

D) Absolution from censures can be given to one absent, indeed even unwilling. But absolution given to one unwilling does not have its effect as to a censure which is annexed to a sin still enduring, for example, adherence to a Masonic sect.

E) He who is bound by several censures can be absolved from one, without being absolved from the others. Hence "one seeking absolution must indicate all cases; otherwise the absolution is valid only for the expressed case; but if the absolution, although a particular petition was made, was general, it

is valid also for things concealed in good faith, excepting a censure reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner."[33]

[33] Can. 2249.

Article II. Concerning Censures in Species. — § I. Concerning Excommunication.

We shall declare its nature and effects.

1151. I. Nature. Excommunication is a censure by which someone is separated from the communion of the faithful.

Among the excommunicated, some are tolerated, others are to be avoided, according as it is lawful or not to communicate with them.

Formerly, all who were struck by major excommunication had to be avoided by the faithful. Now, no one is to be avoided unless he has been excommunicated by name by the Apostolic See, the excommunication has been publicly denounced, and in the decree or sentence it is expressly said that he must be avoided.[1]

[1] Can. 2258.

1152. II. The effects are expressed by canonists in these little verses:

Sacred things, rites, communion, crypt, power,
Sacred estates, forum, civil rights are forbidden.

1. Sacred things. By these words there is interdicted to the excommunicated person both the reception and the administration of the sacraments.

A) As to the reception of the sacraments, the excommunicated person is prohibited under grave sin from receiving the sacraments,[2] unless grave necessity excuses, for example, fear of death, danger of grave infamy, etc.[3] Yet an excommunicated person validly receives any sacraments, even penance itself, at least if he approaches it in good faith. But the excommunicated person is bound to dispose himself for absolution, so that he may satisfy the precept concerning paschal Communion.

[2] *Code*, c. 2260. Cf. can. 855, § 1.

[3] Thus D'Annibale (I, n. 360) judges that an excommunicated person, even one to be avoided, is not kept from Penance if he is in lethal sin and would long be deprived of a confessor. For then grave necessity presses.

B) As to the administration of the sacraments: a) the excommunicated person is prohibited from licitly confecting and administering Sacraments and Sacramentals, with the exceptions which follow preserved:

a) The faithful can for any just cause seek Sacraments and Sacramentals from an excommunicated person, especially if other ministers are lacking; and then the excommunicated person who is requested can minister the same and is held by no obligation of questioning the one requesting about the cause; b) but from excommunicated persons to be avoided, and also from other excommunicated persons after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence has intervened, the faithful can, in danger of

death alone, seek both sacramental absolution and also, if other ministers are lacking, the other Sacraments and Sacramentals.[4] - Any excommunicated person is also prohibited from the right of electing, presenting, and nominating.[5]

[4] *Code*, c. 2265.

[5] *Code*, c. 2261.

1153. 2. Rites. Any excommunicated person lacks the right of assisting at divine offices, but not at the preaching of the word of God. If a tolerated person assists passively, it is not necessary that he be expelled; if one to be avoided does so, he must be expelled, or, if he cannot be expelled, the office must cease, provided this can be done without grave inconvenience; but from active assistance, which carries with it some participation in celebrating divine offices, not only one to be avoided is to be repelled, but also anyone who, after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence or otherwise, is notoriously excommunicated.[6]

[6] *Code*, c. 2259.

3. Communion. By this word is indicated privation of common suffrages, that is, spiritual helps which are accustomed to come to the faithful from good works done in the name of the Church, or from the treasury of the Church. Of this kind are the fruits of Mass and the Breviary, insofar as they are performed in the name of the Church, indulgences, sacramentals, etc. - Excommunicated persons, even those to be avoided, are not deprived of private suffrages which, from good works done in a private name, are applied by private intention. - Indeed priests privately and with scandal removed can apply Mass for an excommunicated person; but if he is to be avoided, only for his conversion.[7]

[7] *Code*, c. 2262.

1154. 4. Crypt, that is, ecclesiastical burial, must be denied: A) To excommunicated persons after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence.[8] If, without signs of penance, an excommunicated person dies after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, the cemetery is violated by his burial;[9] but if he dies penitent, he must be absolved (cf. *Rit. Rom.*, tit. 3, c. 4), and buried in a sacred place. B) But as to tolerated persons, although they have no right to ecclesiastical burial, this nevertheless can be conceded to them. Yet often it will have to be denied to them for another reason, namely if they are public sinners, or notorious heretics (or apostates).

[8] *Code*, c. 2260.

[9] *Code*, c. 1207, 1172.

To this pertain, for example, the responses of the Sacred Penitentiary concerning deputies or senators who in France approved laws against religion by their vote. They must be held as excommunicated; they are to be deprived of ecclesiastical burial if it is notoriously established that they died in their sin; but if they died penitent, they are not to be deprived of the customary honors. In doubt, let them be buried without solemnities, for example, let only a low Mass be conceded, with a simple absolution of the corpse.[10]

[10] S. Penit., May 20, 1908; cf. *Canoniste*, XXXI, p. 558.

5. Power, that is, jurisdiction, is taken away from an excommunicated person if a condemnatory or declaratory sentence has been brought against him, so that he exercises it illicitly and invalidly, whether in the external forum or in the internal forum, except the case of necessity in danger of death. But a tolerated person, even a notorious one, is not deprived of jurisdiction, and exercises it licitly if he has been asked by the faithful.[11]

[11] *Code*, c. 2261, 2264.

6. Sacred estates, or benefices, cannot validly be conferred upon an excommunicated person,[12] even a tolerated one. But an excommunicated person retains benefices previously possessed, and makes their fruits his own, provided a condemnatory or declaratory sentence has not intervened.[13] But any excommunicated person is prohibited from performing ecclesiastical offices or functions and from enjoying privileges previously conceded by the Church.[14] But one to be avoided remains at once deprived of dignity itself, office, or benefice.[15]

[12] *Code*, c. 2265.

[13] *Code*, c. 2266.

[14] *Code*, c. 2263.

[15] *Code*, c. 2266.

By the new law, graces of every kind conceded by the Holy See, even to those entangled in censure, are ratified and legitimate, unless there is question of those who are excommunicated persons to be avoided, or excommunicated persons by declaratory or condemnatory sentence. The same things have been sanctioned as to the suspended and interdicted.[16]

[16] *Code*, c. 2265, § 2; c. 2283; c. 2275.

7. Forum: namely every communication in the forum (formerly even in the civil forum) with the faithful is interdicted to the excommunicated person.[17] And so: a) he cannot be judge, arbiter, advocate, procurator, notary, witness, etc. But if he is cited as accused, he can do all things which are required for his defense, unless he is one to be avoided or has undergone a declaratory or condemnatory sentence.[18] b) But a tolerated person is excluded from no function by the law itself,[19] but can be repelled by the judge, by the plaintiff, or by the accused.

[17] *Code*, c. 2263: "An excommunicated person is removed from legitimate ecclesiastical acts."

[18] *Code*, c. 1654.

[19] Ibid.

1155. 8. Civil rights. "The faithful must avoid communion in profane matters with an excommunicated person to be avoided, unless there is question of spouse, parents, children, servants, subjects, and generally unless a reasonable cause excuses."[20]

[20] *Code*, c. 2267.

Formerly communication in civil matters, even with tolerated persons, was prohibited. But Martin V (Const. *Ad evitanda*) benignly granted to the faithful that, scandal or danger of one's own perversion being excluded, no one was bound to abstain from communion with a tolerated person.

A) The acts prohibited with one to be avoided are expressed by this little verse:

Mouth, prayer, greeting, communion, table are denied.

Hence it is not lawful (unless in excepted cases) to write to one to be avoided, to give a kiss or some sign of special benevolence (*mouth*); nor to pray with him, even privately, at least under venial sin, unless a state of subjection excuses (*prayer*); nor to greet him for the sake of exhibiting honor, unless civility requires (*greeting*); nor to enter into society with him (*communion*), or to feast as a table-companion (*table*).

B) Excepted cases. Communication in civil matters with one to be avoided is lawful when necessity or utility excuses, whether spiritual or temporal, either of the excommunicated person himself, or of the faithful person communicating with one to be avoided, or of some third person.

C) Penalties against those communicating. That prohibition of communicating with one to be avoided, although in itself it does not oblige under mortal sin unless the communication is in divine matters, still subsists,[21] and those violating it sometimes undergo certain penalties.

[21] Holy Office, August 2, 1893, *A. S. S.*, XXXI, 401.

§ II. Concerning Suspension.

We shall weigh its nature and effects.

1156. I. Nature. 1. Notion. Suspension is "a censure by which a cleric is prohibited from office or benefice or both." Hence: a) it touches only clerics, because only they can enjoy office or benefice and be deprived of it; b) suspension does not deprive one of ecclesiastical power itself, but only removes the right of using that power:[22] and thus it differs from deposition,[23] which deprives the cleric of office itself.

[22] Can. 2279, § 1.

[23] Can. 2303.

2. Species. a) Suspension *ab homine* can be brought in a threefold way: as a precaution, for removing scandals, against a cleric suspected of crime:[24] this suspension is not a penalty, but a simple prohibition; or by way of vindicative penalty, whether for a time or perpetually, in punishment of some delict; or by way of medicinal penalty, until the delinquent comes to his senses, and this is properly a censure. b) Suspension can be total or partial, according as it deprives a cleric wholly or partly of the use of ecclesiastical power.[25]

[24] *Code*, c. 2222.

[25] *Code*, c. 2278.

1157. II. Effects. 1. He against whom total suspension is brought is suspended from office and from benefice, that is, from the exercise of a spiritual function (office), and from the right of using the temporal goods annexed to this function (benefice); but not from the right of

administering benefice goods, unless the decree or sentence of suspension expressly takes away from the suspended person the very power of administering and attributes it to another.[1] - But the suspension which is brought absolutely without any determination is judged total.[2]

[1] *Code*, c. 2280.

[2] *Code*, c. 2278.

2. Partial suspension can be either from office or from benefice.

A) Office comprehends two things: the power of order and the power of jurisdiction.

a) Suspension from office simply, with no limitation added, forbids every act both of the power of order and of jurisdiction, and also of mere administration competent from office, with the administration of the goods of one's own benefice excepted.[3]

[3] *Code*, c. 2279, § 1.

b) Suspension from divine things forbids every act of the power of order which one obtains either through sacred ordination or through privilege.[4]

[4] Ibid., § 2.

c) Suspension from orders forbids every act of the power of order received through ordination; suspension from exercising a certain and definite order forbids every act of the designated order, the conferring of the same order, and the receiving of a higher one, and the exercise, after suspension, of one received; suspension from conferring a certain and definite order forbids the conferring of that order itself, but not an inferior or a higher one.[5] - One suspended from an order, if he solemnly exercises an act of the sacred order from which he is suspended, becomes irregular.[6]

[5] Ibid., § 2.

[6] *Code*, c. 985.

d) Suspension from jurisdiction generally forbids every act of the power of jurisdiction for both forums, ordinary as well as delegated. Indeed a suspended person exercises jurisdiction invalidly if he is one to be avoided or under a declaratory or condemnatory sentence,[7] and on the other hand jurisdiction is necessary for the validity of the act; but he does not become irregular. Someone can also be suspended from determinate acts of jurisdiction: in which case he can exercise other acts validly and licitly.

[7] *Code*, c. 2265, 2283.

1158. B) Suspension from benefice deprives one of the fruits of the benefice, with habitation in the benefice buildings excepted, but not of the right of administering the benefice goods, unless this is expressly declared. - If, although the censure stands in the way, the beneficiary receives the fruits, he must restore the fruits, and can be compelled to this restitution even by canonical sanctions, if need be.[8]

[8] *Code*, c. 2280.

If a community or college of clerics has committed a delict, suspension can be brought either upon the individual delinquent persons, or upon the community as such, or upon the delinquent persons

and the community. 1) If the first, let the rules explained above be observed. 2) If the second, the community is prohibited from the exercise of spiritual rights which belong to it as a community. 3) If the third, the effects are combined.[9]

[9] *Code*, c. 2285.

A suspended cleric can be absolved from sins by a simple confessor before he is absolved from a reserved suspension by a superior. For suspension does not deprive one of the reception of sacraments, excepting however order.[10]

[10] *Code*, c. 2250.

§ III. Concerning Interdict.

1159. I. Notion. Interdict is a censure by which the faithful, while remaining in the communion of the Church, are prohibited from the sacred things indicated below.

It differs from excommunication and suspension. For excommunication "can affect only physical persons, and therefore, if at any time it is brought upon a moral body, it is understood to affect the individuals who have concurred in the delict; interdict and suspension can also affect a community as a moral person; excommunication and interdict can affect even laymen; suspension, only clerics; interdict can also affect a place; excommunication is always a censure; interdict and suspension can be either censures or vindicative penalties, but in doubt are presumed to be censures."[11]

[11] *Code*, c. 2255, § 2.

1160. II. Species and effects. One must distinguish between personal interdict and local interdict.

1. Personal interdict is that which immediately and directly affects persons and adheres to them, so that they are subject to it everywhere.

Those personally interdicted: a) cannot celebrate divine offices or assist at them, except the preaching of the word of God; those passively assisting need not be expelled; but from active assistance, which carries with it some participation in celebrating divine offices, the interdicted must be repelled after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence has been brought, or when otherwise notoriously interdicted; b) they are prohibited from receiving the sacraments, and indeed, after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, also sacramentals; they are also prohibited from confecting and administering Sacraments and Sacramentals; yet the faithful can seek sacraments and sacramentals for any cause from one simply interdicted, but from one to be avoided only in the necessity of danger of death; c) they are prohibited from the right of electing, presenting, nominating, obtaining dignities and offices in the Church, and receiving orders, and after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence they cannot validly obtain any pontifical grace; d) they lack ecclesiastical burial after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence.[12]

[12] *Code*, c. 2275.

1161. 2. Local interdict is that which directly affects places and not persons, so that persons in another place are not kept from divine things.

A) If it immediately touches some territory, for example, a kingdom, city, village, there is a general local interdict.

If nothing else has been expressed by the decree of interdict: a) clerics not personally interdicted are permitted to perform all divine offices and sacred rites privately, with doors closed; b) but in the cathedral church, in parish churches, or in a church which is the only one in a town, and in these alone, there are permitted the celebration of one Mass, reservation of the Most Holy Sacrament, administration of baptism, Eucharist, penance, assistance at marriages, with nuptial blessing excluded, funerals of the dead, preaching, etc., but without solemnity.[13]

[13] *Code*, c. 2271.

B) If the interdict immediately touches certain sacred places, for example, this oratory, this church, or all churches of this place, there is a particular local interdict.

In this case, "if an altar or chapel of some church has been interdicted, no sacred office or sacred rite is to be celebrated in them. If a cemetery has been interdicted, the bodies of the faithful can indeed be buried there, but without any ecclesiastical rite."[14] If capitular churches (the chapter not being interdicted) or parish churches have been interdicted, sacred rites without solemnity are permitted, unless the decree of interdict disposes otherwise.[15]

[14] *Code*, c. 2272, § 1-2.

[15] Ibid., § 3.

He who is subject to a local interdict or to an interdict upon a community or college, without having given cause for it, can receive the sacraments without absolution from the interdict or other satisfaction.[16]

[16] *Code*, c. 2276.

N. B. "On the day of the Nativity of the Lord, Easter, Pentecost, the Most Holy Body of Christ, and the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary into heaven, a local interdict is suspended, and only the conferral of orders and solemn blessing of nuptials is prohibited."[17]

[17] *Code*, c. 2270, § 2.

1162. Scholium. Akin to interdict properly so called is interdict from the entrance of the church and cessation from divine things.

"Interdict from the entrance of the church carries with it the prohibition that someone celebrate divine offices in a church or assist at them, or have ecclesiastical burial; but if he assists, it is not necessary that he be expelled, nor, if he is buried, is it necessary that the corpse be removed."[18]

[18] *Code*, c. 2277.

Concerning Censures *Latae Sententiae* in the Individual.

1163. Preliminary remarks. - A) Censures *latae sententiae* in force today are found in the Code of Canon Law (c. 2314-2414),[19] mixed with other penalties; we have thought it opportune to separate them.

[19] For in canon 6, 5, it is read: "As for penalties of which no mention is made in the Code, whether spiritual or temporal, medicinal or, as they call them, vindicative, *latae* or *ferendae sententiae*, let them be considered as abrogated."

But it must be kept before the eyes that by these censures the principal accomplices of delinquents also are bound, as is established from can. 2231 and 2209: "If several have concurred in perpetrating a delict, although only one is named in the law, those also of whom in can. 2209, § 1-3, are held, unless the law has expressly provided otherwise, by the same penalty..." Moreover can. 2209 has itself thus: "§ 1. Those who by common counsel of delinquency physically concur together in a delict are all held guilty in the same manner, unless the circumstances increase or diminish the culpability of someone. § 2. In a delict which by its nature requires an accomplice, each party is culpable in the same manner, unless from the circumstances something else appears. § 3. Not only the one commanding, who is the principal author of the delict, but also those who induce to the consummation of the delict or in any way concur in this, contract, other things being equal, no lesser imputability than the executor of the delict himself, if the delict would not have been committed without their work."

They are of a threefold kind: excommunications, suspensions, and interdicts.

§ I. Concerning Excommunications.

1164. Among excommunications, some are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, others to Bishops, and others finally to no one. Again, from the new law, some are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff in a most special manner, others in a special manner, and others simply.

Now for absolving from a censure reserved to the Apostolic See, delegated power is required by anyone besides the Roman Pontiff, whether general, if the censure is simply reserved, or special, if reserved in a special manner, or most special, if reserved in a most special manner,[1] with the exception, however, of more urgent cases, concerning which the treatment is given in the Treatise on Penance.

[1] *Code*, c. 2253. - We treat absolution from censures in the Treatise on Penance; meanwhile let canons of the Code 2247-2254 be read.

I. Excommunications Reserved to the Roman Pontiff in a Most Special Manner.

Four are numbered in the Code:

1165. I. "He who has cast away the consecrated species, or has carried them away or retained them for an evil end, is suspect of heresy; he incurs excommunication *latae sententiae* reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See; he is infamous by the fact itself, and a cleric besides is to be deposed."[2]

[2] *Code*, c. 2300.

From this canon it is established that he who in the designated ways has violated the Venerable Sacrament of the Altar, besides suspicion of heresy (and the sanctions following from this suspicion, can. 2315), infamy contracted by the fact itself with its consequences (can. 2294), and deposition *ferendae sententiae* (can. 2303), incurs moreover by the fact itself excommunication reserved to the

Apostolic See in a most special manner, with the consequences of such reservation indicated in canons 2247, § 3, 2249, § 2; 2252, 2253, 2254.

1166. II. "He who has laid violent hands on the person of the Roman Pontiff contracts excommunication *latae sententiae* reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner; and is by the fact itself to be avoided."[3]

[3] *Code*, c. 2343.

1167. III. "One absolving, or pretending to absolve, an accomplice in a base sin incurs by the fact itself excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See; and this even in the article of death, if another priest, even one not approved for confessions, can receive the confession of the dying person without some grave infamy and scandal about to arise, except the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another.

"The same excommunication is not escaped by one absolving, or pretending to absolve, an accomplice who indeed does not confess the sin of complicity, from which he has not yet been absolved, but conducts himself thus because he has been induced to this by the accomplice-confessor either directly or indirectly."[4]

[4] *Code*, c. 2367.

1168. IV. "A confessor who has presumed directly to violate the Sacramental seal."[5]

[5] *Code*, c. 2369.

The sacramental seal is directly violated when that which is matter of the seal is expressly revealed, and at the same time the person who did it is designated.

N. B. Here it can be added that an excommunication *ab homine*, which the Supreme Pontiff sometimes brings, is reserved to him in a most special manner.

II. Excommunications Reserved to the Roman Pontiff in a Special Manner.

Eleven are enumerated in the Code:

1169. I. "All apostates from the Christian faith, and all and individual heretics or schismatics."[6]

[6] *Code*, c. 2314, § 1.

Moreover, "if they have given their name to, or publicly adhered to, a non-Catholic sect, they are by the fact itself infamous; and... clerics, after a warning has been sent in vain, are to be degraded."[7]

[7] Ibid.

But those favoring heresy are not excommunicated by the fact itself, but are suspect of heresy: "He who in any way voluntarily and knowingly helps the propagation of heresy, or who communicates in divine things with heretics... is suspect of heresy."[8]

[8] *Code*, c. 2316. Can. 2315 establishes by what penalties one suspect of heresy can be struck, and adds: "If within six months... he has not amended himself, let him be held as a heretic, liable to the penalties of heretics."

The one suspect of heresy does not fall under excommunication unless he is obstinate, below, n. [source gives no number after "n."]

1170. As to the absolution of this censure, let these things be noted:

If the delict of apostasy, heresy, or schism has been brought in any way to the external forum of the local Ordinary, even through voluntary confession, the same Ordinary, but not the vicar general without special mandate, can by his ordinary authority in the external forum absolve the one repenting, after abjuration has first been juridically performed and the other things to be observed by law have been observed; but one thus absolved can then be absolved from sin by any confessor in the forum of conscience. Abjuration, moreover, is held juridically performed when it is done before the local Ordinary himself or his delegate and at least two witnesses.[9]

[9] *Code*, c. 2314, § 2.

But by delegated authority, by force of quinquennial Indult n. 3, bishops could absolve from the sin of heresy even when not brought to the external forum, under certain conditions; but, from the decree of the S. C. Consistorial, April 25, 1918, faculties of this kind have now ceased; therefore unless special Indults are obtained, recourse must be had to the Holy See for individual cases.

In the conversion of heretics, the Instruction of the Holy Office, July 20, 1859 (*Collect.*, 2nd ed., n. 1178), must be kept before the eyes. First inquiry must be made concerning the validity of baptism received in heresy: (a) If it is judged certainly invalid, they must be baptized absolutely: then no abjuration nor absolution will be required; (b) If it was doubtfully valid, 1) let them emit an abjuration or profession of faith; 2) afterward let them be baptized again under condition; 3) finally let them make a sacramental confession, and be absolved conditionally; (c) if certainly valid, only the abjuration or profession of faith is received, which absolution from censures (and from sins) follows. Yet if the newly converted person greatly desires that the rites formerly omitted in his baptism be supplied on this occasion, it is lawful for the priest to satisfy this wish.[10]

[10] Cf. other practical questions in Gennari, *Cons. Moral.*, 122.

1171. II. "When a work has been made public, the publishers of books of apostates, heretics, and schismatics which defend apostasy, heresy, or schism, and likewise those defending the same books or other books prohibited by name through apostolic letters, or knowingly reading or retaining them without due license."[11]

[11] *Code*, c. 2318.

Here by the name of books are not understood manuscripts, newspapers, journals, periodical publications taken individually, books written by heretics of the first centuries...; true books of apostates and heretics are understood, not indeed if they merely contain heresy, but if they defend heresy; and books written by any author whatever, but condemned by name, with the title of the book expressed, under penalty of excommunication reserved to the Roman Pontiff, through letters given by the Roman Pontiff himself or in his name. - Those, however, are struck by excommunication who knowingly read, understanding what is written, or retain or publish or defend in any way these books. But those defend books who praise or protect their authors or doctrines precisely insofar as they defend or contain heresy or schism.

Bishops formerly, by force of Indult, had delegated power "of absolving from censures incurred on account of the retention and reading of prohibited books: with a suitable salutary penance imposed; and with the obligation remaining firm of handing over, according to law, either by oneself or through another, without any delay, and, insofar as it can be done, before absolution, the prohibited books which the penitent retains in his power." (Indult. S. Penit., n. 5). Today recourse should be had to the Holy See.

1172. III. "All and individual persons of whatever state, grade, or condition, even if royal, episcopal, or cardinalitial, appealing from laws, decrees, or mandates of the Roman Pontiff existing at the time to a universal Council, are suspect of heresy and by the fact itself contract excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See."[12]

[12] *Code*, c. 2332.

By this excommunication are struck those appealing from any ordinance whatever of the Roman Pontiff as such to a Council, even one present and legitimately gathered, but not to a future Pope; yet in this latter case those appealing with difficulty escape the excommunication brought against heretics and schismatics. - Moreover those appealing are suspect of heresy, and therefore liable to the penalties enumerated in canon 2315.

1173. IV. "Those laying violent hands on the person of a Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church or of a Legate of the Roman Pontiff, or of a Patriarch, Archbishop, Bishop, even titular only."[13]

[13] *Code*, c. 2343.

1174. V. "Those who publish laws, mandates, or decrees against the freedom or rights of the Church; those who directly or indirectly impede the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, whether of the internal or external forum, having recourse for this to any lay power whatever."[14]

[14] *Code*, c. 2334. - In the old text it read "and having recourse for this"; but in the Code "and" is omitted, and therefore only those are excommunicated who in fact impede the exercise of jurisdiction.

This penalty is incurred: 1. by those publishing laws...

a) Those publishing, namely those who participate in some legislative power, or must concur so that some law may obtain the force of law.

b) Those publishing laws properly so called, or mandates or decrees brought for the completion of law or for its practical execution, but not judicial sentences; yet stable ordinances brought by provincial or municipal magistrates, which are equivalent to laws for a province or city, are included.

c) Against the freedom or rights of the Church. By these words is designated not only the exercise of ecclesiastical power, but any right belonging to the Church, such as the right of teaching, the right of conferring benefices, the right of carrying out public supplications, the right of acquiring and possessing, etc.[15]

[15] It must be noted that this excommunication, brought against those who published laws or decrees opposed to the freedom or rights of the Church, already flourished from the constitution *Apostolicae Sedis*. Hence the Deputies and Senators who gave their vote for the French laws against religious associations (July 1, 1901) and concerning the Separation of Church and State (December 9, 1905), even if they gave their vote after the necessary number of voters

had been completed, were and remain liable to an excommunication of this kind until absolution; likewise the President of the Republic who promulgated them; the Ministers who published decrees for their execution.

1175. 2. Those impeding the exercise of properly ecclesiastical jurisdiction, by which the faithful are governed unto eternal life:

Namely, those who unjustly, by some coercion, physical or moral, effectively place an obstacle lest someone exercise an act of jurisdiction which he has ready at hand; this indeed is done by those having recourse for this to any lay power, whether supreme, intermediate, or lowest, such as the power of a municipal magistrate; for example, those who oppose the ordinances and decrees of bishops concerning neutral and impious schools, by recurring to any lay authority.

1176. VI. "He who has dared to drag before a lay judge any of the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church or Legates of the Apostolic See, or major Officials of the Roman Curia concerning business pertaining to their office, or his own Ordinary."[16]

[16] *Code*, c. 2341.

This censure is incurred not only by legislators and other authorities, but also by private persons who summon the aforesaid ecclesiastical persons to the tribunal of laymen and compel them to be present there.

1177. VII. "Those having recourse to the lay power in order to impede any letters or acts whatever proceeding from the Apostolic See, or from its Legates, and directly or indirectly prohibiting their promulgation or execution, or on account of them striking or terrifying either those to whom the letters or acts pertain, or others."[1]

[1] *Code*, c. 2333.

Here there is question of any acts whatever, whether of the Roman Pontiff, or of the Sacred Congregations, or of the Legates, Nuncios, or Delegates of the Apostolic See, provided that they have already proceeded.

This excommunication is incurred: 1. by those who effectively have recourse to the lay power in order to impede those acts; 2. by those who directly by edict, or indirectly by deeds, prohibit their promulgation or their execution, even if, notwithstanding the edict, the promulgation is afterward made or the act is put into execution; 3. by those who, on account of them, that is, in order to impede the promulgation or execution of the acts, strike, or terrify by grave threats, either the parties themselves or others joined with the parties.

1178. VIII. "All fabricators or falsifiers of letters, decrees, or rescripts of the Apostolic See, or those knowingly using the same letters, decrees, or rescripts."[2]

[2] *Code*, c. 2360.

Here there is question of official letters, not private ones, not only of the Roman Pontiff, but also of the Roman Congregations. Moreover, these are excommunicated: (a) fabricators, namely those who fashion these documents wholly from the beginning; (b) falsifiers, that is, those who in the same documents change, add, or take away something, so that the sense is changed; but not those who

correct errors or mistakes; (c) those using the same letters, and indeed knowingly, that is, with full advertence and liberty, for extorting certain advantages either for themselves or for others.

1179. IX. "Those usurping or detaining by themselves or through others goods or rights pertaining to the Roman Church."[3]

[3] *Code*, c. 2345.

1180. X. "One not promoted to the priestly order, if he has simulated the celebration of Mass or has heard sacramental confession."[4]

[4] *Code*, c. 2322. - Besides, if the one thus acting is a cleric, let him be deposed; if a layman, let him be deprived of pension or office, if he has any in the Church, and let him be punished with other penalties.

This excommunication is established by new law.

1181. XI. "If anyone, by himself or through others, has falsely denounced a confessor before Superiors for the crime of solicitation, he incurs by the fact itself excommunication reserved in a special manner to the Apostolic See, from which he can in no case be absolved unless he has formally retracted the false denunciation, and has repaired, according to his powers, the damages, if any have followed therefrom, with a grave and lasting penance imposed besides."[5]

[5] *Code*, c. 2363.

Moreover, a sin of this kind of calumnious denunciation is, by reason of itself, reserved to the Holy See,[6] when the denunciation is made or renewed before an ecclesiastical judge.

[6] *Code*, c. 894.

Let it be noted: (a) that these are suspect of heresy: 1. those who are united in marriage with an explicit or implicit pact that all or some offspring be educated outside the Catholic Church (can. 2319); 2. parents, or those taking the place of parents, who knowingly hand over children to be educated or instructed in a non-Catholic religion (can. 2319); 3. one who has cast away the consecrated species, or has carried them away or retained them for an evil end (can. 2320); 4. one who, with hardened soul, has remained for a year in the censure of excommunication (can. 2340); 5. those who through simony have knowingly promoted to orders, or have been promoted, or have administered or received other sacraments (can. 2371); 6. "one who in any way voluntarily and knowingly helps the propagation of heresy, or who communicates in divine things with heretics..." (can. 2316);

(b) that these sanctions are decreed against one suspect of heresy: "One suspect of heresy who, after warning, does not remove the cause of suspicion, is to be prohibited from legitimate acts, and a cleric besides, after warning has been repeated in vain, is to be suspended from divine things; but if within six months completed from the contracted penalty one suspect of heresy has not amended himself, let him be held as a heretic, liable to the penalties of heretics." From these last words it appears sufficiently that one suspect of heresy who is so obstinate immediately incurs the excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See. This is confirmed from the analytical-alphabetical Index appended to the Code, under the word Excommunication.

III. Excommunications Simply Reserved to the Roman Pontiff.

Only eleven are recounted in the Code, of which two are new, namely IX and XI.

1182. I. "Those perpetrating a duel, or simply provoking another to it, or accepting it, or furnishing any assistance or favor whatever, as also those deliberately watching it and those permitting it, or, as far as lies in them, not prohibiting it, of whatever dignity they may be."[7]

[7] *Code*, c. 2351.

1. By what excommunication are they punished:

A) The duelers themselves, that is, those who perpetrate a duel; indeed also he who provokes another to a duel, or who accepts, even if in reality the duel does not follow;

B) Those furnishing any assistance or favor whatever, that is: (a) all and individual persons cooperating in any way in a duel;

Thus: seconds, unless they accept this office with the intention and hope of wholly impeding the duel; those ordering that the duel take place; those persuading, or advising, if the counsel or reason was of itself efficacious and the duel follows; the physician who, asked by the duelers, assists at the duel; the physician and confessor who, by agreement with the duelers, station themselves in a neighboring house or in a nearby place.

(b) Those deliberately watching, even from mere curiosity, but not those who see it by chance as passers-by, or in secret, nor those who go to the place of combat in order wholly to impede the duel;

(c) Those positively permitting the duel, and indeed those who, possessing authority, do not prohibit it, as far as lies in them, when they ought and are able to prohibit it.

1183. 2. By delegated law, bishops formerly absolved "from censures established against duelers, in cases only not brought to the forum of the Ordinary: with a grave salutary penance imposed, and with other things imposed which by law were to be imposed."[8] Today the Holy See is to be approached.

[8] Indult of the Sacred Penitentiary, n. 2.

1184. II. "Those giving their name to a Masonic sect or to other associations of the same kind which plot against the Church or legitimate civil powers."[9]

[9] *Code*, c. 2335.

1. There is question of societies whose members, under the same leaders, tend to the same end, namely the end recounted in the canon, whether secrecy is required or not.

With prohibited associations are assimilated societies of nihilists and others similar to them, as also cremation societies if they are affiliated with Masonic sects.

In the Code, indeed, the obligation of denouncing the leaders and chief men of Masonic sects is passed over in silence; but, from can. 2336, § 2, "clerics and religious giving their name to a Masonic

sect and other similar associations must be denounced to the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office."

2. Formerly, by force of an Indult,[10] Bishops could absolve from this excommunication those who had given their name to forbidden sects under certain conditions; but since today this Indult has ceased, recourse must be had to the Holy See.

[10] Indult of the Sacred Penitentiary, n. 7.

1185. III. "1. Those violating the enclosure of nuns, of whatever kind or condition or sex they may be, by entering their monasteries without legitimate permission, and likewise those introducing or admitting them;[11] 2. women violating the enclosure of male regulars, and superiors and others, whoever they may be, introducing or admitting them, of whatever age they may be...; 3. nuns illegitimately departing from the enclosure against the prescription of can. 601."

[11] "If they are clerics, besides let them be suspended for a time to be defined by the Ordinary according to the gravity of the fault" (*Code*, c. 2341, 1).

1. Therefore by force of this canon these are excommunicated: (a) those violating the enclosure of nuns,[12] even women, unless they have permission to enter the monastery legitimately given by the competent superior in a case of necessity; besides, those introducing or admitting those who violate the enclosure; (b) women violating the enclosure of male regulars, but not men; and besides, whoever they may be (superiors or others) who are of the house and belong to the house (but not externs), who receive women into the enclosure or retain them in it, or do not prohibit their admission, when they can and by office ought to prohibit it.

[12] Here there is question of nuns as they are described in the Code itself, c. 488: "By the name of nuns come religious women of solemn vows, or, unless from the nature of the matter or from the context of the speech another thing is established, religious women whose vows from the institute are solemn, but for some places by prescription of the Apostolic See are simple."

(c) Nuns illegitimately going out against can. 601, which reads thus: "It is lawful for no nun after profession to go out of the monastery, even for a short time, under any pretext, without a special indult of the Holy See, except in the case of imminent danger of death or of another most grave evil. This danger, if time allows, must be recognized in writing by the Ordinary."

1186. 2. By delegated law, today suppressed, bishops could absolve "from censures on account of violation of the enclosure of Regulars of either sex, provided that it had not been committed with intention toward an evil end,[13] even if the effect did not follow, nor the cases had been brought to the forum of the Ordinary, with a fitting salutary penance; and, besides, absolve women only from censures and ecclesiastical penalties incurred on account of violation, for an evil end, of the enclosure of male religious, provided, however, that the cases remain occult: with a grave salutary penance imposed, with the prohibition of approaching the church, or convent, or monastery of the said religious, while the occasion of sinning lasts."[14] Today the Holy See is to be approached.

[13] By an evil end is understood the intention of sinning against chastity.

[14] Indult of the Sacred Penitentiary, n. 4.

1187. IV. "Those perpetrating the delict of simony in any ecclesiastical offices, benefices, or dignities whatever."[15]

[15] *Code*, c. 2392.

What the delict of simony is we have already explained, n. 935.

1188. V. "Those making gain from indulgences."[16]

[16] *Code*, c. 2327.

That is, those receiving money or something estimable by price for the concession or publication of indulgences.

1189. VI. "Those presuming to absolve, without due faculty, from an excommunication *latae sententiae* reserved in a most special or special manner to the Apostolic See."[17]

[17] *Code*, c. 2338, § 1.

This indeed must be understood of cases in which there is not danger of death or urgent necessity.

1190. VII. "Those furnishing any help or favor whatever to an excommunicated person to be avoided in the delict on account of which he was excommunicated; likewise clerics knowingly and spontaneously communicating with the same in divine things and receiving him in divine offices."[18]

[18] *Code*, c. 2338, § 2.

The second part touches only clerics who, with full advertence and liberty, communicate in divine things with an excommunicated person to be avoided, that is, either in liturgical offices they authoritatively admit him, so that he may perform sacred functions, or they receive him in divine offices so that he may assist at them or receive sacred things.

1191. VIII. "If anyone has presumed, by himself or through others, to convert and usurp ecclesiastical goods of any kind, whether movable or immovable, whether corporeal or incorporeal, to his own uses, or to impede the fruits or revenues of the same from being perceived by those to whom they belong by law, let him be subject to excommunication until he has restored the goods themselves integrally, removed the aforesaid impediment, and thereafter obtained absolution from the Apostolic See."[19]

[19] *Code*, c. 2346.

1. The goods of which there is question are not only those which pertain to the Church collectively, but also those which pertain to private ecclesiastical persons by reason of their churches or benefices: of this kind are the goods of seminaries, monasteries, dioceses, hospitals, montes pietatis, and other pious places erected by ecclesiastical authority and administered by the Church.

2. All are touched who knowingly convert to their own uses goods of this kind which have been usurped, or authoritatively impede them from being perceived by those to whom they belong by law. Hence not only the first usurpers are excommunicated, but all successive possessors, indeed also those receiving the same goods in lease.[20] But those who buy the natural fruits of these goods, although of themselves they do not escape excommunication, can be absolved, with alms imposed in favor of the legitimate owner, if they bought below the just price.[21]

[20] Sacred Penitentiary, August 5, 1907, *Canoniste*, 1908, p. 684.

[21] Ibid., to the 3rd.

3. City councilors, and their Mayor (*le Maire*), do not incur the excommunication when they acquire an ecclesiastical good not for their own uses but for the common uses of the city;[22] nor one who even freely accepted the office of administering goods taken from churches or monasteries (*liquidateur, sequestre*); nor, a fortiori, those who cooperate less principally, e.g., notaries and clerks.[23] For the excommunication touches the usurpers and possessors themselves, not their accomplices, unless you except a cleric who has consented in this delict.

[22] Sacred Penitentiary, January 3, 1906, *A. S. S.*, vol. XL, p. 249.

[23] Sacred Penitentiary, September 17, 1906, *Canoniste*, 1907, p. 194.

1192. 4. Absolution from this censure must not be given except after restitution of goods unjustly detained. In France, however, bishops have been endowed with special faculties, so that they may be able to admit possessors of ecclesiastical goods of this kind to composition and to impart absolution to them; in many cases they can also give permission to buy or lease.[24] Similar faculties had previously been granted to the bishops of Italy.

[24] Secretariat of State, September 24, 1907, *A. S. S.*, vol. XLI, pp. 202-209. Cf. above, n. 492, with note.

1193. IX. "If anyone, against the prescription of can. 120, has dared to drag before a lay judge... another Bishop (namely not his own Ordinary), even merely titular, or an Abbot or Prelate *nullius*, or one from among the major Superiors of religions of pontifical right, he contracts excommunication *latae sententiae*, simply reserved to the Apostolic See."[1]

[1] *Code*, Can., 2341. - This censure is new, contained only implicitly in n. VII of the Bull *Apostolicae Sedis*.

1194. X. "Clerics constituted in sacred orders, or regulars or nuns after a solemn vow of chastity, and likewise all those presuming to contract marriage, even only civilly, with any one of the aforesaid persons, incur excommunication *latae sententiae* simply reserved to the Apostolic See..."[2]

[2] *Code*, c. 2388.

1195. XI. "A capitular vicar or any others, both of the Chapter and externs, who by themselves or through another have removed, destroyed, concealed, or substantially changed any document whatever pertaining to the episcopal Curia, incur by the fact itself excommunication simply reserved to the Apostolic See."[3]

[3] *Code*, c. 2405.

Here it must also be noted that the censures which are incurred by revelation of the secret of the Holy Office are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, can. 239, § 1.

IV. Excommunications Reserved to Ordinaries.

Six are numbered in the Code:

1196. I. "Those procuring abortion, the mother not excepted, when the effect has followed."[4]

[4] *Code*, c. 2350.

Thus the opinion hitherto probable, which excepted the mother from excommunication, is rejected.

Moreover, in order to incur this censure, it is required that the abortion have been procured, that is, sought deliberately and directly willed, and that it truly follow. Properly so called accomplices likewise incur it, from what has been said, n. 1163.

1197. II. "Catholics who enter marriage before a non-Catholic minister against the prescription of c. 1063; who are united in marriage with an explicit or implicit pact that all or some offspring be educated outside the Catholic Church; who knowingly presume to offer their children to non-Catholic ministers to be baptized; parents or those holding the place of parents who knowingly hand over children to be educated or instructed in a non-Catholic religion."[5]

[5] *Code*, c. 2319.

All these things will be explained in the Treatise on Marriage. Let it only be noted that excommunication is incurred by those who, either by themselves or through a procurator, enter marriage before a non-Catholic minister against can. 1063.

1198. III. "Those who make false relics, or knowingly sell, distribute, or expose them publicly to the veneration of the faithful."[6]

[6] *Code*, c. 2326.

1199. IV. Those who lay violent hands on the person of other clerics (i.e., below bishops), or of religious of either sex.[7]

[7] *Code*, c. 2343, § 4.

1200. V. Those professed of perpetual simple vows, both in Orders and in religious Congregations, and likewise all those presuming to contract marriage, even only civilly, with any one of the aforesaid persons.[8]

[8] *Code*, c. 2388.

1201. VI. "A religious apostate from religion incurs by the law itself excommunication reserved to his own major Superior, or, if the religion is lay or not exempt, to the Ordinary of the place in which he is dwelling."[9]

[9] *Code*, c. 2385.

1202. Scholion. Here we have judged it opportune to observe that Superiors having coercive power, in applying penalties *ferendae sententiae*, must attend to can. 2223:

"§ 1. In applying penalties the judge cannot increase a determined penalty, unless extraordinary aggravating circumstances demand it.

"§ 2. If the law, in establishing a penalty *ferendae sententiae*, uses facultative words (e.g., let him punish according to his prudent judgment), it is committed to the prudence and conscience of the judge to inflict it, or, if the penalty has been determined, to temper it.

"§ 3. But if the law uses preceptive words (e.g., let him be suspended, let him be declared incapable, etc.), ordinarily the penalty must be inflicted; but it is committed to the conscience and prudence of the judge or Superior: 1. to defer the application of the penalty to a more opportune time, if greater evils are foreseen as about to arise from a too hasty punishment of the accused; 2. to abstain from inflicting the penalty, if the accused has been perfectly amended and has repaired the scandal, or has been sufficiently punished or is foreseen to be punished sufficiently by penalties sanctioned by civil authority; 3. to temper a determined penalty, or to apply some penal remedy in place of it, or to impose some penance, if there is a circumstance notably diminishing imputability, or if indeed amendment of the accused is had or punishment inflicted by civil authority, but the judge or Superior judges some milder punishment to be opportune besides.

"§ 4. To declare a penalty *latae sententiae* is generally committed to the prudence of the Superior; but whether at the instance of the party whose interest is involved, or when the common good so demands, a declaratory sentence must be given."

V. Excommunications Reserved to No One.

Five are recounted by the new law:

1203. I. "Those who shall have dared to command or compel infidels, apostates from the faith, or heretics, schismatics, or others either excommunicated or interdicted against the prescription of can. 1240, § 1," that is, those excommunicated or interdicted after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence, "to be handed over to ecclesiastical burial."[10]

[10] *Code*, c. 2339.

This censure does not punish those burying, nor those admitting to burial, but only those commanding (authoritatively) and compelling (physically or morally) one of the aforesaid to be buried in a sacred place (deputed for burial by the authority of the bishop, and duly blessed), or with a Catholic rite.

1204. II. "If the apostolic good pleasure (required from can. 534 and 1532 for alienating ecclesiastical goods whose value exceeds thirty thousand francs) has knowingly been omitted, there remains for all guilty in any way, whether by giving, or by receiving, or by furnishing consent, excommunication *latae sententiae* reserved to no one."[11]

[11] *Code*, c. 2347, 3.

This excommunication is incurred also when, without apostolic good pleasure, debts and obligations are contracted beyond the aforesaid sum, as is established from can. 534. Besides, such contracts are invalid by ecclesiastical law.

1205. III. "A faithful person who has knowingly omitted to denounce within a month him by whom he had been solicited, against the prescription of can. 904."[12]

[12] *Code*, c. 2368.

This will be explained in the Treatise on Penance.

1206. IV. "All, shining with any dignity whatever, who in any way compel either a man to embrace the clerical state, or a man or woman to enter religion or to emit religious profession, whether solemn or simple, whether perpetual or temporary."[13]

[13] *Code*, c. 2352.

1207. V. "Authors and publishers who, without due license, take care that books of Sacred Scripture, or annotations or commentaries on them, be printed."[14]

[14] *Code*, c. 2318, § 2.

1208. To these excommunications can be added those by which, in the Constitution of Pope Pius X, *Vacante Sede Apostolica*, these are struck: those guilty of the crime of simony in the election of the Roman Pontiff; those who, while the Roman Pontiff is living and without consulting him, presume, even if they shine with the honor of the Cardinalate, to treat of the election of his successor, or to promise some vote, or, with private little meetings made for this cause, to deliberate and decide something; Cardinals or any others having a part in the Conclave who receive from any civil power the charge of proposing a veto or Exclusive.[15]

[15] Constitution of Pope Pius X, *Vacante Sede Apostolica*, December 25, 1904, nn. 79-81, at the end of the Code.

§ II. Suspensions *Latae Sententiae*. — I. Suspensions Reserved to the Holy See.

Six are computed in the Code:

1209. I. "Chapters, convents, and all others to whom it pertains, admitting those elected, presented, or nominated to an ecclesiastical benefice or dignity before the presentation of the letters, remain by the fact itself suspended from the right of electing, nominating, or presenting, at the good pleasure of the Apostolic See."[16]

[16] *Code*, c. 2394, 3.

Let it be noted that this suspension cannot be absolved except by the Holy See or by its delegate, on account of the words: at the good pleasure.

1210. II. "Into suspension for a year from the conferral of Orders, reserved to the Apostolic See, these incur by the fact itself: 1. those who have ordained another's subject without dimissorial letters of the proper Ordinary (against the prescription of can. 955); 2. those who have ordained their own subject who has resided elsewhere for so long a time that he could have contracted there a

canonical impediment (against the prescription of can. 993, 994); 3. those who have promoted someone to major orders without a canonical title (against the prescription of can. 974, § 1, n. 7); 4. saving legitimate privilege, those who have promoted a religious belonging to a family which is outside the territory of the one ordaining, even with dimissorial letters of his own Superior, unless it has been legitimately proved that some one of the cases occurs of which there is question in can. 966," that is, unless it has been established that the diocesan Bishop is either consenting, or of a different rite, or absent, or will not have an ordination at the next legitimate time.[17]

[17] *Code*, c. 2373.

1211. III. "They contract by the fact itself suspension from divine things, reserved to the Apostolic See, who presume to receive orders from one excommunicated, or suspended, or interdicted after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, or from a notorious apostate, heretic, or schismatic; but one who in good faith has been ordained by any of them lacks the exercise of the order so received until he is dispensed."[18]

[18] *Code*, c. 2372.

1212. IV. "A Bishop consecrating someone as Bishop, the Bishops, or, in place of Bishops, the priests assisting, and he who receives consecration without apostolic mandate against the prescription of can. 953, are suspended by the law itself, until the Apostolic See has dispensed them."[19]

[19] *Code*, c. 2370.

1213. V. "All, even those endowed with episcopal dignity, who knowingly have promoted to orders through simony, or have been promoted, or have administered or received other Sacraments, are suspect of heresy; clerics besides incur suspension reserved to the Apostolic See."[20]

[20] *Code*, c. 2371.

1214. VI. "A religious cleric whose profession has been declared null on account of deceit admitted by him, if he is constituted in minor orders, is to be cast out of the clerical state; if in major orders, he remains by the fact itself suspended, until the Apostolic See has judged otherwise."[21]

[21] *Code*, c. 2387.

II. Suspensions Not Reserved to the Holy See.

Nine are recounted in the Code:

1215. I. A cleric who, without having obtained permission from the Ordinary of the place, has dared to drag before a lay judge a person enjoying the privilege of the forum, by the fact itself incurs suspension from office reserved to the Ordinary.[22] - See above, n. 1176, 1193.

[22] *Code*, c. 2341.

1216. II. "A fugitive religious by the fact itself incurs privation of office, if he has any in religion, and suspension reserved to his own major Superior if he is in sacred orders."[23]

[23] *Code*, c. 2386.

1217. III-IV. "A priest who, without the necessary jurisdiction, has presumed to hear sacramental confessions is by the fact itself suspended from divine things; but one who has presumed to absolve from reserved sins is by the fact itself suspended from hearing confessions."[24]

[24] *Code*, c. 2366.

1218. V. "One who with no letters, or with false dimissorial letters, or before canonical age, or by leap, has maliciously approached orders, is by the fact itself suspended from the order received."[25]

[25] *Code*, c. 2374.

1219. VI. "A cleric who has presumed to resign an ecclesiastical office, benefice, or dignity into the hands of laymen, incurs by the fact itself suspension from divine things."[26]

[26] *Code*, c. 2400.

1220. VII. "An Abbot or Prelate *nullius* who has not received the blessing is by the fact itself suspended from jurisdiction."[27]

[27] *Code*, c. 2402.

1221. VIII. "A capitular vicar granting dimissorial letters for ordination against the prescription of can. 958, § 1, n. 3, by the fact itself is subject to suspension from divine things."[28]

[28] *Code*, c. 2409.

1222. IX. "Religious Superiors who, against the prescription of can. 965-967, have presumed to send their subjects to another Bishop to be ordained, are by the fact itself suspended for a month from the celebration of Mass."[1]

[1] *Code*, c. 2410.

1223. Besides, "one who obtains an office, benefice, or dignity with the burden of residence, if he is illegitimately absent, is by the fact itself deprived of all the fruits of his benefice or office in proportion to the illegitimate absence, and must hand them over to the Ordinary, who is to distribute them to the church or to some pious place or to the poor."[2]

[2] *Code*, c. 2381.

§ III. Interdicts.

Four are numbered in the Code:

1224. I. Universities, Colleges, Chapters, or other moral persons, by whatever name they may be called, appealing from laws, decrees, or mandates of the Roman Pontiff existing at the time to a Universal Council, incur an interdict reserved in a special manner to the Apostolic See.[3]

[3] *Code*, c. 2332.

1225. II. "Those knowingly celebrating, or causing divine things to be celebrated, in interdicted places, or admitting to the celebration of divine offices forbidden by censure clerics excommunicated, interdicted, or suspended after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, contract by the law itself an interdict from entrance into a church, until, at the judgment of him whose sentence they have contemned, they have fittingly made satisfaction."[4]

[4] *Code*, c. 2338, § 3.

1226. III. "Those who gave cause for a local interdict, or for an interdict against a community or college, are by the fact itself personally interdicted."[5]

[5] Ibid., § 4.

1227. IV. Those spontaneously giving ecclesiastical burial to infidels, apostates from the faith, or heretics, schismatics, or others either excommunicated or interdicted after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, contract an interdict from entrance into a church, reserved to the Ordinary.[6]

[6] *Code*, c. 2339.

Scholion: the Principal Other Penalties Are Recounted.

1228. It will not be beside the matter to enumerate the principal other penalties recounted in the Code:

1229. 1. By the law itself these are infamous: (a) those who have given their name to a non-Catholic sect or publicly adhered to it;[7] (b) those who have cast away the consecrated species, or have carried them away or retained them for an evil end;[8] (c) those who have violated the corpses or tombs of the dead for theft or another evil end;[9] (d) those who have laid violent hands on the person of the Roman Pontiff, a Cardinal, or a Legate of the Roman Pontiff;[10] (e) duelers and those who are called their seconds;[11] (f) bigamists, i.e., those who, despite the conjugal bond, have attempted another marriage, even only civil, as they say;[12] (g) laymen legitimately condemned on account of graver delicts against the sixth;[13] (h) besides, clerics constituted in minor orders, guilty of some delict against the sixth, are to be punished according to the gravity of the fault, even by dismissal from the clerical state, if the circumstances of the delict advise this.

[7] *Code*, c. 2314.

[8] *Code*, c. 2320.

[9] *Code*, c. 2328.

[10] *Code*, c. 2343.

[11] *Code*, c. 2351.

[12] *Code*, c. 2356.

[13] *Code*, c. 2357.

Now, "he who labors under infamy of law is not only irregular according to the norm of can. 984, n. 5, but besides is incapable of obtaining ecclesiastical benefices, pensions, offices, and dignities, of performing legitimate ecclesiastical acts, of exercising an ecclesiastical right or office, and finally must be kept from exercising ministry in sacred functions."[14]

[14] *Code*, c. 2294, § 1. - From can. 2293, "infamy of law is that which is established in cases expressed by common law."

Moreover, he labors under infamy of fact who, "on account of a perpetrated delict or on account of depraved morals, has lost good esteem among upright and grave faithful; judgment concerning this belongs to the Ordinary."[15]

[15] *Code*, c. 2293, § 3.

1230. 2. By the law itself these are held excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts: (a) ravishers of women (can. 2353); (b) laymen legitimately condemned because of certain more atrocious crimes (can. 2354); (c) Catholics who have dared to enter a mixed marriage, even valid, without dispensation of the Church (can. 2375); (d) religious who are apostates from religion (can. 2385).

Moreover, by a sentence *ferendae sententiae*, these must be excluded from legitimate acts: (a) those who incur infamy of fact (c. 2294, § 2); (b) one suspect of heresy who, after warning, does not remove the cause of suspicion (c. 2315); (c) those attempting suicide (c. 2350, § 2); (d) those legitimately condemned because of delicts against the sixth, public adulterers and concubinarians (can. 2357).

1231. "Moreover by the name of legitimate ecclesiastical acts are signified: to exercise the office of administrator of ecclesiastical goods; to act as judge, auditor and relator, defender of the bond, promoter of justice and of the faith, notary and chancellor, summoner and apparitor, advocate and procurator in ecclesiastical cases; to act as sponsor in the sacraments of Baptism and Confirmation; to cast a vote in ecclesiastical elections; to exercise the right of patronage."[16]

[16] *Code*, c. 2256, 2.

Appendix: On the Censorship and Prohibition of Books

Concerning the Previous Censure of Books and Their Prohibition

1232. Two things are established in the Code concerning this matter: 1. the previous censure of certain books; 2. the prohibition of certain books. "Those things which are prescribed under this title concerning books are to be applied to publications, newspapers, periodicals, and any other published writings whatever, unless the contrary is established."[17]

[17] *Code*, c. 1384, § 2.

I. - Concerning the Previous Censure of Books

1233. 1. Certain books cannot be published, even by laymen, unless ecclesiastical censure has preceded, which "can be given either by the local Ordinary proper to the author, or by the Ordinary of the place in which the books or images are made public property, or by the Ordinary of the place in which they are printed, yet so that, if any one of these Ordinaries has denied permission, the author cannot seek it from another Ordinary unless he has informed the same of the permission denied by another."[18]

[18] *Code*, c. 1385, § 2.

Now these books are: "(a) Books of Sacred Scripture, or annotations and commentaries on them; (b) books which regard divine scriptures, sacred theology, ecclesiastical history, canon law, natural theology, ethics, or other religious and moral disciplines of this kind; books and booklets of prayers, devotion, or religious, moral, ascetical, mystical doctrine and instruction, and others of this kind, although they seem to conduce to fostering piety; and generally writings in which there is something which is of special interest for religion and honesty of morals; (c) sacred images to be printed in any way, whether they have prayers joined, or are published without them."[19]

[19] *Code*, c. 1385, § 1.

Besides, "in newspapers, sheets, or periodical booklets which are accustomed to attack the Catholic religion or good morals, let not even Catholic laymen write anything, unless a just and reasonable cause persuades, approved by the Ordinary of the place."[20]

[20] *Code*, c. 1386, § 2.

1234. 2. Secular clerics are forbidden, without the consent of their Ordinaries, and religious without the license of their major superior and of the local Ordinary, to publish also books which treat of profane matters, and to write in newspapers, sheets, or periodical booklets, or to moderate the same.[21]

[21] Ibid., § 1.

1235. 3. Express license of the Apostolic See is required "so that it may be lawful to publish in print, in any language, both an authentic collection of prayers and pious works to which

the Apostolic See has attached indulgences, and a list of apostolic indulgences, and a summary of indulgences either previously collected but never approved, or now for the first time to be gathered from diverse concessions."[22] - Moreover all books, summaries, booklets, sheets, etc., in which concessions of indulgences are contained, are not to be published without license of the Ordinary.[23]

[22] *Code*, c. 1388, § 2.

[23] Ibid., § 1.

4. "Those things which in any way pertain to the causes of beatifications and canonizations of Servants of God cannot be published without the license of the Sacred Congregation of Rites."[24]

[24] *Code*, c. 1387.

5. "Collections of decrees of the Roman Congregations cannot again be published unless permission has first been obtained and the conditions prescribed by the Moderators of each Congregation have been observed."[25]

[25] *Code*, c. 1389.

6. "In publishing liturgical books and their parts, and likewise litanies approved by the Holy See, agreement with the approved editions must be established from the attestation of the Ordinary of the place in which they are printed or made public property."[26]

[26] *Code*, c. 1390.

7. "Versions of Sacred Scripture into the vernacular language cannot be printed unless they have been approved by the Apostolic See, or unless they are published under the vigilance of the Bishops and with annotations chiefly excerpted from the holy Fathers of the Church and from learned and Catholic writers."[27]

[27] *Code*, c. 1391.

8. Translations and new editions of an approved work must be fortified by a new approval. But chapters excerpted from periodicals and published separately do not need new approval.[28]

[28] *Code*, c. 1392.

1236. 9. As regards censors to be established in all episcopal curias:[29]

[29] *Code*, c. 1393.

(a) "Let them be chosen from either clergy, commended by age, erudition, and prudence, who in approving and disapproving doctrines go by a middle and safe path."

(b) Examiners, in performing their office, with every acceptance of persons laid aside, should keep before their eyes only the dogmas of the Church and the common doctrine of Catholics which is

contained in the decrees of General Councils, or in the constitutions or prescriptions of the Apostolic See, and in the consent of approved doctors.

(c) A censor must give his judgment in writing. If it is favorable, the Ordinary is to grant the power of publishing; nevertheless the judgment of the censor is to be placed before it, his name being inscribed, except in a few extraordinary cases in which mention of the censor, by the prudent judgment of the Ordinary, can be omitted. - But the name of the censor should never be made known to authors before he has issued a favorable judgment.

10. The Ordinary[30] should grant the power of publishing in writing, at the beginning or at the end of the book, sheet, or image to be printed, with the name of the one granting, the place and time of the concession expressed. - If license is denied, unless a grave cause demands otherwise, the reasons are to be indicated to the author asking.

[30] *Code*, c. 1394.

II. - Concerning the Prohibition of Books.

1237. 1. Besides books prohibited under penalty of excommunication,[1] and books reported in the Index, from the Code itself these are prohibited by the law itself:[2]

[1] *Code*, c. 2318.

[2] *Code*, c. 1399.

1. Editions of the original text and of ancient Catholic versions of Sacred Scripture, even of the Eastern Church, published by any non-Catholics whatever; likewise versions of the same into any language, made or published by the same;[3]

[3] Yet the use of these books is permitted to those who devote themselves to theological or biblical studies, provided that the same books have been published faithfully and integrally, and that the dogmas of the Catholic faith are not attacked in their prolegomena or annotations. *Code*, c. 1400.

2. Books of any writers whatever which defend heresy or schism, or strive in any way to overthrow the very foundations of religion;
3. Books which, by set purpose, attack religion or good morals;
4. Books of any non-Catholics whatever which treat professedly of religion, unless it is established that nothing is contained in them against the Catholic faith;
5. Books of which there is question in c. 1385, § 1, n. 1, and c. 1391; likewise, from those of which there is question in the cited c. 1385, § 1, n. 2, books and booklets which narrate new apparitions, revelations, visions, prophecies, or miracles, or which introduce new devotions, even under the pretext that they are private, if they have been published without observing the prescriptions of the canons;
6. Books which attack or deride any one whatever of the Catholic dogmas, which defend errors proscribed by the Apostolic See, which detract from divine worship, which contend to

overthrow ecclesiastical discipline, and which by set purpose heap reproaches upon the ecclesiastical hierarchy, or the clerical or religious state;

7. Books which teach or commend superstition of any kind, sorceries, divination, magic, evocation of spirits, and other things of this kind;

8. Books which establish as licit the duel, or suicide, or divorce; books which, treating of Masonic sects or other societies of the same kind, contend that they are useful and not pernicious to the Church and civil society;

9. Books which professedly treat, narrate, or teach lascivious or obscene matters;[4]

[4] But expurgated classical books do not fall under the prohibition.

10. Editions of liturgical books approved by the Apostolic See, in which anything has been changed so that they do not agree with the authentic editions approved by the Holy See;

11. Books by which apocryphal indulgences, or indulgences proscribed or revoked by the Holy See, are spread abroad;

12. Images printed in any way whatever of Our Lord Jesus Christ, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, of the Angels and Saints, or of other Servants of God, alien from the sense and decrees of the Church.

1238. 2. Local Ordinaries can also proscribe books, and they must warn the faithful of the danger and harm of reading depraved books, especially prohibited ones.[5] They can besides grant permission to their subjects to read books prohibited by the law itself or by decree of the Holy See, but only for individual books and only in urgent cases. But if they have obtained from the Apostolic See a general faculty of permitting their subjects to retain and read proscribed books, let them grant it only with selection and for a reasonable cause.[6]

[5] *Code*, c. 1405.

[6] *Code*, c. 1402.

1239. 3. Those only can read and retain proscribed books who have obtained opportune faculties. - License to read or retain books condemned by the Holy See does not include license to read and retain books prohibited by a Bishop, unless in the case of express mention.[7] Besides, they are held by grave precept to guard prohibited books in such a way that these do not come to the hands of others.[8]

[7] *Code*, c. 1403.

[8] *Code*, ibid., § 2.

1240. 4. Sellers of books are wholly prohibited from selling, lending, or retaining books treating professedly of obscene matters; moreover, they are forbidden to have other proscribed books for sale without permission of the Congregation of the Index, or to sell them to those who do not legitimately ask.[9]

[9] *Code*, c. 1404.

Addenda from the Code

Addenda from the Code

By the obligation of emitting a profession of faith, according to the formula approved by the Holy See, these are held (*Code*, c. 1406):

[1] On p. 376 we indicated only summarily those who must emit the profession of faith; here we explain the matter more fully from the Code.

1. Those who are present at an ecumenical or particular Council or diocesan Synod with either consultative or deliberative vote, before its president or his delegate; the president, moreover, before the same Council or synod;
2. Those promoted to the cardinalitial dignity, before the Dean of the Sacred College, the Cardinals first in the order of priests and deacons, and the Camerarius of the Holy Roman Church;
3. Those promoted to an episcopal see, even not residential, or to the rule of an Abbey or Prelature *nullius*, Apostolic Vicariate, or Apostolic Prefecture, before a delegate by the Apostolic See;
4. A capitular vicar before the cathedral chapter;
5. Those promoted to a dignity or canonry, before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the Chapter;
6. Those assumed to the office of diocesan consultors, before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the other consultors;
7. The vicar general, pastors, and those for whom provision has been made concerning any benefices whatever, even manual ones, having the care of souls; the rector, professors of sacred theology, canon law, and philosophy in Seminaries, at the beginning of any scholastic year, or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; all those to be promoted to the order of subdiaconate; censors of books... priests destined for receiving confessions and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with faculty of exercising these offices, before the local Ordinary or his delegate;
8. The Rector of a University or Faculty, before the Ordinary or his delegate; all professors in a University or Faculty canonically erected, at the beginning of each scholastic year, or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; likewise those who, after trial has been made, are endowed with academic degrees, before the Rector of the University or faculty, or his delegate;
9. Superiors in clerical religions, before the Chapter or Superior who named them.

N. B. - Those who, after a former one has been laid aside, obtain another office or dignity, even of the same species, must again emit the profession of faith (c. 1406, § 2).

Supplement: On the Virtue of Chastity

Concerning the Virtue of Chastity

Since in some Seminaries those things which pertain to chastity are explained only to deacons or subdeacons, we treat of these separately and briefly, handing on only those things which are necessary for the confessor, so that he may be able to understand the confessions of penitents and to give them opportune counsels for cultivating this virtue. Therefore we shall speak: 1. concerning the nature and excellence of chastity; 2. concerning sins opposed to it; 3. concerning the means of preserving and cultivating chastity.

[1] St. Thomas, 2. 2ae, q. 151-156; St. Alphonsus, l. III, n. 412-485; Lequeux, *De virtutibus*, Paris, 1843, second part; Craisson, *Notiones theologicae circa sextum*, Paris, 1888; Capellmann, *Medicina Pastoralis*, Aachen, 1896; Eschbach, *Disputationes physiologico-theologicae*, Rome, 1901; Noldin, *De sexto praecepto*, Innsbruck, 1902; Antonelli, *Medicina pastoralis*, Rome, 1905; Debreyne and Ferrand, *La theol. morale et les sc. medicales*, 6th ed., Paris; Surbled, *La Morale dans ses rapports avec la medecine*, Paris, 1900; Vigouroux, *Traite de Medecine*, Paris, Letouzey, t. iv.

Art. I. Concerning the Nature and Excellence of Chastity. — § I. Concerning the Nature of Chastity.

1. 1. Concerning chastity itself. Chastity, which is referred to temperance (above, n. 1077), is a moral virtue moderating or excluding the appetite of venereal delectation, according to each one's state and condition.

(A) For the understanding of this, it must be known that venereal delectation is that which arises from acts serving human generation. For God willed that, in the present order of things, the human race should be propagated through the sexual union of male and female. Wherefore, creating the first parents, "male and female He created them, and God blessed them, and said: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth."[2] But that they might more easily apply themselves to the procreation of children, He attached a special delectation to those acts which serve human generation, and this is called venereal, or carnal, or libidinous.

[2] Gen. 1:17-18.

This, therefore, is distinguished from merely sensible or sensual delectation. (a) Sensible delectation is that which arises from the perception of an object suitably proportioned to the sensitive power, such as that which is perceived from hearing harmony, from the smell or sight of a flower, from drinking wine, from touching a smooth thing, etc.; for in these the sensitive appetite is delighted without the organs serving generation being necessarily moved. (b) This sensible delectation is sometimes called sensual, namely when it arises from sight, touch, or conversation with a person loved with sensible affection: for then the heart and blood are more vehemently moved; and, although this delectation of itself is not venereal, nevertheless it easily excites carnal commotion and tends toward venereal pleasure.

2. (B) Chastity moderates the appetite of venereal delectation in spouses, and excludes it among the unmarried. For God wisely willed that men should not beget children outside legitimate matrimony. For offspring once born is by no means sufficient to itself, but for many years

needs both parents in order to receive physical, intellectual, and moral education; but this cannot properly be done unless the man and woman who intend to beget and educate children enter a society firm and indissoluble of itself, live together, and mutually help each other in nourishing, supporting, and rightly instructing the offspring.[3]

[3] This has been proved in the dogmatic part of the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 61.

3. Wherefore, among almost all Nations, vague and concubinary unions are held as dishonorable, and also as contrary to the good of offspring and of the whole society; but, on the contrary, legitimate matrimony is considered not only honorable, but also as bearing before itself something sacred. - But how spouses ought to moderate venereal delectations, and to preserve the bed unspotted from filth and uncleannesses, we have explained elsewhere, in the Supplement to Marriage.

From this it follows that the unmarried, namely the younger before they have duly entered matrimony, and widowers who have not contracted new nuptials, must abstain from every venereal delectation. For since this is lawful only insofar as it is ordered to the generation of offspring, and, moreover, the procreation of children outside legitimate matrimony is unlawful, they are held to abstain from every voluntary carnal delectation.

4. (C) Therefore a threefold chastity is usually distinguished: (a) youthful chastity, which abstains from every venereal delectation until the time of nuptials; (b) conjugal chastity, which moderates the appetite of pleasure in spouses and excludes whatever is unlawful in the use of matrimony; (c) widowed chastity, which, after matrimony has been dissolved, contains itself from every carnal pleasure either perpetually or until second nuptials. Here we treat of youthful and widowed chastity, since speech is had of conjugal chastity in the Treatise on Matrimony.

5. 2. Concerning virginity. (A) Virginity, as a virtue,[4] is nothing other than perfect chastity, i.e., abstinence from every venereal delectation perpetually preserved, or the firm purpose of the will of perpetually abstaining from all venereal delectations, even those which are lawful in matrimony. Therefore it excludes not only external acts, but also internal acts by which consent is furnished to carnal delectation presented to the imagination. True and formal virginity, however, is preserved even if the integrity of the flesh is injured against the will, for example through involuntary pollution, or when a woman is oppressed unwillingly.

[4] Virginity also designates integrity of the flesh, which is lost in men through voluntary pollution, or effusion of seed; it is lost in women through voluntary rupture of the membrane which is called the hymen or virginal enclosure, whether this is done through carnal copulation or through touch. - Material virginity, or integrity of flesh, can therefore subsist after formal virginity has been lost through internal sins. - When a vow of virginity is emitted, the intention of the one vowing must be examined, in order to know whether he wished to vow perfect chastity, or only abstinence from that first act by which material virginity is lost. Concerning this see the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 250.

Virginity is distinguished from perfect chastity in this, that it has been preserved perpetually, while chastity, even perfect, can be preserved by him who previously furnished consent to carnal

delectation. - Nevertheless, according to the common manner of speaking, these two are often taken promiscuously.

6. (B) That virginity cultivated for God is not only lawful but laudable, and of itself more excellent than matrimony, we proved in the dogmatic part of the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 17; that the same is not contrary to the health of body or mind has been demonstrated in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 93 (1064).

(C) Sometimes virginity is called continence, because namely it contains itself from carnal concupiscences. Of itself, indeed, a word of this kind extends more widely and designates the struggle of the mind against all disordered sensible movements; but by antonomasia it designates virginity insofar as it repels the more vehement concupiscences of the flesh.

Sometimes also it is called pudicity. Yet pudicity, in the proper sense, designates that virtue by which we flee all those things which excite shame, or modesty, and therefore all external acts which can allure to venereal delectation, such as looks, touches, kisses, and other things of this kind.

§ II. Concerning the Excellence of Chastity.

7. Chastity understood in the aforesaid sense, insofar as it restrains the disordered appetite of venereal delectation, greatly promotes the good of the whole society, of the family, and of the individual.

1. It promotes the good of society. For chastity was prescribed for this reason, that the human race might be rightly propagated and educated. For experience has made it known that those who immoderately indulge lust are sterile, or at least little fruitful, or beget weak offspring liable to many diseases, and at the same time are unfit, or at least less suitable, for the good education of children.

8. (A) For those who from childhood touch themselves shamefully, frequently indulge pollution or fornication and other vices of this kind, not rarely become impotent, especially because of weakness of nerves and disturbance induced by these shameful things.[1] Now in this matter frequent abuse is most easily incurred, as soon as the first acts have been voluntarily committed, because of the vehement inclination toward venereal acts innate in most men. Therefore unless chastity is sedulously preserved by the young, the fecundity of marriages is diminished. - Besides, the custom of seeking pleasure alone against the order of right reason often generates another abuse in spouses themselves, namely onanism, by which the procreation of children is voluntarily impeded.[2] - Moreover, not a few, by having carnal intercourse with prostitutes, contract the syphilitic disease, and from this head either become impotent or beget weak offspring infected with syphilitic disease.[3] - For the rest, it is sufficiently evident that parents addicted to lust are little suited to educate offspring rightly.

[1] Concerning this see Lassegue, *Etudes medicales*, Paris, Asselin, 1884, t. II, pp. 353-354; Surbled, *La Morale dans ses rapports avec la medecine*, Paris, 1900, t. II, pp. 35-37.

[2] Concerning this elsewhere, in the Supplement to the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 39.

[3] E. Duclaux, *L'hygiene sociale*, Paris, Alcan, 1902, pp. 237-240; Vigouroux, *Traite de Medecine*, Paris, Letouzey, s. d., pp. 202-304. E. Legouve graphically describes an example of this matter, *Les Peres et les Enfants, Jeunesse*, Paris, Hetzel, 5th ed., pp. 196-227.

On the contrary, those who in their youth contain themselves, and use matrimony according to the rules of temperance, generally generate numerous and strong offspring, whom they instruct with good morals; thus they contribute greatly to the preservation and right education of the human species.

9. 2. It promotes the good of the family. For unless young persons remain chaste before they marry, and spouses inviolably preserve the fidelity mutually given to each other, peace can scarcely reign in families.

(a) Indeed the bridegroom generally intends to take a virgin bride in marriage, and if he finds her already corrupted, he can scarcely restrain indignation, and not rarely seeks divorce. Why should he himself indulge lust with impunity before nuptials? Are there two weights and two measures? Is he not ashamed to join unclean flesh to a virgin? - This indeed is more horrible if, infected with venereal disease, he has contaminated the bride: for then love is turned into hatred or contempt, and nothing remains for the wretched spouses except to lead a most miserable life. To avert this danger, there is no efficacious means except chastity; for the syphilitic disease can be contracted by one impure contact, and once contracted can suddenly infect the body again at any time of life, and pass into descendants. - The same must be said of conjugal chastity: for if adultery is committed even once by either spouse, the danger of contamination is incurred. Moreover justice itself demands that both spouses preserve inviolate the fidelity mutually given to each other.

(b) But besides, when adulterous loves or other shameful acts are fostered, how many dissensions arise, how many envies, how many quarrels, how many homicides or suicides! For love despised is easily turned into fury, and the more intense it had been, the more anger is enkindled, as soon as the other spouse has become unfaithful.

(c) Moreover, unless children are chastely instructed, soon they too fall into vice, and bring shame and sadness to their parents. Now how will they remain chaste, unless good example in this matter is given to them?

On the contrary, when the betrothed have wisely contained themselves before nuptials, and pursue each other only with modest love, seeking nothing except to beget children legitimately and to instruct them with the best morals, and preserve inviolate fidelity to each other in adversities as well as in prosperity, they obtain peace and joy, with God's help.

10. 3. It contributes very greatly to the good of the individual. In order that man may rightly order his life according to the principles of reason and faith, it is necessary that he subdue the passions which delay or remove him from spiritual good. Now among the passions, none is more tyrannical than the love of venereal delectations; for it so blinds the mind and invades and moves the whole soul, that the voluptuous man postpones health of body, human dignity, intellectual progress, and the eternal salvation of the soul to lust.[4]

[4] To the point Augustine (*De Civitate Dei*, lib. XIV, c. 16, P. L., XLI, 424): "Although, therefore, there are lusts for many things, nevertheless when lust is named, and the thing of which it is the lust is not added, scarcely anything is accustomed to occur to the mind except that by which the obscene parts of the body are excited. But this claims for itself not only the whole body, nor only externally, but also internally, and moves the whole man, with affection of soul joined and mingled with appetite of flesh, so that that pleasure follows, than which none is greater among bodily pleasures: so that at the very moment of time at which one arrives at its extreme, almost every edge and, as it were, watchfulness of thought is overwhelmed."

For, as St. Thomas rightly observes,[5] when the lower powers are vehemently drawn toward their objects, it follows that the higher powers are impeded and disordered in their acts. But through the vice of luxury the lower appetite tends most intensely to its object, on account of the vehemence of passion and delectation; hence the higher powers, namely reason and will, are most easily distracted and disordered from their object. Thus the intellect, ensnared by pleasure, often judges of things without mature consideration of motives, the impulse of passion driving it, and therefore not rarely is deceived; soon reason is clouded and gradually blinded, since it no longer approves what is honorable, but what appears delectable. The will labors under weakness and inconstancy, because it seeks the honorable good, even when approved by reason, only slowly and reluctantly, and soon, conquered by lust, deserts the path of virtue. A little afterward, with the desire of pleasure growing, love of God and of heavenly things is diminished; thence sometimes hatred of God is born, insofar as He prohibits the desired delectation, and also despair, because while one is too much detained by carnal delectations, he loathes spiritual things and does not care to obtain them. Thus step by step man is turned away from God, becomes carnal and animal, and falls into the mire of vices.

[5] St. Thomas, 2. 2ae, q. 153, a. 5; cf. q. 46, a. 3.

Therefore chastity is most excellent, for it submits that untamed passion to the yoke of right reason and faith; thus it preserves man's true liberty immune from unclean tyranny, adds strength and beauty to his body, increases the keenness of the intellect, strengthens the will, makes us more human, and orders the whole soul to God.

11. Wherefore Scripture often praises chastity: "Grace upon grace is a holy and modest woman. But every weight is not worthy of a continent soul... O how beautiful is the chaste generation with glory: for the memory thereof is immortal, because it is known both with God and with men."[6] Hence, Augustine testifying, all, even the vicious, admire chastity:[7] "For so great is the force of probity and chastity, that every human nature, or almost every human nature, is moved by its praise; nor is it so vicious through baseness that it entirely loses the sense of honesty."

[6] Ecclus. 26:19-20. - Wis. 4:1.

[7] St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei*, lib. II, c. 26, P. L., XLI, 75.

Art. II. Concerning Sins Opposed to Chastity.

12. Sins opposed to chastity are called by the general name of luxury (from the word *luxus*). Before we explain the individual sins, a general principle concerning their gravity must be established.

General principles concerning the gravity of luxury. There are two, according as venereal delectation is directly or indirectly willed.

13. First Principle: Venereal delectation properly so called, directly willed, with full deliberation, outside legitimate matrimony, is a mortal sin from its whole genus, or does not admit smallness of matter. Thus commonly against Caramuel and a few others who excuse from mortal sin a slight venereal delectation deliberately sought.

It is explained. (a) Here there is question of venereal delectation properly so called, which arises from the movement of the organs serving generation, but not of merely sensible, or organic, delectation, which according to many theologians of itself does not exceed venial fault. "Whence," says Billuart,[1] "as one who hears a sonorous voice, who tastes savory food, precisely on account of the organic or sensual delectation arising therefrom, sins only venially; so he sins only venially who looks at a beautiful woman, or touches her hand or face, precisely on account of merely organic or sensual delectation, consisting, as I have already said, in a certain proportion and conformity of the thing seen or touched with the organ of sight or touch; so that it is nothing other than delectation concerning a beautiful thing which is seen, or concerning a pleasing, soft, tender thing which is touched, without any other delectation of any shameful thing whatever." Nevertheless the wise author observes that from sensual delectation to venereal there is an easy progress, and therefore in practice one must not linger over these organic delectations.

[1] Billuart, *De temperantia*, diss. V, art. 2.

(b) There is likewise question of venereal delectation directly willed, namely which is expressly intended as an end or means (above, n. 168); and indeed with full deliberation and perfect consent: for these conditions are required for every mortal sin (n. 474-475).

14. It is proved. (a) For from what has been said (n. 1), venereal delectation has been ordered by the Author of nature to the propagation of the human race, and therefore is unlawful outside legitimate matrimony. But this prohibition is grave; for the end of the law is of the greatest moment, namely the propagation of the human race; and besides, unless it obliged under grave sin, it would be ineffective. For since man is most inclined to carnal delectations, and lust, once voluntarily admitted, clouds the mind and easily draws the will to worse things, it can scarcely happen that someone deliberately consent to venereal pleasure without incurring the danger of falling into the worst corruption: for one who, placed on a precipice, wishes to descend a few steps, is exposed to the proximate danger of sliding farther; and he who loves danger will perish in it. Therefore it is necessary that every deliberate delectation of this kind be prohibited under grave sin, lest man rush headlong into the vices of the flesh and thus frustrate the end intended by God. - In reality venereal delectation, deliberately admitted, easily induces or prepares the effusion of human seed. Now, unless such disorder were prohibited under grave sin, many men would refuse the burdens of matrimony, and would seek pleasure outside conjugal intercourse, and would not care for offspring to be begotten and educated.

(b) It is established from the condemnation of this proposition 40 by Alexander VII: "The opinion is probable which says that a kiss had on account of carnal and sensible delectation which arises from the kiss is only venial, with the danger of further consent and of pollution set aside." This proposition was condemned because it falsely supposes that a kiss had on account of carnal delectation, that is, venereal,[2] does not induce danger of consent into graver acts: for one who expressly seeks venereal

delectation in a kiss, from things commonly occurring, does not stop here. Wherefore there is the greatest difference between honorable kisses, which are signs of friendship, and those which are done for the sake of lust.

[2] Carnal delectation signifies the same thing as venereal; sensual delectation, although by some it is distinguished from venereal, is taken by others for it: hence the sense must be determined from the context. Cf. Viva, on this proposition.

15. Second Principle: Venereal delectation only indirectly voluntary is not mortal from its whole genus, but admits smallness of matter. Thus commonly against the few who assert that there is not smallness of matter in luxury even indirectly voluntary.

It is explained. There is question of one who by no means intends venereal delectation, but places an action from which he foresees that some delectation of this kind will arise, although he does not wish to consent to it; e.g., concerning an adolescent who reads a book otherwise useful, foreseeing that from its reading carnal commotion will follow.

16. It is proved. For carnal delectation directly sought is said to be gravely sinful insofar as it induces proximate danger of further consent; but such danger often does not exist when an action honorable of itself is placed, from which indeed some venereal delectation is foreseen, but not intended; and therefore often there is either no sin, or the sin is only venial, according as there is or is not a proportionately grave reason for placing that action from which venereal delectation is foreseen. - But if at the same time it is foreseen that consent will accede to this pleasure, he commits mortal sin, because he truly wills to sin gravely.

17. For the rest, these principles will be understood more clearly from what is to be said below concerning the individual sins of luxury. - Sins of this kind are called consummated when voluntary and culpable effusion of seed is present;[3] non-consummated when this effusion is not had. Sins are called naturally consummated if semination occurs in the mode by which generation can be obtained; consummated against nature if it happens in the mode which is opposed to the generation of offspring.

[3] In women there is not properly effusion of seed, but only of some mucous fluid which is not prolific; but since this vaginal mucus is emitted with pleasure and erection of the organs, it is also called pollution, as in a man, and is held as a consummated sin of luxury when it happens voluntarily. Cf. Antonelli, t. I, n. 559-563.

§ I. Concerning Non-Consummated Sins of Luxury.

Sins of this kind are internal or external.

I. Concerning Internal Sins of Luxury.

18. From what has been said above (n. 499), there are three internal sins in general, namely morose delectation, desire, and joy; the principles explained there are easily applied to luxury.

[1] Morose delectation is had when the imagination depicts something shameful or obscene, or the mind thinks about a venereal matter without legitimate cause, and at the same time the will deliberately takes complacency in the pleasure arising therefrom. This is mortally sinful when there is full deliberation and full consent concerning the venereal delectation itself: for then it is directly intended, and moreover, from what has been said, in this matter smallness of matter is not admitted. - Delectation takes on the malice of the object as it is represented in the mind (n. 501).

But if the delectation falls only upon the knowledge of a shameful thing, e.g., when someone by office studies physiological matters, or upon the ingenious manner in which a sin was committed or is narrated by another, or upon the good effect following from an evil act, e.g., the relief obtained from pollution, there is not properly venereal delectation, and therefore not sin. But since there is a very easy passage from delectation concerning the knowledge or manner to delectation concerning the shameful thing itself, it is not lawful without reason to linger over these thoughts, because of the danger of sinning (above, n. 502-503).

Often these imaginations are accompanied by carnal movements of the organs serving generation. Generally it is not necessary to declare these in confession, unless they induce proximate danger of pollution, because the confessor knows that these usually follow from morose delectation.

For practice likewise the confessor must recall to memory what was said above, n. 443, concerning the distinction between suggestion, delectation, and consent: for not a few penitents labor under anxiety concerning shameful thoughts to which in reality they did not furnish consent.

19. 2. Depraved desire is had when someone depicts for himself venereal delectation as future, and deliberately wishes to enjoy it. Now the absolute desire of a gravely unlawful act is a mortal sin. This is clear from the words of Christ: "Whoever shall look on a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart."[1] Besides, desire includes all the malices which it apprehends in the object; hence if someone wishes to have copulation with a married woman, his sin takes on the malice of adultery.

[1] Matt. 5:28.

The same must be said in practice concerning conditioned desire; for from what has been said, n. 505, in those things which are intrinsically evil, as venereal delectation outside matrimony is, the condition added does not remove the malice of the act.

But among unlawful desires must not be counted those which spouses foster of legitimately using matrimony, and therefore of enjoying the venereal delectation annexed to marital intercourse: for this is lawful for them, provided the danger of pollution outside legitimate intercourse is absent. Indeed, a betrothed man can of itself desire future intercourse; but because in such desire there is also danger of consenting here and now to venereal delectation, the betrothed are to be exhorted diligently to turn away from themselves thoughts of this kind.

20. 3. Evil joy is free complacency concerning an unlawful venereal act as past; it is gravely sinful, just as morose delectation is, with this difference, however, that it more easily takes on the malice of the circumstances of the object depicted in the mind, because past things offer themselves more concretely to the imagination. - Sometimes also sadness arises concerning an evil not carried out, e.g., concerning intercourse not had when an occasion was given; this is very close to depraved desire, and gravely sinful if perfect consent is furnished to it.

Spouses can indeed rejoice concerning intercourse lawfully had and the delectation annexed to it, with the danger of pollution excluded; wherefore, if one spouse is absent, a vivid thought of the joy

experienced in intercourse is very dangerous, and in practice to be avoided (Supplement on Matrimony, n. 38).

21. Disputed question. Here, moreover, it is asked whether it is a mortal sin to behave passively and negatively with respect to venereal delectation which arises from depraved thoughts. (a) Certain theologians, such as Cajetan and Navarrus, say that this manner of acting is indeed a venial sin, because it includes some disorder, but not grave, provided the danger of furnishing positive consent is absent. (b) But most other theologians teach that it is a grave sin not positively to resist these movements of concupiscence: for it belongs to the will to restrain and repel the disordered movements of the other faculties; moreover, one who, after full advertence, behaves wholly passively exposes himself to the danger of furnishing consent.

This second opinion is more probable, and in practice far safer: for from things commonly occurring, unless delectation of this kind is strenuously and quickly repelled, it soon grows and allures the will to consent. But it is not necessary, nor opportune, directly to withstand these temptations; rather, after briefly invoking divine help, it is better to turn the mind away from these matters, seriously applying it to an honorable thought or action. - Indeed, it is expedient to repel not only shameful and obscene imaginations, but also sensual ones, as full of danger, so that chastity may be preserved whole.

II. Concerning External Sins of Non-Consummated Luxury.

22. Preliminary notes. The acts of which there is question are not of themselves directly opposed to chastity, but to pudicity, which flees everything that excites shame and allures to lust. Wherefore, with depraved affection excluded, they are acts rather immodest than venereal. Therefore their malice proceeds from the fact that sometimes they arise from libidinous affection, or induce a more or less proximate danger of consenting to venereal delectation. And so here one must recall to memory what we wrote concerning proximate occasions in the Treatise on Penance, n. 451-469.

(A) For judging the gravity of sins of immodesty, there are certain general rules:

(a) The intention of the one acting must be attended to: if someone acts from libidinous affection, deliberately pursuing venereal delectation, the external acts, even if by their nature they seem honorable, are mortal sins and take on the malice of the evil act which is ultimately intended. Thus to look at a woman and to touch her hands with the intention of seducing her and fornicating with her is a mortal sin which is reduced to fornication; for external acts take their malice from the internal affection. - From this it is given to understand how many sins are committed by those who, giving themselves wholly to luxury, seek nothing else in conversations, looks, or touches, except to indulge lust; concerning whom Peter says:[2] "Having eyes full of adultery and of unceasing sin."

[2] 2 Pet. 2:14.

23. (b) With depraved affection set aside, it must also be attended to whether the action, not only considered in itself, but also with respect to the one operating, proximately and gravely moves to lust; if the matter so stands, to place the external act without sufficient cause, deliberately and morosely, is commonly a grave sin, because of the proximate and grave danger of

consenting to venereal delectation. Indeed, if the act is of itself apt gravely to excite the lust of others, it will be a mortal sin of scandal. - But if there is a sufficient reason for placing the act, there is no sin, provided consent is absent; thus physicians and surgeons can look at and touch the dishonorable parts of a person of the other sex when true necessity is present, even if, apart from the intention, venereal delectation should arise from it. - But if the acts, although of themselves apt to excite lust, are done from levity or curiosity, and briefly, generally they are not grave sins, because they do not influence the shameful movements proximately and gravely.

(c) When external acts, neither from the intention of the one acting nor from their nature, tend notably toward venereal delectation, but are only apt to excite some commotion of the flesh, they are venial sins if they are done without a reasonable motive; they are excused from every sin if they are exercised for a sufficient reason.

24. (d) For rendering a judgment concerning the malice of external acts, customs of places, education, temperament, and the psychological dispositions of the one acting must also be attended to. Thus young men reared in cities, where nude statues or paintings are publicly displayed, generally can look at them, with depraved affection set aside, without sinning; whereas those who were educated in villages and have never seen anything nude are gravely moved as soon as they look at nude statues. Likewise, by force of education and temperament, certain persons are much more affected than others by the reading of novels. Wherefore the confessor must ask penitents about the manner in which matters of this kind influence them in exciting depraved imaginations.

25. (B) For judging the species of the sin committed, the following rules are handed on:

(a) Looks and touches are of diverse species, according to the moral estimation of prudent persons, because they attain their object in a diverse manner.

(b) Looks at persons of different sex are likewise held as sins of diverse species, because, from common estimation, they are referred to acts diverse in species.

(c) Touches, and therefore kisses and embraces, are of diverse species according to the diverse circumstances of persons; and therefore of itself in confession it must be opened whether someone has touched a person of different sex, a married person, a blood-relative, etc., because the sin takes on a special malice from these circumstances. Nevertheless, some do not advert to this malice except confusedly, especially when they by no means intend to proceed further. These things being posited, let us briefly run through the principal acts of immodesty, in order to investigate their malice.

26. 1. Concerning kisses. Kisses and embraces can be done on account of venereal delectation, on account of sensual delectation, or for the sake of civility and friendship.

(A) If they proceed from venereal affection, fully deliberate, they are mortal sins from what has been said. - Say the same if they are done upon dishonorable or less honorable parts, such as the breasts, because they usually excite grave carnal movements, and moreover suppose libidinous affection, since honorable persons are not accustomed to kiss these parts. - Generally also grave sins are kisses

which are morose, repeated often, with great affection, between mature persons of different sex, especially when the tongue is introduced into the mouth: for these of themselves tend to move concupiscence and can scarcely be done without depraved affection.

27. (B) Decent kisses, which are had for the sake of sensuality, on account of sensible love, without reasonable cause, do not exceed venial sin: for on the one hand they are not free from fault, because a reasonable cause is lacking, and on the other hand the fault is not mortal, because libidinous affection or proximate danger of exciting carnal delectation is lacking. But because from sensual love and delectation to pleasure there is an easy passage, especially among mature persons of different sex, kisses of this kind, if they are done frequently and morosely, soon reach mortal sin.

(C) Kisses, embraces, touches of the hands, which are done according to the custom of the country, for the sake of civility, friendship, or kinship, even among mature persons of different sex, without depraved affection, are lawful, even if by accident a carnal movement should sometimes be excited therefrom, provided the danger of consenting to venereal delectation is absent.

28. 2. Concerning touches. Almost the same must be said as concerning kisses.

(A) To touch the body, whether one's own or that of others, from venereal affection, is mortal; thus to touch the genitals of others,[3] especially of different sex, even mediately over clothes, with the case of necessity set aside (as happens to physicians, surgeons, and others having care of the sick): for this provokes lust and can scarcely be done without depraved affection.

[3] Antonelli notes (*op. cit.*, t. I, n. 391) that women's breasts, and precisely their apex, are the seat of pleasure, and that excitation of these carries with it vehement commotion of the genitals, so that it is a grave sin morosely to touch the breasts, apart from the case of necessity.

Mothers and nurses, however, are excused from mortal sin when they briefly touch the organs of little children from curiosity or levity, because then generally the danger of venereal delectation is absent; but if they do this often and morosely, even for quieting children, they generally sin gravely, since from this children sometimes contract the habit of touching themselves shamefully. - To touch the dishonorable parts of beasts briefly, from curiosity or sensuality, generally does not exceed venial sin, because it does not gravely move lust; but to do this for a long time, even to the pollution of beasts, is generally a grave sin, because it induces danger of one's own pollution.

29. (B) To touch a person of the same or of different sex in less honorable parts, e.g., on the breast, without venereal affection, but without usefulness, from a certain curiosity or from sensible love, is not free from fault; if it is done briefly, from jest or levity, generally it does not exceed venial sin; but if morosely, and with grave commotion of the organs, especially if there is question of a person of different sex, it can scarcely be excused from grave sin, because of the proximate danger of consenting to venereal delectation.

(C) To touch oneself in dishonorable parts, for the sake of necessity or usefulness, e.g., to drive away itching, to wipe away filth, to cure infirmity, is not sin, provided consent to the delectation which can arise from it is excluded. But every depraved affection, indeed disordered curiosity, must be diligently avoided; and therefore it is expedient to turn the mind to good things or at least indifferent things. -

But if someone touches himself in dishonorable parts without just cause, from levity or curiosity, without depraved affection, he sins venially, because he imprudently exposes himself to the danger of causing carnal movements. Those who are prone to pollution, moreover, must altogether abstain from these touches.

(D) Here it can also be asked whether it is lawful to admit touches or kisses which are known to arise from libidinous affection. - (a) If the touches are of themselves dishonorable, and are done without necessity, it is not lawful, because thus there is cooperation in the sin of another without just cause. (b) If there is question of a kiss or touch honorable in itself, before others who do not know the depraved intention of the other, it can be admitted lest the other be defamed, with the danger of one's own consent set aside; if it is done secretly, so that it can be prevented without grave inconvenience, it cannot be permitted, since it is not lawful without grave cause to cooperate in the mortal sin of another.

30. 3. Concerning looks. Although immodest looks move lust less than touches, nevertheless they are very dangerous.

(A) Those who, without necessity, morosely and deliberately look at the private parts of another sex,[1] sin gravely of themselves, or also of the same sex if they are prone to sodomy; or who look at a man and woman exercising gravely immodest acts upon one another; or at individual persons polluting themselves. - The same must generally be said of those who morosely look at the wholly nude breasts of a woman.

[1] In most academies of painting or sculpture, nude persons are proposed as models (*modeles*), because, as they say, studies on the nude body are necessary for the perfection of art. This certainly is not lawful for painting or sculpting obscene things. But if this is judged truly necessary, in certain circumstances, for the perfection even of honorable art (concerning which let Christian directors of Academies judge), Berardi, *Praxis*, t. I, n. 804, establishes these things: "Directors of academies of this kind certainly can tolerate that women, according to the custom already introduced, be used as a model, with the private parts nevertheless covered and precautions used lest disorders follow. - Young men who learn the art are excused, provided they are cautious." But honorable girls are with difficulty excused from sin if they exhibit themselves in these academies. But those who have already become accustomed to these things are in lesser danger and can be excused if true necessity is present. Hence those sin who, without necessity, enter this slippery way. - And indeed it is to be lamented that, in Christian regions, studies on the nude body are considered necessary. - Cf. Ball. P., t. II, n. 984; Genicot, t. I, n. 407; Noldin, n. 56.

As regards statues or paintings, they indeed move the passions less than persons do; nevertheless, some are so obscene that it is not lawful to look at them without sin, the gravity of which depends on the danger itself of consenting to depraved delectation; but others, although nude, do not vehemently excite lust unless they are looked at morosely from disordered affection; hence to look at them briefly is not a mortal sin, unless from experience it is established that this is a proximate and grave danger for certain persons; indeed there is no sin with respect to those who experience no temptation from this look.

31. (B) To look at the less honorable parts of a person of different sex, if it is done briefly from curiosity, generally does not exceed venial sin, because it is not accustomed gravely to excite the passions. The same can be said of looking at the coupling of animals, without libidinous affection, from curiosity; if a cause is present, there will be no sin.

(C) To look at one's own private parts from curiosity or levity, without cause, but without depraved affection, of itself does not exceed venial sin; if some reason of usefulness is present, there is no sin. The same must be said concerning the look at a nude person of the same sex, if it is done briefly from mere curiosity. In regions where men are accustomed to swim nude, such a look is generally free from every fault, with depraved affection set aside, because it does not excite lust; but it is more consonant with Christian modesty that private parts be covered, as is done in most Christian regions.

From this it is lawful to infer that those sin mortally who expose to the eyes of others gravely obscene objects which bring grave scandal; those sin venially who display something indecent, which of itself offends pudicity, even if it does not vehemently provoke to lust.

32. 4. Concerning conversations. (A) Those sin gravely who speak shameful things from libidinous affection, or with the intention of seducing others or gravely scandalizing them, or have conversation about entirely obscene matters, at least before the unmarried,[2] e.g., about the conjugal act, about means of impeding generation or of polluting oneself: for these things induce a proximate danger of sinning mortally, both in the one speaking and in those hearing, and therefore they include a twofold malice. The same must be said of those who narrate grave sins perpetrated by themselves in very obscene words, apt to excite lust.

[2] Shameful conversations among the married, although diligently to be avoided for the sake of pudicity, are rarely mortal sins, with depraved affection set aside, because, since these are accustomed to these matters, they are moved less gravely by them.

33. (B) But if the words are only lightly indecent, or indeed gravely so, but for the sake of jest and briefly, among persons accustomed to these matters, generally they do not exceed venial sin, because they do not induce grave danger of sinning. - To speak decently about venereal matters, for true usefulness, is not sin.

(C) To hear shameful conversations, without cause, with a certain complacency, is a grave or light sin according to the danger which is incurred of consenting to depraved delectation; generally it is a light sin if someone hears these only from curiosity or human respect, without depraved affection, especially when he cannot morally leave. Finally, to hear these with displeasure, when it is morally necessary, is no sin, provided means are used to drive away evil thoughts, e.g., by praying or by turning the mind to other things.

In practice it is altogether to be avoided to speak about these matters, even for the sake of jest, but one ought to turn the conversation to other things whenever this can be done: "But fornication, and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you, as befits saints."[3]

[3] Eph. 5:3.

34. 5. Concerning the reading of books and attendance at theaters. These two excite the passions more or less, according as they display matters more or less luxurious, and at the same time according to the diverse persons who read the books or attend the spectacles.

Hence (a) to read shameful books from a libidinous intention, or books so obscene that there is proximate danger of consenting to venereal delectation, is a mortal sin. Say the same of spectacles. (b) With shameful affection and proximate danger of sinning gravely excluded, to read shameful or dangerous books without cause, from curiosity, is a venial sin; if a just cause is present, there is no sin, provided all consent to carnal delectation is guarded against.

Today not a few young persons are corrupted by reading depraved books or by frequenting spectacles of the lowest kind; wherefore parents must take care lest in this matter they furnish evil example to their children.

35. 6. Concerning dances. Dances (*danses, bals*) of themselves are not sins, but often become an occasion of sin by reason of nudities, songs, gestures, touches, etc. Hence dances are of themselves lawful, provided they are done with honorable persons and in an honorable manner, namely by avoiding nudities and touches and other things of this kind which provoke lust; but, since they are dangerous, let them be done rarely and cautiously, not for the sake of pleasure, but for the sake of usefulness.

Some hold that dances called waltz, polka, mazurka, schottische, etc., can never be permitted; nevertheless in practice women, even honorable ones, today take part in these and contend that they do nothing evil, because they attend so much to rhythmic movements and music that they do not think of sensual pleasure.[4] Wherefore the matter cannot be prohibited in a general and absolute manner, but in individual cases, according to the circumstances of persons, the custom of places, the manner of dancing, etc., it must be judged whether dances of this kind are, for a determined person, a truly proximate occasion of sin or of scandal; nor can they be permitted unless both dangers have been removed.

[4] Berardi, *De Recidivis et occasionariis*, 5th ed., 1897, t. II, n. 188; *Ami du Clerge*, t. XIX, 1897, pp. 401, 663, 1064, 1069.

Another and greater danger is had when, after the dance has been had, young men lead girls home, as happens in certain regions: for while they walk or ride together, alone with alone, there is a much more proximate occasion of sinning; wherefore parents must not tolerate this practice, at least regularly.

Concerning dances St. Francis de Sales rightly writes:[5] "Ordinarily they include danger, dissipate the spirit of devotion, weaken spiritual powers, render charity cold, and excite six hundred kinds of depraved affections in the soul; wherefore they can be frequented only circumspectly and with the greatest prudence." - Where the custom of dances does not flourish, pastors will take care that this not be introduced; where it exists, they will prudently strive to restrain abuses, by private rather than public admonitions; by promoting works of sincere piety and the frequentation of the sacraments, sometimes they will be able to remove the matter from the midst, or at least to free it from many dangers.

[5] St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction*, part III, c. 33.

36. N. B. In all these things we have tried to establish what is prohibited under grave or light sin, the morals of the present day being attended to. But true Christians, not content with these things, must change morals for the better; this indeed they will accomplish not only by

furnishing good example to others, but also by establishing associations and leagues by which chastity and pudicity are promoted, according to the things to be said below, art. III.

§ II. Concerning Consummated Sins of Luxury.

There are two genera, according as they are according to nature or against nature.

I. Concerning Consummated Sins According to Nature.

37. 1. Concerning fornication. (A) Simple fornication is intercourse of an unmarried man, or one not joined in marriage, with an unmarried woman, from mutual consent. Intercourse, moreover, properly consists in penetration of the female vessel with semination made there; if male seed is not poured forth, there is begun or imperfect intercourse; but effusion of female humor is by no means required for perfect intercourse.

(B) Fornication is a mortal sin, prohibited not only by positive law, but also by natural law. For Paul says:[1] "For know this and understand, that no fornicator, or unclean person, or covetous person, which is the service of idols, has inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God." Moreover, that this is forbidden by natural law is established from this proposition condemned by Innocent XI: "It seems so clear that fornication according to itself involves no malice, and is evil only because forbidden, that the contrary seems altogether discordant with reason." - In reality fornicators seek venereal delectation without the burdens of matrimony; and this indeed tends to the detriment of human society: for when vague and free concubinage is admitted, provision is not sufficiently made for the education of offspring, which demands the care of father and mother. But even if in a determined case provision were made for the education of offspring, fornication would nevertheless be a grave sin, because of itself and from things commonly occurring it tends to evil or at least imperfect education of offspring.

[1] Eph. 5:5.

38. (C) Sometimes various malices are added to fornication: (a) intercourse is sometimes committed in an onanistic manner, in order to prevent the generation of offspring: then it is against nature (Supplement on Matrimony, n. 40).

(b) When intercourse is frequently had with the same person, whether she is retained at home or not, concubinage is present; its special malice consists in the purpose of persevering in sin. - The concubinarian is in a proximate occasion of sinning, and regularly cannot be absolved unless he has dismissed the concubine, if she is retained at home; the case is excepted in which death is imminent, so that time is lacking for casting out the concubine. Here what we have said concerning occasionaries must be recalled to memory, in the Treatise on Penance, n. 460.

(c) Prostitution is the state of a woman who prostitutes herself to all, for the sake of gain or lust. There also is a depraved will of committing many sins, even adulteries and sacrileges, if the occasion should present itself.

Prostitution cannot be tolerated by magistrates except to impede greater evils,[2] namely sins against nature, and lest perhaps honorable women be subjected too frequently to the impure solicitations of

the depraved. Hence let it be tolerated not everywhere, but only in great cities, and indeed precautions having been used to remove scandals, insofar as this can be done.

[2] St. Thomas, 2. 2ae, q. 10, a. 11.

39. 2. Concerning rape. Rape is distinguished as threefold: in the strict, or canonical, sense, it is the defloration[3] of a virgin, she being unwilling; in the less strict sense, it is the defloration of a virgin, even if she is consenting; in the broad sense, it is intercourse with any woman whatever, she being unwilling.

[3] A virgin is deflowered when through first carnal intercourse she loses the flower of virginity.

(A) Rape is called violent not only when a woman is oppressed by force, but also when intercourse is extorted by threats or by fear unjustly inflicted, or by deceit or fraud, e.g., by abusing the ignorance of a girl, by falsely promising marriage, by carnally knowing a woman in sleep or drunkenness. Now every violent rape, even with a woman who is not a virgin, includes a twofold malice, one against chastity and the other against justice, since the right of the woman over her own body is violated.

(B) But rape which is punished by canonical penalties is the defloration of a virgin, she being unwilling, unless another thing is expressly noted. - When a virgin is deflowered with her consent, there is indeed a notably aggravating circumstance, but the species of the sin is not changed.

(C) Related to rape is abduction, or the violent carrying off of a person, for the sake of fulfilling lust. Therefore it differs from the impediment of abduction, which is incurred when the carrying off is done for the sake of entering marriage. It likewise includes a twofold malice, namely against justice and chastity.

N. B. A woman to whom violence is brought is always held not only to resist internal delectation, but also exteriorly to manifest dissent, by crying out and, according to her strength, by repelling the aggressor; nevertheless she is not held to resist in that external manner which exposes her to danger of death or infamy, provided the proximate danger of internal consent is absent.

40. 3. Concerning adultery. (A) Adultery is intercourse with the spouse of another; it is simple if an unmarried person sins with a married woman or vice versa, but double if both are married. External acts, even non-consummated, and also impure desires of sinning with the spouse of another, in some way take on the malice of adultery. Nevertheless, not a few, from lack of consideration or ignorance, do not advert to this twofold malice in incomplete acts: in which case they are not strictly held to declare it.

(B) Adultery, even simple, always includes a twofold malice, both mortal, namely against chastity and against justice, by violating the right of the other spouse. This indeed is true even if the other spouse consents: for the right of which there is question, since it arises from a contract necessary for the public good, cannot be alienated. Wherefore this proposition 50 was condemned by Innocent XI: "Intercourse with a married woman, with the husband consenting, is not adultery; and therefore it suffices in confession to say that one has fornicated." - But besides, as often as offspring is born from an adulterous wife, temporal damage is brought upon her husband by introducing an adulterine infant into his family, and also upon legitimate children, who thereby lose a portion of inheritance; when and how such damage must be repaired, we explained in the Treatise on Justice, n. 575.

41. (C) Intercourse had with a person who has contracted valid betrothal with another is certainly a notably aggravating circumstance, because the inchoate right of another is violated; but whether it changes the species of the sin, and therefore must be declared in confession, is not certainly established; hence if the penitent is silent about this matter, the confessor is not held to ask.

42. 4. Concerning incest. (A) Incest is intercourse between blood-relatives or relatives by affinity who, according to the law of the Church, cannot enter valid marriage with each other, e.g., between blood-relatives up to the fourth degree. Under the name of relationship also comes spiritual relationship, arising from baptism or confirmation, and legal relationship, from valid adoption.[4] - External acts and desires of sinning with blood-relatives or relatives by affinity are referred to incest, as was said concerning adultery.

[4] Concerning these see the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 333 and 334.

(B) Incest includes a twofold malice, namely against chastity and piety, both mortal; but those who sin with remote blood-relatives or relatives by affinity, or with spiritually or legally related persons, do not always advert to this. - Incest arising from consanguinity or affinity differs in species from that which proceeds from spiritual or legal relationship; but it is commonly admitted that incest from consanguinity does not differ in species from that which arises from affinity.

Some say that incests committed between blood-relatives or relatives by affinity in any degree whatever, even between parents and children, brothers and sisters, are probably of the same species.[5] But with most theologians we think that incest with an ascendant or descendant and with a brother or sister differs in species from the others;[6] and common sense indeed so bears, which holds such horrendous crimes as worthy of special reprobation. Indeed, if someone has sinned with a stepmother (*belle-mere*) while the father is living, we judge that this circumstance must be declared in confession, by reason of the atrocious injury toward the parent:[7] thus Lehmkuhl, n. 882.

[5] Sporer-Bierbaum, t. III, p. IV, n. 609; Ball. P., t. II, n. 1016; Noldin, n. 21.

[6] Lugo, *De Poenitent.*, disp. XVI, n. 143; St. Alphonsus, l. III, n. 448, and l. VI, n. 470; Lehmkuhl, t. I, n. 882.

[7] Concerning this crime Paul said (1 Cor. 5:1): "There is absolutely heard among you fornication, and such fornication as is not even among the Gentiles, that one should have his father's wife."

43. (C) Carnal sins committed by a pastor with parishioners take on a special malice, not indeed of incest, but of injustice, insofar as a shepherd induces to sin those whom by office he ought to draw back from vice. - Moreover a confessor who sins carnally with a penitent, although he does not commit incest, incurs excommunication if he absolves the accomplice (On Penance, n. 510-528).

44. 5. Concerning sacrilege. Sacrilegious luxury is the violation of a sacred person, place, or thing through a venereal act; concerning the threefold species of this sin it was said above, n. 930-934. The sin of solicitation participates in some way in the malice of sacrilege, by which the confessor abuses the sacrament of penance for a shameful sin (On Penance, n. 529).

II. Concerning Consummated Sins Against Nature.

There are four: pollution, onanism, sodomy, bestiality; but onanism is treated in the Supplement to the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 39.

45. 1. Concerning pollution. (A) By this name theologians designate any effusion whatever of human seed, whether voluntary or involuntary, without intercourse. Physicians, however, commonly understand by this word involuntary effusion of seed, especially that which happens during sleep. But voluntary emission they call onanism, solitary vice, masturbation (from the words *manu*, stupration); this indeed must be noticed, lest, in hearing confessions or understanding books of physicians, a harmful error be incurred.

Pollution properly so called is not found in those who do not have true seed, namely in the prepubescent, eunuchs, indeed also women. For in women there is no other seed except the ovum, which descends from the ovaries into the uterus without perception of delectation; the vaginal humor, which flows within the organs and sometimes externally, is not prolific; nevertheless, since it is joined with complete venereal delectation, the voluntary effusion of this humor, outside marital intercourse, is a mortal sin, because, although not necessary for generation, nevertheless it is ordered to it as something accessory.

Pollution in men differs from distillation, which is a small effusion of humor flowing from the prostate and urethra, akin to the vaginal humor of which above.

46. (B) For judging the morality of pollution, one must diligently distinguish between pollution willed in itself or in the cause, and pollution wholly involuntary. This sometimes happens in the state of waking, but more often in sleep. (a) Involuntary pollution which happens to those awake is called passive (*perte seminale*), is provoked by very slight causes, and occurs without delectation: this is truly a disease, not rarely proceeding from the habit of sinning, but in itself free from every fault.

47. (b) The latter is called nocturnal pollution, because it occurs during sleep. Often it arises from merely natural causes, especially from abundance of seed, and is, as it were, an emptying of nature. Young men who have attained puberty and those who remain unmarried suffer this more or less frequently; when it happens only once in a week, it is not to be cared about; if three times or more often, and indeed in a habitual manner, it is expedient to have recourse to a physician.

Now nocturnal pollution, when both in itself and in its cause it is involuntary, is no sin, even if phantasms more or less dishonorable precede or accompany it: for it is natural that phantasms of this kind occur when superabundant seed is expelled,[1] on account of the connection between the genital organs and the brain, the seat of imagination. - If it happens to those half-asleep with some consent to the delectation accompanying it, it does not exceed venial sin, because of imperfect knowledge and volition (above, n. 79). In doubt whether someone consented, it must be judged that consent was not given, at least not fully, if in the waking state all these things displease him. - Sometimes, however, it happens that pollution is voluntary in the cause, insofar as it is caused by dishonorable thoughts,

readings, or conversations deliberately had, with foresight of this depraved effect: then it is a sin, more or less grave, according as the aforesaid actions were more or less sinful and the foresight more certain and distinct. But the sin is committed not at the time when the pollution happens, but at that instant when it is foreseen and its cause is deliberately placed (above, n. 174).

[1] St. Thomas, 2. 2ae, q. 154, a. 5.

48. (C) Pollution in itself, or directly voluntary, is a grave sin. For St. Paul numbers effeminacy, that is, pollution, among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of God.[2] In reality the effusion of human seed is ordered solely to the generation of offspring, and the pleasure annexed to it is for attaining this end more efficaciously; but in pollution directly willed, seed is emitted for the sake of pleasure alone, against the order of nature, and therefore it is sin;[3] but if it were lightly unlawful, the end intended by nature would be frustrated: for many men, content with this pleasure, would bid farewell to the burdens of matrimony, or would contract nuptials only after lust had been fulfilled, when they have become impotent for generating. - Therefore this proposition 49 was rightly reproved by Innocent XI: "Effeminacy is not prohibited by natural law. Hence if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good and sometimes obligatory under mortal sin."

[2] 1 Cor. 6:10.

[3] The pagans themselves admitted this, the poet Martial testifying (*Epigram.*, l. IX, 42): "Believe nature herself to say of things: That which with your fingers, Ponticus, you destroy, is a man."

49. Moreover, the physical and moral effects which follow from voluntary pollution clearly show how much it is contrary to nature. For young persons addicted to this vice easily contract a wholly tyrannical habit, which greatly weakens their strength: frequency of immodest acts disturbs the whole nervous system and the brain; hence weakness and general weariness, pains of the head, diminution of appetite, convulsions of the limbs, weakening of sight and hearing; then involuntary, or passive, pollutions accede, vehement palpitations of the heart; sometimes also incurable diseases: phthisis, dropsy, epilepsy, tabes dorsalis, and, among women, inflammation of the uterus, hysteria. Often also by frequent masturbation the power of coition and generating is lost. - To these effects must be added others, moral, namely depression of soul, enervation of the will, inability for labors, especially intellectual ones: for the mind, infected with obscene images, can scarcely think about other things; soon noble ideas and pure affections vanish, insane egoism prevails; sometimes madness succeeds. - Not all these effects indeed are always produced, nor in the same degree in all: for this depends on bodily constitution, frequency and duration of acts, and other circumstances; but the danger is certainly present that an inveterate and almost incurable habit be contracted, from which the aforesaid effects will follow more or less.[4]

[4] Many physicians have described these effects, among whom: Tissot, *De l'onanisme*, 1760; Garnier, *Onanisme*; Fournier, *L'onanisme*, Paris, 1892; Ribbing, *L'hygiene sexuelle*, Paris, Alcan, 1901, p. 156; Surbled, *La Morale*, t. II, ch. 3-8; idem, *Le vice solitaire*, Paris, 1905; Vigouroux, *Traite de Medecine*, t. IV, pp. 304-317; Stall, *What a young boy ought to know*, Philadelphia, 1897, pp. 97-118.

Nor are those physicians to be heard who, in order to deter young men from pollution, advise fornication to them, falsely asserting that seed must sometimes be poured forth for the sake of

health. - For part of the seed is reabsorbed in the body, to which it adds new strength;[5] the other part is poured forth naturally during sleep, without any disturbance of the nerves; while fornication, which is morally evil, can induce syphilis.

[5] Surbled, *Vie de jeune homme*, ch. 6-7.

50. Corollary. When pollution has begun without consent of the will, whether in sleep or in waking, he sins gravely who voluntarily and positively performs and completes it, whether by touch or by movement. Nevertheless there is no strict obligation positively to restrain it, but it can be permitted that nature empty itself, provided the danger of consenting to the delectation itself is absent. For in the prior case pollution is truly procured; in the latter only the emptying of nature is permitted: which in certain circumstances is useful, lest a grave temptation arise therefrom, which the will would resist with difficulty, and lest disturbance of the nerves occur.[6] Generally, however, it is more advisable to restrain imminent pollution when this can be done without irritation of the nerves.

[6] Theologians formerly said that this was lawful lest the seed be corrupted; this reason indeed is physiologically false; but sudden and frequent suppression of begun pollution predisposes to nervous diseases; cf. Debreyne-Ferrand, *La theol. morale et les sc. med.*, 6th ed., p. 87.

51. (D) Pollution not directly, but only voluntary in the cause, is culpable or not, gravely or lightly, according as there was or was not a reason for placing the cause from which the evil effect arises.

Pollution is called voluntary in the cause when it is foreseen as about to follow from some other act. Now, from what has been said above, n. 175, it is lawful to place an act good or indifferent in itself from which an evil effect will follow, provided a proportionately grave reason is present, and moreover consent to the evil end is guarded against. (a) If the danger of pollution, from the very nature of the action, is proximate and very probable, the proportionately grave reason must be necessity or great usefulness; thus it is lawful for physicians, surgeons, servants who in hospitals or baths serve the necessities of the body, to place acts from which pollution is foreseen, because their ministry is necessary or very useful. (b) If the danger is of itself remote and probable, a light reason suffices for placing an act otherwise good or indifferent. Therefore honorable kisses, embraces, decent dances, gymnastic exercises, riding, abundant meals are lawful, even if probably pollution should sometimes follow therefrom, provided they are done for the sake of civility or recreation, without depraved affection and danger of consenting to venereal delectation. - To guard against this danger, it is better immediately to divert the mind to honorable things.

52. On this occasion it is asked whether it is lawful to drive away by touch or rubbing an itching which someone suffers in the private parts, with danger of pollution. Generally it is better to tolerate it patiently. Nevertheless, if the itching arises from some inflammation or acrimony of blood, it is not unlawful to drive it away thus, because true usefulness is present, provided the danger of consent is absent; but if it arises from abundance of seed or ardor of lust, it is not lawful, because the touch tends to calming lust through pollution; moreover, it is not lawful to use an evil as a means to an end, even a good one.

53. Corollaries. From what has been said it is established what must be judged concerning distillation and concerning movements of the flesh.

(a) Distillation which occurs involuntarily and frequently, without commotion of the organs and pleasure, is not sin, but a disease, concerning which a physician is to be approached. - Distillation which occurs with some excitation of the organs is a mortal sin if it is directly excited on account of venereal delectation; a venial sin if it is caused from curiosity or levity, without depraved affection and danger of consent; no sin if it arises from honorable and lawful acts, e.g., conversations and looks otherwise decent, provided consent to the commotion is absent: for then it must be attributed to human weakness.

54. (b) The same can be said of carnal movements, which especially consist in erection of the male member or of the female clitoris: if directly voluntary, they are a grave sin because of the venereal delectation which accompanies them; if indirectly voluntary, or in the cause, although without sufficient reason, they generally do not exceed venial sin, with depraved affection and danger of consent set aside, because they proceed from levity; when a sufficient cause accedes, they are no sin, provided no complacency is voluntarily taken in them.

When these movements arise spontaneously, if they are light and transitory, one need not care about them; for solicitude to impede them is accustomed rather to increase them. If they are grave and lasting, it is not enough to behave passively, but one must resist them, in order to avoid the danger of consent. Direct resistance, however, generally excites the nerves and increases the force of the temptation. Wherefore one must resist indirectly, by changing place or posture, by working, walking, writing, in one word by diverting the mind to other things.

55. 2. Concerning sodomy. (A) Paul testifies that the unspeakable crime of sodomy flourished among the pagans:[1] "For their women changed the natural use into that use which is against nature. And likewise the males also, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their desires toward one another, males with males working shame."

[1] Rom. 1:26-27.

A twofold sodomy is distinguished: perfect, or properly so called, which is intercourse of two of the same sex, namely of male with male,[2] or of female with female; imperfect, or improperly so called, which is intercourse with a person of different sex, but in an unnatural vessel. They are two diverse species. - For sodomy simple touch does not suffice, but there is required, at least on one side, application of the genital member to the body of another, in whatever manner it is done.

[2] When men abuse boys to fulfill lust, it is called pederasty.

(B) Sodomy is a most grave sin, graver than fornication and simple pollution, both because it is most against nature and because both sodomites furnish scandal to each other and concur in the sin of the other.

56. Although perfect sodomy can be performed in various ways, penitents are not to be asked about these: it is enough to know whether it was consummated by effusion of seed.

Sodomy improperly so called, which is committed in the preposterous vessel, is accustomed to induce most grave diseases, especially in women; concerning these read physicians.

There is a more horrendous kind of sodomy, which by theologians is called *irrumatio*, by the common people abuse of the mouth: it consists in licking the genitals of the same or of another sex, and in other shameful acts committed with the tongue and mouth; this likewise draws many diseases after itself.

When sodomy is a reserved sin, as in many dioceses, sodomy properly so called, and indeed consummated, is understood, unless another thing is declared; this more frequently happens among males, but sometimes also among girls and women, who rub genitals against genitals with each other.

57. 3. Concerning bestiality. (A) Bestiality is intercourse with a beast; when effusion of seed in the natural vessel accedes, bestiality properly so called and consummated is had. Where sodomy is reserved, reservation is to be understood of this kind, unless another thing is established.

(B) Bestiality is of itself the gravest of all sins of luxury, since through it man is compared to beasts and becomes one flesh with them.[3] - The species of the sin is not changed, whatever the sex of the beast may be. - This crime is committed especially by country people, and by certain women who use dogs to fulfill lust. Immodest touches with a beast are not properly bestiality, but lead to it and often provoke pollution: in which case they are gravely sinful.

[3] In the old law the horrendous crime of bestiality was not only prohibited, but punished with death: "He who has intercourse with a beast or cattle, let him die the death; kill the beast also. The woman who shall lie under any beast, let her be killed together with it" (Lev. 20:15-16).

58. (C) Related to this sin is the crime of necrophilia, or intercourse with a dead woman, which is sometimes committed by guardians of the dead: it shows a wholly depraved sense.

Conclusion of This Article: — The Manner of Questioning Concerning the Aforesaid Sins.

59. One must recall to memory the principle explained in the Treatise on Penance, n. 385, namely, in questions all those things are to be avoided which can probably scandalize penitents: for material integrity of confession is prescribed only by positive divine law, while scandal must be avoided from the natural law itself. Now the confessor can especially scandalize in two ways, by imprudently teaching penitents a way of perpetrating sins unknown to them, or by proposing useless questions from which penitents judge the confessor to be too versed in venereal matters.

To avoid this, the confessor should first take pains that the penitent declare that by which his conscience is burdened, promising, however, that afterward he will help him.

60. (a) If there is question of the prepubescent, it is enough to ask whether and how often they have heard, spoken, or done anything against modesty, decency, purity - whether alone or with others. It would be imprudent to inquire about the manner in which the sin was committed,

whether by using the hands or in another way. It is better to suggest that those actions which they would blush to commit before parents are seen by God, from whom nothing is hidden, and are very displeasing to Him, and are often punished by Him in this life, but especially in the other.

(b) As regards the mature, if they say that they touched themselves dishonorably, not from necessity but for the sake of pleasure, it can already be inferred, without further question, that pollution was committed. Wherefore girls are not to be asked whether they have procured pollution or emission of seed for themselves (which could excite their curiosity), but only whether they experienced dishonorable movements with pleasure, and fully consented to them, or voluntarily caused them (not inquiring about the manner); in which case the greatest horror of this delict should be impressed upon them.[4] Since some accuse external acts, while saying nothing about thoughts or desires, they are to be asked whether they previously voluntarily desired to commit those acts, whether they wished to perpetrate other acts. - On the other hand, some accuse depraved thoughts without daring to declare external acts; they can be asked whether they furnished consent to these imaginations not only internally, but by some exterior act.

[4] Cf. Fenelon, *Avis aux confesseurs*, *Oeuvres*, t. III, ed. Lebel, pp. 421-422.

(c) If the penitent accuses dishonorable familiarities with companions, it must be asked whether with persons of the same or of the other sex. If with persons of the same sex, whether as far as pollution (if there is question of males), as far as full pleasure (if of females); whether they did anything more shameful. If with persons of the other sex, whether they attempted what spouses do, or entirely consummated the evil action. Afterward one can ask about the quality of the person, so that it may be known whether adultery, incest, or sacrilege was committed. - Finally, opportune remedies are to be prescribed.

Art. III. Concerning the Means of Cultivating Chastity.

For avoiding the aforesaid foulnesses, nothing is more profitable than positively and assiduously to cultivate chastity by means both natural and supernatural, which it is pleasing briefly to describe.

61. 1. Chaste education. (A) Since young persons, like soft wax, receive any impressions more distinctly, it is of the greatest importance that already from tender years they learn how highly they ought to value purity of body and soul, and therefore with what horror they ought to flee whatever savors of impurity. Therefore let them be taught with how great reverence they ought to treat their own body, which is the instrument of the soul and the temple of the whole Trinity,[2] by avoiding sensual looks and touches, and by doing nothing in private which they would be ashamed to do before parents and honorable persons. Therefore let nothing be said or done before them which can excite a morbid and dangerous curiosity;[3] for they attend to these things, even while they seem distracted by other things; what they see, they desire to imitate; what excites curiosity, they diligently investigate. Likewise care must be taken lest nurses, servants, and others conversing with children say or do anything indecorous which could insert an impure thought into their minds: for some, still innocent, have been corrupted by the depraved

conversations or examples of servants. - Boys and girls should not sleep in the same room, nor especially in the same bed, at least after the seventh year.

[2] To the point Paul says (1 Cor. 6:19-20): "Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you?... Glorify and bear God in your body."

[3] This the poet Juvenal was already observing (*Satire* 14): "The greatest reverence is owed to a boy; if you are preparing anything shameful, do not despise the years of the boy."

62. (B) But when they have now become pubescent, and have experienced depraved movements in themselves, and at the same time seem anxious about the cause of these, we think it opportune that the parents themselves prudently and decently explain those things which younger persons may legitimately desire to know about these matters, lest perhaps they seek this from companions, who by depraved counsels and depraved examples can lead them to venereal acts. Parents, however, will opportunely adapt answers and counsels to the character of the young, not explaining all things at once, but little by little, adding that they are ready to answer honorably their honorable questions, as often as these shall have noticed something unusual.[1] If parents fail in this matter, it pertains to confessors chastely and prudently to instruct the young, as often as their confession offers them the opportunity. In which case, at the same time they should propose efficacious remedies for resisting temptations, both natural and supernatural.

[1] Cf. Fonssagrives, *Conseils aux parents et aux maitres sur l'education de la purete*. Parents themselves can use books written on this matter, and imbued with a Christian spirit, e.g., Surbled, *Vie de jeune homme*, Paris, 1900; idem, *La vie de jeune fille*, Paris, 1903; Stall, *What a young boy ought to know*; idem, *What a young girl ought to know*, Philadelphia.

63. 2. Flight from occasions. Since many fall into shameful vices because of the occasions of sinning by which they are surrounded, a few things must be noted concerning these.

(A) First, idleness is to be diligently avoided, even and especially by those who are rich. For idleness has taught much malice, especially as regards vices of the flesh. When the mind is held by no useful occupation, shameful thoughts often arise, especially in the young, and carnal movements, from which danger of pollution is imminent.

This indeed is more proximate when someone lies long in a soft bed after he has already awakened: for then the warmth of the dorsal region excites the genitals, and therefore grave temptations. - Some drive away leisure by reading; but if amorous books are read, as often happens, the temptation increases. - Likewise let young persons flee solitude: for generally those who remain long alone, without assiduous work or study, indulge in the solitary vice.

Therefore all, whether poor or rich, girls as well as boys, ought energetically to devote themselves to some honorable occupation; even when they need rest, let them avoid idleness, and let them occupy their mind by some useful recreation, games, physical exercise, and other ways.[1]

[1] Concerning girls who remain idle, Payot writes, *Education de la volonte*, p. 198: "A more serious thing, the absolute idleness in which they pass the years which follow their leaving school, the excellent nourishment which they receive, the absence of all fatigue, the exciting evenings to which they are taken, the opera, the reading of sentimental novels which is permitted to them and which the fashion or young ladies' journals serve them - this complex of causes makes

it impossible that their imagination not be perverted. People do not know how terrible are the hidden sufferings of idle young girls."

64. (B) Gluttony also, as the mother of luxury, is altogether to be moderated; for by abundant use of meats and wine, by frequent and sumptuous banquets and feasts, concupiscence blazes up. Many remain chaste as long as they are sober; but as soon as they indulge in banquets, and especially in wine and alcoholic liquors, they miserably slide into vices of the flesh. In reality sensuality and pleasure are akin; moreover, from abundant food and drink the mind is weighed down and begins to think about carnal things; soon concupiscence blazes up, the genitals are excited, and venereal delectation is ardently sought. Wherefore St. Paul says:[2] "Be not drunk with wine, wherein is luxury." - Concerning the means of overcoming gluttony and drunkenness, however, it was said above, nn. 540, 552.

[2] Eph. 5:18.

65. (C) Vain and unlawful loves are likewise to be fled, which do not tend to chaste matrimony.

Chaste love, which is ordered to honorable marriage, is by no means prohibited, provided it stands within the limits of pudicity; indeed it is often joined to carnal love, which is very dangerous; and therefore future spouses ought to take care lest, conquered by lust, they proceed further in this matter, as was said in the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 162. Nay more, since matrimony, instituted chiefly for the creation of offspring, is also a remedy of concupiscence, chaste love is to be fostered among persons able to marry, at the time when they seriously wish and are able to marry. But where there is no hope of legitimate matrimony, carnal love must be diligently avoided, for it tends to nothing else than copulation. Certain persons are deceived, thinking that there is no evil in tender love toward persons of the other sex. Concerning these friendships St. Francis writes:[1] "All these friendships are evil, foolish, and vain: evil indeed, because at last they end in carnal sin, and they steal away the love owed to God, to a wife, or to a husband; foolish, because they rest on no solid foundation or reason; vain finally, because no advantage, honor, or true delectation follows from them. On the contrary, they cause a notable loss of time, and bring a stain upon honor." Loves of this sort are the cause of almost innumerable sins, because they fill the mind with impure thoughts and desires. Often also they end in shameful concubinage, especially in cities, both among workmen and among young men who study in the Universities.[2] Not rarely even Christian parents tacitly approve or easily tolerate this manner of acting, and mothers do not hesitate to hand innocent girls over to impure men. These morals are truly pagan, and unless Catholics reprove and strive to change them, not only by words, but by examples, at length someday they will pay the penalties of their sins.

[1] St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction*, P. III, c. 18.

[2] Payot describes the miserable state of young men who give themselves to mistresses, op. cit., pp. 217-220; likewise he suggests natural means for avoiding these loves, p. 215: "One must avoid the reading of novels, and especially of indecent books or journals. There is such a page of Diderot which is equivalent to the absorption of a violently aphrodisiac substance. One must avoid the sight of obscene engravings, still more dangerous for the calm of the mind than descriptions. One must avoid the company of libidinous companions; one must foresee occasions down to the small details, never allow oneself to be surprised by temptation. At the beginning it is a simple thought, still without strength, which insinuates itself. If at this moment one is on guard, nothing is easier than to drive away the importunate thing. But if one lets the images become precise, if one takes pleasure in evoking them and complacently dwells upon them, it is too late. This is why the sovereign remedy is the work of the mind. When thought is strongly

occupied, the timid solicitations of passion are stopped, powerless, at the threshold of consciousness." To these, however, must be joined the supernatural means explained below.

66. Sometimes also among persons of the same sex truly sensual friendships are formed, which are full of dangers. True and supernatural friendship, by which we love certain persons before others, so that we may do good to them and receive help from them, is certainly legitimate; but when it is sensual, and seeks sensual embraces, it preoccupies the mind with vain thoughts, and excites depraved movements; it easily becomes carnal and soon tends to lust: therefore this must be diligently fled. Likewise it must be noted that from spiritual love there is an easy passage to sensual love, and afterward to carnal love, especially among persons of different sex.

There are other occasions to be avoided, such as shameful readings, depraved conversations, spectacles, dances less honorable: but concerning these it was already said above.

67. 3. Mortification of the flesh and the senses. (A) For since the flesh lusts against the spirit, it is necessary to tame it, so that we may live according to the spirit. The Apostle indeed did this:[1] "I chastise my body, and bring it into servitude, lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become reprobate."

[1] 1 Cor. 9:27.

The best means indeed of taming the flesh is assiduously to work or study, according to each one's condition: for just as an untamed horse, impatient of the bridle, becomes much gentler by bodily fatigue, so likewise with our body. To work may be added frequent walks, especially for those who are given to study, and also very brief cold baths: for thus sleep quickly seizes those who are tired, and many temptations are avoided. Let the bed be hard; let sleep not be taken lying on the back, but on the right side; let it not be prolonged beyond seven or eight hours; let no one except the sick remain long in bed after he has already awakened. Let foods be chosen which are light, by no means exciting, namely eggs, milk, tender and roasted meats, vegetables. Let wine be mixed with water, and let other alcoholic drinks be taken either rarely or never.

Physical chastisements, when they are done prudently, according to the counsel of the confessor, generally produce salutary effects. Thus the moderate withdrawal of some food can be useful, even outside ecclesiastical fasts. Hair-shirts or small iron chains, if they are worn neither long nor daily, tame the flesh in some measure by the sense of pain. Say the same of scourgings, provided neither the thighs nor the region of the genitals and loins are struck: for in these parts they easily excite concupiscence; moreover they should not be prolonged beyond a quarter of an hour, nor be permitted to weak, nervous, or hysterical persons. - Finally, let it always be borne in mind that the best of all scourgings is the assiduous and faithful fulfillment of the duties of one's state.

68. (B) Among the senses, especially the eyes, ears, and hands are to be guarded, according to what was said above (n. 30 sq.), by avoiding looking at, hearing, or touching not only what is evil, but also what is dangerous, indeed sometimes by abstaining from those things which are lawful. For thus pudicity is cultivated, the guardian of chastity; thus little by little the sense of sensual pleasure is weakened, from which there is an easy passage to venereal delectations. - Nor must it be passed over that the internal senses, namely imagination and memory, are often a cause of sin, by presenting to the mind phantasms and recollections which multiply

temptations, even when the external object is absent. Therefore those who wish to remain perfectly chaste should immediately and strenuously repel empty images of this sort, by diverting the mind to other things. Thus many attacks of the flesh are forestalled; thus the will is strengthened in good.

69. 4. Prompt and strenuous resistance to first temptations. Notwithstanding these things, grave temptations sometimes arise; to overcome these efficaciously, the rules explained above concerning temptations in general, n. 447, are especially to be applied. Resistance must indeed be made immediately, because, on account of the inclination toward venereal delectation, the temptation and the danger of consenting to it soon increase, unless it is quickly repelled; and also strenuously, because, since the inclination toward lust is vehement, it can be overcome not by soft resistance, but by a strong, generous, and constant effort.

For this, however, merely negative means do not suffice, but positive means are altogether desired. These consist in a truly Christian life, or in the ordering of the whole life to God: for if we wish to serve pleasure and the world, and at the same time God, soon depraved thoughts and impure desires invade the mind. But if we wish to please God alone, not only at the time when we perform religious duties, but also while we are occupied with actions profane in themselves, with manual labor, study, and honorable recreations, only a few temptations occur, and these are easily repelled by diverting the mind to other things. Hence those who need labor in order to obtain a livelihood for themselves should labor assiduously, not only to procure necessities for themselves and others, but also to attain eternal life; but the rich, whether men or women, should devote part of their time and of their resources to works of charity and social benevolence, according to what was said above, nn. 817-835; for thus their mind does not perpetually tend to earthly and carnal pleasures, but to love of God and neighbor; if any temptations occur, they are more easily overcome; if any falls occur, they are more benignly remitted, "because charity covereth a multitude of sins."[1]

[1] 1 Cor. 6:15.

70. 5. Frequent reception of the sacraments.[2] The aforesaid means become much more efficacious if the sacraments are received frequently and devoutly, especially penance and the Eucharist. (a) For as often as we seriously look into the recesses of conscience, and candidly open to the spiritual physician not only external sins, but also internal thoughts more or less shameful which tend to lust, as well as the dangerous occasions which we voluntarily approach, or in which, compelled by a certain necessity, we dwell - first indeed we conceive a greater horror of all such foulnesses; then we receive opportune counsels concerning fleeing occasions and the means of overcoming temptations; and, sacramental grace acceding, we are made more strenuous for despising the enticements of the flesh.

[2] Lacordaire speaks excellently concerning the means which the Catholic religion supplies for cultivating chastity, *Conf. de N. Dame*, 22nd and 23rd.

(b) Nor is holy communion less efficacious; for there our flesh is sanctified by the flesh of Christ, and, when we frequently receive the author of purity Himself, does it not shame us to hand over the

very members of Christ to luxury? "Know you not that your bodies are the members of Christ? Taking therefore the members of Christ, shall I make them the members of a harlot? God forbid."[1] Besides, nothing protects us more from sensual love than the chaste love of Christ: therefore when we are lovingly joined to the Lord in the sacrament of the altar, earthly pleasures indeed become distasteful; and our heart, preoccupied by the love of God, is less solicitous about unlawful loves.

[1] 1 Pet. 4:8.

Therefore let Christians attend to these words of Paul:[2] "For this is the will of God, your sanctification; that you should abstain from fornication. That every one of you should know how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honor; not in the passion of desire, like the Gentiles who know not God."

[2] 1 Thess. 4:3-5.

Civil law in various regions punishes with penalties certain delicts against good morals, especially when they are public, or perpetrated by force, or against justice. From the French Penal Code we have excerpted the following articles:

Art. 330. (Law of May 13, 1863.) Any person who shall have committed a public outrage against modesty shall be punished by imprisonment from three months to two years, and by a fine of 16 francs to 200 francs.[3]

[3] In order that the outrage against modesty be deemed public, it suffices that it has been or could have been perceived, whether it was committed in an open place, or in a private place in the presence of a witness. - This article was completed by the law of March 16, 1898: "Whoever shall have committed the delict of outrage against good morals shall be punished by imprisonment from one month to two years and by a fine of 100 to 5000 francs: - by the sale or placing on sale, the offering, exhibition, posting, or distribution, on the public way or in public places, of writings, printed matter other than a book, posters, drawings, engravings, paintings, emblems, objects, or images which are obscene or contrary to good morals; - by the sale or offering, even non-public, to a minor, of the same writings, printed matter, posters, etc.; - by their distribution at home, by their delivery under wrapper and under unsealed envelope at the door..., by unauthorized songs publicly uttered, by public announcements or correspondence contrary to good morals."

331. (Law of May 13, 1863.) Every assault against modesty, consummated or attempted without violence upon the person of a child of either sex, under the age of thirteen years, shall be punished by reclusion.

The assault against modesty committed by any ascendant upon the person of a minor shall be punished by the same penalty, even if he is more than thirteen years of age, but not emancipated by marriage.[1]

[1] The attempt foreseen by article 331 has its own character and is not subject to the general rule of article 2 of the Penal Code; the assault is committed as soon as it has been attempted. Therefore it is not necessary to establish, as in ordinary cases, that the attempt failed to have its effect only by a circumstance independent of the will of its author. - Cass., Aug. 4, 1853.

332. Whoever shall have committed the crime of rape shall be punished by hard labor for a term.

If the crime was committed upon the person of a child below the completed age of fifteen years, the guilty person shall undergo the maximum of the penalty of hard labor for a term.

Whoever shall have committed an assault against modesty, consummated or attempted with violence against individuals of either sex, shall be punished by reclusion.

If the crime was committed upon the person of a child below the completed age of fifteen years, the guilty person shall undergo the penalty of hard labor for a term.

333. (Law of May 13, 1863.) If the guilty persons are ascendants of the person upon whom the assault was committed, if they are of the class of those who have authority over him, if they are his teachers or his hired servants, or hired servants of the persons designated above, if they are public officials or ministers of a cult, or if the guilty person, whoever he may be, was aided in his crime by one or several persons, the penalty shall be that of hard labor for a term, in the case foreseen by paragraph 1 of article 331, and hard labor for life, in the cases foreseen by the preceding article.[2]

[2] The designation made by this article of certain persons upon whom their quality impresses the character of authority is only enumerative and does not exclude the application of the law to special and unforeseen facts from which authority can result. - Cass., Aug. 9, 1867. - Article 333 extends to those who have authority over the victim, without distinguishing between permanent authority and discontinuous authority. - Cass., Aug. 27, 1857.

334. Whoever shall have made an attempt against morals, by habitually exciting, favoring, or facilitating the debauchery or corruption of the youth of either sex below the age of twenty-one years, shall be punished by imprisonment from six months to two years, and by a fine of fifty francs to five hundred francs.

If the prostitution or corruption was excited, favored, or facilitated by their father, mother, tutor, or other persons charged with their supervision, the penalty shall be from two years to five years of imprisonment, and from three hundred to one thousand francs of fine.[1]

[1] Article 334 is inapplicable to him who, in exciting minors to debauchery, has no other end than to satisfy his own passions, without making himself an intermediary agent of corruption. - Cass., assembled chambers, March 24, 1853; May 1, 1854; March 15, 1860; Aug. 21, 1863. - Although article 334 must be understood in this sense, that it reaches only him who has employed himself as an intermediary agent of corruption in the interest of the passions of another, nevertheless there is complicity in this delict on the part of him who, to satisfy his own libertinage, has, by one of the means set forth in article 60, provoked the intervention of procuring. - Cass., Nov. 10, 1860. - And it is not necessary, in order that complicity exist in such a case, that the provocation in question have been habitual: habit, which forms one of the elements of the delict of excitation to debauchery, is not required to constitute complicity in the terms of article 60.

335. Those guilty of the delict mentioned in the preceding article shall be interdicted from every tutelage or curatorship, and from every participation in family councils; namely, the individuals to whom the first paragraph of that article applies, for at least two years and at most five years, and those of whom it is spoken in the second paragraph, for at least ten years and at most twenty years.

If the delict was committed by the father or the mother, the guilty person shall moreover be deprived of the rights and advantages accorded to him over the person and goods of the child by the Civil Code, book I, title IX, On Paternal Power.

In all cases, the guilty persons may moreover be placed, by the decision or judgment, under the surveillance of the high police, observing, for the duration of the surveillance, what has just been established for the duration of the interdiction mentioned in the present article.

336. The adultery of the wife may be denounced only by the husband; this faculty itself shall cease if he is in the case foreseen by article 339.[2]

[2] The public ministry cannot prosecute the delict of adultery except upon the complaint of the husband, and he can charge a third party, by special power, to denounce the adultery in his name and follow the action. - Cass., Nov. 23, 1855.

337. The woman convicted of adultery shall undergo the penalty of imprisonment for at least three months and at most two years.

The husband shall remain master of stopping the effect of this condemnation, by consenting to take back his wife.

338. The accomplice of the adulterous woman shall be punished by imprisonment for the same space of time, and, moreover, by a fine of one hundred francs to two thousand francs.

The only proofs which may be admitted against the accused of complicity shall be, besides the manifest delict, those resulting from letters or other written pieces written by the accused.

339. The husband who shall have kept a concubine in the conjugal home, and who shall have been convicted upon the complaint of the wife, shall be punished by a fine of one hundred francs to two thousand francs.

The Belgian Penal Code contains analogous provisions, art. 372-391, and moreover penalties against the abduction of minors, especially girls below the completed age of sixteen years (368-371).

An international arrangement was concluded at Paris, on May 18, 1904, between France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden and Norway, and Switzerland, in view of assuring effective protection against "the white-slave traffic," that is, against the recruitment of women and girls for debauchery abroad, and to facilitate the repatriation of the victims of this shameful traffic. The text was published by the *Journal Officiel* of February 19, 1905. Cf. *Questions actuelles*, t. 77, March 4, 1905, pp. 286-287.

ALPHABETICAL INDEX (VOLUME II)

Abomination, insofar as it is distinguished from hatred of the person, p. 442, p. 458.

Aboulia diminishes liberty, p. 77.

Abrogation of law in general, p. 183; of the old law, p. 147.

Abstinence from flesh on fast days, p. 655; outside fast days, p. 660; causes excusing from it, p. 661.

Non-Catholics, whether they can assist at Catholic offices?, p. 394; whether it is lawful for Catholics to be present at the offices of non-Catholics, to enter their temples, p. 396; to build or adorn their temples, or to contribute money for building them, p. 399; to be present at the sermons and funerals of non-Catholics, p. 396; to dispute with them, p. 397.

Acceptance of ecclesiastical law by subjects or by civil authority is not required, p. 162.

Acedia, notion, malice, remedies, p. 327, p. 330.

Acquired virtues, p. 336; whether intellectual, 337, or moral, p. 337, p. 339.

Human act and act of man, voluntary and involuntary, deliberate and indeliberate, p. 41; necessary or free, p. 42; elicited or commanded, p. 45; natural principles concurring for a free act, p. 48, p. 51; supernatural principles, p. 51, p. 53; Concerning the moral act, p. 86; concerning the meritorious act, p. 118; concerning the morality of the external act, p. 99; concerning the indifferent act, p. 113; A heroic act generally is not prescribed, p. 158.

Adjuration of the divine name, what force it has, and when it is lawful, p. 563, p. 565.

Adoration is owed to God internally, externally, and publicly, p. 505.

A newcomer, insofar as he is bound by the laws of the territory, p. 171.

Full and semi-full advertence, p. 49; distinct and confused, p. 49; full advertence required for mortal sin, p. 279.

The sick are excused from Mass, p. 603; from fasting.

Equiprobabilism is historically set forth, p. 232; its doctrine is explained, p. 233; its arguments are critically weighed, p. 233.

Affected ignorance, p. 57.

Causes of alcoholism, p. 318; harms, p. 319; remedies, p. 321.

Ambition, in what sense unlawful, p. 306.

The demented are not subject to human law, p. 169; in what sense they are subject to natural law, p. 139.

Friendship in general, p. 427; friendship with God: what does it import?, p. 437.

Love in general, natural, sensible, rational, p. 426; causes of love, p. 428; effects, p. 429; Cf. charity.

Antecedent ignorance, p. 60.

Apostasy from the faith, p. 384; especially through adherence to Masonic sects, p. 384, p. 388.

Architect with respect to the building of heterodox temples, p. 399, p. 400.

Associations of mutual insurance to be fostered, p. 487.

Craftiness, what sort of vice it is, p. 615.

Avarice, in what sense it is a sin, p. 325; what are its remedies?, p. 326.

Man's beatitude consists not in created goods, but in the attainment of the ultimate end, 9, or in perfect knowledge and love of God, p. 9, p. 10.

Beneficence toward God, p. 437; beneficence toward neighbor, greatly commended by Scripture and the Fathers, p. 454, p. 456; principal works of beneficence, p. 462, p. 466.

Benevolence toward God, p. 435.

Whether non-Catholic Bibles can be used in taking an oath?, p. 550.

Blasphemy, how it is distinguished from imprecations, p. 542; its species and malice, p. 543; remedies, p. 544.

Whence moral goodness comes, p. 14, p. 20.

Charity, as a theological virtue, p. 426; its object and motive, p. 431; subject, p. 434.

Charity toward God, its nature and various acts, p. 535; necessity, p. 438; extension of this precept, p. 439; sins against charity, and especially hatred of God, p. 442; means of profiting in charity, p. 443.

Charity toward oneself, toward the soul, p. 447; toward the body, p. 448.

Charity toward neighbor, its qualities, p. 450; the precept in the Old Testament, p. 453; in the New Testament, p. 462; Charity toward enemies, p. 457; Charity prescribes almsgiving, 462, and also fraternal correction, p. 462, p. 466; The order to be observed in charity, p. 471; Principal works of charity, especially social ones, p. 477; Sins opposed to charity, p. 491.

Flesh-meats, what they are in an ecclesiastical sense, p. 655.

Ecclesiastical censures, 667 sq, p. 667.

Cessation from labor, how it is provided for, p. 478, p. 489.

Cessation of law, p. 183; cessation of the obligation induced by law, p. 179; cessation of a vow or of its obligation, p. 580.

Use of chloroform, p. 317.

Christ, object of faith, p. 369; love of Christ leads to perfect charity, p. 434; Christ, exemplar of humility, p. 306; exemplar of patience, p. 311.

Circumstance, what it is, and how it influences the morality of a human act, p. 98.

Civil law, p. 190; its author, p. 191; object, p. 192; promulgation, p. 191; obligation, p. 194.

Clemency, how it differs from meekness, p. 633.

Use of cocaine, p. 317.

Cemetery, how it is violated or polluted, p. 148.

Little supper on fast days, p. 653.

Evil thought, or suggestion, the first grade of temptation, p. 259; when voluntary delectation accedes, it becomes sin, p. 293.

Evening collation on fast days, p. 653.

Craft guilds, how they are to be promoted, p. 482.

The moral system of compensation is set forth, p. 239; critically weighed, p. 240.

Complacency in God, p. 435; complacency in an evil thing, or morose delectation, p. 292.

Concomitant ignorance or error, p. 60.

Concupiscence, or passion, antecedent or consequent, p. 64; antecedent concupiscence, although it increases the intensity of the act, diminishes the free element, p. 65; consequent concupiscence does not diminish the free element, but is a sign of intense volition, p. 60; Concupiscence as cause of sin, p. 255.

Condition in a vow, p. 168; how it must be fulfilled, p. 578.

Confessor with respect to the scrupulous, p. 209; with respect to the use of probable opinions, p. 242; with respect to the education of conscience, p. 246.

Roman Congregations, insofar as they authentically interpret laws, p. 174.

Moral conscience, how it is distinguished from intimate sense and psychological consciousness, p. 200; certain and doubtful, p. 201; true and erroneous, lax and scrupulous, p. 201; Lax conscience: notion, causes, remedies, p. 202; Scrupulous conscience: notion, causes, harms, remedies, p. 205; Certain conscience as the proximate rule of morals, p. 213; Doubtful conscience: notion, p. 216; manner of solving practical doubt, p. 218; Education of conscience, p. 243; Remorse of conscience, p. 276.

Consent necessary for sin, p. 259; full consent is required for mortal sin, p. 269; signs of imperfect consent, p. 290.

Consequent ignorance and error, p. 57; consequent concupiscence does not diminish the free element, p. 66.

Evangelical counsels, p. 154.

Associations to be fostered among workmen, p. 487; among the rich, for aiding workmen, p. 487.

Constancy, a virtue annexed to fortitude, p. 623.

Custom, how it induces or abrogates law, p. 179; conditions that it be legitimate, p. 185; sense of the clause "notwithstanding any custom whatever,", p. 187.

To counsel the lesser evil, when is it lawful?, p. 497, p. 499.

Contention is a sin opposed to charity, p. 491.

Conversion to God, when necessary, p. 440.

Cooperation in general in an evil act, formal or material, 109, immediate or mediate, p. 109, p. 110; when it is lawful, p. 111; when unlawful, p. 112; Cooperation in matters pertaining to faith, p. 398; with respect to the building of non-Catholic temples, p. 399; with respect to heterodox schools and orphanages, p. 400; with respect to calling a minister, p. 400.

Cooperative societies to be promoted, p. 482.

How we must love our body, p. 448.

Corpus Juris Canonici, of what parts it consists, p. 188.

Fraternal correction, when it falls under precept, p. 467; conditions required for correction, p. 468; order to be observed in correction, p. 469.

Fault, in what sense it is distinguished from sin, p. 254; concerning the guilt of fault which remains after the sinful act has passed, p. 275; see sin.

Worship, internal, external, and social, owed to God, p. 506; the virtue of religion inclines us to render to God the worship of latria, p. 502; False worship, p. 527; Whether it is lawful to be present at the worship of non-Catholics, p. 395.

Cupidity, notion, p. 323; malice, p. 325; remedies, p. 326.

Curiosity, as cause of sins, p. 256; harmful to devotion, p. 525.

Demon, or devil: how he allures us to sin, p. 257; Pact with the demon unlawful, p. 530.

The Decalogue promulgated on Mount Sinai, p. 143; contains ten precepts, p. 145; how the precepts of the Decalogue agree with the virtues, p. 635.

Declaration of law, comprehensive and extensive, p. 173.

Decrees of Roman Congregations, when they have the force of law, p. 175.

Delectation, whether it is lawful to act from delectation alone, p. 95; Morose delectation concerning an evil thing: what sort of sin it is, p. 292.

Deliberation, or advertence, full and non-full, p. 49; signs of imperfect deliberation, p. 279.

Denunciation, whether it must sometimes be made, p. 468, p. 470.

Derogation of law, what it is, p. 182.

Desire of an evil thing, absolute: what sort of sin, p. 293; conditional: when unlawful, p. 294.

Concept of devotion, p. 523; means of fostering devotion, p. 524.

Despair, what it is and what sort of sin, p. 420.

Desuetude, insofar as it abrogates law, p. 185.

Dictamen, or judgment of conscience, p. 200.

Diffidence, distinct from despair, p. 422.

Delay of a vow, when grave, p. 578.

Love, or charity, p. 427; see love, charity.

Discord, opposed to charity, p. 491; what sort of sin, p. 492; how it can be avoided, p. 493.

Dispensation from law, p. 180; who can dispense and be dispensed, p. 180, p. 181; conditions that a dispensation be legitimate, p. 182.

Disputation with heretics, p. 397.

Distinction of sins, specific, p. 285; numerical, p. 287; distinction of internal sins, p. 291; distinction of formal and material sin, p. 294.

Divination, in what sense unlawful, p. 530.

The Lord's Day, how instituted, p. 589, p. 590; why to be sanctified, p. 593; how, through hearing Mass, 598, and abstinence from servile work, p. 598, p. 604.

Doubt in a moral matter, how many kinds, p. 216; especially concerning practical doubt and the manner of solving it, p. 217, p. 218; various systems for solving practical doubt, 221 sq, p. 221; axiom: a doubtful law does not oblige, p. 236; Doubt in faith, p. 382.

Malice of drunkenness, p. 314; remedies, p. 321; concerning sins committed in drunkenness, p. 315; drunkenness induced by narcotics, p. 317.

Church, how it is violated or polluted, p. 548.

Education, what influence it obtains over liberty, p. 72; Education, a great work of charity, p. 479; education of workmen must be Christian, manly, professional, p. 480.

Election as a special act of the will, p. 45.

Almsgiving, commended in the old law, p. 452; in the new, 454, and also by the Fathers, p. 454, p. 455; when the precept of giving alms obliges, p. 463.

Epikeia, what it is, and when legitimate, p. 178.

Epileptic disease, insofar as it influences liberty, p. 82.

Bishop, what laws he can make, p. 156; and from what laws dispense, p. 182.

Error, how it is distinguished from ignorance, p. 54; vincible error diminishes the free element, p. 56; invincible error removes the free element, p. 56.

A pagan, how he can be saved, p. 369.

Eutrapely is referred to temperance, p. 633.

Evolutionism, how it explains the notion of good and evil, p. 25.

External act, how it influences morality, p. 99.

Favors, in what sense they are enlarged, p. 179.

Women laboring in workshops, how they are to be protected, p. 489.

Ecclesiastical feasts, which were instituted as of precept, p. 591.

Divine faith, as a theological virtue, p. 356; genesis of faith, p. 358; excellence, p. 360; its necessity, insofar as it is a habit, p. 365; act of faith: in what sense necessary for salvation, p. 365; and indeed by necessity of means, 367, and by necessity of precept, p. 367, p. 371; concerning the external act of faith, p. 375; what acts are opposed to it, p. 376; Sins against faith: heresy, p. 379; apostasy, p. 384; infidelity, p. 388; causes of sins against faith, whether internal, 389, or external, p. 389, p. 392; Means of profiting in faith, p. 400.

End, what it is and how manifold, p. 3; man's ultimate end is God, p. 6; the supernatural end consists in intuitive vision and beatific love of God, p. 7; End of a human act, or intention: what it contributes to morality, p. 95; concerning the obligation of intending the ultimate and honorable end, p. 93; When the end of a law ceases, the law itself ceases, p. 185.

Forensic works are forbidden on feast days, p. 606.

Freemasons are most hostile to the Catholic religion, p. 385.

Fortitude is one of the cardinal virtues, p. 340; its notion and various grades, p. 617; vices opposed to fortitude, p. 621; means of profiting in fortitude, p. 623.

The little piece which can be taken in the morning on fast days, p. 654.

Joy concerning an evil thing, what sort of sin, p. 293; joy concerning a good effect, p. 293; concerning the manner in which an evil thing is carried out, p. 294.

Gratitude toward God is a way to perfect love, p. 434.

Gluttony, or excess in eating or drinking, p. 312; malice, p. 313; remedies, p. 314.

Habit, what it is, and how it influences liberty, p. 74; subject, origin, and increase of habits, p. 332; loss of habits, p. 335; concerning the manner of acquiring good habits and eradicating depraved ones, p. 77.

Hereditary propensities, what influence they have on liberty, p. 65.

Formal and material heresy, p. 379; malice of voluntary heresy, p. 382; what doubt constitutes heresy, p. 383.

Heretics, in what sense they are subject to the laws of the Church, p. 170; Is it lawful to build temples of heretics, p. 398; to give money for constructing them, p. 399; to give to schools and orphanages of heretics, p. 399; to be present at their sacred rites, p. 395; to celebrate in their temples, p. 396; to cooperate in their rites, p. 397; to dispute publicly with them, p. 397; to call a heretical minister, p. 400.

Human acts, how they differ from acts of man, p. 41; Cf. act.

Humility, a virtue annexed to temperance, p. 627; its concept and principal acts, p. 627; excellence of humility, p. 638.

Hypnotism, what it is and in what degree it influences liberty, p. 84; whether it is diabolical, p. 537; precautions to be used in its use, p. 540.

Hysteria, how it influences liberty, p. 80, p. 81.

Idolatry, what it is and what sort of sin, p. 527.

Sloth, insofar as it is opposed to fortitude, p. 619.

Vincible and invincible ignorance, p. 54; antecedent, concomitant, and consequent, p. 55; invincible ignorance removes the free element, p. 56; vincible ignorance diminishes it, p. 56; Ignorance of the natural law: in what sense it can be admitted, p. 140.

Inadvertence is equivalent to ignorance, p. 54; cf. ignorance.

Vain glory, one of the daughters of pride, p. 301.

Mystery of the Incarnation, whether and in what sense it must be believed by necessity of means, p. 369.

Indeliberate act, p. 41.

Systems of independent ethics are set forth, p. 35; critically weighed, p. 36.

Indifferent act, whether it is given in the individual, p. 113; doctrine of St. Thomas, 114, of the Thomists, 115, of the Scotists, p. 114, p. 115, p. 116; conclusion, p. 119.

Indirectly voluntary, what it is, p. 102; how manifold, p. 103; when an effect indirectly willed must be imputed, p. 104.

Induction into sin is practically referred to direct scandal, p. 495.

Infants, in what sense they are subject to natural law, p. 137; to ecclesiastical law, p. 169.

Negative and positive infidels, p. 388; how they can obtain faith and salvation, p. 369; they are not subject to the laws of the Church, p. 168.

Infused virtues, p. 343; their existence, p. 344; increase and loss, p. 345.

Enemies, in what sense they are to be loved, p. 457; hatred toward enemies, what sort of sin, p. 457; what signs of love are to be shown to an enemy, p. 460; how reconciliation with them is to be sought, p. 461.

Intellectual virtues, p. 337.

Intention, what it contributes to morality, p. 92, p. 93; what intention is required for a moral act, p. 95; for a supernatural act, p. 124; usefulness of frequently directing the intention to God, p. 117.

Internal acts, in what sense they can be prescribed by the Church, p. 158; internal sins are three: evil delectation, desire, joy, p. 292.

Authentic, judicial, and usual interpretation of laws, p. 174, p. 175; doctrinal, p. 176.

Envy, a capital sin, arises from pride, p. 304; its daughters and malice, p. 305; remedies, p. 306.

Invincible ignorance or error, p. 49; see ignorance. - Invincible propensity: how it influences liberty, p. 72.

Anger, its notion and grades, p. 307; malice, p. 309; remedies, p. 310.

Irreligiosity includes blasphemy, tempting God, sacrilege, and simony, p. 541; cf. these words.

Irritation of vows, by whom and when it can be done, p. 580.

Boasting, daughter of vain glory, p. 302.

Ecclesiastical fast, how it is distinguished from the Eucharistic fast, p. 646; its origin, p. 649; its usefulness, p. 651; present-day extension of the law of fasting, p. 652.

Breakfast permitted on fast days, p. 654.

Judicial interpretation of laws, p. 167.

Oath, what it is and how manifold, p. 555; its honesty, p. 557; conditions that it be lawful, p. 558; obligation which it induces, p. 561; extension and interpretation of this obligation, p. 562.

The moral system of Kantism is set forth, p. 32; critically weighed, p. 34.

Servile labor prohibited on feast days, p. 603; causes excusing from this law, p. 607; when it is lawful for workmen to labor in gardens, p. 609.

Milk foods, what they are and when prohibited, p. 654.

Lard, when permitted on days of abstinence, p. 661.

Lax conscience, p. 202; its causes, p. 203; dangers, p. 203, p. 205; remedies, p. 205.

Reading books attacking the faith, p. 393.

Law, as the objective norm of morality, p. 126; its notion, 127, and difference from a precept, 129, from eternal law, p. 127, p. 129, p. 129.

Natural divine law, p. 131; truly exists, p. 132; its object, p. 135; character, p. 136; in what sense immutable, p. 137; how promulgated, p. 139; whether it can be ignored, p. 140.

Positive divine law, p. 141; Character and end of the Mosaic law, p. 142; object, p. 145; obligation, p. 146; abrogation, p. 147; Character and end of the Christian law, p. 148; object, p. 151; perfection, p. 154.

Ecclesiastical law, p. 155; who can make law in the Church, p. 156; concerning what objects, p. 157; how ecclesiastical law is promulgated, p. 160; how it obliges, p. 163; whom it obliges, p. 170; how it must be fulfilled, p. 172; how interpreted, p. 173; in how many various ways it ceases, p. 179; Concerning unwritten law, or custom, p. 184.

Civil law, p. 190; by whom it is made, p. 191; concerning what objects, p. 192; how it is promulgated, p. 191; whom it obliges, and how, p. 194; especially concerning the obligation of invalidating and penal law, p. 197.

Liberty of human acts, p. 41; its grades, p. 42; principles which concur for this liberty, p. 48; causes influencing liberty: ignorance and error, 53, and also passions, 58, especially fear, p. 53, p. 58, p. 62; habit, 75, and hereditary propensities, 67, and also temperament, 70, and education, p. 75, p. 67, p. 70, p. 72; Pathological states which influence liberty, p. 77; aboulia and invincible propensity, p. 77; neurasthenia, p. 79; hysteria, p. 80; epileptic disease, p. 82; hypnotic suggestion, p. 82; How true liberty is preserved and increased, p. 84.

Sacred place, how it is violated, p. 548.

Play is moderated through modesty, or eutrapely, p. 633.

Magic, or superstition, p. 529.

Magnanimity, a virtue annexed to fortitude, p. 620.

Animal magnetism, p. 533; its nature, p. 535; responses of the Holy Office concerning magnetism, p. 537; use of magnetism is dangerous and sometimes evil, p. 539.

Magnificence, a virtue annexed to fortitude, p. 621.

Malefice, p. 532.

Whence the moral malice of acts arises, p. 13; Manifold malice of mortal sin, p. 271.

Meekness, virtue moderating anger, p. 631.

Husband, when he can irritate the vows of his wife, p. 581.

Masonic sect, insofar as it is a cause of apostasy, p. 386.

Merit of human acts, p. 118; conditions required on the part of the one operating, p. 121; on the part of the work, p. 124; on the part of God, p. 125; circumstances from which merit is increased, p. 125.

Grave and light fear, p. 61; how it influences a free act, p. 62.

Soldiers, when they are excused from the law of fasting and abstinence, p. 649, p. 655.

Works of mercy, p. 476; see charity.

Hearing Mass is prescribed on Sundays and feast days, p. 590; in order to satisfy the precept, corporeal and religious presence is required, 598, in the due place, p. 598, p. 601; causes excusing from hearing Mass, p. 603.

Modesty, a virtue annexed to temperance, p. 632.

Morality of acts, whence it arises, p. 14; morality derived from the object, p. 88; from the end, or intention, p. 91; from circumstances, p. 77; from the external act, p. 99; Extension of morality to indirectly willed effects, 103, to cooperation, p. 103, p. 111.

Morose delectation, what sort of sin, p. 292.

Use of morphine, 317, especially with respect to the dying, p. 317, p. 318.

Mortal sin, in what sense it is recognized by Scripture, p. 262; and also by the Fathers, p. 265; its difference from venial sin, p. 269; its malice, p. 271; in what sense it can be called infinite, p. 273; effects of mortal sin, p. 275; conditions that a sin be mortal, p. 278.

Gifts, when it is simony to accept them, p. 549.

Mysteries of faith to be believed by necessity of means, 367, or of precept, p. 367, p. 371.

Necessity of means and of precept, p. 364; extreme, quasi-extreme, grave, common necessity, p. 463.

Negatively voluntary, p. 51.

Neurasthenia diminishes liberty, p. 79.

Numerical distinction of sins, p. 288.

Markets, whether lawful on feast days, p. 606.

Formal object, about which acts are concerned, gives them primary and essential morality, p. 88.

Obligation induced by law, p. 130; by oath, p. 560; by vow, p. 575.

Vain, or superstitious, observance: what it is and how manifold, p. 529; what its malice is, p. 530.

Odious things are to be restricted, p. 177.

Hatred of God is the gravest sin, p. 442; hatred of neighbor is a mortal sin from its genus, p. 458.

Workmen, how they are to be aided by Christian education, p. 479; by mutual associations, p. 481; by various works of benevolence, p. 486.

Servile work is prohibited on Sundays and feast days, p. 605; what servile works are, p. 606; causes excusing from servile work, p. 607.

Prayer, what it is and how manifold, p. 508; its necessity, p. 509; when the precept of praying obliges, p. 511; attention required in prayer, p. 513; concerning distractions, p. 514; concerning the efficacy of prayer, p. 515; conditions that prayer be efficacious, p. 518; Concerning the Lord's Prayer, p. 521.

Public, semi-public, and private oratories, with respect to hearing Mass on feast days, p. 602.

It is not lawful to play the organ in churches of heretics, p. 396.

Feminine adornment, when sinful, p. 634.

Father, when he can irritate the vows of children, p. 580, p. 581.

Patience, a virtue annexed to fortitude, p. 622.

The poor, when they are to be helped, p. 463; whether they can labor on Sundays, p. 604; when they are excused from the law of fasting, 656, and abstinence, p. 656, p. 661.

Sin receives various names among the sacred authors, p. 248; its concept in the Old Testament, 248, and in the New, p. 248, p. 250; theological notion, p. 251; whether there is a merely philosophical sin, p. 252; various divisions of sin, p. 253; Concerning causes which induce to sin, p. 255.

Concerning mortal sin, according to Scripture, 262, and the Fathers, 265, and also Theologians, p. 262, p. 265, p. 269; Its manifold malice, p. 271; effects, p. 275; conditions required for mortal sin, p. 278.

Concerning venial sin, and its distinction from mortal, p. 281; in what sense it is said to be beside the law, p. 282; concerning its effects, p. 283.

Concerning the distinction of sins, specific, 285, and numerical, p. 285, p. 287; concerning internal sins, p. 291; concerning material sin, p. 294.

Concerning capital sins, p. 296.

Pilgrims with respect to particular laws, p. 171.

Perplexed conscience, p. 211.

Plurality of objects, insofar as it multiplies sins, p. 290.

The penalty of guilt induced by sin, p. 267.

Roman Pontiff, he can make laws for the universal Church, p. 156; how he is accustomed to promulgate them, p. 160; he can dispense in all ecclesiastical laws, p. 180.

Precept, how it is distinguished from law, p. 129.

Presumption of law, what force it has, p. 165; law founded on presumption of danger, p. 166.

Morning and evening prayers are greatly to be advised, p. 511.

Probability, what it is and how manifold, p. 216.

Probabiliorism, in what time it flourished, p. 228; its exposition, p. 229; its arguments are critically weighed, p. 230.

Probabilism, ancient, 224, and modern, p. 224, p. 235; the arguments favoring this system are set forth, 235, and also those opposed to it, p. 235, p. 236; in what sense it can be admitted, p. 238.

Profession of faith, when necessary, p. 375; in what sense denial or dissimulation of faith is prohibited, p. 376.

Promulgation of law necessary, p. 108; how the natural law is promulgated, p. 139; ecclesiastical law, especially pontifical, p. 160; civil law, p. 192.

Prudence, notion and elements, p. 611; vices opposed to it, p. 614; its excellence, p. 615; means of profiting in it, p. 616.

Children with respect to ecclesiastical laws, p. 169; with respect to vows, p. 580, p. 581.

Pusillanimity opposed to fortitude, p. 621.

Reconciliation with enemies, when to be sought, p. 461.

Religion as a virtue, 501, compared with other virtues, p. 501, p. 502; its principal acts, p. 502; its excellence, p. 503; Principal acts of religion, namely adoration, prayer, devotion, p. 504; secondary acts, namely oath and vow, p. 555; social act, or sanctification of Sunday, p. 589; Vices opposed to religion, namely idolatry, p. 527; superstition, p. 529; blasphemy, p. 542; tempting God, p. 545; sacrilege, p. 546; simony, p. 549; vain assumption of the divine name, p. 564; violation of oath, p. 560; violation of vow, p. 575; profanation of Sunday, p. 605.

Reserved vows, p. 384.

To be present at non-Catholic rites, or to take part in them: when unlawful, p. 396.

Sacred things, what they are, p. 546; to treat them contumeliously is blasphemy, p. 542; unworthily, or irreverently, is sacrilege, p. 547; to sell them is simony, p. 549.

Sacrilege, what it is and how manifold, p. 546; its malice, p. 549.

Scandal, notion and species, p. 494; malice, p. 496; gravity, p. 497; when it is lawful to place an action from which scandal follows indirectly, p. 497; reparation of scandal, p. 499.

Neutral schools dangerous to faith, p. 392.

The scrupulous, by what signs they are discerned, p. 206; causes and harms of scruples, p. 206, p. 207; remedies, p. 208.

Servile work, what it is and when prohibited, p. 605; see labor, work.

Description of simony, p. 549; species, p. 550; malice, p. 551; obligation of restoring what has been simoniacally accepted, p. 552.

Solemnity of vows is of ecclesiastical law, p. 570; in what it is situated, p. 571.

Dreams, when it is unlawful to believe them, p. 532.

Specific distinction of sins, p. 285.

Hope, theological virtue, p. 405; its object, p. 406; motive, p. 407; properties, p. 410; subject, p. 412; honesty, p. 413; necessity, p. 417; sins against hope, p. 420; means of profiting in hope, p. 424.

Origin and phenomena of spiritism, p. 534, p. 535; what is to be said of its causes, p. 537; in what sense gravely unlawful, p. 540.

To persuade the lesser evil, when lawful, p. 496.

Pride, one of the capital vices, p. 299; its daughters, p. 300; malice and consequences, p. 301; remedies, p. 302.

Supernatural principles of human acts, p. 51; supernatural merit, p. 121; see merit.

Superstition in the general sense, p. 527; in the particular sense, insofar as it designates superstitious observances, p. 529.

Support of pastors by the faithful, in what sense it is prescribed, p. 663.

Synderesis, or habit of first principles, is distinguished from conscience, p. 200.

Turning tables, p. 534, p. 535; their use is often dangerous, p. 529.

To be silent, when confession of faith is required, p. 375.

Temerity, insofar as it is opposed to true fortitude, p. 620.

Temperament, what it is, how manifold, and how it influences liberty, p. 70.

Temperance, as a cardinal virtue, p. 625; general rule of temperance, p. 625; virtues annexed to it, p. 627.

To construct heterodox temples, or to contribute money for building them, p. 398; to enter the same, p. 396.

Temptation, as cause of sin, p. 258; distinction between feeling temptation and consenting to it, p. 259; it is not lawful to expose oneself uselessly to temptation, p. 259; means for overcoming temptations, p. 259; usefulness of temptation, p. 261; Tempting God: in what sense it is prohibited, p. 544.

Whether the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity must be believed by necessity of means, p. 369; what sort of faith suffices, p. 370.

Sadness concerning a good accomplished or concerning an evil not completed, p. 292.

The safer part, when to be chosen, p. 221.

Absolute or mitigated tutiorism, p. 217.

Vows of a wife, when they can be irritated by a husband, p. 581.

Wanderers, to what laws they are subject, p. 171.

Vain glory, one of the daughters of pride, p. 301.

Venial sin, how it is distinguished from mortal, p. 282; in what sense it is said to be beside the law, p. 282; its effects, p. 283.

Vincible ignorance or error, p. 54, p. 60.

Violence, insofar as it impedes the execution of free volition, p. 66.

Divining rod is not always superstitious, p. 532.

Virtue is a good habit, p. 331; Concerning acquired virtues, 336, whether intellectual, 337, or moral, 339, especially cardinal, p. 336, p. 337, p. 339, p. 340; concerning the connection and mean of the moral virtues, p. 341; Concerning infused virtues, p. 342; how they are increased, 346, or lost, p. 346, p. 347; whether they can be diminished, p. 349.

The will is free when it is borne toward particular goods, p. 42; what command the will exercises over the other faculties, p. 46; how it concurs for a free act, p. 50; what causes influence the will, p. 58; education of the will, p. 84.

Voluntary and involuntary, p. 41, p. 42; voluntary direct and indirect, p. 102; rules concerning the indirect voluntary, p. 103.

Vow, p. 565; conditions for a vow properly so called: a promise made to God, 566, and apt matter, that is, honest, concerning a possible and better good, p. 566, p. 568; Species of vows, p. 570; Honesty and utility of a vow, p. 572; a work done from vow, other things being equal, is better, p. 576.

Obligation arising from vow, p. 576; Cessation of a vow or of its obligation from the nature itself of the thing, p. 580; through irritation, p. 581; through dispensation, p. 583; or commutation, p. 586; Vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, p. 585; The confessor must be discreet in advising vows, p. 587.

Zeal, effect of love, p. 430; zeal for promoting the glory of God, p. 436.

The numbers are the 1922 edition's pages; each is a link to the passage it cites.