commentary — Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion
First Commentary: On the Response of the Holy Office concerning Craniotomy. Cf. n. 402
1.
- To all moral theologians the question concerning craniotomy is known, and known is the response which concerning it came forth from the Congregation of the Eminent Fathers of the S. R. and U. I. As soon as a response of this sort was published, doubt began to arise concerning its value, namely whether it really settled the controversy, and truly condemned the opinion concerning the lawfulness of that surgical operation. For there were not lacking, nor are there lacking, grave theologians who thought and still think that that decree has no other value except a merely disciplinary one, and that it does not render improbable the opposite opinion concerning the lawfulness of craniotomy. Therefore it will not be unpleasant to students of moral matters briefly to weigh the force of the aforesaid decree.
2.
- The preceding Response can be explained by a twofold consideration, extrinsic and intrinsic. Let us begin from the first. A similar question was proposed to the S. R. U. I. concerning Ontologism, namely: "whether the following propositions can safely be handed down:" there follow the seven known propositions concerning Ontologism. The Sacred Congregation, Feria IV, on the day 18 Sept. 1861, rescripted: "The Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords, the vote of the Consultors having first been had, and all and singular of the propositions above enunciated having been maturely weighed, responded to the proposed doubt: Negatively," namely: that they cannot safely be handed down.
3.
- By this decree theologians and the Philosophers themselves understood a true condemnation and proscription of the doctrine. Wherefore those who were defending Ontologism attempted to show that in those seven condemned propositions there was not contained the doctrine of Ontologism which they themselves were maintaining, but another doctrine quite different. Cf. the little work of the most learned philosopher and theologian Joseph Kleutgen, L'Ontologismo e le sette tesi censurate dalla Sacra Inquisizione, Rome, with the types of La Civilta Cattolica, 1867, p. 10 ff.
4.
- Nor did private and public Professors alone interpret that decree in this way; but also the Roman Congregations themselves understood that decree in this sense, namely of true condemnation and proscription. These things are read in the Decree transmitted through the Most Eminent Card. Patrizi to the Most Eminent Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin concerning the philosophical books of G. C. Ubaghs, decurial doctor in the University of Louvain. "Moreover, what already, as from my letters given to the individual Bishops in Belgium on the day 11 Oct. of the year 1864 they had reserved to themselves to be done, the aforesaid Cardinals undertook to examine other doctrines which are contained in the more recent editions of the works of the same author. And indeed they had to perceive that in those books are handed down doctrines plainly similar to some of the seven propositions... which the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office on the day 18 Sept. of the year 1861 judged could not safely be handed down; ... hence it will be altogether necessary that not only those books and those similar to them be kept away from the Catholic University and from all Schools; but also," etc. Rome, 2 March 1866. Cf. the cited little work, p. 84 ff.
5.
- After the decree related in the preceding number, new doubts arose on the part of the defenders of Traditionalism and Ontologism. For they said that the decisions given were disciplinary, not doctrinal; that those things which had previously been handed down could not be taught, but could be kept in the heart; and that they were still probable and lawful. When these things had been denounced to the Supreme Pontiff by the Most Eminent Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin and other Bishops of Belgium, by letters given 1 Aug. 1866, the Most Eminent Patrizi in the name of the Most Holy Father rescripted these things to them: "In the letters... given to Most Holy Pius IX, a judgment is sought from the Apostolic See concerning certain doubts stirred up... concerning the responses of the sacred Congregations of the Holy Office and of the Index, both in the year 1864 and in this year 1866, sanctioned by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff. But those doubts are not of such a sort as to require a new interpretation and declaration of a matter already defined: for to dissolve them utterly, through the very responses of the Sacred Congregations, more than enough is done. Indeed it has been heard not without admiration that doubts of this sort have been proposed.... Moreover, Catholic men, much more indeed ecclesiastics, have this duty, that they subject themselves fully, perfectly, and absolutely to the decrees of the Holy See, contentions being removed from the midst which would obstruct the sincerity of assent." Rome, on the day 30 Aug. 1866. Cf. the cited little work, p. 86-89.
6.
- The preceding letter having been received, the Most Eminent Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin and other Bishops of Belgium, on the day 17 Dec. of the year 1866, gave letters to the Rector and Professors of the University of Louvain, in which, speaking of the resolution of both Congregations, of the Holy Office and of the Index, on the day 2 March of the year 1866, cf. above n. 5, they assert these things: "These decisions are so clear that the cause must be held as definitively decided. But we know that the most firm will of the Most Holy Lord is that, errors having been removed, all think the same. And so, that all dissensions may remain extinguished forever, and that in a question long agitated and now defined there may remain nothing to be wished for or expected, we send the formula of letters to be subscribed by all who either handed down the reprobated doctrines or adhered to the same in any way." But in the formula it is said: "To the decisions of the Holy Apostolic See of the day 2 March and 30 August of this year, 1866, cf. above nn. 4, 5, I submit myself fully, perfectly, and absolutely, and from the soul I acquiesce. And therefore from the heart I reprobate and reject whatsoever doctrine opposed," etc. Cf. cited little work, p. 90, 91.
7.
- The retractation of Ontologism, by force of the condemnation pronounced by the Holy Office, was required from Rev. Dr. Ugonin when he was proposed for the Episcopate. This was the formula of retractation: "Since I, the undersigned, have received from the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord Archbishop of Myra, Apostolic Nuncio in France, that the doctrine which I set forth in my philosophical work on Ontologism (Etudes philosophiques-Ontologie) is disapproved by the Holy Apostolic See, as especially either explicitly or implicitly favoring those propositions which the S. R. and U. I. C. in the year 1861 decreed could not safely be handed down; I myself, no delay having been interposed, freely and spontaneously declare that I hold and disapprove the aforesaid doctrine in precisely the same way as the Holy See has judged, as wandering more or less from sound principles of philosophy; and at the same time I promise that, as far as will be in me, I will take care in the future that it be no longer handed down in the schools. Given at Paris on the day 13 Oct. 1866." Cited little work, p. 15.
8.
- Therefore, if craniotomy has been condemned by the Holy Office in the same manner in which Ontologism was condemned, if parity stands for each condemnation, it plainly appears how great is the force of that juridical censure concerning craniotomy, it cannot safely be taught. Nor indeed should it be objected that not once but several times proscriptions and decisions intervened against Ontologism on the part of the Most Holy Congregations and of the Holy See itself, which has not yet been had against craniotomy. For those repeated proscriptions and decisions do nothing else than inculcate and confirm that first condemnation of the Holy Office on the day 18 Sept. 1861, by force of which the Most Eminent Card. Patrizi, in his Letter and Decree on the day 2 March 1866, pronounces books infected with that doctrine to be kept away from the University of Louvain and from all Schools, and the Most Reverend Bishops of Belgium hold the cause as definitively decided; and the cause also concerned Ontologism; and, errors having been removed, they exhort all to subscribe to sound doctrines.
9.
- We now make a step to the intrinsic consideration of the matter. That is called safe which is without danger. Therefore an opinion which cannot safely be taught is an opinion which cannot be taught without danger. And thus in the cited Decree of 2 March 1866, given through the Most Eminent Patrizi, after it had been affirmed that in the philosophical books of G. C. Ubaghs "doctrines plainly similar to some of the seven propositions... which the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office on the day 18 Sept. of the year 1861 judged could not safely be handed down" are handed down, it is then said that in the same books there are found doctrines or opinions which cannot be handed down without danger.
10.
- Moreover this danger is the danger of error, if we wish to understand the mentioned decision of the Holy Office in its proper and obvious sense. For it is said that it cannot safely be taught, and danger in teaching some opinion, properly and in the obvious sense, is nothing other than the danger of error. Wherefore that Decree is not some mere disciplinary prohibition of teaching or handing down in public or even private schools that opinion; but it is a true doctrinal judgment concerning the truth and falsity of the same opinion, which consequently can no longer be handed down in any schools, but must be altogether kept away from them.
11.
- Nor indeed should it be said that this danger is to be understood from the subject matter, which is some practical thing. For the matter about which there is question is practical and most practical, but it is a matter not regarding ecclesiastical and positive discipline, but regarding morals and touching the natural law itself. Wherefore from the consideration of the subject matter it does not follow that that decree is merely disciplinary, but that it is doctrinal in a matter of morals. For that decree involves this in other words: that that opinion concerning craniotomy cannot be taught without danger of error in a matter of morals. Nor should it be urged by saying that it can very well happen that that opinion cannot be safely taught, even speaking speculatively, because practically someone could easily abuse it, by applying it badly to practical cases, and by not rightly distinguishing the cases in which it can lawfully be given to execution from the cases in which that would be altogether illicit. This objection has no force, for that confusion of the case of lawful application and the case of unlawful application is impossible, and thus that danger is not this danger, of badly applying practically the aforesaid opinion and of confounding case with case. For indeed the opinion concerning craniotomy has not been condemned in the abstract, considered according to itself and generally; but the opinion concerning craniotomy has been condemned in the concrete, according to determined circumstances and considered in particular. For the question proposed, which the Sacred Congregation resolved by its decision, is not: "Whether it can safely be taught in Catholic Schools that the surgical operation which they call Craniotomy is lawful," thus, generally; but in that peculiar and determined case concerning which there was question and controversy among theologians, "namely when, if it is omitted, the mother and child would perish, but if it is admitted, the mother would be saved, the infant perishing." In this case, surely, the doctrine concerning craniotomy is declared dangerous. Therefore the very application to a determined case is declared a dangerous doctrine; IT CANNOT SAFELY BE TAUGHT. Therefore that danger is not the danger of practical abuse, the danger of unlawful application, but it is the danger of error in the opinion enunciating the lawfulness of craniotomy in that aforesaid case.
12.
- But it is still objected that the aforesaid opinion could well be called not safe, although determined to that peculiar case concerning which there was question, because of the practical danger itself of discerning the case of true necessity, namely that, if craniotomy is omitted, the mother and child truly would perish, but if it is admitted, the mother truly would be saved, the infant perishing. This cannot reasonably be objected. For that case of necessity is supposed as certain in that proposition concerning the lawfulness of craniotomy. Only in such a hypothesis was the question made by Theologians and proposed to the Sacred Congregation, and the Sacred Congregation certainly understood it in this sense; for it says in its Response, "account also having been taken of those things which in this matter were written by expert Catholic men and transmitted by Your Eminence to this Congregation." Besides, that objection would then have force when that case of necessity were truly difficult to know; but where craniotomy is concerned the matter is most clear and subject to no difficulty, unless the Surgeon is wholly stupid, which is accidental and is not attended to in the condemnation of a general proposition. For the matter is considered in itself.
13.
- Danger is one thing intrinsic, another extrinsic; and likewise one is proximate, another remote. The danger of error in asserting the lawfulness of craniotomy cannot be from a circumstance extrinsic to craniotomy itself, insofar as it is applied in such circumstances of things as render it unlawful. For, as has just been observed, what is condemned is not the lawfulness of craniotomy in general, but the lawfulness of craniotomy in the stated circumstance of the death of the mother and child, if that operation is omitted, and of the safety of the mother and death of the child, if it is done. Moreover, if any circumstance can be thought up which could render craniotomy lawful, this plainly is no other than the one just enunciated, since without that operation neither mother nor child is saved, while, when it is applied, the child is not placed in a worse condition and the mother is saved. But the Holy Office, in this very case, declares it dangerous to teach the lawfulness of craniotomy. Therefore the danger of error is intrinsic to craniotomy itself; namely because it is the direct killing of an innocent person. The danger of error is intrinsic to the complex itself, that is, to craniotomy clothed with the aforesaid circumstance; for in that complex craniotomy remains with its whole nature, which is not changed in the least by that maximally favorable circumstance. But if the danger of error is intrinsic, namely by force of craniotomy itself, consequently that danger of error cannot be remote, but proximate and most proximate; for nothing is more proximate to any thing than its intrinsic and innermost nature. Therefore the lawfulness of craniotomy cannot be taught without proximate and intrinsic danger of error.
14.
- An action which is a danger of sin is an action distinct from the action itself of sin, and is sin not properly and strictly speaking by reason of itself, but by reason of that action sinful in itself with which it is connected. Likewise an opinion containing danger of error is an opinion distinct from another certain and unshaken doctrine against which that opinion contains the danger of erring, and thus is connected with it insofar as it is opposed to it. Therefore, generally and speaking in itself, an opinion which cannot safely be taught, or which contains danger of error, is an opinion which, although it is not in itself error, nevertheless is connected with error; at least insofar as of itself and in the obvious sense, and not accidentally from mere inconsideration, it so labors under equivocation between error and truth that by an easy way it turns aside toward error rather than toward truth, and one who adheres to it is judged to embrace error indeed, not truth. Nevertheless, when from the subject matter a proposition is so determined that no way lies open to truth, although it is defined merely as not safe, and by reason of the note itself or censure cannot be held except as merely dangerous, or containing danger of error, consequently that proposition must nevertheless be held as error, namely by reason of legitimate deduction. And hence it is easily explained why, although those seven propositions of Ontologism were not marked with any other censure than that they cannot safely be handed down, nevertheless in the Schools they have commonly been held as altogether improbable after that Decision of the Holy Office. The same seems to happen in our case. For no true sense can be thought up, since in the very case most favorable it is said that it cannot safely be taught. Wherefore it does not appear how craniotomy can still be defended probably.
15.
- That adverb, safely, can be explained in another way; but the conclusion is nearly the same. That adverb can be resolved into an adjective, and then the substantive understood under it is to be sought. Moreover this substantive, which can be thought up more favorably in the present matter, is conscience; so that it cannot safely be taught is the same as it cannot be taught with a safe conscience. This interpretation, which pertains most greatly to a moral and practical matter, seems altogether to agree with the decision of the Holy Office which we are treating; for in it there is question of a moral and practical matter. Moreover, in Moral matters, that opinion is called safe which someone can follow practically without danger and fear of violating some precept or some law. Likewise in a moral matter an opinion is called safe in the merely speculative order which someone can hold in the mind and teach externally to others without danger and fear of erring against some certain law or precept. In our case that certain and unshaken law is the law, Thou shalt not kill. Wherefore that craniotomy in that case set forth above cannot safely be taught is the same as that craniotomy cannot be taught without danger and fear of error against the law, Thou shalt not kill. But this danger and fear of error would then remain on the part of the thing a mere danger of error, and would not consequently become error, if a case could be given in which the law Thou shalt not kill was in reality not infringed. But here this case cannot be given. For if this case were given, it would be no other than the proposed case itself. But that proposed case would then on the part of the thing remain a mere danger of error, and would not become error, directly against that law Thou shalt not kill, since it would not yet be ultimately determined by every favorable circumstance, and could still be further determined. Therefore, although by force of the condemnation that opinion is only a doctrine not safe, nevertheless in reality by force of the matter that opinion becomes altogether improbable.
16.
- But someone will ask why then the Holy Office negatively said that sentence was not safe, and did not positively say that it was erroneous, if not safe is in reality the same as erroneous? It is responded, first: it did not say this, because this was not asked, but that; and Sacred Congregations respond with customary formulas to proposed doubts, nor are they accustomed in their brief responses to make a treatment of the matter about which there is question, so as to set it forth and explain it. It is responded, secondly: although the sentence not safe in our case falls back in reality, by reason of the matter, by legitimate conclusion, into an erroneous or false sentence, nevertheless that theological censure, not safe, is not the same as the other censure: erroneous or error, which is a far graver censure. We contend for the former, not the latter. But we say erroneous or false also to restrict the signification of error, since strictly speaking error and false are not the same. "From Augustine, in the Enchiridion, ch. 17, and Contra Academicos, ch. 4, to err is nothing other than to approve true things for false, or false things for true. In this signification error is nothing other than a false proposition, and so it can be found not only in the matter of faith or Theology, but also in any natural or human matter: but according to the common manner of speaking, error, as it were by antonomasia, is accustomed in each matter to signify not just any false judgment, but, by a certain exaggeration, that which is more evidently or more certainly false." Suarez, De Fide, D. 19, S. 2, n. 11. Hence the same Suarez, discoursing on an erroneous proposition, as it is distinguished from a heretical one in theological censures, says that it is one "which is opposed to a truth certain by theological certitude, which does not attain the certitude of faith; because it is in no way immediately revealed, as is supposed, but is a conclusion evidently inferred from one proposition of faith and from another evident by the natural light.... A proposition contrary to such a proposition does not attain the grade of a heretical proposition, because it does not have the highest opposition with a proposition of faith, such as immediate opposition is: but that it is erroneous is manifest; because after a heretical proposition, it has the highest repugnance with the truth of faith, namely mediate through evident inference." l.c., n. 14. The doctrine of Cardinal Lugo, De Fide, D. 20, S. 3, n. 73, is the same. "The word error, taken most broadly, can be attributed to any false proposition in any matter; for he who believes the false as true errs from the true and is deceived. Commonly, however, that word is accustomed to be restricted to the false which is opposed not only to the true, but to the evident or certain, which among all is commonly known certainly. Nor in Philosophy is just any false opinion called error, but one which is opposed to a certain dogma and received as such among philosophers. Wherefore in Theology that will not be called error unless it is opposed to some certain truth which is held as certain among Catholics and Theologians." But insofar as error is a special censure below heresy, according to the same Lugo, "error properly is that which is not opposed immediately, but only mediately to the doctrine of faith, insofar as it immediately denies a proposition which is not of faith, but only a theological conclusion, evidently deduced from one proposition of faith and another evident by the light of nature." l.c., n. 78.
17.
- Wherefore if that censure, it cannot safely be taught, is taken altogether properly and strictly by reason of itself, according to the general rule of interpreting condemned propositions, the aforesaid opinion concerning craniotomy is a dangerous opinion, which namely cannot be taught without danger of error; consequently, moreover, it is also a dangerous opinion, which cannot be reduced to practice without danger of sin. But if the censure, it cannot safely be taught, is considered in the subject matter, that same opinion concerning craniotomy is simply false, and in this sense can also be called not safe and dangerous in the true and proper sense; for it contains an intrinsic and proximate danger of denying a truth, evident, certain, received by all; namely, Thou shalt not kill.
18.
- Finally it must be noted that if craniotomy cannot safely be taught, neither can the direct procurement of abortion in the same circumstances be safely taught. This follows by legitimate reasoning. For first, the arguments by which craniotomy was defended are the same as the arguments by which the direct procurement of abortion is defended. Besides, it matters little whether the infant's head is cut or compressed, or whether the infant is infected with poison, or an immature fetus by mere ejection from the maternal womb is directly and of itself deprived of the natural element altogether necessary to it for life. It is surely the same thing to kill a man by steel, poison, or projection into fire, or immersion into water.