Sentiments of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus on the Precept of the Love of God

The occasion of the reproach made against the Jesuits, that they release men from the obligation of loving God, and the foundation of all the invectives that have been made and are still made every day on this subject against their Society, was a book entitled The Defense of Virtue. The author of this book was a Jesuit named Antoine Sirmond, who is not the famous Sirmond, so well known and so esteemed by learned men, without excepting even those of the heretical party. This one was a very obscure man; but everything is dug up when it is a question of causing trouble for the Jesuits.

The design of the Author in this treatise on the defense of virtue is to examine whether it is permitted to act through fear, or through hope, or through some motive other than that of the pure love of God. And there he combats the error condemned by the Popes and renewed by the Innovators, who maintain that every action that does not have the motive of charity for its principle is a sin.

In order to disentangle this matter, and to make more clearly seen the difference between the sentiment of this Author and that of his Society, from which he departed, it is necessary to make in a few words some observations on this subject, observations that were already made some years ago in another Work. [In the Reply to the Provincial Letters.]

First, there has never been a Theologian who absolutely denied that we had a precept of loving God, the observance of which was necessary for salvation. But after making, in order better to clarify matters, the distinction of various kinds of precepts in this matter, the Doctors find themselves divided on some points.

They say that this precept is at the same time a general precept and a particular precept. It may be regarded as a general precept, because it is impossible to fulfill its entire extent without observing all the other commandments, not one of which can be violated without destroying charity. It is regarded as a particular or special precept because it commands the acts of one certain virtue in particular, that is to say, acts of love, which in their species are altogether different from the acts of the other virtues by which the other precepts are observed.

Thirdly, the precept of charity is negative and affirmative. A precept is called negative when it is considered with respect to the things which it forbids one to do. It is called affirmative when it is considered with respect to the things which it commands one to accomplish. Thus the precept of the love of God is negative insofar as it forbids hating the sovereign good; which is understood not only of formal hatred, which is scarcely anything but the sin of the devil, but also of every other sin, because every sin contains an estrangement from God. This precept is affirmative insofar as it commands us on certain occasions to make acts of the love of God: for example, at the hour of death, and, according to the Thomists, at the time when, upon leaving childhood, we begin to know ourselves and to make use of our reason, which represents God to us as our last end.

Moreover, the Theologians teach that a precept can oblige either of itself or accidentally; these are the terms they use, per se, per accidens. It obliges of itself when, independently of every other precept, it commands me to make an act of the particular virtue to which it relates. Thus the precept of charity will oblige me of itself if, independently of every other precept, it obliges me to make acts of the love of God. A precept obliges me accidentally when I have to discharge some duty or to repel some temptation, and when the one or the other cannot be done without an act commanded by that precept. Thus, finding myself in some circumstance obliged by the precept of penance to make an act of perfect contrition, the precept of charity obliges me on that occasion accidentally, because, the act of contrition being nothing but a detestation of sin from the motive of the love of God, I cannot fulfill the precept of penance without making an act of the love of God.

Finally, all the Theologians agree that there is a precept of loving God; that this precept is negative, because it contains the prohibition against doing anything against God, and that it is also affirmative, because it obliges us to certain duties. Moreover, they agree that this precept is general and extends to the observance of all the other commandments; that there is also a special one which obliges at least accidentally, as in the case of the necessity of contrition and in some others. All the Theologians agree on all these points, and Father Antoine Sirmond agrees with them throughout the Treatise in question. Nor was it on this that he was accused; but, in accusing him of something else, it was concealed that he had even taught this, which alone would suffice greatly to diminish the horror that people endeavor to spread over his entire doctrine. The sole question that can therefore be asked here with respect to the doctrine of this Theologian in particular is to know whether, supposing all these other obligations upon which everyone agrees, this precept, insofar as it is special and affirmative, obliges us, in addition, not only accidentally but of itself, to make formal acts of love, by which one says to God: My God, I love you with all my heart.

The sentiment of this Doctor is that there is a precept of effective love which obliges one to observe all the other commandments under pain of damnation, whether through the motive of the virtue of hope, through the motive of the virtue of religion, or through that of some other virtue; but that there is no precept of affective love which obliges us of itself to make interior, formal, and proper acts of the virtue of charity. It is on this that a Writer lashes out in these terms against the Jesuits: They have gone so far as this impiety, of maintaining that the interior act of the love of God was only counseled, not commanded; and it was proclaimed everywhere that they wished to abolish the first and the principal of God’s Commandments.

To answer this horrible accusation, the Jesuits did not undertake the defense of the doctrine of Father Antoine Sirmond; but they endeavored only to excuse him, saying that if he had failed on this occasion, it was only after great Theologians. In fact, I find in the Book of a Doctor of Louvain named Dubois, Royal Professor of Holy Scripture, who wrote on the propositions of Moral Theology censured by Pope Alexander VII in 1665 and 1666 - I find that this Doctor, who is in no way of this opinion, having caused a search to be made for the Authors who had held it, places among them Bannez, a famous Theologian of the Order of Saint Dominic; Cardinal Cajetan, of the same Order; Marchantius; Jean Sanchez (who must not be confused with the Jesuit of the same surname); Jansenius, Bishop of Ghent; and Molanus, another celebrated Doctor of Louvain. I also find in another Author who gives himself the name Florimond du Plessis, Saint Antonin, Sylvester, Almaïn, an ancient Doctor of Paris, the learned Tostat, Gerson, and several others cited in favor of this doctrine. But this is not what the Jesuits of today principally wish people to consider. They will be content merely to point out that, if this doctrine is not attributed to the Order of Saint Dominic, nor to the University of Louvain, nor to the Faculty of Paris, although it was taught by one or more Doctors of these celebrated Societies, there is scarcely any justice in wishing it to be regarded as the doctrine of the Body of Jesuits because it is found in the Book of one of their Writers.

Whether, then, this doctrine was taught by others or was not; whether it was suffered with impunity in non-Jesuit Doctors and censured only in the Book of a Jesuit - this is not the matter at issue. What the Jesuits claim here solely is to make known, as they declare aloud, that they reprove this doctrine and that it was never that of their Society.

But in order to show that it is not, so to speak, after the fact that they make this declaration, as though the clamor raised against them on this occasion had caused them to change their sentiment on this subject and to return, despite themselves, to sound doctrine, it will now be shown, by the citation of a great number of their most celebrated Doctors, that the doctrine of their Society has at all times been such as they declare it to be today concerning the indispensable obligation of the precept of the love of God. Here are the extracts from these Theologians.

Cardinal Bellarmine. [Tom. 4, l. 6, De grat. & lib. arbitr., cap. 7.] Holy Scripture does not say only that charity is a gift of God, but in addition it commands us to love God. Now it does not command us merely to preserve the infused habit of charity, but it obliges us to love God with all our heart; for laws have for their object the acts of virtues and not the habits.

Cardinal de Lugo. [Disput. 7, sect. 12, num. 250.] The precept of loving God is absolutely of natural law. Even if there were no positive command of God, this precept would oblige us to it.

Suarez. [Tract. ult. De Charitat., disp. 5, De praecepto Charitatis.] First, I say that this precept is for all men. This is evident from the sixth Chapter of Deuteronomy: You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart; and from the tenth of Saint Matthew: This Commandment is the first and the greatest of all. The reason for my conclusion is that this love is a means necessary for salvation; now such means are always of an obligation of precept.

Suarez, continued. [Sect. 3.] I say, secondly, that this precept sometimes obliges of itself. For the rest, it is difficult positively to determine the time when it obliges. On this one must say what is said of the precept of restitution: that one is obliged not to delay very long.

And elsewhere. [T. 2, De Relig., lib. 1, De Orat., cap. 30.] One may give this general rule for all these affirmative precepts: that the acts they command must not be long delayed, and that these acts must be reiterated from time to time.

Molina. [Tract. 5, De Justit. & Jure, disp. 59, p. 3165.] I am persuaded that we are obliged, under pain of mortal sin, by virtue of the precept of the love that we owe to God, to undertake the defense of his interests; to oppose what might wound his honor and his glory; to do what we believe can be useful for this; and that we must do it at the peril of our life. This does not prevent there being (he says again two pages later) a particular precept of the love of God, as of a thing which is owed to him, and this love being commanded to us as a means necessary to obtain the possession of God and eternal life.

Laymann. [Libro 2, tract. 3, cap. 2.] The precept of loving God above all things, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges only at certain times. The first time is when man has attained the use of reason, God, through the lights of Faith, being sufficiently represented to him as his last end. According to Suarez (he adds), man is obliged often during the course of his life to produce acts of charity toward God.

Becan. [De Sacr., cap. 35, q., num. 4.] There is a double precept of loving God. The first is a general precept, which is comprised in the whole Decalogue and obliges us to keep the Law of God. The second is particular and positive, which obliges us to produce the act of charity, whether that act is a movement of love toward God or of detestation of sin insofar as it offends God.

Thomas Sanchez. [In Decal., l. 2, c. 3.] It is certain that there is a commandment to love God. The reason is that the act of the love of God is necessary for Salvation. He who does not love, says Saint John, remains in death. Now everything that is necessary for Salvation is commanded.

Tannerus. [In 2. 2, d. 2, De Spe & Charit., q. 4, d. 4, n. 48.] The precept of the love of God obliges at the point of death, and when, after having attained the age of reason, one is capable of penetrating the truths that engage us to love God above all things and to refer everything to him. This is the common sentiment of the Doctors.... Moreover, the precept of loving God above all things imposes on us the obligation to produce from time to time acts of love toward him, although one cannot precisely determine in particular the times of this obligation.

Arriaga. [Disp. 36, De charit., sect. 3, n. 10.] In view of the motives for this love that I have marked above, when I proved the obligation that this precept imposes on us, it is saying little to maintain that one is obliged at least once a year to renew its act.

Filliucius. [Tr. 2, c. 9, n. 287.] It appears to me that the fulfillment of the obligation which this precept imposes on us cannot be better determined as to time than it is in the third opinion, where there is marked for this the beginning of the use of reason.... the point of death.... and, in the third place, the time of life that passes between these two extremes, during which there is an obligation to make from time to time acts of the love of God.

Hurtado de Mendoza, after marking the beginning of the use of reason for the first fulfillment of this precept, adds: [d. 174, sect. 5.] I say, secondly, that one is obliged to make acts of it in the course of life, and every year; and it is asking scarcely anything to limit this obligation there.

Gregory of Valencia, after proving the possibility and the necessity there is for salvation of fulfilling this precept, and determining with the other Theologians the obligation to make the act of the love of God above all things at the beginning of the use of reason and at the point of death, notes still several other cases in which one is obliged to it, as when one receives some singular benefit from God, etc. [In 2.20, disp. 3, q. 19.]

Finally, I do not believe that, among the very great number of Jesuit Theologians who have printed courses of Theology, a single one can be shown who ever denied the necessity of the act of the love of God for salvation. An infinity of them applied themselves to proving it when they had occasion to do so. The Theologian of Louvain whom I have already cited, Dubois, took the trouble to gather as many as thirty and to transcribe their passages. Only the most famous of the Society have been reported here, in order not to weary the Reader with a multitude of extracts which all say nearly the same thing. After which the Jesuits will find themselves sufficiently exculpated before the public tribunal from the calumny that people do not cease to impose upon them even every day, by publishing everywhere that they exempt the faithful from the obligation of loving God.

It is surprising that their calumniators are so readily listened to on this subject. For, although in order to justify them not everyone can have recourse to the Books of their Theologians, which are not within the reach of an infinity of persons, who is there in the world, provided he has some affection for Books of devotion, who has not read or been able to read the Books of Rodriguez, of Saint-Jure, of Hayneuve, of Suffren, of Dupont, and a quantity of others which are in the hands of all persons of piety? One has only to open the Books of these Jesuits to see on every page that they recommend nothing so much as the exercise of divine love. And whoever wished to take the trouble to consult the Bibliography of their Writers would see, from the titles alone, that no Society has ever labored more to inspire this excellent virtue in Christians.

What is most bizarre here is that, at the same time as people continued in these latter years to decry the Jesuits on this article, they accused them of being too zealous partisans of pure and disinterested love, and it did not depend upon a thousand people that they should not be made to pass for Quietists. And what is still more admirable is that this same Father Sirmond, who was the occasion of so much clamor only by denying the indispensable necessity of affective love, understood nothing else by this affective love than pure and disinterested charity, of which since then not only the necessity but even the possibility has been called into doubt.

The Jesuits, in order perfectly to exculpate themselves on the subject in question, add that they condemn with all their heart certain particular propositions that relate to it and that are among those which Popes Alexander VII, Innocent XI, and Alexander VIII condemned. They are the following five Propositions.

1. There is no obligation, by virtue of the divine precepts which concern Faith, Hope, and Charity, to produce any act of these virtues at any time of life whatsoever.

2. We should not dare to condemn of mortal sin one who in his whole life should make only one act of the love of God.

3. It is probable that the precept of Charity does not of itself oblige, in rigor, to make an act of it every five years.

4. This precept obliges only when we are bound to be reconciled with God and have no other means of returning to his grace.

5. Man is not obliged to love God either at the beginning or in the course of his moral life.

The Jesuits therefore say anathema to these five propositions. They declare that this is not, and that this has never been, the doctrine of their Society; they do not even believe that these propositions can be shown in the books of any of their Theologians such as they are in the censure of the Popes.

The Doctors, in view of the great difficulty, or, to speak more accurately, the impossibility, of determining surely all the times and all the conjunctures in which the precept of charity obliges to the act it commands, have had very different sentiments on this subject. The Jesuits followed the doctrine which they found common in the School in this matter, as in all the others. The Popes did not believe they ought to determine anything concerning it; and they contented themselves with censuring the propositions in question, which departed too visibly from the truth, without touching several others whose truth or falsity was not evident to them.

These are the things of which the Jesuits believed they ought to inform the public, seeing themselves so unjustly accused on a point of this importance. If after this calumny were still to prevail, they would console themselves before God and would regard this oppression as a disposition of Providence which they would adore and to which they would endeavor to submit with an entire resignation. I pass to the second point, which concerns the doctrine of philosophical sin.