Section — Vermeersch, On Forbidden Books
I. What General Principles Are to Be Used
25. The laws of the Index contain a few censures latae sententiae; they strictly command or forbid many things, with arbitrary penalties being threatened; they commend or advise some things; finally, they grant certain faculties.
General rule
On censures
1. That these censures latae sententiae are to be interpreted strictly, no one today doubts; formerly it was denied by Suarez.1
1 De Fide, disp. 20, sect. 2, n. 10. Cf. the responses of Schmalzgrueber, in book 5, title 7, n. 55; and Castropalao, treatise 4, disp. 20, point 10, section 1, n. 3.
On precepts and prohibitions
26. 2. That rigorous precepts and prohibitions are to be interpreted strictly is held by the common opinion,1 against very few.2
Concerning the more benign opinion, which is ours, these three things must first be observed, lest it be understood wrongly.
The more benign opinion is safeguarded
a) We are dealing only with positive prohibition; when this has been removed, the obligations of natural prudence remain. By these we are forbidden to expose our faith or our morals to proximate danger, and to be a scandal to others. Moreover, if it is neither lawful nor expedient to increase the force of obligations beyond what is just, nevertheless our counsels ought to strive for this: that, as far as possible, they remove dangers of spiritual ruin. Therefore, when there is question of counsels to be given, we plainly agree with St. Alphonsus writing: "In this matter it is ordinarily expedient to follow the more rigid opinions."3
b) We consider and interpret the Constitution as it was enacted, that is, in relation to the universal Church. But if the very good circumstances of some diocese can bear and seem to demand more severe sanctions, the remedy is ready at hand, and its use has more than once been commended by the Holy See: namely, the faculty granted to the Bishop of supplying, by particular laws, that which is wanting in the general Law for his diocese. But private persons are not thereby permitted to have recourse to an arbitrary interpretation of the common law.
c) The canon concerning the restriction of an odious law does not give the supreme rule of interpretation. Therefore it can happen that, in appearance, it must be derogated from, in order to observe higher canons, which command us, for example, to adapt an explanation to the clear mind of the Legislator,4 or to interpret words in such a way that they have some effect.
And it is proved
These things having been laid down, our solution rests especially on the circumstances in which this Constitution was enacted. Their sum is this: the desire of reading everything has increased immensely; regard for authority and docility of minds have greatly diminished; the Church has been deprived of every support of secular power;5 in our mixed societies there is daily commerce with men of every opinion and religion; there is a daily publication of books and writings which of themselves would be worthy of a censorial mark, and yet, at the same time, on account of other merits, furnish to many a useful, not to say necessary, reading; hence there are innumerable reasons, both pretended and true, for keeping and reading writings of this kind; and the necessity of a more benign law has been declared more than once. In his preface, Leo XIII, according to his prudence, acknowledges that the Bishops both of France and of Germany, who insisted in this sense with weighty words, had asked what was equitable, by denouncing the scruples, anxieties, and most grave temptations of violating the law by which the consciences of Catholics were burdened more than was fair.6 Add finally that not one region professed itself immune from the rules of the Index, and that it was among the wishes of the Supreme Pontiff that universal observance of these sanctions be restored. To one weighing these things, unless we are mistaken, the following will easily be clear:
a) The common good demands a strict interpretation of the prohibitions, lest, from the inclination of minds to cast off a yoke of this kind, there would be too great a temptation to violate the law, and thus for too many there would be an occasion of sinning; lest "imperfect persons, unable to bear precepts of this kind, break forth into worse evils."7 But the common good, just as it is the supreme norm of making law, so also is it the supreme norm of interpreting law.
b) The wish and command of the Supreme Pontiff, who desires that "Catholic men throughout the whole world obey these sanctions religiously," demands a strict interpretation. Rigid explanations of this law will not greatly profit this end.
c) If we wish to take refuge in axioms: "Every odious law is to be interpreted strictly."8 But that law is understood as odious which imposes a burden, an encumbrance.9 Who can doubt that the present law is of this kind, since it prohibits and indeed under a grave penalty,10 especially if you look to the circumstances? And it is already enough that, since the prohibitions run far beyond the limits of natural prohibition, it directly restricts natural liberty.11
d) The character of the present Constitution demands a strict interpretation of the prohibitions. By this law of his the Supreme Pontiff imitates "the maternal zeal of the Church: which indeed desires nothing so much as to impart herself benignly, and has always taken care, and takes care, to heal those born of her in such a way that she lovingly and zealously spares their infirmity." He acknowledged and professed the necessity of softening the laws of the Index. He wills that "to obey" these laws, "provided one is not of evil disposition, cannot be grave and arduous." Yet, being well aware of the difficult circumstances, when the Bishops of England requested it, he immediately granted the very great power of which we spoke in n. 24. A broad acceptance of the prohibitions corresponds little with these things. Apply, for example, this method in explaining article 11.12 Will you not immediately seem to yourself to be carried away by excessive rigor?
e) Together with the prohibitions, this Constitution contains penalties; indeed, all the precepts are sanctioned by arbitrary penalties. All acknowledge that these are of strict interpretation.13
But if you understand the prohibitions broadly, it will happen that you take the same words in a different sense in the offense than in its sanction! Moreover, if, on account of the favor of faith, we must interpret the prohibitions broadly, shall we not be compelled from the same cause to take strictly the licenses or faculties of reading, and the articles which hold certain books as not prohibited?14 No one will fail to see how strange these things are, and how much they are opposed to received practice.
1 Genicot, I, 451; Hollweck, Das kirchliche Bücherverbot, p. 20, V; Péries, op. cit., p. 55; Pennacchi, op. cit., nn. 34, 38, 49 and passim; Palmieri, op. cit., n. 794; the writer of Archiv, vol. 78, p. 187; Piat, Nouvelle Revue Théologique, vol. 32 (1900), p. 479; Wernz, op. cit., n. 110, IV; Ciolli, op. cit., n. 4, etc.
2 Planchard, Revue Théologique Française, vol. 2, p. 159; Van Coillie, op. cit., nn. 9, 10; L. Van Ruymbeke (somewhat more temperately), in Nouvelle Revue Théologique, vol. 36 (1904), p. 98.
3 Appendix, chapter 5, n. 8.
4 We understand that mind which can be demonstrated from reason, the connected discourse, or the circumstances, so that it has been promulgated with the law. For a private declaration of the Legislator can no more be efficacious than a private will. Very well Wernz, I, n. 131, II, where the words are doubtful, says: "From the disposition of the law one must have recourse to the mind of the Legislator truly manifested in some other way."
5 If, as formerly, the matter concerned preventing the introduction of dangerous books into some region, the common utility of warding off common harms could easily demand that the commands given, especially those which are given to public powers, be accepted broadly; but prohibitions which affect individuals in particular are to be accepted otherwise. Just as you will understand more broadly a general prohibition by which men infected with plague are kept away, and a particular prohibition lest you approach a man suffering from plague.
6 Cf. the words in the Collectio Lacensis, vol. 7, p. 843; or in Péries, pp. 46, 47; or Pennacchi, op. cit., nn. 29, 30.
7 St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 96, art. 2, ad 2. Cf. also the body of the article.
8 Reiffenstuel, I, 2, 427; and cf. Rule 15 of Law in Sexto.
9 B. P., tract. 3, n. 381.
10 Cf. already Albitius, De inconstantia in fide, chapter 30, n. 224 ff.
11 In this matter Reverend Father Van Ruymbeke seems to err in an otherwise learned dissertation, when he describes the laws of the Index as gentle and easy to observe of themselves. It is enough even briefly to question, I do not say impious men and haters of the Church, but Catholics and priests (provided they devote themselves to studies, for what does it matter with respect to others?), so that you may become more certain that those laws, both concerning prohibition and concerning previous censorship, are today held as most troublesome, and are far from being marked by that note which Suarez himself requires in order to indicate that prohibitions are favorable, that is: that they command something "moderate, and agreeable to the common manner of living of men" (De Legibus, book 5, chapter 2, n. 6).
12 Cf. below, in the commentaries.
13 Lehmkuhl, I, 1073, 4; Van Gestel, De Iustitia in Lege civili, p. 185.
14 For example, article 4.
General rule concerning faculties
27. 3. But faculties either of reading and retaining prohibited books, or of granting this permission, seem to us to have, of themselves, an ample interpretation.
We say this of indults for granting faculties, such as Bishops obtain, because faculties of this kind are referred to privileges which are outside the law and not against the law.
We hold the same concerning indults for reading books, because they have the character of a faculty, not of a dispensation. For the law does not simply forbid reading, but forbids you to read without license. By reading with license, you observe the law, far from being dispensed from it.
But since a general faculty concerning the reading of books expressly obscene is never granted, the necessity on account of which you think yourself exempt from that prohibition seems to be to be taken strictly - I do not say scrupulously.