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Certain Sayings Annexed to the Moral System
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Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. I, § IV, Point III, I. On Certain Sayings Annexed to the Moral System
The sayings to be explained either represent, in a brief formula, the moral system itself or its demonstration, or they exhibit rules by which doubts of fact are solved.
I. A doubtful law does not oblige. The sense is: A law whose existence or enactment is strictly doubtful does not oblige. But a law whose cessation or fulfillment is strictly doubtful does oblige; likewise a law whose existence or enactment is certainly more probable.
II. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. Wherefore observe:
The principle has force both in the matter of justice and in the matter of other virtues, whenever the dispute is between liberty and law (St. Alphonsus, I, 26). Nevertheless the sense of the principle is different according as it regards justice or another virtue, as will be clear from what must be said under 2 and 3.
In the matter of justice he is said to possess who holds the thing about which there is dispute with the mind of an owner or as his own. In this matter the principle has force insofar as one who has begun in good faith to possess a thing can retain it until it is demonstrated that it belongs to another (St. Alphonsus, I, 36; VI, 904, 905).
But if the dispute is between liberty and law, that is said by us to possess which is at least prior by nature. Hence liberty possesses in doubt: 1. whether a positive law has been established or promulgated; 2. whether a law comprehends some person or case; 3. whether the fact founding the law has taken place. The law possesses in doubt whether it has ceased or has been fulfilled. But the principle has force only, or the condition of the possessor is better only, in strict doubt, and not if that which supervenes is more probable.
III. In doubt a fact is not presumed but must be proved. The principal fact is understood; such are, for example, the establishment of a law, the fact founding a law, the cessation and fulfillment of a law. These, therefore, are considered as if they had not taken place until, according to the things explained above, they have been sufficiently proved.
IV. In doubt that which has been done is presumed to have been done rightly; or: In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act. These have force if the principal fact is established, but there is doubt about an accessory fact or about the circumstance or manner in which the fact took place. In that case the fact is presumed to have been done duly. Hence one who doubts, for example, whether he confessed duly or obtained a dispensation validly, can stand for the validity of the act (St. Alphonsus, I, 182; VI, 461). The principle does not have force if the manner in which the act was placed is established, but there is doubt whether the act so placed is valid.