Development of the Mind

1. In addition to developing his physical powers, man is obliged to cultivate his mental and moral faculties. Intellectual and moral culture should go hand in hand, because mere knowledge and mental acuteness do not ennoble the mind, but may co-exist with brutality.¹

¹ Cfr. J. Guibert, Le Caractère, Paris 1905; P. Levy and M. Brahe, Die natürliche Willensbildung, Leipsic 1903.

a) Though it is not true, as the ancient sophists claimed, that knowledge spells virtue and that, consequently, a learned man is invariably a good man, no sane person will deny that, broadly speaking, genuine moral culture is impossible without a definite sum of knowledge. In the matter of education we must beware of two extremes. It is as foolish to train any one faculty exclusively as it is to attempt to train all faculties of the intellect in an equal measure.² To demand that all men be raised to the highest attainable proficiency in literature and science is to require what is practically impossible. "Non omnia possumus omnes." The various faculties and talents were given to men for the purpose of being fully developed as a whole, for the benefit of society, but they need not all be developed in each individual, in fact this would be impossible on account of the difference in ability and character.

² Cfr. J. B. Krier and J. Schofer, Das Studium und die Privatlektüre, 5th ed., Freiburg 1904; Brother Azarias, Books and Reading, New York 1896.

"Knowledge," says Lord Bacon,³ taking the term in its true and highest sense, "is power," and an ancient adage declares that the master of one book commands respect.⁴ St. Paul says: "If any man know not, he shall not be known."⁵ Yet knowledge alone does not insure goodness. Intellectual proficiency may lead or help a man to adopt a sublime conception of the universe, but it will never by itself render him good and happy. Truth and knowledge are precious gifts, by means of which man enriches himself, makes his fellowmen happy, and glorifies God. This is the highest attainable prize of earnest and continuous mental culture. But something more is necessary. Man must not only know the truth, he must also act in conformity with it; in other words, he must lead a morally good, that is, a virtuous life. To be good, he must assimilate moral goodness through the will. Education, therefore, is not complete unless the will is trained as carefully as the intellect. Only in this way does a man become contented and happy and helpful to his fellowmen.

³ Novum Organum, aphorism III: "Scientia et potentia in idem coincidunt." —Cfr. St. Ignatius Loyola's dictum: "If you wish to accomplish anything, you must know something."

⁴ "Timeo lectorem unius libri."

⁵ 1 Cor. XIV, 38.

“Every man naturally desireth to know; but what doth knowledge avail without the fear of God? Better indeed is an ignorant laborer who serveth God, than a proud philosopher who, neglecting himself, contemplateth the course of the heavens.... If thou wouldst profitably know or learn something, love to be unknown and to be thought of no account. This is the most sublime and most useful subject of study: true self-knowledge and self-contempt."⁶

⁶ “Every man naturally desires to know, but what does knowledge avail without the fear of God? Better indeed is a humble peasant who serves God than a proud philosopher who, neglecting himself, considers the course of heaven.... If you wish usefully to know and learn something, love to be unknown and to be reckoned as nothing. This is the highest and most useful lesson: true knowledge and contempt of oneself.” (De Imit. Christi, I, 2, 1; ed. Pohl, II, 7 sq.)—Cfr. I, n. 3: “What does it profit you to discuss lofty things concerning the Trinity, if you lack humility, by reason of which you displease the Trinity?” (Ibid., p. 6).

b) Every man has the strict duty of acquiring so much intellectual and moral education as will enable him to follow a useful calling and to strive consistently for his mental and moral perfection. This duty implies instruction in matters of faith and morals and practice in the arts of reading, writing, and arithmetic, which, among civilized nations, constitute the elements of a general education and the indispensable means of communication. Every man who lives within the pale of civilized society, is bound under pain of sin to make use of the opportunities available to him for the acquisition of these elements, and, if the laws of State or Church demand it, he should also acquire a higher education.

When an opportunity of acquiring intellectual culture involves a proximate occasion of sin, there is no obligation to use it.

Religion is the foundation of true culture, and any compulsory school law directed against religion would violate the natural rights of parents and children alike, for parents are commanded by God to take care that their children are trained in the principles of religion, and the children have a natural right to such training. Compulsory education may be a benefit to society, but it degenerates into tyranny when the children are compelled to attend un-Christian, or, what is worse, positively anti-Christian schools, or if the State does not provide for, or at least permit, the giving of sufficient religious instruction.

Education contains both a religious and a secular element. The control of the former belongs solely to the Church, whereas in regard to the latter, the State cannot be denied a reasonable share.⁷ "Though children are facts of the domestic order," says Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J., "and the care and formation of them belongs primarily to their parents, yet if the parents neglect their charge, the State can claim the right of intervention ab abusu. It certainly is within the province of the State to prevent any parent from launching upon the world a brood of young barbarians, ready to disturb the peace of civil society. The practical issue is, who are barbarians and what is understood by peace. The Emperor Decius probably considered every Christian child an enemy of the Pax Romana. But the misapplication of a maxim does not derogate from its truth. It also belongs to the State to see that no parent behaves like a Cyclops (κυκλωπικῶς, Aristotle, Eth., X, ix, 13) in his family, ordering his children, not to their good, as a father is bound to do, but to his own tyrannical caprice. For instruction, as distinguished from education, it is the parent's duty to provide his child with so much of it as is necessary, in the state of society wherein his lot is cast, to enable the child to make his way in the world according to the condition of his father. In many walks of life one might as well be short of a finger as not know how to read and write. Where ignorance is such a disadvantage, the parent is not allowed to let his child grow up ignorant. There, if he neglects to have him taught, the State may step in with compulsory schooling. Compulsory schooling for all indiscriminately, and that up to a high standard, is quite another matter."⁸

⁷ On the respective rights of Church and State in regard to education see M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, Dublin 1917, pp. 486 sqq.; W. Turner in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XIII, p. 558; Quigley, Compulsory Education, N. Y. 1894; Zach. Montgomery, Poison Drops in the U. S. Senate; S. M. Brandi, S.J., "The Touchstone of Catholicity," in the Am. Eccles. Review, Vol. VI (1892), pp. 89 sqq.; F. S. Chatard, "Dr. Bouquillon on the School Question," ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 98 sqq.; R. I. Holaind, S.J., The Parent First, N. Y. 1895; S. G. Messmer, "The Right of Instruction," Am. Eccl. Review, Vol. VI, pp. 104 sqq.; Card. O'Connell, The Reasonable Limits of State Activity, Columbus, O., 1919.

⁸ Moral Philosophy, p. 358.

The spread of culture is beneficial not only from the intellectual but also from the moral point of view. Cultured nations as a rule stand on a higher moral level than those which are unlettered, and the same is true of social classes. A sound training of the mind and heart is a protection against evil passions and a means of conciliation between opposing classes of people. Lectures, study courses, public libraries, university extension, the dissemination of good literature, are means of satisfying the popular craving for knowledge, but they cannot attain their highest object if they merely convey information; they must above all else train the will, for man's true worth depends, not on his intellect alone, but on his character. Intellectual proficiency does not level social inequalities. The only kind of culture that really promotes the progress of society, as of the individual, is that which leads up to Him who is "the way, the truth, and the life."⁹

⁹ John XIV, 6.—Cfr. St. Augustine, Confess., V, c. 4: “Surely, O Lord God of truth, does whoever knows those things thereby please Thee? Unhappy is the man who knows all those things but does not know Thee; but blessed is he who knows Thee, even if he does not know those things. And he who knows both Thee and those things is not the more blessed because of those things, but is blessed because of Thee alone.” (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 708).—Thomas à Kempis, De Imitatione Christi, I, 1: “If you knew the whole Bible outwardly and the sayings of all the philosophers, what would it all profit without the charity and grace of God?”

2. Knowledge becomes transmuted into virtue if its motive, object, and standard are brought into harmony with the moral law.¹⁰ By earnestly striving to apply true knowledge to his conduct man acquires prudence or wisdom (prudentia), which, in the words of St. Thomas, is "the noblest of the moral virtues and directs all virtuous acts."¹¹

¹⁰ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Trinit., L XII, c. 14, n. 21: “Knowledge also has its own good measure, if that in it which puffs up, or is accustomed to puff up, is overcome by the charity of eternal things, which does not puff up but, as we know, builds up (1 Cor. VIII, 1). For without knowledge not even the virtues themselves, by which one lives rightly, can be possessed, through which this wretched life may be so governed that one may arrive at that eternal life which is truly blessed.” (P. L., XLII, 1009).—St. Bernard, Serm. in Cant., XXXVI, n. 3: “But I send you better to the Master. For this opinion is not ours, but His—indeed ours also, since it is the opinion of Truth. ‘He who thinks that he knows something,’ He says, ‘has not yet known the manner in which he ought to know’ (1 Cor. VIII, 2). You see that He does not approve one who knows many things if he has not known the manner of knowing. You see, I say, how He places the fruit and usefulness of knowledge in the manner of knowing. What, then, does He call the manner of knowing? What, except that you should know in what order, with what eagerness, and for what end each thing ought to be known? In what order: that first which is more immediately conducive to salvation; with what eagerness: that more ardently which more vehemently conduces to love; for what end: not for vainglory or curiosity or anything similar, but only for your own edification or that of your neighbor. For there are some who wish to know for this end alone, that they may know, and it is shameful curiosity. And there are some who wish to know that they themselves may be known, and it is shameful vanity. These certainly will not escape the satirist who mocks them and sings to one of this kind: ‘Your knowledge is nothing unless another knows that you possess this knowledge’ (Persius, Sat., I, 27). And there are likewise some who wish to know in order to sell their knowledge, for example for money or honors, and it is shameful gain. But there are also some who wish to know in order to edify, and it is charity; and likewise some who wish to know in order to be edified, and it is prudence.”—Ibid., n. 4: “Of all these, only the last two are not found in the abuse of knowledge, since they wish to understand for this purpose, that they may act well.” (Migne, P. L., CLXXXIII, 968). —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 166 sq.

¹¹ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 47, art. 6, ad 3: “Prudence is nobler than the moral virtues and moves them.”—Ibid., qu. 55, art. 3: “Prudence is right reason concerning things to be done, just as knowledge is right reason concerning things to be known.”—Ibid., qu. 56, n. 1: “It is itself the directive of all virtuous acts.”

Prudence as the fundamental virtue manifests itself: a) In love of truth or a tendency to develop the innate faculty by which the soul acquires the knowledge of truth. The desire to acquire knowledge per se serves only the truth, inasmuch as it is apt to lead man to the absolute Truth, i. e., God. Hence to seek enlightenment and knowledge for the sake of enriching the mind and cultivating the spiritual sense is a proof of true wisdom. The Christian religion, indeed, demands faith; but its essential object is to propagate the truth, and hence, far from interfering with the desire for knowledge, far from opposing new discoveries and ideas, it, on the contrary, hails and welcomes every increase of knowledge because the truth renders man intellectually and morally free.¹²

¹² Cfr. John VIII, 32. —St. Jerome, In Ierem., l. I, c. 1: “Truth is always to be loved, and the multitude of men is not to be feared.” (Migne, P. L., XXIV, 687).—Ibid., l. VI, c. 23: “Truth can be shut up and bound, but it cannot be conquered; it is content even with the fewness of its adherents and is not frightened by the multitude of its enemies.” (P. L., XXIV, 829).—IDEM, In Is. Proph., l. XVI, c. 58: “As the morning light dispels the darkness, so the light of knowledge and truth puts all errors to flight.” (P. L., XXIV, 568).

It follows from all this that intellectual dullness and credulity is not only a mental, but also a moral defect, and a serious one if it furnishes cause for doubt and superstition. It follows further that the pursuit of knowledge, if carried on purely for its own sake or to satisfy inquisitiveness or vanity, is immoral. Knowledge acquired from such motives, in the words of the Apostle, "puffeth up," whereas "charity edifieth."¹³

¹³ 1 Cor. VIII, 1.—Cfr. J. Gerson, Opera Omnia, I, 117: “Knowledge puffs up and makes a devil. For what does ‘devil’ mean except one who knows, but without charity?”—Thomas à Kempis, De Imit. Christi, l. I, c. 3: “Knowledge or any simple acquaintance with a thing is not to be blamed, since it is good considered in itself and ordained by God; but a good conscience and a virtuous life are always to be preferred.... How many perish through vain knowledge in the world, who care little about the service of God! And because they choose rather to be great than humble, therefore they vanish in their thoughts.” (Ed. Pohl, II, 10 sq.)—Cfr. St. Bernard, Serm. in Cant., XXXVI, n. 2: “Perhaps I may seem excessive in censuring knowledge and as though reproving the learned and forbidding literary studies. Far be it! I am not ignorant of how much the Church’s learned men have benefited and do benefit her, whether in refuting those who oppose her or in instructing the simple. Indeed, I have read: ‘Because you have rejected knowledge, I also will reject you, so that you shall not perform the priesthood for Me’ [Os. IV, 6]; I have read: ‘Those who have been learned shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and those who instruct many unto justice as stars unto perpetual eternities’ [Dan. XII, 3]. But I also know where I have read: ‘Knowledge puffs up’ [1 Cor. VIII, 1], and again: ‘He who adds knowledge adds also sorrow’ [Eccles. I, 18]. You see that there is a difference among kinds of knowledge, since one puffs up and another causes sorrow. But I should like you to know which of these seems more useful or more necessary for salvation: that which swells, or that which sorrows.... The Apostle does not forbid being wise, but being wiser than one ought [Rom. XII, 3]. What is it, then, to be wise unto sobriety? To observe most vigilantly what one ought to know more and what one ought to know first. For the time is short. All knowledge, so far as it is in itself, is good, provided that it rests upon truth; but you, who hasten with fear and trembling to work out your own salvation, take care to know rather and more fully those things which you perceive to be nearer to salvation.” (Migne, P. L., CLXXXIII, 967).

"Happy are they who do not pay for the treasure of knowledge with their hearts," says Schiller. The desire for knowledge, when inspired by proper motives, leads not to pride, but to humility. Dom Odilo Rottmanner, O.S.B., one of the greatest savants of his age, says: "If, as sometimes happens, a really learned man is puffed up with pride, this is an aberration of the heart, for which science must not be held responsible. As a rule those who display pride and vanity are least proficient and have acquired at best only half an education; their knowledge is limited and one-sided. They resemble the empty ear of grain, which stands upright, whereas its neighbor, laden with kernels, bows humbly to the ground. How is it possible for one to be proud who at every step in the realm of knowledge perceives more clearly the vastness of science and the incapability of his tiny mind to compass it! How could he regard himself otherwise than as small who has envisaged, nay, glimpsed the immensity of the universe! How puerile is it to take pride in the fragments of knowledge which man can attain, in view of the infinite realm he can never hope to explore! Need we wonder that the highest degree of knowledge attainable to man is invariably united with sincere humility and modesty?"¹⁴

¹⁴ O. Rottmanner, O.S.B., Predigten und Ansprachen, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1904, p. 256.

Prudence furthermore manifests itself b) In the exercise of a reasonable caution. The virtue of cautiousness stands midway between fatalistic carelessness and indifference on the one hand, and, on the other, that un-Christian solicitude and worry against which Jesus has warned us so earnestly.¹⁵

¹⁵ Matt. VI, 25-34; cfr. Luke XII, 22-32; Phil. IV, 6.

We are commanded to employ all our bodily and mental faculties for the purpose of pressing the laws and powers of nature into the service of humanity, and as far as possible, warding off harmful influences from ourselves and others. Hence it is not distrust of Providence, nor "un-Christian interference with the plans of God," as one writer has charged, but a morally licit precaution, which under certain conditions may become a duty and a virtue, to employ those means of protection which human foresight and prudence furnish, and take all proper or necessary measures to escape harm and loss,—for instance, by insuring one's life and material possessions against death, disease, fire, and other vicissitudes. The time-honored maxim, "Help yourself and God will help you," is in thorough harmony with the Catholic doctrine of Divine Providence, for, as Sacred Scripture says, "by slothfulness a building shall be brought down, and through the weakness of hands the house shall drop through."¹⁶

¹⁶ Eccles. X, 18.

"To one who no longer takes an interest in the sun, the moon, and the stars," says a modern novelist, "they cease to convey a message; and if a man neglects his house, it will go to ruin. This rule is of general applica- tion. Neglect kills, whereas charity inspires all things with new life."

Therefore, in the words of the gentle and cultured Brother Azarias, whose writings are not as highly esteemed among us as they deserve to be, "it is worthy of our noblest efforts and our most undivided attention to foster in ourselves the Spiritual Life. Herein is the highest cultivation of the moral sense. No time should be thought too precious to devote to it, for it deals with the things of eternity; no thought too sustained or too painful, for its object is the Light of all intelligence.”¹⁷

¹⁷ Brother Azarias, Phases of Thought and Criticism, Boston, 1896, p. 79.

"Gather up with care," says the same writer in another place, "the treasures of knowledge and wisdom that lie strewn about you. Guard them with a jealous eye. See that they be not sullied either by the daubing of error or the turpitude of vice. Cherish them as a heaven-sent patrimony by the right use and investment of which you are to purchase your title to eternal glory. All else may pass away, but the wisdom of well-digested knowledge and methodical thought remains through sunshine and storm, making the sunshine more beautiful and the storm less severe."¹⁸

¹⁸ Op. cit., pp. 10 sq.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 47-55.—Brother Azarias, Phases of Thought and Criticism, Boston 1896. —IDEM, Books and Reading, 5th ed., New York 1896. —J. L. Spalding, Education and the Higher Life, Chicago 1894. —J. Guibert, Le Caractère, Paris 1905.—C. Krieg, Die Wissenschaft der Seelenleitung, Vol. I, pp. 506 sqq., Freiburg 1904. —Albert Muntsch, S.J., The Pilgrimage of Life, St. Louis 1918, pp. 179 sqq.