Diverse Cooperations, Considered according to the Diversity of the Evil in which One Concurs

I. Cooperation in non-Catholic worship. 1. To contribute money for building temples of non-Catholics is lawful "only in order to free oneself and one's own temples from that inconvenient and scandalous simultaneity with Protestants."¹ It is more easily lawful, yet only for a grave cause, to contribute money for constructing institutions, for example schools, orphanages, whose primary end is social rather than religious. Yet care should be taken lest the subsidies given be regarded as favor furnished to a false sect; and this, indeed, with respect to deputies who vote for subsidies of this kind, is already sufficiently clear, so that a special protestation is not required. Finally, even Catholic deputies, with the necessary conditions posited, can vote for subsidies for temples, schools, etc., of non-Catholics, because the cooperation is only material, and the common good demands that they be able to cooperate.

2. To construct temples and altars of idols; likewise to make idols and sell them to idolaters, according to declarations of the Sacred Congregations, is never lawful.² The reason seems to be that they contain (material) cooperation in a work so injurious to God that no cause excuses. Yet it is lawful to doubt whether the aforesaid things must be urged in such a way that, for example, for masons and other subordinate workmen they would not become lawful even for a most grave cause. Moreover it is lawful to make and sell idols if they are sought, for example, to be displayed in museums, gardens, etc.

3. To build temples of Muslims, Jews, and heretics is not lawful except for a grave cause; for a graver cause if there is question of a sect which does not yet have temples in that place, but especially if there is question of a recently arisen sect. Moreover, subordinate workmen are more easily excused than architects and contractors.³ The same must be said of the manufacture, sale, and placing of implements (for example, organs) serving for the use of heretics; likewise of building the houses of Freemasons or of other impious societies, for example of Socialists; likewise of constructing theaters which commonly will serve for evil use (St. Alphonsus, II, 72).

4. To ring bells in a non-Catholic temple seems lawful from a very grave cause; since by its nature it seems to be a sign or announcement of some thing rather than a true invitation. Yet a very grave cause is required, because it is easily regarded as an invitation, and therefore the character of scandal is found in an act of this kind in a higher degree.

5. To play the organ, likewise to direct singing in a non-Catholic religious function, is always prohibited, because it is a part and ornament of a perverse rite. With regard to the playing of the organ there is added a response of the Holy Office approved by Leo XIII.⁴ The same seems to have to be said of directing singing and playing the organ outside the rite, but performed in order toward it, because preparation for a perverse rite seems to imbibe the malice of that rite.

6. To call a minister of a false religion for a sick non-Catholic who asks for that minister is illicit.⁵ Yet it is lawful, in order to call him, to use a person belonging to the same sect.⁶ Besides, for a grave cause it is lawful merely to notify the non-Catholic minister that there is a dying person who desires his visit. Now, with respect to Catholic hospitals, commonly a sufficiently abundant cause is present, since from denial of a service of this kind greater evils would easily threaten, such as hatred of the Catholic Religion and the interception of the faculty of furnishing many good things. Moreover, as far as possible, care must be taken that provision be made for the eternal salvation of the dying person, especially by eliciting with him, after the other acts necessary by necessity of means, an act of perfect contrition.

7. For a non-Catholic minister who is going to perform his rite, to prepare a table, and in the rite itself to hand over utensils, bread, and wine, is material cooperation, yet nearer than that of which there was discussion under 6. But since in this case the minister is more prepared for acting, it is lawful for a grave cause. Yet, insofar as it can be done, care must be taken that service not be furnished immediately in the rite itself.

¹ Sacred Penitentiary, 1822, in Konings, Theol. Mor., n. 313.

² C. C. de Prop. Fid., December 7, 1626; Holy Office, January 8, 1851 (Collect., nn. 29 and 1055).

³ S. C. de Prop. Fide, November 21, 1837 (Collect., n. 862); Holy Office, July 7, 1864, responded that subordinate workers are not to be disturbed, provided scandal is absent and it is not done in contempt of religion (Collect., n. 1257).

⁴ June 19, 1889.

⁵ Holy Office, December 14, 1898 (Collect., n. 2030), compared with Holy Office, March 15, 1848 (Collect., n. 2030, note 2).

⁶ Holy Office, December 14, 1898, compared with Holy Office, February 5, 1872 (Collect., n. 2030, note 3).

II. Cooperation in bad books, newspapers, etc. 1. It is illicit to compose, publish, and undertake for printing bad writings, because those acting thus harm the common good most gravely. There is added the fact that those who compose act in this way, while others easily proceed in this way with the intention that the bad writings be bought and worn out by use; in which case they must be charged with formal cooperation (n. 555).

2. It is lawful for a grave cause to perform those things which are remotely related to printing or reading, such as procuring paper and other implements, preparing paper, arranging printed sheets or books, carrying bought books to buyers. This follows from what has been said about remote cooperation in common harm (n. 556). For a very grave cause those things are lawful which are less remotely related to printing and reading, such as arranging type or inking it, placing paper underneath, turning the press, correcting printed sheets. Yet if there is question of a printing shop specially erected to attack good morals or religion, for example by communistic, socialistic writings, etc., by reason of scandal it will scarcely ever be right to remain in it. Moreover, everyone should strive that provision for support be made in another way.

3. It is illicit to circulate bad writings by commending them, because there is formal cooperation. Nor is it of itself lawful to expose them publicly or announce them, for example in shops, in newspapers, at railway stations. Yet these things of themselves involve mere pronouncement (notification), not invitation, and therefore of themselves contain material cooperation only; and this, even with common estimation considered, is sufficiently probable. From intention, indeed, commonly approval and invitation are had; but if one proceeds in the name of another, that is, of the one commanding, abstraction can be made from a depraved intention. This being posited, on the part of the agent there remains only material cooperation, which seems to be excused for a very grave cause. Yet one should strive that as soon as possible he obtain a livelihood in another way.

4. With respect to the sale of bad writings, first note these things from the Code: "The prohibition of books¹ brings this about, that a book without due permission can neither be published, nor read, nor retained, nor sold, nor translated into another language, nor communicated with others in any way" (can. 1398, § 1). Sellers of books should not sell, lend, or retain books treating professedly of obscene matters; they should not have other prohibited books for sale unless they have obtained due permission from the Apostolic See, nor should they sell them to anyone unless they can prudently judge that they are legitimately sought by the buyer (can. 1404). With these things noted, I say:

a) Owners of bad bookstores not only most gravely violate public honorableness and most gravely harm the common good, but also, since they proceed with this intention, that others buy and wear out by use what has been bought, are guilty of formal cooperation (n. 555). I have said owners of bad bookstores; since a somewhat milder judgment must be made concerning lower assistants: for on the one hand they are more easily immune from that depraved intention; on the other hand the acts placed by them do not necessarily involve approval of sin - neither of themselves, as is clear, nor from the circumstances, because it can be believed that they intend only the support of life. Hence they can be immune from formal cooperation (n. 555), and therefore can be excused for a proportionate cause. Yet, with scandal and the danger to which the faith and morals of the assistants are often exposed considered, a proportionate cause will be present only with difficulty. Moreover, one must always strive that livelihood be provided in another way.

b) With respect to others - for example, to owners of bookstores which cannot be called bad, and their assistants - this must be said: to sell bad writings is of itself illicit, unless there is question of those to whom it is sufficiently clear that reading is lawful; to commend the purchase of bad writings is simply illicit, unless again there is discussion of those who enjoy permission to read them.

5. To write, from time to time, some article for a bad newspaper is lawful for a reasonable and just cause. Yet attention must be paid to can. 1386.²

6. To subscribe to a bad newspaper is lawful for a grave cause, for example if someone needs it for conducting business.

7. To announce in a bad newspaper one's things to be sold is lawful for a middling cause. Yet work must be done so that announcements of this kind do not become necessary, and that they be made in good rather than bad newspapers.

8. To display bad papers in one's inns or houses is illicit; nor is it lawful from the fact that those gathering there seek them, otherwise being about to go elsewhere. Yet if such a paper is asked for on account of announced matters necessary to know, it is lawful to display it in a separate place. Further, on account of notable loss of profit otherwise to be feared, it is lawful to display those newspapers which only now and then contain something dangerous.

Moreover, what is to be said about the prior censorship of books and their prohibition and about penalties should be compared.

¹ "The things prescribed under this title concerning books are to be applied to publications, newspapers, periodicals, and any other published writings, unless something else is clear" (can. 1384, § 2).

² Canon 1386 states: 1. Concerning secular clerics: "Secular clerics are forbidden without the consent of their Ordinaries, and religious without the permission of their major Superior and the Ordinary of the place, to publish books, even those which treat of profane matters, and to write in newspapers, sheets, or periodical pamphlets, or to moderate the same" (§ 1). 2. Concerning Catholic lay persons: "In newspapers, sheets, or periodical pamphlets which are accustomed to attack the Catholic religion or good morals, not even Catholic lay persons should write anything, unless a just and reasonable cause advises it, approved by the Ordinary of the place" (§ 2).

III. Cooperation in dangerous amusements. 1. To perform plays or dances notably dishonorable is gravely illicit, and no excusing cause seems able to be admitted. The same must be said of plays notably contrary to religion (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 428). A somewhat milder judgment seems to have to be made about musicians.

2. To concur in introducing plays of this kind, if the concurrence is necessary, cannot be excused. Nor in practice will an excusing cause be present, even if the concurrence is not necessary. But to favor plays or dances of this kind by applause is formal cooperation.

3. To introduce amusements which indeed are not in themselves dishonorable, but are dangerous to very many, is of itself a grave sin (n. 551).

IV. To sell or rent a house to prostitutes is lawful "in cities in which this has been permitted for the sake of avoiding a greater evil; especially if other tenants are lacking: unless, however, the prostitutes would gravely harm honest neighbors, or on account of the location would give a greater occasion of sins" (St. Alphonsus, II, 70). The same must be said of renting a house to a tavern-keeper who permits dishonorable dances, or intends to introduce or alone sustain honorable ones.

To sell or rent a house to a man or group who will abuse it to public harm, for example to a Masonic, socialistic, spiritistic group, etc., is not lawful if other suitable buildings cannot be found. Otherwise it is lawful for a grave cause, unless however the character of scandal requires a graver cause.

V. To cast an illicit work upon another, that is, to agree that another perform a prohibited work in your place, is formal cooperation. Yet it is lawful to agree that another take your place, for example that in your place he exercise the office of judge, for example if, with the law considered, an unjust sentence would have to be rendered.

VI. To paint the image of a person for someone whom he knows to be affected toward that person with filthy love is not lawful except for a cause of grave necessity. But to paint truly obscene images, since they can scarcely serve any other end than sin, is almost simply illicit. To buy images of this kind already painted for a master can be permitted for avoiding notable harm.

VII. To make notably dishonorable feminine adornment is not lawful except for a grave cause; if there is question of adornment only slightly dishonorable, a lesser cause suffices.

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, Dissertations morales, 1st series, La cooperation au mal; Sleumer, Die Mitwirkung zur fremden Suende; Bender, in Ned. Kath. Stemmen, 1929, p. 137 sq. and 165 sq.

Cooperation in Defamation.—Not only the defamer sins, but also those who cooperate with him. Among the cooperators with defamation are those who give orders for defamation, those who show how it can be done, those who protect defamers, and those who participate in defamation by directing the conversation to a certain subject or by joining in the criticisms. The most ordinary form of participation in defamation is that of the listener, for no one defames successfully unless he has a sympathetic listener. Those who listen to detraction in such a way as to consent to what is said share in the guilt of the detraction. This happens as follows:

(a) the listener consents directly to defamation when he spurs the speaker on (e.g., by saying, “Tell us about So-and-So,” by insincerely praising an absent person in order to excite dispraise, by nodding approvingly, cheering, or smiling, by showing great marks of favor to those who bring him news against others or of disfavor to those who refuse to do this), or when he rejoices internally at the defamation he hears, because he hates the victim:

(b) the listener consents indirectly to defamation when he does not spur the speaker on nor approve of what is said, but omits to stop the defamation or to protest against it, when he could and should do one or the other of these things.

Sinfulness of Direct Consent to Defamation.—The listener who consents directly shares in the guilt of the defamer according to the words of St. Paul: “They who do such things (detractors, etc.) are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them” (Rom., i. 32), Indeed, St. Bernard says that it is not easy to say which is more deserving of condemnation, to defame or to listen to defamation. But we may distinguish as follows:

(a) he who spurs the defamer on is more guilty than the defamer. This listener sins against the detractor whom he scandalizes by inducing to sin, against the detracted whom he deprives of his good name. Thus, he is both uncharitable to the detractor and unjust to the detracted, and is the moving cause of all the harm that is done (cfr. 2065);

(b) he who hears the defamer willingly may be more guilty internally than the defamer, since his hatred of his neighbor and his love of injustice may be more intense; but externally his sin is less, since, as is supposed, he is not bound to resist the defamation and he does not give any cooperation to the external injustice. He sins against justice affectively (i.e., in wish), but not effectively (i.e., in word or deed).

Persons Who Listen from Curiosity.—What of those listeners who hear defamation willingly, not because they approve of the harm or evil that is being done, but because they are unusually curious or the speaker is unusually interesting?

(a) If these listeners could and should stop the defamation, they consent to it indirectly by their silence and thus are guilty (cfr. 2079).

(b) If these listeners are not able or are not bound to stop the defamation, some would nevertheless hold them guilty of grave sin, since they wish to hear something only because the knowledge will give them pleasure, knowing all the while that this knowledge cannot be had except at the expense of the good opinion they have of a neighbor. But the general view is that in this case there is no grave sin; for the listener does not approve of the moral evil (he is interested only in the graceful or eloquent or witty manner of the speaker, or the strangeness of the things related, or he is only concerned to hear the latest news, cfr. 234), and what he hears does not cause the lowering of his neighbor in his own opinion. But here it is supposed that the listener in no way encourages the defamation and that he is not bound to stop it. Curiosity about things that do not concern one is, however, a venial sin.

Sinfulness of Indirect Consent to Defamation.—The listener who consents indirectly to defamation by not impeding it as he should is also guilty of sin, and in Scripture his conduct is strongly forbidden: “Have nothing to do with detractors” (Prov., xxiv. 21); “Hedge in thy ears with thorns, hear not a wicked tongue” (Ecclus., xxviii. 28).

(a) It is commonly admitted that the listener in question sins doubly against charity, and grievously if the defamation is seriously harmful; for he sins against the detractor by refusing to give a brotherly correction (see 1258 sqq.), and he sins also against the one detracted by refusing to raise his voice in behalf of the absent who cannot defend himself.

(b) It is also commonly admitted that, if the listener is the superior of the defamer or of the person defamed, he sins more gravely, since he is specially bound to correct his subject who is detracting in his presence, or to defend his absent subject who is being defamed. If the listener is a private person not responsible for the defamed person’s reputation, he does not sin against justice by his indirect consent to the defamation. Indeed, the inferiors or equals of the defamer rarely sin gravely by their neglecting to oppose his defamatory remarks.

Guilt of Superior Who Consents to Defamation.—Is the superior who indirectly consents to defamation of a non-subject by a subject guilty thereby of injustice?

(a) As regards the spiritual injury (i.e., the guilt of sin incurred by the defamer), the superior is guilty of injustice towards his subject, if by reason of his office or contract he is bound to correct faults and neglects to do so. Thus, a bishop or pastor is supported by his people, and there is at least an implied agreement that he will direct them in spiritual matters and reprove their faults. Hence, it seems that a spiritual superior of this kind is unjust, if he fails to correct a subordinate who carries defamatory tales to his ears.

(b) As regards the temporary injury (i.e., the detriment to fame incurred by the person maligned), all depends on whether the superior is bound by reason of his office or contract to prevent injury to non-subjects by those who are his subjects. If the superior exercises his authority in the temporal order and has an agreement with those not subject to him to protect them against defamation by his subjects, he is bound in justice to abide by his agreement. But the common opinion is that a superior in the spiritual order is not responsible ex officio for the fame or other temporal welfare of those not subject to him.

Is the superior who indirectly consents to defamation of a subject guilty thereby of injustice?

(a) If the superior has authority in the temporal order, he is unjust by his inaction, in so far as law, custom or agreement hold him to prevent the defamation of his subject. Thus, a guardian entrusted with the care of his ward’s reputation is unjust if he makes no effort to prevent defamation of the latter.

(b) If the superior is in the spiritual order, some believe that he is unjust by inaction, since fame is closely connected with spiritual goods, being necessary for moral influence over others and useful for personal perseverance in virtue. But others—and it seems more commonly—deny this, and state that the relation between fame and spiritual goods is only accidental.

Circumstances Which Lessen Guilt of Indirect Consent.—Indirect consent to defamation is often only a venial sin. (a) Thus, by reason of the lightness of the matter, as when only trivial defects are mentioned by the defamer; (b) by reason of insufficient reflection, as when the listener is distracted in mind and does not clearly advert to the sinfulness of the words he hears; (c) by reason of insufficient consent, as when the failure to stop or protest against the defamation is due to slight laziness, to bashfulness, or to fear of the speaker, at least when the defamation is not extremely harmful to fame or other good, or gravely slanderous.

Inaction in the Face of Defamation.—Inaction in the face of defamation of a third party is sometimes no sin at all.

(a) Thus, there is no sin when one is unable to act (e.g., when a slanderous speech is being delivered by a person in authority who will not suffer any interruption to be made), or is unable to act with any success (e.g., when the attempt to correct would provoke worse defamation, when the listener is too unskilled to refute or remonstrate). Scrupulous persons should not attempt to correct, since they are not suited for this. Their attempts to defend an absent person would generally make them ridiculous, and would often be unjust to the person whom they suspected of defamation.

(b) There is no sin when one is not obliged to act (e.g., when interference will expose one to very serious evils, when the defamation is not grave or is not taken very seriously, when the listener is uncertain whether the speaker is really guilty of defamation or whether he himself is bound to intervene). It is sometimes unwise to interrupt a defamatory story, for many such story seems to promise dire disclosures at its beginning, but when heard to the end is seen to be an affair of no importance or to contain little that is new or startling or credible.

Ways of Opposing Defamation Made in One’s Presence.—(a) Positive resistance is made by a command to the defamer to be silent, or by refutation of his words if they are false, or by a rebuke if his words are true. This mode of correction is generally required if the listener is the superior of the defamer, and is sometimes suitable if he is the latter’s equal.

(b) Negative resistance is made by leaving the company, by having no share in the conversation, by changing the subject, by showing displeasure or at least gravity in one’s looks or acts: “The north wind driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue” (Prov., xxv. 23). This mode of resistance is usually the proper one for an inferior, and as a rule is found more satisfactory even between equals (see 1267).