Injury to Truth in Confessing

I. Truth, as it is taken here, consists in this: that the penitent declares those things which regard sacramental judgment as they are in conscience. To truth is opposed a lie, by which the penitent, in matter pertaining to sacramental judgment, denies those things which he holds as true or affirms those things which he holds as false.

1. He does not sin against truth, as it is understood here: 1. who lies about those things which do not pertain to sacramental judgment, for example, if someone falsely says that he is from this or that parish; if he falsely responds about those things concerning which the confessor lacks the right of questioning; 2. who confesses light sins to his usual confessor, but as often as he has committed a grave sin goes to another confessor. If he does this lest he expose himself to danger of keeping back the sin, he acts rightly; but badly, if it happens for this end, that he may sin more freely.

2. He sins against truth: 1. who confesses sins which he did not commit, or denies those which he perpetrated; 2. who responds falsely about those things concerning which he is rightly questioned by the confessor.

II. As regards the malice of a lie in confession, take these things: a lie in a matter pertaining to sacramental judgment involves a twofold malice, one of lying, the other of sacrilege; of sacrilege indeed, because it inflicts injury on the sacrament. The malice of lying is light. But the malice of sacrilege is grave or light according as the penitent deceives the confessor in a grave or light matter. Hence it is grave, for example, if he confesses a mortal sin not committed as committed, or a certainly committed sin as doubtfully committed, or a doubtfully committed sin as certain, although the latter is rather done from simplicity for greater tranquility and therefore subjectively is excused from grave sin; likewise if he declares a sin not confessed as confessed; likewise if, rightly questioned about a grave matter, he says what is false; if he falsely asserts that he grieves over the sins which he has confessed, even if he has declared only one venial sin, because it concerns a matter, that is, contrition, pertaining to validity, and therefore grave. It is light if the penitent, for example, declares a confessed mortal sin as not yet confessed (St. Alphonsus, VI, 495-497, who nevertheless does not agree as regards the malice of lying).

Question. Whether it is ever licit to use in confession a restriction that is not purely mental.

Response. Negatively, if it concerns a matter about which the confessor rightly questions. Otherwise it must be affirmed: and so if the confessor undeservedly asks, for example, whether the penitent has confessed elsewhere, the penitent can respond "Negatively," understanding underneath, for example, "so that I am bound to tell you that."

290. A lie, or silence, in matter pertaining to confession, is grave sacrilege whenever it turns upon matter necessary for the integrity of confession, or upon dispositions necessary for absolution. It is certain.

For a lie or silence is injurious to the sacrament and destroys its efficacy: for if a mortal sin which must be declared is denied or kept silent, or it is affirmed that contrition is present when in reality it is not had, no sin is remitted, and so an injury is done both to the sacrament and to the blood of Christ from which the sacraments derive their power; - it is pernicious to the penitent himself, who is deprived of the grace of the sacrament.

It is said: a lie in matter pertaining to confession; for a lie in other matters, for example, by narrating a false history, although it is said in the sacred tribunal and while confessing, does not receive mortal gravity from that circumstance of time and place. It is added: whenever it turns upon necessary matter or dispositions; for to deny some venial sin, or a mortal sin which in no way pertains to the present confession, does not seem to be a grave sin, since of itself it does not impede the effect of the sacrament.

291. Corollaries: (A) He who accuses a recent mortal sin as an old one, not by positively lying, but by leaving the matter in doubt, for example, by making a general confession in which by design he does not distinguish mortal sins committed after the last confession from those which had been committed before, - per se satisfies the substantial integrity of confession, because the circumstance of time in this case does not change the species of the sin; besides, if the confessor does not know sufficiently, from this confused accusation, the state of the penitent, he can question him, and then the penitent is bound to answer sincerely.

I said per se; because per accidens such a way of acting would substantially vitiate the confession, if the species of the sin were not understood; if, for example, the confessor could not discern whether a shameful sin was committed before or after marriage, before or after a vow of chastity.

For the rest, such a way of acting is to be reproved, since it is opposed to perfect sincerity and can prepare a way to sacrilege.

292. (B) On the contrary, according to the common opinion, he sins gravely who confesses a mortal sin not yet accused as an old one already declared before, whether explicitly by saying: "I accuse myself of such a sin which I already declared before"; or equivalently, by using this formula: "then I accuse myself of the sins of my past life, especially of this..." For this manner of speaking is not a mental equivocation, but a true lie, by which the confessor is truly deceived in a grave matter pertaining to confession; for from this he concludes that such a grave sin is not necessary matter.

Some after Ballerini¹ contradict this, because they judge this lie to be slight, since the confessor is not deceived concerning things necessary to be known; yet they grant that he sins gravely who, burdened with one sole mortal sin, would accuse it as remitted before, because then he would deceive the confessor concerning the state of his conscience.² This reason seems to militate against their opinion; for even when other mortal sins are present, the confessor is deceived concerning a matter necessary to be known, namely the existence of one mortal sin in the conscience of the penitent. - Whence there must be no departure from the common opinion.

¹ Ballerini-Gury, note to n. 448; Bucceroni, n. 715; Genicot, n. 288.

² Genicot, n. 288.

293. (C) He who accuses venial sins to his ordinary confessor, but mortal sins to another, (a) certainly sins mortally if he obtains absolution from the venial sins before he has been absolved from the mortal sins, because he sacrilegiously receives the former absolution without due dispositions; (b) but if he is first absolved from the mortal sins and afterward from the venial sins, he per se does not sin, provided that he does this for the sake of shame or lest perhaps he be exposed to the danger of keeping back a grave sin, but not for sinning more freely. - It is said per se, because young men who act thus so that they may embrace the clerical state or a religious order,³ from which otherwise they would be barred, sin gravely per accidens: for then they deceive the confessor in a grave matter pertaining to vocation.

³ Thus Sabetti, p. 743, q. 5.

Whence in practice the confessor should not curiously inquire whether perhaps the penitent has approached another priest, but on the contrary by his whole manner of acting should show that it is in no way displeasing to him that penitents approach another confessor; indeed sometimes he should offer them the occasion of approaching outside confessors; otherwise, not a few are exposed to the danger of making sacrilegious confessions.¹

¹ Cf. Zelle, La Confession, p. 205 sq.; Brahim, De reticentia volunt. peccat., p. 73 sq.

294. (D) Per se he does not sin who disguises his voice lest he be recognized by the confessor, provided that he opens all his mortal sins; for it is not necessary that the penitent be recognized by name. Indeed it is often expedient that the confessor say nothing from which it would appear that the penitent is known to him, since not a few confess more freely to a priest by whom they think they are not known. - It is said per se, because if this is done by design by a habitual sinner or recidivist, in order to deceive the confessor and more easily extort absolution, it is a sin per accidens.

(E) The penitent is bound to respond sincerely to the confessor asking, as often as the latter legitimately asks, for example, about habit, relapse, proximate occasion, in a word, about those things without which a prudent judgment cannot be rendered. But if the question is indiscreet, for example, concerning name, country, place of dwelling, etc., the penitent is not bound to respond, since these things do not pertain to sacramental confession.

364. 6. Faithful, that is, without any lie. Concerning a lie made in confession the following things are to be noted: if someone lies about a grave matter which must necessarily be declared, he commits grave sacrilege. But to lie about some matter which does not necessarily pertain to confession is a sin according to the quality of the matter.

Thus, for example, he sins gravely who in confession denies a circumstance changing the species of a grave sin, and likewise he who speaks a grave calumny concerning his neighbor; but he who denies some venial sin committed or a mortal sin already previously remitted, or lies about indifferent matters, sins venially, at least per se. Nevertheless, every lie made in confession, even one objectively light, introduces an aggravating circumstance, since it is great irreverence toward the sacrament to sin at the same time at which remission of sins is sought.¹⁸⁰ A penitent does not per se sin against fidelity if he confesses mortal sins to an unknown confessor and afterward tells venial sins to his ordinary confessor, provided that he never receives this second absolution before he has been duly absolved from the mortal sins. In practice, however, attention must be given to the motive for which this manner is chosen. If the penitent intends the deception of his ordinary confessor, his own glory, or something else inordinate, he certainly commits a more or less grave sin; but if he acts thus from the shame with which he would be suffused because he knows the confessor familiarly, he does not sin. Therefore the confessor should never inquire curiously concerning a confession made elsewhere, nor show that it displeases him if the penitent has confessed to another priest.

There are still several other ways in which fidelity is more or less injured, for example, if someone accuses a recent sin as an old one, or if the penitent makes a general confession in which he deliberately does not distinguish sins perpetrated since the last confession from those which were committed previously. Indeed, per se the circumstance of time does not gravely violate the fidelity of confession; per accidens, however, when, namely, the confessor's right judgment concerning the present state of the penitent is thereby impeded, it is a grave violation. That such a manner of acting is always blameworthy is evident of itself; but after Lugo certain authors, such as Gury, D'Annibale, Bucceroni, and especially Noldin-Schmitt,¹⁸¹ teach that the penitent neither sins gravely nor gravely injures the fidelity of confession, although he deliberately deceives the confessor by declaring that a sin which he actually committed recently and has not yet confessed was committed a long time ago. Everyone sees that by such a manner of acting the confessor is deceived so gravely that he can no longer judge rightly concerning the present state of the penitent. Therefore the reasons adduced for this opinion seem to be specious rather than solid, and it would be most dangerous if this opinion were reduced to practice. But the fidelity of confession is injured little and not gravely if the penitent disguises his voice or employs other means lest he be recognized by the confessor. When a legitimate cause exists and a right intention is had, however, such disguise is not sinful.

The penitent is also bound to respond faithfully and sincerely to a confessor legitimately questioning him; but he can decline illegitimate questions, for example, concerning his name, country, or place of residence, by refusing an answer or by employing a broad mental restriction.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Concina, De poenit. l. 1, diss. 4, c. 3, n. 6.

¹⁸¹ De sacr.¹⁷ III, n. 283.

St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 6, a. 4.

529. Principle. Confession must be faithful, i.e., true and sincere, in this sense, that it be made without falsity and lying, so that the penitent confesses sins according as they are in conscience, namely certain things as certain, doubtful as doubtful, mortal as mortal, etc., and in the declaration does not fall short, as in denying or lessening sins committed, nor exceed, in exaggerating them or adding fictitious faults. Concerning this, a threefold rule can be stated:

I. To lie in confession concerning a grave thing necessarily to be declared is, from its nature, a grave pernicious lie and grave sacrilege, namely, if it is done concerning matter necessary for the integrity of confession or concerning the dispositions required for absolution, because it is in a grave matter to pervert the sacramental judgment and to deceive the judge, and thus the confession would not be integral and therefore would be void and the absolution invalid; which also would be gravely pernicious to the penitent himself.

Thus of itself he sins gravely who in confession denies a circumstance changing the species of a grave sin, - who denies a mortal sin not yet confessed, or so covers it or says it in a reduced way that it can scarcely be understood by the confessor, - who confesses a certainly mortal sin as doubtful or vice versa, - who from malice accuses himself of a grave sin not committed, - who increases the number of mortal sins unless perhaps this is done from scruple, disturbance of mind, simplicity, or ignorance, for greater security, - who expressly or equivalently confesses a recently committed sin as an old sin already previously declared (otherwise, if by the accusation this is left in doubt), - who falsely denies a habit, relapse, or occasion about which the confessor asks, or studiously avoids this declaration lest it be sought by the confessor.

II. To lie concerning a slight thing or concerning free grave matter is of itself a venial sacrilege, because this does not pervert the judgment in a grave matter, nor make the sentence void, nor render the sacrament invalid, or impede its effect. Thus he sins lightly who falsely accuses himself of a light sin which was not committed, - or denies a venial sin which was committed, - or denies a mortal sin which has already been duly accused.

Yet accidentally it could be mortal a) if the penitent falsely accused himself of a venial sin, bringing no other matter, or b) if he denied things which he is bound to say for rightly forming the judgment of the confessor or for exercising the office of physician, e.g., with respect to habit, custom, occasion, restitution to be enjoined or satisfaction, a remedy against relapse, etc., in one word, if the confessor asked about those things or about free matter as belonging to the present grave matter (cf. condemned prop. 58, by Innocent XI).¹

¹ "We are not held to confess to the confessor asking the habit of some sin."

III. To lie concerning a thing which does not pertain to confession, e.g., concerning name, age, parents, domicile, etc., or by narrating a false story, although it is said in the sacred tribunal while confessing, is not for this reason sacrilege, because it in no way perverts the sacramental judgment.

Hence the sin remains as it was before, mortal or venial; - nevertheless to mix a light lie with confession, for another reason, is a venial irreverence toward the sacrament, namely, to sin at the same time at which remission of sins is sought; but a grave lie is mortal sacrilege because it renders one indisposed for absolution.

530. Practical corollaries. - From the foregoing it is understood:

1. That he does not of himself lie nor sin, at least gravely, who does not declare a recently committed mortal sin negatively as recent, but does not distinguish new mortal sins from old remitted ones and mixes them, yet in such a way that he does not positively affirm but leaves in doubt that they have been previously remitted; e.g., one who in a general confession does not distinguish mortal sins committed since the last confession, even if he does this purposely in order to hide the time at which they were committed. For it is not a lie but an equivocal speech.

Yet accidentally the circumstance of time would have to be declared if it were necessary for removing a proximate occasion, or because of a reserved case, or if otherwise the species of sin would not be understood and thus the confessor could not render a just judgment or impose a congruent penance, e.g., he could not know whether a base sin was committed before or after marriage, before or after a vow of chastity. Hence the confessor can ask about this and then the penitent is bound to answer.

2. On the contrary, that he of himself lies and sins gravely who positively confesses a mortal sin not yet accused, committed after the last confession, as not recent, but as an old one already previously declared, whether by saying explicitly: "I accuse myself of such a sin which I already declared before," or "which I committed last year," or equivalently by using this formula: "then I accuse myself of the sins of my whole life or of my past life, especially of this..." For it is positively to deceive the confessor in a grave matter, namely, in necessary matter of confession, concerning a thing necessary to be known.

Consequently this is grave not only if other recent mortal sins were not declared and therefore the penitent was falsely thought to be in the state of grace, or if otherwise he would escape a fitting penance, or it would be unknown that he is in a proximate occasion, but of itself and generally: both because each mortal sin is a distinct and separate cause to be subjected to the keys (n. 522), and because a lie in such a case is of itself going gravely to pervert the judgment of the confessor, in the same way as adding to committed mortal sins one not committed is a grave sin. And although the circumstance of time is not of itself to be declared, nevertheless it cannot be positively excluded with falsity in an accusation to be made by precept; because the sinner, by positively excluding it, by that very fact denies that he has sinned recently, which is false, and thus accuses a sin which he did not commit before and denies the sin which he now committed.

3. That he does not of himself sin, at least gravely, who feigns that he is making a general confession and nevertheless voluntarily omits some mortal sin previously confessed; indeed, he does not sin at all if there is a just cause of withholding it.

Unless, however, that mortal sin because of some reason had to be necessarily set forth: for then he would sin gravely.

4. That he does not of himself sin who accuses venial sins to one confessor, namely the ordinary one, but mortal sins to another, extraordinary one; not indeed if he obtains absolution from venial sins before he is absolved from mortal sins (for then he sacrilegiously receives the former absolution without the due dispositions), but if first he is absolved from mortal sins, afterward from venial sins,2 provided this is done from an honorable motive, e.g., for the sake of shame, or lest perhaps he be exposed to the danger of withholding a mortal sin; but if he intends the deception of the ordinary confessor, his own glory, or something else inordinate, it is a light sin.

Yet accidentally it is gravely sinful if a grave danger is present from this, because the state of the penitent is unknown to the ordinary confessor, e.g., if the penitent acted in this way in order to sin more freely, or thus remained in a proximate occasion, or if a young person did this so that he could be admitted to religious profession or the clerical state, while otherwise because of a habit of sinning perhaps he would be kept away.

5. That he does not of himself sin gravely who simulates voice or sex or uses other means so that he may not be recognized by the confessor, provided he opens all his mortal sins; for it is not necessary that the penitent be known by name. Indeed, if there is a legitimate cause and a right intention is had, a dissimulation of this sort is not sinful.

Yet accidentally it would be a grave sin if it were done purposely by one habitual in sin or relapsed, for deceiving the confessor and more easily extorting absolution, or if in this way the species of sin were no longer understood, as if a woman simulating the male sex were to confess that an abortion had been procured, which she procured in herself.

1. Indeed according to some he could not only keep this silent from the ordinary confessor, but even say: I have not approached for fifteen days, understanding underneath: to you; but this does not seem to be admitted unless there is a sufficiently grave reason for acting thus.

531. Remarks. - 1. The aforesaid concealments of themselves and generally are not to be approved, but rather reproved, because they harm perfect sincerity.

2. The penitent is bound to answer sincerely a confessor who asks, whenever the latter asks legitimately, e.g., about habit, time, relapse, proximate occasion, in one word about those things without which a prudent judgment cannot be rendered.

3. But if the question is manifestly indiscreet, as easily happens if it concerns name, native land, place of dwelling, whether he has confessed elsewhere, etc., the penitent is not bound to answer, since these things do not regard sacramental confession; indeed, if there is a just cause, he can use restriction in his answers.