718. 1. From universal precepts, which are common to all men or at least to all the faithful, particular precepts of God or of the Church must be distinguished, which refer only to certain persons, namely to those who have embraced a determinate state of life.

2. State in general is called a constant mode of living. Therefore two elements concur to constitute a state: a certain mode of living and constancy in it.

a. In order that a certain mode of living be called a state in the strict and proper sense, it is required that it be immovable or unchangeable, and indeed from an obligation which he who lives in that state cannot cast off at his own will.

Of this kind is the matrimonial state, which is immutable by reason of the matrimonial bond; the priestly state, by reason of the sacramental character and by reason of the solemn vow of chastity; the regular state, by reason of religious profession.

b. In a broader and improper sense a certain condition of life is called a state, which a man cannot easily change at his own will. Its certain immutability arises not from obligation, but from external circumstances.

Of this kind is the state of merchants, officials, physicians, craftsmen, who, although they cannot easily change the condition of life from which they ordinarily take necessary sustenance, nevertheless absolutely can renounce it.

Note 1. We are accustomed also to speak of the state of the just and sinners, of the blessed and the damned; but in this case not a mode of living, but a mode of existing is called a state. Therefore in German we call their condition not so much Stand but rather Zustand.

Note 2. State differs from office, which is not named from the habitual obligation or liberty of the person, but from the acts to be exercised by a determinate person, as the office of judge, physician, confessor, etc.²

The particular precepts to be explained in this place refer to the state of laymen and to the state of clerics; for concerning other states there is treatment either expressly in canon law, as concerning the state of regulars, or in other parts of moral theology, as concerning married persons.

Book First. On the Precepts of Laymen

The precepts which look here do not affect all laymen, but only certain ones because of the special office which they exercise. These precepts are customarily called obligations of state (Standespflichten). Nevertheless there can be discussion here not of all particular offices, but only of the principal ones, of which kind are the offices of judge, plaintiff, defendant, advocate, witness, and physician.

¹ St. Alphonsus, l. 4, n. 140-292; Lugo, De iustitia et iure, disp. 37-41; Elbel-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis, 8th ed. (Paderborn: Typographia Boni Fac., 1894), II, pr. 7; Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theolog. mor., 3rd ed. (Prato: Giachetti, 1900), IV, n. 224-614; Genicot, Theologiae moralis institut., 8th ed. (Brussels: Dewit, 1909), II, n. 1-62; Berardi, Praxis confessariorum, 3rd ed. (Faenza: Novelli, 1898), III, n. 1-186.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri IV, n. 9.

IN the preceding volume we have treated of the duties which are incumbent on all-men, or at any rate on all Catholics, by the natural, divine, and ecclesiastical law. Some special duties, however, arise from the nature of the state in which one is placed or of the office which one holds. Thus a judge or a doctor has as such certain special obligations as well as the cleric or the religious. The confessor should know all the obligations of his penitents, and so moral theologians usually treat in this place of the special duties of judges, doctors, clerics, and religious. We will follow their example in this Book and treat in the first part of the special obligations of certain laymen, in the second of those of clerics, and finally of those of religious.

A JUDGE is defined to be a public person appointed by lawful authority to apply the laws to the settling of disputes between litigants and to the punishment of criminals.

He is said to be a public person because he is appointed by public authority, not chosen like an arbitrator by the litigants themselves, and, moreover, he is guided in his official capacity not by his private knowledge and ideas but by the evidence given in the case and by the laws which he administers. Case law, or judge-made law, in English jurisprudence, is no exception to this rule, for it is but the authentic interpretation and application of the common and statute law to concrete cases made in court by the judges of the superior courts.

A cause in which the private rights of the litigants are to be adjudicated upon is called a civil case or action; if the cause is one in which an offender is tried for the commission of a crime it is called a criminal case or action.

By his very position and the nature of his office a judge is bound to pass a just sentence according to law in the cases brought before him, and so he must possess the requisite qualifications for this and set about it in the right manner, He must have a competent knowledge of the law which is to be his guide and which he is called upon to apply, and he must use at least ordinary diligence to get at the merits of the case before him. He must not allow his judgement to be influenced by such improper motives as fear or favour; his sentence must be dictated by a sense of even-handed justice. He must observe the rules of judicial procedure applicable to the case, and he must have the requisite authority or jurisdiction for dealing with it.

If in any of these points the judge is culpably at fault, he sins against justice and is bound to make good the damage which he causes. Moreover, inasmuch as judges ordinarily take an oath of office, he will also sin against the sanctity of his oath. A judge who should allow himself to be bribed to give an unjust sentence would not only be bound in conscience to repair the injustice done, but he would be liable to severe punishment for his offence. Even if he were to take a bribe for delivering a just sentence, he is bound in conscience to restore what he received. For, as his office binds him in justice to give sentence according to the merits of the case, such a service is no ground for special reward or-payment, nor a just title for retaining a special reward or payment if he has received any.

The judge, as we have seen, must pass sentence according to the evidence before the court, not according to his own private knowledge or views. He may know privately that an accused man is guilty, but he must not condemn him unless his guilt has been proved by the evidence. But what if the judge knows for certain that an accused man is innocent, and yet, according to the evidence available, he has been proved guilty? In such a case as this the judge must, of course, use all the means in his power to bring out the innocence of the accused party, or remit the case to another court, But supposing that he has done all in his power to avoid condemning the innocent man, and nevertheless the jury have found him guilty, and by law it only remains for the judge to pass sentence according to the verdict. Is he allowed to do so?

This question was disputed among theologians. Some, with St Thomas, taught that he might condemn the innocent man, for the witnesses were then guilty of injustice, not the judge, who did his duty in passing sentence according to law. Others denied that this is lawful, for to condemn the innocent, especially if there is question of a death sentence, is intrinsically wrong. Others distinguished, and taught that it is indeed unlawful to condemn an innocent man to death even when, by judicial process, he has been proved to all appearances guilty, but that when there is question of a fine or imprisonment which may be suffered without sin, the judge may pass sentence according to the law, for this is for the public good. Practically, therefore, according to the principles of English jurisprudence the judge may lawfully pass sentence even of death in such a case, but he is bound afterward, by making representations to the proper authority, to do what he can to clear the innocent party.

When the evidence in a criminal trial is not conclusive, the defendant must not be condemned, for a man is presumed to be innocent until he has been proved conclusively to be guilty.

In a civil action, when the rights of the parties are not certain, but only probable, the judge is bound to adjudicate in favour of him who has the more probable right, taking into account possession and all the other circumstances in the case.

If there is equal probability on either side, the parties should come to a compromise, or, as some hold, the judge may decide in favour of either party.

The judge is bound to pass sentence according to law, for this is presumed to be just. It may, however, happen that particular laws are unjust, as when the seal of confession is not respected or divorce is permitted. May a Catholic judge pass sentence in accordance with such laws as these ¹ The judge may sometimes obtain permission to pass sentence according to a law which is unjust merely because it is against the laws and rights of the Church. In order to make the position of Catholic judges tenable the Church will sometimes cede her rights in such cases or grant jurisdiction to try a case which of itself belongs to the ecclesiastical courts.

Thus Cardinal Gasparri deduces from a decree of the Holy Office, December 19, 1860, that jurisdiction has been granted to judges in England to try cases where there is question of judicial separation of married people.

If the law commands what is contrary to the natural or divine law—as, for example, to give evidence as to what has been declared in confession—it is intrinsically wrong to obey such a law, and no Catholic judge may apply it.

If the unjust law only imposes a fine or imprisonment, some theologians maintain that even then it may not be applied by a Catholic judge. Others, however, hold that for grave reason—as, for example, if no Catholic could otherwise accept the office of judge—sentence may be passed according to such a law. The person unjustly condemned must patiently submit for the public good, especially as he would not escape even if Catholic judges refused to execute the law.

The unjust sentence of a judge imposes no obligation in conscience, and of course the aggrieved party may have recourse to all available remedies which the law allows for redress. If none is available the public good will usually require patient submission to the wrong. If there is a doubt about the justice of a sentence, presumption favours the judge, and obedience must be yielded, as in the case of a just sentence, which has the force of the law which it applies.

¹ Gasparri, De Matrim. 2, n. 1165.

What has been said concerning the moral obligations of judges is applicable in due proportion to those who have similar functions, such as arbitrators, referees, and jurymen. An arbitrator differs from a judge in that he is chosen by the parties to the dispute to settle their claims. If the submission to arbitration and the decision of the arbitrator be in writing, the sentence is final, and will be upheld by English courts unless it is evidently corrupt or obtained by unlawful means.¹

Referees are officials or experts to whom the-court entrusts some special question for inquiry or decision, and sometimes the cause itself, if it be complicated and not suitable for trial in the ordinary way. They are bound to act according to the terms of their commission and the rules drawn up for their guidance, ‘The report or award of a referee, unless set aside by the court, has the force of a jury’s verdict.

A jury is a body of men selected and sworn to inquire into certain matters of fact, and to declare the truth upon evidence to be laid before them. They are therefore bound to form the best judgement in their power as to the facts of the case laid before them, and truthfully and fearlessly to give their verdict. If any one of them has any private knowledge of the facts of the case, he is not precluded from communicating it to the others, and he should do this if justice or charity require it.

¹ Cf. Can. 1930.

AN advocate is one who undertakes to assist litigants by his advice and help and by pleading their case before the judge. For the purposes of moral theology we may neglect the technical differences between barristers and solicitors in English law.

As the advocate acts in the name of his client he may in general do what his client is allowed to do, and he must not do what it would be wrong for his client to do. He may not undertake a cause which is manifestly unjust; otherwise he will be guilty of sin, and bound to make restitution for all the damage that he causes. If in the course of the trial it becomes manifest that his client’s cause is a bad one, he must inform his client of the fact and refuse to proceed with the case. However, it is not necessary that the advocate should be certain that his client is right; it will be sufficient if his cause is probably just, for it may be expected that the doubtful rights of the parties will become clear in the course of the trial. In a criminal action the advocate may always defend the accused by lawful means whether he be guilty or not. If he is guilty, the defence of his advocate cannot do any serious harm, and will at least help toward the merciful administration of justice. The prosecution of an accused person may not be undertaken unless his guilt is practically certain, for otherwise there will be danger of injuring the character of an innocent person and of exposing him to vexation without just cause.

From the decree of the Holy Office, December 19, 1860, in answer to the Bishop of Southwark, it is clear that in England an advocate may undertake a case where there is question of judicial separation between husband and wife. Even in an action for divorce in a civil court he may defend the action against the plaintiff. If the marriage has already been pronounced null and void by competent ecclesiastical authority, a Catholic advocate may impugn its validity in the civil courts. Moreover, for just reason, as, for example, to obtain a variation in the marriage settlement, or to prevent the necessity of having to maintain a bastard child, a Catholic lawyer may petition for a divorce in the civil court, not with the intention of enabling his client to marry again while his spouse is still living, but with a view to obtaining the civil effects of divorce in the civil tribunal. This opinion at any rate is defended as probable by many good theologians. The reason is because marriage is neither contracted nor dissolved before the civil authority; in the formalities prescribed for marriage by civil law there is only question of the civil authority taking cognizance of who are married, and of the civil effects which flow therefrom.

With reference to the duties of the advocate toward his client, he must, of course, have the requisite knowledge and skill to undertake the case according to the reasonable expectations of his client, and he must exercise due care and diligence in the execution of the duty which he has undertaken. If in these respects he is culpably negligent, he will be guilty of injustice and bound to make restitution for the harm he does. Furthermore, if his client has no case, and no chance of success in the suit, the advocate must make this known to him; he must avoid useless delays, keep the strictest faith with his client, and use only just means to gain his cause.

English law will not enable a barrister to institute legal proceedings for the recovery of his honorarium if it is withheld. This, however, does not prevent the obligations of a contract existing between an advocate and his client, so that as the former is bound in justice to do his part for the latter, so is the client bound in justice to recompense his lawyer according to the terms which were explicitly or implicitly agreed upon, With regard to solicitors the law sufficiently provides against extortion in the matter of fees.

By the general law of charity a lawyer should be prepared to give his assistance for the love of God to the poor who cannot pay the usual fees. Indeed, if an accused person has no one to defend him, the judge will usually request someone to undertake the office.

English solicitors frequently fulfil the functions of notaries public, and as such receive all acts and contracts which must or are wished to be clothed with an authentic form, confer on such acts the required authenticity, establish their date, and prepare and attest instruments going abroad.

THERE are other persons connected with the administration of justice besides judges and lawyers, and they have special moral obligations of their own. A word must be said about the moral duties of prosecutors, defendants, and witnesses. By canon law the accusation of delinquents in an ecclesiastical criminal trial is reserved to the Promotor of Justice, but as a general rule anyone who has full use of his senses may prosecute according to English law. Nobody should undertake a prosecution when greater evil than good would follow from it, or when there is not moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused. Otherwise it may be done for the sake of the public good, and there may be an obligation to do it, as when one’s office compels one to undertake the task, or the defence of the innocent or the public good require it, or a precept of obedience command it. Thus by ecclesiastical law heretics and priests guilty of solicitation in the sacred tribunal are to be denounced to the Ordinary.

The defendant in a criminal trial is not himself subjected to examination according to English law, unless he offers himself voluntarily to give evidence, and then he may be examined like a witness. In canon law the accused is examined, and the question arises whether he is bound to tell the truth. According to Canon 1743: “ The parties are bound to answer the judge when he interrogates them legitimately, and to tell the truth unless there is question of a crime committed by themselves.”

The defendant may in self-defence make known the secret crime of a witness against him, if it really conduces to his defence; but of course he may never impute false crimes to anybody. A criminal may not defend himself against lawful arrest, for that would be to resist lawful authority, but he is not compelled to deliver himself up to justice, and it is not a sin to escape from justice if he can do so without violence, The law prescribes that he shall be kept in durance, not that he shall voluntarily remain in custody. A criminal lawfully condemned to death is not obliged to save his life by escape or other means if he can do so; he should submit to the execution of the sentence passed upon him, and may do so meritoriously.

Charity or obedience may impose an obligation to give evidence in a court of justice. If serious harm can be prevented by offering one’s self as a witness, there will as a rule be an obligation to do so, and obedience imposes the obligation when one is summoned by lawful authority.

A witness is bound by his oath and by obedience due to lawful authority to tell the truth in answer to the questions lawfully put to him. How far he is privileged when examined concerning what he knows under secret, we saw when treating of the Eighth Commandment of the Decalogue. He is not bound to incriminate himself, nor, of course, may the seal of confession ever be broken (cf. Can. 1755).

The canon law laid it down that two witnesses of unsuspected character were necessary and sufficient evidence of any fact alleged in a court of justice. A solitary witness was not usually sufficient or admissible evidence of a crime, and in keeping with this the theologians decided that a solitary witness should not declare what he knew of a crime, inasmuch as he was not lawfully interrogated. English law, however, with most modern systems, admits one witness, if credible, as sufficient evidence of a fact, and so as a rule there will be an obligation on such a one of answering according to his knowledge when questioned lawfully in a court of justice (cf. Can. 1791).

A doctor who holds himself out as ready to undertake the care of the sick must have competent knowledge of his profession and must exercise his office at least with ordinary care and diligence; otherwise he will sin against justice and charity in exposing himself to the risk of seriously injuring his neighbour. Unless he is bound by some special agreement he is not ordinarily obliged to undertake any particular case, for there are usually others who are willing and able to give the necessary assistance to the sick. Even in time of pestilence he will not commit sin if he leave the neighbourhood, unless he is bound to remain by some special contract. Of course, one who acted thus would show a mean spirit, and would be justly reprobated.

He should not make exorbitant charges for his services, nor multiply visits uselessly and thus increase his fees, nor call in other doctors without necessity. On the other hand, even at his own serious inconvenience, he should visit a patient whose case he has undertaken when called as far as is reasonable, and he should be ready to call in other doctors for consultation when necessary or when he is asked to do so. He is sometimes bound by the general law of charity to give his assistance gratis to the poor who cannot afford to pay the usual fees.

He may not neglect safer remedies in order to try those which are less safe, but there is nothing to prevent him from prescribing what will probably do good if it is certain that it will not do harm. In a desperate case, with the consent of the sick person and of his relations, he may make use of what will probably do good though it may also probably do harm, provided that there is nothing better to be done in the circumstances. It is altogether wrong to make experiments with doubtful remedies or operations on living human beings, fiat experimentum in corpore vili.

What has been said of craniotomy and other similar operations, the use of morphia, hypnotism, and other dangerous remedies, are questions which have been treated elsewhere.

When the patient is in danger of death, the doctor is bound out of charity to warn him or those who attend on him of his danger, in order that he may make all necessary preparations for death if it should come about.

A medical man should know how to administer baptism in case of necessity (Can. 743).

THE sacredness of the duties which a cleric has to perform, and especially the service of the altar, require in him an internal holiness so that he may perform his duties worthily. ‘‘ Let them therefore be holy, because I also am holy, the Lord, who sanctify them.”¹ ‘This holiness must show itself in the exercise of all Christian virtues so that the cleric may be an example to those whom he is called upon to instruct and guide on the way to heaven. As the Council of Trent said: “ There is nothing which is so constant a lesson in piety and the worship of God as the life and example of those who have dedicated themselves to the divine service. For since they have been taken from worldly affairs and placed in a higher position, the faithful look upon them as models for their imitation. And so it becomes the clergy who have been set aside for the service of God so to order their lives and morals that in their dress, demeanour, walk, speech, and everything about them, nothing may be seen but what is serious, modest, religious spirit. and breathes the Let them avoid even slight defects, which in them would not be slight, so that their actions may win the veneration of all.”² This holiness of life is very frequently inculcated on the clergy in the councils and synods.³ Their occupations, if worthily performed, are means of sanctifying them and uniting them with God, and, moreover, the Church does what she can to secure the same end by prescribing the daily recitation of the divine office, and spiritual retreats at stated times (Can. 125, 126).

¹ Lev. xxi 8.

² Sess. 22, c. 1, de Ref.

³ 1 West., d. 24; 4 West., d. 12.

Great personal sanctity becomes the cleric, and is required if he is to perform his duties worthily. It is a disputed question among theologians whether the inferior clergy are as such in a state of perfection. It is allowed by all that bishops are in the state of practising perfection, inasmuch as they are in a permanent condition of life which is devoted to procuring the sanctification of those committed to their charge. Religious, too, by their vows assume the obligation of aiming at perfection, and in religious life find the means of acquiring it. Both bishops and religious, then, are in the state of perfection. St Thomas and many other theologians deny that the secular clergy inferior to bishops are in the state of perfection, properly so called. The chief reason is because their condition of life has not the permanence required for a state in the technical sense, and although they are occupied in labouring for the sanctification of others, like bishops, yet they do this rather as officials and helpers of bishops, not entirely in their own name and of their own authority. As the learned Suarez admits, the controversy is rather about words than things, and we may accept his conclusion that because the higher secular clergy are bound by vow to continence, and partake also in the duties of bishops, they may be said to be in an inchoate state of acquiring and practising perfection.¹

¹ Suarez, De Rel. 3, lib. 1 c. 17.

THE celibacy of the clergy rests on a positive enactment of ecclesiastical law which, nevertheless, supposes the doctrine of Christ and his Apostles about the excellence of virginity and its superiority to marriage. From the first ages of the Church it was felt that there was an incongruity between the Christian priesthood, with its duties of offering up the eucharistic sacrifice, and of whole-hearted devotion to the service of God, and the use of marriage. The example of our Lord and the counsels of St Paul told powerfully in the same direction. Already in the fourth century the law of celibacy existed which was formulated by Leo the Great in his letter to Anastasius written about the middle of the fourth century: “ Although,” he says, “ those who are not clerics may freely give themselves to marriage and the procreation of children, yet for the exhibiting of perfect chastity marriage is not allowed even to subdeacons, so that those who have wives should be as those who have them not, and those who have them not should remain single.” All the more stringently, he goes on to say, does the same law bind the higher clergy, deacons, priests, and bishops. This law was frequently inculcated by subsequent Popes, re-enacted in many ecclesiastical synods, and at latest in the Second Council of the Lateran (1139) marriage of the higher clergy was prohibited under pain of nullity. By ecclesiastical law, then, clerics in sacred orders are bound to observe perfect chastity, and marriage attempted by them is null and void. This law is known to all who aspire to sacred orders, and so those who choose the clerical state voluntarily embrace the law of continence. Indeed, a vow of perfect chastity is by ecclesiastical usage annexed to the reception of sacred orders, so that all who are ordained subdeacons, by the very fact of receiving ordination, take a solemn vow of chastity. The discipline of the Eastern Church is somewhat milder. Clerics belonging thereto may marry before the reception of sacred orders, and if they have already done this (Can. 132, 1072) they may keep their wives, except bishops. Even in the East clerics in sacred orders cannot contract a valid marriage.

There is a dispute among theologians as to whether the obligation of celibacy, which binds clerics in sacred orders, should be ascribed immediately to ecclesiastical law or immediately to a vow of chastity tacitly taken when sacred orders are received according to the precept of the Church. The question is not of great practical importance, for in any case the obligation of celibacy is derived ultimately from ecclesiastical law, which binds all clerics in sacred orders to the observance of perfect chastity. The violation of such a law, at any rate by external act, is not morally different from a violation of a vow of chastity. The more common and more probable opinion is that the obligation of celibacy is derived immediately from a vow of chastity which every subdeacon takes tacitly according to the precept of the Church when he receives the first of the sacred orders. Tacit profession even of the essential vows of religion was admitted in certain cases until it was altogether abrogated by a decree of Pius IX dated June 12, 1858. Boniface VIII decided that the vow of chastity thus tacitly taken by subdeacons is solemn, and that it annuls subsequent marriage if attempted.

A man who was married but whose wife is dead may be promoted to sacred orders. ‘‘ Men who have a wife” are prohibited from receiving orders according to Canon 987, 2; and Canon 132, sec. 3, lays down that a married man who, without a dispensation from the Holy See has received holy orders even in good faith is prohibited from the exercise of the same.

Ever since about the sixth century clerics have had a special dress of their own to distinguish them from laymen. It is their uniform, like that of soldiers or sailors, and is a perpetual reminder to them that they should always conduct themselves as becomes their profession. At first the clerical dress was introduced by custom, and then sanctioned by positive law. On this point the Council of Trent (sess. 14, c. 6, de Ref.), after saying that although the habit does not make the monk, yet clerics must always wear the dress suited to their order, so that by the decency of their dress they may make manifest the goodness of their moral character, goes on to prescribe under pain of suspension that all in sacred orders and beneficed clerics should wear the clerical dress suited to their order and dignity, according to the ordinance and command of their bishop. “ Let all clerics wear a decent ecclesiastical dress according to the lawful customs of the place and the precepts of the local Ordinary ” (Can. 136).

The common law of the Church therefore imposes on all the clergy the obligation of wearing the clerical dress, and it leaves to bishops the task of making further regulations on the point suitable to the circumstances of the country. In England, the Fourth Synod of Westminster (d. 11, nn. 12-14) decreed that the Roman collar was always to be worn, that the dress must be of black or dark material, and that in the house or church the cassock should be worn. The Third Plenary Council of Baltimore (n. 77) made the same regulations for the United States, except that the wearing of the cassock in the house or in the church is prescribed, not merely declared to be especially becoming.

The clerical tonsure is also prescribed by the common law of the Church, but it has not been reintroduced into England since the Reformation, nor is it in use in the United States. However, the obligation of not wearing hair on the face is laid down in the Fourth Synod of Westminster (doc. cit.). On this point Canon 136 prescribes: “Let them wear the tonsure or clerical crown, unless this be against the received manners of the people, and let them use a simple and ordinary care of the hair.”

All religious are bound by these and similar obligations of clerics according to Canon 592.

These laws of themselves bind under pain of mortal sin which, however, would not be committed if there were good cause for doing what they forbid, nor if they were neglected without contempt or grave scandal for a short time. Theologians consider that the clerical dress would have to be neglected for more than three or four days in order to sin grievously, and a much longer time would be required for a grave violation of the law concerning tonsure. Venial sin, of course, is committed by breaking the law without legitimate excuse even for a short time.

ALL who are in sacred orders, all beneficed clergy, and all religious orders which have solemn vows and keep choir, are bound every day to recite the divine office, otherwise called the canonical Hours, or the breviary. This obligation is now enforced by positive ecclesiastical law in Canons 135, 1475 (sec. 1), 610, 413.

The obligation of saying the office begins for secular clerics with the reception of the subdiaconate, or the lawful and full possession of their benefice. The obligation as it affects religious is primarily incumbent on the superior, whose duty it is to provide for the saying or singing of the divine office under pain of grave sin. Each religious is bound to assist in choir unless lawfully excused, and if one who is solemnly professed is absent he must recite the office in private.

Religious under simple vows should be present in choir, but if they failed to be present they are not obliged to say the office in private, unless, of course, they be in sacred orders.

The obligation of saying the divine office for all who are bound by it is grave, so that a mortal sin is committed by wilfully and without lawful excuse omitting it or any considerable portion of it. According to theologians, one of the little Hours or any portion of the same length is to be reckoned considerable, so that its culpable omission will be a grave sin. Anything less than this will be only venial. A beneficed cleric not only sins by neglecting his office, but he loses his right to a proportional amount of the fruits of his benefice, and if he has already received that amount he must restore it to the fabric of the church or to the diocesan seminary, or give it to the poor (Can. 1475, sec. 2).

When two or more say the office together, the psalms may be said in alternate verses, one side listening while the other is reciting its verse. The rest listen while the lessons are said or sung by those appointed to the task.

Although the canonical Hours as said at different periods and in different churches have always been much the same in substance, yet in many details there has been considerable variety. Pope Pius V desired to introduce greater uniformity in the method of saying the divine office, and for this purpose he issued the Roman Breviary, and made its use obligatory on all who were bound to the office under pain of not satisfying their obligation. He abolished the use of other breviaries with the exception of such as dated back more than two hundred years. The divine office, therefore, must be recited according to the form of the Roman Breviary, and in Latin, the liturgical language of the Church.

Offices proper to particular countries, dioceses, and religious orders, are allowed to be inserted in the breviary and said only by the authority of the Apostolic See, and when a proper office has been thus granted it becomes obligatory on the grantees unless it was expressly conceded as permissive.

Pius V took away the obligation, which existed according to the rubrics of the breviary, of reciting the Little Office of the Blessed Virgin, the penitential and gradual psalms, and the Office of the Dead; but though he took away the obligation, still he exhorted those bound to the divine office to recite them, and granted indulgences to such as followed his exhortation. The recitation of the Litany of the Saints on the feast of St Mark, and on the Rogation Days, forms part of the office.

The office to be said on any particular day is indicated in the calendar drawn up and approved by the proper authority. It is a matter of obligation under pain of venial sin to adhere to the calendar, even if it seem to be wrong, unless it is manifestly against the rubrics or decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites. A reasonable cause, however, even though it be not a very grave one, will suffice to excuse the substitution of one office for another. If a wrong office has been said by mistake or inadvertence, there is no obligation to say the correct one; but if this is notably longer, some portion should be said to make up the difference.

The calendar to be followed is that of the church, diocese, or religious order to which one belongs. If absent from one’s place of domicile for a time, the general rule is that one’s own calendar should be followed; but in the case of regulars who recite the office in choir, a regular living for a time in another monastery should conform to the calendar of the place where he resides.

In each day’s office the order of the Hours should be observed at any rate under pain of venial sin. But here also any reasonable cause of some weight will excuse the saying of the Hours out of their proper order. If the time has arrived for anticipating Matins and Lauds for the next day, these may be said without any special reason even though the office of the day has not yet been finished, for each day’s office is independent of any other.

The divine office is a vocal prayer imposed on the clergy by the Church. It is not sufficient to run over it with the eyes or mentally; the words must be uttered and formed without. mutilation by the lips, though it is not necessary to produce an audible sound. The different Hours must be said without interruption as one continuous prayer under pain of venial sin, from which any reasonable cause will excuse. The recitation may be interrupted between the several Hours, between Matins and Lauds, and for the space of a few hours even between the Nocturns of Matins. Provided that the whole office be said within the natural or ecclesiastical day, whatever interruptions may have taken place, the obligation will be substantially fulfilled, and when an interruption has been made within an Hour, or even in the middle of a psalm or lesson, there is no obligation to repeat what has already been said.

As was said above, the divine office is the task of the day, and provided that the whole of it is said within the day, reckoning from midnight to midnight, the cleric will have fulfilled his duty substantially so as to be excused at least from mortal sin. The rubrics, however, which in this matter bind under venial sin, assign certain times of the day for the saying of the Office. Matins and Lauds should be said before Mass, Prime and Terce should be said before midday, Sext and None are said in the interval between midday and Vespers, Vespers and Compline are said when the sun is midway between the zenith and sunset. All the little Hours may be said before midday, and during Lent, beginning with the first Sunday, Vespers are also said before midday.

Matins and Lauds of the following day may be anticipated on the previous evening. The normal time for anticipating begins with the hour of Vespers, but a special privilege is often granted by which Matins and Lauds of the following day may be begun at 2 p.m. throughout the year. Indeed, there does not seem to be any necessity for a special grant, for a custom has been introduced, by the very common practice of good priests, of anticipating throughout the year after two o’clock. A cleric may safely follow this custom.

Permission to anticipate is a privilege which no one is bound to use; the obligation of the day’s office only begins at twelve o’clock.

The breviary contains rubrics directing that certain prayers be said on bended knee; these rubrics, however, do not bind when office is said privately out of choir. In private the office may be said in any place or in any position that is compatible with the due reverence to God which should be shown in prayer.

The obligation of saying the breviary is imposed by ecclesiastical precept, and the question arises what internal dispositions are necessary while reciting the office in order to satisfy the positive precept of the Church. Does one who is voluntarily distracted while saying the office satisfy his obligation, or must he repeat what he said with voluntary distractions ? It is not a question of what is required that prayer may be pleasing to God—voluntary distractions while praying are certainly venial sins—but the question is, what sort of attention is required by the law of the Church under pain of not fulfilling the obligation imposed by the law ?

Attention, which is an act of the mind adverting to what is being done, must be distinguished from intention, which is the will to do something. At least, a virtual intention to say the office is required that the act may be voluntary, such as the law prescribes. Theologians distinguish between internal and external attention. The former consists in directing the mind to God, or in thinking of the sense of the words uttered, or in being careful to pronounce them correctly, and it is certain that any of these forms of internal attention is sufficient to satisfy the precept. External attention means the abstaining while engaged in prayer from any external occupation which is incompatible with internal attention. Thus one who curiously examines a painting while praying, or intently listens to what someone is saying, has not external attention.

It is a disputed point among theologians whether this external attention is sufficient in order to satisfy the precept of saying the office, or whether there must be in addition internal attention. In other words, they dispute whether one who is voluntarily distracted but apparently devout while saying the breviary satisfies the law, or whether he must repeat what he has said with wilful distractions.

Although, of course, all should strive after internal attention, and sin is committed if voluntary distractions are admitted while praying, yet it is probable that external attention is sufficient to satisfy the positive law of the Church. For the Church does indeed prescribe prayer, but there is prayer in a real sense when one says the breviary with the intention of fulfilling his obligation, and with decorum and a devout demeanour, even though he is thinking of something else the while. If voluntary distractions destroy the essence of prayer, involuntary distractions will do so likewise, and yet it is impossible to avoid involuntary distractions altogether. This milder opinion is especially of use in order to calm scrupulous and anxious souls.¹ 9. As the obligation of saying the divine office arises from positive law, it does not bind when it would entail serious inconvenience. On this ground one who is sick, or who cannot say his office without causing a serious headache, is excused. Moreover, other occupations, undertaken for the good of our neighbour and such as cannot be neglected without his loss, will be a sufficient excuse for omitting the office, when both duties cannot be fulfilled. And so missionaries, who are all day long occupied in hearing confessions and preaching, are excused from the office which would interfere with their work, Even when there is not a sufficient cause to excuse of itself from the law, a dispensation may be lawfully obtained from the competent authority, if there be good cause for it. The Pope can grant a dispensation to any cleric, a bishop can dispense in particular cases with those of his diocese, and a regular prelate has similar powers for his own subjects. Wider powers are also granted as a special privilege by the Holy See. The faculty of saying fifteen decades of the rosary instead of the office is frequently granted to missioners who are lawfully prevented from saying the office. The meaning of which is that there must be some difficulty in getting in the office, but it need not be so great as would of itself excuse altogether from the obligation. Inasmuch as the office is composed of several portions which are usually said separately, there will be an obligation to say any such portion if it can be done without serious inconvenience, even though it be impossible to say the whole,

¹ Lugo, De Eucharist. 22, n. 25.

In general, clerics are forbidden to do anything which is unbecoming their state of life or which interferes with the due discharge of their duties—“‘ No man being a soldier to God entangleth himself with secular businesses,” says St Paul (2 Tim. ii 4). They are expressly forbidden to indulge in games of chance for money, to carry arms unless there is good reason to fear attack, to hunt with hounds, to enter inns and similar places without necessity or some good reason approved of by the Ordinary of the place (Can. 138).

Similarly, they are forbidden to practise medicine or surgery without leave of the Holy See, to act as public notaries, except in the ecclesiastical court, to hold public offices which involve the exercise of lay jurisdiction or administration.

Without leave of their own Ordinary they should not undertake the agency for property belonging to laymen, nor secular offices which entail the duty of rendering accounts; they should not exercise the office of procurator or advocate except in the ecclesiastical court, or when a cause of their own or of their church is being tried in the civil court; they should take no part, not even as witnesses, without necessity in a lay criminal trial.

Clerics are forbidden to go surety even with their own property without consulting the local Ordinary.

They are forbidden to offer themselves for the post of Members of Parliament or to accept it without leave of their own Ordinary and of the Ordinary of the place where the election is held (Can. 137, 139).

Clerics are forbidden to retain in their houses or in any way to be familiar with women about whom any suspicion can arise.

They may live under the same roof only with those women of whom natural ties allow no suspicion to be entertained, such as mother, sister, aunt, and so forth, or whose good character and mature age make them free from all suspicion.

The judgement as to whether the retaining or being intimate with women, even with those on whom suspicion does not usually fall, can in any particular case create scandal or be a danger to morals, belongs to the Ordinary of the place, whose duty it is to forbid such retaining or intimacy to clerics (Can. 133, sec. 4; West. d. 11, n. 3).

Canon 140 forbids clerics to be present at spectacles, dances, and pageants which do not become them, or when their presence would cause scandal, especially in public theatres.

“The word spectacula,” says Fr. Ayrinhac, ‘ comprises all theatrical representations and likewise such exhibitions as horse-races, bull-fights, prize-fights, etc., at least if it be taken in its most general sense.”” Dom Augustine gives a similar definition of the term.

Provincial legislation often makes this general law more precise. Thus 4 West., d. 11, n. g is as follows: “ We strictly prohibit ecclesiastics who have received sacred orders from being present at stage representations in public theatres or in places temporarily made use of as public theatres, under the penalty to transgressors of suspension to be incurred ipso facto, as has hitherto been the rule in all parts of England, with reservation to the respective Ordinaries.”

Clerics, therefore, are forbidden to be present at public not at private theatricals by this law. Custom in England makes an exception with regard to those exhibitions which are given by mere children.

Clerics are forbidden to enter military service, unless they do so with the leave of their own Ordinary in order that they may be free the sooner, and to aid in any way civil war and disturbances of public order (Can. 141).

Clerics are forbidden to trade in person or through another, whether in their own interest or in that of others (Can. 142).

The trading which is forbidden to clerics and all religious is trading in the strict sense of the term. In this sense to trade is to buy commodities, not for consumption, but with the intention of selling them again at a higher price without changing their nature. So that it is not trading in the strict sense to sell the produce of one’s own land, nor to sell what was bought for consumption but was found to be unsuitable, nor to sell without profit to the poor, nor to sell a picture painted by one’s self with colours bought in the market. However, certain transactions which have the appearance of trading are sometimes forbidden on account of the danger and scandal which they are apt to cause.

It is not illicit trading to invest money in Government stock or other bonds which bear interest, though it would be unlawful speculation to invest money with the intention of selling out at a profit if the price rises. Although it is forbidden to clerics to act as directors or to take part in the management of industrial and commercial companies, yet it is probable that a cleric may lawfully invest money in such enterprises as are honest merely with a view of getting interest on his investment. He only buys the right to receive interest on his money, much in the same way as if he invested it in Government stock.

The prohibition against trading binds under pain of grave sin if the matter be considerable. However, trading implies a habit, and so in the opinion of many divines to trade once in a way, even in a considerable quantity, would not be a mortal sin.

Canon 2380 prescribes that clerics and religious who violate the law against trading be punished by the Ordinary according to the gravity of the fault.

MENTION has several times been made already of benefices, and in this place moral theologians usually treat of the special obligations in conscience of beneficed clergy. - An ecclesiastical benefice is a juridical entity founded or erected in perpetuity by competent ecclesiastical authority, and it consists of a sacred office and the right to receive the income from the dowry annexed to the office (Can. 1409).

The dowry of a benefice consists either of property whose ownership belongs to the juridical entity itself, or of certain and due payments made by some family or moral person, or of certain and voluntary offerings of the faithful, which belong to the rector of the benefice, or stole fees, as they are called, within the amounts fixed by the diocesan tax or lawful custom, or of choral distributions with the exception of a third part of them, if the whole income of the benefice consists of choral distributions (Can. 1410).

When he has lawfully taken possession of his benefice, every beneficiary enjoys all the rights both temporal and spiritual which are annexed to the benefice (Can. 1472).

Although the beneficiary may have other property besides what is derived from his benefice, he can freely use and enjoy the fruits of his benefice which are necessary for his decent support; but he is bound by the obligation of spending what remains over on the poor or on pious causes, but a Cardinal can dispose even by will of all the fruits of his benefice (Can. 1473).

The theological and moral virtues treated in the previous Question are obligatory upon all states and conditions, for all men have the same supernatural destiny, and all alike are bound to govern their acts and their passions by the rule of reason. But not all have the same calling or office, or consequently the same particular ends to be striven for or the same special means to be used; wherefore, there are moral duties proper to particular classes and particular ways of life. Those special obligations, however, do not constitute new virtues, but are applications of the seven general virtues to the states of man diversified in reference to the acts and habits of the soul. The diversities now spoken of may be reduced to the three mentioned by St. Paul (I Cor., xii. 4 sqq.), namely, diversities of graces (i.e., some are gifted to edify the Church in marvellous ways by knowledge, speech or miracles), diversities of operations (i.e., some are called to the life of contemplation, others to active life), and diversities of ministries (i.e., there are various stations, ranks, occupations, both in ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical life). The higher graces and ways of the spiritual life of man are treated in works of ascetical and mystical theology, and we shall confine ourselves here to two subjects: (a) the duties of men as members of the Church, that is, the general duties of the faithful and the special duties of clerics and religious; (b) the duties of men as members of domestic and civil society.

Before proceeding any further, a word is in order regarding the role of the laity in the Church.

“We desire that all who claim the Church as their mother should seriously consider that not only the sacred ministers and those who have consecrated themselves to God in religious life, but the other members as well of the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, have the obligation of working hard and constantly for the upbuilding and increase of this Body” (Pius XII, Mystici Corporis).

The Catholic layman, long a silent partner in the Church’s apostolate, has assumed a more active part in recent years. His role, his apostolate, his milieu, his special claims to divine graces, his spiritual prerogatives—all have been made subjects of theological investigation particularly by European writers. Controversy, uncertainty, at times even error have characterized their efforts as they grope their way in a new area of theology. Their efforts ultimately will lead to the elaboration of a developed theology of the laity, an extremely important and equally necessary body of knowledge, for “the laity are in the front line of the Church’s life; through them the Church is the vital principle of human society. Accordingly they especially must have an ever clearer consciousness not only of belonging to the Church, but of being the Church....” (Pius XII, Allocution to the Sacred College, AAS, 38-149).[1]

[1] To detail the advances made in this new area of theology would demand a volume for itself. We shall have to be content with indicating a select bibliography of the outstanding works available.

Francis M. Keating, S.J., “Theology of the Laity,” Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, 1956, pp. 196 ff.; Ives M. J. Congar, O.P., Jalons pour une theologie du laicat, (Paris, Cerf, 1953); translated as Lay People in the Church, (The Newman Press, Westminster, Md., 1957); G. Philips, _Le role du laicat dans l’Eglise, (Casterman, Tournai-Paris, 1954); translated as The Role of the Laity in the Church. (Mercier, Cork, 1955); Karl Rahner, “The Apostolate of Laymen,” Theology Digest, (Spring 1957), pp. 73 ff.; Jacques Leclercq, “Can a Layman be a Saint?” Theology Digest, (Winter 1956), pp. 3 ff. (This same issue contains a select bibliography on spirituality of the laity, p. 8.); Paul Dabin, S.J., Le sacerdoce royal des fideles dans les livres saints, (Blond et Gay, 1941); Le sacerdoce royal des fideles dans la tradition ancienne et moderne, (Les Editions Universelles, Brussels, 1950): Gustave Weigel, S.J., “The Body of Christ and the City of God,” Social Order, (Vol. 5, 1955, p. 275 ff.).

— Doubt can be raised both concerning the usefulness and concerning the place of this argument on Persons.

Concerning the usefulness. For not without elegance Fr. Lehmkuhl, in his celebrated moral theology, omitted the special treatment On Persons, and joined the treatise On Religious to the treatise on Religion, but the treatise on Clerics to the treatise on the sacrament of Order. For through the various religious Institutes the Church in a peculiar way worships God collectively; but by the sacrament of Order the gradation of clerics is constituted; indeed, through first tonsure, which imitates Order, clerics are made.

Concerning the place. For since through the exercise of virtues and the fruitful use of the sacraments all persons are called to sanctity, but clerics both command acts of virtues and administer sacraments, the special treatment on persons could logically precede or follow the other treatises. In the former order, a step would be made from persons to their offices and sacraments; in the latter arrangement, from offices and sacraments to their subjects or ministers.

Indeed, not rarely the treatment on persons lies as though in the middle between precepts and sacraments. For in it the discourse is chiefly about clerics; but clerics confect and administer sacraments, so that by the treatise on clerics the treatise on the sacraments is, as it were, prepared.

The Code of Canon Law removed the doubt, especially since we are entering into matter chiefly canonical. For in the Code there exists a special book On Persons. This is followed by the book on things, in which first the sacraments are treated, then sacred times, then the censorship and prohibition of books. But Book V is assigned to ecclesiastical censures and penalties.

Therefore there must be in our moral work a special part on Persons, and this part must be placed before the sacraments, the precepts of the Church, and Censures.

And because, except for the fundamental treatise on Laws, it seemed good to enclose canonical matters in a single volume, lest strictly moral parts, such as the virtues, should follow the canonical aspects of persons and sever them from the other canonical matters, we had to treat of persons after the completed exposition on the offices of the virtues, or immediately before the sacraments.

Thus, however, we were led by our own proper formal respect to choose for the book on persons the same place which it occupies in many commentaries.

— Division of the book. Furthermore, three states of persons are distinguished in the Church. For, as we are taught by canon 107 itself: "By divine institution there are in the Church clerics distinct from laymen, although not all clerics are of divine institution; but both can be religious."

Therefore in three treatises we shall speak of clerics, of religious, and of laymen.