Temperament and Moral Character

116. (A) Notion. The complex of those propensions which, whether from heredity or from the organism proper to each one, belong to some individual and constitute his special disposition is called temperament. But native dispositions of this kind are in some way changed by education, external circumstances, and one's own efforts. From this arises character, or the complex of native propensions insofar as they have been changed by education or by one's own will, and have acquired some stability. - Sometimes, however, temperament and character are taken promiscuously.²

¹ As regards ancient systems, cf. Debreyne-Ferrand, La Théologie morale et les sciences médicales, Paris, 1884, p. 9-46; as regards new systems, cf. Fouillée, Tempérament et Caractères, Paris, 1895; Paulhan, Les Caractères, 2nd ed., Paris, 1902; Malapert, Les éléments du caractère et leurs lois de combinaison, Paris, 1897; E. Ledos, Traité de la Physionomie humaine, 2nd ed., Paris, 1904, t. I, p. 85-161.

² Not rarely also temperament designates something physiological, and character something psychological.

Physiologists and moralists by no means agree concerning the species of temperaments. Formerly four were distinguished, according to the four principal elements of the human body, namely: the sanguine, in which the sanguine system prevailed; the nervous, where the nerves dominated; the bilious, in which bile had more force; the lymphatic, or phlegmatic, where the watery part of the blood principally existed. But modern physiology has rejected this division, as lacking a foundation; hitherto, however, no other scientific foundation could be found.

117. Yet commonly enough four principal temperaments are distinguished, which, as regards psychological marks, very nearly approach the division given above. For among men, some are more sensitive, because they feel more vividly, and others more active, because they react more vehemently to sensations. Again, among the former, some excel by abundance of blood, others by organization of the nerves; among the latter, some act more promptly and intensely, as the choleric, others only slowly and weakly, as the phlegmatic. Therefore four temperaments are distinguished:¹

¹ Thus Fouillée, op. cit., p. 3-80; Paulhan proposes another division, op. cit.

(a) Those who are sensitive and sanguine feel promptly and vividly, but not intensely and perseveringly; wherefore they are very unstable; they easily sin and conceive contrition, but, forgetful of promises, soon fall into sin. Among these are numbered Mark Antony, Louis XIV, Mirabeau, etc.

(b) Those who are sensitive and nervous feel much more intensely and lastingly; therefore in them the passions, whether they are ordered to good or to evil, are much more vehement; and thus their moral character depends especially upon the object toward which they turn themselves; they likewise have some instability, arising from the various emotions to which they are given: such were Voltaire and Frederick, king of Prussia. Sometimes they become melancholic, when they cannot attain the ideal perfection which they pursue: thus Pascal.

(c) The choleric act not only intensely but perseveringly and with the greatest force; they are ambitious, they wish to dominate others and to obtain glory in whatever way: such were Caesar, Cromwell, Napoleon.

(d) The phlegmatic act more coldly and slowly, but with great strength and unconquered constancy; thus many Dutchmen, but especially, among them, William, duke of Holland, who became king of England.

These four kinds, however, are often found mixed in one and the same individual, and indeed in various degrees.

118. (B) The influence of temperament on liberty. Concerning this Aquinas had already said:² "The soul rules the body and resists the passions which follow temperament; for from temperament some are more apt than others for concupiscences or angers; yet they abstain from them more, on account of something restraining them, as is clear in the continent." - In reality it is historically evident that there were not a few who, by temperament prone to anger, became most gentle, as St. Francis de Sales; others, inclined to ambition, became humble and full of zeal for souls, as is clear in the example of St. Francis Xavier. - This is proved no less evidently by experience; for one and the same man often acts according to his character, but sometimes against the same;³ moreover, temperament is not rarely changed by education, so that some of those who at first excelled in sensibility afterward rejoice in the greatest activity.

² Sum. Cont. Gentil., lib. II, cap. 63.

³ Whence not rarely it is said concerning some action: "it is contrary to his character."

Therefore, if by temperament the exercise of free will is often diminished, it is not wholly removed. But educators and confessors should strive with all their strength to help the younger, so that whatever is good in their character they may assiduously cultivate, and whatever is evil they may correct by contrary acts, as was said where we treated concerning the passions.¹ - Moreover, some psychological notion of the various kinds of character is especially useful to confessors, so that they may more safely direct their penitents to the practice of virtues: the sanguine are to be persuaded to accomplish all things more deliberately and constantly, lest, moved by a passing ardor, they undertake something above their strength, and afterward, cast down in spirit, fall into despair; the nervous and the choleric are to be moderated, lest, through excessive ardor, they indulge excesses, but especially are to be admonished to turn their passions to a good end; the melancholic need consolation, lest they be oppressed by sadness and despair; the phlegmatic are to be stirred up, lest, made sleepy, they become sluggish and lax.

¹ Concerning this see also A. Martin, L'Education du caractère, Paris, 1889.

1. Theologians are not accustomed to hand down many things about these; the principal things which we set forth here are taken from Vermeersch, Prummer, Tanquerey, Damen, and Wouters.

98. Bodily constitution, which can depend much upon heredity and undergoes change from education, can be enumerated first among the causes which more remotely influence freedom.

1. Bodily constitution (temperament) is the complex of those propensities which belong to each one from his own organism and constitute his special character; but since native dispositions of this sort can in some way be changed by one's own efforts, by education, and by external circumstances, character is called the complex of native propensities insofar as they have been changed by one's own will and by the instruction of others and have acquired some firmness. Hence St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles II, 63): "The soul rules the body and resists the passions which follow the bodily constitution: for from bodily constitution some are more apt than others for concupiscences or angers; yet they abstain from these more, on account of something restraining them, as is clear in the continent." Accordingly bodily constitution diminishes the exercise of free choice, but does not remove it; as was said of the passions and habits of which it is the cause. This, moreover, is established by one's own experience and that of others.

2. The constitution of the body depends much upon heredity, by which propensities that depend more upon the organism are transmitted from parents into children, and indeed not only physical defects or bodily or sensible qualities, but also mental aptitudes, even moral propensities such as inclinations to anger, drunkenness, sins of the flesh, suicide, so that in very many regions examples are alleged of families in which certain virtues or vices have been transmitted through many generations.

Now, although sometimes from vicious parents a certain species of madness can be transmitted which entirely removes liberty, ordinarily nevertheless the use of reason and of liberty remains. Against modern determinists, who contend that by the law of heredity the liberty of children is destroyed, into whom propensities are transmitted without their consent, it must be held that by hereditary propensities free choice is diminished, insofar as by them reason is clouded and the force of the will is in some way weakened, as we have said about passions and habits, to which hereditary inclinations can give rise and therefore can be assimilated. Nor is there only an influence of the body upon the soul; but conversely there is also an influence of the soul upon the body.

3. Natural propensities which arise from bodily constitution or heredity, and are strengthened by character, are much increased and diminished by education. Education influences free choice in three ways: by inculcating principles, whether good or evil, which easily turn into prejudices, or by omitting to inculcate good principles; by providing examples by which the intellect is indirectly led little by little to approve that which is done by many, or even the will is directly drawn to consent; finally, by exciting the passions and directing them to good or evil (for example, by counsels or the reading of books). Now with regard to inculcated principles, the things we said about ignorance must be applied, for ignorance does not always render a thing involuntary simply, if that ignorance is consequent; but with regard to examples and excited passions, the things handed down about passions have force, for they generally do not remove liberty but diminish it.

99. Another cause is pathological states or diseases of the mind, which are so called, not because the soul itself or the spiritual faculties can be sick in themselves, but because, on account of badly affected organs, especially the centers of the brain, and on account of the organic sensitive powers, they are impeded in their action, either transitorily or permanently. Some are merely functional, without lesion of an organ, and are called psychic; others are organic, with lesion of an organ, and are called physio-psychological. They are distinguished:

1. These things are not altogether according to the most recent determinations of the sciences. We have not wished to declare the diverse and manifold terms which they use and new classifications, as being indications sufficiently useless for our purpose. Exposition according to the natural sciences is to be held in great esteem in moral doctrine if it contributes to the elucidation of the matter and to establishing practice; otherwise it is rather to be left aside as useless or even as adding difficulty. Besides, the sense of terms is not the same among all, to which indeed attention must be given lest they be wrongly understood.

A. Psychoses, which habitually disturb the use of reason, at least in a determinate matter, so that the sick are not conscious of their abnormal state. Thus:

1. Dementia, which is a growing weakness and dullness of mind.

2. Phrenesis, of which various species are counted. In it the sick bring forth false judgments which are radically incurable, because they are deceived by perpetual or temporary hallucinations or have disturbed associations of imagination, so that their psychic life can be equated with the life of dreamers.

Hence in delirium, even if it is monomania or a hallucination restricted to one subject, they are not free; during the intervals of deliriums nothing of itself impedes liberty.

B. Psychasthenias, which impede practical judgment and the will, but in such a way that the infirm are conscious of their abnormal state and psychic weakness. And indeed:

1. Obsession occupies the mind in such a way that the obsessed person is bound to thinking about or doing certain things. It disturbs practical judgment sufficiently, so that, if it is vehement, often only room for light fault is left, and grave sin can hardly be present in them. But besides perpetual obsessions, there are others which arise only in certain circumstances; hence outside the state of obsession the infirm are bound by the precept of fleeing occasions of morbid excitation toward committing dishonorable acts, and if they freely violate this, they are guilty.

Phobias, fixed ideas, more intense scruples are reduced to obsession.

1. Concerning remedies and education against obsession and phobias, cf. Prummer, Th. M. I, n. 95, and Vermeersch, Th. M. I, n. 85.

2. Blind impulses or invincible propensities can be present in a morbid state, whether they immediately obtain a non-deliberate act, or overcome vain resistance so that the act is nevertheless elicited. Hence some are merely mechanical or motive, which often are without affection, as for example in an idiot; others are psycho-mechanical or even merely psychic, which occur with a more distinct perception and a stronger affection, and often leave partial liberty.

All suppose a suggestible person, for his passive docility depends upon the intensity of a certain phantasm which rather easily produces an insuperable movement. Thus some are known to be prone to lies, others to internal blasphemies, others to suicide or homicide, others to thefts, drunkennesses, or fires, according as they labor under kleptomania, dipsomania, or pyromania; yet these are not to be confused with those who from habit are thieves, drunkards, liars, etc.: for these certainly are not abnormal, but sinners from malice.

It is not easily discerned whether impulses are truly irresistible, but it must be judged from all the circumstances whether liberty is only diminished or removed. The latter can easily be supposed a) if the action cannot be explained by natural concupiscence, b) if after the evil action the mind has remained quiet and content, c) if something is done which otherwise someone wholly abhors; nevertheless liberty is not always removed. Whence the things we said above concerning violence, fear, and concupiscence can be applied.

3. Abulia renders the will impotent for willing and for effectively commanding what is desired, whether it remains idle, or, as though unwilling, is compelled contrary to its own practical judgments to do or omit certain things. In the first case, the infirm person is often excused from certain positive duties, because liberty is at least sufficiently diminished; in the second case the things said about impulses have force.

Abulia, however, is sometimes not universal, but is limited to certain acts or certain times. Furthermore, it can be voluntary and free in the cause, when someone knowingly and freely has induced this state, for example, by constantly abdicating his will without sufficient reason.

C. Psychoneuroses or disorders of the nervous system itself:

1. Neurasthenia is a pathological state consisting in habitual fatigue of the nervous system from an organic or psychic cause; in this state the nerves appear weakened and exhausted, so that the agent, although in possession of himself, suffers from the greatest inconstancy and is much depressed physically and morally. Therefore liberty is diminished, though it is not removed. Hence the infirm can rather easily be excused when, yielding to weariness, they neglect certain positive precepts, especially those that are merely ecclesiastical, as too great a burden. But if, because of sadness, they seek shameful pleasures to which the disease itself does not impel them, they are to be judged as sinning in themselves.

2. Hysteria, although men dispute about its cause, also brings with it a disorder and disturbance of the nervous system, but much graver than neurasthenia, which consists in a great morbid suggestibility, from which sensibility is diminished or for a time extinguished in certain parts of the body (anesthesia), while in others it is rendered much more intense (hyperesthesia); there also arise bodily movements more or less disordered, as well as vivid hallucinations or vehement passions which are very unstable and greatly impede the free exercise of the will, just as they impede right judgment and the moral sense. Therefore hysterical persons easily deceive themselves and others. Hence in practice, only from circumstances and from the declarations of the hysterical persons themselves can it be known how much liberty remains in them. A hysterical agitation (crise, acces de grande hysterie) cannot be combined with full responsibility and grave guilt.

3. Epilepsy is still graver, that masked or hidden form which impels one to perpetrate various strange, shameful, and atrocious things: to inflict injury, blasphemies, shameful conversations, assault, homicide, etc.; not indeed constantly, but with longer intervals interposed, without the infirm person retaining the memory of all these things. An epileptic agitation or crisis certainly cannot be combined with full responsibility and grave guilt. But outside the times of fury the mind is sound and perfectly free, unless sometimes a transitory psychic disturbance is added.

All the aforesaid disturbances, even if they affect emotion or will, seem to draw their origin from a clouding or diminution of intellectual cognition.

1. Conformably to St. Thomas, I-II, q. 10, a. 1: "insofar as reason remains free and not subject to passion, so far the movement of the will which remains does not tend of necessity to that to which passion inclines."

Therefore, in a general view, as to pathological states, "cases in which imputability remains whole, or in which it is altogether removed, come to be considered as exceptions. For generally imputability neither remains intact, nor is it altogether removed, but is diminished.

This proposition regards acts which proceed from abnormality, and does not regard acts which are placed outside the influence of abnormality, for example, concerning other matters or in lucid intervals; ... moreover it regards actual imputability, and intends to prejudice nothing concerning indirect imputability or imputability in the cause, both as to the abnormality itself and as to the effects of abnormality. But this imputability cannot be neglected.

Even in practice, for example in direction, although one must proceed gently, this imputability is not to be too much diminished by excuses...

As to care, once the state of those laboring under abnormalities has been inspected, the role of priest, physician, friends, and family, and the collaboration of all these, must be determined. As to this collaboration, care should be taken lest the confidence of the sick person in one of the indicated persons harm the confidence which the infirm person ought especially to have toward the priest and physician. On the contrary, it is to be desired that, for example, friends in whom the sick person confides, take pains, insofar as can be done, that confidence in the physician and priest always increase.

Care should also be taken lest there be opposing "remedies" (counsels, suggestions, etc.), so that their action would be mutually weakened or practically have no efficacy. And therefore, by questioning the physician or the family or prudently the sick person himself, the priest should know, insofar as can be done, what the physician has thought and determined. Friends and family also should have suitable indications. Thus all, in a positive and best way, can work toward healing."

2. Theol. Mechl., Tractatus de Actibus humanis, 5th ed., edited by H. De Mesmaecker, n. 41.

100. The third cause is hypnotic sleep. This a) in the perfect or deep state greatly diminishes the exercise of liberty, indeed, as long as it lasts, almost removes it, except perhaps with regard to things to which the person is wholly opposed; b) in the imperfect state of lighter sleep, liberty is diminished; c) with regard to suggestions, however, to be fulfilled afterward in the waking state, the matter is disputed: for the Nancy school contends that the hypnotized person, even in this case, cannot morally resist the suggestion, while the Paris school asserts that liberty is not entirely removed but only diminished.

In practice, therefore, the hypnotized person must be questioned carefully and cautiously so that, from his own testimony, it can be discerned whether and how far he was in some measure free in performing the action. Yet actions which are perpetrated in hypnosis can be free in the cause, when he freely abdicated his will and gave consent to hypnotic sleep, foreseeing that actions of this sort would be suggested or exposing himself to this danger.