The Existence of the Last End

13. What it is. 1. Every rational agent acts for the sake of an end. An end is that for the sake of which something is done, or that toward which someone tends. End is distinguished in many ways; it will suffice here to explain the end of the work and the end of the worker. The end of the work is that good toward which a thing or action tends by its nature: a clock toward indicating time, almsgiving toward relieving the poor. The end of the worker is that good which the agent intends or strives to obtain through his action; for example, almsgiving toward making satisfaction for sins. The end of the worker is the cause which moves the worker to acting.

The end of the worker can be the same as the end of the work, and it can be different from the end of the work. If an artisan builds a house, the end of the work, or of the house, is that it serve for dwelling; the end of the worker can be the same, namely that he construct dwellings, but it can also be another: that he make a profit, that he acquire provisions for himself.

2. If we refer these things to God and to the things created by Him, and ask about the end of the Creator, or worker, and also about the end of creation, or work, it is clear first that there can be no discourse about a motive cause of creation, since God can be moved to acting by no good, neither external nor internal, but only about the reason why God willed that creatures should exist. Then it is certain that even God, acting ad extra, intends some good which He strives to obtain through His works or through creatures.

The end and the motive of an action differ from each other. For the motive is that good which moves the agent to the action; but the end is called both that good to the obtaining of which the action is ordered by its nature, and that good which the agent intends to obtain by his action. This good moves the agent to placing the action. Therefore only the end in this latter sense is the motive of the action, but not the end taken in the former sense, unless the agent is moved by that good to placing the action. Thus the internal end of eating is the preservation of life. In him who eats for the sake of pleasure, pleasure is the motive of eating; in him who eats in order to preserve life, the end is at the same time the motive of eating.

¹ Cf. Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit^2 (Munster: Theissing, 1872), vol. 1, n. 427 ff.; vol. 2, chief part 4: "Von der ubernaturlichen Gemeinschaft mit Gott"; chief part 5: "Vom naturlichen und ubernaturlichen Ziel und Ende des Menschen"; vol. 5, chief part 3: "Von der praktischen Theologie." Bouquillon, Theologia moralis fundamentalis^3, bk. 1, De ultimo fine; bk. 2, De mediis ad finem. Schwane, Allgemeine Moraltheologie (Freiburg: Herder, 1885), § 13. Th. Meyer, Institutiones iuris naturalis^4 (Freiburg: Herder, 1907), I, n. 35 ff. V. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie^4 (Freiburg: Herder, 1904), p. 79 ff.

14. 1. The reason which moved God to create man, or the world, is the divine goodness or the infinite perfection of God. Therefore love and the highest esteem of the divine perfection is the reason for which God from eternity wills that created things should exist in time, and that man should exist.

The reason for which God wills something is goodness, just as the reason for which He understands something is truth. But it cannot be a goodness distinct from God and placed outside God; otherwise God would not be most perfect and sufficient unto Himself. Therefore it is the divine goodness itself. Hence Sacred Scripture says: "The Lord has made all things for Himself,"¹ namely by gratuitous goodness,² and St. Augustine says: "Because God is good, we are."³

From the fact that man was created for the sake of divine goodness or the infinite divine perfection, two things necessarily follow: that man is a participation or participated likeness of the divine goodness, just as, analogically, an effect is a participation of the cause from which it flows; and that man, since he is a likeness and image, is a manifestation and representation of the divine goodness.

2. The good for the obtaining of which man was created by God is twofold: the external glory of God and the beatitude of man. The former is called the external end of man; the latter, the internal end of man.

a. The external glory of God. God creates man, as He creates the whole world, not in order to obtain some good for Himself, but in order to communicate His good to man, and in order that man may manifest it and acknowledge it with praise. But the external glory of God consists in the manifestation of the divine good and in knowledge of it with praise.

a. Glory is twofold, internal and external. Internal glory is the perfection and excellence on account of which someone is worthy to be known and praised; external glory is an external work on account of which someone merits admiration and praise.

Internal glory is either objective, namely the perfection and excellence itself, which constitutes the object of knowledge and the motive of praise, or formal, which is the knowledge of that excellence itself and the praise, love, and joy which follow from this knowledge. External glory likewise is either objective, namely the external work itself, which constitutes the object of knowledge and the reason for praise and admiration, or formal, which is the knowledge of the work and the praise, love, and admiration which follow from it.

b. Therefore the definition by which glory is usually defined, "clear knowledge with praise," that is, knowledge concerning someone's excellence with acknowledgment and praise of the same, this definition, I say, sets forth formal external glory, which in the proper sense is called glory.

c. Objective external glory of God is the universal ultimate end of all created things and properly absolute, both because all things are so ordered to it that its attainment is necessary, and because it is not ordered to another end. Subjective external glory of God is the proper end of man, as a rational creature.

d. Since the nature of creatures is diverse, the glory which they were created to exhibit is also diverse: irrational creatures, which are only a certain trace of God,⁴ glorify God objectively by their mere existence, since they manifest God and His attributes; but man, who is the image and likeness of God,⁵ can know, praise, and love the excellence of God, and therefore by his existence he objectively glorifies God, and by admiration of God's works he formally glorifies Him.

b. The beatitude of man. Since man was made for the glory of God, he was created to know and love God; but the beatitude of man consists in the knowledge and love of God; therefore the ultimate end of man is the glory of God and at the same time the beatitude of man. Each end is acquired by the same acts of knowledge and love.

Beatitude is distinguished as twofold: objective or external, which is the good in whose possession man becomes blessed; and subjective or internal, which is the attainment and possession of that good. Moral philosophy demonstrates at length that the objective beatitude of man is nothing other than God, the highest good, since there is no other good which can quiet the appetite of man, and that subjective beatitude consists in the knowledge and love of God, since by these acts man is intimately joined with the highest good and enjoys it.⁶

Note. What the ultimate end of man is, is here shown from the end which God had and had to have in creation; moral philosophy deduces the same from the very nature of man.

¹ Prov. 16:4.

² St. Bernard, Sermon 3 on Pentecost, n. 4.

³ De doctrina christiana l. 1, n. 32.

⁴ Job 11:7.

⁵ Gen. 1:26-27.

⁶ Cf. Cathrein I^4, p. 81 f., 96 ff.; Meyer I, n. 59 ff.

15. The external glory of God is the primary end of man; perfect beatitude is the secondary end of man.

a. Whatever God wills, He wills for the sake of His goodness. Therefore He wills the beatitude of man only for the sake of His goodness, namely so that this goodness may be communicated and manifested, or for the sake of His external glory. Therefore He wills His external glory primarily, and the beatitude of man secondarily. b. Since the love of God is ordered, He wills individual goods according to their dignity. But the glory of God, since it is a divine good, excels the beatitude of man in dignity, which is the good of a creature.

The Hermesianists thought that this order of ends had to be inverted, namely that God principally intends the beatitude of man, and His own glory secondarily, lest God, if He ultimately referred all things to His own glory, should have to be called desirous of His own advantage and ambitious. But: a. the external glory of God, which is the primary end of creatures, is not some advantage or internal good of God, since such a good cannot accrue to God, as being most perfect. b. He is called ambitious who seeks glory not due to him, or glory due to him in an undue manner; but God seeks and intends glory most due to Himself and in a due manner, namely from love of His infinite perfection and goodness. Therefore God wills and intends only that which right order requires.¹

¹ Cf. Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit I, n. 428 ff.

16. The beatitude to which man is destined in the present order consists in the intuitive vision of God and in the highest love and joy which result from it.

a. Vision. "Beloved, now we are sons of God; and it has not yet appeared what we shall be: we know that, when He appears, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is."¹ By these words the Apostle teaches that our state in eternity will be far different from that which we now have: for then we shall be like God in glory and beatitude; and the cause of this wonderful transformation is the intuitive vision of God. "For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect has come, that which is in part shall be done away. Now we see through a mirror in an enigma: but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know as I also am known."² From these words we learn that the knowledge of God which we enjoy in this life is far inferior to the knowledge which we shall enjoy in eternity: for the knowledge of this life, whether natural through reason or supernatural through faith, is mediated knowledge of God; but the knowledge of the future life is immediate vision and intuition of God. Benedict XII declares: "By apostolic authority we define that the blessed enjoy the divine essence, and also that from such vision and fruition the souls of those who have already departed are truly blessed and have eternal life and rest."³

b. Love. From the intuitive vision by which the human intellect is intimately joined with the divine essence, there arises in the will, by natural necessity, love of the highest good immediately known. The Apostle signifies this highest charity, by which man is borne toward God, in these words: "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."⁴ For he says charity is greater than faith and hope because it is also to remain in eternity.

c. Joy. Speaking of eternal beatitude, Sacred Scripture says: "Well done, good and faithful servant ... enter into the joy of thy Lord."⁵ "Your heart shall rejoice, and your joy no one shall take from you."⁶ And indeed, since through the love of the highest good present every appetite is satisfied and quieted, and since man at the same time knows that the possession of the highest good cannot cease, there necessarily follows from this that highest joy by which Sacred Scripture designates eternal beatitude.

d. The perfect beatitude of man consists in those acts by which he perfectly possesses and enjoys the highest good. But by the intuitive vision of God and by the love which necessarily follows from it, man possesses the highest good in the most perfect way and enjoys it. Therefore Benedict XII says: The blessed "enjoy the divine essence, and from such vision and fruition the souls of those who have already departed are truly blessed."

¹ 1 John 3:2.

² 1 Cor. 13:9-12.

³ Constitution Benedictus Deus, January 29, 1336.

⁴ 1 Cor. 13:13.

⁵ Matt. 25:21.

⁶ John 16:22.

17. It is supernatural. The beatitude to which man is destined in the present order is truly supernatural, that is, it exceeds all the powers and all the demands of created nature, and is a participation in the divine life itself.

The beatitude which is promised to us in heaven can be known only by Him who searches the deep things of the Godhead; but such beatitude surpasses both the powers and the demands of created nature, and therefore is supernatural in the strict sense.¹ The beatitude of the Son of God is altogether supernatural to created nature; but the beatitude which awaits us in eternity is a participation in the beatitude of the Son of God Himself: for He will grant us to sit with Him on His throne, just as He Himself sits on the throne of His Father;² He will dispose the kingdom for us, just as the Father has disposed it for Him; He will grant that we eat and drink at His table in His kingdom.³ The beatitude which awaits us in eternity consists in the intuitive vision of God, together with the love which necessarily results from it. But this is the beatitude of God Himself, and consequently is altogether supernatural. The sonship by which man is constituted an adoptive son of God is plainly supernatural; therefore the beatitude which corresponds in due proportion to adoptive sonship is also supernatural. But the beatitude which we await in eternity is the beatitude of the sons of God.⁴ Although man can produce ethically good works by the powers of nature, nevertheless he cannot perform, without the help of grace, any work that is apt for the ultimate end to which we have been destined by God. But if grace alone renders us apt for works proportioned to the ultimate end, our ultimate end is supernatural.

¹ "Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love Him; but God has revealed them to us through His Spirit: for the Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God." 1 Cor. 2:9-10.

² "He who has overcome, I will give to sit with Me on My throne; just as I also overcame and sat with My Father on His throne." Apoc. 3:21.

³ "And I dispose to you, as My Father has disposed to Me, a kingdom, that you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom." Luke 22:29 f.

⁴ "For whoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God. For you have not received the spirit of servitude again in fear, but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba, Father. For the Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God. But if sons, also heirs: heirs indeed of God, and coheirs of Christ." Rom. 8:14-17. Cf. Gal. 4:1 ff.

(Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 1-5; Contra Gentes, IV, cc. 1-63.)

Existence of the Last End.—Every deliberate act proceeds from the will, and, since the will pursues good as its goal, it follows that every deliberate act is done for some good or end. But, if this end is an imperfect good, it is desired not for itself but as leading up to a perfect good, that is, to one which will leave nothing beyond it to be desired; in other words, the intermediate end is willed on account of a last end. Hence, all that a man wills, he wills directly or indirectly on account of a last end. All men desire their own happiness and perfection; but not all understand in what beatitude consists, since some aim ultimately at finite goods.

20. God is the last end of man and of his acts, so that man is bound to tend toward God and to glorify Him.

Proof. We presuppose, both from sound philosophy and from Catholic faith, that a personal God, infinitely perfect, exists, and that He freely created the world and man. These things having been presupposed, the stated proposition can easily be proved. For man and every creature must tend toward that last end which God wished to obtain by creating; otherwise God would not be the supreme and omnipotent Lord of creation. Now the end which God proposed to Himself in creating cannot be something outside Himself, but He Himself is His own end. For every end placed outside the one operating is intended as some good not yet possessed. Therefore the one operating would intend something foreign, if he already had that thing in himself? - Therefore God, in all His operations and accordingly also in the creation of man, cannot intend something outside Himself, because He is infinitely perfect, containing all goods in Himself. "The Lord has wrought all things for Himself."¹² It follows therefore that God Himself, that is, the manifestation of His glory, is the end of the creation of man and of the whole world; and accordingly all creatures ought to intend the glory of God as the last end. Hence St. Thomas says: "The whole universe with its individual parts is ordered to God as to an end, insofar as in them, by a certain imitation, the divine goodness is represented unto the glory of God."¹³

Irrational creatures intend this end by a coerced necessity; for they are as it were vestiges of the divinity,¹⁴ and the perfections and beauties shining in them necessarily manifest the majesty of God the Creator. Whence the Psalmist¹⁵ exclaims: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the works of His hands." But rational creatures, such as man and angel, are bound to glorify God freely; for they are not only vestiges but also images of the divinity,¹⁶ and they are endowed with free choice. Rational creatures ought to glorify God insofar as they willingly acknowledge His majesty with subjection and praise, and venerate and love Him. Certainly this glorification offered to God by creatures does not increase His beatitude, for the Psalmist¹⁷ says: "Thou art my God, since Thou hast no need of my goods." For God is infinitely perfect and infinitely blessed. Therefore the Vatican Council¹⁸ deservedly teaches that "God, by His goodness and omnipotent power, not for increasing His beatitude, nor for acquiring it, but for manifesting His perfection through the goods which He imparts to creatures, by a most free counsel, together from the beginning of time created each creature out of nothing"; and it pronounces anathema upon him who should deny that the world was created for the glory of God. But since man is immortal, he must also glorify God in the other life; and this indeed is done by the damned through the manifestation of divine justice and omnipotence, but by the just who are blessed through the manifestation of divine mercy and goodness. Throughout all eternity the blessed will glorify God through intimate union with Him. Therefore God, just as He is the principle, so also is the last end of man; or, as it is said metaphorically, God is Α and Ω.

Man is bound to glorify God by all his acts, by serving and obeying Him and by loving and venerating Him. I say: by all his acts. Therefore if he should fail to do this even by one deliberate act, he sins. In this sense the Apostle St. Paul¹⁹ admonishes: "Therefore whether you eat or drink, or do anything else, do all things unto the glory of God." - It is not required, however, that man in all his acts explicitly and expressly intend the glory of God; but it suffices that he at some time elicit an act of charity, and that his remaining acts be virtually ordered to the last end, or God. But if man elicits acts which cannot be referred to the last end, he sins; and indeed gravely, if acts of this kind are altogether opposed to the last end, or God; but venially, if in the elicited acts there is not aversion, but only some deflection from the last end on account of an inordinate affection for a temporal good.

Proposition 2

¹² Prov. 16:4.

¹³ S. theol. I, q. 65, a. 2.

¹⁴ Job 11:7; S. theol. I, q. 93, a. 2.

¹⁵ Ps. 18:2.

¹⁶ Gen. 1:26 sq.; S. theol. I, q. 93, a. 1 sqq.

¹⁷ Ps. 15:2.

¹⁸ Const. "Dei Filius" cap. 1, can. 5.

¹⁹ 1 Cor. 10:31.

21. Thesis I. According to Catholic doctrine, the beatitude of man does not consist in created goods, neither external goods, nor internal goods of the body or soul, whether these are taken distributively or collectively.

This must be proved by parts. For the proof it is necessary to consider the conditions required for beatitude, which are not found in the aforesaid goods. For beatitude is the state perfected by the aggregation of all goods, or the stable possession of the perfect good which totally quiets the soul. Hence, that some good may be able to beatify man, perfectly complete and satiate him, it must be:

a) perfect in itself, or ultimately appetible for its own sake and not for the sake of another;

b) sufficient and supreme, or filling all legitimate aspirations of the intellect and will;

c) stable and unfailing.

These things being posited, it must be said that man cannot obtain his beatitude in created goods: whether external goods of fortune, or goods of the body, or goods of the soul, which, although under a manifold respect they are desirable, lack the three aforesaid conditions (q. 2, a. 4).

22. The first part A is proved: Beatitude does not consist in external goods, such as riches, dignities, honors, reputation, glory, power, etc. For these:

a) Are not desirable per se, but only on account of another, namely, on account of man, insofar as they either help toward acquiring goods of soul or body: thus riches are sought for sustaining life or enjoying pleasures; power is given on account of the republic and serves happiness as a means; or they rather suppose and follow perfection: thus honors, reputation, and glory do not make excellence, but suppose some excellence to be in man, of which they are the sign and testimony.

b) They are not sufficient, because they do not exclude every evil, since they are common to good and evil men; indeed evil can come from them. For often the more riches and honors abound, the more they inflame desire; not rarely also, after some time, they bring in disgust and weariness; furthermore they are indifferent to good and evil, so that someone can use them badly, whence perfection is more in the good use of them than in the things themselves. Besides, those who have all these can lack many other things necessary for happiness, such as health of body, wisdom, tranquility of soul, etc. Therefore they do not fulfill all the legitimate aspirations of man.

c) Nor are they stable: for they are easily lost by some misfortune; hence they are acquired with labor, retained with solicitude and anxiety of fear, lost with sorrow, and at last at the time of death they pass away.

d) Beatitude is acquired by interior principles, namely, by our studious acts of intellect and will, and perfects man intrinsically, since man is naturally ordered to it; but those things are rather from exterior causes, indeed often from fortune.

This the Scriptures teach: concerning riches, Mt. V, 3; Eccli. XXXI, 8; Eccles. V, 9; Ps. LXI, 11; concerning honor, III Kings X, 24 and XI, 4; concerning reputation and glory, Is. XL, 6 sq.; concerning power, Wis. VI, 1 sq.

23. The first part B is proved: Beatitude does not consist in goods of the body, which consist in health, strength, vigor, beauty, sensual pleasure, and delight of the senses:

a) By their nature they are subordinated to goods of the soul, whence they are not to be sought on account of themselves; nor are they truly useful except insofar as they serve the operations and perfection of the soul. The very being of the body is not the end, because it is not the highest good: for the being of the soul is more principal, because the being of the body depends upon the soul and not vice versa. Hence goods of the body are ordered to the soul.

b) They do not fulfill all the legitimate desires of man, for they are common to beasts and men, and therefore they do not satiate the nobler appetites of the soul, nor constitute the proper end of man, nor exclude all evils, but are common to the good and the evil. Indeed, when someone immoderately indulges bodily delights, the powers of the soul are depressed, and man becomes like a beast, since he is delighted with the same pleasures and rests in them against the right order of reason.

Moreover, delight per se is not principally beatitude, but its accident, which follows total or partial beatitude; a fortiori bodily delight, which follows a sensible good that pertains to the body, and therefore is not the perfect good of man.

c) Besides, how uncertain and unstable they are, there is no one who has not experienced it (cf. Gen. III, 19; Wis. II, 1-9).

24. The first part C is proved: Beatitude does not consist in goods of the soul.

a) It is not the very substance of the soul, because this must be completed from without, as being in potency to act and to further perfection, for example wisdom and virtue; whence it is not the ultimate end of itself.

b) It is not faculties or habits, because these also are in potency to act.

c) It is not the acts themselves, because they are something finite. But the human appetite tends to universal and complete good; yet any good inhering in the soul itself, even an act, is a participated and consequently particularized good. Hence it is impossible that any of them should be the ultimate end of man. Moreover, acts depend upon the object, and therefore they are perfect and can satiate the human appetite only if they attain the universal true and highest good, which cannot be found in finite things intrinsic to the soul. And therefore the very thing which renders us blessed is not a created good intrinsic to the soul, but exists outside the soul, although the attainment and possession of it is an act of the soul.

Hence specifically beatitude is not wisdom and virtue, which, moreover, in this life do not place us in possession of the complete good. For virtue does not satiate, but makes the appetite right, and can be lost; it is the way to beatitude, and happiness itself is the reward of virtue. Wisdom is a means of acquiring truth, tending toward total and perfect truth. But those things cannot perfectly quiet the appetite.

25. The second part is proved: Beatitude does not consist in created goods taken collectively.

Their unsuitability for beatitude comes not from their quantity, but from their nature, intrinsic imperfection, and limitation, and therefore it cannot be removed by mere accumulation. And no one has possessed or will be able to possess all these things at once. Cf. Eccli. I, 2; XII, 8; 13-14; Ps. LXXII; Eccles. II, 11; Wis. II; Mt. XVI, 21-26.

26. They object that there are many who care little about God and place happiness only in created things. - Response: This moral perversion is a fact of humanity corrupted by sin. This is explained from a twofold cause: 1) from the fact that eternal goods, as invisible and future, seem to us more remote, and therefore affect the mind less; while, on the contrary, created goods, visible and present, appear nearer and procure actual delight. Nevertheless, right reason teaches that eternal and future goods are to be preferred to these transitory and imperfect goods, and faith teaches the same, the Apostle admonishing in II Cor. IV, 17: "For that which is at present momentary and light in our tribulation works above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory in us"; 2) from the fact that men, by indulging earthly pleasures against conscience, have become animal, pursuing sensual delights more than spiritual things; "but the animal man," says the Apostle, I Cor. II, 14, "does not perceive the things which are of the Spirit of God." Yet reason shows that intellectual goods, as higher, are to be preferred to sensible goods, and that all sensible and earthly things will have an end; these things considered, the man who intends to act rightly desires eternal happiness that will endure perpetually.

1. Tanquerey, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, n. 17.

27. Thesis II. God alone is the true and complete beatitude of man. - It is proved:

1. Indirectly, from the fact that beatitude does not consist in any created good; therefore in uncreated good, God.

2. Directly: "For beatitude is the perfect good, which totally quiets the appetite; otherwise it would not be the ultimate end, if something to be desired still remained. But the object of the will, which is the human appetite, is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal truth. From this it is clear that nothing can quiet the will of man except universal good; and this is not found in anything created, but only in God, because every creature has participated goodness. Hence God alone can fulfill the will of man... Therefore in God alone does the beatitude of man consist" I-II, q. 2, a. 8. Hence St. Augustine, Confessions, book I, n. 1: God, "You have made us for Yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in You." Cf. Ps. XV, 2, 5, 10; LXXII, 25-26; CII, 5.

They object that the aforesaid argument is not valid. For universal good is either abstract (universal in predicating), and then the conclusion does not follow, because such a good is found in any created good whatever; or it is concrete or complete universal good (universal in being), and then there is a begging of the question, for concrete universal good is nothing but God. - Response:

1. In the argument of St. Thomas, universal good is taken abstractly, but not formally as abstracted from concrete existence, or as good in common, which can be any good whatever; but most broadly as unlimited, and absolutely as every good, prescinding from finite and infinite and not contracted to this or that good. But what is limited exists in individual created beings. Therefore those things are not the universal good which is the beatitude of man. Namely, the power of the intellect extends to every true thing, and therefore the power of the will to every good; whence it is not satiated if it possesses one good, since it can still extend itself to another. Some participated and finite good does not exhaust the extension of the object; only infinite good does this.

1. Thus Cajetan, on q. 2, a. 7 and 8; Sylvius, Medina, the Salmanticenses, Lehu.

2. Even if concrete universal good were understood, the argument could be valid, by understanding good not absolutely, but the complete good of man. But man is able to know not only created and finite truth but also uncreated and infinite truth, and therefore he can also seek uncreated or infinite good. Therefore the complete good of man is not finite good but infinite good.

28. Corollary. - From all these things it follows that the supreme beatitude of man truly coincides with the ultimate end of the universe, and essentially consists in attaining it; and not only in the same object, but also in the same act of knowledge and love, namely, in knowing, loving, and therefore glorifying God. Thus while man pursues the glory of God, the primary end, by that very fact he promotes his own happiness, which is the secondary end because the good of the creature must be subordinated to the good of the Creator as ultimate end; and by attaining his own good, he also glorifies God, and by tending toward his proper good, by that very fact he tends toward the good of the universe. Hence the two ends are really identified, but differ in reason. The highest glory of God is our beatitude, and our highest good can be nothing other than His highest glory. Thus through beatitude man fulfills the ultimate end of the universe, because he proximately seeks objective beatitude as his own good, but at the same time ultimately as divine good.

29. Observations.

1. That God may be the object of human beatitude, there is not required a proportion of entity (that is, of quantitative commensuration or equality) between human nature and God, but a proportion of objective habitude and final relation (of proportionality) suffices, that is, the capacity and ordination of the appetite for attaining Him. Supplement III, q. 92, a. 1, ad 6.

2. In this sense the human appetite can in some way be called infinite according to object and appetition and habitude and capacity, although subjectively, as to being, it is finite. Thus also subjective beatitude is a good of which man is capable as of a thing intrinsic and inhering and therefore finite; objective beatitude is a good of which he is capable as of an object, which is infinite. I-II, q. 2, a. 8, ad 3.

3. Nevertheless man does not seek God so as to possess Him in an infinite mode (which is impossible for a creature), but tends to possess Him as much as is possible by his powers, namely, in various degree according to each one's proper capacity, disposition, and preparation. Ibid., q. 3, a. 8, ad 2.

4. Man does not seek God as a mere means which he uses for beatifying himself, as if God were a useful good which is loved only for the sake of something else, but as the highest good, the cause of beatitude and the source of all perfection and the ultimate end, who is loved for His own sake and to whom, therefore, man himself is ultimately subordinated. In other words, he does not so much seek God for the sake of beatitude, but rather beatitude for the sake of God.

5. On the part of the object, no created goods besides God are essentially required for man's beatitude, because He is the infinite good capable of satiating all appetitions. Yet there are several created, sensible, and bodily goods which pertain to beatitude consequently, but follow as if spontaneously from essential beatitude. For by force of divine possession the blessed one will certainly have the things he reasonably desires.

6. We mean here by end the purpose for which a thing exists; the end of an act is the purpose for which that act is done. For instance, some may read a certain book for pleasure; others for instruction, others again to practise obedience: the act is the same, the ends are various.

7. Every human act is done for an end. For a human act is an act of the will, and the will cannot act unless the intellect proposes to it something to which it may tend, i. e., something good. The will is only another name for the rational appetite — that is, the power of tending to a good which the intellect proposes to it. The good intended is the end of the act. Hence, every act is done for an end. You may object that you have no special intention, e. g., in reading; that you read merely to kill time, to be busied with something, etc.; nevertheless, you act for an end or purpose, the end in this case being to kill time or to find occupation.

8. We do not say that the end intended is always a true good, but only that it is always good after a manner; that it is at least an apparent good, and aimed at because apprehended as good. It may be conceived as good in itself, worth tending to for its own sake, or as a means conducive to some other good. No man, however, intends evil for the sake of evil, but only because he sees something good and desirable in what he wills or in its result. A man may do evil to another for the sake of revenge, and thus do what is morally bad; he may do evil to himself — he may even kill himself; yet he cannot do so except for a purpose which he apprehends as good in some respect — for example, to be freed from trouble. No will can possibly act without aiming at something that has been apprehended as in some way desirable.

9. We must distinguish the nearest or proximate end, the farther or remote end, and the last or ultimate end, beyond which the agent does not look and in which his desire rests. Thus a student may exert himself in order to win a prize, because, by gaining the prize, he will please his parents, and by striving to please his parents he will please God. In this act of the student the prize is the nearest end, his parents a farther end, and God the last end.

Perhaps he does not think of God, but aims at pleasing his parents so as to receive a promised sum of money, with which finally he intends to buy some sweetmeats for the gratification of his palate. In this act he makes the enjoyment he derives from the gratification of his palate the last end.

10. In the example just given, the sweetmeats constitute the objective end; the enjoyment of them is the student's subjective end. The objective or material end is the object aimed at; the subjective or formal end is the attainment of that object.

11. We must also distinguish the end of the work from the end of the workman. A watchmaker, e. g., constructs watches in order to earn a living. The end of the work, the watch, is to mark the time; the end of the workman is to earn a living.

12. An end is said to be (a) actually intended, if at the time of the act it is thought of and aimed at; (b) virtually intended, if the act is influenced by a former intention to attain an end, though that end is not thought of at the time of the act; (c) habitually intended, if a former intention has not been retracted, yet does not for the time being affect the act; (d) interpretatively intended, if the act was not really intended, but would have been so intended, if the case in hand had been foreseen. Let us take an example. A boy is sent by his father to assist a distressed family. He sets out with the actual intention of fulfilling this commission. While walking along, he is occupied with other thoughts and is unmindful of his message, yet he directs his steps aright in virtue of his former intention — that is, with a virtual intention. He may delay for hours at a friend's house, totally uninfluenced by the purpose for which he started out; nevertheless, as that purpose has not been given up, it remains as a habit; it is habitual. At last he reaches the distressed family, and finds them in such want that he feels confident that his father, if he knew the circumstances, would wish him to give a larger alms than the sum appointed. Accordingly he gives this larger alms, acting on his father's intention as he interprets it. This is the father's interpretative intention — i. e., what he would have actually intended if he had known the facts.