The Obligation of Knowing the Cause

388. Concerning Knowledge of the Cause. 1. Before absolution the confessor ought to know the cause, or render judgment concerning the sins of the penitent and their moral malice, namely whether they are mortal, and whether the mortal sins are specifically distinct. To render this judgment he ought to attend both to the objective malice of the sin and to the subjective fault of the penitent, which chiefly depends on his advertence.

a. To judge the objective malice of a sin it is not required that the confessor actually and explicitly render a determinate judgment concerning the gravity and specific malice of every sin, but only this is required: that, endowed with habitual knowledge by which he can distinguish between grave and slight sins and between sins specifically diverse, he hear the penitent and, even if he does not reflectively think about them, judge in hearing according to common principles. But if he lacked the aforesaid knowledge and from ignorance judged falsely concerning sins, the confession would not for that reason be invalid.

b. To judge the subjective malice, he can presume that the penitent apprehended the sin according to its objective malice, unless there is a particular reason for doubting the truth of the presumption. But if such a reason is present, the penitent must be questioned about his apprehension of the malice; and if after the question has been made the doubt concerning the subjective malice of the sin cannot be solved, the matter must be left to the judgment of God.

Just as the penitent by divine precept is bound to declare all and individual mortal sins, and to declare them in such a way that they can be rightly understood by the confessor, so the confessor ought to attend to the individual sins which the penitent accuses and to understand each one. Hence a. if the confessor, on account of lack of skill in the language, does not understand all the mortal sins which the penitent accuses, he is bound to direct him to another confessor skilled in the language, if such a one is present and can be approached without grave inconvenience. But if this cannot be done without grave inconvenience, the penitent can be absolved. But if the penitent had only venial sins, the confessor could validly and licitly absolve him after one or another sin has been sufficiently understood.

b. If the confessor, on account of singing or sleep or distraction or another cause, did not hear the sins of the penitent, he should supply the defect in this way, if it can be done without grave annoyance. Let him ask the penitent whether he thinks that among the things accused any grave sin is contained; if he denies this, he can absolve him; if he affirms it, let him ask what that sin is, saying that he did not understand the matter sufficiently. But if from the conscience of the penitent known to him he can presume that the things which he did not hear are venial sins, he can absolve him without questioning about them.

2. The judgment concerning the sins of the penitent ought to be sacramental, which requires in the confessor the power of jurisdiction, and in the penitent a sacramental accusation, i.e., one made to the confessor as judge for obtaining absolution.

Therefore, to obtain valid absolution, a friendly narration of sins or an exposition of them made to the confessor for the sake of counsel does not suffice, unless the penitent again, at least generically and confusedly (I accuse myself of all the things which I said outside confession), accuses himself sacramentally.

3. Yet it is not required that the confessor, while he absolves, still remember either all the sins which the penitent accused or some sin in species and distinctly; rather, it suffices that he remember the sins confusedly, prudently judge that the penitent is actually disposed, and will to absolve him by divine authority from the sins which he had submitted to the keys.