Pius X, 1903-1914

[From the Encyclical, "Ad diem," February 2, 1904]

As the result of this participation between Mary and Christ in the sorrows and the will, she deserved most worthily to be made the restorer of the lost world," * and so the dispenser of all the gifts which Jesus procured for us by His death and blood. . . . Since she excels all in sanctity, and by her union with Christ and by her adoption by Christ for the work of man's salvation, she merited for us de congruo, as they say, what Christ merited de condigno, and is the first minister of the graces to be bestowed.

[From the Response of the Biblical Commission, February 13, 1905]

The question:

Whether to solve difficulties that occur in some texts of Holy Scripture, which seem to present historical facts, it is permitted the Catholic exegete to state that it is a matter in these texts of the tacit or implicit citation of a document written by an author who was not inspired, all the assertions of which the inspired author does not at all intend to approve or to make his own, and which therefore cannot be held to be immune from errors?

The answer (with the approbation of Pius X):

In the negative, except in the case where, preserving the sense and judgment of the Church, it is proved by strong arguments: I) that the sacred writer really is citing the words or documents of another, and 2) that he does not approve the same nor make them his own, so that it is rightly decided that he is not speaking in his own name.

[From the reply of the Biblical Commission, June 23, 1905]

The question:

Whether the opinion can be admitted as aprinciple of sound exegesis, which holds that the books of Sacred Scripture which are held to be historical, either in whole or in part sometimes do not narrate history properly so called and truly objective, but present an appearance of history only, to signify something different from the properly literal and historical significance of the words?

The answer(with the approbation of Pius X) :

In the negative, except in the case, however, not readily or rashly to be admitted, where without opposing the sense of the Church and preserving its judgment, it is proved with strong arguments that the sacred writer did not wish to put down true history, and history properly socalled, but to set forth, under the appearance and form of history a parable, an allegory, or some meaning removed from the properly literal or historical significance of the words.

[From the Decree of the Congregation of the Holy Council, approved by Pius X December 20th, 1905]

The desire (indeed) of Jesus Christ and of the Church, that all the faithful of Christ approach the sacred banquet daily, is especially important in this, that the faithful of Christ being joined with God through the sacrament may receive strength from it to restrain wantonness, to wash away the little faults that occur daily, and to guard against more grievous sins to which human frailty is subject; but not principally that consideration be given to the honor and veneration of God, nor that this be for those who partake of it a reward or recompense for their virtues. Therefore, the Sacred Council of Trent calls the Eucharist, "an antidote, by which we are freed from daily faults and are preserved from mortal sins" [see n. 875 ]

Because of the plague of Jansenism, which raged on all sides, disputes began to arise regarding the dispositions with which frequent and daily communion should be approached, and some more than others demanded greater and more difficult dispositions as necessary. Such discussions brought it about that very few were held worthy to partake daily of the most blessed Eucharist, and to draw the fuller effects from so saving a sacrament, the rest being content to be renewed either once a year or every month, or at most once a week. Such a point of severity was reached that entire groups were excluded from frequenting the heavenly table, for example, merchants, or thosewho had been joined in matrimony.

In these matters the Holy See was not remiss in its proper duty [see n. 1147 ff. and1313]. . . . Nevertheless, the poison of Jansenism, which had infected even the souls of the good, under the appearance of honor and veneration due to the Eucharist, has by no means entirely disappeared. The question about the dispositions for frequenting communion rightly and lawfully has survived the declarations of the Holy See, as a result of which it has happened that some theologians even of good name rarely, and after laying down many conditions, have decided that daily communion can be permitted the faithful.

. . . But His Holiness, since it is especially dear to him that the Christian people be invited to the sacred banquet very frequently and even daily, and so gain possession of its most ample fruits, has committed the aforesaid question to this sacred Order to be examined and defined.

[Hence the Congregation of the Holy Council on the 16th day of December, 1905] made the following decisions and declarations:

I. Let frequent and daily communion . . . be available to all Christians of every order or condition, so that no one, who is in the state of grace and approaches the sacred table with a right and pious mind, may be prevented from this.

2. Moreover, right mind is in this, that he who approaches the sacred table, indulges not through habit, or vanity, or human reasonings, but wishes to satisfy the pleasure of God, to be joined with Him more closely in charity and to oppose his infirmities and defects with that divine remedy.

3. Although it is especially expedient that those who practice frequent and daily communion be free from venial sins, at least those completely deliberate, and of their effect, it is enough, nevertheless, that they be free from mortal sins, with the resolution that they will never sin in the future. . . .

4. . . Care must be taken that careful preparation for Holy Communion precede, and that actions befitting the graces follow thereafter according to the strength, condition, and duties of each one.

5. . . Let the counsel of the confessor intercede. Yet let confessors beware lest they turn anyone away from frequent or daily communion, who is found in the state of grace and approaches (it) with a right mind. . . .

9. . . Finally, after the promulgation of this decree, let all ecclesiastical writers abstain from any contentious disputation about dispositions for frequent and daily communion.

[From the Decree of Pius X, "Provide sapientique," Jan. 18, 1906]

1. In the entire German Empire today let the chapter, Tametsi, ofthe Council of Trent [see n. 990 ff.], although in many places it has not yet been definitely promulgated and introduced by manifest publication or by lawful observance, nevertheless henceforth from the feast day of Easter (i.e., from the 15th day of April) of this year 1906, bind all Catholics, even those up to now immune from observing the Tridentine form, so that they cannot celebrate a valid marriage between one another except in the presence of the parish priest and two or three witnesses [cf. n. 2066 ff.].

2. Mixed marriages, which are contracted by Catholics with heretics or schismatics, are and remain firmly prohibited, unless, when a just and weighty canonical reason is added, and lawful cautions have been given on both sides, honestly and formally, a dispensation has been duly obtained from the impediment of the mixed religion by the Catholic party. These marriages, to be sure, although a dispensation has been procured, are by all means to be celebrated in the sight of the Church, in the presence of a priest and two or three witnesses, so much so that they sin gravely who contract them in the presence of a non-Catholic minister, or in the presence of only a civil magistrate, or in any clandestine manner. Moreover, if any Catholics in celebrating these marriages seek and accept the service of a non-Catholic minister, they commit another sin and are subject to canonical censures.

Nevertheless, mixed marriages in certain provinces and localities of the German Empire, even in those which according to the decisions of the Roman Congregations have thus far been subject to the definitely invalidating force of the chapter Tametsi,already contracted without preserving the Tridentine form or (and, may God forbid this) to be contracted in the future, provided no other canonical impediment stands in the way, and no decision of nullity because of the impediment of clan destinity has been lawfully passed before the feast day of Easter of this year, and the mutual consent of the spouses has persevered up to the said day, these mixed marriages we wish to be upheld as entirely valid, and We declare, define, and decree this expressly.

3. Moreover, that a safe norm may be at hand for ecclesiastical judges, We declare, decide, and decree this same (pronouncement), and under the same conditions and restrictions, with regard to non-Catholic marriages, whether of heretics or of schismatics, thus far contracted between themselves in the same regions without preserving the Tridentine formula, or hereafter to be contracted; so that, if one or both of the non Catholic spouses should be converted to the Catholic faith, or controversy should occur in an ecclesiastical court regarding the validity of the marriage of two non-Catholics, which is bound up with the question of the validity of the marriage contracted or to be contracted by some Catholic, these same marriages, all other things being equal, are similarly to be held as entirely valid.

[From the Encyclical, "Vehementer nos.,, to the clergy and people of France, February 11, 1906]

We, in accord with the supreme authority which We hold from God, disprove and condemn the established law which separates the French state from the Church, for those reasons which We have set forth: because it inflicts the greatest injury upon God whom it solemnly rejects, declaring in the beginning that the state is devoid of any religious worship; because it violates the natural law, international law, and public trust in treaties; because it is contrary to the divine constitution of the Church and to her essential rights and liberty; because it overturns justice, by suppressing the right of ownership lawfully acquired by manifold titles and by the Concordat itself; because it gravely offends the dignity of the Apostolic See and Our own person, the ranks of bishops, the clergy, and the Catholics of France. Consequently, We protest most vehemently against the proposal of the law, its passage, and promulgation; and We attest that there is nothing at all of importance in it to weaken the laws of the Church, which cannot be changed by the force and rashness of men. *

[From the Decree of the Holy Office, April 25, 1906]

It has been decreed that in the case of true necessity this form suffices: "By this holy unction may the Lord forgive you whatever you have sinned. Amen."

[From the Response of the Commission on Biblical Studies, June 27, 1906]

Question 1.Whether the arguments accumulated by critics to impugn the Mosaic authenticity of the Sacred Books, which are designated by the name of Pentateuch, are of such weight that, in spite of the very many indications of both Testaments taken together, the continuous conviction of the Jewish people, also the unbroken tradition of the Church in addition to the internal evidences drawn from the text itself, they justify affirming that these books were not written by Moses, but were composed for the most part from sources later than the time of Moses?Reply:No.

Question 2. Whether the Mosaic authenticity of the Pentateuch necessarily demands such a redaction of the whole work that it must be held absolutely that Moses wrote all and each book with his own hand, or dictated them to copyists; or, whether also the hypothesis can be permitted of those who think that the work was conceived by him under the influence of divine inspiration, and was committed to another or several to be put into writing, but in such manner that they rendered his thought faithfully, wrote nothing contrary to his wish, omitted nothing; and, finally, when the work was composed in this way, approved by Moses as its chief and inspired author, it was published under his name. Reply: No, for the first part; yes, for the second.

Question 3.Whether without prejudice to the Mosaic authenticity of the Pentateuch it can be granted that Moses for the composition of the work made use of sources, namely written documents or oral tradition, from which, according to the peculiar goal set before him, and under -the influence of divine inspiration, he made some borrowings, and these, arranged for word according to sense or amplified, he inserted into the work itself? Reply:Yes.

Question 4.Whether, safeguarding substantially the Mosaic authenticity and the integrity of the Pentateuch, it can be admitted that in such a long course of ages it underwent some modifications, for example: additions made after the death of Moses, or by an inspired author, or glosses and explanations inserted in the texts, certain words and forms of the antiquated language translated into more modern language; finally false readings to be ascribed to the errors of copyists, which should be examined and passed upon according to the norms of textual criticism.Reply:Yes, the judgment of the Church being maintained.

[From the Decree of the Holy Office, "Lamentabili" July 3, 1907]

1. The ecclesiastical law which prescribes that books dealing with the Divine Scriptures be submitted to a previous censorship does not extend to critical scholars, or to scholars of the scientific exegesis of the Old and New Testaments.

2. The Church's interpretation of the Sacred Books is not indeed to be spurned, but it is subject to the more accurate judgment and the correction of exegetes.

3. From the ecclesiastical judgments and censures passed against free and more learned exegesis, it can be gathered that the faith proposed by the Church contradicts history, and that Catholic teachings cannot in fact be reconciled with the truer origins of the Christian religion.

4. The magisteriumof the Church, even by dogmatic definitions, cannot determine the genuine sense of the Sacred Scriptures.

5. Since in the deposit of faith only revealed truths are contained, in no respect does it pertain to the Church to pass judgment on the assertions of human disciplines.

6. In defining truths the learning Church and the teaching Church so collaborate that there is nothing left for the teaching Church but to sanction the common opinions of the learning Church.

7. When the Church proscribes errors, she cannot exact any internal assent of the faithful, by which the judgments published by her are embraced.

8. They are to be considered free of all blame who consider of no account the reprobations published by the Sacred Congregation of the Index, or by other Sacred Roman Congregations.

9 They display excessive simplicity or ignorance, who believe that God is truly the author of the Sacred Scripture.

10 The inspiration of the books of the Old Testament consists in this; that the Israelite writers have handed down religious doctrines under a peculiar aspect which is little known, or not known at all to the Gentiles.

11. Divine inspiration does not so extend to all Sacred Scripture that it fortifies each and every part of it against all error.

12. The exegete, if he wishes to apply himself advantageously to Biblical studies, should divest himself especially of any preconceived opinion about the supernatural origin of Sacred Scripture, and should interpret it just as he would other merely human documents.

13. The Evangelists themselves and the Christians of the second and third generation have artificially distributed the parables of the Gospels, and thus have given a reason for the small fruit of the preaching of Christ among the Jews.

14, In many narratives the Evangelists related not so much what is true, as what they thought to be more profitable for the reader, although false.

15. The Gospels up to the time of the defining and establishment of the canon have been augmented continually by additions and corrections; hence, there has remained in them only a slight and uncertain trace of the doctrine of Christ.

16. The narrations of John are not properly history, but the mystical contemplation of the Gospel; the discourses contained in his Gospel are theological meditations on the mystery of salvation, devoid of historical truth.

17. The Fourth Gospel exaggerated miracles, not only that the extraordinary might stand out more, but also that they might become more suitable for signifying the work and glory of the Word Incarnate.

18, John, indeed, claims for himself the character of a witness concerning Christ; but in reality he is nothing but a distinguished witness of the Christian life, or of the life of the Christian Church at the end of the first century.

19. Heterodox exegetes have more faithfully expressed the true sense of Scripture than Catholic exegetes.

20. Revelation could have been nothing other than the consciousness acquired by man of his relation to God.

21. Revelation, constituting the object of Catholic faith, was not completed with the apostles.

22. The dogmas which the Church professes as revealed are not truths fallen from heaven, but they are a kind of interpretation of religious facts, which the human mind by a laborious effort prepared for itself.

23. Opposition can and actually does exist between facts which are narrated in Sacred Scripture, and the dogmas of the Church based on these, so that a critic can reject as false, facts which the Church believes to be most certain.

24. An exegete is not to be reproved who constructs premises from which it follows that dogmas are historically false or dubious, provided he does not directly deny the dogmas themselves.

25. The assent of faith ultimately depends on an accumulation of probabilities.

26. The dogmas of faith are to be held only according to a practical sense, that is, as preceptive norms for action, but not as norms for believing

27. The divinity of Jesus Christ is not proved from the Gospels; but is a dogma which the Christian conscience has deduced from the notion of the Messias.

28.When Jesus was exercising His ministry, He did not speak with this purpose, to teach that He was the Messias, nor did His miracles have as their purpose to demonstrate this.

29. It may be conceded that the Christ whom history presents, is far inferior to the Christ who is the object of faith.

30. In all the evangelical texts the name, Son of God, isequivalent to the name ofMessias;but it does not at all signify that Christ is the true and natural Son of God.

31. The doctrine about Christ, which Paul, John, and the Councils of Nicea, Ephesus, and Chalcedon hand down, is not that which Jesus taught, but which the Christian conscience conceived about Jesus.

32. The natural sense of the evangelical texts cannot be reconciled with that which our theologians teach about the consciousness and the infallible knowledge of Jesus Christ.

33. It is evident to everyone, who is not influenced by preconceived opinions, that either Jesus professed an error concerning the immediate coming of the Messias, or the greater part of the doctrine contained in the Synoptic Gospels is void of authenticity.

34. The critic cannot ascribe to Christ knowledge circumscribed by no limit, except on the supposition which can by no means be conceived historically, and which is repugnant to the moral sense, namely, that Christ as man had the knowledge of God, and nevertheless was unwilling to share the knowledge of so many things with His disciples and posterity.

35. Christ did not always have the consciousness of His Messianic dignity.

36. The resurrection of the Savior is not properly a fact of the historical order, but a fact of the purely supernatural order, neither demonstrated nor demonstrable, and which the Christian conscience gradually derived from other sources.

37. Faith in the resurrection of Christ was from the beginning not so much of the fact of the resurrection itself, as of the immortal life of Christ with God.

38. The doctrine of the expiatory death of Christ is not evangelical but only Pauline.

39. The opinions about the origin of the sacraments with which the Fathers of Trent were imbued, and which certainly had an influence on their dogmatic canons, are far different from those which now rightly obtain among historical investigators of Christianity.

40. The sacraments had their origin in this, that the apostles and their successors, swayed and moved by circumstances and events, interpreted some idea and intention of Christ.

41. The sacraments have this one end, to call to man's mind the ever beneficent presence of the Creator.

42. The Christian community has introduced the necessity of baptism, adopting it as a necessary rite, and adding to it the obligation of professing Christianity.

43. The practice of conferring baptism on infants was a disciplinary evolution, which was one reason for resolving the sacrament into two, baptism and penance.

44. There is no proof that the rite of the sacrament of confirmation was practiced by the apostles; but the formal distinction between the two sacraments, namely, baptism and confirmation, by no means goes back to the history of primitive Christianity.

45. Not all that Paul says about the institution of the Eucharist [ 1 Cor. 11:23-25] is to be taken historically.

46. There was no conception in the primitive Church of the Christian sinner reconciled by the authority of the Church, but the Church only very gradually became accustomed to such a conception. Indeed, even after penance was recognized as an institution of the Church, it was not called by the name, sacrament, for the reason that it would have been held as a shameful sacrament.

47. The words of the Lord: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins ye shall forgive they are forgiven them, and whose sins ye shall retain they are retained" [John 20:22, 23] , do not refer at all to the sacrament of penance, whatever the Fathers of Trent were pleased to say.

48. James in his Epistle [ Jas. 5:14 f.] does not intend to promulgate some sacrament of Christ, but to commend a certain pious custom, and if in this custom by chance he perceives some means of grace, he does not accept this with that strictness with which the theologians have accepted it, who have established the notion and the number of the sacraments.

49. As the Christian Supper gradually assumed the nature of a liturgical action, those who were accustomed to preside at the Supper acquired the sacerdotal character.

50. The elders who fulfilled the function of watching over gatherings of Christians were instituted by the apostles as presbyters or bishops to provide for the necessary arrangement of the increasing communities, not properly for perpetuating the apostolic mission and power.

51. Matrimony could not have emerged as a sacrament of the New Law in the Church, since in order that matrimony might be held to be a sacrament, it was necessary that a full theological development of the doctrine on grace and the sacraments take place first.

52. It was foreign to the mind of Christ to establish a Church as a society upon earth to endure for a long course of centuries; rather, in the mind of Christ the Kingdom of Heaven together with the end of the world was to come presently.

53. The organic constitution of the Church is not immutable; but Christian society, just as human society, is subject to perpetual evolution.

54. The dogmas, the sacraments, the hierarchy, as far as pertains both to the notion and to the reality, are nothing but interpretations and the evolution of the Christian intelligence, which have increased and perfected the little germ latent in the Gospel.

55. Simon Peter never even suspected that the primacy of the Church was entrusted to him by Christ.

56. The Roman Church became the head of all the churches not by the ordinances of divine Providence, but purely by political factors.

57. The Church shows herself to be hostile to the advances of the natural and theological sciences.

58. Truth is no more immutable than man himself, inasmuch as it is evolved with him, in him, and through him.

59. Christ did not teach a defined body of doctrine applicable to all times and to all men, but rather began a religious movement adapted, or to be adapted to different times and places.

60. Christian doctrine in its beginnings was-Judaic, but through successive evolutions it became first Pauline, then Johannine, and finally Hellenic and universal.

61. It can be said without paradox that no chapter of Scripture, from the first of Genesis to the last of the Apocalypse, contains doctrine entirely identical with that which the Church hands down on the same subject, and so no chapter of Scripture has the same sense for the critic as for the theologian.

62. The principal articles of the Apostles' Creed did not have the same meaning for the Christians of the earliest times as they have for the Christians of our time.

63. The Church shows herself unequal to the task of preserving the ethics of the Gospel, because she clings obstinately to immutable doctrines which cannot be reconciled with present day advances.

64. The progress of the sciences demands that the concepts of Christian doctrine about God, creation, revelation, the Person of the Incarnate Word, the redemption, be recast.

65. Present day Catholicism cannot be reconciled with true science, unless it be transformed into a kind of nondogmatic Christianity, that is, into a broad and liberal Protestantism.

Censure of the Holy Pontiff: "His Holiness has approved and confirmed the decree of the Most Eminent Fathers, and has ordered that all and every proposition enumerated above be held as condemned and proscribed" [See also n. 2114].

[From the Decree Ne temere of the Holy Council, August 2, 1907]

Betrothal.--I. Those betrothals alone are held valid and carry canonical effects, which have been contracted in writing signed by the parties, and either by the pastor or ordinary of the place, or at least by two witnesses.

Marriage.III. The above marriages are valid, which are contracted in the presence of the pastor or ordinary of the place, or a priest delegated by either of the two, and at least two witnesses. . . .

VII. If the danger of death is imminent, when the pastor or ordinary of the place, or a priest delegated by either of the two cannot be had, out of consideration for the conscience (of the betrothed) and (if occasion warrants) for legitimizing offspring, marriage can be validly and licitly contracted in the presence of any priest and two witnesses.

Vlll. If it happens that in some region the pastor or ordinary of the place or priest delegated by them, in the presence of whom marriage can be celebrated, cannot be had, and this condition of things has lasted now for a month, the marriage can be validly and licitly entered upon after a formal consent has been given by the betrothed in the presence of two witnesses.

Xl. Sec. I. All who have been baptized in the Catholic Church and have been converted to her from heresy or schism, even if one or the other has afterwards apostasized, as often as they enter upon mutual betrothal or marriage, are bound by the laws above established.

Sec. 2. They also hold for the same Catholics mentioned above, if they contract betrothal or marriage with non-Catholics, whether baptized or not baptized, even after having obtained dispensation from the impediment of mixed marriage, or of difference of worship, unless it has otherwise been established by the Holy See for some particular place or region.

Sec. 3. Non-Catholics, whether baptized or not baptized, if they make contracts between themselves, are nowhere bound to keep the Catholic form of betrothal or of marriage.

Let the present decree lawfully published and promulgated be kept by its transmission to the ordinaries of places; and let what has been disposed in it begin to have the force of law everywhere, from the solemn day of the Pasch of the Resurrection D.N.I.C. [April 19] of next year, 1908.

[From the Encyclical, "Pascendi dominici gregis," Sept. 8, 1907]

Since it is a very clever artifice on the part of the modernists (for they are rightly so-called in general) not to set forth their doctrines arranged in orderly fashion and collected together, but as if scattered, and separated from one another, so that they seem very vague and, as it were, rambling, although on the contrary they are strong and constant, it is well, Venerable Brothers, first to present these same doctrines here in one view, and to show the nexus by which they coalesce with one another, that we may then examine the causes of the errors and may prescribe the remedies to remove the calamity. . . . But, that we may proceed in orderly fashion in a rather abstruse subject, this must be noted first of all, that every modernist plays several roles, and, as it were, mingles in himself, (1) the philosopher of course, (11) the believer, (111) the theologian, (IV) the historian, (V) the critic, (Vl) the apologist, (VII) the reformer. All these roles he must distinguish one by one, who wishes to understand their system rightly, and to discern the antecedents and the consequences of their doctrines.

[I] Now, to begin with the philosopher, the modernists place the foundation of their religious philosophy in that doctrine which is commonly called agnosticism. Perforce, then, human reason is entirely restricted to phenomena, namely, things that appear, and that appearance by which they appear; it has neither the right nor the power to transgress the limits of the same. Therefore, it cannot raise itself to God nor recognize His existence, even through things that are seen. Hence, it is inferred that God can by no means be directly an object of science; yet, as far as pertains to history, that He is not to be considered an historical subject.--Moreover, granting all this, everyone will easily see what becomes of Natural Theology, of the motives of credibility, of external revelation. These, of course, the modernists completely spurn, and relegate to intellectualism, an absurd system, they say, and long since dead. Nor does the fact that the Church has very openly condemned such portentous errors restrain them, for the Vatican Synod so decreed: "If anyone, etc.," [see n. 1806 f., 1812].

But in what way do the Modernists pass from agnosticism, which consists only in nescience, to scientific and historic atheism, which on the other hand is entirely posited in denial; so, by what law of reasoning is the step taken from that state of ignorance as to whether or not God intervened in the history of the human race, to the explanation of the same history, leaving God out altogether, as if He had not really intervened, he who can well knows. Yet, this is fixed and established in their minds, that science as well as history should be atheistic, in whose limits there can be place only for phenomena, God and whatever is divine being utterly thrust aside.--As a result of this most absurd teaching we shall soon see clearly what is to be held regarding the most sacred person of Christ, the mysteries of His life and death, and likewise about His resurrection and ascension into heaven.

Yet this agnosticism is to be considered only as the negative part of the system of the modernists; the positive consists, as they say, in vital immanence. Naturally, they thus proceed from one to the other of these parts.--Religion, whether this be natural or supernatural, must, just as any fact, admit of some explanation. But the explanation, with natural theology destroyed and the approach to revelation barred by the rejection of the arguments of credibility, with even any external revelation utterly removed, is sought in vain outside man. It is, then, to be sought within man himself; and, since religion is a form of life, it is to be found entirely within the life of man. From this is asserted the principle of religious Immanence. Moreover, of every vital phenomenon, to which it has just been said religion belongs, the first actuation, as it were, is to be sought in a certain need or impulsion; but, if we speak more specifically of life, the beginnings are to be posited in a kind of motion of the heart, which is called a sense. Therefore, since God is the object of religion, it must be concluded absolutely that faith, which is the beginning and the foundation of any religion, must be located in some innermost sense, which has its beginning in a need for the divine. Moreover, this need for the divine, since it is felt only in certain special surroundings, cannot of itself pertain to the realm of consciousness, but it remains hidden at first beneath consciousness, or, as they say with a word borrowed from modern philosophy, in the subconsciousness, where, too, its root remains hidden and undetected.--Someone perhaps will ask in what way does this need of the divine, which man himself perceives within himself, finally evolve into religion? To this the modernists reply: "Science and history are included within a twofold boundary: one external, that is the visible world; the other internal, which is consciousness. When they have reached one or the other, they are unable to proceed further, for beyond these boundaries is the unknowable. In the presence of this unknowable, whether this be outside man and beyond the perceptible world of nature, or lies concealed within the subconsciousness, the need of the divine in a soul prone to religion, according to the tenets of fideism, with no judgment of the mind anticipating, excites a certain peculiar sense; but this sense has the divine reality itself, not only as its object but also as its intrinsic cause implicated within itself, and somehow unites man with God." This sense, moreover, is what the modernists call by the name of faith, and is for them the beginning of religion.

But this is not the end of their philosophizing, or more correctly of their raving. For in such a sense the modernists find not only faith, but together with faith and in faith itself, as they understand it, they affirm that there is place for revelation. For will anyone ask whether anything more is needed for revelation? Shall we not call that religious sense that appears in the conscience "revelation," or at least the beginning of revelation; why not God himself, although rather confusedly, manifesting Himself to souls in the same religious sense? But they add: Since God is alike both object and cause of faith, that revelation is equally of God and from God, that is, it has God as the Revealer as well as the Revealed. From this, moreover, Venerable Brothers, comes that absurd affirmation of the modernists, according to which any religion according to its various aspects is to be called natural and also supernatural. From this, consciousness and revelation have interchangeable meanings. From this is the law according to which religious consciousness is handed down as a universal rule, to be equated completely with revelation, to which all must submit, even the supreme power in the Church, whether this teaches or legislates on sacred matters or discipline.

Yet in all this process, from which according to the modernists, faith and revelation come forth, one thing is especially to be noted, indeed of no small moment because of the historico-critical sequences which they pry from it. For the unknowable, of which they speak, does not present itself to faith as something simple or alone, but on the contrary adhering closely to some phenomenon, which, although it pertains to the fields of science and history, yet in some way passes beyond stem, whether this phenomenon be a fact of nature containing some secret within itself, or be any man whose character, actions, and words do not seem possible of being reconciled with the ordinary laws of history. Then faith, attracted by the unknowable which is united with the phenomenon, embraces the whole phenomenon itself and in a manner permeates it with its own life. Now from this two things follow: first, a kind of transfiguration of the phenomenon by elation, that is, above its true conditions, by which its matter becomes more suitable to clothe itself with the form of the divine, which faith is to introduce; second, some sort of disfiguration, (we may call it such) of the same phenomenon, arising from the fact that faith attributes to it, when divested of all adjuncts of place and time, what in fact it does not possess; and this takes place especially when phenomena of times past are concerned, and the more fully as they are the older. From this twofold source the modernists again derive two canons, which, when added to another already borrowed from agnosticism, constitute the foundations of historical criticism. The subject will be illustrated by an example, and let us take that example from the person of Christ. In the person of Christ, they say, science and history encounter nothing except the human. Therefore, by virtue of the first canon deduced from agnosticism whatever is redolent of the divine must be deleted from His history. Furthermore, by virtue of the second canon the historical person of Christ was transfigured by faith; therefore, whatever raises it above historical conditions must be removed from it. Finally, by virtue of the third canon the same person of Christ is disfigured by faith; therefore, words and deeds must be removed from it, whatever, in a word, does not in the least correspond with His character, state, and education, and with the place and time in which He lived. A wonderful method of reasoning indeed! But this is the criticism of the modernists.

Therefore, the religious sense, which through vital immanence comes forth from the hiding places of the subconsciousness, is the germ of all religion, and the explanation likewise of everything which has been or is to be in any religion. Such a sense, crude in the beginning and almost unformed, gradually and under the influence of that mysterious principle, whence it had its origin, matured with the progress of human life, of which, as we have said, it is a kind of form. So, we have the origin of any religion, even if supernatural; they are, of course, mere developments of the religious sense. And let no one think that the Catholic religion is excepted; rather, it is entirely like the rest; for it was born in the consciousness of Christ, a man of the choicest nature, whose like no one has ever been or will be, by the process of vital immanence. . . . [adduced by can. 3 of the Vatican Council on revelation; see n. 1808].

Yet up to this point, Venerable Brethren, we have discovered no place given to the intellect. But it, too, according to the doctrine of the modernists, has its part in the act of faith. It is well to notice next in what way. In that sense, they say, which we have mentioned rather often, since it is sense, not knowledge, God presents himself to man, but so confusedly and disorderly that He is distinguished with difficulty, or not at all, by the subject believer. It is necessary, therefore, that this sense be illuminated by some light, so that God may completely stand out and be separated from it. Now, this pertains to the intellect, whose function it is to ponder and to institute analysis, by which man first brings to light the vital phenomena arising within him, and then makes them known by words. Hence the common expression of the modernists, that the religious man must think his faith.--The mind then, encountering this sense, reflects upon it and works on it, as a painter who brightens up the faded outline of a picture to bring it out more clearly, for essentially thus does one of the teachers of the modernists explain the matter. Moreover, in such a work the mind operates in a twofold way: first, by a natural and spontaneous act it presents the matter in a simple and popular judgment; but then after reflection and deeper consideration, or, as they say, by elaborating the thought, it speaks forth its thoughts in secondary judgmeets, derived, to be sure, from the simple first, but more precise and distinct. These secondary judgments, if they are finally sanctioned by the supreme magisterium of the Church, will constitute dogma.

Thus, then, in the doctrine of the modernists we have come to an outstanding chapter, namely, the origin of dogma and the inner nature of dogma. For they place the origin of dogma in those primitive simple formulae, which in a certain respect are necessary for faith; for revelation, to actually be such, requires a clear knowledge of God in consciousness. Yet the dogma itself, they seem to affirm, is properly contained in the secondary formulae.--Furthermore, to ascertain its nature we must inquire above all what revelation intervenes between the religious formulae and the religious sense of the soul. But this he will easily understand, who holds that such formulae have no other purpose than to supply the means by which he (the believer) may give himself an account of his faith. Therefore, they are midway between the believer and his faith; but as far as faith is concerned, they are inadequate signs of its object, usually called symbolae; in their relationship to the believer, they are mere instruments. --So by no means can it be maintained that they absolutely contain the truth; for, insofar as they are symbols, they are images of the truth, and so are to be accommodated to the religious sense, according as this refers to man; and as instruments they are the vehicles of truth, and so they are in turn to be adapted to man, insofar as there is reference to the religious sense. But the object of the religious sense, inasmuch as it is contained in the absolute, has infinite aspects of which now one, now another can appear. Likewise, the man who believes can make use of varying conditions. Accordingly, also, the formulae which we call dogma should be subject to the same vicissitudes, and so be liable to change. Thus, then, the way is open to the intrinsic evolution of dogma.--Surely an infinite piling up of sophisms, which ruin and destroy all religion.

Yet that dogma not only can but ought to be evolved and changed, even the modernists themselves in fragmentary fashion affirm, and this clearly follows from their principles. For among the chief points of doctrine they hold this, which they deduce from the principle of vital immanence, that religious formulae, to be really religious and not only intellectual speculations, should be alive, and should live the life of the religious sense. This is not to be understood thus, as if these formulae, especially if merely imaginative, were invented for the religious sense; for their origin is of no concern, nor is their number or quality, but as follows: that the religious sense, applying some modification, if necessary, should join them to itself vitally. Of course, in other words, it is necessary that the primitive formula be accepted by the heart and sanctioned by it; likewise that the labor by which the secondary formulae are brought forth be under the guidance of the heart. Hence it happens that these formulae, to be vital, should be and should remain adapted alike to the faith and to the believer. Therefore, if for any cause such an adaptation should cease, they lose the original notions and need to be changed.--Furthermore, since this power and the fortune of the dogmatic formulae are so unstable, it is no wonder that they are such an object of ridicule and contempt to modernists, who say nothing to the contrary and extol nothing but the religious sense and religious life. And so they most boldly attack the Church as moving on a path of error, because she does not in the least distinguish the religious and moral force from the superficial significance of the formulae, and by clinging with vain labor and most tenaciously to formulae devoid of meaning, permits religion itself to collapse.-- Surely, "blind and leaders of the blind" [Matt. 15:14] are they who, puffed up by the proud name of science, reach such a point in their raving that they pervert the eternal concept of truth, and the true sense of religion by introducing a new system, "in which from an exaggerated and unbridled desire for novelty, truth is not sought where it certainly exists, and neglecting the holy and apostolic traditions, other doctrines empty, futile, uncertain, and unapproved by the Church are adopted, on which men in their extreme vanity think that truth itself is based and maintained.''* So much, Venerable Brothers, for the modernist as a philosopher.

[11] Now if, on advancing to the believer, one wishes to know how he is distinguished from the philosopher among the modernists, this must be observed that, although the philosopher admits the reality of the divine as the object of faith, yet this reality is not found by him anywhere except in the heart of the believer, since it is the object of sense and of affirmation, and so does not exceed the confines of phenomena; furthermore, whether that reality exists in itself outside that sense and affirmation, the philosopher passes over and neglects. On the other hand for the modernist believer it is established and certain that the reality of the divine definitely exists in itself, and certainly does not depend on the believer. But if you ask on what then the assertion of the believer rests, they will reply: In the personal experience of every man.--In this affirmation, while they break with the rationalists, to be sure, yet they fall in with the opinion of Protestants and pseudomystics [cf. n. 1273]. For they explain the subject as follows: that in the religious sense a kind of intuition of the heart is to be recognized, by which man directly attains the reality of God, and draws from it such conviction of the existence of God and of the action of God both within and without man, that it surpasses by far all conviction that can be sought from science. They establish, then, a true experience and one superior to any rational experience. If anyone, such as the rationalists, deny this, they say that this arises from the fact that he is unwilling to establish himself in the moral state which is required to produce the experience. Furthermore,

this experience, when anyone has attained it, properly and truly makes a believer.--How far we are here from Catholic teachings. We have already seen [cf. n. 2072] such fabrications condemned by the Vatican Council. When these errors have once been admitted, together with others already mentioned, we shall express below how open the way is to atheism. It will be well to note at once that from this doctrine of experience joined with another of symbolism, any religion, not even excepting paganism, must be held as true. For why should not experiences of this kind not occur in any religion? In fact, more than one asserts that they have occurred. By what right will modernists deny the truth of an experience which an Islamite affirms, and claim true experiences for Catholics alone? In fact, modernists do not deny this; on the contrary some rather obscurely, others very openly contend that all religions are true. But it is manifest that they cannot think otherwise. For on what basis, then, should falsity have been attributed to any religion according to their precepts? Surely it would be either because of the falsity of the religious sense or because a false formula was set forth by the intellect. Now the religious sense is always one and the same, although sometimes it is more imperfect; but that the intellectual formula be true, it is enough that it respond to the religious sense and to the human believer, whatever may be the character of the perspicacity of the latter. In the conflict of different religions the modernists might be able to contend for one thing at most, that the Catholic religion, inasmuch as it is the more vivid, has more truth; and likewise that it is more worthy of the name of Christian, inasmuch as it corresponds more fully with the origins of Christianity.

There is something else besides in this part of their doctrine, which is absolutely inimical to Catholic truth. For the precept regarding experience is applied also to tradition, which the Church has hitherto asserted, and utterly destroys it. For the modernists understand tradition thus: that it is a kind of communication with others of an original experience, through preaching by means of the intellectual formula. To this formula, therefore, besides, as they say, representative force, they ascribe a kind of suggestive power, not only to excite in him who believes the religious sense, which perchance is becoming sluggish, and to restore the experience once acquired, but also to give birth in them who do not yet believe, to a religious sense for the first time, and to produce the experience. Thus, moreover, religious experience is spread widely among the people; and not only among those who are now in existence, but also among posterity, both by books and by oral transmission from one to another.--But this communication of experience sometimes takes root and flourishes; sometimes it grows old suddenly, and dies. Moreover, to flourish is to the modernists an argument for truth; for they hold truth and life to be the same. Therefore, we may infer again: that all religions, as many as exist, are true; for otherwise they would not be alive.

Now with our discussion brought to this point, Venerable Brethren, we have enough and more to consider accurately what relationship the modernists establish between faith and science; furthermore, history, also, is classed by them under this name of science.--And in the first place, indeed, it is to be held that the object-matter of the one is entirely extraneous to the object-matter of the other and separated from it. For faith looks only to that which science professes to be unknowable to itself. Hence to each is a different duty: science is concerned with phenomena where there is no place for faith; faith, on the other hand, is concerned with the divine, of which science is totally ignorant. Thus, finally, it is settled that there can never be dissension between faith and science; for if each holds its own place, they will never be able to meet each other, and so contradict each other. If any persons by chance object to this, on the ground that certain things occur in visible nature which pertain also to faith, as, for example, the human life of Christ, the modernists will deny it. For, although these things are classified with phenomena, yet, insofar as they are imbued with the life of faith, and in the manner already mentioned have been transfigured and disfigured by faith [cf. n. 2076], they have been snatched away from the sensible world and transferred into material for the divine. Therefore, to him who asks further whether Christ performed true miracles and really divined the future; whether He truly rose from the dead and ascended into heaven, agnostic science will give a denial, faith an affirma- tion; yet as a result of this there will be no conflict between the two. For one, addressing philosophers as a philosopher, namely, contemplating Christ only according to historical reality, will deny; the other, speaking as a believer with believers, viewing the life of Christ as it is lived again by the faith and in the faith, will affirm.

A great mistake, however, is made as a result of this by anyone who thinks that he can believe that faith and science are subject to each other in no way at all. For, as regards science he does indeed think rightly and truly; but it is otherwise with faith, which must be said to be subject to science not only on one, but on three grounds. For, first, we must observe that in any religious fact, after the divine reality has been taken away, and whatever experience he who believes has of it, all other things, especially religious formulae, do not pass beyond the confines of phenomena, and so fall under science. By all means let it be permitted the believer, if he wills, to go out of the world, yet as long as he remains in it, whether he likes it or not, he will never escape the laws, the observations, the judgments of science and history.--Furthermore, although it is said that God is the object of faith alone, this is to be granted with regard to the divine reality, but not with regard to the idea of God. For this is subject to science, which, while it philosophizes in the logical order, as they say, attains also what is absolute and ideal. Therefore, philosophy or science has the right to learn about the idea of God, and to direct it in its evolution, and, if anything extraneous enters it, to correct it. Hence the axiom of the modernists: Religious evolution should be reconciled with the moral and the intellectual, that is, as one teaches whom they follow as a master, it should be subject to them.--Finally it happens that God does not suffer duality within Himself, and so the believer is urged on by an innermost force so to harmonize faith with science that it never disagrees with the general idea which science sets forth about the entire universe. Thus, then, is it effected that science is entirely freed from faith, that faith on the other hand, however much it is proclaimed to be extraneous to science, is subject to it.--All this, Venerable Brethren, is contrary to what Pius IX, Our predecessor, handed down teaching: "It is the duty of philosophy, in those matters which pertain to religion, not to dominate but to serve, not to prescribe what is to be believed, but to embrace what is to be believed with reasonable obedience, and not to examine the depths of the mysteries of God, but to revere them piously and humbly.* The modernists completely invert the matter; so what Our predecessor, Gregory IX, similarly wrote about certain theologians of his age can be applied to these: "Some among you, distended like bladders by the spirit of vanity, strive by novelty to cross the boundaries fixed by the Fathers; twisting the meaning of the sacred text . . . to the philosophical teaching of the rationalists, to make a show of science, not for any benefit to their hearers. . . . These men, lead astray by various strange doctrines, reduce the head to the tail, and force the queen to serve the handmaid.''*

This, surely, will be quite clear to one who observes how the modernists act quite in conformity with what they teach. For much seems to have been written and spoken by them in contrary fashion so that one might easily think them doubtful and uncertain. But this takes place deliberately and advisedly, namely, in accord with the opinion which they hold on the mutual exclusion of faith and science. Thus in their books we find certain things which a Catholic entirely approves, yet on turning the page certain things which one could think were dictated by a rationalist. So, when writing history they make no mention of the divinity of Christ, but when preaching in the churches they profess it most strongly. Likewise, when discussing history they have no place for the Councils and the Fathers, but when teaching catechism, they refer to the former and the latter with respect. Thus, too, they separate theological and pastoral exegesis from the scientific and the historical. Similarly, on the principle that science in- no wise depends on faith, when they are treating of philosophy, history, and criticism, with no special horror about following in the tracks of Luther [cf. n. 769], they display in every way a contempt for Catholic precepts, the Holy Fathers, the Ecumenical Synods, and the ecclesiastical magisterium; and if they are criticized for this, they complain that they are being deprived of their freedom. Finally, professing that faith must be made subject to science, they rebuke the Church generally and openly, because she refuses most resolutely to subject and accommodate her teachings to the opinions of philosophy; but they, repudiating the old theology for this purpose, endeavor to bring in the new, which follows the ravings of the philosophers.

[III] Here now, Venerable Brethren, we approach the study of the modernists in the theological arena, a rough task indeed, but to be disposed of briefly. It is a question, indeed, of conciliating faith with science, and this in no other way than by subjecting one to the other. In this field the modernist theologian makes use of the same principles that we saw employed by the philosopher, and he adapts them to the believer; we mean the principles of immanence and symbolism. Thus, moreover, he accomplishes the task most easily. It is held as certain by the philosopher that the principle of faith is immanent; it is added by the believer that this principle is God; and he himself (the theologian) concludes: God, then, is immanent in man. From this comes theological immanence. Again, to the philosopher it is certain that the representations of the object of faith are only symbolical; to the believer, likewise, it is certain that the object of faith is God in Himself; so the theologian gathers that the representations of the divine reality are symbolical. From this comes theological symbolism.--Surely the greatest errors, and how pernicious each is will be clear from an examination of the consequences.--For to speak at once about symbolism, since such symbols are symbols with regard to their object, but with regard to the believer are instruments, the believer must first of all be on his guard, they say, lest he cling too much to the formula, as formula, but he must make use of it only that he may fasten upon the absolute truth, which the formula at the same time uncovers and covers, and struggles to express without ever attaining it. Besides, they add, such formulae are to be applied by the believer insofar as they help him; for they are given as a help, not as a hindrance, with full esteem indeed, which out of social respect is due the formulae which the public magisterium has judged suitable for expressing the common consciousness, as long, of course, as the same magisterium shall not declare otherwise. But regarding immanence what the modernists mean really, is difficult to show, for they do not all have the same opinion. There are some who hold on this subject, that God working in man is more intimately present in him than man is even in himself; which, if rightly understood, bears no reproach. Others on this matter lay down that the action of God is one with the action of nature, as the action of the first cause is one with that of the second cause, which really destroys the supernatural order. Finally, others so explain it in a way that causes a suspicion of a pantheistic meaning; yet this fittingly coincides with the rest of their doctrines.

Now to this axiom of immanence is added another which we can call divine permanence; these two differ from each other in about the same way as private experience does from experience transmitted by tradition. An example will illustrate the point, and let us take it from the Church and the sacraments. The Church, they say, and the sacraments are by no means to be believed as having been instituted by Christ Himself. Agnosticism stipulates this, which recognizes nothing but the human in Christ, whose religious conscience, like that of the rest of men, was formed gradually; the law of immanence stipulates this, which rejects external applications, to use their terms; likewise the law of evolution stipulates this, which demands time and a certain series of circumstances joined with it, that the germs may be evolved; finally, history stipulates this, which shows that such in fact has been the course of the thing. Yet it is to be held that the Church and the sacraments have been mediately established by the Christ. But how? All Christian consciences, they affirm, were in a way virtually included in the conscience of Christ, as the plant in the seed. Moreover, since the germs live the life of the seed, all Christians are to be said to live the life of Christ. But the life of Christ according to faith is divine; thus, also, is the life of Christians. If, then, this life in the course of the ages gave origin to the Church and the sacraments, quite rightly will such an origin be said to be from Christ, and be divine. Thus they effect completely that the Sacred Scriptures also are divine, and that dogmas are divine.--With this, then, the theology of the modernists is essentially completed. Surely a brief provision, but very abundant for him who professes that science must always be obeyed, whatever it orders. Everyone will easily see for himself the application of these principles to the other matters which we shall mention.

Up to this point we have touched upon the origin of faith and its nature. But since faith has many outgrowths, chiefly the Church, dogma, worship, and devotions, the Books which we call "sacred," we should inquire what the modernists teach about these also. To take dogma as a beginning, it has already been shown above what its origin and nature are [n. 2079 f.]. It arises from a kind of impulse or necessity, by virtue of which he who believes elaborates his own thoughts so that his own conscience and that of others may be the more clarified. This labor consists entirely in investigating and in refining the primitive formula of the mind, not indeed in itself, according to the logical explanation, but according to circumstances, or vitally, as they say, in a manner less easily understood. Hence it happens that around that formula certain secondary formulae, as We have already indicated, gradually come into being [cf. n. 2078]; these afterwards brought together into one body, or into one edifice of faith, as responding to the common consciousness, are called dogma. From this the dissertations of the theologians are to be well distinguished, which, although they do not live the life of dogma, are not at all useless, not only for harmonizing religion with science and for removing disagreements between them, but also for illumining and protecting religion from without, even perchance as a means for preparing material for some new future dogma.--It would by no means have been necessary to discuss worship at length, did not the sacraments also come under this term, on which the errors of the modernists are most serious. They say that worship arises from a twofold impulse or necessity; for, as we have seen, all things in their system are said to come into existence by innermost impulses or necessities. The first need is to attribute something sensible to religion; the second is to express it, which surely cannot be done without a sensible form, or consecrating acts which we call sacraments. But for the modernists sacraments are mere symbols or signs, although not lacking efficacy. To point out this efficacy, they make use of the example of certain words which are popularly said to have caught on, since they have conceived the power of propagating certain ideas which are vigorous and especially shake the mind. Just as these words are ordered in relation to ideas, so are the sacraments to the religious sense, nothing more. Surely they would speak more clearly if they affirm that the sacraments were instituted solely to nourish faith. But this the Synod of Trent has condemned: "If any one says that these sacraments were instituted solely to nourish the faith, let him be anathema" [n. 848].

We have already touched somewhat on the nature and origin of the Sacred Books. According to the principles of the modernists one could well describe them as a collection of experiences, not such as come in general to everyone, but extraordinary and distinguished, which have been had in every religion.--Precisely thus do the modernists teach about our books of both the Old and the New Testament. Yet, in accord with their own opinions they note very shrewdly that, although experience belongs to the present, yet one can assume it equally of the past and of the future, inasmuch as naturally he who believes either, lives the past by recollection in the manner of the present, or the future by anticipation. Moreover, this explains how the historical and apocalyptic books can be classified among the Sacred Books. Thus, then, in these Books God certainly speaks through the believer, but as the theology of the modernists puts it, only by immanence and vital permanence.--We shall ask, what then about inspiration? This, they reply, is by no means distinguished from that impulse, unless perhaps in vehemence, by which the believer is stimulated to reveal his faith by word or writing. What we have in poetic inspiration is similar; wherefore a certain one said: "God is in us, when he stirs we are inflamed." * In this way God should be called the beginning of the inspiration of the Sacred Books.--Furthermore, regarding this inspiration, the modernists add that there is nothing at all in the Sacred Books that lacks such inspiration. When they affirm this one would be inclined to believe them more orthodox than some in more recent times who restrict inspiration somewhat as, for example, when they introduce so-called tacit citations. But this is mere words and pretense on their part. For, if we judge the Bible according to the precepts of agnosticism, namely, as a human work written by men for men, although the theologian is granted the right of calling it divine by immanence, just how can inspiration be forced into it? Now, the modernist assuredly asserts a general inspiration of the Sacred Books, but admits no inspiration in the Catholic sense.

What the school of modernists imagines about the Church offers a richer field for discussion.--They lay down in the beginning that the Church arose from a twofold necessity: one in any believer, especially in him who has found an original and special experience, to communicate his faith to others; the other, after faith has communicated among many, in collectivity to coalesce into a society and to watch over, increase, and propagate the common good. What, then, is the Church? It is the fruit of the collective conscience, or of the association of individual consciences which, by virtue of vital permanence, depends on some first believer, that is, for Catholics, on Christ. Moreover, any society needs a directing authority, whose duty it is to direct all associates toward the common end, to foster prudently the elements of cohesion, which in a religious society are fulfilled by doctrine and worship. Hence, the triple authority in the Catholic Church: disciplinary, dogmatic, liturgical.--Now the nature of the authority is to be gathered from its origin; from its nature, indeed, its rights and duties are to be sought. In past ages a common error was that authority came to the Church from without, namely, immediately from God; therefore it was rightly held to be autocratic. But this conception has now grown obsolete. Just as the Church is said to have emanated from the collectivity of consciences, so in like manner authority emanates vitally from the Church itself. Authority, then, just as the Church, originates from religious conscience, and so is subject to the same; and if it spurns this subordination, it veers towards tyranny. Moreover, we are now living at a time when the sense of liberty has grown to its highest point. In the civil state public conscience has introduced popular government. But conscience in man, just as life, is only one. Unless, then, ecclesiastical authority wishes to excite and foment an intestine war in the conscience of men, it has an obligation to use democratic forms (of procedure), the more for this reason, because unless it does so, destruction threatens. For, surely, he is mad who thinks that with the sense of liberty as it now flourishes any recession can ever take place. If it were restricted and checked by force, it would break forth the stronger, with the destruction alike of the Church and religion. All this do the modernists think, who as a result are quite occupied with devising ways to reconcile the authority of the Church with the liberty of believers.

But the Church has not only within the walls of its own household those with whom she should exist on friendly terms, but she has them outside. For the Church does not occupy the world all by herself; other societies occupy it equally, with which communications and contacts necessarily take place. These rights, then, which are the duties of the Church in relation to civil societies, must be determined, and must not be determined otherwise than according to the nature of the Church herself, as the modernists have indeed described to us.--In this, moreover, they clearly use the same rules as were introduced above for science and faith. There discussion centered on objects, here on ends. So, just as by reason of the object we see faith and science extraneous to each other, so the state and Church are extraneous to each other because of the ends which they pursue; the former pursuing a temporal, the latter a spiritual end. Of course it was once permitted to subordinate the temporal to the spiritual; it was permitted to interject discussion on mixed questions, in which the Church was held as mistress and queen, since the Church, of course, was declared to have been instituted by God without intermediary, inasmuch as He is the author of the supernatural order. But all this is repudiated by philosophers and historians. The state, then, must be disassociated from the Church, just as even the Catholic from the citizen. Therefore, any Catholic, since he is also a citizen, has the right and the duty, disregarding the authority of the Church, pushing aside her wishes, counsels, and precepts, yes, spurning her rebukes, of pursuing what he thinks is conducive to the good of the state. To prescribe a way of action for a citizen on any pretext is an abuse of ecclesiastical power, to be rejected by every means.--Of course, Venerable Brothers, the source from which all this flows is indeed the very source which Pius Vl, Our predecessor, solemnly condemned [cf. n. 1502 f.] in the Apostolic Constitution, Auctorem fidei.

But it is not enough for the school of modernists that the state should be separated from the Church. For, just as faith, as far as phenomenal elements are concerned, as they say, should be subordinated to science, so in temporal affairs should the Church be subject to the state. This, indeed, they do not by chance say openly, but by reason of their thinking are forced to admit. For laying down the principle that the state alone has power in temporal matters, if it happens that the believer, not content with internal acts of religion, proceeds to external acts, as for example, the administration or reception of the sacraments, these will necessarily fall under the dominion of the state. What, then, about the authority of the Church? Since this is not explained except through external acts, it will be entirely responsible to the state. Obviously forced by this conclusion, many of the liberal Protestants entirely reject all external sacred worship, rather, even any external religious association, and strive to introduce individual religion, as they say. But if the modernists do not yet proceed openly to this point, they ask meanwhile that the Church of her own accord tend in the direction in which they themselves impel her, and that she adapt herself to the forms of the state. Now these are their ideas on disciplinary authority.--On the other hand, by far more evil and pernicious are their opinions on doctrinal and dogmatic power. On the magisterium of the Church they comment, for example, as follows: A religious society can never truly coalesce into one unless the conscience of the associates be one, and the formula which they use one. But this twofold unity demands a kind of common mind whose duty it is to find and determine the formula which corresponds best with the common conscience; and this mind must have sufficient authority to impose on the community the formula which it has determined upon Moreover, in this union and fusion, as it were, both of the mind which draws up the formula, and of the power which prescribes it, the modernists place the notion of the magisterium of the Church. Since, then, the magisterium finally arises at some time from the individual consciences and has as a mandate the public duty to the benefit of the same consciences, it necessarily follows that the magisterium depends on these, and so must bend to popular forms. Therefore, to prohibit the consciences of individuals from expressing publicly and openly the impulses which they feel; to obstruct the way of criticism whereby it impels dogma in the path of necessary evolutions, is not the use but the abuse of the power permitted for the public weal. Similarly, in the very use of power, measure and moderation are to be applied. To censure and proscribe any book without the knowledge of the author, without permitting any explanation, without discussion, is surely very close to tyranny.--Thus, here also a middle course must be found to preserve the rights at once of authority and liberty. Meanwhile the Catholic must so conduct himself as to proclaim publicly his strict respect for authority, yet not to fail to obey his own mind.--In general they prescribe as follows for the Church: that, since the end of ecclesiastical power pertains only to the spiritual, all external trappings must be abolished, by which it is adorned most magnificently for the eyes of the onlookers. In this the following is completely overlooked, that religion, although it pertains to souls, is not confined to souls exclusively, and that the honor paid to authority redounds to Christ as its founder.

Moreover, to complete this whole subject of faith and its various branches, it remains for us, Venerable Brethren, to consider finally the precepts of the modernists on the development of both.--Here is a general principle: in a religion which is living nothing is without change, and so there must be change. From here they make a step to what is essentially the chief point in their doctrines, namely, evolution. Dogma, then, Church, worship, the Books that we revere as sacred, even faith itself, unless we wish all these to be powerless, must be bound by the laws of evolution. This cannot appear surprising to you, if you bear in mind what the modernists have taught on each of these subjects. So, granted the law of evolution, we have the way of evolution described by the modernists themselves. And first, as regards faith. The primitive form of faith, they say, was crude and common to all men, since it had its origin in human nature and human life. Vital evolution contributed progress; to be sure, not by the novelty of forms added to it from the outside, but by the daily increasing pervasion of the religious sense into the conscience. Moreover, this progress was made in two ways: first, in a negative way, by eliminating anything extraneous, as for example, that might come from family or nation; second, in a positive way, by the intellectual and moral refinement of man, whereby the notion of the divine becomes fuller and clearer, and the religious sense more accurate. The same causes for the progress of faith are to be brought forward as were employed to explain its origins. But to these must be added certain extraordinary men (whom we call prophets, and of whom Christ is the most outstanding), not only because they bore before themselves in their lives and works something mysterious which faith attributed to the divinity, but also because they met with new experiences never had before, corresponding to the religious needs of the time of each.--But the progress of dogma arises chiefly from this, that impediments to faith have to be overcome, enemies have to be conquered, objections have to be refuted. Add to this a perpetual struggle to penetrate more deeply the things that are contained in the mysteries of faith. Thus, to pass over other examples, it happened in the case of Christ: in Him that divine something or other, which faith admitted, was slowly and gradually expanded, so that finally He was held to be God.--The necessity of accommodating itself to the customs and traditions of the people especially contributed to the evolution of worship; likewise, the necessity of employing the power of certain acts, which they have acquired by usage.-- Finally, the cause of evolution as regards the Church arose in this, that she needs to be adjusted to contemporary historical conditions, and to the forms of civil government publicly in vogue. This do they think regarding each. But before we proceed we wish that this doctrine of necessities or needs be well noted; for beyond all that we have seen, this is, as it were, the basis and foundation of that famous method which they call historical.

To linger still on the doctrine of evolution, this is to be noted especially, that, although needs or necessities impel to evolution, yet if driven by this alone, easily trangressing the boundaries of tradition and thus separating itself from the primitive vital principle, it would lead to ruin rather than to progress. Thus, following the mind of the modernists more completely, we shall say that evolution comes out of the conflict of two forces, one of which leads to progress, the other holds back to conservation. The conserving force flourishes in the Church and is contained in tradition. Indeed, religious authority makes use of it; and this it does both by right itself, for it is in the nature of authority to guard tradition, and in fact, for authority remote from the changes of life is pressed on not at all, or very little by the incentives that drive to progress. On the contrary the force which attracts to progress and responds to the inner needs, lies hidden, and works in the consciences of individuals, especially of those who attain life, as they say, more closely and intimately.--Behold here, Venerable Brethren, we perceive that most pernicious doctrine raise its head, which introduces into the Church the members of the laity as elements of progress.--By a kind of covenant and pact between these two forces, the conserver and the promoter of progress, namely, between authority and the consciences of individuals, advances and changes take place. For the consciences of individuals, or certain of them, act on the collective conscience; but this last acts upon those who have authority, and forces them to effect agreements and to abide by the pact.--As a result of this, moreover, it is easy to understand why the modernists marvel so, when they realize that they are caught or are punished. What is held up to them as a fault, they themselves hold as a religious duty to be fulfilled. No one knows the needs of consciences better than they themselves, because they come in closer touch with them than does ecclesiastical authority. Therefore, they gather all these needs, as it were, within themselves; and so they are bound by the duty of speaking and writing publicly. Let authority rebuke them, if it wishes; they themselves are supported by the conscience of duty, and they know by intimate experience that they deserve not criticism but praise. Surely it does not escape them that progress is by no means made without struggles, nor struggles without victims; so let they themselves be victims, just as the prophets and Christ. Because they are held in evil repute, they do not look askance at authority on this account; they even concede that it is carrying out its duty. They complain only that they are not heard; for thus the course of souls is impeded; yet the time to put an end to delays will most certainly come, for the laws of evolution can be halted, but they can by no means be broken. Therefore, they continue on their established road; they continue, although refuted and condemned, concealing their incredible audacity with a veil of feigned humility. Indeed, they bow their heads in pretense, yet with their hands and minds they boldly follow through what they have undertaken. Moreover, thus they act quite willingly and wittingly, both because they hold that authority must be stimulated and not overturned, and because it is a necessity for them to remain within the fold of the Church, that they may gradually change the collective conscience. Yet when they say this, they do not remark that they confess that the collective conscience is apart from them, and thus without right they commend themselves as its interpreters. . . . [Then is adduced and explained what is contained in this Enchiridion n. 1636 1705, 1800].--But after we have observed the philosopher, believer, and theologian among the followers of modernism, it now remains for us to observe the historian, critic, apologist, and reformer in like manner.

[IV] Certain of the modernists who have given themselves over to composing history, seem especially solicitous lest they be believed to be philosophers; why, they even profess to be entirely without experience of philosophy. This they do with consummate astuteness, lest, for example, anyone think that they are imbued with the prejudiced opinions of philosophy, and for this reason, as they say, are not at all objective. the truth is that their history or criticism bespeaks pure philosophy; and whatever conclusions are arrived at by them, are derived by right reasoning from their philosophic principles. This is indeed easily apparent to one who reflects.--The first three canons of such historians and critics, as we have said, are those same principles which we adduced from the philosophers above: namely, agnosticism, the theorem of the transfigura- tion of things by faith, and likewise another which it seemed could be called disfiguration. Let us now note the consequences that come from them individually.--According to agnosticism, history, just as science, is concerned only with phenomena. Therefore, just as God, so any divine intervention in human affairs must be relegated to faith, as belonging to it alone. Thus, if anything occurs consisting of a double element, divine and human, such as are Christ, the Church, the sacraments, and many others of this kind, there will have to be a division and separation, so that what was human may be assigned to history, and what divine to faith. Thus, the distinction common among the modernists between the Christ of history and the Christ of faith, the Church of history and the Church of faith, the sacraments of history and the sacraments of faith, and other similar distinctions in general.--Then this human element itself, which we see the historian assume for himself, must be mentioned, such as appears in documents, raised above historical conditions by faith through transfiguration. so, the additions made by faith must in turn be dissociated, and relegated to faith itself, and to the history of faith; so when Christ is being discussed, whatever surpasses the natural condition of man, as is shown by psychology, or has been raised out of the place and the time in which He lived, must be dissociated.--Besides, in accord with the third principle of philosophy those things also which do not pass beyond the field of history, they view through a sieve, as it were, and eliminate all and relegate likewise to faith, which in their judgment, as they say, are not in the logic of facts or suited to the characters. Thus they do not will that Christ said those things which appear to exceed the capacity of the listening multitude. Hence from His real history they delete and transfer to faith all his allegories that occur in His discourses. Perhaps we shall ask by what law these matters are dissociated? From the character of the man, from the condition which He enjoyed in the state; from His education, from the complexus of the incidents of any fact, in a word, if we understand well, from a norm which finally at some time recedes into the merely subjective. They aim, of course, themselves to take on the character of Christ and, as it were, to make it their own; whatever, in like circumstances they would have done, all this they transfer to Christ.--Thus then to conclude, a priori and according to certain principles of philosophy which they in truth hold but profess to ignore, they affirm that Christ, in what they call real history, is not God and never did anything divine; indeed, that He did and said as a man what they themselves attribute to Him the right of doing and saying, taking themselves back to His times.

[V] Moreover, as history receives its conclusions from philosophy, so criticism takes its conclusions from history. For the critic, following the indications furnished by the historian, divides documents in two ways. Whatever is left after the threefold elimination just mentioned he assigns to real history; the rest he delegates to the history of faith or internal history. For they distinguish sharply between these two histories; the history of faith (and this we wish to be well noted) they oppose to the real history, as it is real. Thus, as we have already said, the two Christs: one real, the other, who never was in fact, but pertains to faith; one who lived in a certain place and in a certain age; another, who is found only in the pious commentaries of faith; such, for example, is the Christ whom the Gospel of John presents, which, according to them is nothing more or less than a meditation.

But the domination of philosophy over history is not ended with this. After the documents have been distributed in a twofold manner, the philosopher is again on hand with his dogma of vital immanence; and he declares that all things in the history of the Church are to be explained by vital emanation. But either the cause or the condition of vital emanation is to be placed in some need or want; therefore, too, the fact must be conceived after the need, and the one is historically posterior to the other. --Why then the historian? Having scrutinized the documents again, either those that are contained in the Sacred Books or have been introduced from elsewhere, he draws up from them an index of the particular needs which relate not only to dogma but to liturgy, and other matters which have had a place one after the other in the Church. He hands over the index so made to the critic. Now he (the critic) takes in hand the documents which are devoted to the history of faith, and he so arranges them age by age that they correspond one by one with the index submitted, always mindful of the precept that the fact is preceded by the need, and the need by the fact. Surely, it may at times happen that some parts of the Bible, as for example the epistles, are the fact itself created by the need. Yet whatever it is, the law is that the age of any document is not to be determined otherwise than by the age of any need that has arisen in the Church.--Besides, a distinction must be made between the origin of any fact and the development of the same, for what can be born on one day, takes on growth only with the passage of time. For this reason the critic must, as we have said, again divide the documents already distributed through the ages, separating the ones which have to do with the origin of the thing, and those which pertain to its development, and he must in turn arrange them by periods.

Then again there is place for the philosopher, who enjoins upon the historian so to exercise his zeal as the precepts and laws of evolution prescribe. Thereupon the historian examines the documents again; examines carefully the circumstances and conditions which the Church has experienced for period after period: her conserving power, the needs both internal and external which have stimulated her to progress, the obstacles which have been in her way, in a word, everything whatsoever which helps to determine how the laws of evolution have been kept. Finally, after this he describes the history of the development in broad outlines, as it were. The critic comes in and adapts the rest of the documents. He applies his hand to writing. The history is finished.--Now we ask, to whom is this history to be ascribed? To the historian or to the critic? Surely to neither; but to the philosopher. The whole business is carried on through apriorism; and indeed by an apriorism reeking with heresy. Surely such men are to be pitied, of whom the Apostle would have said: "They become vain in their thoughts . . . professing themselves to be wise they became fools" [Rom. 1:21-22]; but yet they move us to anger, when they accuse the Church of so confusing and changing documents that they may testify to her advantage. Surely they charge the Church with that for which they feel that they themselves are openly condemned by their own conscience.

Furthermore, as a result of this division and arrangement of the documents by ages it naturally follows that the Sacred Books cannot be attributed to those authors to whom in fact they are ascribed. For this reason the modernists generally do not hesitate to assert that those same books, especially the Pentateuch and the first three Gospels, from the brief original account grew gradually by additions, by interpolations, indeed, in the manner of either theological or allegorical interpretations; or even by the interjection of parts solely to join different passages together.--To state it briefly and more clearly, there must certainly be admitted the vital evolution of the Sacred Books, born of the evolution of faith and corresponding to the same.--Indeed, they add that the traces of this evolution are so manifest that its history can almost be described. Nay, rather, they do in fact describe it with no hesitation, so that you would believe that they saw the very writers with their own eyes as they applied their hand in every age to amplifying the Sacred Books. Moreover, to support these actions they call to their aid a criticism which they call textual; and they strive to convince us that this or that fact or expression is not in its own place, and they bring forward other such arguments.--You would indeed say that they had prescribed for themselves certain types, as it were, of narrations and discourses, as a result of which they decide with certainty what stands in its own place or in a strange place.--Let him who wishes judge how skilled they can be to make decisions in this way. Moreover, he who gives heed to them as they talk about their studies on the Sacred Books, as a result of which it was granted them to discover so many things improperly stated, would almost believe that no man before them had turned the pages of these same books; and that an almost infinite number of doctors had not examined them from every point of view, a group clearly far superior to them in mind, and erudition, and sanctity of life. These very wise doctors indeed, far from finding fault with the Sacred Scriptures in any part, rather, the more thoroughly they investigated them, the more they gave thanks to divine authority for having deigned so to speak with men. But alas, our doctors with respect to the Sacred Books did not rely upon those aids on which the modernists did; thus they did not have philosophy as a master and guide, nor did they choose themselves as their own authority in making decisions. Now, then, we think that it is clear of what sort the method of the modernists is in the field of history. The philosopher goes ahead; the historian succeeds him; right behind, in order, works criticism, both internal and textual. And since it is characteristic of the first cause to communicate its power to its consequences, it becomes evident that such criticism is not criticism at all; that it is rightly called agnostic, immanentist, and evolutionist; and that so, he who professes it and uses it, professes the errors implicit in the same and opposes Catholic doctrine.--For this reason it can seem most strange that criticism of this kind has such weight today among Catholics. This obviously has a twofold cause: first of all the pact by which the historians and the critics of this kind are so closely joined, the differences of nationality and the dissension of religions being placed in the background; then the endless effrontery by which all with one voice extol whatever each of them prattles, and attribute it to the progress of science; by which in close array they attack him who wishes to examine the new marvel or his own; by which they accuse him who denies it of ignorance, adorn him with praises who embraces and defends it. Thus no small number are deceived who, if they should examine the matter more closely, would be horrified.--From this powerful domineering on the part of those in error, and this heedless compliance on the part of fickle souls, a corruption in the surrounding atmosphere results which penetrates everywhere and diffuses its pestilence.

[VI] But let us pass on to the apologist. He, too, among the modernists depends in a twofold manner upon the philosopher. First, indirectly, taking history as his subject matter, written at the dictation of the philosopher, as we have seen; then directly, having obtained his doctrines and judgments from him. Hence that precept widespread in the school of the modernists that the new apologetics should resolve controversies over religion by historical and psychological investigations. Therefore, the modernist apologist approaches his task by advising the rationalists that they defend religion not by means of the Sacred Books, nor by history as widely employed in the Church which is written in the old way, but by real history composed of modern principles and the modern method. And this they assert not as if using an argumentum ad hominem, but because in very fact they think that only such history hands down the truth. They are indeed unconcerned about asserting their sincerity in what they write; they are already known among the nationalists; they are already praised for doing service under the same banner; and on this praise, which a real Catholic would reject, they congratulate themselves, and, hold it up against the reprimands of the Church.--But now let us see how one of them proceeds in his apologies. The end which he places before himself for accomplishment, is this: to win a person thus far inexperienced in the faith over to it, that he may attain this experience of the Catholic religion, which according to the modernists is the only basis of faith. A twofold way is open to this: one objective, the other subjective. The first proceeds from agnosticism, and it strives to show that that vital virtue is in religion, especially the Catholic religion, which persuades every psychologist and likewise historian of good mind that in its history something of the unknown must be concealed. To this end it is necessary to show that the Catholic religion, as it exists today, is exactly that which Christ founded, or that it is nothing other than the progressive development of that germ which Christ introduced. First, then, it must be determined of what nature the germ is. This, furthermore, they wish to prove by the following formula: The Christ announced the coming of the kingdom of God, which was to be established shortly; and that He Himself would be its Messias, that is, the divinely given founder and ordainer. Then it must be shown in what way this germ, always immanent and permanent in the Catholic religion, has evolved gradually, and according to history, and has adapted itself to succeeding circumstances, taking to itself from these vitally whatever of the doctrinal, cultural, and ecclesiastical forms was useful to it, but meanwhile overcoming such obstacles as met it, scattering its enemies, and surviving all attacks and combats. Yet after it has been shown that all these, namely, obstacles, enemies, attacks, combats, and likewise the vitality and fecundity of Church have been of such nature that, although the laws of evolution appear unimpaired in the history of the Church, yet they are not alike to be fully developed by the same history; the unknown will stand before it, and will present itself of its own accord.--Thus do they argue. In all this reasoning, however, they fail to notice one thing, that that determination of the primitive germ is due solely to the apriorism of the agnostic and evolutionist philosopher, and the germ itself is so gratuitously defined by them as to fit in with their case.

Yet while by reciting arguments the new apologists struggle to proclaim and bring conviction to the Catholic religion, of their own accord they grant and concede that there is much in it which offends. With a kind of ill-concealed pleasure they even declare repeatedly and openly that they find errors and contradictions also in the field of dogma; yet they add that these not only admit of an excuse, but, which should be an object of wonder, that these have been produced rightly and lawfully. Thus, even according to themselves much in the Sacred Books within the field of science and history is affected by error. But they say that here it is not a question of science or history, but only of religion and morals. There science and history are a kind of covering with which the religious and moral experiences are bound, so that they may be more easily spread among the masses; since, indeed, the masses would not understand this otherwise, a more perfect kind of science and history would not have been a help but a harm to them. But, they add, the Sacred Books, because they are religious by nature, necessarily possess life; now, life also has its own truth and logic, quite different from rational truth and rational logic, rather of an entirely different order, namely, the truth of comparison and proportion not only with reference to the medium (so they themselves call it) in which it is lived, but also with reference to the end for which it is lived. Finally, they proceed to such a point that, abandoning all restraint, they assert that whatever is evolved through life, is entirely true and legitimate.--Now We, Venerable Brethren, for whom there is one, unique truth, and who regard the Sacred Books thus, "that written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit they have God as their author" [see n. 1787], declare that this is the same as giving the lie of utility, or the officious lie to God Himself, and We assert in the words of St. Augustine: "Once some officious lie is admitted against so high an authority, there will remain not a clause in those books which, according as it will appear to anyone difficult to practice or incredible of belief, is not referred according to this same pernicious rule to the plan and purpose of a lying author." * Therefore it will happen, as the same Holy Doctor adds: "In these, namely the Scriptures, everyone will believe what he wishes; what he does not wish, he will not believe."--But the modernist apologists move forward rapidly. They also concede that in the Sacred Books such reasonings are frequently discovered which attempt to prove a certain doctrine without rational foundation; such kind are those which rest upon the prophecies. And they defend these as a kind of artifice for preaching, which are made legitimate by life. What more? They admit, rather, they assert that Christ Himself manifestly erred in indicating the time of the coming of the kingdom of God; and this should not seem strange, they say, for He, too, was bound by the laws of life! Again, what about the dogmas of the Church? These also abound in open contradictions; but in addition to the fact that they are admitted by vital logic, they are not opposed to symbolic truth; for in these it is a question of the infinite, to which belong infinite considerations. Finally, they so prove and defend all this that they do not hesitate to profess that no more noble honor is shown the Infinite than the affirming of contradictions about Him.--But when a contradiction is approved, what will not be approved?

He who does not yet believe can be disposed toward faith not only by objective but also by subjective arguments. To this end the modernist apologists return to the doctrine of immanence. They labor in fact to persuade man that in him, and in the innermost recesses of his nature and life are concealed a desire and need for some religion; not for any religion, but for such a one as is the Catholic religion; for this, they say, is ab- absolutely postulated by the perfect development of life.--Here, moreover, we should again complain vigorously that there are not lacking among Catholics those who, although they reject the doctrine of immanence as a doctrine, yet employ it as a method of apology; and they do this so heedlessly that they seem to admit in human nature not only a capacity and a suitability for the supernatural order, as certain Catholic apologists have always demonstrated within proper bounds, but a genuine need in the true sense of the word.--To speak more accurately, this need of the Catholic religion is introduced by modernists who wish to be known as the more moderate. For, those who can be called integralists wish that the germ be demonstrated to the man who does not yet believe, as being hidden in him, the very germ which was in the consciousness of Christ and was transmitted to men by Him.--Thus then, Venerable Brethren, we recognize the apologetic method of the modernists, summarily described, as quite in keeping with their doctrine; a method indeed, as also the doctrines, full of errors, not suited for edifying, but for destroying, not for making Catholics, but for dragging Catholics into heresy, yes, even for the complete subversion of every religion.

[VII] Finally, a few words must be said about the modernist as a reformer. What we have said thus far shows abundantly with how great and keen a zeal for innovating these men are carried away. Moreover, this zeal extends to absolutely everything which exists among Catholics. They wish philosophy to be reformed, especially in ecclesiastical seminaries, so that, after relegating scholastic philosophy to the history of philosophy along with the other obsolete systems, youth may be taught modern philosophy which alone is true and in accord with our age.--To reform theology, they wish that that which we call rational have modern philosophy as a basis, but they demand that positive theology be based especially upon the history of dogma.--They also demand that history be written and be taught according to their method and modern prescriptions. Dogmas and the evolution of the same, they declare, must be brought into harmony with science and history.--As regards catechesis, they demand that only those dogmas be noted in catechism, which have been reformed, and are within the capacity of the masses. As for worship they say that external devotions are to be reduced in number, and that steps be taken to prevent their increase, although some who are more favorable toward symbolism show themselves more indulgent on this score.--They cry out that the government of the Church must be reformed in every respect, but especially on the disciplinary and dogmatic side. Thus, both within and without it is to be brought in harmony with the modern conscience, as they say, which tends entirely towards democracy; so to the lower clergy and to laity itself appropriate parts in the government should be assigned, and when authority has been unified too much and too centralized, it is to be dispersed.--The Roman congregations they likewise wish to be modified in the performance of their holy duties, but especially that which is known as the Holy Office and is also called the Index. Likewise, they contend that the action of ecclesiastical authority must be changed in the political and social fields, so that it may at the same time live apart from civil affairs, yet adapt itself to them in order to imbue them with its spirit.--In the field of morals they adopt the principle of the Americanists, that the active virtues are to be placed before the passive, and should be put ahead of them in practice.--They desire that the clergy be prepared to practice the ancient humility and poverty; moreover, that in thought and deed they conform with the precepts of modernism.--Finally, there are some who, giving heed to the words of their Protestant masters, desire the removal of holy celibacy itself from the priesthood--What, then, do they leave untouched in the Church, that is not to be reformed by them or according to their pronouncements?

In explaining all this doctrine of the modernists, Venerable Brethren, We shall seem to some, by chance, to have delayed too long. Yet it was quite necessary to do so, both that, as is customary, We might not be charged by them with ignorance of their tenets, and that it might be clear that when it is a question of modernism we are dealing not with scattered teachings in no way connected with one another, but with a single and compact body, as it were, in which, if you admit one thing, the rest necessarily follows. Thus we have made use of what amounts to didactic reasoning, and sometimes we have not rejected the atrocious words which the modernists have employed.

Now as we look back upon the whole system in one glance, as it were, no one will be surprised when we define it as the synthesis of all heresies. Surely, if anyone had proposed this to himself, to bring together into one the sap and blood of all the errors that have ever existed about the faith, no one would have performed the task more completely than the modernists have done it. Rather they have gone so much beyond this as not only to destroy completely the Catholic religion, but all religion, as We have already intimated. Hence, the applause of the rationalists; for this reason do those among the rationalists who speak more freely and openly congratulate themselves on having found no more efficacious allies than the modernists.

Now let us return for a moment, Venerable Brothers, to that most pernicious doctrine of agnosticism. By it evidently, as far as the intellect is concerned, every way to God is barred to man, while a more fitting approach is supposed to be open through a certain sense of the soul and action. Who does not see how wrong this is? For the sense of the soul is the response to the action of the thing which the intellect and the external senses have proposed. Take away the intellect and man will be prone to follow the external senses, in which direction he is already proceeding. Again this is bad; for any phantasies of the religious sense will not destroy common sense; moreover, by common sense we are taught that any disturbance or occupation of the soul is not a help but rather a hindrance to the search for truth, for truth, we say, as it is in itself; for that other subjective truth, the fruit of the internal sense and action, if indeed it is adapted to play, contributes nothing at all to man whose chief concern it is to learn whether outside himself there is a God into whose hands he will one day fall.--But the modernists do introduce experience as an aid to so great a task. Yet, what will this add to that sense of the soul? Nothing at all, except to make it more vehement; and as a result of this vehemence to make its conviction of the truth of the object proportionately stronger. Now these two certainly never make the sense of the soul cease to be sense, nor do they change its nature which is always liable to deception, unless it is directed by the intellect; but rather they confirm and assist it, for the more intense the sense, by that greater right it is sense.

Now since we are here dealing with religious sense and the experience contained in it, you know well, Venerable Brethren, how much there is need of prudence in this matter; likewise how much doctrine to guide prudence itself. You know this from your own experience with souls, especially certain ones in whom the sense is pre-eminent; you know it from your habit of reading books which treat of asceticism, which works, although they are of little worth in the estimation of the modernists, yet present a doctrine far more solid and more profound for observing wisdom than that which they arrogate to themselves. Indeed, it seems to Us the part of madness, or at least consummate imprudence, to hold as true without investigation the intimate experiences which the modernists recommend. But why, to speak cursorily, if there is so much force and value in these experiences, should not the same value be attributed to that experience which many thousands of Catholics assert that they have regarding the erroneous path on which the modernists tread? Is not all this false and fallacious? But the great majority of men firmly hold this, and will hold this: that through sense alone and experience, with no guidance and light of the mind, man can never attain God. And so we again have atheism, and no religion.

The modernists promise themselves nothing better by proclaiming the doctrine of symbolism. For if all intellectual elements, as they say, are merely symbols of God, will not the very name of God, or of the divine personality be a symbol. And if this is so, then there will be a possibility of doubt about the divine personality and the way is open to pantheism. Moreover, in the same way the other doctrine of divine immanence leads to pure and unmixed pantheism. For we ask this: Does such immanence distinguish God from man or not? If it does so distinguish, in what then does it differ from Catholic doctrine, or why does it reject the doctrine of external revelation? If it does not so distinguish, we have pantheism. But this immanence of the modernists holds and grants that every phenomenon of conscience proceeds from man as man. Thus good reasoning infers from this that God and man are one and the same; and so we have pantheism.

Indeed, the distinction which they proclaim between science and faith admits no other conclusion. For, they place the object of science in the reality of the knowable; the object of faith, on the contrary, in the reality of the unknowable. Now, the unknowable is fully established from this, that between the material object and the intellect there is no proportion, and this defect of proportion can never be removed, not even in the doctrine of the modernists. Therefore, the unknowable will always remain unknowable, to the believer as well as to the philosopher. Therefore, if we will possess any religion, it will be of an unknowable reality. Why this cannot also be the soul of the universe, as certain rationalists admit, we certainly do not see. But let these words suffice now to show fully how the doctrine of the modernists leads by manifold routes to atheism, and to the destruction of all religion. Indeed, the error of the Protestants was the first to take the step down this road; the error of the modernists follows; atheism will be the next step. [After fixing the causes of these errors-- curiosity, pride, ignorance of true philosophy--certain rules are laid down for the support and organization of philosophical, theological, and profane studies, and for the cautious selection of teachers, etc.]

[Response of the Biblical Commission, May 29, 1907]

Question I: Whether from the constant, universal, and solemn tradition of the Church coming down from the second century, inasmuch as it is taken chiefly a) from the testimonies and allusions of the Holy Fathers, ecclesiastical writers, even heretics, which, since they must derive from the disciples and first successors of the apostles, are necessarily closely connected with the very origin of the work itself; b) from the acceptance always and everywhere of the name of the author of the fourth Gospel in the Canon and in the catalogues of the Sacred Scriptures; c) from the oldest manuscripts, codices, and versions in various languages of the same Books; d) from the public liturgical practice obtaining in the whole world from the beginnings of the Church; prescinding from theological proof, it is demonstrated by such strong historical proof that John the Apostle and no other is to be recognized as the author of the fourth Gospel, that the reasons adduced by critics in opposition by no means weaken this tradition?--Answer: In the affirmative.

Question II: Whether the internal reasons also, which are taken from the text of the fourth Gospel, considered separately, from the testimony of the author and the manifest relationship of the Gospel itself with the First Epistle of the Apostle John, are to be considered as confirming the tradition which undoubtedly attributes the fourth Gospel to the same Apostle?--And whether the difficulties which are assumed from a comparison of the Gospel with the other three, the diversity of the times, purposes, and audiences, for whom and against whom the author wrote, being kept in view, can be reasonably solved, just as the most Holy Fathers and exegetes have shown in different places?--Answer: In the affirmative to both parts.

Question III: Whether, not withstanding the practice which flourished constantly in the whole Church from the earliest times, of arguing from the fourth Gospel as from a truly historical document, in consideration, nevertheless, of the peculiar nature of the same Gospel, and of the manifest intention of the author to illustrate and to prove the divinity of Christ from the very deeds and words of the Lord, it can be said that the deeds related in the fourth Gospel are totally or partially so invented that they are allegories or doctrinal symbols; but that the words of the Lord are not properly and truly the words of the Lord himself, but theological compositions of the writer, although placed in the mouth of the Lord?--Answer: In the negative.

[From Motu prop Rio, "Praestantia Scripturae," Nov. 18, 1907]

. . . After long discussions and most conscientious deliberations, certain excellent decisions have been published by the Pontifical Biblical Commission, very useful for the true advancement of Biblical studies and for directing the same by a definite norm. Yet we notice that there are not lacking those who have not received and do not receive such decisions with the obedience which is proper, even though they are approved by the Pontiff.

Therefore, we see that it must be declared and ordered as We do now declare and expressly order, that all are bound by the duty of conscience to submit to the decisions of the Biblical Pontifical Commission, both those which have thus far been published and those which will hereafter be proclaimed, just as to the decrees of the Sacred Congregations which pertain to doctrine and have been approved by the Pontiff; and that all who impugn such decisions as these by word or in writing cannot avoid the charge of disobedience, or on this account be free of grave sin; and this besides the scandal by which they offend, and the other matters for which they can be responsible before God, especially because of other pronouncements in these matters made rashly and erroneously.

In addition to this, intending to repress the daily increasing boldness of spirit of many Modernists, who by sophisms and artifices of every kind endeavor to destroy the force and the efficacy not only of the Decree, "Lamentabili sane exitu," which was published at Our command by the Sacred Roman and Universal Inquisition on the third of July of the current year [see n. 2071 ff.], but also of Our Encyclical Letter, "Pascendi Dominici gregis," given on the eighth of September of this same year [see n. 2071 ff.] by Our Apostolic authority, We repeat and confirm not only that Decree of the Sacred Supreme Congregation, but also that Encyclical Letter of Ours, adding the penalty of excommunication against all who contradict them; and We declare and decree this: if anyone, which may God forbid, proceeds to such a point of boldness that he defends any of the propositions, opinions, and doctrines disproved in either document mentioned above, he is ipso facto afflicted by the censure imposed in the chapter Docentes of the Constitution of the Apostolic See, first among those excommunications latae sententiae which are reserved simply to the Roman Pontiff. This excommunication, however, is to be understood with no change in the punishments, which those who have committed anything against the above mentioned documents may incur, if at any time their propositions, opinions, or doctrines are heretical; which indeed has happened more than once in the case of the adversaries of both these documents, but especially when they defend the errors of modernism, that is, the refuge of all heresies.

[Response of the Biblical Commission, June 28th, 1908]

Question I: Whether it can be taught that the prophecies which are read in the book of Isaias, and here and there in the Scriptures, are not prophecies in the true sense of the word, but either accounts composed after the event or, if it is necessary that they be acknowledged as being foretold before the event, that the prophet foretold them not from any natural revelation of God who knows the future, but by a kind of happy sagacity and natural acumen of the mind from things that have already happened?--Reply: In the negative.

Question II: Whether the opinion which prevails that Isaias and the other prophets uttered only prophecies which were to take place in the near future, or after no great space of time, can be reconciled with those prophecies, especially the Messianic and eschatological, which were certainly pronounced by these same prophets a long time in advance, and also with the common opinion of the Holy Fathers who assert with one accord that the prophets foretold those things also which were to be fulfilled after many ages?--Reply: In the negative.

Question III: Whether it can be admitted that the prophets, not only as reformers of human depravity, and heralds of the divine Word for the benefit of those who heed it, but also as foretellers of future events, must have continually addressed themselves, not to future listeners but to contemporary ones, on an equal footing with themselves, and in a manner to make possible a clear understanding; that as a consequence the second part of book of Isaias (chapter 40, 66), in which the prophet living among them addresses and consoles not the Jews on an equal footing with Isaias, but the lamenting in Babylonian exile, cannot have had Isaias himself, who was already dead, as its author, but should be assigned to some unknown prophet living among the exiles?--Reply: In the negative.

Question IV: Whether the philological argument taken from the language and style to impugn the identity of the author of the book of Isaias, is to be considered of such importance as to force a serious person, skilled in the art of criticism and in the Hebrew language, to recognize in the same book a plurality of authors?--Reply: In the negative.

Question V: Whether solid arguments stand out, even taken collectively, to induce the conviction that the Book of Isaias is not to be attributed to Isaias himself alone, but to two, or even to several authors.--Reply: In the negative.

[From the Encyclical, "Communium rerum,'' April 21, 1909]

. . . (Therefore) the task of philosophy is chiefly to set forth prominently the "reasonable service" [Rom. 12:1] of our faith, and the duty which follows from that of joining faith to divine authority which proposes the most profound mysteries which, proven by many evidences of truth, "are become exceedingly credible" [Ps. 92:5]. Far different from this is the task of theology, which relies on divine revelation and makes more solid in the faith those who confess that they rejoice in the honor of the Christian name; for no Christian should dispute how what the Catholic Church believes in heart, and confesses in words is not so; but always unhesitatingly holding to the same faith, but loving and living according to it, humbly seek the reason, insofar as he can, how it is so. If he can understand, let him give thanks to God; if he cannot let him not push his horns to the struggle [Cf. 1 Mach. 7:46], but let him submit his head to veneration.

[Response of the Biblical Commission, June 30th, 1909]

Question I: Whether the various exegetical systems which have been proposed to exclude the literal historical sense of the three first chapters of the Book of Genesis, and have been defended by the pretense of science, are sustained by a solid foundation?--Reply: In the negative.

Question II: Whether, when the nature and historical form of the Book of Genesis does not oppose, because of the peculiar connections of the three first chapters with each other and with the following chapters, because of the manifold testimony of the Old and of the New Testaments; because of the almost unanimous opinion of the Holy Fathers, and because of the traditional sense which, transmitted from the Israelite people, the Church always held, it can be taught that the three aforesaid chapters of Genesis do not contain the stories of events which really happened, that is, which correspond with objective reality and historical truth; but are either accounts celebrated in fable drawn from the mythologies and cosmogonies of ancient peoples and adapted by a holy writer to monotheistic doctrine, after expurgating any error of polytheism; or allegories and symbols, devoid of a basis of objective reality, set forth under the guise of history to inculcate religious and philosophical truths; or, finally, legends, historical in part and fictitious in part, composed freely for the instruction and edification of souls?--Reply: In the negative to both parts.

Question 111: Whether in particular the literal and historical sense can be called into question, where it is a matter of facts related in the same chapters, which pertain to the foundations of the Christian religion; for example, among others, the creation of all things wrought by God in the beginning of time; the special creation of man; the formation of the first woman from the first man; the oneness of the human race; the original happiness of our first parents in the state of justice, integrity, and immortality; the command given to man by God to prove his obedience; the transgression of the divine command through the devil's persuasion under the guise of a serpent; the casting of our first parents out of that first state of innocence; and also the promise of a future restorer?--Reply: In the negative.

Question IV: Whether in interpreting those passages of these chapters, which the Fathers and Doctors have understood differently, but concerning which they have not taught anything certain and definite, it is permitted, while preserving the judgment of the Church and keeping the analogy of faith, to follow and defend that opinion which everyone has wisely approved?--Reply: In the affirmative.

Question V: Whether all and everything, namely, words and phrases which occur in the aforementioned chapters, are always and necessarily to be accepted in a special sense, so that there may be no deviation from this, even when the expressions themselves manifestly appear to have been taken improperly, or metaphorically or anthropomorphically, and either reason prohibits holding the proper sense, or necessity forces its abandonment?--Reply: In the negative.

Question VI: Whether, presupposing the literal and historical sense, the allegorical and prophetical interpretation of some passages of the same chapters, with the example of the Holy Fathers and the Church herself showing the way, can be wisely and profitably applied?--Reply: In the affirmative.

Question VII: Whether, since in writing the first chapter of Genesis it was not the mind of the sacred author to teach in a scientific manner the detailed constitution of visible things and the complete order of creation, but rather to give to his people a popular notion, according as the common speech of the times went, accommodated to the understanding and capacity of men, the propriety of scientific language is to be investigated exactly and always in the interpretation of these?--Reply: In the negative.

Question VIII: Whether in that designation and distinction of six days, with which the account of the first chapter of Genesis deals, the word (dies) can be assumed either in its proper sense as a natural day, or in the improper sense of a certain space of time; and whether with regard to such a question there can be free disagreement among exegetes?--Reply: In the affirmative.

[Reply of the Biblical Commission, May 1, 1910]

Question 1: Whether the designations Psalms of David, Hymns of David, Davidian Psalter, used in the ancient collections and in the Councils themselves to designate the Book of 150 psalms of the Old Testament, just as also the opinion of many Fathers and Doctors who held that absolutely all the psalms of the Psalter are to be ascribed to David alone, have such force that David ought to be held as the only author of the entire Psalter?--Reply: In the negative.

Question 11: Whether from a comparison of the Hebraic with the Alexandrian Greek text and with other old versions it can rightly be argued that the titles of the psalms prefixed to the Hebraic text are more ancient than the so-called version of the seventy men; and therefore have derived, if not directly from the authors themselves of the psalms, at least from an old Judaic tradition?--Reply: In the affirmative.

Question III: Whether the aforesaid titles of the psalms, witnesses of the Judaic tradition, since there is not serious argument against their authenticity, can prudently be called into doubt?--Reply: In the negative.

Question IV: Whether, if the by no means infrequent testimonies of Holy Scripture about the natural skill of David, illustrated by the grace of the Holy Spirit in composing the religious hymns, are considered, the institutions established by him on the liturgical singing of the psalms, the attributing of the psalms to him both in the Old Testament and the New, and in the inscriptions themselves which were prefixed to the psalms from antiquity, besides the consensus of opinion of the Jews, Fathers, and Doctors of the Church, it can be prudently denied that David is the chief author of the hymns of the Psalter; or on the other hand affirmed that only a few hymns of the Psalter are to be attributed to him? Reply:--In the negative to both parts.

Question V: Whether in appearance the Davidian origin can be denied to those psalms which are cited in the Old and New Testament distinctly under the name of David, among which to be considered before the rest come: psalm 2, Quare fremuerunt gentes; psalm 15, Conserva me, Domine; psalm 17 Diligam te, Domine, fortitudo mea; psalm 31, Beati, Quorum remissae sunt iniquitates; psalm 68, Salvum me fac, Deus; psalm 109, Dixit Dominus Domino meo?--Reply: In the negative.

Question Vl: Whether the opinion of those can be admitted who hold that among the psalms of the psalter some, whether of David or of other authors, which for liturgical and musical reasons, the listlessness of the amanuenses, or for other unknown reasons, have been divided into several groups or joined into one; and likewise that there are other psalms, such as Miserere mei, Deus, which, that they may be made to fit in better with historic circumstances or the solemnities of the Jewish people, have been lightly revised and modified by the subtraction or addition of one or two verses, although preserving the inspiration of the entire sacred text?--Reply: In the affirmative to both parts.

Question Vll: Whether the opinion can probably be sustained of those among more recent writers who, relying on internal indications only, or on an inaccurate interpretation of the sacred text, tried to show that not a few psalms were composed after the times of Esdras and Nehemias, even in the late period of the Machabees.--Reply: In the negative.

Question VIII: Whether because of the many testimonies of the Sacred Books of the New Testament, and the unanimous consent of the Fathers, together also with the indications of the writers of the Judaic nation, more psalms should be recognized as prophetic and messianic, which have predicted the coming of the future Liberator, the kingdom, the priesthood, the passion, the death, and resurrection; and therefore their opinion ought to be completely rejected, who pervert the prophetic and messianic nature of the psalms and restrict the same oracles on Christ only to pronouncing the future lot of the elect people?--Reply: In the affirmative for both parts.

[From the Decree, "Quem singular)," of the Congregation on the Sacraments, August 8, 1910]

I. The age of discretion both for confession and for Holy Communion is that at which the child begins to reason, that is, at about the seventh year, more or less. The obligation of satisfying both precepts of confession and communion begins from that time [see n. 437].

II. For first confession and for first communion a full and perfect knowledge of Christian doctrine is not necessary. But the child will be obliged afterwards to learn gradually the whole catechism in accord with his intelligence.

III. The knowledge of religion which is required in a child, that he may prepare himself fittingly for his first communion, is that by which in accord with his capacity he perceives the mysteries of faith necessary by a necessity of means, and by which he distinguishes Eucharistic bread from the common and corporeal, in order that he may approach the most blessed Eucharist with that devotion which his age carries.

IV. The obligation of the precept of confession and communion which rests upon a child, falls especially upon those who should have care of him, that is, upon parents, confessor, teachers, and pastor. But to the father, or to those who take his place, and to the confessor, it pertains, according to the Roman Catechism, to admit the child to first communion.

V. Once or several times a year let the pastors take care to announce and to hold general communion for children, and to admit to it not only new communicants but also others who by the consent of their parents or confessor, as has been mentioned above, have already partaken for the first time from the holy altar. Let some days for instruction and preparation be set aside in advance.

VI. Those who have charge over children must make every effort to see that these same children after first communion approach the holy table often, and, if it can be done, daily, just as Jesus Christ and Mother Church desire [see n. 1981 ff.]; and that they do this with that devotion of mind which is appropriate to such an age. Let those who have this responsibility remember besides the very serious obligation by which they are bound, see to it that the children themselves continue to be present at the public instructions in catechism, or otherwise in some manner supply the same with religious instruction.

VII. The custom of never admitting children to confession, or of never absolving them when they have arrived at the use of reason, is to be disapproved entirely. Therefore, the local ordinaries will see to it, even by applying the remedy of the law, that this custom is entirely abandoned.

VIII. The abuse of not administering Viaticum and extreme unction to children past the age of reason, and of burying them according to the rite of infants is entirely an abuse. Let the local ordinaries deal severely with those who do not abandon such a custom.

[From Mot?' proprio, "Sacrorum antistitum,', September 1, 1910]

I . . . firmly embrace and accept all and everything that has been defined, affirmed, and declared by the unerring magisterium of the Church, especially those chief doctrines which are directly opposed to the errors of this time. And first, I profess that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be certainly known and thus can also be demon strafed by the natural light of reason "by the things that are made" [cf. Rom. 1:20], that is, by the visible works of creation, as the cause by the effects. Secondly, I admit and recognize the external arguments of revelation, that is, divine facts, and especially miracles and prophecies, as very certain signs of the divine origin of the Christian religion; and I hold that these same arguments have been especially accommodated to the intelligence of all ages and men, even of these times. Thirdly, likewise, with a firm faith I believe that the Church, guardian and mistress of the revealed word, was instituted proximately and directly by the true and historical Christ Himself, while he sojourned among us, and that the same was built upon Peter, the chief of the apostolic hierarchy, and his successors until the end of time. Fourthly, I accept sincerely the doctrine of faith transmitted from the apostles through the orthodox fathers, always in the same sense and interpretation, even to us; and so I reject the heretical invention of the evolution of dogmas, passing from one meaning to another, different from that which the Church first had; and likewise I reject all error whereby a philosophic fiction is substituted for the divine deposit, given over to the Spouse of Christ and to be guarded faithfully by her, or a creation of the human conscience formed gradually by the efforts of men and to be perfected by indefinite progress in the future. Fifthly, I hold most certainly and profess sincerely that faith is not a blind religious feeling bursting forth from the recesses of the subconscious, unformed morally under the pressure of the heart and the impulse of the will, but the true assent of the intellect to the truth received extrinsically ex auditu, whereby we believe that what has been said, attested, and revealed by the personal God, our Creator and Lord, to be true on account of the authority of God the highest truth.

I also subject myself with the reverence which is proper, and I adhere with my whole soul to all the condemnations, declarations, and prescriptions which are contained in the Encyclical letter, "Pascendi" [see n. 2071 ff.] and in the Decree, "Lamentabili" [see n. 2001 f.], especially on that which is called the history of dogma. In the same manner I disapprove the error of those who affirm that the faith proposed by the Church can be in conflict with history, and that Catholic dogmas, in the sense in which they are now understood, cannot be reconciled with the more authentic origins of the Catholic religion.--I also condemn and reject the opinion of those who say that the more erudite Christian puts on a dual personality, one of the believer, the other of the historian, as if it were permitted the historian to hold what is in contradiction to the faith of the believer; or to establish premises from which it follows that dogmas are either false or doubtful, provided they are not directly denied.--I disapprove likewise that method of studying and interpreting Sacred Scripture, which disregards the tradition of the Church, the analogy of faith, and the norms of the Apostolic See, and adheres to the fictions of the rationalists, and no less freely than boldly adopts textual criticism as the only and supreme rule.--Besides I reject the opinion of those who hold that to present the historical and theological disciplines the teacher or the writer on these subjects must first divest himself of previously conceived opinion either on the supernatural origin of Catholic tradition, or on the aid promised by God for the perpetual preservation of every revealed truth; then that the writings of the individual Fathers are to be interpreted only by the principles of science, setting aside all divine authority, and by that freedom of judgment with which any profane document is customarily

investigated. Finally, in short, I profess to be utterly free of the error according to which the modernists hold that there is nothing divine in the sacred tradition; or, what is far worse, admit this in the pantheistic sense, so that nothing remains but the bare and simple fact to be assimilated with the common facts of history, namely, of men by their industry, skill, and genius continuing through subsequent ages the school inaugurated by Christ and His disciples. So I retain most firmly the faith of the Fathers, and shall retain it until the final breath of life, regarding the certain gift of truth, which is, was, and will be always in the succession of the episcopacy from the apostles,* not so that what may seem better and more fitting according to each one's period of culture may be held, but so that the absolute and immutable truth preached * by the apostles from the beginning may never be believed otherwise, may never be understood otherwise.

All these things I promise that I shall faithfully, completely, and sincerely keep and inviolably watch, never deviating from them in word and writing either while teaching or in any other pursuit. So I promise, so I swear, so may God, etc.

[From the letter, "Ex quo,,' to the Archbishops Apostolic Delegates in Byzantium, in Greece, in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, in Persia, in Syria, and in the Oriental Indies, December 26, 1910]

No less rashly than falsely does one approach this opinion, that the dogma concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son by no means is taken from the very words of the Gospel, or is sanctioned by the faith of the ancient Fathers;--most imprudently, likewise, is doubt raised as to whether the sacred dogmas on purgatory and on the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary were acknowledged by the holy men of earlier years;--. . . regarding the constitution of the Church . . . first of all an error, long since condemned by Our predecessor, Innocent X, is being renewed [cf. n. 1091], in which it is argued that St. Paul is held as a brother entirely equal to St. Peter;--then, with no less falsity, one is invited to believe that the Catholic Church was not in the earliest days a sovereignty of one person, that is a monarchy; or that the primacy of the Catholic Church does not rest on valid arguments.--But . . . the Catholic doctrine on the most Blessed Sacrament of the Eucharist is not left untouched when it is taught inflexibly that the opinion can be accepted which maintains that among the Greeks the words of consecration do not produce an effect unless preceded by that prayer which they call epiclesis, *although, on the other hand, it is well known that to the Church there belongs no right whatsoever to innovate anything touching on the substance of the sacraments; and no less inharmonious with this is the view that confirmation conferred by any, priest at all is to be held valid.

These opinions are noted as "grave errors."

[Response of the Biblical Commission, June 19, 1911]

I. Whether after noting the universal and constant agreement of the Church from the earliest times, which is clearly shown by the eloquent testimonies of the Fathers, the inscriptions of the manuscripts of the Gospels, even the most ancient versions of the Sacred Scriptures, and the catalogues handed down by the Holy Fathers, the ecclesiastical writers, the Highest Pontiffs, and the Councils, and finally the liturgical practice of the Eastern and Western Church, it can and should be affirmed with certainty that Matthew, the Apostle of Christ, is in fact the author of the vulgate Gospel under his name?--Reply: In the affirmative.

II. Whether the opinion should be considered as sufficiently supported by the assent of tradition, which holds that Matthew preceded the other evangelists in his writing, and that he composed the first Gospel in the native language then employed by the Jews of Palestine, to whom that work was directed?--Reply: In the affirmative to both parts.

III. Whether the redaction of this original text can be placed beyond the time of the overthrow of Jerusalem, so that the prophecies which are read there about this same overthrow were written after the event; or whether what is customarily alleged to be the testimony of Irenaeus [Adv. haer., lib. 3, cap. I, n. 2] of uncertain and controversial interpretation, is to be considered of such weight that it forces us to reject the opinion of those who think, more in accord with tradition, that the same redaction was composed even before Paul's arrival in the City? --Reply: In the negative to both parts.

IV. Whether that opinion of certain moderns can even with some probability be sustained, according to which Matthew did not properly or strictly compose the Gospel such as has been handed down to us, but only some collection of the words or conversations of Christ, which another anonymous author has made use of as sources, whom they make the redactor of the Gospel itself.--Reply: In the negative.

V. Whether from the fact that the Fathers and all ecclesiastical writers, indeed the Church herself from her own incunabula used, as canonical, only the Greek text of the Gospel known under the name of Matthew, not even excepting those who taught expressly that Matthew the Apostle wrote in his native language, it can be proved with certainty that the Greek Gospel is identical as to substance with that Gospel written in his native language by the same Apostle?--Reply: In the affirmative.

VI. Whether from the fact that the author of the first Gospel pursues especially the dogmatic and apologetic aim, namely, of demonstrating to the Jews that Jesus is the Messias foretold by the prophets, and descended from the lineage of David, and from the fact that when arranging the deeds and words which he narrates and sets forth anew, he does not always hold to the chronological order, it may be deduced that these matters are not to be accepted as true; or, also, whether it can be affirmed that the accounts of the accomplishments and discourses of Christ, which are read in the Gospel itself, have undergone a kind of alteration and adaptation under the influence of the prophets of the Old Testament, and the status of the more mature Church, and so are by no means in conformity with historical truth?--Reply: In the negative to both parts.

VII. Whether in particular the opinions of those persons should be rightly considered as devoid of solid foundation, who call into question the historical authenticity of the two first chapters, in which the genealogy and infancy of Christ are related; as also of certain opinions on dogmatic matters of great moment, as are those which have to do with the primacy of Peter [Matt. 16:17-19], the form of baptizing, together with the universal mission of preaching handed over to the apostles [Matt. 28:19-20], the apostles' profession of faith in the divinity of Christ [Matt. 14:33], and other such matters which occurred in Matthew announced in a special way?--Reply: In the affirmative.

[Reply of the Biblical Commission, June 26, 1912]

I. Whether the evident judgment of tradition, from the beginnings of the Church in wonderful agreement with and confirmed by manifold arguments, namely, the eloquent testimonies of the Holy Fathers and ecclesiastical writers, the citations and allusions which occur in the writings of the same, the practice of the ancient heretics, the versions of the Books of the New Testament, the most ancient and almost entire body of manuscripts, and also the internal reasons taken from the very text of the Sacred Books, definitely compels the affirmation that Mark, the disciple and expounder of Peter, and Luke the physician, the hearer and companion of Paul, are in fact the authors of the Gospels which are respectively attributed to them?--Reply: In the affirmative.

II. Whether the reasons by which some critics strive to demonstrate that the last twelve verses of the Gospel of Mark [Mark 16:9-20] were not written by Mark himself, but were added by another hand, are such as to give the right to affirm that they are not to be accepted as inspired and canonical; or at least demonstrate that the author of the said verses is not Mark?--Reply: In the negative to both parts.

III. Whether one may likewise doubt the inspiration and canonicity of the accounts given by Luke of the infancy of Christ [Luke 1-2]; or the apparition of the Angel strengthening Christ, and the sweat of blood [Luke 22:43 f.]; or whether it can at least be shown by solid reasons--as pleased the ancient heretics, and is agreeable also to some more recent critics--that the said accounts do not belong to the genuine Gospel of Luke?--Reply: In the negative to both parts.

IV. Whether those most rare and very peculiar documents, in which the Canticle Magnificat is directed not to the Blessed Virgin but to Elizabeth, can and should in any way prevail against the harmonious testimony of almost all manuscripts, both of the original Greek text and of the versions, as well as against the interpretation which the context no less than the spirit of the Virgin herself, and the constant tradition of the Church clearly exacts?--Reply: In the negative.

V. Whether, with respect to the chronological order of the Gospels, it is right to withdraw from that opinion which, strengthened equally by the most ancient and continued testimony of tradition, testifies that Mark was the second in order to write and Luke the third, after Matthew, who was the first of all to write his Gospel in his native tongue; or, whether their opinion, which asserts that the Gospel was composed second and third before the Greek version of the first Gospel, is to be regarded in turn as in opposition to this idea?--Reply: In the negative to both parts.

VI. Whether the time of composition of the Gospel of Mark and Luke may be postponed until the overthrow of the city of Jerusalem; or, because the prophecy of the Lord in Luke about the overthrow of this city seems more definite, it can be sustained that his Gospel at least was composed after the siege had already begun?--Reply: In the negative to both parts.

VII. Whether it ought to be affirmed that the Gospel of Luke preceded the book of the Acts of the Apostles; and although this book, with same i author Luke [Acts 1:1 f.], was finished before the end of the Apostle's Roman captivity [Acts 28:30 f.], his Gospel was not composed after this time?--Reply: In the affirmative.

VIII. Whether, keeping in mind both the testimonies of tradition and internal evidence, as regards the sources which both evangelists used in composing the Gospels, that opinion can prudently be called into question which holds that Mark wrote according to the preaching of Peter, but Luke according to the preaching of Paul; and which also asserts that other sources worthy of trust were also at hand for these same evangelists, either oral or even already consigned to writing?--Reply: In the negative.

IX. Whether the words and deeds which are described accurately and, as it were, graphically by Mark according to the preaching of Peter, and are most sincerely set forth by Luke, following everything diligently from the beginning through witnesses clearly worthy of trust, inasmuch as they themselves from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word [Luke 1:2 f.], rightly vindicate that complete historical faith in themselves which the Church has always given them; or, whether on the contrary the same deeds and actions are to be judged void of historical truth, at least in part, either because the writers were not eyewitnesses, or because in both Gospels defects in order and discrepancies in the succession of the deeds are not rarely caught; or because, since they came and wrote later, they were obliged to represent conceptions necessarily extraneous to the minds of Christ and the apostles, or deeds now more or less distorted by the imagination of the people; or, finally, because they indulged in preconceived dogmatic ideas, each one according to his purpose?--Reply: In the affirmative to the first part; in the negative to the second.

[Reply of the Biblical Commission, June 26, 1912]

I. Whether, preserving what must be jealously preserved according to the decisions made above, especially on the authenticity and integrity of the three Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke; on the substantial identity of the Greek Gospel of Matthew with its early original; also on the order of time in which the same were written, to explain their mutual likenesses and differences, midst so many varying and opposite opinions of the authors, it is permitted for exegetes to dispute freely and to appeal to the hypotheses of tradition whether written or oral, or even of the dependence of one upon a preceding or upon several preceding?--Reply: In the affirmative.

II. Whether they should be advised to preserve what was established above, who, supported by no testimony of tradition or by historical argument, easily taken in by the hypothesis publicly proclaimed of two sources, which labors to explain the composition of the Greek Gospel of Matthew and of the Gospel of Luke chiefly by their dependence upon the Gospel of Mark and a so-called collection of the Lord's discourses; and whether they are thus able to defend this freely?--Reply. In the negative to both parts.

[Reply of the Biblical Commission, June 12, 1913]

I. Whether in view especially of the tradition of the whole Church going back to the earliest ecclesiastical writers, and noting the internal reasons of the book of Acts, considered in itself or in its relation to the third Gospel, and especially because of the mutual affinity and connection between the two prologues [Luke 1:1-4; Acts 1:1 f.], it must be held as certain that the volume that is entitled Actus A postolorum, or, (Greek text deleted), has Luke the Evangelist as author?--Reply: In the affirmative.

II. Whether for critical reasons taken from the language and style, and from the manner of narrating, and from the oneness of aim and doctrine, it can be demonstrated that the book of the Acts of the Apostles should be attributed to one author alone; and therefore that the opinion of more recent writers which holds that Luke is not the only author of the book, but that different persons are to be recognized as authors of the same book is devoid of any foundation?--Reply: In the affirmative to both parts.

III. Whether in outward appearance, the prominent chapters in the Acts where the use of the third person is broken off and the first person plural introduced, weaken the unity and authenticity of composition; or rather historically and philologically considered are to be said to confirm it?--Reply: In the negative to the first part; in the affirmative to the second.

IV. Whether because of the fact that the book itself is abruptly concluded after scarcely making mention of the two years of Paul's first Roman captivity, it may be inferred that the author had written a second volume now lost, or had intended to write it; and so the time of composition of the Book of Acts can be deferred long after this captivity; or whether it should rather rightly and worthily be held that Luke toward the end of the first Roman captivity of the Apostle Paul had completed his book?--Reply: In the negative to the first part; in the affirmative to the second.

V. Whether, if there is considered together the frequent and easy communication which Luke undoubtedly had with the first and prominent founders of the Palestinian church, and also with Paul, the Apostle of the Gentiles, whose assistant in the preaching of the Gospel and companion in travel he was; also his customary industry and diligence in seeking witnesses, and in observing things with his own eyes; also, and finally, the evident and amazing agreement for the most part of the Book of Acts with the letters of Paul and the more genuine monuments of history, it should be held with certainty that Luke had at hand sources worthy of all trust, and applied them accurately, well, and faithfully, so that he rightly indicates for himself full historical authority?--Reply: In the affirmative.

VI. Whether the difficulties which are usually raised from the supernatural deeds related by Luke, and from the narration of certain discourses which, since they are handed down in summary, are considered fictitious and adapted to circumstances; also from certain passages, apparently at least, in disagreement with history whether profane or biblical; finally also from certain accounts which seem to be at odds with the author of the Acts, or with other-sacred authors, are such as can call the historical authority of the Acts into doubt or at least in some manner diminish it?--Reply: In the negative.

Letters of Paul the Apostle

[Response of the Biblical Commission, June 12, 1913]

I. Whether, keeping in mind the tradition of the Church which continues universally and steadily from the earliest times, just as the ancient ecclesiastical records testify in many ways, it should be held with certainty that the so-called pastoral letters, that is, the two to Timothy and another to Titus, notwithstanding the rashness of certain heretics who have eliminated them as being contrary to their dogma from the number of Pauline epistles, without giving any reason, were composed by the Apostle Paul himself, and have always been reckoned among the genuine and canonical?--Reply: In the affirmative.

II. Whether the so-called fragmentary hypothesis introduced by certain more recent critics and variously set forth, who for no otherwise probable reason, rather while quarreling among themselves, contend that the pastoral letters were constructed at a later time from fragments of letters, or from corrupt Pauline letters by unknown authors, and notably increased, can bring some slight prejudice upon the clear and very strong testimony of tradition?--Reply: In the negative.

III. Whether the difficulties which are brought up in many places whether from the style and language of the author, or from the errors especially of the Gnostics, who already at that time are described as serpents; or from the state of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which is supposed to have been already evolved, and other such reasons in opposition in some way, weaken the opinion which holds the authenticity of the pastoral letters as valid and certain?--Reply: In the negative.

IV. Whether, since no less from historical reasons as from ecclesiastical tradition, in harmony with the testimonies of the oriental and occidental most holy Fathers; also from the indications themselves which are easily drawn from the abrupt conclusion of the Book of the Acts and from the Pauline letters written at Rome, and especially from the second letter to Timothy, the opinion of a twofold Roman captivity of the Apostle Paul should be held as certain, it can be safely affirmed that the pastoral letters were written in that period of time which intervenes between the liberation from the first captivity and the death of the Apostle?--Reply: In the affirmitive.

[Reply of the Biblical Commission, June 24, 1914]

I. Whether so much force is to be attributed to the doubts which inthe first centuries possessed the minds of some in the Occident regarding the divine inspiration and Pauline origin of the Epistle to the Hebrews, because of the special abuse of heretics, that, although aware of the perpetual, unanimous, and continued affirmation of the Oriental Fathers, to which was added after the fourth century the full agreement of the entire Western Church; weighing also the acts of the Highest Pontiffs and of the sacred Councils, especially of Trent, and also the perpetual practice of the universal Church, one may hesitate to classify it with certainty not only among the canonical--which is determined regarding faith--but also among the genuine epistles of the Apostle Paul?--Reply: In the negative.

II. Whether the arguments which are usually drawn from the unusual absence of the name of Paul, and the omission of the customary introduction and salutation in the Epistle to the Hebrews--or from the purity of the same Greek language, the elegance and perfection of diction and style,--or from the way by which the Old Testament is cited in it and arguments made from it,--or from certain differences which supposedly existed between the doctrine of this and of the other epistles of Paul, somehow are able to weaken the Pauline origin of the same; or whether, on the other hand, the perfect agreement of doctrine and opinions, the likeness of admonitions and exhortations, and also the harmony of the phrases and of the words themselves celebrated also by some non-Catholics, which are observed between it and the other writings of the Apostle of the Gentiles, demonstrate and confirm the same Pauline origin?--Reply: In the negative to the first part; in the affirmative to the second.

III. Whether the Apostle Paul is so to be considered the author of this epistle that it should necessarily be affirmed that he not only conceived and expressed it all by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, but also endowed it with that form with which it stands out?--Reply: In the negative, save for a later judgment of the Church.