On the Fifth Precept of the Decalogue

“Concerning the secular power we assert that it can exercise judgment of blood without mortal sin, provided that in inflicting punishment it proceeds not from hatred but by judgment, not incautiously but advisedly.” Profession of Faith of the Waldensians.

“19. A husband who by his own authority kills his wife caught in adultery does not sin.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII.

“The Catholics of this diocese are inexorable in vengeance, and this is because there is no one in those regions who administers justice to them. It is therefore asked: 1. Whether, every other means of obtaining redress for their wrongs being excluded, the Christians can, with respect to this point, consider themselves as if they were in the state of nature. 2. Whether they are capable of receiving the Sacraments so long as they persist in this desire of theirs for vengeance. The reason which they bring forward to prove the necessity under which they are of avenging themselves is that the killer and his supporters would become fiercer and more intolerable against the relatives of the one killed, and would commit new homicides, if these relatives did not resist and oppose force to force. Resp. In the negative to both parts.” Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 21 May 1759.

“It is a custom among the independent Gallas that, if anyone is killed or afflicted with a grave wound, from that very moment all and each of his relatives and fellow tribesmen are bound to swear mortal hatred against all and each of the killer’s relatives and fellow tribesmen, and to pursue them to extermination; and no one can exempt himself from this obligation without losing his social rights in his own tribe and being expelled from it as an enemy. But this right and duty of avenging blood lasts until a certain sum of money, to be determined by the judgment of arbitrators, is paid for the homicide, and thus the tribe to which the one killed belonged receives satisfaction. This satisfaction would be hoped for in vain if an obligation of this kind to undertake the aforesaid hostility or vengeance were removed, because among the independent Gallas there is a complete absence of public magistrates who watch over the punishment of crimes and the protection of rights. Therefore it is asked:

“1. Whether hostilities exercised in the aforesaid manner can be regarded as a just war of one tribe against another. — 2. Whether one can be admitted to the sacraments who on the one hand protests that he fosters no hatred or animosity whatsoever in his soul against the men of the enemy tribe, but rather shows himself ready and desirous of exhibiting to them the customary signs of friendship as soon as satisfaction has been made for his right; but who on the other hand promises that he will never seek an occasion of quarreling with his enemies, but will avoid encountering them, lest he be cast into the danger either of accepting a fight or, if he refuses it, of incurring the displeasure of his own people.

“Resp. Of the three conditions required for a just war, namely, legitimate authority, a just cause, and a suitable manner, it is manifest that the third is entirely lacking in the case of fact to which the first doubt refers. For a suitable manner especially demands that war be waged neither with the cruelty of taking vengeance nor with a desire to do harm, but with the right intention of obtaining due satisfaction, and that the innocent be in no way harmed, insofar as this can be done. But the Gallas, as soon as anyone from their family or tribe has been killed, swear mortal hatred against all and each of the blood relatives of the killer, and, without discrimination, if they meet them, attack, strike, and slaughter them, looking only to this: that by a barbarous rite they expiate blood with blood, until the satisfaction customary among them is furnished. Nor do they take vengeance under the guidance of public authority, to which alone it belongs to declare and direct war, but private persons rise up against private persons in the manner of wild beasts. Nor do they examine beforehand whether the homicide might have been committed accidentally or from the necessity of lawful defense and without fault. Nor, before they rush to arms, do they try every way through common friends by which they might peacefully obtain the satisfaction due to them; but, as the same Vicar Apostolic reports in another letter, from the very moment at which any homicide or lethal wounding occurs, all the blood relatives of both the killer and the one killed immediately separate themselves in such a manner that they are bound not only to break off every intercourse of speech and life with one another but also, if they meet, to fight even to extermination. Certainly no one fails to understand how greatly all these things are abhorrent to a suitable manner of waging war, indeed to the very notion of a true war. Therefore let the Vicar Apostolic take care, and let all the missionaries dwelling in those regions take care, that they utterly root out from their midst so barbarous and pernicious a custom, from which incredible slaughters of men and devastations of goods arise.

“But in the meantime will he be able to admit to participation in the sacraments one who is disposed in soul as is explained in the second doubt? The response depends upon the best-known principles of moral theology concerning the love of enemies, restitution on account of homicide, and the dispositions necessary for receiving the sacrament of Penance. That rule which the Vicar Apostolic relates that he gave to the missionaries subject to him is in no way opposed to these principles: namely, that the sacraments are not to be denied to one who protests that he has no personal hatred in his soul and wishes nothing else through the external hostility than what belongs to him by right according to the laws of his country, and who at the same time promises that he will accomplish by every means that he abstain from killing any of his enemies. The missionaries will therefore be able to follow this rule with respect to those who belong to the family or tribe of the one killed. But if there is question of those who are from the family or tribe of the unjust killer, it is required in addition that, insofar as it lies within them, they be prompt and prepared to furnish due satisfaction, and to undergo the displeasure of their own tribe rather than attack and injure anyone from the opposing tribe if perhaps they meet him, with the exception of the right of self-defense with the moderation of blameless defense.” Holy Office, 20 June 1866.

“According to the custom of this kingdom, every chief, even the least, although placed over only ten men, has full judicial and coercive power over his subjects, so that he can even pronounce a capital sentence against them according to his pleasure. Likewise a master has this power over his slaves. Nor would they permit their delinquent subjects to be brought before another tribunal. The customary form of judgment, moreover, is very summary. It is asked: — 1. Whether a Christian chief or master, with a safe conscience and with natural and divine law preserved, can exercise this power over his subjects or slaves and even decree capital punishment against them for an enormous crime; for example, if some subject wishes to destroy him or another, or to hand him over to persecutors for death on account of religion or another cause? — 2. Insofar as the answer is affirmative, when the chief himself questions the missionary concerning his right, can the missionary advise him concerning his right either in general or in a particular case? — Resp. To the first and second, that it can be tolerated until an exact form of judicial proceedings is introduced, with justice preserved and provided that in graver causes, especially capital ones, the procedure is as mild as possible and follows the counsel of upright men.” Holy Office, 27 January 1892; C. 2098.

“31. As a rule, I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin. — 32. It is lawful to defend with a lethal defense not only the things which we actually possess, but also those to which we have an inchoate right and which we hope that we shall possess. — 33. It is lawful both for an heir and for a legatee to defend himself in this manner against one who unjustly prevents either the inheritance from being entered upon or the legacies from being paid; likewise also for one having a right to a chair or prebend against one who unjustly prevents possession of them.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

“17. It is lawful for a religious or cleric to kill a slanderer who threatens to spread grave crimes concerning him or his religious order, when another manner of defending himself is not available; as it does not appear to be available if the slanderer is prepared publicly and before most eminent men to charge the aforesaid things against the religious himself or his religious order unless he is killed. — 18. It is lawful to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, and even a judge from whom an unjust sentence certainly threatens, if the innocent person cannot avoid harm in another way.” Propositions condemned by Alexander VII.

“30. It is lawful for a man of honor to kill an assailant who endeavors to inflict slander upon him, if this ignominy cannot otherwise be avoided; the same is also to be said if anyone strikes him with an open hand or with a club and, after inflicting the blow of the hand or the stroke of the club, flees.” Proposition condemned by Innocent XI.

“1. Will acceleration of delivery be lawful whenever the emergence of the fetus at its natural time would become impossible because of the narrowness of the woman? — 2. And if the narrowness of the woman is such that even premature delivery is judged impossible, will it be lawful to procure an abortion or to perform a Caesarean operation at its proper time? — 3. Is laparotomy lawful when there is question of an extrauterine pregnancy, or of ectopic conceptions? — Resp. To 1. Acceleration of delivery is not unlawful in itself, provided that it is performed for just causes and at that time and by those methods through which, according to ordinary contingencies, provision is made for the life of the mother and of the fetus. — To 2. As regards the first part, in the negative, according to the decree of Wednesday, 24 July 1895, concerning the unlawfulness of abortion. But as regards the second part: nothing prevents the woman in question from being subjected to a Caesarean operation at its proper time. — To 3. When necessity compels, laparotomy for extracting ectopic conceptions from the womb of the mother is lawful, provided that serious and opportune provision is made, insofar as this can be done, for the life both of the fetus and of the mother.” Holy Office, 4 May 1898.

“34. It is lawful to procure an abortion before the animation of the fetus, lest a girl who has been discovered to be pregnant be killed or defamed. — 35. It appears probable that every fetus, so long as it is in the womb, lacks a rational soul, and begins to have it only when it is born; and consequently it will have to be said that homicide is committed in no abortion.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

“Can it safely be taught in Catholic schools that the surgical operation which they call craniotomy is lawful, namely, when, if it is omitted, the mother and child will perish, but if it is admitted, the mother will be saved while the infant perishes? Resp. After all matters had been considered for a long time and maturely, account also having been taken of those things written on this matter by expert Catholic men and transmitted by Your Eminence to this Congregation, they judged that the response must be: It cannot safely be taught. The Most Holy Lord fully confirmed it.” Holy Office, 28 May 1884.

“It cannot safely be taught in Catholic schools that the surgical operation which they call craniotomy is lawful, as was declared on 28 May 1884, nor that any surgical operation directly destructive of the fetus or of the pregnant mother is lawful.” Holy Office, 19 August 1889.

“When the physician Titius was called to a pregnant woman who was gravely ill, he commonly observed that there was no other underlying cause of the lethal disease apart from the pregnancy itself, that is, the presence of the fetus in the womb. Therefore, in order that he might save the mother from certain and imminent death, one way was available to him, namely, to procure an abortion or the expulsion of the fetus. He customarily entered upon this way, but employed means and operations not indeed tending of themselves and immediately toward killing the fetus in the mother’s womb, but only toward bringing it forth alive into the light, if this could be done, although it would soon die, since it was still altogether immature.

“Now, after reading what the Holy See wrote in response to the Archbishop of Cambrai on 19 August 1889—‘it cannot safely be taught that any operation directly destructive of the fetus is lawful, even if this were necessary to save the mother’—Titius remains doubtful concerning the lawfulness of the surgical operations by which he had not rarely procured abortion up to this time, in order to save gravely ill pregnant women.

“Therefore, in order to provide for his conscience, Titius suppliantly asks whether he can safely undertake the stated operations again in the circumstances repeatedly described. — Resp. In the negative, according to the other Decrees, namely, those of 28 May 1884 and 19 August 1889.” Holy Office, 24 July 1895.

“Whether it is sometimes lawful to extract from the womb of the mother ectopic (extrauterine) fetuses which are still immature, before the completion of the sixth month after conception? — Resp. In the negative, according to the decree of 4 May 1898, by force of which serious and opportune provision must be made, insofar as this can be done, for the life of the fetus and of the mother; but as regards the time, according to the same decree, let the petitioner remember that no acceleration of delivery is lawful unless it is performed at a time and by methods through which, according to ordinary contingencies, provision is made for the life of the mother and of the fetus.” Holy Office, 5 March 1902; Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 20 March 1902. Cf. no. 742.

Apostolic Letter to the Ordinaries in the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires:

“Moved by the consciousness of your pastoral office and by charity toward your neighbors, you judged it necessary, in letters sent to Us last year, to report the frequency among your people of single combats which they call duels. You indicated with sorrow that this kind of fighting, as though a right established by custom, prevails even among Catholics; and at the same time you requested that Our voice also endeavor to deter men from an error of this kind.

“This error is certainly exceedingly pernicious, and indeed it is not confined within the borders of your states, but extends much more widely, so that scarcely any nation is found free from the contagion of this evil. Therefore We praise your zeal; and although it is known and thoroughly understood what Christian philosophy, with natural reason certainly agreeing, prescribes in this matter, nevertheless, since the depraved custom of dueling is especially nourished by forgetfulness of Christian precepts, it will be expedient and useful that this very matter be recalled briefly by Us.

“Namely, both divine laws—that which is natural from the light of reason, and that which has been promulgated in writings composed by divine inspiration—strictly forbid anyone to kill or wound a man apart from a public cause, unless, compelled by necessity, it is for the sake of defending his own safety. But those who challenge another to a private combat or accept one offered act for this purpose and direct their mind and strength toward this: although constrained by no necessity, to take away the life of their adversary or at least to inflict a wound upon him. Moreover, both divine laws forbid anyone rashly to cast away his own life, exposing it to grave and manifest danger, when no consideration of duty or magnanimous charity urges it; but this blind rashness, contemptuous of life, plainly inheres in the nature of a duel. Therefore it can be obscure or doubtful to no one that upon those who privately engage in single combat there fall both the crime of another’s destruction and the voluntary endangerment of their own life. Finally, there is scarcely any plague which is more abhorrent to the discipline of civil life and more subversive of the just order of the state than the permission granted to citizens that each man should become the defender of his own right by private force and hand, and the avenger of honor which he thinks has been violated.

“For these reasons the Church of God, which is guardian and vindicator both of truth and of justice and uprightness, by the union of which public peace and order are maintained, has always vehemently condemned the practice and has taken care that those guilty of private combat be restrained by the graver penalties which she could impose. The Constitutions of Alexander III, Our predecessor, inserted in the books of canon law, condemn and execrate these private combats. The Council of Trent punished with singular severity of penalties all who enter into them or participate in them in any manner; for, besides other things, it also branded them with the mark of infamy and, having cast them from the bosom of the Church, judged them unworthy, if they died in the combat, of ecclesiastical burial. Our predecessor Benedict XIV enlarged and explained the Tridentine sanctions in the Constitution issued on 10 November 1752, whose beginning is Detestabilem. But in the most recent period Pius IX, of happy memory, in the Apostolic Letter whose beginning is Apostolicae Sedis, by which latae sententiae censures are limited, openly declared that ecclesiastical penalties are incurred not only by those who fight in a duel, but also by those whom they call seconds, and likewise by witnesses and accomplices.

“The wisdom of these laws shines forth the more clearly, the more evident it is how foolish are those things customarily brought forward to defend or excuse the savage custom of dueling. For what is spread among the common people—that combats of this kind are adapted by their nature for washing away the stains which another’s slander or insult has placed upon the honor of citizens—is such as can deceive no one but a man bereft of judgment. For although the one who, having received an injury, declared the combat should depart from it victorious, the judgment of all sensible men will be that by such an outcome of the combat the challenger is proved better indeed in strength for fighting or in handling arms, but is not thereby proved superior in uprightness. But if that very man should fall, to whom in turn would this manner of defending honor not appear inconsiderate and altogether absurd? Indeed, We think that there are few who undertake this crime because they have been deceived by an error of opinion. It is altogether the desire for vengeance which impels proud and fierce men to seek punishment. If they were willing to restrain their haughty spirit and to obey God, who commands men to love one another with fraternal love and forbids anyone to be violated, who most gravely condemns the lust of taking vengeance in private men and reserves to Himself alone the power of exacting punishments, they would easily depart from the savage custom of dueling.

“Nor do those who accept an offered combat have available a just excuse of fear, because they fear that they will be considered cowardly by the common people if they refuse the fight. For if the duties of men were to be measured according to the false opinions of the common people and not according to the eternal norm of right and justice, there would be no natural and true distinction between upright actions and deeds shamefully committed. The wise pagans themselves both knew and taught that the fallacious judgments of the common people are to be despised by a brave and constant man. Rather, it is a just and holy fear which turns a man away from unjust slaughter and makes him solicitous for his own safety and that of his brethren. Indeed, he who disdains the empty judgments of the common people and prefers to undergo the lashes of insults rather than to abandon duty in any matter is clearly of a far greater and loftier spirit than one who, when provoked by an injury, rushes to arms. Indeed, if the matter is judged rightly, he alone is the one in whom solid fortitude shines forth—that fortitude, I say, which is truly called virtue and whose companion is a glory neither counterfeit nor deceptive. For virtue consists in a good consonant with reason, and unless glory rests upon the judgment of an approving God, all glory is foolish.

“Finally, the baseness of the duel is so manifest that even the legislators of our age, although it is supported by the votes and patronage of many, have judged that it must be restrained by public authority and by prescribed penalties. In this matter, however, it is most perverse and pernicious that written laws are nearly eluded in deed and fact, and this not rarely while those whose office it is to punish the guilty and to provide that the laws be obeyed know of it and remain silent. Thus it comes about that everywhere it is possible with impunity to descend to single combats, the majesty of the laws having been spurned.

“Foolish also and unworthy of a wise man is the opinion of those who, although they think that civilians are to be restrained from this kind of combat, nevertheless judge that it is to be permitted to soldiers, because they say that military virtue is sharpened by such exercise. First, honorable and base things differ by nature and can in no manner be changed into their contraries on account of the diverse state of persons. All men, in whatever condition of life, are altogether bound in an equal manner by divine and natural law. Furthermore, the reason for such indulgence toward soldiers would have to be sought from public utility, which can never be so great that under its pretext the voice of natural and divine right may be silenced. What if the very reason of utility is manifestly lacking? For the incentives of military virtue aim at this: that the state be better instructed against enemies. But will that be able to be effected with the aid of that custom which by its own nature aims at this: that, when a quarrel arises among soldiers, causes of which are not rare, one or the other of the defenders of the fatherland, on either side, is harmed?

“Lastly, the recent age, which boasts that it excels earlier centuries by far in a more humane culture and elegance of manners, is accustomed to make little of more ancient institutions and all too often to reject whatever is at variance with the complexion of more recent refinement. What is it, therefore, that, amid so great a zeal for humanity, it does not repudiate these ignoble remnants alone of a ruder age and of foreign barbarism—We mean the custom of the duel?

“It will be your office, Venerable Brethren, diligently to inculcate in the minds of your peoples these things which We have briefly touched upon, lest they rashly accept false opinions concerning this matter or allow themselves to be carried along by the judgment of lighter men. Take care in particular that young men become accustomed early to think and judge concerning the duel that which, with natural philosophy agreeing, the Church judges and thinks; and let them constantly take from that judgment their rule of action. Indeed, just as in some places it has been received by custom that Catholics, especially those of flourishing age, spontaneously and perpetually forbid themselves to enroll in disreputable societies, in like manner We deem it opportune and very salutary that they should make among themselves something like a covenant, pledging their word that at no time and for no cause will they fight a duel.

“We suppliantly ask God to strengthen our common endeavors with heavenly power and graciously to grant that which We desire for the public welfare, for integrity of morals, and for the Christian life. And as a pledge of divine gifts and likewise a witness of Our benevolence, We most lovingly impart to you, Venerable Brethren, the Apostolic blessing in the Lord.

“Given at Rome at Saint Peter’s, on 12 September 1891, the fourteenth year of Our Pontificate. LEO PP. XIII.”

“The Bishop of Breslau explained to the Holy See that at that University the very evil custom prevails among the young students of fighting duels very frequently; indeed, societies have been established there in which the young men do not obtain the higher ranks without having sustained a great and fixed number of duels. Nevertheless, combats of this kind among the said students are not so dangerous that there is reason to fear for life or the mutilation of any member. For the most part they take place with a short knife, with which the face alone is aimed at, and the contest very often ends with a small wound, curable within a few days, which leaves no trace whatsoever.

That Bishop, having to admit certain young men to ecclesiastical tonsure and orders, who had been students of that University and who at that time had themselves also been duelists or seconds in duels, asked the Sacred Congregation whether, and from what irregularities, they had to be dispensed: whether from that which arises ex homicidio, or from the other which arises ex defectu lenitatis, or finally from that ex infamia iuris imposed by the Council of Trent.

Hence the following doubt was proposed: Whether, by whom, and under what title an irregularity is contracted when a duel is committed in the manner in which it is customary for one to be conducted in these times among the students of a German University, as in the case. — Resp. In the affirmative: by the duelists and their seconds, from infamy of law.” Sacred Congregation of the Council, 9 August 1890.

“1. A military man who, unless he should offer or accept a duel, would be regarded as fearful, timid, abject, and unfit for military offices, and hence would be deprived of the office by which he supports himself and his family, or would have to lack perpetually the hope of a promotion otherwise due to and merited by him, would be free from guilt and penalty whether he offers or accepts a duel. — 2. Those accepting a duel or challenging another to it can also be excused for the sake of defending honor or avoiding human contempt, when they know with certainty that the fight will not follow, since it will be prevented by others. — 3. A commander or officer of the military who accepts a duel from grave fear of the loss of reputation and office does not incur the ecclesiastical penalties imposed by the Church against duelists. — 4. In the natural state of man, it is lawful to accept and offer a duel in order to preserve one’s fortunes with honor, when their loss cannot be averted by another remedy. — 5. The license asserted for the state of nature can also be applied to the state of a badly ordered commonwealth, in which, namely, through either the negligence or the malice of the magistrate, justice is openly denied.” Propositions condemned and prohibited as false, scandalous, and pernicious by Benedict XIV in the Constitution Detestabilem, 10 November 1752.

“2. A gentleman challenged to a duel can accept it, lest he incur among others the mark of cowardice.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII.

“34. To fight against the Turks is to resist God visiting our iniquities through them.” Proposition of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

“62. The principle which they call non-intervention is to be proclaimed and observed.” Proposition condemned by Pius IX in the Syllabus.