§ I. Number of Persons as a Standard

A distribution of produce according to the number of persons of a given section or community has not, to our knowledge, been advocated by any socialist. And naturally so; for to give the same amount of produce to each individual, whether diligent or idle, skilful or unskilful, strong or weak, whether his wants be few or many, would be evidently most unfair. Such a system would set a premium upon idleness and incapacity, and would blast all industry in the bud.

The preceding lines were written before Bellamy’s novel came into our hands. The American fictionist of the future has all produce equally divided among all in his socialist commonwealth. Each one, according to Bellamy, receives at the beginning of the year an equal number of credit cards, on which he can at all times draw an equal value of goods from the public storehouses. In every community or ward there is such a magazine, from which each one can draw exactly what he pleases. The value of the credit cards, given to all, is so high as considerably to surpass the ordinary wants of an individual or family. If, however, in an exceptional case the value of the card is not sufficient, each one may receive credit in advance for the following year. For, as Bellamy remarks, the nation is wealthy, and does not wish its members to suffer any want. Economy is no longer considered a virtue. No one is concerned for the morrow, whether for himself or for his children, for the nation guarantees nourishment, education, and comfortable support to all its citizens, from the cradle to the grave. What luxury must develop from such a state of things, in which economy is no longer considered a virtue, may be easily imagined. How we are to judge of the assertion that the socialist state shall be so rich that there will be no more need of economy, and that supplies will be equal to the demands in all sections, we may easily conclude from what has been said under a previous heading.

But how will Bellamy reconcile with justice the principle that no regard is had for the amount of labor performed, for capacity, and for the experience and skill of individuals; that the weakest, the most stupid, and most inexperienced receive the same remuneration as the strongest, the most skilful, and the most experienced? Bellamy, through his mouthpiece Dr. Leete, replies to this difficulty that the amount of labor performed has nothing to do with the distribution of produce, since this is a question of merit; and merit is a moral idea, while the quantity of produce is material. It would be a remarkable kind of logic, he thinks, to endeavor to decide a moral question by a material standard. The degree of effort alone is decisive in regard to merit; whence we do not reward a horse because he bears a heavier burden than a goat would bear. But if Bellamy would compare man with a horse he must be consistent, and deny him all merit also in view of effort. We do not attribute true merit to a horse, no matter how great has been his effort; we do not feed him on account of his merits, but on account of his usefulness; and thus, too, Bellamy must treat the man of the future, if he wishes to be consistent.

But merit is a moral idea, and the quantity of labor produced is material. As to this quibble, we reply first of all that Bellamy contradicts himself; for the effort of the laborer is at least mainly material or physical; why, then, does Bellamy attribute merit to it? Or does he imagine that only the effort, but not the product of labor or the labor performed, is a rational moral activity? But when we ascribe merit to labor performed we do not understand by it the physical product of labor as such, but the performance itself, in as much as it is a valuable, creative activity. We reward, not the food which the cook prepares for our use, * but the labor of cooking, the value of which, it is true, we determine by the product or the food cooked.

In the second place, if Bellamy asserts that merit is something moral, we must distinguish between formal merit as such—that is, in as much as it implies a right to a reward, and the title of merit—or the meritorious action. The former, it is true, is something purely moral, the latter is not. The title of merit is an action which is useful for another; and whenever there is not question of moral merit (with God), but of physical merit (with man), its value is determined according to the usefulness of the action performed for the benefit of our fellow men or society—always supposing, of course, that the action is free and imputable to the subject.