Section — Clark, New Questions, Old Answers
A Proposed Synthesis
In none of the magisterial literature is there any suggestion that NFP may be used without serious motives. However, there is also no exploration of the precise excuse for using the sexual act to achieve so-called secondary ends, such as psychological or social health or the expression of love, as opposed to other means which can also achieve these things; the literature is altogether silent on this, while, as we have seen, St. Thomas is not. Yet in the Commentary on the Sentences St. Thomas simply calls all requests for the marital debt venial sin if not requested for the sake of procreation, which sin varies in degrees depending on whether its motive is to avoid one’s own worse sin (lesser guilt) or merely for pleasure (greater guilt).
The solution which ties all of this together, including the core of the doctrine of St. Thomas and his forebearers on the use of marriage, is the following thesis: the use of marriage can never be licit if it is not intended for procreation, as a payment of the debt, or the reasonably needful relaxation of one’s concupiscence in view of removing distractions to work or prayer, and/or in view of avoiding unchastity. Recourse to infertile periods leaves the couple with only two other excusing motives, even if other motives may exist, however causally connected with the act they may be.
A repetition and rephrasing of the thesis may help to explain the point. Conjugal acts in NFP may be used in relation to the request for and payment of the marital debt for the sake of preserving fidelity (preventing unchastity) or for the general calming of concupiscence in favor of rational goods. It may not be used merely for the sake of venereal (sexual) pleasure or even merely for the sake of other benefits which are accidental to the sexual act but which flow from or are annexed to venereal pleasure, such as the psychological or social health of the spouses, without the true need for the relaxation of one’s passions. Thus, St. Thomas’ distinction between “preventing sin” and “mere pleasure” is preserved – to pursue “pleasure” is forbidden, while preventing sin is allowed.100 There must be a per se order between the sexual act and what one seeks from it, and this means desiring either children, or desiring the calming of morally hazardous or at least distracting concupiscence, as desiring mere pleasure (also a per se effect) is clearly excluded by St. Thomas. The pleasure must be a means to the removal of the passions which urge one to pursue the sexual act in the first place; the pleasure must not be pursued simply for its own sake, or even merely as a means of increasing social ties between the spouses or other psychological or social goods (i.e. to pass the time). This relaxation of concupiscence, however, also has a per se order with the sexual act, as it is the natural completion of the trajectory of this particular desire. The satiation which is concomitant with the passion of delight simply is the same as the removal or relaxation of the desire by fulfilling that same desire. 100 See ST Supp. q. 64, a. 8, resp.
Both the removal of distracting concupiscence in view of the normal pursuit of rational goods, and in view of avoiding sin, would be justified on this account.101 The act is certainly not unnatural vice,102 nor does it seem right to call it natural vice as it does not directly threaten the welfare of a future child, but neither is it licit. It sits in a third category in between all three, which we might call “immoderateness.” It is simply immoderate natural sexual activity by a kind of excess, just like the Commentary on the Sentences implies of any requested sexual activity on holy days. Immoderateness, therefore, could be due to time or place or some other condition, but in this case it is immoderate with respect to the act itself and one’s intention in using it. 101 This is a very slight shift beyond the doctrine put forward by St. Alphonsus through Busembaum which we will see; they seem exclusively concerned with the danger of incontinence. However, given that concupiscence grows more dangerous over time, and the pursuit of normal rational goods is impeded by the fomentation of concupiscence into strong desire which is still not yet “proximate to sin,” I see this minimal and cautious extension as being justifiable or at least plausible. 102 See SCG, III, 122, 5.
In the case of using NFP for recreation’s sake, the couple exceeds the moderate use of intercourse even more than a couple who simply seeks pleasure without virtually or actually intending procreation and without the need of the pacification of concupiscence. Desiring merely sexual pleasure from the marital act is a venial sin, much like merely desiring pleasure when eating (gluttony) or when speaking immoderately (idle words), and in this case it is aggravated by the positive insistence upon infertility, rather than a mere lack of intention to conceive. Taking the speech analogy, the use of NFP in view of sexual recreation while legitimately needing to avoid pregnancy is like the use of a justified broad mental reservation mixed with idle speech and insisting on the lack of the hearer’s understanding for the sake of obtaining the pleasure of speaking; that is to say, one has the right to deceive with speech in this case, but one does not actually need to speak at all and to do so is immoderate, and furthermore one is delighting in the inability of the hearer’s deception so that pleasure can be taken in one’s idle speech. Whether or not intending against and actively avoiding conception in the act (the “broad mental reservation”) is itself justified is a separate question, but if it is unjustified then the guilt of immoderate sexual activity clearly increases even more.
In the case of NFP as a framework for the moderate use of the marital debt in view of relieving dangerous concupiscence, the couple uses the marital debt in a way that also avoids an unnecessary and dangerous burden to themselves or some kind of peril to any potential children due to a severe lack of economic means or similarly grave circumstances which would occasion the legitimate avoidance of welcoming children. The man or woman delays its use until such a time as children are not likely to proceed, essentially suppressing his or her concupiscence until there is a suitable moment to relieve it. The use of the marital debt planned around natural infertility is an act of justice which is without sin itself and helps to avoid the grave sins of self-abuse or adultery and removes the distraction of habitual and acute pulls of concupiscence; simultaneously it ideally also builds discipline, communication, and trust, and it hopefully also builds anticipation for the time when children can in fact be welcomed indiscriminately.
Finally, it is easily argued that, while originating with concupiscence, the act itself proceeds from rightly ordered reason, a kind of act of temperance under the aspect of prudence exercised over oneself,103 in view of both avoiding future sin by removing its occasion and also of removing barriers to purer friendship and contemplation. We have already looked at the analogy with communication, but this is also in some way analogous to St. Thomas’ treatment of sobriety, wherein he lauds the complete abstinence from alcohol as ideal but calls its moderate use “most profitable.”104 While alcohol calms the mind and body without necessarily depriving one of the use of reason, such a possibility does not obtain with sexual intercourse, which by its very nature generally does not admit of the use of reason during its act or at a minimum greatly inhibits its act, especially on the part of the man; therefore, one must be more discerning in its use.105 However, it seems the debt can and even ought to be requested when it is authentically needed, even if beholden to a predictable schedule by which one must hold him or herself, but not without careful interior moderation and self-honesty in regard to one’s true needs, vis-à-vis truly just reasons for avoiding pregnancy in the first place.106 This also solves the conundrum of perpetual infertility: the couple who can no longer conceive for whatever reason does not therefore have license to recreate sexually at will, presuming upon their infertility. Since such a couple is unable to form a true intention in favor of children, given they know conception to be impossible (or at least extremely improbable), they find themselves in the same position in relation to the conjugal act as a couple using periodic continence to avoid having children during the window of time when there is moral certitude that conception cannot occur.107 Thus we have provided for one part of the phrase from the 1932 dubium submitted to the Sacred Penitentiary: “upright motives.” 103 ST I-II q. 47, a. 12, ad. 3. 104 ST II-II q. 149, a. 3, ad. 2, etc. 105 In general, pleasures of food and drink are less relevant for the common good and thus are not as important to moderate (with the obvious exception of intoxicating drinks being very important not to use to excess). See SCG III ch. 123, 7: “It should be considered, further, that generation is the only natural act that is ordered to the common good, for eating and the emission of waste matters pertain to the individual good, but generation to the preservation of the species . . . [A] greater sin results from a disorder in this area [sexual impropriety] than in regard to the use of food or other things of that kind.” It is to be observed, however, that the five classical species of gluttony (see ST I-II q. 148, a. 4) could be mapped onto excesses in the conjugal act between spouses, albeit somewhat imperfectly. 106 The need for the relief of concupiscence should also, of course, be judged in light of the possibility of pregnancy which could result in the sort of struggles which would justify recourse to the use of the infertile periods in the first place, or else there could begin to be sin in the request on account of a lack of due self-restraint given the circumstances. However, taking the case of the leprous husband given by St. Thomas, it seems that the absolute or unconditional refusal of the debt would only be licit in the case only in grave circumstances as opposed to merely “serious” circumstances (i.e., leprosy), which the Angelic Doctor himself discusses and provides examples of, albeit not making the serious/grave distinction. St. Thomas does not consider the question of whether one spouse may lawfully refuse the debt if he or she foresees independently that another child would be impossible to care for, i.e., to feed. 107 One must be honest about how plausible conception can be during a period where infertility is the norm. If one can actually form a reasonable intention to attempt conception, then so be it; this seems to be a binary evaluation, not admitting of a judgment of proportion (viz., strength of intention vis-à-vis possibility of conception). Rather, if one can actually form an honest intention to procreate and do have this intention in a conjugal act, then the act is formed by that intention. Ironically, having less knowledge about the fertility cycle of the woman allows for more freedom in this way, as one is unsure when the most infertile time would be.
The question of whether the woman might try to extract a small amount of pleasure without inhibiting reason as a kind of recreation, let alone in paying the debt or attempting to procreate, was addressed indirectly in the past, such as by Kenrick in his famous manual,108 but the opinions on this point were tainted by flawed biological assumptions about the role of pleasure with respect to conception. While claims that the woman sins mortally in the suppression of pleasure are overwrought, there is certainly reason to be skeptical of the proposal to moderate the pleasure of natural union in view of the extraction of that same pleasure without inhibiting reason. This is for at least two reasons. First, because the use of marriage still inhibits the reason of the man. Second, the desire for pleasure during the act would be frequently too difficult to control. A further consideration is the psychological (and social) frustration which could arise from such behavior practiced over a long time. Therefore, this kind of sexual activity seems to be venial sin on the part of the woman, albeit very slight. All this separates such a practice from the moderate use of intoxicants. 108 See Bishop Francis Kenrick, Theologiae Moralis (1843), vol. III, ch. 3, §2 (#70), p. 310, etc.
So there are these five cases: desiring the relief of concupiscence to free oneself from distraction in view of rational goods; desiring the relief of concupiscence to avoid sin; desiring pleasure alone without an intention for or against children; desiring pleasure alone with a justified intention of infertility (and use of infertility); desiring pleasure alone with an unjustified intention of infertility (and use of infertility). The latter three are immoderate, by degrees. They are made less sinful by the intention of other goods beyond pleasure, such as honor, to settle a dispute, affection, etc., but absent a virtual or actual intention in favor of children (or as a fulfillment of a request for the debt) they will remain venially sinful.
A doctrine quite similar to the proposed synthesis is given by St. Alphonsus Liguori himself, in quoting Busembaum (without subsequent comment or modification, thus implicitly endorsing the content or at least indicating it as a reasonable opinion):
From the foregoing cases, it follows that it is permissible to use marriage: 1) for the sake of children, even if this should not necessarily be intended while it is practiced, provided that it is not positively hindered; nay, even sometimes it is lawfully intended against, such as by the poor man, lest he be burdened too much with children; 2) to avoid the risk of incontinence in oneself or in one’s partner; whoever requests the act commits venial sin, unless the impulses of the flesh cannot be restrained in another way [Alphonsus: as the same ends for which one may marry render honest the request for the debt]; 3) on account of health or on account of other extrinsic ends: because what is honorable by its nature and related to one end is lawfully referred to another not inconsistent with it. But to use it only for the sake of health is probably venial sin.109 109 “Ex dictis casibus consequenter resolvitur, licitum esse uti matrimonio: 1) prolis causa, etsi haec non necessario debeat intendi, dum exercetur, dummodo positive non impediatur; imo etiam aliquando simplici affectu licite excludatur, v. gr. a paupere, ne nimium prolibus gravetur; 2) ad vitandum periculum incontinentiae in se vel comparte; qui vult, esse veniale, nisi tamen stimuli carnis aliter sedari non possint [Alphonsus: Iidem enim fines, quos habere licet ad matrimonium contrahendum, cohonestant etiam petitionem copulae]; 3) valetudinis causa vel propter alios fines extrinsecos: quia honestum ex natura sua et relatum ad unum finem licite refertur ad alium isti non repugnantem. Solius tamen sanitatis causa uti, probabile est, esse veniale.” [Edited to remove some references.] Quoted in St. Alphonsus Liguori, Theologia Moralis: De Matrimonii, (Book VI, Tract VI) §927; cf. Hermann Busembaum, Medulla Theologiae Moralis (1645), p. 566; see also the preceding “cases,” (p. 564-6) which regard illicit uses (i.e. in public, when one’s life is threatened, etc.). See also p. 562. Note that “qui vult” seems to indicate the one requesting beyond the need to avoid incontinence in oneself or in one’s spouse, not one perceiving signs for a request and taking initiative to make a reciprocal request (as one is sometimes bound – a topic which St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus also discuss in some detail). For an exposition of St. Alphonsus’ treatment, and of its relation to Sánchez and other authors with a related (and somewhat problematic) discussion which exceeds the specific scope of the present book, see Fr. Shaji George Kochuthara, CMI, Towards a Theology of Sexual Pleasure: Continuity and Development in the Theology of Sexual Pleasure in the Catholic Tradition (Lambert, 2011), and see also John T. Noonan, Contraception (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1986); in Contraception one finds helpful material, including material about some of the earliest authorities (i.e. St. Albert the Great, Denis the Carthusian, Le Maistre, etc.) who signaled a slow shift away from the Augustinian line on the use of marriage. A full treatment of St. Alphonsus’s own doctrine on the use of marriage would require its own book-length work. Here I am only pointing to the most immediately relevant passage for our consideration.
We see here the doctrine which has been laid out in the present text in these three points. This 17th century passage (1645), reiterated by St. Alphonsus in the 18th century, represents perhaps the most significant endorsement of NFP prior to the Sacred Penitentiary declarations of the mid and late 1800’s, even though it is primitive in its articulation, lacking altogether the explicit mention of periodic continence to obtain what is desired.110 110 It seems that Sánchez overall takes a somewhat relaxed view of the use of marriage compared to St. Alphonsus, but, as noted earlier, he explicitly rejects the thesis that the Sacrament of Matrimony as such itself provides an excuse for the use of marriage (De Matrimonii IX, 8, 13-14). However, on the other hand, earlier in the same Disputation we read him: “Hinc deducitur, conjugem utentem matrimonio, nec expresse intendentem, nec excludentem prolem, sed illius immemorem, intendentemque solum copulari conjugi tanquam conjugi, minime peccare. Quia licet non intendat prolem formaliter, at virtute intendit cum actus ille suapte natura ad prolis generationem tendat, nec ex operantis intentione ad alium finem referatur.” Here, we have to wonder whether Sánchez would think that periodic continence used specifically to avoid procreation would fit into this kind of use of marriage. It is also unclear how an exterior act can be its own motivation per se, without any pleasure or other purpose motivating the act.
The first two points are rather affirmative of what has already been said. The first point notes that the intention to have children is one justification for the use of marriage. This is modified by the statement, already anticipating the modern theory on NFP, that in some cases not only is a virtual intention of procreation not required, but an intention positively against having children is sometimes admissible, as in the case where more children would be too burdensome for a family. The second point is essentially making the same claim as the current synthesis. The request for the marital debt is licit to make when and only when it is the only sufficient means of relaxing the concupiscence. Finally, of course it is licit in itself to pay the debt to one’s spouse when asked.
The third point requires some careful examination. When it is said that extrinsic ends are lawful to pursue by using the marital act, this does not necessarily mean such ends may be pursued independently of some other, “intrinsic” end. To take the given example, supposing one wishes to engage in the marital act for the sake of health, it is necessary also to have some other motivation, or else it is “probable” that it is venial sin, it is said. Likewise, I propose, if one engages in the marital act for the sake of honor, or to end a dispute, one indeed pursues an honest end; however, just as with health, to act for such honest ends alone is difficult to excuse without venial sin.111 Clearly, if the good of one’s own body is not sufficient motive of itself, these other goods would not be either (with the possible exception of consummation, as it corresponds quite directly with the good of the sacrament). This would also extend to social and psychological goods, viz., the increasing of marital intimacy; this seems all the more plausible given the fact that if Busembaum or St. Alphonsus had wanted to say a psychological or social good (the intensification of the “gentle association” which St. Thomas speaks of in the Summa Contra Gentiles) would be a sufficient motive by itself for using the marital act, we ought to presume that they would have simply said so.112 Therefore, my extension of Busembaum’s text, is that if one is not intending children, or paying the debt, he or she must be intending the relief of desire which cannot otherwise reasonably be relieved. These are the only three motives which of themselves will excuse conjugal acts. This stays as close as is reasonably possible to the thought of St. Thomas. 111 This way of addressing the problem differs slightly from St. Alphonsus. I also note the intriguing and somewhat unexplored possibility that a conjugal act used exclusively to render a marriage indissoluble (“consummation”) could arguably justify the act’s use. This is perhaps how one might argue for an excusing good corresponding to the good of “sacrament,” thus completing the trio – with the payment of the debt corresponding to “fidelity” and procreation corresponding to “children.” Once the marriage is consummated, however, the two are now one flesh, as Christ and the Church in habit if not in act, regardless of whether they are united in carnal union ever again. (I doubt that the request for the debt is lawful simply in order to re-establish the normal dynamics of rights and duties in marital life after the commission of adultery; one ought to take an oath reestablishing fidelity instead. However, the contrary opinion is also plausible as a good annexed to fidelity, or perhaps somehow annexed both to fidelity and sacrament.) 112 I note further that the fact that the relief of concupiscence is not treated as an extrinsic end. Health is treated as an extrinsic end because, even though it stays within the same substance (and therefore does not depend on the disposition of some second substance outside itself), it does not necessarily follow, while the relaxation of concupiscence does necessarily follow, especially on the part of the man – on the part of the woman, it may follow in various degrees. Health – or even bonding, affection, honor, and other goods (except indissolubility arising from consummation) – could in fact be harmed, and in many cases is harmed. Never, however, is there an effect contrary to procreation (an “anti-child”), and the pleasure of sexual union is a universally sufficient cause of the relaxation of sexual concupiscence. We can see that other honest ends (i.e. health, fostering affection, etc.) have a different and weaker causal relationship with the marital act than pleasure and relief of concupiscence. Procreation has a formally stronger causative connection, insofar as it is the purpose for which the generative organs exist in the first place, despite the fact that conception does not always follow their natural use.
The justification or ratio of the relief of concupiscence through the use of marriage apart from an intention of conception is the avoidance of sin and the pursuit of rational goods (i.e. contemplation, mental capacity for needful work, etc.). The former good is noted well in the older authors, such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas, but the latter is not as clearly enunciated but is nevertheless a true good which must be considered. By temporarily inhibiting one’s powers of reason, one regains them rejuvenated, like taking a nap. There must be equivalence, however, between the good given up (temporary use of reason) and the good gained; just as one ought not to take a nap when there is work to do and a coffee would suffice, one ought not to ease concupiscence by inhibiting one’s reason through pleasure when some simple prayers or focused attention on other things would suffice. Certainly, there will be times when it will not suffice within reason, and this might even be able to be known well enough across longer amounts of time, and even according to certain “seasons.” In addition to perceiving clearly an immediate need, understanding the patterns or trends in one’s needs in the long-term, the logic of planning times during a month when conjugal acts will be used while avoiding conception begins to make some minimal amount of sense. One delays the act in accordance with the expectation that in some days it will be possible, and this expectation is enough to keep one satisfied until then. However, should it then not actually be necessary at that time, one ought to make this judgment honestly and forego the act. (One might also delay the request for the debt out of some kind of consideration of one’s spouse – whether the spouse’s condition is from a physical, psychological, or moral defect, i.e., they would be very angry if the debt was requested during fertility).
Knowing the times of cyclical infertility helps each spouse attend to his or her own needs in this matter while avoiding conception, taking for granted that conception is licitly avoided. The knowledge provides the freedom to help oneself and one’s spouse ease concupiscence if it is really needed during that time, which need might be part of an ebb and flow of temptations and desires which are treated in the aggregate rather than according to some particular feeling in the present moment. In any case, one must be honest about his or her needs.
We read Pius XII on this matter in the same speech to Italian midwives already referenced. He says,
The husband and wife do no wrong in seeking out and enjoying this pleasure [cooperating with God in propagating the human race]. They are accepting what the Creator intended for them. Still, here too, the husband and wife ought to know how to keep within the bounds of moderation. As in eating and drinking, they ought not to give themselves over completely to the promptings of their senses, so neither ought they to subject themselves unrestrainedly to their sensual appetite. This, therefore, is the rule to be followed: the use of the natural, generative instinct and function is lawful in the married state only, and in the service of the purposes for which marriage exists.113 113 Pope Pius XII, “Address to Participants in the Conference of the Italian Catholic Union of Obstetricians,” (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, October 29, 1951).
He continues,
The moral lawfulness of such conduct [limiting the use of the marital act to times of natural sterility] would be affirmed or denied according as to whether or not the intention to keep constantly to these periods is based on sufficient and reliable moral grounds. The sole fact that the couple do not offend against the nature of the act and that they are willing to accept and bring up the child that is born notwithstanding the precautions they have taken, would not of itself alone be sufficient guarantee of a right intention and of the unquestionable morality of the motives themselves. . . . The seriousness and holiness of the Christian moral law does not permit the unrestrained satisfying of the sexual instinct, nor such seeking merely for pleasure and enjoyment. It does not allow rational man to let himself be so dominated either by the substance or the circumstances of the act.114 114 Ibid. He goes on, “Make it clear that nature has undoubtedly given the instinctive desire for pleasure and sanctioned it in lawful wedlock, not as an end in itself, but in the service of life. Banish from your hearts this cult of pleasure, and do your best to stop the spreading of literature which considers it a duty to describe the intimacies of married life under the pretext of giving instruction, guidance and reassurance. In general, common sense, natural instinct, and a short instruction on the clear and simple maxims of the Christian moral law, will suffice to give peace to husband and wife of tender conscience.”
Based on his tone, we can see that Pius XII is not of one mind with the popular authors of today. He does allow for recourse to infertile periods as long as it is for a purpose of marriage – and here we recall that the easing of concupiscence is a good of marriage, albeit a secondary good.115 115 A note on virtual intentionality is warranted. While a true virtual intention in favor of the procreation of new life excuses every conjugal act (keeping in mind that conception must at least be seen as a reasonable possibility such that an actual intention could be formed were there advertence to the question of fertility), it is important to note that there can easily exist such a weak desire for children that it reduces to merely “notional” intention – one simply likes the idea of having children, or wants to have children someday, but this desire does not truly influence or motivate the act at all.
We can also see that this hypothesis – that the naturally and intentionally infertile use of marriage is justified by the need for relief from harmful concupiscence – is the middle position between two extremes. On the one hand, there is the classical position of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, which sees this sort of act as venial sin; on the other hand, there is the position taken by the popular authors today, who think affective goods alone suffice for the licit use of marriage or even that pleasure alone suffices, basically because marriage and its act are good things in themselves. The hypothesis also essentially tracks and logically extends the teaching of St. Alphonsus on the point – it is essentially an application of his teaching in light of the clear and certain knowledge we now possess regarding cyclical fertility.116 Those wishing to argue for one of the extreme positions are invited to consider that they are in fact so doing. 116 As a topic generally treated in the manuals in a section normally titled “On the Use of Marriage,” an enormous amount of writing exists in the classical authors on the motives for the conjugal acts. A large book could and should be written summarizing, comparing, and analyzing the various opinions. This is only a perfunctory treatment of the topic in view of addressing the central question, using St. Alphonsus as a primary authority (and cautiously extending beyond him in a minimal capacity, as noted in footnote 101.