Other Errors Discussed

One of the great problems with the way the problem is set up is that rigorist critics of NFP wish to jump into analyzing the avoidance of conception in a given conjugal act before asking the question, “What is the motive for the act in the first place?” As already mentioned, conjugal activity is not the default state of a person. Not attempting to conceive at the present moment is certainly not immoral – it is the habitual state of all human beings most of the time – and few people would argue that there are no circumstances which would justify a couple from intending not to have children for a considerable amount of time (i.e. war, famine, serious health problems, etc.) Given that intending not to have children is certainly not morally problematic in itself, nor is abstaining from relations, the question of motives for individual conjugal acts is then perhaps a better starting point for the conversation than “conjugal acts as desired to be infertile in the context of periodic continence.” If a couple is habitually intending not to have children, this is one object of moral evaluation – if they use conjugal acts, why they are doing so in each instance is a separate albeit connected object of moral evaluation. “NFP” actually refers to a bundle of conditions, acts, and non-acts, in relation to contrary ends (achieving conception or avoiding conception); caution is warranted in speaking about “NFP” as if it was clear what one is actually talking about, especially with respect to an individual person’s will, which is the fundamental subject of sin, not “acts” and certainly not “non-acts and conditions,” even if united around a single intention. Each conjugal act is in fact its own choice requiring its own moral evaluation, including an evaluation of the motivation for that particular act. These acts and non-acts based on various circumstances are informed by the more general or universal intention of “such-and-such kind of family situation.” As long as the intended result is itself good and just to pursue, and as long as each act will be in itself morally upright, there is good moral order towards such an end in those various acts which converge thereto, even if other ends are pursued besides.⁵⁰ Some skeptics of NFP might be very confident that the overall “planning” of the family while using conjugal acts during infertile times is immoral, but they might not be able to say which particular act is a sin – either this or that conjugal act (by commission), this or that non-act (by omission), or the intention of this or that end (such-and-such a family situation). Simply because an infertile time was specifically chosen for a conjugal act a few days ago, and there is a conscious choice not to engage in a conjugal act now during a fertile time on account of fertility, and an intention to engage in another conjugal act once infertility returns, does not mean one is acting against nature; it means one is attempting not to conceive through one’s natural conjugal acts. There is not some mysterious piece of the moral puzzle in between the acts with their intended secondary goods, the non-acts to avoid conceiving, the circumstances of fertility and infertility which accompany these, and the greater intention being sought of a particular family situation. There are simply these things, no “planning” or “system” which is somehow itself a distinct object of volition and therefore subject to its own moral analysis. ⁵⁰ See ST I-II, q. 18, a. 2; a. 6; a. 7.

The reality of gametes as secondary causes helps to explain why it is not obligatory to will conception in a sexual act – a topic which will be discussed in particular in Chapter Three. It is the gametes which have the immediate (or proximate) natural inclination towards conception, not the primary causes (human beings). All that nature insists upon from the primary causes is the proper disposition of gametes according to the natural order of human generation through the use of the body according to its design (“natural union”). It is the “responsibility” of the gametes to achieve conception, whereas it is only the couple’s responsibility to use their bodies in a natural (“integral”) way. The parsimony reflected by this principle is echoed in the minimal duty of one who speaks to tell the truth without necessarily willing that it be understood or believed by anyone (an example to be discussed momentarily) – the secondary cause (the statement itself in words) has its own causative power, in cooperation with the intellect of the hearer. In a sense, with the use of faculties involving secondary causes we are only absolutely responsible for willing what we can ourselves achieve by the means of our rationally coordinated action, as a matter of natural ethical parsimony. Conception in the natural way goes beyond this ability (unlike artificial conception). With the use of faculties whose use just is to achieve their purpose we see that this principle is not at work – for instance, to use the faculty of locomotion really is the same as to move, the logical distinction notwithstanding. With such faculties there is also not a duty that they achieve their end, because the achievement of their end is the same as their use. Even with inward-facing faculties like digestion or breathing, which have unconscious and essentially involuntary processes which work to achieve the proper end, it seems one is only bound to will the end be reached insofar as it relates to the principle of totality (namely, doing good to oneself overall). The stomach and the lungs as designed by God are “responsible” for achieving the end, not the one eating or breathing.

Frequently, one hears that it is required to be “open to life” in a conjugal act and that using NFP means one remains “open to life.” It is important to note that this phrase can be used in different ways and that only one of these senses addresses the bare minimum requirements for a licit conjugal act. The first sense is with respect to the act itself being “open to life” in that there remains some probability of conception in a conjugal act. This is not a very helpful criterion, as acts which are contraceptive simply speaking can and do sometimes result in pregnancy by accident, and acts which are totally sterile on account of some physical condition (i.e. the absence of a uterus) can still be licit. The second sense is with respect to the individual being “open to life,” and it is to say that one must will that conception be achieved, or at least not find its achievement to be repugnant. This is false, as explained above, and as taught by St. Alphonsus, as we will see. One is not bound to desire conception and may even will that it not occur. The third and correct sense, or at least the most useful sense, is said with respect to the physical integrity of the act being “open to life,” that is, according to its externalities and circumstances willed there is not anything which would impede the well-functioning of gametes in view of procreation. (A fourth sense, which confuses the issue further, is to speak of being “open to life” as a matter of habitual disposition – a sort of positive attitude toward having children in general.)

The objection that NFP violates the “hierarchy of ends” of the use of marriage is an understandable error. This claim confuses the finis operis (the “end of the work”) and the finis operantis (the “end of the worker”) by collapsing them together. The finis operis of a natural sexual act is primarily the generation of offspring, and secondarily it has a natural tendency towards causing other goods (i.e. mutual affective inclination, relief of concupiscence).⁵¹ I propose that the more dependent upon special rational or physical dispositions the more “secondary” these goods are.⁵² What is most important to understand is that the hierarchy of ends of the moral agent (indicating the finis operantis) does not in principle need to match the finis operis in order for the hierarchy of ends of the act and its finis operis to be maintained. Rather, the finis operis must have equality with (or “match”) its principle, namely, the sexual faculty, which has the generation of offspring as its exclusive end. (The sexual act may have several naturally ordained ends, but the sexual faculty as such only exists for procreation.) This is to say that the act which one does when using the sexual faculty (viz., any sexual act of any kind) must have a natural hierarchy of ends which includes human generation by not acting on undue matter which of its essential nature does not admit of conception in the act (homosexual acts, barriers, self-abuse, etc.).⁵³ Human generation is both the greatest good able to be obtained by any sexual act through a per se order, and the good toward which everything about any use of the sexual faculty and its directly annexed pleasures are ordered: by incentivizing union, preparing the body for union, and by disposing gametes for procreation – the man immediately, actively, and (normally) indirectly voluntarily in the sexual act itself; the woman habitually, passively, and (normally) involuntarily irrespective of the sexual act itself (she will ovulate regardless of whether or not there is union). Therefore, as long as conception is possible according to the matter acted upon (viz., man and woman as such) and the gametes are not impeded from pursuing their own ends (viz., procreative union/conception), procreation will be the primary end of the act itself, the finis operis, both as to its goodness and its order. To summarize, the completed union of man and woman through the generative organs just is to be doing an act that has procreation as its primary end, as the man does what is necessary to allow for male gametes to pursue union with their female pair, and the woman cooperates and consents to such disposition, while her own sexual faculty’s use is essentially involuntary in its principal act (the release of ova). There is no other primary end of the marriage act. ⁵¹ Here we are speaking of a per se order, rather than an order per accidens, which in this author’s view is best summarized by the connection between a choice to act upon a particular substance and effects which actually occur in that substance, and to some extent those effects which would occur without intervention. To light a tree on fire has a per se order with respect to the production of ash, smoke, heat, and light from the tree, but it has a per accidens order with these same things in an adjacent tree which is foreseen and even intended to be lit on fire by means of the fire of the first tree. A classical Aristotelian-Thomistic example illustrating per accidens order is theft to give alms or to commit adultery. (See ST I-II, q. 18, a. 6; a. 7.) ⁵² Later we will also see a treatment of “extrinsic” goods of conjugal acts, as opposed to “intrinsic” goods. ⁵³ Like onanism (withdrawal), the use of barriers (condoms) would be better construed as acting on undue matter rather than as contraception strictly speaking. This is because the man acts on inanimate matter (rubber), with the woman consenting to this and cooperating in it. All sexual contact properly speaking is mediated contact. This means in the order of depravity the use of barriers lies somewhere in between invasive chemical contraception (i.e. the pill, a temporary intervention harming the well-functioning of the body) and self-abuse, and it likely exceeds mutilation (a habitual intervention harming the well-functioning of the body) and certainly exceeds invasive physical intervention (such as an “IUD,” an “intra-uterine device”). It seems the least depraved kind of contraception would be non-invasive physical intervention (such as attempting to remove all male gametes from the birth canal after an act), followed by non-invasive chemical intervention (i.e. spermicide); lighter than this would be various interventions meant to reduce but not eliminate the chance of conception, even if biologically misguided (i.e. certain spatial modes of natural union, certain kinds of diets, etc.). Intentionally partial penetration in natural completed union stands between contraception and the amplexus reservatus (intentionally incomplete natural union) in terms of depravity. (To me it seems that medical use of a perforated condom – i.e. to collect sperm to study them for therapeutic reasons – is legitimate if it is sufficiently clear that male seed can still substantially access the cervix and that no substantial reduction of access is intended.)

Opposing the primary end of natural union by contraception does not render the finis operis non-conceptive, as interfering with the well-functioning of gametes in view of their pursuit of conception does not change the matter that is acted upon from due to undue. The act of contraception is an opposition to the intentionality of the secondary causes of conception within the male-female reproductive complex by intentionally rendering them unable to pursue their proper ends. The contraceptive hysterectomy ensures that ova cannot be prepared to receive a sperm cell, and that a sperm cell cannot survive past the birth canal and cervix. The use of “the pill” interferes with the normal well-functioning of the process of ovulation (among other things) so that an ovum will not be released when it otherwise would be in order that it is prevented from meeting its reproductive pair. The use of a spermicide kills male gametes as they attempt to pass through the birth canal and the cervix in their act of seeking an ovum to fertilize. And so on.

The use of marriage during a known infertile period on account of its infertility is also not an “unnatural act” by acting upon undue matter, as it is the exterior generative organs themselves which constitute “due matter” for sexual acts. This is the matter the primary causes (humans) act upon as objects, whereas the secondary causes have matter beyond this, namely, their procreative pair. In searching for an ovum, sperm cells attempt to make use of the matter of the woman’s body (i.e. moving through the uterus); if the conditions of her body are made bad, or an ovum is made unavailable, or sperm cells are made unable to pursue an ovum by blocking them or making them unhealthy, this is contraceptive, as it has created matter unsuitable for the secondary causes to pursue their ends or has harmed the secondary causes themselves. It is not, however, the creation of “undue matter” for a sexual act, except in a metaphorical sense. In fact, it is only because there is due matter that such an act can be properly called “contraceptive.”

If a contraceptive act is not “acting on undue matter,” much less will an act without such an intervention be an act on undue matter. Rather, a conjugal act done together with the condition of infertility not caused by a positive intervention is simply a natural act, even if the infertility is desirable and chosen as a condition for doing the act itself. This is what is involved in NFP.

To reiterate: contraception is a positive intervention which intends to harm the well- functioning of the secondary causes of procreation as such and the processes which dispose them for union with their reproductive pair in view of restricting or eliminating the possibility of conception in a freely chosen sexual act between a man and a woman as such.⁵⁴ This definition is altogether unsuited to describe NFP. ⁵⁴ Note that a woman might lawfully take a “contraceptive pill” not only for reasons aside from preventing conception which actually have nothing to do with ovulation (which decision would require sufficient motivation, especially given the temptation to begin tacitly willing the effect of infertility in conjugal acts as instrumentally caused by the pill, thus drifting into sin), but she might even use such a pill in favor of conception. Suppose a 42-year-old woman’s husband goes away for months at a time working on a fishing vessel; she wants to have one more child, and so she takes a “contraceptive” pill when he goes away for work in order to prevent ovulation in view of attempting to conceive later. Such a practice may not be advisable for medical or practical reasons, but this use of “the pill” would not be contraceptive.

We are left then concluding that “NFP” – as individual acts, and as a bundle of acts, non-acts, and circumstances united by a more general intention towards a particular family situation, is not and cannot be included under the heading of “unnatural vice.”

As it stands, the normal case of using NFP is that a particular couple wishes to have relations for various non-procreative goods (affective/social goods, health, pleasure, etc.) and wishes these acts not to result in conception. It is simply to choose not to have relations during fertile times to avoid having more children, and to choose to have relations during infertile times to pursue other goods. Abstinence from relations during fertile times is unobjectionable in itself. Having relations during an infertile time very much seems conducive to the end of avoiding conception from a conjugal act and also conducive to the pursuit of other goods which can be procured from relations. The hierarchy of ends within the act itself remains unaffected, as it is a natural act, even though the hierarchy of ends in the moral agent (the one doing the act) does not match. So – what is the problem?

The questions which remain are whether the pursuit of such non-procreative goods are sufficient to excuse the marriage act, and whether the motivations for avoiding children are sufficient. These questions are taken up in subsequent chapters. However, given how widespread is the error of conflating NFP with contraception in diverse ways, and given how damaging that error can be, more time is warranted in explaining the difference both in causal structure and in relation to the faculty’s end.