Affection and Solam Voluptatem

Is the expression of affection, or the cultivation of affection, distinct from the “pleasure” condemned by Innocent XI? It is argued that there is a kind of expression of affection unique to the conjugal act, and that the social and psychological goods obtained by the couple for themselves through the act, such as the “gentle association” spoken of by St. Thomas, are sufficient for excusing the act.¹²⁸ Clearly, one’s selfless desire for another’s good, and the desire to strengthen such love as a couple, are not reducible to “pleasure,” are they? ¹²⁸ Note that we are concerned here with a “final cause” – that which the act is done for the sake of, rather than an “efficient cause,” that which impels one towards the act.

This question has become urgent only somewhat recently. As previously noted, Fr. Gury seems to be the first moralist to propose that the expression of affection suffices as a motive for the use of marriage, in the second edition (1852) of his once extremely popular manual. This proposal seems to coincide somewhat with the decline in marriage seen as a publicly oriented reality and more as a personal reality driven by the quest for self-fulfillment in romantic love, as briefly explored in the Introduction. However, this topic is for the study of historians.

While it is certainly possible to read Innocent XI’s condemnation in such a way as to make room for the thesis that “affection” is distinct from pleasure, this does not seem to be a fair or realistic reading. Perhaps a satisfying solution to the solam voluptatem debate is still a long way off. It is difficult to hold the position I am proposing, as it very much sits in between simpler solutions, namely, the mainstream doctrine of today one the one hand which says at least implicitly that affective goods are not “pleasure” and therefore can excuse the marriage act, and the Augustinian-Thomistic line on the other which says that there is sin even in requesting the debt without the intention to procreate. However, it may in fact help the case: very frequently, Catholic truth is found in between the simple claims. The solutions which I can propose are the following.

First: Perhaps there is an analogy with the relief of concupiscence. The conjugal act is to be used to show or increase mutual affection only when there is no other way to show one’s affection or increase mutual affection. This is arguably a circumstance which does not obtain in any real case. However, that is not so clear, and taking this approach is probably the best way to adopt something approximating the current mainstream doctrine as proposed by nearly all contemporary literature. Those who will write against this book’s argument ought to begin with this line of attack, no doubt going on to say something like, “It is impossible to express marital love properly without the conjugal act, and the use of marriage gives the increase and of affection requisite for a healthy relationship, as laid down in the first section of Gaudium et Spes §51.” My response to that argument is a question: Did Joseph and Mary love each other as spouses? Yes, they did, and their marriage is the exemplar of human marriage after the Fall.¹²⁹ The objection might be strengthened by considering the proportion between the loss of reason and the obtaining of the affective goods proper to a healthy marriage – could such a pursuit be proportionate, the way sleep-inducing anesthesia is proportionate to the good pursued in a necessary surgery which would be unbearably painful otherwise? The problem with this is threefold. First, such affective goods be effectively pursued in other ways in the majority of cases, provided one’s spouse is cooperative; second, the frequency of this kind of use of marriage inclines one to abuse such a structure; third, there is no strict causal relationship (sometimes the act might even cause the opposite of what is intended). I conclude that the analogy with the relief of concupiscence fails. ¹²⁹ Of course, their marriage was not sacramental properly speaking, and Christ and the Church are the true exemplar cause of Matrimony (by analogy) – the point is simply that there was never a greater human marriage after the Fall than between Mary and Joseph.

Second: A further solution is proposed by Sasserath and was referenced already. It is that “pleasure alone” is immoral as an end because it inverts the order of the act’s interior hierarchy of ends, while not perverting the act in its exterior structure as does unnatural vice. The physical pleasures of the conjugal act exist to motivate procreation. Here, “pleasure alone” is understood as “physical pleasure being sought, absent the intention for reasonably needful relief of concupiscence, and absent the intention of procreation.” Other goods could be pursued in the act in this understanding of “pleasure alone.” It follows that any affective/social goods which are dependent upon the pleasures being pursued, which would certainly include the affective goods under consideration but could also include honor, reconciliation, etc., are dependent upon an inversion of the interior structure of the conjugal act in relation to the will – it is to use the act to obtain pleasure which causes social goods, rather than to use pleasure to complete the act which will also cause social goods. Social goods are totally exterior to the act and thus are in an accidental relationship to it, however causally strong that relationship might be.¹³⁰ It could be replied that the relief of concupiscence is just as much an inversion of the act as the pursuit of pleasure is, which means that either we must revert to the Augustinian-Thomistic position or else abandon Sasserath’s argument. However, we have already treated of pleasure sought as a means of relieving concupiscence above. While it is in fact the same pleasure in the man which leads to the completion of the act and which constitutes at least the physical dimension of “positive pleasure,” the relation to the will is diverse, as in one case it is willed instrumentally for the sake of completion of an integral conjugal act (the physical ending of the act by delivering male gametes), and in the other it is willed for its own sake apart from completion except insofar as the “act” or process of completion itself constitutes the same pleasure. (Pleasure in the woman is physically irrelevant to the achievement of anything other than the relief of concupiscence in her, so pleasure sought by her is either for the relief of concupiscence or for some other good extrinsic to the act, as it is never for procreation per se.) ¹³⁰ Today’s unwitting proponents of the idea that any “honest” extrinsic goods would suffice to excuse the marriage act of themselves will find support in the argument made about the same question by Anthony of the Holy Spirit (see Directorii Confessariorum [1680], Tract XI, Disp. IX, sec. 1). They will want to show that “affective goods” (i.e. bonding, expressing affection, etc.) are rightly considered “honest goods.” However, I believe this approach is mistaken, as such affective goods can be pursued in other ways and do not necessarily follow, and therefore they lack sufficient proportion with the act to justify of themselves the inhibition of reason. I note also that there is a somewhat undefended assertion in St. Alphonsus’s gloss on Busembaum, as quoted above, namely, that the motives which are lawful for one to contract marriage will also make the marriage act itself lawful; he does not prove this in the section he himself cites (§882), which concerns lawful motives for contracting marriage, and he seems not to address directly Busembaum’s clear contradiction of this very same principle with respect to health. (Busembaum is supported by Fr. Francis Silvius [d. 1649], who argues against the “proportionality” between the marriage act and health [see his commentary on ST, Suppl. q. 49, art. 6; Conclusion 6], as Fr. Leonard Gaudé quotes in a footnote on §881 in the 1953 edition of De Matrimonio [Tomus Quartus, p. 61]: “licet finis intentus sit bonus, et medium quod eligunt sit sibi licitum, non est tamen proportio medii ad finem.” I extend this to all honest extrinsic motives.) However, especially since Busembaum does not forbid the intention of extrinsic goods other than health “alone,” but he does not explain why. In any case, this is a significant opening for those who wish to argue that honest extrinsic goods are sufficient to excuse the marriage act (such as perhaps “affection,” “bonding,” etc. – which are not considered at all by St. Alphonsus, it must be noted, least of all as pursued during infertility chosen on account of avoiding conception.) Or else, perhaps I simply do not understand St. Alphonsus’s argument. The most relevant part of §882 reads: “Ad rationem autem contrariae sententiae, nempe quod sit deordinatio eligere finem secundarium prae primario: respondetur quod deordinatio quidem esset, si ordinaretur finis primarius ad secundarium; sed non, si ex duobus finibus licitis secundarius prae primario eligatur. Hujusmodi tamen fines intrinseci accidentales (vel procreandae prolis vel vitandae incontinentiae), ut honesti sint, oportet ut referantur ad Deum . . .” Other honest extrinsic ends also render the contraction of marriage lawful, and seemingly by extension its act, for St. Alphonsus, though he expressly excludes “pleasure,” which is a dishonest end (see §883) and thus casts doubt on the lawfulness of using “pleasure” for the sake of obtaining honest extrinsic ends, so the relationship between “pleasure” and affective goods must be considered. (There is also an appeal in §883 to extrinsic goods not merely as final causes but as efficient causes in view of adopting the proper motives necessary for contracting marriage, a point which must be considered as well.) A clear definition of honest goods is not given, nor is it evident St. Alphonsus would consider all “affective goods” as being honest insofar as they would be reducible even to psychological pleasure (though he would undoubtedly consider authentic love between spouses to be an honest good). All this is to say that there is a puzzle to explore. My own thesis stays as close to St. Thomas as I think reasonably possible – this is one of the principal goals of this work. It seems that a demonstration that any motive which makes contracting marriage morally upright will make the marriage act morally upright in use would suffice to show that affective goods excuse the marriage act, as affective goods would seem lawful to motivate the marriage contract, and this would be the best way to argue that they are honest goods.

Here it is perhaps helpful to put forward some clarification of terminology. My proposal for a coherent and useful distinction between primary-secondary ends and intrinsic-extrinsic goods regards a spectrum and a binary way of viewing the relation of conjugal acts to what might be obtained by them. Health is not a primary good of any conjugal act because it has no essential relationship to the sexual faculty, but it is a secondary good because of the way the body is constituted – it is the sort of thing which follows from the act, on account of its design, but this will actually occur depending on various factors that are not directly related to the well-functioning of the sexual faculty. In fact, only procreation is a primary good of the marriage act. The more factors apart from the well-functioning of the sexual faculty are required, the more secondary an end is (i.e., the relief of concupiscence is less secondary than health which is less secondary than honor). When there is no meaningful relationship between the act and an end except due to the will of either the man or the woman subsequent to the act (i.e. to obtain information, to make money, etc.) or is otherwise totally alien to the nature of conjugal acts within a rightly ordered social context (which the act is designed to be annexed to in the broader scheme of things), the end is no longer secondary but is per accidens. Intrinsic goods, in my synthesis and proposal (and not necessarily tracking any one particular authority), are goods which are necessary for or are by nature concomitant with the act’s completion (pleasure in the man in view of completion, pleasure in the woman), which flow from the former necessarily (namely, the relief of concupiscence), and which constitute the fundamental purpose of the act (its primary end, procreation). Extrinsic goods are everything else which might be obtained from a sexual act, whether willed or unwilled.^{131 131} We also read in the authors of “honest” and “dishonest” goods – this language, in my opinion, perhaps ought to be abandoned; while it attempts to clarify the sort of goods which can lawfully be pursued, it tends to obfuscate the issue because “pleasure” is considered “dishonest” and yet is itself a good thing, unlike “vanity” (which would be a dishonest good, including in contracting marriage). One might even say the same of the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction. (St. Alphonsus speaks of honest and dishonest goods in marriage, as well as goods which are intrinsic-essential, intrinsic-accidental – which are, in fact, children and relief of concupiscence – and extrinsic-accidental. See De Matrimonio, §882-3 etc.) The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction might also be coherently described as being a spectrum of how the act relates to goods which flow from it as they actually ought to be pursued according to the design of the act and its proper role in married life vis-à-vis society. Then health is more intrinsic than honor, and honor is more intrinsic than money. In this case health would arguably be more intrinsic than bonding because it flows more necessarily from the act, but it would be more secondary than bonding because it is less of the sort of thing which ought to be pursued by means of the act.

Third: Yet another part of the solution is to read Innocent XI’s condemnation in a fuller context; everything but delighting in one’s last end is done for more than its own sake. Therefore, we must look for a reasonable way to see sexual pleasure as a proximate end, as it is not fair to think that Innocent XI means pleasure “as a last end” – clearly, this would not only be venial sin but mortal sin. Therefore, what Innocent XI must have in mind is pleasure sought “now.” Therefore, the question to be asked is not, “Is this act being done for the sake of pleasure alone,” but rather, “Is this act being done on account of the pleasure contained in the act without the pursuit of any other intrinsic goods?” This is a much more reasonable reading of the Pontiff’s words than the “loophole hermeneutic” employed by any number of casuists (especially the Spanish, over and against the French who had pushed for the proposition’s condemnation).

Fourth: It can be replied that the affective goods are simply the same as the “pleasure” which Innocent XI is referring to. It is just the case that the couple wants to experience each other’s bodies and have erotic feelings and emotional catharsis. Even with the explicit intention to use such acts for the sake of cultivating a healthier domestic life in the long run, what the couple wants right now, as the object of their act, is this pleasant experience as pleasant, not only physically but also psychologically, emotionally, and socially. This argument, when coupled with the third argument, forms quite a plausible and clear picture of the basic moral structure of the marital act as pleasure-seeking in the teaching of Innocent XI.

One of these arguments alone may not suffice, but taken together I think they form a strong presumption in favor of the conclusion that affective or social goods do not of themselves suffice to excuse the conjugal act, should one wish to stay faithful to the teaching of Innocent XI on the matter – which one ought.

However, a final objection occurs. It could be argued that the principle of totality excuses the use of marriage for social goods. This is to say that the momentary inhibition of reason is worth what is gained for one’s overall good, like the use of anesthesia in view of a lifesaving surgery which would be excruciatingly painful and even impossible without being put under. This is a very powerful objection, but it faces several serious problems. First, it finds no support before modern authors (and the modern authors do not describe things in these terms anyway). Second, there is not a strict causal relationship between conjugal acts and the social goods which follow even when explicitly sought, such as there is between anesthesia and insensitivity to pain, so there seems to be a kind of “mismatch” or lack of proportion; such goods can be obtained in other ways and ought to be, and sometimes the intention “backfires.” Third, following upon the second point, we see many couples who are rather sexually active, even within the bounds of nature, and yet are quite miserable. Fourth, social and rational goods themselves are simply more delightful and yet are impossible to delight in properly when one’s reason is suspended, and yet one is purporting to pursue them in a better way while not actually needing the relief of concupiscence which is distracting the mind; other means ought to be used, such as conversation, prayer, service, and other mutual recreation. Finally, in connection with the fourth point, the proposal does not accord with the basic logic of the ascetical life, which is built upon human nature – to use pleasures to the point of losing one’s ability to rejoice in the love of God with one’s rational faculties is to do something which tends toward drawing one’s affect away from Him, even in conjugal acts which do not actually offend Him; this last point is why celibacy is recommended for those who are able to embrace it. The evangelical counsel of chastity is a weapon with which to fight against the flesh and its desires most perfectly, for those who are strong enough to lift the sword.¹³² Needlessly indulging in the most intense pleasures which the body can experience, to the point of incapacity for rational action whereby we can elicit acts of faith, hope, and love for God, is harmful for one’s pursuit of spiritual perfection, especially when done habitually over a long period of time.^{133 132} The sources of sin are the world, the flesh, and the Devil; they tempt by the concupiscence of the eyes, concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life; the habits which dispose one for conquering them are the evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience; the acts which fit the habits are the penances of almsgiving, fasting, and prayer. All are called to live this pattern of life according to one’s state, and gradually living this pattern more perfectly helps us to love God more perfectly over time. ¹³³ See ST Supp., q. 41, a. 3, ad. 2.

It must be reiterated – as the point can be missed in the all distinctions, objections, and puzzles – that the main question here regards “sexual recreation,” that is, the use of conjugal acts not done for the three purposes listed above by St. Alphonsus: to pay the debt, to procreate (even with a virtual intention), and to relieve concupiscence not otherwise reasonably relieved. The word “recreation” should not be misconstrued as meaning “for pleasure alone” but also for the sake of any other good if the three excusing motives are all lacking. We are only concerned with the couple who do not presently intend to have a child, or with individual husbands and wives who do not intend to have a child.

In closing this chapter I note that while one will perhaps find many papal writings which indicate the value of conjugal acts in relation to affection, I do not believe one will find a magisterial text contradicting the position which I have herein proposed.