Objections to this Theory

There are at least five significant objections to the foregoing hypothesis. We leave aside the appeal to the pure doctrine of St. Thomas as seen in the Commentary on the Sentences and his other writings which we have discussed as correct over and against the present interpretation of the papal literature and the pronouncements of the Sacred Penitentiary, as this has already been addressed in the discussion about commutative justice between the spouses, though more could be said. We also leave aside practical objections about the difficulty of teaching this doctrine and living it out, which ultimately fail to address the intrinsic weight of the argument.

The first objection is that this position which is being submitted is not founded on the magisterial texts, namely, the responses of the Sacred Penitentiary and the papal literature. These documents do not put forward this precise position, it is admitted. However, they do not contradict it either; they are silent on the morality of requesting the marital debt altogether, therefore they could not take a position on reasons legitimizing such a request. Attempts to “read between the lines” might suggest that the true intention of the authors must be one which favors the use of the marital debt for any reason whatsoever, especially goods like “the expression of love,” “the increasing of bonding,” and so on, so long as one’s intentions remain within marriage itself; but these attempts would need to furnish positive evidence of this on the part of the authors and show why that argument is more persuasive in its intrinsic authority or show why and how the positions taken elsewhere by the extrinsic authorities themselves ought to influence how we read and are bound to assent to the doctrine contained in the relevant texts in such a way that the present argument is overturned. Put plainly, the burden of proof lies with those who wish to claim that the texts mean something more than what they actually say. Furthermore, we have already noted that St. Thomas is fully aware of the affective and social goods which sexual union procures, as he speaks of this in the Summa Contra Gentiles.¹¹⁷ Despite having such an awareness he does not see this as sufficient in itself to justify conjugal activity. He explicitly denies that there is such a use of marriage related to the good of “sacrament,” which is what the motive of expressing affection would correspond to.¹¹⁸ We should also presume that recent popes were not ignorant of St. Thomas’s doctrine and could have addressed it directly had they so wished. Finally, Pius XII shows himself at least unenthusiastic about the mainstream attitudes of today, as we have already noted. ¹¹⁷ SCG III, ch. 123, 6. ¹¹⁸ ST Suppl. q. 49 a. 5 resp.: “But the third good does not relate to the use of marriage, but to its excuse, as stated above (Article 3); wherefore it makes marriage itself honest, but not its act, as though its act were wholly excused from sin, through being done on account of some signification.” Sánchez also takes this line. (De Matrimonio, Book IX disp. VIII) Those who want to argue that “expressing love” and other similar motives excuse the marriage act would do well to focus on connecting the good of the sacrament to the “signification” discussed by St. Thomas and Sánchez. (This does leave untouched, however, the question of non-sacramental marriages. Would it be the case that a sacramental marriage allows for the pursuit of social goods through pleasure but a non-sacramental marriage does not? Any explanation hinging on sacramental signification would need to grapple with this question.)

The second objection is more serious, namely, that regardless of the strength or distracting character of one’s concupiscence, one is still owed the marital debt anyway; this holds even without the strain of concupiscence. Therefore, along the line of reasoning used to defend the liceity of requesting the debt as proposed here, is one not simply asking for what one is owed, thereby removing the inordinate quality and excusing one of sin? The answer is that, surely, it is not sin to ask for what one is owed, but it is sin to ask for what one is owed for a bad reason. For example, one who lends a large sum of money to another may request his debt to be repaid and have a bad motive for doing so, i.e., to use that money for simony or to bribe a judge. In the case of an inordinate request for the marital debt, one is asking for what one is owed for an inordinate or sinful reason, which is the unnecessary pleasure of sexual recreation, which activity would be illicit for the reasons mentioned previously, viz., the unnecessary inhibition of one’s reason, coupled with the movement toward a habit which dulls the spiritual sensibilities over time. While it is true that St. Thomas sees room for withholding deposits, such as a man who is requesting his deposited weapon so that he might commit a murder,¹¹⁹ this seems to be quite different from the case of the marital debt, whereby one has rights over the other’s body not by a deposit or even a loan but by the very nature of the relationship. When a superior of a religious community or a bishop of a diocese commands his subjects to do something which is within his authority to command, even when his reasons are secretly based on vanity or some other bad motive, his subjects are held to obey unless the command is completely ordered to his own personal good at the expense of the common good or has some other clear legal defect; this includes a case in which his bad motives are known. One may even draw an analogy between the marital debt and St. Thomas’ teaching on the legitimacy of usury on the part of the borrower in some cases, insofar as one is making good use of a sinner, in that the spouse paying the debt is preventing infidelity.¹²⁰ In any case, this objection goes to the very logic of the marital debt in the first place; according to St. Thomas’ teaching in the Commentary on the Sentences the request for the marital debt apart from an intention to procreate is always venial sin, so clearly on that account the justice of asking for the marital debt squares with its allegedly intrinsically illicit character. The difference which I am proposing is that sometimes this request is not illicit, on account of there being a sufficient excusing motive.^{121 119} ST II-II q. 62 a. 5 ad. 1. ¹²⁰ ST II-II q. 78, a. 4; One does not always sin in making us of a sinner’s sin, except unless he occasions mortal sin where it would not otherwise have occurred. The request for the marital debt, under normal circumstances, is merely venial sin in the view of the Commentary on the Sentences. See also ST I-II q. 62, a. 5, ad. 2 on giving for a bad purpose wherein the giving itself is not sinful, i.e., payment for prostitution. ¹²¹ Yet another consideration is that a spouse might request the relations simply for the sake of procuring children when the other spouse does not want children. This, too, is a kind of use of the marital debt, albeit not in the most normal sense of the phrase. It seems that this situation is not precisely articulated by St. Thomas – nor by any of the magisterial literature.

The third objection is that pleasure is itself what eases the concupiscence. It then appears that to desire this pleasure is the very thing which St. Thomas and Innocent XI say is illegitimate, as it comes under the category of venial sin.¹²² The response first of all requires a distinction between pleasure sought as a remedy for sorrow and pleasure merely sought for its own sake.¹²³ All pleasures, as St. Thomas argues, afford a remedy against the passion of sorrow;¹²⁴ however, sometimes only fulfilling a desire will suffice for removing it in a reasonable way. Sexual desire is sometimes on able to be reasonably removed by achieving its final cause (delight in sexual pleasure), and the pain which arises especially from persistent desire is able to be removed by removing its efficient cause (desire). For Innocent XI, we note, there is no objection to pursuing pleasure, but only pursuing “pleasure alone.” In seeking pleasures natural to the sexual act as a tool for removing distracting and potentially harmful concupiscence (and its accompanying pain) which is not otherwise reasonably removed, one does not seek pleasure alone but seeks to free one’s mind and avoid sin. There is not merely a logical distinction but a real distinction between the pleasure which removes desire and sorrow and the due equilibrium which is actually reached by their removal. More will be said on “pleasure alone” momentarily. ¹²² See The Catechetical Instructions of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 80. ¹²³ Cf. ST I-II, q. 34, a. 2, ad. 2. ¹²⁴ ST I-II, q. 38, a. 1. (Note that “passion,” “desire,” “sorrow,” and “delight” have precise technical meanings for St. Thomas.)

The fourth objection is that arousal is the same as distracting or hazardous concupiscence; if such desire provokes a request for the marital debt, it seems that the request is therefore moderate. But this is not so, because momentary desires are not the same as gnawing and persistent desires which become distracting and morose. The latter kind of desire is liable to produce various psychological strains, as well as emotional and even physical signs.¹²⁵ To be moderate, there has to be a real need based on the distracting and uncomfortable quality of concupiscence – a kind of pain which is concomitant with the desire, or a desire which will not go away easily and distracts one from work, study, prayer, and normal life. ¹²⁵ In fact, St. Thomas speaks about precisely such signs as indicating implicitly that one would wish the debt to be paid but that one is ashamed to ask outright. See ST Suppl. q. 64, a. 2.

If this is also a kind of habitual desire which anticipates and requires planned relief based around the infertile period, which is possible, then the integration of NFP into a standard ascetical paradigm becomes different from both the rigorous model of the marital debt in the Commentary on the Sentences and the lax mainstream model which foresees no restrictions other than the constraints of nature and the need for just causes for avoiding procreation. In the model of the Commentary on the Sentences, temperance is conforming one’s acts to nature in the right circumstances, and using marriage for upright motives, which includes never requesting the marital debt for the relief of one’s own concupiscence, while infused temperance¹²⁶ essentially is reducible to going without licit marriage acts for a time in order to discipline oneself in view of prayer or penance, especially if done under a (mutual) vow or at least resolution of continence, whether temporary or permanent.¹²⁷ In the lax model, temperance is only conforming one’s acts to nature in the right circumstances, and having a sufficient reason to avoid having children if using marriage exclusively during infertile times, while infused temperance hardly even figures at all in the paradigm but is perhaps seen as the act of avoiding using marriage during fertile times for the sake of one’s family. ¹²⁶ See ST I-II q. 63, a. 4. ¹²⁷ This can only be lawful if mutual, and it would also be an act of religion.

In the model being presented here, the content of the rule of temperance is “floating,” dependent upon one’s legitimate needs: it will either materially amount to the rigorous model because one has sufficiently mastered oneself or is of such a bodily condition that one does not really need to use marriage to relieve concupiscence, or it will be the self-discipline required to confine one’s sexual activity to a precise period of time, namely, the infertile period of the month (a particularly noteworthy circumstance) due to the legitimate need to avoid pregnancy. Infused temperance would be the suppression of one’s concupiscence in the exercise of extended continence when it would be easier and licit to make a request of the marital debt, the strength of the concupiscible urge being sufficient to excuse it, albeit not so strong that it would count as presumption upon strength one does not have to forego requesting the debt, risking various psychological and social and spiritual pressures which are better avoided by making use of the marriage act. The development of neurosis, or persistent melancholy, or discomfort around one’s spouse would be signs that one is being too severe in restricting sexual desires.

The fifth and final objection is that the mere expression or cultivation of affection is a sufficient motive for the marital act. This requires a lengthier treatment.