The Scope of This Book

The present text does not seek to provide an exhaustive treatment of particular questions related to chastity, nor does it evaluate the contemporary literature of Catholic sexual ethics in detail; rather, it is focused exclusively on proposing a teaching on the use of what is commonly called “Natural Family Planning” (NFP) with respect to the motives for the marriage act itself which is more rigorous than what is commonly found in any number of books, websites, journal articles, or parochial and diocesan programs. It does not advocate for an abandonment of the practice of using NFP to avoid having children, as some in their misguided zeal for chastity mistakenly think is necessary, but instead argues in part that there are moral rules for its right use beyond simply having a justification for avoiding having more children in the first place. A mechanism is also proposed for how to evaluate whether avoiding having children is justified, a principle which is admitted by every author but is explained in serious and morally useful detail by exceedingly few.

The doctrines laid down here are, of course, only safe and probable, in the technical sense of these terms; one remains free enough to disagree and pursue his or her own way, possibly without actually offending God unless his or her conscience is truly convicted by the arguments set down.¹² Furthermore, the subject matter is arguably complicated enough that in following and using the laxer opinion one might do what is venially sinful according to its structure but without any guilt (so-called “material sin”), or have only very slight guilt. However, the motivation remains to propose the theses, along with any number of disputed questions of casuistry. Why? ¹² Moral science does not admit of the same degree of certitude as dogmatic theology, which itself admits of disputes, even on important matters; the reality is uncontestable that many points which refer to sin, even mortal sin, are not settled doctrine, despite being closely related to moral data which are settled, whether by direct revelation or authoritative determination. Sifting through opposing opinions on conclusions in moral theology on finer points, often called “casuistry,” is the bulk of the work in St. Alphonsus Liguori’s Theologia Moralis. Readers should not be disturbed by such disputes, nor claim that such-and-such is “Catholic teaching” when significant dispute exists and no definitive decision has been made by the Holy See, or at least a decision which binds one to religious submission of intellect even without being fully definitive.

As for the more rigorous doctrine on NFP vis-à-vis the use of marriage which will be presented, it is necessary for two reasons. First, because many devout couples have the strong suspicion that something is not quite right with the thought that one’s marriage is fully chaste by merely abstaining from relations for a week each month and doing whatever they like the rest of the time, specifically in the context of trying to avoid having children. They feel like they are somehow “cheating the system,” and they are right in their intuition, despite their lack of an ability to articulate their reasoning. This text seeks to help bring those couples to the “next level” and introduce them to the discipline which is proper to marital chastity, which they will find to be a welcome challenge. Such a way of living conjugal life will be found empowering to the soul, and it will even likely enhance the experience of the marital act itself on account of the act’s purified significance and less frequent use. This doctrine also evades the overly rigorous error into which many people fall, namely, that the use of “NFP” to avoid conception is “diet contraception” (or is simply contraceptive strictly speaking) and is therefore immoral in itself.¹³ Second, because if my thesis is correct the vast majority of couples who are sincerely trying to live out the Christian duties of married life are engaged unwittingly in at least material venial sin. True enough, material sin does not actually offend God – only formal sin does (that which is known to be sin or that which one is obliged to know is sin but does not) – but material sin nevertheless sets the individual on a path towards formal sin by weakening the will’s perception of what is truly good and possibly occasioning other acts which are indirectly or directly occasioned by material sin. This is especially true with regard to sexual matters, towards which humans are violently inclined by the intensity of pleasures, which pleasures God placed in our nature so that we would keep the human race in existence. Furthermore, one can rarely be sure that material sin is merely material sin except in special cases. In any case, as just noted, taking on the proposed modus vivendi, the couple will experience the interior freedom which will improve their spiritual lives and their marriage. ¹³ Some even make the claim that NFP is “Modernist” – not only is this to misunderstand what Modernism is, but it also is hilariously ignorant of the fact that Fr. Andreas Steinhuber, SJ, the individual who gave the major positive consultation on NFP as reflected in the 1880 responsum of the Apostolic Penitentiary, was also a principal ghostwriter for the great anti-Modernist encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis. (In some months after the release of the present text, I will publish the full text of Fr. Steinhuber’s consultation – however, while cautiously positive, the text is mostly interesting from a historical point of view rather than for its moral analysis per se.)

With regard to the motive for elaborating a clearer mechanism by which to evaluate the legitimacy of avoiding children, one need only ask any group of pious couples what exactly a “just cause” is to use NFP, and one will see the problem in the discussion which ensues. In the best case, the discussion will end with, “Be prudent and generous.” This is not untrue, but it is not particularly helpful either.

This book is not meant as an introduction to the topic of NFP, especially its biology, psychology, or practicalities. It is not a survey of the history of NFP, as it has been treated in older popular literature or in broader “cultural” and ecclesiastical contexts (though such a book should be written). It is also not an introduction to Catholic sexual ethics in general, though some explanation is given on the most relevant points. It takes for granted that the reader is at least somewhat familiar with the topic already, especially the incompatibility of Catholic morals with consequentialism in its various forms.¹⁴ It furthermore takes for granted the value of synthesizing and reconciling the major authorities in Catholic moral theology, in particular papal magisterial texts, St. Thomas Aquinas (the Common Doctor), and St. Alphonsus Liguori (the patron saint of moral theologians). It is assumed that the popes and great moral doctors of the Church generally have serious extrinsic authority and are therefore much more important guides than the latest trends in popular Catholic literature on the same topics, and so a goal to reconcile “the authors” as far as is honestly possible has been adopted.¹⁵ Readers who do not intuitively appreciate such a goal or method will probably not like this book. Finally, this text does not present in any rigor the historical context of or developmental narrative between major sources except in a single case (viz., the Sacred Penitentiary decisions). This is because the development of the literature on the role of pleasure in conjugal life and the particulars of the tradition’s treatment of the marital debt is largely irrelevant to the point being made, and other authors have done some of this kind of work already, such as John Noonan in Contraception.¹⁶ There is, however, some serious discussion of the solam voluptatem (“pleasure alone”) debate by way of offering my own solutions to this rather vexing, relevant, and complicated problem. ¹⁴ The way in which a good is obtained potentially matters in an of itself; to steal money and to earn money are both “taking money from someone” but are very different kinds of acts. This is the beginning of the critique against those who say that NFP is contraception because both “stop conception.” It matters what one does, not only what happens because of what one does. ¹⁵ I do not here enter into any discussions regarding the “doctrinal weight” of propositions or “extrinsic authority” of texts. Overall, common sense informed by piety will suffice for the purposes of the present argument. ¹⁶ Noonan’s research is excellent, though his theological reasoning is not always the best. He is also helpful as a guide through the history of the topic of pleasure in the use of marriage. I do not present any material about the shift in perspective between St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus but instead point to Noonan’s work as a starting point for this kind of research.

Readers who are entirely unfamiliar with the concept of the “marital debt” will find only a brief introduction to the topic in Chapter One; they may be startled to learn that such a principle exists and is in fact strongly rooted in the greatest authorities, including Sacred Scripture. They ought to allow themselves to be challenged by the discussion. For a relatively recent text which gives some more explanation, I recommend the fine volume prepared by Frs. McHugh and Callan¹⁷ which addresses this topic with great clarity and marvelous efficiency, though much more could be said (and is said by many older authors). I do not bother to defend the legitimacy of the principle of the marital debt in this book at any length – once again, to dismiss something which has been held by so many weighty authors, and which rests so squarely upon Sacred Scripture (1 Cor. 7:2-5) as well as upon the natural logic of marriage is extremely temerarious at best and possibly next to heresy (proxima haeretica) or worse. (An extended discussion of the marital debt also exceeds the scope of the purpose of this book, which is quite narrow.) Instead of seeing the highly unpopular and little-discussed positions of our famous elders in theology – decorated war-heroes, as it were – as primarily constrictive, we ought to see them as helpful guides towards the infinite freedom and perfect goodness of union with Christ. Even though we face new problems which many of them never faced themselves, they offer us powerful tools with which to solve those problems. We do not need to reinvent the wheel, even if we need to repurpose it. ¹⁷ Fr. John McHugh, OP and Fr. Charles Callan, OP, Moral Theology: A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern Authorities, #2614-2616; see also #2622 for their treatment of periodic continence (wherein they also reference an interesting text by Cardinal Hayes, of September 8, 1936); the famous moralist Fr. Dominic Prümmer, OP also gives a helpful summary in his one-volume Handbook of Moral Theology, #860-861. Both texts are easily found online.

Furthermore, despite the fact that we are today freer than in past centuries to publish books and articles with all sorts of questionable positions even on settled doctrine, such as on consummated unnatural vice (i.e. contraception, homosexual acts, self-abuse), this is not a good use of our time. We ought to be orthodox, and we ought to be thorough. In fact, there is much to the world of sexual ethics which is left practically untouched which would be more theoretically and pastorally useful than is commonly imagined. We ought to use the guidance of our elders for all it is worth; there is no need to walk alone when they have already largely done the work for us. Finally, we should take a genuine interest in the methods and focus of the older sources. While we need not imitate their style, or speak exclusively about the same topics, we ought to take them as cues for what the important issues are. The matter of theology, especially sexual ethics, is not simply a matter of taste – souls are on the line, more than with any other matter, and they are threatened by distinct and identifiable errors. While it can be interesting and even very profitable to meander through the psychology or cultural significance of various sexual behaviors, as is so common today in the popular literature, in the end, moral theology includes judgments about what is right, what is wrong, and what is wrong enough to lose one’s soul to the pains of unending Hell. One might even conclude that such considerations ought to take center stage, albeit without limiting the entirety of moral science thereto; after all, one can do more than simply not offend God, one can positively please Him in various degrees.

In this book I will argue for two principal theses, fully aware that the first in particular is extremely unfashionable and that both are possibly wrong. First, contrary to St. Thomas and St. Augustine, but in line with both St. Alphonsus and modern papal magisterial literature, I will argue that the request for the marital debt can be without sin when not intending procreation; however, I will conclude that it is only licit under a certain condition, namely, the legitimate need for the relaxation of concupiscence on the part of the one making the request, rather than for “sexual recreation,” no matter what other non-procreative goods are being pursued thereby (i.e. increased bonding, health, honor, expressing affection, settling a dispute, etc.) so long as the couple is not attempting to have children. As will be discussed, this thesis is in sharp contrast to the thought, seemingly originating with Gury’s manual (1852) and today left practically unchallenged, that the use of marriage is sufficiently justified by the exclusive intention to “express affection” or provide some kind of affective or social good.¹⁸ Second, I will argue that the intention to avoid pregnancy by recourse to using marriage during infertile periods alone must be evaluated by a method of evaluation that is analogous to the judgment which ought to be made in giving alms. Finally, as a conclusion, I will offer some limited observations about the spiritual significance and pastoral application of the doctrines presented herein. ¹⁸ Of course, the thought that conjugal relations have to be excused at all in the first place is almost totally alien to mainstream contemporary Catholic sexual ethics. This is a sign that something is wrong with the literature’s framing of the entire topic.