Chapter XII: The Taxation of Betting

GREAT excitement some time since was caused by the Government’s proposal to tax betting transactions. Mr. Snowden denounced it in the House of Commons, several Nonconformist religious bodies have declared that they are opposed to it, and even some sections of the Church of England have raised their voice against it. The chief objection against the proposal, and the only one which concerns us here, is that the proposed taxation would be against sound morality. A writer in the Guardian acknowledged that it was difficult to draw the line between a bet which is harmless and gambling which is ruinous, but he would have the moralist decline to attempt to draw such a line; he quoted Pascal to the effect that the heart has reasons of which the intellect knows nothing.

But, surely, if we want sound ethics we must appeal to reason and not to sentiment. It is often difficult to draw the line between what is right and what is wrong, but there is no other way of obtaining a code of rational morality. All right rules of conduct are a mean between two vicious extremes. The right use of money is the mean between stinginess and extravagance, and so with all virtues except divine charity. Divine charity is the end of all virtue; it is the measure of all virtue, and we cannot have too much of it. But of all other virtues we may have too much as well as too little, and so if we want to have moral rules for the guidance of our conduct, we must necessarily draw the line, separate what is defective from what is excessive, and thus define what is right and what is wrong.

Betting is not necessarily wrong. A man intends to go on a short holiday at the week-end. On Friday morning he says to a friend: “I think it will be a fine day to-morrow.” The friend prides himself on being weather-wise and he answers: “I'll bet you a shilling that it will rain.” “Done,” said the other “I’ll take your bet.” Few people would maintain that such a bet as this is morally wrong. We suppose that both parties can spare a shilling, that both intend to pay if they lose, that nobody suffers in consequence of the bet. As one might give the other a shilling as a present if he chose, so he may pay a shilling to the other according to agreement, because he was wrong in his forecast of the weather.

But, as everybody knows, betting is liable to abuse. Money may be staked of which the bettor has not the free disposal, or more than he can afford. If he loses his bet he may be ruined, or he may be sorely tempted to commit theft or fraud in order to get wherewith to pay. Frequent betting becomes gambling, and a very dangerous habit is formed. Gambling encourages idleness, leads people into bad company, and very frequently ends in ruin. Gambling, then, or playing for high stakes, is usually wrong for one reason or another. In other words, betting may be unobjectionable from the point of view of morality if it is indulged in sparingly and under certain conditions. It may be compared to drinking intoxicating liquor. It is not wrong to drink a glass or two of beer or wine if you can afford it; it is wrong to drink to excess or more than you can afford to pay for. It was necessary to try to get clear notions about the morality of betting before going on to consider the question of the morality of the taxation of betting. The two questions are connected, but they are not identical. With regard to an institution which is certainly immoral I can well imagine a most moral Government saying to itself: “I cannot suppress you; if I attempted to do so I should probably do more harm than good. But I know that you are making a great deal of money. I will tax you, and that, at any rate, will have the good effect of diminishing your profits, and preventing others, perhaps, from imitating your example, induced thereto by the hope of realizing the excessive profits which you realize at present,”

Is there, then, anything objectionable, from the point of view of sound morality, to the proposal of the Government to tax betting transactions? I cannot see that there is anything objectionable to the proposal. As to the assertion of Mr. Snowden that the proposed tax would patronize, legalize, and make respectable one of the greatest curses of the country. I must say that I fail to see it. After all, to tax a man is hardly to patronize him or make him respectable. Such an argument may come well enough from His Majesty’s Opposition in the House of Commons, but it hardly produces conviction when it is read calmly in the quiet atmosphere of one’s room. The taxation of intoxicating liquor offers a complete parallel. In the case of intoxicating liquor, taxation does not patronize or legalize drunkenness, or make it respectable; how, then, could taxation patronize or legalize gambling, or make it respectable ? Without qualms of conscience on the part of the most scrupulous, the Government obtains a large annual revenue from the taxation of intoxicating liquor; why should it not endeavour to raise a little money by the taxation of betting? Drinking intoxicating liquor is a luxury, and so is betting.