Case 27. A Loose Principle

Peter and Paul, laborers, were smoking tobacco near the hayricks of James, whom they had formerly served but who had dismissed them unjustly. By an unexpected accident they inadvertently threw burning matches among the hay. Having gone a little farther on their way, they looked back and saw a small flame arising from the hay. Because of their old enmity toward James, and because each reproached the other for starting the fire, neither moved a foot to warn James of the impending danger; consequently, the efforts of those who ran up to extinguish the fire were fruitless, and the hayricks were destroyed. Afterwards Peter, thinking about fulfilling the Easter precept, approaches Caius, a confessor, and, inquiring especially about the obligation of restitution, relates that half the value of the things that perished has already been paid by an insurance company, and that James, terrified and reduced almost to the extremity of life, has at length recovered his former health, but not without incurring great expenses. Caius, however, excuses him from every burden of restitution, as he always does otherwise, because, as he says, some cause is always present which renders the obligation of restitution at least doubtful; but a doubtful law does not oblige. Hence it is asked:

1. What are the conditions for a harmful action to produce an obligation of restitution?

2. What if a confessor has unduly obligated someone to make restitution or released someone from making it?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What conditions are necessary that an obligation to make restitution may arise from an action which causes damage?

There must be theological fault, the damage must be really and objectively unjust, the action must be the cause, not merely the occasion, of the damage.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 408 ff.

2. What if a confessor has improperly imposed the obligation of making restitution, or improperly exonerated a penitent from it.

If this was done without grave theological fault, the confessor will be bound to correct his mistake and prevent harm coming from it as far as he can. If his action involved grave fault on his part, either through grave negligence or malice, he becomes a co-operator in injustice, and is bound to make good the harm done to his penitent or to a third person by his wrong conduct.²

2 Ibid., 226 f.

3. The case. Caius’ principle is certainly false, and will be the cause of his doing serious harm if he continues to apply it in practice. Still in the case before us it did not cause him to go astray. Peter and Paul inadvertently threw lighted matches among James’ hay, and after they had left the spot they looked back and saw that a small fire had been kindled. The one who had caused the fire was bound in justice to do his best to put it out, otherwise he would be compelled to make good the damage. But they did not know who had caused the fire; it was uncertain whether it was caused by Peter, or by Paul, or by both of them. On account of this doubt neither of them can be compelled to make good the damage done, although both committed sins against charity by their ill-will against James and by neglecting to extinguish the fire at first. The damage done to James’ health was not foreseen, nor was the expense foreseen which he incurred on that account, and so no obligation to make restitution could arise on this ground.