A Forgotten Theologian and His Theory of Morals

Some time ago while looking over the shelves of the library my eye was caught by a venerable-looking quarto bound in limp parchment. Outside it bore the title in faded ink, Hallus: De Quinquepartita Conscientia. I took the book to my room and soon became interested in it. In these days when the history of moral theology is so frequently perverted to the prejudice of the Church, it may be worth while to give my readers some of the fruits which I gathered from a closer acquaintance with the rare old quarto. But first of all a word about its author.

Dr. Richard Hall was a young student at Christ’s College, Cambridge, in the reign of Queen Mary. He took his degree in the year 1556, and was elected a Fellow of Pembroke Hall. He was held in general esteem, and his ability and upright character seemed to insure him a useful and honorable career in life. However, before he took his degree of Master of Arts, Queen Mary died, and Elizabeth succeeded to the throne of England. The new Queen very soon made known what was to be her policy in religion, and young Hall, who was sincerely attached to the Catholic faith, followed the example of many more English Catholics of the time and retired to the continent in search of the liberty of conscience denied to him at home. He first went to Belgium and thence to Rome, where he finished his theological studies and took the degree of Doctor of Divinity. He then returned to Belgium and was given the post of Professor of Morals in the Benedictine monastery of St. Rictrude at Marchiennes not far from Douay. Before long the disturbed state of Belgium at the time compelled Dr. Hall to retire to Douay, where the English College for the education of priests destined for the work of preserving the ancient faith in England had just been founded by Dr. Allen. At Douay, Hall became professor of Holy Scripture, and it was there that Pits, the author of De illustribus Angliae Scriptoribus, made his acquaintance about the year 1580. Subsequently Hall was made canon of the cathedral church of St. Omer and official of the diocese. He died at St. Omer in the year 1604. Pits tells us that Dr. Hall’s “ piety, charity, affability, and varied erudition, caused him to be held in universal esteem.” Dodd, in his Church History of England, says that he was “an excellent casuist, and zealous promoter of Church discipline,” that “his writings and behavior were a continual curb to vice and the liberties of the age, and as he was an enemy to complaisance upon those occasions, so the severity of his morals met with some opposition even among the learned.” 1 The Dictionary of National Biography testifies 1 Vol. II., p. 70.

that “he was a severe and uncompromising moralist.”

While engaged in teaching casuistry to the brethren of St. Rictrude Dr. Hall collected the material which he afterwards used in the composition of his chief work De Quinquepartita Conscientia. He tells us in the Dedicatory Epistle prefixed to this work that the general custom was for the professor of casuistry to begin at once with the discussion of cases of conscience. Hall desired to lay the foundations a little deeper, and began with an elaborate treatise on Conscience, for the matter of which he confesses that he was much indebted to the Dominican, John Nider, who wrote his book, Consolatio Pusillanimium, about the middle of the fifteenth century. Many years’ experience in hearing confessions confirmed him in his estimate of the importance of the treatise on Conscience, and when he was now an old man he devoted the leisure moments which his duties as official of the diocese left him, to the composition of his work. He dedicated it to the Archbishop of Cambrai, a prelate who was zealous for the reformation of morals and the restoration of ecclesiastical discipline. To show the lofty aim which Dr. Hall proposed to himself in publishing his work and as a specimen of his manner, we may quote the following passage from the Dedicatory Epistle:

For when once men’s consciences have been put right, and that Augean stable has been cleansed, it will be very easy to establish that external discipline which all good men desire and long for. To achieve this purpose in the first place pious and good men must everywhere be appointed pastors and confessors who will teach others by word and example and who will not like hirelings only feed themselves, and seek after their own gain and advantage; but who will seek God’s honor alone and the salvation of souls. From such offices those must be excluded who are addicted to gluttony and other fleshly vices, as well as the ambitious and the avaricious. When the tribunal of conscience has been put right, the next step will be the external forum, where judges and magistrates must be appointed who are not only upright and incorrupt so as not to be turned aside a hair’s breadth from the path of duty by hatred or affection, fear, or hope of reward; but who are as far as possible removed from all striving after popularity and notoriety. Because if they are Thasos there will never be wanting Gnathos who will so distort and blind their judgment with their flattery that they will hardly be able to distinguish good from evil. A very good example of this is furnished by Henry VIII of England who held flatterers in high favor and esteem. Once on his return from a battle in which he had been victorious, and which was fought in defense of the Holy See against those who desired to weaken its authority, he met one of the English bishops who had come to congratulate him on his victory. ‘‘Are we not much beholden, Reverend Father in God,’’ said the King, ‘‘to the divine goodness for the glorious victory which we have gained over the enemy?’’ The bishop knew the vainglorious character of the king, and he answered: ‘‘Nay, most serene King, Almighty God owes much to your Majesty since you have fought so well for His glory and the authority of the Holy See.’’ The king was not a little puffed up by the bishop’s words, and conceiving too high an opinion of himself he not long afterwards fell away from the Holy See and from the Faith which he had defended before with his pen and with the sword.

Dr. Hall’s book, the fruit of long years of study and practical experience, was published at Douay in 1598. The date of publication is of special interest. The book was an elaborate treatise on Conscience, written by a learned and experienced Englishman, a confessor for the Faith, a man of lofty character, somewhat austere even and stern in disposition. Twenty-one years before the publication of Hall’s book Bartholomew Medina, O.P., had issued his celebrated Expositio in Primam Secundae Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae Aquinatis. In this book the learned Dominican had been the first to propound and defend Probabilism in the modern form. No theologian of the Society of Jesus, whose pet doctrine Probabilism is supposed to be, had as yet written at any length on the subject. In 1599 Cardinal Toletus, S.J., issued his Instructio Sacerdotum, and in the same year appeared the Commentaries of Gabriel Vasquez, S.J., on the Prima Secundae of St. Thomas. Cardinal Toletus approved of and used the theory, as two or three other Jesuits had already done, but Vasquez was the first Jesuit theologian who discussed Probabilism at length and defended it. From the historical point of view it may be of interest to inquire what was Dr. Hall’s system of morals, and what was his attitude toward the theory of Medina. In this inquiry I propose to adhere strictly to the rôle of the historian. I shall not play the advocate; I shall strive to be as accurate and objective as possible; and I shall let the texts and the facts speak for themselves. As experience has taught me how little we can trust to what is commonly written on this subject, I will only use authorities whose doctrine I have studied at first-hand in their own works.

Catholic theologians have always taught as a primary rule of conduct that it is sinful to do anything which we are not morally sure is right. To act in doubt whether our action is a good or bad one is to manifest a disposition to do it whether it be good or bad, and thereby sin is committed. It is a mortal sin to do what we think is mortal or what we doubt whether it be mortal or not. Hall insists upon this as do all theologians who discuss the point. “In practical doubt,” he says, “or in doubt about doing something in this place and time, or, as others say, here and now, when its lawfulness is supported by only probable reasons, it is the constant teaching of all theologians that as long as the conscience is in such uncertainty nothing may be done against this doubt, whether the doubt be equal on both sides, or unequal ; and whether there is greater danger on one side than on the other, or equal danger on both sides, for then the text of Wisdom is verified —‘ He who loves danger shall perish in it;’ and it is settled by the authority of all masters that he who exposes himself to the danger of committing mortal sin thereby sins mortally. The text of St. Paul is applicable here: ‘Whatever is not of faith is sin” But what is not according to conscience is not of faith, nor is an action according to conscience — or a certain judgment concerning its lawfulness — when the conscience sways to both sides, hesitates which to choose, and to do what you are not sure whether it be lawful.”² He then quotes Origen and Theophylact who explain the text of St. Paul in this sense. The moral certainty of the lawfulness of an action which is required before performing it must not be taken in too absolute or metaphysical a sense. “It is not the result,” says Hall, “ of evident demonstration, but of probable conjectures, which incline more to one side than the other.”³

² De Quinquepartita Conscientia, L. II., c. 2.

³ Loc. cit., L. III., c. 14.

We come to the special subject of this paper when we inquire what rules Hall followed to determine the choice of an opinion when Doctors disagree. He puts the crucial question on this point in the ninth chapter of the second book. He there asks whether it is lawful in morals to abandon an opinion which is more probable and follow one which is only probable. After giving one or two examples in which the question is of practical importance, and quoting the reasons of those who answer the question in the negative, he says:

But we who hope that timid consciences will derive some help from this little work, and who see that innumerable would be the difficulties of pious souls if it were always necessary to inquire which opinion out of many is the more probable, nor could an issue be readily found since an opinion frequently seems more probable to some though it is not so in reality,—supported by the authority of great men we assert that it is sufficient to follow the probable opinion of some Doctor, so that we need not adopt those obscure arguments by which some maintain that the more probable opinion must be discovered and followed. For as that is a probable opinion in the schools and in disputations which can be defended without incurring any note of error, so in practical matters that is probable which we can follow without sin or danger of sin. For a probable opinion is not so called because it can be supported by reasons drawn from either side, for in this sense many errors and heresies, such as that of Arius, have more numerous, and in appearance more probable arguments in their favor than have some truths held by Catholics. But a probable opinion is so called because it seems probable to one or more men of learning, or to those whose knowledge is specially known and approved. Since then this is agreeable to right reason and is confirmed by the judgment of learned men, why may we not follow it? Is it because the other opinion is more probable? But we are not always bound to follow what in everything is more perfect, because it is sufficient if a thing is perfect in its kind; and since in the schools and in theory it is lawful to defend that which is probable, what hinders us from being able to follow that which is probable in practice and in action? And so this is lawful provided that the opinion which we judge to be probable is not evidently contrary to Holy Scripture or a decision of the Church, as St. Thomas says, and if one can by one’s own knowledge or that of another who is worthy of confidence answer the reasons to the contrary, or at least one sees that clever men despise them; for a good argument in practical matters is derived from the praiseworthy life and excellent doctrine of good and holy men. And indeed though there are some precepts which are common to and obvious to all, and of those no one who has the use of reason and free will can or ought to be ignorant, such as the precepts of the Decalogue which natural reason and Holy Scripture clearly manifest to us; there are others which Holy Scripture and ecclesiastical decisions leave uncertain, as is the case with many contracts. No one should violate the former on account of the opinion of any Doctor whatever; but in the latter which are not yet settled by a decision of the Church we may follow the opinion of some Doctors against others,

provided that we are ready to stand by the judgment of the Church, if she determine otherwise, make restitution if required, and in the meanwhile form for ourselves a good conscience in everything without hesitation or notable doubt to the contrary.

In this passage Hall formally adopts the theory which Bartholomew Medina had formulated some twenty years earlier and which is known as Probabilism. In the extract which I have quoted he does not mention either Medina or any one else by name; he is content with saying in general terms that his doctrine is supported by the authority of great men. However, he does mention Medina on the next page and in the same context, and by other frequent references to him Hall shows that he was largely indebted to him for his doctrine. He makes use too of the principal arguments by which Medina proved his theory. In adopting this view he was clearly of the opinion that he was adopting no novelty, he was merely making use of a ready formula for what in substance had been taught by the older theologians. This comes out well in a passage which occurs in the sixteenth chapter of the third book on a Scrupulous Conscience. He there says:

The scrupulous are often tortured at reading the chapter Juvenis, de sponsalibus, in which the saying occurs—‘‘The safer way must be chosen when in doubt’’; from which they think it follows that in everything that course must be chosen which is the furthest removed from all appearance of sin. But if this be granted them, nobody can ever be certain that in any of his actions he has played the part of an honest man, without being afraid that he could have done better. However, the answer to this is easy: it is not necessary always to choose the safer way; it is sufficient to choose that which is safe, as was said above when I was treating of a probable conscience in questions where Doctors differ. I there said that it is not necessary to follow the more probable opinion; it is sufficient to hold that which is probable when both are defended by approved authors. And Navarrus gives this advice as a special remedy against scruples, viz., to adopt one out of several opinions, choosing first of all in the external forum that which is confirmed by custom, unless it is clearly against the natural or divine law, for against these custom can do nothing. But if the matter be doubtful, custom can interpret it, and such interpretation is to be followed. If there is no such custom, that opinion should be preferred which rests on some text, and against which it is not easy to find arguments, though the common opinion may be on the other side, and that, although the chief question may be concerning one law and the text concerning another. Furthermore, that opinion among several should be chosen which rests on an argument which cannot easily be answered. And if none of these rules is applicable, the common opinion should be chosen, that namely which is known for certain to be the common opinion; and if there is no common opinion, that should be chosen which rests on better grounds and reasons, although they may be arguments which can be answered without difficulty because other things being equal a double or a triple cord is broken with greater difficulty. But where none of these rules applies, the more lenient and more favorable opinion is to be followed. The more lenient and the more favorable opinion is that which favors an oath, marriage, dower, will, freedom, a ward, widow, stranger, or other miserable person, or a private person against the exchequer, when the exchequer bases its action on the wrongdoing of a private person; otherwise the contrary holds. That opinion also is more lenient and more favorable which upholds the validity of the act, whether the act whose validity is in question be

a last will, or a statement of claim, or a joining of the issue, or a sentence, or any judicial act, rescript, or privilege. For the presumption in favor of the act outweighs other considerations, although the validity of the act redounds to the advantage of the plaintiff, and to the disadvantage of the State. With these exceptions that opinion is the more lenient which favors the defendant. And if one opinion is better than another in none of these ways, that should be held which those Doctors affirm who excel in authority or knowledge in the matter in question, as theologians if the question belong to theology, canonists in canon law, legists in civil law; for in all these ways an opinion is probable although perhaps the contrary is sometimes more probable.

It is obvious that in thus quoting what Navarrus teaches about the various methods for choosing an opinion and forming one’s conscience when Doctors disagree, Hall believed that he was merely putting his own theory in other words. “In all these ways,” he says, “an opinion is probable although perhaps the contrary is sometimes more probable.” 4

What Hall quotes from Navarrus is merely the common teaching of theologians on this question previous to the time of Medina. Angelus de Clavasio, O. F. M., who published the first edition of the Summa Angelica in 1486, teaches the same doctrine in almost identical terms, as also does Prierias, O. P., who issued the first edition of the Summa Sylvestrina in 1516. So that according to Dr. Hall the theory of Probabilism was no novelty; it was merely a short and convenient way of stating a theory which was

4“ Nam totidem modis opinio fit probabilis ; etsi fortassis altera sit interdum probabilior.”

supported by the common consent of theologians of all schools. This was not an opinion peculiar to Hall; it was shared by all his contemporaries, as is clear from the fact that Medina’s formula was at once accepted by theologians of all schools as an accurate and convenient statement of what they all held. Let us take a few examples. Michael Salon, a Spanish Augustinian, published his Controversiae de Justitia et Jure in the year 1581, four years after the publication of Medina’s work. Salon holds with Medina “ that it is lawful to abandon the more probable opinion and to follow that which is probable and believed to be true, while to follow the more probable is merely matter of counsel.’”” He adds that this is the opinion of “many and very eminent Doctors, especially among the followers of St. Thomas; that more numerous and more eminent authors and more weighty reasons can be quoted for it than for the opposite opinion; and that these reasons cannot be refuted, while those on the other side can be refuted.”⁵

⁵ Quest. 63, a. 2, controv. 2, conclus. 4.

Gabriel Vasquez, the first Jesuit theologian who wrote at length on the question, published his Commentarii ac Disputationes in Primam Secundæ S. Thomæ in 1599, one year after the publication of Hall’s book. Vasquez says: “I think the opinion is true which Bartholomew Medina follows, and which was already common in the schools and long before his time, viz., that a man of learning may act on the opinion of others although that opinion is less safe and in his judgment less probable (provided that it be not destitute of reason and probability) against his own opinion which he considers to be more probable.”⁶

⁶ Disp. 62, c. 4.

John Azor, S.J., published the first volume of his Institutiones Morales in the year 1600. He gives the common rules in vogue at the time for the choice of opinions; they are identical with those which have been given above as quoted by Dr. Hall from Navarrus. Incidentally he mentions the formula of Probabilism, and says that although authors have not taught it, yet it can be defended by this conclusive argument: “ Because that is well done which is done prudently; but one who is guided by the advice of others acts prudently; and therefore one who in his actions follows a probable opinion of Doctors acts prudently.”⁷

⁷ Lib. 2, c. 16.

These theologians whom we have quoted are merely specimens of great numbers of all schools who might be mentioned. With the solitary exception of the Jesuit Comitolus, we have to wait for another forty years before a dissentient voice is raised against Probabilism. Comitolus, an Italian theologian, published his Responsa Moralia in 1608. He brands Probabilism as the shameful lapse of Armilla, who, this writer asserts, taught it in his Summa, while other representative authors are quoted as upholders of Probabiliorism.⁸ With this solitary and not very weighty exception Probabilism was the universally accepted theory of Moral Theology at least from the time of the publication of Medina’s book till the rise of Jansenism in the middle of the seventeenth century. This historical fact of itself is very significant, and it will have the greatest weight with those who are acquainted with the conservative instincts and the quickness to detect novelties which have always been characteristic of theologians. Furthermore, it is the simple fact that in practice the rule of Probabilism when applied to the solution of disputed questions made no difference in ethical doctrine. The laxity of some authors who abused the theory should not be attributed to sound Probabilism. It is merely a universal formula applicable in all disputed questions of right and wrong, and therefore a convenient substitute for the many and diverse rules which were in use before Medina’s time. The practical solutions of ethical questions remained the same, though they were arrived at by a different and more simple process after the introduction of Probabilism. This will be more clear if we continue the last extract from Dr. Hall where we left off. He continues thus:

⁸ Lib. 5, q. 15,

The same author, Navarrus, gave four very useful rules for the use of those who make choice of one opinion out of many. First, that a judge, counselor or agent, who is going to judge, advise, or do anything in a doubtful matter, before doing it, should, to avoid sin, forthwith drive that doubt out of his mind, and believe or hold for certain that the opinion which he chooses is true; and that he ought to judge according to it in that case; because if before doing it he judged what he advised or did to be doubtfully right, he would commit sin by exposing himself to danger of a doubtful conscience. Secondly, he remarks this, that in both the tribunal of justice and of conscience, one and the same man, in one and the same matter, both may and ought to believe something to be true under one respect for one reason, and the contrary to be true under another respect for another reason. As, for example, a woman may and ought sometimes to believe that the man with whom she lives is her husband with regard to rendering to him his marital rights, but the contrary when there is question of demanding them for herself. Thirdly, that although in a court of law, the rules which we borrowed from Navarrus are to be applied, yet in the forum of conscience to avoid sin it is sufficient to choose as true the opinion of one whom we deservedly consider to be a man endowed with the knowledge and uprightness necessary to form a sound opinion. For, he says, the right understanding of the common saying—‘‘The safer opinion must be chosen in doubt’’— is that it is applicable only in negative doubt, which does not exist when a view is held with sufficient authority and reason, nor when one opinion is chosen as true out of many. Fourthly, that an opinion is not to be called common so as necessarily to be preferred to another on the sole ground that many follow it like sheep one after another, for in this respect, he says, I should consider that to be the more common opinion which six or seven classical authors defend and who professedly treat of the matter, than an opinion approved by fifty who were almost entirely led by the authority of others. He even thinks that both opinions may be said to be common when each is defended by eight or ten authors of weight who choose it deliberately.⁹

⁹ Lib. 3, c. 16.

Prierias tells us in his Summa that theologians were unanimous in teaching that in doubtful matters where Doctors disagreed a man might safely follow the opinion of his own Master. “ And this,” he says, “you are to understand not only of one who does his best to get at the truth, for such a one would be excused on account of invincible ignorance even if he embraced a manifestly false opinion; but you are also to understand it of one who from a liking for his own Master forms a probable judgment, as it seems to him that what is false is true.”

Although some Doctors distinguished and put certain limitations, still it was commonly admitted that a confessor not only might, but was obliged to, absolve a penitent who wished to follow a probable opinion, although the confessor was convinced that the opinion was less probable and less safe than the opposite opinion which he held himself.

Men who had been taught and who had acted upon such opinions as the foregoing would accept the formula of Probabilism as a matter of course. They were accustomed to the idea that it was lawful to follow a probable opinion even though the opposite might be objectively more probable and supported by greater authorities and better reasons. A confessor was obliged to give absolution to a penitent who wished to act on a probable opinion, though the confessor believed that it was less probable than the opposite which he held himself. In other words, he was compelled in this case to follow a probable opinion of another against his own more probable opinion. The only step that remained to be taken was to show that logically one might always follow a soundly probable opinion even though recognizing at the same time that the opposite was more probable. Theologians who wrote before the time of Medina had not admitted this. The doctrine that in order to act lawfully one must have a certain conscience and no doubt about the lawfulness of the action stood in the way. A man who chooses what he considers to be a less probable opinion exposes himself to the danger of sin, they said; his conscience fluctuates and is uncertain, and so he commits sin, Where there is danger on both sides we must choose that on which there is less. Moreover, rules of law prescribe that in doubt the safer way must be chosen, and what is uncertain must be abandoned. Besides, a judge would certainly do wrong who gave sentence against a litigant who had more probable arguments on his side than his adversary had.

Medina answers these objections and establishes his theory of Probabilism by pointing out that one who follows a probable opinion exposes himself to no danger of committing sin. The opinion in question is admittedly probable, that is, it is approved, and so there can be no danger of committing sin by following it; if there were any such danger, the opinion could not be approved as a rule for action, it could not be probable. The opposite is more probable and more safe, it is true, but we are under no obligation to follow the safer way; it is sufficient if we follow one that is safe. Medina admits that a judge is bound to give sentence in favor of the litigant who brings the stronger arguments; Probabilism has nothing to do with this case, for here there is no doubt but that the litigant has a strict right to sentence being given in his favor; but he maintains that when there are two opinions about the interpretation of a law the judge may follow a probable against a more probable opinion.¹⁰

¹⁰ Loc. cit., Quest. 19, a. 6.

In this Medina was followed by Salon, Dr. Hall, and other theologians, but this last proposition was rejected by Vasquez and others, and finally it was condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March, 1679. Besides his opinion about a judge, there was another weak point in Medina’s exposition of his theory. To the argument that one who acts on probable opinion, acts with the consciousness that the opposite opinion may be true, and so acts in doubt and against his conscience, Medina replies: ‘One who in these cases acts against his own opinion, does indeed act against a speculative doubt or opinion, but he does not act against his conscience, for he is convinced and has made up his mind that when there are two probable opinions one may follow either indifferently.” 11 But, it may be asked, what ground has he for being certain that he is acting lawfully when he acts according to a probable opinion? Medina virtually replies that the certainty rests on his own judgment or on the judgment of prudent and good men that there is no danger of sin in following the opinion ; that is what a probable opinion means. And it is certainly lawful to do what there is no danger of sin in doing. The maxim that in doubtful matters one may do what prudent and learned Doctors judge to be safe was, as we have seen, commonly admitted by theologians, and in general it is a safe rule of conduct. However, on the theoretical side the basis of the maxim is weak. We have seen that Medina and other approved authors misapplied Probabilism to questions of law in the external forum. It would be easy to give instances where scores of approved theologians have gone wrong and held untenable opinions. Whence one might conclude that an opinion is not necessarily probable because it is judged to be so by a number of 11 Quest. 19, a. 6,

prudent, good, and learned men. We might reply that, although this is so sometimes, as a rule the judgment of good and learned men is correct, and therefore is sufficient ground for moral certainty. However this may be, modern probabilists prefer other methods of forming a certain conscience by means of a probable opinion. For this purpose they use reflex principles, such as —“ A doubtful law does not bind.” Virtually the process takes some such form as this: When there is a probable opinion that a particular action is lawful, there is no certain law which forbids it; such a law is at most doubtful. But a doubtful law cannot impose a certain obligation, or in other words a doubtful law does not bind. This is one of the favorite arguments of St. Alphonsus.

In his method of forming a certain conscience by means of a probable opinion Dr. Hall follows Medina and other theologians of his time. In the ninth chapter of the second book from which we quoted above, he argues as follows:

As to what some say, that a man would expose himself to the danger of committing sin by following a probable opinion and abandoning one that is more probable, this we deny absolutely, seeing that in doing this learned men see no danger of sin. In doubts, indeed, the safer opinion must be followed, because there is danger on both sides; but when one opinion is probable and another more probable, both are safe in morals, though the latter may be safer. And when the canon law says that what is more certain must be followed in case of doubt, it supposes that there is danger on both sides; and this we maintain is by no means the case when there are two opinions of which one is probable though the other is more probable. The reason is because in a question of morals not settled for certain by Holy Scripture or by the Church, it is safe to follow that opinion which one sees approved by a good and wise man. Finally, we allow that a judge ought to give sentence for the party which brings the better proofs of its claim, but when there are two opinions in law, of which one is only probable and the other more probable, he can follow the probable opinion, nor need he investigate which is the more probable so as necessarily to follow it.

Vasquez, the first great Jesuit theologian who treated the question ex professo, not only rejected this opinion about the judge, as we have seen, but required the support of more than one Doctor to make it lawful to follow an opinion against one that is recognized by the agent as more probable. He also required that the opinion should be commonly held not to be erroneous, but still to maintain its probability, and thus not to be obsolete.¹²

¹² Disp. 62, c. 4

In both these points Vasquez was followed by the great body of Jesuit theologians, and we see how true was the remark of the learned Cardinal D’Annibale that the Jesuits, far from being the inventors of Probabilism, were as a matter of fact its moderators.