The Campaign Against the Child

The Encyclical brands in the first place the base selfishness and the audacious lie of many who dare to call the

child “the disagreeable burden of matrimony”;¹ it brands the “criminal abuse”² of those who avoid children by frustrating the marriage act, whether they wish to gratify their passions without the consequent burden, or whether they excuse themselves on the ground of two concurrent impossibilities: that they cannot on the one hand remain continent, nor on the other have children. This last impossibility is claimed to exist either because of personal difficulties, or the condition of the mother, or family circumstances.

¹ P. 37.

² The same work.

He rejects them all at one sweep by reminding us:¹ No reason, however grave, may be put forward by which anything intrinsically against nature may become conformable to nature and morally good. Conjugal relations debased in this way are nothing more than “a form of debauchery which the world has come to look upon as regular and permissible.”²

¹ P. 38.

² Paul Bureau, L’Indiscipline des moeurs.

He does this in three ways: 1. By a proof from natural reason. It is a violation of nature to deliberately deflect from its natural end an act which belongs to the rational order to which we are subject. Now the marital act belongs to that superior order to which we are all subject. And its natural purpose is procreation. Hence any artifice which deprives the conjugal act of this its destiny is necessarily and always a violation of nature. 2. By Holy Scripture. According to the interpretation which is accepted in the Church, God struck Onan dead because he was guilty of this sin. 3. He proves it from the teaching of the Church, where he states that an uninterrupted traditional Christian teaching reprobates these practices, and where he solemnly confirms this teaching of the ordinary magisterium of the Church.

Before formally answering so grave a question it seems proper to quote the words of the Sovereign Pontiff himself.

Since, therefore, openly departing from the uninterrupted Christian tradition, some recently have judged it possible solemnly to declare another doctrine regarding this question, the Catholic Church, to whom God had entrusted the defense of the integrity and purity of morals, standing erect in the midst of the moral ruin which surrounds her, in order that she may preserve the chastity of the nuptial union from being defiled by this foul stain, raises her voice in token of Divine ambassadorship and through Our mouth proclaims anew: Any use whatsoever of matrimony exercised in such a way that the act is deliberately frustrated in its natural power to generate life is an offence against the law of God and of nature, and those who indulge in such are branded with the guilt of a grave sin.¹ Next, let us remember that the Pope, either alone or in union with the College of the Bishops, is the teaching Church, whose infallibility is guaranteed by Our Lord Jesus Christ. The Church speaks through the Pope, not as through her messenger, but as through her head and teacher. This mission of teaching and of defending the integrity of morals to which the Holy Father appeals here, is in himself. Infallible, in matters of faith and morals, is the traditional and constant doctrine of the Church treasured in the ordinary magisterium of the Bishops united to the See of Peter. Infallible is the solemn proclamation of a doctrine regarding faith or morals which the supreme Pastor, speaking as such to the universal Church, obliges it to hold. To what conclusion do these considerations lead us? We must conclude that the Holy Father, who, in this Encyclical, from the start, declares that he is addressing himself to the entire Church and even to the whole world: (a) States that on this question of conjugal onanism, there exists a Christian doctrine which has been transmitted from the beginning and which has been always faithfully kept, and hence is already infallibly taught by the ordinary magisterium; (b) Takes occasion from the departure from this doctrine on the part of some to promulgate it solemnly for all; and since he does this as teacher of the universal Church, conscious of his mission to teach, and as a sign of his Divine mission, he thereby obliges all to hold this doctrine. It is,

as he explicitly states, the Catholic Church which speaks by his mouth. In the presence of such language on the part of the supreme Pastor,² we cannot doubt that we are confronted with one of those cases, which are not infrequent, where the Pope teaches infallibly a truth already defined and believed by the Church. This is the reason why the Sovereign Pontiff can also declare himself an infallible interpreter of the primitive Church.³

¹ P. 38.

² The phrase in which the Holy Father declares that the Catholic Church speaks through his mouth on this subject, “is extremely solemn and impressive.” Dr. John Ryan, Ecclesiastical Review, 1931, p. 265, “The Moral Teaching of the Encyclical.”

³ We admit, however, that there are some very estimable priests who hesitate to recognize this as an infallible declaration ex cathedra distinct from the equally infallible teaching of the ordinary magisterium. On the other hand, a professor of theology, after a personal study of the passage, said to us: “If that is not an infallible definition, I do not know what terms the Pope could use in order to make one.” The manner in which the Belgian Bishops in their Pastoral on the Encyclical represent the role assumed by the Vicar of Jesus Christ in this memorable document, serves only to confirm our conviction. See Z. H. Paus, Pius XI, Wereld-brief “Casti Connubii” en het Belgisch Episcopaat (Vastenbrief 1931) over het Christelijk Huwelijk, p. 53.

These three: (a) Every use of marriage in the exercise of which the act is artificially deprived of its natural power of procreating life, is a violation of the law of God; (b) It is a violation of the natural law; (c) It is a grave sin.

That all preventive measures whose purpose is to make future marital intercourse sterile, whether temporarily or permanently, are also intrinsically wrong, and are also grievously sinful. More than once before, the Holy See had expressed itself rather clearly on this subject. On April 19, 1853, the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office, without going into details, declared that such an abuse of marriage is intrinsically evil. Then the Sacred Penitentiary, November 13, 1901, approved the action of a priest who refused to follow the direction of a confessor who was otherwise well-qualified and who had been professor of moral theology in a seminary, where the confessor had held that in order to avoid an excessive number of children or excessive fatigue on the part of the wife, a husband might vitiate the conjugal act, provided he had in view only the allaying of concupiscence. The Sacred Penitentiary declared that a penitent who refused to give up such a practice could not be absolved, as it amounted to onanism pure and simple.

They are the prelates of the Anglican Church, who numbering 307 in congress at Lambeth Palace in London, by a majority of 193 to 67, declared, in nebulous terms it is true and not without some signs of shame, that in certain cases where procreation was forbidden, another voice than that of continence might be followed.¹ The count indicates that many refused to vote. Since in its report the Commission of the Conference acknowledged the tradition to which the Pope appeals, but observed that the tradition lacked the confirmation of a conciliar definition, we think it probable that the Holy Father intended by a solemn declaration to fill what might falsely be regarded as a lacuna.

¹ See our article: La Conférence de Lambeth et la Morale du Mariage, Nouvelle Revue Théologique, Dec., 1930.

Far from it. Coming to a very important practical conclusion, he immediately adds:¹ We admonish, therefore, priests who hear confessions, and others who have the care of souls, in virtue of Our supreme authority and in Our solicitude for the salvation of souls, not to allow the Faithful entrusted to them to err regarding this most grave law of God; much more, that they keep themselves immune from such false opinions, in no way conniving in them. If any confessor or pastor of souls, which may God forbid, lead the Faithful entrusted to him into these errors or should at least confirm them by approval or by guilty silence, let him be mindful of the fact that he must render a strict account to God, the Supreme Judge, for the betrayal of his sacred trust, and let him take to himself the words of Christ: "They are blind leaders of the blind. And if the blind lead the blind, both fall into the pit” (St. Matth. xv, 14). This grave warning is in itself an obligatory standard for those to whom it is addressed, that is, confessors and those

who have care of souls. In fact, the Holy Father gives it in virtue of his supreme authority and as universal Pastor. He, therefore, warns those who hear confessions and who have the care of souls: (a) not to leave the Faithful who are entrusted to them in error regarding this grave law of God; (b) to preserve themselves from false opinions in this matter; (c) to connive in no way in false opinions on this subject. Consequently, he threatens with a severe account to be rendered to God: (a) those among them who should lead the Faithful into error; (b) those who might confirm them in their error, either by formal approval or deliberate silence. Former declarations of the Holy See define in a very useful way the attitudes on the part of confessors which are condemned in this passage of the Encyclical, and the duty of all confessors to avoid all connivance and even to undeceive penitents who have fallen into error on a point of such grave moral and social consequence. A priest of the diocese of Angers, in a query to the Sacred Penitentiary, described three classes of confessors. (1) Those of the first class, believing that ignorance even if it be vincible excuses from grave sin, and being persuaded that to call attention to the abuse of marriage would only increase the guilt of the parties and even perhaps keep them away from the Sacraments, conclude that it is licit and even advisable to favor this error on the part of penitents, by not disturbing it, or even by adroitly insinuating it, provided that can be done without lying. Consequently, they not only ask no questions on the subject, but even when the question of the gravity of the guilt of onanism is put to them, they evade it by skillful parrying, or they ask the penitent what he himself thinks of it. And when the latter declares that in view of the rights of marriage or of some other consideration “he can't see so much harm in it,” these confessors are glad to leave him in this good faith. (2) Others, although they hold the same views as those of the still do not conceal the truth if they are asked about it; first class, but when the penitent confines himself to simply confessing the sin of onanism, they take care not to lay an emphasis on this accusation, but, having heard the confession, they content themselves with arousing the penitent to contrition in a general way, and they absolve him on his affirmation that he detests all sin. (3) A third class of confessors are of opinion that it is extremely rare that vincible ignorance can go so far as to render subjectively venial a sin which is objectively grave, and that such error can in any event not last very long—the character of the sin itself as being contrary to nature, the environment in which the question is constantly being discussed, prevent that. Hence, whether the avowal of this sin has been spontaneous, or whether it has been brought out by prudent questioning, these confessors chide the penitent who has

been guilty of this sin, just as they would for any other grave sin, to the extent that his interest seems to require it, and they absolve him only when they have elicited from him sufficient signs of repentance and of a firm purpose of amendment for the future. Following this exposition, three questions were submitted to the Sacred Penitentiary: 1. Is it allowed to favor the good faith spoken of in the first instance? Is it allowed to produce it? 2. Do the confessors of the second class fulfil the duties of their state? 3. Are the confessors of the third class open to the reproach of disturbing themselves and their penitents more than is reasonable; or is their practice rather to be regarded as absolutely right? The Sacred Penitentiary answered the first two questions in the negative. To the third, it replied: “Assuming that, as regards the questions sometimes to be asked of married persons about their use of marriage, these confessors confine themselves within the limits indicated by the Roman Ritual and by approved authorities, their practice is beyond all reproach.” Ten years later, in 1886, a French Bishop addressed himself to the Sacred Penitentiary. After bewailing the spread of the evil which is now committed no longer for fear of having too many children, but for fear of having any, an evil which has depleted the country and the sanctuary, and has alarmed sociologists and moralists alike, the Bishop refers to the disagreement which exists among confessors on the need of questioning penitents, in modest and reserved language, upon this matter. In support of the position of those confessors who think that they are not allowed to remain mute, he cites the words of Benedict XIV in his Bull “Apostolica Constitutio”: “By such silence the penitent is either kept in ignorance of crimes which he ought to know about, or he is confirmed in the evil practice, not without scandal to others who think that anything is lawful for themselves when they see that it is practised with impunity by persons who are frequenting the Sacraments.” Then, proceeding to his questions, the Bishop asks: 1. When a confessor has reason to suspect that the penitent, who says not a word of birth control, is addicted to this criminal practice, may the confessor omit to question him prudently and discreetly because he foresees that by doing so he will disturb the good faith of some persons and cause many to avoid the Sacraments? Is not the confessor rather bound to question the penitent in a prudent and discreet manner? 2. When a confessor knows, either from spontaneous confession or as a result of prudent questioning, that the penitent is given to birth control, is he bound to warn him of the gravity of this sin as of other mortal sins, and (as the Roman Ritual puts it) to chide him with paternal charity, and to give him absolution only when from sufficient indications he shall judge that he repents of the past and has the purpose of never practising onanism any more? “In view of the fact,” thus spoke the Sacred Penitentiary, “that the abominable vice of which there is question in the case proposed, has become widespread, the Sacred Penitentiary has deemed it its

duty to reply to the questions asked as follows: To the first question usually, in the negative to the first part, in the affirmative to the second. To the second question: in the affirmative, according to the teaching of approved authorities.” These replies tell us clearly enough that questions should not be asked without reason, but only when there is ground for suspicion that the crime is being dissimulated or concealed; that the fear of disturbing good faith or of driving away from the Sacraments should not regularly stop a confessor from questioning; that when a penitent is known to be guilty, he must be informed of the gravity of the sin. Certainly, as a professor of theology remarked not long ago, we cannot, by lightly giving absolutions, put the sacramental seal upon immorality. It goes without saying that the questioning must always be done in correct language, rather reserved, but clear and leaving no room for misunderstanding or evasion.²

¹ P. 39.

² On the manner of questioning, a helpful article will be found in L’Ami du Clergé, Le devoir des confesseurs, pp. 185-187 (1931).

The Holy Father makes no pronouncement for particular exceptional cases. The general practice must be to undeceive the Faithful when they are in error on this matter; and one may never positively confirm them in error, even by silence which would be interpreted as approval. But, in the absence of scandal and of any positive confirmation, a genuine good faith may, in our opinion, be left to spouses who are embarrassed by a humanly inextricable situation. See, for example, the excellent Instructio pro confessaris de usu et abusu matrimonii written at Eichstatt Seminary, 1931.

Because there are cases of so-called good faith which are such only in appearance. For example a Catholic who, though he knew the teaching of the Encyclical, preferred to follow his own judgment on the plea that the severity of that teaching was extreme, could not be considered to be in good faith.

On the contrary it evidences a just moderation. (a) It excuses the party who suffers rather than commits sin, when for a perfectly weighty reason he tolerates on the part of his partner a perversion of the right order, which he himself does not intend, and fulfils his duty of charity by striving to induce the other party to return to right conduct.¹ (b) It mentions the other secondary ends of the conjugal union: mutual affection to be fostered, the allaying of concupiscence;—two ends which render the use of marriage lawful under circumstances in which, considering either the persons or the time, sterility seems either certain or very probable, provided always that the act takes place in the regular way.²

¹ P. 39.

² Ibid.

Among well-intentioned Anglicans there are several authorities who are of opinion that the vocation to the married life imposes on the parties the duty to give children to their country and to the Church, if they can.¹ This is, however, a false position. The possession of a right may be conceived without the obligation to use it. No doubt, in the institution of marriage, God wished to provide for the propagation of the human race. But this end is sufficiently attained without every couple being obliged to have children.

¹ This thesis is advanced notably by H. L. Goudge, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford, in his monograph, “The Question of Contraceptives” (London, League of National Life, 1931).

As the Holy Father has no intention of coming down to details of practical morality, we must evidently have recourse to approved authorities and to former declarations of the Holy See. According to this teaching, there is question of cooperation in an act which was begun in the right way, and which the other party alone interrupts in such a way as to violate nature.

We are therefore, for our part, unable to agree with the passage in which Reverend John Ryan of Washington, in his notes on the moral teaching of the Encyclical, insinuates that the Encyclical may extend the field of permissible material cooperation in the face of the common opinion now existing on the subject.¹ The distinctions which the moralists make are founded on a certain principle and are confirmed by the replies of the Sacred Penitentiary of April 3 and June 3, 1916.²

¹ “The Moral Teaching of the Encyclical,” Ecclesiastical Review (1931), p. 266.

² Cf. Vermeersch, De Castitate, n. 253.

The Encyclical says: Nor are those considered as acting against nature who in the married state use their right in the proper manner although on account of natural reasons either of time or of certain defects, new life cannot be brought forth.² As long as the act takes place normally it remains objectively directed toward its primary end, which is generation; and since, according to the maxim that the purpose of the law is not within the matter of the law (finis legis non cadit sub legem), there is no obligation, while observing the law, to intend the end for which it was promulgated, it follows that the act is not necessarily vitiated by deliberately choosing a certain time with the intention of avoiding conception. Of course, the couple are bound to welcome any children that might come, if, as sometimes happens, their plan fails. The conjugal intercourse in any event serves the other ends of marriage. Besides, let us observe that there is this great difference between the practise of birth control and the restricted use of marriage of which we speak: the abuses of birth control can be practised constantly, they give free rein to passion, they do not demand the exercise of any moral force whatever; whereas this limited use of marriage requires, for the voluntary abstinence on certain

days, a moral force the exercise of which is not without its social value. In itself indifferent or objectively good, this limitation which is not a violation of nature, may, according to the circumstances and the intention, be praiseworthy, less desirable, or even worthy of blame.³ Accordingly the Sacred Penitentiary, in its reply of June 16, 1880, declared that there was no reason to disturb those married people who in their use of marriage restricted themselves to days that are physiologically sterile, and that this practice might be insinuated caute, that is with prudent discretion. With prudent discretion we say; the uncertainty of the result is enough to suggest prudence; besides the confessor should not be a counselor of infecundity. The insinuation of this course of action may be appropriate as a means of preventing formal sins, or as offering a way out of a critical situation where the danger of incontinence makes intercourse imperative, and yet where conception would be perilous for the mother. It goes without saying that this practice normally supposes the agreement of both parties.

¹ The latest researches of Dr. Knaus of Germany and Dr. Ogino of Japan lead to the conclusion that these periods include the last days before and the first days after the monthly period of the woman. Or, more exactly, if we suppose a cycle of 28 days, it would be ten days before and ten days after the beginning of the last menstruation period; if the cycle is not of 28 days, the number ten should be increased by one for every day the cycle is above 28, and diminished by one for every day it is below 28. But no absolute guarantee can be given. The theory itself is only seriously probable — not absolutely certain, and various causes may upset the calculations. Several ecclesiastical magazines have recently dealt with this question, notably the Collationes Brugenses, 1930, p. 360; 443; 1931, p. 178, articles by Rev. M. Coucke; also the Nederlandsche Katholicke Stemmen 1931, p. 41, by Rev. P. Buysse, C.SS.R.

² P. 39.

³ Studien (Malmberg, s’ Hertogenbosch, March, 1931) Periodieke Onthouding by Rev. Heymeyer, S.J.

Because these other ends, subordinated as they are to the principal end, cannot be in opposition to it. Besides, the other ends themselves would be frustrated by wrong relations. Such relations cannot foster true love, which supposes mutual respect; too often they result only in disagreement and separation. Neither does the seeking of satisfaction at all costs allay concupiscence. “It is like a drink which increases thirst.”¹

¹ Fahsel, Ehe, Liebe und Sexualproblem (Herder, 1931).

Some, of which any decent person should be ashamed, the Encyclical disdains to mention; but it could not be indifferent in the presence of the extremely difficult situation in which a poor mother may find herself. Here, it begins by toning down the alarms with the remark, so often

confirmed by experience, that the reasons for alarm are often exaggerated; then, showing an affectionate compassion and at the same time giving encouragement to the mother who is face to face with death through heroic devotion to duty, it expresses admiration for her and assures her of a magnificent reward from God.¹

¹ P. 39.

On this subject also the Holy Father shows a deep feeling of compassion for the parents. However, he immediately lifts up their hearts to the high reality of God's law. However [he adds] these parents should take care lest the calamitous state of their external affairs should be the occasion for a much more calamitous error. No difficulty can arise that justifies the putting aside of the law of God which forbids all acts intrinsically evil. There is no possible circumstance in which husband and wife cannot, strengthened by the grace of God, fulfil faithfully their duties and preserve in wedlock their chastity unspotted.¹

¹ P. 39.

The Encyclical treats as a crime all attempts upon the life of the child in the womb of his mother.¹

¹ Pp. 40-42.

It means not only a child whose body is already formed, but also a child in the fetal or embryonic stage, in other words every fertilized ovum. In fact Canon 747 of the Code of Canon Law in prescribing the baptism of every fetus, however small, enjoins that every fetus be treated as a human being.

It includes in the first place feticide, that is the cruel operation which crushes the skull of the fetus or cuts his little body to pieces according to the need for saving the mother. Besides, it includes every direct abortion. Not only the majority of the more modern moral theologians, but the Holy Office itself consider direct abortion as similar to feticide.¹ For abortion

is not merely the placing of a child outside the surroundings which are indispensable for him to live, but it is the violent tearing away of the membranes and tissues by which the child is as it were one with his mother, and through which he breathes and receives nourishment—membranes which, at least in part, belong to him as an organ developed by his own growth. Abortion directly produced is a deadly wound inflicted on an innocent human being.

¹ See the reply of the Holy Office, August 19, 1889.

Catholic teaching is today unanimous in condemning all feticide and all abortion directly produced upon a fetus, unless it be morally certain that he is already dead. Outside of this Catholic tradition, some, holding that the unborn child has no rights,¹ allow the father or mother to decide his fate; others allow feticide only in case of imminent danger, where it is the only way to save the mother's life, or they allow abortion only for very grave medical, social or eugenic reasons. Such a determining reason of a medical nature would be to kill the child in order to solve the conflict which has arisen between the life or health of the mother and the existence of the child. Social reasons are to save the honor and reputation of the mother, or to leave her free to carry on her occupations and gain her livelihood. A eugenic reason is to prevent the birth of children who would be monstrous or idiotic. The idea of the required gravity of the motive is evidently more or less broad, according to the religion or “philosophical convictions” of the doctor or adviser. All of them, however, as the Encyclical goes on to state, demand that the “indication” which in one form or another they defend, be recognized as such by the public law and in no way penalized.² In other words, they insist that the law should conform itself to their theories and distinguish on the one hand between criminal feticide or abortion, punishable by legal penalties, and on the other, therapeutic or medical feticide or abortion, which should be legally authorized. In

fact, already a doctor is in no danger of prosecution as long as he is supposed to have acted according to the dictates of science. Worse still, it sometimes happens that a doctor is forbidden to practise laparotomy (cesarian section) in rural districts, although this operation might save both mother and child, while at the same time he is liable to prosecution for malpractice if he allows the mother to die under circumstances where he might have saved her by directly killing the child.

¹ They consider it as part of the organs of the mother, viscera matris.

² P. 40.

He opposes to them in the first place the peremptory argument embodied in the Divine commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”; and he rejects in passing the futile exceptions which have had a certain vogue. He declares that the right to take away life cannot be appealed to, since even public authority has no such power in the case of an innocent person; nor can the right of self-defense, since there is no question of an aggressor, even materially unjust, and the development of the child, even though it should become a fatal danger to the mother, does not violate objectively any of her rights, nor contain any injustice; nor the right of extreme necessity, since that never goes to the extent of killing a living person. The life of each of the two individuals is equally inviolable. Such a thing as a conflict in which one life might be regarded as of less value than the other, is an impossibility. We must, therefore, conclude with the Encyclical that physicians are bound to try to save both lives, both having an equal value in the eyes of God, the mother’s and the child’s. The physician has no right to set himself up as judge to pronounce a sentence of death. No diploma confers such power, which would exceed that of the most absolute monarch.

When the doctor abstains from interfering, he himself sacrifices no one; whereas if he does interfere by abortion or

feticide, he protects the life of the mother at the cost of committing a homicide. Here is a mere comparison, which we do not offer as an argument: suppose two men, for want

of provisions, are about to die of hunger; is it permissible for the stronger of the two to kill the weaker, in order to take his share of the provisions? That is the act of the physician who kills the weaker, the child, to save the stronger, the mother. If the parity is denied on the ground that in the supposed case the weaker person is not causing to the stronger any direct harm, whereas it sometimes happens that the fetal placenta poisons the mother, we answer in the first place that some good gynecologists have told us that the theory of placental poisoning is being more and more questioned. But suppose even that it is true, and return to our comparison. If the weaker person, forcibly held close to the other, involuntarily exhales a harmful vapor, is his right to life thereby impaired? May the stronger in that case resort to murder to free himself from this unhealthy environment? Besides, is it quite certain that unless an abortion is performed the mother and the child will die? It is very far from certain. There are not wanting cases in which a conscientious physician has saved both mother and child in spite of the medical indication of abortion. The doctor’s verdict is based on probabilities.¹

¹ See in the excellent little book of Dr. Clement, Le droit de l’enfant à naître (Bruges, Beyaert, 6th ed. 1931) the chapter, Vers la suppression de l’avortement thérapeutique.

It is not, when that principle is a saving one, which preserves greater values than those it sacrifices. Now faith in Providence assures us that every principle imposed by the law of God is a conserving force of higher values. In the present instance, one sees, it is true, some very sad, pitiable cases, in which a person dies, who might have been saved by abortion. But does not a more far-sighted vision see also a greater number of lives saved by the rigor of the principle? The severity intensifies the effort to save both lives; and this effort is sometimes rewarded with complete success. At the same time the spirit of invention is stimulated, and

this results in discoveries which render out of date even the medical indication for abortion or feticide. ‘‘Respect for the life of the child,” writes Dr. Clement,¹ “stimulates progress.” Is it not through this means that specialists now declare themselves able to control cases which were formerly despaired of, cases of so-called uncontrollable vomiting?² Let us in addition observe this psychological fact. When a physician who practices medical abortion is attending a woman who is pregnant and ill, everything conspires against the child. What reproaches are in store for the doctor if the mother dies when he had reason to believe he could save both her and the child! But the child, needlessly sacrificed, will make no complaint from beyond the grave! If one could get the statistics, we are persuaded that the number of real victims of medical abortion would be far greater than that of so-called victims who are supposed to have died for having been unwilling to consent to abortion.

¹ Work cited, p. 81.

² See for example one of the studies of Dr. Leven of Paris, Les vomissements au cours de la grossesse. La Médecine, April, 1929, in which he details the treatment which he finds successful. We have also direct assurances of the same fact from other gynecologists. Dr. Leven concludes with these words: “At a time when the birth-rate is so low, the fear of pernicious vomiting should no longer cause dread of pregnancy; nor should avoidable abortions any longer be practised.”

Because the death of the child may be a consequence, not willed, although foreseen and inevitable, of a medical treatment which is permitted in spite of this foreseen consequence. Although we may never do what is evil, still we have neither the obligation nor the power to prevent all evil from happening. We cannot be responsible for an evil consequence flowing from our good actions, when that consequence does not depend on us, and when the motive for acting is in proportion to the evil which is feared. In such cases the evil cannot be imputed to us as willed, because we do not will it; nor as permitted, because by our scrutiny of the reasons for acting, and by the precautions we have taken, we have fully satisfied our positive duty of removing, as far as is humanly possible, the accidental evil consequences of our action.

It is necessary that the abortion be not willed either as an end or as a means, but simply be permitted as occurring in spite of all, through the intervention of a factor which we cannot remove. It is, therefore, not sufficient that in an abortion the only purpose intended be to save the mother, if the abortion is a measure to that end, if the expulsion of the fetus is utilized as a means. In such a case, since the abortion is chosen, it is willed, and is, therefore, direct. Consequently, abortion will be indirect only in case the morbid condition of the maternal matrix requires the immediate removal of that organ, even though this removal necessarily entails the exit of the fetus which is enclosed in the uterus. The abortion, however, would be direct if the womb were to be emptied in order by that means to stop a hemorrhage. It is absolutely direct when it is practised because the mother is affected with tuberculosis or general weakness, or because it is feared that the child will be physically deformed or mentally affected.

It is notorious that in Soviet Russia, notably in Moscow, there is an official Institute where abortion is practised upon any woman who asks for it. About 30,000 abortions a year are performed there. But statistics supply us with precious information on the physical harm caused by these operations. Nature takes her revenge upon these unnatural mothers.¹

¹ Even outside of Russia, are not the statistics of abortion alarming? Take a single example. Already in 1923—and it is no better since then—there were in France 500,000 abortions a year, of which 85 per cent (425,000) were criminal, according to Doctors Pinard and Richet. (Speech of Mr. Zamanski at the Social Congress of Marseilles, 1929.) In Germany there are yearly one million abortions.

On the contrary, efforts and researches which tend to improve the health and vigor of the human race are in themselves praiseworthy. The Holy Father teaches that we may, and should, take account of the findings and recommendations of this science or art.

But the end does not justify the means. One cannot give to eugenics such primacy as to forget the law of God in order to satisfy its demands. On March 21 of this year (1931) the Holy Office, with the approval of the Holy Father, declared that we must absolutely reject and hold as false and condemned by the Encyclical “Casti Connubii” of December 31, 1930, the so-called “eugenic” doctrine, as well “positive” eugenics as “negative,” together with the means which it indicates for the improvement of the human race, by neglecting the laws of nature, of God, or of the Church, concerning marriage and the rights of individuals.¹ The Holy Father takes occasion in this connection to remind public authorities that it is their duty to protect the lives of the innocent, especially of those who cannot defend themselves. To deliver them to death, even at the hands of physicians, is to commit a crime that cries to heaven for vengeance.²

¹ Acta Ap. Sedis, Vol. XXXII, p. 118.

² P. 56.

We must distinguish between abortion (the moralists call it abortion when a child who is not viable is removed) and premature delivery. The latter will be allowed when it is practised at such a time and by such means that under ordinary conditions the lives of both the mother and the child will be provided for.¹

¹ Reply of the Holy Office, May 4, 1898, reply to question 2.

In the first place, the child must be already viable. At present, thanks to artificial incubators the child may be said to be viable after about six months of life within the womb. But this initial viability is a very different thing from full viability which requires at least eight months. Between these two periods viability goes through varying degrees, in which the chances of life are unequal. Moreover, premature delivery is more or less harmful to the child, according to his degree of maturity. Mere viability may not, therefore, always be a sufficient reason for delivering a child of six months. If there is imminent danger, the

operation will be legitimate as soon as the child has a chance to survive. If such a danger is not certain, then its probabilities must be considered, as well as the harm that would result from prolonging the pregnancy; and in the absence of a controlling reason of this nature, one should wait the full eight months. In short, the formula of the Holy Office gives us this rule: Consider the two lives, that of the mother and that of the child, as of equal value; and do what is for the best interests of both, everything considered, and without forgetting that the saving of the mother’s life is a very great benefit to the child himself.

The Holy Father in no wise admits that the State may for eugenic reasons directly forbid marriage to persons who are naturally capable of fulfilling its functions; and still less does he admit the right of the State to so mutilate a person as to deprive him of a natural faculty.¹ In our day those who cultivate the science of eugenics will willingly grant that their studies are not sufficiently advanced, nor their conclusions sufficiently certain to enable even themselves, just yet, to advocate such radical measures. But these arguments lead only to a tentative answer. Accordingly the Holy Father passes over these considerations, and, by a peremptory and definite answer, confronts the “eugenists” with the principle of the incompetence of the civil authority.

¹ Pp. 42, 43.

It can be shown first from a true concept of human society. The mission of society is by no means to deprive man of rights which he had before, but rather to facilitate and protect the normal exercise of these rights. As long as there is no question of persons guilty of crime, the State cannot, even for the common good, restrict rights, other than those which come from itself, such as political rights. It can also be shown from the dignity of a human person. Man, with his body and its members, does not belong to himself; he belongs to God and to His Christ. God gives him only the use thereof. The consent of the individual could not therefore avail to transfer to others a right which he never had himself.

The Encyclical does not pronounce on these questions. It does not intend either to approve or to condemn such measures. Our own humble opinion would be for the negative, at least at the present time, for the reason that this type of punishment is repugnant to our penal system which does not favor corporal punishments directly and positively applied, such as whipping.

According to the Encyclical “Casti Connubii”¹ such persons should often be advised not to marry; but if they are otherwise capable of marrying, they cannot be charged with grave sin in neglecting the advice.

¹ P. 42.

Because the prevision of defective children diminishes for the parties themselves the hope of a happy union, and suggests temptations against right conduct in married life. Neither is it right to aggravate without necessity the burdens that weigh down public administration or private charity.

Because there may be grave reasons, either of a private nature, such as the moral weakness of the parties, or of a public nature, such as for example the need of an heir for a throne or for an illustrious family, which outweigh the undesirable consequences of such unions. Let us not forget the words of the Apostle: It is better to marry than to burn with the flame of unrestrained passion.¹

have to suffer and also, by fostering feelings of sympathy, which is a sentiment of so social a nature that an unbelieving philosopher² ranked it above all others; by bringing into play the noble virtue of charity and by delivering men from the selfishness which seeks enjoyment for its own sake. How dull, sad, and cold life would be in a society where there were no unfortunates to help, no afflicted ones to console.

¹ “It is better to marry than to be burnt.” I Cor. vii, 9. Neither must we forget that those whom nature has, so to speak, disinherited have still the sublime last end of human individuals, and can still attain eternal blessedness. Indirectly, they even render a service to society by detaching the affections of men from this earth where so many

² Schopenhauer, Grundlage der Moral (Complete Works, Munich, 1912, Vol. III, p. 678).

Because the power of procreation gives him the right to contract marriage. The exercise of a right does not involve in itself any contradiction of the essential order, and cannot therefore, as such, be stigmatized as a grave sin.

The text of the Encyclical does not exclude venial sin, but neither does it affirm that one is committed in every case. It simply abstracts from the question of venial sin.

The fact that in the use of the right, though there is no violation of the essential order, there is nevertheless a yielding to a disordered inclination. Such would be the case for instance if a person physically unfit should insist on marrying, although a life of continence were not beyond his power. The venial sin, therefore, is found in the inopportune use of a right, just as, in the state of marriage, such a sin is committed when the parties use their right in a somewhat irregular fashion.

The State could exercise such power, at least by putting

itself in agreement with the competent authority, which, in the case of baptized persons, is the Church.

That is the claim made by some eugenists; but the better informed contest the value of their arguments. It seems rather that nature herself tends to eliminate the unfit.¹

¹ See for example Oswald Bumke, Lehrbuch der Geisteskrankheiten, Munich, 1924, p. 347; Jaschke und Pankow, Lehrbuch der Gynäkologie, Berlin, 1921, p. 494.

The power of condemning guilty persons to seclusion in virtue of vindicative justice, and the power to protect society against dangerous persons by imprisoning them, and by segregating those whose contact would spread disease.

It attacks, not the children whom it permits to be born and to live, but those whom it prevents from being born. These suffer an irreparable personal wrong, because the others can never take their place. At the same time, more directly, it attacks marriage in the natural right man has to marry. For two reasons, therefore, the Encyclical had to condemn its exaggerations.