Compensationism

Compensationism.—Between 1850 and 1880 a number of theologians, feeling that there were serious difficulties against all the systems up to then considered, developed a reformed or restricted Probabilism, which would not be open to the criticisms made against ordinary Probabilism, and yet would have those good qualities that make it preferable to the stricter systems. This new doctrine is called Compensationism, because it permits one to follow a probable opinion against the law only when there is present a sufficient reason to compensate for this course of action.

The following rules are, therefore, given as restrictions on the use of Probabilism: (a) the more serious or the more probable the doubtful law, the greater the reason must be to justify one in acting against it; (b) the higher and greater the good to be obtained from the exercise of freedom against a doubtful law, the less the reason that suffices for exercising freedom.

Illustrations of the Use of Compensationism.—(a) Titus, a poor man, is in uncertainty, through no fault of his own, about two debts. He thinks it more probable that he owes $10 to Sempronius, and 10 cents to Caius; but he believes it is really probable that he has paid both debts. He foresees that, if he offers the money to Sempronius, he will be subjected to serious quarrels and vexations, or at least that very bad use will be made of the money; while, if he offers to pay Caius, the latter may take some slight offense. He decides that there are proportionate reasons in each case to justify his following the less probable opinion.

(b) Fr. Titus thinks that a penitent is more probably bound to ask pardon of one whom he has offended. But he knows that, if he imposes the obligation, the present good faith of the penitent will be changed to bad faith, and he will refuse to do what is imposed. Fr. Titus decides, therefore, that it will be more profitable for the penitent if the less probable opinion—that there is no obligation—be followed.

The two chief arguments for Compensationism, which are also the two chief objections it makes against ordinary Probabilism, are:

(a) The obligation of a law depends on the knowledge one has about it. If one knows that the law exists, there is certain obligation; if one knows that the law does not exist, there is no obligation; if one holds it as probable that the law exists, there is probable obligation. Now, since one may not be excused from obligation unless there is a reason proportionate to the obligation itself (see 495), he who is under probable or more probable obligation must have a graver reason for using freedom than he who is under no obligation (against Probabilism), but he need not have as grave a reason as one who is under a certain obligation (against Probabiliorism). Hence, one may not act against a probable law, unless by so doing there is some good secured that compensates for the danger to which the right of the law is exposed.

(b) It is lawful to perform a good act from which an evil effect will result, only if one has a proportionally grave cause for permitting the evil effect (see 102 sqq.). But he who follows the opinion for liberty against a more probable or equally probable opinion for law, performs an act from which will probably result the evil of a material transgression of law. Therefore, one may not use Probabilism unless by so doing there is some good secured that compensates for the danger of material sin to which one exposes oneself.

Criticisms from the Probabilists.—(a) The dictum that a doubtful law obliges doubtfully cannot be applied, for in actual life there is no middle way between decision for the law and decision for liberty, unless it be indecision. The principle of Compensationism must mean, then, that we must always decide for a doubtful law (which is Tutiorism), or remain in suspense (which is no help to the one in doubt).

(b) The supposition that there must always be some special reason of good to offset the evil of the danger of material sin is not correct. For there always exists a compensation proportionate to the danger, namely, the exercise of liberty, a great gift of God, and the avoidance of the burden of fulfilling all uncertain obligations.

Reply of the Compensationists.—(a) The principle that a doubtful law obliges doubtfully means only that the reasons in favor of the law deserve some consideration, and should not be put aside unless one has some better reason than mere arbitrariness, self-will, or the intention to take always the easier way. There is no question of either Tutiorism or hesitation, but only of a prudent and honest facing of the fact that there are two sides to one’s doubt.

(b) It is not true that the exercise of liberty and the escape from the burden of uncertain obligations are always a sufficient compensation for the danger of material sin. For material sin is not only an evil in itself, as being a violation of law; it is also the source of many and great evils both to the individual and society, such as wrong habits acquired, scandal given, etc. Liberty is a great gift, but it should not become a cloak for malice. Neither is the foregoing of liberty so great an evil that one should not be willing to suffer it now and then in order to prevent the greater evils spoken of just above.

Other Objections Against the System of Compensation.

(a) From Authority.—Compensationism is of very recent origin, and it cannot be admitted that the right solution of moral difficulties was unknown before this new system appeared.

(b) From Reason.—It runs counter to the principle commonly accepted in the controversies of the systems, namely, that the decisive factor as to obligation in doubt is knowledge. For it introduces a new factor, that of sufficient reason or compensation.

(c) From Serviceability.—It is easy to say in the abstract that one should always have a suitable reason for adopting a probable opinion in favor of liberty. But, when one attempts to apply this rule to actual cases, difficulties innumerable arise (searchings of motives, comparison of probabilities, measuring of consequences, etc.), so that for use Compensationism is impossible, or impracticable.

Reply of Compensationists.—(a) Compensationism is an example of doctrinal progression from the implicit to the explicit. The principles on which it is based are found in the teaching and practice of the most ancient authorities.

(b) Sufficient reason is not a new principle, since it is admitted by all moralists for the case of double effect (see above, 102 Sqq.); its application to the solution of doubts of conscience is not an innovation, since the cases of doubt and of double effect are analogous.

(c) Compensationism is not intended as a system to be applied by those who have not sufficient theological training, but as a guide for moralists, directors and confessors. That it is not difficult, is clear from the fact that it is only an application of the commonly accepted principle of double effect, and that Probabilists themselves recommend it and make very general use of it, as if they instinctively recognized its necessity.

415. (A) Exposition. Since not a few difficulties are found in the aforesaid systems, certain authors devised a new system for solving doubt from the principle of sufficient reason, or compensation: thus, among others, Manier, Laloux, Potton.² (a) According to them indeed, a doubtful law is not lacking every obligatory force, nor does it have all its force of obliging, but it obliges more or less, according as it is more or less known: as often as the law is wholly known, it has its whole force of obliging in relation to us; as often, on the contrary, as it is altogether unknown to us, it in no way obliges; therefore, if the law is imperfectly known, it binds us imperfectly. Now, so that we can act licitly against a law even imperfectly obliging, some excusing cause, or sufficient reason, or compensation, is required. Or, in other words, a doubtful law is not worth as much as a certain law, but is worth more than no law, and therefore, for relaxing its obligation, some sufficient reason is required, although less grave than for a certain law.

² Manier, Compendium Philosophiae, 10th ed., t. III, Appendix I, p. 539-553; Laloux, De Actibus humanis, diss. IV, p. 42-148 (which work, not yet completed, was published not by the author himself, but by a disciple); Potton, O.P., De Theoria probabilitatis, Paris, 1874.

(b) This is declared in another way: in even a material transgression of a just law, some evil is always found; for, from what has been said, law is an ordination of reason, and he who violates it even ignorantly inflicts some detriment on himself or on others: thus dueling, infanticide, and other things of this kind, although committed ignorantly, truly harm individuals and society; and therefore knowingly to expose oneself to the danger of material evil, without sufficient reason, is a sin, but it is licit if there is a sufficient reason proportionately grave. For here the principles handed down above, n. 175-182, concerning the indirectly voluntary, can be applied: it is licit to place an act in itself good or indifferent, from which an evil effect is foreseen as probably going to follow, provided that there is a proportionately grave reason. Namely, he who violates a doubtful law indeed foresees the evil effect probably going to follow from it, - the material transgression of the law; - but his action is not intrinsically evil, and therefore he is excused from sin, provided that he has a sufficient reason for acting thus; but if there is no reason of this kind, the agent in some way sins, because freely, without cause, he exposes himself to the danger of at least materially transgressing the law. - Wherefore, in order to know whether it is licit to act against some doubtful law, attention must be given: (a) to the gravity of the law and to its probability: the more holy and grave the law is, and the more probable its existence, the greater the reason ought to be so that it may be sufficient; (b) to the goods which are obtained from the transgression of the doubtful law: the greater they are and the higher their order, the more easily the material transgression of the law can be permitted.

416. (B) The system of compensation is weighed critically. The probabilists attack the aforesaid system thus:¹ (a) Compensationism leads to tutiorism: for if a doubtful law always obliges in some degree, unless an excusing reason occurs, the safer part must always be followed, even when the opinion favoring liberty is most probable: which nevertheless was reproved by Alexander VIII, above n. 399. - Yet it can be said that this system does not lead to tutiorism any more than probabilism draws toward laxism: for just as probabilists avoid laxism by rejecting the sufficiency of an opinion slenderly probable, so likewise compensationists escape tutiorism by asserting that a doubtful and uncertain law does not oblige except when a sufficient reason for transgressing it is wholly lacking, and that an altogether slight cause excuses from a very doubtful law.

¹ Gury, Casus consc. 7, concerning Conscience; Montrouzier, in the periodical Revue des Sciences eccles., t. XXI, 1870, p. 220 sq.; two anonymous authors in the same periodical, t. XXV, 1872, p. 383 sq.; whom Potton tries to refute, op. cit., p. 169-240.

(b) It is by no means proved, say the probabilists, that an imperfect obligation is induced from imperfect cognition of the law: what does this half and partial obligation mean? What degree is required for sinning gravely or lightly? Is it not better deduced from an uncertain law that it gives no obligation? - The compensationists respond that there are certain degrees in obligation, since an obligation light is distinguished by all from a grave one, and that those degrees can be discerned from all the circumstances from which grave sin is distinguished from venial.

Nevertheless, in our judgment, a response of this kind does not completely remove the difficulty. For, in a moral matter, a little is reckoned as nothing, and therefore we think that a law whose existence is only slenderly probable imposes no obligation, even under light sin. It can indeed be said that it is better to obey this law if there is no reason for receding from it; but with the common opinion of theologians we judge that no one is held to this.

(c) The probabilists add that there is nothing evil in the material violation of a law; - which assuredly we do not admit, from what was said above, n. 356. They also say that in the aforesaid system the danger of private judgment or private inspiration is incurred, since each one must judge whether in each case a sufficient reason is present or not; - which argument is easily retorted, since in any system someone must judge whether such an opinion is truly probable, equiprobable, or not.

417. Conclusion. Nevertheless we do not admit compensationism as a general system by which practical doubt can be solved; but we think that prudent confessors, in the use of equiprobabilism or probabilism, ought to use a certain prudent compensation: namely, to attend not only to what is licit, but also to what is expedient, and therefore diligently to weigh whether or not there is had a sufficient reason for counseling the use of such or such a probable opinion, in such a determinate case, with attention given not only to external circumstances, but also to the psychological dispositions of the penitent.

351. Arguments for the system of compensation. No system from those mentioned above avoids grave difficulties; indeed, each one, deduced all the way to its last consequences, impedes the profitable practice of the confessor. Probabiliorism excels both Equiprobabilism and pure Probabilism, and each one should strive to practice Probabiliorism in his own life. And in reality any sincere lover of truth embraces that which is certainly more like the truth, if he cannot obtain every kind of certitude. Indeed, this sincere and ardent love of truth can scarcely be commended enough, especially in our times, since so many men are deceived by the devil, the father of falsehood, who by his falsehood already deceived our first parents and thus induced them to go into exile from paradise. - But the confessor in the direction of souls is compelled not rarely to embrace, the more probable opinion having been set aside, an opinion less probable indeed, but truly probable, in order to avoid a greater evil. Just as he also sometimes ought to permit material sins in order to avoid formal sins. Hence also the Sacred Penitentiary often prescribes that the penitent is to be left in good faith, even if there is question of things materially certainly evil. For example, it is permitted that putative spouses existing in good faith live together maritally. Therefore according to the now universal practice it is sometimes licit for the confessor to permit material sins and to follow an opinion less safe and less probable. Nevertheless, it is never licit to act thus without a grave and proportionate cause, since even a material transgression of the law or material sin is something evil.¹⁵⁶ Generally in these cases one must act according to the rules established for the indirect voluntary. But if those rules are observed, on the one hand the dangers of Laxism, which are joined with pure Probabilism, are avoided; on the other hand the spiritual salvation of the penitent is procured in the better manner in which it can be done. Hence in practice this system of compensation or of sufficient reason, which is better called the system of Christian prudence, seems to be preferred to all others. But in order to know whether in a particular case it is licit to follow an opinion truly and certainly probable for liberty, the more probable one for law having been set aside, the individual circumstances must prudently be attended to: the holier and graver the law is, and the more probable its obligation, the greater the sufficient reason ought to be for acting according to the opinion favoring liberty; but the greater the utility hoped for the penitent, the more easily can the probable opinion favoring liberty be permitted. - Nor should anyone say that this system of sufficient reason is morally impossible in practice, since the confessor can scarcely, indeed not even scarcely, judge rightly whether there are sufficient reasons for following a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside. To this objection it is easily responded that such impossibility is no more an obstacle here than in six hundred other cases of the indirect voluntary, in which nevertheless every confessor ought to judge concerning the sufficient reason rendering the act honorable.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. St. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 36.

352. Practical conclusion. We have sincerely set forth the reasons which are brought forward for the individual systems. If you prescind from absolute Rigorism and from Laxism, each system from those declared is tolerated by the Church, and therefore can freely be assumed, so that the confessor has no right to force some system upon his penitent, and a fortiori he cannot strictly demand that the penitent fulfill some obligation to which according to the principles of another system he is not bound. For the confessor is not the judge of opinions, but of the disposition of conscience.¹⁵⁷ Hence the confessor can indeed prudently counsel safer and more probable opinions, but cannot impose a strict burden to which the penitent probably is not bound. In practice it is to be counseled that the confessor act according to the system of Christian prudence, because a) thus he avoids the rocks of Probabilism, Equiprobabilism, and Probabiliorism; b) thus he proceeds according to Christian prudence, which is the mover and charioteer of all moral virtues and which is most necessary for living well.¹⁵⁸ Up to Bartholomaeus Medina none of these three systems was certainly known. And yet most holy and most prudent confessors with great fruit administered the sacrament of penance. Are today's confessors wiser than they? Are other sins committed today than at that time? The confessor who prudently explores the condition of the penitent and the circumstances of the act will judge rightly, 1. if he attends especially to the principle: "In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands"; 2. if he attentively consults good authors; and 3. if he does not trust too much in his own judgment. For then he applies the system which is best and which can rightly be called: the system of Christian prudence. Concerning this Christian prudence it is said: "Her ways are beautiful ways, and all her paths are peaceful."¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ Ib. l. 3, n. 669.

¹⁵⁸ St. Thom., S. theol. 1, 2, q. 57, a. 5.

¹⁵⁹ Prov. 3, 17.

99. Concerning the system of compensation it must be observed:

1. The twofold compensation, of probability and at the same time of the gravity of the law, is very difficult to estimate in practice; whence it is not a system apt to be a practical rule of acting and of forming conscience for all, even those sufficiently cultivated.

2. Not only does an inconvenience arise from the free positing of an act probably prohibited, namely, the danger of materially violating the law and frustrating the end intended by the legislator; but a greater one arises from the imposition of all uncertain precepts, namely, the deprivation of liberty and the danger lest men, on account of their weakness, fall rather into formal sins. Whence one could judge that, in a case of a solidly probable opinion, there is always a sufficiently compensating reason for the danger of materially transgressing an uncertain law.⁵

⁵ Thus in the new edition (5th) of the Tractatus de Conscientia from the Mechlin Theology, p. 81 sq. Article IV.

3. The proposition an uncertain law does not oblige seems sufficiently proved, so that of itself it can always be brought into practice, unless there is question of the value of an act and the obtaining of an end.

Yet something true is had in that system, not insofar as it hands down the due rule of acting and of forming conscience, but insofar as it admonishes prudence in the application of the rule, namely: for practice, in the application of any system whatever, all the circumstances of the subject must be considered in order to see whether it is expedient, or whether greater evils are not to be feared. But this only proves that the principles concerning the formation of conscience in such or such a state are to be subjected to the more general principles concerning human acts which govern the whole moral matter.

In spite of his objections to the maxim: Doubtful laws do not bind — Dr. McDonald allows that sometimes it is true. A doubtful law does not bind, he says, “whenever observance of such a law is the greater of two or more evils or dangers of which one has to be faced or accepted.” (Page 205.)

There is, of course, a well known principle of moral theology which prescribes that in case of a perplexed conscience, when we must choose one of two evils, there is an obligation to choose the less. Dr. McDonald goes further than this and seems to propose the principle as the one universal solvent of all cases of doubtful conscience. He writes: —

Doubtful laws are to be observed whenever the evil or the danger to be apprehended from not observing them, is considered greater than any that would result from observance. This, accordingly, of all the principles yet proposed for the resolution of practical doubts, is the only one that a scientific moralist can harmonize with the other principles of his science. (Page 205.)

Further on he gives us an algebraic formula for the principle: —

When once you have become convinced that in cases of doubt the golden rule is to follow the course which is apprehended as least dangerous, the next question to be considered is, how quantities of danger are to be measured and compared so as to find out which is the least. It seems to me that they may be measured according to the following general rule: The quantity of the evil that is feared, multiplied by the probability that it will occur,—probability being regarded as a fraction of the unit certainty,— is equal to the amount of danger in any given case. The formula may be stated algebraically thus: D = lp; where D means the danger, l the loss or evil, and p the probability that this loss will be incurred. (Page 210.)

It seems to me that there is no probability that this golden rule will be adopted by moralists for other cases of doubt than those so-called cases of perplexity, in which there is no choice but the less of two moral evils. In one class of cases it would be immoral to apply it. I cannot do better than take an instance given by Dr. McDonald himself: —

Take, for instance, the case of a trades-union rule which is probably inordinate. It is a serious loss to the artizans concerned if the rule should be in order objectively whilst they are not allowed to act on it; and it may also be a serious loss to employers if the men are allowed to act on a rule which, objectively, is a violation of employers’ rights. In this case the dangers are capable of being compared, just as if the question in doubt were one merely of fact. (Page 213.)

Let l be the loss to the artizans and p the probability that it will occur, while l′ represents the loss to the employers and p′ the probability that it will occur. Then by the formula, if

lp > l′p′

the artizans may act on the trades-union rule, which is probably unjust. And so, according to this doctrine, I may do something which is probably unjust to my neighbor in order to avoid a greater money loss to myself. Does Dr. McDonald mean this? Is it sound morality?

In many other cases of doubt, the rule cannot be applied for want of definiteness in the elements of the case, or because the two evils or losses are incommensurable, or too dependent on subjective considerations. I doubt, for example, whether I have said my Breviary. In such cases Dr. McDonald tells us, if I understand him rightly, to estimate the relation of the loss accruing from enforcing a law which does not exist, to that which is caused by not enforcing a law which does exist. The loss accruing from enforcing a law which does not exist in this case is about an hour of my time; but, on the other hand, by saying my Breviary again I gain merit. On the other side of the account by not enforcing a law which does exist I lose spiritual merit, but I gain an hour of time. Dr. McDonald seems to suppose that there is always loss to somebody, the Church or the law-giver perhaps, when a doubtful law is not enforced. This I fail to see. When an adverse custom makes the obligation of a law first of all doubtful, and then removes it altogether, is it not for the public good in the circumstances? Putting this aside, how can the loss of merit be measured in this case? On one supposition I gain merit for saying my Breviary twice in the day, on the other I lose what I should have gained by saying it once. Then, what is the relation between the value of merit and of time? And what value shall I give to my time? It is worth more in the morning when I am fresh; less after dinner; it has probably a middle value in the evening up to, say, six o’clock, when it rapidly increases till bed-time. But how measure all this quantitatively for the purposes of the formula?

Then there is the difficulty of assessing the probabilities. Dr. McDonald takes it for granted that a probabilist will assess them differently from an equiprobabilist. Here, then, we are landed in all the dangers of subjectivism. In short, Dr. McDonald’s great principle had better be confined to the class of cases for which it is suitable, and for which it is commonly employed by theologians. If we attempt to apply it to other cases, we shall find that it is no fixed guide, but a very weathercock which will point in any direction towards which the impulse of passion drives us. The foregoing strictures on the special conclusions arrived at by Dr. McDonald in his book suggest a question with regard to his fundamental assumption, that the general principles as stated in our text-books on Human Acts, etc., are not in keeping with the particular conclusions formulated in the treatises on the special virtues. Is this true?

It seems to me that it is only true in a very qualified and immaterial sense. The general principles necessarily abstract from special features and particular circumstances, which have to be considered and allowed for, when the general principles are applied to concrete cases. This is no more than has to be done in other sciences. When we apply the truths of pure mathematics to physical science, corrections and allowances have to be made continually. The infinite complications of nature are too complex for our abstract theories. In some such sense it may be said that the intricacies of human acts cannot be expressed in a simple formula. And yet, just as no one would deny the truth and the value of pure mechanics, because the truths it teaches have to be applied with caution and with necessary corrections when we come to applied mechanics, so the truth and the value of the general principles of morality should not be impugned because in their application we have to allow for special circumstances. This is done by theologians, who frequently apply a general principle tacitly, without quoting it in so many words, just as the mathematician uses the multiplication table, or the logician the principle of contradiction. If Dr. McDonald will give due attention to these considerations, I shall be surprised if the inconsistency which he has noticed in our text-books will not disappear.