On Human Acts — Chapter II: On the Morality of the Human Act

137. State of the question. (A) Hitherto we have treated of the free act considered psychologically; but the same act is called moral when it is considered in its relation with the rule of morals. Now, as was proved above, n. 25-26, the proximate norm of morals is the rational nature of man, and the ultimate norm is God, insofar as He is the supreme good and the ultimate end. For this reason morality is defined as the conformity or difformity of a human act with rational nature and divine goodness.¹

¹ Some define morality as conformity or difformity with the eternal law manifested through reason; for the eternal law is nothing other than divine wisdom insofar as it is directive of all acts, and therefore it is not really distinguished from divine goodness.

Therefore, by reason of morality, human acts are good or evil according as they tend toward God, the highest good and ultimate end, or are turned away from Him. - But those are called indifferent which are neither good nor evil, because they have no relation with the norm of morality. Whether, however, such acts exist not only objectively, but also in the individual case, will be weighed below. Meanwhile it can be noted that indifference is not properly a species of morality, but a negation of morality.

138. (B) Here we treat of an act naturally or ethically good, not of a supernatural and meritorious act. Man indeed has been elevated to the supernatural state, and sometimes ought to elicit supernatural acts; but he is not bound, under penalty of sin, to act supernaturally in all things. Besides, since an act morally, or ethically, good is presupposed as one of the conditions for merit, this must first be discussed, so that it may be defined when an act is morally good.

(C) Intrinsic and extrinsic morality are distinguished: the former arises from the relation of the act to the natural order of things; the latter from the relation to the positive rule alone. Whence an action is called intrinsically evil which of itself is opposed to the natural order of things, which exists necessarily independently of any law whatever, as for example to hate God, to kill the innocent unjustly; an action is called extrinsically evil which is opposed only to the order freely constituted through positive law, such as the violation of the sabbath day, of the precept of communion, or of the law of fast.

These things posited, we shall speak: I. concerning the elements of the human act from which morality is derived; II. concerning the extension of morality, namely to which acts it extends, adding a few things concerning the indifferent act.

139. When the will elicits a human act, it tends toward an object, on account of some end, in certain determinate circumstances, and often under its command an external act is effected. Therefore there are four elements which can influence morality: the object, the end, the circumstances, the external act; concerning these we must speak separately.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18-20; Suarez, De bonitate et malit. human. act., disp. IV-X; Billuart, diss. IV; St. Alphonsus, n. 34-40; Ball. B., n. 81-102; Bouquillon, n. 351-374; Lehmk., n. 27-36; Noldin, n. 56-65.

140. 1. Notion. (A) When the will acts deliberately, it tends toward some object; consequently the object of the human act is that toward which the action tends primarily and of itself; thus it is distinguished from the circumstances, which are touched only secondarily and per accidens, and also from the end, which is the motive on account of which the agent operates. If, for example, I bestow a copious alms upon a wounded poor man, on account of the love of Christ, the alms is the moral object toward which my action primarily tends; the abundance of the alms and the condition of poverty of the wounded neighbor are the circumstances of the act; and the love of Christ is the end, or motive, on account of which I relieve the poor man.

141. (B) But the object, by reason of morality, can be threefold: (a) good, if in itself it is consonant with the rule of morals, for example to love God, to love one's neighbor; (b) evil, if, on the contrary, in itself it is opposed to this rule, such as hatred of God, the unjust killing of an innocent person; (c) indifferent, if of itself it has no relation with the rule of morals, as to walk, to write, to read, to eat. Yet Bouquillon, n. 356, rightly observes that an object of this kind does not remain indifferent except when it is considered indeterminately, namely by abstracting from the circumstances and especially from the end; for to walk for the sake of health is a naturally good act; to write in order to instruct others in truth is something very honorable, while conversely to read depraved books is something dishonorable.

142. Here, moreover, it is permitted to observe that some things are evil absolutely, so that they can never become good or indifferent, for example hatred of God or of neighbor; but some things are evil relatively, and indeed in a twofold way: on account of a defect of right in the agent, as if someone takes another's good while the owner is reasonably unwilling; or on account of a danger of sinning which is incurred, for example if someone reads books harmful to faith or to good morals.

143. (C) But the object, whether good or evil, can be considered in two ways: (a) objectively, or materially, insofar as it is considered in itself, relative to the remote rule of morals, but independently of conscience; (b) formally, insofar as its goodness or malice is perceived by the conscience of the agent, and freely intended by the will. Thus another's property can be taken without the injustice of such an action being known, and in this case such an action is materially evil, but not formally; but if it is adverted to and intended insofar as unjust, it is formally evil. From this it is given to understand what material and formal sin are: the former is committed without knowledge or consent; the latter with knowledge and consent.¹

¹ Concerning this see Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clergé, XXI, 1899, p. 1105-1109; concerning material sin it will be said below, n. 507.

144. 2. Concerning the morality derived from the object. Human acts receive their primary and essential morality from the object formally taken.

The material object of itself constitutes the objective morality of the act; for certain acts are good of themselves, by reason of the object, as to love God and neighbor; certain acts are of themselves better than others; thus the love of God, by reason of the object, is more perfect than the love of neighbor. - Nevertheless, when the act is considered in the concrete, as it is performed by the agent, the primary and essential morality is taken from the object formally taken; for since morality properly so called is conformity or difformity with the rule of morals insofar as it is perceived by reason, the act is not truly moral unless that relation is adverted to.

But the morality which is derived from the formal object is called primary, because it is conceived before every other morality which comes from the end and circumstances, and, if it is a question of malice, perseveres even when the end and circumstances are changed. Thus the deliberate taking away of another's property, while the owner is reasonably unwilling, is conceived as unjust before the end and circumstances are considered, nor can it be rendered honorable even when the end and circumstances are changed, even if, for example, someone stole in order to give alms.

It is also called essential, because it is intrinsically present in the action itself; thus the love of God deliberately elicited is good by a goodness inhering in the object itself, while conversely hatred of God freely willed is evil by force of the object itself formally considered.

145. Corollaries. (a) In order that a human act receive goodness from a good object, the will must tend toward that object, at least confusedly, on account of its honorable character; for, if good of this kind is not intended, at least confusedly, as honorable, it will be intended as something delightful or useful; consequently the act will not be morally good, because it will have no formal relation with the rule of morals, which is by no means situated in delight or utility: thus to be present at Mass solely for the sake of curiosity. But it suffices to intend this goodness confusedly; this happens as often as an object honorable of itself is not sought ultimately as delightful or useful; thus he acts rightly who gives alms, not indeed formally thinking about its honorable character, but neither exclusively seeking his own delight or utility: this will be better understood from what is to be said where we treat concerning the end.

146. (b) In order that a human act contract the malice of the object, it is not required that this malice be sought in itself, even confusedly, but it suffices that it be known and interpretatively willed, or logically willed by way of consequence. For malice so adheres to the object itself that it cannot be torn away from it even through a good intention. Thus he who knows that it is prohibited to eat meat on Friday, and nevertheless, without sufficient reason, eats it, sins, even if he does not will the malice of the act: for then he truly wills to break the law, although he would not wish to sin; the same must be said concerning him who becomes drunk, intending only the delight from drink, and not the malice of drunkenness: for while he foresees that he will be drunk from the drink, by that very fact he wills, at least interpretatively, the malice of drunkenness.

147. Notion. (A) The end concerning which we are treating is not the end of the work, which is not distinguished from the object formally taken, but the end of the one operating, or the intention, the motive on account of which the agent operates (above n. 4). Thus, if someone gives alms, the end of the work is the relief of the poor man, but the end of the one operating can be love of neighbor for his own sake, love of God or of Christ, the intention of redeeming sins, or vainglory, etc. Indeed one and the same act by the same agent, and at the same instant, can be performed on account of a manifold intention; thus someone can bestow alms in order to relieve the poor man, because he is loved on account of Christ and God, and at the same time in order to obtain remission of sins, etc. - Hence the end of the work is sometimes the same as the end of the one operating, namely when the agent intends the very goodness intrinsically inhering in the act, for example the relief of the poor man in the case of alms. - The intention itself is necessarily good or evil: for since it is deliberate, if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason and is good; otherwise, it is evil.¹

¹ Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9: "For since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, from this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the nature of evil; but if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason, whence it has the nature of good. But it is necessary that it either be ordered or not be ordered to the due end." Cf. Didiot, op. cit., n. 440-454.

(B) With the end is connected the means, or that through which the agent wills to attain the end. A means, insofar as it is a means,² is not desirable or good of itself, because the will does not rest in it; but it is perceived as something useful for attaining the end, and therefore it is intended not on account of itself, but on account of the end. From this arose the axiom: he who wills the end, by that very fact wills the means; and he who wills the means, as it is a means, by that very fact wills the end. For the end cannot be obtained without the means, and consequently no one sincerely wills the end without by that very fact willing the means necessary for attaining the end. Likewise the means, as it is a means, is not intended except insofar as it conduces to the end; therefore no one sincerely wills the means as such unless at the same time he wills to attain the end. Thus he who wills to kill Peter, by that very fact wills the means necessary for perpetrating this homicide; likewise he who knowingly wills to apply, or in reality applies, means of themselves apt for killing Peter, by that very fact wills to kill Peter.

² It is said insofar as it is a means; for if it is considered not in order to the end, but in itself, insofar as it is an independent act, it has its own morality from the object, its proper end, and the circumstances.

Therefore the end and the means, by reason of morality, are indivisibly connected and are subjected to the same rules.

148. 1. Principle: A human act receives some principal morality from the end, or intention on account of which it is done. For from this intention it can happen that an action is conformable or difform to right reason: for by force of the intention, an act indifferent of itself can become good or evil, a good act can become better or evil, an evil act can become worse. Thus a walk, indifferent of itself, is good if it is done so that afterward one may be more free for work or prayer, but evil if it is done in order to seek occasions of sinning; alms, good in itself, is rendered better if it is done from love of Christ, but evil if it is done in order to turn the poor man away from the true faith; theft, evil in itself, becomes worse if it is committed for the sake of drunkenness or lust.

But St. Thomas¹ declares thus that this morality, derived from the end, although not primary or fundamental nor essential, is principal: "To the second it must be said that the end, although it is not of the substance of the act, is nevertheless the most principal cause of the act, insofar as it moves the agent to acting; whence also a moral act most especially has species from the end."

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 7, a. 4, ad 2.

149. 2. Corollaries. (A) An act good from the object, and referred to a good end, besides the objective goodness which it retains or can retain, acquires a new goodness, and sometimes a manifold one, from the intention or end.

Thus alms given to a poor man, for relieving him, on account of the love of God, and at the same time in satisfaction for sins, has a threefold goodness: that of mercy from the object, that of charity from the intention of loving God, and also that of penance, on account of the motive of making satisfaction for sins; for the agent truly seeks this threefold goodness, and his action is virtually and morally threefold.

We said: an act can retain its objective goodness. Indeed it in fact retains it if this is at least implicitly intended; but if it is in no way intended, and only the final goodness is sought, the act derives its morality solely from the end; thus if someone abstains from wine, not on account of the moral goodness of abstinence, about which he cares nothing, but in order more easily to preserve the health of the body.

From this it follows that those who wish to progress in the spiritual life and to acquire greater merits ought especially to take care concerning the purity and perfection of their intention, and to embrace several good ends; for the purer, more perfect, and more manifold the intention is (provided excessive anxiety about this matter is avoided), the more perfect is the manner of acting.

150. (B) An act good from the object, but referred to an evil end, (a) becomes totally evil if the depraved intention is the total and adequate cause for positing it; for example if someone bestows alms solely in order to turn the poor away from the true religion. For then the agent wills the good, not as it is good, but as a means to an evil end, and therefore as something evil.

(b) But if an act good of itself is posited partly on account of a good end and partly on account of an end lightly culpable, it is more probable that the whole is not vitiated, but that it is partly good and partly evil; for example if someone gives alms both in order to relieve the poor man and in order to catch praise. For then the will is truly borne toward the good object, and that tendency is not destroyed by the intention lightly culpable, which by no means turns us away from God.¹

¹ Thus Billuart, diss. IV, art. 4, § 2; Collet, De act. hum., cap. IV, art. 2, sect. 1, conclus. 1; Gury, n. 30; Ball. P., I, n. 98; Noldin, n. 65. - But Suarez, op. cit., disp. 8, sect. I; Vasquez, in Ia IIae, disp. 70, cap. 2; Walsh, n. 546-561, defend the contrary opinion.

But if the evil intention, although not the adequate cause of the act, is nevertheless gravely culpable - as is alms given partly in order to relieve the poor, but partly and especially in order to turn them away from the faith - the act is totally evil, at least much more probably; for that intention turns us away from God, and consequently prevents the act itself from pleasing God.

151. (C) An act evil from the object, and known as such, even referred to a good end, remains evil, though less so than if it were elicited on account of an evil end.

(a) It remains evil; for if the object is evil and is known as such, the good end does not prevent the will from seeking evil; for example, if someone steals in order to relieve a friend who is by no means placed in extreme necessity, by that very fact he wills the malice of theft, although the relief of the poor man is good. In this sense the Apostle says:¹ "And not (as we are slandered, and as some claim that we say) let us do evil that good may come." - Therefore it is not lawful to apply a means evil of itself in order to attain a good end.²

¹ Rom. III, 8.

² Therefore they slander Catholics who ascribe to them this saying: The end justifies the means. For theologians reprove it; while certain non-Catholics approve the same, among whom Matthew Prior, who wrote that from a good end even evil means become legitimate, and that only he sins who has a depraved intention:

"The end must justify the means, He only sins who ill intends."

Cf. The works of the english poets, London, 1810, t. X, p. 155; Etudes des PP. Jésuites, 5 August 1904, p. 357.

(b) Nevertheless a good end diminishes the malice of the act, because it shows that the affection toward evil is lesser, since the evil is not sought except from love of some good, or as a means for attaining an honorable end; thus, in the case brought forward, the malice of theft committed for doing good is less than that committed for harming one's neighbor. - Conversely, however, an evil end adds new malice to an act objectively evil, because it is difform from the rule of morals in a twofold way, as if someone steals in order to become drunk.

152. (D) An act indifferent from the object, but referred to a good end, receives from the end a certain goodness; but if it is ordered to an evil end, it receives moral malice from it. Thus to sing in order to praise God is an act of religion, while to sing in order to excite lust is a sin of scandal: for in the former case the will truly intends something good, in the latter something evil.

From this it is given to understand of how great importance it is to set before oneself an honorable end in all actions, even indifferent ones, so that all may become morally good.

Having set forth the influence of the end or intention upon morality, another question now arises, namely whether for the morality of an act there is required the ordination of the intention to the ultimate end, or at least to an end morally honorable.

153. 1. Concerning the relation of the act to God. Baius, the Jansenists, and certain Louvain doctors, thinking that human nature had been wholly vitiated by original sin, taught that for the moral goodness of an act it is required that it be referred to God as ultimate end, and indeed not only implicitly, but also explicitly.¹ Now the relation of an act to the ultimate end is explicit when the agent thinks about it and intends it; implicit, when the ultimate end is not intended in itself, but in another, for example in the objective goodness of the act.

¹ According to Baius and Jansenius, he sins who acts without charity or heavenly delight, because no middle is given between charity and vicious cupidity; the Louvain doctors embraced the doctrine of Baius, although they tried to soften it somewhat. Cf. Vacant-Mangenot, Dict. de théol., t. II, under the word Baius.

154. Thesis: For the moral goodness of an act an explicit relation to God is not required, but an implicit relation suffices. Thus the common and true opinion.

(A) For here there is question of a work good in itself and performed on account of an honorable motive. But he who does good from an honorable end by that very fact acts in a manner consonant with right reason, and consequently with divine reason itself. Therefore such a work of itself, by its own weight, tends to the glory of God, and consequently is truly done on account of God, although implicitly.

155. (B) Nor does the argument taken by the adversaries from the words of St. Paul² avail to the contrary: "Whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all things unto the glory of God." Whether those words are to be understood of a precept or of a counsel is controverted among theologians. But even those who, with St. Thomas, hear them as concerning a precept, require nothing else than that all works be referred implicitly and objectively to God, as has already been explained. - Augustine³ declares this excellently thus: "I suggest a remedy, whence all day long you praise God, if you wish: whatever you do, do it well, and you have praised God... Have you ceased from singing a hymn, do you depart so that you may refresh yourself? Do not become drunk, and you have praised God... Do you carry on business? do not commit fraud, and you have praised God."

² I Cor., X, 31.

³ St. Augustine, on Psalm 34, serm. II, n. 16, Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 341.

And indeed, if the aforesaid words signified a universal precept of referring all acts explicitly to God, it would follow that all the works of unbelievers are sins, since these do not explicitly refer them to the true God; yet this has deservedly been reprobated by the Church.⁴ - But if it is said that here there is question of a particular precept binding only the faithful, an intolerable yoke is imposed on them: for most very often act without thinking about the ordination of their works to God; indeed they are persuaded that they act well when, for example, they give alms to relieve a poor man, without thinking about the ultimate end. Therefore such an interpretation is opposed to the common sense and practice of the faithful.

⁴ Indeed by Pius V, 1 October 1567, this proposition 25 of Baius was condemned at least as scandalous: "All works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices." (Denzinger, Enchiridion, n. 905).

N. B. Although we are not bound to refer all our acts to God, nevertheless there is given a precept of turning oneself to Him several times in the course of life, as will be explained below, where we treat concerning the virtue of charity. - Besides, it is certainly expedient not only in the morning, but also more often during the day, to offer all one's acts to God, that they may become more perfect.

156. 2. Concerning the relation of the act to an end positively honorable. As we noted above, n. 5, honorable good is distinguished from delightful or useful good. Wherefore the question arises whether we ought to act on account of an honorable end, or whether it is lawful to act on account of delightful or useful good. Among theologians themselves the matter is controverted.

(A) For some teach that it is by no means required that the will positively intend an honorable end, but that it suffices that it not exclude it, or apprehend that it is doing nothing contrary to an honorable end; for, they say, for an honorable action it is not required that an honorable end always be intended, but it suffices that it be good from the circumstances, provided the end is not evil; thus he acts well who plays in order to recreate himself, without thinking about the honorable character of this action.¹

¹ Thus Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, n. 112-129; Genicot, I, n. 39; Noldin, n. 69.

157. (B) But others, more commonly and more truly, teach that delightful or useful good ought not to be sought except on account of an honorable end, positively willed at least implicitly. For delight is ordered by God, the author of nature, primarily to alluring men to necessary or useful operations to which it is annexed; thus a certain delight is annexed to the use of foods, so that man may thereby be allured to eating and may preserve his life; therefore he acts inordinately who, at least implicitly, does not refer this delight to self-preservation, but eats solely on account of pleasure.² The same must be said concerning useful good, which from its own nature ought to be referred to a further end. - But he implicitly intends on account of an honorable end who acts moderately; for moderation proceeds from right reason.

² To this belongs proposition 8, condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "To eat and drink even to satiety, for pleasure alone, is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its own acts." For, according to Viva (on this proposition, n. 7), the proposition was condemned not only because here there is question of immoderate pleasure, but also because it supposes that it is lawful to enjoy pleasure by intending it uniquely and ultimately. Cf. Denzing., n. 1025.

Nevertheless we can intend useful or delightful good not only insofar as it is honorable, but also insofar as it is useful or delightful, provided the reason of the honorable is not neglected, nor the due order inverted. For the delightful and the useful are something good, although subordinated to honorable good; therefore it is lawful to intend each, not indeed primarily, but secondarily, as an intermediate end to honorable good.

Hence the intention of one's own good, even delightful good, does not render an action evil, provided the will does not rest in it as in the ultimate end; nevertheless he acts more perfectly who, affectively renouncing delights, intends nothing except the properly universal good and that which is consonant with right reason, namely honorable good.

158. (A) A circumstance is something accidental, coming upon a human act already constituted in its substance, and affecting it in some way.¹ This, if it regards the act morally, is called moral. Thus in theft, a threefold element morally constitutes the substance of the act: another's property, the appropriation of it while the owner is unwilling, by one who does not have the right of taking the thing away; now many conditions can come upon this threefold element and influence its morality, for example whether the property of another is sacred or profane, precious or vile; whether the owner is altogether unwilling or has yielded something of his right; whether the thief is poor or rich, layman or priest, etc.

¹ The origin of this name St. Thomas declares, Ia IIae, q. 7, a. 1: "The name circumstance is derived from those things which are in place, and is applied to human acts. But in local matters something is said to stand around, which is indeed extrinsic to a thing, yet touches it or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances."

(B) Seven circumstances are usually recounted, contained in this verse:

Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when.

Aristotle, however, had added an eighth, namely concerning what. St. Thomas¹ expounds the matter thus: "A circumstance is so called as existing outside the substance of the act, yet in such a way that it touches the act itself in some way. Now this can happen in three ways: in one way, insofar as it touches the act itself; in another way, insofar as it touches the cause of the act; in a third way, insofar as it touches the effect. But it touches the act itself either by way of measure, as time and place (when, where); or by way of the quality of the act, as the mode of acting (how). But on the part of the effect, as when one considers what someone has done. But on the part of the cause of the act, as regards the final cause, why is taken; but on the part of the material cause, or of the object, concerning what is taken; and on the part of the principal efficient cause, who acted is taken; but on the part of the instrumental efficient cause, by what aids is taken." - One of these circumstances is the final cause (why), concerning which we have already spoken.

¹ Ibid., a. 3.

159. 1. Principle: A human act receives some morality, although less principal, from circumstances. For (a) Christ Himself declared that the poor widow, who put two mites into the treasury, gave more than the rich who cast in many things; and this indeed is not explained otherwise than by reason of circumstances, namely because "of her want she cast in all that she had, her whole living."² (b) Trent defined that it is necessary to confess the circumstances of sins which change the species of sin;³ certainly because they increase moral malice. (c) For circumstances, when considered in their relation to such a determinate act, can be conformable to the rule of morals or not; for not rarely law determines in what place, time, mode, etc., this act is to be performed. Now, if they are conformable to right reason, they have some goodness which they confer upon the act; but if they are difform, they add a certain malice to the act.

² Mark, XII, 41-44.

³ Trent, sess. XIV, can. 7.

160. 2. Applications. Circumstances can attribute morality to a human act in a fourfold way:

(a) An act indifferent from the object can become good or evil from circumstances; thus to eat temperately, for refreshing one's strength, is good; to do this with excess is evil.

(b) An act good from the object is sometimes rendered evil from circumstances, gravely or lightly, according to the degree of malice which is present in them; thus, for example, the exercise of trade in a sacred place, servile labor on Sunday, marriage entered into with a person bound by a vow of chastity, etc., by reason of circumstances, bear something evil before them.

(c) An act good or evil from the object can receive a new species of goodness or malice from circumstances; for example, he who from a vow preserves continence attains not only the goodness of chastity, but also that of religion; conversely he who unjustly carries off a sacred thing from a place contracts not only the malice of theft, but also of sacrilege. Circumstances of this kind are called those changing the species.

(d) An act good or evil from the object can acquire some degree of goodness or malice from circumstances, or, conversely, lose it. For there are circumstances which, although they do not change the species of the act, nevertheless increase or diminish its goodness or malice. Thus a poor man giving alms performs, other things being equal, a more excellent act of mercy than a rich man; a priest committing the same act of intemperance as a layman sins more gravely; he who steals because he is placed in a certain grave necessity sins less gravely than he who already abounds in wealth.

161. 3. Required conditions. In order that an act derive morality from circumstances, two things are required: (a) the circumstances must bear some goodness or malice before them; for if they are indifferent, they do not morally influence the act; thus generally it matters little whether a theft was committed on Monday or Tuesday; (b) they must be apprehended as moral and intended at least implicitly and in the confused; otherwise, although good or evil in themselves, they are not sought under this respect.

N. B. A gravely evil circumstance takes away the whole goodness of an act; otherwise, if it is lightly evil, as was said above concerning intention, n. 150. - From circumstances differ actions, internal or external, which sometimes are done during the principal action: for example, an idle word during prayer, an act of impatience while working; these are truly distinct acts, which can be evil, but do not take away the goodness of the principal action.

162. 1. State of the question. The things which thus far we have said concerning morality regard the human act, whether internal or external. But here the question arises whether the external act, or the execution of the interior act, adds to it a special goodness or malice. (a) We suppose here that there is question of an efficacious internal act, to which full consent has been given, and of an external act which is nothing else than the mere execution of this interior act; for according to all, between a desire more or less ineffectual and its execution there is a great difference; likewise, if the external act adds something to a merely internal desire, as not rarely happens, by that very fact it introduces new morality. (b) All concede that the external act increases per accidens the goodness or malice of the internal act, and indeed especially in a threefold way: by reason of intensity, insofar as the will, in the very execution of the act, is borne toward the object with greater vehemence, on account of the delight or difficulty which is found in it; by reason of duration, insofar as the one executing, by continuing the act of the will until he has completed the work, perseveres in it longer; by reason of multiplication, because often, on the occasion of the external act, the internal act is renewed several times, and from this becomes better or worse.

163. 2. Opinion of the Scotists. These things posited, the Scotists say that the external act of itself increases the morality of the internal act. For (a) internal and external acts are prohibited by diverse precepts of the Decalogue; thus by the seventh precept the external act of theft is prohibited: you shall not steal; but by the tenth the very desire of theft: you shall not covet; therefore theft outwardly perpetrated has a special malice of itself.

(b) From the common sense of the faithful, the external act of sin must be accused, nor does it suffice for the thief to say: I efficaciously willed to steal; but if the external act adds no malice to the internal act, why are we bound to confess it?

(c) If the opposite opinion is true, something false follows; for example, if someone has an efficacious desire of killing a thousand men, he sins as gravely as if in reality he had killed them; if, conversely, he has an efficacious will of feeding a thousand poor persons, he merits equally as if in fact he had fed them; yet no one admits this.

164. 3. The common opinion of the Thomists and others. The Thomists, with whom in this matter most theologians agree, teach that the exterior act, as it is precisely the execution of a truly efficacious interior act, does not of itself add to this a new goodness or malice.

(a) For here belong the words of Christ:¹ "Everyone who looks at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart"; for there the merely internal act is equated with the external act. Many Fathers, explaining the aforesaid words, in reality declare this explicitly.

¹ Matt., V, 28.

(b) There is no morality without liberty; but the whole liberty of the external act proceeds from the internal one, so that, if that act happens without the free consent of the will, it is neither free nor imputable; therefore the external act of itself has no morality, and consequently cannot increase the goodness or malice of the interior consent.

Hence if desire and its execution are prohibited by diverse precepts, it does not follow from this that these two have distinct malice, but that God willed that a rude people, such as the Israelite people was, should better understand that not only the external act, but also the internal desire, although separated from its execution, is evil.

165. (c) If the opinion of the Scotists were true, someone could deprive another unwilling person of moral goodness by impeding the external act; for example, a thief, by taking away money destined by someone for alms, could deprive this person of the special goodness annexed to the external act of almsgiving; which indeed is altogether repugnant.

Nor is it absurd to say that he who efficaciously wills to feed a thousand poor persons, although he is prevented from accomplishing this by theft or another cause, attains the goodness annexed to such an action; for God looks upon the heart, and rewards the very volition as well as its execution. Thus He said to Abraham, who had immolated his son only intentionally: "Because you have done this thing, and have not spared your only-begotten son for My sake, I will bless you."² - Nevertheless the external act must be declared in confession, not because it has per se a distinct malice, but because for the most part it becomes graver per accidens, and besides the confessor can scarcely fulfill his office concerning avoiding occasions, imposing restitution, or suggesting remedies, unless together with the internal consent, the external action is candidly set forth.

² Gen., XXII, 16.

166. Conclusion. Speculatively speaking this latter opinion seems more probable. But in practice, for the most part the execution of the interior act supposes a more intense volition and a greater goodness or malice, as was explained above, n. 162. Whence one would be much deceived who cared little about external acts. (a) If it is a question of good acts, these things are to be kept before the eyes: the volition is not truly efficacious which, where it can, does not pass to the external act; besides, by acting externally, we strengthen the will itself by forming good habits; finally many external acts are prescribed by positive laws, and deservedly, since the exterior act often suggests the interior.

(b) If the question is about evil acts, from their execution there not rarely follow scandals, the obligation of restitution, depraved habits, and greater facility for sinning.

Therefore, although care must chiefly be taken about rightly ordering internal acts, the right ordination of external acts cannot be passed over.

167. Corollary concerning the sense of the axiom: Good from the whole cause, evil from any defect. That axiom, which is found in the works ascribed to St. Dionysius the Areopagite,¹ has been commonly received by theologians in this sense: that moral goodness does not belong to an act which, whether from the object, or from the end or circumstances, is evil. Yet this must be understood with the restrictions set forth above.

¹ Lib. de divinis nominibus, cap. 4, apud Migne, P. G., t. III, 730.

(A) As regards the object, an act evil from the object and known as such cannot become good from the end or circumstances, n. 151. But an act indifferent of itself can become good from the end or circumstances, nn. 152, 160. Therefore for the goodness of an act, it is not required that the object be good of itself, but it suffices that it receive some goodness from the end or circumstances.

(B) If it is a question of the end, an intention totally and adequately evil suffices for vitiating an act otherwise good from the object and circumstances, n. 150; likewise an intention gravely culpable, although it is not the adequate cause of the act, vitiates it; but an intention lightly culpable accompanying a good intention more probably does not vitiate the whole act, n. 150.

(C) When speech is about circumstances, a gravely evil circumstance vitiates the whole act, but not a lightly evil one, nn. 150, 161.

From this it is likewise understood that the conditions required for moral honorableness are: 1. that the act be free; 2. that the object not be evil at least formally or in knowledge; 3. that the act be good at least on the part of the end, whether of the work or of the one operating; 4. nor otherwise be vitiated by some gravely evil circumstance.

168. State of the question. The things which we have said concerning morality regard the act in itself, or directly willed; but, since there are effects which are voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, it remains to be inquired whether these also are moral and imputable to the agent. For understanding this, a few things must be noted beforehand.

(A) That is voluntary in itself, or directly, which the will immediately and expressly intends either as the end or as the means; thus certainly the death of an enemy which the murderer intends as the end is voluntary in itself, or the killing of a traveler which a thief intends as a means for taking money. - But that is voluntary in the cause, or indirectly, which is intended neither as the end nor as the means, but is foreseen as going to follow from the act directly willed, and consequently is imputed to it in some way; thus he who from curiosity reads a depraved book, foreseeing that doubts concerning the faith are going to arise from reading of this kind, by that very fact indirectly, or in the cause, wills to experience these doubts. - Again an effect can be voluntary in the cause in two ways: positively, if an action is posited from which the effect is foreseen as going to follow; and negatively, if an action is omitted while foreseeing the effect as going to follow from this omission; thus he who sees a house blazing in fire, and does nothing to extinguish the fire, when he could do something, indirectly and negatively wills the conflagration.

169. (B) These things posited, it is asked whether an effect voluntary in the cause is truly voluntary and ought to be imputed to the agent. Namely, an act is imputable when its goodness or malice can and ought to be attributed to the agent as to its proper author; moreover one can be held as the proper author of this action when he freely posited it, with prior knowledge of its morality.

Nevertheless in this matter one must carefully distinguish between a good effect and an evil effect. A good effect, willed only in the cause, is not imputed to the agent; thus he who writes a book for the sake of making profit, foreseeing at the same time good effects going to follow from its reading, but not intending them in themselves, even confusedly, does not perform a morally good act, because he intends his own utility, not honorableness; this is clear from what was said above, n. 145. - But an evil effect, willed only in the cause, can be imputed to the agent; for from what was said in n. 146, an act contracts the malice of the object as often as this is known and interpretatively willed; but when it truly ought to be imputed will be clear from what is to be said below.

(C) The indirect voluntary can occur in two ways: (a) sometimes an evil effect, willed in the cause, follows from an act directly willed without the concurrence of another free agent: then it is called the indirect voluntary simply. (b) Sometimes, however, an evil effect is produced with the concurrence of another free agent: then it is called a case of cooperation, because namely two (or more) concur toward the production of this effect. - Concerning each one, we must speak separately.

170. Preliminary notes. In order that one may judge concerning the morality of an effect, it must first be inquired how it is connected with the cause.

¹ St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 7; Suarez, De volunt., disp. I, sect. 5; Billuart, diss. I, a. 4; Elbel-Bierbaum, t. I, n. 23; Walsh, n. 88-192; Laloux, De Act. humanis, diss. 8; Ball. P., I, n. 26-32; Bouquillon, nn. 328, 371-374; Noldin, n. 33-38.

(a) Sometimes a cause is so determined to producing one effect that this effect follows necessarily: then the effect is directly intended and is deservedly imputed to the agent; thus he who knowingly applies fire to wood directly wills to burn it, because fire of itself is determined to burning.

(b) Sometimes, however, the cause produces a double effect, yet in such a way that one is subordinated to the other and follows necessarily from it; thus if someone knowingly and willingly discharges a gun at the father of a family, certainly foreseeing that from his death his children will be deprived of support, the double effect (the death of the father and the miserable condition of the children) is deservedly imputed to the agent, because the former is directly intended as a means to the end, namely vengeance, but the latter indirectly as an effect which necessarily follows from the means directly willed.

(c) Effects produced by a cause can be so coordinated that they proceed equally immediately, because the cause of itself is determined to producing each; thus if a physician gives to a pregnant woman a medicine which can heal her and at the same time cause abortion; in which case each effect is said to follow per se. But if one effect does not proceed equally immediately from the cause, because this is not of itself determined to producing such an effect, this follows per accidens: thus if someone writes a good or indifferent book for the sake of making profit, by whose reading, however, another, on account of his own fragility, is scandalized. - Now the question is whether and when effects of this kind, which proceed either per se or per accidens from the cause, and were willed in the cause, are imputable to the agent.

There will be a double principle: the former declares when an evil effect is imputable; the latter when it can be permitted.

171. First principle: An evil effect, willed only in the cause, is morally imputable when these three things concur at the same time, namely: 1. the agent foresaw the effect at least in the confused; 2. he was able not to posit the cause; 3. he ought to have impeded the effect. It is explained and proved by parts.

1. It is required that the agent have foreseen the effect at least in the confused; for if he did not foresee it in any way, the effect is not voluntary, and therefore not imputable: nothing is willed unless foreknown. - But he foresees the effect in the confused who knows, even obscurely or indistinctly, or at least suspected that the effect was going to follow; thus he who undertakes the office of physician, judge, confessor, etc., adverting that he is wholly lacking the knowledge required for such an office, truly, although indistinctly, foresees the evil effects going to follow from this; likewise the hunter who suspects that what he sees is a man, and nevertheless fires upon it, confusedly foresees the homicide going to follow from this.

Conversely, he who becomes drunk from a small draught of liquor whose force he did not suspect does not incur the malice of drunkenness.

From this it is given to understand when sins committed in drunkenness ought to be imputed: if someone has known by experience that, in the state of drunkenness, he is liable to anger, fights, blasphemies, etc., and nevertheless freely becomes drunk, he is guilty of sins of this kind, because he foresaw them; but if he is not accustomed to commit these things, the same cannot be imputed to him, if perhaps they occur, because they were not foreseen.¹

¹ Certain theologians assert that for imputability it suffices that the agent could and ought to have foreseen the effect; which falls back into the same thing, for he neither could nor ought to have foreseen it if he in no way actually foresaw it.

172. 2. It is required that the agent could not have posited the cause: for if he is morally bound to posit the cause, he cannot abstain from that act, and therefore the effect is not morally imputable to him; since no one is bound to the impossible. - Thus the priest is not guilty of sacrilege who gives communion to a sinner whose unworthiness he knows only from confession, because he is bound faithfully to keep the sacramental seal.

173. 3. It is required that the agent be bound to impede the evil effect; for if he is by no means bound to this, he permits rather than effects the effect; and besides, if he has a just and proportionate reason for permitting it, such an effect is not to be imputed to him.

Now he is bound to impede the effect if this flows of itself from the cause: for then he who wills the antecedent wills also the consequent. But if the effect follows per accidens, namely from other causes independent of the will of the agent, so that the act posited is rather the occasion than the cause of the evil effect, the agent is not bound to impede this effect by abstaining from an act otherwise good, which is only the occasion of the evil effect. Thus a physician who, in the exercise of his art, is liable to not a few movements of concupiscence, is not guilty of these, even if he foresaw them, because the exercise of medicine produces those movements not of itself, but per accidens.

174. But when the three aforesaid conditions concur, the evil effect, although indirectly willed, is truly free and consequently imputable. Then, however, sin is committed not at that instant in which the evil effect follows, but at that instant in which it was foreseen and intended; and therefore, even if the effect does not follow, the sin has already been committed, because it has been willed.

Thus he who gives poison to another, foreseeing that death will follow from it, at this very instant commits homicide in his heart, even if, on account of the intervention of a physician or some other cause, death does not in fact follow. Thus he who adverts that he will be made drunk by further drink, and by experience knows that in drunkenness he commits many sins, implicitly intends all these sins at that instant in which he intends to drink the further drink.

Whence, in order to judge concerning the gravity of an indirectly willed sin, attention must be paid to the very malice of the internal act: the more distinct and certain the foresight of the evil effect was, the graver is the fault; the less distinct and certain, the lighter is the fault. Whence many are excused from grave sin because, on account of lightness of soul, they apprehend only confusedly the depraved effects of their actions.¹

¹ Vieux Moraliste rightly explains this, apud Ami du Clergé, XX, 1898, p. 1121-1129.

175. Second principle: It is lawful to posit an act good in itself or indifferent, from which a double effect follows, one good and the other evil, provided the good effect is not produced except not by means of the evil, a proportionately grave reason is present, and the end of the agent is honorable.

Therefore four conditions are required:

1. That the act be in itself good or indifferent; for if it is evil in itself, it can never become lawful, even if a good effect follows from it, and a fortiori if an evil effect follows. - But in order to judge whether the act is evil in itself or not, attention must be paid to whether the malice arises from the circumstances, or is found in the act itself according to the common estimation of the prudent: if the former, the act is judged good or indifferent in itself; if the latter, it must be judged evil in itself. - Thus, since hypnotic sleep is evil not in itself, but from circumstances, sometimes, though rarely, it can be permitted on account of a grave reason, provided due precautions are applied for warding off depraved effects.

176. 2. That the good effect not be produced except by means of the evil effect; for if the evil effect immediately follows from the cause, and the good arises only through the mediation of that evil effect, it is not lawful to posit the cause: for then the evil effect is assumed as a means to good, and therefore is directly intended.² Thus he acts illicitly who gives an intoxicating drink to a servant so that thereby he may cast horror of drunkenness into others.

² Certain persons, however, deny the necessity of this second condition; for, they say, it is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor in order to protect one's own life; now in this case the good effect, namely the preservation of one's own life, is not obtained except through the mediation of the evil effect, that is, the death of the aggressor. Thus Walsh, n. 143-144. - The matter is not without difficulty; nevertheless it can be said that in this case the death of the unjust aggressor is not an effect morally evil in itself: by natural and divine right, the killing of the innocent is indeed prohibited, but not that of the guilty. - Besides, he who, in order to protect himself, kills the aggressor, does not intend his death as a means to the preservation of life, but strikes or fires for the end of rendering him unarmed and incapable of harming, foreseeing nevertheless that perhaps the death of the aggressor will follow from this.

177. 3. That there be present a proportionately grave reason for positing the cause and permitting the evil effect, so that the good effect compensates for the evil. For right reason dictates that it is better to lack a lesser good than to obtain it through an act from which a greater evil follows; but conversely, if the good effect surpasses or at least compensates for the evil, the law which prohibited the evil effect now seems to cease.

The whole difficulty is in defining what reason is proportionately grave. But this, in individual cases, can be discerned only from the judgment of the prudent, all the circumstances being attended to. The principal adjuncts to be carefully weighed are reduced to these:

(A) One must inspect not only the advantage or disadvantage going to arise in the particular case, but also that which would threaten the whole society, if such an action were generally permitted or prohibited. For there are actions for which there does not seem to be a sufficient reason, if attention is paid to the particular case; but it will be recognized as present if regard is had to the universality of cases, with attention to the public good, or the good of the whole society.¹ Thus the social good requires that an unjust aggressor can be killed when other means of preserving one's own life are lacking, even if the aggressor perhaps loses not only temporal life, but eternal life; for otherwise assassins, robbers, and impious men, knowing that good men, for guarding life, would never kill, would become more audacious and would disturb families and society itself with homicides and robberies, as is explained in De Justitia, n. 325.

¹ Cf. Laloux, diss. 8, p. 217; Walsh, n. 136-137.

178. (B) Attention must be paid to the gravity of the evil effect: the graver the evil foreseen is, the greater the excusing reason must be. Thus if someone repels an unjust aggressor by bringing death upon him, a greater reason is required than if he inflicts a non-lethal wound: in the former case, it is required that the goods to be defended be of the greatest importance, while in the latter they can be of lesser importance (De Justitia, n. 329-331).

179. (C) The influence of the action upon the effect, whether good or evil, must also be inspected. For the evil effect must be compensated by the agent because his action influences that effect; therefore it must be compensated in that proportion in which it influences the effect. - But the measure of the influence depends on several things, namely on proximity, probability, and the positive or negative mode of acting. Generally, the more proximately, the more probably, the more positively the action influences the evil effect, the greater reason is required for lawfully positing it.

(a) A cause is called the more proximate the fewer intermediates there are between it and the effect; for example, if someone learns to read, foreseeing that perhaps he will incur the danger of reading depraved books, and from this of experiencing temptations, this last effect follows quite remotely from the act; but if someone in reality reads a depraved book, movements of concupiscence follow more proximately from this reading; therefore a greater reason is required.

(b) A cause influences the effect the more probably the more likely this effect is foreseen as going to follow from the cause; for example, if someone throws a stone from a window in a city and on a street where many pass by, the wounding of one's neighbor is going to follow much more probably than if he does this in a village where very few make the journey; therefore a much greater reason is required.

(c) The agent influences the effect the more positively the more actively he behaves; thus a greater reason is required for doing something than for omitting something from which an evil effect is going to follow.

180. (D) Attention must also be paid to the connection, more or less necessary, between the cause and the effect; thus, for leasing to heretics some building in which they will spread their errors, a greater reason is required if they cannot find any other building in the place than if they can easily lease others.

(E) Likewise one must keep before the mind the right or office which belongs to the agent of positing the act: certainly a lesser reason is desired if there is question of those who have a special right, or a fortiori an office, of doing the act; for example, if a physician or priest foresees that he will experience some temptation by reading books which he has the right and office of reading, in order rightly to fulfill his duty, a much lesser reason suffices than if there is question of another who wants to read the same books only from curiosity.

181. 4. It is required that the end of the agent be honorable, that is, that the agent not intend the evil effect which he foresees, nor afterward approve it, but behave permissively only with regard to it; wherefore he cannot take complacency in the depraved effect, but ought to be so disposed that he would wish it not to be produced, if he could otherwise obtain the good effect which he intends. This is clear from what was said where we treated concerning the end, n. 150; for he who intends a depraved end, or takes complacency in it, by that very fact wills some evil.

182. When the four aforesaid conditions concur at the same time, the evil effect only indirectly willed is not imputed to the agent; for that effect, insofar as it is evil, must be judged morally involuntary, since the will neither intends it nor takes complacency in it.¹ The agent indeed foresees and permits, or tolerates, the evil effect, but on account of a just and proportionate cause, just as God Himself tolerates evil on account of grave reasons. Now the public good demands that an act, otherwise good or indifferent, not be prohibited on account of an evil effect, if there is present a grave reason for positing it, as is clear from the examples already brought forward and from others to be brought forward in the whole course of the work.

¹ "Nothing prevents there being two effects of one act, one of which alone is in the intention, while the other is outside the intention. But moral acts receive species according to that which is intended, not from that which is outside the intention." (St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 7).

183. State of the question. (A) To cooperate in general is to operate with another; and therefore, if there is question of an evil matter, cooperation is the concurrence furnished to the depraved action of another. But someone can cooperate with the sin of another in two ways: by influencing the will itself through counsels, examples, flatteries, etc.; this kind of cooperation is properly called scandal, concerning which we shall treat where we treat concerning charity; by helping another, already determined to sin, in the perpetration of the sin: and this is cooperation properly so called, about which we must say something.

² Most theologians treat this matter where they treat concerning charity; thus St. Alphonsus, lib. III, n. 59-80; Elbel-Bierbaum, t. I, p. 11, n. 361-464; Bouquillon, De virt. theologicis, n. 545-555; cf. Waffelaert, La coopération au mal, 2nd ed., Bruges, 1892; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clergé, XXIII, 1901, pp. 721, 785, 961, 1025, 1073 sq.

(B) But this cooperation can be intentional or formal, or only material: the former is present when the one cooperating knowingly and willingly concurs in the action insofar as it is evil, and therefore truly intends its malice, whether explicitly, or implicitly by exercising a work which is directly ordered to a depraved action; for example, by writing and selling a book which of itself is ordered to corrupting morals. For then he proposes to himself an evil end, and consequently sins,¹ according to the principles given above, n. 150. - It is material when he concurs in the action of another insofar as it is physical, without the intention of cooperating in the sin. Thus he who hands over the keys of a house to a thief, so that the thief can more easily steal, cooperates formally and culpably; but materially, if he does this only for the end of avoiding his own harm, for example death, in no way intending to cooperate in the theft. Here we do not treat of formal cooperation, which is evidently directly evil; but only of material cooperation, which, as is clear from the notion given, falls back into the case of the indirect voluntary. For the one cooperating directly wills his own utility, for example to preserve life, and only indirectly wills the evil action, for example the theft which he foresees as going to follow from the handing over of the key.

¹ That sin has a double malice: one against charity, by inducing one's neighbor to sin; the other against the special virtue which is harmed by the cooperation.

184. (C) This material cooperation can be immediate, if someone has a part in the depraved action itself, for example by helping a thief to carry off a chest in which another's money is contained; or mediate, if the one cooperating concurs only in those acts which precede or follow the sin itself, for example by opening the door of the house to the thief, so that he may be able to enter or leave. - Again mediate cooperation can be more or less proximate, according as by its own nature or from circumstances it is more or less connected with the sin of another; for example, a servant who on Friday cooks meat cooperates less proximately toward the violation of the law of abstinence than an innkeeper who provides the same meats to be eaten by guests.

185. Principles. (A) He who cooperates only materially and mediately, even proximately, in an evil action does not sin, provided the act which he performs is not intrinsically evil and, besides, there is had a proportionate reason for cooperating.

For he who cooperates in this way does not will the evil effect except indirectly and permissively; but, from what was said above, n. 175, this is lawful when a proportionately grave reason is present. - Besides, when a sufficient reason is lacking, it is not lawful to cooperate with sin, even materially; for something inordinate is found in the act by which one concurs toward sin.¹

¹ Wherefore the following proposition (51) was condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "A servant who, with shoulders submitted, knowingly helps his master to ascend through windows to violate a virgin, and many times serves him in this by carrying a ladder, opening the door, or cooperating in something similar, does not sin mortally if he does this from fear of notable harm, for example lest he be badly treated by his master, lest he be looked upon with stern eyes, lest he be expelled from the house." (Denzing., n. 1068; Viva, on this proposition.) For since in this case the cooperation is proximate, a very grave reason is required, which is lacking; for the servant here is supposed to have been able to find another master; he ought at least to have sought another, lest he be forced many times to cooperate in a depraved action.

186. (B) Immediate cooperation is not always and necessarily illicit, but sometimes it is permitted, provided there is present a proportionately grave reason. Thus more probably.

Certain theologians deny this, with Billuart,² because immediate cooperation is intrinsically evil; for does not he who helps a thief to carry off another's money himself steal? - Yet that argument does not hold in all cases. (a) Let the case of theft, concerning which Billuart treats, be taken; if someone cannot avoid death except by helping thieves in carrying off another's money, the taking away of another's thing in these adjuncts is not morally theft. For no one is bound, apart from a special pact, to lose his own life for protecting the goods of fortune of another; for the owner of the thing taken away would be unreasonably unwilling if he demanded this, at least when the one cooperating is not bound by a special pact to guard the thing. (b) Again, when someone asks for the sacraments, on account of a grave reason, from an unworthy minister, he by no means sins, according to the common opinion of theologians, although he is truly and immediately a participant in the action by which the minister sins; the reason is that the whole malice of the act holds itself on the part of the minister, who can, if he wishes, recover the state of grace by an act of contrition; and therefore the cooperation of the one asking in those adjuncts is not illicit.

² Billuart, De Justitia, diss. VIII, art. 13, § 6.

Therefore it cannot be said that in every case immediate cooperation is illicit. - Yet there are many cases in which immediate cooperation is sin; thus it is never lawful to participate immediately in the unjust killing of an innocent person, since such an action taken concretely is intrinsically evil.

The matter, therefore, is to be judged from the very nature of the evil act toward which one concurs, or from the circumstances; namely, if such an act, considered in the concrete, is so intrinsically evil that someone cannot cooperate in its physical perpetration without at least implicitly intending its malice, the cooperation is illicit.

187. (C) To judge whether the reason is proportionately grave, attention must be paid to the gravity of the sin with which one cooperates, to the propinquity and influence of the cooperation, and also to the obligation of impeding the sin.

(a) To the gravity of the sin: the graver the sin toward which someone cooperates is, the greater the excusing reason must be; thus a greater cause is required for someone to cooperate toward homicide than toward theft.

(b) To the propinquity of the cooperation: the more proximate the cooperation is, the greater reason is required; thus remote cooperation is excused on account of a light inconvenience; nearby cooperation, on account of a grave inconvenience; proximate cooperation, from a very grave cause; immediate cooperation, from a most grave cause. Thus he who sells paper to a publisher printing depraved books cooperates only remotely, and is excused from the mere motive of earning money; the worker who moves the machines cooperates nearby, and is excused only on account of a grave inconvenience, for example the loss of notable profit; but he who sets the type cooperates proximately, and is not excused except on account of a very grave cause, for example the greatest difficulty of finding another employer.

188. (c) To the influence of the cooperation; namely if the cooperation so influences the evil effect that, without it, the sin would not happen, a greater cause is required than if the sin would be committed without that cooperation; for example, a lesser reason is required for selling arms to him who is foreseen as going to abuse them, if there are present many other merchants who sell arms in this place.

(d) To the obligation of impeding sin; thus if someone by office of piety, as a father, or of justice, as a magistrate, is bound to impede some sin, a much greater cause is required for him to permit it.

Concerning special cases of cooperation as regards religion, charity, justice, temperance, etc., we shall treat in the course of the work.

189. 1. State of the question. After the things said concerning the morality of an act directly or indirectly voluntary, it remains to be inquired whether there is given an act which is neither good nor evil, but indifferent with respect to morals. Concerning this there was keen dispute in the schools. - In order that we may separate certain things from uncertain ones, a few things must be noted beforehand:

(A) A human act can be considered in species, or in the abstract, or in the individual case, or in the concrete: it is considered in the former way when it is inspected in its object, the circumstances and the end of the one operating being set aside: thus to walk, to eat, to play, etc.; it is considered in the individual case when not only the object, but at the same time the circumstances and the end of the one operating are inspected: thus to eat moderately, in order to renew strength and to work better. Now all concede that there are given some acts indifferent in species, at least when the object is inspected in the abstract, without those marks which introduce objective morality, for example to walk, to play, without any other determination; hence St. Thomas says:¹ "But it happens that the object of the act does not include anything pertaining to the order of reason, such as to lift a straw from the ground, to go to the field, and things of this kind; and such acts according to their species are indifferent."

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 8.

190. (B) Here there is question of mere natural honorableness; for, in the supernatural order, acts are given which are neither meritorious nor demeritorious or sinful: thus the works of unbelievers, or of those who are placed in mortal sin, are not truly meritorious, or do not merit an eternal reward, although they can be morally good (for example, alms given from a natural affection of mercy).

(C) Moreover there is question of deliberate acts, that is, acts done with knowledge and advertence; for all confess that there can be indeliberate acts indifferent even in the individual case: for these are not truly human, nor moral.

191. 2. The doctrine of St. Thomas. These things posited, St. Thomas (a) explicitly teaches that there are not given deliberate acts in the individual case which are naturally indifferent; for it is necessary that any individual act have some circumstance through which it is drawn to good or to evil, at least on the part of the intention. For an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason, to which it belongs to order rightly, and has the nature of evil; but if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason, whence it has the nature of good. But it is necessary that it either be ordered or not ordered to the due end.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9; cf. Quaest. disp., De malo, q. 2, a. 5.

(b) Yet he does not require, for the honorableness of the act, that this be explicitly referred to God, but only that the natural goodness which is conformable to right reason be intended. Now works indifferent of themselves are consonant with reason when they are done moderately, without any excess; for virtue stands in the mean;² wherefore he acts well who eats and drinks, the mode of temperance being observed, or who plays for recreation, the mode of eutrapelia being observed, which keeps the mean in games, or rests in order to repair the powers of the body.³ Wherefore idle words are reprehended only because they lack the reason of just necessity or pious utility: "For what is done on account of just necessity or on account of pious utility is done laudably and is a good act."⁴ Thus, for example, if there is question of play or conversation, the act will be morally good if these three things are observed: if delight is not sought in shameful or harmful operations or words; nor is the gravity of the soul totally relaxed, or, in other words, if one plays or converses moderately; if recreation agrees with the person, time, and place, and is duly ordered according to the other circumstances.¹

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 64, a. 1.

³ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9, ad 3; IIa IIae, q. 168, a. 2-4; in 2 Sentent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5^†.

⁴ St. Thomas, Quaest. disp., De malo, q. 2, a. 5.

¹ St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 168, a. 2.

(c) Works indifferent of themselves, when they are done deliberately by a just man (i.e. one who is in the state of grace), are not only morally good, but also meritorious of supernatural reward: "It sometimes happens that a man does not order some act to God, while nevertheless that act of itself does not contain any disordering by reason of which it is not referable to God, and because the mind of man is habitually related to God, that act is not only not a sin, but is also a meritorious act." For he who enjoys habitual grace, in a general mode orders his whole life to God, and therefore the act of a just man, which bears before itself nothing inordinate, by that very fact tends to God.²

² St. Thomas, Quaest. disp., De malo, q. 9, a. 2.

192. 3. Opinion of many Thomists. Yet many Thomists progress further, or perhaps declare the matter in a more explicit way, saying that an act is not good unless it is referred to God at least virtually and implicitly: virtually, that is, by force of an actual intention, at least general, previously had and still persevering; and implicitly, namely one which is contained in the general intention of living rightly and always acting according to reason.³ This they prove from a double text of Scripture: (a) from the words of the Apostle:⁴ "Therefore whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all things unto the glory of God"; for there, they say, is included the precept of referring all acts to God, at least virtually and implicitly. (b) Besides, Christ Himself declared that an account must be rendered for every idle word;⁵ but a word is called idle, not because it has an evil end, but because it does not have a good and honorable end. (c) In reality, man acting deliberately cannot act except on account of delight or on account of an honorable end: if he acts on account of delight and rests in it, he acts inordinately, since the delightful ought to be subordinated as a means to some end; if on account of an honorable end, the action is good, as implicitly ordered to God.

³ Thus Billuart, diss. IV, art. 6.

⁴ I Cor., X, 31.

⁵ Matt., XII, 36.

193. 4. Opinion of the Scotists. But the Scotists, after St. Bonaventure,⁶ hold that indifferent acts in the individual case can be given, and therefore they try to blunt the force of the aforesaid arguments.

⁶ Scotus, in II lib. Sentent., dist. 40-41; St. Bonaventure, in l. II Sentent., dist. 41, a. 1, q. 3; Vasquez, in Ia IIae, disp. 52; Arriaga, De act. hum., disp. 21; Henno, Theologia, Cologne Agrippina, 1718, De Act. hum., disp. III, q. 6.

(a) They understand the words of St. Paul brought above as concerning counsel, not however concerning precept; besides, they say, St. Paul here speaks of supernatural charity and of the supernatural relation of acts to God, not however of their natural honorableness.

(b) What Christ says concerning an idle word is to be understood not of a merely idle word, but of a lying and calumnious word, both from the context and according to the opinion of many Fathers;¹ therefore from this it is by no means inferred that there falls upon man the obligation of referring all acts and all words positively to God.

¹ Cornelius a Lapide reports these on this place.

(c) Nor is this obligation proved by reason. It is indeed true that man is rational, and therefore ought to do nothing against reason; but from this it by no means follows that the office falls upon him always of directing his actions to an honorable end; for since man is composed of soul and body, and his nature is spiritual and bodily, sometimes he can act on account of bodily good, or on account of delight, provided he does not seek an evil end.

194. 5. Conclusion. (A) With the Angelic Doctor we think that per se there are not given deliberate acts morally indifferent in the individual case; for the end which a man deliberately operating intends is either in some way subordinated to the ultimate end, or it is not; if it is subordinated in some way, mediately or immediately, implicitly or explicitly, the act is good; but if in no way, namely if someone rests ultimately in delight, the act is disordered, and consequently evil.²

² In this sense the doctrine of St. Thomas is embraced not only by Thomists, but by most other theologians, such as Suarez, De bonit. et malit., disp. IX, sect. 3; Costa Rossetti, op. cit., th. 26, p. 84-90; Meyer, op. cit., t. I, n. 193; Bouquillon, n. 377; Walsh, n. 674-688; Noldin, n. 74.

(B) Nevertheless we do not assent to those Thomists who hold that for a good act a positive relation of the act to God is required, even virtual and implicit; for we judge that acts indifferent of themselves, which do not lack the reason of just necessity or true utility, which otherwise do not recede from the mean through excess or defect, are morally good, according to the principles of the Angelic Doctor himself set forth above, even if they are not positively referred to a further honorable end; for acts of this kind, considered in the concrete, are conformable to reason, and consequently tend toward God as by their own weight.

But per accidens indifferent acts in the individual case can be given, namely if they are indeliberate, or are done without advertence to their morality.

195. In practice, however, although it is not certain concerning a precept of referring all acts to God, nothing is more expedient for spiritual progress than often and explicitly to refer oneself and all one's thoughts, affections, words, and works to God, loved on account of Himself. This is the nobler, more useful, safer, and more compendious way to perfection: "If it is kept seriously and perseveringly, it will easily and most sweetly lead a man to the summit of Christian perfection within the proper state of each one, and thence to a sublime and most excellent degree of glory; but if it is not kept, although other things are applied, scarcely can mediocre progress in the spiritual life be obtained."¹

¹ Card. De Aguirre, S. Anselmi Theologia, t. III, tr. VII, disp. 130, n. 149 sq.