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Credulity and Rationalism
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McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology
Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 2. The Sins Against F…, Credulity and Rationalism
Credulity and Rationalism
Credulity and Rationalism.—Opposed in special ways to the material and formal objects of faith are credulity and errors about the existence and nature of revelation.
(a) Other sins against faith are opposed to its material object (i.e., the articles of belief), inasmuch as they subtract from it by denying this or that article. Credulity, on the contrary, adds to the material object of faith by accepting a doctrine as revealed when there is no prudent reason for so doing, contrary to the teaching of scripture that “he who is hasty to believe is light of heart” (Ecclus., xix. 4). This sin is opposed rather to prudence, inasmuch as it causes one to neglect the consideration of the reasons on which a prudent judgment rests (see Vol. II), and hence it does not destroy the virtue of faith. It is, nevertheless, injurious to faith, since it brings Christianity into contempt, keeps others from embracing the teachings of the Church, and leads to superstition, the “twin-sister of unbelief.” Examples: Sempronia, who is not well educated, accepts as matters of faith every pious legend, every marvellous report of miracle no matter from what source it comes or how suspicious may be its appearance. Titus holds many views considered by good authorities as improbable or false, or as at best only opinions, but he gives them out as doctrines of the Church that must be accepted, or as infallible or revealed teaching. The credulity of Sempronia is excusable imprudence on account of her ignorance, if she has not neglected instruction; but that of Titus is blameworthy, for he ought to inform himself better before attempting to instruct others.
(b) Other kinds of unbelief are opposed to the formal object of faith (i.e., to the authority of revelation as the motive of belief); for implicitly at least they substitute private judgment for authority. The various systems of Naturalism, such as Deism, go farther and openly attack supernatural revelation as the ground of belief. Some of these systems deny the fact of revelation (e.g., Deism), others its character (e.g., Modernism, which makes revelation to consist in the internal experience of the believer), others its necessity (e.g., Rationalism). These heterodox teachings pertain, some to infidelity (e.g., Deism), some to heresy (c.g., Modernism). The great majority of Protestants nowadays cannot be said to have faith, declares Cardinal Newman, since they deduce from scripture, instead of believing a teacher. What looks like faith is mere hereditary persuasion.
Konings, Theologia Moralis
Vol. I, Decrees, Declarations, and Instruct…, I. Chronological Series of…, P. Syllabus Embracing the …, § I, Naturalism, and Absolute Rationalism · Vol. I, Decrees, Declarations, and Instruct…, I. Chronological Series of…, P. Syllabus Embracing the …, § II: Moderate Rationalism
Vol. I, Decrees, Declarations, and Instruct…, I. Chronological Series of…, P. Syllabus Embracing the …, § I, Naturalism, and Absolute Rationalism
- No supreme, most wise, and most provident Divine Being exists distinct from this universe of things, and God is the same as the nature of things, and therefore subject to changes; and God really comes to be in man and in the world, and all things are God and have the very substance of God; and one and the same thing is God with the world, and therefore spirit with matter, necessity with liberty, true with false, good with evil, and just with unjust.
Alloc. Maxima quidem, June 9, 1862.
- Every action of God upon men and the world is to be denied.
Alloc. Maxima quidem, June 9, 1862.
- Human reason, with absolutely no respect had to God, is the sole arbiter of true and false, good and evil; it is a law to itself, and by its natural powers suffices for caring for the good of men and peoples.
Alloc. Maxima quidem, June 9, 1862.
- All truths of Religion derive from the native force of human reason; hence reason is the principal norm by which man can and ought to attain the knowledge of all truths of whatever kind.
Encyclical letter Qui pluribus, November 9, 1846. - Encyclical letter Singulari quidem, March 17, 1856. - Alloc. Maxima quidem, June 9, 1862.
- Divine revelation is imperfect, and therefore subject to a continuous and indefinite progress which corresponds to the progress of human reason.
Encyclical letter Qui pluribus, November 9, 1846. - Alloc. Maxima quidem, June 9, 1862.
- The faith of Christ is opposed to human reason; and divine revelation not only profits nothing, but even harms the perfection of man.
Encyclical letter Qui pluribus, November 9, 1846. - Alloc. Maxima quidem, June 9, 1862.
- Prophecies and miracles, set forth and narrated in the Sacred Scriptures, are fictions of poets, and the mysteries of the Christian Faith are the sum of philosophical investigations; and in the books of both Testaments mythical inventions are contained; and Jesus Christ himself is a mythical fiction.
Encyclical letter Qui pluribus, November 9, 1846. - Alloc. Maxima quidem, June 9, 1862.
Vol. I, Decrees, Declarations, and Instruct…, I. Chronological Series of…, P. Syllabus Embracing the …, § II: Moderate Rationalism
- Since human reason is equated with Religion itself, therefore theological disciplines are to be treated in the same way as philosophical disciplines.
Alloc. Singulari quadam perfusi, December 9, 1854.
- All dogmas of the Christian Religion indiscriminately are the object of natural science or philosophy; and human reason, cultivated only historically, can by its natural powers and principles arrive at true knowledge of all dogmas, even the more hidden, provided these dogmas have been proposed to reason itself as an object.
Letter to the Archbishop of Freising, Gravissimas, December 11, 1862. - Letter to the same, Tuas libenter, December 21, 1863.
- Since the philosopher is one thing, philosophy another, the former has the right and duty of submitting himself to the authority which he himself has proved true; but philosophy neither can nor ought to submit itself to any authority.
Letter to the Archbishop of Freising, Gravissimas, December 11, 1862. - Letter to the same, Tuas libenter, December 21, 1863.
- The Church not only ought never to take notice of philosophy, but indeed ought to tolerate the errors of philosophy itself, and leave it to itself that it may correct itself.
Letter to the Archbishop of Freising, Gravissimas, December 11, 1862.
- The decrees of the Apostolic See and of the Roman Congregations impede the free progress of science.
Letter to the Archbishop of Freising, Tuas libenter, December 21, 1863.
- The method and principles by which the ancient scholastic Doctors cultivated Theology are by no means congruent with the necessities of our times and the progress of the sciences.
Letter to the Archbishop of Freising, Tuas libenter, December 21, 1863.
- Philosophy is to be treated with no account had of supernatural revelation.
Letter to the Archbishop of Freising, Tuas libenter, December 21, 1863.
N.B. With the system of rationalism there cohere for the most part the errors of Anton Gunther, who is condemned in the letter to the Cardinal Archbishop of Cologne, Eximiam tuam, June 15, 1847, and in the letter to the Bishop of Breslau, Dolore haud mediocri, April 30, 1860.