Deprecative Prayer

138. Notion. Prayer taken in a broader sense is an elevation of the mind to God; but taken in the stricter sense it is a petition of fitting things from God. This petition before God can be made either by mind alone or also by voice.

a. A twofold act concurs in prayer: one of the will, namely desire, by which we desire that some good be conferred by God or some evil averted; the other of the intellect, which is petition, or the manifestation of this desire, by which we endeavor to induce God to furnish what we desire.

b. Fitting things are called goods which can be desired honorably and fittingly: spiritual goods indeed absolutely, but temporal goods under at least the implicit condition that they contribute to the salvation of the soul.

c. Prayer is an act of religion: for by the very fact that we ask goods from God, we acknowledge the power and goodness of God and profess that we depend on God and need Him as the first author of our goods, which is the duty of religion.

¹ Fr. Schmid, Die Wirksamkeit des Bittgebetes, Brixen: Pressverein, 1895; Ch. Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, 3rd ed., Freiburg: Herder, 1899, IX, nn. 312-365; St. Alphonsus de Liguori, Del gran mezzo della preghiera.

139. Whether attention of mind is required for the essence of prayer. The question is referred to vocal prayer, namely whether vocal prayer performed with distraction of mind is essentially prayer. Internal attention is not required for the essence of prayer; wherefore wandering of mind during the course of prayer does not prevent prayer from being, as to substance, true prayer, provided it is begun with attention of mind and this attention virtually endures during the time of prayer.

a. With respect to prayer, a twofold attention is distinguished: external and internal. Attention excludes distraction; therefore external attention excludes external distraction. But external distraction consists in external actions which so occupy the mind that they entirely impede internal attention, such as conversation, the reading of some book, etc. Internal attention is the exclusion of internal distraction; internal distraction is a wandering of the mind to other things not pertaining to prayer. Therefore internal attention consists in application of the mind to prayer.

Internal attention is distinguished as threefold: material, by which attention is paid to the words of the prayer, so that they may be uttered entire and in their order; literal, by which attention is paid to the meaning of the words; spiritual, by which attention is paid either to God, who is worshiped by prayer, or to the mystery to be recalled to memory, to which the prayer is ordered, or to the good which is asked from God through prayer.

b. For the essence of prayer a twofold condition is required: a. intention, and indeed in order that prayer be formally true prayer, or a special act of divine worship, it is required and sufficient that it be begun with the intention of praying to God, and that this intention virtually endure through the course of the prayer. Without this intention the prayer would not be true prayer; but from this intention virtually enduring the prayer has it that it is formally true prayer and an act of divine worship. b. Attention to the act of prayer had at the beginning and virtually enduring is required, because without this attention prayer would not be a human act: for the one praying must know that he is praying. But just as the intention of praying, so also attention is judged to endure as long as no external action is placed which impedes the internal attention of mind and the intention of praying. Therefore for the essence of prayer there is indeed required internal attention of mind to the act of praying elicited at the beginning of the prayer; nevertheless through the course of the prayer formal internal attention is not required for the substance of prayer. From these things it is inferred that practically nothing else is required for validly reciting a prayer than that the one praying have at the beginning of the prayer the will of praying and that through the course of the prayer he avoid external distraction.¹

c. Therefore external distraction indeed impedes true prayer; but internal distraction does not impede it, because it does not prevent attention and intention from virtually enduring. Now the principal reasons by which Lugo shows that prayer recited with a distracted mind is substantially prayer are these: To pray signifies to speak with God and to manifest one's desires to Him; but one can do this even when plainly distracted. For if someone, wishing to manifest a petition to a king, reads it from writing while meanwhile he is plainly distracted in mind, he is to be said to speak to the king and to ask him. Moreover, all concede that the administration of the sacraments is valid, although the minister, plainly distracted, utters the form of the sacrament; but the form of extreme unction, which is deprecatory, could not in this case be valid if it were not even substantially prayer. Finally, all concede that one validly recites the office who is indeed plainly but involuntarily distracted; but if every distraction impeded the very essence of prayer, not even one involuntarily distracted would satisfy the obligation.

Whether distraction in prayer is a sin. It is clear that involuntary distractions in themselves are no sin; but voluntary distractions, although they do not corrupt the substance of prayer, nevertheless contain some irreverence toward God, however not grave; wherefore they are a venial sin, even if the matter concerns prayers which are not to be recited from precept.

¹ Cf. Lugo, De eucharistia, disp. 22, n. 29 ff.

140. Division of prayer. Prayer taken in a broader sense:

1. By reason of end is: a. adoration, by which we acknowledge before God the supreme excellence of God and our entire subjection; to this prayer of adoration is referred praise of God; b. thanksgiving for benefits received; from the virtue of gratitude man is bound several times in life positively to give thanks to God for goods obtained; c. petition, which is prayer strictly taken.

It is manifest that propitiatory prayer, by which remission of sins and punishments is asked, and likewise prayer of intercession, by which goods are asked for others, pertain to prayer of petition taken generally; wherefore they are not to be distinguished from it as diverse species.

2. By reason of mode, one prayer is mental, which is performed by the mind alone, namely by intellect and will; and the other is oral (vocal), which is performed at the same time by mind and mouth: for what is done by words alone is not prayer.

3. Oral prayer is one kind public, which is made in the name and by the authority of the Church; the other is private, which is made in the name and by the proper authority of the one praying. Therefore two things are required for public prayer: that it be made in the name of the Church and that it be instituted by the authority of the Church, such as the canonical hours, the greater litanies, etc. (n. 136, d).

No one can pray in the name of the Church except a minister of the Church, or a person deputed to this by the Church. Prayers instituted by the authority of the Church are performed according to a determinate form approved and prescribed by the Church. Prayers recited, although instituted and approved by the authority of the Church, are private prayer if they are performed not in the name of the Church, but in the name of the one praying, whether the one praying is an ecclesiastical or secular person.

4. By reason of the one praying, prayer is singular, which is made solitarily by only one person, and common, which is made commonly by several persons together. The Lord commends common prayer in a special way: Where two or three are gathered in My name, there am I in the midst of them.¹

¹ Matt. 18:20.

141. Who are to be prayed to. Although God alone is to be prayed to as the principal author and giver of goods, so that to pray to a saint in this way is true idolatry, nevertheless, as patrons and intercessors before God, these can usefully be invoked:

1. Angels and saints in heaven, which the Council of Trent teaches as of faith.¹

a. Privately, even baptized infants who died before the use of reason can be invoked.

b. Although there is no precept of invoking the intercession of saints, nevertheless he who would never invoke the Blessed Virgin Mary could not be excused from venial sin: for he would be guilty of neglect of salvation if he wholly neglected so efficacious a help.²

2. Saints and just persons existing on earth, which likewise is of faith from Sacred Scripture.³

3. It is very probable that souls detained in purgatory not only intercede for us, but that we also can privately invoke them.

a. Since the Church has defined nothing concerning this matter, there is not one opinion of theologians. Commonly now it is conceded that the souls of purgatory help us by their suffrages: for the communion of saints suggests this, and it is confirmed by the testimony of Sacred Scripture, from which it is established that souls detained in limbo prayed for the people.⁴ Nevertheless the older authors with St. Thomas deny this, because the souls of purgatory are in a state of punishment;⁵ but more recent authors, especially Bellarmine and Suarez, depart from them. And indeed, the state of punishment does bring it about that the souls do not pray for us as the saints in glory do, as if from their proper office; but it does not prevent them from being able to intercede for us, since they are in the state of grace and divine friendship.

b. Those who deny that we can usefully direct our prayers to the souls of purgatory contend that they do not know our needs and our prayers. But although the contrary cannot be demonstrated by certain arguments, nevertheless it is piously believed that God, either by Himself or through guardian angels, manifests our needs and prayers to them. The opinion which holds that we can usefully invoke souls is confirmed by the practice of many of the faithful.

¹ Sess. 25, De invocatione sanctorum.

² Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 25, De invocatione sanctorum.

³ Rom. 15:30; James 5:16.

⁴ Jer. 15:1; 2 Macc. 15:12 ff.

⁵ Summa, II-II, q. 83, a. 11, ad 3.

142. For whom one must pray. We can and must pray for all who can be helped by prayer and whom we are commanded to love from the precept of charity. Therefore one can and ought to pray:

a. Each one for himself, as is clear from the nature of the thing;

b. For his neighbor, even for a sinner and an enemy,¹ so that from prayers poured out for all, such as, for example, the Lord's Prayer, it is not licit without sin to exclude anyone positively. Yet we are not bound to pray for a determinate person unless he is constituted in grave or gravest necessity and a special relation of office or necessity intervenes with that person.

c. For the souls detained in purgatory, both for all in common and especially for those who are joined to us by a special bond, as parents and benefactors; for since their necessity is truly grave and since we can easily succor them in various ways, piety and gratitude suggest that we help them by prayer. Yet a strict obligation of praying for parents and other connected persons cannot be established, because it is not certainly established that they need our intercession.

¹ 1 Tim. 2:1-3; James 5:16; Matt. 5:44.

143. What must be prayed for. What goods we can ask from God is gathered first from the Lord's Prayer handed down to us by Christ, then from the prayers which the Church directs to God for her faithful. Therefore we can ask:

1. Supernatural goods, namely eternal beatitude and the means necessary for it; and these indeed absolutely, because by their nature they are necessary or useful for salvation and no one can abuse them for sin.

But it is not licit to ask them contrary to or beyond the order of divine providence, for example beatitude without good works, remission of sins without penance, grace greater than the highest saints have; but within the order of divine providence supernatural goods can be asked without limitation. Graces gratuitously given are not to be asked, except in the case of special necessity.

2. Natural goods, whether spiritual (sciences, arts) or bodily (health, riches, honors, dignities), can indeed be asked, but only under the at least implicit condition that God has foreseen that they will be profitable to us for salvation: for these are not of themselves useful for salvation, and therefore we can abuse them.

3. That God avert evils from us, both moral evils (sins, temptations) and physical evils (diseases, pains, want, misfortunes), unless it is useful for our salvation that we bear temptations and certain physical evils.

It is not to be asked that God entirely extinguish concupiscence in us, because this is contrary to ordinary divine providence; nor is it to be asked that we be able to avoid all or even the lightest sins, because this is a special privilege; but privileges are not to be asked. With regard to light sins, we can ask that we diminish them more and more or avoid determinate ones.

4. To ask from God a morally evil thing (evil of fault) is always a grave sin, even if the thing which is asked is in itself only lightly evil: for to ask from God help for an evil thing and thus to make Him the author of evil, even light evil, is grave irreverence toward God, because it is directly opposed to His infinite sanctity.

It is not licit to ask an indifferent thing without further relation to an honorable end, for example profit from a game without relation to another end, because it is not the petition of a true and fitting good. Yet because a petition of this kind is not directly opposed to some divine attribute, it is not a mortal sin.

144. Efficacy of prayer. Prayer made with the due conditions, from the liberal promise of God, has infallible efficacy of obtaining those things which are asked, whether he who prays is just or a sinner; and from the clear sayings of Sacred Scripture this seems to be certain of faith to theologians.

a. Insofar as prayer is a good work, with the suppositions to be supposed, there belongs to it the threefold effect common to all good works, namely meritorious of sanctifying grace, satisfactory for temporal punishments, and impetratory of actual graces. Insofar as prayer is a petition by which we implore God, powerful and merciful, that He succor our need, it has a special impetratory power of obtaining those things which are asked from God. Now here the discussion is of this special force and virtue of prayer for obtaining. But the conditions which are required for prayer infallibly to obtain that which it asks are commonly numbered as four, as will be said below.

Prayer deprived of the due conditions nevertheless is not wholly without every effect: for although it does not obtain infallibly from the promise of God, nevertheless from His kindness it will obtain at least the spirit of more fervent prayer.

b. Although it befits God, supremely powerful and kind, that He succor him who humbly implores His help, nevertheless prayer has infallible efficacy from the promise of God, whose promise cannot deceive. God in fact promised infallible efficacy to prayer made with the due conditions: Amen, amen I say to you, if you ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it to you.¹ Ask, and it shall be given to you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you, etc.²

Note. Since every prayer or petition intends to move God so that by His special intervention He may effect that which is asked, it can now be asked how God produces the effects of prayer, namely whether through natural causes or through supernatural causes.

a. If the effect of prayer is a good of the supernatural order, namely actual grace, God Himself produces it immediately, without the intervention of a natural cause.

b. If the effect of prayer is a good of the natural order, it can be produced by God in a diverse way:

a. Either God Himself produces the effect without the intervention of natural causes (at least acting in a natural way). In this case God, because of prayer, works a miracle, either according to substance or at least according to mode.

b. Or God, because of the foreseen prayer, from eternity so disposes and directs natural causes that the effect follows necessarily in time.

c. Or God foresees that the effect is going to follow from natural causes according to the present order without special intervention. In this case God by His intervention only prevents the effect from being frustrated through the influence of a free cause (of a demon or of man).³

Therefore the effects of prayers are sometimes miracles, which are produced by God Himself without the concurrence of natural causes; but more frequently they arise from natural causes, yet not without the special intervention of God. From these things the difference is clear between miracles and what are called hearings of prayers (Gebetserhorungen). For if hearing of prayers is taken generically for any effect which God produces because of prayer, even miracles are numbered among hearings of prayers; but if the term is taken specifically, hearing of prayers is opposed to miracle and signifies an effect which God produces because of prayer through secondary causes.

¹ John 16:23. Cf. 14:13-14.

² Matt. 7:7 ff. Cf. Luke 11:10; James 4:3; Ps. 49:15.

³ Cf. Suarez, De oratione, bk. 1, c. 18; Pesch, IX, n. 331 ff.

145. The conditions which are required in order that prayer have an infallible effect are comprehended in this brief formula: that prayer be made in the name of Jesus: whatever you ask the Father in My name, this I will do.¹ To pray in the name of Jesus signifies to pray in union with Jesus; but for prayer to be made in union with Jesus, four conditions are required, of which one is referred to the object, two to the mode, and the fourth to the subject of prayer.

a. The object of prayer ought to be useful for promoting the end intended by Christ, namely our salvation.²

If supernatural goods are asked, prayer has an infallible effect, although sometimes the very goods which are asked are not granted, but in place of them others which contribute more to our salvation. If natural goods are asked, prayer does not have an infallible effect, because those goods can be an impediment of virtue and an occasion of sinning for us; but if God foresees this, He does not grant them, although they are asked earnestly and constantly.

b. As to mode, prayer first ought to be made with confidence, without hesitation and distrust: therefore let us approach with confidence to the throne of grace.³ The divine promises especially demand this condition: for we pray in the name of Jesus if we pray with confidence in His merits.

This confidence proceeds from theological faith and hope: for first we must believe that God can and wills to succor men; then, because God has so often promised that He will hear prayers, we ought without doubt to trust that God will give what we ask, provided that it contributes to our salvation. This confidence, necessary for efficacious prayer, refers to prayer in general; a particular prayer by which a determinate good is asked can be joined with doubt whether God will grant it, both because there can be defect in the prayer, and because it is not evident to the one praying that what is asked is truly good. This doubt indeed does not impede, but diminishes the efficacy of prayer. Hence if someone by the grace of the Holy Spirit can pray with great confidence, he has a sign of future obtaining.⁴

Then it ought to be made with perseverance.⁵ Those goods indeed which are necessary here and now, such as helps for overcoming temptation, God grants immediately; but other goods He does not always bestow immediately. For certain goods, by a positive disposition of God, are not granted except after constant prayer, as the gift of perseverance; but other goods, both natural and supernatural, God does not confer except after some time, so that meanwhile through prayer we may dispose ourselves better for receiving them.

c. The subject of prayer ought to be in the state of grace: for he prays most in union with Jesus who prays in the state of grace. Not that the prayer of a sinner, if the remaining conditions are not lacking, is not heard, but that the state of grace contributes much to increasing the efficacy of prayer.⁶

The prayer of sinners is not only efficacious for obtaining, which is established from Sacred Scripture, where sinners are read to have been heard;⁷ but also for infallibly obtaining, because the efficacy of prayer is not founded on the dignity of the one praying, but on the mercy and promise of God.⁸ But if in Sacred Scripture it is said that God does not hear the prayers of sinners,⁹ this signifies that the prayers of sinners are less efficacious, or even inefficacious if namely sinners ask badly. From these things it is clear that great care must be taken not to deter sinners, as if their good works and prayers were useless before God.

Whether prayer made for others is of infallible efficacy. There are those who for the infallible efficacy of prayer require this condition also, that prayer be made for oneself. St. Augustine¹⁰ and St. Thomas¹¹ seem to require this; but others with Suarez¹² teach that of itself even prayer made for others has infallible efficacy, because the divine promise, wholly general, contains no limitation: Whatever you ask. Yet this difference intervenes between prayer made for oneself and for others: that he who in the due manner asks for himself things useful for salvation by that very fact acquires the disposition necessary for receiving graces; but by the fact that someone prays for another, this other does not acquire the necessary disposition; on the contrary, he can obstinately resist the graces which are asked, on account of which obstinacy prayer made for others can lack effect.

¹ John 14:13.

² John 16:23-24.

³ Heb. 4:16.

⁴ Suarez, De oratione, bk. 1, c. 21, n. 9.

⁵ Cf. Luke, c. 11.

⁶ John 14:13; 15:7, 16; 16:23.

⁷ Luke 18:14; 23:43.

⁸ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 83, a. 16; Suarez, De oratione, bk. 1, c. 25.

⁹ John 9:31; Ps. 65:18.

¹⁰ In Joannem, tr. 102, n. 1.

¹¹ Summa, II-II, q. 83, a. 7, ad 2.

¹² De oratione, bk. 1, c. 27.

146. Necessity of prayer. An adult man is bound to pray (with impetratory prayer), not only by necessity of divine precept, but also by necessity of means.

a. Concerning the necessity of divine precept no one doubts: for so many explicit testimonies of Sacred Scripture by which prayer is inculcated cannot be understood of counsel alone: Ask and it shall be given to you;¹ Be instant in prayer;² It is necessary always to pray and not to faint.³ The internal reason of this precept is: a. the obligation of exhibiting worship to God, which is exhibited by every kind of prayer; b. one's own indigence.

Prayer of petition prescribed need not be vocal: for we have no divine precept of vocal prayer. Nor do the words of Christ the Lord, Thus therefore shall you pray,⁴ contain a precept imposed upon individual faithful of using that formula of praying which He Himself taught.

b. Concerning the necessity of means, the question is whether adult man is bound to ask for himself the helps necessary for salvation. Most theologians say the affirmative opinion must be held not only as certain, but scarcely not as of faith. The reason is this: that must be called necessary by necessity of means without which ordinarily salvation cannot be obtained; but without prayer, according to the ordinary mode of providence, salvation cannot be obtained. For it is certain of faith that the grace of God is necessary for salvation; but according to the ordinary mode of providence, God does not confer efficacious helps of grace except on those asking: Ask and you shall receive,⁵ that is, according to the interpretation of the holy Fathers: if you do not ask, you do not receive.

¹ Matt. 6:9.

² Col. 4:2.

³ Luke 18:1. Cf. Luke 11:9; Matt. 26:41; 1 Pet. 4:7; 1 Thess. 5:17.

⁴ Matt. 6:9.

⁵ John 16:24.

147. When the precept of praying obliges. 1. When man is bound to pray of himself cannot be accurately determined; without doubt he is bound to pray frequently. Yet he who fulfills the obligation of praying arising from his own indigence also fulfills the obligation arising from the precept of worshiping God.

a. There are those who say that we are bound to pray every week; there are those who with St. Alphonsus say every month; there are those who say that to have prayed once a year is sufficient. But neither the weekly nor the monthly obligation is certainly established. The same must be said concerning the opinion of those who teach that there exists an obligation of praying at the moral beginning of the use of reason. Besides, since the faithful are bound on every Sunday to assist at the sacrifice of the Mass, those who rightly fulfill this precept also satisfy the precept of praying.

b. Therefore he who through a long time (through years) neglects every prayer sins in a twofold way, both because of neglected divine worship and because of neglected care of salvation. Yet in confession it is sufficient to indicate the time during which he omitted prayer, and the other sins which he committed because of neglected prayer.

2. But accidentally we are bound to pray as often as without prayer we cannot fulfill another precept or overcome temptation.

Note. From these things it now follows: a. that the precept of praying is satisfied even by merely internal prayer: for this precept refers to private prayer, and to it insofar as it is petition of divine help; b. that for those who are not constituted in sacred orders, there are no certain and determinate prayers which must be recited from precept; c. that neither of itself nor accidentally are we bound to pray morning and evening, before and after table. Therefore the omission of those prayers of itself is no sin, not even venial. Yet pastors and confessors ought earnestly and frequently to commend this pious exercise to the faithful: for if they neglect morning and evening prayers, it will soon happen that they rarely pray, and thus are deprived of the special help of God, and in dangers of sinning which occur daily fall into sins.

I. Notion. Deprecative prayer is defined by St. Thomas as: a petition of fitting things from God (II-II, q. 83, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., III, pref.). It is said:

1. Petition, that is, the manifestation of our will; and indeed with a trusting desire of obtaining something, so that it is not simply a narration, but truly a motive cause.

2. Of fitting things, that is, of those things which can honestly be sought from God.

3. From God; for deprecation, as an act of the virtue of religion, is directed primarily to God, to be fulfilled by him himself.

II. Division. Deprecative prayer is divided:

1. Into internal and external prayer, according as we do not use, or do use, the external voice. External prayer, however, does not necessarily exclude application of the mind. It is disputed whether or not the sole use of words (with the intention, however, of obtaining something from God having been had and not retracted) suffices for prayer; in other words, whether or not internal attention¹ at least virtually persevering pertains to the essence of prayer. Several affirm, because when internal attention at least virtually persevering is lacking, there is mere battology. Others deny, relying on these reasons. First, it does not appear that a true petition is lacking if someone, though voluntarily distracted, from the intention of obtaining something utters words which have and retain a precatory sense. Then, if internal attention pertained to the essence of prayer, even involuntary distraction would stand in its way.

"They say," says St. Alphonsus, "that he who spontaneously distracts himself actually revokes the first attention and therefore does not satisfy, since he no longer prays; but he who is involuntarily distracted remains virtually attentive, and therefore prays and satisfies. I, however, confess my weakness: I have never been able to understand how attention can virtually remain in one who is distracted, even involuntarily. Indeed I understand well that intention, since it pertains to the will, when once it has been had and is not retracted, virtually perseveres in the effect or in the means undertaken, because these means proceed from that intention. But I do not understand how someone can be said to be virtually attentive to prayer, who has his mind occupied elsewhere. It will rightly be said that this one, involuntarily distracted after the intention of attending has been had and not retracted, wishes to attend; but it cannot be said that he attends when he is wholly wandering elsewhere. For just as it is repugnant to say that someone virtually understands what he reads when he does not actually understand, even if he had had the intention of understanding, so it is repugnant to say that one virtually attends who does not actually attend" (IV, 177). The first opinion seems more probable to St. Alphonsus, at least because of extrinsic authority (loc. cit.). Nevertheless the other is also held by him as sufficiently probable (III, 669).

2. Into private prayer, which is made by a man as a private person, in a private name; and public prayer, which is made by a legitimate minister of the Church, in the name of the Church. Thus a priest, alone in a desert praying the breviary, pours forth public prayers. On the contrary, if the same priest in the Basilica of St. Peter, in the midst of a gathering of men, silently prays the rosary, he pours forth private prayers.

3. Into continued prayer, which is made through more extended delays; and ejaculatory prayer, which we, in a certain way, dart forth very briefly and rapidly. This last prayer, frequently repeated, is very useful: both because often time is lacking for pouring forth continued prayers; and because attention, which is necessary for prayer, is more easily lost through more extended prayer; and because it is a very efficacious means for repelling temptations, and for preserving the intimate union of the soul with God.²

¹ Attention is distinguished as twofold, internal and external. Internal attention consists in the application of the mind to that which is being done. External attention consists in the fact that someone excludes external works with which internal intention cannot be combined. Internal attention is threefold, namely superficial, literal, and spiritual, according as one attends to pronouncing the words well, to the sense of the words, or to other divine things.

² Let St. Augustine, Epist. 130, ch. 10, nn. 19-20, be read (ed. G., t. 2, col. 584).

III. Object. St. Thomas declares: "It is lawful to pray for that which it is lawful to desire" (II-II, q. 83, a. 6); these words agree plainly with the general rule stated in the Roman Catechism: "But whatever can rightly be wished, it is lawful to ask,... as those most abundant promises of the Lord testify: Whatever you wish, you shall ask, and it shall be done for you. For he promises that he will grant all things."¹ Therefore, just as within the order of divine Providence it is absolutely lawful to desire those goods by which we are beatified and by which we merit beatitude, so it is also lawful to ask the same things absolutely. But other goods we can neither lawfully desire nor ask except conditionally, namely insofar as they are helps by which we are aided to tend toward beatitude. Temporal evils, under the aspect of good, for an honorable and proportionate end, both for oneself and for others, can be the conditional object of prayer (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 83, a. 5; St. Alphonsus, De Magno orat. Medio, part I, ch. 3, n. 5 sq.).

¹ Roman Catechism, part IV, ch. IV, q. 1.

IV. Morality. 1. Prayer is an act of religion, and indeed of latria; this is clear from the fact that he who prays professes the power of God and his goodness (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 83, a. 3). If prayer is directed to the Saints, it is an act of hyperdulia if it is referred to the Blessed Virgin Mary, and of dulia if it is referred to other Saints (n. 400).

2. Prayer is necessary by necessity of means and of precept. But here by the name of prayer is understood formal, supernatural, and indeed deprecative prayer, whether mental or vocal. I say: a) formal, so that prayer included in every good work is excluded, insofar as every honorable work has an impetratory force; b) supernatural, because it is a means and work ordered to supernatural salvation; c) deprecative, so that it may be indicated that meditative prayer does not suffice; d) whether mental or vocal, since either one suffices. Therefore:

a) Prayer, as it has just been explained, is necessary by necessity of ordinary means, so that such prayer is the ordinary means by which an adult obtains eternal salvation. This is proved first from Sacred Scripture, which continually urges us to prayer, and indeed to this end, that we may be able to work our salvation;¹ there is added the authority of the holy Fathers and Doctors, who call prayer a necessary means for obtaining grace; and grace is necessary by necessity of means.

St. Augustine: "God wills to give, but only to the one asking."² And elsewhere: "It is established that God has prepared some things to give even to those not praying, as the beginning of faith; other things only to those praying, as perseverance unto the end."³ St. Thomas: "Everyone is bound to prayer from the very fact that he is bound to procure spiritual goods for himself, which are given only divinely; whence they cannot be procured in any other way except by being asked from him" (in IV Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3). St. Alphonsus, that strenuous defender of the importance of prayer, writes: "Without me you can do nothing... But that help of grace, according to ordinary Providence, God does not grant except to those praying, according to the celebrated sentence of Gennadius: We believe that no one comes to salvation unless God invites him; that no one invited works out his salvation unless God helps him; that no one merits help except one praying. Therefore, posited on the one hand that we can do nothing without the help of grace, and on the other that that help is for the most part not granted by God except to those praying, who does not see it to follow that prayer is altogether necessary for us unto salvation?" (De Magno orationis Medio, part I, ch. 1, pp. 635-636).

b) The necessity of precept follows from the necessity of means, and is declared countless times in Sacred Scripture.⁴ Besides, note:

a) With respect to the time of fulfilling the precept of prayer, it must be said that it obliges sometimes of itself, sometimes by accident.

It obliges of itself: 1. at the beginning of moral life; 2. more frequently in life; 3. at the point of death, almost as was said about the theological virtues, because almost the same reason can be urged (n. 489).

It obliges by accident: 1. when a temptation presses which can scarcely be overcome otherwise; 2. when a great benefit somehow necessary for salvation (for example, the choice of a state of life) must be obtained from God; 3. when a community is placed in grave danger (St. Alphonsus, III, pref.; Inst. Catech., part 1, ch. 1, n. 32; De Magno or. Medio, part I, ch. 3, § 4, n. 36).

According to St. Alphonsus and others, he sins gravely who neglects prayer for a notable time, say for two months, because it seems grave to omit for so long the most ordinary means of obtaining necessary graces (Inst. Catech., p. 1, ch. 1, § 4). But prayer made when it obliges by accident should also be counted.

Finally there is not of itself an obligation of praying morning and evening; nevertheless that practice is very greatly to be inculcated, all the more because often (by accident, namely) it will not be omitted without venial sin. These things also hold concerning prayers before and after the more principal meals.

b) With respect to the persons to be invoked, first note that the doctrine which teaches that the invocation of the Saints is good and useful is proximate to faith from the Council of Trent.⁵ But there is also an obligation of invoking them according to these words of St. Thomas:

"An order has been divinely instituted in things, according to Dionysius, so that through intermediates the lowest things may be led back to God. Whence, since the saints who are in the homeland are nearest to God, the order of divine law requires this: that we who, remaining in the body, are pilgrims from the Lord, be led back into him through the saints as intermediates. And this indeed happens when through them the divine Goodness diffuses its effect. And because our return into God ought to correspond to the procession of his good things to us, just as through the mediation of the suffrages of the saints the benefits of God come down upon us, so it is fitting that we be led back into God in order that we may again receive his benefits through the mediation of the saints; and thence it is that we establish them as intercessors for us with God, and as mediators, when we ask from them that they pray for us" (Sent., lib. IV, dist. 45, q. 2, a. 2). "But these things," adds St. Alphonsus, "if they must be affirmed of the Saints, will hold more strongly when we speak of the intercession of the divine Mother" (De Magno or. Medio, part 1, ch. 1, n. 26), since she has been constituted mediatrix of all graces. - There is no obligation of invoking souls detained in purgatory.

c) With respect to the persons for whom one must pray, a distinction must be made between private and public prayer. In private prayer one must pray for all wayfarers, because the precept of charity extends so widely; hence for oneself, for all the living, and for souls in purgatory (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 83, a. 7; IV Sent., dist. 21, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2; St. Alphonsus, De Magno or. Medio, part 1, ch. 1, n. 17 sq.); but not for the damned, as is clear, nor for the blessed, who have attained the term. But in order that there be an obligation of praying for a determinate person, a special reason of necessity, familiarity, or office must intervene. - In public prayer one must not pray for the excommunicated; priests can privately and with scandal removed apply Mass for them; but if they are to be avoided, only for their conversion (can. 2262).

¹ 1 Pet. 4:7; Matt. 26:41; Jas. 4:2.

² M.P.L. 37, col. 1324.

³ M.P.L. 45, col. 1017.

⁴ Luke 18:1; 1 Thess. 5:18; Col. 4:2.

⁵ Sess. 25, decree on the invocation of the Saints.

V. Efficacy. By the efficacy of prayer is understood that force of prayer which is proper to it as prayer, not as a good work; this force of impetrating is founded not on the dignity of the prayer, nor on the merit of the work, but on the sole promise of God. Moreover prayer duly made is of infallible efficacy when someone prays for himself. This is clear from innumerable texts of Sacred Scripture.¹

It is disputed whether the same must be said when someone prays for another living person who is well disposed. But it seems that this must be affirmed, because the texts of Sacred Scripture are universal. There is added that Sacred Letters continually urge prayer for others; by this they seem to suggest that even prayer of this kind is of itself certainly going to be heard (St. Alphonsus, Op. asc., 3, pp. 59, 60, 63). Prayer for souls in purgatory² more probably infallibly profits some soul; nevertheless, not infallibly that soul for which in particular it is poured forth, although for the most part it will at least profit that soul somewhat.

¹ Jer. 33:3; Ps. 49:15; Matt. 7:7, 11; Luke 11:10; Matt. 18:19; Mark 11:24; John 14:14; 15:7; 16:23.

² Cf. St. Bellarmine, De purgatorio, lib. 2, ch. 16.

VI. Conditions. In order that prayer have the efficacy described, it is required that someone ask: 1. for a thing useful to salvation according to divine providence;³ 2. with humility;⁴ 3. with confidence;⁵ 4. perseveringly⁶ (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 83, a. 2, ad 2 and a. 15, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, De Magno or. Medio, part 1, ch. 3).

Nevertheless prayer poured forth without these due conditions is not always altogether useless, because even if it does not require an infallible effect from the fidelity of God, nevertheless often it obtains grace from God's mercy; as, for example, a sinner pouring forth a tepid prayer often through it receives grace for praying more fervently (St. Alphonsus, in Trent, sess. 6, n. 143).

Finally I note with St. Thomas: "If someone from set purpose wanders in mind during prayer, this is a sin, and impedes the fruit of prayer" (II-II, q. 83, a. 13, ad 3); namely, it is a venial sin because of a certain irreverence toward God. "But wandering of the mind which occurs apart from set purpose does not take away the fruit of prayer" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.).

¹ Cf. John of St. Thomas, in II-II, q. 83; Monsabre, La Priere; Sertillanges, La Priere; Tillmann, Das Gebet; Massoulie, Traite de la veritable Oraison.

² Cf. Jansen, Het smeekgebed; Schmid, Die Wirksamheit des Bittgebetes.

³ 1 John 5:14.

⁴ Luke 18:14; Jas. 4:6.

⁵ Mark 11:24; Jas. 1:6-7.

⁶ Luke 11:8-9.

S. Th. II-II, q. 83, a. 9, 12, 13, 17.

669. Prayer is one kind internal, another external and vocal. By reason of the mode in which it happens, prayer is distinguished into merely internal, which happens by the mind alone, and external, which is performed at once by mind and by an external act. This latter happens principally by the voice, and then is called vocal; and it is necessary on account of reasons similar to those for external worship (n. 652). Moreover, for the essence of vocal prayer three conditions are required: one exterior, the pronunciation of words; two interior, namely, intention on the part of the will, attention on the part of the intellect.

670. For vocal prayer, first there is required the pronunciation of words. The pronunciation of words requires two things:

1. That the words be truly pronounced by human speech, that is, be emitted by an articulate voice; hence he would not pray vocally who only read the words with his eyes or conceived them in his mind; nor he who, with mouth unmoved, emitted a sound from the throat; nor he who, without expiration or inspiration of air, moved only tongue or lips. And although vocal prayer by its nature is audible, nevertheless it is not required that in fact someone hear himself or be able to hear himself, because it can be so quiet that it is not perceived, and on the other hand the one praying can be certain that he is pronouncing by consciousness of his own inner sense.

2. That the words truly signify the desire of the one praying; hence he would not pray vocally who brought forth incoherent words.

671. For vocal prayer there is also required intention, or the purpose of praying. It is not enough to bring forth words even voluntarily, but there is required:

1. On the part of the end or object, a determinate intention: for vocal recitation is an indifferent action which can be done for diverse things, for study, curiosity, play, the worship of God, etc.; therefore that it may be an act of religion, it must be determined to the worship of God through the intention of praying. Yet with this intention and with the essence of prayer there can stand an evil secondary end, as if someone were at the same time to pray for the honor of God and for vain glory.

2. On the part of the subject: a) an actual intention had here and now is not required, but a virtual one suffices, by which someone from the force of a past intention begins or continues prayer;

b) Nor is an explicit intention required, by which someone says: I intend to pray to God; but an implicit one suffices, contained in another act, as if someone goes to church, or takes up the breviary according to custom, or takes up the rosary and recites in the manner of one praying, etc.: in these actions there is included the intention of praying and worshiping God.

672. For vocal prayer, attention is also required. Attention is an act of the mind applying itself to something. Although all attention, as an act of the intellect, is subjectively internal, nevertheless:

A. On the part of the object, a twofold attention is usually distinguished: internal and external.

1. External attention is when the mind is applied to avoiding external actions incompatible with prayer or with internal attention, such as talking, writing, attentively hearing others speaking, dressing oneself quickly, doing something with great application, etc.

2. Internal attention is when the mind is applied to something intrinsic to prayer: a) either to the right pronunciation of words, and then it is called superficial; b) or to perceiving the signification of the words, and then it is literal; c) or to God and divine things, and then it is spiritual.

B. On the part of the act or subject, attention is perfect, distinct, great, or intense, which is also reflexively perceived by consciousness; or imperfect, small, confused, or remiss, which man does not easily or in no way perceives in consciousness, so that he also attends to several things.

C. On the part of its own being, it can be according to essence or according to virtue. Now:

1. At least that attention is required which is necessary for the right pronunciation of words; for this cannot happen without some attention or application of mind so that the words may be duly pronounced; otherwise it will not be a human act: for the preceding intention does not exercise its force upon the subsequent prayer except through some application of mind.

2. The attention required for this is not only external but also internal, by which the mind is applied not only to removing those things which impede prayer, but also positively to the right pronunciation of words.

3. Yet this attention is not required to be great, intense, and distinct, but confused, remiss, and minimal attention suffices.

4. Indeed, it is not proved that during prayer more is required than virtual attention. Thus the older authors, who say that internal attention according to the essence of the act is necessary at the beginning, but in the course of prayer it suffices that attention remain according to virtue, insofar as it perdures unless it is removed by a contrary intention, or through an incompatible work there occurs so great a wandering of the mind that the force of the first intention wholly perishes, as St. Thomas has it, in IV Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, qc. 4. The reason is the general principle: when two or more powers concur for the same operation, it suffices that the influx of the moving power virtually remain while the action is exercised.

But if theologians who require only external attention and deny that internal attention is required intend only to exclude intense and conscious attention, or actual attention, in fact they agree with us; just as those who require actual attention continued during prayer, but unconscious and very remiss, do not differ much from us. In practice: as long as the first intention of praying and attending is not revoked, whether directly through a contrary intention, or indirectly through an act incompatible with attention, prayer perdures; indeed, he who has external attention is judged to have that minimal superficial attention which seems to be required for prayer; nor therefore should penitents examine themselves more scrupulously concerning this.

With the essence of prayer the following actions are compatible: walking; looking at fields, a hill, a river; making a bed; building a fire; preparing a pen for writing; gathering herbs, grapes, flowers; dressing not altogether quickly; combing the head; looking up psalms, lessons, etc.; likewise distractions even voluntary, provided they do not wholly remove the attentive pronunciation of words. But if these actions are placed together with prayer from a cause of necessity or utility, they are no sin, for example, if someone thinks about a matter to be retained, or if he wishes to pray while he must dress; if they are exercised idly, without reason, they are a venial sin against religion, because it is irreverence toward God during prayer to divide one's attention between prayer and idle acts, for example, if someone, while he prays, wishes to dress (a. 13, ad 3); finally, if someone places an action gravely evil while he truly prays, for example, a shameful desire, the irreverence will be greater, but it is not proved to be mortal.

673. Among vocal prayers, the Lord's Prayer is the most worthy, because it has Christ Himself as author, and the most perfect, because with the greatest brevity it embraces all things which can rightly be asked, in that order in which they are to be asked.

It is proved: first we ought to desire the end, then the means to the end, finally the removal of those things which impede the attainment of the end. Now the primary end, the glory of God, we ask by saying: Hallowed be Thy name; the secondary end, beatitude by which we enjoy the glory of God, by saying: Thy kingdom come. The means conducing to the end principally and directly, namely, merits which are acquired by the fulfillment of the commandments, we ask by saying: Thy will be done; temporal goods, which conduce to beatitude instrumentally and indirectly, we ask by saying: Give us this day our daily bread. Finally we ask that sin, which directly impedes the attainment of the end, be turned away from us, by saying: Forgive us our debts; temptation, which impedes indirectly by leading to sin: And lead us not into temptation; finally temporal evils, which impede altogether indirectly, by impeding the sufficiency of life, and to this pertains: Deliver us from evil (a. 9).

But if we have asked these things, nothing remains which ought further to be asked.

674. Private and public, solitary and common prayer. On the part of the one praying, prayer is divided into private or singular, which is made by private persons in their own name, and public or social and common, which is made by the whole community or by the ministers of the Church in the name of the whole community; thus the canonical hours. Moreover, prayer, whether private or public prayer of the ministers of the Church, can be made solitarily, by one person only, or in common, by several gathered together at the same time; in which case it is better and more efficacious, according to Christ, Mt. XVIII, 20: For where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them (a. 12).

675. Observation. Several parts of prayer can be distinguished, namely: obsecrations, prayers, postulations, thanksgivings. St. Thomas shows this in this way, a. 17:

"For prayer three things are required: of which the first is that the one praying approach God, whom he prays to; this is signified by the name of prayer, because prayer is the ascent of the intellect into God. The second thing required is petition, which is signified by the name of postulation: whether the petition is proposed determinately, which some properly name postulation; or indeterminately, as when someone asks to be helped by God, which they name supplication; or whether only the fact is narrated, according to that of John XI, 3: Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick, which they call insinuation. The third thing required is the reason for obtaining what is sought; and this is either on the part of God, or on the part of the one asking: a) the reason for obtaining on the part of God is His holiness, on account of which we ask to be heard... and to this pertains obsecration, which is a sacred attestation, as when we say: By Thy Nativity, deliver us, O Lord. b) But the reason for obtaining on the part of the one asking is thanksgiving, by which, giving thanks for benefits received, we merit to receive greater ones...

"And therefore... in the Mass, obsecrations are those things which precede the consecration, in which certain sacred things are commemorated; prayers are in the consecration itself, in which the mind ought especially to be raised to God; postulations are in the petitions which follow; and thanksgivings are at the end."

1. Insofar as prayer is taken more strictly and is distinguished from the remaining parts, which all together constitute prayer taken commonly (ad 2).