Article — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Article II. On Deprecative Prayer
I. Notion. Deprecative prayer is defined by St. Thomas as: a petition of fitting things from God (II-II, q. 83, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., III, pref.). It is said:
Petition, that is, the manifestation of our will; and indeed with a trusting desire of obtaining something, so that it is not simply a narration, but truly a motive cause.
Of fitting things, that is, of those things which can honestly be sought from God.
From God; for deprecation, as an act of the virtue of religion, is directed primarily to God, to be fulfilled by him himself.
II. Division. Deprecative prayer is divided:
- Into internal and external prayer, according as we do not use, or do use, the external voice. External prayer, however, does not necessarily exclude application of the mind. It is disputed whether or not the sole use of words (with the intention, however, of obtaining something from God having been had and not retracted) suffices for prayer; in other words, whether or not internal attention1 at least virtually persevering pertains to the essence of prayer. Several affirm, because when internal attention at least virtually persevering is lacking, there is mere battology. Others deny, relying on these reasons. First, it does not appear that a true petition is lacking if someone, though voluntarily distracted, from the intention of obtaining something utters words which have and retain a precatory sense. Then, if internal attention pertained to the essence of prayer, even involuntary distraction would stand in its way.
"They say," says St. Alphonsus, "that he who spontaneously distracts himself actually revokes the first attention and therefore does not satisfy, since he no longer prays; but he who is involuntarily distracted remains virtually attentive, and therefore prays and satisfies. I, however, confess my weakness: I have never been able to understand how attention can virtually remain in one who is distracted, even involuntarily. Indeed I understand well that intention, since it pertains to the will, when once it has been had and is not retracted, virtually perseveres in the effect or in the means undertaken, because these means proceed from that intention. But I do not understand how someone can be said to be virtually attentive to prayer, who has his mind occupied elsewhere. It will rightly be said that this one, involuntarily distracted after the intention of attending has been had and not retracted, wishes to attend; but it cannot be said that he attends when he is wholly wandering elsewhere. For just as it is repugnant to say that someone virtually understands what he reads when he does not actually understand, even if he had had the intention of understanding, so it is repugnant to say that one virtually attends who does not actually attend" (IV, 177). The first opinion seems more probable to St. Alphonsus, at least because of extrinsic authority (loc. cit.). Nevertheless the other is also held by him as sufficiently probable (III, 669).
Into private prayer, which is made by a man as a private person, in a private name; and public prayer, which is made by a legitimate minister of the Church, in the name of the Church. Thus a priest, alone in a desert praying the breviary, pours forth public prayers. On the contrary, if the same priest in the Basilica of St. Peter, in the midst of a gathering of men, silently prays the rosary, he pours forth private prayers.
Into continued prayer, which is made through more extended delays; and ejaculatory prayer, which we, in a certain way, dart forth very briefly and rapidly. This last prayer, frequently repeated, is very useful: both because often time is lacking for pouring forth continued prayers; and because attention, which is necessary for prayer, is more easily lost through more extended prayer; and because it is a very efficacious means for repelling temptations, and for preserving the intimate union of the soul with God.2
1 Attention is distinguished as twofold, internal and external. Internal attention consists in the application of the mind to that which is being done. External attention consists in the fact that someone excludes external works with which internal intention cannot be combined. Internal attention is threefold, namely superficial, literal, and spiritual, according as one attends to pronouncing the words well, to the sense of the words, or to other divine things.
2 Let St. Augustine, Epist. 130, ch. 10, nn. 19-20, be read (ed. G., t. 2, col. 584).
III. Object. St. Thomas declares: "It is lawful to pray for that which it is lawful to desire" (II-II, q. 83, a. 6); these words agree plainly with the general rule stated in the Roman Catechism: "But whatever can rightly be wished, it is lawful to ask,... as those most abundant promises of the Lord testify: Whatever you wish, you shall ask, and it shall be done for you. For he promises that he will grant all things."1 Therefore, just as within the order of divine Providence it is absolutely lawful to desire those goods by which we are beatified and by which we merit beatitude, so it is also lawful to ask the same things absolutely. But other goods we can neither lawfully desire nor ask except conditionally, namely insofar as they are helps by which we are aided to tend toward beatitude. Temporal evils, under the aspect of good, for an honorable and proportionate end, both for oneself and for others, can be the conditional object of prayer (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 83, a. 5; St. Alphonsus, De Magno orat. Medio, part I, ch. 3, n. 5 sq.).
IV. Morality. 1. Prayer is an act of religion, and indeed of latria; this is clear from the fact that he who prays professes the power of God and his goodness (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 83, a. 3). If prayer is directed to the Saints, it is an act of hyperdulia if it is referred to the Blessed Virgin Mary, and of dulia if it is referred to other Saints (n. 400).
- Prayer is necessary by necessity of means and of precept. But here by the name of prayer is understood formal, supernatural, and indeed deprecative prayer, whether mental or vocal. I say: a) formal, so that prayer included in every good work is excluded, insofar as every honorable work has an impetratory force; b) supernatural, because it is a means and work ordered to supernatural salvation; c) deprecative, so that it may be indicated that meditative prayer does not suffice; d) whether mental or vocal, since either one suffices. Therefore:
a) Prayer, as it has just been explained, is necessary by necessity of ordinary means, so that such prayer is the ordinary means by which an adult obtains eternal salvation. This is proved first from Sacred Scripture, which continually urges us to prayer, and indeed to this end, that we may be able to work our salvation;1 there is added the authority of the holy Fathers and Doctors, who call prayer a necessary means for obtaining grace; and grace is necessary by necessity of means.
St. Augustine: "God wills to give, but only to the one asking."2 And elsewhere: "It is established that God has prepared some things to give even to those not praying, as the beginning of faith; other things only to those praying, as perseverance unto the end."3 St. Thomas: "Everyone is bound to prayer from the very fact that he is bound to procure spiritual goods for himself, which are given only divinely; whence they cannot be procured in any other way except by being asked from him" (in IV Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3). St. Alphonsus, that strenuous defender of the importance of prayer, writes: "Without me you can do nothing... But that help of grace, according to ordinary Providence, God does not grant except to those praying, according to the celebrated sentence of Gennadius: We believe that no one comes to salvation unless God invites him; that no one invited works out his salvation unless God helps him; that no one merits help except one praying. Therefore, posited on the one hand that we can do nothing without the help of grace, and on the other that that help is for the most part not granted by God except to those praying, who does not see it to follow that prayer is altogether necessary for us unto salvation?" (De Magno orationis Medio, part I, ch. 1, pp. 635-636).
b) The necessity of precept follows from the necessity of means, and is declared countless times in Sacred Scripture.4 Besides, note:
a) With respect to the time of fulfilling the precept of prayer, it must be said that it obliges sometimes of itself, sometimes by accident.
It obliges of itself: 1. at the beginning of moral life; 2. more frequently in life; 3. at the point of death, almost as was said about the theological virtues, because almost the same reason can be urged (n. 489).
It obliges by accident: 1. when a temptation presses which can scarcely be overcome otherwise; 2. when a great benefit somehow necessary for salvation (for example, the choice of a state of life) must be obtained from God; 3. when a community is placed in grave danger (St. Alphonsus, III, pref.; Inst. Catech., part 1, ch. 1, n. 32; De Magno or. Medio, part I, ch. 3, § 4, n. 36).
According to St. Alphonsus and others, he sins gravely who neglects prayer for a notable time, say for two months, because it seems grave to omit for so long the most ordinary means of obtaining necessary graces (Inst. Catech., p. 1, ch. 1, § 4). But prayer made when it obliges by accident should also be counted.
Finally there is not of itself an obligation of praying morning and evening; nevertheless that practice is very greatly to be inculcated, all the more because often (by accident, namely) it will not be omitted without venial sin. These things also hold concerning prayers before and after the more principal meals.
b) With respect to the persons to be invoked, first note that the doctrine which teaches that the invocation of the Saints is good and useful is proximate to faith from the Council of Trent.5 But there is also an obligation of invoking them according to these words of St. Thomas:
"An order has been divinely instituted in things, according to Dionysius, so that through intermediates the lowest things may be led back to God. Whence, since the saints who are in the homeland are nearest to God, the order of divine law requires this: that we who, remaining in the body, are pilgrims from the Lord, be led back into him through the saints as intermediates. And this indeed happens when through them the divine Goodness diffuses its effect. And because our return into God ought to correspond to the procession of his good things to us, just as through the mediation of the suffrages of the saints the benefits of God come down upon us, so it is fitting that we be led back into God in order that we may again receive his benefits through the mediation of the saints; and thence it is that we establish them as intercessors for us with God, and as mediators, when we ask from them that they pray for us" (Sent., lib. IV, dist. 45, q. 2, a. 2). "But these things," adds St. Alphonsus, "if they must be affirmed of the Saints, will hold more strongly when we speak of the intercession of the divine Mother" (De Magno or. Medio, part 1, ch. 1, n. 26), since she has been constituted mediatrix of all graces. - There is no obligation of invoking souls detained in purgatory.
c) With respect to the persons for whom one must pray, a distinction must be made between private and public prayer. In private prayer one must pray for all wayfarers, because the precept of charity extends so widely; hence for oneself, for all the living, and for souls in purgatory (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 83, a. 7; IV Sent., dist. 21, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2; St. Alphonsus, De Magno or. Medio, part 1, ch. 1, n. 17 sq.); but not for the damned, as is clear, nor for the blessed, who have attained the term. But in order that there be an obligation of praying for a determinate person, a special reason of necessity, familiarity, or office must intervene. - In public prayer one must not pray for the excommunicated; priests can privately and with scandal removed apply Mass for them; but if they are to be avoided, only for their conversion (can. 2262).
1 1 Pet. 4:7; Matt. 26:41; Jas. 4:2.
2 M.P.L. 37, col. 1324.
3 M.P.L. 45, col. 1017.
4 Luke 18:1; 1 Thess. 5:18; Col. 4:2.
5 Sess. 25, decree on the invocation of the Saints.
V. Efficacy. By the efficacy of prayer is understood that force of prayer which is proper to it as prayer, not as a good work; this force of impetrating is founded not on the dignity of the prayer, nor on the merit of the work, but on the sole promise of God. Moreover prayer duly made is of infallible efficacy when someone prays for himself. This is clear from innumerable texts of Sacred Scripture.1
It is disputed whether the same must be said when someone prays for another living person who is well disposed. But it seems that this must be affirmed, because the texts of Sacred Scripture are universal. There is added that Sacred Letters continually urge prayer for others; by this they seem to suggest that even prayer of this kind is of itself certainly going to be heard (St. Alphonsus, Op. asc., 3, pp. 59, 60, 63). Prayer for souls in purgatory2 more probably infallibly profits some soul; nevertheless, not infallibly that soul for which in particular it is poured forth, although for the most part it will at least profit that soul somewhat.
1 Jer. 33:3; Ps. 49:15; Matt. 7:7, 11; Luke 11:10; Matt. 18:19; Mark 11:24; John 14:14; 15:7; 16:23.
2 Cf. St. Bellarmine, De purgatorio, lib. 2, ch. 16.
VI. Conditions. In order that prayer have the efficacy described, it is required that someone ask: 1. for a thing useful to salvation according to divine providence;3 2. with humility;4 3. with confidence;5 4. perseveringly6 (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 83, a. 2, ad 2 and a. 15, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, De Magno or. Medio, part 1, ch. 3).
Nevertheless prayer poured forth without these due conditions is not always altogether useless, because even if it does not require an infallible effect from the fidelity of God, nevertheless often it obtains grace from God's mercy; as, for example, a sinner pouring forth a tepid prayer often through it receives grace for praying more fervently (St. Alphonsus, in Trent, sess. 6, n. 143).
Finally I note with St. Thomas: "If someone from set purpose wanders in mind during prayer, this is a sin, and impedes the fruit of prayer" (II-II, q. 83, a. 13, ad 3); namely, it is a venial sin because of a certain irreverence toward God. "But wandering of the mind which occurs apart from set purpose does not take away the fruit of prayer" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.).
1 Cf. John of St. Thomas, in II-II, q. 83; Monsabre, La Priere; Sertillanges, La Priere; Tillmann, Das Gebet; Massoulie, Traite de la veritable Oraison.
2 Cf. Jansen, Het smeekgebed; Schmid, Die Wirksamheit des Bittgebetes.
3 1 John 5:14.
4 Luke 18:14; Jas. 4:6.
5 Mark 11:24; Jas. 1:6-7.
6 Luke 11:8-9.