Divination and the devil

Divination in all its forms is per se mortally sinful, because, in the words of Father Slater, “it is a great insult to God to hold intercourse with, and seek aid from, the devil, His bitter enemy,” who is invoked either expressly or tacitly whenever men try, by inordinate means, to find out what is secret and hidden.

n. ¶7.

The same writer pertinently recalls a remark which St. Thomas makes after St. Augustine, and which should always be borne in mind when there is question of the practices with which we are here dealing. It is said that the devil wishes to excite among men a greater curiosity about occult matters, “so that, being implicated in these observances, they may become more curious and get themselves more entangled in the manifold snares of pernicious error.”⁴

⁴ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 96, art. 2 sq.; Slater, I, 220 sq.

Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. VI, Section 3: Superstition in the Preternatural Order

n. ¶2.

SUPERSTITION IN REGARD TO MAN’S RELATION TO THE DEMONS.—a) Undoubtedly this form of superstition draws sustenance from the theological belief in the existence of demons, from the possibility and reality of their influence upon mankind, and from the deep-seated conviction existing in the minds of men that evil spirits exercise extraordinary power. Nevertheless it is not true to say that this kind of superstition is a by-product of Christian angelology; rather is it an unconquered relic of paganism,¹ and consequently, like superstition itself, much older than the Christian Church. Wherever Christianity has not yet penetrated, this particular kind of superstition takes the form of a distortion of Catholic teaching. For this reason it is a mistake to try to eradicate it by simply denying the existence of the devil and his kingdom. Only by propagating the undiluted truth concerning Satan and his work can this spiritual malady be overcome.

¹ Cfr. Döllinger, Heidentum und Judentum, pp. 181 sqq., 617 sqq.

n. ¶3.

The Catholic Church teaches: (1) that the evil spirits, like the angels, are entirely subject to God and can do nothing without His concurrence and permission; (2) that they can work no miracles, but by means of their superior insight and of a certain control over the powers of nature, are able to produce what seem to us extraordinary phenomena; (3) that they are, by themselves, incapable of producing any good effects, but, on the contrary, habitually practice falsehood and deception.²

² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 8; qu. 114; Cat. Rom., P. IV, c. 15.

n. ¶4.

From these truths it follows that it is superstitious and foolish to attribute exaggerated power to the evil spirits, to ascribe extraordinary happenings to them too readily, to invoke their help in order to injure others, and, in general, to attempt with the aid of the devil and his fallen angels to do things which transcend the order of nature.

n. ¶5.

b) The principal forms of this species of superstition are sorcery and witchcraft. These and other practices, by which disproportionate means are employed to procure a certain effect, are embraced by theologians in the technical term vana observantia.

α) Sorcery, in the broad sense (also called natural, artificial, or white magic), is defined as the art of working apparent wonders by the help of natural causes. In a stricter and more limited sense sorcery means the art of producing effects which, though not supernatural, exceed the powers of man and, consequently, can be wrought only by the help of the devil, explicitly or implicitly invoked for that purpose.³

³ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 264: “Magic broadly taken, or natural or artificial magic, which is called white magic, is the art of doing wonderful things, at least apparently, through natural causes or human skill without any ministry of a demon. Magic strictly so called is the art of doing wonderful things which, although they are not supernatural, nevertheless surpass the powers of man and consequently can be done only by the aid of a demon explicitly or implicitly invoked.”

n. ¶7.

There is only an accidental difference between these kinds of superstition and divination; for while divination uses disproportionate means to discover, by the help of the devil, what is hidden, witchcraft and magic employ disproportionate means to obtain certain and wonderful effects by the same agency. Morally, therefore, the two practices are equally reprehensible.

n. ¶8.

β) Witchcraft, like divination, may imply an express or a tacit compact with the devil. If the compact is express, it always involves mortal sin. If it is merely tacit, ignorance, good faith, or lack of confidence in the effect will frequently be a cause of leniency. Moreover, there must be ad- vertence to the total inadequacy of the means to produce the desired effect, and to the danger of diabolic intervention, otherwise there will be no sin of superstition.⁴

⁴ Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 221 sq.

n. ¶9.

Belief in malevolent witchcraft (maleficium) is based upon the idea that certain persons, especially of the female sex, in virtue of a formal compact with the devil, command diabolical powers, by means of which they can produce preternatural effects for the purpose of injuring their fellow-creatures.⁵

⁵ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 264: “Magic broadly taken, or magic involving the intervention of a demon, is distinguished into two kinds, namely, amatory and harmful. Amatory sorcery, or a philter, is a diabolical art by which lustful love or hatred toward another person is violently aroused in someone. Harmful sorcery is precisely the art of injuring one’s neighbor in various ways with the aid of a demon, for example, by diseases, dullness, etc. Harmful sorcery is commonly called sortilege, because through it an evil lot is cast upon those against whom vengeance is exercised by a diabolical operation. Hence in canon law and ecclesiastical history male and female magicians are called sorcerers.”—Ibid., n. 265: “Magic does not differ from vain observance except in that its effects are more wonderful, for example, the transformation of bodies, etc. It does not differ in moral species either from vain observance or from divination, because it matters little whether knowledge of hidden things or wonderful effects are sought from a demon. Harmful sorcery, however, differs in species from other superstitions because, besides the sin opposed to religion, it inflicts injury on one’s neighbor. Amatory sorcery does not necessarily induce one to commit a sin of lust; for it does not take away freedom but only violently excites lust toward some determined person by altering and more vividly arousing the imagination, presenting more beautiful appearances, and stirring the humors lustfully.”—Cfr. A. Stöckl, Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Vol. III, pp. 424 sqq., 450 sqq.

n. ¶10.

Though the possibility of a mystic union between man and Satan is admitted by Catholics, the epidemic occurrence of witchcraft and the persecution of alleged witches in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is not traceable to this theoretical belief, but finds its explanation, partly at least, in the religious, political, and social conditions of the time, in the introduction of narcotics and alcoholic liquors, and in the low state of theology and the natural sciences.⁶ We say, “partly at least,” because from the Catholic point of view there can be no doubt that the devil has a hand in exploiting the superstitions and prejudices of men.

⁶ See the works on witchcraft cited in the bibliography infra, p. 303.

n. ¶11.

“The possibility of human intercourse with Satan,” says Pohle, “cannot be denied in view of the many instances recorded, or assumed as true, in the New Testament. The medieval witch-baiters sinned grievously by exaggerating the power of the devil, by neglecting the most elementary principles of sound psychology, and by proceeding with unpardonable carelessness and inhuman cruelty in the trial of persons accused of witchcraft. No period of the world’s history is characterized by so many insane superstitions and such a radical want of common sense as the terrible time during which thousands of supposed witches were tried, tortured, and executed for practicing sorcery.⁷ Of course, the theological principle that there are demons, and that they have power to injure men in body and soul, is no more disproved by these medieval excesses than by the all too ready credence which in our own time thousands of well-meaning Catholics gave to the bogus revelations of Leo Taxil and his fictitious Diana Vaughan.”⁸

⁷ See J. Janssen, Geschichte des Deutschen Volkes seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters, Vol. VIII (English tr. by A. M. Christie, Vol. XVI).

⁸ Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 3rd ed., St. Louis 1919, pp. 348 sq.

n. ¶12.

It is pleasing to remember that the principal opponent of witchcraft was a Catholic and a Jesuit, the renowned Friedrich von Spee. He was born at Kaiserwerth on the Rhine, Feb. 25, 1591, and died at Treves, Aug. 7, 1635. His famous “Cautio Criminalis,” written in elegant Latin, is a powerful arraignment, based upon the author’s own awful experiences, of trial for witchcraft. The book was printed anonymously in 1631, although Spee was undoubtedly known to many as its author. He describes in thrilling language and with cutting sarcasm the horrible abuses in the prevailing legal proceedings, particularly the inhuman use of the rack, and demands measures of reform. Several generations passed before the persecution of witches ceased in Germany, the classic land of these outrages, but the “Cautio Criminalis” finally brought about its abolition in Mayence and a number of other places and led the way to its general suppression.⁹ Christian Thomasius († 1728), the leading opponent of witchcraft among the legal profession, confesses that it was the Jesuit theologian, Spee, who turned him against the inhuman practice of persecuting women as witches. The abuse was strongly defended by the famous jurist Benedict Carpzov († 1666), whose teaching was endorsed as late as twenty years after the death of Thomasius by the Protestant jurist Bechmann,¹⁰ of Saxony. Bechmann advocated the burning of “witches” even when no damage could be proved, and does not even mention Spee and Thomasius. In view of these facts it is unjust to blame the theologians for the survival of this barbarous superstition.¹¹

⁹ H. Cardauns in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 213 sq.; B. Diel and B. Duhr, S.J., Friedrich Spee, Freiburg 1901.

¹⁰ Discursus Iuridicus de Crimine Maleficii, Halle 1749.

¹¹ Cfr. B. Duhr, S.J., “Zur Biographie des P. Friedrich Spee,” in the Historisches Jahrbuch, 1905, pp. 327 sqq.

n. ¶14.

The Bull “Summis desiderantes affectibus,” of Pope Innocent VIII is not, as many older writers have asserted, responsible for the witch mania of the two succeeding centuries. Innocent may have personally believed in the actual existence of illicit intercourse between evil spirits and human beings; but he does not say so in his Bull. What he says is that he had heard such evil practices charged against witches in Germany; for example, intercourse with incubi and succubi.¹² To judge his attitude correctly, we must consider that, in the words of Fr. Thurston, S.J., “not only had an active campaign against most forms of sorcery already been going on for a long period [before the publication of the Bull “Summis desiderantes affectibus”] but in the matter of procedure, of punishments, of judges, etc., Innocent enacted nothing new. The direct purport of his Bull was simply to ratify the powers already conferred upon Henry Institoris and James Sprenger, inquisitors, to deal with persons of every class and with every form of crime (for example, with witchcraft as well as heresy), and it called upon the Bishop of Strasburg to lend the inquisitors all possible support.”¹³

γ) It may be advisable to add a few words on the so-called magic wand or divining rod, a forked twig, generally of witch-hazel or witch-elm, used to discover springs of water, mineral deposits, oil wells, etc. The rod is held by the tips, and the larger end is supposed to bend toward the earth when the spring or deposit is reached. The divining rod is sometimes used also to find lost articles and to detect criminals. This latter use is clearly illicit be- cause superstitious. To employ the rod for discovering water, oil, or mineral deposits is permissible only if all superstitious beliefs are excluded. There can scarcely be a doubt that the divining rod in the hands of some persons aids in the discovery of water, oil, and minerals. The reason for this has not yet been satisfactorily explained. Fr. Slater thinks that “particular individuals may be very sensitive to the presence of water or minerals, even when hidden under the surface of the earth,” and that a power of detecting the presence of underground water from the vegetation or other surface indications may be developed.¹⁴

¹² “Indeed, it has recently come to our hearing, not without immense distress, that in certain parts of Upper Germany . . . many persons of both sexes, forgetful of their own salvation and deviating from the Catholic faith, abuse themselves with incubi and succubi demons. . . .” (Bull, “Summis desiderantes affectibus,” 1484).—On incubi and succubi cfr. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. XV, c. 23; St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 51, art. 3, ad 6; St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 475 (ed. Gaudé, I, 697); J. Hansen, Zauberwahn, Inquisition und Hexenprozess, pp. 25 sqq., 185 sqq., Leipsic 1900.

¹³ Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XV, p. 676.

¹⁴ A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 220. Noldin says (Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. I, p. 172): “He will scarcely err who attributes the movement of the rod placed in the hand of a certain determined person to natural magnetic or electrical forces, which are contained more copiously in the bodies of certain persons, in the branches of certain trees (for example, peach trees), and in certain bodies (water, metals), provided the rod moves independently of the intention of the one using it, only toward certain bodies (water, metals), and always in an equal manner toward those bodies.”—A correspondent of the Scientific American (Vol. 108, No. 15) recently suggested an explanation of the modus operandi of the divining rod which was favorably received by a number of journals (cfr. the Catholic Fortnightly Review, Vol. XX, No. 9). It may be termed the theory of mental expectancy. The whole secret, this writer thinks, “is in the way the rod is held. Get a forked stick, with each limb about fifteen inches long, and small enough, so as to bend easily. Take a firm hold of both limbs, one in each hand, with the palm up, so the limbs will enter the hand under the little finger and go out under the thumb. Now begin to explore for water. My first experiment was to walk over a water pipe about six feet under ground. Just as I passed the pipe, the end of the stick rose in the air, came over toward me, and pointed down and back in the direction of the running water, but the pull was too strong to be accounted for by any action of the water. The rough knots would have cut the skin of my hand if I had not loosened my grip. I crossed the pipe repeatedly, always with the same result, until I tried it with my eyes closed, so as not to know when I passed the pipe. In this case it failed to work at all. I also found that when the stick is held in any other way, it will never move. Held in the way directed, the muscles of the hands and arms are in a strained position, and the limbs are bent outward, so that a very slight movement of the ends of the limbs will cause the end of the stick to move a long distance in either direction.” In the opinion of this writer the natural efforts of the muscles to relieve the strain, and the automatic action of the mind, account for the working of the divining rod. This theory is not quite satisfactory, but so much is certain that the effect of the virga divinatoria is nowadays commonly explained by natural powers and therefore St. Alphonsus’ condemnation of its use is no longer sustained by moralists. (Cfr. Ad. Tanqueray, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Pastor., Vol. II, Tournai 1905, p. 522; Revue du Monde Invisible, Paris, Oct. 15, 1898; Surbled, “Le Secret des Sorciers” in the Science Catholique, Paris, Sept. 1902).

n. ¶15.

The use of the divining rod in the belief that a stick of a particular shape, cut from a particular kind of tree or bush, will point out hidden treasures, or mines, or springs of water, is superstitious and sinful for the reason that “there is no natural force which acts in the arbitrary manner in which the divining rod is said to act under the circumstances.”¹⁵

¹⁵ Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology, I, 218 sq.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 2 passages

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. II, Q. I, Ch. III, Article III. On Divination

n. 512.

512. Moral malice. 1. Divination which is done with express invocation of a demon is a mortal sin in its whole genus.

The reason is that:

a) through it divine worship is rendered to the devil;

b) in this manner there is a most manifest commerce with the bitter enemy of God;

c) there easily arises a danger of apostasy and of other grave sins, indeed, even of eternal damnation; for just as association with angels is a certain beginning of eternal life, so commerce with the devil is a certain beginning of eternal damnation.

Divination through implicit invocation of a demon is indeed a mortal sin from its genus, because it is a certain commerce with the devil; nevertheless, it becomes a venial sin: a) from the ignorance and simplicity of the agent; b) from the jest and levity with which it is performed; c) from the fact that firm faith is not placed in those vain signs.

Therefore the faithful are indeed to be earnestly admonished not to approach diviners practicing chiromancy, sortilege, etc., but they are not so readily to be condemned as having committed a grave sin.⁷⁷⁴

⁷⁷⁴ Divination by cards (Kartenschlagen) can also be reduced to divinatory sortilege.

n. 513.

513. The specific malice of divination. Theologians indeed commonly teach that all diverse divinations, whether they are done by an explicit or implicit pact with the devil, are not distinguished specifically in the moral genus, because all are reduced to the worship of a false divinity; nevertheless, for two reasons it must be declared in confession whether the divination was done through an explicit pact with the devil or not: 1. because thus the confessor can judge more easily whether the sin committed was grave or not; for divination with an explicit pact with the devil is always a mortal sin, as has been said; 2. because with divination through the express invocation of the devil very many other sins are customarily joined, for example, blasphemy, sacrilege, abuse of sacred things, etc.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 10 passages

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Sect. C, Ch. I, Question Three: On Divination

n. ¶1.

S. Th. II-II, q. 95.

777. Divination and its various species. - Those who presume to foreknow and foretell future contingent things attribute to themselves something which is proper to God, and therefore they are called diviners, and their action divination (waarzeggerij). By extension this word designates every undue inquiry into hidden things by the help of a demon (a. 1).

It is twofold: 1. Express, which is made by expressly asking the intervention of a demon, and which is divided into various species according to the diverse modes by which he himself is consulted, or responds: prestige, if he appears under some sensible form; necromancy, if he responds through the dead, whom he falsely presents as present; pythonism, if through the living whom he invades; oracle, if through idols; haruspicy, if through the entrails of sacrificed animals; geomancy, hydromancy, aeromancy, pyromancy, if from signs in inanimate things; oneiromancy or divination of dreams, etc.

Tacit, which is made by seriously employing means which, unless a demon intervened, are wholly ineffective for the knowledge of hidden things, and thus by implicitly imploring his help. For he who employs means disproportionate and vain for naturally detecting a thing, by that very fact expects help from an intelligent being. But God or a good angel cannot approve these vain inquiries, nor do they involve themselves in them or furnish aid; but if the means is not valid for divine aid, by that very fact someone expects help from malign spirits, who willingly insert themselves into vain inquiries. Nor does it suffice to protest that he does not intend this; he acts against the protestation while he uses means disproportionate and otherwise ineffective. This is done in two ways:

a) Either by considering, for foreknowing future things, certain dispositions of things; as judicial astrology does, from the position or even motion of the stars; augury or auspice from the voices or motion of birds; chiromancy from the lines of the hands; physiognomy from the lines of the face; spatulamancy from the shoulder-blades of animals; omen from a chance occurrence, for example, meeting a funeral or human words said without intention which someone twists toward future things, etc.

b) Or by doing something and considering the action for knowing hidden things, and this is called divination by lots or sortilege (a. 3).

778. Divination is a mortal sin of superstition from its whole genus. - For the diviner, even if he acts without the mind of honoring a demon, in fact enters into a certain society with the enemy of God and ours, and implicitly subjects himself to him as teacher of truth (Lev. XX, 6, 27; Deut. XVIII, 10-12; Is. XXVIII, 15; Gal. IV, 10, 11). Whence divination is a sin.

It is a sin of superstition. For by divination divine worship is exhibited to a demon, since a) the hidden things which are investigated often are future free things or secrets of the heart, of which certain knowledge is proper to God; whence he who expects the manifestation of such things from a demon attributes to him a certain divine excellence;¹ b) even outside this case, because the demon, through society with men, intends to usurp something of the excellence of God and of the honor owed to Him by men; and therefore one consulting a demon consents to him and cooperates in the usurpation of divine excellence, and thus works superstitiously against religion (a. 2 and 4).

¹ It should be noted that demons cannot with certitude know future contingent things, nor even things wholly hidden, and especially the secrets of hearts, but nevertheless they know far more than men about future and other hidden things, for various reasons: 1. because the natural intellective power of spirits is much more perfect than the intellect of man; moreover this natural intellective power was not diminished in demons by sin; 2. because through the experience of ages they know sufficiently perfectly what is accustomed to happen in certain circumstances even from contingent causes; 3. because with wonderful speed they can pass from one place to another and transfer corporeal things, and thus predict effects from causes which they see placed in distant places; 4. because, God permitting, they can apply natural causes to effects, indeed also instigate free causes to producing certain effects, yet not with every kind of certitude.

Hence it is a grave sin from its whole genus: for that in a small matter a demon be summoned as friend is always gravely injurious to God.

Slater, Cases I, The First Commandment, Case 3. A Dangerous Advertisement · Slater, Cases I, The First Commandment, Case 4. The Divining Rod

Nevertheless, if it is done tacitly, in fact it will often be venial because of imperfection of the act, whether from ignorance and simplicity of the agent, or from play and levity by which it is performed rather than from serious intention, or from the fact that full faith is not employed.

Concina, Theologia Christiana III

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 14 passages

Diss. II, Chapter IV — What divination is, and how many its species are

n. I.

I. Marcus Tullius Cicero wrote two entire books on divination. At the very outset he describes it thus: "This opinion has already been common from the earliest ages, confirmed by the agreement of the Roman people and of all nations, that a certain divination exists among men" — that is, a foreknowledge and knowledge of future things. St. Thomas also devotes eight articles to this subject (II-II, q. 95), and gives the very same definition Cicero offers, saying that it consists in the foretelling of future things. Future things, he says, can be known beforehand in two ways: one, in their causes; the other, in themselves. Some causes are natural, producing their effects necessarily, such as the motions of the heavenly spheres and eclipses; others, though they do not produce their effects necessarily, nevertheless rarely fail to do so — as when the aspects and conjunctions of the stars bring on rain or drought. Now one who knows necessary causes can also know for certain the effects that necessarily follow from them. But one who knows causes that do not necessarily produce their effects, but only usually and rarely fail to, can foretell such things only by probable conjecture, not with certainty — in this way astrologers can foretell rain or drought from the observation of the stars, and physicians health or death. The effects of free causes, however, God alone knows; wherefore Isaiah (ch. 41) attributes the foreknowledge of future contingents to God alone: "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods."

n. II.

II. The foretelling of future things through divine revelation is called prophecy — "Divination is in the lips of the king; his mouth shall not err in judgment" (Prov. 16). The foretelling of future things by the power of natural causes is called natural divination. But that foreknowledge of the future which occurs neither through divine revelation, nor through the power of natural causes, but solely through the agency of a demon, is properly called "divination" in the species of superstition. Hence St. Thomas concludes that the term "divination" is nearly always taken in a bad sense. It is of this divination that we now speak, which is commonly defined by theologians, following St. Thomas (II-II, q. 95, art. 1), as "the foreknowledge of future things by the agency of a demon." It is called "foreknowledge" because it can be conveyed by words or by signs. The words "by the agency of a demon" are added so that it may be understood that one who seeks knowledge of future things from God, not from a demon, does not commit this fault. It is called "of future things" because it chiefly foretells what is to come, although it can also concern the past.

n. III.

III. Question I. What future things can demons foretell? Response: All those things that depend on natural causes — such as the conjunctions of the stars, the motions of the heavens, and the eclipses of the sun and moon — demons can foretell with certainty. Things that arise only contingently from natural causes — such as rains, droughts, plagues, storms, and the like — they can only conjecture probably. Things, however, that depend solely on the divine will, or on the free choice of men — such as the thoughts of the human heart, and future contingents — they cannot know at all, as St. Thomas teaches (I Part, q. 57, art. 3). Nevertheless, those demons who, by the sharpness of their intellect, grasp natural causes, and who penetrate men's native dispositions, temperaments, and inclinations, can foretell many things, even among those that proceed from men's free will. The order of freedom certainly lies beyond the bounds of natural causes, and escapes the grasp even of the subtlest demonic intellect; yet, on account of the connection between the order of free acts and the order of nature, demons can often foretell, through their own diviners, much that pertains to human freedom. They can likewise know future things through divine revelation. They can also foretell things happening in distant regions, on account of the speed of their movement. This much only can they teach their own diviners.

n. IV.

IV. Question II. In what manner do demons teach their diviners? Response: Demons instruct their diviners in many ways — sometimes by express words, making themselves visible to them; sometimes without any sensible appearance, uttering words in the air, or producing the same effect in sleep. Sometimes they instruct them through writings, or through the voice of animals. Diviners, for their part, prepare themselves to obtain such knowledge in various ways — now by burning incense, sometimes by offering sacrifices, now through signs and instruments, according to their various established conventions with the demons.

n. V.

V. Question III. Is a demon's assistance always invoked by an explicit pact? Response: This invocation is sometimes explicit and solemn, whereby diviners enter into a mutual contract with a demon, who appears to them in royal guise, as it were seated upon a throne. Here the diviners renounce the divine religion, the sacraments, and the other mysteries, and promise the demon worship, pledging themselves to fulfill his wishes — a sacrilegious pact which they are accustomed to seal with a document signed in their own blood. Sometimes they enter into the pact with this solemnity omitted, but the demon prescribes certain formulas by which he promises to lend them help and assistance — either way, this is called an explicit pact. But when someone seeks to know things that lie beyond the grasp of the human mind by means of various vain and unsuitable methods forbidden by God — even though he does not wish to be instructed by a demon's agency — the demon nonetheless insinuates himself uninvited into such vain observances and signs, beyond the man's own intention; and this is called an implicit pact. St. Thomas explains the whole matter in a few words (II-II, q. 95, art. 4): "The counsel or help of demons is sought either explicitly or implicitly; a demon insinuates himself secretly, beyond man's intention, in order to foretell certain future things unknown to men."

n. VI.

VI. St. Thomas (loc. cit.) further enumerates various species of this divination, in which an explicit pact with a demon is involved. I cannot express these species more clearly than by citing the Angelic Doctor's own words. "Demons, when invoked, are accustomed to foretell future things in many ways. Sometimes indeed, by certain apparitions, they present themselves expressly to men's sight or hearing, in order to foretell future things: and this species is called prestige [illusion], because men's eyes are thereby deceived." The bodies, however, which are presented to diviners in this way are not true human bodies possessing real flesh, as Cajetan explains most excellently in his commentary on this article. Such simulated bodies, he says, fall short of true bodies in two respects. First, in the very substance of the flesh: for the father of lies himself confessed, when his flesh, as if made of ice, was exposed to touch, that he could not truly fashion human flesh — since he cannot combine natural elements without true human generation so as to produce real human flesh; and by similar reasoning he cannot produce human semen, but only transfer it. And from this it is made most clear how true was Christ's saying after his Resurrection: "Handle, and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones," as a demon has not. Secondly, in the pleasure of touch and of intercourse: for the natural union of human persons is the more pleasurable, the more the real surpasses the merely apparent. Thus far Cajetan, with a few omissions. St. Thomas adds that the second species of divination is through dreams, and this is called the divination of dreams. The third species is through the apparition or speech of the dead, and this species is called necromancy. The fourth is that which foretells future things through living men, as through those possessed — and this is divination by "pythons," so called from the Pythian Apollo, who was said to be the author of divination. The fifth species of divination is when a demon makes use of signs or figures of inanimate bodies — wood, iron, or stone — to foretell the future; and this is called geomancy. If, however, he makes use of water, this is the sixth species, called hydromancy; if of air, there arises the seventh species, called aeromancy; if of fire, the eighth species, called pyromancy. The ninth, finally, is called haruspicy, when future things are foretold through signs appearing in the entrails of animals sacrificed to demons.

n. VII.

VII. Divination that occurs without an explicit invocation of a demon is divided into two kinds. The first is when, in order to foreknow future things, we consider something in the dispositions of certain things which have no power at all to produce such knowledge; this kind of divination contains six species under it. The first is genethlialogy, which pertains to the astrologers called "genethliac," when they foretell men's fates, and what is to come to them, from the motion of the stars at their birth. The second is augury, which is done from the chattering of birds. The third is auspice, in which future things are foretold from the flight of birds, or the movement of other animals. The fourth is called omen, which is a prediction drawn from words uttered by men without any such intention. The fifth is chiromancy, from the lines of the hands. The sixth, finally, is called scapulimancy, when divination is made from certain signs appearing on the shoulder-blade of some animal.

n. VIII.

VIII. To the second kind of divination belongs that in which future things are foretold from the consideration of things which men seriously undertake in order to inquire into something hidden, without any express invocation of a demon. If future events are foretold from the drawing of points or marks, this is called geomancy, and is the first species. The other is called sortilege (casting of lots), when future things are investigated either by considering the figures that arise from molten lead cast into water; or from certain slips, written or unwritten, hidden away, and it is observed which one each person draws; or by observing who draws the greater or lesser number, whether by the casting of uneven sticks, or by the throwing of dice; or finally, when, upon reflection, it is determined which page of a book will fall open when one considers what is to be revealed. All these go by the name of "lots."

n. IX.

IX. St. Thomas concludes this matter in almost these very words (loc. cit.): "There is a threefold kind of divination: the first is through the manifest invocation of demons, which pertains to necromancers; the second is through the mere consideration of the disposition or movement of some other thing, which pertains to augurs; the third is when we do something ourselves so that something hidden may be made manifest to us, which pertains to lots. Under each of these, however, many further kinds are contained, as is clear from what has been said."

n. X.

X. Question IV. Are all the aforesaid species of divination morally distinct, such that they must be explained individually in confession? Response: From what has been said, the answer is clear. St. Thomas reduces divination to three genera: namely, to necromancy, augury, and lot-casting. That not all the recognized species of divination are morally distinct is established by the fact that, in whatever manner divinations are carried out — whether by the use of the stars, of fire, of water, or of dreams — they are opposed, in the same way, to the worship owed to God and to the end of religion. This diversity, then, is a material, not a moral, one — provided we are speaking of all the species enumerated together.

n. XI.

XI. Question V. Does divination carried out by an explicit pact with a demon differ, in moral species, from that carried out by a tacit pact? Response: The more common opinion teaches that these divinations do not differ in moral species, since a tacit and an explicit pact do not differ in kind. From this not a few draw the conclusion that the circumstance of an explicit pact need not be disclosed in confession, since aggravating circumstances need not necessarily be specified. But — setting aside the more rigorous discussion of the strict specific moral difference — I hold that a pact explicitly entered into with a demon must indeed be disclosed [in confession]... This explicit agreement and solemn compact, mutually struck between man and demon, betrays a malice so distinct from that of a merely tacit pact that even common sense itself perceives it. I therefore cannot agree with the opinion of the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 11, punct. 3, §2, n. 45), who, with others, teach that this explicit pact need not necessarily be disclosed in confession in every case, since it is merely an aggravating circumstance. First, even if it were merely an aggravating circumstance, it would not follow, on the opinion I hold more probable, that it may be passed over in silence in confession. Second, it is by no means so well established that these two pacts do not differ in moral species that one could conclude, without qualification, that such a difference need not be disclosed in confession. Indeed, St. Thomas himself, in the words cited above (n. 9), seems to indicate a specific, not merely a physical, distinction; for he adds there: "In all these it is graver to invoke a demon expressly than to do something by which one exposes oneself to becoming the object of such [demonic] insinuation, whatever it may bring." The theologians of Salamanca reply that the Angelic Doctor is speaking of a physical, not a moral, diversity here — a claim so patently absurd that no one fails to see it, since St. Thomas is not discussing physical controversies here, but moral theology. They add that this must be understood of a greater malice within the same species — but this response seems no better than the last. The Angelic Doctor plainly says that the reason for sinning is not the same; therefore, if the reason for sinning is not the same, the formal grounds of sinning are different, and therefore there is a specific moral distinction here, and not merely a material one — which always falls under the same formal ground, whichever way one turns it. It should be added, moreover, that whether or not there is a specific distinction, when a confessor hears of an express and solemn pact, he necessarily forms an altogether different, and more severe, judgment of the penitent. It matters little, say the theologians of Salamanca, whether this judgment is distinct. To this I answer that their response misses the truth by a great deal, not a little. This difference in judgment is given great weight by Sánchez, Castropalao, and very many other Probabilists themselves.

n. XII.

XII. Even the theologians of Salamanca themselves, however, along with other theologians, admit that this explicit pact must in practice be disclosed to the confessor — on the grounds that other sins commonly accompany such a pact: for there arises a grave danger of pernicious deception, both of the one who invokes the demon and of others, thus exposing oneself to grave danger of deception, whether of oneself or of others — a grave malice against charity. Likewise, the crime of idolatry is frequently committed in the express invocation of a demon, on account of the worship offered him. Heresy, too, is often contracted, whether by placing a certain trust in the demon, or by denying the true faith, religion, and the sacraments; and it not infrequently happens that an abuse of sacred things occurs in this invocation. On account of these crimes — of which at least one nearly always accompanies an explicit pact — all agree that such a pact must be disclosed in confession. I would add, following the more probable opinion, that this explicit pact must be disclosed in confession absolutely, even apart from these other crimes.

n. XIII.

XIII. Question VI. Is it a mortal crime to divine by a pact, whether explicit or tacit? Response: The affirmative opinion is certain among all, and is clearly gathered both from Deuteronomy 18 — "Let there not be found among you anyone who consults soothsayers, or seeks oracles from spirits" — and from Isaiah 28: "You have said: We have entered into a covenant with death, and with hell we have made a pact." All likewise affirm that no invincible ignorance of an explicit pact can ever exist. For who could be ignorant that entering a covenant with the enemy [of mankind] is treacherous betrayal and monstrous treason? That invincible ignorance of a tacit pact can occur, several affirm; nor do I myself deny it — though I say this happens very rarely, especially once one has heard the aforesaid warnings. What, then, of those who make use of lots, of numerical calculations (commonly called "cabala"), and other such unsuitable means of divining the future, without any superstitious intention, indeed expressly professing that they place no faith in such vain signs? The theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit., n. 33), together with Sánchez, Bonacina, Navarro, De Lugo, and others, teach that these are excused from mortal sin when they do this once or twice. I myself would not dare to condemn them of mortal fault either. But what of those who indulge frequently in such nonsense with these vain signs? Let them consider, then, what danger they expose themselves to who indulge in such things not once or twice, but rather often, out of a certain vain and dangerous curiosity. What sort of speech is it, then, that requires the formula "once" or "twice" for the graver fault? Whoever plays at such games even once sins venially, all the surrounding circumstances lurking beneath. Why, then, should no one consider them safe from mortal guilt? What is it, then, that they ought not do, so that they might withdraw themselves from a certain light fault, and from the danger of a graver one?

n. XIV.

XIV. Theologians commonly also teach that one must abstain from that pact whereby two people agree that whichever of them dies first will appear to the survivor and reveal to him the state of his soul's salvation. For although this pact, entered into with due submission to the divine will, is absolutely lawful in itself, yet on account of the danger of illusion — since a demon, aware of this pact, could deceive the survivor — it is more advisable to restrain such useless curiosity.

Concina, Compendium

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 1 passage

Bk. III, Diss. VIII, Chapter I — The definition and division of superstition. Various cases in which superstition creeps in are explained

n. XI.

XI. Divination with a pact, whether express or tacit, is a mortal sin, as all teach. What must be said of those who set up computations of numbers and verses, and practice what is commonly called the Cabala in games, that they may divine future numbers? That these sin mortally when, with faith placed in it, they practice this Cabala, no one can deny.

Slater, Cases I

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 10 passages

Slater, Cases I, The First Commandment, Case 3. A Dangerous Advertisement

n. ¶5.

Solution

What is divination and wherein lies its malice?

Divination is the express or tacit invocation of the devil to gain knowledge of the occult. We obtain knowledge lawfully by using natural means or by studying the revelation given by God. If we try to obtain knowledge of occult matters from the devil, we commit sin by associating ourselves with the enemy of God and of ourselves, an enemy who is certain to do us harm, and to whom we offer a sort of worship by attributing to him knowledge of the occult. Such communication with the devil is specially prohibited in Holy Scripture.¹ By the very fact of employing means which are altogether incapable of themselves to give us the knowledge which we seek, we invite the intervention of the devil and tacitly invoke him.

1 1 Cor. x. 20; Deut. xviii. 10.

Slater, Cases I, The First Commandment, Case 4. The Divining Rod

n. ¶1.

Caius, a Catholic, cultivated fairly extensive lands, which, however, did not abound in water. When he heard that Marcus had rather often found water for others by means of a divining rod, Caius consulted his confessor as to whether it was lawful to hire Marcus to find water for him on his land. Hence it is asked:

n. ¶2.

What is divination, and whence is it unlawful?

n. ¶3.

Can it be proved with sufficient certainty that water does not naturally bend the divining rod?

n. ¶4.

What is to be said of the case?

n. ¶5.

Solution

This question is answered in “Manual of Moral Theology,” vol. i, p. 217.