Duties of Electors and Deputies

311. Deputies can be elected to the assemblies of the kingdom or of the province or of the municipality. Indeed these things apply to all, proportion having been preserved, but chiefly to deputies to the assemblies of the kingdom, to whom belongs the power of making laws. In like manner it makes no difference whether the government is liberal or Catholic, provided it is legitimate.

Their obligations. 1. Deputies legitimately elected are bound from legal justice to accept this office, unless they are excused on account of grave inconvenience, provided they are suitable.

a. Therefore those who on account of defect of knowledge or prudence or probity are unfit for this office can neither seek nor accept the office of deputy without sin, because they expose themselves to the danger of inflicting grave damage upon the republic.

b. Suitable persons not accepting the office without just cause sin against legal justice: for although the damages which by accepting the office they could have impeded, but did not impede, can be imputed to them, nevertheless they are not guilty of violated commutative justice but of legal justice.

2. They are bound to have sufficient knowledge so that they can rightly discharge their office, namely without danger of inflicting damage upon the republic or of approving wicked laws and decisions.

a. Therefore they ought to know wherein consists the end and true good of the republic, what the rights of the Catholic Church are, what the relation between the Church and civil society is, and what the obligations of civil society toward the Church are.

b. Before the exercise of the office in individual sessions, they are bound by study and by taking counsel to render themselves fit for handling the affairs which will be proposed in the assemblies, or at least to seek a suitable guide whom they can follow with a safe conscience.

3. Of themselves they are bound to be present at sessions and to cast a vote for the common good.

a. They are excused: alpha. if notable damage is not to be feared from their absence; beta. if by attending they would have to undergo grave inconvenience; gamma. if they foresee that their presence and vote will be of no utility.

b. Therefore they ought to beware: alpha. lest led by vain respect toward the ministers of the kingdom or pursuing private advantages they cast a wicked vote; beta. lest they prefer the advantages of the nation to the common good.

c. Since by office they are bound to impede damages to the republic, they violate commutative justice if by a positively evil vote they are the cause on account of which damage follows.

4. If a law certainly wicked or unjust is proposed, they ought either to abstain from casting a vote or, if there is hope of fruit, to cast a vote for the contrary side. For since in modern assemblies of the kingdom deputies are held as true legislators, laws are attributed to them as to their true causes; for a law proceeds from votes as from so many particular causes.

Therefore if they make a wicked law, they not only sin by consenting to an evil matter, but where damage is inflicted upon others through the law, they are also bound to restitution, provided the vote was certainly efficacious for the effect of the law.

¹ Deputies are to be elected either to the assemblies of the kingdom or to the assemblies of the province and municipality; but the obligations which refer to electors are the same in each case, proportion being preserved. Likewise it makes no difference whether the government is Catholic or non-Catholic or liberal, provided it is licit to use the faculty of electing. The obligation of those who have the right of electing is twofold: of concurring in the election and of electing a suitable deputy.

¹ Vict. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie^4, II, p. 674 ff.; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 799 s.; Villada, Casus conscientiae^3 (Bruxellis: Vromant, 1885), I, p. 139 ss.; Genicot, I, n. 359; Vermeersch, Quaestiones de iustitia^2 (Brugis: Beyaert, 1904), n. 85-96; Waffelaert, De virtutibus cardinalibus (Brugis: Beyaert, 1886), III, n. 406-413; Leo XIII, encyclical Sapientiae Christianae, 10 Jan. 1890.

323. On the obligation of electing. Individual citizens are bound from legal justice to use the faculty of electing where the use of this faculty is necessary or useful for promoting a good election or impeding an evil one, unless they are legitimately excused; for everyone is bound, as much as is in him, to promote the necessary or useful good of the community and to forestall damages to the republic.

a. The right of electing does not belong to citizens by force of a function or office. Therefore one who does not use his right where he is bound to use it does not act against commutative justice, and hence he is not bound of himself to repair the damages which have arisen from that neglect. The right of electing ought rather to be considered as a privilege granted by the ruler to those for whom certain conditions are verified. Therefore from the faculty of electing granted to citizens there does not by that very fact also arise the obligation of concurring in the election, since of himself no one is bound to use a privilege. This obligation arises either from the obligation of contributing to the common good or from civil law, if somewhere citizens are commanded to concur in elections; but this obligation is an obligation of legal justice. Therefore those exercising the right of electing contribute from legal justice to the common good; but there exists no obligation of contributing to the common good unless necessity or utility demands it.

b. A legitimate excuse from the obligation of concurring in an election must be admitted if concurrence brings great inconvenience, because affirmative laws do not oblige with so great an inconvenience. But loss of time or labor necessary for this is not such an inconvenience, nor the mockery or insult of the malicious, but only grave damage or great expense or notable vexation and things of this sort.

c. The obligation of electing, especially if it is commanded by law, must be called grave or light according to the measure of the good which can be promoted, or of the evil which can be averted from the community. Now all agree that in our time the good both of the Church and of the republic depends much upon elections; wherefore a grave obligation of concurring in elections can exist. But in particular it must be noted: alpha. if two candidates are to be elected, of whom one is good, the other evil, or one more evil, the other less evil, there exists an obligation of concurring as long as it can prudently be hoped that the good or less evil one will be elected; beta. if someone can prudently hope that by his concurrence in the election several others will be drawn to electing, and thus an evil election be impeded, for him there exists a grave obligation of electing.

Note. A Catholic and upright man in certain circumstances can be bound under grave obligation to offer himself as a candidate for public office and to accept election to magistracy or to deputy, whether of the province or of the kingdom, namely: a. if his election is certain; b. if he can impede grave common damages; c. if he can hold public office without truly grave inconvenience; d. if there is no other who may equally benefit the common good.

324. On the obligation of electing a worthy man. There indeed exists no obligation of electing the more worthy; but anyone is bound under grave obligation to elect a suitable man if grave damage can be foreseen from the election of an unworthy man. The reason for the first is that nowhere is it prescribed that superiors be the best, but that they be apt and suitable. The reason for the second is: a. because electors of themselves are judged to approve the principles and actions of those whom they elect; b. because those knowingly electing an unsuitable man cooperate in all the evils which the elected man inflicts upon the republic or the Church; c. because they are a scandal to others.

alpha. A candidate must be called unsuitable both if from defect of knowledge, prudence, or experience he is unequal to his office, and especially if he is hostile to the Catholic religion. Wherefore, so that a Catholic man can be held truly suitable, he ought to be one who not only shines by praise of ability and prudence, but also discharges his office according to Catholic principles.

beta. Those who knowingly elect a candidate hostile to Catholic principles, such as liberals and socialists are, and intend to help him so that he may attain his evil ends, sin gravely, even if otherwise he displays skill; for they formally cooperate in evil.

gamma. This also holds concerning elections to provincial assemblies, indeed even municipal ones. Therefore those are deceived who think that men not plainly Catholic, elected to magistracies, do not harm cities, provided they are suitable for managing affairs; for magistrates who are hostile to the Church can harm a city very greatly, because in the education of youth they follow false and impious principles, do not impede scandals and crimes, etc.

325. On the election of an unworthy man. Sometimes it is licit to elect an unworthy man. The cases in which it can happen that an evil man is licitly elected are these:

a. If without very grave inconvenience, for example, loss of office, no one can be elected except an evil man.

In this case the elector can abstain from election even in those circumstances in which election is prescribed to others under grave obligation; for an affirmative law does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. But if he can neither abstain without incurring great evils nor cast a good vote without being discovered, it is licit for him to elect the unworthy candidate, because cooperation in the evil election is only material. For by his action to effect that someone receive the office of deputy is not evil, even if it is established that he will abuse this office to inflict evils; nor does election necessarily involve approval of the principles and actions of an evil deputy.

b. If an evil man must be elected to impede the election of a worse man.

If it happens that electors are given only the option between two candidates who are both evil, of whom one, however, is less unworthy, the other more unworthy, of themselves they ought to abstain from election. Yet if by casting votes they can effect that, the more unworthy being rejected, the less evil one be elected, it is licit to concur; for it is licit to cooperate by an indifferent action in a lesser evil so that a greater evil may be impeded. Some affirm and others deny that electors in this case are also bound to concur.

c. If it can rightly and deservedly be hoped that from the election of an evil man great utility will come to the city, province, or republic.

d. If there is no hope that a list composed of good men will be elected unless evil men who are contained in the same list are also elected.

I. Electors are bound to use the right of electing as follows:

1. The obligation of electing is grave: 1. if there is hope through one's own election of bringing it about that there will be present a number of good deputies sufficient for establishing good laws or at least for warding off harmful ones; in other words, at least in practice, that there will be present a number of good deputies greater than, or at least as great as, the number of wicked deputies; 2. if there is hope through one's own election of warding off a deputy who by his influence will notably harm the common good; 3. if it is of great importance that it be signified how many electors favor right principles, for example if from the number of votes the boldness of adversaries will be diminished.

2. Outside the aforesaid cases the obligation of electing is everywhere light, either because there is hope of increasing the number of good deputies, or because at least it is of interest that it be signified how many men oppose wicked principles. A just cause excuses from a light obligation. I said everywhere; for:

3. If neither of the enumerated causes is present, there is no obligation of using one's right, unless perhaps from a law which obliges at most under light sin, and which is satisfied by a blank ballot dropped into the urn. If the election is only between two wicked candidates, and the worse will certainly be warded off without the cooperation of Catholics, per se one should abstain from the election.

Corollary I. He who elects an unworthy deputy:

a) Sins gravely: 1. if he is led by a wicked end, for example because he approves wicked principles; 2. if it is to be feared that by electing an unworthy one he brings it about that the number of good deputies sufficient for establishing good laws, or at least for warding off wicked laws, will be lacking; 3. if it is to be feared that by electing he is the cause why a deputy is elected who by his influence will notably harm the common good.

b) Does not sin if he acts thus so that a greater evil may be forestalled, for example so that a worse candidate may be warded off.

c) Outside the aforesaid cases, he sins at least lightly.

Corollary II. He who abstains from an election is not bound to restitution of the damages that followed, because he is not bound by commutative justice to use the right of electing. There is a dispute about one who has voted illicitly; but the obligation of making restitution is denied with sufficient probability, because electors are rather the occasion than the cause of the damage, nor is it sufficiently proved that there belongs to the community a strict right that an unworthy candidate not be elected.

II. Deputies are bound to promote the common good, especially by establishing good laws and warding off harmful ones. Moreover, they sin gravely: 1. whenever they vote for a law intrinsically evil; 2. when, either by abstaining or by voting, they are the cause why a gravely harmful law, even though not intrinsically evil, is established, unless this is done so that a more harmful law may be warded off.

Corollary I. Deputies who, either by abstaining from voting or by giving a vote, have been the cause why a harmful law was established, are bound to restitution, because by reason of their office, to which remuneration is joined, and therefore from commutative justice, they must, if they can, promote the common good and ward off evil.

Corollary II. The things said about electors and deputies have greatest force concerning electors of legislative assemblies and concerning deputies to the aforesaid assemblies; nevertheless they can also be applied to electors of administrative assemblies, for example of a province or municipality, and to deputies to the said assemblies.

The Duty of Exercising the Electoral Franchise.—(a) There is a grave duty of using the privilege granted to citizens of voting in public elections, and especially primaries; for the welfare of the community and the moral, intellectual and physical good of individuals depend on the kind of men who are nominated or chosen to rule, and on the ticket platforms voted for. Hence, those who neglect to vote cooperate negatively with a serious harm (viz., evil in power), or at least with public unconcern about public matters—for example, those who neglect through laziness or indifference to condemn by their vote. A grave inconvenience (e.g., sickness, ostracism, exile, persecution), but not a slight inconvenience (such as loss of time, trouble, ridicule), excuses from the duty; for an affirmative law has exceptions. Neither is there an obligation to vote when an election is a mere formality, as when there is but one candidate or party.

(b) The duty is not one of commutative justice, as the ballot is either a privilege, or a thing commanded by authority, but not a service to which the citizen has bound himself by contract or office. The obligation is, therefore, one of legal justice, arising from the fact that the common weal is everybody’s business and responsibility, especially in a republic. Hence, representatives of the people who by abstention from voting cause a serious damage which they were bound ex officio to prevent, are guilty of commutative injustice and are held to restitution; but a citizen who stays away from the polls sins, and perhaps gravely, against legal justice, though there is no duty of restitution for the damages that result. Moreover, in a general election the vote of one citizen is usually not of decisive influence, and citizens do not make themselves responsible for all the acts of their representatives.

Manner of Voting.—(a) Object.—It is not necessary to vote for the best candidate, provided one votes for a person who is fitted by character, ability, record, experience, etc. for the office, and gives indications, not merely promises, that he will serve the community well. But in certain ecclesiastical elections the voters must take oath beforehand to vote, not only for a worthy candidate, but also for the person whom they honestly think, all things considered, most worthy. In minor offices (such as constable or town clerk) it suffices that the candidate be known as conscientious; but in major offices (such as President, governor, congressman, legislator, or judge) the party principles for which he stands have to be considered chiefly. Per accidens, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate when this is necessary to prevent a greater evil, as when the opposing candidate is much worse, or a good ticket cannot be elected unless some less worthy candidates are included.

(b) Purpose.—The end which the voter should have in mind is the good of the public, and hence it is not right to vote for candidates solely or chiefly because they are personal friends, members of one’s own race, organization or religion, or because one wishes to gain favor or escape enmity.

(c) Circumstances.—The voter must avoid all that is contrary to natural law (e.g., selling of votes, repeating, stuffing ballot boxes) or positive law (e.g., state laws require not only citizenship and a period of previous residence, but also other conditions such as registration and freedom from bribery and other election crimes). The opinion that politics is necessarily corrupt, and that all is fair that helps to win, is a false and pernicious doctrine. The conditions for ecclesiastical elections are given in Canons 160 sqq.

Obligation to Seek Office.—A worthy man should run for office in the following case: (a) when the public good calls for his candidacy (e.g., when his election or candidacy will avert serious evils, and there is no one else so available); and (b) there is no grave impediment to his candidacy (such as supremely important private affairs or ill-health that makes it impossible to run).

195. Since all are bound to love their own fatherland, all are also bound, as far as lies in them, both to promote the common good of the fatherland and to avert common damage from it. Since this, in the present regime of society, depends especially on good deputies elected to national, provincial, and municipal assemblies, all who have such a faculty from the law are bound, by reason of the common good and consequently from legal justice, to concur in the election of these deputies, unless they are legitimately excused, and to elect fit deputies. Unless they are legitimately excused; the matter is per se grave, and consequently only a cause of grave damage to be undergone can per se excuse. Per se; for in practice various circumstances must be attended to, from which the obligation can be grave or light, or even all obligation can be absent. But this obligation, when it is present, is not from commutative justice, but only from legal justice, and consequently, if it is not fulfilled, no obligation of repairing damage arises from it.

196. Indeed there is an obligation of electing a worthy man, not the more worthy; but a grave obligation is present of electing a worthy man, with an unworthy man passed over, from whose election grave damage of society can be feared. There is indeed no precept of electing the more worthy, but there is a precept of not electing an unworthy man; for by electing him someone cooperates by his own votes in the damage to be brought by him, besides the scandal which by his depraved example he furnishes to others. Yet the election of an unworthy man is not always forbidden. It is lawful if someone otherwise would undergo very grave damage, for that election is not intrinsically evil. For to receive the office of deputy is not something intrinsically evil; and cooperation in the abuse of such an office is material and remote. Likewise it is lawful if an unworthy man is elected in order to remove another worse and worst man from that office. Cooperation is then had to impede a greater evil. And consequently it will also be lawful if a worthy man cannot be elected unless an unworthy man is elected together with him. Likewise it is lawful if it is hoped that the unworthy man will profit more than he will harm.

197. "It is of interest to public safety to contribute work wisely to the administration of urban matters; and in it especially to study and effect that provision be made publicly for forming adolescents to religion and to upright morals, in that way in which it is fitting for Christians; on these things greatly depends the safety of individual commonwealths. Likewise, for the work of Catholic men to run farther from this narrower field and embrace the very sum of the commonwealth is generally useful and honest. We say generally for this reason, that these our precepts touch all nations. But it can happen somewhere that, for greatest and just causes, it is by no means expedient to undertake the commonwealth and to be occupied in political offices. But generally, as we have said, to will to touch no part of public affairs would be as much in fault as to bring no zeal, no work, to the common utility; and this the more because Catholic men are impelled, by the admonition of the very doctrine which they profess, to conduct the matter integrally and from faith. On the contrary, if they are idle, those will easily receive the reins whose opinions bring by no means a great hope of safety. And this would also be joined with harm to the Christian name, because those who are badly disposed toward the Church would have very much power, and those who are well disposed, very little. Wherefore it is evident that Catholics have a just cause of approaching the commonwealth; for they do not approach, nor ought they to approach, for this cause, that they approve what is not honest at this time in the systems of public affairs, but that they may transfer these very systems, as far as can be done, to the public good, having their mind sincerely and truly destined to introduce the wisdom and virtue of the Catholic religion, as the most healthful juice and blood, into all the veins of the commonwealth." Leo XIII, encyclical letter Immortale Dei, Nov. 1, 1885.

198. Deputies legitimately elected, and truly fit, by reason of the common good, from legal justice, are bound to accept the office brought to them, unless they are excused by a grave and just cause. But Deputies and Senators, since a certain part of public rule has truly been committed to them, not only ought they not to consent to depraved laws to be borne to the damage of religion and to the damage of the public good, but they are also bound to impede them by their presence and by their vote. Therefore it is not lawful for them to vote for depraved laws of this kind, nor is it lawful for them to be absent. And if by culpable absence they are the cause why depraved laws are made to public damage, they are guilty both of violated legal justice, by which they are bound to promote the public good by the special reason of their office, and of violated commutative justice, from a quasi-pact with their electors.

As regards the election of Deputies, the things which St. Thomas has from St. Augustine, 1.2, q. 97, a. 1, pertain to the matter: "If a people is well moderated and grave, and a most diligent guardian of the common utility, a law is rightly borne by which it is lawful for such a people to create magistrates for itself through whom the commonwealth is administered. But if little by little the same people, depraved, has a saleable vote, and commits rule to disgraceful and criminal men, rightly is taken away from the people such power of giving honors."

199. Is it ever lawful not to obey temporal authority? - Laws unjust by contrariety to human good do not oblige in the forum of conscience. Laws unjust by contrariety to divine good it is in no way lawful to observe. St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 96, a. 4. But in those things which are lawful and which pertain to civil power, obedience must be given to civil Princes, even difficult ones, and also to those who abuse their authority. From these most pure sources, namely Scripture and Tradition, says Gregory XVI in the Brief of June 9, 1832, we are most openly taught that obedience which men are bound to furnish to powers constituted by God is an absolute precept, which no one can oppose. - Pius VI, Brief Pastoralis, July 5, 1796; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 102, a. 1; q. 104, a. 5, 6.