Article Sixth. On the Obligation of Electing Deputies

¹ Deputies are to be elected either to the assemblies of the kingdom or to the assemblies of the province and municipality; but the obligations which refer to electors are the same in each case, proportion being preserved. Likewise it makes no difference whether the government is Catholic or non-Catholic or liberal, provided it is licit to use the faculty of electing. The obligation of those who have the right of electing is twofold: of concurring in the election and of electing a suitable deputy.

¹ Vict. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie^4, II, p. 674 ff.; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 799 s.; Villada, Casus conscientiae^3 (Bruxellis: Vromant, 1885), I, p. 139 ss.; Genicot, I, n. 359; Vermeersch, Quaestiones de iustitia^2 (Brugis: Beyaert, 1904), n. 85-96; Waffelaert, De virtutibus cardinalibus (Brugis: Beyaert, 1886), III, n. 406-413; Leo XIII, encyclical Sapientiae Christianae, 10 Jan. 1890.

323. On the obligation of electing. Individual citizens are bound from legal justice to use the faculty of electing where the use of this faculty is necessary or useful for promoting a good election or impeding an evil one, unless they are legitimately excused; for everyone is bound, as much as is in him, to promote the necessary or useful good of the community and to forestall damages to the republic.

a. The right of electing does not belong to citizens by force of a function or office. Therefore one who does not use his right where he is bound to use it does not act against commutative justice, and hence he is not bound of himself to repair the damages which have arisen from that neglect. The right of electing ought rather to be considered as a privilege granted by the ruler to those for whom certain conditions are verified. Therefore from the faculty of electing granted to citizens there does not by that very fact also arise the obligation of concurring in the election, since of himself no one is bound to use a privilege. This obligation arises either from the obligation of contributing to the common good or from civil law, if somewhere citizens are commanded to concur in elections; but this obligation is an obligation of legal justice. Therefore those exercising the right of electing contribute from legal justice to the common good; but there exists no obligation of contributing to the common good unless necessity or utility demands it.

b. A legitimate excuse from the obligation of concurring in an election must be admitted if concurrence brings great inconvenience, because affirmative laws do not oblige with so great an inconvenience. But loss of time or labor necessary for this is not such an inconvenience, nor the mockery or insult of the malicious, but only grave damage or great expense or notable vexation and things of this sort.

c. The obligation of electing, especially if it is commanded by law, must be called grave or light according to the measure of the good which can be promoted, or of the evil which can be averted from the community. Now all agree that in our time the good both of the Church and of the republic depends much upon elections; wherefore a grave obligation of concurring in elections can exist. But in particular it must be noted: alpha. if two candidates are to be elected, of whom one is good, the other evil, or one more evil, the other less evil, there exists an obligation of concurring as long as it can prudently be hoped that the good or less evil one will be elected; beta. if someone can prudently hope that by his concurrence in the election several others will be drawn to electing, and thus an evil election be impeded, for him there exists a grave obligation of electing.

Note. A Catholic and upright man in certain circumstances can be bound under grave obligation to offer himself as a candidate for public office and to accept election to magistracy or to deputy, whether of the province or of the kingdom, namely: a. if his election is certain; b. if he can impede grave common damages; c. if he can hold public office without truly grave inconvenience; d. if there is no other who may equally benefit the common good.

324. On the obligation of electing a worthy man. There indeed exists no obligation of electing the more worthy; but anyone is bound under grave obligation to elect a suitable man if grave damage can be foreseen from the election of an unworthy man. The reason for the first is that nowhere is it prescribed that superiors be the best, but that they be apt and suitable. The reason for the second is: a. because electors of themselves are judged to approve the principles and actions of those whom they elect; b. because those knowingly electing an unsuitable man cooperate in all the evils which the elected man inflicts upon the republic or the Church; c. because they are a scandal to others.

alpha. A candidate must be called unsuitable both if from defect of knowledge, prudence, or experience he is unequal to his office, and especially if he is hostile to the Catholic religion. Wherefore, so that a Catholic man can be held truly suitable, he ought to be one who not only shines by praise of ability and prudence, but also discharges his office according to Catholic principles.

beta. Those who knowingly elect a candidate hostile to Catholic principles, such as liberals and socialists are, and intend to help him so that he may attain his evil ends, sin gravely, even if otherwise he displays skill; for they formally cooperate in evil.

gamma. This also holds concerning elections to provincial assemblies, indeed even municipal ones. Therefore those are deceived who think that men not plainly Catholic, elected to magistracies, do not harm cities, provided they are suitable for managing affairs; for magistrates who are hostile to the Church can harm a city very greatly, because in the education of youth they follow false and impious principles, do not impede scandals and crimes, etc.

325. On the election of an unworthy man. Sometimes it is licit to elect an unworthy man. The cases in which it can happen that an evil man is licitly elected are these:

a. If without very grave inconvenience, for example, loss of office, no one can be elected except an evil man.

In this case the elector can abstain from election even in those circumstances in which election is prescribed to others under grave obligation; for an affirmative law does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. But if he can neither abstain without incurring great evils nor cast a good vote without being discovered, it is licit for him to elect the unworthy candidate, because cooperation in the evil election is only material. For by his action to effect that someone receive the office of deputy is not evil, even if it is established that he will abuse this office to inflict evils; nor does election necessarily involve approval of the principles and actions of an evil deputy.

b. If an evil man must be elected to impede the election of a worse man.

If it happens that electors are given only the option between two candidates who are both evil, of whom one, however, is less unworthy, the other more unworthy, of themselves they ought to abstain from election. Yet if by casting votes they can effect that, the more unworthy being rejected, the less evil one be elected, it is licit to concur; for it is licit to cooperate by an indifferent action in a lesser evil so that a greater evil may be impeded. Some affirm and others deny that electors in this case are also bound to concur.

c. If it can rightly and deservedly be hoped that from the election of an evil man great utility will come to the city, province, or republic.

d. If there is no hope that a list composed of good men will be elected unless evil men who are contained in the same list are also elected.