The Force and Interpretation of These Laws

Words of the Constitution

18. I. At the end of the Preamble itself, the Supreme Pontiff sets down a most ample abrogation of the earlier law when he says: "We will that these alone have the force of law, the Rules published by order of the Holy Synod of Trent, the Observations, the Instruction, the Decrees, the Admonitions, and every other statute and command of Our predecessors concerning this matter being abrogated, with the sole exception of the Constitution Sollicita ac provida of Benedict XIV, which, just as it has been in force up to now, so we will to remain wholly in force for the future."

II. Therefore:

The statutes which were prefixed to the Index are abrogated

19. 1. By the first enumeration there are suppressed, under their proper indicated title, most of the general statutes which, in editions of the Index, were prefixed to the catalogue itself. They are, namely: the Rules of the Index, promulgated by order of the Sacred Tridentine Council; the Observations of Clement VIII on Rules IV and IX, and of Alexander VII on Rule X; the Instruction of Clement VIII for those who are to devote labor to books, both to be prohibited and to be expurgated, and also to be printed; the Decrees of Benedict XIV concerning prohibited books not expressly named in the Index; the Admonitions of the Sacred Congregation of the Index, March 4, 1878, January 7, 1836. The Constitution Sollicita ac provida of Benedict XIV is omitted, since it still remains in force; also the Mandate of Leo XII and the Most Recent Addition (concerning censures), which have material confirmation in the new Constitution.

And any other dispositions concerning this matter

Extent of this abrogation

As to extension

2. By the universal words which follow the enumeration, this abrogation is made most ample. But we declare its extensive amplitude thus: Excepting the Constitution Sollicita, which is expressly confirmed, and saving perhaps a future exception to be introduced by Decrees or Responses of the Congregations, every sanction of the superior pontifical law concerning the censorship or prohibition of books is suppressed. Nor does it matter whether it is a general or special law distinctively concerning this subject, or whether the disposition concerning censorship or prohibition is part of another law which principally treats another matter.

I say, saving perhaps a future exception. For it happens that the breadth of dispositions of this kind is afterwards sometimes opportunely tempered by "restrictive" Declarations of the Holy See. Thus, after the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis had been promulgated, which suppressed all censures latae sententiae of the superior law, it nevertheless wished the Declaration of Pius IX to remain in force, namely the excommunication laid down against missionaries who trade.¹

Concerning the censorship or prohibition of books. For the Supreme Pontiff says: concerning this matter. Therefore it is not of itself repugnant that a special law be preserved which indeed does not prohibit a book, but subjects a certain use of it to a special solemnity. Cf. the things which we shall discuss concerning liturgical books.

Moreover, we prove our conclusion:

a) From the words by which, at the end of the Preface, the Supreme Pontiff both negatively abrogates every other statute and command concerning this matter, and positively designates his present Decrees as the single source of law in this matter; he wills that they alone have the force of law, and that the sacred Council for marking books use them alone.

b) From the end. The Holy Father wishes to effect this, that "a certain and clear norm of acting in this kind be available to all." Nothing contributes more to this end than to have, collected in a single Constitution, as in a certain Code, all the laws concerning the same matter. On the contrary, if particular dispositions which wander through various Constitutions and were already partly obsolete still had to be approached,² who would not see with how many doubts and questions that effect would be impeded?

c) From the examples given in the Constitution itself. If he had wished a less ample abrogation, why in articles 47 and 48 would the Supreme Pontiff have judged that the excommunications latae sententiae promulgated by Pius IX in the recent Constitution Apostolicae Sedis had to be expressly confirmed? For those excommunications do not so much prohibit something in our matter as they are penal sanctions of an existing prohibition. Why, in articles 31, 32, and 34, did he have to recall special dispositions concerning documents pertaining to causes of beatification,³ and Decrees issued by the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide for Missionaries?

d) From the fact that, if you circumscribe the abrogation to those statutes which were prefixed to the Index,⁴ or even to others which are general by their object, the clause "every other statute and command concerning this matter" accomplishes scarcely anything. For by express words those things are suppressed which were contained in the volume of the Index. But what other general statutes in force can be designated?

e) From authority. Dilgskron,⁵ Cardinal Gennari,⁶ Hollweck,⁷ Planchard,⁸ and Wernz⁹ seem to think with us; hence, for example, Gennari and Hollweck compare the effect of our Constitution with the similar effect which the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis had for censures latae sententiae.

That correction of law is odious, as J. V.¹⁰ objects, what obstacle does that present? Are we thereby forbidden to understand words according to their proper sense, and as the end of the law demands?

¹ Promulgated by the encyclical letter of Propaganda Fide, March 29, 1873 (Collectanea P. F., nn. 351, 352).

² Thus, those who hold that the sanctions of Urban VIII concerning the narration of miracles still remain in force must send the reader back to the works of Benedict XIV, so that he may fish out from them the texts of the two protestations which we have seen inserted in no book!

³ Sacred Congregation of Rites, July 23, 1661.

⁴ The distinguished Pennacchi, n. 34, seems to do this.

⁵ Analecta Ecclesiastica, 1897, pp. 129, 130, 226.

⁶ Monitor Ecclesiasticus, loc. cit., pp. 13, 14.

⁷ Op. cit., p. 16.

⁸ Revue Theologique Francaise, loc. cit., nn. 4-7.

⁹ N. 110, note 45.

¹⁰ Nouvelle Revue Theologique, vol. 30, p. 109.

Intrinsic force of the abrogation

20. III. Moreover, this abrogation has a most full efficacy, or in its intensity is very strong. The Supreme Pontiff wills that, from this promulgation of his, even those dispositions which materially sound like the ancient ones draw their force solely from it. Pius IX did not do thus in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, but confirmed the ancient law in the parts which agreed with his Constitution, so that they received their force also from the authority of the old canons. Therefore, while in declaring the Constitution of Pius IX one immediately had to look back to the earlier jurisprudence, here, on the contrary, above all from our Constitution itself, as Pennacchi says,¹ that is, from the connected discourse, from the end of softening the law which the Legislator professes, questions are to be solved and the sense is to be determined.

Whether the suppressed Decrees are plainly useless

Only when this criterion is lacking, or remotely and secondarily, is appeal most usefully made to the understanding of the earlier age. For in this case the mind of the Supreme Pontiff becomes doubtful, and there is place for the principle of harmonizing the new law with the old. Cf. concerning these principles the letter Redditae Nobis, sections 9-13, which Benedict XIV, as a private Doctor, wrote on December 5, 1744.

¹ Op. cit., n. 34. Cardinal Gennari is somewhat otherwise in Monitor Ecclesiasticus, loc. cit., p. 14. Cf. also Wernz, n. 110, note 45.

Whether customs have been suppressed

21. IV. What of custom, I mean of a particular custom of places which has been contrary to this law?

1. No clause of the law abrogates particular customs of places, if they have been legitimate. For they are not taken away by a general law, "unless it is expressly provided in the law itself."¹ But in our Constitution no clause, not even generically, commemorates them, whereas the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis contains the most ample revocations of them. Nor does the end of our law demand this severity, so long as the matter concerns certain secondary mitigations which had prevailed even in those places where the laws of the Index undoubtedly were in force, and which can be composed with general obedience to our Constitution. We judge that these, if they have been legitimately prescribed, can still be retained. In explaining articles 7 and 41, examples of mitigations of this kind will occur. Genicot,² the Archiv fur katholisches Kirchenrecht,³ and several others are with us; nevertheless Wernz is against us,⁴ since he considers only our written Constitution.

What custom can be legitimate

But the custom of plainly setting aside those prohibitions which contribute so greatly to protecting faith and morals seems to many not to be capable of being reasonable. So Fessler.⁵ Gopfert denies that this reason is effective,⁶ since this custom tended only to this: that those who would read reprehensible writings without detriment would not commit a sin against ecclesiastical laws, a case which otherwise would be very frequent. And in truth, can the faithful not, by the counsels of a prudent confessor, avoid the excessive danger of delusion, on account of which that custom would seem unreasonable?

Nevertheless, a general exemption from the laws of the Index, even one resting on custom, cannot stand with the manifest intention of the Legislator, by which he commands that "Catholic men throughout the whole world obey these decrees religiously." Yet he prudently knows how to urge the force of his law. Cf. below concerning England.

¹ C. Licet 1, De Constitutionibus, in Sexto. Cf. Reiffenstuel, I, 4; or I, 2, nn. 498, 499; Laymann, Ius canonicum, in book 1, title 2, chapter 1 in Sexto, n. 12.

² Loc. cit., I, n. 455.

³ Vol. 78, p. 187.

⁴ N. 110, note 46.

⁵ Cited by Arndt, op. cit., n. 90, p. 104.

⁶ Op. cit., p. 322.

What value the reformed catalogue of the Index preserves

22. V. Once the new Index has been promulgated, the former one is abrogated. Yet it preserves usefulness for declaring doubtful points, if perhaps any things occur in the new Index that are obscurely stated, or even for correcting material errors if any have slipped in when ancient Decrees are being referred to. For the Legislator certainly does not wish to change the Decrees to which he refers his subjects.

Twofold aspect of the question

23. The question concerning the universal force of these laws has a twofold aspect:

Do these laws bind all persons, or are there some who, for example, on account of their dignity or knowledge, are exempt from them?

Do these laws bind in every place?

Reserving the first aspect for the commentaries on the articles (cf. art. 23), here we deal only with the second.

Of themselves they bind everywhere among nations

Proceed then: understood in this way, the universal force of these sanctions (apart perhaps from certain mitigations introduced by a particular and reasonable custom)¹ can no longer be doubted; and the controversy, if any remained, has been completely removed by this Constitution. For thus it states in the preface: "and let Catholic men throughout the whole world obey these [General Decrees] religiously"; and article 45: "Books condemned by the Apostolic See are to be held prohibited everywhere among nations." Thus the common opinion now holds, and it was confirmed by the Sacred Congregation of the Index when, on May 19-23, 1898, it responded affirmatively to the question "whether the said Constitution has obligatory force even for regions of the British language, which some think enjoy a tacit dispensation."

Nevertheless, Pennacchi writes² "that men of those nations are not to be disturbed who still wish to defend a custom introduced among themselves concerning exemption from the laws of the Index." A subjective excuse of good faith can indeed found a prudent dissimulation;³ yet this does not take away the actual efficacy of binding all, which the present law possesses of itself. Therefore, in order that very many may be freed from necessary solicitude, and the Bishops themselves may be immune from the obligation by which they are bound to promulgate new pontifical laws throughout their dioceses and bring them into use, we do not see another safe way available, except that which the distinguished Pennacchi² calls most advisable: namely, recourse to the Holy See.

¹ Cf. Aichner, ed. 1890, p. 146.

² Op. cit., n. 33.

³ Compare the Instruction of the Holy Office of February 1, 1871, concerning the admonition to be given to those who had incurred the censures of the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis. It is in the Collectanea Prop. Fidei, n. 1003, and is recited by Planchard, loc. cit., n. 10.

What now in England

24. The Bishops of England entered upon this way, and obtained ample faculties from the Holy See. Relying on these, His Eminence Archbishop Vaughan, in the 36th Synod of Westminster (1897), declared that each priest had the power prudently to permit the reading of prohibited books, saving, as is clear, the natural law.¹

At the same time, however, in order that they might act more gently and prudently, in the periodical The Tablet, December 18, 1897, they took care that by an article which bore the character of a communication not merely private but "official," the faithful should be admonished that nothing had been substantially changed in the discipline of England.² Then, by other encyclical letters, December 29, 1900, they commend the ecclesiastical laws concerning books and exhort the faithful to their diligent observance.³

**Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide**

Rome, May 31, 1897.

Most Eminent and Most Reverend, my most honored Lord,

Since the Apostolic Letters issued by the Supreme Pontiff **Leo XIII** on January 25 of the preceding month concerning the prohibition of evil books have given certain Prelates in England occasion to set forth grave difficulties which, on account of the peculiar circumstances of that region, stand in the way of Catholic men there being kept away from reading books of heretics; hence it has seemed opportune to this Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide to equip the sacred Prelates in England with due faculties, so that the rigor of the law may be tempered, according to the opportunity of the matter, by prudent counsel.

Therefore by the present letters, by the authority of the Apostolic See, a faculty is granted to Your Eminence, for as long as your episcopal office endures, of granting to the faithful of Christ of your Diocese who request it permission to read and retain, though under custody, prohibited books, even those treating against religion, except those which expressly deal with obscene matters. Your Eminence is to use this most ample faculty according to your prudence, when you shall judge it expedient in the Lord.

Meanwhile I most humbly kiss your hands.

Of Your Eminence,

the most humble and devoted servant,

**M. Cardinal Ledochowski**, Prefect.

**A.**, Archbishop of Larissa, Secretary.

To Lord Cardinal **Herbert Vaughan**, Archbishop of Westminster.

Then, by rescript of June 7, 1897, the clause "though under custody," which, as the Bishops thought, could create difficulties, was suppressed; that is, its use was committed to the prudent judgment of the Bishops.

He used these words: "Respecting the Apostolic Constitution on the Prohibition and Censorship of Books, by virtue of faculties granted by the Holy See, the Clergy are hereby allowed to give permission to all who apply to them to use their discretion as to the books they may read and retain; the natural law of course remaining in full force, which forbids people to expose themselves to suffer in their faith or morals by reading works that are likely to injure them in this way."

¹ The indult is of this kind:

² "In January last, the Holy See published a Constitution which in a considerable measure modified and simplified the provisions of the Index. Such a Constitution was naturally issued to the Church at large, and when it appeared in the Catholic press of this country, it necessarily, as we might expect, elicited from both clergy and laity the question whether this new constitution was or was not intended to supplant the status quo which had hitherto existed amongst us. The Cardinal Archbishop and Bishops of England addressed an inquiry to Rome upon the subject, and at once received from the Propaganda the 'most ample' faculties for dispensation, so that owing to 'the special circumstances of the country,' they should be fully empowered 'to modify the rigour of the law by their prudence and counsel according as the case might demand.' Rome's reply was thus as ready and as liberal as we could well desire. It contained an official recognition of our special circumstances to which we have referred, and it responded to it by investing the local ecclesiastical authorities with the fullest faculties to meet every need of our position. The possession of such faculties practically leaves the status quo substantially untouched, while the Constitution itself has the additional benefit of modifying the law for the universal Church."

³ A joint pastoral letter on the Church and liberal Catholicism by the Cardinal Archbishop and the Bishops of the Province of Westminster (December 29, 1900). The summary of that letter is in Civiltà Cattolica, series XVIII, vol. I, 1901, p. 156, the place which interests us.

25. The laws of the Index contain a few censures latae sententiae; they strictly command or forbid many things, with arbitrary penalties being threatened; they commend or advise some things; finally, they grant certain faculties.

General rule

On censures

1. That these censures latae sententiae are to be interpreted strictly, no one today doubts; formerly it was denied by Suarez.¹

¹ De Fide, disp. 20, sect. 2, n. 10. Cf. the responses of Schmalzgrueber, in book 5, title 7, n. 55; and Castropalao, treatise 4, disp. 20, point 10, section 1, n. 3.

On precepts and prohibitions

26. 2. That rigorous precepts and prohibitions are to be interpreted strictly is held by the common opinion,¹ against very few.²

Concerning the more benign opinion, which is ours, these three things must first be observed, lest it be understood wrongly.

The more benign opinion is safeguarded

a) We are dealing only with positive prohibition; when this has been removed, the obligations of natural prudence remain. By these we are forbidden to expose our faith or our morals to proximate danger, and to be a scandal to others. Moreover, if it is neither lawful nor expedient to increase the force of obligations beyond what is just, nevertheless our counsels ought to strive for this: that, as far as possible, they remove dangers of spiritual ruin. Therefore, when there is question of counsels to be given, we plainly agree with St. Alphonsus writing: "In this matter it is ordinarily expedient to follow the more rigid opinions."³

b) We consider and interpret the Constitution as it was enacted, that is, in relation to the universal Church. But if the very good circumstances of some diocese can bear and seem to demand more severe sanctions, the remedy is ready at hand, and its use has more than once been commended by the Holy See: namely, the faculty granted to the Bishop of supplying, by particular laws, that which is wanting in the general Law for his diocese. But private persons are not thereby permitted to have recourse to an arbitrary interpretation of the common law.

c) The canon concerning the restriction of an odious law does not give the supreme rule of interpretation. Therefore it can happen that, in appearance, it must be derogated from, in order to observe higher canons, which command us, for example, to adapt an explanation to the clear mind of the Legislator,⁴ or to interpret words in such a way that they have some effect.

And it is proved

These things having been laid down, our solution rests especially on the circumstances in which this Constitution was enacted. Their sum is this: the desire of reading everything has increased immensely; regard for authority and docility of minds have greatly diminished; the Church has been deprived of every support of secular power;⁵ in our mixed societies there is daily commerce with men of every opinion and religion; there is a daily publication of books and writings which of themselves would be worthy of a censorial mark, and yet, at the same time, on account of other merits, furnish to many a useful, not to say necessary, reading; hence there are innumerable reasons, both pretended and true, for keeping and reading writings of this kind; and the necessity of a more benign law has been declared more than once. In his preface, Leo XIII, according to his prudence, acknowledges that the Bishops both of France and of Germany, who insisted in this sense with weighty words, had asked what was equitable, by denouncing the scruples, anxieties, and most grave temptations of violating the law by which the consciences of Catholics were burdened more than was fair.⁶ Add finally that not one region professed itself immune from the rules of the Index, and that it was among the wishes of the Supreme Pontiff that universal observance of these sanctions be restored. To one weighing these things, unless we are mistaken, the following will easily be clear:

a) The common good demands a strict interpretation of the prohibitions, lest, from the inclination of minds to cast off a yoke of this kind, there would be too great a temptation to violate the law, and thus for too many there would be an occasion of sinning; lest "imperfect persons, unable to bear precepts of this kind, break forth into worse evils."⁷ But the common good, just as it is the supreme norm of making law, so also is it the supreme norm of interpreting law.

b) The wish and command of the Supreme Pontiff, who desires that "Catholic men throughout the whole world obey these sanctions religiously," demands a strict interpretation. Rigid explanations of this law will not greatly profit this end.

c) If we wish to take refuge in axioms: "Every odious law is to be interpreted strictly."⁸ But that law is understood as odious which imposes a burden, an encumbrance.⁹ Who can doubt that the present law is of this kind, since it prohibits and indeed under a grave penalty,¹⁰ especially if you look to the circumstances? And it is already enough that, since the prohibitions run far beyond the limits of natural prohibition, it directly restricts natural liberty.¹¹

d) The character of the present Constitution demands a strict interpretation of the prohibitions. By this law of his the Supreme Pontiff imitates "the maternal zeal of the Church: which indeed desires nothing so much as to impart herself benignly, and has always taken care, and takes care, to heal those born of her in such a way that she lovingly and zealously spares their infirmity." He acknowledged and professed the necessity of softening the laws of the Index. He wills that "to obey" these laws, "provided one is not of evil disposition, cannot be grave and arduous." Yet, being well aware of the difficult circumstances, when the Bishops of England requested it, he immediately granted the very great power of which we spoke in n. 24. A broad acceptance of the prohibitions corresponds little with these things. Apply, for example, this method in explaining article 11.¹² Will you not immediately seem to yourself to be carried away by excessive rigor?

e) Together with the prohibitions, this Constitution contains penalties; indeed, all the precepts are sanctioned by arbitrary penalties. All acknowledge that these are of strict interpretation.¹³

But if you understand the prohibitions broadly, it will happen that you take the same words in a different sense in the offense than in its sanction! Moreover, if, on account of the favor of faith, we must interpret the prohibitions broadly, shall we not be compelled from the same cause to take strictly the licenses or faculties of reading, and the articles which hold certain books as not prohibited?¹⁴ No one will fail to see how strange these things are, and how much they are opposed to received practice.

¹ Genicot, I, 451; Hollweck, Das kirchliche Bücherverbot, p. 20, V; Péries, op. cit., p. 55; Pennacchi, op. cit., nn. 34, 38, 49 and passim; Palmieri, op. cit., n. 794; the writer of Archiv, vol. 78, p. 187; Piat, Nouvelle Revue Théologique, vol. 32 (1900), p. 479; Wernz, op. cit., n. 110, IV; Ciolli, op. cit., n. 4, etc.

² Planchard, Revue Théologique Française, vol. 2, p. 159; Van Coillie, op. cit., nn. 9, 10; L. Van Ruymbeke (somewhat more temperately), in Nouvelle Revue Théologique, vol. 36 (1904), p. 98.

³ Appendix, chapter 5, n. 8.

⁴ We understand that mind which can be demonstrated from reason, the connected discourse, or the circumstances, so that it has been promulgated with the law. For a private declaration of the Legislator can no more be efficacious than a private will. Very well Wernz, I, n. 131, II, where the words are doubtful, says: "From the disposition of the law one must have recourse to the mind of the Legislator truly manifested in some other way."

⁵ If, as formerly, the matter concerned preventing the introduction of dangerous books into some region, the common utility of warding off common harms could easily demand that the commands given, especially those which are given to public powers, be accepted broadly; but prohibitions which affect individuals in particular are to be accepted otherwise. Just as you will understand more broadly a general prohibition by which men infected with plague are kept away, and a particular prohibition lest you approach a man suffering from plague.

⁶ Cf. the words in the Collectio Lacensis, vol. 7, p. 843; or in Péries, pp. 46, 47; or Pennacchi, op. cit., nn. 29, 30.

⁷ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 96, art. 2, ad 2. Cf. also the body of the article.

⁸ Reiffenstuel, I, 2, 427; and cf. Rule 15 of Law in Sexto.

⁹ B. P., tract. 3, n. 381.

¹⁰ Cf. already Albitius, De inconstantia in fide, chapter 30, n. 224 ff.

¹¹ In this matter Reverend Father Van Ruymbeke seems to err in an otherwise learned dissertation, when he describes the laws of the Index as gentle and easy to observe of themselves. It is enough even briefly to question, I do not say impious men and haters of the Church, but Catholics and priests (provided they devote themselves to studies, for what does it matter with respect to others?), so that you may become more certain that those laws, both concerning prohibition and concerning previous censorship, are today held as most troublesome, and are far from being marked by that note which Suarez himself requires in order to indicate that prohibitions are favorable, that is: that they command something "moderate, and agreeable to the common manner of living of men" (De Legibus, book 5, chapter 2, n. 6).

¹² Cf. below, in the commentaries.

¹³ Lehmkuhl, I, 1073, 4; Van Gestel, De Iustitia in Lege civili, p. 185.

¹⁴ For example, article 4.

General rule concerning faculties

27. 3. But faculties either of reading and retaining prohibited books, or of granting this permission, seem to us to have, of themselves, an ample interpretation.

We say this of indults for granting faculties, such as Bishops obtain, because faculties of this kind are referred to privileges which are outside the law and not against the law.

We hold the same concerning indults for reading books, because they have the character of a faculty, not of a dispensation. For the law does not simply forbid reading, but forbids you to read without license. By reading with license, you observe the law, far from being dispensed from it.

But since a general faculty concerning the reading of books expressly obscene is never granted, the necessity on account of which you think yourself exempt from that prohibition seems to be to be taken strictly - I do not say scrupulously.

Which books prior to the Constitution are proscribed by the General Decrees

28. 1. On books published before the present law. The matter of a law of itself is not a past act.¹ Therefore sanctions which prohibit books of a certain kind because some solemnity, for example of seeking approval, prescribed to be observed by the publisher, has been omitted, affect only books which are published after this Constitution has been promulgated.² Certainly the new precaution will perhaps have been most prudently prescribed. But even dangerous subjects, of sacred instruction for example, could have been treated in a most useful way, and this in books which lack positive approval. Therefore danger is not a sufficient reason for extending the prohibition to past things, unless the Legislator has expressly declared this.³ What of the fact that the Legislator himself seems to join the prohibition of such books with the precept given to the publisher, as in article 20, or to employ words which look to future times, as in article 13: if they are published. Moreover, the precept could not have been violated before it was enacted; and if the Legislator had wished to proscribe books previously published, he could have said: if they are published or have been published.

Nevertheless, except the case in which books were already forbidden by a similar prohibition of the superior law now in force. I say, a prohibition now in force; for several sanctions had been greatly tempered by usage.

But a prohibition which does not follow upon a neglected solemnity, but rests upon an intrinsic reason, also affects books prior to this Constitution. For here there is no precept imposed upon the author, ignorance of which can be alleged. Nor, in proscribing a book, is the writer's mind or intention considered; but the book itself, as it lies there, is pronounced harmful and prohibited.⁴ Moreover, each one publishes a work at his own risk, and he cannot prevent the Church from consulting the safety of the faithful by its Decrees, whether general or special. Besides, special decrees are always and necessarily later than at least the first edition, so that of themselves they regard a past act of publishing.

For this reason, a book which defends propositions afterwards proscribed as heretical is to be assimilated to a book which defends heresies already proscribed.

¹ Suarez, De Legibus, book 3, chapter 4.

² So also Hollweck, Das kirchliche Bücherverbot, pp. 16, 17; Monitore Ecclesiastico, X, 2, p. 116; Ciolli, op. cit., n. 36.

³ Against Wernz, n. 110, V.

⁴ Therefore no mark is of itself imposed upon the writer, nor does justice require that he be able to set forth his reasons. Nevertheless, if the matter concerns a Catholic man who is distinguished by some reputation, and the work seems to be such that "with the things needing removal removed, it is recognized that it can come forth into public," Benedict XIV provided for his fair defense. For unless the writer himself is permitted to defend his own cause personally, a defender is appointed for him ex officio by the Sacred Congregation. Constitution Sollicita ac provida.

A prohibited book is prohibited as a whole. Separated parts

29. 2. Objective extension of a special prohibition. a) A book which is prohibited is prohibited as a whole, and not only the part which gave occasion to the proscription. Nevertheless, when this part has been separated (if it is established what part it is), by cutting it out, sealing it up, or obliterating it, the prohibition probably ceases.¹

On a work which consists of several volumes, or a periodical booklet of several fascicles

b) When the first volume or earlier volumes of some work have been condemned, if others are afterwards printed, these are not strictly marked by that special decree, to which they are later, but they are to be held as suspect unless the author has proved that he has corrected himself. Cf. above, n. 17, e, where we learned both these things from the Preface of the Index itself.

The same is to be said of fascicles of a periodical booklet which are later than its proscription.

But if the work, when it is condemned, has already grown into several volumes, and it is established that the cause of the prohibition is found in one only, Sanchez² denies that the others are prohibited, because they seem to be several books. Suarez does not admit that unless they are of diverse subject matter.³ Commonly they hold the doctrine of Lugo,⁴ who resolves the question from this point: whether or not the subject matter admits division. Thus, for example, in a universal history, a volume narrating ancient history is so distinguished from a volume destined for the description of the Middle Ages that they are, as it were, several works.

Yet in either case, if you remove the volume in which the error is contained, you separate the part which gave occasion to the proscription; and therefore, unless you wish to deny the opinion just recited here under a), the prohibition of the remaining volumes probably ceases.

New editions and versions

c) The proscription affects all editions and versions of the work which have been made before the decree, unless it is expressly provided otherwise in the Index. (Cf. the Preface of the Index.)

d) A new edition of the same book, even corrected, in whatever language it is made, is prohibited unless faculty has been granted by the Sacred Congregation of the Index (art. 31). This holds even if you refute the errors by notes, or if it was proscribed not absolutely, but with the added mention "until it is corrected."

Nevertheless, except books of authors whom they call classics, and which expressly treat or teach lascivious matters. For these, when well expurgated, are permitted to be handed over to children (art. 10).

Properly speaking, however, this is not an exception. For the books which article 31 forbids to be published again because they have been proscribed by the Holy See seem to be only those which are prohibited by a special decree of the Index, not by a general rule. So Cardinal Gennari and Palmieri on this article.

¹ St. Alphonsus, book 7, n. 283; D'Annibale, III, 141; B. P., op. cit., n. 14. The response of the Holy Office, July 26, 1848 (Collectanea Prop. Fidei, n. 1883), is by no means an obstacle, contrary to what Piat asserts, Nouvelle Revue Théologique, vol. 30, p. 58. For the matter there concerns translations of the New Testament which were already proscribed for this reason, that they had been made by non-Catholics. This defect is not removed by taking away the errors.

² In Decalogum, book II, chapter 10, n. 36.

³ De Fide, disp. 20, sect. 2, n. 9.

⁴ De Fide, disp. 21, n. 62.

What of compendia

30. e) Nevertheless, you do not publish a work anew by the fact that you have written a compendium of the work which is sufficiently distinct from the earlier work.

This, therefore, is to be judged in itself. One must indeed see whether perhaps it is touched by some general decree.

On the historical account of systems

Hence it appears what must be thought concerning those books which historically report the system and opinions of some heretical or unbelieving writer.

If these are so proposed, with arguments added and no response made, that they seem to defend heresies or errors, they will fall under the law by which books that defend such things are prohibited; if they were composed by a heretic and expressly treat religion, they will easily be touched by article 3, and so forth. You will estimate the doctrine of those books in itself.

What of literary miscellanies which excerpt places from prohibited books

31. f) What of literary miscellanies, "chrestomathies," which report passages from condemned works? They can be considered either as some new book, composed from various works of others, or formally as reporting passages of other works.

Under the first heading, their own proper character is to be weighed, and the General Decrees are to be applied to them as to any other work. For they can expressly oppose faith, morals, etc. But under the other heading, if they seem morally to exhibit some same proscribed work, they will share its proscription. But if, as generally happens, the condemned books contain few pages in number, the miscellanies themselves are not already prohibited on that account. The solution is confirmed by practice itself.

On a periodical booklet which reports a condemned work

32. g) But what if a certain book or work, proscribed by name, is previously or afterwards reported in a periodical booklet, which in its general character is good, or treats matters which do not concern religion?

Certainly it is not lawful to disseminate again, by periodical publication, a work already reproved, which would be entirely unworthy of a Catholic man. This is not in doubt.

But it has already happened that a work was condemned which had been taken up in good faith in a periodical booklet; and the question arises concerning those who read and retain the collection of the periodical booklet.

Must we hold as proscribed the volume in which that work is found? In the rigor of law, you would perhaps answer thus.

Yet no one fails to see that a special inconvenience underlies this, namely that on account of this insertion you can no longer possess some whole good and useful collection.¹

Again, as appears from the Constitution Officiorum itself, periodical booklets are to be judged from their successive course rather than from individual articles. Nor would you call a periodical permitted which, being habitually evil, happens to contain one or a few good treatments.

Therefore, because of this reason, and because a work in a periodical booklet seems to lose the figure of a book, we judge that a benign response can be given: those who preserve that volume in their collection are not to be troubled. Yet they will have to abstain from reading the proscribed work, unless they are equipped with a positive faculty.

And on newspapers in a similar case

You would say the same of newspapers which by chance have published a similar work in parts (en feuilletons, in serial installments). Here, however, the reason drawn from loss is usually of less benefit.

¹ They know that a collection is made of much less value because even one volume is lacking.

3. On the Signification of Various Words and Clauses

A) What is a Book?

A certain bulk is required

Whether newspapers, sheets, little works?

33. What is a Book? According to common acceptance, by this word there is designated a volume of a certain bulk, which offers to readers a subject matter of a certain unity.

a) Of a certain bulk, I say. Therefore newspapers, even more ample ones, sheets (imprimés),¹ and small opuscula are not understood, since they "are accustomed to be called by some other name, such as elegies, letters, or speeches, rather than books."² Many, after Schmalzgrueber,³ require ten sheets for a book. We understand these as whole sheets, so that an octavo work would be 160 pages, a sextodecimo work 320. This estimate seems sufficiently fair.⁴ Without denying, therefore, the material truth which this rule can generally have, we judge, with Lugo,⁵ that the formal reason of the solution is rather to be drawn from common usage.

We have some opponents, who, under the earlier law, either argue with B. P.⁶ from the fact that in the Decrees concerning books, the Legislator spoke of poems, images, etc.; or with Piat⁷ infer the same from certain words of an allocution of Pius IX. But the words of Pius IX, according to Villada,⁸ seem to be referred "to eleven newspapers which the same Supreme Pontiff, by express name, had prohibited for the Roman diocese through his Vicar, June 30, 1871." And by the response of the Holy Office, April 27, 1880, denying that excommunication is incurred by one reading "newspapers defending heresy," our opinion is strongly confirmed.⁹ Now an argument is added from the present Constitution, which in a distinct chapter, namely the eighth, treats of newspapers, sheets, and periodical booklets; and in article 13 distinguishes writings from books; and in articles 17 and 20 distinguishes booklets and sheets.¹⁰

b) Of a certain unity. Therefore smaller booklets bound together by chance are not books.¹¹ But if from the beginning they are destined to compose one volume, which is thus published in parts, the whole volume thus composed is to be held as a book; indeed, the individual parts also, even taken separately, which reach the bulk of a book.

¹ Avanzini, op. cit., Appendix 3.

² Planchard, Revue Théologique Française, loc. cit., n. 14.

³ Book 5, title 7, n. 55.

⁴ D'Annibale, op. cit., III, 141; Pennacchi, op. cit., n. 38; Génicot, op. cit., 454, against Planchard, loc. cit., 13, 14, though he remains doubtful.

⁵ De Fide, disp. 21, n. 38.

⁶ Treatise 7, section 4, nn. 12, 13.

⁷ Op. cit., p. 619.

⁸ Op. and loc. cit., n. 11.

⁹ Acta Sanctae Sedis, vol. 20, p. 368.

¹⁰ We argue from this deservedly, contrary to the opinion of C. V. C., loc. cit., since we have proved that prohibitions also are to be taken strictly. Add that it would be strange if you took the same word books in one way in the prohibition and in another way in the censure which is its sanction, and now, as Planchard observes, loc. cit., 14, part of the same law. Did the ancients do so?

¹¹ For the same reason we judge that newspapers are not to be placed among books, even if they are gathered into one volume. So also Sleutjes, De prohibitione, etc., p. 24, note 2. We do not know with what truth several, Cardinal Gennari, loc. cit., p. 155, and Hollweck, loc. cit., p. 26, bring forward to the contrary the response of the Holy Office alleged below in the text, from which those incur the excommunication of persons knowingly reading certain books of apostates, heretics, etc., who read periodical publications of the same "bound into fascicles." For in the obvious sense, since we are not accustomed by the name fascicle to designate the large volume which newspapers bound together make, the petitioner who used this expression in proposing the doubt does not seem to have been thinking of newspapers, but wished to describe those publications which, as Lehmkuhl explains (II, 923), "are published periodically in compact fascicles" (qui paraissent en fascicules); otherwise, "les revues," "le riviste." Nor does Arndt, p. 217, seem to have understood the matter otherwise.

Whether periodical booklets are to be held as books

34. What of periodical booklets, "reviews"?

What generally prevents them from being called books is the lacking unity, since they are accustomed to embrace disparate, indeed diverse, subjects and treatises. Yet if from their habitual subject matter they have some unity of kind or tendency, under this respect, and not under another, they will be equated with books as soon as they reach the bulk of a book. Therefore periodical booklets devoted to cultivating the sciences or to philosophy are to be held as books of the sciences or of philosophy.

But a volume which, among other things, contains a study written by a heretic is not to be treated as the book of a heretic.

And in a similar way, periodical booklets which are customarily published by heretical authors and habitually defend heresy are to be equated with books of heretics defending heresy. Therefore, wisely, on January 13, 1892, the Holy Office responded that the censure laid down against those reading books of heretics defending heresy is incurred by those who knowingly read periodical publications bound into fascicles, having a heretical author and defending heresy.¹

Summary concerning the laws by which they are governed

Because the matter is one of daily use, it is helpful here to set forth, as it were in summary, which positive laws must be obeyed in keeping or reading periodical booklets.²

First, indeed, we observe this: individual fascicles are generally of less bulk (cf. n. 33) than that they can be called books; yet today several periodical booklets appear whose individual fascicles, in number of pages, equal even a fairly large book. Proceed then:

1. The General Decrees concerning books seem to us to affect periodical booklets only then:

a) When you have in hand a volume or fascicle which by its bulk equals a book, and if, moreover:

b) By its general character or habitual course the periodical booklet itself, or the whole fascicle, has the quality or sins by the defect which is marked by the General Decrees.

Therefore, if the first condition is lacking, neither a book on religion, nor a book in which the Church is disparaged, nor a book teaching magic, is a separated article of a periodical booklet, or a whole fascicle not reaching the quantity of a book, although they treat of religion, disparage the Church, teach magic. Therefore articles 3, 4, 11, 12 of the Constitution Officiorum do not fall upon an article or fascicle of this kind.

But if the second condition is lacking, neither is a complete volume or a collection of several volumes a book of this kind, if in them, besides articles on religion, there are also other longer articles of profane subject matter, or besides articles in which the Church is disparaged or magic is taught, there are found others of a different kind, so that from the prior articles you cannot gather one character of the periodical booklet.

But, on the contrary, a book of heretics is a periodical booklet which heretics are accustomed to write; a book on religion is a periodical booklet which has been accustomed to treat religious subjects; and so forth, provided you look at a volume of just bulk.

2. But individual fascicles, even smaller ones, are governed as by their own law by the General Decrees which are sanctioned in articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution Officiorum.

3. But if a work, whether previously or subsequently proscribed by name, has been published in a periodical booklet in several successive articles, to read one of those articles truly separated from the others does not seem contrary to the positive law; but you will have offended against the law if you morally have all or almost all the articles before your hands. For in the first case you do not read the work, but a separated part of it (cf. n. 36); in the other, you read the work itself, which, even as it is in the periodical booklet, is prohibited by positive decree. Yet the collection itself, or series of volumes, will not therefore always have to be mutilated. Cf. n. 32.

¹ This, therefore, seems to us to be the proper force of that decree. By no means, contrary to what many think and what we ourselves previously thought, is it there defined that periodical booklets are to be held as books. Nor, even if the individual articles reach the bulk of a book, would we say that the fascicle is then virtually to be compared with several books, as Villada writes, op. cit., n. 12.

² The things which we say concerning periodical booklets can almost be transferred to newspapers.

Whether calendars

35. By its external figure itself, a calendar whose leaves are to be torn off on individual days (Calendrier à effeuiller), and which therefore is more like a newspaper, does not seem to us to have the character of a book. It is otherwise, however, if it has had the character of a stable volume.¹

¹ Schmalzgrueber, 5, 7, 33; Bucceroni, p. 339; in the second edition, p. 368.

Sheets separated from a book

36. Nor do several sheets separated from a book come under the name of book. Against Piat,¹ who brings forward many authorities.

¹ Op. cit., p. 620.

Whether a collection of images

37. Nor is a collection of images considered a book. Therefore, by this Constitution, obscene or impious images are not touched by positive prohibition.¹

¹ Pennacchi, op. cit., n. 40; Hollweck, op. cit., p. 32.

Whether manuscripts

38. Whether it is further necessary that it be printed with type, or whether a manuscript work comes under the name of book, is not entirely certain. Most include manuscripts, because the word book is older than the typographical art, and the reason of the law, or the danger of infection, also obtains here. This is preferred by St. Alphonsus,¹ Arndt,² and B. P.³ Others, however, to whom laws of this kind seem to be interpreted strictly, not improbably observe that in our days, by common usage, books are distinguished from manuscripts, and that the reason of the law is less urgent concerning these, since they are disseminated with more difficulty. This is maintained by D'Annibale,⁴ Avanzini,⁵ and Bucceroni;⁶ Göpfert, however, says the same is probable.⁷ And after the Constitution was issued, Cardinal Gennari,⁸ Planchard,⁹ Génicot,¹⁰ and Hollweck¹¹ are of the same opinion; Hollweck adds this excellent reason, that the use of a manuscript work is today so rare that concerning it this holds: "what is minimal the legislator does not consider." Palmieri now holds the same in Gury, II, 794.

But there is no reason why you should deny the character of a book to works which indeed are not printed with type, but by other methods (lithography, hectography) which can give place to similar diffusion.

¹ Book 7, n. 293.

² N. 101, pp. 118-121.

³ Loc. cit., n. 13. Cf. in Piat, loc. cit., p. 618, note 1, many, both of the earlier and of the present age, holding the same.

⁴ III, 141.

⁵ Op. cit., I, appendix 3, pp. 134, 135.

⁶ II, p. 339, n. 4.

⁷ Op. cit., p. 323.

⁸ Loc. cit., p. 132.

⁹ Revue Théologique Française, loc. cit., n. 12.

¹⁰ I, 454.

¹¹ Op. cit., p. 24.

Whether lithographed or printed codes

39. Furthermore, at least as regards the necessity of previous censorship, books are not regarded except insofar as they are published. Hence works set down lithographically, which professors are accustomed to prepare so that hearers may make a compendium of what is to be written, and which are not of public right, are not subject to this censorship.¹ We know this to be approved by Roman usage itself. We think the same must be said of treatises which, for the same reason, are even printed with type. In German they say: Als Manuskript gedruckt - printed as a manuscript. And here again we are confirmed by usage, which is the best interpreter of laws.

¹ Génicot, op. cit., I, 454.

What is a Booklet?

40. A booklet designates a work of smaller bulk, which does not reach the just quantity of a book, but nevertheless is composed of some pages. So also Pennacchi, op. cit., n. 58. Booklets are spoken of in articles 17, 20, and 21 of the Constitution Officiorum.

What is a Writing?

41. Writing is a most general word, apt for designating a composition of every bulk and form. Therefore even individual numbers of some newspaper are a certain writing. Cf. Pennacchi, op. cit., nn. 51 and 59.

Whether, by the general breadth of this word, even sheets which have not been printed with type are designated? Some deny this.¹ Yet the affirmative opinion of others agrees more with the force of the word, and is confirmed by a decree of the Holy Office which, by prohibiting any writings whatever (provided they were propagated) concerning a recently invented new devotion, added that "it matters little whether they had been printed with type."² Generally, however, writings will not be published unless printed with type.

¹ Génicot, loc. cit.

² Hollweck, loc. cit. Decree of February 6, 1896. Cf. Decree of the Index, April 19, 1896, Acta Sanctae Sedis, vol. 28, p. 640.

II. Applications or Particular Cases

What are Fabulae amatoriae?

42. B. Fabulae amatoriae. In the new Index this means the same thing as opera romanensia in the former one. For since we are referred back to the same prohibitory decrees, and there is no indication of any mitigation, it is sufficiently clear that this formula was adopted for the sake of a more elegant language, but that no change was made in the matter. Therefore stage plays are not included, nor are "novels" excluded if they are not strictly love stories. It is to be translated: romans, not, as some have written, romans d'amour.

C. What is ex professo, data opera?

43. C. Ex professo, data opera. The clauses ex professo and data opera scarcely differ in use; and by most they are held as sounding the same.¹ Yet if you consider the force of the words, Pennacchi rightly understands more by the clause ex professo than by the other, data opera.²

For data opera is the same as "by design,"³ deliberately, studiously. In French you would say: de propos délibéré, de parti pris;⁴ in Italian: a bella posta, etc.; and opposed to it is the expression: incidentally, by the way (en passant, à l'occasion).

Ex professo further denies the dissimulation of such a plan, so that you act as if professing it, for example, with developed explanation and proposed arguments.⁵

Therefore these clauses also suppose in the writer a certain direct intention of the thing which the book is judged to do ex professo, data opera.

But in order that the book, and not only the writer in some place, be reputed to do something data opera, ex professo,⁶ it is necessary that either by its general tendency, or in a notable part, it devote itself to that thing. One chapter will be a notable part, sometimes less, if the chapters are lengthy.

Concerning this notion, cf. Génicot,⁷ Hollweck,⁸ Pennacchi,⁹ Planchard.¹⁰

¹ For example, Gennari, Monitore, loc. cit., p. 80; Wernz, note 56.

² Op. cit., n. 59.

³ Forcellini, s.v. Deditus.

⁴ Planchard, loc. cit., n. 43.

⁵ Pennacchi, ibid. "Not dissemblingly, openly and data opera, and as if by professing it." Forcellini, s.v. Ex professo.

⁶ Some pass this over, such as Gennari, Monitore, loc. cit., p. 36; Piat, Nouvelle Revue Théologique, vol. 30, p. 56, when he approves Boudinhon, Canoniste, 1897, p. 214.

⁷ Op. cit., I, pp. 416-418.

⁸ Op. cit., pp. 34 and 40, and Die kirchlichen Strafgesetze, where in section 107, 7, c, he translates ex professo: Ihrem Hauptinhalte nach.

⁹ Acta Sanctae Sedis, loc. cit., pp. 214 and 346.

¹⁰ Loc. cit., n. 24.

D. In hatred of the author?

44. D. In odium auctoris. A prohibition made in hatred of the author used to include even future and innocent works.

But today the Holy See now abstains from this kind of prohibition, as is clear from the suppressed universal prohibition of the works of heresiarchs, and from the way in which the clause Opera omnia is explained in the Preface of the Index.

E. Opera omnia

45. E. Opera omnia. This general clause, although it seems graver than the prohibition of a single book, touches all the books of a writer less perfectly than the distributive proscription of individual books.

The force and reason of this clause must now be explained carefully from the Preface itself.

Objective comprehension of the clause

a) As regards the object: it no longer affects all the writings of someone, "but only those works which either deal with religion, or, even if they do not deal with it, nevertheless have been proscribed by some general or special decree" (Preface of the Index).

Therefore, in order that it may appear which books are contained under that censorial mark, their subject matter must be observed. Do they deal with religion? There is none which escapes condemnation. Do they treat a non-theological subject? Only those books are prohibited which are either marked by special decree, or are proscribed by a general decree, for example because they are expressly against morals, etc.

To illustrate this by example, we hold the work, for example, of Zola whose title is Le rêve to be excepted from the clause Opera omnia, by which that most evil writer is marked.

What of works published afterwards

b) As regards time, the prohibition, taken closely, falls only upon works which were available when that general proscription was issued. Nevertheless, as the praised Preface warns, and as we already said in our own dissertation, works published afterwards are to be held as suspect; indeed, they are to be presumed to fall under some General Decree, and therefore they cannot be read or retained unless it is established that they are touched by no decree of that kind.

Yet the known repentance of the author will destroy even this presumption.

Case of a periodical booklet, or of later volumes

c) For a similar reason, the Preface declares that a periodical booklet continued after the decree by which it was proscribed, and later volumes of some work, if any have been published anew after the first or earlier volumes were condemned, are infected by an equal suspicion and presumption.

d) Besides, it is helpful to ask two things, so that the information on the matter may be fuller.

Whether only books are marked by this clause

1. In the clause Opera omnia, can the word Opera be understood of books alone?

Response. We indeed think so, unless they are of such a subject matter that, even in smaller writings, it has aroused the solicitude of the present Constitution. Cf. articles 17, 20, 21. Therefore there are included accounts of new miracles, prophecies; booklets of prayers, of devotion; writings which specially concern religion; indeed, a newspaper or periodical booklet which can morally be said to have been written by the condemned author.

Whether a similar rule has force concerning the prohibition Fabulae amatoriae omnes?

2. Concerning the force of the clause Fabulae amatoriae omnes, by which some writers are marked: does it admit the same restriction as the clause Opera omnia, so that if it is established that some such novel is touched neither by a singular decree nor by a general law, it is not to be considered prohibited?¹

Response. This matter can be disputed. Indeed, if a formula of this kind is to be equated with a special decree, it will not be lawful to derogate from it in some case.

Yet because such a clause is rather to be counted among the general clauses, since it proscribes all works of a certain subject matter, we shall incline toward this interpretation: similar exceptions which are not repugnant to the more universal clause Opera omnia can be reconciled with this censorial mark. For Fabulae omnes sounds milder than Opera omnia. But if an innocent work escapes the severity of the latter, would it not be strange for the same work to be touched by the less absolute proscription? Usage, therefore, will bear this benign understanding, unless something deceives us, or unless it seems otherwise to the Holy See.

What is certain is that later works are not comprehended by the decree; nevertheless these, as we were just saying, will come under suspicion.

¹ A mark of this kind is branded, for example, on the novels of George Sand and of both Dumas. Yet there is some novel among those which belong to George Sand or to the elder Dumas which does not seem to be comprehended by the general law of Leo XIII. Thus, unless we are mistaken, among the novels of George Sand, La petite fadette and La mare au diable; and of the elder Dumas, Le comte de Monte Christo, Le capitaine Pamphile, Jehanne la Pucelle - of the elder Dumas, I say; for the novels of the son are accustomed to show dogmatic designs (romans à thèses), on account of which they easily incur article 14 of the Constitution Officiorum ac Munerum, by which books "which establish divorce as lawful, or defend errors proscribed by the Holy See," are condemned. Beware, therefore, lest you immediately pronounce a novel innocent because it is not expressly obscene. On that subject one can consult the work of Reverend L. Bethleem, Romans à lire et Romans à proscrire, Cambrai, Masson, 1905.

F. Donec corrigatur?

46. F. Donec corrigatur. Donec corrigatur places a book among the forbidden books until the corrections themselves have been approved by the Holy See. As the Preface of the Index says, this clause regards the mode of the prohibition, but not its effect.

775. To what precisely does the law of prohibition oblige? - The aforesaid laws oblige the faithful (not Cardinals, Bishops, Ordinaries according to can. 1401), and indeed under grave obligation, because the end of warding off from the faithful the danger which threatens from reading is more grave, and the law contributes much to this end; this is also clear from the penalties. Moreover, it obliges the faithful so that:

a) they are bound everywhere on earth (can. 1396), unless nevertheless in some place a special indult has been obtained;

b) even those for whom danger is not present are bound (can. 21);

c) and so that "without due permission a book can neither be published, nor read, nor retained, nor sold, nor translated into another language, nor communicated in any way with others" (can. 1398, § 1).

It cannot:

1. be published, that is, be made public, which is done by: the author if he handed over the book for the end that it be published; the publisher who cares for its dissemination; and the owner of the printing house who undertakes its printing; - yet probably not proofreaders or the printers themselves;

2. nor be read in the proper sense, which is done by those who, scanning a book with their own eyes, understand the things written; - but not by those who hear another reading, nor by those who recite from memory, nor by those who scan with their own eyes but do not understand because of ignorance of the language, nor probably by those who hear a reader whom they have induced to read by requests or by command.

Grave matter and mortal sin are present: a) by reason of quality, when a very depraved passage is read, or an article in newspapers, even if it comprises only one or another page; b) by reason of quantity, if someone reads indiscriminately all things, or a notable part of a writing of unknown nature, because he commonly exposes himself to great danger: what a notable part is is difficult to determine, whether 6, 10, or perhaps even 20 pages, according to the depravity or bulk of the writing and the gravity of the danger; but for newspapers it is the custom of reading; c) to read things which certainly are harmless, not only to the reader but by their nature and commonly to all, is venial, unless there is danger of contracting a habit and reading the rest; d) it is venial to read that which is prohibited only because it was published without approval;

3. nor be preserved, which is done by: the owner who keeps his own book with himself, even if he did so not for reading but for mere ornament, even if he does not understand the language; - by the depositary who keeps another's book with himself; - by the depositor who keeps his own book with another, provided he does not deposit it with an agreement not to reclaim it except after permission has been obtained; - yet not by the bookbinder (at least if it is not done for a long time), nor by the custodian or librarian, provided he does not remove the books and transfer them into his own house.

It is a grave sin to preserve one for a notable time, for example, for some weeks or for a month; but if someone is waiting for a suitable occasion of asking permission, the books can be retained somewhat longer;

4. nor be sold. Hence can. 1404: "Sellers of books are not to sell, lend, or retain books treating professedly of obscene matters; other prohibited books they are not to have for sale unless they have obtained due permission from the Apostolic See, nor are they to sell them to anyone unless they can prudently judge that they are lawfully sought by the purchaser." But those also sell who procure the book;

5. nor be translated into another language;

6. nor be communicated with others, for example, by propagating, lending, leasing, etc. (can. 1403, § 2).