Imprudence

VI. Opposed Vices. Vices opposed to prudence are some by defect, others by excess.

1. Vices by defect are called by the common name of imprudence, and they are four: precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, and negligence.

a) Precipitation is directly opposed to eubulia, and by it man is borne to acting by an impulse of will or passion, sufficient counsel of reason being omitted (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 3).

b) Inconsideration is a vice by which man is inclined to contemning or neglecting those things from which right judgment proceeds; and therefore synesis and gnome are opposed to it (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 4).

c) Inconstancy is a vice inclining one to withdraw from a defined good proposal; by it reason fails in commanding those things which right counsel and right judgment dictate must be commanded. Hence it is directly opposed to prudence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 5).

d) Negligence is a vice by which man is inclined to neglecting right command, through a defect of solicitude and promptness of will; for this reason it too is directly opposed to prudence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 54, a. 2, corpus and ad 3; ibid., a. 1).

From these points it is clear that imprudence has under itself as many species as there are potential parts of the virtue of prudence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 2). St. Thomas alleges lust as the origin of these vices (II-II, q. 53, a. 6). But imprudence considered in this way constitutes a special sin, because it is contrarily opposed to the virtue of prudence; and just as prudence is a special virtue, so also its contrary is a special sin. But if by the name of imprudence there is indicated not so much the contrary as the lack of prudence, imprudence does not constitute a special sin, but rather a general one, insofar, namely, as it participates in the nature of the sin which is committed against that virtue for whose exercise the act of prudence was being commanded. "For just as prudence is in some way participated in all virtues, insofar as it directs them, so also imprudence is in all vices and sins; for no sin can happen unless there is a defect in some act of reason directing, which pertains to imprudence" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 2).

2. Vices by excess have some likeness with prudence itself, but they apply its offices to an undue object, namely to a dishonorable matter; hence they bear before themselves a false species of prudence. These vices are: prudence of the flesh or of the world, craftiness, guile, fraud, excessive solicitude for temporal things, and excessive solicitude for future things.

a) Prudence of the flesh or of the world is a vice "according as someone has the goods of the flesh as the ultimate end of his life" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 1); and it obtained this name because "prudence is concerned with those things which are toward the end of the whole of life" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 2).

b) Craftiness is a vice by which someone, "for attaining some end, whether good or evil, uses not true ways, but simulated and apparent ones" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 3).

c) Guile is the execution of those things which craftiness thinks out, whether it is done by words or by deeds; and therefore it pertains to craftiness (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, aa. 4 and 5).

d) Fraud differs from guile in this, "that guile pertains universally to the execution of craftiness, whether it is done by words or by deeds; but fraud more properly pertains to the execution of craftiness insofar as it is done by deeds" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 5).

e) Excessive solicitude for temporal things is had either by seeking temporal things as an end, the spiritual end being excluded; or when superfluous effort is applied to procuring them, "on account of which man is drawn back from spiritual things, which he ought principally to serve" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6); or when "someone fears that, by doing what he ought, necessary things will fail him" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6).

f) Excessive solicitude for future things is had when someone is solicitous about future things before the opportune time (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 7).

St. Thomas assigns avarice as the principal source of these vices (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 8).

Kinds of Imprudence.—There are three kinds of imprudence. (a) Negatively considered, imprudence is nothing more than the absence of prudence, and it is not necessarily a sin. Thus, children and young people through no fault of their own are negatively imprudent, though of course their lack of prudence may be traced back to original sin.

(b) Privatively considered, imprudence is the failure to have the habitual prudence that one is bound and able to possess. This failure is due to the fact that one has taken no pains to educate oneself through study, sermons, instructions, etc., so as to be able to act prudently when the occasion arises. Privative imprudence is therefore reducible to the sin of negligence, although negligence itself, as being opposed to carefulness (1634), is also against prudence, as we shall see.

(c) Contrarily considered, imprudence is the voluntary omission of some act or condition demanded by prudence (as when one is so taken up with amusements that one makes no effort to deliberate on an important matter or deliberates with undue haste), or the voluntary commission of an act exclusive of an act or condition of prudence (as when one expressly contemns deliberations or decides to act against the rules of prudence). This kind of imprudence is a mortal sin when it leads away from things necessary for salvation; otherwise it is a venial sin.

Sinfulness of Imprudence.—Is imprudence a general sin, that is, a sin which is included in every kind of sin?

(a) Imprudence is not included in every kind of sin in the sense that it forms a part of the very nature of every kind of sin; for, just as prudence has its own special acts (i.e., to direct according to reason), distinct from those of other virtues, so has imprudence its own special defects that do not belong to other kinds of sin.

(b) Imprudence is included in every kind of sin in the sense that everyone who sins acts imprudently in sinning; for, just as one does not act virtuously unless prudence directs one, so one does not act sinfully unless there is some defect in the deliberation, or decision, or direction given by reason.

It should be noted that, while the defects against deliberation, decision, and direction are so many different kinds of imprudence, they do not form species of sin distinct from the motivating sin if they are all directed to one evil purpose. Hence, if a person has deliberated badly, decided badly, and directed badly in the matter of striking a priest, he needs to confess but one sin, namely, that of laying sacrilegious hands on a cleric.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53 and 54.

36. Imprudence is taken 1. negatively, for the mere absence of prudence, and thus it can be without sin, as is clear in children; 2. privatively, for the lack of prudence which someone can and ought to have, and thus it is an indirectly voluntary sin, by reason of negligence or omission, because someone does not sufficiently strive to have prudence; nevertheless it is not a special sin but a general one, that is, any sin whatever or the condition of every sin: for it is included in every sin, since none occurs without defect in the act of directing reason; 3. contrarily, for imprudence directly and in itself intended, by which, namely, reason is directly moved and acts against prudence, by despising and repudiating counsel (judgment, command) of reason or divine rules; which rarely occurs. This is a special sin of commission according to the proper notion of prudence, mortal from its genus, and therefore to be declared in confession if there is grave contempt of divine rules; otherwise it is venial.

1. Cf. q. 53, a. 2, and q. 51, a. 1, ad 3. Hence it seems to be a sin of omission, although some, such as Cajetan, say that it is reduced to commission; but this is a question of name. It is a sin against the affirmative precept of prudence; this is not a special precept but a general one; whence that is a general sin, not by essence insofar as it is predicated of every sin, but by participation insofar as it is included in every sin, just as in every sin there is that it is against charity of God and of oneself.

2. It is a sin of commission against the negative precept of not contemning divine counsels and rules; special, because directly and in itself voluntary, just as to will the rectitude of prudence is a special act of virtue. Several, such as Lessius and generally the Jesuits who copy him, say that imprudence is venial from its genus and only mortal per accidens; whence precipitation and inconsideration are only mortal by reason of the danger of mortal sin; inconstancy only if someone is bound by vow or precept to persist in a judgment, or from something extrinsic, for example because of scandal; negligence only if that is omitted which obliges under mortal sin or if there is danger of mortal sin. Their reason is that the defect of prudence alone, without defect of another virtue, is defect in the act of reason alone, which is not great: for the rectitude of reason is not sought for its own sake, but on account of the work to be directed; thus perversity is to be estimated from the work which follows.

But no defect of practical reason exists alone; therefore always and per se there is present the defect of another virtue, just as prudence alone is also never exercised, but always together with some other virtue, which consequently is the proper matter of prudence; and therefore the defect of prudence is not mortal per accidens, but per se and from its genus, because a great defect in another virtue is a defect in the proper matter of prudence. Otherwise prudence, which is called the virtue most necessary (I-II, q. 57, a. 5), would oblige only under slight sin!

They object a) the example of a lie, which of itself is venial. But this does not prove the point, because a lie can exist without injury to another virtue.

b) They also allege St. Thomas, who, q. 54, a. 3, says that negligence is mortal either by reason of necessity for salvation or by reason of the cause: both per accidens, because not only the sin of imprudence distinct in species is considered, but at the same time with the work which is omitted from negligence, and this is per accidens. But this is false: negligence is always considered with the omitted work, and thus it is considered according to itself, because the work to be placed is the proper matter of prudence. And even if it were true concerning negligence, it would not yet be true concerning imprudence: the former is by omission, the latter by commission.

37. Various species of imprudence. - Imprudence is divided into various species:

1. By opposition to the annexed virtues and the diverse acts of reason, there is distinguished

a) against counsel and eubulia: precipitation (overhaasting, voorbarig oordeel), by which, with the various modes of inquiry neglected and necessary things to be considered passed over, someone through impulse of will or passion immediately undertakes the work or judges concerning the means of executing it. Whence there is a defect in the inquiry of reason, insofar as reason does not descend in an ordered way to the execution of the work through means according to the required grades, which are five integral parts, namely memory of past things, understanding of present things, shrewdness in considering future events, docility by which someone acquiesces in the judgments of elders, and reasoning comparing one thing with another: for when all these, or several of them, are neglected, there is disorder of counsel. But if this happens from contempt of counsel, it is called temerity (vermetelheid);

b) against judgment and synesis and gnome: inconsideration (onbedachtzaamheid, onbezonnenheid), by which someone, with diligent inspection omitted, contemns or neglects to attend to those things from which right judgment proceeds; whence there is a defect in the judgment of the practical intellect;

c) against command and prudence properly so called: inconstancy (wankelmoedigheid, onbestendigheid, onstandvastigheid), which is a retreat from a good established proposal, whereby reason, because of slight motives, and without any cause or without a just cause, repudiates what it had before rightly dictated;

d) against solicitude (watchfulness in executing), required for prudence strictly so called and for command: negligence (nalatigheid).

2. By opposition to the integral parts required in prudence. But because all those are ordered to directing the aforesaid three acts of reason, concerning which under 1, thence the opposed imprudences are reduced to the sins enumerated above.

3. By opposition to the diverse species of prudence, it is divided into personal, regnative, political, economic, and military imprudence.

1. Cf. q. 53, a. 4, ad 2: "Consideration of those things which are attended to in counsel is ordered to judging rightly. And therefore consideration is perfected in practical judgment. Whence also inconsideration is most of all opposed to the rectitude of judgment."

38. The cause of imprudence. - Precipitation, inconsideration, and inconstancy arise especially from luxury, which most of all impedes the use of reason, because it absorbs the soul and draws it to sensible delight, while the perfection of intellectual virtue consists in abstraction from sensible things. And although envy, anger, avarice, ambition, etc., also draw reason away to something else, luxury extinguishes the very judgment of reason.

39. Negligence is taken in two ways: 1. generally, for the omission of any due act whatever, and thus it is not opposed to prudence but to the virtue in whose matter it is concerned, for example, negligence in counsel, in restitution, or in prayer is opposed to eubulia, justice, or religion; 2. for the defect of solicitude in commanding efficaciously, required, namely, in the act of reason for exciting and directing the will in the execution of the work; and thus it is opposed to prudence strictly so called: namely, it is an act of reason not commanding when it ought or in the way in which it ought. Therefore it differs from inconstancy: this latter is from weakness of reason which does not hold itself firmly in the good proposal conceived, and denotes lightness of soul in a judgment once prudently received. On the contrary, negligence is the omission of judgment and command: reason is deficient in commanding the things which were counseled and judged.

Negligence can be a mortal sin (Prov. XIX, 16): a) per se, on the part of that which is neglected, if it is something of the necessity of salvation; b) per accidens, on the part of the cause, if it comes from a mortally evil will, for example from perfect contempt. Otherwise it is venial, as if it is concerned with something small, and comes from defect of fervor.

40. Observation. - Billuart notes from St. Thomas: Negligence strictly is distinguished from omission, sloth, torpor, and inconstancy. Negligence consists in the defect of an interior act of reason not commanding what it ought or in the way in which it ought. Omission properly pertains to an exterior act; sloth and torpor to execution, yet in such a way that sloth imports slowness in executing, while torpor imports a certain remissness in execution. Finally the inconstant man is deficient in commanding as if impeded by something; the negligent man, through defect of prompt will (q. 54, a. 2, ad 1, 2, 3). For "negligence comes from a certain remissness of the will, through which it happens that reason is not solicited to command those things which it ought, or in the way in which it ought" (a. 3).

INCONSIDERATION is thoughtlessness, or a not sufficiently attentive cognition of those truths from which one would judge rightly, as D. Thomas says. And so this sin is opposed to Prudence by reason of Synesis, and Gnome, annexed to it, which are judge of right judgment. On that account Cautelam and Incircumspectio are enclosed under this sin, against Cautela and Circumspection, which are integral parts of Prudence: For those ordinations are made toward right judgment, from which those two opposites fall short, which for that reason constitute one vice, and at the same time, together with Inconsideration, as Valentia and Tannerus say numero 52.

But it happens for the most part, when someone, otherwise having knowledge of the Law or of fact, sins inconsiderately against either; whence he is recalled to that ignorance which the prudent man ought to have avoided; hence he has culpability when it arises from that inconsideration which is called affectata, by which someone, letting himself be carried away by the impetus of his passion, ceases to consider what and how he ought to act; But often he does not have culpability, if from the sudden presence of some unexpected thing the mind is suddenly snatched into oblivion, and is otherwise prepared to act rightly; for often, from the surreption of some affair, the mind is dispersed into various things, and however attentively you had considered, they are scattered into alien thoughts; wherefore inconsideration taken in this sense is not adverse to prudence; since it passes into the inculpable nature of Ignorance.

Nor does culpable Inconsideration intervene only in choosing evil simply; but also in rejecting the greater, or better good; which happens when a sensible good allure more vehemently, and reason does not weigh all with mature deliberation; whence it follows that this vice always precedes sin; although sometimes it is the effect of that sin of which it is not the cause; for the more the will succumbs to the appetite of sensible things, the less the Intellect can attend to the due pondering of things.