Indignation

It was said above (see 1313) that hatred differs from other sins against charity, inasmuch as it dislikes another’s good unqualifiedly, whereas these other sins dislike his good with some qualification. Hence, envy differs from hate, because envy is a qualified displeasure. It differs from other kinds of displeasure over the prosperity of others, because the qualification in each case is different.

(a) Thus, emulation is displeased at the thought of a neighbor’s prosperity, not because it does not like his success, but because it dislikes the unsuccess of self. Example: Titus is grieved when he thinks of the virtue of Balbus, because he himself lacks virtue.

(b) Fear dislikes the prosperity or superiority of another, not on account of the prosperity or superiority in itself, but on account of the evil results it apprehends from that prosperity. Example: Caius is displeased at the elevation of Claudius, because he knows the latter is his enemy and will persecute him. He is also displeased that, in spite of his own greater learning and soundness, he has not the influence possessed by Balbus, who misleads many by long-winded sophistry.

(c) Indignation (nemesis) is displeased that a neighbor has a certain good, of which he is unworthy. Example: Sempronius is angry because Titus, who is dishonest, succeeds in business.

(d) Envy grieves over a neighbor’s prosperity, not because it thinks this prosperity will actually bring about a lessening of the honor of self, but because it regards the very fact of that prosperity, in itself and apart from any consequences, as a change in one’s relationship to the neighbor, and to that extent an obscuration of the glory of self. Example: Balbus is grieved at the prosperity of Claudius, because he knows Claudius will use his resources to defame him. Caius is grieved at Claudius’ prosperity, because he regards it as a reflection on his own fame, since he is less prosperous. Balbus fears, Caius envies.

Is grief at the prosperity of another sinful, when it is caused by his unworthiness of prosperity? (a) If the indignation could be about spiritual things, of course it would be sinful; but this is not possible, for it is precisely spiritual goods (such as virtues) that make one deserving. Indignation, then, is about temporal goods, which are enjoyed by the bad, as well as the good. (b) If the indignation is about temporal things owned by the wicked, and one grieves that they have prosperity, sin is committed. For it is God who distributes to the undeserving the goods they have; His purpose is just, namely, that these goods may be for the correction or the punishment of the wicked; those who grieve over the prosperity of the unworthy overlook the fact that eternal goods are a reward to man, temporal goods only a trust to be administered. Hence, the Psalmist says: “Be not emulous of evil-doers, nor envy them that work iniquity, for they shall shortly wither away as grass” (Ps. xxxvi. 1).

Two special cases of sorrow over the prosperity of the wicked must be considered. (a) If one sorrows precisely because the prosperity is had by an undeserving person, and is not thinking of the divine cause and purpose in human affairs, it does not seem that one sins; for, abstracting from Divine Providence, there does appear an unsuitability in the prosperity enjoyed by the wicked, and hence it is something to be sorry about. But such sorrow is at least a preparation for the sin spoken of in the previous paragraph, and so it should be shunned: “My feet were almost moved, my steps had well-nigh slipped, in anger at the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners” (Ps. lxxii. 2, 3). (b) If one sorrows precisely because the sinner will use his prosperity in such a way as to become more wicked and to incur chastisement, the sorrow is not uncharitable, but charitable.

Envy is a greater sin than the other kinds of sorrow at a neighbor’s good. (a) Thus, envy grieves over the neighbor’s good (even if he is worthy), and is greater or less in proportion to that good; (b) emulation grieves over one’s own deficiency, fear over the consequences of the other’s good, indignation over the prosperity of one who is unworthy.

What is envy? Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is diminutive of one's own glory. - Moreover, in five ways can someone be saddened concerning the good of another: 1. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another absolutely, because it is the good of the neighbor; and properly this is hatred of enmity, or simply hatred or aversion of the person to whom we will evil, insofar as it is his evil; and this indeed from its genus is mortal. 2. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor relatively, because he fears some evil from him; and properly this is fear, which will be licit unless it is inordinate, e.g., if he fears evil is to be inflicted on himself or on others unjustly. 3. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another because he thinks the same person unworthy of such good; and this is indignation or abomination, which is not a sin; nevertheless it will be a sin, and indeed mortal, if it either accuses God's providence, and is blasphemy, or if it so affects that it leads men to imitate evil. 4. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor, not because the neighbor has it, but because he himself lacks the same, and this is not envy, but emulation or zeal, which, if it concerns honorable good, is praiseworthy; but if it concerns temporal goods, sometimes it is venial, as if the good is disproportionate to the one grieving, such as it would be if a peasant grieved that he is not a king. 5. If someone grieves that another equal to himself, or not greatly unequal, grows in glory and excellence, so that thereby he becomes superior to him, and he apprehends the very increase of glory and excellence as an impediment to his own good and as an evil to himself, insofar as it is diminutive of his own glory and excellence; and this is envy properly so called. For he is called envious because he is not seeing, since he cannot see the goods of another without sadness. Equal or not greatly unequal, because the good of those who greatly excel us is not usually apprehended as diminishing our excellence and glory. The goods of another, especially those in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be in good opinion.

Envy is mortal from its genus, Gal. 5:21. For it is directly against charity, which rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, which envy desires destroyed or grieves is not destroyed. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36; L. 72. "Pride alone and envy are purely spiritual sins, which can belong to demons." S. Th. 1 p., q. 63, a. 2 ad 2.

What are the daughters of anger? - Some are from the heart: 1. Indignation, which is an inordinate affection from the fact that someone reckons himself treated unworthily by such a person. It is commonly venial. Indeed, if it proceeds from a just judgment of reason, it is nothing. Nevertheless it could be mortal if it increased up to deliberate hatred and grave contempt of the person. 2. Swelling of mind, by which someone morosely thinks out diverse ways of revenge, and by those thoughts puffs up his mind. What kind of sin it is must be judged from the quality of the revenge which is thought out. - Some are in the mouth: 1. Shouting, when an angry person raises his voice, pouring forth many things inordinately and confusedly. It is commonly venial, unless something else is added. 2. Blasphemy against God, and it is mortal. 3. Contumely against men, by which someone casts some evil upon his neighbor, with the intention of dishonoring him. 4. Malediction, by which someone wishes and imprecates evil upon another, under the account of evil. - Some are in deed, as quarrels, fights, seditions, wounds. "Quarrels, by which are understood all harms which are inflicted in deed on neighbors from anger." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 158, a. 7. When "someone intends to harm another, with the latter knowing and resisting, this is imported under the name of quarrel." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 42, a. 1. Quarrels, if they do not exceed measure, as also slight fights, are venial; otherwise, if they progress to seditions, wounds, killings. And these are commonly mortal sins on the part of the one beginning the quarrel; for the other can defend himself with the moderation of blameless defense. L. 80, 83; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 40, 41, 42.

Contumely: From its genus it is mortal. It is only venial if it is small, or only material without the mind of dishonoring, provided that no notable injury to the neighbor's honor follows. And thus many parents are excused at least from mortal sin when they call their children asses, etc.; likewise women, children, and men of the lowest sort, burdening one another with insults, because, since credit is not given to them, honor is not gravely injured. Nor indeed is it a sin if it is done with the mind of correcting, humbling, or for another reason. And thus a superior can cast forth some word otherwise contumelious. Yet in this one can sin if the mode of due correction is exceeded, or the subject is more gravely dishonored than he deserved. Likewise, if for the sake of a joke, through fitting recreation, light defects are cast forth, it is pleasantness, according to S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 2, provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger. Contumely is also done by deed, both indirectly, as if you trample or burn the image or letters of another, etc., and directly, as if you beat an honorable man with a club, set horns at his door, or represent something which injures the honor of another.

To this belongs mocking, derision, and ridicule, when it is done by signs, as by wrinkling the nose, stretching out the lips, etc., intending the neighbor's confusion; and if this is grave, or at least the neighbor is gravely saddened by it, they are mortal. - Concerning these things note that one who has injured another's honor by contumely is bound to restore it, even if reputation has not been injured. But this can be done either through an honorable and friendly greeting, or an invitation to table, or a petition for pardon, sometimes even on bended knees and before witnesses, according as the injury was grave. It is not necessary to explain in confession the varied quality of mortal contumely. L. 81, 82. "Malediction, of which we now speak, is that by which evil is pronounced against someone either by commanding or by wishing. But to will, or by command to move toward, the evil of another, according to itself repugns to charity, by which we love our neighbor; and so according to its genus it is a mortal sin, and so much the graver, the more we are bound to love and revere the person whom we curse.... Nevertheless it happens that a word of malediction uttered is a venial sin, either because of the smallness of the evil which one imprecates upon another by cursing, or also because of the affection of the one who utters the words of malediction, while from a light movement, or jest, or from some surreption, he utters such words, because sins of words are weighed especially from the affection." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 76, a. 3; L. 83.