Insanity and marriage

Imbeciles who have not the use of reason are incapable by the law of nature of contracting a valid marriage, unless it is contracted in a lucid interval. If the loss of reason supervenes on marriage which has been validly contracted already, it cannot of course annul the marriage.

31. • I. Defect of the use of reason.

a) Those who actually are not masters of reason, such as: infants, the completely intoxicated, those sleeping, the hypnotized, and also the insane, i.e., those who are mad regarding all things, contract matrimony invalidly. The reason is evident, because they are incapable of human acts.

b) What concerning the demented, i.e., those who are mad regarding some matter?

Resp. Most certainly they contract invalidly if they are mad precisely concerning matrimony. Otherwise, in practice, their matrimony will often be doubtful.

32. • II) Ignorance.

"In order that matrimonial consent can be had, it is necessary that the contracting parties at least not be ignorant that matrimony is a permanent society between a man and a woman for procreating children." (Can. 1089 § 1.)

a) Therefore one contracts invalidly who does not know that matrimony consists in the mutual handing over and acceptance of a right over the body in order to generation.

Certainly there is not required a precise and exact knowledge of the mode by which conjugal intercourse occurs, but it is necessary that the contracting parties know that children are generated through joined bodies, or at least that "by a certain concurrence and familiarity of the parents offspring is obtained, and is brought forth by the mother."¹ Otherwise knowledge concerning the formal object of the contract is lacking, and consequently consent into it.

¹ Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis, t. IV, n. 39.

b) In the external forum, ignorance concerning the essence of matrimony is presumed before puberty; after puberty, however, knowledge is presumed. (Can. 1081 § 2.) Yet that presumption is only of law, namely admitting proof to the contrary.

c) Any other ignorance whatsoever, besides that which regards the essence of matrimony, does not make matrimony invalid, even if, had it not existed, matrimony would never have been contracted.

804. Ignorance, under which name inadvertence and error also come (I, n. 80-83), impedes the deliberation required for valid consent if it is substantial, or turns upon a substantial element. Wherefore they can be distinguished:

1° Inadvertence, i.e., an actual defect of sufficient use of reason, which impedes a human act and consequently the due intention and free consent.

Hence consent furnished in insanity, by the perfectly drunk, by hypnotized or sleeping persons, by the furious or by the foolish, is invalid from the very nature of the thing.

2° Ignorance, i.e., a habitual defect of knowledge concerning the very substance or nature of matrimony: from natural law itself it invalidates consent, because nothing is willed unless first known.

Hence can. 1082: "§ 1. That matrimonial consent can be had, it is necessary that the contracting parties at least not be ignorant that matrimony is a permanent society between a man and a woman for procreating children.

"§ 2. This ignorance after puberty is not presumed."

Yet it is not required that the manner in which carnal intercourse is instituted or generation occurs be explicitly known; it suffices that it be known confusedly that this is done by some common work of the bodies, or that matrimony is ordered to having children from a spouse; this being known, if someone consents, by that very fact he implicitly consents to all things necessary or fitting for this.

3° Error, or false apprehension, which adds to ignorance a false judgment concerning the object of consent.

One error is of law, which turns upon matrimony itself, namely, its nature, or properties or obligations; another is of fact, concerning the person and his or her qualities; but each can be antecedent, which gives cause to the contract, so that otherwise it would not have been entered, or merely concomitant, which does not influence the contract, so that this would have been entered even without the error. Now:

A. in error of law: a) Error concerning the very substance or nature of matrimony, even merely concomitant, renders consent invalid (can. 1082, § 1).

Thus one who thinks that matrimony is not a stable society, but a merely friendly one, or some fornicarian or merely precarious conjunction, or the hiring of work in a family matter, or a society for educating children bought from another, contracts invalidly.

b) Error concerning only the properties or obligations of matrimony does not invalidate consent, because it is merely accidental error, even if it was antecedent and the contracting party, if he had known, would not have entered matrimony; - unless, however, the error was deduced into a pact, or was a condition to which consent is bound: for then it becomes substantial, because it concerns the object first intended.

Hence can. 1084: "Simple error concerning the unity or indissolubility or sacramental dignity of matrimony, even if it gives cause to the contract, does not vitiate matrimonial consent." Therefore one who falsely thinks matrimony is dissoluble or is not a sacrament contracts validly unless he intends: I do not contract unless it is dissoluble, or provided that it is not a sacrament.

B. in error of fact: a) Error concerning the person himself or herself, even merely concomitant, invalidates consent, because it is substantial, concerning the very essential object of the contract.

b) Error concerning only the qualities of the person (for example, that she is a virgin, or rich or noble) does not invalidate consent, because it is accidental, although it is antecedent and the contracting party, if he had known, would not have entered matrimony; - unless, however:

1. the error redounds into substance or into error of person, as if someone wishes to marry the daughter of the king, or the firstborn daughter of a count;

2. the quality is an express condition to which consent is bound, as if someone says: I do not wish to marry unless she is a virgin, noble, rich, because then the quality is principally intended and redounds into substance;

3. or the error is concerning servile condition, in the case in which the free contracting party (not so the slave) is ignorant of the slavery of the other and thinks that person to be free: by law, namely, the quality of a free person is presumed to be a condition without which there is not consent, because a free person is presumed to be unwilling to enter matrimony except with a free person, and therefore generally the law invalidates such marriages.

Hence can. 1083: "§ 1. Error concerning the person renders matrimony invalid.

"§ 2. Error concerning a quality of the person, even if it gives cause to the contract, invalidates matrimony only:

"1° If the error of quality redounds into error of person.

"2° If a free person contracts matrimony with a person whom he thinks free, while on the contrary that person is a slave, by servitude properly so called."

St. Thomas states the principle, q. 51, a. 2: "it is necessary that the error which impedes matrimony be concerning one of those things which are of the essence of matrimony. But matrimony itself includes two things, namely, the two persons who are conjoined, and mutual power over one another, in which matrimony consists." The first is taken away by error of person, the second by error concerning the nature of matrimony. And thus it is from natural law itself. Except, however, the case of unknown slavery, which seems to invalidate matrimony only from positive law, although this is urged by natural equity as fitting: for slavery does not wholly stand in the way of the primary end of matrimony, although in many ways it harms the individual society and cohabitation of spouses. Whence St. Thomas, q. 52, a. 1, ad 3: "by the determining positive law it has been made that unknown servitude impedes matrimony, lest someone be punished without fault: for it is a certain punishment of the wife that she have a slave as husband, and conversely." And therefore, since it is a disposition of ecclesiastical law, it does not directly affect unbelievers; moreover, it could be taken away by dispensation, but the Church in fact does not dispense.

805. Observation. - To bind consent to a condition and to deduce it into a pact: certain ones have understood this strictly of an external pact, as if an explicit condition had to be added to it and had to be placed in the contract itself. Yet it suffices that it be mentally in the intention of one contracting party, and that in the mind it be deduced into a pact as a condition to which consent is bound, or as principally intended, whether explicitly or implicitly; as is clear from the very nature of a contract and from the general laws which govern contracts. Nor is it required that it be explicitly enunciated or added to an external pact; although otherwise the means of proof can be lacking by which in the external forum it can be established, in which case the presumption of law is for the validity of the matrimony.

The aforesaid sense is clear from the declaration of the Holy Office, December 2, 1680, and April 6, 1843; and S. C. C., February 9, 1732. Whence also the Sacred Rota, which previously seemed to require an intention deduced into an external pact, no longer requires it: thus for example explicitly March 1, 1913, and February 9, 1915.