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Judicial Injustice
Each work's treatment of this topic, whole and in its own order, in its own column. Paragraph numbers link to the passage in its place in the manual. Back to the topic page, where the passages of The Roman Catechism on this topic are also listed.
McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology
Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 4. The Vices Opposed …, Judicial Injustice
Judicial Injustice
Judicial Injustice.—We pass now from injustices committed by deed to those committed by words, and shall consider first unjust words spoken in courts of law and next unjust words spoken in private or outside of legal processes. Judicial injustice will be treated under the following heads: (a) injustice in judges; (b) injustice in plaintiffs or accusers; (c) injustice in defendants; (d) injustice in witnesses; (e) injustice in lawyers.
Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fourth Part: On Distributi…, Question Four: On Public Judgments
S. Th. II-II, q. 63, a. 4.
635. Public judgment formally and primarily is an act of distributive justice, by which the judge grants protection and guardianship to individuals proportionately to the quality and quantity of their rights; but if he grants it beyond proportion, there is acceptance of persons by which judgment is corrupted.
Although, therefore, public judgment by reason of the end pertains to legal justice, because it is exercised with a view to the common good (q. 60, a. 1, ad 1), and by reason of the matter can be an act of commutative justice, because it protects strict and rigorous right in individuals, nevertheless by reason of the form, according to its essence, it is an act of distributive justice. Hence St. Thomas says, q. 63, a. 4, ad 1: "Judgment can be considered in two ways: in one way as regards the thing itself judged, and thus judgment is related commonly to commutative and distributive justice: for by judgment it can be defined how some common thing is to be distributed among many, and how one person is to restore to another what he has received from him. In another way it can be considered as regards the very form of judgment, insofar as, namely, even in commutative justice itself the judge receives from one and gives to another; and this pertains to distributive justice. And according to this, acceptance of persons can have place in any judgment."