Question Four: On Public Judgments

S. Th. II-II, q. 63, a. 4.

635. Public judgment formally and primarily is an act of distributive justice, by which the judge grants protection and guardianship to individuals proportionately to the quality and quantity of their rights; but if he grants it beyond proportion, there is acceptance of persons by which judgment is corrupted.

Although, therefore, public judgment by reason of the end pertains to legal justice, because it is exercised with a view to the common good (q. 60, a. 1, ad 1), and by reason of the matter can be an act of commutative justice, because it protects strict and rigorous right in individuals, nevertheless by reason of the form, according to its essence, it is an act of distributive justice. Hence St. Thomas says, q. 63, a. 4, ad 1: "Judgment can be considered in two ways: in one way as regards the thing itself judged, and thus judgment is related commonly to commutative and distributive justice: for by judgment it can be defined how some common thing is to be distributed among many, and how one person is to restore to another what he has received from him. In another way it can be considered as regards the very form of judgment, insofar as, namely, even in commutative justice itself the judge receives from one and gives to another; and this pertains to distributive justice. And according to this, acceptance of persons can have place in any judgment."