Kantism

56. (C) Kant contradicts himself, by asserting on the one hand that an act elicited on account of hope of beatitude is not morally good, and on the other hand that the supreme good is situated in the conjunction of virtue and beatitude. For, if the supreme good implies true beatitude, why are we prohibited from desiring and seeking it? Surely it cannot be evil to pursue what is more perfect; but, with Kant as witness, it is more perfect to cultivate virtue and at the same time to enjoy beatitude; and nevertheless, if we think of beatitude and desire it, our action ceases to be morally good!

132. Pure Rationalism or Formalism.

In general, the followers of autonomic rationalism, rejecting the eternal law and excluding every relation to the reason and will of a personal God, deduce morality and moral obligation solely from the conformity of the act with reason itself or with nature as rational, without respect to utility, delight, happiness, and sanction. Hence they proclaim a purely rational morality, and moral good is only in the rational part of man; and therefore it consists in rational decency and must be sought solely from the motive of decency, namely, of virtue or of duty, for its own sake. This is formalism.

It first appeared in Greece, in the Cynic school, but there it especially flourished in the Stoic school.

The foundation of morality is: "to live conformably to nature"; and since human nature is rational, virtue is in a life instituted according to reason. The supreme and only good is life according to virtue; hence virtue is an end in itself: for good is to be loved and sought for its own sake, not on account of another. Virtue and happiness are the same in reality: "to live happily and to live according to nature are the same thing," says Seneca; beyond virtue nothing is needed for happiness. Nevertheless virtue is not to be desired on account of happiness; happiness is never to be desired as an end.

All other things are either indifferent things, such as health, riches, sickness, poverty, to be sought or fled according to circumstances; or vices always to be fled, such as passions, which are evil, against reason: to follow passion or affection or delight is contrary to morality. Virtue is wisdom: the truly wise man patiently sustains all inconveniences and abstains from various joys, "sustain and abstain"; he subjects all affections and passions to reason, indeed he extirpates them through a certain apathy or impassibility, so that he is elevated above all things and cannot be disturbed by any influence of pain or pleasure: thus he is freed from affection.

But against this:

1. The identity of virtue and full happiness or beatitude does not exist here on earth, where there are numerous and excessive pains.

2. The fundamental error by which it teaches that virtue is to be cultivated solely for its own sake, so that every consideration of one's own happiness is excluded, is common to it with Kant; and therefore the arguments to be brought against this point of Kantian doctrine also have force here (cf. next n., 2 and 3).

3. The nature conformably to which one must live, it says, is reason; but it understands reason in an entirely exclusive sense, so that there is not merely a preponderance and dominion of reason, but pure rationality, all other things being excluded from morality.

4. Hence the affective life lacks all morality. The passions must be reduced to servitude and extirpated rather than ruled and moderated, so that there may be perfect apathy, by which man is not acted upon by them, and the proper life of each one becomes indifferent to him.

5. Moreover, several other false things are contained in it. Thus no degree of morality is admitted, but goodness or malice is held as equal in all acts; the passions also are held as evil of themselves.

6. Finally, in applying the principles many errors occurred, and indeed most pernicious ones, since in fact they held lying, suicide, and many foul things against nature to be licit.

133. Kantianism.

Kant (1724-1804), the author of critical philosophy, followed Stoicism in some measure. After he had attempted to show that by pure speculative reason we can know only phenomena, not noumena, or what things themselves are in themselves; but that concerning these there is had a merely subjective cognition without objective value, and consequently that the existence of God, the freedom of man, and the immortality of the soul cannot be certainly proved; he determined to establish the foundations of ethics by another way, by the help of pure practical reason.

From the testimony of the conscience of all men, nothing is simply good except a good will, that is, reason-will; and this alone is moral. But the will is good not from the object, but from the motive by which it is moved to acting; this can be nothing other than duty to be fulfilled; and this duty is nothing other than conformity with the universal moral law. Therefore the will, in order to be morally good, must do what is commanded and solely because it is commanded: "to act according to duty and for the sake of duty." Hence morality is from form alone, which alone is universal, independently of matter: for if it fulfills the law on account of some empirical or eudaemonistic end, such as natural satisfaction of a tendency, fear of power, avoiding evil, or on account of some happiness or utility to be obtained, then the will is already pursuing the useful and has an egoistic motive destructive of morality, and therefore morality is not good; but it is good only when it is impelled from pure reverence for the law. Therefore Kant not only formally distinguishes every eudaemonistic element from morality, but excludes it as something incompossible with it.

1. Lehu notes: According to Kant, "material ethics is impossible. For moral law must be universal. But material ethics cannot be universal, because a) either it concludes the goodness of an action from order to happiness, but not all have the same happiness; b) or it is taken from order to some supreme good, but this opinion contradicts the natural appetite for happiness. Therefore the will will not be good except on the part of form, which alone can be universal, and consists in this, that the law is observed on account of the sole motive of law," o. c. n. 320.

Hence ethics a) must be pure from every empirical element of experience and proceed a priori; and consequently it does not depend upon concrete human nature and is without respect to psychology; b) obligation does not depend upon morality, but morality upon obligation.

But the universal moral law shows itself to man as something commanding, not conditionally and hypothetically, "if you wish to be happy, do this," but absolutely and categorically, "do good": hence there is the categorical imperative of practical reason, which must be obeyed simply and without any respect to the object and to the consequences of the act or to obtaining a reward, and without further inquiry concerning its foundation or authority; hence it is called the formal imperative. For the moral law proceeds from reason or rational nature as such, which is an end in itself, so that man cannot be ordered as a means to another end. Morality, namely, is essentially autonomous, by which the will observes its own law; reason, just as it alone is the measure of morality, so also is the only foundation. For in heteronomy, if we are subjected to the law of another, even of God, we are always led by a utilitarian or eudaemonistic motive, of love, hope, or fear, and the imperative will not be categorical but conditioned: "if he commands, if you wish to obey, in order to attain something material, act thus." Hence the ultimate end is the fully possible fulfillment of duty, or the autonomous pursuit of duty, which is an end in itself and has absolute value in itself: in the realm of ends man is both subject and legislator. Autonomy, namely, is the sole foundation of proper value, just as it is the ultimate foundation of morality and obligation.

But the categorical imperative is an unconditioned and universal rule. Hence:

a) the first and fundamental subjective rule, or "maxim," as it is called, which will be the criterion of morality, is this: "Act so that the rule of your will can always become a principle of universal legislation"; that is, before you act, carefully consider whether something absurd would follow from your action, if all were ordered to do the same thing and in fact acted so. From this rule two others follow:

b) the other, which determines the end of morality: "Act so that you hold humanity in yourself and in others as an end, and not as a means which you use"; for if you use yourself or others as a means, by that very fact you act on account of utility or pleasure, not on account of duty, and the imperative will already be conditioned, not categorical;

c) the third, which indicates the source of morality: "Act so that you consider your will, on the part of matter, as universally legislative"; autonomy is altogether necessary, otherwise we would no longer act for the sake of duty.

Now, in order that ethics be possible, there are three postulates of practical reason, which, although theoretically indemonstrable, must be admitted and believed as truths. For:

1. the moral law postulates freedom: for if the will were compelled to act, it could not be morally good; hence there is not phenomenal freedom, but noumenal freedom is given, which determines phenomenal operations;

1. The will in phenomena is not free; insofar as it is above phenomena, belonging to the intelligible world, it is free. Theoretical reason nevertheless does not know freedom, but knows the limitation which furnishes a foundation for thinking the possibility of freedom: it is a notion empty of every objective content, but conceivable. The positive foundation of the existence of freedom is from practical reason. Hence the primacy of practical reason, which reaches the noumenon itself.

2. the necessary object and end of a created will is to effect the supreme good, which consists in the intimate union of happiness and virtue. But this cannot be attained in the present life, for by that very fact obligation would cease. Hence the will is destined to tend by perpetual progress toward the supreme good; for this it is postulated that the soul is immortal;

3. man cannot think the supreme good except joined to supreme happiness. But the moral order is opposed to the order of happiness. Therefore it is postulated that there be some cause which joins morality with beatitude, and this can be nothing other than God. Hence there will be retribution, because virtue is worthy of retribution, although it cannot be exercised with a view to retribution. Retribution in this life is impossible. Therefore it is in the other life, and therefore God exists.

Thus God is introduced as the end of ethics, without being the foundation of morality.

From these postulates there results the primacy of practical reason and of the will over speculative reason.

Many have followed Kant as to the substance, and several of his principles have had influence upon the whole of modern philosophy. Yet not a few things can be objected to his system.

1. Cf. E. Janssens, La morale de l'imperatif categorique et la morale du bonheur.

1. It rests upon three false foundations: namely, it supposes a) an ideological and critical system of speculative reason; b) that the characters "universal" and "necessary" cannot be derived from things known experimentally; c) that all "material" principles place the motive in the lower appetitive faculty and that men are not moved by them except through the mediation of delight; hence man cannot act honorably except "on account of the form" of law, namely, from pure reverence for law. Here there is a twofold error, namely, a) that law does not move except through the lower faculty, although good can be appetized by a twofold faculty; b) that one acts either from mere reverence for law or from a motive of delight, for there are many other motives of the higher appetite, for example, agreement with human nature or with right order, love of God, the excellence of virtue, etc.

2. It does not explain morality or the norm of morality; for a) it removes the real end, beatitude; hence it renders impossible the relation of acts to the end and consequently removes the rule of conduct; therefore b) if a moral rule is not present, there will not be a true law or obligatory rule. For obligation is a necessity of acting. But the will is not solicited except by a final cause or by a willed good. Therefore the categorical imperative, which intends to exclude every real end, cannot found real obligation, and therefore is not law; indeed c) the norm handed down is psychologically impossible. For one must act solely from the motive of duty, without consideration of one's own good and without the affection of the appetitive faculty. But this is impossible. The will has good as its proper object, and whatever it wills it wills under the notion of good. Hence it cannot act from pure reverence for law unless this is fitting and good for it; otherwise it would be a good which remained foreign to the will and could not move it. Therefore it is impossible to exclude the affection of the appetitive faculty: that something is good for man and pertains to happiness, if it is not always the principal motive, is nevertheless a condition without which there is no appetition. Hence Kantian ethics mutilates human nature, and therefore is unnatural and fruitless; truly d) it assumes as known from common persuasion that that will alone is simply good which wills both what the law commands and because the law commands. But such a persuasion does not exist, for men often call actions honorable which are commanded by no law, for example, if someone of his own accord devotes himself to the service of the poor and sick or to the service of his country; moreover, they also hold prescribed actions good if they are done from another motive, not prohibited by another law, such as mercy, love of neighbor, etc.: thus a good will is manifested.

3. The honesty of an action is not necessarily corrupted by a eudaemonological intention. For there is a twofold degree of perfection, namely, a) to act for the sake of honesty or on account of a deontological end; b) to act for the sake of happiness, though not exclusively for its sake alone, but with due subordination to the deontological end, using hope of reward or fear of punishment to pursue honesty more efficaciously. This remains good, because in this way man acts according to nature adequately considered. This nature, by an invincible appetite implanted by the Creator, tends toward its good or happiness. Hence, acting thus in regard to the honorable good, man wills that to which he is brought through nature by the Creator. Otherwise the Kantian rule is not proportioned to nature; for it is impossible that a being which by the whole weight of nature is inclined toward its own happiness should continually neglect this in acting, as is confirmed, moreover, by the universal mode of acting of men, even of the most perfect.

1. If man excluded the motive of honesty, by that very fact he would act badly, and consequently would not obtain reward or avoid punishment. - The question properly pertains to the treatise on hope.

Therefore it is false that reason prohibits following the inclination to happiness or delight; this appetite can be directed by right reason.

4. For it contradicts itself: a) by asserting on one side that an action elicited on account of hope of beatitude is not good, and on the other side that the supreme good consists in the conjunction of virtue and beatitude. For if this is true, why are we prohibited from desiring and seeking it? For it is not evil to seek what is more perfect; but it is more perfect to cultivate virtue and at the same time to be happy. Therefore.

b) Likewise by asserting on one side that the only honorable motive is duty to be fulfilled, and on the other side that man is to be considered as an end, indeed that the rule of acting is to be so constituted by each one that it can have force for all. But this is to introduce a material element distinct from duty, and consequently to render the imperative conditioned.

5. Indeed, from the system several absurdities follow:

a) that human nature is an end to itself, and its perfection is absolute autonomy; for human nature is not autonomous, since dependence is essential to man;