Multiplied Venial Sins

I. Venial sins multiplied by reason of multiplication alone do not make a mortal sin. The reason is that multiplication alone cannot introduce a wholly diverse notion of sin. But the notion of sin is wholly diverse in mortal and in venial sin (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 4). And this is valid even if multiplied venial sins are united in one intention, for example, in the purpose of lying on any occasion whatever. For the purpose cannot involve greater malice than the acts proposed (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, V, 57, 3).

From what has been said it follows that he also does not sin gravely who induces several persons to sin venially, as if someone causes several persons to labor a little on a feast day, whether they work simultaneously or successively. For the one inducing cannot sin more than the individual persons induced (St. Alphonsus, III, 306).

It is asked whether he sins gravely who proposes in no way to care about venial sins and to avoid only mortal sins.

I respond: against several, with St. Alphonsus it seems this must be denied, because a purpose of this kind leads only remotely to mortal sin. Except, however, venial sins which induce a proximate danger of sinning gravely; such things occur especially in venereal matter (St. Alphonsus, IV, 12). Observe besides that multiplied venial sins easily lead to mortal sin, both because the desire of sinning grows, because the fervor of charity becomes lukewarm, and because graces are diminished (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, aa. 3 and 4).

II. Multiplied venial sins can become mortal by reason of coalescing matter. Now matter coalesces¹ if venial sins are multiplied against one obligation in number. I say one: whether by reason of harm physically or morally continued, as if someone commits several small thefts retained or not morally interrupted; or by reason of time through which one and the same obligation is prolonged, as "if you omit at intervals several psalms from the same Office; if on the same fast day you several times eat a little; on the same feast day you several times labor a little" (St. Alphonsus, V, 57). But not if you labor a little on different feast days, if daily in Lent you eat a little, "even if at the same time you had the purpose of doing so" (St. Alphonsus, cited place); or by reason of the intention by which the one commanding or vowing imposed acts, although wholly disparate or to be performed at different times, in the manner of one obligation. If, for example, a confessor orders a penitent to recite five Our Fathers and Hail Marys daily for a week, the omissions made on individual days would coalesce, because the confessor is considered to have imposed all the prayers in the manner of one grave satisfaction. On the contrary, "he does not sin mortally who on different days violates a vow of praying some little thing daily or on individual days, or of giving a small alms, if it is a burden affixed to the day; because, since the obligation of each day is extinguished daily, those matters are not continued... If, however, similar vows are not a burden affixed to the day, but only the day is fixed beforehand as a terminus beyond which execution is not to be delayed, there will be mortal sin after notable matter has been reached" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

¹ Matter coalesces only in appearance if someone, for example, after several excesses in food or drink finally by a new excess falls into drunkenness; likewise if someone after repeated slight vexations and insults finally excites another to grave anger, quarrel, etc. I said only in appearance, because, strictly speaking, in the cases brought forward, once the preceding acts and their effect have been posited, the final act is gravely evil by reason of itself.

III. He who by multiplied and coalescing transgressions arrives at grave matter:

1. Already by the first transgression he sins gravely, if from the beginning he intends to proceed through coalescing transgressions to grave matter. Namely, although the execution of the individual transgressions is externally light, nevertheless, insofar as it is subject to a gravely evil intention, it is gravely evil. Nevertheless, these several transgressions constitute only one sin in number, unless the depraved intention is morally interrupted.

2. If he does not intend to proceed to grave matter, then he sins gravely when he advertently completes grave matter. Light transgressions which follow the completed grave matter, according to others, involve a continuation of the same mortal sin in number; according to St. Alphonsus and others, they do not constitute mortal sin unless they reach a new grave quantity (St. Alphonsus, III, 538).

Practical Admonitions. 1. Let the confessor strive to remove penitents, especially pious ones, even from venial sins. Hence: a) "Let him inculcate in his own the greatest possible horror of mortal sin; for the more vivid this is, the more efficaciously it will deter men even from venial sins, which dispose toward mortal sin. b) Let him repeatedly insist on the question of the Catechism: 'What evils do venial sins cause us?' c) Let him strive to know the dominant vice of the penitent, to which he may suggest suitable remedies. Thus, if he has found it to be a desire for riches greater than is fair, let him prescribe more ample alms; if excessive ambition, let him urge flight from conversations; if wandering of mind in prayers and other duties, let him indicate greater recollection and solitude; and so in the others. For contraries are most excellently cured by contraries. d) Let him very much commend daily and particular examination.

2. But if venial sins must be avoided by a simple member of the faithful, how much more by clerics! Therefore, as Trent admonishes, 'let them flee light offenses, which would be very great in them, so that their actions may bring veneration to all' (session 22, chapter 1, De Reformatione). Before the others, let them avoid omissions and negligences in prayer or in the duties of their state, useless conversations or familiarities with persons of the other sex, a critical spirit toward the precepts of superiors, and detractions concerning fellow clerics, especially when laypersons are listening."¹

¹ Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, n. 850.

367. Notion. According to the force of the word, venial sin is that which can obtain pardon. In this sense all sins committed on this earth are venial, because they are remissible. St. Thomas notes⁶⁶ (with several authors of the thirteenth century) that sin is called venial in three ways: 1. from the outcome, because it has obtained pardon; and thus St. Ambrose says that "every sin through penance becomes venial"; 2. on the part of the cause, insofar as it has in itself something lessening the fault, as when it is done from infirmity or ignorance, although in itself it is a grave sin; 3. on the part of its own nature, insofar as it takes away neither the order to the ultimate end nor sanctifying grace. Here we speak only of venial sin in the third sense. But in what the essence of such venial sin accurately consists, authors do not agree.

a) It is certain that the essence of venial sin does not consist in this, that venial sin is against counsel, but mortal sin is against precept. This opinion is attributed by some, though others contradict, to Scotus.⁶⁷ The falsity of this opinion is manifest. For, for example, an officious lie, which is a venial sin, is strictly prohibited and not only dissuaded.

b) Likewise it is certain that the essence of venial sin does not consist in this, that it brings in temporal punishments, while on the contrary mortal sin brings in eternal punishment; nor in this, that mortal sin makes an irreparable disorder, but venial sin a reparable one. For these are rather effects of venial and mortal sin, but not their constitutive differences.⁶⁸

c) Leaving aside these opinions, some say that venial sin neither turns away from God nor constitutes the creature as the ultimate end of the sinner, as mortal sin does; others teach that mortal sin errs concerning the ultimate end, but venial sin concerning the means to the ultimate end; others say that mortal sin is contrary to charity, but venial sin is not; others think that mortal sin is the death of the soul, while venial sin is only a sickness of the soul. - Perhaps all these modes of speaking differ rather in words than in the thing signified. The better mode of speaking seems to be: the essence of venial sin consists in a certain disorder, but not in total aversion from the ultimate end, as mortal sin is. Thus also speaks the Angelic Doctor:⁶⁹ "Sins which have disorder concerning those things which are for the end, the order to the ultimate end being preserved, are reparable and are called venial." But if the same Angelic Doctor sometimes teaches that venial sin is not against but beside the law of God,⁷⁰ it must be understood in this way: venial sin is not against the law simply but in a certain respect, that is, it is not against the end and fullness of the law, or it does not destroy union with God as ultimate end, but certainly it is against the law, because it is a transgression of the law. Hence St. Thomas himself in several places⁷¹ expressly teaches that venial sin is against the law, that is, that it is a transgression of the law.

d) From what has been said it is apparent that there is the greatest difference between mortal and venial sin; indeed venial sin is not called sin except analogically. Hence theologians commonly teach that the notion of sin and of offense against God belongs not univocally but analogically to mortal and venial sin, just as the notion of being belongs analogically to substance and accident.⁷² But just as a thousand accidents do not constitute one substance, so any number however great of venial sins does not constitute one mortal sin nor is it equivalent to it in malice.⁷³ Indeed certain texts of the Holy Fathers, considered at first glance, apparently teach the contrary. Thus, for example, St. Augustine⁷⁴ says: "Those [light sins], although they are perceived not to strike, one by one, with a lethal wound, ... nevertheless all gathered together, like scabies, the more numerous they are, kill." But these and similar things must be explained with the Angelic Doctor⁷⁵ in this sense, "that many venial sins dispositively cause mortal sin." Moreover, concerning the effects of venial sin the discussion will return below in n. 390. - But small thefts and other venial sins on account of smallness of matter, if they are multiplied, can at last sometimes coalesce, so that they constitute a mortal sin. Then, however, the venial sins themselves do not coalesce, but the matter coalesces, which becomes grave. But to transgress the law in grave matter is a mortal sin.

⁶⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 2. Cf. Bl. Albert the Great 2, dist. 22, a. 4 ad 2.

⁶⁷ 2, dist. 21, q. 1. Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 8, a. 2.

⁶⁸ De malo q. 7, a. 1.

⁶⁹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 1.

⁷⁰ "It is fittingly said that venial sin is not against the law, but beside the law: because, if in some respect it withdraws from the order of law, nevertheless it does not corrupt the law itself, because it does not corrupt charity, which is the fullness of the law" (De malo q. 7, a. 1 ad 1). Cf. Cajetan, Com. in 1, 2, q. 88, a. 1.

⁷¹ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 74, a. 10 ad 1; 2, 2, q. 100, a. 3.

⁷² S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 1 ad 1. De malo q. 7, a. 1 ad 1. Durandus, as is his custom, contradicts St. Thomas.

⁷³ S. theol. l. c. a. 4.

⁷⁴ Sermo 351, n. 5 (Migne, Patr. lat. 39, 1541).

⁷⁵ S. theol. l. c. ad 1.

368. Two corollaries follow from the nature of venial sin explained thus far:

1. The act of venial sin in a just man is in some way referred to God.⁷⁶ This indeed is not to be understood as if a just man actually referred his venial sins to God or to his honor. For this would be blasphemy, since even venial sin is an injury and offense against God; but the act of venial sin is referred to God because it coexists with the habit of charity in a man who does not wish gravely to offend God and destroy his friendship, and who himself tends toward God as ultimate end.⁷⁷

2. Adam and Eve before the fall could not sin venially in Paradise, but their first sin necessarily was mortal. So St. Thomas⁷⁸ and the Thomists. The reason is that in the state of innocence the first parents had the gift of original justice, which impedes venial sin. For venial sin can occur only in a twofold way: a) on account of imperfection of the act, when namely full advertence or full consent is not present, as, for example, semi-deliberate morose delectations; b) on account of disorder concerning means which are for the end, the order of the end itself being preserved, as are venial sins from their genus or from smallness of matter. But each of these was impossible in the state of innocence, because each happens on account of a defect of order, from the fact that the lower powers of man refuse to obey the higher. For the fact that sudden motions of sensuality arise in us, which induce to action before reason has perfectly deliberated, and so produce venial sin from imperfection of the act, arises from an order disturbed between reason and the lower powers of the soul. But the fact that the human soul is disordered concerning means which are for the end, while due order to the end itself is preserved, comes from this, that the means which are for the end are not infallibly ordered under the end. But in the state of innocence, as long as Adam and Eve were subject to God, there was the most perfect and most firm submission and due ordering among the diverse powers of the soul. Therefore Adam and Eve could not sin venially either from imperfection of the act or from lightness of matter, as long as their most happy union with God had not been destroyed through mortal sin. - Likewise an angel, whether good or evil, cannot sin venially for the same reason.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 1 ad 2 et 3; 2, 2, q. 24, a. 10 ad 2.

⁷⁷ Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 8, a. 4, § 2.

⁷⁸ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 89, a. 3. De malo q. 7, a. 7.

⁷⁹ S. theol. ib. a. 4.

369. The existence of venial sin was denied by Pelagius, Wiclef, Luther,⁸⁰ Melanchthon, Calvin, Baius, and perhaps also by Gerson,⁸¹ all of whom do not seem to admit an intrinsic difference between mortal and venial sin. Nevertheless it is of faith that man, both the just man and the sinner, can sin venially. This indeed appears from Sacred Scripture, from the Holy Fathers, and from definitions of the Church.

1. Sacred Scripture, without any respect to persons, compares certain sins to very light things, certain sins to very grave things. Thus some are compared to a gnat, some to a camel;⁸² some to a mote, some to a beam.⁸³ Likewise according to Sacred Scripture all men commit certain sins. But it cannot be said that even all just men commit mortal sins. Thus, for example, it is said: "In many things we all offend."⁸⁴ "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."⁸⁵ "The just man shall fall seven times and shall rise again."⁸⁶

Often also the text of St. Paul, 1 Cor. 3, 10 sqq., is brought forward to prove the existence both of venial sin and of purgatory: "According to the grace of God which was given to me, as a wise architect I have laid the foundation; but another builds upon it. But let each one see how he builds upon it. For no one can lay another foundation besides that which has been laid, which is Christ Jesus. But if anyone builds upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, the work of each one will be manifest; for the day of the Lord will declare it, because it will be revealed in fire, and the fire will prove of what sort each one's work is. If anyone's work remains, which he built upon it, he will receive a reward. If anyone's work burns, he will suffer loss; but he himself will be saved, yet so as through fire." - Although in this text the discussion is not directly about venial sins, but only about certain not so correct doctrines of the Corinthian doctors, which are compared to wood, hay, and stubble, nevertheless at least indirectly and by way of conclusion this text seems clearly enough to prove the existence both of venial sin and of purgatory;⁸⁷ for those doctors will endure temporal punishment through fire for the less correct doctrines proposed, and therefore they had previously sinned venially.

2. The Holy Fathers speak of venial or light sins. Thus St. Ambrose says:⁸⁸ "Because, just as there is one baptism, so there is one penance, which however is done publicly; for daily sin ought to cause us to repent; but this penance is for light delicts, that one for grave delicts." Indeed already Tertullian speaks of light sins, explaining the text of St. John, "He who knows his brother to sin a sin not unto death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him who sins not unto death,"⁸⁹ in this way: "Nor have we ourselves fallen away from that distinction of delicts from which we departed. For here also John commended that [distinction], that there are certain delicts of daily incursion, to which we all are subject. For to whom does it not happen either to be angry unjustly and beyond the setting of the sun, or even to lay on a hand, or easily to speak evil, or to judge rashly, or to destroy faith pledged, or to lie from shame or necessity? ... In eating, in seeing, in hearing, how greatly we are tempted, so that, if there were no pardon for these things, salvation would belong to no one.... But there are also things contrary to these, as graver and deadly, which do not receive pardon: homicide, idolatry, blasphemy, certainly, and adultery and fornication. Beyond these Christ will not be an intercessor [the sense seems to be: these cannot be blotted out by prayer alone]. These things he who has been born of God will by no means admit.... Thus John's account of diversity will stand, disposing the distinction of delicts."⁹⁰ Although Tertullian, as is his custom, does not speak so clearly, nevertheless this text seems to be of great moment for a twofold reason, namely a) because it is a very ancient testimony for the distinction between grave and light sins; and b) because Tertullian interpreted the text of St. John the Apostle in this way. - More clearly concerning the distinction between grave and light sins speaks St. Augustine:⁹¹ "For those whom you see doing penance have committed crimes, either adulteries or certain immense deeds: hence they do penance. For if their sins were light, daily prayer would suffice for blotting these out." From the times of St. Augustine onward testimonies for the existence of venial sin abound.⁹²

3. Definitions of the Church concerning venial sin are not lacking. The Council of Trent says: "For although in this mortal life even the saints and just, however holy, sometimes fall at least into light and daily sins, which are also called venial, they do not for that reason cease to be just."⁹³ Pius V condemned the proposition (20) of Baius: "There is no sin venial by its own nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment."⁹⁴

Therefore it is certain by faith that venial sins exist, that is, sins which of themselves do not cause the death of the soul. The same is very consonant with right reason, which utterly recoils from an opinion asserting that because of any light sin whatever, for example because of a jocose lie or a voluntary distraction in prayer, a just man loses sanctifying grace and becomes worthy of the eternal punishment of gehenna.

⁸⁰ Luther thought that a just man cannot sin mortally: "You see how rich a Christian man is. Even willing, he cannot lose his salvation by however many sins, unless he should be unwilling to believe. For no sins can damn him except unbelief alone. All the rest, if faith returns or stands in the divine promise made to the baptized, are in a moment absorbed through the same faith" (De captiv. Babyl.).

⁸¹ Heretics do not admit venial sin except from the outcome, that is, because of pardon afterwards following; and this indeed happens from predestination (Wiclef), from faith (Luther), or from both at once (Calvin). Gerson, however, thought that every sin, even a light one, merits eternal punishment, but that from divine mercy certain light sins are not imputed unto death. (Lib. de vit. spir. animae, lect. 1.) Baius taught the same (Prop. condemned 20). Cf. Billuart l. c. a. 1.

⁸² Matth. 23, 24.

⁸³ Luc. 6, 41.

⁸⁴ Iac. 3, 2.

⁸⁵ 1 Io. 1, 8.

⁸⁶ Prov. 24, 16. Many exegetes understand this text of light sins, for example Jerome, St. Gregory, St. Bede, etc.; but others more rightly understand it of tribulation or persecution.

⁸⁷ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 89, a. 2. In 1 Cor. c. 3, lect. 2 ad vers. 12.

⁸⁸ De poenit. c. 10 (Migne, Patr. lat. 16, 541).

⁸⁹ 1 Io. 5, 16.

⁹⁰ De pudicitia c. 19 (Migne, Patr. lat. 2, 1074).

⁹¹ De symb. ad Catech. c. 7 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 636).

⁹² Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 8, a. 1.

⁹³ Sess. 6, c. 11 de iustif. (Denz. n. 804).

⁹⁴ Denz. n. 1020; cf. also n. 748 1539.

370. Divisions. Venial sins are distinguished as of a threefold genus:

1. ex genere suo, from their genus, namely those sins whose moral object constitutes only a light disorder, for example a jocose lie, an idle word, etc.;

2. ex parvitate materiae, from smallness of matter, namely those sins which indeed of themselves are grave, but nevertheless because of light matter are also light disorders, for example the theft of an obol;

3. ex imperfectione actus, from imperfection of the act, when full advertence or full consent is lacking, as happens in all objectively evil second-first acts, for example semi-deliberate impure thoughts.

371. Change of malice. Although venial sin can never become mortal by multiplication, as was said above in n. 367, nevertheless an action objectively evil venially can become subjectively mortally sinful, and conversely an action objectively gravely evil can become subjectively lightly evil. In this sense authors are accustomed to say briefly: venial sin becomes mortal, and conversely mortal sin becomes venial.

a) Venial sin considered objectively becomes subjectively mortal in the following ways:

1. From erroneous conscience. Thus, for example, if someone, firmly believing that every lie committed in the tribunal of penance, even about those things which do not pertain to the integrity of confession, is a mortal sin, nevertheless lies in the confessional, he truly sins mortally. This is clear from what was said above in n. 307 concerning erroneous conscience.

2. From a gravely evil end of the one acting. Thus, for example, if someone lies with the intention of fornicating, he sins gravely. The reason is that the end of the one acting specifies the act. This is clear from what was said above in n. 121.

3. From multiplied matter coalescing. But the matters of sins coalesce if a) they fall under the same precept and b) they are morally united. Thus, for example, several light parts omitted from the same Divine Office coalesce, as do several light eatings done on the same day of fasting; on the contrary, parts pertaining to diverse Offices do not coalesce, nor do light eatings done on diverse days. The matter of small thefts can so coalesce that at last, at some time, it becomes grave; and then the thief sins mortally by each following small theft, because in any following theft he is judged to hold ratified all the preceding takings, which, taken together, assuredly constitute grave matter.⁹⁵

4. From formal contempt. Theologians are accustomed to distinguish a twofold formal contempt: one perfect, the other imperfect. - The first is total rebellion against the superior commanding, so that the subject now refuses to obey in any matter whatever. It is clear that contempt of this kind is always a mortal sin, whenever it is repeated even in a light matter. For it is a grave wound to the virtue of obedience. - The other formal contempt, namely imperfect contempt, is refusal of obedience in some determined matter, yet together with readiness to obey in other matters. Authors do not agree whether even this imperfect contempt, even if it is objectively light, renders any disobedience gravely evil. There seems to be only an apparent disagreement among authors. For if such contempt is material rather than formal, it certainly admits smallness of matter; but if it is strictly formal, so that the superior himself as superior is spurned, it seems always to be gravely sinful according to that saying of St. Luke: "He who spurns you, spurns me,"⁹⁶ because it is a grave injury inflicted upon a lawful superior.

5. From grave detriment (whether of material damage, or scandal, or danger of sinning), which is foreseen as going to follow from venial sin. Thus, for example, he sins mortally who foresees that grave quarrels will arise from jocose words; he sins gravely who is so addicted to play that he omits hearing Mass on a day of precept, that he neglects the duties of his state; he sins gravely who from curiosity reads rather free things with proximate danger of falling into grave sin.⁹⁷

b) Mortal sin considered objectively becomes subjectively venial in the following ways:

1. From erroneous conscience. This is clear from what was said above in n. 307.

2. From imperfection of the act,⁹⁸ when namely sufficient advertence or full consent is lacking. From imperfection of the act any mortal sin whatever, even that which is mortal ex toto genere suo, from its whole genus, such as lust, blasphemy, etc., can become venial. But the reason is that for mortal sin, to which such enormous punishments are inflicted, such as the privation of sanctifying grace, the eternal punishment of gehenna, etc., a human act perfectly deliberated and voluntary is deservedly necessary. For it would be too harsh if such punishments were inflicted on account of an act not perfectly imputable to the agent.

3. From smallness of matter. As is manifest from what was said above, grave matter is required for mortal sin; if this is lacking, mortal sin also must be lacking. Sins mortal from their whole genus do not admit smallness of matter, but only sins mortal from their genus, such as theft, detraction, disobedience, etc.

⁹⁵ Cf. below II in the treatise on justice.

⁹⁶ Luc. 10, 16.

⁹⁷ Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 8, a. 3, § 2.

⁹⁸ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 6.

372. Scholion. On the difficulty of discerning the gravity of sin. All theologians agree that mortal sin is present as often as the three conditions listed above in n. 364 are present; but in practice it is very difficult, indeed not seldom altogether impossible, to judge whether an act committed, with all the circumstances and the dispositions of the penitent attended to, is a mortal sin or not. Who, for example, can always determine with certitude when matter grave and sufficient for mortal sin is accurately present in theft; when sufficient consent was present in depraved thoughts; when sufficient advertence intervened in blasphemies uttered by uneducated men! St. Augustine, as an eagle among the Doctors, confesses that notwithstanding his own study he could not arrive at this, and warns that this must be weighed by divine rather than human judgment.⁹⁹ Since these things are so, let the confessor not be prone to judging that such or such an act was a mortal sin. Often he must leave the judgment to divine wisdom; let him be solicitous about arousing contrition in the heart of the penitent, and earnestly exhort him to abstain from every deliberate sin.

As objective criteria for discerning between grave and light sins are held the same things which were indicated above in n. 364 for recognizing grave matter in sin, namely:

1. Authority a) of Sacred Scripture; b) of the Church; c) of the Doctors.

2. Right reason, judging whether some sin wounds gravely or lightly the moral order instituted by God.

⁹⁹ De civ. Dei l. 22, c. ult., and Enchir. c. 78.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 89; q. 88, a. 3; De Malo q. 7, a. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9.

551. Thesis. There are venial sins distinct from mortal sins. - Thus the Church teaches against the Jovinians and Pelagius (cf. Council of Milevis, can. 7, and the African Council in ep. 95 of St. Augustine, and the book of 50 homilies, hom. 19), and it is of faith against the Protestants from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 11, can. 7, 23, and 25; and sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7. Cf. condemned proposition 20 of Baius.

It is established a) from the Scriptures, which teach that there is a genus of sins which are essentially small and distinct from the graver ones (Matt. XXIII, 24; Luke VI, 42), - that there is no just man on earth who does not sin (Eccles. VII, 21), - that all offend in many things (Jas. III, 2), - and that even the holiest have sin (I John I, 8), - indeed that upon the building of faith and charity there can be built wood, hay, and stubble (which therefore do not take away charity), which do not impede salvation, but nevertheless are to be burned, that is, punished (I Cor. III, 11-15).

b) The Fathers distinguish from capital sins (that is, greater sins) and middling sins, minute and light sins not to be submitted to public penance. Cf. Augustine against Pelagius, ep. 108.

c) From reason: 1. Not every disorder takes away the principle of order, nor every infirmity the principle of life; therefore not every sin takes away the order of subjection to the ultimate end, or charity, which is the principle of life. - 2. In every society there occur light offenses which do not dissolve friendship; therefore also in the society and friendship which man has toward God. For man understands that certain things are prohibited by God, yet not in such a way that they dissolve friendship, and he would be prepared to leave them if they did dissolve friendship.

Therefore, just as a man constituted in the state of mortal sin can, while he remains habitually turned away from God, perform some good works without referring them, however, to God loved above all things; so likewise a man existing in the state of grace can, while he remains habitually turned toward God, elicit acts venially evil, which, although they are not referred to God, are not on that account referred to a creature as to an ultimate end (q. 89, a. 1 and 2).

552. It is objected: He who by a deliberate act prefers his own will to the will of God, loves something above God. But to love something above God is to adhere to it as to the ultimate end, and therefore no longer to be subject to God the ultimate end. Therefore every sin from its nature is mortal and contains aversion from God. - Response. I distinguish: he who prefers his own will to the uncreated will of God loves something above God, I concede; he who prefers the thing willed to the thing willed and commanded by God, I subdistinguish: if the thing commanded is necessary for adhesion and subjection to God, I concede; if it is outside the order of subjection and adhesion to God, I deny. Venial sin is outside subjection to and friendship with God; it is not subjected to God nor does it love God, although it does not cast away subjection to and friendship with God.

553. Venial sin disposes to mortal sin. - All venial sins, because they impede fervor, that is, the exercise of charity, indirectly dispose per se to mortal sins: 1. insofar as they remove subjection to God, which was impeding the soul from tending toward an object contrary to God: "for from the fact that a man becomes accustomed not to subject his will in lesser things to due order, he is disposed to this, that he also not subject his will to the order of the ultimate end" (q. 88, a. 3 - Eccli. XIX, 1; Luke XVI, 10); 2. insofar as they impede the helps of God which would draw one back from mortal sin.

Venial sins directly dispose to mortal acts of the same species, namely:

1. venial sins from their own genus directly dispose to mortal sins per accidens, insofar as he who habitually commits a venial sin is disposed to loving it even as an ultimate end and to sinning mortally on account of it;

2. venial sins from lightness of matter and from imperfection of the voluntary act directly dispose to mortal sins of the same species: thus a small theft (or detraction) directly disposes to a great one, and half-full consent to lust disposes to fully voluntary lust (ibid.).

554. An angel cannot sin venially. - His intellect, since it is not discursive, does not know means except as connected with the end; whence his will cannot will means except in order to the end, and consequently there cannot be in him an inordination concerning the means without there being at the same time a disorder concerning the end itself. Whence good angels do good, evil angels evil, in all things, namely, from charity or from pride (q. 89, a. 4).

Likewise in the state of innocence venial sin was impossible; for then the lower part was perfectly subject to reason, whence venial sin from imperfection of act was impossible, that is, an act imperfectly subjected to deliberation; likewise reason was perfectly subject to God, whence venial sin per se and from the genus was impossible, that is, an act which is not subjected to the end, God, before man cast away perfect subordination to God, which is mortal (q. 89, a. 3).

555. Observation. - Venial sin cannot be committed before the use of reason is sufficient for mortal sin. Not indeed venial sin from its own genus or per se, because man more easily and earlier knows grave and perfect sin than light sin and sin in a qualified respect. - Nor venial sin from indeliberation, because for such a sin it is not sufficient that man deliberate imperfectly, but that he do this while he can deliberate perfectly; otherwise, the fact that the deliberation is not perfect but imperfect would not be voluntary and imputable to him. But perfect deliberation before the full use of reason is impossible. Thus Cajetan, on I-II, q. 89, a. 6, conformably to the doctrine of St. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 5, ad 7.