Article VI: On Venial Sin in Itself

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 89; q. 88, a. 3; De Malo q. 7, a. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9.

551. Thesis. There are venial sins distinct from mortal sins. - Thus the Church teaches against the Jovinians and Pelagius (cf. Council of Milevis, can. 7, and the African Council in ep. 95 of St. Augustine, and the book of 50 homilies, hom. 19), and it is of faith against the Protestants from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 11, can. 7, 23, and 25; and sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7. Cf. condemned proposition 20 of Baius.

It is established a) from the Scriptures, which teach that there is a genus of sins which are essentially small and distinct from the graver ones (Matt. XXIII, 24; Luke VI, 42), - that there is no just man on earth who does not sin (Eccles. VII, 21), - that all offend in many things (Jas. III, 2), - and that even the holiest have sin (I John I, 8), - indeed that upon the building of faith and charity there can be built wood, hay, and stubble (which therefore do not take away charity), which do not impede salvation, but nevertheless are to be burned, that is, punished (I Cor. III, 11-15).

b) The Fathers distinguish from capital sins (that is, greater sins) and middling sins, minute and light sins not to be submitted to public penance. Cf. Augustine against Pelagius, ep. 108.

c) From reason: 1. Not every disorder takes away the principle of order, nor every infirmity the principle of life; therefore not every sin takes away the order of subjection to the ultimate end, or charity, which is the principle of life. - 2. In every society there occur light offenses which do not dissolve friendship; therefore also in the society and friendship which man has toward God. For man understands that certain things are prohibited by God, yet not in such a way that they dissolve friendship, and he would be prepared to leave them if they did dissolve friendship.

Therefore, just as a man constituted in the state of mortal sin can, while he remains habitually turned away from God, perform some good works without referring them, however, to God loved above all things; so likewise a man existing in the state of grace can, while he remains habitually turned toward God, elicit acts venially evil, which, although they are not referred to God, are not on that account referred to a creature as to an ultimate end (q. 89, a. 1 and 2).

552. It is objected: He who by a deliberate act prefers his own will to the will of God, loves something above God. But to love something above God is to adhere to it as to the ultimate end, and therefore no longer to be subject to God the ultimate end. Therefore every sin from its nature is mortal and contains aversion from God. - Response. I distinguish: he who prefers his own will to the uncreated will of God loves something above God, I concede; he who prefers the thing willed to the thing willed and commanded by God, I subdistinguish: if the thing commanded is necessary for adhesion and subjection to God, I concede; if it is outside the order of subjection and adhesion to God, I deny. Venial sin is outside subjection to and friendship with God; it is not subjected to God nor does it love God, although it does not cast away subjection to and friendship with God.

553. Venial sin disposes to mortal sin. - All venial sins, because they impede fervor, that is, the exercise of charity, indirectly dispose per se to mortal sins: 1. insofar as they remove subjection to God, which was impeding the soul from tending toward an object contrary to God: "for from the fact that a man becomes accustomed not to subject his will in lesser things to due order, he is disposed to this, that he also not subject his will to the order of the ultimate end" (q. 88, a. 3 - Eccli. XIX, 1; Luke XVI, 10); 2. insofar as they impede the helps of God which would draw one back from mortal sin.

Venial sins directly dispose to mortal acts of the same species, namely:

1. venial sins from their own genus directly dispose to mortal sins per accidens, insofar as he who habitually commits a venial sin is disposed to loving it even as an ultimate end and to sinning mortally on account of it;

2. venial sins from lightness of matter and from imperfection of the voluntary act directly dispose to mortal sins of the same species: thus a small theft (or detraction) directly disposes to a great one, and half-full consent to lust disposes to fully voluntary lust (ibid.).

554. An angel cannot sin venially. - His intellect, since it is not discursive, does not know means except as connected with the end; whence his will cannot will means except in order to the end, and consequently there cannot be in him an inordination concerning the means without there being at the same time a disorder concerning the end itself. Whence good angels do good, evil angels evil, in all things, namely, from charity or from pride (q. 89, a. 4).

Likewise in the state of innocence venial sin was impossible; for then the lower part was perfectly subject to reason, whence venial sin from imperfection of act was impossible, that is, an act imperfectly subjected to deliberation; likewise reason was perfectly subject to God, whence venial sin per se and from the genus was impossible, that is, an act which is not subjected to the end, God, before man cast away perfect subordination to God, which is mortal (q. 89, a. 3).

555. Observation. - Venial sin cannot be committed before the use of reason is sufficient for mortal sin. Not indeed venial sin from its own genus or per se, because man more easily and earlier knows grave and perfect sin than light sin and sin in a qualified respect. - Nor venial sin from indeliberation, because for such a sin it is not sufficient that man deliberate imperfectly, but that he do this while he can deliberate perfectly; otherwise, the fact that the deliberation is not perfect but imperfect would not be voluntary and imputable to him. But perfect deliberation before the full use of reason is impossible. Thus Cajetan, on I-II, q. 89, a. 6, conformably to the doctrine of St. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 5, ad 7.