Proximate Matter

The matter of penance is one thing remote, another proximate; it must be noted, however, that the word matter is used here in another sense than in the remaining sacraments.

233. The proximate matter of this sacrament is the three acts of the penitent: contrition, confession, and satisfaction as to be accepted. By the Council of Trent these acts are called the quasi-matter of the sacrament of penance.¹ In what manner the acts of the penitent stand in this sacrament, whether they are true matter from which the sacrament is constituted and confected, or only a necessary condition so that sacramental absolution may obtain its effect (n. 222), dogmatic theologians dispute.²

a. With the Thomists, the common opinion of more recent authors affirms that the acts of the penitent are the true matter of this sacrament, which together with priestly absolution constitutes the sacramental sign efficacious of grace. These think that the Council of Trent calls these acts quasi-matter because they are not a material thing as water is in baptism.

b. The Scotists with a few more recent authors teach that the acts of the penitent are not matter from which the sacramental sign is essentially constituted, but only a condition necessarily prerequired so that absolution, which alone is the efficacious sign of grace, may produce its effect. These judge that by the Council of Trent these acts are called quasi-matter because they do not truly and properly have the character of sacramental matter. Nevertheless, this must be added: the Scotists conceive their opinion in a diverse manner. For several, especially the older ones (Bosco, Sporer, Holzmann, etc.), require contrition and sensible confession as a condition of valid absolution, because the nature of sacramental judgment demands knowledge of the cause; but others, especially the more recent authors (Ballerini, Berardi, etc.), teach that merely internal acts suffice for valid absolution, namely contrition, in which the purpose of confessing is always implicitly contained, and which alone is a sufficient disposition for obtaining pardon of sins through absolution.

alpha. The Church in the Council of Trent deliberately abstained from deciding this question (whether the acts of the penitent are the matter of this sacrament);³ wherefore we can follow either opinion theoretically and practically. But because the opinion which teaches that the acts of the penitent are the proximate matter of the sacrament does not lack its probability, absolutions cannot be held certainly valid when a sorrowful confession of the penitent, in some way sensible, has not preceded them. And since the opinion which teaches that the acts of the penitent have only the character of a necessary condition is not destitute of all probability, those also can be absolved under condition who manifest no sign of sorrow and confession.

beta. The practical importance of this controversy is seen especially in the absolution of the dying: for if the acts of the penitent are essential parts and true matter of this sacrament, which by its nature ought to be sensible, he cannot validly be absolved who does not outwardly manifest those acts by a sensible sign; but if they have only the character of a necessary condition and disposition, absolution will be valid even if those acts are not manifested outwardly.

¹ Sess. 14, c. 3.

² Cf. Palmieri, De poenitentia, p. 144 ff.; Pesch, VII, n. 75 ff.; Ballerini-Palmieri, V, n. 9 ff.

³ Cf. Pallavicini, Historia concil. trid., l. 12, c. 10, 27.

Proximate matter is constituted by contrition and confession or accusation of the penitent (n. 291). Hence:

I. For validity, so that it be indubitable here, these suffice: 1. anointings of the different senses together with partial forms; 2. in a case of necessity, a single anointing in one sense with the prescribed shorter form, which will be cited immediately. It is said:

1. Anointings of the different senses together with the particular forms suffice. Moreover, they suffice even if the anointing of a paired part, for example of one eye, etc., is omitted.

2. In a case of necessity, a single anointing in one sense with the prescribed shorter form suffices. This is clear: 1. from canon 947, § 1; 2. from the Roman Ritual;¹ 3. from a decree of the Holy Office approved by Pius X.²

The decree states: "When this Supreme Congregation was asked that one short formula be determined in the administration of the sacrament of Extreme Unction in a case of imminent death, the Most Eminent and Reverend Father General Inquisitors, after the matter had been most maturely weighed and after the vote of the Reverend Consultors had been had, decreed: In a case of true necessity the form is sufficient: 'Through this holy anointing may the Lord forgive you whatever you have committed. Amen.'" The decree indeed explicitly speaks only of the abbreviated form, but implicitly signifies that the single anointing corresponding to it is sufficient. Besides, note:

a) Likewise outside necessity a single anointing in one sense with the prescribed shorter form seems sufficient: both because, with respect to validity, a distinction is not readily to be admitted; and because St. James³ speaks only of anointing the sick person, without mention of the parts of the body. Finally, this is supported by the very great variety which, with respect to the number and place of anointings, has prevailed in the Greek and Latin Church.⁴

b) Whether a single anointing in one sense together with the particular form suffices for validity is not beyond doubt. If it suffices, the later anointings seem to be regarded as sacramentals, which plainly express the effect of Extreme Unction. If it does not suffice, it must be said that the effect is produced in the last necessary anointing according to these words of St. Thomas: "When there are many actions ordered to the same effect, the last is formal with respect to all the preceding and acts in virtue of them; and therefore in the last action grace is infused, which gives the sacrament its effect" (Supplement, q. 30, a. 1, ad 3).

¹ Title V, cap. 1, n. 21.

² April 24, 1906.

³ James 5:14.

⁴ Kern, op. cit., p. 131 sq.

II. For liceity outside the case of necessity there is required: 1. that the members to be designated be anointed, and this 2. in the prescribed order; 3. by the minister's own hand, that is, with the right thumb, no instrument being used; and 4. in the manner of a cross (canon 947, joined with the Roman Ritual).

1. Members to be anointed. The organs of the five senses must be anointed, namely the eyes, ears, nostrils, mouth, and hands (canon 947, § 1, joined with the Roman Ritual, title V, c. 1, n. 15). The anointing of the kidneys is always to be omitted (canon 947, § 2).¹ The anointing of the feet can be omitted for any reasonable cause (canon 947, § 3). If someone is mutilated in some member, the part nearest that place is anointed, with the same form of words.² If someone lacks a sense itself, for example hearing, or has always lacked it, nevertheless the organ is anointed. With respect to paired organs, the anointing should be made separately on each organ, but under one form, beginning from the right; except the lips, which are anointed with a single anointing.

The anointing of the organs of the five senses is prescribed under grave obligation. Likewise the anointing of each of the paired organs seems to oblige under grave obligation, so that only a grave cause excuses, for example the difficulty of turning the sick person and reaching the paired organs (St. Alphonsus, VI, 710).

2. The prescribed order obliges, so that every inversion is a sin; indeed an inversion of at least several anointings seems to be grave (St. Alphonsus, VI, 710). Now, considering the prescribed order, the following are anointed:

a) The eyes, over both closed eyelids.

b) The ears, at the lower parts of the auricles.

c) The nostrils, over each nostril, and indeed from the side, lest sneezing be excited.

d) The mouth, over each closed lip; with a single anointing by which both lips are anointed; but if this cannot conveniently be done, it is sufficient to anoint one lip.

e) The hands, in the middle of the palms; but the hands of a priest are anointed on the outside.

f) The feet, on the upper part or on the soles according to the prevailing custom.³

3. The anointings should be made by the minister's own hand, that is, with the right thumb;⁴ not with another finger nor with a brush or similar instrument: a contrary custom, if it prevails anywhere, cannot be observed.⁵ Nevertheless, in a case of grave necessity, for example if contagion is to be feared from contact, as if some sick person is suffering from leprosy, plague, or smallpox, it is permitted to use a brush or small rod⁶ (St. Alphonsus, VI, 710).

4. In the manner of a cross, as the Roman Ritual has it.⁷

5. Finally, it is very much recommended that for each anointing the thumb be dipped in the oil, all the more because some doubt whether one drop suffices for all the anointings (St. Alphonsus, VI, 709, dub. 4).

¹ In place of the kidneys, in some dioceses the anointing of the breast was permitted. Now, with the anointing of the kidneys forbidden, the anointing of the breast also is to be omitted.

² Roman Ritual, title V, cap. 1, n. 19.

³ Sacred Congregation of Rites, August 27, 1836, n. 2743.

⁴ Roman Ritual, title V, c. 2, n. 8.

⁵ Sacred Congregation of Rites, May 9, 1857, n. 3051.

⁶ Sacred Congregation of Rites, May 9, 1857, ad II, n. 3051.

⁷ Roman Ritual, title V, c. 2, n. 8.

III. For liceity in a case of necessity a single anointing in one sense, or more rightly on the forehead, with the prescribed shorter form suffices, with the obligation remaining of supplying the individual anointings when the danger has ceased (canon 947, § 1). It is said:

1. In a case of necessity. But a case of necessity is present: 1. when there is some danger that the sick person may die before the individual anointings have been performed; 2. when several persons must be anointed and it is feared that, if each is anointed in the ordinary manner, someone may die without Extreme Unction; 3. when, if the individual anointings are performed, danger of contagion can arise or increase; nevertheless, if the danger arises from contact, it should be forestalled by use of a brush or small rod; 4. when a longer ministration exposes the sacrament to danger of irreverence, as can happen, for example, in anointing an insane person.

2. When the danger has ceased, the individual anointings must be supplied. That is, they must be supplied if the danger on account of which the single anointing was used has ceased. Hence they must be supplied if the sick person has survived; if the danger has ceased that one of several persons to be anointed may die without Extreme Unction; if the danger of contagion has ceased, for example because a brush has been brought by which the individual anointings can be performed.

c) The individual anointings must be supplied; and indeed absolutely, not conditionally, and, as seems most probable, always. I said absolutely, for thus the Holy Office expressly states.¹ I said always, because both canon 947, § 1, and the Holy Office² and the Roman Ritual³ state without any restriction that the anointings are to be supplied, provided, however, that the danger of death continues. But the reason why they are prescribed to be supplied is that the sick person not be deprived of the sacramentals which seem to be contained in the anointings to be supplied and which plainly express the effect of Extreme Unction (n. 570).

Note 1. Not all agree in defining the nature of the anointings to be supplied. Some have thought that the sacrament is iterated in the supplied anointing. This, however, is not satisfactory, both because in that opinion the anointings would have to be supplied conditionally, since it is doubtful whether Extreme Unction can validly be repeated in the same danger, a doubt which is not considered removed either by the decrees cited above or by the Code; and because the iteration of the sacrament in the same danger is severely prohibited by the Code itself.

Others judge that the supplies are parts which with the preceding anointing constitute one whole, whether they are considered as partial sacraments or as the perfection or extension of the sacramental sign itself. But neither does this opinion seem correct, both because it supposes that the preceding anointing lacks the perfection of the sacrament, which is admitted with difficulty, and because, once this opinion is admitted, the anointings cannot be supplied if the moral union between them and the earlier anointing has ceased.

Others teach that the supplies are integral parts of the sacrament. But then also moral union between them and the essential part seems to be required; and if that is lacking, the supplies would have to be omitted.

These things being posited, it remains to be said, as it seems, that sacramentals, or ceremonies very efficacious by reason of the accompanying prayers of the Church, are contained in the supplied anointings.⁴

Note 2. What has been said about the anointings to be supplied after a single anointing is also to be applied to anointings neglected in the ordinary ministration, for example through forgetfulness; these therefore must likewise be supplied. If, however, it is feared that, because of the space of time, the required union is lacking, the sacrament is in itself to be repeated conditionally.

¹ March 9, 1917.

² January 31, 1907.

³ Title V, cap. 1, n. 21.

⁴ Cf. Nederlandsche Katholieke Stemmen, 1917, p. 241; 1928, p. 92.

162. 1° State of the question. A twofold matter is distinguished in the sacraments: remote and proximate. The remote matter of Penance, or rather the matter to be removed, as some theologians say, or, as is more pleasing to others, the matter about which the sacrament is concerned, is all sins committed after baptism, whether mortal or venial, whether already remitted by absolution or not. Mortal sins not yet accused and absolved are necessary matter, or matter necessarily to be subjected to the keys of the Church; but venial sins and mortal sins already remitted are sufficient and free matter, that is, matter which can, but need not necessarily, be subjected to the power of the keys, as will be declared more fully in the moral part.

¹ St. Thomas, 3, q. 84, a. 2; Suarez, disp. XVIII, sect. 3; Salmant., disp. I, dub. 2; Billuart, diss. I, a. 2; Palmieri, th. 14; Billot, th. 3; L. de San, n. 300-343.

But the question arises concerning the proximate matter of this sacrament; theologians dispute in what, namely, it essentially consists, whether in the three acts of the penitent, or in absolution or some other action. Three opinions especially have come forth on this matter.

163. (A) Some older theologians, such as William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales, thought that the proximate matter was situated in the imposition of the hand made by the priest while he absolves the penitent. But this opinion is commonly rejected by theologians. A threefold imposition of this kind is indeed commemorated among ecclesiastical authors:² the first, which was employed when public penance was imposed; the second, which was repeated over the penitents whenever they were dismissed from the church after the catechumens; the third, finally, in the reconciliation of penitents. But this rite was not regarded as essential, as is clearly gathered from the canon of the First Council of Orange, where it is said: "Those who depart from the body, penance having been received, it has pleased us that they be communicated without the reconciling imposition of the hand, which suffices for the consolation of one dying, according to the definition of the Fathers." Now if the imposition of the hand had been necessary for the remission of sin, certainly the dying would not have been deprived of it.

² Cf. Sirmundus, Historia paenitent. publicae, ch. VII; Palmieri, p. 159.

164. (B) The Scotists, with whom Maldonatus, Ballerini, Berardi and others agree,³ teach that the whole essence of the sacrament consists in absolution, which, insofar as it is an external ceremony, constitutes the matter, and insofar as it has the force of signifying, is the form. According to Scotus and his older disciples, the three acts of the penitent are not only dispositions for the valid and fruitful reception of the sacrament, but also conditions without which, having gone before, the minister cannot sufficiently know the cause and pass sentence; for which reason they conclude that the external manifestation of these dispositions is truly of the necessity of the sacrament. According to more recent Scotists, acts of this kind are only dispositions required for the worthy reception of the sacrament; wherefore it is not necessary that they be manifested by an exterior act.

³ Scotus, in 4 dist. 14, q. 4 and dist. 16, q. 1; Maldonatus, de Paenitent., p. III, th. 7; Ballerini-Palmieri, de Paenit., n. 5 sq.; Berardi, Praxis Confessar., t. IV, n. 2.

But they argue thus: (a) first, the matter was not defined by Trent, as is asserted by certain Thomists; for, as C. Pallavicini relates,¹ the Synod called the three acts of the penitent not matter, but quasi-matter, and declared them necessary not for the essence, but only for the integrity of the sacrament. (b) A sacrament is that which properly confers grace; but only the absolution of the Priest properly confers sacramental grace; therefore it alone is properly the essence of the sacrament. (c) It is certain, from the practice of the Church, that sacramental absolution can be given to those who present no exterior sign of contrition; but if the three acts of the penitent were the matter of the sacrament, this would be invalid, since matter must be sensible; therefore acts of this kind are not the matter of the sacrament, but only dispositions, and the whole essence of the sacrament consists in absolution.

¹ Historia C. Trident., bk. XII, ch. 12.

(C) Yet the more common opinion, which not only St. Thomas and his disciples defend, but also Suarez, the Salmanticenses, De Lugo, Bellarmine, and many others, holds that the three acts of the penitent are truly the proximate matter of the sacrament.

165. 2° Thesis: The three acts of the penitent, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, are the proximate matter of the sacrament of Penance. Thus more commonly.

(A) The Council of Florence, in the Decree to the Armenians, after declaring the necessity of matter and form in any sacrament, adds these things: "The fourth sacrament is Penance, whose quasi-matter is the acts of the penitent, which are distinguished into three parts." Similarly Trent:¹ "But the quasi-matter of this sacrament is the acts of the penitent himself, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction. These, insofar as they are required in the penitent for the integrity of the sacrament and for the full and perfect remission of sins by the institution of God, for this reason are called parts of Penance." Hence thus: the two aforesaid Councils distinctly commemorated the matter and form of the other sacraments, and when they treated of Penance, they designated no other matter except the three acts of the penitent; therefore those acts are truly the proximate matter of this sacrament, unless perhaps it be said that matter of this kind was intentionally passed over: which can scarcely be admitted in a matter of such great moment. Nor should it be objected that the Councils said quasi-matter, and not matter; "nor indeed are these acts called quasi-matter by the holy Synod because they do not have the character of true matter, but because they are not matter of that kind which is applied externally, as water in Baptism, and chrism in Confirmation."² Namely, Penance is a sacrament of its own kind, whose matter is not a corporeal element, as in certain others, but the very virtue of penance raised to the dignity of a sacrament, and for that reason it is called quasi-matter.

¹ Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 3; cf. can. 4.

² Catechism of the Council of Trent, on Penance, n. 17. - Hence St. Thomas himself used this manner of speaking: "The fourth sacrament is Penance, whose quasi-matter is the acts of the penitent." (De artic. fidei et eccl. sacramentis, t. XXVII, p. 180, ed. Vives.)

(B) Besides, Christ instituted this sacrament in the manner of a judgment, in which it is possible to find two constitutive elements, namely the matter of the judgment itself which the penitent provides, and the sentence which is passed by the judge; but the matter of the judgment is provided by the three acts of the penitent, namely by the humble confession of sins, which sincere contrition accompanies and satisfaction follows; therefore acts of this kind are truly the proximate matter of the sacrament. It is indeed objected that grace is conferred only by absolution, and not by these acts, and consequently that they do not pertain to the essence of the sacrament; but undeservedly, for although such acts do not of themselves confer grace, nevertheless, because by the positive institution of Christ they have been raised to the dignity of sacramental matter, they truly concur with the form by which, so to speak, they are fecundated, for producing grace. Nor is it useful to say that contrition is not something sensible; for although it is not sensible immediately and in itself, nevertheless it becomes sensible mediately, insofar as it is manifested through the exterior acts of confession, satisfaction, and other signs of sorrow.¹ Moreover it suffices that the matter be virtually sensible; consequently even a man destitute of the senses, who before falling into this state manifested contrition by words or signs, by that very fact exhibits virtual contrition.

¹ St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 90, a. 2, ad 1.

Yet notwithstanding these things, we freely confess that the opinion of the Scotists is not lacking in probability, nor to be despised in practice: consequently, in a case of extreme necessity, even if exterior signs of contrition are lacking, the penitent is to be absolved under condition.

326. The proximate matter of the sacrament of penance consists of the three acts of the penitent, namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Contrition must be present actually (or virtually), but confession and satisfaction at least in voto, or as implicitly included in contrition. These three acts are rightly called the proximate matter because they operate upon the remote matter, that is, sins, and prepare the sinful man so that, when the form of the sacrament, namely, the absolution of the confessor, is added, sanctifying grace may be infused into him. Thus holds the most common opinion, which rests upon the authority of St. Thomas, the Councils of Florence and Trent, the Roman Catechism, and the Roman Ritual, and moreover upon a valid theological reason.

St. Thomas⁵⁰ says: "The fourth sacrament is penance, of which the acts of the penitent are the quasi-matter." The Council of Florence as well as the Council of Trent employs these same words. The Roman Catechism, however, explains them as referring to the true matter of the sacrament.⁵¹ The Roman Ritual⁵² says: "But since three things concur to constitute it [the sacrament of penance]: matter, form, and minister, its remote matter indeed consists of sins, but its proximate matter consists of the acts of the penitent, namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction; while the form is those words of absolution: I absolve thee, and so forth."

The theological reason, however, is this: Christ instituted the sacrament of penance in the form of a judgment. Now in a judgment there must be two elements: the matter of the judgment, that is, the offense accused, proved, and to be punished, and the sentence of the judge. Thus, by parity, in the sacrament of penance there must be two elements: one material, namely, the offenses of the penitent and his three acts; the other formal, namely, the absolution of the confessor. It is also evident that the three acts of the penitent, although by themselves they cannot, at least ordinarily, confer grace, nevertheless dispose one toward it.

The three acts of the penitent are the partial instrumental cause by which God causes grace in the sacrament of penance. St. Thomas⁵³ manifestly teaches this, saying: "Every sacrament produces its effect not only by the power of the form but also by the power of the matter.... Hence ... the remission of fault is the effect of penance, principally indeed from the power of the keys which the ministers possess, from whose part is taken that which is formal in this sacrament; but secondarily from the power of the acts of the penitent pertaining to the virtue of penance, yet insofar as these acts are in some manner ordered to the keys of the Church."

Moreover, in practice two things are admitted by almost all: 1. It is not lawful to give absolution to a penitent who has not elicited these three acts, although he was able to do so; 2. absolution can and must be given to dying Christians even when deprived of their senses, provided that they have at least an interpretative intention of receiving it. This interpretative intention is almost always to be presumed, and indeed even among material heretics or schismatics. Hence the more severe opinion of several older authors, for example, Concina,⁵⁴ is to be abandoned. The reason is that almost every Christian man at some time externally manifests a desire to die religiously. Now such a desire (as is already sufficiently expressed by the words, "Hail Mary ... pray for us sinners, now and at the hour of our death. Amen") necessarily includes the will to perform all those things which are necessary for obtaining the remission of sins, among which are contrition and confession. Therefore, since the sacraments are for men and in a case of death it is lawful to administer even doubtfully valid sacraments, a baptized man who is dying and deprived of his senses is presumed to have a sufficient intention and contrition and confession previously manifested and now virtually and even externally persevering,⁵⁵ so that he can be absolved conditionally.⁵⁶ It is otherwise if such a dying man shortly before had manifestly expressed the will not to receive the sacrament of penance; but even in that case absolution can sometimes be given under condition, because it is not certain that the dying man persisted in his perverse will. In practice it is better that a priest assisting a dying Catholic deprived of his senses proceed in this manner: Since one who appears deprived of his senses nevertheless not rarely hears well and understands the words spoken, let the priest elicit in a loud voice an act of contrition for him and then give him absolution under condition; for a salutary penance let him offer him an image of the Crucified to be kissed. Afterward, if time permits and another obstacle is absent, let him give him Extreme Unction.

⁵⁰ Op. de articulis fidei et Eccl. sacr.

⁵¹ Cf. below, n. 327, the texts cited.

⁵² Title 3, c. 1, n. 1.

⁵³ S. theol. 3, q. 86, a. 6.

⁵⁴ De poenit. l. 1, diss. 4, c. 10.

⁵⁵ Experience establishes that such men, who indeed appear deprived of their senses, have in reality perceived the words spoken and manifested contrition by a movement of the muscles and nerves.

⁵⁶ Cf. Holy Office, July 20, 1898; May 17, 1916 (Linzer Theol. Quartalschr. 1916, 693 ff.).

327. Those who think otherwise concerning the proximate matter. Certain older theologians, such as William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales, are said to have taught that the proximate matter of this sacrament is the imposition of the hand made by the confessor. But this opinion is now obsolete, because it is certain that no imposition of the hand pertains to the essence of penance.

Several Scotists, to whom are added Melchior Cano,⁵⁷ Maldonatus,⁵⁸ and among modern authors Gury-Ballerini,⁵⁹ and more clearly Ballerini-Palmieri,⁶⁰ and Berardi,⁶¹ teach that the acts of the penitent are indeed a condition prerequired, but that the whole essence of the sacrament consists in absolution, which, insofar as it is an external ceremony, constitutes the proximate matter, but insofar as it has the power of signifying, is the form. Several arguments collected in favor of this opinion are found in Ballerini-Palmieri.⁶² The principal argument is this: The matter of a sacrament must be a sensible sign. But it is lawful to give sacramental absolution to a dying man who by no sensible sign manifests either confession or contrition or satisfaction. Therefore in this case a sacrament would be administered without matter, which is manifestly false. But it is answered to this argument that the matter of penance even in this case is truly sensible, namely, virtually. For a man deprived of his senses could not be validly absolved unless previously by words or signs he had manifested the intention of receiving the sacrament of penance in a similar case. Now, with such an intention virtually persevering, there also virtually exists the matter necessary for the sacrament of penance, namely, confession and contrition externally manifested.

The opinion of the Scotists can be reconciled only with difficulty with the Councils of Florence and Trent defining that the quasi-matter of the sacrament of penance consists of the three acts of the penitent. The Roman Catechism, however, whose authority is very great and whose authors knew the mind of the Council of Trent exceedingly well, thus teaches: "Nor indeed are these acts called quasi-matter by the Holy Synod because they do not have the character of true matter, but because they are not matter of that kind which is applied externally, as water in baptism and chrism in confirmation." From all these things it follows that the opinion of the Thomists teaching that the three acts of the penitent are the matter of the sacrament of penance is safer and truer. If, on the contrary, the opinion of the Scotists were true, corollaries of the greatest moment would follow; for if confession, contrition, and satisfaction were not the proximate matter of penance, a) this sacrament could be valid without them; b) in controversies concerning them we would not be obliged to follow the safer opinion, because this obligation exists only for the essentials of the sacrament. It would therefore be lawful to follow a truly probable opinion. These two corollaries indeed are most commonly rejected by modern theologians.

⁵⁷ Relect. de poenit. p. 6, q. 16.

⁵⁸ De poenit. p. 3, thes. 7.

⁵⁹ Comp. Theol. mor. II, n. 414 and 447, q. 7, note.

⁶⁰ De poenit. n. 5 ff.

⁶¹ Prax. confess. IV, n. 2.

⁶² Loc. cit. P. Galtier, S.J., treats abundantly of these diverse opinions in De poenitentia, n. 376 ff.

S. Th. III, q. 84, a. 1 and 4.

437. State of the question. - Concerning proximate matter there have been various errors and opinions:

1. Luther taught that the terrors of conscience struck in from sin recognized and from the threats of the Gospel, together with certain confidence of remission obtained, are the proximate matter.

But a) the Council of Trent condemned this, sess. 14, c. 3, can. 4; b) these terrors are not acts of penance, indeed not even a necessary disposition to penance; but confidence itself supposes remission already made.

2. Calvin assigns two parts of penance for its matter, namely, the mortification of passions and vices, and the pursuit of living well.

But these things follow penance; and they also exist if they are not sins. Whence they do not constitute penance.

3. Several scholastics thought that proximate matter is in the imposition of the hand, made by the priest as a sign of jurisdiction while he absolves the penitent. This is attributed, among others, to William of Paris and to Thomas Waldensis.

But a) that rite was not held as essential, but as a mere ceremony, as is gathered from the fact that it was repeated several times in the course of penance over public penitents,¹ and from the fact that sins were at least sometimes remitted by the Church without it; whence the Council of Trent is also silent concerning it; b) nor is it suitable as matter of this sacrament, as St. Thomas shows, q. 84, a. 4: "The imposition of hands in the sacraments of the Church is done to designate some abundant effect of grace, by which those upon whom hands are imposed are, in a certain way, through a certain likeness, continued to the ministers in whom an abundance of grace ought to be. And therefore the imposition of hands is done in the sacrament of Confirmation, in which the fullness of the Holy Spirit is conferred; and in the sacrament of Order, in which a certain excellence of power in divine mysteries is conferred... But the sacrament of Penance is not ordered to obtaining some excellence of grace, but to the removal of sins, and therefore for this sacrament the imposition of hands is not required, just as neither for Baptism, in which nevertheless a fuller remission of sins is made."

¹ A threefold imposition is commemorated: the first was used when public penance was imposed; the second was repeated over penitents whenever they were dismissed from the church after the catechumens, but this was rather a rite of blessing; the third was done in reconciliation.

4. It is disputed between St. Thomas and Scotus whether the acts of the penitent, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction, are true proximate matter from which, and therefore an intrinsically constitutive part of, the sacrament.

a) Scotus teaches² that judgment is the pronouncement of sentence alone, and therefore that the whole essence of the sacrament is in absolution; but that the acts of the penitent are something extrinsic to the sacrament and are called matter, but improperly, or quasi-matter, because they are an extrinsic condition and disposition. Whence in this sacrament there is only form; - or if someone should prefer to distinguish matter and form, he will be able to say with Maldonatus: that absolution, as it is an external ceremony, is matter; as it has the power of signifying, it is form; or with other Scotists: that the words, insofar as they signify remission, are matter; insofar as they effect it, are form.³ Moreover the older Scotists, and, as it seems, Scotus himself,⁴ understood that the acts of the penitent are not mere dispositions, but extrinsic conditions without which, once previously manifested, the minister cannot sufficiently know the cause and pronounce sentence, and therefore that they are absolutely necessary for the validity of the sacrament. Thus, for example, Frassen, Montefortino, Herinx, Major, Occam, Gabriel Biel, Almain, Maldonatus. But the more modern Scotists, and also Ballerini, Berardi, etc., consider the acts as only dispositions for the worthy reception of the sacrament, and therefore that it is not always absolutely necessary that they be externally manifested; - but that opinion, as altogether more recent, has no foundation in the tradition of the Church.

² He says that the acts of the penitent "are required for the sacrament of penance, so that it may be worthily received" (in IV, d. 16, q. 1, n. 7), but this is to be understood of requisites for validity.

³ Yet this explanation is not to the point, because it does not regard the physical composition of the sacramental sign distinctive of Penance, but the logical or metaphysical composition which is common to all sacraments.

⁴ In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 4, n. 3, and d. 16, q. 1, n. 7.

b) On the contrary, St. Thomas says that judgment consists in the whole judicial process; and therefore that the acts of the penitent pertain to the essence of the sacrament as an intrinsically constitutive part; whence they are true proximate matter from which the sacrament is constituted together with absolution as form. And thus not only all Thomists, but also St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales, Richard, Suarez, Vasquez, Bellarmine, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, Billot, indeed also certain Scotists such as Brancatus and Mastrius.

c) Durandus entered upon a middle way, whom Marsilius followed, saying: that confession alone is the matter of the sacrament, but not contrition, which is not sensible, because of itself it is internal, nor satisfaction, which follows upon the sacrament: namely, contrition is a disposition to the sacrament of Penance, and satisfaction is a fruit. - But this opinion is antiquated, and deservedly. For contrition is sensible through confession, and confession is not unless it is sorrowful; but satisfaction is not only a fruit but also the complement of the sacrament. Whence concerning the three acts of the penitent one and the same thing must be said.

For, d. 14, q. 4, a. 4, from the fact that absolution is "a certain sentence absolving the guilty," he deduces the corollary that the doctrine concerning the sacrament of penance "is subordinated to the doctrine concerning judgments and also to the doctrine concerning sentences"... "and for this reason the sacrament of penance can be called a judicial sacrament and a sacramental judgment," insofar namely as it terminates the process.

Whence in Rep. par. in IV, d. 16, q. 1, n. 12: "For sacramental absolution... presupposes and requires (those acts)... so that the penitent may be capable of the sacramental sign of absolution."

438. Thesis. The three acts of the penitent: contrition, confession, and satisfaction, are the proximate matter of the sacrament of Penance. - Thus more commonly, and more conformably to the traditional sense.

It is proved:

A. From the manner of speaking of the Councils. Florence, in the decree to the Armenians, after declaring the necessity of matter and form in every sacrament, says: "The fourth sacrament is Penance, whose quasi-matter is the acts of the penitent, which are distinguished into three parts." But Trent, after it had said, sess. 14, c. 2, that this sacrament "differs from Baptism... in matter and form, by which the essence of the sacrament is perfected," says c. 3: "The form of the sacrament of Penance, in which chiefly (not uniquely) its power is situated, has been placed in those words of the minister: I absolve thee, etc... But the quasi-matter of this sacrament is the acts of the penitent himself, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Since these, in the penitent, are required for the integrity of the sacrament and for the full and perfect remission of sins from the institution of God, for this reason they are called parts of Penance."

These things being posited, we say that the thesis stated is the obvious sense of the Councils and of the whole Church, if their terms are taken properly.

1. For if the acts of the penitent were only extrinsic conditions or dispositions, they would not be parts required for the integrity of the sacrament; otherwise the Council of Trent would speak altogether improperly.

2. The Councils distinctly commemorate the matter and form of the other sacraments, and assign no other matter of Penance except the three acts of the penitent; therefore those acts are truly the proximate matter of this sacrament; - unless it is said that its matter was passed over, which in a matter of such moment does not seem able to be admitted.

They object: a) The Council said quasi-matter, not matter. - Resp.: The acts of the penitent are so called because they are placed in the place of external and corporeal matter; as the Catechism of the Council of Trent itself already explains (on Penance, n. 17): "Nor indeed are these acts called quasi-matter by the holy Synod because they do not have the reason of true matter, but because they are not matter of that kind which is applied from without (namely, a corporeal element), such as water in Baptism and chrism in Confirmation." Moreover, the Councils, by speaking thus, do nothing except transcribe the words of St. Thomas himself, saying in opusc. 5, on the articles of faith and sacraments of the Church: "The fourth sacrament is Penance, whose quasi-matter is the acts of the penitent."1

b) The Council of Trent said that the acts of the penitent are integral parts, not essential parts; therefore they do not pertain to the intrinsic constitution of the essence of the sacrament. - Resp.: Integral parts pertain to the complete intrinsic constitution of a corporeal being, and can even be essential to it, as the heart and brain in man.

B. From the Roman Ritual, on Penance, c. 1, n. 1: "Since three things concur for constituting it, matter, form, and minister: its remote matter indeed is sins, but its proximate matter is the acts of the penitent, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction; but the form is those words of absolution: I absolve thee, etc."

Therefore the essence of the sacrament is constituted both by the acts of the penitent and by the absolution of the minister. But a disposition or condition cannot be called matter, nor is it that from which the essence of the sacrament is constituted; but this is verified only of true parts or a true cause. Therefore.

C. By reason: The sacrament of Penance is instituted in the manner of a forensic judgment. But of forensic judgment there is a twofold constitutive part: a determining element, namely the sentence pronounced by the judge which completes and terminates the judicial process, and a determinable element, namely, accusation, testimony, etc., in one word the instruction of the cause which begins the judgment. Therefore in the sacrament of Penance there is a twofold constitutive part, of which one is: the accusation, testimony, amendment, etc., of the penitent; the other: the sentence of absolution. The minor is proved: The words alone of the sentence, for example, of absolution, considered separately, are not a judicial act, but a mere prayer or some utterance, and they do not constitute a judicial act unless they inform and terminate a process. Therefore the very signification of the sentence of absolution as a judicial act, and therefore as a sacramental sign, depends upon the acts of the penitent, which consequently concur toward the intrinsic constitution of the sacramental sign itself in itself. Otherwise, namely, absolution would not be sacramental.

It is confirmed: a) Just as the form of Baptism without washing would not sacramentally (or symbolically) signify the purification of the soul, so the words of absolution without a judicial process do not signify judicially, nor therefore sacramentally, the remission of sin.⁵ Thus, for example, the words of Christ in Matt. IX, 2: Thy sins are forgiven thee, are not sacramental absolution.

⁵ Cf. III, q. 84, a. 1, ad 1.

b) Interior penance by the power of absolution is elevated to the dignity of a sacramental sign and becomes the title and cause of the remission of sin, as the reality and sacrament (q. 84, a. 1, ad 3). But it is elevated to that dignity, not only as signified by absolution, but also as juridically known and externally signified through the external acts of the penitent (n. 430). Therefore not absolution alone, but also the external acts of the penitent, are connaturally elevated to the dignity of an external sacrament, and intrinsically constitute it. In the same way as in Order and Matrimony: by the very fact that sacred power and the conjugal bond were elevated to the dignity of a sacred sign, the external signs also by which the power is handed on or the bond is constituted were connaturally elevated to this, that they should be the external sacrament.

c) If absolution alone were the whole sacrament, it would not be (as all the other sacraments are) a symbolic or ceremonial sign signifying by likeness of a sensible thing; but merely conventional, like all human speech.

d) The sacrament is called the sacrament of confession or of penance, which supposes confession or penance to be a constitutive part; otherwise the sacrament would be denominated from an extrinsic element.2

e) Satisfaction is part of the sacrament, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 14, c. 2 and 3, can. 4, and it operates unto the perfect remission of punishment; whence it seems to pertain to the practical sign itself; and a fortiori this must be said of the other more necessary acts.

1. Let it not be said with De San: from the fact that the signification of the form, namely of absolution, cannot be conceived without the matter or acts of the penitent, it is proved only that the matter is a necessary condition, but from this it does not strictly follow that it is a constitutive part of the sacramental sign. - Resp.: It is not only a condition without which the signification of the form is not conceived, but there is something more: the very signification of the form in itself depends upon the matter and is completed by the matter. For, just as in Baptism water is necessary, not indeed for the signification of the words of the form according to themselves, but nevertheless for their sacramental signification, or for the signification of the form as form; so in penance the acts of the penitent are not necessary for the signification of the words of absolution according to themselves, but for the judicial signification of the form as form, or of absolution as informing the judicial process. Whence the very signification of the form (as form) in itself depends upon matter; and therefore matter concurs toward signification; and thus it is not only a condition, but a constitutive part of the sacramental sign.

2. It could be called the sacrament of the imposition of hands; but this ceremony indicates the very exercise of the power of the keys, which is an essential and constitutive element, not so the acts of the penitent in the opinion of Scotus.

439. The Scotists object: 1° Judgment is essentially only the sentence of the judge.

Resp.: Thus judgment is arbitrarily limited, for in the common sense, judgment is also understood as the whole judicial process, not only the sentence which terminates it and which is held as the essential complement of judgment.

2° The priest alone is the minister of the sacrament, because he alone has the power of the keys; therefore the act of the priest absolving alone, not the acts of the penitent, perfect the sacrament, otherwise the penitent too would be a minister.

Resp.: The priest must exercise the power by forensic judgment, which is not made without instruction of the cause; whence absolution does not have value except as it is exercised in a judicial process. Namely, it is one thing to ask concerning the subject of the power of the keys, and another concerning the rite or mode by which the power of the keys must be exercised. From the fact that Christ gave the power of the keys to priests alone, it does not follow that it is to be exercised by the act of the priest alone without another act or external sign. - Nor nevertheless is the penitent a minister, but he who applies and joins the form to the matter, and effects the composite: the penitent ministers the matter, but he does not minister the sacrament.

3° Absolution alone, not the acts of the penitent, signifies and confers grace remissive of sin; therefore.

Resp.: a) External penance of itself is only the sign which signifies interior penance; the latter from the power of absolution is elevated to the dignity of a sacrament and becomes the title and cause of grace remissive of sin; therefore from absolution external penance now signifies that interior penance is the title and cause of grace.

b) Moreover absolution of itself without the acts of the penitent does not have its signification and power, but absolution as terminating the judicial process. Therefore the acts of the penitent together with the act of the minister are one practical sign, and thus not only a sign, but also the instrumental efficient cause of grace remissive of sin.

4° According to the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4, contrition is a disposition for receiving the sacrament with fruit; therefore it is not part of the sacrament.

V. QUESTION III. What is the proximate matter of this sacrament? ANSWER. They are three acts of the penitent, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction, as Trent intimates, session 14. Of each in turn discourse is to be instituted by us.