Article — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Article II: On Proximate Matter
S. Th. III, q. 84, a. 1 and 4.
437. State of the question. - Concerning proximate matter there have been various errors and opinions:
- Luther taught that the terrors of conscience struck in from sin recognized and from the threats of the Gospel, together with certain confidence of remission obtained, are the proximate matter.
- Calvin assigns two parts of penance for its matter, namely, the mortification of passions and vices, and the pursuit of living well.
But these things follow penance; and they also exist if they are not sins. Whence they do not constitute penance.
- Several scholastics thought that proximate matter is in the imposition of the hand, made by the priest as a sign of jurisdiction while he absolves the penitent. This is attributed, among others, to William of Paris and to Thomas Waldensis.
But a) that rite was not held as essential, but as a mere ceremony, as is gathered from the fact that it was repeated several times in the course of penance over public penitents,1 and from the fact that sins were at least sometimes remitted by the Church without it; whence the Council of Trent is also silent concerning it; b) nor is it suitable as matter of this sacrament, as St. Thomas shows, q. 84, a. 4: "The imposition of hands in the sacraments of the Church is done to designate some abundant effect of grace, by which those upon whom hands are imposed are, in a certain way, through a certain likeness, continued to the ministers in whom an abundance of grace ought to be. And therefore the imposition of hands is done in the sacrament of Confirmation, in which the fullness of the Holy Spirit is conferred; and in the sacrament of Order, in which a certain excellence of power in divine mysteries is conferred... But the sacrament of Penance is not ordered to obtaining some excellence of grace, but to the removal of sins, and therefore for this sacrament the imposition of hands is not required, just as neither for Baptism, in which nevertheless a fuller remission of sins is made."
1 A threefold imposition is commemorated: the first was used when public penance was imposed; the second was repeated over penitents whenever they were dismissed from the church after the catechumens, but this was rather a rite of blessing; the third was done in reconciliation.
- It is disputed between St. Thomas and Scotus whether the acts of the penitent, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction, are true proximate matter from which, and therefore an intrinsically constitutive part of, the sacrament.
a) Scotus teaches2 that judgment is the pronouncement of sentence alone, and therefore that the whole essence of the sacrament is in absolution; but that the acts of the penitent are something extrinsic to the sacrament and are called matter, but improperly, or quasi-matter, because they are an extrinsic condition and disposition. Whence in this sacrament there is only form; - or if someone should prefer to distinguish matter and form, he will be able to say with Maldonatus: that absolution, as it is an external ceremony, is matter; as it has the power of signifying, it is form; or with other Scotists: that the words, insofar as they signify remission, are matter; insofar as they effect it, are form.3 Moreover the older Scotists, and, as it seems, Scotus himself,4 understood that the acts of the penitent are not mere dispositions, but extrinsic conditions without which, once previously manifested, the minister cannot sufficiently know the cause and pronounce sentence, and therefore that they are absolutely necessary for the validity of the sacrament. Thus, for example, Frassen, Montefortino, Herinx, Major, Occam, Gabriel Biel, Almain, Maldonatus. But the more modern Scotists, and also Ballerini, Berardi, etc., consider the acts as only dispositions for the worthy reception of the sacrament, and therefore that it is not always absolutely necessary that they be externally manifested; - but that opinion, as altogether more recent, has no foundation in the tradition of the Church.
2 He says that the acts of the penitent "are required for the sacrament of penance, so that it may be worthily received" (in IV, d. 16, q. 1, n. 7), but this is to be understood of requisites for validity.
3 Yet this explanation is not to the point, because it does not regard the physical composition of the sacramental sign distinctive of Penance, but the logical or metaphysical composition which is common to all sacraments.
4 In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 4, n. 3, and d. 16, q. 1, n. 7.
b) On the contrary, St. Thomas says that judgment consists in the whole judicial process; and therefore that the acts of the penitent pertain to the essence of the sacrament as an intrinsically constitutive part; whence they are true proximate matter from which the sacrament is constituted together with absolution as form. And thus not only all Thomists, but also St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales, Richard, Suarez, Vasquez, Bellarmine, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, Billot, indeed also certain Scotists such as Brancatus and Mastrius.
c) Durandus entered upon a middle way, whom Marsilius followed, saying: that confession alone is the matter of the sacrament, but not contrition, which is not sensible, because of itself it is internal, nor satisfaction, which follows upon the sacrament: namely, contrition is a disposition to the sacrament of Penance, and satisfaction is a fruit. - But this opinion is antiquated, and deservedly. For contrition is sensible through confession, and confession is not unless it is sorrowful; but satisfaction is not only a fruit but also the complement of the sacrament. Whence concerning the three acts of the penitent one and the same thing must be said.
For, d. 14, q. 4, a. 4, from the fact that absolution is "a certain sentence absolving the guilty," he deduces the corollary that the doctrine concerning the sacrament of penance "is subordinated to the doctrine concerning judgments and also to the doctrine concerning sentences"... "and for this reason the sacrament of penance can be called a judicial sacrament and a sacramental judgment," insofar namely as it terminates the process.
Whence in Rep. par. in IV, d. 16, q. 1, n. 12: "For sacramental absolution... presupposes and requires (those acts)... so that the penitent may be capable of the sacramental sign of absolution."
438. Thesis. The three acts of the penitent: contrition, confession, and satisfaction, are the proximate matter of the sacrament of Penance. - Thus more commonly, and more conformably to the traditional sense.
It is proved:
A. From the manner of speaking of the Councils. Florence, in the decree to the Armenians, after declaring the necessity of matter and form in every sacrament, says: "The fourth sacrament is Penance, whose quasi-matter is the acts of the penitent, which are distinguished into three parts." But Trent, after it had said, sess. 14, c. 2, that this sacrament "differs from Baptism... in matter and form, by which the essence of the sacrament is perfected," says c. 3: "The form of the sacrament of Penance, in which chiefly (not uniquely) its power is situated, has been placed in those words of the minister: I absolve thee, etc... But the quasi-matter of this sacrament is the acts of the penitent himself, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Since these, in the penitent, are required for the integrity of the sacrament and for the full and perfect remission of sins from the institution of God, for this reason they are called parts of Penance."
These things being posited, we say that the thesis stated is the obvious sense of the Councils and of the whole Church, if their terms are taken properly.
- For if the acts of the penitent were only extrinsic conditions or dispositions, they would not be parts required for the integrity of the sacrament; otherwise the Council of Trent would speak altogether improperly.
- The Councils distinctly commemorate the matter and form of the other sacraments, and assign no other matter of Penance except the three acts of the penitent; therefore those acts are truly the proximate matter of this sacrament; - unless it is said that its matter was passed over, which in a matter of such moment does not seem able to be admitted.
They object: a) The Council said quasi-matter, not matter. - Resp.: The acts of the penitent are so called because they are placed in the place of external and corporeal matter; as the Catechism of the Council of Trent itself already explains (on Penance, n. 17): "Nor indeed are these acts called quasi-matter by the holy Synod because they do not have the reason of true matter, but because they are not matter of that kind which is applied from without (namely, a corporeal element), such as water in Baptism and chrism in Confirmation." Moreover, the Councils, by speaking thus, do nothing except transcribe the words of St. Thomas himself, saying in opusc. 5, on the articles of faith and sacraments of the Church: "The fourth sacrament is Penance, whose quasi-matter is the acts of the penitent."1
b) The Council of Trent said that the acts of the penitent are integral parts, not essential parts; therefore they do not pertain to the intrinsic constitution of the essence of the sacrament. - Resp.: Integral parts pertain to the complete intrinsic constitution of a corporeal being, and can even be essential to it, as the heart and brain in man.
B. From the Roman Ritual, on Penance, c. 1, n. 1: "Since three things concur for constituting it, matter, form, and minister: its remote matter indeed is sins, but its proximate matter is the acts of the penitent, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction; but the form is those words of absolution: I absolve thee, etc."
Therefore the essence of the sacrament is constituted both by the acts of the penitent and by the absolution of the minister. But a disposition or condition cannot be called matter, nor is it that from which the essence of the sacrament is constituted; but this is verified only of true parts or a true cause. Therefore.
C. By reason: The sacrament of Penance is instituted in the manner of a forensic judgment. But of forensic judgment there is a twofold constitutive part: a determining element, namely the sentence pronounced by the judge which completes and terminates the judicial process, and a determinable element, namely, accusation, testimony, etc., in one word the instruction of the cause which begins the judgment. Therefore in the sacrament of Penance there is a twofold constitutive part, of which one is: the accusation, testimony, amendment, etc., of the penitent; the other: the sentence of absolution. The minor is proved: The words alone of the sentence, for example, of absolution, considered separately, are not a judicial act, but a mere prayer or some utterance, and they do not constitute a judicial act unless they inform and terminate a process. Therefore the very signification of the sentence of absolution as a judicial act, and therefore as a sacramental sign, depends upon the acts of the penitent, which consequently concur toward the intrinsic constitution of the sacramental sign itself in itself. Otherwise, namely, absolution would not be sacramental.
It is confirmed: a) Just as the form of Baptism without washing would not sacramentally (or symbolically) signify the purification of the soul, so the words of absolution without a judicial process do not signify judicially, nor therefore sacramentally, the remission of sin.5 Thus, for example, the words of Christ in Matt. IX, 2: Thy sins are forgiven thee, are not sacramental absolution.
5 Cf. III, q. 84, a. 1, ad 1.
b) Interior penance by the power of absolution is elevated to the dignity of a sacramental sign and becomes the title and cause of the remission of sin, as the reality and sacrament (q. 84, a. 1, ad 3). But it is elevated to that dignity, not only as signified by absolution, but also as juridically known and externally signified through the external acts of the penitent (n. 430). Therefore not absolution alone, but also the external acts of the penitent, are connaturally elevated to the dignity of an external sacrament, and intrinsically constitute it. In the same way as in Order and Matrimony: by the very fact that sacred power and the conjugal bond were elevated to the dignity of a sacred sign, the external signs also by which the power is handed on or the bond is constituted were connaturally elevated to this, that they should be the external sacrament.
c) If absolution alone were the whole sacrament, it would not be (as all the other sacraments are) a symbolic or ceremonial sign signifying by likeness of a sensible thing; but merely conventional, like all human speech.
d) The sacrament is called the sacrament of confession or of penance, which supposes confession or penance to be a constitutive part; otherwise the sacrament would be denominated from an extrinsic element.2
- Let it not be said with De San: from the fact that the signification of the form, namely of absolution, cannot be conceived without the matter or acts of the penitent, it is proved only that the matter is a necessary condition, but from this it does not strictly follow that it is a constitutive part of the sacramental sign. - Resp.: It is not only a condition without which the signification of the form is not conceived, but there is something more: the very signification of the form in itself depends upon the matter and is completed by the matter. For, just as in Baptism water is necessary, not indeed for the signification of the words of the form according to themselves, but nevertheless for their sacramental signification, or for the signification of the form as form; so in penance the acts of the penitent are not necessary for the signification of the words of absolution according to themselves, but for the judicial signification of the form as form, or of absolution as informing the judicial process. Whence the very signification of the form (as form) in itself depends upon matter; and therefore matter concurs toward signification; and thus it is not only a condition, but a constitutive part of the sacramental sign.
- It could be called the sacrament of the imposition of hands; but this ceremony indicates the very exercise of the power of the keys, which is an essential and constitutive element, not so the acts of the penitent in the opinion of Scotus.
439. The Scotists object: 1° Judgment is essentially only the sentence of the judge.
Resp.: Thus judgment is arbitrarily limited, for in the common sense, judgment is also understood as the whole judicial process, not only the sentence which terminates it and which is held as the essential complement of judgment.
2° The priest alone is the minister of the sacrament, because he alone has the power of the keys; therefore the act of the priest absolving alone, not the acts of the penitent, perfect the sacrament, otherwise the penitent too would be a minister.
Resp.: The priest must exercise the power by forensic judgment, which is not made without instruction of the cause; whence absolution does not have value except as it is exercised in a judicial process. Namely, it is one thing to ask concerning the subject of the power of the keys, and another concerning the rite or mode by which the power of the keys must be exercised. From the fact that Christ gave the power of the keys to priests alone, it does not follow that it is to be exercised by the act of the priest alone without another act or external sign. - Nor nevertheless is the penitent a minister, but he who applies and joins the form to the matter, and effects the composite: the penitent ministers the matter, but he does not minister the sacrament.
3° Absolution alone, not the acts of the penitent, signifies and confers grace remissive of sin; therefore.
Resp.: a) External penance of itself is only the sign which signifies interior penance; the latter from the power of absolution is elevated to the dignity of a sacrament and becomes the title and cause of grace remissive of sin; therefore from absolution external penance now signifies that interior penance is the title and cause of grace.
b) Moreover absolution of itself without the acts of the penitent does not have its signification and power, but absolution as terminating the judicial process. Therefore the acts of the penitent together with the act of the minister are one practical sign, and thus not only a sign, but also the instrumental efficient cause of grace remissive of sin.
Resp.: Before it is assumed by the priest as matter to be joined to the form, it is only the disposition of the penitent; but as joined with the form, it is no longer a mere disposition.
5° The practice of the Church is to grant absolution to the dying who give even no external sign of contrition or confession; therefore these acts are not a necessary and constitutive part of the sensible sign, but only a disposition.
Resp.: a) From the practice nothing is proved, because absolution is given under condition; whence it is very uncertain whether it has value. And therefore at most from that practice it is drawn that a certain slight probability is attributed to the opinion of Scotus, but not that it is demonstratively certain. b) Even in the opinion of St. Thomas the practice is understood, because the dying man, before he was destitute of his senses, could have manifested contrition by words or signs; or he also actually exhibits signs to the priest present, although they are not noticed by those standing around. And because this is presumed with some probability, therefore he is absolved only under condition. c) In the opinion of Scotus the same difficulty must be solved, because he holds the external manifestation of sin and contrition as a condition necessary for the value of sacramental judgment.
440. Conclusion. - In practice, the opinion of the recent Scotists does not seem probable. At least it is solidly proved that the acts of the penitent are conditions; that they are intrinsic parts of the sacrament also seems true.